AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT


- 5×	-			200	1.13		_
١.	G	-			D	A	
	1 -	-	N	100	PK.	44	
	u	State 1	, ,	Diam'r.			2an

	Aroot in	W. 36	ALLY COVE				(†) Time of	Retur		_(Zone)
			NUMBER ENGAGING ENEMY A/C	NUMBER ENGAGING ATTACKING		BOMBS AND TORPEDOES CARRIED (PER PLANE)			FUZE, SETTING		
(a)	(b)	OFF (c)	(d) .	(e)	•		(f)			(g)	
.8	23-33	4	0		2 - 500		- 100- 54			1(1001)	c 101A2(
	Marketonic Physical Control of the C								140		
	HER U. S.	OR ALLIE	DAIRCRAFT	EMPLOYE	1	*****	ATION.		NAME AND ONLY		
TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER		BASE		YPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER		BASE	
			U.S. 27114								
IV EN	ENAV AIDO	DAET ORS	FRVFD OR F	NGAGED (By Own Air	craft	Listed in 11	Only).			
(a) TYPE	(b)-	NO. ENGAGIN	(b)		(e) ATION OF COUNTER	BOMBS, TORPEDOES CARRIE GUNS OBSERVED)	CAMOUFLAGE AND MARKING		GE AND NG
			(ZO	NE)		/			*		
			(20	NE)							
			(Z0	NE)							
						1					
Did Any Encount Time of of Sun	Day and Bror Moon —	ar in Cloud rilliance	A CONTRACT OF STREET OF STREET	If so, Desc	Y, OVERCAST; E	TC.)		(k) Vis	bility_	NTHS OF COVER)	
Did Any Encount Time of of Sun V. EN	Part of ter(s) Occur Day and Bror Moon —	ar in Cloud rilliance	(NIGHT, BRI	If so, Desc	Y, OVERCAST; E	TC.)		(k) Vis	bility_ Only).	(MILE:	
Did Any Encount Time of of Sun	Part of ter(s) Occur Day and Bror Moon —	rilliance RAFT DEST OYED OR DAM	(NIGHT, BRI TROYED OR NAGED BY:	If so, Desc	Y, OVERCAST; E	TC.)	Aircraft Lis	(k) Vis	bility_ Only).	(MILE:	S) (d)
Did Any Encount Time of of Sun V. EN TYPE	Part of ter(s) Occur Day and Bror Moon — EMY AIRC (b) DESTR	rilliance RAFT DEST OYED OR DAM	(NIGHT, BRI TROYED OR NAGED BY:	If so, Descons DA	Y, OVERCAST; E	Own	Aircraft Lis	(k) Vis	bility_ Only).	(MILE:	(d) DAMAGE
Did Any Encount Time of of Sun V. EN TYPE	Part of ter(s) Occur Day and Bror Moon — EMY AIRC (b) DESTR	rilliance RAFT DEST OYED OR DAM	(NIGHT, BRI TROYED OR NAGED BY:	If so, Descons DA	Y, OVERCAST; E	Own	Aircraft Lis	(k) Vis	bility_ Only).	(MILE:	(d) DAMAGE
Did Any Encount Time of of Sun V. EN TYPE	Part of ter(s) Occur Day and Bror Moon — EMY AIRC (b) DESTR	rilliance RAFT DEST OYED OR DAM	(NIGHT, BRI TROYED OR NAGED BY:	If so, Descons DA	Y, OVERCAST; E	Own	Aircraft Lis	(k) Vis	bility_ Only).	(MILE:	(d) DAMAGE
Did Any Encount Time of of Sun V. EN TYPE	Part of ter(s) Occur Day and Bror Moon — EMY AIRC (b) DESTR	rilliance RAFT DEST OYED OR DAM	(NIGHT, BRI TROYED OR NAGED BY:	If so, Descons DA	Y, OVERCAST; E	Own	Aircraft Lis	(k) Vis	bility_ Only).	(MILE:	(d) DAMAGE
Did Any Encount Time of of Sun V. EN TYPE	Part of ter(s) Occur Day and Bror Moon — EMY AIRC (b) DESTR	rilliance RAFT DEST OYED OR DAM	(NIGHT, BRI TROYED OR NAGED BY:	If so, Descons DA	Y, OVERCAST; E	Own	Aircraft Lis	(k) Vis	bility_ Only).	(MILE:	(d) DAMAGE

13

14

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT



REPORT No.

(a) TYPE OWN A/C	S OR DAM (b) SQUADRON	AGE, COMBAT OR OPERATION. CAUSE: TYPE ENEMY A/C, TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE	AL, OF OWN AIRCRAFT (of the WHERE HIT, ANGLE (List armor, self-sealing tanks, equipment hit)	EXTENT OF LOSS OR DAMAGE, (Give Bureau serial number of planes destroyed)
		TYPE GUN, OR OPERATIONAL CAUSE	Serr-searing tanks, equipment into	Call shole, 6 %, allente E wall shole, slight. Calcus sas leak and leok of Lloyes cantral newseitht
7	TC-08		Bombley, wing, \$1100	Chall holos, altght.
0				

VIII. RANGE, FUEL, AND AMMUNITION DATA FOR PLANES RETURNING (h) NO. OF PLANES RETURNING (g) TOTAL AMMUNITION EXPENDED AV. FUEL CONSUMED (d) AV. HOURS IN AIR (e) AV. FUEL LOADED (c) MILES RETURN (b) MILES (a) TYPE MM 20MM OUT A/C 3000 210 230 117 3.3

IX. ENEMY ANTI-AIRCRAFT ENCOUNTERED (Check one block on each line).

CALIBER

NONE

MEAGER

MODERATE

INTENSE

MEDIUM — Impact-fused shells, 20mm-50mm

X. COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE, OWN AND ENEMY AIRCRAFT (use check list at left).

SPEED, CLIMB, at various altitudes

TURNS
DIVES
CEILINGS
RANGE
PROTECTION
ARMAMENT

LIGHT -- Machine gun bullets, 6.5mm-13.2mm

AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED (Reclassify when filled out)

(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)



Titled data

(c) Clouds Over Target	- 800 - 100	(BASE IN FEET			
(d) Visibility of Target	LEAR, HAZ	ZY. PARTIALLY OBSCURED	BY CLOUDS, ETC.)	isibility	(MILES)
(f) Bombing Tactics: Typ	e Glido	(LEVEL. GLIDE OR DIVE)	Bomb Sight Use	ed to the	(TYPE)
Bombs Dropped per Ru	IN NUMBER	Spacing	(FEET) Altitude o	of Bomb Rele	ase
(g) Number of Enemy Air	rcraft Hit on Gro	ound: Destroyed	Probably Destroyed_		Damaged
(h) AIMING POINT	DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(i) NO A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED EACH AIMING POINT	NO HITS On Aiming Point	DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
	4 2 308			300 (0)	
3 4	Wind Colonia C				Damagod but ox-
5					
6					
7					
8					

- (o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).
- 1. Rechain and straing were directed at morthern slope of Mt. Switachi shead of troops where every can positions were reported. No gan positions were seen but the area from which they were reported to be firing was struck by both reckets and straing. No damps was absorbed, however.
- 2. All books and rockets were aimed at pur flashed seen on ground. One run only was made with no time to observe results of attack (see XII) and therefore no accurable assessment of dusage was possible. One recket hit on a gan position, with resultant explosion and debris was seen, however, so that some damage was caused.

(p) Were Photographs Taken? Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.

REPORT No.

XIII. MATERIAL DATA. (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.

Use additional sheets if necessary).

ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights
Turrets
Ammunition
Bombs, Torpedoes
Bomb Sights
Bomb Releases

COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar Homing Devices Visual Signals Codes, Ciphers

RECOGNITION

IFF Signals Battle Lights Procedures

PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles of Fire Needing Further Protection Leak Proofing

EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes
 Life Belts, Life Rafts
 Safety Belts
 Emergency Kits
 Rations, First Aid

NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses
Driftsights
Octants
Automatic Pilots
Charts
Field Lighting

INSTRUMENTS

Flight Power Plant

OXYGEN SYSTEM

CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

STRUCTURE

Airframe
Control Surfaces
Control System
Dive Flaps
Landing Gear
Heating System
Flight Characteristics
At Various Loadings

POWER PLANT

Engines
Engine Accessories
Propellers
Lubricating System
Starters
Exhaust Dampers

HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant Lights

FUEL SYSTEM

FLIGHT CLOTHING

MAINTENANCE

BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment Personnel Facilities

REPORT PREPARED BY:

Lt. Herbster, in using survival equipment, following his water landing, ran into many minor difficulties. He became tangled up in his parachute harness trying to get out of the cockpit; while treading water, after unpacking the liferaft, he had difficulty finding the CO2 bottle; tired by his exertions, loaded down with heavy shoes, and with Hae West fully inflated, he had to rest before he was able to pull himself into the raft. After he and the radioman had getten into the raft the distance between it and the gumner who had not reached the raft quickly widened. He makes the following recommendations:

- (1) Don't inflate the raft until all personnel are together; otherwise those in raft will probably be separated from those still in water if wind and sea are at all strong.
- (2) Include in training climbing into raft with heavy shoes and gear and Mae West fully inflated by CO, rather than by mouth.
- (3) Backpads for aircremmen cannot be worn by them when escaping through turret nor will time allow their being handed out through turret. Keep this equipment in 2nd cockpit; remove it from outside if time permits. Aircremmen will not be so encumbered.

APPROVED BY

SIGNATURE.

REPORT No.

XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY OWN AIRCRAFT

Altitudes
Speeds
Approach Tactics
Use of Cover, Deception
Angles of Attack and
Their Effectiveness
Distance of Opening Fire
Defense Tactics and
Their Effectiveness

ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance Disposition Altitudes Speeds Approach Tactics Use of Cover, Deception Angles of Attack Distance of Opening Fire Defensive Tactics

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses
Enemy Weaknesses
Offensive Tactics, Own
" Enemy
Defensive Tactics, Own
" Enemy
Flexible Gunnery, Own
Escort Tactics
Fighter Direction
Use of Radar
Night Fighting

Recognition, Aircraft

OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target
Approach to Target
Altitudes, Speeds
Approach
Dive
Pull-Out
Dive Angle
Strafing
Retirement
Defensive Tactics
Use of Jamming

DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships Concealment Searchlights Night Fighter Tactics Use of Jamming

RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics
Torpedo Tactics
Effectiveness of
Bombs, Torpedoes
Selection of Targets
Fuzing
Strafing Tactics
Defensive Tactics
Use of Radar
Reconnaissance
Photography
Briefing

OPERATIONAL

Navigation
Homing
Rendezvous
Recognition, Ships
Communications
Flight Operations
Search and Tracking
Base Operations
Maintenance

Four Thm and four PM-2 of VC-88 joined with a same number of row VC-86, made two attacks in support of land operations on Iwo Jima. The four PM-2, piloted by Lt. E. A. KAMP, Lt(jg) R. J. HENNAN, Lt. P. V. MOTT and Lt(jg) B. L. SIMS, were directed to conduct a rocket and strafing a ttack immediately shead of Marine troops beginning to advance up the northern slope of Mt. Suribachi. This particular area was harboring gun emplacements causing our troops trouble. Each pilot made two runs, beginning at about 4000-5000 feet, at a 40-45 degree dive, pulling out about 700 feet altitude. Lt. Nott and Lt(jg) Sims, firing rockets, saw no gun emplacements or damage resulting from their rocket attack. Lt. Kamp saw and strafed three gun positions, each approximately 6' x 10', but saw no damage. The air coordinator informed this group that their fire was going exactly where it was wanted. He enemy gun fire was seen in this area.

The four Tim's of VC-88, piloted by Lt. C.L. Hindstin, Lt(ig) G. M. PETERSON, Lt(js) F. C. HERFURTH and Ens. W. L. STEPHENS, were led by the air coordinator to the target area which was to be attacked. The pilots were not fully informed as to the nature of the aiming point except that there were gun emplacements north of airfield no. 2, in target area 199 Oboe, located about a quarter of a mile north of the southwest-northeast rummy. Conditions for making the attack were extremely unsatisfactory. The cloud base at this particular area was at about 1000 foot with about .8 doverage. In attacking the planes eighter came through the clouds or small heles in the clouds, with little or no time to got on the aiming point. While the pilots were instructed to drop all bombs and fire all rockets on one run only two pilots, Peterson and Herfurth did this. Both began their glides at about 4200 feet, 8 turned and released as soon as they came through the clouds. There was little time to look for the siming point. The bombs and rockets were dropped and fired at about 700 feet altitude, dangerously low. Stephens did not drop his bombs but fired 8 rockets, pulling out at about 500 feet altitude. Herbster, pushing over at 3300 feet through a hole, descended at thirty degree angle, fired his rockets at 2200 feet altitude and pulled out at 1500 foot. Stephens saw at least one of Herbster's rockets hit a spot where red flashes of gunfire were seen and debris fly through the air.

point, both light and medium, were firing at the planes attacking. All received some damage (see VI). Herbster saw a bright red flush ahead of his plane, very close. He pulled cut, immediately smelling gas funes. His gummer, P. G. IHMAN, ACMSO, thought at first the plane was on fire and Herbster headed toward the west coast of Iwo Jima, losing altitude in preparation for a water landing if necessary. Actually there was no fire and Herbster joined the other 5 TBM's and proceeded back to the carrier. He had lost 20 gallons of gas from his right wing tank. Gas fumes required radioman, R. G. McKEM, ARMSO, to go on oxygen. The oxygen supply lasted 7 1/2 minutes and McKee crowled up into second cockpit to avoid fumes.

On reaching formation the carrier was launching so Herbster circles: After making a flipper turn to the left, he gave full right aileren to straighten. The right aileren stayed up; plane started wandering, and

XII TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATE

working ailerons he noticed both stayed up regardless of the maneuver. He tried a right turn to get into wind but couldn't do it; he was losing stability, so, after pulling up landing gear except tailwheel and notifying crewmen to prepare for water landing, he landed 120° away from the direction of the wind. He had looked his shoulder straps, put prop in full low pitch. He kept his flaps closed until tail hook bounced on water, than opened his flaps, immediately the plane was out of control. The left wind hit first and landing was hard. The plane set low in water and sank within 30 - 60 seconds. Inman, the gumner, had jettisoned the turret cover and got out quickly but had to standby and aid the radioman to come out through the turret. McKee had returned to the bilge before landing but was stunned by the impact; the hatch in the bilge was below water. Herbster in the meanwhile pulled out the large raft which he and McKee used. Inman, about 40 feet away, was well supported by his Mae West. DE no. 406, EDMONDS, came up quickly tossed a line to Imman and accurately fired a line to the raft, picking all three men up. The following day they were transferred to their ship. See KIII for recommendations and difficulties in reference to survival equipment.

In commenting on the attack on the gun positions, the torpedo pilots were of the opinion that the method of attack ordered was unwise, dangerous and was not conductive to accurate bombing and rocket attack. They had no opportunity to observe the aiming point until they emerged from the clouds at about 1000 feet and were asked to drop 500# bombs at this low altitude. The damger of injuries to the planes from bomb blasts and explosions in addition to enemy anti-aircraft fire were apparently not taken into consideration in ordering the attack.