AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED (Reclassify when filled out)

I. GENERAL

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) Mission	f: Date		spicionia	Wa Gutato				at. Time o	•		(Zone
				ERED BY TH	IIS REPORT	•		1			
TYPE	SQUADRON	TAKING	NUMBER	ATTACKING			ND TORPEDOE (PER PLANE)	1	15	FUZE, SETTI	NG
(a)	(b)	OFF (c)	ENEMY A/C	TARGET (e)	C/	AKKIED	(f)	153	-	7-7 (9)	
	177-33	8			1600 rd	3 • E	0 21. 4	1100		1/1/	
					•				13.		
/ III. O	THER U. S.	OR ALLIED	AIRCRAFT	EMPLOYED	IN THIS C)PER/	ATION.				
TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER		BASE	TY	/PE	SQUADRON	NUMBER		BASE	
Long											
iV. E	NEMY AIRC	CRAFT OBSI	ERVED OR E	NGAGED (raft L	isted in II	Only).		(g)
TYPE	NO. OBSERVED	NO. ENGAGING		LOCA	ATION OF BOMBS, TORPEDOES CARRIED; COUNTER GUNS OBSERVED				CAMOUFLA	CAMOUFLAGE AND MARKING	
indo	1	1100	(ZOI	VE)			ot doter	mirrod		on in	
magnification	1	1			1		not determined				
	1	2000	(ZO)				A dotor	nind			rvod
	1		(ZO:	NE)			A dotor				rvod
) Appare	ent Enemy A	Aission(s)		NE)							rvod
	ent Enemy Any Part of		(ZO:	NE)	riha Clouds						
Did Ar Encour Time o	ny Part of Inter(s) Occu of Day and Br	ur in Clouds rilliance	(ZO:	NE) NE) If so, Desci	ribe Clouds		(BASE I			NTHS OF COVER	
Did Ar Encour Time of of Sun	ny Part of Inter(s) Occu of Day and Br or Moon —	ur in Clouds rilliance	(ZO:	NE) LIF so, Description of the moon; day,	OVERCAST; ET	C.)		(k) Vis	ibility_	(MIL)	f
Did Ar Encour Time of of Sun	of Day and Broon Moon	ur in Clouds rilliance	(ZO:	NE) If so, Descri	OVERCAST; ET	C.)		(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MIL)	f
Did Ar Encour Time of of Sun V. EN	ny Part of other(s) Occupation of Day and Broon — NEMY AIRC (b) DESTR	ar in Clouds rilliance RAFT DEST	(ZO:	NE) LIF so, Description of the moon; day,	OVERCAST; ET	C.)	Aircraft Li	(k) Vis	ibility_	(MIL)	f
Did Ar Encour Time of of Sun V. EN	ny Part of other(s) Occupation of Day and Broon — NEMY AIRC (b) DESTR	rilliance RAFT DEST	(ZO:	NE) If so, Descriptions day, DAMAGED	OVERCAST; ET	Own	Aircraft Li	(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MIL)	f
Did Ar Encour Time of of Sun V. EN	ny Part of other(s) Occupation of Day and Broon — NEMY AIRC (b) DESTR	rilliance RAFT DEST	(ZO:	NE) If so, Descriptions day, DAMAGED	OVERCAST; ET	Own	Aircraft Li	(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MIL)	f
Did Ar Encour Time of of Sun V. EN	ny Part of other(s) Occupation of Day and Broon — NEMY AIRC (b) DESTR	rilliance RAFT DEST	(ZO:	NE) If so, Descriptions day, DAMAGED	OVERCAST; ET	Own	Aircraft Li	(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MIL)	f
Did Ar Encour Time of of Sun V. EN	ny Part of other(s) Occupation of Day and Broon — NEMY AIRC (b) DESTR	rilliance RAFT DEST	(ZO:	NE) If so, Descriptions day, DAMAGED	OVERCAST; ET	Own	Aircraft Li	(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MIL)	f
Did Ar Encour Time of of Sun V. EN	ny Part of other(s) Occupation of Day and Broon — NEMY AIRC (b) DESTR	rilliance RAFT DEST	(ZO:	NE) If so, Descriptions day, DAMAGED	OVERCAST; ET	Own	Aircraft Li	(k) Vis	Dnly).	(MIL)	f

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED (Reclassify when filled out)

CONFIDENTIAL

VI. LOSS OR DAMAGE, COMBAT OR OPERATIONAL, OF OWN AIRCRAFT (of those listed in II only).

(a) TYPE OWN A/C	(b) SQUADRON	CAUSE: TYPE ENEMY A/C, TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE	(d) WHERE HIT, ANGLE (List armor, self-sealing tanks, equipment hit)	EXTENT OF LOSS OR DAMAGE, (Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed)
1				
2				
3				
4				
5				
5				
7				
8				
9				
0				
1				
2				
3				
4				

VII. PERSONNEL CASUALTIES (in aircraft listed in II only; identify with planes listed in VI by Nos. at left).

a) O.	(b) SQUADRON	(c) NAME, RANK OR RATING	(d) CAUSE	(e) CONDITION OR STATUS
1				
1				
		The same of the sa		
			1	
		THE MENTAL SE		

VIII. RANGE, FUEL, AND AMMUNITION DATA FOR PLANES RETURNING

(a)	(b)	(b) (c)		(d)	(e)	(f)	(g) TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED				NO OF PLANES
TYPE A/C	MILES	MILES RETURN		HOURS	LOADED	AV. FUEL CONSUMED	.30	.50	20MM	MM	RETURNING
72-2			30 1	150	230	110					
233-5			3 1	LOT	330	130			The second)	

IX. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED (Check one block on each line).

CALIBER	NONE	MEAGER	MODERATE	INTENSE
HEAVY — Time-fused shells, 75mm and over	**			
MEDIUM — Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm				
IGHT — Machine gun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm				

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

SPEED, CLIMB, at various altitudes

TURNS DIVES

CEILINGS

RANGE

PROTECTION

ARMAMENT

performance could not be determined.

C . A

REPORT No ______

XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance
Disposition
Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack
Distance of Opening Fire
Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses
Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
", Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
", Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting
Recognition, Aircraft

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships Concealment Searchlights Night Fighter Tactics Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

On 7 June 1945, at 0515, eight FM-2's took off from Lunga Point to fly LCAP for TF 32.1.1 while they were ingaged in a strike on Sakishima Gunto. At the same time four TBM-3's under the command of Lieut. W. T. HOMAN took off to fly LASP.

At 0635 when GAP was at 1800 feet and two to three miles distant Lieut. A. PISANI leading the second division sighted an enemy plane in a suicide dive on Natoma Bay. This flight had not been informed of a bogey and at that time was unaware of enemy planes in the vicinity. When first sighted the plane was in a 50° dive, altitude about 1000 feet. The enemy plane had evidently emerged from the cloud dover which, at that time, was about 1500 feet.

Enemy plane was observed strafing all the way down in his dive and finally crashed the flight deck of Matoma Bay forward of the forward elevator.

Enemy plane was a single engine fighter thought to be Zeke or Oscar. He was not camouflaged but was a dull green color. No markings were observed.

Approximately four minutes later CAP saw another plane in a suicide dive but only saw the splash as it plunged into the sea off the port bow of the Moggatt Bay.

It would appear that the enemy approached the formation at a low altitude to avoid radar interception and then climbed to low cloud cover for suicide dive. CAP did not receive a vector on the first plane and were only warned to turn right 90° in time to see the second plane dive into the sea.

C C A C

REPORT No. VC99-1

XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY OWN AIRCRAFT

Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance Disposition Altitudes Speeds Approach Tactics Use of Cover, Deception Angles of Attack Distance of Opening Fire Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses

Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
""", Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
""", Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting

Recognition, Aircraft

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships Concealment Searchlights Night Fighter Tactics Use of Jamming

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

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distant Lieut. A. PISANI leading the second division sighted an enemy plane in a suicide dive on Natoma Bay. This flight had not been informed of a bogoy and at that time was unaware of enemy planes in the vicinity. Then first sighted the plane was in a 30° dive, altitude about 1000 feet. The enemy plane had evidently emerged from the cloud dover which, at that time, was about 1500 feet.

Enemy plane was observed strafing all the way down in his dive and finally crashed the flight deck of Natoma Nag forward of the forward elevator.

Enemy plane was a single engine fighter thought to be Zeke or Oscar. He was not camouflaged but was a dull green color. No markings were observed.

Approximately four minutes later CAP saw another plane in a suicide dive but only saw the splash as it plunged into the sea off the port bow of the Hoggatt Bay.

It would appear that the enemy approached the formation at a low altitude to avoid radar interception and then climbed to low cloud cover for suicide dive. CAP did not receive a vector on the first plane and were only warned to turn right 90° in time to see the second plane dive into the sea.

REPORT No.

XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.

Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes
Bomb Sights
Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar Homing Devices Visual Signals Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF Signals Battle Lights Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles of Fire Needing Further Protection Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes Life Belts, Life Rafts Safety Belts Emergency Kits Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

STRUCTURE

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment Personnel Facilities

REPORT PREPARED BY:

in material fallures reported.

Pormardod:

Captain, U. S. Davy Commanding Officer, U. S. S. Lunga Points (CVE 04)

APPROVED BY:

SIGNATURE

R. S BREEKS LOCATO, USN CLEMEN

RANK AND DUTY

3 Jun 1945 DATE