

PS 4200

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(52)

INTERROGATION OF

Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Date and Time: 18 January 1946, 1030-1145 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO
Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth, Interrogator
Captain J. J. Robinson, Interrogator
Mr. Hugh B. Helm
Lt Commander Frank B. Huggins, Interpreter
Miss Edna Hickam, Stenographer

Questions by : Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth
Captain J. J. Robinson

Interrogation by Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth:

- Q. Colonel, yesterday you drew a rough sketch of your position at Wuhu there on the river and the location in regard to Nanking. Will you take a piece of paper and show where your command was located at Wuhu at the time of the Panay incident.
- A. (A sketch was drawn and is attached to original of this interrogation as Exhibit No.) Advance on Nanking was being made by the forces coming from the south, southeast, and I was to make a flanking movement and take Wuhu and go on from there downstream to Nanking. Hence, there was no area of command because they were in a position of advance, the object being Nanking.
- Q. Was there an airfield near Nanking?
- A. No, there was no airfield, either our own or Chinese, it being the first advance in that area.
- Q. Were there any Japanese Naval ships near Wuhu?
- A. No. There were no Naval troops at all.
- Q. Where did the Naval planes come from which attacked the Panay.
- A. I do not know, but believe they came from the direction of Shanghai.
- Q. Did they have a carrier ship at Shanghai?
- A. I do not know.

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Q. How far did the trucks which you sent from Wuhu go toward Nanking -- the trucks which you sent at the request of the British Naval Captain?

A. I deny having much knowledge of when the trucks left, but believe it was in the afternoon sometime and they arrived back in the evening. I do not know the distance they went.

Q. They were dispatched on your orders, were they not?

A. Yes, on the request of the British Captain.

Q. Who was in command of the trucks?

A. Soldiers and a non-commissioned officer.

Q. Did the non-commissioned officer make a report to you on his return?

A. I did not see them at all -- There are about 50 kilometers between Wuhu and Nanking and on the road there was a bridge over a small tributary, which was broken to my knowledge.

Q. Please locate on the map the position of your artillery, your batteries, when they fired on the Ladybird.

A. Right on the bank of Wuhu.

Q. How many guns did you have in action?

A. Twelve 15 centimeter guns. I had 12 guns there but because we were having to move guns to fire downstream I do not believe that more than two or three were used in firing on the Ladybird.

Q. That incident happened on the 12th of what month?

A. I do not believe it was the 12th -- think it was the 10th of December, but it might be one day off, I am not sure.

Q. Before the fall of Nanking?

A. Yes.

Q. At what time of day was it you opened fire?

A. About 1000 o'clock.

Q. You were decorated with the Order of the Golden Kite Fourth Class. According to the Japan Times and Advertiser of January 24, 1942, that decoration was awarded you on account of your action against the British ship Ladybird?

A. That is not true.

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Q. Did you make a statement to a Domei reporter the day you were decorated?

A. No I did not.

Q. You did not have an interview with a newspaper reporter?

A. No I did not.

Q. Did you state at that time that the United States and Britain should be chastised thoroughly in the war of Greater East Asia, and "by so doing this country will console the souls of the war dead".

A. I deny making the statement.

Q. Were you in Tokyo when you received the decoration?

A. Yes I was in Tokyo. I was in Tokyo and the award was given to me by mail. My regiment was a Kyushu Regiment, and thus the award was sent from Kyushu.

Q. Where were you in 1931, Colonel, at the time of the first Manchurian incident?

A. I was in Tokyo.

Q. What work were you engaged in at that time?

A. I was attached to the General Staff.

Q. What Section?

A. The Russian Section.

Q. Did you at that time know an officer named TOJO Hideki?

A. Yes, I knew him and he was in General Staff Headquarters.

Q. What was his position? What Section of General Staff was he in?

A. I believe that he was working in the Organizational Department of the General Staff.

Interrogation by Captain Robinson:

Q. Where were you on December 8, 1941?

A. I was in Tokyo.

Q. How long had you been in Tokyo?

A. I was in Tokyo from April of 1939.

Q. You knew then that events were moving toward war between Japan and the United States?

A. Yes.

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- Q. How long had you thought that war between Japan and the United States could not be avoided?
- A. Ever since the ABCD Agreement.
- Q. In what year?
- A. I believe it was in the summer of 1941.
- Q. Did you consider that Japan was justified in making the attack at Pearl Harbor?
- A. The attack was made after the start of the war. I believe it was justified insofar as it was after the beginning of hostilities.
- Q. What do you consider the beginning of hostilities?
- A. The beginning of hostilities was Pearl Harbor, and insofar as war was started, I believe Japan was justified in attacking Pearl Harbor.
- Q. What was the act which you think constituted the beginning of hostilities?
- A. Being a civilian at the time I am not certain of the events which led up to Pearl Harbor, but believe that while no actual declaration of war had been made, a state of war existed prior to Pearl Harbor, and hence the attack on Pearl Harbor was simply another link in the chain of events.
- Q. What event then was the opening of hostilities?
- A. Being a civilian I was not aware of what the actual event precipitating the war was, but believe there must have been something before Pearl Harbor.
- Q. You said there was a state of war existing before Pearl Harbor. Therefore, you assumed the responsibility of saying there had been an event which constituted the beginning of the war. Now I want to know what it was.
- A. There must have been a declaration of war prior to the attack by Japan, but being a civilian I do not know for certain and I believe an attack without a declaration of war is not a good thing.
- Q. You understood that Japan was bound by the Hague Treaty to give notice before she attacked the United States?
- A. Yes, I am aware of that.

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Q. And therefore you consider that Japan did violate international law by starting the war without having given a declaration of war.

A. Yes, I believe that.

Q. And therefore you disapprove the Pearl Harbor attack?

A. I believe that the Cabinet had made a declaration of war; I received that news about noon. I believe an attack without a declaration of war is not good.

Q. What leads you to think that the Cabinet had declared war?

A. I believe that if they had not made a declaration of war there would be no reason for them to attack Pearl Harbor.

Q. You knew TOJO at this time, the Premier?

A. I am fairly certain that I have not met TOJO except when we were in General Staff together.

Q. Then you have not met TOJO since 1931?

A. No.

Q. And you have had no correspondence with him by mail or by any personal messenger?

A. No.

Q. Why didn't you have any associations with him? Did you object to him? Did you think his leadership was bad?

A. Since I was put on the Reserve List I had very little to do with any Regular Army officers.

Q. You were a leader of these various Societies?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they oppose TOJO's policies?

A. Very few of these people had actual contact with TOJO.

Q. That was not the question. I asked -- did these societies you were leader in oppose TOJO's policy?

A. No they did not oppose it.

Q. Did they support it?

A. They did not support it either. Being a civilian I had no connection with these matters.

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Q. These were patriotic societies?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore, they were supposed to be supporting the Premier and the Government of Japan?

A. You are somewhat misled in believing that the Japanese civilian organizations had anything to do with the Cabinet. The Japanese civilian organizations have no connection whatsoever with the Cabinet.

Q. Did these political societies support or oppose the policy of the national government?

A. We did not oppose them; we supported them. I believed that when the ABCD agreement was made we would have to fight the United States.

Q. Why?

A. Japan would be in a precarious position as far as food, oil, and other materials went, and I believed that in this chaotic state it would be necessary to fight the United States.

Q. What about Great Britain?

A. I believed at the time of the Tri Partite Pact that England was behind China in the China incident and I stated that we would have to (literally) get rid of England before we could clear up this matter.

Q. That policy of Great Britain and the United States in regard to China really dated from the 1922 treaty did it not -- the Nine Power Treaty?

A. No, I do not believe it was in accordance with this pact. However, I was very young at the time of the Nine Power Pact and do not know a great deal about it.

Q. It was the pact in which Japan, China, Great Britain, and six other nations agreed to what was known as the open door policy in China.

A. Yes, I know that.

Q. Did you approve or oppose the open door policy for China?

A. Being very young when it came into effect, and not feeling, later on, that it was any longer in effect, I did not feel one way or the other about it.

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- Q. When did you think it ceased to be in effect?
A. I knew very little about it and, therefore, did not think of it.
- Q. You were 32 years of age when it came into effect, were you not? You had graduated from military academy 15 years before it came into effect, and still you say you were too young to know anything about it.
A. I knew of the treaty, but I say that I was not of an age yet to be thinking much about things of this type.
- Q. You had been connected with the Special Service Branches of the Japanese Army?
A. Yes I had.
- Q. And your Army connections had been such that it was your duty to keep in touch with relations with other nations, was it not?
A. Yes. Particularly in regard to Russia.
- Q. And Russia was a party to the Nine Power Treaty of 1922?
A. I don't believe it was a member.
- Q. You had opposed Naval Limitation Treaty of 1924?
A. I did not like it.
- Q. You made speeches in which you said that the Japanese had been misled and had been mistaken in entering into that treaty.
A. No I did not. Lectures were not permitted.
- Q. How about the publication of pamphlets?
A. No, none at all.
- Q. How did you express your opposition to those treaties -- that is, both the "Open Door" Treaty and the Naval Limitation Treaty?
A. I made no speeches or anything. I simply thought they were wrong. I did not feel very good about this 5-5-3 ratio.
- Q. How did you express your feeling against it?
A. I did not make it public at all.
- Q. What did you do in private?
A. I naturally spoke to friends of that period about the matter.
- Q. Including friends in the Army and in the Government?
A. Yes, to fellow officers and people of that period.

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- Q. To what fellow officers and what members of the government did you speak regarding your opposition to these treaties?
A. That is so long ago I do not remember who it might be.
- Q. Did you speak to ISHIHARA, Kenji?
A. I had not met ISHIHARA, Kenji at that time.
- Q. You met him in 1936?
A. No I had never met him. I have never met him.
- Q. Have you met MITSUI?
A. Yes, this man was a member of the House of Representatives, so I had a great deal of contact with him.
- Q. You had met SASAKI, Jiro?
A. I do not know this man.
- Q. You remember the incident of February 26, 1936?
A. Yes.
- Q. You counselled with the young officers preparatory to that incident, did you not?
A. No not prior to the incident.
- Q. At the time of the incident then?
A. At the time of the incident, because the incident had occurred, I went to stop it.
- Q. Whom did you see in regard to stopping it?
A. I met a Captain by the name of MURANAKA.
- Q. What did you say to him?
A. I told him to stop it.
- Q. Where did you see him?
A. At the War Minister's home.
- Q. At what time?
A. Two o'clock in the morning.
- Q. What did he say to you?
A. He stated that he would not quit.
- Q. Why?
A. He did not give any reasons.
- Q. You knew what his reasons were, did you not?
A. I believe that what he meant was that once it was started he would go through with it.

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- Q. You knew that one reason for that revolt or uprising was opposition to the Open Door Treaty and to the Washington Naval Limitations Treaty?
- A. I do not know that.
- Q. What did you think had caused the uprising? What were the reasons behind it?
- A. I believe it was in order to do away with the political parties.
- Q. No other reason? Nothing to do with international affairs? Had the Army approved the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty?
- A. Naturally they approved it as it was ratified.
- Q. What do you mean by approved?
- A. Because it would not be ratified unless the Army approved it.
- Q. I mean after it had been ratified and while it was in effect, did the Army not object to it?
- A. It did not.
- Q. The February 26 incident then was not in any way a protest against the 1922 Treaty, Open Door China Treaty, or the Naval Limitation Treaty by the Army?
- A. I do not know these officers at all and I do not know anything about how they felt about international matters. I simply believe it was an incident fomented in order to dissolve the political parties. I was in Mishima commanding my regiment when the incident took place, and I came to Tokyo that night in order to try to stop them.
- Q. Why was the Army opposed to the political parties?
- A. The two major political parties were hand in glove with the financiers, that is the Zaibatsu and consequently there was a rise of moneyed interests, with the result that the Army was held down and hence they naturally opposed these parties.
- Q. On the international policy of these parties, did the Army not oppose them on that ground?
- A. I have not heard much about that.
- Q. Of course we can't believe that. You were political leader here, and we want to know what your attitude was as a political leader and as a member of the Army toward these treaties which the Army considered as cutting down Japanese national prestige and power.
- A. Because these political parties were in with the moneyed interests they thought nothing of the common people, and politics were extremely corrupt, hence I opposed them strongly.

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- Q. I repeat my question. Did you oppose them also on the ground of their international policies as represented by these treaties?
- A. I therefore stated that a war with the United States was inevitable following the ABCD Agreement. Prior to this I said nothing. However, I did oppose the 5-5-3 ratio as stated before.
- Q. How did you oppose it?
- A. We officers were not able to make any statements to the press or make any speeches, etc., therefore I did not actively voice my opinions.
- Q. What do you mean then when you said you did oppose it?
- A. Simply telling people in gatherings and among friends, things of that sort.
- Q. In what gatherings?
- A. Not in any large gatherings, but when some members of the House of Representatives and people like that were gathered, I opposed this treaty.
- Q. Did you make speeches in the House of Representatives opposing the treaty?
- A. No I did not.
- Q. Did anyone make speeches in the House opposing the treaties.
- A. I do not think so.
- Q. You did favor the expansion of the influence of Japan in the Greater East Asia League; did you not?

RECESSED FOR LUNCH 1145 hours

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Date and Time: 18 January 1946, 1515-1630 hours
Place : Same
Present : Same

INTERROGATION BY CAPTAIN ROBINSON:

Q. Was there any answer that you made this morning that you would like to correct, or any explanation you would like to add?

A. No.

Q. You have travelled in America and Europe?

A. In Europe, yes, but not in the United States.

Q. You have never been to the United States?

A. No.

Q. When were you in Europe?

A. I was in Europe in 1928-1929 and 1930.

Q. What part of Europe did you visit?

A. Mainly in Istanbul.

Q. Where else?

A. Russia, the Balkans, Germany, France and England. Apart from Istanbul my travels in these other countries were for a period of about one week only.

Q. Did you see anything in these other countries which influenced you in your later policies with regard to Japan?

A. No I did not. However, I did study a good deal about Russia's policies and politics, etc.

Q. Did your study of Russian policies lead you to any plan or policy with regard to Japan?

A. Not particularly. However, I did believe that there was danger of the Comintern fostering its communistic ends in Japan, and I did not like this.

Q. Have you seen any indications of the Comintern interfering in Japan's affairs?

A. Around 1922 men by the names of SANO and YAMAKAWA started the Japanese Communistic Party and were active from then on in spreading Communistic propoganda in Japan. I made quite a study of Communism in Japan.

Q. Did your study influence your policy with regard to enlarging the Japanese Army?

A. No, not because of any study of the Communist policy. I have never advocated increasing the size of the Japanese Army.

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- Q. Haven't you stated that with the British closing in and the Russians closing in, and the Dutch and America, Japan would have to increase her Army to protect herself against these powers that were closing in on her?
- A. I have never made such a statement.
- Q. Have you heard others make it in Japan?
- A. I do not believe there were many people who advocated an increase in the size of the Army, but I do believe there were many who advocated mechanizing the Army.
- Q. What was your policy when you were in the Diet in regard to voting appropriations for the Army? Were you for smaller appropriations or larger appropriations?
- A. There has never been any argument in the Diet on such matters.
- Q. Who has determined how big appropriations for the Army should be?
- A. The Cabinet. The Army and Navy let the Cabinet know what they need and the Cabinet in turn passes it on to the Diet. There has never been an argument on this matter. It has always been passed without discussion.
- Q. Including the large secret funds that could be disposed of without any accounting?
- A. There is never any detailed accounting of the budget for the Army and Navy. It is simply the overall requests for appropriations.
- Q. Have you ever received any Army funds for the purpose of financing the patriotic societies you have been officially connected with?
- A. I have never received a penny from such sources.
- Q. How have these societies been financed?
- A. Membership dues and no other funds.
- Q. And no other funds?
- A. No other funds. My societies never used much more than one thousand yen a month.
- Q. Going back to your policy with regard to the size of the Army, you say you have never favored an enlarged Army because of the possible closing in of Russia or England or the Netherlands or the United States? That is true, is it not?
- A. Yes. I never have. I did say that they should build more airplanes.
- Q. Have you ever favored a larger Army in order that Japan might exercise greater influence in East Asia?
- A. No I have not.
- Q. In March of 1941 the Greater East Asia League was formed, was it not, with you as a permanent director?
- A. I have never heard of such a society.

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- Q. Did you say this morning that you had had no conversation with Premier TOJO or members of his official cabinet or government after he became Premier on 19 October 1941?
- A. I have only seen him in the Diet, and have never had any conversation with him. If you will ask TOJO I am sure he will corroborate my statement. Since the end of the war I did meet him once in a train, but we did not speak to each other.
- Q. It is not true then that you were a member of a small unofficial ring of leaders in his government who helped to shape imperial policy?
- A. I do not see how I could be because I have not had any dealings with TOJO.
- Q. Do you know that that statement has been made in regard to your activities here?
- A. I do not know. I have not seen him.
- Q. Calling your attention to Russia and Communism again, did you ever state that unless a Fascist Party could be created as a bulwark, Japan would be engulfed by Communism?
- A. No I did not.
- Q. How many times have you been the subject of disciplinary action by the Japanese military authorities?
- A. I was censured at the time of the 2-26 incident and after the October incident and also when I was at the War College.
- Q. In addition to being censured, you were in prison, were you not, after the 1936 incident?
- A. I was not taken to jail but I was under house arrest.
- Q. For how long a period?
- A. For 20 days.
- Q. What was the reason for the censure in each case?
- A. In the February incident I was disciplined for having come to Tokyo without orders. In the October incident I was taken into custody on the charge that I had not listened to General Orders over a period of time. And when at the War College for being AWOL.
- Q. Only three instances then?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How many times have you been placed on inactive duty or at least relieved of active duty in the nature of a disciplinary treatment?
- A. Those are the only cases.
- Q. The statement then that you have been disciplined by the Army eighty times is erroneous to the extent of 77 times?
- A. Yes, absolutely. If I had been as bad as you paint me I could not have been an officer.

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- Q. That is not my statement. That statement is in the record here.
Do you have any enemies who would make such a statement about you?
- A. The Communists might make such a statement. I do not believe that there would be any others.
- Q. Going back to the 1936 incident and the disciplinary action taken then, how many miles was it from your station to Tokyo?
- A. About three hours by train.
- Q. The incident occurred on the 26th of February and you came to Tokyo early in the morning of the 27th of February.
- A. No, I believe I arrived here about eight o'clock in the evening of the 26th.
- Q. You knew then that the incident was going to take place before it occurred?
- A. The incident took place in the morning.
- Q. How did you learn of it so quickly?
- A. By phone.
- Q. From whom did you learn of it?
- A. From a man named MATSUNOBU, Shigeji.
- Q. Why did he call you?
- A. This man MATSUNOBU is just a friend of mine, a civilian in Tokyo, and he called me to say that an important event had taken place.
- Q. And you immediately took the train for Tokyo?
- A. I then spoke to my Brigade Commander who told me not to go, but I argued the point until he gave me permission of a sort to go but to return the next morning. I did go therefore and returned by the six o'clock train, arriving back at my regiment about nine.
- Q. Why were you disciplined then?
- A. Because he told me to go and come back immediately and I did not return until the next morning.
- Q. Why did you not come back until the next morning?
- A. I wanted to go to the War Minister's home and speak to these people immediately, but was not able to enter the premises at that time.
- Q. That does not answer the question. How did that delay you?
- A. I could not get in -- I finally got in at 0200 AM and was there for about one hour and came back by the six AM train.
- Q. What did you do while there, after getting in?
- A. I told them to stop doing what they were doing and to surrender.
- Q. Did you see your friend who had called you by telephone?
- A. No I did not.

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- Q. You had know that an incident of this kind was about to occur, had you not?
- A. No, I knew nothing about it.
- Q. You never suspected the likelihood of such an incident occurring?
- A. I never even suspected such a thing.
- Q. Why did you think they would listen to you when you told them to stop?
- A. I knew Captain MURANAKA slightly from before, so that I figured if I spoke to him he would listen to me.
- Q. Was he a leader in the incident?
- A. Not the leader, one of the members of it.
- Q. You had talked to him before about the possibility of such an incident occurring?
- A. I had not seen him for a considerable period of time prior to the incident.
- Q. You had never discussed with MURANAKA matters of political nature or of Army policy or the possibility of an Army incident?
- A. No I did not. -- I went first to the Kempei Tai Headquarters where the members of the War Ministry had fled, and asked them did they not think it was a rather shameful thing for them to be fleeing from their own quarters, and I gave them hell along these lines and then proceeded to go there, being the first to enter the premises, where I found MURANAKA and spoke to him. I did not know until I entered the premises that I would meet MURANAKA.
- Q. Why did you come down from your Regiment unless you knew you --
- A. I came down from the Regiment after the phone call, and it was only after I entered the War Minister's residence that I discovered the man there I knew.
- Q. Who were the members of the War Ministry whom you say you reprimanded?
- A. They were all sitting around eating dinner when I arrived. The ones there were only Lieutenant Colonels and under, no high ranking officers. The place was full of members from GHQ and the War Ministry.
- Q. Was the War Minister there?
- A. No he was not.
- Q. Was the Inspector General of Military Education there?
- A. No none of the higher-ups were there?

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Q. How many people or how many officers of the Japanese War Ministry were assassinated in that February 26 incident?

A. SUZUKI was wounded badly, was he not? And OKADA the Prime Minister was saved (musing to himself). I am sorry but I can not recall exactly how many there were at the moment.

Q. Well, it was at least five, was it not?

A. I believe so. I can not recall at the moment very well.

Q. Had you known AIZAWA?

A. Yes I knew him very well when I was a youth at the Military Academy, but later had no dealings with him.

Q. What was his connection with the February 26 incident?

A. I do not believe there was any connection.

Q. You think not?

A. Yes.

INTERROGATION BY MR. HELM:

Q. Colonel, after the war was started, you helped organize several political societies, did you not?

A. The IRAPS is the only one that I took part in organizing. I also had connections with the IRAA.

Q. What was the purpose of these organizations.

A. The IRAA was formed in 1940 during the time of the KONOYE Cabinet. At this time the reputation of the two major political parties became bad and they dissolved themselves, so that in order to have one unified political party the IRAA was set up, and I was one of the directors of this organization.

Q. Did that organization continue after the attack on Pearl Harbor? That is, during the war?

A. Yes.

Q. Would you say that after the war one of its main purposes became to assist in the successful prosecution of the war?

A. Yes.

Q. To what extent?

A. This society had no political affiliations and hence our way of prosecuting the war was to tell the people to grow more rice or to work in factories, or to keep the national spirit up -- things of this type.

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Q. Now in 1944 were you connected with an organization known as DAI NIPPON SANGYORODO DAN?

A. I had no connection with such an organization.

Q. Were you connected with DAI TOA DOSHI KAI?

A. There were no such organizations.

Q. Radio Tokyo reported that you were at an inaugural ceremony of this society on 9 January 1945 at the Tokyo Imperial Hotel.

A. DAI TOA DOSHI KAI -- There was no such organization.

Q. On 17 February 1945 did you resign from IRAPS?

A. Yes. Although I do not recall the date.

Q. Why?

A. I was sick and tired of how they were following the cabinet and everything that was said there, so 29 of us resigned in protest.

Q. Colonel, did these 29 members of the DIET then form the GOKOKU DOSHI KAI?

A. The 29 of us formed an organization known as the GOKOKU DOSHI KAI.

Q. What were the aims of this society?

A. In order to oppose the IRAPS. A vote of 25 members is needed in the Diet in order to speak on the floor, hence 29 of us gathered together so that we might have a chance to speak our piece.

Q. Was one of the reasons for the formation of this party extreme dissatisfaction with the way the Cabinet was prosecuting the war?

A. Mainly my reasons were not opposition to the way in which the war was being prosecuted, but more the fact that because of the IRAPS the right to speak on the floor of the Diet was being muzzled.

Q. Colonel, in 1945 did you advocate a last ditch stand?

A. Yes I did.

Q. At any time after 1941 did you oppose efforts toward peace?

A. I know of no such movement for peace.

Q. In other words, you were for active prosecution of the war to the bitter end?

A. Yes.

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Q. Colonel, why did you have that attitude?

A. I believed that the United States would land on the mainland of Japan and at that time I believed that we should make an all out attack and defeat them.

INTERROGATION BY INTERPRETER:

Q. Did you believe that last attack would defeat the United States?

A. Yes I thought so. But we were defeated.

REMARKS:

Mr. Helm: Tell him when we come back the next time that if he would like to we would appreciate a prepared statement on the Japanese side of the war and his views on that.

Cmdr Huggins: Will that be Monday or Tuesday? Do you want him to write it?

Mr. Helm: If he wants to.

Cmdr Huggins: What do you mean exactly by that?

Mr. Helm: What he thinks the causes of war were and just the whole Japanese side of the war. I would also like to question him about his political beliefs and principles.

Cmdr Huggins: Causes for war?

Mr. Helm: How Japanese victory would have improved things or what the results of Japanese victory would have been.

Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO

I, Frank B. Huggins, Serial Number 167619, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of pages 1 to 30, inclusive, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Frank B. Huggins

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of February 1946.

G. Woolworth

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

I, Edna M. Hickam, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Edna M. Hickam

We, Gilbert S. Woolworth, Colonel

J. J. Robinson, Captain USNR, Serial No. _____

Hugh B. Helm

certify that on the 17th and 18th of January 1946 personally appeared before us Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO and according to Lt Commander Frank B. Huggins, interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan
4 February 1946

G. Woolworth
J. J. Robinson
Hugh B. Helm

4200

INTERROGATION OF
Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO

DATES:

17 January 1946

18 January 1946

INTERROGATORS:

Col Gilbert S. Woolworth

Capt J. J. Robinson

Mr. Hugh B. Helm

343-6

INTERROGATION OF

Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Date and Time: 17 January 1946, 1000-1130 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO
Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth, Interrogator
Captain J. J. Robinson, Interrogator
Mr. Hugh B. Helm
Lt Commander Frank B. Huggins, Interpreter
Miss Edna Hickam, Stenographer

Questions by: Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth
Captain J. J. Robinson

Oath of Interpreter: Administered by Captain Robinson.

Captain Robinson: Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

Commander Huggins: I do.

Interrogation by Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth.

Q. Please state name and rank.

A. Kingoro HASHIMOTO, Reserve Colonel.

Q. What was the date of your birth?

A. 19 February 1890.

Q. What year did you graduate from Military Academy?

A. In 1907 from the Kumamoto Military Academy. Then two years later, in 1909, I graduated from Tokyo Military Academy.

Q. When did you graduate from the Staff College?

A. In 1911 I graduated from the Advanced Military Academy in Tokyo. I became a 2nd Lieutenant towards the end of the year 1911.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. In what branch of service did you serve?

A. As an Artillery Officer.

Q. Where did you serve and in what countries did you serve from 1911 on to 1927?

A. In 1913 I went to the Artillery Engineering School; in 1914 to Chinta Tao. In 1915 I returned to the Artillery Engineering School and graduated from same. In 1917 I entered Military War College, and in 1919 graduated from War College. In 1922 I was attached to General Staff. In 1923 I was attached to the Special Service Organization officer in Harbin. In 1923 I was again attached to General Staff. From 1923 to 1925 I was a Special Service Organization Officer at Manchuli in Manchuria. From 1925 to 1927 I was again attached to General Staff.

Q. In 1927 you became Military Attache to Russia?

A. From 1928 to 1930 I was Military Attache to Turkey.

Q. Were you ever Military Attache to the Embassy in Russia?

A. No.

Q. When did you return from Turkey to Japan?

A. I believe it was in May of 1930 that I returned from Turkey. It might have been April, but I believe it was May.

Q. When did you serve on the staff of the Kwantung Army?

A. I was never on the staff of the Kwantung Army.

Q. Did you ever serve with the Kwantung Army at any time?

A. When I was at Harbin I was under the Kwantung Army, that being part of the area controlled by the Kwantung Army.

Q. That was prior to 1930, was it?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you serve as Chief of the Hailir Special Services at any time? If so, when?

A. Towards the end of 1932.

Q. When did you take command of the 2nd Field Artillery Regiment?

A. In 1933 I was an officer attached to the 2nd Heavy Artillery Regiment. Then in 1934 I became Commanding Officer of this same regiment.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. Then during that year you were promoted to the rank of Colonel?
A. Yes.

Q. Where was the 2nd Field Artillery located at that time?
A. At Mishima. And in 1936 I was retired.

Q. Did you have any part in the formation of the Dai Nippon Seinen To?
A. After being retired in October 1936 I organized this society.

Q. And you were President of the society, were you not?
A. I was head of the society.

Q. What was the purpose of this society?
A. Politics at the time, in my opinion, being corrupt, this society was organized in order to attempt to better the condition. Also:
1. To better Japanese politics by having the Emperor as its central factor.
2. To advance the national structure by the use of the Japanese spirit.
3. To build towards an internal national economy, making it unnecessary to rely on foreign countries.
4. To foster national defense by placing emphasis on the air.
5. To distribute to foreign countries the culture of Japan.

These were the five aims of the aforementioned society.

Q. How was the society supported financially?
A. The society received one yen a year from each member, and it cost about one thousand yen a month to keep it running.

Q. How many members did the society have?
A. I don't know the exact count, but believe that towards the end there were 20,000 members.

Q. Is that society still in existence?
A. It was broken up in 1940. After this was broken up, the principal aim of the society being political change, I started a new organization to advance spirit matters, called the Seki Sei Society; and this society was dissolved in 1944.

Q. What service were you on in 1931?
A. I was attached to General Staff in Tokyo.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. Did you go to Manchuria at any time during 1931?

A. I never did go to Manchuria in 1931.

Q. When were you recalled to active duty after retirement?

A. In August 1937.

Q. Where did you serve.

A. I went to China at that time and returned in 1939.

Q. Did you command an Artillery Regiment in China?

A. I participated in the China incident as Commanding Officer of an Artillery Regiment.

Q. Was that in the neighborhood of Shanghai?

A. Originally I went to North China to a place called Sekkaso, and then very soon afterwards went to Shanghai. I then participated in the attack on Nanking and subsequently went to Rosan. Then I returned to Japan in 1939.

Q. Were you again placed on the retired list in 1939?

A. Yes.

Q. You were decorated, were you not for your services in China?

A. Yes.

Q. What decoration did you receive?

A. The Grand Order of the Imperial Kite.

Q. Where was your regiment stationed at the time of the Panay incident?

A. At a place called Wuhu, on the Yangtze River above Nanking.

Q. Who was the General in command over you at that time?

A. Lieutenant General Yanagawa.

Q. How did the attack on the Panay happen? What caused it?

A. I had no knowledge of the Panay incident until the British gunboat Ladybird passed by Wuhu; I shelled the Ladybird and took it into custody and at that time the Commanding Officer of the Ladybird told me he was going to the assistance of the Panay because he had gotten word that the Panay was in trouble. This was my first knowledge of the incident. I simply knew the Panay was downstream and did not know anything further than that.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. Did you permit the Ladybird to proceed to help the Panay?
- A. Yes I did. Later somebody came requesting use of my trucks to haul some of the Panay wounded, and the trucks did go downstream but returned without accomplishing their mission.
- Q. Under whose orders did you act when you shelled the Ladybird?
- A. This was under orders from Lt Gen YANAGAWA. These orders read as follows: "Hanking being in a state of siege, and it appearing that enemy troops will attempt to flee upstream, Colonel HASHIMOTO is to sink all vessels proceeding towards Hanking without regard to nationality." I believe these orders were issued two days before the fall of Hanking. I believe that was about the 10th of December 1937. These orders were received about 0200 when I was about 5 or 6 miles downstream from Wuhu. Having received the orders I returned to Wuhu and prepared my guns. The next morning the river was heavily fog bound and when the fog lifted at about 1000 I noticed four ships were in the stream, three of which were gray and one ship was painted white. I immediately started shelling them and the three gray ships fled downstream. The white ship came towards our position and it turned out to be the British gunboat, "Ladybird." The other three were Chinese ships which had been landing troops on the shore. While the Ladybird was in my custody, evidently they received a wireless communication to the effect that the Panay had been hit, and the Commanding Officer of the Ladybird asked my permission to go to the rescue of the Panay.
- Q. Where was the Panay at that time?
- A. I can not say where it was, being at a considerable distance. (I point it out on the rough sketch I have made as being somewhere upstream from Hanking.)
- Q. And downstream from Wuhu?
- A. Downstream from Wuhu.
- Q. About how far would you say it was from Wuhu?
- A. I have no idea at all as I could not see any ships, but it was a distance of about 50 kilometers between Wuhu and Hanking.
- Q. Did you see any of the survivors from the Panay?
- A. No.
- Q. Do you know what batteries hit the Panay or how it was hit?
- A. At that time I did not know anything. I saw in the papers that it had been bombed.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. Upon your return to Japan, did you become a member of the IRAA?
A. The Imperial Rule Assistance Political Society (Yokusan Seiji Kai) was started in 1942 for the first time, hence prior to that time there was no society and I was not a member.
- Q. You did become a member of that society later?
A. I was in general affairs of the organization for about six months. Then I was later Vice President of MP's within the organization for another six months, after which I did nothing in the organization.
- Q. Later were you elected to the House of Representatives along about April 1942?
A. Yes in April 1942 I was elected to the House of Representatives.
- Q. How long did you serve in the House of Representatives?
A. I was representative until I was taken to Omori Prison.
- Q. Did you serve as Director of IRAPS?
A. Sometime around the beginning of 1945 I left the IRAPS and with 29 members of the House of Representatives built an organization known as the Gokoku Doshi Kai. I opposed the aims of the IRAPS because it was headed by a group of old politicians.
- Q. Did you at one time belong to the Black Dragon Society?
A. No. I didn't even know where they were.
- Q. Do you know TOYAMA Mitsuru, NAKANO Seigo, and OKAWA Shumei?
A. Yes, I knew all these men.
- Q. Were you a member at that time of the East Asia Society?
A. No.
- Q. Were you at any time a member of Sakura Kai?
A. Yes, I was.
- Q. How was that society financed?
A. This organization had no funds as it was a study organization.
- Q. Were you at this time a member of Kinki Kai?
A. No.
- Q. Were you one of the organizers of Sakura Kai?
A. Yes, I was.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. Do you know what caused the resignation of Premier Hamaguchi in 1931?

A. He was stabbed by a man named SAGOYA.

Q. Who was stabbed?

A. He was stabbed by this man and while he did not die, he was no longer able to appear in Parliament and hence he resigned.

Q. About October or November 1931 were you put in prison for some time?

A. About 17 October 1931 I was apprehended by the Kempei and was in prison for 15 days.

Q. For what reason?

A. I was planning a revolution to overthrow the existing government at that time. I went to General ARAKI to request him to become the head of this new Government, but ARAKI opposed the plan and turned my name into the War Department, so that I was apprehended on the same day.

Q. General Minami was in favor of this revolution, was he not?

A. I did not at that time have any meeting with General Minami so that I do not know how he felt about it.

Q. Were TOJO, DOIHARA and ITAGAKI in favor of this revolution?

A. I had no meeting with them so do not know.

Q. Were you at any time a member of Kokoku Seinen Shoko Domei?

A.

Q. Were you at any time a member of Seiei Kai?

A. I do not know what this means.

Q. Were you acquainted with Major ISHIWARA?

A. Yes, I know him. However, he was a Lieutenant Colonel instead of a Major.

Q. In 1931 he was a Major?

A. I believe he was a Lieutenant Colonel. This man was a Lieutenant Colonel, as I had just become a Lieutenant Colonel.

Q. Were you a member of JINMU KAI?

A. No I was not.

Q. Who founded that organization? Do you happen to know?

A. I believe it was OKAWA.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Interrogation by Captain Robinson

- Q. Referring to the China incident, were you reprimanded by Japanese military authorities for your action in that case?
- A. Nothing was said.
- Q. I understood you to say that your Commanding Officer was Lt General YANAGAWA.
- A. Yes.
- Q. What was the command at that time of General Iwane MATSUI?
- A. General MATSUI was above General YANAGAWA.
- Q. General MATSUI then was your Commanding Officer?
- A. General MATSUI then General YANAGAWA and then a Division Commander.
- Q. I repeat the question. MATSUI was your Commanding Officer?
- A. I was under YANAGAWA, but MATSUI was in charge of all troops in China.
- Q. Including HASHIMOTO and his command?
- A. That is true. However, my orders concerning the Ladybird incident came from YANAGAWA.
- Q. After the incident what did General MATSUI do or say with regard to your action in the Ladybird-Panay incident?
- A. No action was taken.
- Q. Did he talk to you about what you had done in that incident?
- A. I did not see MATSUI.
- Q. Do you know whether or not MATSUI felt that your action in regard to the Ladybird and Panay was the right action?
- A. I did not meet MATSUI so do not know for sure, but believe MATSUI opposed the action. I just heard it from people and therefore was not sure.
- Q. Were you not recalled to Japan immediately following that incident?
- A. No, I later took part in the attack on Rozan.
- Q. You were recalled in 1938?
- A. Yes.

Kingoro, HASHIMOTO

Q. What was the reason for the recall?

A. No -- it was April 1939. Only regular officers who had not been recalled from retirement were used as Regimental Commanders, and hence they said they had no use for me and I was again retired.

Q. Was your retirement due in any part to your conduct in the Ladybird-Panay incident?

A. No.

Q. You were asked to speak in Japan and did make speeches in Japan after the Ladybird-Panay incident, did you not?

A. Yes.

Q. And you in those speeches approved and praised the action that had been taken by the Japanese authorities in those instances?

A. I did not say anything in my lectures about the Panay incident as I did not know about it.

Q. Did you think at that time that the action taken in the Panay incident was right?

A. No, I believe it was a mistake.

Q. Why?

A. Because it was in the papers.

Q. From a military standpoint or international standpoint -- why do you condemn the action of Japan in the Panay incident?

A. I believe they bombed the Panay by mistake, but do not think things of this kind should occur.

Q. Why by mistake? What was the mistake?

A. They bombed it without knowing whether it was friendly or enemy.

Q. Didn't the orders call for bombing whether the ship was friendly or enemy?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore, why was it a mistake?

A. The Panay incident was a Navy affair and Navy Commander HASEGAWA subsequent to the bombing apologized for it as being a mistake, while in my case my orders were clear cut to shoot at any vessel friendly or enemy.

Kingoro, HASHIMOTO

- Q. What was the relation between the Navy Command and your command there at Wuhu and Nanking?
- A. Around my part of the world there was no Navy at all.
- Q. Navy planes took part in the bombing?
- A. There was no liaison where I was.
- Q. Where did those Navy planes come from?
- A. I do not know.
- Q. There was not any coordination then by you in regard to Navy action? Had you not had part in any Navy coordination?
- A. The Navy was not there and I had no liaison with them at all.
- Q. Did you have any communications with the Navy?
- A. None.
- Q. Do you not know who was in command of the Navy planes?
- A. I only heard about it, so have no idea.
- Q. What did you hear?
- A. I only heard from the British Naval Captain aboard the Ladybird that the Panay had been hit and later read in the papers that Navy planes had bombed it.
- Q. You made no investigation then?
- A. Because of the distance from where the Panay was bombed, it was not in my jurisdiction and I carried out no investigation.
- Q. You did send trucks there didn't you?
- A. The trucks were requested by the British Naval Officer who had probably, in my opinion, received wireless communication from somewhere.
- Q. What was the name of the British Naval Officer?
- A. I do not know. -- Where the Panay incident took place was so far from Wuhu I neither saw or heard anything of it.
--- I thought the bombing of the Panay was a mistake.
- Q. Do you consider it to be a mistake from viewpoint of international relations with the United States?
- A. It could not be helped, after all, because it was a mistake; but I did not think that a good thing for relations with the United States.

Kingoro, HASHIMOTO

Q. Did you later learn that machine guns strafed the Panay and survivors?

A. No, I didn't know.

Q. You never heard that?

A. I never heard it.

Q. Didn't the Commander of the Ladybird tell you about it?

A. No.

Q. Where were the survivors he told you to go down and get in trucks?

A. I was simply asked to go downstream.

Q. You received the decoration on 24 January 1942.

A. I do not remember for sure, but think it was not in 1942 but in 1939 that I received the medal.

Q. What was it received for?

A. I believe I received it for my action at Roxan, but there being no letter stating reasons I was not sure.

Q. Was it not in the papers at that time that you received it for the attack on the Panay and the Ladybird?

A. No.

Q. Were you commended or censored for your firing on the Ladybird?

A. I heard that General MATSUI censored me for my action in the Ladybird matter and that General YANAGAWA stated to General MATSUI that I had been only following orders and hence I had done a good job. I was in a fog at about 4,000 meters and I shot at the ships not knowing one was the British gunboat; I stopped when I knew its identity.

Q. What did you think the identity of the ships was when you fired?

A. I believed them to be Yangtze River ferries the Chinese were using for ferrying troops, and when I saw one was a gunboat and believed it might be friendly I ceased fire.

Q. What happened then? Did the gunboat fire back?

A. No.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. What did the gunboat do?

A. The Ladybird came close to shore and I ordered them to anchor there and stand by, at which time a communication from the Panay evidently was received by them. The Ladybird was hit twice by my guns. I did not board the Ladybird and I met the Captain in the Customs Office ashore, which I was using as headquarters.

Q. Why did the Captain come ashore?

A. To speak to me.

Q. Did you order him ashore?

A. No, I did not order him ashore.

Q. Did the Captain then return to the Ladybird?

A. Yes.

Q. And did the Ladybird then proceed.

A. Yes.

Q. To Nanking?

A. I don't know whether it was to Nanking or not, but they went downstream.

Q. Were you a member of the Greater East Asia League formed in 1941?

A. No.

INTERROGATION OF

Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Date and Time: 18 January 1946, 1030-1145 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

Present : Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO
Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth, Interrogator
Captain J. J. Robinson, Interrogator
Mr. Hugh B. Helm
Lt Commander Frank B. Huggins, Interpreter
Miss Edna Hickam, Stenographer

Questions by : Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth
Captain J. J. Robinson

Interrogation by Colonel Gilbert S. Woolworth:

- Q. Colonel, yesterday you drew a rough sketch of your position at Wuhu there on the river and the location in regard to Nanking. Will you take a piece of paper and show where your command was located at Wuhu at the time of the Panay incident.
- A. (A sketch was drawn and is attached to original of this interrogation as Exhibit No.) Advance on Nanking was being made by the forces coming from the south, southeast, and I was to make a flanking movement and take Wuhu and go on from there downstream to Nanking. Hence, there was no area of command because they were in a position of advance, the object being Nanking.
- Q. Was there an airfield near Nanking?
- A. No, there was no airfield, either our own or Chinese, it being the first advance in that area.
- Q. Were there any Japanese Naval ships near Wuhu?
- A. No. There were no Naval troops at all.
- Q. Where did the Naval planes come from which attacked the Panay.
- A. I do not know, but believe they came from the direction of Shanghai.
- Q. Did they have a carrier ship at Shanghai?
- A. I do not know.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. How far did the trucks which you sent from Wuhu go toward Nanking -- the trucks which you sent at the request of the British Naval Captain?
- A. I deny having much knowledge of when the trucks left, but believe it was in the afternoon sometime and they arrived back in the evening. I do not know the distance they went.
- Q. They were dispatched on your orders, were they not?
- A. Yes, on the request of the British Captain.
- Q. Who was in command of the trucks?
- A. Soldiers and a non-commissioned officer.
- Q. Did the non-commissioned officer make a report to you on his return?
- A. I did not see them at all -- There are about 50 kilometers between Wuhu and Nanking and on the road there was a bridge over a small tributary, which was broken to my knowledge.
- Q. Please locate on the map the position of your artillery, your batteries, when they fired on the Ladybird.
- A. Right on the bank of Wuhu.
- Q. How many guns did you have in action?
- A. Twelve 15 centimeter guns. I had 12 guns there but because we were having to move guns to fire downstream I do not believe that more than two or three were used in firing on the Ladybird.
- Q. That incident happened on the 12th of what month?
- A. I do not believe it was the 12th -- think it was the 10th of December, but it might be one day off, I am not sure.
- Q. Before the fall of Nanking?
- A. Yes.
- Q. At what time of day was it you opened fire?
- A. About 1000 o'clock.
- Q. You were decorated with the Order of the Golden Kite Fourth Class. According to the Japan Times and Advertiser of January 24, 1942, that decoration was awarded you on account of your action against the British ship Ladybird?
- A. That is not true.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. Did you make a statement to a Domei reporter the day you were decorated?

A. No I did not.

Q. You did not have an interview with a newspaper reporter?

A. No I did not.

Q. Did you state at that time that the United States and Britain should be chastised thoroughly in the war of Greater East Asia, and "by so doing this country will console the souls of the war dead".

A. I deny making the statement.

Q. Were you in Tokyo when you received the decoration?

A. Yes I was in Tokyo. I was in Tokyo and the award was given to me by mail. My regiment was a Kyushu Regiment, and thus the award was sent from Kyushu.

Q. Where were you in 1931, Colonel, at the time of the first Manchurian incident?

A. I was in Tokyo.

Q. What work were you engaged in at that time?

A. I was attached to the General Staff.

Q. What Section?

A. The Russian Section.

Q. Did you at that time know an officer named TOJO Hideki?

A. Yes, I knew him and he was in General Staff Headquarters.

Q. What was his position? What Section of General Staff was he in?

A. I believe that he was working in the Organizational Department of the General Staff.

Interrogation by Captain Robinson:

Q. Where were you on December 8, 1941?

A. I was in Tokyo.

Q. How long had you been in Tokyo?

A. I was in Tokyo from April of 1939.

Q. You knew then that events were moving toward war between Japan and the United States?

A. Yes.

Kingoro, HASHIMOTO

- Q. How long had you thought that war between Japan and the United States could not be avoided?
- A. Ever since the ABCD Agreement.
- Q. In what year?
- A. I believe it was in the summer of 1941.
- Q. Did you consider that Japan was justified in making the attack at Pearl Harbor?
- A. The attack was made after the start of the war. I believe it was justified insofar as it was after the beginning of hostilities.
- Q. What do you consider the beginning of hostilities?
- A. The beginning of hostilities was Pearl Harbor, and insofar as war was started, I believe Japan was justified in attacking Pearl Harbor.
- Q. What was the act which you think constituted the beginning of hostilities?
- A. Being a civilian at the time I am not certain of the events which led up to Pearl Harbor, but believe that while no actual declaration of war had been made, a state of war existed prior to Pearl Harbor, and hence the attack on Pearl Harbor was simply another link in the chain of events.
- Q. What event then was the opening of hostilities?
- A. Being a civilian I was not aware of what the actual event precipitating the war was, but believe there must have been something before Pearl Harbor.
- Q. You said there was a state of war existing before Pearl Harbor. Therefore, you assumed the responsibility of saying there had been an event which constituted the beginning of the war. Now I want to know what it was.
- A. There must have been a declaration of war prior to the attack by Japan, but being a civilian I do not know for certain and I believe an attack without a declaration of war is not a good thing.
- Q. You understood that Japan was bound by the Hague Treaty to give notice before she attacked the United States?
- A. Yes, I am aware of that.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. And therefore you consider that Japan did violate international law by starting the war without having given a declaration of war.

A. Yes, I believe that.

Q. And therefore you disapprove the Pearl Harbor attack?

A. I believe that the Cabinet had made a declaration of war; I received that news about noon. I believe an attack without a declaration of war is not good.

Q. What leads you to think that the Cabinet had declared war?

A. I believe that if they had not made a declaration of war there would be no reason for them to attack Pearl Harbor.

Q. You knew TOJO at this time, the Premier?

A. I am fairly certain that I have not met TOJO except when we were in General Staff together.

Q. Then you have not met TOJO since 1931?

A. No.

Q. And you have had no correspondence with him by mail or by any personal messenger?

A. No.

Q. Why didn't you have any associations with him? Did you object to him? Did you think his leadership was bad?

A. Since I was put on the Reserve List I had very little to do with any Regular Army officers.

Q. You were a leader of these various Societies?

A. Yes.

Q. Did they oppose TOJO's policies?

A. Very few of these people had actual contact with TOJO.

Q. That was not the question. I asked -- did these societies you were leader in oppose TOJO's policy?

A. No they did not oppose it.

Q. Did they support it?

A. They did not support it either. Being a civilian I had no connection with these matters.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Q. These were patriotic societies?

A. Yes.

Q. Therefore, they were supposed to be supporting the Premier and the Government of Japan?

A. You are somewhat misled in believing that the Japanese civilian organizations had anything to do with the Cabinet. The Japanese civilian organizations have no connection whatsoever with the Cabinet.

Q. Did these political societies support or oppose the policy of the national government?

A. We did not oppose them; we supported them. I believed that when the ABCD agreement was made we would have to fight the United States.

Q. Why?

A. Japan would be in a precarious position as far as food, oil, and other materials went, and I believed that in this chaotic state it would be necessary to fight the United States.

Q. What about Great Britain?

A. I believed at the time of the Tri Partite Pact that England was behind China in the China incident and I stated that we would have to (literally) get rid of England before we could clear up this matter.

Q. That policy of Great Britain and the United States in regard to China really dated from the 1922 treaty did it not -- the Nine Power Treaty?

A. No, I do not believe it was in accordance with this pact. However, I was very young at the time of the Nine Power Pact and do not know a great deal about it.

Q. It was the pact in which Japan, China, Great Britain, and six other nations agreed to what was known as the open door policy in China.

A. Yes, I know that.

Q. Did you approve or oppose the open door policy for China?

A. Being very young when it came into effect, and not feeling, later on, that it was any longer in effect, I did not feel one way or the other about it.

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

- Q. When did you think it ceased to be in effect?
A. I knew very little about it and, therefore, did not think of it.
- Q. You were 32 years of age when it came into effect, were you not? You had graduated from military academy 15 years before it came into effect, and still you say you were too young to know anything about it.
A. I knew of the treaty, but I say that I was not of an age yet to be thinking such about things of this type.
- Q. You had been connected with the Special Service Branches of the Japanese Army?
A. Yes I had.
- Q. And your Army connections had been such that it was your duty to keep in touch with relations with other nations, was it not?
A. Yes. Particularly in regard to Russia.
- Q. And Russia was a party to the Nine Power Treaty of 1922?
A. I don't believe it was a member.
- Q. You had opposed Naval Limitation Treaty of 1924?
A. I did not like it.
- Q. You made speeches in which you said that the Japanese had been misled and had been mistaken in entering into that treaty.
A. No I did not. Lectures were not permitted.
- Q. How about the publication of pamphlets?
A. No, none at all.
- Q. How did you express your opposition to those treaties -- that is, both the "Open Door" Treaty and the Naval Limitation Treaty?
A. I made no speeches or anything. I simply thought they were wrong. I did not feel very good about this 5-5-3 ratio.
- Q. How did you express your feeling against it?
A. I did not make it public at all.
- Q. What did you do in private?
A. I naturally spoke to friends of that period about the matter.
- Q. Including friends in the Army and in the Government?
A. Yes, to fellow officers and people of that period.

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- Q. To what fellow officers and what members of the government did you speak regarding your opposition to these treaties?
- A. That is so long ago I do not remember who it might be.
- Q. Did you speak to ISHIHARA, Kenji?
- A. I had not met ISHIHARA, Kenji at that time.
- Q. You met him in 1936?
- A. No I had never met him. I have never met him.
- Q. Have you met MITSUI?
- A. Yes, this man was a member of the House of Representatives, so I had a great deal of contact with him.
- Q. You had met SASAKI, Jiro?
- A. I do not know this man.
- Q. You remember the incident of February 26, 1936?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You counselled with the young officers preparatory to that incident, did you not?
- A. No not prior to the incident.
- Q. At the time of the incident then?
- A. At the time of the incident, because the incident had occurred, I went to stop it.
- Q. Whom did you see in regard to stopping it?
- A. I met a Captain by the name of MURANAKA.
- Q. What did you say to him?
- A. I told him to stop it.
- Q. Where did you see him?
- A. At the War Minister's home.
- Q. At what time?
- A. Two o'clock in the morning.
- Q. What did he say to you?
- A. He stated that he would not quit.
- Q. Why?
- A. He did not give any reasons.
- Q. You knew what his reasons were, did you not?
- A. I believe that what he meant was that once it was started he would go through with it.

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- Q. You knew that one reason for that revolt or uprising was opposition to the Open Door Treaty and to the Washington Naval Limitations Treaty?
- A. I do not know that.
- Q. What did you think had caused the uprising? What were the reasons behind it?
- A. I believe it was in order to do away with the political parties.
- Q. No other reason? Nothing to do with international affairs? Had the Army approved the Washington Naval Limitation Treaty?
- A. Naturally they approved it as it was ratified.
- Q. What do you mean by approved?
- A. Because it would not be ratified unless the Army approved it.
- Q. I mean after it had been ratified and while it was in effect, did the Army not object to it?
- A. It did not.
- Q. The February 26 incident then was not in any way a protest against the 1922 Treaty, Open Door China Treaty, or the Naval Limitation Treaty by the Army?
- A. I do not know these officers at all and I do not know anything about how they felt about international matters. I simply believe it was an incident fomented in order to dissolve the political parties. I was in Mishima commanding my regiment when the incident took place, and I came to Tokyo that night in order to try to stop them.
- Q. Why was the Army opposed to the political parties?
- A. The two major political parties were hand in glove with the financiers, that is the Zaibatsu and consequently there was a rise of moneyed interests, with the result that the Army was held down and hence they naturally opposed these parties.
- Q. On the international policy of these parties, did the Army not oppose them on that ground?
- A. I have not heard much about that.
- Q. Of course we can't believe that. You were political leader here, and we want to know what your attitude was as a political leader and as a member of the Army toward these treaties which the Army considered as cutting down Japanese national prestige and power.
- A. Because these political parties were in with the moneyed interests they thought nothing of the common people, and politics were extremely corrupt, hence I opposed them strongly.

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- Q. I repeat my question. Did you oppose them also on the ground of their international policies as represented by these treaties?
- A. I therefore stated that a war with the United States was inevitable following the ABCD Agreement. Prior to this I said nothing. However, I did oppose the 5-5-3 ratio as stated before.
- Q. How did you oppose it?
- A. We officers were not able to make any statements to the press or make any speeches, etc., therefore I did not actively voice my opinions.
- Q. What do you mean then when you said you did oppose it?
- A. Simply telling people in gatherings and among friends, things of that sort.
- Q. In what gatherings?
- A. Not in any large gatherings, but when some members of the House of Representatives and people like that were gathered, I opposed this treaty.
- Q. Did you make speeches in the House of Representatives opposing the treaty?
- A. No I did not.
- Q. Did anyone make speeches in the House opposing the treaties.
- A. I do not think so.
- Q. You did favor the expansion of the influence of Japan in the Greater East Asia League, did you not?

RECESSED FOR LUNCH 1145 hours

Kingoro HASHIMOTO

Date and Time: 18 January 1946, 1515-1630 hours

Place : Same

Present : Same

INTERROGATION BY CAPTAIN ROBINSON:

- Q. Was there any answer that you made this morning that you would like to correct, or any explanation you would like to add?
- A. No.
- Q. You have travelled in America and Europe?
- A. In Europe, yes, but not in the United States.
- Q. You have never been to the United States?
- A. No.
- Q. When were you in Europe?
- A. I was in Europe in 1928-1929 and 1930.
- Q. What part of Europe did you visit?
- A. Mainly in Istanbul.
- Q. Where else?
- A. Russia, the Balkans, Germany, France and England. Apart from Istanbul my travels in these other countries were for a period of about one week only.
- Q. Did you see anything in these other countries which influenced you in your later policies with regard to Japan?
- A. No I did not. However, I did study a good deal about Russia's policies and politics, etc.
- Q. Did your study of Russian policies lead you to any plan or policy with regard to Japan?
- A. Not particularly. However, I did believe that there was danger of the Comintern fostering its communistic ends in Japan, and I did not like this.
- Q. Have you seen any indications of the Comintern interfering in Japan's affairs?
- A. Around 1922 men by the names of SAHO and YAMAKAWA started the Japanese Communistic Party and were active from then on in spreading Communistic propaganda in Japan. I made quite a study of Communism in Japan.
- Q. Did your study influence your policy with regard to enlarging the Japanese Army?
- A. No, not because of any study of the Communist policy. I have never advocated increasing the size of the Japanese Army.

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- Q. Haven't you stated that with the British closing in and the Russians closing in, and the Dutch and America, Japan would have to increase her Army to protect herself against these powers that were closing in on her?
- A. I have never made such a statement.
- Q. Have you heard others make it in Japan?
- A. I do not believe there were many people who advocated an increase in the size of the Army, but I do believe there were many who advocated mechanizing the Army.
- Q. What was your policy when you were in the Diet in regard to voting appropriations for the Army? Were you for smaller appropriations or larger appropriations?
- A. There has never been any argument in the Diet on such matters.
- Q. Who has determined how big appropriations for the Army should be?
- A. The Cabinet. The Army and Navy let the Cabinet know what they need and the Cabinet in turn passes it on to the Diet. There has never been an argument on this matter. It has always been passed without discussion.
- Q. Including the large secret funds that could be disposed of without any accounting?
- A. There is never any detailed accounting of the budget for the Army and Navy. It is simply the overall requests for appropriations.
- Q. Have you ever received any Army funds for the purpose of financing the patriotic societies you have been officially connected with?
- A. I have never received a penny from such sources.
- Q. How have these societies been financed?
- A. Membership dues and no other funds.
- Q. And no other funds?
- A. No other funds. My societies never used much more than one thousand yen a month.
- Q. Going back to your policy with regard to the size of the Army, you say you have never favored an enlarged Army because of the possible closing in of Russia or England or the Netherlands or the United States? That is true, is it not?
- A. Yes. I never have. I did say that they should build more airplanes.
- Q. Have you ever favored a larger Army in order that Japan might exercise greater influence in East Asia?
- A. No I have not.
- Q. In March of 1941 the Greater East Asia League was formed, was it not, with you as a permanent director?
- A. I have never heard of such a society.

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- Q. Did you say this morning that you had had no conversation with Premier TOJO or members of his official cabinet or government after he became Premier on 19 October 1941?
- A. I have only seen him in the Diet, and have never had any conversation with him. If you will ask TOJO I am sure he will corroborate my statement. Since the end of the war I did meet him once in a train, but we did not speak to each other.
- Q. It is not true then that you were a member of a small unofficial ring of leaders in his government who helped to shape imperial policy?
- A. I do not see how I could be because I have not had any dealings with TOJO.
- Q. Do you know that that statement has been made in regard to your activities here?
- A. I do not know. I have not seen him.
- Q. Calling your attention to Russia and Communism again, did you ever state that unless a Fascist Party could be created as a bulwark, Japan would be engulfed by Communism?
- A. No I did not.
- Q. How many times have you been the subject of disciplinary action by the Japanese military authorities?
- A. I was censured at the time of the 2-26 incident and after the October incident and also when I was at the War College.
- Q. In addition to being censured, you were in prison, were you not, after the 1936 incident?
- A. I was not taken to jail but I was under house arrest.
- Q. For how long a period?
- A. For 20 days.
- Q. What was the reason for the censure in each case?
- A. In the February incident I was disciplined for having come to Tokyo without orders. In the October incident I was taken into custody on the charge that I had not listened to General Orders over a period of time. And when at the War College for being AWOL.
- Q. Only three instances then?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How many times have you been placed on inactive duty or at least relieved of active duty in the nature of a disciplinary treatment?
- A. Those are the only cases.
- Q. The statement then that you have been disciplined by the Army eighty times is erroneous to the extent of 77 times?
- A. Yes, absolutely. If I had been as bad as you paint me I could not have been an officer.

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- Q. That is not my statement. That statement is in the record here.
Do you have any enemies who would make such a statement about you?
- A. The Communists might make such a statement. I do not believe that there would be any others.
- Q. Going back to the 1936 incident and the disciplinary action taken then, how many miles was it from your station to Tokyo?
- A. About three hours by train.
- Q. The incident occurred on the 26th of February and you came to Tokyo early in the morning of the 27th of February.
- A. No, I believe I arrived here about eight o'clock in the evening of the 26th.
- Q. You knew then that the incident was going to take place before it occurred?
- A. The incident took place in the morning.
- Q. How did you learn of it so quickly?
- A. By phone.
- Q. From whom did you learn of it?
- A. From a man named MATSUNOBU, Shigeji.
- Q. Why did he call you?
- A. This man MATSUNOBU is just a friend of mine, a civilian in Tokyo, and he called me to say that an important event had taken place.
- Q. And you immediately took the train for Tokyo?
- A. I then spoke to my Brigade Commander who told me not to go, but I argued the point until he gave me permission of a sort to go but to return the next morning. I did go therefore and returned by the six o'clock train, arriving back at my regiment about nine.
- Q. Why were you disciplined then?
- A. Because he told me to go and come back immediately and I did not return until the next morning.
- Q. Why did you not come back until the next morning?
- A. I wanted to go to the War Minister's home and speak to these people immediately, but was not able to enter the premises at that time.
- Q. That does not answer the question. How did that delay you?
- A. I could not get in -- I finally got in at 0200 AM and was there for about one hour and came back by the six AM train.
- Q. What did you do while there, after getting in?
- A. I told them to stop doing what they were doing and to surrender.
- Q. Did you see your friend who had called you by telephone?
- A. No I did not.

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- Q. You had know that an incident of this kind was about to occur, had you not?
- A. No, I knew nothing about it.
- Q. You never suspected the likelihood of such an incident occurring?
- A. I never even suspected such a thing.
- Q. Why did you think they would listen to you when you told them to stop?
- A. I knew Captain MURANAKA slightly from before, so that I figured if I spoke to him he would listen to me.
- Q. Was he a leader in the incident?
- A. Not the leader, one of the members of it.
- Q. You had talked to him before about the possibility of such an incident occurring?
- A. I had not seen him for a considerable period of time prior to the incident.
- Q. You had never discussed with MURANAKA matters of political nature or of Army policy or the possibility of an Army incident?
- A. No I did not. -- I went first to the Kempei Tai Headquarters where the members of the War Ministry had fled, and asked them did they not think it was a rather shameful thing for them to be fleeing from their own quarters, and I gave them hell along these lines and then proceeded to go there, being the first to enter the premises, where I found MURANAKA and spoke to him. I did not know until I entered the premises that I would meet MURANAKA.
- Q. Why did you come down from your Regiment unless you knew you --
- A. I came down from the Regiment after the phone call, and it was only after I entered the War Minister's residence that I discovered the man there I knew.
- Q. Who were the members of the War Ministry whom you say you reprimanded?
- A. They were all sitting around eating dinner when I arrived. The ones there were only Lieutenant Colonels and under, no high ranking officers. The place was full of members from GHQ and the War Ministry.
- Q. Was the War Minister there?
- A. No he was not.
- Q. Was the Inspector General of Military Education there?
- A. No none of the higher-ups were there?

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- Q. How many people or how many officers of the Japanese War Ministry were assassinated in that February 26 incident?
- A. SUZUKI was wounded badly, was he not? And OKADA the Prime Minister was saved (musing to himself). I am sorry but I can not recall exactly how many there were at the moment.
- Q. Well, it was at least five, was it not?
- A. I believe so. I can not recall at the moment very well.
- Q. Had you known AIZAWA?
- A. Yes I knew him very well when I was a youth at the Military Academy, but later had no dealings with him.
- Q. What was his connection with the February 26 incident?
- A. I do not believe there was any connection.
- Q. You think not?
- A. Yes.

INTERROGATION BY MR. HELM:

- Q. Colonel, after the war was started, you helped organize several political societies, did you not?
- A. The IRAPS is the only one that I took part in organizing. I also had connections with the IRAA.
- Q. What was the purpose of these organizations.
- A. The IRAA was formed in 1940 during the time of the KONOYE Cabinet. At this time the reputation of the two major political parties became bad and they dissolved themselves, so that in order to have one unified political party the IRAA was set up, and I was one of the directors of this organization.
- Q. Did that organization continue after the attack on Pearl Harbor? That is, during the war?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Would you say that after the war one of its main purposes became to assist in the successful prosecution of the war?
- A. Yes.
- Q. To what extent?
- A. This society had no political affiliations and hence our way of prosecuting the war was to tell the people to grow more rice or to work in factories, or to keep the national spirit up -- things of this type.

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- Q. How in 1944 were you connected with an organization known as DAI NIPPON SANGYORODO DAN?
- A. I had no connection with such an organization.
- Q. Were you connected with DAI TOA DOSHI KAI?
- A. There were no such organizations.
- Q. Radio Tokyo reported that you were at an inaugural ceremony of this society on 9 January 1945 at the Tokyo Imperial Hotel.
- A. DAI TOA DOSHI KAI -- There was no such organization.
- Q. On 17 February 1945 did you resign from IRAPS?
- A. Yes. Although I do not recall the date.
- Q. Why?
- A. I was sick and tired of how they were following the cabinet and everything that was said there, so 29 of us resigned in protest.
- Q. Colonel, did these 29 members of the DIET then form the GOKOKU DOSHI KAI?
- A. The 29 of us formed an organization known as the GOKOKU DOSHI KAI.
- Q. What were the aims of this society?
- A. In order to oppose the IRAPS. A vote of 25 members is needed in the Diet in order to speak on the floor, hence 29 of us gathered together so that we might have a chance to speak our piece.
- Q. Was one of the reasons for the formation of this party extreme dissatisfaction with the way the Cabinet was prosecuting the war?
- A. Mainly my reasons were not opposition to the way in which the war was being prosecuted, but more the fact that because of the IRAPS the right to speak on the floor of the Diet was being muzzled.
- Q. Colonel, in 1945 did you advocate a last ditch stand?
- A. Yes I did.
- Q. At any time after 1941 did you oppose efforts toward peace?
- A. I know of no such movement for peace.
- Q. In other words, you were for active prosecution of the war to the bitter end?
- A. Yes.

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Q. Colonel, why did you have that attitude?

A. I believed that the United States would land on the mainland of Japan and at that time I believed that we should make an all out attack and defeat them.

INTERROGATION BY INTERPRETER:

Q. Did you believe that last attack would defeat the United States?

A. Yes I thought so. But we were defeated.

REMARKS:

Mr. Helm: Tell him when we come back the next time that if he would like to we would appreciate a prepared statement on the Japanese side of the war and his views on that.

Cmdr Huggins: Will that be Monday or Tuesday? Do you want him to write it?

Mr. Helm: If he wants to.

Cmdr Huggins: What do you mean exactly by that?

Mr. Helm: What he thinks the causes of war were and just the whole Japanese side of the war. I would also like to question him about his political beliefs and principles.

Cmdr Huggins: Causes for war?

Mr. Helm: How Japanese victory would have improved things or what the results of Japanese victory would have been.

Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO

I, Frank B. Huggins, Serial Number _____, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English, respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of pages 1 to 30, inclusive, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of February 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

I, Edna M. Hickam, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Edna M. Hickam

We, Gilbert S. Woolworth, Colonel
J. J. Robinson, Captain USNR, Serial No. _____
Hugh B. Helm

certify that on the 17th and 18th of January 1946 personally appeared before us Colonel Kingoro HASHIMOTO and according to Lt Commander Frank B. Huggins, interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan
4 February 1946

The origin transcript of this Interrogation will be found in our EXHIBIT FILE as EXHIBIT # 180. The original shorthand notes of Miss Edna Nichan on this interrogation will be found in our EXHIBIT FILE as EXHIBIT # 181.

FILE NO. 343

SERIAL NO. 6