

Folder No. 6

MISSION #34 SAIGON "DISIMPRISON"
7 Feb. 45
TOP SECRET
Classification
SECRET 5-7-46

By Authority of
Ray Baker

Mission #34

SAIGON

"DISIMPRISON"

7 Feb. 45

25240-57

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *AW 760063*
By *CD* NPA Date *11/18*

WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
INCOMING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

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A-3 OC&R	A-3 OC&R
A-4	A-4
A-5 PLANS	A-5 PLANS
A. G.	A. G.
SURG.	SURG.
AIR INSP.	AIR INSP.
PRO	PRO
COMM	COMM
O. A.	O. A.
S. C. O.	S. C. O.

SECRET I VI

URGENT

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

To: War Department

REF: CMD 8875E

6 February 1945

COMAF 20 from DEPCOMAG 20 IB and C CMD 8875E.

In compliance with your instructions regarding your TELECON message nbr K-5-8 the following change was made in CO nbr 34. The primary target for all 56 aircraft scheduled is CO. AAF target TM.O-TT. Aiming point is still center of dry dock.

End

ACTION COPY

ACTION: 20th Air Force

CM-IN-5678 (6 Feb 45) DTG 061106Z bjm


SECRET

4

COPY No.


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FEB 6 45 AM



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

FEB 6 45 AM



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

6 February 1945
COMAR 20 FROM DEPARTMENT 20 1B and C OMD 8875E
In compliance with your instructions regarding your
message for K-3-8 the following change was made in
the primary target for all 20 aircraft scheduled
for 20 February 1945. The primary target is still center of
the target area.

END

SECRET 20th Air Force

SECRET (6 Feb 45) 20-11-2078

SECRET

TELETYPE CONFERENCE

19

WASHINGTON PARTIES

KHARAGPUR - HONOLULU - GUAM PARTIES

TELECON MSG NO. K-5-8 (~~TOP SECRET~~) DTG 052318Z

TO: COMGENBOMCOM 20

FROM: COMGENAF 20

SUBJECT: MISSION NO. 34

RAMEY FROM NORSTAD

~~TOP SECRET~~

1. IT IS NOTED IN YOUR CMD 8778E THAT TWO PRIMARY TARGETS ARE LISTED. I REALIZE THAT TARGETS ARE NOT THE BEST, BUT STILL CANNOT ACCEPT THE JAP ARMY HEADQUARTERS AS A SUITABLE TARGET FOR B-29'S. BELIEVE IT FAR BETTER TO PUT ALL EFFORT ON OTHER TARGET MENTIONED IN YOUR MESSAGE.

2. AS FOR MISSION NO. 35, YOUR PLAN SEEMS DESIGNED TO SECURE MAXIMUM TRAINING AND IS ACCEPTED AS SUCH.

END

TOD 060153Z MJG

~~TOP SECRET~~

ORIGINATOR OF MESSAGE _____

DISTRIBUTION

	C/S	DC/S Opr	DC/S Adm	A-1	A-2	A-3 Tng	A-3 CC&R	A-4	A-5 Plans
ACTION	A.G.	Surg	Air Insp	PRO	Comm	Op Anal	Stat Con		
	C/S	DC/S Opr	DC/S Adm	A-1	A-2	A-3 Tng	A-3 CC&R	A-4	A-5 Plans
INFORMATION	A.G.	Surg	Air Insp	PRO	Comm	Op Anal	Stat Con		

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority 760063
 By CD NAPA Date 12/1/88

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A-3 CC&R	A-3 CC&R
A-4	A-4
A-5 PLANS	A-5 PLANS
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SURG.	SURG.
AIR INSP.	AIR INSP.
PRO	PRO
COMM	COMM
O. A.	O. A.
S. C. O.	S. C. O.

SECRET IVI
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

[Handwritten signature]

From: CG 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

To: War Department

Re: CMD 8779 E.

5 February 1945

COMAF 20 from COMGENBOMBCOM 20 CMD 8779E

Reference our wire ~~8778 E~~ code name for Mission 34 will be DISIMPRISON number 2 and CAPACIOUS number 5 for Mission 35.

D Date will be LNLO.

Saigon (Bombing)

End

→ Bangkok

0.702 Feb. 7

ACTION: 20th Air Force

ACTION COPY

CM-IN-4771 (5 Feb 45) DTG. 05/NFT sdw

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3

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T.S 309

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET I VI

Headquarters
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ACTION COPY TO *oct/rr*
INFO. COPY TO *c/s - Ad*

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

TOP SECRET	
Chief of Staff	
Deputy C. of S. Adm.	
Deputy C. of S. Op.	
C. of S.	

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

To: War Department

Nr: CMD 8778 E 5 February 1945

COMAF 20 from COMGENBOMCOM 20 CMD 8778 E.

The following is our plan^{xx BC's} for mission number 34:

A. Effort:
56 airborne aircraft.

B. Targets:
(1) Primary: Japanese Army Headquarters, *Saigon*
Saigon, Indo-China and AAF target TM-O-TT. *85.2-PP*
(2) Secondary: Royal Ordnance Factory, Bangkok, *Magford*
Thailand. *Armed*
(3) Last resort: Martaban railroad yards.

C. Route:
Base area - Grand Lake (13 degrees 15 minutes N,
103 degrees 42 minutes E) - IP (Chulong 12 degrees 16 minutes
N, 105 degrees 58 minutes E) - target - Tavoy Point (13 de-
grees 32 minutes N, 98 degrees 08 minutes E) - base area.

D. Time over target:
0330Z.

E. Axis of attack:
155 degrees magnetic.

F. Aiming points:

CM-IN-4907 (5 Feb 45)

ACTION COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET

RETURN THIS COPY TO
A. G. TWENTIETH AIR FORCE

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24-75724

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *760063*
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

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~~TOP SECRET~~ SECRET IVI
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 2

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

Nr: CMD 8778 E 5 February 1945

(1) Primary: Center of Majestic Hotel and center of drydock.

✓ G. Method of bombing:

By 12 ship formation with minimum interval train from 18,000 feet to 20,000 feet pressure altitude.

✓ H. Bomb load:

Minimum of 6,000 pounds, one group carrying M-76 incendiary bombs fused instantaneous nose and non delay tail and one group carrying 1,000 pound GP bombs fused .1 second nose and .025 second tail.

✓ I. Flight time:
13:43

✓ J. Total distance:
3121 SM.

~~The following is our plan for mission number 35:~~ *Capacious 4*

✓ A. Effort:
56 airborne aircraft.

✓ B. Targets:

(1) Primary: AAF target AT .O-UM 98-2.45
(2) Secondary: Railroad marshalling yard, *Roma VI*
Martaban. *N. R. Bridge*

✓ C. Route:

Base area - Diamond Island (50 degrees 52 min- *Bangkok*
Chailand)

CM-IN-4907 (5 Feb 45)

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~~TOP SECRET~~ I VI
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 3

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

Nr: CMD 8778 E 5 February 1945

utes N, 94 degrees 17 minutes E) - Tavoy Point (13 degrees 32 minutes N, 98 degrees 08 minutes E) - (13 degrees 32 minutes N, 99 degrees 50 minutes E) - target - Tavoy Point (13 degrees 32 minutes N, 98 degrees 08 minutes E) - base area.

✓ D. Time over target:
0500Z.

E. Axis of attack:
68 degrees magnetic.

F. Aiming points:
(1) Primary: Center of bridge.
(2) Secondary: Rolling stock.

✓ G. Method of bombing:
Three plane formations with minimum interval train from 18,000 feet to 20,000 feet pressure altitude.

✓ H. Bomb load:
Twelve - 1,000 pound GP bombs fused .10 nose and .10 tail.

✓ I. Flight time:
10:26.

J. Total distance:
2270. End.

Classification of this message raised to Top Secret by WDCMC
ACTION: 20th Air Force

CM-IN-4907 (5 Feb 45) DTG 050747Z hcw

~~TOP SECRET~~

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HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE	
Chief of Staff	
Deputy C. of S. Adm.	
Deputy C. of S. Op.	
A. G.	

Headquarters
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ACTION COPY TO *DC/S/OP*
INFO. COPY TO *DC/SEC*

SECRET IVI
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

ACTION COPY

AAF

ACTION

CSTI

INFO

AEP

MSC

RDB

RER

DAO

RWX

ABI

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India
To : War Department
General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area,
Leyte, Philippines
General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area,
Advance Echelon, San Miguel, Philippines
Deputy Commander, 20th Air Force, Guam
CG, Army Air Forces, India-Burma Sector,
Calcutta, India
CG, 10th Air Force, Myitkyina, Burma

NY : CMDX 8895 D 7 February 1945

COMAF 20, MacArthur, DEPCOMAF 20 POA, Stratemeyer,
Davidson from COMGENBOMCOM 20 CMDX 8895 D.

Airborne on mission 34 against primary target Naval
yards at Saigon, secondary Royal Ordnance factory Bangkok and
last resort marshalling yards at Martaban Burma were 32 air-
craft of the 444th Group and 35 aircraft of the 462nd Group;
with first off at 062001Z and last at 2133Z. *67*

Airborne one mission 35 against primary target Rama
six bridge at Bangkok, secondary marshalling yards at
Martaban Burma were 33 aircraft of the 40th Group with first
off at 062230Z and last at 2323Z. 31 aircraft of 468th Group
delayed in take off by fog were off between 070057 and 0150

End *64*

ACTION: CG AAF

INFO : OPD, G-2, Admiral King, Log

CM-IN-6494 (7 Feb 45) DTG 070442Z m/m

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No reply BJR
ACTION COPY

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TELECON MESSAGE NUMBER D-1697 (((SECRET)))

SUBJECT: TAKEOFF RPTS - MISSIONS NO. 34 & 35

TO COMGENAF 20 FROM COMGENBOMCOM 20

SECRET

I. 1. TARGETS FOR MISSION 34 (444TH AND 462ND GROUPS ONLY)

(A). PRIMARY: NAVAL YARD, SAIGON, F.I.C.

(B) SECONDARY: ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORY, BANGKOK, SIAM.

(C) LAST RESORT: MARSHALLING YARD, MRATABAN BURMA.

2. BOMB LOAD: 444TH GROUP -500 POUND- M-76 INCENDIARY BOMBS FUSED IN-
STANTENOUS NOSE AND NON DELAY
TAIL. 10 AIRCRAFT ARE CARRYING
21 BOMBS; 22 AIRCRAFT ARE
CARRYING 20 BOMBS.

462ND GROUP -1000 OPOUND G.P. BOMBS FUSED .1 SECOND NOSE
AND .025 TAIL: 19 AIRCRAFT ARE CARRYING 12
BOMBS, 1 AIRCRAFT IS CARRYING 8 BOMBS.

-200

0 POUND G.P. BOMBS, SAME FUSING: 15 AIR-
CRAFT ARE CARRYING 6 BOMBS.

3. TAKEOFFS: 444TH GROUP - 32 A/C AIRBORNE , FIRST AT 2030Z.

LAST AT 2133Z.

462ND GROUP - 35 A/C AIRBORNE , FIRST AT 2001Z.

LAST AT 2108Z.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T
By authority of
CG Twentieth AF

Copy for _____
Officer Section Date Initials

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
Washington, D. C.

Information for Briefing on "20 Bomber Command
Mission No. 34 - 7 Feb 45
Date

Mission Code Name "Disimprisa" (As of Z - _____)
Date

Targets: Primary - NAVY YARD AND ARSENAL, SAIGON
Secondary - ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORY, BANGKOK
Last Resort - MARTABAN RAILROAD YARDS

Take-off Times: 062030Z (061630 Wash Time)

Time Over Primary Target: _____

Tactics: 12 plane formation with minimum interval train.

Aircraft Bombing: Aircraft bombing from 1800 to 20,000 Ft. pressure Alt.
66 a/c Bombing

Primary Target - 63 A/C

Secondary Target - 1

Other Targets - 02 A/C

Bomb Load: Average bomb load per A/C - 10,000 lbs. One group carrying
M-76 Incendiary Bomb fused instantaneous nose and non delay tail.
One group carrying 1000lb. G.P. fused 1 sec. nose-.025sec tail.

Losses: _____

Target Weather: _____

Fighter Opposition: _____

Anti-Aircraft Encountered: _____

Results of Bombing: 9 A/C reported results GOOD. 54 A/C reported results UNOBSERVED

Remarks: This information is fragmentary and is subject to change so
Should not be used or presented as final.

S E C R E T

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AW 7600 63
By CD NAPA Date 12/1/88

SECRET

TELECON MSG. NO. D-1699 - SECRET
SUBJECT: BOMBS AWAY MESSAGES.
TO: COMAF 20 FROM: COMGENBOMCOM 20

BOMBS AWAY SUMMARY AS OF 070530Z

ON MISSION NO. 34

PA 2: 09 Pri - Visual - Good - 9 A/C

PB 5: 54 Pri - Radar - Unob. - 54

LA 1: 01 Last R - Visuals - Exc - 1

LA 4: 01 Last R - Visual - Poor - 1

JETTISONED: 01

SECRET

SECRET
By authority of
CG Twentieth AF

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE

7 Feb. 45 *ATP*
Date Initials

Washington, D. C.

PRELIMINARY MISSION REPORT OF XX BOMBER COMMAND

OPERATION NO. 54 - - - 7 FEBRUARY 1945

"DISH PRISON 2"

Targets: Primary - Navy Yard and Arsenal, Saigon
Last Resort - Martaban Railroad Yards

Take-off: 061601 - 061733 Washington Time (062001Z - 062133Z)

Time of Attack: 062334 - 062400 Washington Time, 071134 - 071200 Theater Time,
(070334Z - 070400Z)

Aircraft: Total Bombing 66
Primary 44
Other Targets 22

Aircraft Lost or Missing: None

Casualties: 2 killed, 4 wounded, 0 missing

Bomb Load: Average bomb load per A/C-11,000 lbs. One group carrying 15-76
1B fused instantaneous nose and non-delay tail. One group
carrying 1000 lb GP fused 1 sec nose - .025 sec tail

Bomb Tons Dropped: 380 short tons of which 248.5 tons were dropped on primary

Tactics: Radar bombing in 12 plane formation with minimum interval train
from 18000 to 20,000 ft. pressure altitude

Weather: 9/10 to 10/10 cloud cover

Fighter Opposition: Nil -- (7 Oscars and 2 Tojos seen but did not attack)

Flak: Nil to very meager and inaccurate

Claims: None destroyed, 0 probably destroyed, 1 damaged

Results: Unobserved

Crew Observations: 15 mine sweepers dragging mouth of Irrawaddy

Remarks: This information is fragmentary and subject to change, therefore
should not be used for official records.

As of 1430, 7 February 1945

Lauris Norstad
LAURIS NORSTAD
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

SECRET

5073

HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL



FEB 7 45

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *AWP 7600 63*
By *CD* NAPA Date *10/1/88*

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JM

**SECRET TVI
OPERATIONAL PRIORITY
Headquarters
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE**

ACTION COPY TO DE/SO/PR
INFO. COPY TO C/S

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE	
Chief of Staff	
Deputy C. of S. Adm.	
Deputy C. of S. Opr.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
A. G.	

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

To: War Department
Deputy Commander, 20th Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.
General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Areas,
Leyte, Philippines
CG, Army Air Forces, India Burma Sector,
Calcutta, India
CG, US Army Forces, India Burma Theater,
New Delhi, India
CG, 14th Air Force, Kunming, China
CG, US Army Forces, China Theater, Chungking, China
Headquarters 10th Army Air Force, Myitkina, Burma
General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Areas,
Advanced, San Miguel, Philippines.

Nr: CMDX 8951 7 February 1945

COMAF XX from Ramey info DECOMAF XX, MacArthur,
Stratemeyer, Davidson, Sultan, Wedemeyer, Chennault CMDX
8951 D

Preliminary reports follow on missions 34 and 35
flown today from India bases.

On mission 34 against Naval yards at Saigon as
primary, Rama 6 bridge Bangkok as secondary and railroad
yards at Martaban Burma as last resort, 67 aircraft were air
borne, 44 bombed primary, 2 bombed last resort and 20 bombed
opportunity target, the warehouses at Phnom Penh. One
failed to bomb. Bombing at primary was by radar through
9-10/10 undercast from 18,000 to 21,000 feet, at last resort
visual, and opportunity blind through undercast with unob-
served results at primary and opportunity and poor to ex -

CM-IN-7149 (8 Feb 45)

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ABI RAD RWX DAO RER RDB AEP MSG INFO CST ACTION AAF

27

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OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

Page 2

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

Nr: CMDX 8951 7 February 1945

cellent on last resort. Average bomb load was approximately 11,250 pounds, one group carrying M 76 incendiaries and one group one and two thousand pound GP's.

Air opposition was nil at all targets with 7 Oscar and 2 Tojos observed out of range at primary and a few interceptions on route home antiaircraft varied from nil to very meager and inaccurate at primary and nil elsewhere. No aircraft were lost to enemy action. Claims are one aircraft damaged. On mission 35 against Rama 6 bridge as primary with Martaban as secondary 64 aircraft were airborne, 58 bombed primary target, 1 bombed secondary and 5 failed to bomb. Average load was six tons per aircraft and all carried one thousand pound GP bombs.

Bombing was visual in formations of two to four aircraft from 18,000 to 21,000 feet. Weather was CAVU to 2/10 undercast. Observed results were poor to excellent with last formation seeing center span buckled and in water.

Enemy air opposition was nil, and antiaircraft fire was meagre and inaccurate to accurate. No aircraft are lost or missing. No claims. Observations include very large fire with smoke to three thousand feet vicinity of Basseun. Three rows of silver balloons, two to a row at 13 degrees 48 minutes north 98 degrees 15 minutes east. Ten to twenty single and twin engine aircraft at Don Maung airfield. Two columns of smoke five thousand feet high, approximately 14 degrees north, 100 degrees east. Photo interpretation report follows. Sighting have been sent to interested addresses.

End

ACTION: CG AAF

INFO: OPD; G-2; Adm King; Log

CM-IN-7149 (8 Feb 45) DTG: 071619Z pa

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FEB 8 45 AM



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

FEB 8 45 AM



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

YFK R-13

TELECON MESSAGE NR. D-1707

(SECRET)

SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY MISSION REPORT -
MISSION NR. 34

SECRET

TO: COMAF 20 FROM: COMGENBOMCOM 20

(ALLTIMES ZEBRA: DATA AS OF 071330Z)

1. DESIGNATION OF UNIT: XX BOMBER COMMAND (444, 462ND GROUPS ONLY)
2. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT TAKING OFF: 67
3. TIME OF TAKE-OFF (FIRST TO LAST): ⁰⁶¹⁸⁰¹ 062001 - ^{061733 Wash} 062133
4. TIME DOWN LAST PLANE (OF MAIN FORMATION): 071145
5. TIME OVER PRIMARY TARGET (FIRST AND LAST): ⁰⁶²³³⁴ 070334 - ⁰⁶²⁴⁰⁰ 0400
6. ALTITUDE OF ATTACK ON PRIMARY TARGET: 18000 - 21100
7. WEATHER OVER PRIMARY TARGET: 9 TO 10/10
8. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT BOMBING (ALL TARGETS): 66
9. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT BOMBING PRIMARY: 44
10. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT BOMBING SECONDARY: 0
11. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT BOMBING LAST RESORT: 2
12. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT BOMBING T OF O: 20 (WAREHOUSES ALONG WEST BANK OF RIVER AT PHNOM PENH)
13. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT UNKNOWN AS TO BOMBING: 0
14. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT FAILING TO BOMB: 1
15. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT LOST TO ENEMY AIR OPPOSITION: 0
16. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT LOST TO ENEMY AA: 0
17. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT LOST BY ACCIJENT: 1 (CRASHED AT DUM DUM)

SECRET

SECRET

18. NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT MISSING: 0
19. DISPOSITION OF BOMBS: (SHORT TONS) (ESTIMATED)
 - A. TOTAL TONNAGE DROPPED ON ALL TARGETS: 380
 - B. TOTAL TONNAGE DROPPED ON PT: 248.5
 - C. TOTAL TONNAGE DROPPED ON ST: 0
 - D. TOTAL TONNAGE DROPPED ON LRT: 11.5
 - E. TOTAL TONNAGE DROPPED ON TARGET OF OPPORTUNITY: 120
 - F. TOTAL TONNAGE UNREPORTED AS TO DISPOSITION: 0
 - G. TOTAL TONNAGE JETTISONED: 0
 - H. TOTAL TONNAGE RETURNED TO BASE: 6

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20. OBSERVED RESULTS OF BOMBING:
PRIMARY: UNOBSERVED

SECRET

SECONDARY: -----

LAST RESORT: POOR TO EXCELLENT

TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY: UNOBSERVED

21. METHOD OF BOMBING:

- A. PRIMARY: ALL RADAR
- B. SECONDARY: ---
- C. LAST RESORT: VISUAL
- D. OPPORTUNITY: BLIND

SECRET

22. CASUALTIES: KILLED: 2. WOUNDED: 4. MISSING: 0

23. CLAIMS: DESTROYED: 0. PROBABLY DESTROYED: 0. DAMAGED: 1. -
(ENROUTE HOME)

24. ENEMY FIGHTER OPPOSITION:

- A. PRIMARY: NIL (7 OSCARS AND 2 TOJOS SEEN BUT DID NOT ATTACK)
- B. SECONDARY: -----
- C. LAST RESORT: NIL
- D. OPPORTUNITY: NIL

SECRET

25. ENEMY HEAVY ANTI-AIRCRAFT:

- A. PRIMARY: NNIL TO VERY MEAGRE AND INACCURATE
- B. SECONDARY: -----
- C. LAST RESORT: NIL
- D. OPPORTUNITY: NIL

26. STATUS OF AIRCRAFT LANDED AT THEIR HOME BASE: 2 AIRCRAFT LANDED AT COXS BAZAAR AND ONE AT CHITTAGONG. ONE AIRCRAFT CRASHED AT DUM DUM, HAVING LOST ALL FOUR ENGINES DUE TO FUEL SHORTAGE ON APPROACH.

27. CREW OBSERVATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE ITEMS OF INTEREST: 15 MINE SWEEPERS DRAGGING MOUTH OF IRRAWADDY.

28. PRELIMINARY STRIKE PHOTOGRAPHS: LATER, IF ANY.

THIS REPORT IS PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO REVISION. A FINAL INTELLIGENCE STATISTICAL SUMMARY WILL BE SENT ON D-DAY PLUS FIVE.

...END...

TOD: 071710Z (LJO) YFK

SECRET

~~THAT IS ALL ACK PLS~~

YFK
R/S

SECRET

TELECON MESSAGE NR. D-1705

(S E C R E T)

SUBJECT: LANDING REPORT - MISSIONS 34 AND 35

TO: COMAF 20

FROM: COMGENBOMCOM 20

ALL AIRCRAFT FOR MISSIONS 34 AND 35 HAVE LANDED SAFELY EXCEPT 1 WHICH
CRASH LANDED AT DUM DUM - NO DETAILS AS YET AVAILABLE. TWO AIRCRAFT
LANDED AT COX BAZAAR AND HAVE ALREADY TAKEN OFF FOR HOME BASES, AND
1 HAS LANDED AT CHITTOGONG.

...END...

TOD: 071227Z (LJO) YFK

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DC/S ADM	DC/S ADM
A-1	A-1
A-2	A-2
A-3 TNG	A-3 TNG
A-3 OC&R	A-3 OC&R
A-4	A-4
A-5 PLANS	A-5 PLANS
A. G.	A. G.
SURG.	SURG.
AIR INSP.	AIR INSP.
PRO	PRO
COMM	COMM
O. A.	O. A.
S. C. O.	S. C. O.

SECRET I VI

PRIORITY

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE	
Chief of Staff	
Deputy C. of S. Adm.	
Deputy C. of S. Op.	
A. G.	

of c lost or missing

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India
 To: War Department
 No. CMD 8998 YB 8 February 1945
 COMAF 20 from COMGENBOMCOM 20 CMD 8998 YB.
 Aircraft base report for mission number 34 on 7 February 45.

- A. 42-24461
- B. Lost all four engines due to fuel shortage on approach.
- C. Crashed at Dum Dum.
- D. 2 killed, 4 injured.

End

ACTION COPY

ACTION: 20th AF

CM-IN-7938 (8 Feb 45) DTG 081006Z gjg

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3

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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

FEB 8 4:30 PM



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

FEB 8 7:45 PM



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL

FEB 9 7:45 AM



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL


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TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL



FEB 9 7:45 AM

11/71/6819



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EXTRACT OF TELETYPE CONFERENCE BETWEEN
WASHINGTON AND KHARAGPUR

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INGOMING MESSAGE

Mission Folder

TELECON MSG NO.	SUBJECT	DATE
YB 1741	A/C Failing to Bomb Primary Target <i>Charts</i>	13 Feb 45

(To: COMGENAF 20 From: COMGENBOMBOM 20)

Airborne aircraft failing to bomb primary on Mission No. 34 on 7 February 1945. Target Siagon--only the 444th Group and the 462nd Group participated in this mission.

A/C Serial Group Number	Specific Mechanical Malfunction	Local Action To Prevent Recurrence	Unsatisfactory Report Submitted
444th Group 63376	No. 2 turbo malfunction caused by loose intake pipe and excessive oil in turbo governor.	Replaced pipe and governor.	U.R. 45-78
462nd Group 24786	No. 1 prop governor failure. Resistor clip broken.	Replaced prop governor and electric head.	UOMR. 45-94
63393	Blown exhaust stack No. 2 engine.	Replaced stack.	U. R. 45-92
24456	Rear bomb bay door would not open fully, and would close only halfway. This occurred on 1st run over target and A/C could not stay in formation. Retracting screw trouble. Material failure of part.	No other action required, replaced screw.	No submitted as this system is no longer in production.

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION	ACTION	Stat Con (2 cys)
	INFORMATION	DC/S Opr; A-4 (3 cys); Flying Safety

5-33, AF (REV 1 JAN 45)

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 Authority *now 760063*
 By *CD* WAPA Date *12/1/88*

TELECON MESSAGE NO K-7-2

RESTRICTED

072008Z

SUBJECT COMMUNIQUE NUMBER 55

TO COMGENBOMCOM 20

FROM COMAF 20

RELES RPT RELEASING FOLLOWING COMMUNIQUE AT 072100Z.

RESTRICTED

ATTACKING IN TWO SEPARATE FORCES, B-29'S OF THE TWENTIETH AIR FORCE'S XX BOMBER COMMAND STRUCK AT VAVAL AND OTHER JAPANESE MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN SAIGON, INDO-CHINA AND AT KEY

COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES IN THE BANGKOK, THAILAND AREA TODAY, (FEBRUARY 7, INDIA CALENDAR). GENERAL OF THE ARMY H. H. ARNOLD, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE TWENTIETH AIR FORCE, ANNOUNCED THAT ALL SUPERFORTRESSES PARTICIPATING IN THE TWIN MISSIONS RETURNED TO THEIR BASES IN INDIA.

RESTRICTED

BOMBING AT SAIGON WAS ACCOMPLISHED BY A SIZEABLE FORCE EMPLOYING PRECISION INSTRUMENTS. RESULTS WERE UNOBSERVED.

MEANWHILE, A SUBSTANTIAL FORCE OF B-29'S ATTACKED COMMUNICATION FACILITIES IN THE BANGKOK AREA. RETURNING DREWS OBSERVED BOMB STRIKES IN THE TARGET AREA. DAMAGE TO THE SPECIFIC TARGET AT BANGKOK COULD NOT BE IMMEDIATELY DETERMINED.

ON THE SAIGON MISSION, DREWS REPORTED OBSERVING SMALL FORCES OF JAPANESE FIGHTER AIRCRAFT WHICH DID NOT ATTACK. LIKEWISE, THERE WAS NO FIGHTER OPPOSITION ON THE BANBKOK MISSION. ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE AT BOTH TARGETS WAS MEAGER.

TO GLASS FROM REES.

END MESSAGE-----

TOD: P 072034Z

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SECRET

AC/AS, INTELLIGENCE

XX BOMBER COMMAND

MISSION NO. 34, 7 FEBRUARY 1945

SAIGON, FRENCH INDO-CHINA

Enemy air opposition was practically non-existent. The number of attacks was so small that directions and levels of approach followed no particular pattern. No coordinated attacks, air-to-air bombs or rockets were observed.

BOX SCORE: Enemy: One TOJO damaged. Ours: None
(Claimed)

SECRET	
By Authority of The Commander in Chief Army of the South	
16 Mar. 45	
Date	Initials
Deputy C. of S. T.M.&E.	
Jap Fighter Tactics	

SECRET

* SECRET *
* By Authority of CG *
* XX Bomber Command *
* 14/2/45 *ACJ* *
* Date Initials *

HEADQUARTERS
XX BOMBER COMMAND
INTELLIGENCE SECTION
APO 493

14 February 1945

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE	
Chief of Staff	
Deputy Chief of Staff Adm.	
Deputy Chief of Staff Opr.	
A. G.	

PRELIMINARY REPORT
ANTIAIRCRAFT OPPOSITION

MISSION NUMBER 34, (DAYLIGHT), 7 FEBRUARY 1945

Enemy Attacks XX BC
Primary Target - NAVAL YARD, SAIGON, F.I.C., Secondary Target -
ROYAL ORDNANCE FACTORY, BANGKOK, and Target of Last Resort -
MARSHALLING YARD, MARTABAN, BURMA

A. ANTIAIRCRAFT FIRE ENCOUNTERED

1. SAIGON (10°46'N-106°45'E)

Meager and inaccurate black heavy antiaircraft fire was reported for 4 of a total of 74 aircraft-runs over this area from 18,000 to 20,500 feet altitude from 0300Z to 0400Z through 9/10 to 10/10 undercast conditions. A total of 5 bursts were observed. The following table shows aircraft over the area in relation to fire encountered.

Table I; Heavy AA Fire Encountered.

Formation	Total Aircraft	A/C Reporting	Time	Time Encountered	HAA Fire Encountered	Altitude in Feet	Undercast	No. of bursts	Heading
1*	10	0	0300Z	-----	-----None-----	19,000	10/10	0	155°
1*	10	0	0320Z	-----	-----None-----	19,000	10/10	0	335°
2*	10	0	0318Z	-----	-----None-----	19,000	10/10	0	155°
3	13	3	0334Z	0333-37Z	Meager & inaccurate	18-18500	10/10	4	130°
4	14	1	0355Z	0355Z	Meager & Inaccurate	19600 to 20,500	9/10	1	303°
5	17	0	0400Z	-----	-----None-----	19300 to 20,200	10/10	0	154°

* Formations #1 and #2 made runs over SAIGON as indicated but did not bomb due to undercast conditions. Bombing was accomplished over PHNOM PENH.

Deviations of bursts varied from level to below, were generally behind, and to the left or right or in line with the aircraft. Fire is believed to have been Continuously Pointed, with no enemy aircraft observed on the same course or altitude.

Meager and inaccurate automatic weapons fire was also observed at 0355Z and consisted of 5 bursts very low and to the left of the aircraft.

Although heavy AA fire was conducted through a 9/10 to 10/10 undercast, gun-laying radar was not used. R.C.M. Observers monitoring the appropriate frequencies obtained no intercepts characteristic of gun-laying radar, nor was the fire of sufficient intensity or accuracy to indicate radar fire control methods. Although formations were in range of the known gun defense (8 HAA from cover to 8 Feb 45), the capabilities of this defense were not utilized to the fullest extent as evidenced by the reporting of a total of only 5 bursts.

B-I-1

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Authority *AW 7600 63*
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

S E C R E T

2. PHNOM PENH (11°35'N-104°55'E)

Although two formations of 10 aircraft each bombed this area at 0347Z and 0354Z from 18,000 to 19,150 feet altitude on headings of 230°M and 309°M through a 8/10 to 9/10 undercast, no antiaircraft opposition was encountered.

3. MARTABAN-MOULMEIN AREA (16°33'N-107°36'E)

Four aircraft of a known total of 7 passing within range of heavy AA defenses in this area encountered meager and accurate to inaccurate black and some white heavy antiaircraft fire. Table II shows known aircraft over the area in relation to heavy AA fire encountered.

One aircraft also encountered moderate and accurate (the aircraft was struck) automatic weapons fire at 0049Z while enroute to SAIGON at 8,000 feet under CAVU conditions. From 10 to 15 bursts were observed at one instant resulting in a total count of from 30 to 40 for the encounter. Deviations were level or below, abreast, and either in line or to the right.

Table II; Heavy AA Fire Encountered.

Formation	No. of Aircraft	Bomb Release Time	Time Encountered	Heavy AA Fire Encountered	Altitude in Feet	Undercast	No. of bursts	Heading
1*	1	-----	2331Z	Moderate-Accurate	8,000	CAVU	30	-----
2*	1	-----	2332Z	Moderate - Accurate	8,000	CAVU	20	-----
3*	1	-----	0012Z	Meager - Inaccurate	8,000	3/10	4	-----
4	1	0013Z	-----	-----None-----	18,000	CAVU	---	58°M
5*	1	-----	0032Z	Moderate - Accurate	8,000	CAVU	35	-----
6*	1	-----	0049Z	None (AW only)-----	8,000	CAVU	---	-----
7	1	0051Z	-----	-----None-----	18,000	CAVU	---	222°M

* These aircraft encountered fire from this area while enroute to SAIGON as a result of straying to the south of the briefed flight path.

The number of heavy AA bursts observed at any one instant varied from 4 to 7 with the total for the encounters varying from 4 to 35. Continuously Pointed fire is believed to have been used, and no enemy aircraft were observed on the same course and altitude.

The following table (III) lists reports of intensity, accuracy and deviations for the heavy antiaircraft fire encountered. The numbers indicate aircraft reporting in the affirmative while percentages are determined from the total number of reports in one direction as above, level, or below.

Table III; Intensity, Accuracy, and Deviations

Reports of Accuracy		Reports of Intensity	
Struck	1 (25 percent)	Intense	0 (0 percent)
Rocked	0 (0 percent)	Moderate	3 (75 percent)
Within 150'	2 (50 percent)	Meager	1 (25 percent)
Outside 150'	1 (25 percent)		

Reports of Deviations			
Above	4 (40 percent)	Ahead	4 (50 percent)
Level	3 (30 percent)	Left	2 (33 percent)
Below	3 (30 percent)	In Line	3 (50 percent)
		Behind	3 (38 percent)
		Right	1 (17 percent)

S E C R E T

4. RANGOON (16°47'N-96°10'E)

Three aircraft, while enroute to SAIGON and off the briefed flight line, encountered or observed attempts at opposition from the RANGOON Area from 6,000 feet altitude with 3/10 undercast conditions.

Table IV: Opposition, RANGOON Area.

Formation	No. of A/C	Time Encountered	Fire Encountered
1	1	2342Z	HAA - Moderate and Accurate, total of 15-20 bursts 4 at one time.
2	2	0000Z	HAA and AW ground flashes observed with both aircraft beyond maximum range. Number of bursts and deviations not reported.

Formation #1, at 2342Z, encountered black bursts within 150' with deviations of above, level, and below; ahead or behind; and to the left or right. Barrage type fire was reported and no enemy aircraft on the same course and altitude were seen.

5. Unidentified Naval Vessel at 16°50'N-96°50'E

Meager and inaccurate black antiaircraft fire (undetermined caliber) was encountered by one aircraft at 0002Z while enroute to SAIGON through a 10/10 undercast at 7,700 feet. Bursts were below and to the left with 5 occurring at one instant resulting in a total of 25 for the encounter.

6. SITTANG BRIDGE (17°25'N-96°53'E)

Two aircraft encountered moderate and accurate to inaccurate black automatic weapons fire at 2320Z and 0020Z at 6,500 feet altitude under CAVU conditions. One aircraft was struck. Bursts at one instant varied from 1 to 5 with a total of from 6 to 35 observed for the two encounters. Deviations were above, level, and below; and to the left or in line.

This opposition was also observed by 12 aircraft then in the vicinity, which reported two guns on each side of the river in a wooded area.

7. SATTANIB (12°40'N-100°51'E)

One aircraft observed (from a distance of 10 miles) 2 black bursts of heavy antiaircraft fire from 12,000 feet altitude that appeared to originate from this area. No other aircraft were observed in the vicinity at the time.

8. HNINPALE (17°10'N-97°15'E)

Two aircraft at approximately 2330Z (just at dawn) from 7,000 feet altitude observed a total of 35 to 40 black heavy antiaircraft bursts (occurring one at a time) and originating from this area. Gun flashes were observed from 5 guns on the east bank of the river near the bridge and fire was reported as directed against 5 other B-29's approximately 12 miles distant.

Believed to be the 12 aircraft referred to above, 12 planes observed fire originating from the bridge at TAUNGZUN (17°12'N-97°09'E) in this area. Caliber of fire was not determined but it was reported that fire came from "3 guns 40mm or heavier". As it is known that HNINPALE is defended by 4 heavy guns (WIS EAC Section V, #24, Cover to 1 Feb), the origin of this inaccurate fire is listed under HNINPALE rather than TAUNGZUN.

B-I-3

S E C R E T

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B. SMOKESCREENS, GROUND-TO-AIR ROCKETS, BARRAGE AND HIGH-ALTITUDE BALLOONS

None reported.

C. DAMAGE FROM ANTI-AIRCRAFT FIRE

Five aircraft were damaged by anti-aircraft fire while enroute to the target areas. The exact locations and conditions under which damage was inflicted to two aircraft could not be determined as shown below.

Table V: Damage from Antiaircraft Fire.

Aircraft Number	Group	Location	Under-cast	Caliber	Time	Altitude in feet	Extent
897	444th	Sittang Bridge	CAVU	AW	0020Z	6,500	Minor
268	444th	Moulmein	CAVU	HAA	0032Z	8,000	Minor
446	444th	Moulmein	CAVU	AW	0049Z	8,000	Minor
448	462nd	-----	----	----	-----	-----	Minor
454	462nd	-----	----	----	-----	-----	Minor

D. WARNING NETS

It is believed that the enemy had prior warning of the attack directed against SAIGON because of early warning radar activity as determined by R.C.M. intercepts in conjunction with 8 enemy fighter attacks occurring between 0302Z and 0316Z made by approximately 5 fighter aircraft.

F. L. Scott, Jr.
FRANK L. SCOTT, JR.
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Intelligence Section.

B-I-4

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
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6589

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ADJUTANT GENERAL



FEB 26 45



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INCOMING MESSAGE

TELECON MSG NO. D-1765	SUBJECT Japanese Fighter Tactics - Mission No. 34	DATE 17 Feb 1945
---------------------------	--	---------------------

(To: COMAF 20 From: COMGENBOMCOM 20)

XYBC

I. Japanese fighter tactics - Mission No. 34.

Target: Saigon, French Indo-China.
Time: Day Mission.
Date: 7 February 1945.

1. General.

Enemy air opposition was practically non-existent. One group experienced no attacks (although enemy aircraft were sighted). The other group reported nine attacks against four B-29's in the area of the primary target. Enemy pilots opened fire in only two of the nine encounters, however, (both at ranges of about 1000 yards), and the others were listed as attacks only because the B-29's fired in each case. Fire from the bombers was effective defensively, because in only one instance did an enemy aircraft approach closer than 900 yards. The enemy inflicted no damage on the B-29's, and preliminary claims list but one enemy aircraft, a Tojo, as damaged.

The attacks occurred in the Saigon to Phnom-Penh Area between 0255Z and 0352Z, and all at about 18,000 feet altitude. All of the action took place before bombing as the two formations attacked made two runs on the primary target and did not bomb as proper radar scope images were not picked up; the formations then proceeded to Phnom-Penh where bombs were dropped at 0347Z and 0354Z.

Four attacks were made by Oscar, three by Tojo and two by Zeke. Probably no more than five enemy aircraft were involved in the action.

The number of attacks was so small that directions and levels of approach follow no particular pattern. No coordinated attacks, aerial bombs or rockets were observed. The enemy usually terminated the attacks with dives for fast breakaway.

The highlight of the aerial opposition encountered was the extreme reluctance of Jap pilots to press their attacks.

Page - 1


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
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Deputy C. of S. Adm.	
Deputy C. of S. Opr.	
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By CD NAPA Date 12/1/88



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INCOMING MESSAGE

TELECON MSG NO. D-1765 (cont'd)	SUBJECT	DATE
------------------------------------	---------	------

Details of combat are shown in Table No. 1, and enemy aircraft sightings in Table No. 2.

Table No. 1 - Details of Attacks

A/C No.	Type E/A	Direction of Approach	Level of Approach	E/A Opened Fire (Yds)	E/A Closed To (Yds)	B-29 Opened Fire (Yds)	E/A Claims
456	Tojo	6	Level	1000	900	1000	No
456	Tojo	3	Level	1000	900	1500	No
456	Oscar	2	Level	No	900	1500	No
456	Oscar	2	Low	No	1000	1500	No
456	Oscar	5	High	No	1200	1500	No
479	Zeke	6	Level	No	900	900	No
484	Zeke	11	Low	No	300	300	No
801	Oscar	11	Low	No	1000	1100	No
801	Tojo	9	Low	No	1000	1200	Damaged

Table No. 2 - Enemy Aircraft Sightings

A/C No.	No.	E/A Type	E/A	Time	Location	Altitude	Distance
378	3	S/E		-- --	Rangoon	-- -- --	-- -- --
202	3	Unidentified		-- --	Bangkok	-- -- --	10 miles
884	2	Float Planes		-- --	Sattahib	(Moored)	-- -- --
537	1	S/E		-- --	St. Jacques	(Low)	-- -- --
227	1	S/E		-- --	Martaban	-- -- --	-- -- --
375	3	Tony		-- --	Grande Lake	-- -- --	2000
375	3	Unidentified		-- --	11 degrees 32'N - 104 degrees 50'E	(On A/P)	-- -- --
590	1	Rufe		0332Z	Saigon	18,000	3000
838	3	Oscar		0325Z	Saigon	18,000	4000
838	1	Tojo		0325Z	Saigon	18,000	3000

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
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TELECON MSG NO.	SUBJECT	DATE
D-1765 (cont'd)		

484	2	Zeko	-- --	Saigon	19,000	-- -- --
479	6	Zeko	-- --	Saigon	14,000	1000
456	2	Oscar	-- --	Saigon	18,000	-- -- --
450	8	S/E	-- --	Saigon	18,000	4000
502	1	T/E	-- --	Saigon	18,000	-- -- --
502	2	S/E	-- --	Saigon	18,000	-- -- --

Page - 3

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Deputy C. of S. Adm.	
Deputy C. of S. Opr.	<i>He</i>
A. G.	

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Headquarters
OPERATIONAL TWENTIETH AIR FORCE

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From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

To: War Department
Deputy Commander, 20th Air Force, Hickam Field, T. H.
General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Areas,
Leyte, Philippines
General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Areas,
Advanced Echelon, San Miguel, Philippines

Nr: CMDX 8953D *Mission 34 - Sighting* 7 February 1945
COMAF 20 from Ramey info DECOMAF 20, MacArthur,
Stratemeyer, Strategic Air Force, Air Command Southeast Asia,
222nd Group pass to C in C Eastern Fleet CMDX 8953 D.

Composite sightings including spot sightings already sent follow for missions 34 and 35.

15 small craft anchored at Bangkok harbor. Two stationary small craft believed gun boats at 13 degrees 42 minutes North 98 degrees 15 minutes East. Seven small barges anchored at 16 degrees 00 minutes North 94 degrees 59 minutes East. Ten possible barges anchored at 13 degrees 33 minutes north 98 degrees 09 minutes East. Nine stationary barges at 16 degrees 55 minutes North 95 20 minutes East.

Six ships, three CL and three MAK or six AK of 450 to 500 feet at harbor Sattahib at 0527Z position 12 degrees 40 minutes North 100 degrees 50 minutes East. 15 mine sweepers dragging mouth of Irrawaddy at 0258Z. Two large AK at mouth of river south of Bangkok. 10 barges large wakes 15 degrees 40 minutes North 94 degrees 35 minutes East heading south at 0840Z. Two possible SS in river 16 degrees 14 minutes North 97 degrees 34 minutes East at 0832. Three unidentified 0630

CM-IN-7184 (8 Feb 45)

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Page 2

From: CG, 20th Bomber Command, Kharagpur, India

Nr: CMDX 8953D 7 February 1945

at 18 degrees 07 minutes North 92 degrees 22 minutes East.
Unreported number of ships at 11 degrees 28 minutes North
102 degrees 55 minutes East heading 330 degrees at 0434.

11 freighter transports 10 degrees 50 minutes North
110 degrees 30 minutes East at 0508Z 40 degrees course. Two
MV in harbor at 10 degrees 30 minutes North 103 degrees 53
minutes East anchored at 0445. Six possible large cargo
at 12 degrees 35 minutes North 100 degrees 50 minutes East
at 0525.

One BB, one CL, one DD, two freighter transports,
two unidentified at 12 degrees 36 minutes North 100 degrees
55 minutes East anchored at 0540.

Three DD, three cargo at 12 degrees 30 minutes North
100 degrees 40 minutes East no course or speed reported.

End

ACTION: CG AAF

INFO: OPD
G-2
Adm King
Log

CM-IN-7184 (8 Feb 45) DTG: 071702Z pa

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
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SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

RESTRICTED

SECRET
HQ TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

EXTRACT OF TELETYPE CONFERENCE BETWEEN
WASHINGTON AND KHARAGEUR

INITIALS

CHIEF OF STAFF	
DC/S ADM.	
DC/S OPR.	
AG	

INCOMING MESSAGE

Mission 34, Stat - XX BC

TELECON MSG NO. YB 1801	SUBJECT Rate of Recovery from Mission No. 34 & 35 against Saigon & Bangkok on 7 February 1945	DATE 22 Feb 45
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GROUP	MISS. NO.	TOTAL TACTICAL A/C ON MISSION	LOST ON MISSION	CAPABLE OF RECOVERY	RECOVERED BY D PLUS 11	PARTICIPATED IN 11 FEBRUARY 1945 MISSION
40th	34	32	0	32	32	12
444th	35	32	0	32	32	12
462nd	35	35	1	34	32	14
468th	34	32	0	32	32	11
TOTAL		131	1	130	128	49

RECOVERY: NO. OF A/C CO. BAT OPERATIONAL (CUMULATIVE)

GROUP	20	22	28	28	29	30	30	32	32	32	32
40th	20	22	28	28	29	30	30	32	32	32	32
444th	17	26	31	31	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
462nd	17	24	29	30	31	31	31	32	32	32	32
468th	19	25	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
TOTAL	73	97	120	121	124	125	125	128	128	128	128
D-Day	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	-6	-7	-8	-9	-10	-1

PERCENT OF THOSE CAPABLE OF RECOVERY WHICH RECOVERED
56PC 74PC 92PC 93PC 95PC 96PC 96PC 98PC 98PC 98PC 98PC 98PC

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DISTRIBUTION	ACTION	None
	INFORMATION	c/s DC/S Opr (2 cys); A-2; A-30C&R (6 cys); Op Anal; Stat (2)

5-33, AF (REV 1 JAN 45)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority AW 760063
By CD NAPA Date 12/1/88

S E C R E T

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE AND THE TRANSMISSION OF THIS MESSAGE IN LITERAL PLAIN TEXT ~~AND~~ AUTHORIZED SUBJECT TO NORMAL PROCEDURE, FOR THE SAFEGUARDING OF MILITARY INFORMATION

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
WASHINGTON, 20, D.C.

COPY NO. 2

SECRET

By AUTHORITY OF
CG, TWENTIETH AIR FORCE

12 Feb. 45
(Date)

EXTRACT TELETYPE CONFERENCE BETWEEN WASHINGTON, PHARACUR

WASHINGTON PARTIES

Lt. Col. Hewitt

Telecon Message No. D-1728

SUBJECT: Intell Stat Summaries - Missions 34 & 35.

(FROM: COMBENBOMCDL 20

TO: COMAF 20)

TERMINAL PARTIES

Colonel Herman

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH AIR FORCE	
Chief of Staff	
Deputy C. of S. Adm.	
Deputy C. of S. Opr.	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
A. G.	

Following are the intelligence statistical summaries for Missions No. 34 and 35.

Intelligence Statistical Summary - Mission No. 34

7 February 1945

(Based on Preliminary Statistics as of 091130Z)

(All times Zebra)

I. Disposition of Aircraft:	444TH	462ND	Total
1. A/C Airborne	32	35	67
2. Returned to XX DC Bases	29	34	63
3. Landed elsewhere	3	- 0	3
4. Operational Losses	0	1	1

2 A/C landed at Cox's Bazaar and 1 at Chittagong for fuel.
1 A/C crashed at Dum Dum on return from mission.

II. Bombing Record:

1. A/C bombing	32	32	65
2. PT - A	31	13	44
3. ST - B	-	-	-
4. LRT - C	1	1	2
5. TGTS OF CFP.	-	19	19
6. Jettisoned bombs	-	1	1
7. Returned with bombs	-0	1	1
8. Total Airborne	32	35	67
9. Bombing altitudes:			
A. At PT - Low	19300	18000	18000
- High	20500	18500	20500
B. At Opp. TGT. - Low	-	18000	18000
- High	-	19150	19150

a. Naval yard, Saigon, French Indo-China.
b. Royal Ordnance Factory, Bangkok, Thailand.
c. Marshalling Yard, Martaban, Burma.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

III. Method of bombing:

1. PT	Radar	Radar	Radar
2. ST	-	-	-
3. LRT	Visual	Visual	Visual
4. OPP Target	-	Visual	Visual

IV. Disposition of Bombs:

	M-76	M-34	M-44	
1. On all targets	649	78	236	-
2. On Saigon - PT	629	12	128	-
3. On Bangkok - ST	-	-	-	-
4. On Martaban - LRT	20	-	12	-
5. On Opp. Targets	-	66	96	-
6. Jettisoned	-	6	-	-
7. Returned	-	6	-	-
8. Total Bombs	444th	462nd	Total	
8. Total Bombs	M-76	M-34	M-44	
	649	90	236	
9. Total tonnage on targets:				
A. All targets	156.73	83.79	120.17	360.69
B. Saigon	151.9	12.89	65.18	229.97
C. Bangkok	-	-	-	-
D. Martaban	4.83	-	-C.11	10.94
E. Opportunity	-	70.9	48.88	119.78
10. Average Lb. bombs per A/C Airborne:	20.26	6 M-34	or 11.8	M-44
11. Average Tonnage per A/C Airborne:	4.9		6.2	5.58
Bombs used were as follows:				
444th - M-76	Incendiary weighing 483 pounds			
462nd - M-34	G.P. weighing 2146.5 pounds			
M-44	G.P. weighing 1013.4 pounds			

V. Observed Results of Bombing:

1. PT	UNOB-POOR	UNOB	UNOB-POOR
2. LRT	EXCELLENT	POOR	POOR-EXC
3. Opportunity	-	UNOB	UNOB

VI. Time and Weather:

1. PT - First	070355	070334	070334
2. LRT - First	070051	070013	070013
3. . Last	-	8-	070051
3. Opportunity - First	-	070347	070347
Last	-	070354	070354
4. Weather - PT	9/10-10/10	10/10	
-OPP	Undercast	Undercast	9/10/10
	-	8/10-9/10	
		Undercast 8- 9/10	

VII. Casualties:

1. Killed	0	3	3
2. Wounded or Injured	0	3	3
3. Mission	0	0	0

VIII. Claims:

1. Destroyed	0	0	0
2. Probably destroyed	0	0	0
3. Damaged	0	1	1

INTELLIGENCE STATISTICAL SUMMARY - MISSION NO. 35

7 February 1945

(Based on Preliminary Statistics as of 091130Z)

I. Disposition of Aircraft:	40th	462nd	Total
1. A/C Airborne	32	32	64
2. Returned to XX R ⁶ Bases	32	32	64

S E C R E T

II. Bombing Record:

1. A/C Bombing	31	28 59	59	
2. PT - A	31	27	58	
3. St. - B. I	9	1	1	
4. Jettisoned bombs	1-C	1-D	2	
5. Returned with bombs	0	3	3	
6. Total Airborne	32	32	64	
7. Bombing altitudes at PT - Low		19600	18500	18500
-High		21200	19200	27-00

- A. Rama VI Bridge, Bangkok, Thailand.
- B. Marshalling Yards, Martaban, Burma
- C. A/C 374 dropped 11 bombs on PT and Jettisoned 1.
- D. A/C 445 jettisoned 4 bombs and returned with 8.

III. Method of bombing:

1. PT - Visual	31	27	58
2. St. - Visual	0	1	1

IV. Disposition of bombs:

1. On all Targets	371	336	707
2. On Rama VI bridge	371	324	6 95
3. On Martaban	0	12	12
4. Jettisoned	13	4	17
5. Returned	0	44	44
6. Total Bombs	3 84	384	768
7. Total Tonnage on Targets:			
A. All targets	188.9	171.1	30.0
B. Rama VI Bridge	188.9	165.0	33.9
C. Martaban	0	6.1	6.1

8. Average bombs per A/C:

Airborne	12	12	12
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9. Average Tonnage per A/C:

Airborne	6.1	6.1	6.1
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Bombs used were as follows: 1000-pound M-44, GP (Actual weight 1018.4 pounds)
Bombs fused .1 second nose and .1 second tail.

V. Observed results of bombing:

1. PT	unob-exc	poor-exc	unob-exc
2. ST	-	poor	poor
3			

VI. Time and Weather:

1. PT. - First	0325Z	0548Z	0325Z
- Last	0420Z	0637Z	0637Z
2. St. - First	9	0600Z	0600Z
- Last	-	0600Z	0600Z
3. Weather - PT	Cavu-2/10	Cavu	Cavu-2/10

VII. Casualties:

1. Killed	0	0	0
2. Wounded	0	1	1
3. Missing	0	0	0

VIII. Claims: None

DISTRIBUTION:

Action: None
Information: C/S; DC/S-Opr; A-2 (14 Cys); A-3 OC&R (6 cys)
Op-Anal; Stat-Con (2 cys) AA (1 cy)
Note: 5 extra copies for file.

FEB 13 25 AM



HEADQUARTERS
TWENTH AIR FORCE
DEPUTY ASSISTANT GENERAL

HEADQUARTERS
TWENTH AIR FORCE
DEPUTY ASSISTANT GENERAL



OUT

FEB 13 25 AM

DECLASSIFIED

Authority AW 7600 63

By CD NAPA Date 11/1/88

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7

Twentieth Air Force
Combat Mission No. 34 - 7 Feb 1945
Target: Saigon (Daylight)

Mission 34
Analysis
IT R/C

RCM INFORMATION

1. GENERAL

Six RCM search aircraft, each equipped with D/F antenna, participated in this mission. The RCM observers again searched for early warning radar enroute to and from the target and for radar fire control equipment while in the target area.

2. RESULTS

a. Fighters were encountered in the target area, suggesting that the Rangoon, Moulmein and St. Jacques early warning radar sites could have alerted the target area. The radars logged at the above mentioned locations were noted as having the usual early warning characteristics with frequencies ranging from 80 to 200 Mcs and pulse lengths of 26 to 38 microseconds.

b. One site with only six microsecond pulse length was thought to be a ship at sea at approximately 108°40'E; 10°30'N and was reported to track the formation all the time it was in the area.

c. In the target area four radars, intermittently tracking and searching, were intercepted with similar characteristics to the Mark 1 Model 3 radar with signal strength varying from weak to fairly strong.

d. Meager and inadequate flak was encountered from an unidentified Naval vessel at 96°50'E; 16°50'N in the Moulmein area. However, the radar intercept made in the target area did not indicate characteristics of radar fire control equipment.

e. Strong jamming on 2,960 Kc (channel used 2,995 Kc) was encountered. The frequency had to be changed, the jamming was so strong. One aircraft reported CW jamming on the 8 Mc band only when our Allied ground station transmitted. It is not conclusive enough evidence to class it as intentional jamming.


AC/AS, INTELLIGENCE COMMENT: It appears that the Japanese are gradually beginning to use information obtained from the early warning net. It is anticipated that increasing pressure applied to their homeland will cause the enemy to step up his early warning system and smooth out his method of reporting. The D/F antenna equipped RCM planes have certainly helped the observers to obtain more accurate and complete data during their searching missions. For example, it is noted that the direction finding equipment enabled an observer to discriminate between a coastal radar site and one that may be on a ship at sea.

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HEADQUARTERS, TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



VLRCO

21 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR AC/S, COMBAT OPERATIONS

Subject: Analysis of Report of XX Bomber Command Mission No. 34

In accordance with Hq Twentieth Air Force Memorandum dated 15 September 1944, Subject: Study and Analysis of Twentieth Air Force Combat Operations, comments on the employment of communications, radar and countermeasures during XX Bomber Command Mission No. 34 are submitted herewith.

1. RADAR

On this mission, the bombing of the primary target was done entirely by radar due to a 9/10 - 10/10 undercast. Three formations (33 a/c) used the coordinated procedure and bombed blind on the primary target. Two of these three formations dropped on the first and briefed run and the third dropped on the second run. Two additional formations (21 a/c) did not release on the primary target due to the 10/10 undercast and the inability to obtain adequate radar responses despite the fact that they made two runs over the primary target. Practically all of these last two formations bombed a target of opportunity using a radar approach. The visual run was of a very few seconds duration. In regard to the primary target, the bombs of one formation hit 3,000 feet southwest of the target. The bombs of the other two formations have not been located. It seems somewhat inconsistent that this report states the bombs located landed in the center of the town, which was the radar aiming point whereas the visual aiming point was the Navy Yard and Military harbor 3,000 feet away.

The difficulties encountered over the primary target are typical of what will be encountered when a poor radar target is attacked with no opportunity for visual sighting.

The following quotation from the report is gratifying: "Very splendid navigational aid was received from the radar operator." The AN/APQ-13 was used extensively to identify check points and the I.P.

The scope photographs included in the report are very good. It appears that considerable interference between radar sets necessitated the shutting-down of all but the lead aircraft radar sets, and as a result the number of over the target scope photos was reduced.

Maintenance of the equipment prior to this mission was apparently excellent, since the AN/APQ-13's were 94% operational over the target, which is above average.

2. RCM

Six aircraft equipped with search equipment including DF antennas participated.

Fighters encountered in the target area indicate the possibility of effective prior warning of the attack. No unusual signals were intercepted. The use of gun laying radar was not apparent.

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Memo to DC/S, Combat Operations, dtd 21 March 1945
Subject: Analysis of Report of XX BomCom Mission No. 34.

Interference was reported by two aircraft; one on 2960 kc (bagpipes) and another on 8 mc (CW when our ground station transmitted).

3. COMMUNICATIONS.

Bombs away messages and 400-mile position reports accounted for 100% of the aircraft participating in this mission.

No violations of cryptographic or transmission security were logged, and all aircraft complied with all provisions of the Command's Tactical Doctrine.

Interference on frequency 8395 kilocycles was reported originating from 6 allied stations, 3 Japanese stations and 2 unidentified voice stations. No positively established attempts at jamming or deception tactics on the part of the enemy were noted.

Four radio homing beacons were used by 45 a/c with extreme initial contact at 450 miles. Two requests for D/F aid were made with no unusual occurrences noted. Air-to-air homing signals were transmitted by 5 a/c, upon which 27 a/c homed for distances ranging from 17 to 80 miles.

Twenty malfunctions of equipment were reported, of which five were repaired in flight.

S. S. Lamb
S. S. LAMB
Colonel, Air Corps
Asst Communications Officer

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SECRET

Memo to DC/S, Combat Operations, 4th SI March 1945
Subject: Analysis of Report of XX Bomber Mission No. 34.

Interference was reported by two aircraft; one on 2900 kc (parapjes) and another on 8 mc (CW when our ground station transmitted).

3. COMMUNICATIONS.

Bombs away messages and 400-mile position reports accounted for 100% of the aircraft participating in this mission.

No violations of cryptographic or transmission security were noted, and all aircraft complied with all provisions of the Command's Tactical Doctrine.

Interference on frequency 8825 kilocycles was reported originating from 6 allied stations, 3 Japanese stations and 8 unidentified voice stations. No positively established attempts at jamming or deception tactics on the part of the enemy were noted.

Four radio homing beacons were used by 45 a/c with extreme initial contact at 450 miles. Two requests for D/T aid were made with no unusual occurrences noted. Air-to-air homing signals were transmitted by 5 a/c, upon which 27 a/c homed for distances ranging from 17 to 80 miles.

Twenty malfunctions of equipment were reported, of which five were reported in flight.

[Handwritten signature]

Colonel, Air Corps
Asst Communications Officer

8824
HEADQUARTERS
TWENTIETH AIR FORCE
ADJUTANT GENERAL



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DECLASSIFIED
Authority: *AW 7600 63*
By: *CD* NAPA Date: *10/1/88*



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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES
WASHINGTON

IN REPLY REFER TO:

AFACO-E/CM-2

27 Feb 45

HEADQUARTERS	
TWENTY FOR VICTORY	
BUY UNITED STATES WAR BONDS AND STAMPS	
Deputy C. of S. P & A	
Deputy C. of S. G. S.	MB
Deputy C. of S. M. & E.	
A. G.	

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Twentieth Air Force Division

Subject: XX Bomber Command RCM Mission Report No. 34
of 7 Feb 45 to Saigon

*Mission 34
XX-BC analysis*

1. Six aircraft equipped with search equipment including DF antennas participated.
2. Fighters encountered in the target area indicate the possibility of effective prior warning of the attack. No unusual signals were intercepted. The use of gun laying radar was not apparent.
3. Interference was reported by two aircraft; one on 2960 Kc (bagpipes) and another on 8 mc (CW when our ground station transmitted).
4. The RCM Mission Report was distributed by JEIA.

Henry U. Graham
HENRY U. GRAHAM
Major, Air Corps

8830



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ADDRESS REPLY TO: COMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCES, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority *AW 7600 63*
By *CD* NAPA Date *12/1/88*

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Mission 34
~~ABC~~

Misc

1 March 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary, Joint Staff Planners

Subject: Bombing of Indo-Chinese Territory.
(File--JPS 613/D)

1. The enclosed report by the designated Joint Staff Planners subcommittee is submitted for consideration of the Joint Staff Planners.

PHILIP G. BOWER

Lt. Colonel, A. C.

Steering Member

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ENCLOSURE

BOMBING OF INDO-CHINESE TERRITORY

Reference: C. C. S. 783

Report by the Joint Staff Planners

THE PROBLEM

1. To report on a memorandum from the Chief of the French Naval Mission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS 783) relative to bombing of Indo-Chinese territory and incorporating a suggestion for attachment of French officer personnel to all Allied air commands likely to take part in operations over Indo-China.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The basic memorandum from the French Mission dated 20 February 1945 stated that bombing of Saigon on 7 February caused considerable damage and heavy loss of life in the French and native quarters, including hits on the hospital and barracks occupied by French troops. Apart from casualties sustained in this instance, it was stated that "bombing of non-military objectives" might affect the morale of resistance elements and might complicate efforts of French local authorities to safeguard U. S. airmen making emergency landings in Indo-Chinese territory. The memorandum suggested that "technical opinion of well informed sources" be sought prior to any further bombing of Indo-Chinese territory, and that a competent French officer be attached to each Allied Air Force Commander in the Far East likely to take part in operations over Indo-China. An answer to these proposals was requested.

3. On 7 February, B-29 aircraft of the XX Bomber Command from India bases performed a mission against the Saigon area. The designated target was the Naval Yard and Arsenal (Army Air Forces Target 85.02 - 88) on the northeastern edge of Saigon City, at the junction of the Saigon River and Avalanche Arroyo. This target was selected in connection with a series of missions designed to impede repair and recuperation of Japanese naval vessels after naval engagements incident to Philippine

SECRET

reoccupation. The Saigon facilities were considered relatively accessible for battle damaged vessels unable to reach more distant bases and requiring the relatively light repairs and servicing available at Saigon.

4. After a flight of approximately 1500 miles, the attacking aircraft encountered 9/10 to 10/10 weather over the target area necessitating bombing of the designated primary target by radar. Bombing altitudes were 18,000 - 21,000 feet. The XX Bomber Command reported results "unobserved."

5. Available intelligence indicates that a hospital and French barracks are sited within approximately 2000 feet of the designated target.

6. The Saigon area is characterized by many and winding water courses which do not provide optimum radar target characteristics.

CONCLUSIONS

7. The damage and loss of life reported by Admiral Fenard are to be considered as unavoidable results of the performance of a bombing attack on an important and strictly military objective. The target was adequately identified and described in intelligence material. Bombing was performed by standard procedures.

8. The presence of a French officer would not have affected the decision to bomb important military objectives in Indo-China, nor have been of practicable aid in the accomplishment of the mission, the performance of missions being governed largely by the weather, operational considerations and the degree of resistance encountered at the target.

9. In view of the political implications, the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff should be coordinated with the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) prior to presentation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

RECOMMENDATIONS

10. That the attached memorandum (Appendix "A", page 3) for the Secretaries of War and the Navy enclosing a copy of this report and requesting the comments of SWNCC on the proposed memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (Appendix "B", page 4) be signed and dispatched.

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APPENDIX "A"

DRAFT

Memorandum for the Secretaries of War and the Navy

SUBJECT: Bombing of Indo-Chinese Territory

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have approved the recommendation in paragraph 10 of the attached study prepared by the Joint Staff Planners.

2. In view of the political considerations, it is considered that the draft memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (Appendix "B", page 4) together with the proposed reply to the Chief of the French Naval Mission (Annex to Appendix "B", page 5) should be referred to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for comment prior to presentation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

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APPENDIX "B"

DRAFT

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have considered Admiral Fenard's memorandum of 20 February 1945 (CCS 783) in which the suggestion is made that a French officer be attached to each Allied Air Force in the Far East likely to take part in operations over Indo-China.

2. The United States Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that the damage reported by Admiral Fenard and which prompted the suggestion that French officers be attached to each Allied Air Force Commander was not the result of lack of "technical opinions of well informed sources." The target for the attack of 7 February 1945 was the Naval Yard and Arsenal at Saigon. It was adequately identified and described in intelligence material, and was of a strictly military character. The attack was one of a series seeking to impede the repair and rehabilitation of Japanese naval vessels damaged in, or seeking haven following, naval action in connection with the Allied recapture of the Philippine Islands. Bombing was performed by standard procedures.

3. It is believed that the presence of a French liaison officer at the Headquarters of the attacking force would not have affected the decision to bomb important military objectives, nor have been of practicable aid in the accomplishment of the mission, the performance of missions being governed largely by the weather, operational considerations and the degree of resistance encountered at the target.

4. Therefore, the United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff dispatch the attached memorandum to Admiral Fenard informing him that it is not believed necessary to attach French officers to Allied Air Force Commands.

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX "B"

DRAFT

Memorandum to the Chief of the French Naval Mission

SUBJECT: Bombing of Indo-Chinese Territory

1. Inquiry has been made concerning the bombing of Saigon by United States Air Forces which was the subject of your memorandum of 20 February 1945.

2. The target for the attack of 7 February 1945 was the Naval Yard and Arsenal at Saigon, an important and strictly military objective. This attack was one of a series seeking to impede the repair and rehabilitation of Japanese naval vessels damaged in, or seeking haven following, naval action connected with the Allied recapture of the Philippine Islands. There was adequate intelligence on the identity and location of the target. Bombing was performed by standard procedures.

3. It is believed that the presence of a French liaison officer at the Headquarters of the attacking force would not have affected the decision to bomb important military objectives, nor have been of practicable aid in the accomplishment of the mission, the performance of missions being governed largely by the weather, operational considerations and the degree of resistance encountered at the target.

4. In view of the foregoing, the Combined Chiefs of Staff perceive no military advantage from the attachment of French officers as suggested in your memorandum.

5. The Combined Chiefs of Staff greatly appreciate all assistance to Allied airmen making emergency landings in Indo-China as result of military operations.

SECRET

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have careully reviewed the circumstances of the bombing of Saigon by United States Air Forces which was the subject of your memorandum of 20 February 1945.

The attack was one of a series seeking to impede the repair and rehabilitation of Japanese naval vessels damaged in, or seeking haven following, naval action connected with the Allied recapture of the Philippine Islands. The target was the naval yard and arsenal at Saigon, an important military objective. Bombing was performed by standard procedures.

In such circumstances, it is felt that the presence of French liaison officers would not alter decision to bomb important military objectives, nor affect the performance of missions, which is governed largely by operational considerations and conditions encountered at the target. For this reason, the Combined Chiefs of Staff perceive no military advantage from the attachment of French officers as suggested in your memo.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff deeply regret any loss of French life or property that may have been incurred on the occasion of the 7 February attack, and emphasize that every effort is made to prevent unnecessary suffering on the part of innocent persons in any of the Axis-occupied countries. However, it is believed evident that possibility of such consequences as result of the location of important enemy installations can not be permitted to influence military action and thereby prolong the war and the enemy's presence in occupied countries.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff are greatly appreciative of all assistance to Allied airmen making emergency landings in Indo-China as a result of military operations in the prosecution of the war against Japan.

SECRET

For Colonel McRae

Handled McRae 8 Mar 45

SAIGON

PGB: 22/2/45

Lingayen landings on 9 January. 11 January approximately 25 B-29's hit Singapore (floating dry dock). On 12 February the Third Fleet worked over Indo-China coast. At Saigon reported (ONI Weekly 17 January): "Oil storage facilities, including 5 tanks, were destroyed, along with buildings and warehouses along the river. Heavy damage was inflicted on oil refineries near Saigon and large fires were started in the navy yard. Tokyo radio reported that the attack on Saigon was made in two phases. Between 0800 and 1330, according to the Japanese, about 50 U.S. planes raided the city; between 1510 and 1730 Saigon was attacked by about 40 more." Formosa on 15 and 17. On 25 January approximately 25 B-29's mined at CamRanh Bay, Mekong, etc. 26 January approximately 40 B-29's mined at Singapore. 27 January approximately 20 B-29's hit Saigon, with naval yards and arsenal (85.2-88) as target -- radar bombing from 19,000 feet, 9/10 cloud with occasional breaks which resulted in some observation of "fair to good" bombing. 1 February approximately 90 A/C re-hit floating dock at Singapore. 7 February approximately 44 B-29's went back to Saigon, navy yard and arsenal as target. 9/10 to 10/10 cloud. Radar bombing from 18,000 to 20,000, results unobserved. Saigon roughly 1500 miles from Calcutta.

PGB: 22/2/45

		BOMBING PRIMARY
Jan. 3	Bangkok	45
" 6	Omura	-
" 9	Formosa	-
" 11	Singapore	25
" 15	Formosa	-
" 17	Formosa	-
" 25	Saigon (mining)	25
" 26	Singapore (mining)	40
" 27	Saigon	20
Feb. 1	Singapore	90
" 7	Saigon	40
" 7	Bangkok	55
" 11	Rangoon	55
" 19	Kuala Lumpur	50

CS2600

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
JOINT STAFF PLANNERS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

22 February 1945.

		<u>Telephone</u>
MEMORANDUM FOR:	Captain W. D. BROWN, USN	(N) 5435
	Lt. Colonel T. R. HANNAH, USA	(W) 71932
	Lt. Colonel Phillip G. BOWER, USA (Steering Member)	(W) 6018 ←

Subject: Bombing of Indo-Chinese Territory.
(File--JPS 613/D)

References: a. J.P.S. 613/D.
b. C.C.S. 783.
c. Form for subcommittee report.

1. The Joint Staff Planners have designated the above listed officers as members of a subcommittee to study C.C.S. 783 and submit a report thereon.

2. Copies of the references are enclosed.

C H Donnelly
C. H. DONNELLY,
Secretary,
Joint Staff Planners.

Copy to:

Rear Admiral D. B. Duncan, USN
Brig. General R. C. Lindsay, USA
Brig. General G. A. Lincoln, USA
Captain Colin Campbell, USN
Sec., Plans Division, Cominch
Colonel D. Z. Zimmerman, USA
Lt. Colonel A. L. Johnson, USA

S E C R E T

COPY NO. 37

J.P.S. 613/D

21 February 1945

JOINT STAFF PLANNERS

DIRECTIVE

BOMBING OF INDO-CHINESE TERRITORY

References: a. C.C.S. 783
b. SM-447

Note by the Secretaries

C.C.S. 783 has been referred to the Joint Staff Planners
for comment and recommendation.

C. H. DONNELLY,

F. J. GREEN,

Joint Secretariat.

JPS 613/D

S E C R E T

COPY NO. 79

C.C.S. 783

20 February 1945

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

BOMBING OF INDO-CHINESE TERRITORY

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosed memorandum dated 20 February 1945 from the Chief of the French Naval Mission is submitted for consideration.

A. J. McFARLAND,
R. D. COLERIDGE,
Combined Secretariat.

CCS 783

S E C R E T

E N C L O S U R E

REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE
MISSION NAVALE AUX ETATS-UNIS
(FRENCH NAVAL MISSION)

No. 3 M.N./S.E.
76 T.S.

February 20, 1945

M E M O R A N D U M

for the Combined Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Bombing of Indo-Chinese territory.

1. The bombing of Saigon on the seventh of February by allied aircrafts caused considerable damage, and heavy loss of life, in the French and native quarters. The hospital and barracks occupied by French troops were hit.

The French Government fears that new such bombings might have serious consequences.

2. Apart from the casualties sustained by the French and native populations, it is considered that bombing of non-military objectives might affect the morale of the resistance elements.

3. Besides, the United States airmen who made emergency landings in Indo-Chinese territory are placed at present under French safeguard.

Such bombing operations as took place on February 7th are obviously apt to place the French local authorities in a delicate situation, though we are determined not to hand in any case the U.S. aviators over to the Japanese, in spite of the insistence with which they press their claim.

4. It is therefore considered most desirable that the technical opinion of well informed sources be sought prior to any further bombing of Indo-Chinese territory. I have been instructed by the General, General Chief of Staff of National

S E C R E T

Defence, to set forth the above considerations and suggest that a competent French officer, provided with adequate factual information, be attached to each Allied Air Force commander in the Far East likely to take part in operations over Indo-China.

5. It would be much valued if such a scheme could be worked out with the shortest possible delay. General Blaizot, our military delegate in the Far East, would make the necessary arrangements with the high command in the theatres concerned, and would coordinate activities on the French side.

6. An early answer to the above proposals would be highly appreciated.

For the Vice-Admiral R. FENARD

/s/ A. M. BROSSIN DE SAINT DIDIER
The Major General BROSSIN de St. DIDIER
Chief of the French Military Mission

S E C R E T

A P P E N D I X

February 21, 1945

No. 4 M.N./S.E.
80 T.S.

--:-- M E M O R A N D U M --:--

for the Combined Chiefs of Staff

- : -

SUBJECT: United States aviators landed in emergency
on Indochinese territory.

REFERENCE: Memorandum No. 3 M.N./S.E. 76 T.S. of February
20, 1945

- : -

I am instructed to forward to you the following information
from Indochinese sources:

"The United States aviators who had to make an
emergency landing in Indochina in the course of the bombing
operations carried out over Saigon on the 12th of January -
and who were sheltered by the French - are believed to have
been transferred in China".

For the Vice-Admiral FENARD
Chief of the French Naval Mission
in the United States

/s/ CAPTAIN R. BLANCHARD
Chief of Staff

S E C R E T

COPY NO. 79

21 February 1945

COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

ADDENDUM

TO

C.C.S. 783

BOMBING OF INDO-CHINESE TERRITORY

Note by the Secretaries

Holders of copies of C.C.S. 783 are requested to attach the enclosed memorandum dated 21 February 1945 from the Chief of the French Naval Mission as an Appendix to that paper.

A. J. McFARLAND,
R. D. COLERIDGE,
Combined Secretariat.

30 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Subcommittees appointed by the Joint Staff
Planners or Joint Logistics Committee.

Subject: Preparation of Subcommittee Report.

1. The Steering Member should arrange for a prompt meeting of all members, supervise and expedite the subcommittee's work, and transmit two "clean" copies of the report to the Secretariat (J.P.S. or J.L.C.) (Room 233, Combined Chiefs of Staff Building, REpublic 6700, Ext. 77465; REpublic 7400, Ext. 62885).

2. The Report proper (see sample attached and instructions thereon).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in their 74th Meeting agreed:

"a. That all papers prepared by supporting agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be prepared, if possible, on two pages to show briefly the problem presented, the facts bearing on the problem, and the conclusions and recommendations of the agency submitting the paper.

"b. That all discussion and supporting data be attached to the paper as enclosure, appendices, or annexes."

The report should be phrased as a report by the Joint Staff Planners or Joint Logistics Committee. It should be double spaced on paper the size of this memorandum. Pages will be numbered consecutively without regard to the breakdown by Enclosure, Appendix, Annex, or Tab. Paragraphs in each Enclosure, Appendix, etc., will be numbered consecutively.

3. Enclosures. The report itself should be headed ENCLOSURE. The main enclosures to the report will be labeled appendices, as APPENDIX "A" ("B", etc.). Enclosures to an appendix will be labeled annexes, as ANNEX "A" ("B", etc.) to APPENDIX _____. Enclosures to an annex will be labeled tabs, as TAB "A" ("B", etc.) to ANNEX _____. Should there be only one appendix it will be labeled APPENDIX and not APPENDIX "A".

4. As further guidance:

a. Priorities for J.C.S. Business on Which Action Should be Expedited. (Joint Secretariat Memorandum No. 35)

"The following priorities are established for business of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on which action should be expedited:

"a. Urgent. Matters of urgency take precedence over all other business. Action thereon will be initiated immediately and pressed to conclusion as rapidly as possible without regard for working hours.

"b. Priority. Matters of priority take precedence over all other business except matters of urgency. Action thereon will be initiated immediately and expedited to the earliest conclusion practicable within the usual working hours."

b. Accuracy of Information. (Paragraph 5 of J.C.S. 318/5)

"In the interest of arriving at sound conclusions in an expeditious manner it is essential that information and data presented for the consideration of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or their subordinate committees by any reporting agency be as accurate as circumstances permit. In the submission of estimates the agencies making them will be prepared to present, on request, the bases upon which the estimates have been made."

c. Use of Abbreviations. (Joint Secretariat Memorandum No. 28)

"It is desired that in the preparation of papers the use of abbreviations be avoided. Where it is considered desirable to use an abbreviation for purposes of brevity or to save space or time, upon the first appearance of the term to be abbreviated the meaning will be spelled out and the abbreviation placed in parentheses immediately following."

d. Draft Correspondence for Dispatch by Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Joint Secretariat Memorandum No. 33)

"Drafts of correspondence included in committee reports and recommended for dispatch by the Joint Chiefs of Staff should omit all details of address, salutation, complimentary close, and signature. The page on which the draft begins should bear the word "DRAFT" and a heading which identifies the correspondence, as for example:

D R A F T

REPLY TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

LETTER TO THE WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION

MESSAGE TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER,
SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR."

e. Memoranda by the United States Chiefs of Staff for presentation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be in the following form:

D R A F T

(Subject)

References:

Memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff

5. References. A list of appropriate references should accompany the report when forwarded to the Secretariat.

(S A M P L E F O R M)

S E C R E T

E N C L O S U R E

(Subject)

Report by the Joint Staff Planners

THE PROBLEM

1. (Indicate briefly the essentials of the problem. The problem should be stated so that those reviewing the papers may be informed of the subject matter without reference to other papers. It is not sufficient to say, "To study J.C.S. 304" or "To draft a reply to a letter from the Department of State".

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. (Enumerate succinctly and in logical order the pertinent facts adduced by the subcommittee. If quotations are made from C.C.S. or J.C.S. papers, appropriate parenthetical references should be given (e.g., See J.C.S. 304, page 16). Attach any necessary discussion and supporting data in the form of appendices, annexes or tabs, and make appropriate references thereto* (e.g., See Annex "A" to Appendix "A", page 41). If the report will exceed two pages, the "Facts" may be placed in an appendix with reference thereto in the report such as:

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

3. For Facts Bearing on the Problem, see Appendix (page ____).)



CONCLUSIONS

4. (List conclusions inferred from the facts.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. (State briefly and clearly the action recommended. If the recommendations call for letters, messages, directives, or memoranda from the Chiefs of Staff, appropriate drafts should be included.)

*NOTE: Do not refer to papers below the J.C.S. level, since such papers are not ordinarily circulated to the Chiefs of Staff.



DECLASSIFIED
Authority *NND 760063*
By *[Signature]* NARA Date *11-25-01*