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894.4016/1-145 -- 12-3148-49



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Col. Goebel, Col. 371 SCAP*

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : A-H - General Hilldring *HH*

FROM : A-H - H. H. Collins, Jr. *HH*

SUBJECT: Nationality and Treatment of Formosans  
(CM-IN 2749 and CM-IN 2841)

DATE: October 3, 1946



Some 20,000 Formosans in Japan include many unruly and black marketeer elements of the population. The question of their treatment in view of their nationality and the problems involved is the subject of these cables.

The State Department is currently taking this up with Nanking. A proposed draft cable stating this fact is given below. War Department concurrence in this draft has been secured. Col. Goebel of CAD is familiar with the matter. Your approval for the dispatch of this cable is requested.

DRAFT CABLE TO SCAP as revised by War Department and cleared by JK Secretariat:

REURADS C 65162 and C 65448 matter of nationality and treatment Formosans has been taken up by State Department with Embassy Nanking Sept 26. See State's 498, 26 Sept to SCAP for POLAD which is paraphrased copy of message sent to Nanking.

*894-4016/10-20-46*

*OK phoned to Mr. Fisher, CAD, 12:55 P.M. Oct. 3, 1946 PL*

*Despatched as War 82060 (2 Oct 46)*



Division of Chinese Affairs  
MAY 25 1948  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
DIVISION OF  
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

No. 72

CONFIDENTIAL

AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL  
Shanghai, China, DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1948.

SUBJECT: Reaction of Shanghai-Korean Community to Closure of Korean Schools and Arrests of Koreans in Japan; Information concerning Korean Community.

VR  
894.42

THE HONORABLE

J. LEIGHTON STUART

AMERICAN AMBASSADOR

NANKING

SIR:

I have the honor to report that considerable attention was given in the local press this week to a series of meetings and press conferences held by Shanghai Koreans over the matter of the closure of Korean schools in Japan and the "massacre" and arrest of a large number of Korean nationals during clashes with the Japanese police at the end of April.

An "Association for the Upholding of the Rights of Koreans in Japan", organized during the past week, proposed to hold a public rally on May 4 but the Bureau of Social Affairs compelled the association to cancel the event as being in contravention of the National Government's order banning all public demonstrations. The group also abandoned its plan to draft protests to SCAP, President Truman and General Bichelberger, and instead contented itself with drawing up a formal protest to the Japanese Government, which included demands for the re-opening of Korean schools, the release of arrested Koreans, compensation to families of the victims of the April incidents, and recognition of the status and rights of Korean residents in Japan as foreign nationals. It is of interest to note that the Soviet-owned SHIH TAI JIH PAO was the only vernacular paper in Shanghai to carry the full text of the draft letter, a translation of which is enclosed.

In a statement to the Chinese public, released by the association, at a press conference on May 3, SCAP was alleged to be "fostering the sophisticated policies of Japanese militarism," and with being misled into helping the Japanese warlords. The statement said that the incident had provided the Japanese Government with the pretext for an attempt to enlarge its police force, a method by which the warlords were trying to regain power. Past Japanese atrocities and acts of aggression committed in China were reviewed and the Chinese public warned that, "the butchering of a few hundred Koreans today may seem to be a small affair, but this will encourage Japan to develop its militarism and one day she will again become a Far Eastern power to massacre mankind and destroy the peace."

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## CONFIDENTIAL

Kim Po, principal of the Korean school in Shanghai and publisher of the small Korean tabloid HAN PAO, told the press that Koreans both at home and abroad opposed the United Nations-sponsored general elections for South Korea to be held on May 10; that at the best the elections would mean a partition of Korea.

An American official, Mr. Vivian L.N. Parker, Advisor to Korea-China Liaison Mission, USEGIX, who has had close contact with Shanghai's Korean community during the past two years, informed the Consulate General that, although there might be some political implications in the statements appearing in the press, he believed they primarily reflected the genuine indignation of members of the Korean community over the treatment of their compatriots in Japan. The community has been resentful over the matter of Koreans remaining in Japan not being granted an independent national status and in not being accorded the same rights as other foreign nationals resident in Japan; it feels that the American occupation authorities are responsible for this state of affairs.

Mr. Parker stated that only seven to eight hundred Koreans now remain in Shanghai. They are nearly all old residents of China with established businesses and little desire to return to Korea. While intensely nationalistic, as a whole they have no pronounced political leanings. Kim Po's statement opposing the holding of elections in South Korea is not representative of the attitude of the community. Although anxious for the occupation of Korea to end, members of community recognize the threat which the vast Soviet-trained North Korean army constitutes to an independent and unified government for Korea and hence they hope that American armed forces will remain in sufficient strength to cope with the situation.

Mr. Parker mentioned that various forces are striving to dominate the Korean Residents' Association, which is the only integrated organization in the community. One faction is the remnant of the Kim Po group which, according to Parker, is close to and has the support of the ultra-reactionary C.C. Clique in the Kuomintang. This group, however, has been unsuccessful in establishing its influence in the Association. At present, an enormously wealthy Korean, Sohn Chang Sik, is making a strong bid for control of the Association through his financial position. He is owner of the HAN PAO, the only Korean paper published locally, and makes large contributions to the support of the Korean school and various Korean charities. Actually he is disliked by the Koreans as he was an arch collaborationist during the war, supplying the Japanese Government with aeronautical equipment which he manufactured. He has been arrested three times by the Chinese authorities as a collaborationist, but on each occasion managed to buy his way out. It is rumored that his freedom has cost him US \$3,000,000 to date. Sohn's anxiety to establish himself as head of the Korean community is connected with his desire to pave the way for his return to Korea as a respected citizen.



3

**CONFIDENTIAL**

He has attempted to ingratiate himself with all visiting Korean celebrities such as Syngman Rhee by offering them elaborate entertainment.

Respectfully yours,

John M. Cabot  
American Consul General

Enclosure:

1. Translation of full text of draft letter carried by SHIH TAI JIH PAO.

File No. 800  
FCavender:f  
Original and copy to Hanking  
Hectograph and copy to Department  
Copy to Seoul  
✓ Copy to USPOLAD, Tokyo



Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch 72, dated  
May 11, 1948, from Consulate, Shanghai.

Copy of SHIH TAI JIH PAO (Soviet-owned), Shanghai,  
May 5, 1948.

Korean Residents Here Draft Letter of Protest  
to Japanese Government.

The Association for Upholding the Rights of Koreans in Japan organized by Korean residents here was originally scheduled to hold a rally yesterday afternoon, but as all necessary procedures have not yet been completed, it announced a postponement of the rally in compliance with the instruction of the local Social Affairs and Police Bureau. However, the letter of protest to the Japanese Government has already been drafted and passed. Following are the contents of the letter:

"We, Korean residents in Shanghai, basing on the principles of international justice and of mutual respect for the sovereignty of each other's nation, do hereby lodge with your Government a strong protest over your policy of interfering in the education of the Koreans in Japan. At the same time we lodge our protest and bring forth our demands as follows:

(1) We protest against the high-handed policy of trespassing on our educational independence without regard for the basic education of our nation; (2) We protest against the arrest and massacre of those Koreans who asked, in a most democratic way, for their legitimate rights.

We demand: (1) That all interferences in the administration and education policy of Korean schools be immediately stopped (2) That the ban on Korean schools be immediately lifted; (3) That the whole body of Koreans who were arrested in connection with the education problem be immediately released and that no prosecution against them be instituted; (4) That the government be responsible for compensating the losses incurred by victims of the recent incidents and that immediate steps be accorded to relieve and to care for the families of the victims; (5) That the Koreans in Japan be accorded treatment and rights equal to those accorded to nationals of other foreign countries and that incidents arising from racial discrimination be prevented; (6) That positive measures be taken to prevent the recurrence of any incident detrimental to the lives and activities of the Koreans.





THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER  
FOR JAPAN

DIVISION OF  
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

MAY 19 1948

one copy of encl letter  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 5/27/90  
JER

No. 270

Tokyo, May 11, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL

(For use of the Department only)

Subject: Korean Demonstrations in Kobe, Japan.

The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch No. 265 of May 6, 1948 concerning the status of Koreans in Japan and to enclose a copy of a letter dated May 4, 1948 from the American Consul at Kobe describing in detail the Korean demonstrations there.

The letter from the American Consul concludes that the disturbances were allowed to reach such sizeable proportions because local military authorities lacked a clear advance conception of what constitutes "activities inimical to the Occupation" and because they were not fully advised as to the Korean situation in Kobe. He also notes that, acting in conjunction with the American authorities, the Japanese police have emerged from the disturbances in a greatly strengthened position and with enhanced prestige, the previous lack of which has been the cause of considerable concern on the part of the Occupation authorities.

894.4016/5-1148

CONFIDENTIAL FILE

894.4016/5-1148

Enclosure:

Copy of a letter dated May 4, 1948 from the American Consul at Kobe, Japan.

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Enclosure to Despatch No. 270 dated May 11, 1948 from the Office of the United States Political Adviser at Tokyo, on the subject of: "Korean Demonstrations in Kobe, Japan."

Kobe Branch, US POLAD,  
May 4, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL - FOR STATE DEPARTMENT ONLY

William J. Sebald, Esquire,  
United States Political Adviser,  
Tokyo.

Sir:

As of possible assistance to the Mission in evaluating political developments, I have the honor to submit the following notes on the recent Korean demonstrations which have taken place in Kobe.

There are between 60,000 and 70,000 Koreans in Kobe. The great majority of them were imported by the Japanese during the war for manual labor. They are of a low type generally, poorly educated and include among their number a high percentage of thugs and roughnecks. Moreover, they harbor a virulent hatred of the Japanese who, while they had the opportunity, treated the Koreans in a most cavalier manner. This large, boisterous and dissatisfied, alien group in the population of the city is an easy prey to organizers and agitators. They are known to include among their leaders a number of communists and quasi-communists who probably receive instructions from Northern Korea or, if not that closely associated, certainly follow the party line.

With the elections in Southern Korea imminent, any clash between Koreans in Japan and the Occupation forces, which could be played up as demonstrating the Occupation supporting the Japanese against the Koreans, would serve as useful propaganda ammunition in Southern Korea, and could also be used throughout the world as a further example of "American imperialism."

The Korean leaders were presented with a ready made cause for mass protest by the closing of Korean schools by the Japanese authorities for the failure of the schools to comply with recently enacted education legislation. No doubt, had this eminently satisfactory cause for protest not come to hand, the leaders would have invented another to obscure their underlying motive.

During the week preceding Saturday, April 24th, there were a number of minor public protest meetings and parades by the Koreans. These were handled by the Japanese police without an important incident and some seventy arrests of ringleaders and instigators were made. On the afternoon of the 24th a large crowd of protesting Koreans began to form in front of the Prefectural Government offices, across the street from the local Military Government headquarters. As the crowd grew it became more unruly. Finally, it surged into the Prefectural Government offices. Telephone connections were ripped out and partitions were broken down. The crowd swarmed into the Governor's office and there cornered the

Governor

CONFIDENTIAL



Enclosure to Tokyo's No. 270,  
May 11, 1948.

- 2 -

Governor of Hyogo-ken, the Mayor of Kobe, and the Kobe Chief of Police.

Meanwhile, the Commanding Officer of the local Military Government team, in response to a telephone call for assistance from the Japanese authorities made before the phones were disconnected, arranged for an officer and two military police to proceed to the Governor's office to extricate him. This small detachment succeeded in reaching the Governor and commenced to escort him to safety. However, when the crowd realized what was happening, it forced the entire party back into the Governor's office and separated the military police from their charge. One of the military police drew his automatic but, upon being invited by a fanatical member of the crowd to make him a martyr, on second thought decided to replace it in its holster. The military police were at first hemmed in by the crowd and jostled a bit but were not seriously harmed or threatened. Subsequently, they were permitted to depart without the Governor.

Without support and in fear of defenestration the Governor and the Mayor capitulated to the mob and authorized the release by the Japanese police of the seventy odd Koreans who had previously been arrested.

During this period of mob rule, while the Japanese governmental machinery was brought to a standstill and the Government leaders were being coerced, the Occupation forces remained aloof, taking no part other than sending the three military policemen to the Governor's office on their abortive mission. I have been informed by the Commanding General of Kobe Base [Brigadier General Pearson Menoher] that the standing instructions to the Occupation forces authorize them to take police action only when life or property of the Occupation is endangered or to prevent "activities inimical to the Occupation." The local commander did not feel warranted to act on his own responsibility and sought authority from the Commanding General, 8th Army, Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger.

Judging by the drastic measures taken when authority to act was finally received from 8th Army, it would appear that the Commanding General, 8th Army, was decidedly of the opinion that "activities inimical to the Occupation" had occurred. This is borne out by the strong statements which have been attributed to General Eichelberger in the press.

When it was decided that the Army would take action to maintain order, the military forces were alerted and the Kobe Base Provost Marshal assumed direction of the Japanese police. Steps were promptly taken to endeavor to apprehend the Korean leaders who had been released on the Governor's orders and to round up dissident Koreans. From the night of April 24 to April 27 about 2000 Koreans were taken into custody, the majority of them during the first twenty-four hours. Among those arrested were most of the leaders who had shortly before been released. While some arrests involved specific individuals known to the Provost Marshal or the Japanese police, the great majority were effected by

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cruising



Enclosure to Tokyo's No. 270,  
May 11, 1948.

- 3 -

cruising groups of military police accompanied by Japanese police upon the latter's identification of the individuals concerned as Koreans. Little, if any, care was taken to identify the persons being arrested with the previous disturbances. The wholesale arrests plus a heavy increase in the number of military patrols and guards (the guard battalion was re-enforced) had the desired effect, and no further trouble occurred.

On May Day, as a show of force, a parade was held at the Base parade ground in which all troops participating, including quartermaster troops, carried arms. The May Day labor parade, which it was feared might be used by subversive elements to foment trouble, was closely controlled and no incidents of importance took place. A few agitators were arrested before they could start anything. On the evening of May 1 the alert was officially declared ended. Some 1200 Koreans who had not yet been released were delivered to the custody of the Japanese police, and the Provost Marshal relinquished to the Japanese police primary responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.

Twelve ringleaders of the disturbance are being held by the Military authorities for trial by Military Courts for offenses against the Occupation. Of these, I am informed, six have been definitely identified as communists and the others are suspected of being fellow travelers.

While the Army, when it finally decided to move, acted with dispatch and in a very short time restored order, it appears to the writer that the local command failed to give sufficient consideration to the broader problem involved. It is unquestionable that to restore order, quick and forceful action was required. On this ground the mass arrests which were made may be justified. However, once the immediate purpose had been accomplished, it is hard to justify the retention in custody for a week of more than half of the persons originally apprehended simply because time had not been found to screen them. I enquired of the Commanding General whether he did not fear that this action might have decidedly disadvantageous repercussions in Korea. His reply was that our position in Korea was hopeless in any event and we might as well cut our losses there. His sole consideration obviously was to restore and maintain order in the area under his command.

The disturbance was apparently permitted to reach such sizable proportions because (1) the local military authorities had no clear conception of what constituted "activities inimical to the Occupation," and (2) they were not fully advised with respect to developments and their portent. The remarks of the Commanding General, Kobe Base, referred to earlier, are indicative of the absence of a definitive conception on the part of the local military authorities of "activities inimical to the Occupation." With respect to (2), the Commanding Officer of the Hyogo Military Government team has been made the scapegoat. He has been summarily relieved of his command. I am not conversant with the details of the military organization in this area, and I do not know specifically what intelligence functions are the responsibility of Military

Government

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Enclosure to Tokyo's No. 270,  
May 11, 1948.

- 4 -

Government, CIC, and Kobe Base G-2 respectively. I have been informed by Kobe Base, however, that, when that organization assumed the responsibility of maintaining order, it was largely dependent upon the Japanese police for information respecting the Korean ringleaders.

The recent disturbances have greatly strengthened the position of the Japanese police and enhanced their prestige. Acting in conjunction with the American Army authorities, they have had a free hand in dealing with the most disturbing and unruly alien element in Kobe. In fact, it was largely their intelligence upon which the Army acted.

As regards the Army itself, it has had an opportunity to test the efficacy of its plans for dealing with public disorders and has been enabled to spot the weak points in its organization. Certainly the military authorities in this area are now much more alert to developments and the necessity for constant vigilance than they were heretofore. This has been accomplished without a major mishap. The only casualty suffered by the Occupation forces was one colored military policeman who was wounded by a second during a midnight chase after a fugitive Korean.

Respectfully yours,

/s/ Douglas Jenkins, Jr.

American Consul

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894.4016/5-1148

DESP. 270 FROM TOKYO

**FILE NO.**

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~~SECRET~~  
UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER  
FOR JAPAN

No. 270

Tokyo, May 11, 1948.

CONFIDENTIAL

(For use of the Department only)

Subject: Korean Demonstrations in Kobe, Japan.

The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch No. 265 of May 6, 1948 concerning the status of Koreans in Japan and to enclose a copy of a letter dated May 4, 1948 from the American Consul at Kobe describing in detail the Korean demonstrations there.

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Enclosure:

Copy of a letter dated May 4, 1948 from the American Consul at Kobe, Japan.

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A true copy  
of the signed  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1948 MAY 26  
PM 2:25

COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

NA - Mr. Allison  
Mr. Board  
Mr. Williams  
Mrs. Dunning

DATE: 5/25/48

TO :

FROM : NA - Mr. Frelinghuysen

SUBJECT: Despatch No. 122

Attached herewith is statement of Major Gen. William T. Dean, Military Governor of South Korea, concerning the Korean riots in Japan caused by the closing of Korean Schools.

The brief summary by the Political Adviser is adequate coverage of this release.

*Hody*  
NA:HOHFrelinghuysen/ggg



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*DC/*  
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No. 122  
**THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Office of U. S. Political Adviser  
Seoul, Korea, Hqs., XXIV Corps, APO 235  
c/o Postmaster, San Francisco, Calif.  
May 12, 1948

*DC/*

**SUBJECT: Military Governor's Statement on Korean Riots  
in Japan**

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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DIVISION OF  
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

MAY 25 1948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**THE HONORABLE**

**THE SECRETARY OF STATE**

**WASHINGTON**

**SIR:**

894.4016/5-1248

1/

With reference to Seoul Polad telegram No. 329 of May 7, I have the honor to enclose a copy of the statement released to the press on May 6 by Major General William F. Dean, Military Governor in South Korea, concerning the Korean riots in Japan caused by the closing of Korean schools. General Dean points out that Koreans resident in Japan are entitled to the same educational privileges in Japanese schools as other non-Japanese residents not attached to the occupation forces and that, in addition, Japanese law provides for the operation of private schools that meet proper standards. Reminding the Koreans that Koreans now in Japan are there of their own choice and must obey local laws, General Dean points to 23 Korean schools in Kanagawa Prefecture that have already applied in writing for inspection and accreditation as private schools under Japanese law.

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Respectfully yours,

*Joseph E. Jacobs*  
Joseph E. Jacobs  
United States Political Adviser

MAY 24 AM 10 04

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

CS/V

**Enclosure:**

✓ 1. Gen. Dean's Press Release  
of May 6, 1948

Original and hectograph to Department

cc: Office of U. S. Political Adviser  
Tokyo

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UNCLASSIFIEDEnclosure No. 1 to Seoul Polad  
Despatch No. 122 of May 12, 1948General Dean's Answer to Written Press Questions of May 6, 1948

Each week since taking over my duties as Military Governor in South Korea I have anticipated receipt of written questions from the press. Your questions have been one of my main sources of information as to public opinion and concern.

The five questions you have submitted this week regarding the Korean school situation in Japan are closely related. In view of this fact, and the fact that I went into considerable detail regarding the subject in our April 22 press conference, I can only reiterate what I said then.

Communist-inspired Koreans in Japan can only lose by such suicidal defiance of law as illustrated in the industrial areas of Kobe and Osaka. Communists profit from any large-scale disorder in Japan and this is the first time they have succeeded in two and one-half years. Election day is only four days from now. It will be the first opportunity Korean people have had in more than four thousand years to play a personal part in choosing a government whose responsibility it will be to shape their country's destiny. The activities of some Koreans in Japan are nothing but attempts to influence their native land's first democratic elections.

Investigations by our Military Government liaison office in Japan reveal that recent public disorders there have been caused by an unfortunate misunderstanding of the educational rights, privileges, and responsibilities of Koreans living there. This unrest has been exaggerated by the politically motivated activities, and manipulations of unscrupulous and irresponsible leaders within the community of Koreans.

Koreans residing in Japan are entitled to the same educational privileges in Japanese schools afforded all other non-Japanese residents who are not attached to the Occupation Force. It is the obligation of the Japanese Government to provide education for all such residents, and to enforce their inherent right to equal opportunity and equal treatment.

The operation of private schools is provided for in proper Japanese laws. Koreans, as well as other non-Japanese not attached to the Occupation Forces, are entitled to sponsor and support private educational institutions. All such schools are required to maintain certain minimum standards in conformity with recognized educational practice throughout the world. The standard to measure school facilities, textbook requirements, and teacher qualifications are all established after review and approval by SCAP and apply equally to all such private schools. There is no objection to the teaching of Korean or other foreign languages in such schools, provided application is made to teach such subjects.

Certain selfish individuals, who proclaim themselves representatives of the Korean community have taken advantage of popular misconception of the foregoing facts to advance their own narrow political interests. These so-called

"leaders"

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-2-

"leaders" are performing a disservice to their own people and to Korean children who deserve and are entitled to worthwhile education. "Political" and "Social Thought" schools, established for advancement of radical philosophies, without regard to fundamental educational standards, are not deserving of public support.

It is well to remember that all Koreans remaining in Japan do so of their own free choice and with full knowledge that their residence in Japan subjects them to all appropriate local laws and regulations, as are all residents of Japan other than United Nations nationals. This was made clear to all Korean residents of Japan in a press release by SCAP in November 1946.

According to information just received by the Office of Foreign Affairs, 23 Korean schools in Kanagawa Prefecture have already applied in writing for inspection and accreditation as private schools under Japanese law.

The Korean League headquarters in Tokyo has announced in its own publication that it has closed the schools under its direction, pending the outcome of negotiations with Japanese government authorities. END

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# INCOMING AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

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From: American Consulate General  
Shanghai, China

No. : A-683

Date: July 29, 1948

Mailed: Jul 30, 1948

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Aug. 2, 1948 3:04 pm

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A-683, July 29, 1948.

According to a Central News Agency dispatch from Tokyo dated July 23, the tribal chieftain of the Ainus in Hokkaido called on General Shang Chen, head of the Chinese Mission in Japan, to request the help of President Chiang Kai Shek for the 3,000 Ainus who have long been subjected to Japanese oppression. The request was based on the right of self determination of minorities and the hope was expressed that Japan would ~~provide~~ a tribal reservation for the Ainus so that they can preserve their independence and identity.

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AUG 11 1948

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PERMANENT RECORD COPY.—This copy must be returned to DC/R central files with notation of action taken.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER DIVISION OF NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS FOR JAPAN

ACTION is assigned to

Handwritten initials in a box

No. 580

CONFIDENTIAL

Handwritten notes: Letter to Eberle, Tokyo, September 3, 1948. Mr. Boardman. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. 10/21/48

Subject: Status of Koreans in Japan.

The Honorable The Secretary of State, Washington.

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE 18 SEP 22 PM 2 53

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE 895.012

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a study dated August 16, 1948 on the subject of Koreans in Japan which was prepared as a staff study of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. The study was prepared by this Mission in its capacity as the Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters and was concurred in by all the other concerned Sections. It was submitted to the Chief of Staff under cover of a "check sheet" of August 16 and was returned by him to the Diplomatic Section under cover of a "check sheet" of August 29 expressing general approval. Copies of these "check sheets" are also enclosed.

It will be noted that the Chief of Staff states that this study will be held as a guide for action when the problem of the status of Koreans in Japan arises in more concrete form. One of the recommendations, with regard to relaxation of restrictions on the transfer of currency and property of Koreans desiring repatriation from Japan to Korea, was specifically approved for immediate action and implementation of this decision is now in process by this Mission.

It may be of interest to the Department that the Chief of Staff in returning the study noted in pen upon his comments that the "Commander in Chief commends the Diplomatic Section on this study and desires it be available when issues are discussed later on the highest level." Foreign Service Officer Richard B. FINN is the original drafter of the study and the commendation by the Commander in Chief has been conveyed to him.

A copy of this despatch is being forwarded to the United States Special Representative in Korea. The study in draft form was discussed with Ambassador MUCCIO when he was last in Tokyo,

and

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FEB 15 1949

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


Tokyo's No. 580,  
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and its present status is therefore being brought to his attention for his information, with a covering letter calling attention to the Chief of Staff's decisions with regard thereto.

Respectfully yours,

  
W. J. Sebald

Enclosures: *att*

1. Copy of staff study concerning Koreans in Japan, dated August 16, 1948.
2. Copy of "check sheet" dated August 16, 1948.
3. Copy of "check sheet" dated August 29, 1948.

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Original and hectograph to Department

cc: U.S. Special Representative, Seoul

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*S. B. B.*



Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 580 dated September 3, 1948 from the Office of the United States Political Adviser at Tokyo, on the subject of: "Status of Koreans in Japan."

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August 16, 1948.

STAFF STUDY CONCERNING KOREANS IN JAPAN

I. THE PROBLEM

To recommend policies for the treatment of Koreans in Japan after a Korean Government has been duly established.

II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. There are now about 600,000 Koreans in Japan; most of these were born in Korea or in Japan of Korean parents. It is estimated that on a monthly average 650 Koreans enter Japan illegally and that 400 are repatriated or deported to Korea.

Large numbers of the Koreans in Japan were brought in by the Japanese before and during the war as forced labor. As a result, it is estimated that nearly half of the Koreans in Japan are adult males; about one-third are children and slightly over one-sixth adult females.

2. SCAP policy toward Koreans in Japan has been twofold: a) in accordance with a Far Eastern Commission policy decision (FEC-034/3, 5 June 1946), Koreans have been treated as liberated people and therefore strenuous efforts have been made to repatriate to Korea all Koreans in Japan who wished to return; b) Koreans who voluntarily continued to reside in Japan have been presumptively considered for purposes of treatment as retaining their Japanese nationality and are to be so considered until such time as a duly established Korean Government accords them recognition as Korean nationals. This latter policy was recommended in radio C 61223, 21 May 1946, from SCAP to WARCOS and approved in W 89799, 31 May 1946, from WARCOS. ✓

In accordance with SCAP policy, therefore, Koreans in Japan are subject to Japanese law and are treated like Japanese nationals. SCAP policy towards Koreans in Japan has been generally outlined in two press releases issued in November 1946.

3. It is estimated that over 900,000 Koreans who were in Japan at the war's end have been repatriated to Korea. Mass repatriation of Koreans from Japan ended in December 1946. Some of these Koreans, perhaps 20,000, have illegally re-entered Japan. Regulations in regard to the personal property and household effects that Koreans might take with them to Korea have been steadily relaxed so that now they are allowed to take as accompanied baggage all that can be carried; as unaccompanied baggage they are permitted to ship 500 pounds of personal effects and 4000 pounds of tools,

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light machinery and business equipment, provided clear ownership on or prior to 2 September 1945 is established. This 4000-pound maximum could be raised upon SCAP approval of specific applications. (SCAPIN 927/16, 16 July 1947.) By SCAPIN 927 of 7 May 1946 Korean repatriates were permitted to take with them ¥1000 in Japanese currency.

4. Under Japanese law, Koreans (both in Korea and in Japan) are considered to possess only Japanese nationality; Korean nationality is considered to have been extinguished by Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910. Koreans who remain in Japan will presumably be considered under Japanese law as retaining Japanese nationality, regardless of the effect of establishment of the Korean Government.

5. A new Korean Government for that portion of Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude was established on 15 August 1948. This Government will in due course be recognized by the United States Government and probably by at least several others of the United Nations as the Government of Korea; this recognition will probably be delayed until the General Assembly of the United Nations has considered the report of its Korean commission at the Assembly session beginning in September. The United States Government has already informed the Korean Government that it regards the Government of the Republic of Korea as the government envisaged by the United Nations General Assembly resolutions of 14 November 1947.

6. The Korean nationality law as enacted by the South Korean Interim Government (Public Act No. 11, 11 May 1948) provides that any person whose father is Korean as well as any person whose mother is Korean and whose father either is unknown or has no nationality shall have Korean nationality; Koreans whose names are entered in a Japanese family register and who have canceled or in the future cancel such registry shall be considered restored to Korean nationality. By the terms of Article 100 of the new Korean Constitution this law will remain in effect if not in conflict with the Constitution, and it is therefore likely that Public Act No. 11 will remain in effect as a law of the Korean Government.

It would appear, therefore, that most of the Koreans in Japan either possess Korean nationality or could by the act of canceling their Japanese registry acquire Korean nationality.

### III. DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM

1. Those Koreans who are continuing to reside in Japan appear for the most part reluctant to return to Korea. Prospects in Korea--both North Korea and South Korea--are extremely uncertain because of depressed economic conditions and dangerous political friction. On the other hand many Koreans have lived all their lives in Japan, have close ties of family and friendship in Japan, and in some cases have acquired considerable financial interests and assets in Japan.

2. Koreans present many problems, however, both to the Occupation and to the Japanese. Politically, Koreans have attempted to establish a large degree of autonomy in Japan. Many of them have tended more and more to participate in communist activity, so that

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now the League of Koreans Residing in Japan, the principal Korean organization in Japan, is largely dominated by communists. Koreans moving illegally between Japan and Korea serve as the link between Japanese communists and those on the continent of Asia--Korean, Chinese, and Russian. Korean cooperation with Japanese communist organizations, particularly labor and educational, is pronounced. It should be noted, however, that there are still fairly strong rightist elements among Koreans in Japan, particularly those close to the leaders of the new Korean Government; there is reason to believe that many Koreans submit to communist dictation only under duress. Economically, Koreans are known to engage heavily in illegal transactions and to have acquired large amounts of "new yen" which appear to be beyond the control or tax authority of the Japanese Government.

Socially the Koreans represent a group which does not readily assimilate to the Japanese both because of the long-standing prejudice of the latter and because of the uneducated and generally underprivileged character of most of the Koreans in Japan. Since Japan's surrender, Koreans have attempted to insist upon preferred treatment in Japan and although legally they have not been successful in this, they have succeeded practically in isolating themselves from Japanese control and in asserting privileges which Japanese authorities have been reluctant to contest. The recent riots in Osaka and Kobe arising from refusal by the Koreans to comply with orders of the Japanese Government afforded a test of the extent of Korean autonomy in Japan; Korean resistance was put down and they complied with Japanese law. The riots have of course increased the bitterness between Japanese and Koreans, and it is undeniable that the Japanese would be only too happy to see all Koreans leave Japan.

3. Establishment on 15 August 48 of a new Korean Government, which is expected to be recognized in due course by the United States and several others of the United Nations, necessitates a re-examination of the problem of Koreans in Japan, both because of the two statements made publicly by SCAP in November 1946 that Koreans in Japan would be treated as Japanese nationals until establishment of a duly recognized Korean Government and because the character of the governmental control in Korea will have changed from a limited, interim nature to that of sovereign, independent state. The fact that the United States has taken the lead in encouraging the establishment of an independent Korean Government is also a strong reason for exploring means of solving this problem.

4. From the standpoint of the three governments primarily concerned--the United States, Korea, and Japan--it is highly desirable that as many Koreans in Japan as possible return to Korea. The large Korean group in Japan, which is for the most part unassimilable in Japan and the source of dangerous friction with the Japanese, constitutes a strong element of instability in the Far East and the cause of unfavorable propaganda directed against the United States as the principal occupying power in Japan. From the Korean point of view, the Korean community in Japan is potentially a valuable asset

to Korea

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to Korea in manpower as well as in skilled training and financial means acquired in Japan; although assimilation of this group would not be easy in Korea, it would be incomparably simpler than in Japan. Koreans in Japan are for the Japanese an almost complete liability because they draw heavily on the war-strained Japanese economy and contribute little in taxes or in constructive effort.

5. The Supreme Commander has been empowered by the Far Eastern Commission to direct the repatriation of Koreans if he finds it necessary (FEC 034/3, 5 Jun 46), but the policy of the United States in Japan has been that repatriation of Koreans should be on a voluntary basis. Enforced repatriation would create tremendous ill feeling on the part of Koreans toward the United States and would necessitate difficult financial and social adjustments in both Japan and Korea. Forcible return in a short period of a large mass of people, many of them indigent and unsettled, would create a major problem in Korea.

6. SCAP policy therefore should be to continue to encourage voluntary repatriation by Koreans. It is accordingly recommended that restrictions affecting the repatriation of Koreans be removed as far as possible.

A SCAPIN should be issued which will amend present regulations concerning the currency which Koreans may take with them from Japan. It is believed that a SCAPIN which relates solely to Korean repatriation will have special publicity value at this time. This SCAPIN should not be issued until consultations now taking place with the appropriate authorities in Korea as to the details of currency transfer from Japan to Korea have been completed.

SCAPIN 927, annex 6, para. 3, of 7 May 1946 permits individual Koreans repatriating to Korea to take a maximum of ¥1000 in Japanese currency with them. This figure should be raised to ¥100,000 for each repatriating Korean family, an amount which will enable all but the most wealthy Koreans to take with them all their cash and if necessary to convert their real property assets in Japan to cash for transfer to Korea.

SCAPIN 927/16 of 16 July 47 limits the amount of personal property and household effects that individual repatriates may take with them to 500 pounds plus what can be carried by the repatriates. Routine unaccompanied shipment of 4000 pounds of tools, light machinery and business equipment, if owned on or prior to 2 September 1945, is also authorized; shipment of amounts in excess of 4000 pounds may also be authorized after specific application to SCAP. It is believed that the date of 2 September 1945 in SCAPIN 927/16 is no longer realistic and that all reference to date of ownership should be deleted. The weight limitations in SCAPIN 927/16 are considered reasonable and should in most cases permit repatriates to return to Korea with all their personal belongings, household effects, and professional instruments.

Those Korean repatriates who hold currency of greater value than ¥100,000 should be permitted to protect these assets by deposit or other safe-keeping in Japan in the name of the Korean owner.

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It is believed that these allowances of currency and baggage are sufficiently generous to induce the repatriation of Koreans presently inclined to return, and at the same time are not so high as to permit large-scale cloaking of Japanese assets and economic activity in Korea. The loss suffered by the Japanese economy, although it may be somewhat considerable, is not likely to be serious, and any loss suffered by Japan will be reflected by a corresponding gain in Korea. In any case, the twofold interests of stimulating repatriation by Koreans and of encouraging the development of the Korean Government will be served.

SCAPIN 4578-A of 24 September 1947 has directed the return to Koreans who have been repatriated to Korea of most of their personal effects which had been detained in Japan. No charge of discrimination can therefore be made in regard to the treatment accorded later repatriates by Koreans who have already return to Korea from Japan.

With the conclusion of mass repatriation of Koreans in December 1946, responsibility for repatriation of individual Koreans unable to take advantage of this repatriation due to circumstances beyond their control passed from G-3 Section to G-1 Section. If mass repatriation is to be reopened, responsibility should properly return to G-3 for this large-scale operation. Rail transportation, processing facilities at Sasebo Reception Center, and SCAP-controlled shipping are adequate to support a program repatriating up to 120,000 Koreans monthly upon as little as 30 days' notice. A more comprehensive program could be arranged but it is not considered necessary. It is felt that the determining factor limiting monthly repatriation under this program will be processing facilities in Korea and the ability of the Korean economy to absorb the additional burden of these returnees. Settlement of this problem must await discussion of the entire program with representatives of CG, USAFIK, and of the Korean Government. And, finally, all of the procedures and mechanics of the repatriation program should be included in a Repatriation Agreement (replacing the Tokyo Conference Repatriation Agreements as approved 12 March 1946) signed by representatives of SCAP and the Korean Government.

Upon confirmation of the above Repatriation Agreement, and after all Koreans now residing in Japan have been advised of the contemplated repatriation program and of their rights and position upon acceptance or non-acceptance of repatriation, it will be necessary that all Koreans in Japan indicate their acceptance or refusal of repatriation. In this way also the flow of Koreans to the Sasebo Reception Center and the handling of their effects can be controlled.

7. This relaxation of rules concerning transfer of currency and property by repatriates to Korea should be accompanied by public statements issued by this Headquarters explaining the new rules and expressing the hope that Koreans who have remained in Japan for three years since the liberation of their country will now see fit to return and devote their efforts to the building of a new Korea. It should be emphasized that the opportunity is now being presented

to Koreans

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to Koreans to overcome the suffering and handicaps of the long years of oppression and to return to their homeland free; for three years their countrymen have worked unceasingly to lay the foundations of an independent Korea and the time has now arrived when all Koreans genuinely eager to advance the welfare of their nation should join in that effort. It should be added that those Koreans who wish to maintain permanent residence in Japan are under no moral obligation to return to Korea. ?

8. It is highly probable that in spite of relaxation of rules concerning transfer of currency and property to Korea, large numbers of Koreans will prefer to remain in Japan. The basic problem is to determine policies in regard to these remaining Koreans which will reduce friction and instability in Japan and at the same time not impair the prestige of the Occupation.

Koreans remaining in Japan are Japanese nationals by Japanese law and for the most part are also Korean nationals by the terms of Public Act No. 11 of the South Korean Interim Government. It appears therefore that most of the Koreans in Japan will have, or could readily acquire, dual nationality status--Japanese and Korean.

It is considered undesirable for SCAP to adopt any position which will have the effect of forcing Koreans in Japan to assume exclusively Japanese nationality or of prejudicing any future treaty settlement between Korea and Japan as to the nationality of Koreans in Japan. In a matter of such tremendous importance and long-term significance as nationality, it would be inadvisable for the occupying authorities to insist that a conclusive election be made at this time.

SCAP should emphasize by public statements that final determination of the nationality of Koreans who continue to reside in Japan is a matter which must await the conclusion of a general treaty settlement or some other definitive international agreement involving Japan and Korea.

9. It is imperative that SCAP be prepared to deal with claims by Koreans in Japan that their Korean nationality entitles them to preferred treatment in Japan.

Preferred treatment in Japan is accorded to nationals of countries which are now members of the United Nations and in certain instances to other foreigners in Japan. Foreigners who are not United Nations nationals are entitled to supplementary food rations, to immunity against special war taxes imposed by the Japanese Government, and to limited financial privileges. United Nations nationals possess these privileges and in addition are entitled among other things to special legal protection, to guarantee in full of their bank deposits, and to restitution of their property wrongfully seized by the Japanese. Koreans in Japan are entitled to none of these privileges.

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If the treatment now accorded United Nations nationals or other foreigners in Japan were extended to Koreans, the position of Koreans in Japan would become further entrenched in direct conflict with SCAP policy to encourage their return to Korea. In addition, a very heavy burden would be imposed on the Japanese economy and the United States Government by the necessity of providing extra food rations to Koreans. It is estimated that such extra rations would require 80,287 additional tons of food imports annually into Japan costing the United States Government 12,043,000 U.S. dollars. Even if policy considerations urged that favored treatment be accorded Koreans in Japan, it is believed that the cost required would be impossible to meet without large appropriations from the United States Congress.

Koreans in Japan are likely to advance numerous other claims which would entitle them substantially to the privileges now accorded United Nations nationals and nationals of Far Eastern Commission countries in Japan, particularly in regard to restitution of property seized by the Japanese during Japanese occupation of Korea and claims for damage suffered at the hands of the Japanese. Koreans are also likely to demand the special legal protection now accorded United Nations nationals in Japan. Because of the veto power held by the Soviet Union over admission of new members to the United Nations and the Far Eastern Commission, it is highly unlikely that the Government of the Republic of Korea will be admitted as a member to either of these bodies and hence technically Koreans in Japan will not be entitled to the special rights and protection granted nationals in Japan of the United Nations countries and of the Far Eastern Commission countries. Furthermore, it is considered that, because of the complex legal and financial problems involved, Koreans in Japan should not be given any special rights or protection until a decision to that effect has been reached by the highest Allied or United States authorities.

10. To support the position taken by SCAP in regard to Koreans in Japan--that they should not receive United Nations national or other foreign national rights and privileges, the entire problem should be referred to the Korean Government for confidential consideration on a diplomatic level. Representatives of the United States Government in Seoul could act in behalf of SCAP in this matter.

*in Japan*  
The solution most to be preferred as a result of this negotiation would be legislation by the Korean Government which recognized the special position of the large Korean population in Japan and specified that only those Koreans who transferred their residence to Korea would be considered Korean nationals and that the matter of conferring Korean nationality on Koreans who remain in Japan would await conclusion of a general treaty settlement.

Another effective solution would be a public statement by the Korean Government that because Koreans in Japan possess both Korean and Japanese nationality, the Korean Government would not accord recognition to their Korean nationality as long as they

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continue to reside in Japan except in the case of those who legitimately enter Japan after the establishment of the Korean Government. Both the British and United States Governments take this position, with minor exceptions, in regard to their nationals in Japan who also possess Japanese nationality. It is believed that to request the Korean Government to make a public statement to this effect would be not unreasonable.

In any case an undertaking by the Korean Government that it would not press for recognition of the Korean nationality of Koreans in Japan would reduce the threat of exaggerated claims by Koreans in Japan.

11. Regardless of the effect of diplomatic conversations with the Korean Government, SCAP should undertake by public statements after such conversations have been completed, to impress upon Koreans in Japan their duty to return to Korea and should state that because they have chosen to remain in Japan for three years since their country's liberation and because they possess Japanese nationality in addition to Korean nationality, they will in accordance with standard international principles be subject to all applicable laws and regulations of the Japanese Government. Furthermore, by remaining in Japan they will be subject to the laws of Japan when the Occupation ends.

Koreans in Japan will doubtless charge that the Occupation is discriminating against them, particularly because the Formosan-Chinese who have remained in Japan have been given the privilege of registering with Chinese consular authorities and thereby acquiring United Nations national privileges. This charge can be met most effectively by a statement to the effect that China is one of the United Nations and one of the Far Eastern Commission countries and as such entitled to certain privileges by international agreement.

12. Koreans who enter Japan legally with the appropriate documentation of the Korean Government should be recognized by SCAP as foreign nationals although not as United Nations nationals, and treated accordingly. It is believed that this policy will serve as an added inducement to Koreans who are now in Japan and who wish to improve their status here to return to Korea and seek re-entry. In this way Koreans who can be of benefit to the Occupation and to Japan will be enabled to enter Japan and acquire foreign national status. Special consideration should be given to technicians and to university students because of the close technological and cultural connection that has existed in the past between Korea and Japan. Consideration should also be given to any long-term policies the United States Government may formulate in regard to cooperation between Korea and Japan.

It should be emphasized that Koreans who leave Japan with the expectation of returning must first establish residence in Korea and that their re-entry to Japan will be governed by the policies of the Occupation.

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13. It is not certain whether the Korean Government will desire to request accreditation of a representative to the Supreme Commander. It is likely that such a request will not be made by the Korean Government until the General Assembly of the United Nations, in its session opening in September, has acted on the report of the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.

If the Korean Government does not seek to establish a mission in Japan, there will appear to be no procedure by which Koreans in Japan may assert and register their Korean nationality, unless this service is requested of a nation already represented in Japan. If therefore a Korean mission is not set up in Japan, it would be difficult for procedural reasons for Koreans in Japan to establish their Korean nationality and claim preferred treatment. In this event the League of Koreans Residing in Japan may attempt to act in behalf of the Korean Government and of Koreans in Japan; such an attempt should not be recognized for the principal reason that the League has no official status.

If the Korean Government should in due course request that a representative be accredited to the Supreme Commander, it is recommended that such a request be granted because of the desire of the United States Government that the Korean Government assume the normal functions of a sovereign state and because of the assistance that a cooperative Korean mission could give toward facilitating a solution of the problems raised by Koreans in Japan.

The functions, size, and composition of a Korean mission in Japan should as far as possible be defined in advance of its establishment by discussions on a diplomatic level with the Korean Government.

14. No distinction should be made by SCAP at this time between Koreans from south of the 38th parallel and those from North Korea, because of the policy to encourage all Koreans regardless of their place of connection in Korea to return to Korea and because of the United States desire that all Koreans eventually be united under one sovereign, independent government.

Only 351 Koreans have been repatriated from Japan to North Korea since the SCAP repatriation program began. It is estimated, however, that about 200,000 Koreans from North Korea are still in Japan. It is probable that few of this group can be persuaded to return to North Korea but it is considered advisable to urge as many of them as possible to go to South Korea to establish residence.

The distinction between North and South Korea clearly raises the problem of subversive activities by Koreans. SCAP policy in this regard should be to rid Japan of as many Korean communists as possible and to prevent their re-entry to Japan. It is suggested that if deemed advisable the appropriate authorities of the Korean

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Government should be informed of the records and activities of all Korean communists who return to Korea so that necessary measures can be taken.

15. A more effective patrol should be established in the Korean Strait between Japan and Korea in order to reduce illegal entry by Koreans into Japan. Such illegal entry has resulted in widespread smuggling and also served as a means of entry into Japan by communist agents. Law enforcement in Japan and Korea is made difficult by this large-scale illegal traffic in people and goods.

Since Japanese patrol craft are limited to Japan's territorial waters, representations should be made to the Korean Government on a diplomatic level urging that it improve its coastal patrol and assist in reducing illegal traffic.

#### IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A SCAPIN should be issued to the Japanese Government authorizing the reopening of mass repatriation of Koreans; Koreans who are returning to Korea for the purpose of establishing residence there should be permitted to take or send to Korea up to ¥100,000 and in addition the personal effects, tools, light machinery and business equipment permitted by SCAPIN 927/16, regardless of the date of acquisition of ownership and regardless of whether the baggage is accompanied or not. The procedure for transfer of yen from Japan to Korea should be worked out with the authorities in Korea. Any property held by Koreans in excess of that which they are permitted to take with them should be held in the name of the individual Korean owner and protected in accordance with Japanese law.

A Repatriation Agreement should be drawn up in accordance with the above recommendation and signed by representatives of SCAP and the appropriate authorities in Korea.

2. Diplomatic discussions, which should be kept confidential, should be opened with the Korean Government in order that the Korean Government recognize the special status of Koreans in Japan in one of the following ways:
  - a. legislation that only those Koreans in Japan who return to Korea to establish residence will be considered Korean nationals pending final settlement between Japan and Korea of the nationality of Koreans in Japan, or
  - b. issuance of a public statement to the effect that since Koreans in Japan possess Japanese nationality by Japanese law and since they have chosen to remain in Japan, the Korean Government will not accord recognition to their Korean nationality so long as they continue to reside in Japan, or
  - c. an informal undertaking that the Korean Government will not press for recognition and special treatment for Koreans in Japan.

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3. Koreans



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3. Koreans who return to Korea to establish residence and then re-enter Japan in compliance with the necessary procedure should be treated by SCAP as foreign nationals, although not as United Nations nationals.
4. If the Korean Government so requests, a Korean representative should be accredited to the Supreme Commander and a Korean mission in Japan permitted after diplomatic discussions with the Korean Government to define the mission's status in Japan.
5. No distinction should be officially made at this time between the treatment accorded South Koreans and that accorded North Koreans.
6. The Korean Government should be requested to take appropriate measures to increase and improve patrol activities in the Korean strait in order to reduce illegal traffic between Japan and Korea.
7. A comprehensive press statement or series of press releases should be issued simultaneously in Japan and in Korea as soon after the establishment of the Korean Government as is feasible. These public statements by SCAP should emphasize the following points:
  - a. SCAP policy is to encourage those Koreans in Japan who do not wish to become Japanese nationals to return to their homeland. Restrictions on the transfer of their property to Korea have therefore been greatly relaxed and a considerable strain on the Japanese economy risked.
  - b. In the interest of strengthening the new Korean Government, those Koreans who have remained abroad for three years since their country's liberation should now return and help their countrymen who have labored to establish a free, independent government.
  - c. Koreans who do not take this opportunity to assist their country by returning to Korea but who remain in Japan will not have their nationality status affected at this time. Their nationality will be settled by Korea and Japan at some future time.
  - d. Koreans who remain in Japan possess Japanese nationality, even though they may also possess Korean nationality, and since they have voluntarily continued to reside in Japan, they have chosen to be treated in the same way as Japanese nationals.
  - e. Charges by Koreans in Japan that they are being discriminated against because Formosan-Chinese in Japan receive United Nations national treatment should not be answered directly. It should be pointed out, however, that Korea is not yet one of the United Nations and therefore is not entitled by international agreement to the rights and privileges accorded members of the United Nations.
  - f. Koreans

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- f. Koreans can show their desire to be Koreans by return to their homeland. Those who remain in Japan will be treated in the same way as Japanese.
8. For the purpose of drafting press releases on the Korean problem, an inter-staff committee should be established with instructions to recommend to the Chief of Staff release of press statements at any time it deems appropriate. This committee should consist of representatives from Korean-Ryukyuan Division of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 Section, Diplomatic Section, Legal Section, and Major K. J. Goff, U.S. Army Military Government in Korea Liaison Officer; representatives of other staff sections should be invited to participate where considered necessary.

Concurrence by:

G-1 Section  
G-2 Section  
G-3 Section  
G-4 Section  
Civil Property Custodian  
Civil Transportation Section  
Economic and Scientific Section  
Judge Advocate General  
Legal Section

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Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 580  
dated September 3, 1948 from the Office  
of the United States Political Adviser  
at Tokyo, on the subject of: "Status of  
Koreans in Japan."

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CHECK SHEET DS/WJS/RBF/cgf

Subject: Staff Study Recommending Policies  
for Treatment of Koreans in Japan.

From: Diplomatic Section To: Chief of Staff Date: 16 August 48

1. Forwarded herewith for approval is a draft study prepared by Diplomatic Section at the request of the Deputy Chief of Staff, SCAP, recommending policies for the treatment of Koreans in Japan.
2. The enclosed draft study makes the following general recommendations:
  - a. Mass repatriation of Koreans from Japan to Korea should be reopened. Korean repatriates should be allowed to take or send to Korea up to ¥100,000 in addition to the personal property and professional instruments permitted by SCAPIN 927/16, 16 July 1947;
  - b. Koreans remaining in Japan should not at this time be compelled to elect either Japanese or Korean nationality;
  - c. Koreans remaining in Japan should continue to be treated in the same manner as Japanese nationals;
  - d. Diplomatic discussions should be held with the new Korean Government with a view to insuring that the Korean Government will not press claims for special treatment of Koreans remaining in Japan.
  - e. An inter-staff committee should be established for the purpose of recommending to the Chief of Staff a proposed press release in explanation of SCAP policy toward Koreans.
3. G-2 has suggested that any SCAPIN issued to the Japanese Government contain an explicit instruction to the effect that Koreans who continue to reside in Japan are to be treated in the same way as Japanese. Even though this is the policy which has been followed since 1946, Diplomatic Section considers it inadvisable and unnecessary, for political reasons, to issue such an instruction at this time; such an instruction would not, in any event, change existing policy.
4. The Civil Property Custodian has suggested that the temporary safekeeping in Japan of the property of Korean repatriates be

made

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made the responsibility of each individual Korean repatriate. Diplomatic Section recommends that mass repatriation be reopened; therefore the cost of storage of Korean repatriates' property as well as of their transportation to ports of embarkation should be made an obligation of the Japanese Government.

5. Commanding General, United States Army Forces in Korea, has requested in ZMGFAF 240, 13 August 48, that USAFIK be "represented in the final phase of any studies" made by SCAP in regard to the status of Koreans in Japan.

6. It is suggested that, if the enclosed staff study is approved, the following steps be taken:

- thru AMREP |
- a. G-3 should be requested to draft a Repatriation Agreement and to negotiate with the authorities in Korea for its acceptance;
  - b. Major Goff, U.S. Army Military Government in Korea Liaison Officer, should be requested to discuss necessary procedures with the authorities in Korea in regard to currency transfers from Japan to Korea and to inform SCAP of the results of these discussions;
  - c. G-3 should thereupon issue a SCAPIN to the Japanese Government incorporating the decisions reached in regard to repatriation of Koreans;
  - d. DS should be requested to communicate with the Department of State and with United States diplomatic representatives in Korea with a view to securing the desired assistance of the Korean Government;
  - e. The staff sections represented on the inter-staff committee charged with drafting a press statement concerning Koreans in Japan should be requested to designate representatives to attend a meeting on a specified date.

7. Concurrences: G-1 Civil Property Custodian  
G-2 Civil Transportation Section  
G-3 Economic and Scientific Section  
G-4 Judge Advocate General  
Legal Section

8. Request approval by Chief of Staff of enclosed draft staff study and return of this file to Diplomatic Section for further implementation.

Incl:  
Draft staff study.

-----W.J.S.-----

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Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 580  
dated September 3, 1948 from the Office  
of the United States Political Adviser  
at Tokyo, on the subject: "Status of  
Koreans in Japan."

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CHECK SHEET

Subject: Status of Koreans in Japan.

From: Chief of Staff      To: Diplomatic Section      Date: 29 August 48

1. Since no representation has yet been made, it is considered inexpedient to initiate action at this time on the recommendations submitted, except with respect to the relaxation of restrictions on the transfer of currency and property of repatriated Koreans. Since it is not anticipated that relaxing these restrictions will result in mass repatriation, no repatriation agreement appears necessary.
2. It is desired that the Diplomatic Section, in coordination with the Economic and Scientific Section, draft and submit the necessary instructions to the Japanese Government relaxing the restrictions on the transfer of currency and property as recommended in recommendation IV. 1. As a preliminary, agreement for this action should be obtained from the proper authorities in Korea.
3. Inasmuch as the new Korean Government is at present in the process of organization, negotiations respecting other phases of repatriation are considered premature at this time. This study will be held as a guide for our action when the problem of the status of the Korean in Japan arises in more concrete form. Should the Korean Government request the accreditation of a representative, the request will be given due consideration and the decision will be based on its merits.

(Penned comment in Chief of Staff's handwriting:)

C-in-C commends DS on this study. He desires it  
be available when issues will be discussed later  
on highest level.

P.J.M.

-----P.J.M.-----

CONFIDENTIAL



OCT 28 1948

In reply refer to  
NA 894.4016/9-348

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear General Eberle:

I am enclosing as of possible interest to you a copy of despatch No. 580 of September 3, 1948, from the Acting Political Adviser in Tokyo, transmitting a copy of a staff study prepared by the Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters concerning the status and treatment of Koreans in Japan.

You will note that the views of the Chief of Staff concerning the implementation of the recommendations formulated in this study are set forth in an attached check sheet.

Although we have not as yet had an opportunity to discuss this problem in detail with Ambassador Muccio, it seems to us upon first reading that these recommendations provide in general a sound basis upon which to proceed in dealing with this difficult and important problem.

Sincerely yours,

John M. Allison  
Chief  
Division of Northeast  
Asian Affairs

Enclosure:

✓ From Tokyo, copy  
of despatch No. 580  
dated September 3,  
1948, with enclosures.

Brigadier General G. L. Eberle,  
Acting Chief, Civil Affairs Division,  
Department of the Army.

CONFIDENTIAL

cc: 0 - Mr. Claxton

FE:NA:NWBond:jh

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894.4016/9-348

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NS Unit	
Dist.	
Col.	
Gen.	
Adm.	
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Exec.	
Asst.	
Chief	

OCT 25 1948

894.4016/9-348



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

CONFIDENTIAL

HMB

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : NA - Mr. Allison ✓

DATE: October 11, 1948

FROM : NA - Mr. Green

*mg, 894.4016/9-348*

SUBJECT: Attached: Tokyo's 580

RECEIVED  
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MG  
FW 894.4016/9-348

Here is an outstanding, comprehensive discussion of the Korean problem in Japan with considered recommendations on Korean repatriation, the settlement of the nationality status of Koreans in Japan and the accrediting of a Korean representative to SCAP. The study was prepared by Mr. Finn of the Diplomatic Section and is to be used by SCAP as a guide whenever these issues are taken up. A copy was sent to U.S. Special Representative, Seoul.

Mr. Finn stresses the desirability of reinitiating a mass repatriation in Japan for the bulk of the 600,000 Koreans still remaining in Japan. 900,000 Koreans had been repatriated by the program which was ended in December 1946, and very little repatriation has occurred since then. Koreans in Japan are, as a group, unassimilable and a proven source of dangerous friction with the Japanese. Furthermore, many Koreans are Communists, maintaining links with Communist groups on the Asiatic mainland. Economically, they draw heavily on the war-strained Japanese economy, engage in black market activities, contributing little in taxes or in constructive effort.

Finn does not recommend that SCAP forcibly repatriate the Koreans but that he encourage their voluntary repatriation by removing as far as possible restrictions on the currency and personal effects which they are allowed to take back with them to Korea.

While Japan has adequate facilities for processing the repatriation of up to 120,000 Koreans monthly, Korea probably could not handle such large numbers of repatriates. Finn therefore recommends that all procedures and mechanics of the repatriation program should be included in a Repatriation Agreement signed by representatives of SCAP and the Korean Government. Thereafter all types of inducements should be offered to maximize the rate of repatriation.

However, because many Koreans will undoubtedly elect to remain in Japan, the basic problem will be to determine

policies

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CONFIDENTIAL

*FW 894.4016/9-348*



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policies which will reduce the friction they may occasion and to arrive at some clarification of their nationality status. Finn recognizes that final determination of nationality of Koreans in Japan must await the peace treaty and that meanwhile their dual nationality status must continue unresolved. To grant them exclusive Korean nationality would result in 600,000 Koreans suddenly acquiring the special rights accorded to foreign nationals in Japan. This would give them supplementary food rations, for example, which would impose an additional strain on the Japanese economy and sharpen Japanese dislike of the Korean minority. It would also instigate numerous Korean claims of property damage.

Finn believes that the best solution would be to persuade the Korean Government through a high-level diplomatic approach to pass legislation specifying that only those Koreans who transferred their residence to Korea would be considered Korean nationals and that the matter of conferring Korean nationality on Koreans who remain in Japan would await a Japanese peace settlement.

Finn suggests that <sup>alternatively</sup> Koreans who enter Japan legally with full documentation by the new Korean Government should be recognized by SCAP as foreign nationals with all the rights of foreign nationals. This would induce Koreans to return to Korea in order to seek reentry to Japan so as to improve their status, but at the same time it would enable SCAP to permit the reentry of only the most desirable Koreans such as technicians.

In conclusion Finn recommends that no distinction be drawn by SCAP between South and North Koreans because of SCAP's desire to encourage all Koreans to repatriate themselves and because of U.S. desire that all Koreans eventually be united under one government. If the Koreans should in due course request that a representative be accredited to SCAP, Finn recommends that such a request be granted.

*OK by me*  
I believe that all of Finn's recommendations are sound. If you and Niles Bond agree, I suggest that we tell Mr. Sebald informally that, ~~whereas~~ <sup>whereas</sup> this Division has not had an opportunity to consult Ambassador Muccio on this problem, we feel that Mr. Finn's recommendations are sound, and subject to Ambassador Muccio's concurrence, we support them fully. Further NA action on this question does not seem to be indicated at this time. You may wish, *however,*

to send

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FINN 800-4016 / 9-3-48

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to send a copy, <sup>of the disputed</sup> if available, to General Eberle. *Good idea*  
An appraisal sheet is attached.

FE:NA:MGreen:lt



WALTER H. JUDD  
5TH DIST., MINNESOTA


COMMITTEES:  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
EXPENDITURES IN THE EXECUTIVE  
DEPARTMENTS

Congress of the United States  
House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

January 12, 1948

Mr. W. Walton Butterworth, Director  
Office of Far Eastern Affairs  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.



Attention: Mr. Allison

Dear Sir:

In compliance with the suggestion made to my office today by Mr. Allison, I am quoting from a letter received from a member of the Minneapolis College Women's Club as follows:

"As a member of the Minneapolis Branch of the College Women's Club (a branch of the AAUW), I have been interested in our Fellowship program which provides funds for graduate study for gifted women scholars. We have for the past four years been bringing students here from foreign countries for refresher courses, in addition to our regular fellowship awards, and it has been my pleasure to know one of these students from China and one from Siam. The student from Siam, in talking about her trip to the United States, said that en route she spent six days in Tokyo. In telling about this experience, she mentioned being the only strange looking person among the Americans and could walk where they did, go through the gates marked "allied Personnel", ride on Allied Personnel buses, etc. I had her repeat all this, because I couldn't believe my ears. The allied personnel people walk on one part of the street and the Japanese on another, etc. I exclaimed that I could hardly believe in this segregation, and she remarked that it was strange when the Americans were trying to teach democracy to the Japanese."

"Can you throw some light on this for me? Part of the reason for bringing these foreign students here is so that we can bring about a better understanding between their country and ours and this is something I feel needs explaining."

Will you please give me a report or explanation that I may send on to my constituent.

DCR - NE Unit

*mgf*

WHJ:EGF

Very sincerely yours,

*Walter H. Judd*

JAN 27 1949

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(Japan)*

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JAN 14 1949

In reply refer to  
NA

My dear Mr. Judd:

In reply to your letter of January 12, 1949, requesting a report on the segregation of Allied personnel and Japanese, I have had the matter investigated and the facts are as follows:

There is no evidence to corroborate the statement that "Allied personnel people walk on one part of the street and the Japanese on another." Certain buses are employed in transferring Allied personnel from Allied billets to Headquarters offices, Allied schools, et cetera. Almost all these buses have been imported by the occupation forces and their operation prevents an even greater strain being placed on the overtaxed Japanese facilities. Some trains have cars, or more often sections of cars, set aside for Allied personnel. Efforts are constantly made to keep the number of such cars to an absolute minimum and to release unused space on them to the Japanese. However, it is essential to the efficient operation of the occupation that it have assured space on certain trains--a system which, I believe, is universally followed in wartime or under occupation conditions. Gates marked "Allied Personnel" are used for identifying entrances to Allied troop trains, billets, and the like.

I hope this information will be helpful to you in clarifying the situation in Japan to your constituent.

Sincerely yours,

DCR - NE Unit

*Handwritten signature*  
JAN 14 1949

W. Walton Butterworth  
Director for Far Eastern Affairs

The Honorable  
Walter H. Judd,  
House of Representatives.

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THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ACTION is assigned to



United States Political Adviser for Japan

Tokyo, February 18, 1949.

*USPOLAD Tokyo notified of Dept's views on the question, on March 15, 49 mg. file*

RECEIVED DEPARTMENT OF STATE

No. 711

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MAR 1 1949

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Subject: Status of Koreans in Japan.

894.4016/2-1849

The Acting Political Adviser has the honor to refer to the Mission's confidential despatch no. 580 of September 3, 1948 transmitting an enclosure dated August 16, 1948, entitled "Staff Study Concerning Koreans in Japan" in which various aspects of the problems arising from the presence in Japan of some 600,000 Koreans were discussed and tentative recommendations were formulated looking to their solution. This staff study had the concurrence of various staff Sections of General Headquarters and has been held available for eventual use in arriving at a more definitive settlement of the general problem.

*1/*

There is now enclosed a further study entitled "Status of Koreans in Japan" dated February 10, 1949, which has been prepared by officers of this Mission in an effort to present the current stage of thinking on this subject from which it is hoped will emerge during the next few weeks a definitive analysis embracing final conclusions and specific recommendations. The Chief of Staff of this Headquarters concurs in the belief that the importance and multiplicity of problems currently arising with respect to Koreans in Japan call for a clarification of their status, and further studies have accordingly been initiated to this end.

*apex to general premise.*

It is the present opinion of this Mission that all parties and legitimate interests concerned with the problem of Koreans in Japan will be best served by reducing the Korean minority in this country to the lowest possible proportions. On the premise that Korean nationality was extinguished by Japanese absorption of Korea in 1910, and that Koreans in Japan can avail themselves of the benefits of nationality newly opened up to them by the liberation of their country only by performing a positive act to that end, it is believed that registration as Korean nationals should be limited to those Koreans in Japan who demonstrate their immediate intention of returning to Korea or who remain in Japan for official Korean purposes or certain limited other purposes acknowledged to be Korean. While making every effort to encourage those who wish to establish their Korean nationality to return to Korea at the earliest possible time, legal and practical considerations point to the desirability of withholding recognition of Korean

nationality

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Tokyo's Despatch No. 111,  
February 18, 1949.

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nationality to those who remain in this country and of continuing to accord them treatment as Japanese nationals pending an ultimate solution of the problem between Japan and Korea as autonomous states.

The results of the Mission's further studies of this problem will be reported to the Department as soon as they have been completed, whereupon it is hoped that they can be coordinated with the position and views of the Korean Government.

2/ A memorandum of a conversation held by an officer of this Mission with an official of the Japanese Foreign Office on February 3, 1949, regarding a study on the problem of Koreans in Japan currently being prepared by the Japanese Government forms the second enclosure to this despatch. It is expected that it will be several months before this study, which apparently will be mainly concerned with devising means of ridding Japan of its Korean minority, will be completed.

The Mission would appreciate receiving any views or suggestions with respect to the problem of Koreans in Japan which the Department may be able to provide at this time.

Enclosures: *WXX*

1. Memorandum dated February 10, 1949 entitled "Status of Koreans in Japan".
2. Memorandum of Conversation dated February 3, 1949 on the subject "Koreans in Japan".

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CKHuston:gd

Original and hectograph to the Department.

Copy to Seoul, Korea

CONFIDENTIAL

*RRM*

*CM*



Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 111 dated February 18, 1949 from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Status of Koreans in Japan".

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

Status of Koreans in Japan

In reference to the Mission's despatch no. 580 of September 3, 1948 with regard to the status of Koreans in Japan, and with regard to further developments in the matter, it may be noted that it continues to be the policy of the Mission to advocate working decisions on the part of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, on a temporary basis, in accord with the principle that ultimate settlement of problems arising from the presence in Japan of Koreans should be relegated to a time when Japan as a sovereign state is able to negotiate with Korea; and to advocate that in the interim this Headquarters, in such decisions on the matter as require earlier determination, give full weight to the views of the Japanese Government, which in the course of time will be in the position of bearing the consequences of current determinations. The magnitude of the problem renders any other attitude of high potential danger to those permanent interests of Japan of which the Supreme Commander is presently the custodian. In ordinary times the residents of Japan holding foreign nationality have been a relatively small number, in the order of ten thousand occidentals and thirty thousand orientals. Recognition by Japan of foreign nationality of the 600,000 Korean residents of this country would create a problem on a new scale. While the Mission would always prefer that there be adequate time to consult the Department, it may be necessary in the present stage for Headquarters to arrive at working decisions concerning Koreans in Japan without such opportunity. The possibility that immediate decision may be necessary only adds to the desirability of submitting this study for the Department's information with regard to current considerations in the matter.

Relaxation of Previous Restrictions on Koreans Returning to Korea

As recommended in the first enclosure to despatch no. 580, this Headquarters has approved provisions relaxing restrictions on the amount of property Koreans returning from Japan to Korea may take with them. These provisions have already been issued to the Japanese Government in the form of a directive (see this Mission's despatch no. 64, January 31, 1949) and after implementing regulations have been issued the new procedure will be fully operative. Preparations have been made to publicize this procedure in both Japan and Korea in order to encourage Koreans in Japan to return to Korea and to indicate the importance attached to such repatriation as a means of alleviating problems raised by Koreans in Japan. Although there is no basis for estimating the number of Koreans who will return to Korea as a result of the revised provisions, and although application of the new regulations is not limited in time, past experience indicates that the number will be small. Of the 600,000 Koreans in Japan, there is no reason to suppose that more than 50,000 will thus elect repatriation.

Possible

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894. 4016/2-1849



Enclosure to Tokyo's Despatch  
No. 111, February 18, 1949.

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#### Possible Registration of Koreans

The problem of defining policy toward those Koreans who remain in Japan has been precipitated by establishment of a Korean Liaison Mission in Japan, raising first of all the question of determination of nationality. It is the view of this Mission (which we hope this Headquarters will sustain) that the Korean Liaison Mission should register as Korean nationals only those Koreans in Japan who demonstrate their immediate intention of returning to Korea or who remain in Japan for official Korean purposes or certain limited other purposes acknowledged to be Korean.

If this view is adopted, the policy hitherto followed by this Headquarters--that Koreans voluntarily continuing to reside in Japan should be accorded the treatment of Japanese nationals--would not be changed, except in respect to those Koreans engaged in official activity in Japan or those who have demonstrated their intention to return to Korea. This would mean in effect that final determination of the nationality status of those Koreans who remain in Japan will be suspended. Official papers with regard to them might uniformly use an expression such as Nationality status undetermined (Korean origin). During this period of suspension, Koreans in Japan can elect Korean nationality by returning to Korea at any time (thereby abandoning any right to proceed again to Japan, except as may be allowed by SCAP regulations), or by engaging in official Korean activity in Japan; but their treatment as Japanese nationals will not be affected while they remain in Japan.

#### Desirability of Encouraging Koreans to Return to Korea

This position is based on what is believed to be the most important consideration in regard to Koreans in Japan, namely, that every effort should be made to encourage those who wish to assert their Korean nationality to return to Korea at the earliest time. If large numbers ultimately return to Korea, this will redound to the advantage both of Japan by reducing the size of a difficult minority group and of Korea by adding the support of those whose primary allegiance and national sympathy are demonstrably Korean. To recognize Korean nationality in all persons of Korean origin and at the same time to permit them to remain in Japan indefinitely would, it is thought, remove their incentive to return to the country of their primary allegiance, deprive Korea of the large numbers of persons having the industrial and commercial skill it so eagerly desires, and aggravate what is the worst source of friction between Korea and Japan, i.e., the tendency of Koreans in Japan to assert the privileges of non-Japanese status.

#### Other Aspects of Problem

Legally it is believed that the withholding of recognition of Korean nationality is the wisest course to follow. It is doubtful that creation of a duly recognized government in Korea has the effect of automatically conferring Korean nationality on persons outside of Korea; generally, transfer of territory from one state to another (in this case from Japan to Korea) causes transfer of nationality of individuals only when they have their residence in the territory at the time of the transfer. The fact that Koreans

in Japan

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in Japan did not return to their country after its liberation, and show no intention to return after the establishment of a duly recognized government there, would seem to indicate that they have surrendered their residence in Korea. Allied policy (FEC 034/1, June 5, 1946) provides that Koreans in Japan are to be treated as "liberated people", and in accordance therewith their repatriation to Korea was encouraged, but that statement of policy is not understood to constitute a decision in respect to their nationality. Assuming, however, that establishment of a duly recognized government in Korea could operate to create nationality in behalf of persons outside Korea, it is nevertheless a generally recognized rule that, when a person with dual nationality is residing in either of the countries of which he is a national, that country has a right to assert its claim to him without any interference by the other, unless perhaps such person, having reached the age of majority, has already elected the nationality of the other country and is only temporarily in the country asserting the claim. Great Britain and the United States, among other countries, follow this practice, and it is believed desirable that the Korean Government recognize its advantageousness, as well in the long-term interest of Korea itself as for other reasons.

The presently established policy has the further advantage of not committing Japan to a definite determination in which it did not participate and which might prove highly impractical in the future. As an ultimate solution of the problem it is envisaged that Japan and Korea will be able as autonomous states to reach a definite agreement in regard to the legal status of these persons, possibly by resort to a treaty provision, such as is not uncommon in the case of territorial changes, under which persons affected by the territorial change are given the option of electing nationality but must also make their country of residence conform with this election. If Japan and Korea were to make such an agreement, Koreans in Japan who elect Korean nationality would thereby be required to return to Korea within a fixed time to take up residence; Koreans not wishing to return to Korea might thereby elect Japanese nationality. A decision taken now by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to permit the Korean Liaison Mission to register Koreans in Japan as Korean nationals would, unless the registration standards imposed by the Korean Government were extremely strict, enable many thousands of Koreans in Japan to assert Korean nationality even though evincing no intention of ever returning to Korea. This decision would, it is thought, have the result, among other undesirable results, of creating serious problems of dual nationality.

#### Question of Food Rations

An additional consideration of present significance involves supplementary food rations now allowed to all (non-Occupation) foreign residents of Japan. Were Koreans permitted to register as Korean nationals, there appears to be no non-discriminatory basis upon which this extra ration could be withheld from them. This extra ration is already an onerous burden, and the feasibility of withdrawing it from all foreign nationals in Japan is now being examined by this Headquarters. In the absence of a decision to withdraw it, it is clear that its extension to 600,000 Koreans, in addition to the 8,000 occidentals and 36,000 Chinese and Formosans

who now

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Enclosure to Tokyo's Despatch  
No. 111, February 18, 1949.

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who now receive it (despatch no. 63 of January 29, 1949), would be an extremely heavy and disproportionate load.

#### Position of Korean Government

It is realized that standards for registration of persons in Japan presumably eligible for Korean nationality are to be determined by the Republic of Korea. Legally, it may be within the power of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to prevent registration of these persons if he determines that the standards for such registration are violative of international law or unduly prejudice the position of Japan. The Supreme Commander should seek by appropriate diplomatic consultation to ensure that the Korean Government imposes standards mutually acceptable to both parties. It would appear imperative that the Korean Government be apprised of those considerations which this Headquarters believes to be controlling and that the Korean Government be urged to formulate its position in accord with these considerations.

#### Political Considerations

The policy presently followed by this Headquarters has not been aimed toward resolving political conflicts among Korean elements in Japan. It is of course desirable that the strength of leftist Koreans be eliminated or reduced to a minimum; but it is submitted that this is part of a more general political problem in Japan and elsewhere. There would appear to be little that politically moderate Koreans in Japan could do by virtue of recognition of their Korean nationality that could not be accomplished by them at present, although Koreans in Japan have constantly and vociferously assumed that recognition of foreign national status for them would mean greatly enlarged privileges and have been inclined to resort to violence to support their demand for privilege. Korean groups in Japan have been attempting since the surrender of Japan to assert their independence of Japanese legal process and in practice they have achieved considerable success in these efforts, notably in the fields of taxation and education. At the same time they have constantly endeavored to obtain recognition as foreign nationals, obviously in the hope of obtaining even greater privileges. Recognition of foreign national status without United Nations national status would mean little in legal terms, although Korean assumptions in this regard have an undeniable psychological validity in the face of present weak law enforcement in Japan and of the ineffectual position of the country's disarmed police.

#### Arguments in Favor of General Registration of Korean Nationals

Although the observations contained in the foregoing paragraphs embody the Mission's conviction with regard to the desirability of deferring until later Japan-Korea determination of their mutual nationality problems, it is recognized that a plea for the registration as Korean nationals of Koreans residing in Japan may be put forward in insistent form. The following paragraphs accordingly present the arguments favoring a general registration of Korean nationals in Japan.

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The Republic of Korea may well press for recognition and special treatment of those Koreans in Japan who are considered to be Koreans by birth, or who while possessing in many instances dual nationality may wish to elect Korean nationality. The Korean Government might insist that those Koreans in Japan who can meet its nationality requirements, and who wish to assume such status, be permitted to register as Korean nationals (within a specified time period) with the Korean Liaison Mission in Japan. Presumably, an oath of allegiance to the Republic of Korea would be included among such requirements, and probably provision would be made for final approval of documentation by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Seoul.

In this connection, it is to be hoped that the Korean Government and SCAP would find it mutually advantageous to keep the registration of Koreans in Japan to a minimum through the establishment of strict, as opposed to lax, registration criteria. The determination of appropriate factors of limitation of a qualitative nature to be applied in this regard might best be worked out through diplomatic discussion with the Korean Government at Seoul. Presumably Koreans with communist sympathies or affiliations would be unwilling to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of Korea; an appreciable number would probably prefer to retain, or to take steps to acquire, Japanese citizenship; and a relaxation of restrictions on transfer of currency and property of repatriated Koreans might somewhat reduce the total. The time element involved in the registration process by the Korean Mission could alone be expected further to reduce in some degree the impact of such action upon Japan's political, economic, and social structure.

As properly registered Korean nationals, it would probably be decided by SCAP that such persons would be treated as foreign nationals in all respects, including the receipt of the foreign national supplementary ration for such time as it may remain in effect. In the matter of legal rights, until such time as Korea is admitted to the United Nations, Korean nationals, under existent Occupation directives, would continue to be subject to Japanese criminal jurisdiction except for offenses against the Occupation.

There are indications that the Korean Government may in the near future find it politically inadvisable to refuse to accord recognition to Koreans in Japan or to prescribe the establishment of a domicile in South Korea as a prerequisite to the issue of the documentation of Korean nationality.

In his New Year's message to the editor of the New World News in Osaka, President RHEE referred to "our six hundred thousand residents in Japan", and stated that the head of the Korean Liaison Mission in Japan "will do all he can in the interest of the Republic and its citizens in Japan". Additionally, the head of the Mission requested the views of his Government regarding the position allegedly taken by the South Korean Interim Government in August, 1948 to the effect that all Koreans residing in Japan should be given the opportunity of choosing between Japanese and Korean nationality and that those who choose Korean nationality be considered as foreign nationals and treated equally with other foreign nationals in Japan not connected with the Occupation; that as foreign nationals in

Japan

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Enclosure to Tokyo's Despatch  
No. 111, February 18, 1949.

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Japan Koreans should be obliged to obey all laws of the Japanese Government; and that the Government of Korea recognizes the right of the Japanese Government to deport Korean illegal entrants and criminal elements but denies that the Japanese Government has the right to deport Koreans because they are unemployed.

If Koreans resident in Japan should be given the opportunity to register and be recognized as nationals of the Republic of Korea, it might be anticipated that many Koreans considered as following and paying lip-service to Korean leftist leadership in Japan will register and thereby affiliate themselves with the present Korean Government. Politically, the proffer of recognition as Korean nationals to those who qualify and register would afford Korean moderates in Japan their first opportunity effectively to counteract presently growing leftist leadership, and would undoubtedly result in strengthening the prestige of the Republic of Korea among its supporters in Japan. Furthermore, from a security standpoint, a purpose would be served in having Korean residents subject to precise identification and affiliation. The right to deport illegal Korean entrants and criminal elements would, of course, in any event remain unchanged.

#### Conclusions

In broad terms, the effect of a system of general registration of Koreans in Japan as Korean nationals should be expected to harden the separation of the Korean community from Japanese without in any way serving to diminish the number of Koreans in Japan who constitute the problem under discussion. Such registration would have the additional disadvantage of losing the potential gain inherent in offering the individual Korean the alternative choice of repatriation on the one hand or election of Japanese nationality and Japanese residence on the other (which is indubitably the outline of the only possible permanent solution to any minority population problem in the large proportions of present Korean residence in Japan). It is clear that, should the Korean Government successfully insist on such registration, the optimum solution of Japan's complex Korean problem would suffer a serious setback. This Mission is in consequence seeking to obtain acceptance of the principle that ultimate settlement of problems arising from the presence in Japan of Koreans should be deferred until direct negotiation between the Korean and Japanese Governments is possible, necessary interim working decisions on a temporary basis being confined to a scope which would not prejudice ultimate settlement by negotiation.

This Mission as the Diplomatic Section of General Headquarters has currently recommended to the Korean representative that, in view of the extensive scope of the problem involved and the probability that it will ultimately be settled by agreement between the Governments of Korea and Japan, he take no steps to register or document any Korean resident in Japan, particularly in the absence of any instruction from his Government in this regard; that he inform those persons who raise the question that he has referred the entire matter to his Government for consideration and early action; and that he make his recommendations in the matter to his Government with a view to decisions at an intergovernmental level. We have been confidentially informed that the Korean representative in a letter of February 4, 1949 to President Rhee has recommended that the President discuss the situation with Ambassador MUCCIO and that, if agreeable to both, the question be referred to Washington.

RBFinn/DMBane/CCoville/gmd

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Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 111 of  
February 18, 1949 from the United States  
Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject:  
"Status of Koreans in Japan."

COPYMEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Tokyo, February 3, 1949.

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Koreans in Japan

PARTICIPANTS: Mr. Eiji WAJIMA, Director of the Control Bureau of the  
Foreign Office.

Mr. Richard B. Finn

1. Mr. Eiji WAJIMA called to discuss Korean problems. He stated that the Japanese Government is preparing a study on the problem of Koreans in Japan. Several ministries concerned, notably the Finance Ministry, have not yet submitted reports to be used in this study. Mr. Wajima observed that the Finance Ministry has been having particular difficulties with the Koreans.

2. The principal consideration motivating the Japanese at present in regard to Koreans in Japan is to get them out of Japan. Mr. Wajima said that there is considerable feeling that since the Japanese were forcibly removed from places on the continent of Asia, the Koreans in Japan should likewise forcibly be removed from Japan to Korea. He acknowledged, of course, that forcible removal of these Koreans was, as a practical matter, impossible now or in the future.

3. In this connection he submitted an informal memorandum, giving his own personal opinion, stating that questions of nationality of Koreans in Japan could be deferred until a peace settlement, but that measures had to be taken for the interim treatment of Koreans in Japan. The pertinent portion of the memorandum stated as follows:

"The Japanese Government thinks it proper

- (a) to treat Koreans now residing in Japan as non-Japanese in all future legislation, and
- (b) to amend the laws and regulations now in force in such a way as to give them the status of non-Japanese in every aspect of the administrative field."

4. Mr. Wajima appeared to feel that by treating Koreans as non-Japanese the possibility of ultimately ridding Japan of all Koreans was greater. I said that in my opinion Japanese law enforcement would be more difficult if Koreans were to be treated as non-Japanese and thus led to believe they had foreign national status. Mr. Wajima agreed but indicated that in the long run his position might be more effective

CONFIDENTIAL

in setting



Enclosure No. 2 to  
Tokyo's Despatch No. 111,  
February 18, 1949.

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in setting Koreans apart from Japanese and contributing to their removal from Japan.

5. We agreed that as far as current problems of law enforcement — police action, tax collection, etc. — are concerned, there is no great difference between treating them as Japanese or as foreign nationals, particularly since they will not acquire UN national status. The principal problem is to increase the effectiveness of the police and the tax collectors. / 7mm

6. Most Koreans in Japan appear to be dual nationals. The Japanese Government never permitted Koreans to transfer their koseki from Korea to Japan but nevertheless during the period of Japanese annexation of Korea they acquired a subordinate Japanese nationality whether they lived in Korea or Japan. A few Koreans in Japan acquired full Japanese nationality by process of adoption into Japanese families, but even these could readily acquire Korean nationality by canceling their entry in a Japanese koseki. Mr. Wajima said that nearly all Koreans in Japan are extremely eager to acquire Japanese nationality and that the present offer for adoption by Japanese is ¥2,000,000.

I pointed out that if Koreans were registered by the Korean Mission as Korean nationals, their dual national status would be clearly recognized and that this in effect might constitute an election of nationality by these Koreans, even though Mr. Wajima's memorandum recommended that such an election be deferred until a peace settlement; I also said that the United States had always found it extremely desirable to reduce the incidence of dual nationality and that it would probably be to the mutual advantage of Japan and Korea that the problems of dual nationality involving Koreans in Japan be kept to a minimum.

7. Koreans in Japan cannot vote because they are registered in Korea. Because Japan's voting regulations require that persons eligible to vote must be registered in Japan, most of the Koreans in Japan are disenfranchised. I agreed with Mr. Wajima that under present conditions it was probably not desirable that Koreans in Japan be allowed to vote, but at the same time I said that this restriction appeared to set up a subordinate type of Japanese citizenship which seemed to me to violate the provisions of the new Constitution calling for complete equality of all Japanese nationals.

8. Mr. Wajima gave his view that the Japanese at present are not confident of their ability to handle a serious minority problem of this nature and that if conditions should improve to the point where there would be a peace treaty and establishment of Japan as an independent nation, the Japanese would be more willing to attempt to absorb at least some of the Koreans into the Japanese community as Japanese. At the present time, however, the Koreans constitute a rather serious menace to the stability and orderly processes of the Japanese Government.

In this

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Enclosure No. 2 to  
Tokyo's Despatch No. 111,  
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In this connection, Mr. Wajima said that the Japanese have always considered the Koreans to be an inferior race. He said that a very elaborate study on the racial characteristics of Koreans had been prepared during the war and that it had concluded that the mental and social capacities of the Koreans were of a very primitive nature. He said that this feeling on the part of the Japanese that Koreans are inferior to a great extent motivates Japanese uncertainty and hostility in regard to the Koreans.

9. As for policies to be followed at present toward Koreans, Mr. Wajima and I ended in general agreement: The question of their nationality could be postponed; the Japanese Government should be free to apply all provisions of Japanese law to Koreans and should be able freely to deport Korean lawbreakers and other undesirables. I think Mr. Wajima ultimately agreed with me that during this interim period it would be preferable that these Koreans not be registered as Korean nationals lest law enforcement problems become aggravated.

10. Mr. Wajima emphasized that he was speaking in a purely personal capacity and that the Foreign Office study would constitute an official expression of Japanese views on this problem. I got the impression that this study will not be ready for at least several months.

R. B. Finn

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RBFinn:hh


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THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ACTION is assigned to



Despatch No. 216

American Mission in Korea

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY Return to DC/R Files when ACTION is completed.

Seoul, April 13, 1949

Action Assigned to

Action Taken *submitted*

*DC/R NA*

Subject: Status of Koreans in Japan

NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS

Date of Action *5/4/49*

APR 28 1949

Action Office Symbol *NA*

The Honorable The Secretary of State, Washington.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Name of Officer *W.H.F.*

*File*

Reference to DC/R *File*

Sir:

With reference to Despatches No. 580, September 3, 1948, and 111, February 18, 1949, from the United States Political Advisor in Tokyo, to the Department, presenting views on the status of the Koreans in Japan, I have the honor to offer the comments of this Mission thereon.

The opinion of both the Supreme Commander Allied Powers and the United States Political Advisor in Japan can appropriately be summed up as follows: Koreans in Japan, in numbers exceeding six hundred thousand, present a serious problem to American Occupation authorities. Apart from the always existing dislike which the two people, by and large, have had for each other, the post-war separation of Korea from Japan has given the Korean minority there exaggerated ideas of its own importance and of the rights which properly belong to it. Koreans in Japan have tended, in a number of fields, to claim special privileges to which ordinary Japanese are not entitled. In addition, since the problem of stabilizing the economy of Japan is a difficult one and already involves the expenditure of large sums of money by the United States Government each year, the presence of six hundred thousand additional persons serves merely to complicate affairs. As a concluding point, officials in Japan apparently recognize that the great majority of Koreans in that country are affiliated with Communist organizations. As such, they present an extra burden upon both Japanese and American law enforcement agencies.

As a result of these considerations, SCAP has taken the stand that the best solution to the Korean minority problem is to liquidate it as far as possible. This has taken two distinct aspects. On the one hand, American authorities have, in various ways, encouraged as many Koreans as possible to repatriate themselves to their homeland. On the other hand, SCAP has dealt with Koreans who would not return to Korea in virtually all respects as if they were indistinguishable from other Japanese. This parallel action, however, has not settled the problem. Granted that there are valid reasons for encouraging Koreans to leave Japan at the present time, it is still felt that

/SCAP has

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American Mission in Korea  
Seoul, Despatch No. 216

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April 13, 1949

SCAP has underestimated the factors hindering such repatriation.

The Mission feels that it might be appropriate to view some phases of the question from the standpoint of the Korean side. It is believed that the great majority of Koreans was induced (and in some instances, virtually forced) to go to Japan to provide labor for the Japanese war machine in the years after 1931. As is admitted in Enclosure No. 2 to above referenced Tokyo Despatch No. 111, they were given the status of second class citizens and generally kept in an inferior position by the Japanese. When the war ended, it can be assumed that these Koreans had two motivations. One was to retaliate against the Japanese who had treated them badly, by obtaining a privileged position in the country. The other was to return to their homeland. In this, however, they were discouraged by the economic depression in Korea, and by the repatriation regulations of SCAP which limited the amount of property and currency which they might carry back with them to Korea.

In approaching the solution to this difficulty, it should first be recognized that there is a possibility that many additional Koreans will repatriate themselves if they can bring back with them all of their valuables from Japan, and if economic conditions in South Korea improve. While the latter is a fairly long range proposition and may involve slow repatriation over a long period of time, the former is one which can be dealt with immediately. The latest SCAP regulations apparently permit Koreans to bring with them to Korea virtually all of their personal effects and tools of trade. In addition, Koreans are permitted to deposit one hundred thousand Japanese YEN in Japan in return for one hundred thousand Korean WUN to be given to them by the Government of Korea when they arrive in their home country.

It is evident, however, that this is still a negligible figure. Many Koreans must liquidate businesses in Japan, since these cannot be carried back with them and for which they can legally be paid only in Japanese YEN. Such persons are liable to have sums far in excess of one hundred thousand YEN. It must be remembered that even at the Military Exchange Rate of 270 Japanese YEN for one dollar, one hundred thousand YEN is still only \$370.37. At the Military Exchange Rate of 450 Korean WUN to the dollar, the one hundred thousand Korean WUN which repatriates receive upon landing in Korea is only \$222.22. Even these dollar sums are under-valued due to the artificially low exchange rates involved. Accordingly, it would appear that a real inducement to repatriation will not exist until Koreans are allowed to transfer unlimited amounts of currency assets from Japan to Korea. Furthermore, in view of the difference in value between the Japanese YEN and the Korean WUN, arrangements should in justice be made to provide that for each Japanese YEN which a Korean repatriate deposits in a blocked account in Japan, he should be given Korean WUN to the dollar equivalent by the Korean Government upon his return. Although from the SCAP point of view it is undoubtedly true that these arrangements would give to the Korean Government large amounts of Japanese currency in blocked accounts in Japan, which the Korean Government can then use for the expenses of its diplomatic mission in Japan or for imports from Japan, and for which the Korean Government would, if these accounts were not available, have to pay the Japanese economy in hard currency or in material exports, the change in regulation seems justified when it is recalled how the Koreans initially happened to be in Japan, how much equity is on their side of the case, and how the ultimate purpose is to encourage the maximum possible voluntary repatriation.

/Even if all

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April 13, 1949

Even if all of the foregoing is accepted and effectuated, it must still be recognized that large numbers of Koreans will remain in Japan. Accordingly, the question will arise concerning what status should be accorded to these persons. It must be accepted that the Republic of Korea is a sovereign nation which is entitled to the same treatment for its nationals in Japan as any other country. Furthermore, although no peace treaty has yet been signed with the Japanese Government, there can be no doubt that through the Potsdam and Cairo declarations, and through the recognition which has been accorded the Republic of Korea by the United States, the United Nations, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Philippines, Korea has been effectually separated from Japan. This can not, in turn, fail to have some effect upon the legal status of Koreans resident in Japan who are theoretically, at least, indistinguishable in status from their countrymen in Korea. This might not be the case if the Japanese Imperial Government had in times past treated them without the slightest discrimination as it treated all ordinary Japanese subjects. As has been noted, however, the line of delineation even prior to the end of the war was never wiped out. Koreans in Japan therefore would appear to have a valid claim to being recognized as Koreans and as distinct from Japanese. If, in this situation, the Japanese Government wishes to offer full Japanese nationality to such Koreans, and if some Koreans wish to accept it, there can, of course, be no quarrel with such a course of action. It cannot, however, preclude the Republic of Korea from identifying remaining Koreans as its citizens and from attempting to afford them protection.

This appears to be the way in which the situation is developing. A nationality law has recently been enacted by the Korean Government which automatically affirms that all Koreans in Japan, except perhaps those few who may have abandoned their registration in family registers in Korea, are Korean citizens. The Korean Mission in Japan will probably wish shortly to begin the registration of those nationals. It is believed that SCAP would encounter strenuous objection by the Korean Government should it attempt to limit such registration to Koreans who declare their intention to return to Korea within the immediate future. The Korean minority should, in this respect, receive the same treatment as Formosan-Chinese, Swiss, or other foreigners in Japan. The fact that Koreans are by far the largest numerical minority in Japan, although a practical consideration, can not properly affect their legal status. In view of conditions in Korea and of the background explaining the presence of Koreans in Japan, there is every reason to give sympathetic consideration to the Korean viewpoint and no reason at all to help the Japanese liquidate, at no inconvenience to themselves, a minority problem which they created for themselves without regard to the plight of the victims.

It is believed that if official action in regard to registration can be delayed until after appropriate discussions between Korean and American authorities, there can be developed an approach to the problem satisfactory to both parties. By this, it is meant that probably some Koreans in Japan who form the hard core of Korean Communist strength in that country, will be unwilling to register their citizenship with agencies of the Government of the Republic of Korea, which they do not recognize as legitimate. If the announcement of registration, however, is preceded by declarations both by the Korean President and by SCAP authorities that non-registering Koreans will henceforth be considered Japanese in all respects and under no circumstances eligible for later repatriation to Korea, it is probable

/that many

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CONFIDENTIALAmerican Mission in Korea,  
Seoul, Despatch No. 216

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April 13, 1949

that many luke-warm Communists among Koreans will be weaned away from their leftist organizations. This seems probable since it is believed that the great majority of Korean leftists in Japan has adhered to Communist-front organizations not because of intrinsic belief in Communist principles but because of some impatience with their economic position in Japan, and even more, because this has seemed a method of expressing opposition to the cordially disliked Japanese authorities. If it could also be made known to the Koreans who present themselves for registration that they will henceforth be recognized in all respects as neutral, non-enemy nationals (like the Swiss) and if the rightist Korean Residents Union were encouraged to take vigorous action among Koreans, it is probable that the membership and strength of the Communist-controlled League of Koreans Residing in Japan may be sharply diminished.

One of the chief problems heretofore in this connection has been the intolerable burden on the Japanese economy (and ultimately on the United States) which the increased supplementary food rations would cause if most Koreans in Japan were to be placed in the same category as other neutral, non-enemy nationals who now are entitled to extra rations. This difficulty, however, should not prevent their being accorded this legal status. Since the other neutral, non-enemy national minorities in Japan are relatively small in number, the practical solution would appear to involve the elimination of all supplementary food rations to the entire group. A distinction can be drawn between such neutral, non-enemy nationals who have been in Japan since before the end of the war, and those who have legally subsequently returned for purposes approved by SCAP to conduct official or commercial business in Japan. The latter category, whose presence in Japan is presumably of benefit to the Occupation and which is small in numbers, may still be authorized the additional food ration.

It is accordingly recommended that the following steps be taken:

1. The Departments of State and Army come to a final decision concerning American policy toward the Korean minority problem in Japan.
2. On the basis of the policy thus adopted, discussions be initiated by the American Mission in Korea with the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a view to obtaining the concurrence of the Korean Government to this policy and with a view thereafter to joint action by SCAP and Korean authorities in Japan in implementation of this policy.
3. The policy should include the following points:
  - a. SCAP should further liberalize current restrictions on the amount of currency and on the amount of personal property which Koreans in Japan may take with them back to Korea.
  - b. The Korean Government should provide Korean WUN at a fair rate for each Japanese YEN which repatriates deposit in blocked accounts in Japan before departure.
  - c. SCAP might provide transportation at the expense of the Japanese Government for the repatriation of all Koreans who volunteer to return to their homeland.

/d. The Korean

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American Mission in Korea,  
Seoul, Despatch No. 216

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April 13, 1949

d. The Korean Government should announce the concrete preparations which it will make to reintegrate repatriated Koreans into South Korean economic life.

e. Koreans refusing the opportunity to repatriate themselves should be allowed to register their Korean citizenship with the Korean Mission in Japan, with the understanding, as announced by the Korean Government, by the Japanese, and by SCAP, that all non-registering Koreans will henceforth be considered only as Japanese and no longer eligible for repatriation to Korea.


f. Since Koreans thus registered should receive the same treatment as all other neutral, non-enemy nationals, supplemental food rations to the entire group of neutral, non-enemy nationals should be withdrawn except for such of them as have been admitted or re-admitted to Japan in the post-war period to further the purposes of the Occupation.

g. The Government of the Republic of Korea should make plans to utilize a portion of the Japanese YEN which will accrue to it in the blocked repatriation accounts for the purpose of financing and strengthening the Korean Residents Union so as to enable that organization to equal and overtake the rival Communist League of Koreans Residing in Japan in the matter of obtaining the membership and support of the majority of Koreans in Japan.

h. In effectuating "g.", SCAP should, within reasonable limits, make available to the Korean Residents Union facilities (such as trucks and gasoline for which the Union will pay but which would otherwise not be legally available to it) which will strengthen the membership drive and organization of the Union.

i. Also in effectuating "g." the Korean Government should be encouraged to dispatch, and SCAP authorized to admit, able political organizers to Japan who will have complete authority to renovate the structure and activities of the Korean Residents Union; if this is not acceptable to the present leadership of the Union, in Japan, the Korean Government should be prepared to abandon the Korean Residents Union and establish a branch in Japan of the National Society for the Acceleration of Korean Independence, as has in any event been announced, or establish some entirely new organization. If either of the latter events occur, recommendations "g." and "h." would be modified accordingly to aid the new organization.

Respectfully yours,

  
John S. Muccio  
Special Representative

Original and hectograph  
to Department  
Copy to POLAD, Tokyo

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In reply refer to  
NA

*May 27, 1949*

*Hugh*  
Dear Cloyce:

I am forwarding for your information the enclosed informal commentary prepared in FE on Mr. Finn's Staff Study of May 2, 1949 entitled "Status and Treatment of Koreans in Japan".

We have found this study and other papers on the same subject prepared in your office extremely helpful. They have afforded us with a clear comprehensive analysis of a problem requiring urgent attention.

The enclosure has been discussed with Bill Sebald who agrees with the ideas therein propounded. Please let us have as soon as possible any views your office may have on our comments.

Sincerely yours,

*Signed*

Max W. Bishop  
Chief

Division of Northeast Asian Affairs

Enclosure:

Memorandum

Cloyce K. Huston, Esquire  
Officer in Charge,  
Office of the United States Political Advisor,  
Tokyo.

Stamp: DOR - NE USA  
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*P. Hall*

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CONFIDENTIAL  
MEMORANDUM

With the few exceptions discussed below, FE is in general agreement with the Staff Study entitled "Status and Treatment of Koreans in Japan":

1. According to generally accepted principles of international law (see especially Article 43 of the Hague Convention of 1907) the occupying power has the right of exercising within occupied territory only such control as is required for the safety and success of its operations. The Japanese constitution provides that the conditions necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law. It is therefore believed that SCAP's authority, despite the broad power conferred upon him under the Terms of Surrender, could not reasonably be held to extend to nationality matters, the basis for which is determined by municipal law and which directly affect the individual rights and duties of the inhabitants of an occupied area. It is alternatively suggested that steps relative to the renunciation of Japanese nationality be taken in the name of the Japanese Government and in accordance with the requirements of Japanese law. We could not agree to a procedure which would permit SCAP to determine the method or scope of the relinquishment of Japanese nationality. Furthermore, it is United States policy that the Japanese Government be given increasing direction of their own affairs, both national and international.

2. On page 6 of the memorandum it is stated: "SCAP should take steps to control the relinquishment of Japanese nationality and to withhold recognition of foreign national status in the case of those Koreans whose relinquishment of Japanese nationality is not approved". Taken in its context, this procedure has evidently been suggested by USPOLAD as a device for permitting SCAP to prevent a large number of Koreans from suddenly acquiring foreign nationality status. We agree with the objective but not with the procedure. We agree that the sudden presence of a large number of foreign nationals in occupied Japan would present difficult economic and public safety problems. But the proposal that this be prevented through SCAP's withholding permission of registered Koreans to relinquish Japanese nationality would seem to us to tend to create more problems than it would solve. Thus, it would impose upon SCAP and/or the Japanese Government the direct responsibility for withholding relinquishment papers in

particular



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particular cases. It would thereby give rise to acrimonious protests both by those involved and by the Korean Government. Rather than solve the dual nationality problem it would tend to create a third, indeterminate nationality group composed of those who had registered but who had not as yet been permitted to relinquish Japanese nationality. Above all it appears to be a procedure evolved by SCAP, rather than by the Japanese Government, for determining the nationality status of persons now holding Japanese nationality.

We would like to have USPOLAD's comments on the following counter-proposal for preventing sudden large-scale acquisition of Korean nationality. The Japanese and Korean Governments, through commissions established by them, should handle this matter directly under SCAP's guiding hand possibly as a mediator. They should agree on the basic principle that, automatically upon being registered as a Korean, an applicant lose his Japanese nationality (this latter step might require revision of current Japanese law). It is possible that these commissions might then work for a solution along the lines of establishing 4 or 5 offices, under the Korean Mission, in representative geographical areas for processing the registration of those Korean residents in Japan who wished to acquire full Korean nationality. It might be agreed by the Japanese and Korean Commissions that the rate of processing would be relatively slow and that priority would be given to those applicants who had bona fide reasons for retaining residence in Japan.

3. With reference to conclusion #4 on page 8, the statement is made that "no change is necessary in present procedure for repatriation of Koreans". It is suggested that this conclusion be phrased in more positive terms to propose giving maximum practicable encouragement to Korean residents in Japan to return to Korea. Such encouragement might include relaxation of currency restrictions, free transportation, accommodation of Koreans on arrival in Korea, and perhaps some vigorous welcoming gestures on the part of the Korean Government.

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Because of the direct bearing which this problem has on U.S. international relations, FE trusts that it will be consulted before any final program for handling this problem is adopted.

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# INCOMING AIRGRAM

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Date of Action \_\_\_\_\_  
USFO/AD, Tokyo  
Action Office Symbol CA  
Dated: June 25, 1949  
Date of Mailing \_\_\_\_\_  
Name of Officer TRP  
Rec'd: July 1, 1949  
Direction to DC/R file

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

A-165, June 25, 1949.

Department's attention is invited to pages 6 and 7 of the Intelligence Summary no. 2479 issued by General Headquarters, Far East Command, on June 23, 1949 (see copy no. 27 sent to Department), which contains an interesting study of the present attitude of the Chinese minority in Japan. The study indicates that the 30,000 Chinese residents of Japan are tending more and more toward sympathy with the Chinese Communist cause, mainly as a result of Communist Army successes, that Chinese students form the nucleus of the leftist element within the Chinese community, and that personnel of the Chinese Mission in Tokyo are now trying to give the impression that they have always had leftist tendencies.

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JUL 8 1949

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No. 554  
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3/25/76  
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MKW

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE



*BNA*  
JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZENS LEAGUE  
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON OFFICE  
300 FIFTH STREET, N. E.  
WASHINGTON 2, D. C.

**ACTION**  
is assigned to

*BNA* *JHS*

MIKE MASAOKA,  
NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR

TEL: FRANKLIN 8346

November 2, 1949

DIVISION OF  
NORTHEAST ASIAN AFFAIRS  
NOV 2 1949  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

✓ EUR INDEX

The Honorable Dean Acheson  
Secretary of State  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Enclosed are copies of letters which we have this date forwarded to the Australian government through its Prime Minister and its Ambassador to the United States.

I feel the letters are self-explanatory.

Because of the policy described, American citizens are being subjected officially to another nation's program of discrimination.

We wish to take this opportunity to urge you to use your good offices in urging Australia to rectify this situation, a task we are sure can be accomplished if this nation will take official cognizance of the irritation and humiliation the policy has enforced upon American citizens.

Sincerely,

*Mike Masaoka*

Mike Masaoka  
National Legislative Director

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EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
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*Copies of 2 letters, identical, one addressed to Mr. Mahin - Ambassador of Australia was in system DC. The other to Mr. Joseph B. Chifley Prime Minister of Australia*

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JAPANESE AMERICAN CITIZENS LEAGUE  
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMMITTEEWASHINGTON OFFICE  
300 - 5TH STREET, N. E.  
WASHINGTON 2, D.C.

November 2, 1949

His Excellency  
Mr. Norman John Oswald Makin  
Ambassador of Australia  
Washington, D. C.

Excellency:

During the past several months, a situation created by the Australian "white only" policy in Japan has repeatedly been called to our attention.

It is neither the policy nor desire of this organization to examine into the internal affairs of another nation. However, when this policy affects American citizens who are members of this league, then, in the name of simple justice and human dignity, we are forced to act.

The policies of the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan, directed by Australia, are such as to deny facilities, offered to Caucasian American citizens and soldier Occupation personnel, to Americans of Japanese ancestry serving in the same capacity.

Specifically, in Hiroshima, American research workers are faced with racial discrimination officially practiced by Australian occupation forces.

Forty American scientists and technicians of Japanese ancestry stationed within the BCOF zone are barred from Australian operated clubs, canteens, hotels and other recreational facilities, although these are available to American Caucasian scientists. Yet all are doing research work on the effect of the atomic bombings which, eventually, will be utilized by Australia, too.

We have been advised of other specific instances in which American personnel of Japanese ancestry have been denied admission to Australian operated institutions in Japan, although Caucasian Americans are welcomed.

We feel this is a rather harsh and inhuman policy for a nation such as Australia to pursue.

Many of those same American Nisei, now so curtly denied facilities by Australia, served with the Allied Translators and Interpreter Service during the war. This organization provided virtually all of the combat intelligence

COPY



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men and officers who served so faithfully and loyally with Australian troops during the war. It is the organization that was officially commended by King George when he bestowed upon it the Order of the British Empire and stated that "the intelligence supplied (by ATIS) from enemy prisoners and documents was of great value to operations in this (the Southwest Pacific Area) as well as all other theaters of war."

What Colonel Sidney F. Mashbir, war-time commander of ATIS had to say of the service of Japanese Americans in the Pacific is equally as true of Australia and the United States. During a recent address in Arlington National Cemetery on Nisei Soldier Memorial day, he said: "No one can ever truly evaluate the debt which we owe to the loyalty, bravery and extreme devotion to duty of the Americans of Japanese descent. How many hundreds of thousands of American lives and how many billions of dollars of treasure were saved due to the intelligence supplied by their efforts, it is impossible to determine.."

Now, of course, the bitter war is over. Australia is no longer fighting for her freedom and existence. Thanks, in no small measure, to the gallantry of Americans of Japanese ancestry who served so faithfully with Australian and American units, your government has emerged successfully from the war.

But we feel it is a bitter commentary upon the Australian sense of justice that those who served her in time of need, now are the objects of her prejudice and discrimination.

We trust that the Australian government will rectify an intolerable situation as it affects Americans of Japanese ancestry, serving with United States Occupation forces in Japan.

We are calling this matter to the attention of our own State Department. We also feel that unless this situation is rectified, it should be brought before the Commission on Human Rights in the United Nations.

Respectfully yours,

Mike Masaoka  
National Legislative Director

mm:lyy

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In reply refer to  
BNA 894.4016/11-249

DEC 11 1949

My dear Mr. Masaoka:

I wish to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated November 2, 1949 (addressed to the Secretary of State) with which you enclosed copies of letters which your organization has sent to the Prime Minister of Australia and to the Australian Ambassador to the United States protesting policies followed by the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces in Japan respecting access to recreational facilities by Americans of Japanese ancestry.

*Do not use this when the subscription below is used*

Copies of your letter and its enclosures have been forwarded to the appropriate United States authorities in Japan. Your courtesy in supplying copies of your communications on this subject to the Department is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

For the Secretary of State:

William P. Snow  
Officer in Charge, Dominion Affairs

894.4016/11-249

Mr. Mike Masaoka,  
National Legislative Director,  
Japanese American Citizens League,  
Anti-Discrimination Committee,  
300 Fifth Street, N.E.  
Washington 2, D.C.

A true copy of  
the signed original

*W.P.S.*  
WUR:BNA:JHShullaw:jz  
11-25-49  
NOV 30 1949

*mg*  
NA

*MP*  
PL

CS/H

894.4016/11-249



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : BNA - Mr. Shullaw  
FROM : NA - Mr. Green *mg*  
SUBJECT:

DATE: November 15, 1949

DEC 1 1949

I couldn't agree more with Masaoka's letter but do not consider this a matter for Department representations to Australia. It is suggested that appropriate action might be the forwarding of copies of Masaoka's letter to the Acting Political Adviser, Supreme Commander Allied Powers, Tokyo, with the suggestion that, at his discretion, he discuss the matter informally with Mr. Patrick Shaw (or his successor who I understand is about to take over the Australian Mission in Tokyo). It would seem to me that sympathetic pressure in the right direction from the Australian Mission in Tokyo would do more good in moving this matter toward an equitable solution than a heave from the Department which might throw it off the tracks.

In replying to Masaoka it is suggested that you say that the Department is pursuing the matter through appropriate channels and sincerely trusts that an equitable solution may soon be forthcoming.

FE:NA:MGreen:clh

FW 894, 9010/11-249



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To the

Acting United States Political  
Adviser for Japan,  
Tokyo.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Acting Political Adviser a letter dated November 2, 1949 received by the Department from Mr. Mike Masaoka, National Legislative Director of the Japanese American Citizens League, Anti-Discrimination Committee, concerning certain alleged discrimination against American research workers of Japanese ancestry stationed within the British Commonwealth Occupation Force Zone. It will be noted that the Japanese American Citizens League has also sent a letter of protest to the Australian Prime Minister.

A copy of the Department's reply to Mr. Masaoka is enclosed with this instruction. It is suggested that, in the discretion of the Acting Political Adviser, this complaint be discussed with the Australian Mission in Tokyo.

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Enclosures:

- 1. Letter from Mr. Mike Masaoka, dated November 2, 1949, with enclosure. *(copy of letter to Prime Minister of Australia)*
- 2. Letter to Mr. Mike Masaoka, dated November 25, 1949.

894.4016/11-249

RESTRICTED

A true copy of the signed original

BUR:BNA:JHShullaw:jz

NOV 30 1949  
Copy of Mr. Masaoka's letter to State Dept made with attached

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894.4016/11-249  
Lwp