




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Soviet Foreign Military Assistance



Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

Approved for Release by CIA
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NI IIM 87-10004C

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Information available as of 1 April 1987 was
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SCOPE NOTE

This Memorandum assesses the role and significance of Soviet military assistance programs in furthering Moscow's foreign policy in lesser developed countries (LDCs). It describes the institutions and mechanisms involved, the impact on recipient countries, and the benefits and costs for the USSR. Finally, it estimates the prospects for Soviet assistance and its significance for US interests over the next five years. []

This Memorandum is the first attempt by the Intelligence Community to evaluate the overall significance of Soviet military assistance in the Third World to both Communist and non-Communist LDCs. It describes the Soviet Bloc effort, including deliveries of military equipment, the functions of advisers, the training programs for LDC personnel in the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries, and what these efforts have and have not brought the USSR. Where necessary, this IIM also addresses Soviet economic programs in LDCs as they relate to Soviet military assistance. The IIM was [] sponsored by the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces. []

Technical Considerations

- *Deliveries versus Agreements.* This IIM discusses military equipment actually delivered rather than agreements. Agreements are a less useful indicator because: we have little detail on most Soviet arms agreements, major agreements are signed periodically but take a number of years to fulfill, and specific evidence is often lacking on numerous follow-on agreements. Finally, some agreements are not completely fulfilled, and thus give an inflated sense of an arms relationship.
- The values of arms deliveries provided in this assessment are in current US dollars, unless otherwise noted. No inflation factor is applied. []
- In this assessment Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Mongolia, and North Korea are considered Communist LDCs. []

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Figure 1
Soviet Foreign Military Assistance



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KEY JUDGMENTS

The USSR's military assistance efforts to date, and those of its partners in Eastern Europe and Cuba, have been impressive both in the amount of weapons, training, and assistance provided and in the coordination among these donor states. Their efforts pose major problems for US and Western interests, especially in Central America and southern Africa. However, there is a limit to the benefits the Soviets can accrue in the more developed and independent countries of the Third World.

Highlights of Soviet efforts in the Third World include:

- The USSR and Bloc countries have delivered over \$225 billion worth of arms over the last 30 years. In 1982, an estimated one-third of total military aid was grants, including almost all deliveries to Communist countries in the Third World; the remainder was sold. Almost a quarter of the arms sold was financed by credits.
- The Warsaw Pact has sent about \$40 billion worth of economic aid in the last five years, mostly to Communist Third World countries. Almost three-quarters of this economic aid—about \$5.6 billion a year—goes to shoring up the economies of Cuba and Vietnam. The remaining quarter is sent to non-Communist Third World countries to support many objectives of Soviet foreign policy; some of it is paid back in hard currency.

Moscow's carefully coordinated military assistance programs play an important role in advancing its overall strategic goals:

- *Political Influence.* Soviet efforts have helped the USSR gain significant influence not only in the Communist countries of Cuba and Vietnam, but also in a number of Third World Marxist countries: Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and South Yemen. As a result, Moscow is able to exert influence in key regions of the Third World: Southeast Asia, southern Africa, the Horn of Africa, and the Caribbean.

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- *Hard Currency Earnings.* Sales of arms to Third World customers are repaid in Western currencies, oil, or other valued commodities. In 1983 such activities reached a peak and accounted for 22 percent of all Soviet exports for hard currency. Hard currency is critical to Moscow's purchase of agricultural products and advanced technological equipment.
- *Access to Military Facilities.* The Soviets' military assistance program has helped them gain access to naval and air facilities in Libya, Syria, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Cuba, and to a base in Vietnam. This access extends Soviet military presence and reach, complicates and hinders Western defense planning, and diverts some US attention from Western Europe and Japan. But the access is limited—only in Vietnam do the Soviets have a full-scale base. Use of naval and air facilities in the other countries is limited to military logistics, reconnaissance, and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) patrols. The USSR has lost its access in Egypt and Somalia.

The Soviet's military assistance policy has brought them significant gains, particularly in countries that have a rigid socialist orientation and face a significant internal or external threat. But many other countries have managed to stay out of or to cast off a close Soviet embrace while continuing to receive Soviet arms. Soviet expansion and influence face limitations:

- *The amount of arms the Soviets deliver seems to have little relation to the amount of influence they ultimately gain.* While the Soviets have sent over the last five years close to \$40 billion worth of arms to Iraq, Syria, India, Algeria, and Libya, Moscow does not exercise significant control over the foreign or domestic policies of any of these nations. Moreover, Soviet attempts to modify the policies of client states by cutting arms supplies, as in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, have proved counterproductive.
- *On occasion Moscow has turned against longstanding clients.* The Soviets have not only shifted support (as they did from Somalia to Ethiopia in 1977) but they have also been involved to varying degrees in the overthrow of governments in Afghanistan in 1979 and South Yemen in 1986. As a result, some Third World countries are wary of hosting a large Soviet presence.

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- *Moscow's training of LDC military personnel has often produced mixed results.* In some poorer countries, mainly in Africa, Soviet military training is sometimes the only type available, is valued, and can win friends and influence people. However, the trainees often resent the political indoctrination, rigid format, and limited hands-on training that characterize Soviet military instruction. They also experience the racism of Soviet society.
- *The Soviets are reluctant to supply advanced weapons to LDCs* because they fear technological compromise to the West, are concerned that their systems will not perform credibly in the hands of Third World operators, and because sales of advanced weapons tend to slow modernization of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces.
- *The Soviets have failed to protect client regimes.* Over the last quarter century the Soviets have repeatedly been unwilling to project their military power against Western military forces in the Third World or even the forces of some well-armed Third World states. Western opposition has become an increasing constraint in Soviet military relationships with LDCs. The application of direct Western force in Grenada, Libya, and Chad, for example, must have dampened Soviet willingness to provide direct military backing to such countries. The Soviets, however, will note the Contra controversy of late 1986 and 1987 and the effect it will have on Washington's willingness to support insurgencies in Angola and Nicaragua.
- *But the most compelling factors that will constrain future deliveries of Soviet military assistance are economic.* The fall in energy prices and the decline of the dollar have reduced the capability of energy-exporting countries such as Libya, Algeria, and Iraq to pay hard currency for Soviet arms. Also reduced is the ability of conservative Arab states to continue subsidizing the arms purchases of states such as Syria. Beyond the decline in the price of oil, other factors constrain Soviet arms earnings: shifting needs and diversification by independent clients and competition from the West and from Communist suppliers outside the Warsaw Pact.

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To counter these factors, Moscow will search aggressively for new customers. New agreements will probably enable Moscow to prevent further decline in hard currency earnings from arms sales; however, these earnings will probably not rise significantly over the remainder of the decade, and the hard currency return to Moscow from these sales will probably remain at about \$5-6 billion a year.

The decline has raised the question of whether Moscow will be able to sustain the economic "burden of empire." Over the last five years Soviet economic assistance has totaled about \$8 billion a year, and military assistance amounted to about \$15 billion a year. We believe this burden is, and will continue to be, affordable.

Outlook and Implications for the West

Gorbachev has projected an image of foreign policy activism by use of increased tactical skills, better harmony between diplomacy and propaganda, and more sophistication in foreign policy. Although the Soviets remain willing to provide economic support to a few clients that depend on it for their survival, the mainstay of Soviet diplomacy in the Third World is still arms transfers.

The delivery of military weapons alone has never given the Soviets significant leverage with most non-Marxist Third World countries, and there is nothing inexorable about growing Soviet influence and presence in the Third World. The demise of colonial regimes, economic factors, cultural antipathy to the USSR in the Arab world, national interests, concern of reigning groups for their own continuance, and the interplay of world politics will remain predominant influences in determining the policies and orientation of LDCs. Thus, it is going to be much more difficult for the Soviets to use their military assistance to make significant new gains in the Third World.

This does not mean that the Soviets are not going to make gains in the future—they are. In particular, their efforts in Central America and southern Africa will prove to be extremely troublesome for the United States. They will also find customers for increased arms sales, possibly in Algeria, Jordan, or Kuwait. They may gain significant influence over a few regimes, and they may expand their use of air and naval facilities in some countries to which they already have access. But the Soviets—

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because of their inability to extend substantial economic aid, the increased Western support to some insurgencies challenging Marxist regimes, their inability to project power against significant opposition, and declining hard currency earnings from arms sales—are coming up against limits to the benefits they can accrue by providing military assistance.

Moscow's difficulties in earning hard currency raise the opportunity costs of aiding its client states and may reduce prospects for new grant aid or credits to non-Communist LDCs. Gorbachev knows that the USSR cannot underwrite the economic, social, or military development of any but a very few Third World countries—historically Cuba and Vietnam and now, increasingly, Nicaragua. In some countries the Soviets encourage a mixed economy with foreign investment from Western nations. Thus, even in states where Soviet influence is strong, the West will maintain an entree.

Soviet limitations are particularly evident in their lack of opportunities to expand military access in return for their military assistance. Even in nations where there is a strong threat to an embattled regime, the Soviets and some major clients have been, and will continue to be, wary about increasing the Soviet presence:

- Moscow will wish to take no actions that would give the United States an excuse to bring its superior air and naval power to bear in Third World settings. On a broad scale, the Soviets will continue to militarily strengthen their allied regimes through measures that stop short of Soviet confrontation with the United States. Thus, even though an increased Soviet presence might be welcome in Cuba, Nicaragua, or Libya, the Soviets are unlikely to increase their military access in these countries.
- Syria probably realizes there are limits to the protection it can expect from Moscow. This stems from shortcomings in the performance of Soviet weapons, Moscow's lack of willingness to directly engage US or Israeli aircraft, and suspicions that Moscow might back revolutionary groups in opposition to the current leadership.
- The best prospects for Moscow's expansion of its access will probably occur in Vietnam and southern Africa. Over the next

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five years the Soviets will probably increase their naval and air capabilities in Vietnam. In southern Africa the Soviets could increase their periodic deployments of Bear reconnaissance aircraft to Angola. They could also send IL-38 ASW aircraft to Mozambique again, but such deployments would probably be sporadic in the near term.

Despite these serious limitations, the political dynamics of the Third World, particularly in the poorer countries, will continue to provide openings for the use of arms transfers in support of Soviet policy:

- Revolutionary groups seeking power, leftist governments fending off revolts, and countries confronting the West will *almost always* turn to the Soviets for support—partly for the political statement such ties imply.
- And the Soviets will *almost always* provide arms to movements and states, particularly those on an anti-Western course, and will benefit from sustaining the movements as long as Moscow's commitment and risk are not substantial.

The Soviets will attempt to maintain their markets and to remain competitive with Western rivals. We believe that the Soviets will provide at favorable prices or terms a number of advanced weapons such as MIG-29s, SU-25s, and helicopters, and will improve the air defenses of selected countries. Because these advanced weapons and improved air defense systems will require more training, the need for Warsaw Pact and Cuban advisers in LDCs will probably increase somewhat. Libya and Angola are already expanding Soviet-supplied air defenses, and Nicaragua will probably do so in the future. The number of Third World military personnel being trained in the USSR will also increase. In addition, the Soviets will beef up the defenses of countries that perceive active threats from across their borders.

Moscow will also continue to supply arms to countries that cannot pay in hard currency when this action could increase its influence and help destabilize states leaning toward the West. Thus, Soviet military assistance will continue to pose major problems for US and Western

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
interests, especially in Central America and southern Africa. In addition, the Soviets also have the potential to gain in other regions if the West fails to provide significant economic and security assistance:

- In the Philippines the Soviets may be able to make inroads.
- Prospects for the Soviets would also improve in Algeria, Morocco, and especially Tunisia, if any of them perceived that the United States or West European countries were unwilling to provide vital economic or security assistance.
- Insufficient Western security assistance to African countries could have adverse consequences for several US interests and policies; for example, facilities agreements with Kenya and Somalia would be at great risk, the containment of Libya in Chad, Niger, and Sudan would be damaged, and the major US effort for economic policy reform by African governments would suffer a major blow.

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Figure 2
New and Old Estimates of
Value of Soviet Arms Deliveries,
1982-86



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The Value of Soviet Military Aid: A Recalculation

The dollar value of Soviet military assistance exports has recently been recalculated. Community estimates of Soviet military deliveries based on this reevaluation result in a 65-percent increase, from a previously estimated \$46 billion to \$75 billion, for 1982 to 1986 (see figure 2).

[redacted]

[redacted] The reestimate is based on more definitive intelligence [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted] the increases are most pronounced [redacted]

[redacted] Iraq, Vietnam, Cuba, Syria, and Angola [redacted]

[redacted] Each of these countries has been at war or involved in conflict during this period, and each has received substantial imports [redacted]

[redacted]

The new estimates also indicate that the grant portion of Soviet military aid is larger than previously thought. Estimates of the Soviet's hard currency earnings from arms sales, however, do not change. [redacted]

[redacted] the reevaluation of Soviet military exports affected only dollar values; no changes have been made to the numbers or types of equipment delivered. [redacted]

In this paper, military assistance data beginning in 1980 reflected the new calculations. [redacted]

[redacted]

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DISCUSSION

I. The Evolution of Soviet Military Assistance in the Third World

1. The Soviet military assistance program is a broad effort that currently provides military equipment, technical services, training, or direct operational support to 42 Third World countries. The program has been an invaluable tool of Soviet foreign policy:

- For over three decades Soviet arms deliveries have provided the entree for a Soviet advisory and military presence in Third World countries. Combined with aid from Eastern Europe and Cuba, Soviet deliveries of arms and deployment of advisers to Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia have propped up a number of Marxist-Leninist regimes, broadened Soviet military reach, extended Moscow's influence, and contributed to the destabilization of countries bordering Soviet-oriented LDCs.
- Since the early 1970s Soviet deliveries of arms for hard currency have been an important prop to the Soviet economy. In 1970 hard currency arms sales amounted to about \$250 million. Hard currency arms sales peaked at \$8 billion in 1983, but declined to \$5.6 billion in 1985, which was still about 20 percent of all Soviet exports for hard currency.¹ As the Soviet Union looks for ways to offset its decline in hard currency earnings brought on by low world oil prices, the pressure for increased Soviet military sales will intensify and will probably result in a more aggressive search for markets in the Third World.

Growth of the Military Assistance Program

2. A number of factors spurred the establishment and growth of the Soviet military assistance program over the last 30 years:
- The breakdown of colonial empires and the increased instability in the Third World resulting

¹ It is sometimes difficult to appreciate the crucial role that a small amount of hard currency earnings plays in the Soviet economy. Soviet hard currency earnings reached their greatest height in 1983 and 1984 with about \$34 billion per year. This is minute compared to Western countries, yet is vital to the USSR to import agricultural products and Western technology.

Table 1 • Billion US \$
Value of Soviet and NSWP Arms Deliveries to Selected Countries

	Soviet 1982-86	NSWP 1982-86
Latin America		
Cuba	6.5	1.36
Nicaragua	1.4	0.11
Peru	0.3	0
Middle East		
Syria	9.5	0.98
Libya	4.8	2.47
Algeria	3.0	0.02
Iraq	15.4	2.88
Iran	0.25	0.88
North Yemen	1.2	0.10
South Yemen	1.8-1.9	0.01
Sub-Saharan Africa		
Angola	4.8	0.20
Mozambique	1.3	0.04
Zimbabwe	NEGL	0.01
Mali	0.06	0
Guinea	0.2	0
Ethiopia	3.75-3.9	0.020
Madagascar	0.11	0
Seychelles	0.05	0
Asia		
Afghanistan	2.5-3.7	0.07
India	6.8	0.29
Vietnam	6.8-7.5	0.14
Cambodia	0.8-0.9	0.001
Laos	0.5	0
North Korea	0.9	0.15
Approximate total (of aid to all LDCs)	75.0	10.2

* Values over \$20 million are rounded to the nearest \$5 million; values under \$20 million are rounded to the nearest million. When one value is given, CIA and DIA estimates are the same or an average of the two was taken. When two values are given, CIA and DIA estimates varied by over 10 percent for major recipients (over \$100 million) or by over 20 percent for minor recipients. DIA estimates are given first.

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from the creation of new states, many of which faced internal and external enemies.

— The unwillingness of Western arms suppliers to upset Third World power balances by shipping sophisticated weapons, or to sell them on terms LDCs could afford.

— Soviet willingness to offer arms to many countries at low prices and on favorable terms of payment.

— The OPEC cartel, whose price escalations enabled several Third World oil-producing countries to purchase large amounts of Soviet arms on a cash basis.

— Moscow's exploitation of the openings provided by the retrenchment of US military activity in the Third World following the Vietnam war. [redacted]

3. One reason for Moscow's success was the conditions under which most developing nations achieved independence. The new nations were inclined to adopt anti-Western positions at home and abroad because of their experience with colonial rule. The USSR, though a superpower, had never been a classic colonial power and was therefore not as suspect in Third World eyes. The Soviets were quick to exploit this opportunity to acquire clients, most of which, while remaining independent in their domestic policies, tended to become dependent on their patron for military assistance. [redacted]

4. Soviet military aid is attractive to many Third World leaders because weapons are readily available at attractive prices. In addition, Soviet military assistance provides them:

- An opportunity to receive crucial weapons supplies rapidly in crisis situations.
- An ability to assist embattled allies and insurgencies.
- An alternative to Western supplies when these are unavailable for political or economic reasons.
- In some cases, an organizational and security structure that aids them in maintaining power. [redacted]

5. Past experience indicates that Soviet client states need not always continue in that status. For example, Egypt, Indonesia, and Somalia—once major recipients of Soviet military aid—expelled their Soviet advisers and turned to more balanced foreign policies. Other Soviet clients, such as Angola and Mozambique, would

be less likely to remain so if external threats were eliminated. [redacted]

6. Broadly speaking, the Soviet military aid program has evolved over the past 30 years as follows:

— The Soviet program that began in the mid-1950s was defined by a growing Soviet determination to compete with the Western powers for influence. In 1955 the Egyptians began to purchase Soviet military hardware with Czechoslovakia acting for Moscow. Soviet military and some economic aid was extended to other Middle Eastern countries without many military advisers. Soviet advisers began to be deployed in Third World countries in small numbers in the early 1960s to provide training and assistance. The Soviets first deployed large numbers of military personnel to the Third World in 1962: about 20,000 military advisers and combat forces were sent to Cuba to set up a ballistic missile force. After their setback in the Cuban crisis, most of the troops were withdrawn and only a brigade remained. The next major Soviet deployment of advisers was to Egypt in 1967. The June war of that year resulted in heavy Egyptian military dependence on the Soviet Union and a large rapid increase in the resident Soviet military presence to about 10,000 men in 1970. Until it was expelled in 1972, the Soviet Military Assistance Group (MAG) in Egypt not only administered a large aid program, but also was instrumental in overseeing the deployment of Soviet air defense troops and in establishing several Soviet naval and air facilities.

— In the mid-1970s Moscow expanded its criteria for providing assistance to include receipt of hard currency whenever possible. This phase was given a major push by the rise in oil prices, which enabled the Soviets to increase arms sales for hard currency and to send their own advisers and those of their surrogates (Cubans and East Europeans) to LDCs. The Soviets also demonstrated their continued interest in exploiting new opportunities created in part by the cutback in arms exports by the United States and by regional conflicts. New military aid commitments to Angola and Ethiopia were quickly consummated, and other advisory relationships that had begun in the 1960s, such as those with Cuba and Syria, were expanded.

— At the beginning of the 1980s, Soviet activities began to be challenged by Western and Chinese

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Table 2
Major Soviet Equipment Delivered to the Third World, 1981-86

Numbers of items

	Near East and South Asia	Sub-Saharan Africa	Latin America	East Asia and Pacific	Total
Tanks/self-propelled guns	3,720	585	500	660	5,465
Light armor	6,975	1,050	200	660	8,885
Artillery	3,350	1,825	800	530	6,505
Major surface combatants	22	4	4	4	34
Minor surface combatants	28	18	39	37	122
Submarines	9	0	1	0	10
Missile attack boats	10	8	6	2	26
Supersonic aircraft	1,060	325	110	210	1,705
Subsonic aircraft	110	5	0	5	120
Helicopters	635	185	130	75	1,025
Other combat aircraft	235	70	50	90	445
Surface-to-air missiles	11,300	2,300	1,300	375	15,275

This table is Unclassified.

support of insurgencies against Soviet-backed client regimes. Soviet and Cuban performance in counterinsurgency operations has not been particularly impressive.

- In the mid-1980s the USSR's hard currency earnings and purchasing power began to fall because of: declining prices for Soviet oil and gas exports and the weakening of the dollar, which reduced the ability of oil-producing Third World countries to buy arms. The decline in Soviet hard currency earnings, combined with an increased potential for military action against Soviet clients, is going to create significant problems for the Soviets in their attempt to maintain their influence in some Marxist countries and to improve their military access in the Third World. Moscow will note, however, the Contra investigations within the United States of late 1986 and 1987 and the effect these will have on Washington's willingness to support insurgencies in Angola and Nicaragua.

Value of Military Aid

7. The amount of military aid delivered by the Warsaw Pact countries over the last 30 years has been significant. Together, they have delivered over \$225 billion² in arms. In recent years, an estimated one-

third of total military aid was grant aid, including almost all deliveries to Communist LDCs, and the remainder was sold. Of the arms sold, almost a quarter was financed by credits. Table 2 shows the types of major Soviet equipment


Value of Economic Aid

8. The amount of Soviet economic aid is a small but important complement to military assistance. Whereas Soviet and Warsaw Pact deliveries of military aid in the years 1982 through 1986 totaled about \$82 billion, economic aid was about half, about \$37 billion. Almost three-quarters of the economic aid, about \$5.6 billion a year, went to prop up the Cuban and Vietnamese economies. The remainder was sent to non-Communist LDCs. Economic aid supports many objectives of Soviet foreign policy by:

- Gaining access to markets for new equipment and strategic commodities.
- Increasing the dependency of LDCs for follow-on support.
- Earning hard currency from the sale of Soviet goods and associated technical services. In the last 10 years, the Soviets alone earned about \$300 million from all non-Communist LDCs for such technical services; about half of that amount was earned by the USSR in oil-producing states by providing development services not necessarily related to aid projects.


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Figure 4
Number of Soviet, East European, and Cuban Military Advisers and Troops in Communist and Non-Communist LDCs, 1965-85



* Includes all LDCs exclusive of the Soviet combat presence in Afghanistan.

Figure 5
Number of Soviet, East European, and Cuban Economic Advisers and Technicians in LDCs, 1965-85*



* Best estimate for 1985 or 1984 figures.

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— Placing large numbers of Soviet economic advisers in recipient countries, sometimes in influential positions.

Personnel Involved in Soviet Military and Economic Aid

9. To carry out its Third World activities, Moscow acts with and often directs its East European allies and Cuba (see inset). Since the mid-1970s this cooperation has increased dramatically:

— The number of military advisers from the USSR, Eastern Europe, and Cuba deployed to LDCs reached over 60,000 (excluding Soviet troops in Afghanistan) (see figure 4 and figure 36 foldout). In the last decade the number of Cuban military advisers has risen dramatically, as has the total Warsaw Pact and Cuban presence.

— Economic technicians now number 159,500—more than double the number of military advisers—a figure over four times the number deployed in 1975 (see figure 5). East European

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
countries have relied more on economic ties than military assistance to sustain their relationship with LDCs, and this is reflected in the large rise in numbers of technicians abroad. Their pledges of economic aid have been designed almost solely to finance sales of equipment; these economic aid pledges exceed East European military agreements by almost \$2 billion.

— LDC personnel receiving training in the Warsaw Pact under the economic and military aid programs has increased to over 100,000—almost triple the number of a decade ago (see figure 6). Roughly 7 percent of these received military training. This training enables the Soviets to identify and sometimes assist the career advancement of pro-Soviet personnel who may ultimately assume positions of leadership.

10. The Cuban role is particularly significant. Moscow's relationship with Havana is probably the closest it has with any country in the Third World. The Cubans have provided large numbers of combat troops for Ethiopia and Angola and, since the early 1980s, a

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Figure 6
Number of Communist and Non-Communist
LDC Personnel Receiving Training in
USSR and Eastern Europe, 1965-85



^a Includes all personnel from LDCs including Communist ones and non-Communist personnel from Africa, Middle East and other regions.

^b Best estimate for 1985 or 1984 figures.

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military advisory presence in Nicaragua. At this time the Cubans have deployed 45,000 combat troops and/or military advisers, primarily in the following countries: Nicaragua, 2,000 to 2,500; Angola, about 36,000; Ethiopia, 3,000 to 4,000; and Mozambique, 800. Soviet military assistance and economic subsidies also have made it possible for the Cubans to send 20,000 economic advisers to countries in pursuit of both Havana's and Moscow's revolutionary goals. Cuba also hosts some 15,000 trainees from Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Guinea, Namibia, South Yemen, Ghana, and Nicaragua.

II. The Function of MAGs in Soviet Military Assistance Policy

11. Military advisory groups generally administer Soviet military assistance in those states where the programs have become fairly extensive. The discussion below will examine the unique functions of MAGs and how they further Soviet national security objectives:

- In some key states, where they see potential for greater economic or strategic gain, the Soviets

Soviet Direction of Allied Efforts in LDCs

We have little reporting on how the burden is shared among Bloc countries and Cuba, but from their conduct it is clear that the Soviets encourage a division of responsibilities. Cuban combat troops and advisers are more acceptable in some Third World countries than are those of the USSR. The East Europeans, in contrast, have assumed virtually no combat role, nor are they likely to in the future. In addition, we believe they do not provide any grant aid: their assistance is primarily for profit and for greater influence in the Third World.

In contrast, the Soviets probably provide little direction to Vietnam, which acts primarily in its own interest. North Korea's arms sales are also probably not coordinated with Moscow. In fact, P'yongyang's sales generally compete with the Soviets.

seek to establish a large, widely skilled group of advisers who structure the clients' armed forces, oversee and support client military operations, and look after broader Soviet security interests in the client country.

- In many cases the Soviet goal is to establish a MAG of sufficient size to guarantee extensive influence—in some cases even control—over the client state's armed forces; and thereby over client security policy.

12. Soviet MAGs are tightly integrated into the Soviet command structure, not just to maintain strict control over any Soviet presence on foreign soil, but also to allow for their direct use by higher command authorities. In some LDCs the Soviet contingents are so large the advisers have broad responsibilities and autonomy, to the point where they constitute a Soviet military colony in the client state.

Planning and Administration

13. Responsibility for planning and administering military advisory groups lies with the Tenth Main Directorate of the Soviet General Staff and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES). These two organizations share responsibility for the day-to-day management of advisory assistance to Third World countries. Apparently, the Tenth Directorate determines policy and prepares for negotiations with clients while the GKES is responsible for administering established contracts.

14. The process that leads to a formal military assistance contract between the USSR and a Third World state will vary depending on the extent of supplies or services contracted as well as on the sense

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Figure 7. African military trainees in East Germany (note: photo is montage).




Figure 8. Soviet MAG headquarters in Damascus, Syria.

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of urgency with which an arrangement must be made. The Soviet political leadership has ultimate decision-making authority; but the extent of its involvement will be governed by the importance of the commitment. []

15. In general, the process unfolds as follows:

— After receiving a request for assistance from a potential client or a directive from the Soviet political leadership, the Tenth Directorate prepares a feasibility report on military assistance to the requester, which includes economic and political information as well as an assessment of the client's military status. The GKES provides specific information on potential financial and contractual considerations of the proposed deal.

— With this information, the Soviet Government, usually led by the Defense Minister, enters into discussions with representatives of the prospective client. Any political conditions associated with granting military aid would be discussed at this time.

— When preliminary agreement is reached, the request for assistance is submitted to the Politburo for the first time. The Politburo passes the agreement back to the participating agencies as a directive. At this point, according to the description of former Council of Ministers Chairman Alexey Kosygin, specific items or requests are considered in detail by all the agencies that have an interest. In particular:

- The General Staff stipulates the effectiveness of specific hardware and advisory aid proposals for the client.
- GKES provides its consideration of the specific economic costs and benefits of the deal for the USSR.
- The Military Industrial Commission provides an appraisal of the agreement's impact on Soviet defense industry capabilities.
- The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Gosplan assess the impact of the proposed military assistance on the internal Soviet economy.
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the International Department of the Central Committee provide an assessment of the internal political implications of the proposed agreement.

— The recommendations of these agencies are forwarded to the Politburo, which considers the proposal a second time.

— Once formally cleared by the political leadership, the proposal is presented to the client and detailed negotiations begin between high-level political and military leaders of the two countries. As Moscow's point men, the Ministry of Defense and the GKES hammer out the detailed contractual arrangements with the client representatives.

— The decision that emerges from these discussions is submitted to the Politburo a final time for approval; in turn, it is submitted to the client government for its full review and approval. Any further contractual details are subsequently negotiated by the Tenth Main Directorate and the GKES. []

Role of the General Staff

16. The functions of the Soviet General Staff's Tenth Main Directorate in military assistance fall into three main categories: planning, program review, and administration. Its planning responsibilities include:

- Review of the military aid requirements of the client.
- Preparation of military aid studies for the Soviet leadership (supporting both negotiations with visiting delegations and visits abroad by the military and political leadership).
- Preparation of military aid plans as inputs to annual and five-year economic plans, as well as inputs to annual, five-year, and longer-term military plans. []

17. The Directorate's program responsibilities involve review of military aid requirements of clients and effectiveness of Soviet military aid programs in client countries, oversight of contract negotiations, coordination of equipment deliveries, and coordination of aid-related activities of other government agencies (intelligence, press coverage, and so forth). The Directorate administers the selection and appointment of personnel and the selection and training of foreign nationals in Soviet military schools. []

18. All indications are that the Soviet military leadership follows the political authorities in determining which countries are to receive military assistance. The military then pragmatically attempts to implement whatever military assistance program has been agreed upon. The military does evaluate client countries in terms of their strategic importance (for example, access to facilities) but, in general, it does not get involved in the larger foreign policy implications of a Soviet presence in a client country. []

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19. Today the largest Soviet military advisory groups are located in the key states of Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba, Ethiopia, Syria, and Vietnam. The importance of the Soviet commitment to these countries is reflected in the number of advisers, rank of the MAG chiefs, and supply of military equipment. Payoffs for the Soviets can be high. In Vietnam the Soviets have bartered substantial military assistance and an expanded MAG for a major military base in a strategically important area. In Cuba, Soviet advisers have established a relationship with the Cuban military that allows them to work effectively together in several Third World countries such as Ethiopia and Angola. Finally, in Afghanistan, the Soviets dominate their client's armed forces even more than they do those in Eastern Europe.

20. In a number of countries, instruction—provided by MAGs on the use and maintenance of Soviet equipment, operations planning, and counsel on counterinsurgency methods or restructure of the armed forces—allows Moscow to reap benefits both overt and hidden. By working to increase the dependence of the client armed forces on its advisers and technicians, usually in conjunction with large deliveries of advanced weapons, Moscow has frequently been able to deploy greater numbers of military advisers, to send other kinds of advisers (such as intelligence specialists from the KGB), and to extract other concessions as well. These include:

- Communications facilities and access to air and naval facilities.
- Increased sales of weapons for hard currency.
- Use of MAGs to provide intelligence, garner allies, and read the pulse of military discontent in states where the military coup is the predominant method of political change. Such relations have provided the Soviets links to officers who might seize power in the future.
- Manipulation of local politics. Advisory relationships provide unique access within the hierarchies of client governments.
- Evaluations of Soviet and Western military hardware.
- Extension of services to insurgents amenable to Moscow, such as the African National Congress and the South-West Africa People's Organization through the use of their MAGs in client countries such as Angola.
- Political indoctrination of client armed forces. Because of the close relationship between high

level officers in the client LDCs and Soviet advisers, the Soviets can make contact with rising military leaders. The Soviet MAG nominates client military officers for long-term study (three to five years) in the USSR, and the Soviets attempt to win their allegiance during their stay by manipulating the process.

21. At times, there is conflict within the Soviet military leadership over the extent of support of Third World clients. Conflict generally arises over:

- The wisdom of providing advanced Soviet technology, such as late-model Soviet aircraft, to countries whose air forces are not well trained or where there is a possibility of compromise of technology. Objections such as these are sometimes overcome by the Soviet need for hard currency and the need for Third World clients such as those in the Middle East to have aircraft capable of matching aircraft provided by the West to neighboring opposing countries.
- The military or strategic value of any client that cannot pay for weapons versus the gains the Soviets may make in increasing influence in any region or in gaining access to air and naval facilities.

How the Soviets Gain and Maintain a Foothold

22. While military supply relationships between the Soviets and Third World countries have commenced under a variety of economic, political, and military circumstances, the development of large MAGs usually has resulted from the heightened sense of military need associated with an internal or external threat to client countries. For example, the large MAG in Syria has been the direct outgrowth of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The MAG in Cuba has prospered from the perceived threat from the United States, and the MAG in Vietnam built up after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the subsequent Chinese attack on Vietnam in 1979. Iraq is an exception; the Soviet MAG there has not grown significantly as a result of conflict with Iran because Moscow tried in 1980 to cut off arms deliveries to show its displeasure with Iraq for starting the war with Iran. Since the embargo was lifted, the number of Soviet advisers in Iraq is estimated to have returned to its prewar level but has not grown, despite large arms shipments.

Fostering Dependence

23. Very often a dependent relationship develops between armed forces of the client and their Soviet

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advisers, especially when the advisers are assisting with ongoing combat efforts. As Moscow responds to urgent requests for materiel or services, the number of advisers and technical personnel increases and the Soviet foothold typically grows. New weapons, in turn, require more training and maintenance assistance, and larger Soviet contingents may require more developed communications and logistic support. In most cases, the increases in MAG personnel are likely to endure even if the need for training decreases. [redacted]

Strategems To Perpetuate the Soviet Presence

24. Soviet policy for arms transfers and advisory services is developed and carried out with the intention of perpetuating a Soviet presence in the client country, rather than promoting the self-reliance of the clients. As a result, no Soviet MAG has yet been voluntarily disbanded. MAG personnel seek to perpetuate their stay in a country in order to position themselves to make additional gains. Several major aid recipients have contended that the Soviets intentionally slow their training regimen and introduce more sophisticated equipment from time to time as a means of justifying a continued large Soviet presence. The USSR has removed its advisers when explicitly told to do so, as was the case with Egypt in the mid-1970s and with Somalia in 1977, but the Soviets prefer to adapt their services rather than reduce their advisory numbers. For example, despite the increasing skill of the Cuban military there has been no reduction in Soviet advisory strength there. [redacted]

25. Moscow also manipulates these relations in order to increase its political penetration of the client government. The Soviets especially seek liaison in the intelligence sphere; access to the host country's intelligence organization allows the Soviets to penetrate the client military and thus neutralizes one of the client government's checks on Soviet subversive activities. [redacted]

Problems Between Soviet MAGs and Host Governments

26. Because of these conflicts and Soviet strategems there is frequently tension between supplier and client. There are local issues as well. One is the aloofness of the Soviets; another is the chronic, often acerbic, criticism of the host country's military forces by the Soviet advisers. (At one time or another officers in most Third World countries have reported Soviet disdain and racist attitudes.) Finally, the performance of Soviet MAG personnel has often been found wanting by the countries they serve. But all of this rarely affects the relationship if the clients' arms needs are



Figure 9. Families often accompany Soviet advisers. Some wives (these in Angola) may perform military intelligence functions. [redacted]

great enough and if Soviet terms of assistance are more favorable than those given by the West. [redacted]

LDC Efforts To Limit Soviet Penetration

27. Although many Third World countries are eager to obtain Soviet arms because of their comparatively better prices or availability, few wish to host a Soviet military colony in their country unless forced by circumstances to do so. Numerous LDCs presume that they can bring in Soviet military advisers and utilize their services to improve their own military capability but effectively isolate the Soviets and limit their influence. Some clients, like India, Algeria, and Zambia, are quite successful in this effort; some are not: for example, the Soviets are heavily involved in military planning and policy in South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Angola. [redacted]

III. Soviet Military Assistance to Third World Countries

Latin America

28. Soviet objectives in the region are to undermine US influence and, in the long term, promote conditions conducive to revolutionary change. Moscow is positioning itself for the future by supporting the regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua by supplying arms, training, and advisers to states and revolutionary movements, and by making incremental advances in a variety of political, economic, and cultural spheres. [redacted]

29. For the near term, the Soviets will concentrate their efforts on Cuba and Central America. Although the removal of the current constraints on Sandinista expansionism would raise South American fears of Soviet influence in the region, most governments would also regard such developments as a significant setback for Washington. [redacted]

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30. *Cuba's Unique Role in Soviet Third World Policy.* Over the last quarter century the USSR-Cuban relationship has evolved into the closest the Soviets have throughout the Third World. The Soviet military presence in Cuba began in 1960. By mid-1962, in addition to deploying medium-range ballistic missiles and light bombers, the Soviets had established four mobile armored combat groups. Full air defense coverage of the island was provided by 24 SA-2 Guideline sites controlled, if not completely manned, by the Soviets. By October 1962, Soviet pilots manned 39 MIG-21 Fishbeds, which flew air defense cover for Cuba, and Soviet air defense troops operated an air surveillance radar system without Cuban participation. At that time, the Soviet Navy also manned 12 Komar-class guided-missile patrol boats and at least four Samlet coastal defense cruise missile sites. After the 1962 missile crisis, the Soviets shipped the missiles and bombers home and turned most of the remaining military equipment on the island over to Cuba.

31. Although a Soviet MAG almost surely existed in Cuba before the 1962 missile crisis, it probably was relatively small and consisted of officers assigned to the Ministry of Defense and service headquarters in an advisory capacity. In 1963, as the Soviets withdrew many combat and combat support units and turned over their equipment to Cuban replacement units, the MAG complement and activities apparently expanded. The Soviet brigade probably has been maintained there since the early 1960s;

32. The Soviets maintain a 7,000- to 7,800-man military contingent in Cuba: 2,600 to 2,900 in the combat brigade; 2,500 to 2,800 in the MAG; and 1,900 to 2,100 KGB, GRU, and military service troops manning intelligence installations. Soviet pilots also fly Soviet TU-95 and TU-142 aircraft that deploy to Cuba from the USSR to monitor US military activity. Moscow values Cuban territory as a base for intelligence collection against the United States. The Soviets also gain the strategic benefits discussed in section IV below.

33. In 1976 and 1977, when Cuban pilots were sent to Angola and Ethiopia, Soviet pilots flew in Cuba to maintain the operational strength of the latter's air force. The maximum Soviet contingent probably consisted of approximately 38 pilots in 1977.

34. Deliveries of new types of weapons to Cuba depend on Cuban needs and Soviet perceptions of the readiness of the United States to respond to provocative armaments deliveries by Moscow. The USSR appears committed to strengthening Cuba's capability to defend against an air attack or possible naval blockade, but it presumably understands that the delivery or deployment to Cuba of weapons that the United States regards as offensive would cause a serious crisis, as it did in 1962 and, to a lesser extent, in 1970 (when the Soviets deployed barges there capable of servicing Soviet nuclear-powered submarines).

35. Soviet military assistance—in most cases, free—has fluctuated, but, since 1982, has amounted to about \$1.3 billion annually—and has transformed Cuba's military into one of the largest and best equipped forces in the Third World. But the costs to Moscow of its relationship with Cuba are much higher. Over the last three years the Soviets have had to subsidize the Cuban economy with an average of \$4.5 billion each year. In the future the Cubans cannot count on a continued expansion of Soviet largess, especially in the economic arena. The economic costs of Soviet support to Cuba are becoming a serious concern to Moscow, and it is likely that Moscow will place stricter limits on this aid, pressing Havana to make much needed internal adjustments. Military deliveries, which generally have not been linked to

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economic performance, are expected to ebb and flow through the present modernization effort. []

36. To date, Moscow has rationalized its economic aid costs. Although Cuban spending and economic problems have created some friction between them, we see little evidence that either country is backing off from its commitment to support key clients or to exploit new opportunities in the Third World as they arise. Indeed, both Gorbachev and Castro have reiterated their willingness to bear the increasing burden of maintaining their influence in the Third World, particularly regarding their allies in Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. Cuba and the USSR mutually benefit from their cooperation in the developing areas and still view support of "movements of national liberation" and consolidation of Marxist regimes in power as integral to their struggle against the West. Castro's disproportionately large role in world affairs and his ability to cause problems for the United States in the Third World will continue to rest on massive levels of Soviet economic and military aid. In fact, Cuban dependence has grown to the point that we believe Castro would be hard pressed to refuse a Soviet request to send military personnel to an endangered pro-Soviet regime in the Third World. []

37. We believe Castro's revolutionary zeal and more aggressive pursuit of socialist "internationalist" goals will continue to be conditioned by Moscow's desire to avoid a serious confrontation with the United States in a region that is peripheral to vital Soviet interests. Castro has, at times, chafed at Soviet constraints on his policy options, but, in the final analysis, he recognizes that he has accomplished far more in the Third World with Soviet assistance than he could have without it. Given Cuba's deep dependence on the Soviet Union, we do not foresee a major Soviet-Cuban fissure over Third World issues in the near future. []

38. *Nicaragua*. The total Soviet presence in Nicaragua is quite limited: about 50 to 60 military advisers, 250 civilian technicians, and some 40 diplomats. Until late 1984 large shipments of Soviet arms for Nicaragua were delivered on ships from Algeria, Bulgaria, and Cuba. Since then, the Soviets have made direct deliveries and, in 1986, delivered in their own ships the great majority of all military materiel. []

39. Even though the number of Soviet military personnel in country is low, their contacts with Nicaraguan counterparts could afford them an opportunity to influence the Sandinista military establishment. Soviet-Nicaraguan relations are formal. Fraternization

is nil, and, to date, there has been no credible evidence that the Soviets have participated in actual combat operations. Soviet personnel still assemble helicopters and light utility airplanes delivered to Nicaragua and test-fly the helicopters after assembly. But reporting suggests that Soviet technicians have not undertaken the normal maintenance and repair work with those aircraft beyond the warranty period (turning this job over to Cuban maintenance personnel). []

40. The Cubans, however, maintain a significant military assistance contingent in Nicaragua of 2,000 to 2,500 men:

- Cuban military personnel are attached to some Nicaraguan units, and their presence is well established at training centers and support bases.
- They have participated actively in combat actions undertaken by the Nicaraguan units to which they are assigned; they are not solely performing in an advisory capacity. Currently, however, their participation in combat is rare.

41. By the end of 1986 the Nicaraguan Air Force had received at least 60 helicopters, including at least 45 MI-8 or MI-17 assault transports and about 12 MI-25 gunships. From September 1985 through 1986 the Nicaraguans lost ten of their MI-8 and MI-17 helicopters for various reasons; some of these helicopters were flown by Cuban pilots. Nicaragua will ask Moscow to replace the losses. []

42. Since the fall of 1985, Nicaragua's Soviet-built helicopters have made a growing contribution to the war effort against anti-Sandinista insurgents. They have increased the government's mobility and firepower and have made it more difficult for the insurgents to mass forces and hold towns, even temporarily. Nonetheless, maintenance problems, command and control limitations, difficult terrain, and bad weather will continue to reduce their effectiveness. If the insurgents learn to employ mobile SAMs effectively, the helicopters' advantage would be further reduced. The helicopter force is still inadequate to meet all military needs, but it has increased Sandinista tactical flexibility. We believe Soviet and Cuban efforts will continue to improve Nicaraguan counterinsurgency capabilities. However, helicopters and other advanced equipment will require even greater Nicaraguan dependence on Cuban and Soviet aid and technicians. []

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43. Soviet deliveries of military equipment have been heavy over the last four years [redacted]. Only substantial increases of Soviet deliveries of economic aid, including oil, have averted the collapse of the Nicaraguan economy. Even though Moscow has indicated that most of its deliveries are covered by credits, cash-short Managua probably will be unable to make any substantial payments on its debts to the Bloc countries, and the Soviets probably do not expect to be repaid any time soon. Warsaw Pact economic aid has grown from less than \$200 million in 1982 to \$500 million in 1986. Even though the Warsaw Pact countries have granted new credits, they will not be sufficient to halt the decline in Nicaragua's economy. Moscow's support will probably have to continue to replace the reduction of aid from Western nations. In 1981 Western multilateral and bilateral aid reached a total of almost \$500 million. It is expected to decline to less than \$150 million by the end of 1986. [redacted]

44. *Peru.* Although the United States served as Peru's principal source of Army and Air Force materiel and training throughout the 1950s and most of the 1960s, the military government that ruled from 1968 to 1975 pursued a stridently nationalistic, Third World-oriented foreign policy, which severely strained relations with the United States. Relations were further exacerbated by the US refusal to sell tanks and sophisticated fighter aircraft to Latin America. Peruvian seizure of US fishing boats resulted in a cutoff of US military aid in 1969. At the same time, Peru sought closer relations with the Soviet Bloc and in 1973 received its first Soviet military advisers and major shipments of arms. [redacted]

45. The Soviet military assistance program gained momentum and produced a growing Peruvian arms dependence on the Soviet Union even as Peruvian-US military relations were improving after 1975. To date Peru is the only South American country to have purchased major Soviet arms, to send its military personnel to the USSR for training (about 2,000 since the early 1970s), and to have Soviet military advisers in country (about 115). The most visible aspect of the Soviet-Peruvian relationship is the extensive Soviet military sales and technical assistance program. The Soviets have provided about half of all Peruvian military deliveries since 1973, about \$1.5 billion; all of the weaponry has gone to the Army and Air Force. [redacted]

46. So far, we believe that the Soviet assistance program has not provided Moscow with any demonstrable influence over decisionmaking in the Peruvian armed forces, and the current working relationship [redacted]





Figure 12. Soviet-supplied, Nicaraguan MI-25 Hind helicopter. [redacted]

between the Soviets and the Peruvians is strained. Soviets are often perceived as uncooperative and insensitive to the Peruvian interests. The Peruvians have gone to some lengths to demonstrate their dissatisfaction. However, we believe severe budget restrictions, the relatively low cost of Soviet arms, the lack of alternative sources for spare parts, and highly favorable financing terms will continue to make Soviet weaponry attractive to the Peruvian military. [redacted]


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Figure 13. MI-8 Hip troop carrier helicopters of the Peruvian Air Force sit in flight-ready position at a Peruvian airfield.

Africa, South of the Sahara

47. In this region the Soviets and the Cubans are facing some of their greatest challenges. At the same time they have an opportunity to exploit and, in some cases, generate instability in the region; to foster Marxist regimes; to gain greater access to commodities for internal consumption or for barter for hard currency; and, potentially, to deny or cause disruptions of the deliveries of strategic materials to the West. In the early 1970s, the Soviets focused on Guinea, Mali, and Somalia. Over the last decade they have concentrated on Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia.

48. The Cuban role in Sub-Saharan Africa gives Soviet arms policies a new dimension. Africa has given Castro the opportunity to become an important political actor on a global scale. Since 1975 the Cuban presence there has grown rapidly and includes some 49,000 military and civilian personnel. The presence of Cuban combat troops in Sub-Saharan Africa presents Cuba with opportunities to exert influence on the internal politics of the host countries and provides a military presence on the continent, limited numbers of which could be moved to other countries that might request assistance. Cuban intelligence and security advisers stationed in numerous African countries provide Havana with prime sources of information and influence.


49. *Angola.* From the time of Angola's independence in November 1975 to 1982 the size of the Soviet MAG grew to 500 men. Over the last three years, it


has expanded further to about 1,200 men. The Soviets are assisted by 500 East Germans and a 36,000-man Cuban military contingent (including some 28,000 combat troops) that backs the Angolan Army, guards rear bases, provides essential support services, pilots jet fighters, and frees an equivalent number of Angolan troops for field operations.


50. The role of Angola's key backers has grown since August 1983, when the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) took the town of Cangamba in a major defeat for Luanda that shocked the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) leadership; UNITA's advances challenged Moscow's credibility as an ally and military patron. As a result, the MPLA requested more Communist military assistance. Soviet arms deliveries to Angola then rose sharply. Since then deliveries have included MIG-23 Flogger and SU-22 Fitter fighter-bombers (as well as additional MIG-21 Fishbed fighters and MI-25 Hind attack helicopters); substantial quantities of anti-aircraft and SAM equipment; and large numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces. From 1982 to 1986, Soviet deliveries amounted to \$4.8 billion.


51. Functions performed by the Soviet MAG through the early 1980s include:


- Planning, coordinating, and supervising the activities of all Soviet military advisers, technicians, and air transport assets in country.


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- Training facilities to advance the Soviet contribution to the training of insurgents seeking to gain power in Namibia and South Africa.
- A testing ground for the Cubans on new Soviet weapons systems prior to their introduction into Cuba. 


- Hard currency for arms deliveries. Until the drop in oil prices, Angola paid Cuba and the Warsaw Pact countries about \$1 billion a year in hard currency for arms, training assistance, Cuban combat forces, and other expenses. A drastic cut in Angolan earnings has forced a moratorium on Angolan payments for arms to the Soviets. 

53. The Soviet position in Angola is strengthened by the almost total reliance on Soviet-supplied weaponry and by the Cuban garrison, without which the embattled regime fears it would fall to the UNITA insurgents. It is difficult to assess whether the Soviet and Cuban roles in Angola are so pervasive that they could prevent a turn to the West on the part of the Angolan leadership. The leadership itself seems to believe that if it would hazard such a turn, the Soviets and Cubans would immediately pull out, leading to a UNITA victory. 


54. *Mozambique.* The Soviets began supporting the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) insurgents against the Portuguese in the late 1960s. Upon coming to power in 1975, FRELIMO began to transform itself from a Marxist-oriented body into a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party on the Soviet model. The Soviets extended substantial military assistance and established a MAG by early 1978, and the East Germans formed and trained the indigenous internal security service. The Soviets provide administrative and political advisers to help form and run the government. Mozambique signed a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with the USSR within two years after independence and also has treaties of cooperation with East European states. 

55. Soviet advisers are assigned to principal officers of the Armed Forces General Staff, the military commanders of each of the 10 Mozambican provinces, the nine ground force brigades, air force/air defense units, and the major military training centers. The largest number of Soviet advisers/specialists is apparently assigned to ground force brigades. 

— Advising the Angolan Ministry of Defense, overseeing and maintaining the operational readiness of Angolan military operations and training.

— Assembling, testing, and maintaining equipment too complex for the Angolans or for which they have not yet been adequately trained. 

— Playing a key role in setting up the Angolan air defense system, which incorporates radars, various surface-to-air missiles, and late-model fighter aircraft.

— Probably monitoring the training of African National Congress (ANC) and South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) insurgents in Angola. 

52. Soviet and Cuban support for the MAG has provided Moscow with important benefits:

— A foothold in southern Africa and access to Angolan ports for Soviet naval vessels, naval repair ships and replenishment facilities, and to airfields for limited deployments of Soviet long-range reconnaissance aircraft for patrols over the South Atlantic Ocean.

— An opportunity to educate large numbers of Angolan youth and to indoctrinate those judged amenable to ideological commitments.

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56. The MAG is engaged in a number of activities in country. Its main duties are to:

- Supervise, organize, and train Mozambique's military forces along Soviet lines.
- Plan combat operations against the insurgents, and monitor the performance of government forces and the course of war.
- Arrange the assembly, turnover, and maintenance of Soviet military equipment provided to the government.
- Arrange for selection of qualified local personnel to be sent to the USSR for training.
- Administer and fly Soviet transport aircraft for intra-Mozambican shuttle flights.

57. Although the late President Machel signed the Nkomati Accord with South Africa in March 1984 in an effort to weaken the RENAMO opposition (Mozambique National Resistance) and to expand ties to the West, there is little likelihood that Mozambique will soon be able to reduce its military dependence on the Soviets. RENAMO continues to pose a serious threat to the regime, and Mozambique must rely on the Kremlin's military assistance. Although the Soviets were stunned by Machel's signing of an accord with South Africa, they continued military assistance, with no apparent reduction in either the roles or importance of the MAG.

58. Although the Soviets have provided about \$1.7 billion worth of arms since 1977 and have deployed some 800 military advisers of their own, their position in the country weakened somewhat. After 10 years of socialism, further undermined by the growing insurgency, Mozambique's economic crisis has reached nearly unmanageable proportions; industry has collapsed and export earnings have fallen below \$100 million a year since 1984. As long as the insurgency continues, the economic and political situation in Mozambique will remain precarious.

59. The new leadership probably views the relationship with Moscow as essential, being based on Soviet willingness to provide arms, to train and educate large numbers of Mozambicans, to furnish security and communication services, and to supply a modest amount of economic aid. But Mozambique also recognizes that total reliance on Soviet patronage is impossible because Mozambican problems are too formidable and the Soviet responses inadequate. Machel's successor, President Chissano, has sought a

middle ground—an accommodation with South Africa, economic aid from the West, and military assistance from other African states, while still retaining a military relationship with Moscow.

60. The modest Soviet economic aid has had little effect on reversing the economic slide, and Soviet weapons and tactical advice are largely inappropriate to the guerrilla war being waged in the countryside. Nonetheless, the Soviets have maintained a flow of arms to Mozambique and preached the standard message on "South African and Western potential for treachery." In early 1985 the Soviets sent a pair of IL-38 ASW aircraft to Maputo. These aircraft flew no operational sorties from Mozambique, and the 10-day deployment of IL-38s has not been repeated.

61. Moscow's expectations over the near term are probably modest. The Soviets are counting on Mozambique's continuing need for Soviet military assistance to maintain their position, although the level of military assistance has fallen since 1983. FRELIMO's search for alternative sources of military support has yielded little so far. Certainly, the small training program granted by the United Kingdom, the modest offers of Portugal and France, and the important but still small contribution of approximately 6,000 troops from Zimbabwe do not add up to a viable alternative to Soviet arms, advisers, and training programs. In the current difficult situation military support is essential.

62. *Zimbabwe.* Until recently Harare's relations with Moscow had been proper but restrained. Prime Minister Mugabe's suspicions of Soviet intentions in southern Africa, and Moscow's close ties to a rival nationalist party during the war for Zimbabwean independence acted as a barrier to improving relations. Zimbabwean-Soviet relations have improved, however, as the Soviets have cut their ties to the opposition and as Mozambique's security situation has declined. Despite Mugabe's wariness of the USSR, his commitment to keeping the railway, road, and pipeline open through Mozambique (the Beira Corridor) and his growing fears of threats from South Africa and RENAMO guerrillas in Mozambique have prompted him to seek Soviet military assistance. In late October 1986, a high-level delegation went to Moscow to negotiate an arms purchase for Zimbabwean forces fighting insurgents in Mozambique and to bolster Harare's air defenses. Recent reporting indicates that negotiations have been difficult, with the Soviets apparently unwilling to offer Zimbabwe concessionary terms. Zimbabwe has also been considering purchases of Western arms.

~~Top Secret~~

Soviet Military Assistance to the
African National Congress

Soviet policy toward South Africa meshes with the policies of other southern African states whose governments are generally sympathetic to the African National Congress (ANC), the most prominent of the organizations attempting to overthrow the South African Government. For example, a portion of the Soviet military assistance to some of those states is channeled toward the arming and training of the ANC. South Africa often retaliates against its neighbors for their support to the ANC, creating a perceived need for improved self-defense and military assistance; this is an opening the Soviets can exploit. []

The Soviets probably calculate that the ANC will be the principal vehicle for change in South Africa and view the South African Communist Party (SACP)—a protege of the Soviet Communist Party, which funds and guides it—as a good means for influencing the ANC. Despite differences, Moscow has treated the ANC as its "natural ally" in the region, deserving of financial, political, and military support. However, the Soviets suspect that the ANC leadership is ideologically unreliable. []

Soviet support to the ANC is across the board and through multiple channels and seems designed both to enhance the influence of the SACP within the ANC and to maintain Soviet influence over the broader ANC leadership. The Soviet Bloc provides much of the military assistance received by the ANC, mainly small arms, landmines, and other insurgency weapons, but is much less generous regarding nonmilitary aid. In both cases, we cannot estimate specific dollar amounts of this assistance. []

63. *Mali.* The Soviet military presence in Mali has turned into a marriage of inconvenience for its hosts. It began in the 1960s and peaked in the mid-1970s. Since 1972 some \$1.1 billion worth of arms has been delivered by the USSR. About 60 Soviet military advisers assisted by civilian technicians have been involved in constructing and maintaining airfields. These fields could improve Soviet airlift capabilities, via Mali and Algeria, to western and southern Africa. Recent Soviet construction has lengthened airstrips in the country to 3,000 meters—long enough to accommodate large, high-performance aircraft. Mali uses the airfields to maintain its own air communications. []

64. The Malians complain that, although a significant part of their military assistance is paid for by indigenous gold production, the Soviets do not instruct Malian technicians on the repair and maintenance procedures for the missiles and aircraft they have supplied. This makes the Malians unnecessarily dependent upon the Soviets and it costs the Malians significant extra hard currency. []

65. Although Mali has expressed an interest in acquiring Western arms, the expense probably makes any significant acquisitions unlikely for the foreseeable future. Soviet interest in access to Malian airfields for contingency purposes makes it probable that Moscow will try to provide aid at terms very favorable to Mali. Mali will continue to rely on Soviet military assistance, but the government remains suspicious of Soviet intentions in Mali and in West Africa as a whole. []

66. *Guinea.* In the heyday of Soviet-Guinean relations in the 1970s the Soviets enjoyed significant access for their ships to Guinea's ports, and Bear reconnaissance aircraft periodically deployed to airfields there. In return the Soviets delivered a substantial amount of military aid, developed bauxite mines within the country, and greatly enlarged the fishing industry. []

67. In 1977 Conakry decreed that Soviet reconnaissance aircraft could no longer use Guinea's airfields. Soviet ships still use Conakry for berthing and Soviet transport aircraft transit Conakry en route to Angola. The Soviet position in Guinea is still substantial because of Moscow's extensive involvement in key military and some economic sectors. This involvement does not guarantee political influence, nor will it regain for Moscow the ability to deploy military aircraft, but it does underpin the Soviet position in Guinea and makes a sudden reversal of its position unlikely. []

68. Moscow has been Conakry's primary source of military equipment and training since independence. The Guinean armed forces operate various types of Soviet equipment, including MIG-21 fighters [] more were delivered in 1986), MI-8 Hip helicopters, and medium tanks and armored vehicles; they are aided by about 50 Soviet advisers. Many Guinean officers have received training in the USSR. While Conakry may seek to diversify its arms inventory somewhat, Guinea's need for Soviet spare parts and maintenance support and its poor prospects for obtaining favorable credit terms in the West should continue to ensure near total military dependence on the USSR. []

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Somalia: A Former Client

Although the Soviet MAG was expelled from Somalia in 1977 when the USSR refused to support Mogadishu in its war with Ethiopia, its role there was a classic case history of the evolution of Soviet military assistance in a Third World country. From 1969 to 1977, Soviet military advisers played an important role, and in that period the Soviet MAG apparently operated in Somalia with little or no control or interference from the Soviet Embassy. []

The authority of the Somali Government over the MAG was also minimal: Soviet advisers could come and go as they wished because neither passports or visas were required. These immigration mechanisms might have been useless in any event because MAG personnel were said to arrive on Soviet aircraft at the Soviet part of the international airport at Mogadishu. Even President Siad was said to be unaware of how many Soviet advisers were in Somalia. The MAG continued to operate with a surprising degree of autonomy even after the months of tension that led up to the beginning of the 1977 Ogaden war. []

The approximately 1,500 Soviet advisers in Somalia helped support Soviet naval and air operations from facilities there. The USSR constructed several facilities in Somalia, including some in Berbera to support the Indian Ocean Squadron. These consisted of a missile storage and handling facility, a POL storage depot, an airbase capable of accommodating all types of aircraft, and a naval communications facility. The Soviets staged

IE-38 May ASW aircraft from the airfield at Hargeysa, and TU-95 Bear D aircraft once visited an airfield outside Mogadishu. []

During the time of the MAG's preeminence, Somalia was almost completely dependent on the Soviet Union for spare parts, training, and periodic maintenance of virtually the entire inventory of Somali military equipment. In addition, Soviet advisers provided training at schools in the USSR and within Somali units. []

During their stay in Somalia, there was only minimal off-duty contact between Soviet military personnel and their Somali counterparts. Contact was inhibited by the fact that the MAG personnel lived in facilities separated from the general population. The Soviets had exclusive recreational facilities, used private cars and buses for transportation, used a portion of a public beach reserved solely for them, and socialized with each other in places like the "Russian Club" located in Mogadishu. By 1975, the lack of fraternization and the Soviets' overbearing attitude had engendered Somali resentment to such a degree that Soviet nationals had to travel in groups at night for fear of attack. []

The expulsion of the Soviets in 1977 contributed to Somalia's defeat by Ethiopia. The advisers had been an important element of the Somali logistic and maintenance system, and their removal hampered Somali military operations. In addition, Soviet advisers had provided secure communications for the entire Somali military. []

69. The Soviets appear confident that Conakry's turn to the West will not jeopardize their important interests—limited access to facilities, landing rights for Soviet military air transport (VTA) flights, and extensive imports of Guinea's bauxite and fish. The Soviet-run bauxite mine pays for nearly half of Guinea's \$236 million debt to the USSR and supplies one-eighth of Soviet bauxite needs. In view of the 1984 collapse of the bauxite industry, Guinea is no doubt happy to have the USSR as a market for its production. Moscow recently provided Guinea with its largest economic credits ever—\$140 million worth—to assuage some of Conakry's previous complaints on the lack of Soviet assistance. []

70. *Ethiopia.* The overthrow of Emperor Haile Selassie by the military in 1974, the subsequent deterioration of once-strong US-Ethiopian relations, and the Soviet shift of priorities in the region led to the Soviet involvement in Ethiopia. The Soviets turned down the first Ethiopian requests for arms in 1975 because of uncertainties over the staying power of the military

council and a fear of upsetting their longstanding patronage of neighboring Somalia. But by the end of 1976 the Soviets were convinced that Ethiopia was too attractive an opportunity to pass up. A small initial arms deal was followed by a succession of others, marking the principal avenue of entree for the Soviets. The Soviets began to send military advisers to Ethiopia in 1977 even before they were expelled from Somalia. Mengistu's purges of his more moderate colleagues in the ruling council, and the elimination of civilian opponents in the Red Terror of 1977-78 established Mengistu as the sole leader of the country and gave further impetus to the movement toward Marxism. Ethiopia is now one of the USSR's staunchest Third World clients. []

71. The Soviets provided arms to Ethiopia in 1977, and the invasion by Somalia in that year led to urgent Ethiopian requests for more arms from the USSR. The Soviets responded with air and sea lifts and arranged with Castro for the dispatch of Cuban combat forces to Ethiopia. Massive arms deliveries and the infusion

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
of Soviet military advisers and Cuban troops turned back the Somalis. []

72. Soviet military advisers assist in planning major Ethiopian military operations against Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents in the north. Ethiopian military leaders frequently criticize or sometimes ignore tactical advice. To a lesser extent the Soviets are involved in an advisory role at the major headquarters in the Ogaden. Soviet MAG personnel almost certainly coordinate closely with the Cuban mechanized brigade in the country and provide the infrastructure that enables the Cubans to remain there. The effectiveness of joint Soviet-Cuban effort was amply demonstrated during the 1977-78 Ogaden war. By early 1978, Soviet and Cuban advisers were effectively in control of Ethiopian strategic and tactical planning during the climactic stages of the war; Cuban combat units were the key to victory, and Soviet advisers accompanied units on combat missions. []

73. In Eritrea in 1978 Soviet advisers directed strategic, tactical, and logistic operations. Soviet involvement in daily combat operations was significantly reduced following the Ogaden war against Somalia and the 1978 campaign against guerrillas in Eritrea, although Soviet advisers continued to accompany some Ethiopian units into combat until the spring of 1984. Today, although Ethiopians appear to be in complete charge of their units fighting the insurgents within their country, a return to close Soviet control cannot be discounted in a future crisis. []


74. While the number of Soviet military advisers in Ethiopia has increased moderately since the late 1970s, as is traditional in the expansion of Soviet activities, the number of Cubans has been significantly reduced:

- In 1978, after Soviet and Cuban efforts had helped Mengistu repulse the invasion from Somalia, there were 1,200 to 1,300 Soviet military advisers in Ethiopia, as well as 50 East Europeans, and 13,000 to 15,000 Cubans (including combat troops).
- By the mid-1980s, the number of Soviet military advisers had grown to at least 1,700 and the number of East German military advisers increased to 500, but the number of Cuban troops and military advisors had been reduced to about 3,500. This change has resulted from the reduction of the threat from Somalia, the need for an increased Cuban military presence in Angola, and Cuban unwillingness to get involved in fighting the northern insurgents. []



75. Ethiopia's relationship with the USSR is based in part upon a continuing strong need for Soviet arms. Soviet deliveries of military equipment averaged over \$900 million a year during 1982-85 but dropped off significantly in 1986 to []. The sharp drop may reflect the large amounts of equipment sent in previous years. Ethiopia has the largest military force in the region, but it also has a large military debt with Moscow—\$3.7 billion. []

76. The Soviets have put considerable effort into their patronage of Ethiopia and undoubtedly believe they get important benefits: extended military reach, consolidation of their influence in the country, and the undermining of US strategic policies in the region:



- The Soviets have acquired virtually free access to Dehalak Deset (Dahlak Island) off the Red Sea coast of Ethiopia. This helped offset the loss of Soviet naval facilities in Somalia in 1977. Dahlak, though a small support facility, is strategically located at the mouth of the Red Sea and is useful to the Soviets for repairing ships and submarines of their Indian Ocean Squadron.

Top Secret [redacted]

— The Soviets are attempting to consolidate influence in Addis Ababa and to foster close ties between the regime and Moscow. They are counting on a continuing Ethiopian need for large-scale military aid to afford the time required to indoctrinate Ethiopian cadres and establish the basis for a vanguard workers party. Some 3,000 Ethiopian youths are undergoing technical, academic, and political training in the USSR, and another 2,000 are in Eastern Europe and Cuba.³ The Soviets expect that a number of these trainees will be more ideologically attuned to Soviet aims and interests, and will move into official positions in Ethiopia.

— The USSR is using its influence in Ethiopia to attempt to undermine perceived US strategic policies in the Horn of Africa area. The Soviets are counting on projecting an image of patron reliability, military force, and permanent presence in Ethiopia in order to intimidate US allies in the region or to persuade them that Soviet patronage carries greater advantages than US patronage. This policy has yet to produce a resounding success, but Somalia, where the United States has access to military facilities, is seeking better relations and some tangible aid from the USSR. The post-Nimeiri government in Sudan, where the United States has pre-positioned equipment, is exploring closer relations with the Soviets. [redacted]

77. From Chairman Mengistu's point of view, the arrangement with the Soviets is indispensable. He depends upon the flow of Soviet arms to maintain pressure on the insurgencies in Eritrea and Tigray and to dissuade the Somalis from another Ogaden invasion. The paucity of Soviet economic aid has not affected his relationship with the USSR. Minor aid deliveries from Communist countries are well publicized, but the generosity of the West is rarely acknowledged publicly. Mengistu has used famine for his own political advantage. He diverted some food from its intended recipients to feed the urban populace and the military, blocked distribution to areas controlled by insurgents, and forcibly removed many northern Ethiopians from the food distribution centers to remote resettlement areas in the west and south of the country. [redacted]

78. Although the Soviets are determined to maintain their foothold in Ethiopia, it is a challenging undertaking:

- The insurgency in Eritrea and Tigray continues, and Addis Ababa shows no sign of ultimately winning.

³ However, many Ethiopian students have defected to Western Europe after completing training in Eastern Europe and the USSR. [redacted]

— The feeding of the population has depended on Western largess over the past two years.

— The cost of supporting the Ethiopian economy continues to rise, and Moscow has had to give the country oil subsidies and credits.⁴ [redacted]

79. To help run the government the Soviets also maintain about 2,000 civilian technicians in Ethiopia, with some at the highest levels of the economic establishment, in an attempt to exercise direct influence over economic decision making. Yet Ethiopia's economy continues to deteriorate. Moscow has refused to join international efforts to assist Ethiopia's millions of starving refugees and has even demanded hard currency payments for Soviet technicians transporting Western donations to refugee camps, although the USSR distributes Western-supplied food within Ethiopia in its trucks and aircraft. [redacted]

80. Over the years there have been instances of disharmony in the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship over issues such as the party, strategy in the insurgency, economic aid, and policy toward South Yemen. The cultural and personal clashes between Ethiopians and Soviets, especially in the military, and the high-handed, ill-mannered behavior of the Soviets toward Ethiopians have marred but not seriously threatened their relationship. With the emergence of Mengistu as the autocratic ruler of Ethiopia, the only Ethiopian attitude that really counts is his. [redacted]

81. *Madagascar.* This country is the largest, most populous, and most strategically located of the southwestern Indian Ocean island states. Soviet military assistance began there in late 1975, and the Soviets have since sold, donated, or leased helicopters, transports, MIG-21 fighter aircraft, and ground force equipment. By mid-1980, the number of Soviet advisers and technicians accompanying these items had risen to an estimated 300. Since then, their number has been reduced to around 50, following a Malagasy decision to assume a more nonaligned posture. After more than a decade in power the often unpredictable Malagasy President, Didier Ratsiraka, has become accommodating to the West out of sheer economic necessity rather than any fundamental change in ideology. Madagascar's need for financial aid thus provides the West opportunities to counter Soviet influence in the region. [redacted]

⁴ From 1981-83 Libya also helped subsidize Ethiopia. Tripoli provided \$265 million worth of oil or cash subsidies and delivered [redacted] military aid. These subsidies stopped in 1984 and will probably not be resumed unless oil prices rise substantially. [redacted]

~~Top Secret~~

82. *Seychelles*. The Seychelles archipelago became a target of Soviet interest soon after it achieved independence in 1976. President Rene came to power in 1977 as the result of a coup, and since then the islands have experienced several coup scares, a mercenary invasion in which South Africans were involved, and a major army mutiny in 1982. The Soviets have consistently supported Rene. Soviet military deliveries to Seychelles began in 1978 and totaled nearly \$70 million worth by the end of 1986, making Moscow Rene's main source of arms. In addition, the Soviet Navy has made a number of port calls to Victoria at Rene's request, particularly during times when he was out of the country and fearful of attempts to depose him. In return for this support, Rene has permitted Soviet VTA and Aeroflot aircraft to use Seychelles as a stopover point on flights to southern Africa. Soviet technicians have also restored some 5,000-ton capacity oil storage tanks at Victoria. Although use of these tanks by Soviet naval vessels has not been confirmed, they would probably be available in an emergency. []

The Middle East: Including the Mediterranean, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Persian Gulf.

83. The Gorbachev regime is understandably displeased with the lack of impact USSR policies have had in the Middle East. However, the specific policy lines being followed under Gorbachev have been in place for some years: preservation of the USSR's key relationship with Syria, support of most objectives of the PLO, the effort to improve relations with moderate Arab governments, and support for an international conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute. In the Gulf region the Soviets maintain relations with Iraq while seeking to develop openings to Iran. Finally, Moscow is experimenting with preliminary moves toward reestablishing relations with Israel, recognizing that relations with both the Arab states and Israel are necessary for achieving a central political role in the region. []

84. *The Mediterranean*. Although the Soviets have been active in the region since the mid-1950s and have delivered more military aid to countries there and in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf than to all other regions combined, there is no country in the area that the Soviets can claim as a reliable ally. Islam, the oil wealth of a number of these countries, their preference for Western goods, and historical ties to the West have, in a number of cases, worked against the Soviet efforts to translate their military assistance into a permanent entree. []

85. Nevertheless, the Arab-Israeli dispute, US support for Israel, the Palestinian issue, and endemic intra-Arab rivalries perpetuate a situation of no-war/no-peace, instability, and the potential for large-scale




Figure 16. Tin Shield acquisition radar exported to Syria in the fall of 1983. []

conflict. As long as the Arab countries have the money to pay for arms and permit the Soviets some access to air and naval facilities, Moscow will have a role to play but will continue to stay clear of direct conflict with superior Western and Israeli military and naval power. The two most important countries to the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean are Syria and Libya. []

86. *Syria*. Although Soviet-Syrian ties are strong, relations have frequently been strained. The arms supply relationship goes back to 1957 and has survived Syrian governmental changes and military defeats over the years. Broad Syrian and Soviet goals in the region are similar. Both countries are primarily interested in limiting the US role in the region while enhancing their own position and influence. For this reason, both states have opposed the Camp David agreements, the Jordanian peace plan, and the Jordanian-PLO Amman Accord. They consider these agreements to be "separate deals," which preclude Soviet and Syrian involvement. While the USSR advocates a general conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute, Syria pays only lipservice to the idea, and Damascus and Moscow have significant differences over the specifics of such a conference. The two countries fundamentally disagree on many other issues; in particular, over the role of, and support to, the PLO, and Syria's support for Iran in the Gulf war. Over the years, the Syrians have taken foreign policy stances that have been directly opposed to Soviet interests, and Soviet attempts to manipulate military assistance to influence Syria's position in these matters has largely failed:

— Syria refused Moscow's urging to attend the proposed US-Soviet-sponsored Geneva Conference in 1973, which underlined the fundamental difference between Moscow and Damascus regarding negotiations with Israel.

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— Syrian President Assad ignored Moscow's objections to Syria's intervention in Lebanon in 1976, despite Soviet threats to stop arms supplies to Syria. In retaliation Damascus reportedly threatened to bar Soviet use of the port of Tartus. Ultimately Moscow resumed arms shipments without Syria having to withdraw.

— Assad sought to improve relations with the United States between 1974 and 1979 in the face of obvious Soviet displeasure.

— Recently, Soviet-Syrian relations have been strained over Assad's policy toward the PLO of undermining Arafat's leadership and blocking Soviet efforts at Palestinian reunification; Syrian support for Iran in the Gulf war; and Syrian activities in Lebanon that threaten Soviet allies there, primarily Assad's support for Amal against the Palestinians in the ongoing camps war. []

87. The Soviets also know that without Syrian cooperation they would have significantly less influence in the Middle East peace process. Thus, the Soviet's dependence on Syria for presence and influence in the Middle East probably is at least as great as Syrian dependence on Soviet arms. For this reason, Moscow has acquiesced to some Syrian policies on regional issues that Damascus considers vital to its security, while Syria promotes Soviet policies as long as they do not conflict with Syrian objectives. []

88. The quality of Soviet military training of Syrians has been described as only adequate. Syrian officers at branch schools have complained that Soviet instructors follow a very rigid lesson plan and are unable (or unwilling) to answer questions that do not exactly follow that outline. Freewheeling discussions and innovative ideas are not encouraged. Nonetheless, Soviet ground training has improved the Syrian Army's combat capabilities, though not providing it with the tactical flexibility emphasized in the Israeli army. Lack of flexibility, which is partially attributable to Soviet training, exacerbates overall Syrian command, control, and communications and information shortfalls, and significantly degrades Syrian operations at the battalion level and higher. Soviet pilot training tends to concentrate more on aircraft safety and on ground control intercept procedures than on air combat maneuvers; as a result, the Syrian Air Force is hopelessly outclassed by the Israelis. []

89. Soviet MAG relations with the Syrians are extensive, but strained:

— While Syrian officers generally recognize the need for Soviet technicians to assist Syrian per-

sonnel with new equipment, they will ignore Soviet advice on the tactical employment of forces. The Syrians believe that the few Indian and Pakistani Air Force advisers who served with their forces prior to 1976 were far better pilots than the Soviets.

— Many Soviet advisers are known to have a low opinion of their Syrian counterparts and of Arabs in general. This attitude has been perceived and reciprocated by many in the Syrian populace. For their part, Syrians are distressed with common incidents of Soviet drunkenness. []

90. Moscow upgraded the rank of the MAG chief in Syria in April 1984 from lieutenant general to colonel general, a strong indication of the MAG's importance. The MAG is very rank heavy, with 90 percent of its military personnel in the rank of lieutenant colonel or above, including up to 16 general officers. The Damascus garrison has generals from the air forces, ground forces, tank troops, motorized rifle troops, and air defense troops, and there are several other garrisons located in various Syrian cities. []

91. There are about 3,000 to 3,600 Soviet military advisers in country. About 1,300 of these work with the Syrian Army and reportedly are present in all tank, mechanized infantry, artillery, commando, and air defense artillery battalions, and probably with the surface-to-surface missile systems such as the SS-21. About 1,800 Soviet air and air defense advisers are at the SA-5 complexes, in the other SAM battalions and brigade headquarters, in all air defense artillery regiments, and at all electronic warfare and radar facilities and interceptor squadrons. The remaining advisers are found in aircraft assembly, maintenance, and logistic support facilities throughout the air and air defense structure. []

92. []

[] Between 1982 and late 1984 the Soviets had 2,000 of their own air defense troops operate and maintain the SA-5 complexes in Syria. The value of the Soviet manning was twofold: to bolster the Soviets' image as a "great power" protector and to deter large-scale Israeli air attacks over Syria itself. But the SA-5s have not been fired at any Israeli aircraft flying over Syria and probably will not be, short of an Israeli invasion of Syria or a direct attack upon the complexes themselves. []

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93. The Soviets have provided Syria with over \$22 billion worth of arms since the beginning of the 1970s, more than half since 1980. Even so, recent Soviet arms deliveries have declined significantly.

Part of this drop reflects the drastic decline in Syrian foreign aid receipts. As figure 18 shows, these are projected to fall by half from the high of over \$1.7 billion in 1981. Although Warsaw Pact deliveries have recently been in decline, Syria was the first recipient outside the Warsaw Pact of a number of weapons including the SA-5 and SA-13 SAM systems; SS-21 surface-to-surface missiles; and one of their most advanced air defense command and control systems, the Vektor II.





Figure 18
Syrian Foreign Aid Receipts,
1980-86



* Estimated.
b Projected.

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312664 5-87 32

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94. In return for their military assistance the Soviets have used Syrian airfields since 1981 to deploy TU-16s (reconnaissance) and IL-38s (reconnaissance and ASW) periodically to Mediterranean airfields (the Soviets have not deployed bombers or air-to-surface missile-carrying aircraft to Mediterranean airfields since they lost their access to those in Egypt in 1972). The Soviet Mediterranean Naval Squadron also uses the port of Tartus for replenishment and minor repairs; support ships berthed in Syria enable the Soviets to extend the patrol time of their ships and submarines in the Mediterranean.

95. Despite frictions, the Syrian low opinion of Soviet training, and the declines in Soviet military deliveries, the Syrians will remain dependent on Soviet arms to maintain and upgrade their armed forces. Of greatest importance to Syria is that an arms relationship with the USSR holds the only hope of achieving their elusive goal of "strategic parity" with Israel.

The Soviets and the Palestinians

The USSR has long been a staunch supporter of the Palestinian cause. Under Moscow's guidance, the other members of the Soviet Bloc have also aided the Palestinians. Although Arab states provide most of the financial underpinnings to the various Palestinian guerrilla groups, the Soviet Bloc provides much of the military assistance and training (along with other forms of aid such as academic scholarships). The training is in both conventional and unconventional military techniques. The fragmentation of the PLO that occurred in the wake of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon presented the Soviets with a problem, because its policies are based on a unified Palestinian front. Moscow's response was to try to paper over the split and to urge the antagonists (whose agents have been murdering each other all over Europe and the Middle East) to submerge their differences for the sake of the Palestinian cause. The Soviets are trying to ensure that, if some faction decisively wins the internecine struggle, Moscow would be on good terms with that faction. Moscow has continued to support various elements in the dispute, thereby forfeiting much of the leverage its support might otherwise bring.

96. *Libya*. Although Libya frequently does not act in concert with Moscow's wishes, its policies and foreign activities often advance Soviet goals. Examples abound:

- Support to revolutionary groups and terrorist factions in a number of states (whose activities cannot be directly traced to Moscow).

~~Top Secret~~

- Provision to the Soviets of limited access to naval and air facilities.
- The potential threat Libyan armed forces pose to Western fleets in the Mediterranean:
- Libyan efforts to reduce Western influence in various countries.
- Libyan economic subsidies of over \$2 billion given to Syria, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua in the early 1980s. []

97. On the other hand, the Soviets realize that Libya's support of terrorism, its incursion into Chad, its subversion of Tunisia, and its "gifts" of arms to Iran alienate countries in the West, and Soviet clients such as Iraq as well. Libyan isolation, along with Soviet concern about future US airstrikes—creating the risk of a Soviet confrontation with the United States—and the possibility of a coup in Tripoli have made the Soviets leery of making a stronger security agreement with Libya. Nonetheless, under certain circumstances, Moscow probably would deliver more arms to obtain greater access to Libyan air and naval facilities. []

98. Libya has obtained a total of about \$18 billion worth of weapons from the Warsaw Pact. Since 1982, the Soviets alone have delivered almost \$5 billion. But deliveries have declined in the last few years both from the Soviets—[] and from non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries—[] (Libya buys Western arms as well—over \$2.6 billion worth of deliveries in the same five-year period.) To train the Libyans and maintain equipment, the Soviets had 1,500 to 2,000 advisers in country at the end of 1986, supplemented by 150 Cubans and 1,100 East Europeans. Until recently, the Soviets also had up to 5,000 civilian personnel in Libya working on projects worth about \$5 billion. []

99. The Soviets have been indispensable in building up the Libyan armed forces; Soviet advisers are currently assisting the Libyans in completely reorganizing the Army. Not only has Moscow supplied weapons, maintenance, and training, it has constructed an extensive air defense system there and has played a role in Libya's foreign confrontations:

[]

- In the 1980s, the Soviets logistically assisted the Libyan occupation and buildup in the Aozou Strip but have avoided providing aid within Chad itself.

[]

[]

- Pairs of Soviet IL-38 maritime patrol aircraft have deployed periodically to Umm 'Aitqah airfield since July 1981. These aircraft and Soviet naval elements have acquired intelligence information on US naval forces in the Mediterranean.

[]

- By the end of 1986 there were over 225 Libyan combat aircraft assigned to Libyan squadrons. (Nearly 100 more were unassigned and another

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Figure 21. One of Libya's MIG-25s. Libya has both an interceptor and a reconnaissance squadron. Soviet advisers reportedly process and exploit the imagery from Libyan Foxbats. [redacted]

[redacted] Nearly 100 sites are defended by over 550 SAM launchers.

- By the end of 1986 the Soviets had also delivered enough equipment to create two SA-5 complexes and the supporting command and control system. Although these systems are manned by Libyan troops, Soviet advisers will probably perform a major role in maintenance and training, at least in the short term. [redacted]

100. Libyan oil has made it one of the most important LDC consumers of Warsaw Pact goods and services. It is the major LDC employer of East European personnel and is the largest source of hard currency services earnings for most East European governments. In 1984 there were close to 50,000 East European workers in Libya under several billion dollars of commercial contracts financed under Libya's current five-year plan. Further growth of Soviet and East European economic projects in Libya may be curtailed by, among other factors, Tripoli's current revenue squeeze, which has already delayed the start of a number of projects that were scheduled to use Soviet equipment and technical assistance. Libyan foreign exchange reserves have dwindled from about \$14 billion in 1981 to \$3.5 billion at the end of 1985. [redacted]

101. There seems to be general dissatisfaction among the rank and file of the Libyan military with Soviet equipment, training, and protection against US attacks. There is a perception that Soviet advisers generally regard Libyan personnel as incapable of operating Soviet equipment without constant Soviet supervision. Many Libyan officers view the East European military personnel in Libya as providing security for Qadhafi from his own military and acting essentially as spies. [redacted]

[redacted] More recently, the Libyan military is probably disappointed that the Soviets refused to intervene in Libya's defense against the US attacks. And Qadhafi knows that Moscow would almost certainly not take risks that could lead to a US-Soviet confrontation in a future US attack. [redacted]

102. Nonetheless, from the US airstrikes in March and April of 1986, Qadhafi may have drawn several important lessons about the impact of the Soviet presence in Libya on US tactical planning. He was almost certainly impressed by several factors:

- US press reports that, in March, Washington directed its forces to attack only the SA-5 radars so as to avoid casualties among Soviet advisers believed to be in other parts of the SA-5 complex.
- In April, US aircraft attacked Tripoli International Airport rather than the nearby Umm Aitiqah airbase, which had dozens of MIG-25s and other military aircraft. Qadhafi probably believes that Umm Aitiqah was a more worthwhile target, but he may conclude it was left untouched because of the presence there of three Soviet naval aircraft.
- In April the United States attacked during a period when the Soviet command and control ship was absent. [redacted]

These factors could convince Qadhafi that Libya would derive increased protection from a larger Soviet presence, even without a Soviet commitment to Libya's defense. [redacted]

103. *Algeria.* The Soviet MAG in Algeria was established in 1963, one year after that country's independence from France. The Soviets recently have streamlined the MAG in Algeria, aligning its structure with the various types of equipment being serviced in the country. [redacted]

- Soviet military advisers generally do not serve with Algerian tactical ground units. Their main functions involve training and include instructing in Algerian military schools and providing maintenance support. The Algerians have been careful

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Figure 22. Algeria was the first country outside the Warsaw Pact to receive the SA-8 surface-to-air missile system. []

to ensure that sufficient Soviet advisers remain to maintain the readiness of the armed forces. It has been reported that without the aid of Soviet advisers, the Algerians would not be able to keep their MIG-23 and MIG-25 aircraft flying.

- Soviet advisers also play a vital role in training the Algerian Navy in submarine operations. In the early 1980s they trained Algerians to operate two Soviet-built Romeo-class submarines. It was reported that 20 percent of the sub crews were Soviet, and that the Soviets manned all essential duty stations. The Algerians now consider the Romeos unreliable for submerged operations, but may soon obtain new Kilo-class submarines. []

104. The Algerian Government has probably forbidden Soviet MAG advisers to have contact with Algerians except on duty; they are also prohibited from having contacts with other advisers in Algeria, including those from Eastern Europe. []

[] Algerian complaints with Moscow include lack of responsiveness to requests for spare parts, political indoctrination of Algerians receiving training in the Soviet Union, Soviet boorishness, and dissatisfaction with the quality of materiel provided by Moscow. []

105. Nonetheless, the Soviets have provided approximately 90 percent of the military equipment of the Algerian armed forces; through 1986 the Warsaw Pact had delivered over \$7.4 billion of military assistance. Over the past five years, the Algerians have received \$3.0 billion worth of arms from the Warsaw

Pact [] compared with less than \$400 million from the West, and have paid cash for all their arms. []

106. Notwithstanding, the Soviets are concerned about the future of their relationship with Algeria and have indicated their displeasure at Algeria's attempts to diversify arms purchases. In addition to reducing the size of the Soviet MAG (from a high of 2,500 in the late 1970s to about 800 in 1986) and seeking Western and US military equipment and technology, President Bendjedid has improved relations with the West and has replaced senior Algerian military officers with men who are strongly nationalistic and more Western in their outlook, tastes, and style. Algeria's efforts to improve its nonaligned credentials along with its more moderate voice in international forums, as well as its concentration on domestic development, are leading it toward closer cooperation with the West on technology transfer and trade issues. These factors, combined with a lack of significant Soviet economic initiatives, are eroding Moscow's influence in this key nonaligned state. []

107. In March 1986, Bendjedid went to Moscow, but the visit appears not to have affected either Algeria's strong support for Arab goals or its slow shift toward genuine nonalignment. During his trip, Bendjedid did not endorse Gorbachev's proposal for the removal of both superpowers' naval presence in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, in line with its long-held position, Algiers is working with Moscow to achieve Palestinian reunification. []

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108. Although the Soviets have offered new weapons deliveries including tanks and advanced aircraft, the ratio of purchases between the Warsaw Pact and the West will probably be more evenly divided over the next five years unless the Soviets severely undercut the Western market. Algiers will still want to buy sophisticated military equipment at a lower cost than is obtainable from the West, as well as maintain its stock of spare parts. Although hard currency payments from Algiers to Moscow could drop if Algerian purchases from the West increase, the Soviets will still be a major supplier of weapons. During 1986 Algeria and the USSR reportedly reached an agreement on a new arms deal that may include T-72 tanks, BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, Kilo-class submarines, new aircraft, and possibly SA-5 SAMs. Thus, Algeria will likely remain dependent on Soviet military assistance for the near term. []

109. *The Arabian Peninsula-Persian Gulf.* Soviet and Warsaw Pact military assistance policy in the region is focused on protecting its entree in Iraq and South Yemen, trying to maintain and increase Warsaw Pact arms deliveries to North Yemen, and attempting to improve relations with Iran. Above all, it attempts to prevent the United States from expanding its military deliveries and presence in the region. Although the Soviets have provided billions of dollars worth of weapons, they have gained a significant toehold in only one country: South Yemen, the poorest of the lot. []

110. *Iraq.* The overthrow of the monarchy in Baghdad in 1958 opened the door to the Soviet military assistance program. Since 1971, Moscow's East European allies have provided Iraq with over \$3.5 billion worth of arms, and the Soviets have sent over \$25.4 billion for a total of nearly \$29 billion. Shortly after Iraq invaded Iran in 1980 the Soviets put an embargo on arms deliveries to both countries. The result backfired: Iraq continued the war, and Western and Chinese arms suppliers moved in to further erode Moscow's once preeminent position. Even though the Soviets restarted deliveries to Iraq, and during the period from 1982 through 1986 they delivered over \$15 billion worth [] the arms deliveries of the West (primarily of sophisticated aircraft) and China rose considerably, and together they were worth \$19.2 billion. The Soviets still delivered the bulk of ground equipment. []

111. Having achieved no gains in Tehran, while angering Baghdad, the Soviets resumed deliveries in 1981. There was no evidence that Soviet MAG personnel were then attached to frontline Iraqi army units.

In recent years this has changed marginally, but there is little evidence of Soviet participation in Iraqi high-level military planning. Contact with Iraqi nationals by the Soviets or other foreign personnel, both military and civilian, is discouraged by Baghdad, which closely monitors the movements of Soviet MAG personnel within the country. The Soviets are required to have all travel approved by Iraqi security organizations. []

112. The Iraqis must rely on MAG personnel to repair some of their newer ground force equipment, especially tanks such as the T-72. An estimated 700 Soviet advisers are attached to the Iraqi Air Force. Most perform repair and maintenance for the large number of Soviet-supplied aircraft, including fighters, transports, bombers, and helicopters. MAG personnel are responsible for assembling and testing Soviet aircraft, and Soviet advisers serve as instructor pilots at Iraqi flight schools and airbases. Soviet and East European deliveries over the last five years have averaged over \$3 billion a year. []

113. There are an estimated 1,000 Soviet MAG personnel in the country, as well as 225 East Europeans. In addition, Soviet and East European countries maintain a strong economic presence in Iraq of 2,000 economic technicians. Soviet experts are responsible for planning, awarding subcontracts, procuring equipment, and handling the finances for Iraqi undertakings in the oil and power industries (of which the most recent example is the appointment of a Soviet to the position of general manager of the trans-Iraqi pipeline. The Iraqis probably will agree to cooperate with the

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[redacted]

USSR and its allies on more development projects. Baghdad will nevertheless keep expanding its commercial ties to the United States because the Iraqis value technology of the United States. [redacted]

114. Although Iraq has undertaken an effort to diversify its sources of arms, it is likely to remain heavily dependent on Soviet military equipment and training. Iraq owes Moscow more than \$9 billion for arms that have already been delivered; despite these debts, the USSR is likely to continue to provide [redacted] arms to Iraq [redacted] as long as the war with Iran continues. [redacted]

115. Baghdad is playing on Moscow's concern that Soviet influence with the Iraqis will erode if Iraq continues to expand its ties to the United States. To satisfy some of Baghdad's requests, the Soviets provided [redacted] SU-25 Frogfoot ground attack aircraft in 1985 and 1986 and [redacted] MIG-29 Fulcrums in late 1986 and early 1987. In his visit at the end of 1985 President Saddam probably renewed Iraq's request for the SU-24 Fencer, which has greater range, speed, and radar capability than Soviet or French aircraft currently in Iraq's inventory. Prospects for its export, however, are slim. [redacted]

116. *Iran.* The Soviets regard Iran as the key strategic country in the region. At the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war the Soviets initially tried to take a neutral stance and stopped arms sales and deliveries to both Iran and Iraq. This was done primarily to improve relations with Iran—Iraq was far more dependent on Soviet weapons. At the start of the war, only a small proportion of key items in Iran's ground forces and none of their Air Force or naval equipment, had been supplied by Warsaw Pact countries. When relations with Iran did not improve and Soviet-Iraq relations were damaged, Moscow resumed arms supplies to Iraq. As a result the Soviets have no military advisers or technicians stationed in Iran, and they have withdrawn a large portion of their economic advisers from the country. Even so, the Soviets continue to sell equipment such as trucks—but not in significant amounts—and they permit other East European countries to sell munitions and other military supplies to Iran for hard currency. [redacted]

117. One reason the Soviet arms cutoff failed to influence Iran was because Tehran looked primarily to Western countries and North Korea and, by 1982, to China as well. By 1984, however, non-Soviet Warsaw

Pact countries had increased their deliveries. East Germany accounted for half of all Warsaw Pact deliveries while Bulgaria also was a key supplier. This probably reflects a Soviet desire for continued East European sales to earn hard currency for the Warsaw Pact, to maintain an indirect entree to Iran, and to hedge Moscow's bets vis-a-vis Iraq without direct Soviet involvement. [redacted]

118. *South Yemen.* The tenacity of Moscow's effort to maintain its presence and military assistance in South Yemen derives from the country's strategic position athwart the sea route from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean and the fact that it is the only Arab Marxist state. Moreover, its proximity to rich Persian Gulf oil countries as well as to the Horn of Africa gives it a key role in the Soviet strategy. [redacted]

119. Soviet ties to Aden were an outgrowth of the leftist coup in South Yemen in 1969. In 1970, the state was reconstituted as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) under a Marxist-oriented regime. To support the country the Soviets provided over \$4.5 billion worth of military aid through 1986, and we believe Moscow also provides \$100-125 million annually in balance-of-payments support. In addition, most of South Yemen's oil debts to the USSR have been rescheduled and probably never will be repaid. [redacted]

120. Soviet advisers perform training, maintenance, and logistic support functions; 1,000 Soviet advisers assist the South Yemeni armed forces (26,000 men in January 1986 before the coup). In addition, there are 500 Cuban military personnel who train the military and the militia, and possibly some East Germans attached to South Yemen's internal security organizations. It is probable that the Soviet MAG commander coordinates the activities of these other foreign military personnel. [redacted]

121. The Soviets have been able to translate their military assistance program in South Yemen into a range of military and political benefits to the USSR. Specifically:

- Aden has supported subversion in neighboring countries.
- An additional 300 Soviet military personnel are involved in operating: [redacted]

[redacted]
Soviet access to facilities in South Yemen (and Ethiopia) supports the USSR's efforts to monitor


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and potentially threaten Western sea lines of communication through the Red Sea, the Bab el Mandeb (strait), and the Arabian Sea. Access to naval and air facilities in South Yemen enables the Soviets to conduct reconnaissance and intelligence-gathering activities in the region and helps to provide logistic support to the Indian Ocean Squadron.

- The South Yemen regime has supported virtually all of the Soviet foreign policy goals. Aden could be counted on to reject any US-identified proposals to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute, to support the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and to join with Moscow in denouncing USCENTCOM activities.
- The status of South Yemen as the only Arab Marxist state is useful as a conduit from the Soviet Communist Party to some Arab parties.
- The extensive training programs maintained by the Soviets in South Yemen and in the USSR, together with Cuban and East German programs, provide access to the next generation of South Yemeni leaders along with opportunities to recruit agents and collaborators.

122. Soviet MAG personnel work closely with South Yemen's military forces:

- Soviet advisers were reported to have given limited help in logistics and communications to support South Yemen's military operations against North Yemen in early 1979.



- Soviet military personnel probably also have provided support to South Yemen in several confrontations between that country and its neighbors. In 1983, for instance, Soviet military personnel (members of the MAG, the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron, or both) provided sup-




Figure 25. South Yemeni amphibious vessel.

port to South Yemeni-based raiding parties operating in the Dhofar region of Oman.

123. When President Ali Nasir took power in 1980, South Yemen remained in general accord with Soviet policies. Ali Nasir's moves to improve relations with South Yemen's neighbors meshed with Soviet desires to promote better relations with states in the region. When Ali Nasir ousted his predecessor, Abd al-Fattah Ismail, the Soviets provided a comfortable place of exile for Ismail in the USSR. In 1984 Ali Nasir accepted the return of Ismail to Aden, and provided a position for him in the party. On his return Ismail became involved in longstanding party factionalism, leading to heightened instability in the party.

124. Although the Soviets realized that the feuding parties in Aden were contemplating armed action, there is no evidence to indicate that they took steps either to avert or precipitate the coup in January 1986. The Soviets were not known to have taken any military or political precautions:

- During the initial stages of the fighting, the Soviets tried to limit the damage to their position by trying to mediate an end to the dispute.
- As the situation deteriorated, the Soviets evacuated most of their civilian advisory personnel.
- They eventually shifted their assessment of the situation as the rebels gained strength.

125. Soviet failure at the outset to give strong support to Ali Nasir and Moscow's subsequent pressure on Ethiopia and North Yemen not to intervene contributed to Ali Nasir's downfall. After Ali Nasir left the country, Soviet military advisers became directly involved in ground and air combat operations against

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the loyalist forces. The Soviets clearly decided to take steps to protect their long-term stake in South Yemen, and they switched sides in time to back the winners.

126. The new regime will have difficulty dealing with tribal differences. Aden does not have sufficient fighter aircraft, helicopters, or pilots to deal with widespread guerrilla attacks. While the new government may be able to hold the capital and the home areas of its tribal backers, its control over the rest of the country is tenuous.

127. *North Yemen.* Moscow has been involved since 1928, when it signed a friendship treaty with Sanaa—the first such Soviet accord with an Arab country. Moscow's presence in North Yemen has always been small but significant. Soviets have served in North Yemeni military units, and in the 1960s took part in combat operations:

Many North Yemenis believe that Moscow's support was instrumental in preventing the Saudi-backed royalists from winning in the civil war that followed the Republican revolution.

128. The Soviets devote a large level of aid to this country because of its strategic position at the mouth of the Red Sea and the potential pressure it can bring to Saudi Arabia. East European countries have delivered nearly \$300 million worth of arms to the country and the Soviets about \$2.3 billion—of which \$1.2 billion has come in the last five years. To train the North Yemenis, and to contest US efforts to build influence in the country, the Soviets maintain 400 military advisers and technicians, as well as 400 economic and other specialists. We estimate that more than 250 North Yemeni military personnel are also training in the USSR. Moscow also offers some 450 academic scholarships a year to North Yemenis to study in the Soviet Union, and approximately 750 North Yemenis are studying there now. Most senior North Yemeni military officers have been trained in the USSR, and some probably have been recruited by the Soviets; they could work to erode President Salih's military support if he threatens Moscow's interests.

129. Frictions have arisen between Moscow and Sanaa over North Yemen's estimated \$600-700 million arms debt and over Sanaa's dissatisfaction with the quality of Soviet military training and equipment. North Yemen is reportedly investigating alternative sources of training and support for its Soviet equipment, including East Germany and India. In addition, President Salih's perception of Soviet complicity in the January 1986 coup in South Yemen has probably heightened his distrust of the Soviets. For their part, the Soviets reportedly informed Salih that shipments of military supplies would cease until Sanaa's relations with Aden improved. However, recently the USSR has made some arms deliveries, perhaps as an interim measure to prevent a further deterioration in the relationship.

Asia: Around China's Periphery

130. The Soviet military assistance program in the four key countries in the region—Afghanistan, India, Vietnam, and North Korea—is based on Soviet efforts to shore up its own borders, contain China, and project power. Because the Soviets have allied themselves with countries that all have uneasy, hostile, or confrontational relations with their neighbors, Soviet efforts with their clients alienate their relations with other states.

131. *Afghanistan.* The Soviet military aid program in Afghanistan began in 1956 when Afghanistan purchased \$100 million of Soviet equipment on credit in order to modernize its armed forces. The Afghan Air Force's purchase of technically sophisticated equipment necessitated a fundamental reorganization of that force, which soon became dependent on Soviet advisory personnel. In the Afghan Army, there was a steadily growing Soviet orientation, and Russian became the technical language. Afghan military students were sent to the USSR for training, and in 1958 Moscow established a course of military instruction in Kabul.

132. As Soviet military deliveries to Afghanistan continued to grow, so did Afghan dependence on the 425-man Soviet MAG, and Soviet advisers were placed directly in all of the most sensitive departments of the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD). Soviet advisers were installed in operational army units to provide operational, logistic, and technical support. While the MAG officers in Afghanistan continued to maintain a low public profile and lacked operational authority, the presence of Soviet officers in the MOD and armed forces units gave Moscow significant leverage.


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133. Between 1956 and 1978 the USSR trained over 3,300 Afghan military officers in the Soviet Union and delivered more than \$700 million in military assistance. Thus by 1978, on the eve of the Afghan-Marxist military coup, they had achieved extensive influence in the armed forces. [redacted]

134. In 1978, following the coup, the Soviet MAG had a period of explosive growth. Soviet advisory personnel were assigned throughout the Afghan Armed Forces down to the battalion level, with each Afghan division receiving approximately 35 Soviet advisers. During this period—from the April 1978 Marxist coup until the December 1979 Soviet invasion—the independence of the Afghan armed forces from Soviet authority was lost. [redacted]

135. Shortly after the 1979 Soviet invasion, the MAG became the essential element in the Kremlin's campaign to train an Afghan Army capable of assuming the counterinsurgency role that Moscow currently performs. The MAG's task, a formidable undertaking under the best of circumstances, has been greatly complicated by three major difficulties: widespread desertion of Afghan soldiers, dependence on conscripted replacements often impressed off the streets, and continued factional strife among Afghan officers. Despite such difficulties, the MAG has continued to insert Afghan units into combat whenever possible. In the initial stages of counterinsurgency operations in the 1980s, the Chief of the MAG and his approximately 3,500 Soviet advisers commanded some 45,000 Afghan troops and were responsible for coordinating joint operations with the then approximately 86,000-man Soviet 40th Army. [redacted]

137. In seeking solutions to the military stalemate the Soviets have tried different tactical approaches, looking for the least costly and most effective combination of manpower and weaponry to achieve their objectives. In recent years, they probably believe that



an influx of advanced weaponry would cut down on casualties and would allow them to increase firepower dramatically with only a marginal increase in manpower and give the Soviet military a unique opportunity to test new weapons in combat. [redacted]

138. Thus during the past two years, the Soviets have made relatively minor increases in their ground combat manpower in Afghanistan, but since the fall of 1984 upgrades of major ground force weapons and the deployment of helicopters have substantially increased both the firepower and mobility of Soviet forces. The resistance has reacted by shifting more of their supply activity to nighttime and dispatching smaller supply caravans over varied infiltration routes. The resistance forces also place more emphasis on cover and concealment techniques and keep their own units as small and as mobile as possible. Consequently, although the insurgents have lost more supply trains to Soviet interdiction, they are generally better supplied now than in the past. [redacted]

139. In the last five years, in addition to supporting their own combat forces there, the Soviets have delivered between \$2.5 to \$3.7 billion worth of arms to Afghanistan. [redacted] Deliveries consist mainly of consumables such as munitions and replacements for lost arms. To counter the effects of the insurgency costs Moscow \$300-400 million a year in grant aid. They will continue to try to wear down the resistance, to close the insurgents' supply routes from Iran and Pakistan, and to train enough Afghans (and kill enough of those resisting) to ultimately set up a viable pro-

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Soviet government. If they could do this, the regime could be buttressed by a reduced contingent of Soviet forces—much like those in Eastern Europe (or, simply, by a large MAG contingent). To this end, the Soviets are reputed to be sending more than 10,000 Afghans a year to schools in the USSR for further training. The Soviets have also placed their own economic advisers in the Afghan Government to exercise direct control over economic decision making.

140. *India.* As a result of the longstanding Indo-Soviet arms relationship the Indian military is heavily dependent on Soviet weapons. Some 65 percent of the combat aircraft, 40 percent of the tanks, and 70 percent of the warships in the Indian arsenal are Soviet in origin. We estimate that at least 3,400 Indian officers and enlisted men have been trained in the USSR since 1975, and about 200 to 500 Soviet technicians usually are present in India to help maintain Soviet-built equipment and assist in the construction of Indian corproduction facilities and military bases.

141. There is no formal Soviet MAG structure within India and the number of Soviet personnel in-country supporting military assistance is relatively small at 500 men. New Delhi's sensitivity to both the form and substance of the Soviet military presence is drawn from an awareness of the potential for subversion that a large Soviet presence could offer, a desire to maintain India's status as a leader of the Nonaligned Movement, and the intention not to view the Soviet Union as an ally. Thus, India has consistently refused Soviet requests for joint military exercises and access to naval and air facilities. Indian policymakers argue that their nonaligned foreign policy would require the extension of similar privileges to other great powers if New Delhi agreed to Moscow's requests.

142. Nonetheless, the continuing interaction required in manufacturing, updating, and operating Soviet equipment in India has created a professional rapport between Soviet and Indian officers. For example, MIG-21 pilots of the early 1960s have recently begun to rise to the top levels of the Indian Air Force Command. The younger generation in all services has been trained on Soviet equipment and, in some cases, develops pro-Soviet attitudes early on. Not only may this interchange contribute to positive attitudes, but also the long-term reliability of Soviet arms deliveries, especially during crisis periods, has made an impression on Indian military professionals. It is the general perception of the USSR as a reliable "friend in need"—the willingness to deliver arms and to deploy Soviet forces in a crisis to deter potential Western or Chinese intervention—that is the most successful aspect of the Soviet effort to influence the Indian military.

143. To restrict the overall Soviet presence in India, New Delhi has employed a procedure whereby teams of Indian specialists are sent to the Soviet Union for training on the use and maintenance of a given piece of Soviet military equipment such as the T-72 tank, the BMP-1 APC, or the MIG-29 aircraft. Upon completion of the training, the Indian teams return and train other Indians in-country. Approximately 500 Indian officers and enlisted personnel from the various services attend training programs in the USSR on an annual basis. Moscow has resisted this Indian approach. The Soviets appear to provide only superficial instruction to Indian teams that train in the Soviet Union and to stress (so far, unsuccessfully) the need for direct Soviet involvement.

144. Despite frictions, India remains one of Moscow's most highly prized Third World clients. Arms




Figure 27. INS Ranjit is the third Soviet Mod-Kashin destroyer purchased by the Indian Navy.


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Figure 28. The Indian Army has acquired large numbers of T-72 tanks from the USSR, and is assembling the tank with Soviet technical assistance.

contracts with India are still made on exceedingly generous terms, normally featuring very long repayment schedules (averaging 17 years), low interest rates (2 to 3 percent), and, often, discounted prices. As a result, the Indians have acquired over \$6.8 billion of Soviet arms over the past five years and a total of well over \$10 billion since the Soviets first started delivering weapons. The country differs from other major Soviet arms customers in two fundamental ways:

- It is the only major arms recipient permitted to purchase weapons in soft, not hard currency.
- It is the only LDC that has extensive coproduction agreements to manufacture Soviet weapons.

145. Barring a Soviet invasion of Pakistan, the Soviet-Indian "special relationship" will probably endure over this decade. Although recognized as the strongest military power in South Asia, India wants to maintain a substantial margin of military superiority over Pakistan. The value of undelivered arms is almost \$10 billion and includes orders of major pieces of equipment from both the USSR and the West.

146. Indian negotiators will continue to use purchases of Western technology to wring more out of the Soviets. Despite deliveries of the MIG-29, however, it is uncertain India can exert enough leverage to pry

deliveries of aircraft with the most advanced Soviet engines and electronics. Indian demands for advanced Soviet weapons and selective purchases of Western technology will be countered with stiff Soviet opposition and substantial efforts to retain its role as India's primary source of arms.

147. *Vietnam.* Soviet deliveries of over \$16 billion worth of military aid in the last 15 years have made Vietnam the strongest military power in Southeast Asia. This assistance, coupled with substantial economic aid, enables Vietnam to sustain its occupation of Cambodia and strengthen its forces along the Chinese border. Soviet deliveries also provide Vietnam with limited capabilities to defend offshore islands and oil exploration sites and to gradually modernize its ground, air, and naval forces.

148. Hanoi's relationship with Moscow is rooted in their shared deep distrust of China, a convergence of foreign policy goals, and the absence of any present alternatives to the Soviets. Neither side fully trusts the other, and there are some potential vulnerabilities in the relationship. Soviet advisers in Vietnam frequently have been discouraged and disillusioned by their experience in working with Vietnamese Army personnel, and, according to some sources, the Soviets have had great difficulties in recruiting personnel for advisory assignments in Vietnam.

149. The Hanoi regime would like to revive its mismanaged economy, but that objective is secondary

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[redacted]

[redacted]

to its national security goals that include maintaining dominance over Indochina. Since the late 1970s when the Western governments withdrew support for Vietnam and Western lending institutions refused to advance loans, hostile relations with China have drawn Vietnam into a tight client relationship with the USSR. The key event was the limited Chinese invasion of 1979, which led to a massive military and economic aid package from the USSR. [redacted]

150. From the Soviet perspective, Vietnam is worth the considerable sums of aid and associated political liabilities. The Soviets enjoy the following tangible benefits:

- Unrestricted use of naval and air facilities at Cam Ranh Bay, which supports the largest concentration of Soviet combat ships and aircraft permanently based outside of the USSR.
- Soviet involvement in some phases of Vietnamese military training helps the Soviets cultivate ties to the next generation of Vietnamese military leaders.
- Vietnamese dependence upon Soviet weapons, spare parts, and technical services.
- The services of some 60,000 Vietnamese laborers in the USSR and Eastern Europe, limited amounts of raw materials, and the potential for mutual sharing of oil production if the current exploratory programs succeed.


[redacted]

— A regime on China's southern flank that is hostile to China's expansion of influence into Southeast Asia and draws China's attention and resources away from the Sino-Soviet border. [redacted]

151. The steady Soviet military buildup at Cam Ranh has substantially increased Soviet capabilities to monitor the US and allied naval and air activity in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean and to threaten regional sea lines of communications (especially maritime traffic passing through the Strait of Malacca). It has also improved Soviet capabilities to augment their naval strength in the Indian Ocean quickly in crises. [redacted]

152. The access to Cam Ranh Bay gives Moscow its first major overseas naval and air base since it was forced to leave Egypt in 1972. The Soviets continue to renovate the port facilities at Cam Ranh, upgrading and constructing new buildings for POL and missile storage, barracks, and other facilities. In addition:

- The overall defense of Cam Ranh has been improved with the deployment of missile-equipped naval combatants, fighter aircraft, and the deployment of mobile surface-to-surface coastal defense missiles.
- The Soviets appear to have formed a composite air regiment at Cam Ranh composed of two to four Bear F ASW aircraft, two to four Bear D reconnaissance aircraft, 16 Badger bombers and support aircraft, and 14 Flogger fighters.
- The Soviets conducted their first large-scale integrated exercise from Cam Ranh in February 1986. It included simulated attacks on a US aircraft carrier battle group that was operating in the region.

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— In an emergency, the Soviets could probably deploy even more strike aircraft to Cam Ranh on short notice. [redacted]

153. During 1982 through 1986 the Soviets provided Vietnam with \$6.8-7.5 billion in military aid [redacted]. They have also sent some \$900 million worth of arms to Cambodia and \$500 million to Laos (for a total of nearly \$9 billion worth of military assistance to Indochina in the past five years). Approximately 2,500 Soviet military advisers support the military assistance program in Vietnam and some 1,500 Soviet military personnel man installations in the country. In addition, there are 500 Soviet advisers in Laos and another 100 in Kampuchea. The advisers have enabled Vietnam to modernize its Army through assistance in training, maintenance, and organization; advisers also instruct on military strategy, tactics, and doctrine. [redacted]

154. Despite frictions, the Soviet/Vietnamese relationship will continue. To back up their commitment, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official said in 1985 that the USSR would double its economic aid to Vietnam in the next five years. The promised aid was tied to Vietnamese undertakings to increase production and to the export of raw materials to the USSR, and a good part of the aid will apparently go to the oil sector. [redacted]

155. *North Korea.* The Soviet Union made major provisions of arms to North Korea until 1974, when deliveries were sharply reduced. The reasons for reduced deliveries of weapons were Soviet reluctance to fuel a new conflict on the Korean Peninsula, Moscow's disapproval of Pyongyang's close ties to China, and

North Korea's inability to pay in hard currency. In addition, the Soviets and the North Koreans became competitors in the Third World arms market. North Korea made almost \$2 billion worth of deliveries of Soviet-designed arms to Middle Eastern countries in exchange for hard currency from 1980 to 1984. [redacted]

156. In the mid-1980s, Soviet-North Korean relations improved, and the provision of arms and assistance resumed. During 1982 to 1986 the value of Soviet deliveries was over \$850 million. The Soviets have delivered [redacted] MiG-23 Floggers, giving North Korea the first qualitative improvement to its Air Force in many years; the Soviets also have provided SA-3 missiles. Ships from the two countries have exchanged port visits and air and naval forces of the two countries recently conducted their first known combined military exercise. In return Pyongyang has

[redacted] and it has increased its support for the USSR's nuclear disarmament initiative and Moscow's call for an Asian security conference. [redacted]

IV. How Military Assistance Advances Soviet Foreign Policy

157. Military assistance plays an important role in advancing Moscow's overall strategic goals:

— *Political Influence.* Soviet military assistance efforts have helped give Moscow significant influence not only in the Communist countries of Cuba and Vietnam, but also in a number of Third World Marxist countries: especially Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and South Yemen. To a limited degree, large arms sales have also increased Soviet influence in non-Marxist countries such as India, Syria, and Libya.

— *Hard Currency Earnings.* These accrued from sales of arms to Third World customers that are repaid in Western currencies, oil, or other valued commodities. In 1983 such activities reached a peak of \$8 billion, and arms sales accounted for 23 percent of all Soviet exports for hard currency. Hard currency remains a critical component of Moscow's efforts to pay for imports of agricultural products and advanced technological equipment. In this regard, hard currency plays a particularly critical role because it can be applied to eliminate bottlenecks (through purchase of spare parts) and to lead modernization efforts (through purchase of turnkey factories and new technology).

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[redacted]

— **Diffusing Western Military Capabilities.** By gaining access to air and naval facilities, the Soviets have been able to use some LDCs to extend its military reach, to complicate Western defense planning, and to divert some US attention from Western Europe and Japan. In a major US-Soviet confrontation, US contingency planners would have to consider the buildup of Cuban air and naval capabilities, the deployment

of Soviet forces to Vietnam, and the threat these forces pose to US bases and sea lines of communication in the Caribbean and the South China Sea.
[redacted]

Other Soviet Benefits

158. **Soviet Military Access.** Through their military assistance programs the Soviets have gained access to naval and air facilities in Libya, Syria, Angola,

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Ethiopia, South Yemen, Cuba, and to a base in Vietnam. Deployments of naval reconnaissance aircraft to Libya and Syria are intermittent but taken together they serve to make a Soviet naval air presence virtually continuous in the Mediterranean. Soviet access to facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen supports a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean (albeit on a much smaller scale than in the Mediterranean). []

159. The Soviets also enjoy benefits vis-a-vis China by their presence in Vietnam. It reinforces the image of the USSR as a global power, helps deter large-scale Chinese military action against Vietnam, curbs Chinese influence in Southeast Asia, and is a constant reminder to China that it is encircled by unfriendly states. []

160. The USSR is also using its political and military influence in Ethiopia to attempt to undermine perceived US strategic policies in the Horn of Africa. The Soviets are counting on projecting an image of patron reliability, military force, and permanent presence in Ethiopia in order to intimidate US allies in the region or to persuade them that Soviet patronage carries greater advantages than does that of the United States. []

161. *Soviet Arming and Training of Terrorists and Revolutionary Groups.* The Soviets have no compunction about supporting foreign insurgent and terrorist groups; the primary consideration is whether the activities of these groups further Soviet interests. A key factor, however, is whether Moscow's efforts can be camouflaged. The Soviets openly support only select insurgent groups, mainly those with a claim to political legitimacy, like the PLO or SWAPO. By contrast, in dealing with most other foreign political extremist groups, they try to work with and through allies and radical states, including several Marxist regimes. Since some of these governments engage in terrorism or support terrorist groups on their own accounts, the precise Soviet role is obscured:

- In the Middle East, some Soviet military equipment—primarily small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, and shoulder-fired SAMs—supplied to Syria, Libya, and South Yemen is passed on to terrorist groups.
- In other parts of the Third World, particularly in Latin America, where violence has long been the normal way to achieve political power, the USSR and its allies—notably Cuba, East Germany, and Bulgaria—provide training, weapons, funding, guidance, and other forms of support to numerous Marxist insurgent and terrorist groups. Chief

among the target countries are Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Typically, the Soviets and East Europeans advocate revolutionary violence only when the prospects seem rewarding; the Cubans and Nicaraguans are more adventuresome, viewing violence as a way to bring about rewarding prospects.⁵ []

162. *Soviet Access to Western Technology.* As a spinoff of its military aid to India, the USSR is well positioned to acquire technology. The large official Soviet presence there reinforces bilateral cooperation across a number of fronts—political, economic, military, and scientific—and provides an excellent cover for clandestine technology acquisition. []

163. The Soviet Union acquires Western technology in India through a variety of mechanisms, including legal and illegal purchases, cooperation and exchange agreements, and intelligence operations. We have no evidence that formal trade agreements themselves promote illegal technology transfer, but the continued well-established, bilateral cooperation over a broad range of scientific disciplines enables Soviet scientists to profit from access to their Indian counterparts. Many scientists in India were trained in the United States and have retained informal contacts with US colleagues in high-technology fields. We believe these contacts—which the Indian Government encourages—offer great scope for technical data diversions that are almost impossible to monitor. []

164. *International Support for Soviet Policies.* Recipients of Soviet military assistance are influenced to support Soviet foreign policy positions, particularly in the UN. Moreover, Third World countries that have emerged from the Western colonial experience are generally predisposed to support Moscow's positions in situations where their own interests or ideology are not engaged. []

165. *Stability of Regimes Friendly to the USSR.* In the countries where Moscow has gained a measure of influence, the Soviet presence has lent a measure of stability. Soviet and Bloc assistance to many LDCs has enhanced their internal security forces to such a degree that they have been able to survive extensive internal strife and insurgencies. In other countries, particularly Cuba, Libya, Nicaragua, and Vietnam, the Soviet-assisted buildup of military forces has strengthened these countries so other Third World countries are deterred from threatening them. Not content merely to deter, Soviet aid has helped Nicaragua and Vietnam to challenge their neighbors, while

⁵ See NIE 11/2-86: *The Soviet Role in International Terrorism and Revolutionary Violence.* []

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Libya's ability to pursue a military role in North Africa stems largely from huge Soviet arms transfers to it over the years. []

V. Factors That Inhibit Growth in Soviet Military Assistance

166. There is little doubt that the Soviets believe they have made significant gains from their military assistance policy, and, by any objective standard of measurement, they have. Particularly noteworthy are gains in countries with a rigid socialist orientation and which face a significant internal and/or external threat. These countries include Nicaragua, Angola, Cuba, Mozambique, South Yemen, Afghanistan, and Vietnam. Many other countries have managed to stay out of or cast off a close Soviet embrace even as they continue to receive Soviet arms. Such countries include Algeria, Guinea, Egypt, India, Libya, North Yemen, Somalia, and Syria. Soviet expansion and influence are subject to limitations:

- *The amount of arms the Soviets deliver seems to have little relation to the amount of influence they ultimately gain.* During the period 1982 through 1986 the Soviets sent approximately \$15 billion worth of arms to Iraq, \$9-10 billion to Syria, \$6-8 billion to India, \$3 billion to Algeria, and \$5 billion to Libya. While none of these states directly criticize Soviet policies and most give vocal support to them, the Soviets do not exercise meaningful control over the foreign or domestic policies of any of these countries. In fact, except for countries where Soviet or Cuban military forces are dominant, for example, Afghanistan and Angola, no Third World country faces the risk of sacrificing its sovereignty to Soviet control.
- *The Soviets have failed to protect client regimes.* Over the last quarter century the Soviets have repeatedly demonstrated an unwillingness to project military power against Western military forces in the Third World or even the forces of some well-armed Third World states.
- *Moscow's most serious setback was in Cuba in 1962 when the potential of escalation with the United States prevented the USSR from setting up medium-range ballistic missiles capable of attacking the United States.*
- *In 1970, at the request of the Egyptian Government, the Soviets deployed almost 10,000 military personnel in a defensive role against Israeli air attacks. But the Soviets took no offensive action against Israel itself.* []

167. As a result of these setbacks, the Soviets have been careful to avoid situations in the Third World that could lead to escalation. In the 1980s, Moscow helped set up new air defense systems and trained pilots in both Syria and Libya. When these air defenses were challenged by Israel and the United States respectively, the Soviets limited their own involvement. They responded to subsequent criticism and repaired diplomatic rifts by providing more advanced weapons. []

168. Moscow has on occasion turned against long-standing client regimes, shifting support from Somalia to Ethiopia in 1977, and overthrowing governments in Afghanistan in 1979 and South Yemen in 1986. As a result, the enthusiasm in some Third World countries for inviting a larger Soviet presence into their territory has been soured. Third World countries have noted other detriments to Soviet aid:

- *Moscow's training of LDC military personnel has often produced mixed results.* In some poorer countries, mainly in Africa, Soviet military training is sometimes the only type available, is valued, and sometimes wins friends and influences people. Often, however, trainees resent the political indoctrination that accompanies the military training. Among more experienced trainees, even the military instruction is disdained because it is technically unsophisticated, rigidly formatted, and provides limited opportunity for hands-on training. Trainees also experience racism from instructors and Soviet society.
- *The Soviets have mixed feelings in supplying advanced weapons to LDCs.* They want their clients to do well in confrontations, but they are reluctant to provide their most advanced systems for three reasons: they fear technological compromise to the West, they are concerned that their systems will not perform credibly in the hands of Third World operators, and sales of advanced weapons tend to slow modernization of Warsaw Pact forces. Nonetheless, the Soviets will need to sell more advanced weapons both to earn currency and to retain markets in key countries, such as India and Algeria, against Western competition. Thus, a variant of the MIG-29, Moscow's latest tactical fighter, will probably be sold abroad in some quantity. In doing so the Soviets will probably accept economic and security trade-offs similar to those of the West providing F-16s and Tornado aircraft to LDCs. []

169. Despite all of these difficulties, it would be very hard to dislodge the Soviets from their most

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valued Third World countries. As previously mentioned, the West will have little success in states such as Angola and Ethiopia as long as the regimes rely so much on Soviet arms, training, logistics, and security. Moreover, such regimes may believe that any attempt to rid themselves of Soviet control would result in a coup:

- The continuing attractiveness of low Soviet prices, substantial grant aid, and easy repayment terms on most military hardware is likely to preserve Soviet military assistance relationships. Although states such as Algeria and Peru flirt with Western hardware supplies, and probably would prefer Western systems, they have not, thus far, found the Western financial terms sufficiently attractive to warrant significantly diminishing their ties to Moscow.
- The provision of spare parts, training, and support equipment is a major part of the Soviet military assistance program. Spare parts, and the technicians who provide needed expertise, afford the Soviets with continued entree over an extended period.

170. Because of the Soviets' concern over maintaining security for their advanced technology and over their own modernization needs, there are certain weapons which we believe the Soviets *will not* deliver to Third World countries in the next few years:


- *The MIG-31 Foxhound.* When deployed in numbers, this aircraft will be the primary defender against cruise missiles launched from the B-52/B-1; it embodies too many technical secrets for the Soviets to risk its export.
- *The SU-24 Fencer D.* The Fencer D has a "buddy" air-refueling capability and was specifically designed to be able to penetrate enemy air defenses and attack ground targets. It has new avionics as well, including TV and/or forward-looking infrared (FLIR).
- *Late-model missiles,* such as the AS-13 Kingbolt, the SA-12 Gladiator, and the SS-12 Scaleboard.
- *Advanced electronics and fire control systems* on selected modern weaponry.

VI. "The Burden of Empire"

171. In the years since World War II the Soviet Union, in its struggle for influence beyond its borders—as it believes befits a world power—has acquired a number of dissimilar socialist allies and has

Figure 32
Soviet Economic Aid to
LDCs, 1982-86

Billion US \$

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established aid relationships with a number of other countries. As noted previously, these countries receive extensive military assistance as well as economic aid and constitute a considerable economic burden to the USSR. This burden has increased at a time when Moscow's export earnings are falling because of reduced oil prices and the decline of the dollar. Nonetheless, we judge that this burden is, and will continue to remain, affordable.

The Value of Economic Aid

172. Soviet economic aid to non-Communist LDCs amounts to about \$1.5 billion—only 14 percent of total Soviet economic aid—and is likely to remain at a low level. As shown in figure 32, the bulk goes to Communist LDCs, with Cuba by far the largest single recipient. Aid requirements to Cuba and Vietnam will continue to run at least \$5-6 billion a year.

173. The protracted deterioration in the economies of Third World Marxist client states is raising the ante for Moscow. Future aid requests from Nicaragua will probably amount to at least half a billion dollars annually over the next five years and the war in Afghanistan is costing Moscow about \$200-300 million annually, according to some sources.

174. Moscow's economic aid has been primarily fashioned to penetrate the economies of a few key states; it is not designed to address the basic developmental needs of Third World countries. In spite of the resources Moscow has devoted to its program in recent years, friends and foes alike have been critical of Soviet aid. In order to stem the further deterioration of

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[redacted]

their clients' economies, in several cases the Soviets have encouraged expanded economic contacts between Soviet-supported LDCs and Western aid donors. Moscow will encourage the manipulation of Western economic assistance while counting on military assistance to maintain its status as these countries' principal patron:

- Among Soviet client states, Angola and Mozambique have encouraged increased aid and investment from the West, and Ethiopia uses Western-supplied food to selectively feed a population that is being deliberately uprooted (and sometimes selectively starved) to prevent dissent.
- Socialist countries such as Congo, Guinea, Mali, and Madagascar are turning to the West to rebuild their economies.
- South Yemen's economy has been shattered by the conflict in early 1986 and the demise of much of its trained and educated leadership. With little help from the West in sight, Moscow will have primary responsibility in propping up its economy.

Although Moscow has typically relied on military programs to preempt Western influence and maintain its own, we believe Moscow's loss of credibility in the economic field is negatively affecting Soviet interests in these countries. [redacted]


The Value of Military Assistance

175. As noted above, Soviet economic assistance to Communist countries is high, and to non-Communist countries is low. The reverse is true for military aid. Figure 33 shows that military assistance has averaged a little over \$3 billion per year from 1982 to 1986 to Communist LDCs. It will probably remain at that level in the future. Most Soviet military assistance goes to non-Communist countries; deliveries to these states peaked at about \$13 billion in 1982-83 as a result of the emphasis (which began in the 1970s) placed on hard currency earnings. While grant aid and attractive credits continued to be offered to Moscow's poorer arms recipients, financial concessions to major customers such as Algeria and Libya largely disappeared. Moreover, since the 1970s the Soviets have generally demanded hard currency payments for spare parts and nonlethal equipment such as trucks and transport helicopters sold by the USSR's civil exporters. [redacted]

VII. Soviet Arms Sales for Hard Currency

176. Despite the difficulties described in the previous section, the military assistance program has pro-

Figure 33 Billion US \$
Current Value of Soviet Arms Deliveries to Third World Countries, 1982-86



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vided the Soviets with significant hard currency earnings. In fact, even though these earnings have declined in the past few years, they still constitute over 20 percent of all Soviet hard currency earnings. Total Soviet earnings from arms sales (including freight and insurance charges) in the last six years—most of which consist of hard currency—are as follows:

Billion US \$					
1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986 (preliminary)
6.5	7.9	8.0	7.5	5.6	6.0

177. Moscow faces a number of constraints in its efforts to retain its share of the arms market. Some are cyclical, for example, the normal period of consolidation after the signing of a major contract. Other constraints, however, appear to be longer term and will in future years reduce Moscow's ability to maintain its market share. In 1986 Soviet total hard currency earnings declined to about \$28-30 billion due primarily to the fall in energy prices, which decreased the earnings of Soviet oil and gas exports and reduced the capability of other oil exporting countries to buy arms and to import goods. Beyond the decline in the price of oil, other factors will constrain Soviet arms earnings:

- *Shifting needs and expectations of recipient states.* Many clients have become more demanding as they encounter problems absorbing equipment already received. Some, such as Algeria,

[redacted]

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are unhappy with Soviet arms and seek better or more sophisticated equipment. Others want to diversify their arms sources for political reasons.

— *Increased competition from the West.* Traditional suppliers, including the United States and Western Europe, have been joined by new ones, such as Brazil and South Korea, in aggressive and successful marketing efforts. In the early 1980s even Egypt delivered almost \$500 million worth of arms to Iraq, including MIG-21s and T-54/55 tanks. This has cut into what might otherwise have been even stronger markets for Moscow.⁶

— *Increased competition from Communist suppliers outside the Warsaw Pact.* China, North Korea, and Yugoslavia—all holders of significant inventories of older Soviet equipment—are making inroads on Warsaw Pact arms sales. During the period 1982-86, these Communist countries exported about \$9.4 billion worth of arms.

In order to retain its market share, Moscow may give some traditional cash customers such as Iraq and Libya substantial amounts of credit. []

178. Moscow's insistence that most of its customers pay for at least part of the arms they receive means increased weapons deliveries will tend to generate increased hard currency earnings even when substantial credit is given. Soviet attempts to maximize hard currency earnings, particularly from arms sales, will result in a more aggressive search for markets in the Third World. This sales campaign will be concentrated on OPEC members and others that have had large hard currency surpluses with the USSR, such as Malaysia and Argentina. Despite declining oil revenues, there are still a few opportunities for expansion, and Moscow could decide to offer state-of-the-art arms as an incentive. The Soviets will probably sign additional agreements with countries such as Algeria, Jordan, and Kuwait. These will probably enable Moscow to prevent further decline in hard currency earnings from arms sales; however, these earnings will probably not rise significantly over the remainder of the decade. []

⁶The greatest challenge to Soviet sales of advanced aircraft to LDCs comes from France. []

VIII. Probable Developments in the Soviet Military Assistance Program Over the Next Five Years

179. While the fall in oil prices and tight finances in Third World countries will continue to constrain Soviet sales of arms for hard currency, these factors, in themselves, will not basically affect the overall Soviet position in the Third World. The number of Warsaw Pact and Cuban advisers and technicians in LDCs will probably increase marginally because of the need for greater technological assistance to service advanced weapons. The number of Third World personnel being trained in Warsaw Pact countries will also increase. Overall, Moscow will look for states in need of a military supplier that perceive there is no better option than the USSR. []

180. Another major group of countries that will continue to receive assistance are pro-Soviet Third World countries facing external threats or insurgencies. Western and Chinese support for insurgencies against Soviet-backed regimes will prompt the Soviets to continue their large deliveries of conventional fighting equipment, particularly military helicopters. Vietnam and Afghanistan received large numbers of helicopters in the early 1980s and, from 1983 to 1985, Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nicaragua received many more. In addition, the Soviets will beef up the defenses of countries such as Libya, Iraq, Angola, and Mozambique, which perceive active threats from across their borders. []

181. The Soviets will continue their indirect support for terrorist groups. The costs of supporting terrorists via intermediaries appear to be slight, whether in terms of money, reputation, influence, or risk. The Soviets will work with and through allies and radical states that engage in terrorism or support terrorist groups on their own accounts, thus obscuring the precise Soviet role. []

In the Americas

182. Deliveries of military assistance will go to:


— *Cuba.* Although Soviet military aid to Cuba has given Castro some offensive capability in recent years, Cuba's military is still primarily a defensive force geared to making an attack by the United States on Cuba as costly as possible. We believe that the Soviets will continue to strengthen Cuban air defenses and naval units but will not send weapons that the United States would

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find provocative. The Soviets have not sent MIG-25 fighters or SA-5 missiles that could challenge SR-71 flights (equipment they have delivered to other LDCs) and probably will not, both for reasons of cost and potential provocation. The Soviets will also continue to moderately expand their own assets on the island and to improve Castro's capacity to support revolutionary regimes and movements abroad.

— *Nicaragua.* Despite Moscow's desire to maintain a ceiling on its commitments, Warsaw Pact military aid continues, and economic aid is going to be an increasing burden to the Soviets. The Soviets and Cubans will continue to support counterinsurgency operations and improve air defenses. Ground-based air defenses probably will be upgraded during the next 18 months as the Sandinista regime expands its air surveillance tracking network, acquires more modern equipment (such as the ZSU-23-4 anti-aircraft guns), and gains experience. The lack of trained Nicaraguan operators and maintenance personnel means that additional Cubans will be needed to staff and maintain the radar network. Despite the fact that the Soviets and their allies have trained or are training up to 40 Nicaraguan pilots to fly MIG-21s, we believe it is unlikely that Moscow will provide jet fighters in the near future. Provision of jet trainers such as the L-39, however, is a possibility.

— *Peru.* We doubt that Peru's ties to the Soviet Union will expand significantly during President Garcia's term, but Peru will continue to be attracted to Soviet weaponry. Despite efforts to reduce dependence on the USSR (for example, by purchasing Mirage 2000 fighter-bombers from France) the Peruvian military, faced with severe budget restrictions, continues to purchase Soviet weaponry because of highly favorable financing terms, the relatively low price tags on Soviet arms, and a lack of alternative sources for spare parts. Soviet arms sales probably will include counterinsurgency equipment for the Army and helicopters and transport aircraft for the Air Force. Because of poor high-altitude performance, the Peruvian Air Force may replace some of its MI-6 Hook and MI-8 helicopters with MI-17 Hip Hs. Such a trade would require the dispatch of more Soviet advisers.



— *Elsewhere in Latin America.* The Soviet Union will continue efforts to improve relations with other Latin American democracies. Economic relationships with Brazil and Argentina may expand, and the Soviets may even succeed in selling military equipment to other Latin countries.

Africa: South of the Sahara

183. Soviet attention to southern Africa has increased in recent years, and the Soviets and Cubans are pursuing long-term objectives there that reflect a mix of motivations. Critical variables will affect the course of Soviet policy, but the unfolding of events will provide Moscow and Havana with several opportunities to expand their influence and undermine US interests in the region. Moscow's efforts will be primarily directed to strengthening its two clients bordering South Africa and reinforcing the Soviet position in the Horn. Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique have often complained about the Soviets' poor logistic supply networks, insufficient stores of fuel and ammunition, inadequate training, poor counterinsurgency strategy and tactics, and the general shoddiness of Soviet equipment. Nonetheless, we expect the USSR to remain the region's principal supplier of military assistance. Few if any of the most advanced Soviet military systems will be deployed; they are not needed in the types of operations that will be conducted.

184. The Soviets will also emphasize their assistance to insurgent groups such as SWAPO and the ANC. Developments expected in specific countries include:

— *Angola.* The Soviet determination to hold on in Angola and to neutralize UNITA is plain. Deliveries of military equipment have been heavy in the last three years, and, at times, there is an apparent urgency to the Soviet effort. The number of Soviet transport aircraft flying military


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cargo missions is the highest since 1975 when the Soviets and Cubans consolidated the MPLA in power; the deliveries of the most recently provided fighter, the MiG-23 Flogger G, and the Soviet-supplied, Cuban-manned SAM belt across southwestern Angola complicate future South African tactical air sorties and resupply flights to UNITA. This Soviet commitment is expected to continue, with expanded air defenses to complete the SAM belt in southeastern Angola, but SA-5s will probably not be sent.

- Should the South Africans inflict serious damage on Angolan Government forces, pressure would almost certainly grow on the Soviets and Cubans for expanded involvement in air-to-ground and air-to-air operations. We believe that Moscow would prefer to avoid direct confrontation with South African-piloted aircraft. However, we cannot rule out a Soviet combat role in air operations if Moscow believes that South Africa's activity poses a direct threat to the viability of Angola's military forces. If such a threat does not materialize, the Soviets are not likely to expand their involvement to include direct participation in combat actions, but Cuban air activity may increase.
- We do not envision new MPLA policies over the next year that would violate what the Soviets perceive as Moscow's fundamental interests. In fact, we anticipate a strengthened MPLA commitment to the armed struggle against both UNITA and South Africa, which, in the MPLA's view, is not inconsistent with participation in the talks on withdrawal of Cuban forces.
- *Mozambique.* While limiting risks and costs, Moscow wants Maputo to return to a more orthodox Marxist-Leninist, pro-Soviet orientation, and the Soviets seek a central role in influencing Mozambique's foreign and domestic policies. The Kremlin will work to undermine Western influence by emphasizing that the West is not to be trusted, despite the fact that Western donors have provided economic aid and minor amounts of military assistance. The security situation will continue to deteriorate, and the FRELIMO government may lose control of some key urban areas.
- If this scenario comes to pass, Moscow would probably increase its military support to Maputo by providing more fighter aircraft, helicopters, tanks, artillery, and advisory support in exchange


for a Mozambican pledge to limit its turn Westward or for an agreement to increase Soviet naval and air access to Mozambican facilities. Moscow might also take this step in response to Western or increased South African efforts to aid RENAMO. A moderate increase in Soviet military aid would not be enough to turn the military tide against the rebels, but it could reinforce the Soviet position in Mozambique at a reasonable cost.

- *Zimbabwe.* The cool relations between Zimbabwe and the USSR are improving somewhat, but military, economic, and party-to-party ties to Moscow and other Communist governments will probably remain limited. Mugabe might increase his reliance on the Soviets as a source of security assistance if Harare becomes bogged down in a seemingly unending military commitment in Mozambique, or if there are more South African cross-border raids, or if other sources of assistance dry up. Although negotiations have so far been difficult, we believe Zimbabwe and the USSR will eventually sign a military aid agreement that includes the provision of air defense equipment.
- *South Africa.* The senior Soviet leadership see its South African programs as a long-term effort. Several Soviet officials have spoken about a 10- to 15-year time frame before the ANC has a real prospect of coming to power because Moscow judges the Botha regime as still firmly in power. South African Communist Party (SACP) and ANC programs to encourage, probe, and exploit disaffection will be encouraged by the Soviets. In the interim, Moscow will keep up its across-the-board but low-level support.
- *Tanzania.* In late 1986 the Soviets signed a arms deal with Tanzania. Moscow has also authorized Tanzanian use of Soviet weapons for operations inside Mozambique, believing it to be an effective way to support Maputo—and to curry favor with the other states adjacent to South Africa—without using Soviet forces.
- *Guinea.* Guinea and the USSR have signed new military assistance agreements, but they do not appear to signify a shift in Conakry's increasingly pro-Western stance.

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but guarantee Moscow a high degree of political leverage with almost any new regime that wields power in Addis Ababa. 

The Mediterranean, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Persian Gulf

185. In response to increased Western competition (and to security threats to their clients), the Soviets have moved to make some of their more capable weapon systems available. Syria obtained SA-5s and SS-21s in 1983. Iraq has received the MIG-29, Syria may get it soon, and Libya (which received SA-5s in 1985-86) could get it later in the decade. Beginning in 1985, SA-13s and SA-14s have been delivered to Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya. To retain valued clients such as Libya, Syria, and Iraq, Moscow has been willing to reschedule payments in the past few years. But we believe major buyers of arms for hard currency owe Moscow at least \$30-45 billion for past deliveries. As a result the Soviets may now be less willing to sell or give away arms to these countries unless there is a clear need, as in Iraq, or unless they can obtain political gains in return for easier terms. 

186. Soviet efforts to gain greater influence in the region through arms deliveries are probably stymied. Few Arab countries in the Mediterranean will allow a significant increase of Soviet advisers and technicians in their countries. In the Arabian Peninsula, most countries are apprehensive of what they perceive as the Soviet role in the coup in South Yemen. The aftermath of the coup will make their relations with other countries there more difficult. The North Yemenis are already openly suspicious of Moscow's behavior in the crisis, and the conservative Persian Gulf states are more convinced of the dangers of opening too much to Moscow. Should South Yemen pursue policies designed to undermine its neighbors, the Soviet position in the region would be adversely affected:

— *Syria*. The Soviet Union will continue to supply Syria with some of its more advanced military equipment. It will do so to demonstrate its commitment to the Syrian regime short of a direct confrontation with the United States or Israel and to attempt to gain greater access to Syrian air and naval facilities. Moscow's refusal to risk escalation will nonetheless preclude Soviet pilots from flying fighters or bombers in a combat role from Syrian airfields. Newer weapons the Soviets could provide to Syrian forces over the next five years include SA-11 SAMs, MIG-29 and SU-25 aircraft, tanks, and Kilo-class submarines. Less likely candidates include SA-10 SAMs

— *Somalia*. Somali President Siad's recent effort to improve relations with the USSR is designed to deflect domestic criticism of his close ties to the United States, to explore the possibility of gaining Soviet assistance in his continuing talks with Ethiopia, and to offset anticipated cuts in US military aid. These initiatives are not likely to enjoy much success, however, because of Moscow's deep distrust of Siad and its unwillingness to jeopardize its relationship with Ethiopia. The Siad government probably believes that the threat of improved Soviet-Somali relations can win it more assistance from Washington. Although Siad is not likely to abrogate the military access agreement with the United States, he may express his frustration by putting restrictions on the use of Somali facilities for operational, exercise, or logistic activity.

— *Ethiopia*. The Soviets will continue to deliver to Ethiopia the same types of military equipment as before. In return, the Soviets may expand their use of military facilities there. Soviet interest in such an expansion is probably heightened because their access to airfields and ports in South Yemen may be affected by the continuing instability in that country. Soviet naval air operations from Asmara airfield will probably not be resumed, however, until the security situation also improves in Ethiopia.

— Despite disagreements, a significant reduction in the Soviet military advisory presence in Ethiopia is unlikely in the foreseeable future. Mengistu appears determined to seek a military solution to the Eritrean and Tigrean insurgencies and needs the Soviets to keep his armed forces combat capable, but neither the government nor the insurgents have the capability to decisively defeat the other. In the unlikely event Mengistu were overthrown soon, we believe a successor military regime might move to eliminate or at least reduce the influence of Marxist-Leninist institutions in an effort to attract Western economic support and to rally domestic political support. But Ethiopian security interests will all



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Figure 34. Frogfoot A (SU-25).

and SS-23 SSMs. But the amounts of future Soviet deliveries will depend on a number of factors: Soviet perceptions of the threats to Syria, Syrian progress on debt payments, and Moscow's concern over Syrian actions that could lead to unwanted escalation.

- The USSR's economic relationship with Syria has been substantially upgraded over the past few years. Moscow has provided more than \$1 billion in new financing as well as planning on construction of nuclear research facilities and possibly a nuclear power plant. The projects greatly increase Damascus' dependence on Moscow for follow-on support. More than 4,000 Soviet and East European technicians are already working on development projects in Syria and, if these programs continue to grow, the number of Warsaw Pact technicians is likely to double. In addition, 6,400 Syrians are studying in Warsaw Pact countries, and, if current trends continue, this number could easily reach 10,000.
- Although Assad is firmly entrenched, his survival is also of concern to the Soviets. If he were to die soon—and there is a moderate chance of this occurring in the next two to five years—the Soviet position in Syria could erode, though we believe this is unlikely and there is little chance that Syria would align itself with the West.
- *Libya.* If oil prices stay at current levels, Tripoli's arms purchases will remain depressed. The Soviets have provided support to automate and upgrade Libyan air defenses, but they will probably wait a few years before providing advanced arms such as the MIG-29, the SU-25, and the 300-km range SSC-1B coastal defense cruise missile. The Soviets are likely to continue to rebuff Qadhafi's requests for a defense agreement, but will attempt to patch over differences with him to gain greater influence over Libyan politics and the choice of a possible successor. Deliveries will probably be carried out on a case-by-case basis to force Libya to pay Moscow its back debts.
- Although Qadhafi knows that the Soviets will not directly intervene if the United States should mount further attacks against Libya, he probably believes that an increased Soviet presence in the country would help deter potential US attacks or limit the resultant damage. Qadhafi probably is prepared to allow Moscow a moderate increase in access to Libyan ports and airfields, above the current rate of 10 ship visits and four to five aircraft deployments to Libya per year. Soviet ships and submarines could also increasingly rely on Libyan ports instead of on some of the offshore anchorages where they currently rest and replenish. But the Soviets would almost certainly not deploy Soviet-manned bombers or interceptors to Libya as long as Qadhafi rules the country.
- Moscow's willingness or ability to influence any succession in Libya is unknown. The Soviets might adopt a wait-and-see approach, believing their interests would be preserved in any case by continued Libyan dependence on Soviet military assistance. To strengthen Libya's dependency, the Soviets might offer additional weaponry to the new regime at concessional rates. A new government could be cool toward such an offer because of reduced enthusiasm for more arms purchases or because other weapons might be available from Western suppliers.
- *Algeria.* Algeria's decisions on weapons purchases are influenced by its perception of a lack of US response to its weapons requests, a fall in the price of oil and gas that greatly reduced its capacity to purchase arms, and its concern over tensions in the region. All of these factors favor continued purchases of Soviet weapons. Despite its need for continued access to sophisticated military equipment at a lower cost than is obtainable from the West, Algeria will remain interested in Western weapons and a military relationship with the United States.
- The Soviets have offered an attractive arms package to Algeria including the T-72 tank, SA-5 missiles, and advanced aircraft. The Soviets might be willing to provide early models of the SU-24 Fencer in a few years. As a long-range penetrator, the SU-24 would add significantly to Algeria's capability to fight a two-front war. It would be especially valuable against Libya, where long distances and heavy SAM defenses must be negotiated to attack key targets.

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- **Iraq.** The Soviets are determined to supply Iraq with the weapons necessary to survive Iranian attacks. Thus, they will continue to provide the type of weapons they have in the past in addition to new types of aircraft, such as the MIG-29. The Soviets have stepped up their deliveries of arms, in particular, tanks and ground attack aircraft. Baghdad will nevertheless keep expanding its ties to the West because the Iraqis value its technology.
- **Iran.** Soviet-Iranian relations will remain strained as long as Tehran keeps up its anti-Soviet rhetoric, gives support to Afghan insurgents, suppresses the Tudeh Party, and keeps up other behavior that is hostile toward Moscow. Nonetheless, the Soviets will probably not restrain continued sales of munitions and small arms by Eastern Europe. Depending on the changing dynamics of international events, the Soviets may even encourage an expansion of sales from East European countries.
- Growing instability in Iran may also increase Soviet opportunities to cultivate contacts with leading radicals and among Iran's minorities and to intensify support for leftist opposition groups. If Moscow were to see opportunities for significantly expanded Soviet influence and Iranian concessions on key issues, including a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, it might consider relaxing its embargo on the sale of major weapon systems to Iran.
- **South Yemen.** By using its MAG forces to intervene in the aftermath of the 1986 coup, Moscow protected its stake in South Yemen. Any South Yemeni government will be dependent on Moscow for most military and economic assistance and, in return, the Soviets will be able to maintain—and possibly enhance—their capacity to monitor US and Western activities in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean through their intelligence facilities there. Improved Soviet access to South Yemeni facilities would probably focus on maintaining their naval air reconnaissance capability and even upgrading it—perhaps by substituting TU-95 aircraft for IL-38s. But Moscow's first priority will be to restore stability in the country.
- **North Yemen.** President Salih has not been satisfied with the quality of Soviet training programs and is concerned with the potential for subversion. In the wake of Soviet support for the

rebels in South Yemen, he has probably moved to reduce North Yemen's reliance on the USSR for military aid and training. North Yemen has already replaced some Soviet advisers with others from Jordan and Egypt. The discovery of oil in North Yemen will enable it to obtain greater economic and military trade with the West over the long term. And in two to three years Salih will be able to achieve greater balance in his relations with Moscow and other countries. Nonetheless, North Yemen's significant debt (about \$700 million) to the USSR for past deliveries of military equipment and its recent renewal of a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty will force Salih to continue to consider Soviet policy concerns. North Yemen could reduce the number of Soviet advisers in country if Jordan and/or Egypt were to send replacements.

Asia Around China's Periphery

187. Soviet arms to Asian countries will continue to play a crucial role in buttressing the USSR's foreign policy in the region:

- **Afghanistan.** Moscow clearly wishes to increase the prospects for eventual Soviet success in pacifying and controlling the country through a more effective Kabul regime, better military performance against the Mujahedin, and, especially, a combination of pressures and inducements that could change Pakistan's policies. The costs and risks of alternatives—either withdrawal without regard for the survival of a Marxist regime or substantial escalation of military activity—have, up to now, contributed to the decision to hold course. The sham withdrawal of a token number of Soviet troops, declarations of a unilateral cease-fire, and pressures on Pakistan are designed to reinforce these efforts. Erosion of Pakistan's resolve is a key goal.
- **India.** Even though India is increasing its arms purchases from the West—advanced fighters from France, an aircraft carrier and Sea Harrier fighters from the United Kingdom, and submarines from West Germany—New Delhi will continue to rely on Moscow to play a strong supportive role in Indian defense strategy. Reporting indicates that Gandhi's government continues to see the USSR as a strategic counterweight to China and the United States. In our view, New Delhi will continue to pay little attention to Soviet naval deployments in the Indian Ocean, which normally operate in the far west, distant


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Figure 35. Kilo-class medium-range attack submarine. [redacted]

from Indian shores. The Indians will also continue to take a low-key approach to the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. We estimate that India will continue to depend on Moscow for spare parts, training, and major new weapon systems such as the MIG-29 aircraft and Kilo-class submarines. Deliveries of Soviet military equipment, under major arms agreements signed in the early 1980s or now planned, will not be completed until the mid-1990s and will dramatically increase India's estimated payments to the USSR. By then almost half of India's combat aircraft and more than half of its armored vehicles and major warships will be Soviet supplied. However, the September 1986 decision of the Indian Government to purchase the US-built F404 jet engine for its own indigenously designed jet fighter was a major blow to Moscow's efforts to limit the Western share of the Indian market.

— *Vietnam*. Over the long term, there are some major weaknesses that might cause the Soviet/Vietnamese alliance to unravel. These include the evergrowing debt that Hanoi owes to Moscow for aid and a rapprochement by either side with China. However, these issues are not likely to be overly troublesome in the next five years. Moscow will continue to deliver the same types of less modern military equipment it has sent before. To back up its military commitment the USSR has pledged to double its economic aid to Vietnam in the next five years. We believe that the Soviets' efforts in Vietnam are directed toward improving the capabilities of their base to better support their forward-deployed composite group of naval ships and military aircraft.

— *North Korea*. With the accession of new leadership in Moscow, Soviet-North Korean relations have improved dramatically over the last three years, particularly in the strengthening of military cooperation. The Soviets realize, however, that P'yongyang has an insatiable need for arms and economic aid. In return for increased deliveries of military equipment, North Korea could let Soviet planes stage flights from North Korean airfields. But relations are not likely to grow too much closer, and the Soviets will probably not deploy their own long-range aircraft to North Korea. The marginal increase in range that such basing would provide Soviet aircraft would be more than offset by the negative reactions of China, Japan, and the United States. [redacted]

IX. Implications for the West

188. Gorbachev has projected an image of foreign policy activism by use of increased tactical skills, better harmony between diplomacy and propaganda, and more sophistication in foreign policy. Although the Soviets remain willing to provide economic support to a few clients that depend on it for their survival, the mainstay of Soviet diplomacy in the Third World is still arms transfers. [redacted]

189. The delivery of military weapons alone has never given the Soviets significant leverage with most non-Marxist Third World countries, and there is nothing inexorable about growing Soviet influence and presence in the Third World. The demise of colonial regimes, economic factors, cultural antipathy to the USSR in the Arab world, national interests, concern of reigning groups for their own continuance, and the interplay of world politics will remain predominant influences in determining the policies and orientation

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of LDCs. Thus, it is going to be much more difficult for the Soviets to use their military assistance to make significant new gains in the Third World. []

190. This does not mean that the Soviets are not going to make gains in the future—they are. In particular, their efforts in Central America and southern Africa will prove to be extremely troublesome for the United States. They will also find customers for increased arms sales, possibly in Algeria, Jordan, or Kuwait. They may gain significant influence over a few regimes, and they may expand their use of air and naval facilities in some countries to which they already have access. But the Soviets—because of their inability to extend substantial economic aid, the increased Western support to some insurgencies challenging Marxist regimes, their inability to project power against significant opposition, and declining hard currency earnings from arms sales—are coming up against limits to the benefits they can accrue by providing military assistance. []

191. Moscow's difficulties in earning hard currency raise the opportunity costs of aiding its client states and may reduce prospects for new grant aid or credits to non-Communist LDCs. Gorbachev knows that the USSR cannot underwrite the economic, social, or military development of any but a very few Third World countries—historically Cuba and Vietnam and now, increasingly, Nicaragua. In some countries the Soviets encourage a mixed economy with foreign investment from Western nations. Thus, even in states where Soviet influence is strong, the West will maintain an entree. []

192. Soviet limitations are particularly evident in their lack of opportunities to expand military access in return for their military assistance. Even in nations where there is a strong threat to an embattled regime, the Soviets and some major clients have been, and will continue to be, wary about increasing the Soviet presence:

- Moscow will wish to take no actions that would give the United States an excuse to bring its superior air and naval power to bear in Third World settings. On a broad scale, the Soviets will continue to militarily strengthen their allied regimes through measures that stop short of Soviet confrontation with the United States. Thus, even though an increased Soviet presence might be welcome in Cuba, Nicaragua, or Libya, the Soviets are unlikely to increase their military access in these countries.

- Syria probably realizes there are limits to the protection it can expect from Moscow. This stems from shortcomings in the performance of Soviet weapons, Moscow's lack of willingness to directly engage US or Israeli aircraft, and suspicions that Moscow might back revolutionary groups in opposition to the current leadership.

- The best prospects for Moscow's expansion of its access will probably occur in Vietnam and southern Africa. Over the next five years the Soviets will probably increase their naval and air capabilities in Vietnam. In southern Africa the Soviets could increase their periodic deployments of Bear reconnaissance aircraft to Angola. They could also send IL-38 ASW aircraft to Mozambique again, but such deployments would probably be sporadic in the near term. []

193. Despite these serious limitations, the political dynamics of the Third World, particularly in the poorer countries, will continue to provide openings for the use of arms transfers in support of Soviet policy:

- Revolutionary groups seeking power, leftist governments fending off revolts, and countries confronting the West will *almost always* turn to the Soviets for support—partly for the political statement such ties imply.
- And the Soviets will *almost always* provide arms to movements and states, particularly those on an anti-Western course, and will benefit from sustaining the movements as long as Moscow's commitment and risk are not substantial. []

194. The Soviets will attempt to maintain their markets and to remain competitive with Western rivals. We believe that the Soviets will provide at favorable prices or terms a number of advanced weapons such as MIG-29s, SU-25s, and helicopters, and will improve the air defenses of selected countries. Because these advanced weapons and improved air defense systems will require more training, the need for Warsaw Pact and Cuban advisers in LDCs will probably increase somewhat. Libya and Angola are already expanding Soviet-supplied air defenses, and Nicaragua will probably do so in the future. The number of Third World military personnel being trained in the USSR will also increase. In addition, the Soviets will beef up the defenses of countries that perceive active threats from across their borders. []

195. Moscow will also continue to supply arms to countries that cannot pay in hard currency when this

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


action could increase its influence and help destabilize states leaning toward the West. Thus, Soviet military assistance will continue to pose major problems for US and Western interests, especially in Central America and southern Africa. In addition, the Soviets also have the potential to gain in other regions if the West fails to provide significant economic and security assistance:

- In the Philippines the Soviets may be able to make inroads.
- Prospects for the Soviets would also improve in Algeria, Morocco, and especially Tunisia, if any

of them perceived that the United States or West European countries were unwilling to provide vital economic or security assistance.

- Insufficient Western security assistance to African countries could have adverse consequences for several US interests and policies; for example, facilities agreements with Kenya and Somalia would be at great risk, the containment of Libya in Chad, Niger, and Sudan would be damaged, and the major US effort for economic policy reform by African governments would suffer a major blow. [redacted]

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