

Documents regarding mis-treatment of imported Chinese laborers

(14)

(122)



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Report of Investigation Division, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP.

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Report by: Robert M. Patterson  
Major, Cavalry

Title:

Ryohey NOGEY, Kyohito HOMMA, Hideshiro OKAZAKI.  
Mistreatment of (Re Imported Chinese Laborers)

Synopsis of facts:

The three Subject named individuals were official agents and personal participants in the criminal IMPORTED CHINESE LABOR (ICL) enterprise perpetrated by the Japanese Government in which: (1) the national policy was to exploit Chinese Manpower in the aggressive interests of Japan; (2) the official Plan was to procure Chinese Nationals in China and expend them as Labor in Japan on heavy-duty high-priority war-industrial work projects; and (3) the coordinated Program cleared via sundry Ministries, bureaus, sections, agencies and agents, all duly designated, empowered, and responsible for results, which were as atrocious as the ways and means employed were criminal.

Altogether, there were some 135 "LCL" groups in Japan. The 'CHUSAN-RYO' case, Hanaoka Copper Mine, Akita Prefecture, was one. There, approximately 1000 Chinese were deprived of the barest vital material necessities, through the brutal neglect, mismanagement and man-handling of the responsible authorities with the result that over 42% of the victims died of starvation, exhaustion and disease. Such was the situation and conditions, and the consequences, which these 3 Subject named suspects helped to create and accomplish. Specifically - NOGI Ryohey, as Chief, Labor Div, Eng. & Constr. Works Control Assoc. (Munitions/Welfare Mins.) was a Contracting and Procurement agent, who shanghaied Chinese many of whom, already famished, ill, old, died in China or en route and kept on dying in Japan. NOGI knew, helped perpetrate, ways and means and deeds and results.

HOMMA Kyohito, as Home Office Advisor on Chinese, worked with Foreign Affairs and Special Police sections and with the so-called "Special Chinese Counter-Measure Committee" of that Ministry; he did much field-inspecting and agent-training and championed brutality to Chinese as 'SOP'.

OKAZAKI Hideshiro, as a high-level Thought-Policeman, Chief of both the 'Peace Preservation' and Foreign Affs sections, Police Bureau, Home Ministry, did much practical policymaking and actual enforcing; he knew, helped form, backed up, the 'big picture' and its consequences.

Owing to the key posts and doings of these 3 suspects, the full investigation and prosecution of their cases should uncover much

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DETAILS:

At Tokyo:

evidence on other persons who are also specifically implicated in the Japanese governmental, strikingly war-crimes-related, IMPORTED CHINESE LABOR tragedy as a whole.

This report arises from evidence first uncovered in the notorious "Chusan-Ryo" Chinese Labor Camp case. The basic matter involved is Importation of Chinese Nationals by the Japanese Government as a part of the national program in the interests of the aggressive Greater East Asia (GEA) War. The related evidence against the Japanese authorities ranges from local atrocities to atrocious national policies. The train of consequences is revealed by the known facts. That cause-and-effect chain of criminal responsibility is linked up by the available evidence with the official governmental chain of authority and responsibility at all levels. Specifically implicated agencies and agents are indicated. Not only are NOGI, HOMMA and OKAZAKI implicated but a number of other suspects as well, including a number of higher-ups a long way beyond and above them in the central government as well as other suspects at the Prefectural levels.

Accordingly, while the mission of this report is primarily to state the situations relating to the three subject named suspects mentioned above it will be an aim also, in stating the details, to indicate the basis for further investigations leading to the eventual prosecution of other suspects who participated in the pernicious program of importing Chinese Nationals and who hence are implicated in the matter of war-crimes-related misdeeds as relating to Chinese laborers in Japan.

The "Chusan-Ryo" case above referred to concerns the Imported Chinese Laborers (hereinafter termed ICL's) who were located at the Hanaoka Copper Mine near Odate in Akita Prefecture. Certain perpetrators in that case are now facing trial. The information contained in the present Report arises initially from that case and is available in the Prosecution Division, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP. The sources of information available in that Division include the following--

1. Four Ltrs, dtd 15 June, 19 July, 15 and 30 Nov 1946, To Legal Section, From HIROBAYSHI Shinichi, Atty for Kajima-Gumi Civil Engineering & Construction Company.
2. Twenty one written exhibits (various) incl Item #3 below.
3. Ex. B-1, Affidavit dtd 12 July 1946 by KUBO Seiichiro.
4. Japanese Govt Order dtd 4 April 1944 re Chinese Labor Importation Program, To Governors of Prefectures, From the Home and Welfare Ministries jointly, incl written Policy and Compendium rules to be enforced by responsible agencies.
5. Contract dtd 8 May 1944 between NOGI Rycho for Kajima-Gumi Co. and CHI-CHAO, Exec. Dir., North China Labor Association.
6. Statement dtd 24 April 1947 by KAJIMA Morinosuke, President of the Kajima-Gumi Civil Engineering & Construction Company.
7. GLO Ltr #6570 (RF) dtd 21 August 1947 and GLO Memorandum #4019 (RF) dtd 14 August 1946 listing and locating the Chinese Labor groups and so-called Employers in Japan.
8. Inv Div Case #419 (Chinese Labor at Sumimoto Mine).

Copies of items Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 enumerated above are filed with the CRD copy of this report. Pertinent details from all of the above sources as relating to this Investigation are summarized in the present text.



For purposes of this report, significant details in connection with the above-mentioned "Chusan-Ryo" case proper include the following. The statistics shown are approximately exact.

(1) During the period Aug 1944 through June 1945 there were 981 ICL's delivered to the immediate custody of a branch office of the Kajima-Gumi Company at the Hanaoka Mine near Odate in Akita Prefecture, segregated, quartered and guarded as one "Chusan-Ryo" group, and there, until mid-October 1945 when relieving Allied Forces took charge of them, during a period of about 15 months of Japanese mis-management, under atrocious conditions and circumstances ranging from brutal mistreatment of their persons to equally brutal neglect, were bullied, beaten, starved, tortured, deprived of anything like enough food, clothes, shelter, fuel, sanitation or medical care adequate to support life adequately for anybody, let alone able-bodied men at work, while at the same time they were kept remorselessly at hard labor on a work-project to which they had been allocated because it had a high-priority rating in the all-out, national, aggressive GEA war-effort in Japan, with the result that, today, 413 (over 42%) of that one ICL group alone are known to be dead.

(2) The mere statistics are as appalling as the physical details and are pertinent to this report as illustrating, what will be shown below, that all this occurred under Government control by designated responsible agencies and persons.

(a) During the 9-months period from August 1944 through April 1945 from an initial strength of 296 there were 88 deaths or 30% in that time.

(b) The monthly death rate rose from the start. There were 4 deaths in August, the 1st month; 16 in April, the 9th month. In May and June 685 ICL's arrived, but fresh blood didn't help the figures: there were 19 and 24 deaths in May and June respectively, as the worn-out survivors of the ICL's already on hand continued to die off.

(c) On 1 July 1945 the traditionally docile Chinese revolted in desperation and were caught, tied, herded, beaten, exposed to sweltering heat and sunlight without water or food for upwards of 3 days, by the Police. Score for July: 100 deaths, 12% of the ICL survivor-strength as of 1 July.

(d) To proceed: During the remainder of the period of Japanese control, for the 3 months, August through October, the deaths by months were 49, 68 and 51; total 168, or 27% of the survivor-strength as of 1 August -- but in the ensuing 5 months, under Allied control, from November 1945 through March 1946 the deaths by months were 9, 3, 1, 0 and 1; total 14, or 2.5% of the strength as of 1 November.

(e) To sum up: For the 11-month period before the "July Incident" there were 131 deaths (13% of the total original ICL strength); for the 9-month period after and including the incident there were 282 deaths (33% of the survivor strength as of the time the 3-day Police tortures occurred); for the entire 20-month period from August 1944 through March 1946 the overall figures are: ICL's 981, dead at Chusan-Ryo 413 or about 42%.

Certain local perpetrators in the "Chusan-Ryo" case now face trial. The summarized details on it stated above suffice to bring out the war-crimes-



relationship at the ground level. But the defendants in that case are not the only offenders, and the "Chusan-Ryo" group of approximately 1000 ICL's is only one of many such groups in Japan. The CLO sources referred to above list 135 ICL groups at as many locations worked by 33 industrial organizations. All of the many thousands of Chinese Nationals who were imported to Japan, survivors as well as dead, and for the reasons shown below, were victimized by the Japanese government officially as such.

(1) On 4 April 1944 the central government sent an Order labelled Welfare Ministry No. 103/Welfare Ministry #6, signed jointly by the two Vice-Ministers indicated, "To: the Governors of Prefectures, Subject: Importation Into Japan of Imported Chinese Labor".

(2) The Order stated: "Pursuant to the Cabinet decision made on 27 November 1942 we have been experimenting on importing Chinese Laborers for some time and ... have now come to a decision made at a Vice-Ministers' conference on the Policy respecting the Importation of Chinese Labor into Japan, as per attached Paper #1, also upon a Compendium thereof, as per attached Paper #2. Since we have launched upon regular importation ... having regard for the acute shortage of labor, you will do all in your power to accelerate the handling of the various matters involved in the materialization of the problem."

(3) The Policy and Compendium were explicit. They stated a Plan. The basis was that the Government would rule the ICL Program in all essential respects. Official approval and supervision and control of Work Projects, of Employers, of ICL Care and Welfare, and of the ICL's themselves were all prescribed. Particular standards and specifications and procedures were laid down, and the responsible governmental agencies were designated. Some significant details contained in the written Policy and Compendium follow.

(4) ICL's were 'in principle' to be worked for 2 years at heavy labor on high-priority war-industry work-projects, as approved by the Ministry of Welfare. The same Ministry allocated a quota of ICL's to each Prefecture.

(5) Employers filed an 'Application Invoking Assistance of Chinese Labor'. The National Labor Mobilization Bureau checked the applications. Governors of Prefectures forwarded these as requisitions on the Welfare Ministry, for approval. Division of that ministry passed on them. The Welfare Ministry notified the Greater East Asia Department. The GEA Dept in turn attended to the overseas procurement.

(6) In China, laborers were collected by the Japanese army, or by the puppet Chinese Government, or, in North China, by the N.China Administrative Commission or by the N.China Labor Association (NCLA), acting under instructions of Japanese Embassy.

(7) ICL's were supposed to be forty years old or less, sound in health and mind. Wages, hours of work and rest, to be on the basis of the average for Japan. Special security measures were directed, to prevent runaways and spies. Food was to be as per prescribed ration for ICL's. Foodstuffs to be provided by the Ministry of Commerce & Agriculture.

(8) "The Employer, acting under the instructions of the Police, the Natl Labor Mobilization Office and other relevant organs, shall



provide the necessary equipment for the training, education, amusement and examination of health" of the ICL's. Employers might be "barred from the privilege" of having ICL aid if they were "found to be incompetent ... or do not obey instructions of the competent authorities", and, if need be, should be made to "submit an oath pledging themselves ... to obey the control and instructions of the Police and the Natl Labor Mobilization Office (NLMO).

(9) The chain of control from the ground up was: Employer - NLMO and Police - Governors of Prefectures - Welfare and Home Ministries - GEA Dept. (Other responsible agencies were the Foreign Affairs and Police bureaus, Home Ministry).

In addition to the significant details contained in the Order, Policy and Compendium, the exact phraseology of the form of Contract undertaken between "Employers" and the North China Labor Association (NCLC) is interesting: The authority invoked for making contracts is "In accordance with the Plan of the Japanese Empire of February 2, 1944." The stated purpose is "having regard to the delivery of laborers by the North China Labor Association", and it was specified that "The terms of the labor contract shall be as per the Particulars of Enforcement".

It is obvious from the above details that the Chinese Labor Importation Program was an official thing over which the Japanese Government held full jurisdiction and dominated through designated official agencies; also obvious where, in the last analysis, the responsibility lies for the mistreatment and death of ICL's in Japan. Off hand the arrangement may not seem particularly objectionable, but from the facts in the 'Chusan-Ryo' case the following considerations emerge:-

(1) Nominally, the ICL's were "contract laborers" but actually they were unfree, supposedly they were able-bodied but actually they were, many of them, in poor physical condition or diseased -- originally POW's, vagrants and the like who were caught and deported by Japanese rounding-up agencies operating in China, including the Army. As one coolie put it: "I hail from Shantung, was grabbed, and brought here" to Japan.

(2) The private "Employers" were held responsible by the Government for ICL care and welfare, etc; actually, they were handicapped by the so-called "competent authorities" - deprived by them of sufficient power or means or facilities or supplies or relevant official aid of any sort to fulfill the obligations imposed upon them;

(3) The Government, as represented by its own designated and responsible official agencies and personnel, broke its own rules, violated its own standards and specifications, failed to meet its own obligations of supervision and control and facilitation or to comply with its own procedures.

In a word, the responsible authorities were not "competent" in an efficient sense. The facts prove that it was the Government, not Industry, that brought about an intolerable situation in the first place, and then not only failed to correct but actually contributed to the criminal conditions and actions and consequences that resulted -- in the course, incidentally, of failing in the avowed official mission of "having regard for the acute shortage of labor." In substantiation of this, the following are some illustrations of what happened in Government circles:-

(1) The authorities violated their own rules by importing laborers who were in many if not in the majority of instances in weakened



or diseased condition -- as evidenced by the affidavit of KUBO Sei-chiro and by there were deaths enroute to Japan in all 3 of the drafts of ICL's shipped to the 'Chusan-Ryo' location.

(2) The Governor of Akita Prefecture and his rationing agents refused to furnish foodstuffs to the starving ICL's although repeatedly begged for the same by the local Kajima-Gumi employees and as ordered by the central governmental authorities to do -- and the central Government failed to enforce its order to do so.

(3) The mistreatment of ICL's appears to have been instigated as a sort of get-tough-with-the-Chinese policy and practical working-principle by at least one Welfare agent (HOMMA), while the Police, including the Special Higher Police of the Police Bureau, Home Ministry, actually perpetrated some of the known crimes.

(4) Similarly; the Foreign Affairs Section, Home Ministry, was another relevant if otherwise incompetent agency which shares in the responsibility for the neglect and mistreatment of ICL's, a fact which implicates OKAZAKI.

(5) Above all, the incredible deeds and statistics in the 'Chusan-Ryo' case are a sort of muster-roll of murder which tends to prove how the Government which dominated the situation failed to control it - an odd exhibition of efficiency by the competent authorities bent upon conserving manpower and a startling degree of 'labor turnover' even in the case of such a cheap and expendable commodity as ICL's.

The foregoing information serves to establish the major war-crimes-relationships existing in the matter of Japanese national program for the importation of Chinese nationals and indicates the train of consequences and the corresponding, implicated official agencies. NOGI, HOMMA and OKAZAKI were tied-in with this matter in the manner stated below.

A key factor as regards all three of these individuals is that the ICL Program in which they mutually participated, in different ways but as fellow team-workers, was a highly coordinated program involving specialized functions, various bureaus, different Ministries. General facts in this connection as pertaining to the three individuals here concerned are, that they are alike, in that each held a key job and performed one or more significant functions; that NOGI and HOMMA are alike in that, as functional specialists at an intermediate level, each performed a subordinate though potent role; but that, beyond that, all three cases are different. NOGI was a contract-maker on the Munitions Ministry payroll; HOMMA was an alleged expert on the Chinese, on the HOME Office books. OKAZAKI headed up two highpowered Sections under the HOME Office, nearer the top and with much more authority than the other two. For all of these reasons, the details on any one of these individuals are peculiarly significant, not merely as implicating them, or only in the light they throw on the 'big picture' but specifically in their farther implications as pertaining to other suspect individuals.

Details re NOGI Ryohey - On 8 May 1944 a contract was entered into between the "North China Labor Association" (NCLA) and "Kashima-gumi Limited" whereby, "in accordance with the Plan of the Japanese Empire, the NCLA undertook the delivery of laborers to Kashimagumi Ltd provided that that Company in turn undertook to employ the laborers for a term of two years and provided further that "the terms of the labor contract shall be as per the Particulars of Enforcement", which were attached.



The contract was duly executed as a document. The 'Chusan-Ryo' victims of it were delivered as a consequence of it. An English translation of the Contract and of the Particulars of Enforcement is available in the Prosecution Division.

The contract was signed, for the NCLA, by one "CHI CHAO, Executive Director of the North China Labor Association", and for the Company by "Ryohey NOGI, Attorney for S. Kajima, Vice-President, Kashinagumi Limited."

Pertinent considerations as relating to NOGI individually are:

- (1) that he personally signed as Attorney for S. Kajima and the Company;
- (2) that the Particulars of Enforcement specified that the laborers would be selected in China on the basis of qualifications which were also specified, it being specified, further, that the Company would participate in their selection, in China. These two considerations implicate NOGI in a number of ways.

(1) As to NOGI being Attorney for the Kajima-Gumi interests, the President of that Company, KAJIMA Morinosuke, in a sworn statement dated 24 April 1947 testifies: that whenever the Company needed laborers it put in a request to the Labor Department of the Engineering & Construction Works Association; that that Association made a contract with the KAHOKU ROKOKYOKAI (NCLA) at Peiping and imported the Chinese Laborers; that the ECWCA was supervised, then, by the MUNITIONS Ministry (and is now, since the War, known as the NIPPON KENCHIKU KOGYO KYOKAI -- Japan Construction & Industry Association); that neither 'SUENAGA' (a Kajima-Gumi employe) nor the Chief of the Labor Section of that Company went to China after Chinese laborers; that although the contract was drawn up between KAJIMA-GUMI and the NCLA, it was concluded through NOGI, "who was then Chief of the Labor Department of the ECWCA" and that the contract was not signed by KAJIMA himself or any other higher executive but, instead, was signed by NOGI "who was not even a member of the Company", "for" the Vice-President of KAJIMA-GUMI.

(2) As to what terms NOGI the contract-signer agreed to as binding in respect to laborers in China, Section VII of the Particulars of Enforcement reads in full as follows: "The Employment Standard shall be: (a) One who is physically strong enough to bear heavy labor; (a) Age shall be sixteen years and above; possibly young men shall be given preference; (c) One who is free from contagious diseases or other despicable diseases; (d) One who is deemed by the NCLA not to be the possessor of unhealthy thoughts and ideas; (e) Selection in China shall be made on the above-mentioned basis, to be participated in by Kajima-Gumi."

Evidently NOGI was a Governmental rather than an Industrial agent, and a responsible one, in a key job, actively engaged in the procurement and delivery of ICL's. He should know much about what the situation really was, what conditions were, what happened, in China and Japan both. That there was serious neglect and abuse of ICL's and that their ill-treatment in both respects was due to the failure of the responsible Japanese authorities to maintain standards or enforce them or otherwise effectually control the ICL Program and its operations which they insisted on dominating is evident from the Chusan-Ryo case; the implications against NOGI start with that general fact: he comes through as a suspect "ex-officio" on that point alone. More specifically, that procurement standards specified by the Particulars of Enforcement as to the physical qualifications of the ICL's were violated from the very start, in China, and that this factor contributed materially to the subsequent high death rate of ICL's in Japan is a well-attested point to which NOGI is closely related, and is evidenced by these



supporting details: KUBO Seichiro (Reference No. 3, listed at the beginning of this Report) describes the diseased and weakened condition of outward-bound ICL's in China before their departure; the records of six, only, shipments of ICL's checked by this Investigator show that there were deaths of ICL's enroute from China in all six instances; two Industrialists, officials of Companies which worked ICL's in Japan, report that the ICL's were in wretched physical condition when they arrived at the work-projects, and state that this factor helped kill off the ICL's after they got there. The evidence in the 'Chusan-Ryo' case substantiates these considerations, which obviously implicate NOGI in more ways than one.

Details re HOMMA Kiyohito:- According to the letter dated 19 July 1946, of HIRABAYASHI, Shinichi, an attorney for KAJIMA-GUMI (See Reference No. 7 listed above, at the beginning of this Report), HOMMA was appointed Advisor to the HOME Office on Chinese Labor on or about 10 February 1941 and was still in office in May 1946. The following additional information on HOMMA is taken from a sworn statement dated 12 July 1946, by KUBO Seichiro, Chief of the Labor Division at the HANAOKA Mining Office of FUGITA-GUMI Ltd, near ODATE in AKITA Prefecture from May 1943 to May 1946, where the 'Chusan-Ryo' Group of ICL's was located, and worked by KAJIMA-GUMI Ltd which had a construction contract with FUGITA-GUMI. (See Reference No. 3, above). KUBO, a Labor management official for a large corporation, was technically and practically familiar with the ICL situation and conditions in general and with the happenings at the Hanaoka Mine in particular. His testimony concerning HOMMA Kiyohito is summarized below:-

HOMMA lived in TSINGTAO, China, for 20 years or more, returned home in the early planning stages of the Japanese Empire's Chinese Labor Importation scheme, and by the HOME Ministry was appointed Advisor on ICL Affairs. As such he collaborated with the CHINESE LABOR COUNTER-MEASURE COMMITTEE, (which was managed by the Foreign Affairs and Police Sections of the HOME Office). Thus, and in every way, HOMMA participated actively and influentially in the official, practical planning and field supervision of the ICL Program. KUBO states that--

"He (HOMMA) was thus occupying a leading post ... and from time to time toured and lectured around the entire (field of the) contractors working camps where Imported Chinese Laborers were allocated; he also worked as a lecturer for all meetings of the leaders ... throughout this country (Japan) thereby directly instructing and leading the people in regard to the disposition of Chinese Labor."

On 13 July 1944 there was a formal visitation at the Hanaoka Mine by a party of Government officials numbering "altogether about 20 officials, chiefly from the Special Higher Police" (the TOKKOKA, Home Office Secret Police Bureau), who inspected the Mine and instructed the Management. Official representatives of the Akita Prefectural administrative and police authorities, other Police, and representatives of the Welfare and Home Ministries were in the party, including HOMMA Kiyoko. KUBO testified that "On that occasion they fully explained the Official Policy", - which was laid down specifically by HOMMA himself, in his role as a Government expert on Chinese Labor. Under the heading: "Resumes of The Said Policy, KUBO presents a page of testimony which he concludes by stating is "the gist of Advisor HOMMA's lecture at the Hanaoka Mining Club on 13 July 1944".

According to KUBO, the keynote of HOMMA's speech was that the local policy at Hanaoka toward ICL's, of "over-indulgence" and "non-interference" in their daily lives, would be taken advantage of by the Chinese, who, deceptive in manner, treacherous by nature, prey upon the weaknesses of others and cheat them. The quarters and bedding were too good for coolies used to sleeping in crude huts or in the open. Staple rations of 22 kg.



flour per head per month was too much. Furthermore, work output should be stepped up, as at the ITMUKA Mine in HOKKAIDO, where the ICL's ate less and produced more than at Hanaoka. Henceforth the principle at Hanaoka must be stringent control of ICL's.

Toward the beginning of September 1944, HOMMA, accompanied by Police and HOME Office officials, visited the KAJIMA-GUMI ('Chusan-Ryo') Work Project at the Hanaoka Mine. - "HOMMA there fully explained the management and control of Chinese Laborers along the same HOME Office principle as was expounded in the lectures made at the Hanaoka Mining Club on July 13th 1944" and added that instructions re ICL's would come downward through the Special Higher Police (TOKKOKA - Home Office) from that time on and must be obeyed by the local staff and all others concerned. KUBO testifies further that--

"Again, HOMMA delivered a lecture at the short-course Class sponsored by the HOME Office for Policemen in charge of Chinese Laborers held in the OTARU Higher Commercial School in HOKKAIDO and on that occasion he expounded the guiding principle of the Government ... According to Asst Police Inspector NARITA of Akita Prefecture, who was a student there at that time, HOMMA's conclusion in regard to the Chinese laborers was exactly the same as his lecture made at the Hanaoka conference on July 13th." KUBO's own conclusion, and he was an industrial labor boss, is: "It would seem that the opinion of HOMMA was virtually made the official instructions of the HOME Office transmitted to all Contractors' Working Camps throughout the country, and enforced".

Evidently HOMMA was indeed, as previously stated in this Report, a Government specialist in a key, influential job, and an individual suspect in his own right, like NOGI; and here again, as in NOGI's case, the implications arising from the above details, immediately as relating to HOMMA, as implications go a long way beyond HOMMA himself. Considered as a source of evidence, HOMMA should be able to throw much light on the ICL picture as a whole and on other implicated parties, including on OZAKI, his superior in the HOME Ministry, who is reported upon below.

Details re OKAZAKI Hideshiro: - (Reference: CIS File #806042, Book V.(5), Serial #2193-C (Statement by OKAZAKI) dated 25 March 1946). According to OKAZAKI's own statement, he was a career public official who entered the service of the HOME Ministry two years after his graduation from college in 1928. In the course of the ensuing 15-year period 1930/1945 the major posts he held were: 1) Chief of the #2 Section, Special Thought Police, AIICHI Prefecture; 2) Chief of the #2 Section, Special Thought Police, Metropolitan Police Board; 3) Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section, Police Bureau, HOME Ministry; 4) Chief of the Special Thought Control Section, Metropolitan Police Board; 5) Chief of the Public Peace (Peace Preservation) Section, Police Bureau, HOME Ministry. He was suspended from office by the Allied authorities on 12 October 1945, and in March 1946 was connected with the Japan Railway and Auto Works, Tokyo.

Thus OKAZAKI, a career man, specialized in the public safety field, and, within that field, as a Policeman, he specialized in policing peoples' thoughts as a matter of peace-preservation, etc. Considered either as a suspect, which he is, or as a potential witness, he is a promising specimen: his specialized career, and the positions he held and the times and levels at which he held them obviously implicate him in the 'big picture' of the ICL tragedy, from the standpoints of policy making and enforcement, both. OKAZAKI should have specific knowledge of policy making and enforcement, both. OKAZAKI should have specific knowledge of HOMMA's doings and vice-versa, and on other implicated agencies and individuals near the top.



According to HIRABAYASHI Seichiro, the Kajima-Gumi lawyer, OKAZAKI was Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section, Police Bureau, Home Ministry, from 27 April 1943 until 3 August 1944. Just what he did between the latter date and April 1945 is not clear; in 1945, from April until his suspension by the Allied authorities in October, he was Chief of the Public Peace (or Peace Preservation) Section. Furthermore, during most of the latter period, from 12 June until the end, he also acted again as Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section which he had headed up before.

The fact that atrocities were perpetrated on ICL's at the ground level is well established; the related evidence in the sources already available in the Legal Section of this HQ is overwhelming in its indications that many of the war-crimes-related happenings at the ground-level are attributable to pressure from above, through official channels to the industrial "employers" locally handling ICL's, and that much of the bullying of "employers" and ill-treatment of ICL's came from the official peace-preservers and thought-controllers, specifically from the agents of the Home Ministry Police Bureau.

To sum up: For the reasons indicated, OKAZAKI comes through emphatically as a high-level official who occupied two specific key-positions at a critical time and actively discharged functions of peculiar significance to the basic, war-crimes-related ICL program as a whole. He is not alone in these respects. From the standpoint of future investigations, he represents a real opportunity. Through him, it should be practicable to trace the farther implications and place them where they belong, on others of his colleagues, some of them higher up the line.

It is concluded, by way of general evaluation, that all three subjects, NOGI, HOMMA and OKAZAKI are prime suspects in the basic matter here concerned. It is believed that they can and should be prosecuted and convicted. They are believed to be truly guilty in the legal sense, in a way that can be made to stick in each case, since it is believed to be inconceivable on the face of the known details that any one of these three could possibly have been a mere functionary in the Japanese machine and not be as it is believed that they were, real participants who were knowingly and actively guilty of concrete, criminal actions.

Their respective cases are obviously correlated with each other and with a larger whole. The latter may be considered as one Subject or prospective 'Case'. In other words, the basic matter which underlies these particular cases both severally and collectively, is nothing less than the Criminal Importation and Exploitation of Chinese Manpower and Chinese Nationals by the Japanese Government. For the present, it is believed simpler and more practicable, and so recommended, to carry further investigations along on the present basis of Investigating individual suspects. However, it is suggested that consideration be given to the idea of eventually pooling them as one miscellaneous subject or case. This angle will be additionally recommended upon later.

The Japanese authorities have been directed to furnish the Legal Section with copies of the military and biographical histories of NOGI Ryohey, HOMMA Kyohto and OKAZAKI Hideshiro and also to have all three of them report (separately) to the Investigation Division for interview.

The immediate detention in custody as suspected war criminals of the three subject named individuals is not recommended since it is believed that, initially at least, more and better information on the background situation, that is, on the Japanese Government's national policy and formal plan and coordinated program for the exploitation of Chinese manpower by the method of importing Chinese nationals to Japan and there disposing of them as an expendible commodity on war-industrial work projects, All as part of the

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Imperial aggressive war effort, and more and better information on other suspect agencies and persons who are likewise implicated in the same war-crimes-related 'ICL' enterprise, can be obtained by treating these three Subjects, for the time being, ostensible as more or less unsuspected and, one hopes, unsuspecting, witnesses, than would be obtained if they were arrested before being questioned. Recommendations as to their eventual arrest and detention will be tendered in due course.

UNDEVELOPED LEADS:

The Tokyo Office:

Will review further, and follow up on, leads contained in the References listed at the beginning of this report and in any other sources presently available in the Legal Section or elsewhere in this Headquarters.

Will interrogate locally available witnesses in the 'Chusan-Ryo' case as to any additional testimony they can provide, which will be obtained accordingly, if any, on the present Subjects, NOGI, HOMMA and OKAZAKI.

Will open investigations of, and report on, certain already known other suspects whose own cases will no doubt throw additional light on the respective cases of the three above named persons who have here been reported upon.

P E N D I N G



KASIWABARA said  
CHIZAKI Co. operated  
in China -  
KIMURA says "No!"



REPORT

\*\*\*\*\*

1. The initial period of employing Korean Laborers by Chizaki-Co. as follows:

Date: 30 Mar. 1941

Location: Kita-Mikuni, Hokkaido, Japan

2. Whether or not Chizaki-Co. had ever operated in China ?

As there was no work site belong to Chizaki-Co. in China, therefore, no Chinese Laborer had been employed there.

I hereby submit the above information which was notified by main office.

KIMURA

The Chief of Chizaki Co. Tokyo Branch.

WANG, L.S.



報 告 書

一 地崎組に於て朝鮮人勞務者を雇傭し受入れた最初の時期

昭和十六年三月三十日

北海道北見國に受入

ニ 地崎組が支那に於て作業をしたことがあるか

地崎組は支那に於て作業場を持つたことなく従つて華人勞務者を支那に於て雇傭したることなし

右之通り本社より通知がありましたから報告致します

株式會社地崎組東京支店長



先日パターソン少佐から西の求士れおしと  
報告書も持参し申し度直とはおね  
致します

王生

地崎班

木村一吉



0110 / 5, Aug. 49.

from Chisaki - Co.

Concerning

by / KIMURA

1. Date of first imported Kover in  
HOKKAIDO
2. The employment in China



Translated by J. Kondo

# My North CHINA Travel (Diary)

By : NOGI, Takayuki

Date : April, 1944

---

## En Route To North China

- (1) April 16 : Throughout Sunday made preparations for ~~the start~~ <sup>journey</sup>. Had a drink after taking a bath in the evening. At 7.00 P.M. had YOSHIO take my big suit-case and bade him farewell at Omori Station. On the



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platform of Tokyo Station, there was such a long line of people that I almost gave up my chance of getting a seat, but, thanks to an old passenger who ~~caught the~~ <sup>caught the</sup> wrong train, I got ~~it~~ <sup>one</sup>.

Mr. CHOKAI, my fellow-traveller, was ~~found~~ rather embarrassed <sup>to be</sup> in the next 2nd-class coach when I ~~saw~~ <sup>looked</sup> for him. On a suit-case beside my seat, he sat for the night. Until Kyoto, there was no change in the passengers, but many got off at Osaka and Kobe.

Near Okayama, a person was seen occupying ~~the~~ <sup>a</sup> two-~~person~~ <sup>passenger</sup> seat ~~for~~ <sup>by</sup> himself. Bought two packages of lunch (containing bread), at Okayama, <sup>and</sup> some Chinese citrons and



a newspaper near Onomichi and that  
was all. ~~To my surprise,~~ Mr. CHOKAI  
bought green tea, presumably because  
he felt he could never drink tea of sweet flavour  
in China. At 7:10, ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> schedule time, the  
train reached and came to a halt at  
the elevated platform of Shimonoseki Station.  
We got off and were greeted by Mr. TANIZAWA  
accompanying a boy from the Accommo-  
dation Department. Mr. TANIZAWA said all the  
hotels of the city were now being occupied by



military personnel and their ~~former~~<sup>other</sup> guests had already been ordered out. He was kind enough to offer us a night's lodging and we barely caught a train just leaving for the ~~same~~<sup>same</sup> <sup>(from which we came)</sup> direction. The boy took care of our baggages and took them to the Accommodation Department.

A <sup>girl, now</sup> 41-day-old, ~~girl~~ had been born to the TANIZAWAS. We were entertained by TOSHIKO-san and had a chat with Mr. TANIZAWA's mother. After taking a bath, we three had a sumptuous meal, drinking about ~~a~~<sup>a</sup> half-gallon <sup>of</sup> sake. So absorbed in talking that it was 11:30 P.M. when we went to bed.



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(2) April 18: Felt very warm last night.

Got up at about 5:00 AM. No sooner washed myself than took breakfast of bean soup

in the dining room. Presented with a

lunch enough for us two, left <sup>the</sup> TANIZAWAS

at 5:30<sup>AM</sup>. Bound for Shimonoseki Station on foot,

in a shower of spring rain, arrived at

the Accommodation Department at 6:00 AM. A

guard led us and other passengers to the pier.

At 7:00 AM, <sup>(taking priority over)</sup> another line of passengers,

we went aboard. In a room with two



berths to be occupied by Mr. CHOKAI and myself, I had a shave and was writing my diary until 9:00 AM, when our boat set out. At about 9:30 AM <sup>they gave us instructions</sup> ~~directions~~ <sup>followed</sup> to be kept aboard <sup>and showed us</sup> how to put on a life-preserver. Due to weather condition, the ~~training for taking~~ <sup>life-boat drill</sup> ~~refuge~~ was not held that morning. So we immediately proceeded to the dining room, and, after waiting for our turn in a line of people, we <sup>were able to eat</sup> ~~could get~~ lunch costing one yen each. Then we retired and stretched ourselves on the berths which we owed to Mr. TANIZAWA.

After a calm voyage, <sup>the</sup> Tenzan-maru, together



with two other smaller transports, arrived at the pier of Fuzan at about 5:40 P.M. After taking a rest at the Inquiry Office of the Toa Travel Bureau and then getting seats in advance on the train, I went down the platform to buy cigarettes. <sup>there</sup> ~~where~~ I ~~was~~ met by Mr. AOYAMA of the Keijo Branch Office who told me to my great joy that he had already gotten <sup>two</sup> berth tickets for us. (only as far as Keijo — from there, the train had no sleeper). When I was in a line of



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people to get into the dining car, a porter  
came and handed <sup>me</sup> a lunch-box to me.  
On inquiry he said it was from Mr.  
YAMAMOTO, Mitsuru. I could not see him  
because he was on the Keijo Express.

My train <sup>the</sup> Koa left Fuzan at 8:30 P.M. I  
was lucky to find beer in the dining room.  
As Mr. CHOKAI gave me his own and a  
soldier some of his own, I was quite  
drunk and went <sup>back</sup> to my berth. The  
coach had only four berths in all, which  
were to be converted into ordinary seats  
from Keijo.



(3) April 19: Got up at 6 in the morning and together with Mr. CHOKAI went to the diner, but finding it already jam-packed, we returned and ate plain rice-balls.

At Keijo, Mr. KAWASAKI came to see us. On the coach we did nothing except reading and sleeping before the train reached Antung after ~~at~~ <sup>after</sup> 8 P.M. Antung. After passing a baggage examination by customs officers there, I and fellow-passengers became absorbed in discussing hunting and fishing, but it was about



10:00 P.M. when I finally fell asleep. At about  
 1 A.M. the train <sup>(suddenly)</sup> came to a halt and even  
 went backward, which caused delay of  
 more than one hour. Seemed that the  
 rain ~~made~~ the steep grade too slippery  
 for the train.

(4) April 20: Arrived at Mukden at 6 A.M.  
 While I was washing myself, more than half  
 of the passengers got off and instead  
 many others came in. Joined in a line  
 of people in the diner, finished break-  
 fast at 7 A.M. and then wrote my diary. At  
 Chinsien, went to the diner to take lunch. Then  
 reading and naps.



At 3:30 P.M., at Shanghaiwan, a customs examination and exchange of paper money. Everything O.K. It was also there that Mr. CHOKAI bought four <sup>pieces of</sup> small bread for two yen and was just going to buy roast chicken but, surprised at the price of ¥12.00, <sup>abruptly</sup> said no. It was a big laugh indeed.

The Kōa Express, which was two hours behind time at Mukden, gradually regained time. Near Tangshan a man of the North China Transportation Co. came in and told me



about <sup>conditions</sup> ~~circumstances~~ in Peking. High prices, scarcity of goods, increased pilferage etc. We agreed that this would eventually lead to shutting out of the Japanese homelander.

At Tientsin a businessman came in who said had been forty years in China. He told me, beside general economic problems in North China, that ample food and hard labor are the best policy in employing laborers. He also discussed high prices and cornering conducted by <sup>the</sup> Chinese. The train at last passed Fengtai, (Here I advised an old mother <sup>who was</sup> travelling ~~for~~ to Taiyang that she must change here and I was deeply ~~appreciated~~ <sup>thankful</sup>) and arrived at Peking <sup>(Station)</sup> at about 12:40 A.M. about 25 minutes behind time.



(of the Station)

At the exit, some one shouted "Mr. CHOKAI."

It was Mr. KIDO, chief of the Supplies Section of the Peiking Branch, <sup>the</sup> Hazama Gummi Co. We rode an automobile he had kindly ~~provided~~ <sup>arranged</sup> for us.

At the Hazama Gummi we were informed that no room was available <sup>to us</sup>, except, perhaps, in

the Eirakuya Hotel. At the Hotel, where every body was <sup>already</sup> fast asleep, we managed to find

one room. We were served a cup of tea and

at 1:30 A.M. ~~with~~ Mr. CHOKAI and I

went to bed.



## In Peking

(5) April 21: Got up at 8 A.M. in a room of the Eirakuya Hotel and washed myself. The breakfast with bean soup was <sup>quite</sup> reminiscent of our homeland. Visited the Hazama Gumi Co. immediately. Exchanged greetings with Mr. TAKAHASHI, the Branch Manager and his staff. Mr. TAKAHASHI's opinion on Chinese <sup>and Japan proper</sup> laborers was that, if the increase in recruiting cost and debased efficiency of about one-third normal ~~but~~ should be considered, the wage per head a day would be ¥30. In view of scarcity of labor, this might not be helped, but he was afraid that ~~this could not be paid.~~

Contact with the Okura Works Co. disclosed that last night they had sent an automobile to ~~fetch~~ <sup>get</sup>



us at ~~the~~ Peking Station and they had also reserved a room at the Peking Hanten Hotel.

Much obliged, we ~~removed~~ moved to Room 337 of the Hotel immediately. After lunch at the Hotel,

went to the Public Works Association to see

Mr NISHIDA, the Branch Manager of the Okura

<sup>public</sup> Works Co. He and Mr. TAKAMURA of the

Shimizu Gumi<sup>Co.</sup>, whom I also saw there, told

me about circumstances in North China.

Left there at 3:00 P.M. and went to Tungan

Market to witness increased prices. A pair



of shoes cost ¥300 ~ ¥500, a pair of boots  
 ¥500 ~ ¥700, a grip sack ¥200 ~ ¥400, a towel  
 ¥12 ~ ¥13 — all as much as ten times  
 former prices — and, to my consternation,

a spring coat ¥1,500. Mr. CHOKAI bought

some telegram notes and letter papers for

¥14 or ¥15 and ordered his name-card for

¥16. On our way back, a telegram <sup>which we</sup> sent to

our Association in Tokyo cost us ¥16.

Returned to the Hotel, wrote many letters

and my diary. Mr. SUGIYAMA came

in and <sup>the</sup> three ~~of us~~ went to the Tungan Market

Restaurant to eat mutton and drink Chinese

wine. Mr. SUGIYAMA paid the bill <sup>of</sup> Ch\$95,000.



Returned at 10:30 P.M. and had a chat ~~with~~ while <sup>17</sup>  
massaged him.  
~~message~~ with Mr. CHOKAI Went to bed at 12:00

(6) April 22: Got up at 8:30<sup>A.M.</sup> and washed myself.

With Japanese meal already sold out, finished  
breakfast with oatmeal (without sugar), eggs  
and coffee. Hired a car (¥4) to visit the  
Embassy (as Secretary UCHIDA was not in, saw  
Chancellor KATAGIRI instead). On the way back,  
visited the NISHIMATSU GUMI Co. and talked  
with Mr. KOSAKA, chief of the Public Works Section,  
though the Branch Manager and the Sub-manager were  
absent. Mr. KOSAKA invited me to a dinner  
at the Suikaro Restaurant and then accompanied



me to the Labor Association. Met  
 Mr. NAGOSHI of the 2nd Mobilization Section  
 and Mr. MATSUKUMA, chief of the Mobilization  
 Department. Mr. MATSUKUMA told me about  
 importation of Chinese laborers into Japan proper.  
 He said as follows:

" There ~~are~~ no volunteers <sup>for employment</sup> ~~to be employed~~ in  
 Japan proper, due to inflated prices and  
 difference <sup>in</sup> value of money. One can easily  
 make ¥20 ~ ¥30 a day in North China.  
 Above all, it is not ~~so~~ <sup>very</sup> difficult for a head-  
 laborer to make ¥10,000 a month (by per head  
 ¥18, commission ¥60). A peasant can get  
 more than ¥50 out of <sup>the</sup> cost of approximately  
 ¥20 if he brings a bag of cereals into



Peking. A tricyclist of the city earns ¥30 a day. Suppose they can earn ¥5 a day and save ¥1,500 in two years <sup>(in Japan)</sup>. Once back home they would spend ¥1,500 in a single month. They do not want to go to Japan because things two years ahead are so uncertain. And there ~~is~~<sup>is</sup> also enemy propaganda that, owing to lack of labor and inability to keep the war going, the Japanese contemplate ~~the~~ using them as "suicide units" and that they are to be imported into Manchuria where synthetic oil is being manufactured in order



that their <sup>own</sup> fat may be taken out of them. 20

These rumors make them extremely uneasy."

Left at 3:30 P.M. and, on my way back, dropped in the Okura <sup>Public</sup> Works Co. to express thanks to Mr. NAKAGAWA, the General Affairs Chief, for his kindness in finding a hotel for me.

Returned to the Hotel at 4:30 P.M. Mr. CHOKAI went to the Hazama Gumi Co. to borrow money —

¥ 1,000.

At 7:00 P.M. went to the Japanese dining room of 6th floor alone to eat the regular meal plus tempura, drinking a bottle of sake. Returned to my room at 8:00 P.M. and after a chat with Mr. CHOKAI went to bed at 9:30 P.M. To-night is the third night since arrival, and I feel gradually recovered from fatigue.



	Prices	Examples
Beer	per bottle	¥13.00
Sake	flask	2.00
Whiskey (White House)		65.00
Beer	per glass	2.50
Cake	a pound	15.00
Egg	raw	.80
"	boiled	1.00
sukiyaki		10.00
Curry & rice		¥ 2.00 - ¥ 5.00
Note-book		6.00
Towel		12.00
Soap	highest	9.00
Barbar		2.00
Pencil		1.20
Shovel		100.00
Handkerchief		¥ 4.00 - ¥ 5.00
Beef Steak		7.50



(7) April 23 (Sunday), ~~at~~ the Peking Hanten Hotel:

Got up at 8:00 AM, and ~~took~~ <sup>ate</sup> foreign meal for breakfast. Drank tea with Mrs. CHOKAI while seeing the Tungan Market. After sightseeing Chinese towns by car (¥2.50) had lunch at a Chinese restaurant (¥23.00). Then went to Tenkyo to look at curios shops. Meanwhile we lost the way and a Chinese policeman came to our rescue. After walking through a street full of ~~displays~~ <sup>displays</sup> and other shows, returned to the former Chinese town, where I bought a grip-sack for ¥200, and at a tea-booth, ate some cakes (¥8.00) before returning to the Hotel by car. After taking a bath, two glasses of beer (¥5.00 beside a tip of ¥1.00 and ¥1.20 beans) and



then went to the Japanese dining room to eat dinner with one bottle of sake.

(8) April 24 (Monday): Got up at 8:00 AM. No <sup>had I eaten</sup> sooner breakfast in the Japanese dining room than Mr. TAKEUCHI of the Mining Control Association came to see me. After a chat in my room, he and I <sup>together</sup> visited Mr. KUMOBAYASHI of the Tōa Travel Bureau to make various arrangements. Bidding farewell to Mr. TAKEUCHI, I visited the Kashima Gumi Co. to see the Sub-manager and the Chief of the Labor Section. They told me that



they had decided to procure POWs at  
Shikmen. Then went to the Labor Association  
to see Mr. ISHIKAWA, chief of the General Affairs  
Department, and talked with him about  
various circumstances in North China.

On my way back, took lunch with Mr.  
CHOKAI at a western-style restaurant on  
the Tokamori Street. Then met by Mr. KAMIYAMA  
of the Labor Association on the street and  
drank tea with him at the Tanyan Market.  
Returning to the Hotel, invited Messrs. ONO  
and NOZAWA of the Kashima Gumi Co. and at 6:30  
the five ~~men~~<sup>of us</sup> including Mr. KAMIYAMA had  
a dinner party at the Gajoen Restaurant. After



drinking beer and watching dances, I bade my friends farewell at 8:00 and returned to the Hotel to sleep.

(9) April 25 (Tuesday), the day for the Extraordinary Festival of the Yasukuni Shrine;

Intentionally ~~overslept~~ <sup>slept late</sup> and got up at 9:00 A.M. <sup>eating</sup> After breakfast <sup>included</sup> which ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> at the Japanese dining room, was writing my diary, when there came two unexpected visitors including Mr. SENTOKU of the Kawaguchi Gumi Co. While discussing laborers to be imported into Japan



proper, Mr. YAMADA, Seisaku of the North  
 China Transportation Co. and ~~there~~ 4 <sup>field</sup> ~~outdoor~~  
 workers at Hiraoka of the Kumagaya Gumi  
 Co. came in. All discussed various matters  
 until 12:00 noon, when <sup>finally</sup> Mr. ISHIGAKI of the  
 Tobishima Gumi dropped in. Eight persons  
 (Kumagaya men, ISHIGAKI, YAMADA, CHOKAI and my-  
 self) had a mutton sukiyaki party, at the  
 Tungan Market Restaurant, eating and drinking  
 a lot. (Ch\$ 165,000) until 2:00 P.M.  
 Mr. CHOKAI caught <sup>the</sup> 3 o'clock train and left  
 for Tangku (to take care of the remaining  
 300 laborers of the Hazama Gumi Co., scheduled  
 to embark on the 28th).



Returned to my hotel alone and prepared to  
 move to the Suimeiso Hotel. As negotiation  
 has already been made with Mr. TAKEUCHI  
 of the Mining Control Association, I went by car  
 and settled down in his No. 3 room of the Suimeiso  
 Hotel. after paying my bill of ¥ 340 to my

former hotel. Wrote letters. After  
 taking bath at 5:00 P.M., was <sup>making</sup> myself

~~easy~~ <sup>easy</sup> at home in Japanese ~~clothes~~ <sup>clothes</sup> when

Mr. NAKAGAWA, the General Affairs <sup>Section</sup> Chief of the  
 Okura Works Co. <sup>Public</sup> invited me. So at 7:00 P.M.



I was in a Japanese Restaurant named Ōgiya.

Mr. NISHIDA, the director, and NAKAGAWA and myself drank gallons of sake and were very happy with geisha girls attending. I had not seen geisha girls for a long time. Returned to my hotel at past ten and went to bed after a chat with my room-mate TAKEUCHI.

(10) April 26 (Wednesday):

Got up at 8:00 A.M. After ~~a wash~~<sup>washing</sup> and breakfast, Mr. TAKEUCHI paid his bill and moved to the NAGOYA Hotel. Then Mr. KOSAKA of the NISHIMATSU Gumi Co., Mr. YONAI of the Kensetsu Kogyo Co., and Mr. MIWA of the <sup>Yasuno</sup>Hiroshima Power Plant visited me and <sup>we</sup> all went together to the Labor Association to discuss various matters until 12:00 noon.



On our way back, Mr. KOSAKA treated us to sukiyaki ( ¥10.00 a head). Bidding farewell there, I did my shopping, had my hair cut and then returned. Asked one to get a ticket to Shikimen for me and waited for Mr. SUGIYAMA to visit me. He came at 4:00 P.M., discussed many matters of business with me. We went to the Hoshi Restaurant (off-limits to non-officers, non-higher civil officials — <sup>order of the</sup> by Army Commanders ) where Mrs. KATO, Yasutami entertained us with gallons of sake.



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After eating <sup>(45.00)</sup> curry and rice at the Oriental Restaurant, we bade farewell <sup>to</sup> each other. Then went to Peking Station to get on a 2nd class coach of the 11:40 train for Shikimen. Fell asleep immediately. Bought some bread at the Station. The train was not crowded.

### Word ~~Words~~ List

12 Chinese words for "Tonarigumi"  
"10 sen" "50 sen" "Hotel" "Station"  
"Toilet" "Boy" "Street" "Girls" etc.

### List of Phone Numbers

of the Okura Works; Obayashi, Kashima,  
Shinizu, Nishimatsu, Hazama and Ito Gumi  
; 8 Hotels; the Laborers' Association;

TANIMURA



(11) April 27, at Shihmen:

Awoke at about 6 A.M. feeling lack of sleep since last night. It was more than one hour before reaching Shihmen.

After eating the bread I had bought at Peking Station, felt drowsy. Only 7 or 8 <sup>persons</sup> were seen riding the 2nd class coach. A

Chinese wife sat opposite my seat. Two Japanese women, who had <sup>just</sup> returned from Japan proper, were discussing <sup>conditions</sup> ~~circumstances~~ in Japan and <sup>of</sup> difficulty in getting a passenger ticket.



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The train arrived at Shikoku Station at 9:30 A.M.,  
one and a half hours behind the schedule time  
(8:00 A.M.). Being a stranger, felt embarrass-  
ed. A Japanese hotel declined making  
a room for me, saying all rooms have already  
been reserved. On inquiry I managed to get to  
the Labor Association and met Mr. KANEKO  
at past 10:00 P.M. (The chief was <sup>then</sup> out). While  
I was talking with him, Mr. KAMIYAMA of  
the Association Headquarters and Mr. NOZAWA  
of the Kashima Gumi Co. (who had come <sup>here</sup> in advance)  
came to meet me. It was decided that  
300 men of the Kashima Gumi Mitake should  
be transferred from the Shikoku Training Camp  
and <sup>that</sup> they should start <sup>here</sup> on the 28th to be



embarked from Tangkou on the 1st / <sup>T.M.</sup> next month /

The four ~~men~~ <sup>of us</sup>, after taking lunch (Chinese style),

visited Manager ICHINOSE of the Toa Travel

Bureau to ask cooperation in transporting the

personnel to be imported / into Japan.

Went to Shihmen Station to check the time

of departure ~~to~~ next morning (8:15 A.M.)

as well as ~~transit~~ <sup>time</sup> at Fengtai. Then

went to the Laborers' Training Camp and

met Mr. OKUFUJI, the Superintendent, and

Mr. ITO. Then observed the ~~circumstances~~ <sup>conditions</sup> in



inside the camp and was surprised at the excellent training, above all the collective military training, of the laborers. Baggage, lunch, tea and all other necessities up to Tangku had already been prepared by the Association and I was only too grateful for their efforts and infallible actions. At about 7:00 P.M. came a release order from the Headquarters of the Area Army, which would from next morning make the laborers free and good citizens to devote themselves entirely to work.

The 300 laborers with various careers were comparatively intellectual, composed of many 20 to 25 years and healthy. If combined and



mobilized, they would be <sup>a</sup> formidable <sup>(force)</sup>. These ex-prisoners  
 should be very happy to be allowed to participate  
 as workers in the Greater East Asia War after  
 going to Japan proper under the flag of "New  
 Asia Builders". But, at the same time, it must  
 be considered that the <sup>Japanese</sup> employers in charge of  
 them would have <sup>the</sup> important task of guiding  
 them and I feel <sup>that</sup> their employers' responsibility  
 would be heavy.

At 6:00 P.M. left the Training Camp, returned  
 with Messrs. NOZAWA and TAKAHASHI to the Tamaya



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 would be heavy.

At 6:00 P.M. left the Training Camp, returned  
 with Messrs. NOZAWA and TAKAHASHI to the Tamaya



Hotel and had a bath. After dinner (with a bottle of beer NOZAWA carried) invited Messrs. KAMIYAMA and KANEKO of the Labor Association to a <sup>5-man</sup> party at the Akashi, a Japanese Restaurant, (one bottle of sake each). Returned to my hotel at past 11:00 P.M. and went to bed.

(12) April 28, Shikmen to Peking:

Woke up by a maid at 6:00 A.M., washed myself, took breakfast. Ran to the Station with Mr. TAKAHASHI, carrying baggages of Messrs. KAMIYAMA, NOZAWA and ONO who had already started. The laborers' Unit had already lined up in front of the Station. In addition to the ordinary coaches, the 8:15 train <sup>(from Shikmen)</sup> had three ambulance cars followed by three laborers'



coaches with 13 armed soldiers guarding.

I alone rode the 2nd class coach with urns of some deceased soldiers. On the train, was handed<sup>a</sup> lunch from the laborer's coach.

Reached Peking at 4:30 P.M. and returned by car to the hotel. While taking a rest after a bath, Mr. CHOKAI returned. Took a stroll with him, had dinner of mutton at the Tojunro Restaurant of the Tungan Market and returned at 10:00<sup>PM</sup> to sleep a sound sleep.

(13) April 29 (Emperor's Birthday):



Decided to take a rest for the whole day because it was holiday for everyone. In the morning, the diary and letters. About 10:00 A.M. went out for a walk in the Shikinjo Park. Three bottles of cider cost me ¥22, at which Mr. CHOKAI also was very surprised. Then went to Seizen to take lunch at the Takashimaya Restaurant. Tired, ~~past 3:00~~ returned to the hotel past 3:00 P.M.

At about 5:00 P.M. Mr. TANIMURA of the Mori Gummi Co. came and told me about the ~~circumstances~~ <sup>conditions</sup> in North China. Was surprised at what he said, "The Chinese brokers are much more reliable than the Japanese and that the reason why so much money is needed for recruiting coolies is that many decamp and <sup>later</sup> come and enlist <sup>again</sup> again." (turns)



At about 6:30 P.M. went to the Choshun Restaurant  
 in front of the Peiking Shrine, and <sup>there</sup> the three <sup>of us</sup> ~~men~~  
 including Mr. MOMIYAMA <sup>and me</sup> drank gallons of sake and  
 ate <sup>in it.</sup> sukiyaki with rice-cake. Returned after

10:00 P.M. They say many shirts have been  
<sup>lost</sup> ~~missing~~ at the laundries, especially the Japanese,

but not so with the Chinese.

The preliminary air-raid warning, which has been  
 given at about 2:00 P.M. the preceding day, was  
 cancelled at 3:00 P.M. on the 29th. <sup>act of</sup> One <sup>act of</sup> terrorism  
 by the 8th Route Army  
 and three <sup>cases of</sup> bloodshed are said to have occurred.



Am surprised at incompleteness of business transaction of the Labor Association.

(14) April 30 (Sunday), sightseeing the whole day.

An agent of the Nishimatsu Gumi<sup>Co.</sup> came to see me in the morning. At about 10:00AM visited

Mr. SUGIYAMA of the North China Branch of the Ito Gumi Co. and heard from him about the ~~circumstances~~<sup>conditions</sup> of North China, especially the inside story of the Public Works Exploitation Company, or the Bosan Co. (Its capital of ¥15,000,000 would be increased to ¥30,000,000 in the near future).

Took lunch with him at the Tenjunro Restaurant of No. 30 Baishigai Street and felt very happy eating Chinese dishes and drinking beer.



Then Mr. SUGIYAMA showed me round Nanikai Central Park and Hokkai Park. Returned at about 7:00 P.M. and had a bath with him. Mr. SENTOKU of the Kawaguchi Gumi Co. invited me to a welcome party at the Suijin Restaurant. After ~~the~~ heavy drinking, returned at 11:00 P.M. and went to bed.

(15) May 1 (Monday):

After breakfast, two visitors including Mr. SENTOKU of the Kawaguchi Gumi Co., followed by Messrs. YONEKURA and MIWA of the Nishimatsu Gumi Co., (came to see me.)



All went together to the Labor Association to make arrangements. After a talk with Mr. MATSUKUMA, chief of the Mobilization Department, left at 12:00 noon. The seven ~~of us~~ <sup>of us</sup>, including Mr. IRIE of the Iron-works who had <sup>also</sup> come <sup>/T.N./</sup> from Japan, had a lunch at a Chinese restaurant.

CHOKAI and I made purchases of some sewing-machine needles etc. <sup>(at the Toke Market)</sup> and returned. Took a

rest after a bath. At night Messrs. IRIE and TSUCHIYA invited me to the Fukujutei Restaurant. Returned <sup>at</sup> past 11:00 P.M.

May 2 (Tuesday):

Visited the Labor Association at 10:00 A.M. After meeting Mr. NAGOSHI and Director MATSUKUMA



it was decided to hold a conference with the employers in the evening, with particulars such as meeting time to be <sup>(later)</sup> decided at 3 P.M. Left the Association, ate foreign meals at the Shingetsu Restaurant of Tokamori and visited the Hazama Gumi Co. Unable to meet the managing staff, returned to the hotel after taking a picture. At 5:30 P.M. invited the employers' agents and the managing staff of the Labor Association to the Tokoro Restaurant in front of Tokamori.

Present: Employers — Iron-workers (2), Kawaguchi <sup>(Co.)</sup> (1)



Nishimatsu Co. (3), Kumagaya Co. (3)

Association — Department Chief, NAGOSHI,  
WATANABE and seven or eight other men,  
(2nd Section) 1st Section (2)

Bill ¥1,970.-

The party broke up at 8:30 P.M.  
Had another spree with Iron-works' IRIE and  
Kawaguchi's SENTOKU at the Fukujuso Restaurant  
until 10:30 P.M. Then returned to the hotel

May 3 (Wednesday):

Went to the Labor Association in the morning.  
After a long talk with Mr. MATSUKUMA, chief of  
the Mobilization Department, it was decided  
to make the allotment <sup>(of laborers)</sup> in the afternoon. (at  
2:00 P.M., the employers were called to hear the  
announcement). Had <sup>(South China style)</sup> lunch with Messrs. IRIE  
and TSUCHIYA of the Iron-works at the Fukujudo



Restaurant. Called on Mr. SUGIYAMA of Daianri  
by car to hear about prices etc. After  
taking a souvenir picture, returned to the  
hotel at 5:30 P.M. and had a bath. At 6 P.M.  
Mr. TAKAHASHI, <sup>the</sup> Branch Manager, and Mr. SUZUKI,  
the General Affairs Department Chief of the Hazama Gumi  
Co. invited me to a Chinese dinner at  
Morzen. Saw Chinese girls and returned  
10:00 P.M. to go to bed.

May 4 (Thursday):

Men of the Kawaguchi, Iron-works, Nishimatsu



and Kumazaya, came to see me in the morning. After a long talk, Mr. KOSAKA of the Nishimatsu Gumi invited me to a sukiyaki party. After returning to my hotel, went by automobile to the Okura Public Works Association, Kashima, Nishimatsu, Shimizu and Hazama Gumi to bid them farewell. Returned and had a bath.

At 6:30 P.M. the Association's Messrs. ISHIKAWA and MATSUKUMA invited me to a sumptuous dinner at the Kikuya Restaurant. At about 10:00 P.M. left the restaurant with Mr. TAKEUCHI of the Mining Control Association and saw the Tungan Market together, but meanwhile lost sight of him and returned alone. Went to bed.



## Peking To Manchuria And Korea

May 5 (Friday): Got up at 7:30 A.M. Washed myself and had breakfast. At 10:00 A.M. made purchases of salt, butter, bread, whisky etc. After returning to the hotel went out to do shopping at the Tungan Market for the last time. At 12:00 noon Mr. SUGIYAMA came with a present of a lot of cakes. Took lunch with him at the Toraijun (a mutton shop), drinking Chinese wine, feeling ~~very~~<sup>not</sup> so good. Then returned. At 3 P.M. Kawaguchi men came and, before long,



left the hotel for Peking Station. Messrs. SUGIYAMA, TANIMURA and MOMIYAMA as well as two persons each from the Iron-works, Kawaguchi, Kamakaya and Hazama Gumi kindly came to see me off. Got on a vacant 2nd class coach at 4:35 P.M. The train left at schedule time. Took a nap until Tientsin where Mr. IKEBE of the Hazama Gumi kindly gave me a flask <sup>(of tea)</sup>. Bought a package of red boiled rice for ¥3.00. The train started again. Felt hungry near Tangshan. After ~~taking~~ <sup>getting</sup> a ~~hot~~ meal (¥4.40) in the diner at 8 P.M., fell asleep in my spacious seat.

May 6 (Saturday): Awakened ~~at~~ at about 1:00 A.M. by



a person in charge. Passed a customs examination <sup>of baggages</sup>

at Shanghaiwan. The train left there at 2:00 A.M.

Fell asleep again. Washed myself at 7:00 A.M.

<sup>just</sup> before Chinsien where many came in and

all the vacant seats were snapped up. After

taking breakfast in the diner, fell asleep in

my seat. (The Express was for Singking)

After lunch, the train at last arrived at Mukden

Station at 12:30 P.M., the schedule time. Got off

with three <sup>pieces of</sup> baggage. Had a porter carry them

to the parcel room of the Station. After drinking



a cup of coffee at the Station Restaurant,  
 hired a bicycle to visit the Kashima Gumi Co.,  
 Met and heard from Mr. SHINOHARA about  
 progress of public works in Manchuria,  
 a boy of the Hazama Gumi led me to the  
 TAKEUCHIS. It was long since I had seen them  
 last. <sup>At 5:00 P.M. they all</sup>  
 (invited me to a Chinese dinner,

Returned to their home about 9:00 P.M. after  
 taking a stroll. Had a bath, drank  
 whisky and then fell fast asleep, being  
 very tired.

May 7 (Sunday):

Woke up by children's voices at about 7 A.M.  
 After breakfast Mr. TAKEUCHI led me to Mrs.  
 YOKOTA, Tsumichi's home just being cleaned up.



It has been long since I had a talk with him ~~last time~~  
 He <sup>himself</sup> served me with a cup of tea (His wife  
 has been on a trip to Japan). After bidding  
 him farewell, a sightseeing <sup>tour</sup> within and outside  
 the Mukden Wall. Met KIYOKO on the ~~Yoko~~  
 street and we three had a Russian meal,  
 took souvenir pictures at Chureito and  
 other spots and returned home. After a bath,  
 sukiyaki and whiskey and got quite drunk.

At 7:30 P.M. Mr. and Mrs. TAKEUCHI saw me off.

At 8:30 P.M. got on the Hikari Express <sup>for Keijo.</sup> Managed



to get a seat in the crowded car and fell asleep.

May 8 (Monday): Reached Antung past 5:00 A.M.,

There was no expected baggage examination because it had been abolished since May 1. Money limit also changed and one could now carry up to ¥2,000 with him. Converted some ¥8.00. Then washed myself and had breakfast of Osushi. Always felt drowsy on the way to Keijo. Apple-blossoms were now in full bloom near Kōshu. From about 1:00 P.M. the Patriotic Group Leader of the coach proclaimed anti-aircraft training. Following an air-raid warning, a ~~practice~~ <sup>practice</sup> air-raid took place. In ten minutes, the enemy planes fled and, before long, the "all clear" was sounded. Suffered



from heat and drowsiness on the coach.

Arrived at Keijo Station at 6:30 P.M. Messrs.

KAWASAKI and AOYAMA came to meet me. After

carrying two big suit-cases into the parcel-room,

went to the Otsuka Hotel. After a bath, had

dinner with Mr. KONDO of the Hazama Gumi Co.

Went to bed in a single room at 10:00 P.M.

for complete recovery from weariness. As no

liquor was available on this War Declaration Day,

drank Chinese wine.



In Keijo

May 9 (Tuesday), at the Otsuka Hotel:

Got up at 7 A.M., washed ~~my~~ <sup>and had</sup> breakfast.

Went to our Branch Office, but finding nobody had yet come, killed time by a stroll and

purchase of some razor blades. Went to our

Office for the second time and arranged various matters of business. At 12:00 noon, had

lunch with Mr. YAMAMOTO of the Iron-works

and drank Korean wine at the Mantei

Restaurant. Returned to the Office in rain.

In the afternoon, the rain prevented me from going out, so I stayed in the Office until

6:00 P.M., when Messrs. IWAI and KONDO and

the Office staff invited <sup>me</sup> to the Meiji Restaurant.

The party broke up at 8:00 P.M.



Instead of going back to the Otsuka Hotel,  
 Mr. KONDO and I went to a red-light  
 district, Merry-making.

May 10 (Wednesday):

Returned by car to the Hotel at 7:00 A.M.,  
 with Mr. KONDO. After breakfast, Mr.  
 Aoyama came. Went with him to the Station  
 to send a ~~baggage~~<sup>trunk</sup> (a suit-case) and returned  
 to our office after a visit to the <sup>T.N.</sup> Toa Travel  
 Bureau. Then had a talk with the Chief  
 of the Labor Section at the Government-General.



After that, had lunch with Mr. TAMURA of the Okura Public Works, did shopping at the Mitsukoshi Department Store before returning to our Office. At Back to the Hotel at 4:00 P.M., checked my baggage, invited KAMISHIMA and IKEBE of the Travel Bureau to drink beer. But when Aoyama and I ran to the Station to catch <sup>the</sup> 8:00 Express for Fuzan, it had already started. In resentment, together with Aoyama and TAKEUCHI of the Kawaguchi Gumi stormed many a saloon. Passed the night in Shinmachi. Passed out.

The ~~trip~~ <sup>Trip</sup> Home

May 11 (Thursday)

Woke up at 5:00 A.M. and hurried <sup>with Aoyama,</sup> by



Hediarab to the Station barely in time for the  
 6:15 train. The 2nd class coach was <sup>almost</sup> vacant,  
 so occupied ~~the~~ <sup>a</sup> two ~~passenger~~ <sup>alone</sup> seat, took naps  
 and had two lunches, feeling very comfortable.

The train reached Fuzan at 8:30 P.M..

The Arai Hotel had no spare room, so  
 doubled up with Mr. UNO. After taking  
 a specially prepared supper at 9:30 P.M., made  
 various arrangements with Mr. UNO who was  
 going to <sup>travel to</sup> China himself. Went to bed at 11:00 P.M.  
 Owed the night to Mr. UNO.



May 12 (Friday), back home:

Got up at 5:30 A.M. and washed myself. Was presented a lunch of boiled white rice by courtesy of a guide from the Okura Co., Mr. UNO paid the hotel charges. Rushed to the pier at 6:00 A.M. Thanks to Mr. ENDO of the Travel Bureau, took priority over others to go aboard the Kongo Maru <sup>which was</sup> jam-packed with passengers, <sup>and</sup> left for Japan.

While aboard, amused myself with an entertainment of ~~the~~ naniwabushi reciting by MUSASHIKUMO and HAYAKAWA, Sampei. Calm voyage. At about 10:00 A.M.

~~a taking refuge~~ <sup>life-boat drill</sup> exercise took place, after directions from life-preservers and some advised by a Naval Guard. Kept wearing a life-preserver <sup>the</sup> whole day.

The dining room reopened at 11:30 A.M.



The Kongo Maru arrived at ~~the~~ Shinonoseki pier  
6:00 P.M. Mr. TANIZAWA, accompanying a guard  
and a janitor, greeted me. Took a rest at  
the Accommodation Department and then dined  
with Mr. TANIZAWA at the Station Restaurant, drinking  
sake and beer. After taking a stroll in the  
city, got on the 09:15 train. Though the  
train was jam-packed, I managed to get a  
seat. Even the corridor was too crowded  
for people to pass freely. Gradually  
stepped down and felt sleepy. Headed for Tokyo.



May 13 (Saturday): Awoke about 5:30 AM, near Okayama. After washing myself, took lunch of rice balls carried from Fuzan and slept from time to time. Many people got off at Kobe and Osaka, but still all <sup>the</sup> seats were occupied.

Arrived at Shinagawa Station at 7:30 P.M. Wife and Hiroshi came to meet me. Returned home at 8:00 P.M. Took a bath and drank sake. Went to bed at 10:00 P.M.

(wife).



to whom  
List of Persons I Owe ~~Gratitude~~ Thanks

(○ a letter of thanks already sent)

North China Labor Association	Mobilization Dept. Chief	MATSUKUMA, Kichiro ○
"	General Affairs Dept. Chief	ISHIKAWA, Shigeru ○
"	Mobilization Dept. 2nd Sect. Chief	NAGOSHI, Yoshiaki ○
Kashima Gumi Co.	Branch Sub-manager	TSUCHIYA, Kunizo ○
"	Engineer	HIGUCHI, Moriyuki
"	Labor Sect. Chief	CHIKAISHI, Denzaburo
"	General Affairs Sect. Chief	YONAI, Koetsu
Okura Public Works Co.	Director & Branch Manager	NISHIDA, Shinichiro ○
"	General Affairs Sect. Chief	NAKAGAWA, Nobuyuki
Nishimatsu Gumi Co.	Branch Sub-manager	KATAYAMA, Kyuhei
"	Engineer	KOSAKA, Kyohei ○
Hazama Gumi Co.	Branch Manager	TAKAHASHI, Suejiro ○
"	General Affairs Dept. Chief	SUZUKI, Toshio ○
"	Branch Sub-Manager	IIDA, Fusataro
"	General Affairs Sect. Chief	SAKAGUCHI, Fujiro
"	Supplies Dept. Chief	KIDO, Kumao
Ito Gumi Co.	North China Agent	SUGIYAMA, Soju ○
Mori Gumi Co.		TANIMURA, Yoshinori ○



North China Travel Bureau

Kainan Construction Dept.

YAMADA, Seisaku

"

Engineers Dept. Examiner

MOMIYAMA, Kan

Kashima Gumi, Mukden,  
Manchuria

Public Works Dept. Chief

SHINOHARA, Shiro D



## Travel Order

April 16	8:15 P.M.	left Tokyo Station
17	7:10 P.M.	reached Shimonoseki,
"		passed the night at TANIZAWA's
18	9:00 A.M.	embarked the Tenzan Maru at Shimonoseki
"	5:40 P.M.	reached Fuzan, went ashore
"	8:30 P.M.	got on the Koa Express
19	8:00 P.M.	reached Antung, a customs examination
20	6:00 A.M.	reached Mukden, on the train
"	12:40 A.M.	reached Peking,
		stopped in the Eirakuya Hotel
21	Afternoon	stopped in the Peking Hanten Hotel
26		and stayed there until April 26
26	Afternoon	stopped in the Suimeiso Hotel
"	11:40 P.M.	left Peking
27	9:30 A.M.	reached Shikmen
		stopped in the Tamaya Hotel
28	8:15 A.M.	left Shikmen
"	4:30 P.M.	reached Peking
		stopped in the Suimeiso Hotel
29		Emperor's Birthday. Passed a day of rest
May 4		stayed in the Suimeiso Hotel until this day.



- May 5 4:35 P.M. left Peking
- 6 1:00 A.M. a customs examination at  
Shanghaiwan
- " 12:30 P.M. reached Mukden,  
Passed the night at TAKEUCHI'S
- 7 8:30 P.M. left Mukden by the  
Hikari Express.
- 8 6:30 P.M. reached Keijo, stopped  
in the Otsuka Hotel
- 9 stay in Keijo
- 10 - do -
- 11 6:15 A.M. left Keijo
- " 8:30 P.M. reached Fuzan, stopped in  
the Arai Hotel
- 12 9:00 A.M. embarked the Kongo Maru at  
Fuzan
- " 6:00 P.M. reached Shimomoseki
- " 9:15 P.M. left Shimomoseki
- 13 17:30 P.M. arrived at Shinagawa and  
back home



/T.N. toward the end of the note-book/

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List of Addresses

Nishimatsu Gumi, Peking - - - - -

MAEBAYASH, Kosaburo, the Toa Public Works Enterprise Co,  
Mukden - - - - -

SUGIYAMA, Soju, and UCHIDA, Nobuichi, the ITO Gumi Co,  
Peking - - - - -

North China Labor Association, Peking - - - - -

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HOSODA, Principal of the Magome 2nd Primary School,  
Tokyo - - - - -

Anti-aircraft Leaders, Magome Town's Office,  
Tokyo - - - - -

KONDO, Tetsutaro and NAGATA, Akio, the Railroad Construction  
Tokyo, Kanda, Misakicho-3 Chome. Co.



MINOCHI, Hidehiko, the Public Works Circulating  
Cultural Association,

Tokyo, Shiba, - - - - -

TSUDA, Seiichi, the Public Works and Construction  
Newspaper

Tokyo, Shiba, - - - - -

TAKIYAMA, Atsu, Kyoto - - - - -

YOSHIDA, Yukichi and other employees,  
the Public Works and Industry Association

Tokyo, Kojimachiku, Uchisaiwaicho,  
the Osaka Building, 6 Floor.

HAYASHI, Shigeru, the General Affairs Department Chief,

YAMAGUCHI, Yuzuru, the Accountants Dept. Chief,

the Nippon Public Works and Construction Control  
Guild, Tokyo, Kyobashi, Tsukiji 3-8 Tsukiji Bdg.

CHIBA, Keizo and TORII, Sogo, the Naval Establishments  
Cooperation Association,

Tokyo, Kyobashi, Kyobashi Bdg.

/END/



Boys' Festival Day --- 1 yen

Mid-Autumn Festival Day --- 1 yen

on the above holidays, an amount corresponding to the yearly bonus paid to the Japanese laborers shall be paid as a bonus divided among the above three holidays.

f. When a laborer does not work due to injury or illness, he shall be paid an injury or illness allowance according to the following standards:

Injury or illness while on duty --- 60% of the average daily earning per day (or a fixed amount of 3 yen per day)

Private illness or injury --- meals shall be provided (if meals are not provided, the actual costs necessary for meals shall be paid)

7. Meal charges.

In the event meals are charged for, this shall follow the example of that for the Japanese laborers.

8. Payment in kind.

Clothing, articles necessary for work, etc., shall be issued corresponding to that for the Japanese.

9. Payment of wages.

A fixed amount of the wages (10 yen per month for ordinary laborers and as appropriate amount to be decided for high-grade laborers) shall be paid to each laborer on a fixed day for the payment of wages, and the balance (if meals are charged for, the balance after deducting such charges) shall be deposited in postal savings in the name of each individual laborers.

NOTE: -- (1) The wage regulations drawn up in accordance with the above shall be reported to the prefectural governor and the supervising government agency or ministry concerned.

(2) In order to make clear the amount of wages paid to each Chinese laborer, the company operator shall draw up a pay-ledger and post it at the place of work, corresponding to that for the Japanese laborers.



1 to 1000	--	TOYODA
1001 to 1250	--	KODAMA
1251 to 1500	--	SASAKAWA
1500 to 2000	--	Reserved
2001 to 2500	--	OPENING HOSTILITIES
2501 to 3000	--	Slave Labor
3001 to 5000	--	Atrocities
5001 to 5250	--	Unlawful Employment of POW Labor
5051 to 5500	--	Opium, Narcotics
5501 to 6500	--	Diplomatic Correspondence
6500 to 8000	--	Reserved
8001 to 8250	--	ABE
8251 to 8500	--	ANDO
8501 to 8750	--	AOKI
8751 to 9000	--	GOTO
9001 to 9250	--	IWAMURA
9251 to 9500	--	KISHI
9501 to 9750	--	TANI
9751 to 19000	--	TERASHIMA



~~AR Donnell~~  
Miss A R O'Donnell  
Col Johnson  
Dr Mortar





Date: 9 October 1947

Report of Investigation Division, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Inv. Div. No.

2691

CRD No.

Report by: Robert M. Patterson  
Major, Cavalry

Title: Ryohey NOGEY, Kyohito HOMMA, Hideshiro OKAZAKI.  
Mistreatment of (Re Imported Chinese Laborers)

Synopsis of facts:

The three Subject named individuals were official agents and personal participants in the criminal IMPORTED CHINESE LABOR (ICL) enterprise perpetrated by the Japanese Government in which: (1) the national policy was to exploit Chinese Manpower in the aggressive interests of Japan; (2) the official Plan was to procure Chinese Nationals in China and expend them as Labor in Japan on heavy-duty high-priority war-industrial work projects; and (3) the coordinated Program cleared via sundry Ministries, bureaus, sections, agencies and agents, all duly designated, empowered, and responsible for results, which were as atrocious as the ways and means employed were criminal.

Altogether, there were some 135 "ICL" groups in Japan. The 'CHUSAN-RYO' case, Hanaoka Copper Mine, Akita Prefecture, was one. There, approximately 1000 Chinese were deprived of the barest vital material necessities, through the brutal neglect, mismanagement and man-handling of the responsible authorities with the result that over 42% of the victims died of starvation, exhaustion and disease. Such was the situation and conditions, and the consequences, which these 3 Subject named suspects helped to create and accomplish. Specifically - NOGI Ryohey, as Chief, Labor Div, Eng. & Constr. Works Control Assoc. (Munitions/Welfare Mins.) was a Contracting and Procurement agent, who shanghai'd Chinese, many of whom, already famished, ill, old, died in China or en route and kept on dying in Japan. NOGI knew, helped perpetrate, ways and means and deeds and results.

HOMMA Kyohito, as Home Office Advisor on Chinese, worked with Foreign Affairs and Special Police sections and with the so-called "Special Chinese Counter-Measure Committee" of that Ministry; he did much field-inspecting and agent-training and championed brutality to Chinese as 'SOP'.

OKAZAKI Hideshiro, as a high-level Thought-Policeman, Chief of both the 'Peace Preservation' and Foreign Affs sections, Police Bureau, Home Ministry, did much practical policymaking and actual enforcing; he knew, helped form, backed up, the 'big picture' and its consequences.

Owing to the key posts and doings of these 3 suspects, the full investigation and prosecution of their cases should uncover much

Distribution:

1 Prosecution (Mr. Faison) ←  
1 CRD  
1 Chinese Liaison Div.  
1 Inv. Div (2691)  
1 Major Patterson

Do not write in this space.



DETAILS:

evidence on other persons who are also specifically implicated in the Japanese governmental, strikingly war-crimes-related, IMPORTED CHINESE LABOR tragedy as a whole.

At Tokyo:

This report arises from evidence first uncovered in the notorious "Chusan-Ryo" Chinese Labor Camp case. The basic matter involved is Importation of Chinese Nationals by the Japanese Government as a part of the national program in the interests of the aggressive Greater East Asia (GEA) War. The related evidence against the Japanese authorities ranges from local atrocities to atrocious national policies. The train of consequences is revealed by the known facts. That cause-and-effect chain of criminal responsibility is linked up by the available evidence with the official governmental chain of authority and responsibility at all levels. Specifically implicated agencies and agents are indicated. Not only are NOGI, HOMMA and OKAZAKI implicated but a number of other suspects as well, including a number of higher-ups a long way beyond and above them in the central government as well as other suspects at the Prefectural levels.

Accordingly, while the mission of this report is primarily to state the situations relating to the three subject named suspects mentioned above it will be an aim also, in stating the details, to indicate the basis for further investigations leading to the eventual prosecution of other suspects who participated in the pernicious program of importing Chinese Nationals and who hence are implicated in the matter of war-crimes-related misdeeds as relating to Chinese laborers in Japan.

The "Chusan-Ryo" case above referred to concerns the Imported Chinese Laborers (hereinafter termed ICL's) who were located at the Hanaoka Copper Mine near Odate in Akita Prefecture. Certain perpetrators in that case are now facing trial. The information contained in the present Report arises initially from that case and is available in the Prosecution Division, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP. The sources of information available in that Division include the following--

1. Four Ltrs, dtd 15 June, 19 July, 15 and 30 Nov 1946, To Legal Section, From HIROBAYSHI Shinichi, Atty for Kajima-Gumi Civil Engineering & Construction Company.
2. Twenty one written exhibits (various) incl Item #3 below.
3. Ex. B-1, Affidavit dtd 12 July 1946 by KUBO Seichiro.
4. Japanese Govt Order dtd 4 April 1944 re Chinese Labor Importation Program, To Governors of Prefectures, From the Home and Welfare Ministries jointly, incl written Policy and Compendium rules to be enforced by responsible agencies.
5. Contract dtd 8 May 1944 between NOGI Ryoho for Kajima-Gumi Co. and CHI-CHAO, Exec. Dir., North China Labor Association.
6. Statement dtd 24 April 1947 by KAJIMA Morinosuke, President of the Kajima-Gumi Civil Engineering & Construction Company.
7. CLO Ltr #6570 (RF) dtd 21 August 1947 and CLO Memorandum #4019 (RF) dtd 14 August 1946 listing and locating the Chinese Labor groups and so-called Employers in Japan.
8. Inv Div Case #419 (Chinese Labor at Summimoto Mine).

Copies of items Nos. 1, 3, 4 and 5 enumerated above are filed with the CRD copy of this report. Pertinent details from all of the above sources as relating to this Investigation are summarized in the present text.



For purposes of this report, significant details in connection with the above-mentioned "Chusan-Ryo" case proper include the following. The statistics shown are approximately exact.

(1) During the period Aug 1944 through June 1945 there were 981 ICL's delivered to the immediate custody of a branch office of the Kajima-Gumi Company at the Hanaoka Mine near Odate in Akita Prefecture, segregated, quartered and guarded as one "Chusan-Ryo" group, and there, until mid-October 1945 when relieving Allied Forces took charge of them, during a period of about 15 months of Japanese mis-management, under atrocious conditions and circumstances ranging from brutal mistreatment of their persons to equally brutal neglect, were bullied, beaten, starved, tortured, deprived of anything like enough food, clothes, shelter, fuel, sanitation or medical care adequate to support life adequately for anybody, let alone able-bodied men at work, while at the same time they were kept remorselessly at hard labor on a work-project to which they had been allocated because it had a high-priority rating in the all-out, national, aggressive GEA war-effort in Japan, with the result that, today, 413 (over 42%) of that one ICL group alone are known to be dead.

(2) The mere statistics are as appalling as the physical details and are pertinent to this report as illustrating, what will be shown below, that all this occurred under Government control by designated responsible agencies and persons.

(a) During the 9-months period from August 1944 through April 1945 from an initial strength of 296 there were 88 deaths or 30% in that time.

(b) The monthly death rate rose from the start. There were 4 deaths in August, the 1st month; 16 in April, the 9th month. In May and June 685 ICL's arrived, but fresh blood didn't help the figures: there were 19 and 24 deaths in May and June respectively, as the worn-out survivors of the ICL's already on hand continued to die off.

(c) On 1 July 1945 the traditionally docile Chinese revolted in desperation and were caught, tied, herded, beaten, exposed to sweltering heat and sunlight without water or food for upwards of 3 days, by the Police. Score for July: 100 deaths, 12% of the ICL survivor-strength as of 1 July.

(d) To proceed: During the remainder of the period of Japanese control, for the 3 months, August through October, the deaths by months were 49, 68 and 51; total 168, or 27% of the survivor-strength as of 1 August -- but in the ensuing 5 months, under Allied control, from November 1945 through March 1946 the deaths by months were 9, 3, 1, 0 and 1; total 14, or 2.5% of the strength as of 1 November.

(e) To sum up: For the 11-month period before the "July Incident" there were 131 deaths (13% of the total original ICL strength); for the 9-month period after and including the incident there were 282 deaths (33% of the survivor strength as of the time the 3-day Police tortures occurred); for the entire 20-month period from August 1944 through March 1946 the overall figures are: ICL's 981, dead at Chusan-Ryo 413 or about 42%.

Certain local perpetrators in the "Chusan-Ryo" case now face trial. The summarized details on it stated above suffice to bring out the war-crimes-



relationship at the ground level. But the defendants in that case are not the only offenders, and the "Chusan-Ryo" group of approximately 1000 ICL's is only one of many such groups in Japan. The CLO sources referred to above list 135 ICL groups at as many locations worked by 33 industrial organizations. All of the many thousands of Chinese Nationals who were imported to Japan, survivors as well as dead, and for the reasons shown below, were victimized by the Japanese government officially as such.

(1) On 4 April 1944 the central government sent an Order labelled Welfare Ministry No. 103/Welfare Ministry #6, signed jointly by the two Vice-Ministers indicated, "To: the Governors of Prefectures, Subject: Importation Into Japan of Imported Chinese Labor".

(2) The Order stated: "Pursuant to the Cabinet decision made on 27 November 1942 we have been experimenting on importing Chinese Laborers for some time and ... have now come to a decision made at a Vice-Ministers' conference on the Policy respecting the Importation of Chinese Labor into Japan, as per attached Paper #1, also upon a Compendium thereof, as per attached Paper #2. Since we have launched upon regular importation ... having regard for the acute shortage of labor, you will do all in your power to accelerate the handling of the various matters involved in the materialization of the problem."

(3) The Policy and Compendium were explicit. They stated a Plan. The basis was that the Government would rule the ICL Program in all essential respects. Official approval and supervision and control of Work Projects, of Employers, of ICL Care and Welfare, and of the ICL's themselves were all prescribed. Particular standards and specifications and procedures were laid down, and the responsible governmental agencies were designated. Some significant details contained in the written Policy and Compendium follow.

(4) ICL's were 'in principle' to be worked for 2 years at heavy labor on high-priority war-industry work-projects, as approved by the Ministry of Welfare. The same Ministry allocated a quota of ICL's to each Prefecture.

(5) Employers filed an 'Application Invoking Assistance of Chinese Labor'. The National Labor Mobilization Bureau checked the applications. Governors of Prefectures forwarded these as requisitions on the Welfare Ministry, for approval. Division of that ministry passed on them. The Welfare Ministry notified the Greater East Asia Department. The GEA Dept in turn attended to the overseas procurement.

(6) In China, laborers were collected by the Japanese army, or by the puppet Chinese Government, or, in North China, by the N.China Administrative Commission or by the N.China Labor Association (NCLA), acting under instructions of Japanese Embassy.

(7) ICL's were supposed to be forty years old or less, sound in health and mind. Wages, hours of work and rest, to be on the basis of the average for Japan. Special security measures were directed, to prevent runaways and spies. Food was to be as per prescribed ration for ICL's. Foodstuffs to be provided by the Ministry of Commerce & Agriculture.

(8) "The Employer, acting under the instructions of the Police, the Natl Labor Mobilization Office and other relevant organs, shall



provide the necessary equipment for the training, education, amusement and examination of health" of the ICL's. Employers might be "barred from the privilege" of having ICL aid if they were "found to be incompetent ... or do not obey instructions of the competent authorities", and, if need be, should be made to "submit an oath pledging themselves ... to obey the control and instructions of the Police and the Natl Labor Mobilization Office (NLMO).

(9) The chain of control from the ground up was: Employer - NLMO and Police - Governors of Prefectures - Welfare and Home Ministries - GEA Dept. (Other responsible agencies were the Foreign Affairs and Police bureaus, Home Ministry).

In addition to the significant details contained in the Order, Policy and Compendium, the exact phraseology of the form of Contract undertaken between "Employers" and the North China Labor Association (NCLC) is interesting: The authority invoked for making contracts is "In accordance with the Plan of the Japanese Empire of February 2, 1944." The stated purpose is "having regard to the delivery of laborers by the North China Labor Association", and it was specified that "The terms of the labor contract shall be as per the Particulars of Enforcement".

It is obvious from the above details that the Chinese Labor Importation Program was an official thing over which the Japanese Government held full jurisdiction and dominated through designated official agencies; also obvious where, in the last analysis, the responsibility lies for the mistreatment and death of ICL's in Japan. Off hand the arrangement may not seem particularly objectionable, but from the facts in the 'Chusan-Ryo' case the following considerations emerge:-

(1) Nominally, the ICL's were "contract laborers" but actually they were unfree, supposedly they were able-bodied but actually they were, many of them, in poor physical condition or diseased -- originally POW's, vagrants and the like who were caught and deported by Japanese rounding-up agencies operating in China, including the Army. As one coolie put it: "I hail from Shantung, was grabbed, and brought here" to Japan.

(2) The private "Employers" were held responsible by the Government for ICL care and welfare, etc; actually, they were handicapped by the so-called "competent authorities" - deprived by them of sufficient power or means or facilities or supplies or relevant official aid of any sort to fulfill the obligations imposed upon them;

(3) The Government, as represented by its own designated and responsible official agencies and personnel, broke its own rules, violated its own standards and specifications, failed to meet its own obligations of supervision and control and facilitation or to comply with its own procedures.

In a word, the responsible authorities were not "competent" in an efficient sense. The facts prove that it was the Government, not Industry, that brought about an intolerable situation in the first place, and then not only failed to correct but actually contributed to the criminal conditions and actions and consequences that resulted -- in the course, incidentally, of failing in the avowed official mission of "having regard for the acute shortage of labor." In substantiation of this, the following are some illustrations of what happened in Government circles:-

(1) The authorities violated their own rules by importing laborers who were in many if not in the majority of instances in weakened



or diseased condition -- as evidenced by the affidavit of KUBO Sei-chiro and by there were deaths enroute to Japan in all 3 of the drafts of ICL's shipped to the 'Chusan-Ryo' location.

(2) The Governor of Akita Prefecture and his rationing agents refused to furnish foodstuffs to the starving ICL's although repeatedly begged for the same by the local Kajima-Gumi employees and as ordered by the central governmental authorities to do -- and the central Government failed to enforce its order to do so.

(3) The mistreatment of ICL's appears to have been instigated as a sort of get-tough-with-the-Chinese policy and practical working-principle by at least one Welfare agent (HOMMA), while the Police, including the Special Higher Police of the Police Bureau, Home Ministry, actually perpetrated some of the known crimes.

(4) Similarly; the Foreign Affairs Section, Home Ministry, was another relevant if otherwise incompetent agency which shares in the responsibility for the neglect and mistreatment of ICL's, a fact which implicates OKAZAKI.

(5) Above all, the incredible deeds and statistics in the 'Chusan-Ryo' case are a sort of muster-roll of murder which tends to prove how the Government which dominated the situation failed to control it - an odd exhibition of efficiency by the competent authorities bent upon conserving manpower and a startling degree of 'labor turnover' even in the case of such a cheap and expendable commodity as ICL's.

The foregoing information serves to establish the major war-crimes-relationships existing in the matter of Japanese national program for the importation of Chinese nationals and indicates the train of consequences and the corresponding, implicated official agencies. NOGI, HOMMA and OKAZAKI were tied-in with this matter in the manner stated below.

A key factor as regards all three of these individuals is that the ICL Program in which they mutually participated, in different ways but as fellow team-workers, was a highly coordinated program involving specialized functions, various bureaus, different Ministries. General facts in this connection as pertaining to the three individuals here concerned are, that they are alike, in that each held a key job and performed one or more significant functions; that NOGI and HOMMA are alike in that, as functional specialists at an intermediate level, each performed a subordinate though potent role; but that, beyond that, all three cases are different. NOGI was a contract-maker on the Munitions Ministry payroll; HOMMA was an alleged expert on the Chinese, on the HOME Office books. OKAZAKI headed up two highpowered Sections under the HOME Office, nearer the top and with much more authority than the other two. For all of these reasons, the details on any one of these individuals are peculiarly significant, not merely as implicating them, or only in the light they throw on the 'big picture' but specifically in their farther implications as pertaining to other suspect individuals.

Details re NOGI Ryohey - On 8 May 1944 a contract was entered into between the "North China Labor Association" (NCLA) and "Kashima-gumi Limited" whereby, "in accordance with the Plan of the Japanese Empire, the NCLA undertook the delivery of laborers to Kashimagumi Ltd provided that that Company in turn undertook to employ the laborers for a term of two years and provided further that "the terms of the labor contract shall be as per the Particulars of Enforcement", which were attached.



The contract was duly executed as a document. The 'Chusan-Ryo' victims of it were delivered as a consequence of it. An English translation of the Contract and of the Particulars of Enforcement is available in the Prosecution Division.

The contract was signed, for the NCLA, by one "CHI CHAO, Executive Director of the North China Labor Association", and for the Company by "Ryohey NOGI, Attorney for S. Kajima, Vice-President, Kashimagumi Limited."

Pertinent considerations as relating to NOGI individually are:

(1) that he personally signed as Attorney for S. Kajima and the Company;  
(2) that the Particulars of Enforcement specified that the laborers would be selected in China on the basis of qualifications which were also specified, it being specified, further, that the Company would participate in their selection, in China. These two considerations implicate NOGI in a number of ways.

(1) As to NOGI being Attorney for the Kajima-Gumi interests, the President of that Company, KAJIMA Morinosuke, in a sworn statement dated 24 April 1947 testifies: that whenever the Company needed laborers it put in a request to the Labor Department of the Engineering & Construction Works Association; that that Association made a contract with the KAHOKU ROKOKYOKAI (NCLA) at Peiping and imported the Chinese Laborers; that the ECWCA was supervised, then, by the MUNITIONS Ministry (and is now, since the War, known as the NIPPON KENCHIKU KOGYO KYOKAI -- Japan Construction & Industry Association); that neither 'SUENAGA' (a Kajima-Gumi employee) nor the Chief of the Labor Section of that Company went to China after Chinese laborers; that although the contract was drawn up between KAJIMA-GUMI and the NCLA, it was concluded through NOGI, "who was then Chief of the Labor Department of the ECWCA" and that the contract was not signed by KAJIMA himself or any other higher executive but, instead, was signed by NOGI "who was not even a member of the Company", "for" the Vice-President of KAJIMA-GUMI.

(2) As to what terms NOGI the contract-signer agreed to as binding in respect to laborers in China, Section VII of the Particulars of Enforcement reads in full as follows: "The Employment Standard shall be: (a) One who is physically strong enough to bear heavy labor; (a) Age shall be sixteen years and above; possibly young men shall be given preference; (c) One who is free from contagious diseases or other despicable diseases; (d) One who is deemed by the NCLA not to be the possessor of unhealthy thoughts and ideas; (e) Selection in China shall be made on the above-mentioned basis, to be participated in by Kajima-Gumi."

Evidently NOGI was a Governmental rather than an Industrial agent, and a responsible one, in a key job, actively engaged in the procurement and delivery of ICL's. He should know much about what the situation really was, what conditions were, what happened, in China and Japan both. That there was serious neglect and abuse of ICL's and that their ill-treatment in both respects was due to the failure of the responsible Japanese authorities to maintain standards or enforce them or otherwise effectually control the ICL Program and its operations which they insisted on dominating is evident from the Chusan-Ryo case; the implications against NOGI start with that general fact: he comes through as a suspect "ex-officio" on that point alone. More specifically, that procurement standards specified by the Particulars of Enforcement as to the physical qualifications of the ICL's were violated from the very start, in China, and that this factor contributed materially to the subsequent high death rate of ICL's in Japan is a well-attested point to which NOGI is closely related, and is evidenced by these



supporting details: KUBO Seiichiro (Reference No. 3, listed at the beginning of this Report) describes the diseased and weakened condition of outward-bound ICL's in China before their departure; the records of six, only, shipments of ICL's checked by this Investigator show that there were deaths of ICL's enroute from China in all six instances; two Industrialists, officials of Companies which worked ICL's in Japan, report that the ICL's were in wretched physical condition when they arrived at the work-projects, and state that this factor helped kill off the ICL's after they got there. The evidence in the 'Chusan-Ryo' case substantiates these considerations, which obviously implicate NOGI in more ways than one.

Details re HOMMA Kiyohito:- According to the letter dated 19 July 1946, of HIRABAYASHI, Shinichi, an attorney for KAJIMA-GUMI (See Reference No. 7 listed above, at the beginning of this Report), HOMMA was appointed Advisor to the HOME Office on Chinese Labor on or about 10 February 1941 and was still in office in May 1946. The following additional information on HOMMA is taken from a sworn statement dated 12 July 1946, by KUBO Seiichiro, Chief of the Labor Division at the HANAOKA Mining Office of FUGITA-GUMI Ltd, near ODATE in AKITA Prefecture from May 1943 to May 1946, where the 'Chusan-Ryo' Group of ICL's was located, and worked by KAJIMA-GUMI Ltd which had a construction contract with FUGITA-GUMI. (See Reference No. 3, above). KUBO, a Labor management official for a large corporation, was technically and practically familiar with the ICL situation and conditions in general and with the happenings at the Hanaoka Mine in particular. His testimony concerning HOMMA Kiyohito is summarized below:-

HOMMA lived in TSINGTAO, China, for 20 years or more, returned home in the early planning stages of the Japanese Empire's Chinese Labor Importation scheme, and by the HOME Ministry was appointed Advisor on ICL Affairs. As such he collaborated with the CHINESE LABOR COUNTER-MEASURE COMMITTEE, (which was managed by the Foreign Affairs and Police Sections of the HOME Office). Thus, and in every way, HOMMA participated actively and influentially in the official, practical planning and field supervision of the ICL Program. KUBO states that--

"He (HOMMA) was thus occupying a leading post ... and from time to time toured and lectured around the entire (field of the) contractors working camps where Imported Chinese Laborers were allocated; he also worked as a lecturer for all meetings of the leaders ... throughout this country (Japan) thereby directly instructing and leading the people in regard to the disposition of Chinese Labor."

On 13 July 1944 there was a formal visitation at the Hanaoka Mine by a party of Government officials numbering "altogether about 20 officials, chiefly from the Special Higher Police" (the TOKKOKA, Home Office Secret Police Bureau), who inspected the Mine and instructed the Management. Official representatives of the Akita Prefectural administrative and police authorities, other Police, and representatives of the Welfare and Home Ministries were in the party, including HOMMA Kiyoko. KUBO testified that "On that occasion they fully explained the Official Policy", - which was laid down specifically by HOMMA himself, in his role as a Government expert on Chinese Labor. Under the heading: "Resumes of The Said Policy, KUBO presents a page of testimony which he concludes by stating is "the gist of Advisor HOMMA's lecture at the Hanaoka Mining Club on 13 July 1944".

According to KUBO, the keynote of HOMMA's speech was that the local policy at Hanaoka toward ICL's, of "over-indulgence" and "non-interference" in their daily lives, would be taken advantage of by the Chinese, who, deceptive in manner, treacherous by nature, prey upon the weaknesses of others and cheat them. The quarters and bedding were too good for coolies used to sleeping in crude huts or in the open. Staple rations of 22 kg.



flour per head per month was too much. Furthermore, work output should be stepped up, as at the ITMUKA Mine in HOKKAIDO, where the ICL's ate less and produced more than at Hanaoka. Henceforth the principle at Hanaoka must be stringent control of ICL's.

Toward the beginning of September 1944, HOMMA, accompanied by Police and HOME Office officials, visited the KAJIMA-GUMI ('Chusan-Ryo') Work Project at the Hanaoka Mine. - "HOMMA there fully explained the management and control of Chinese Laborers along the same HOME Office principle as was expounded in the lectures made at the Hanaoka Mining Club on July 13th 1944" and added that instructions re ICL's would come downward through the Special Higher Police (TOKKOKA - Home Office) from that time on and must be obeyed by the local staff and all others concerned. KUBO testifies further that--

"Again, HOMMA delivered a lecture at the short-course Class sponsored by the HOME Office for Policemen in charge of Chinese Laborers held in the OTARU Higher Commercial School in HOKKAIDO and on that occasion he expounded the guiding principle of the Government ... According to Asst Police Inspector NARITA of Akita Prefecture, who was a student there at that time, HOMMA's conclusion in regard to the Chinese laborers was exactly the same as his lecture made at the Hanaoka conference on July 13th." KUBO's own conclusion, and he was an industrial labor boss, is: "It would seem that the opinion of HOMMA was virtually made the official instructions of the HOME Office transmitted to all Contractors' Working Camps throughout the country, and enforced".

Evidently HOMMA was indeed, as previously stated in this Report, a Government specialist in a key, influential job, and an individual suspect in his own right, like NOGI; and here again, as in NOGI's case, the implications arising from the above details, immediately as relating to HOMMA, as implications go a long way beyond HOMMA himself. Considered as a source of evidence, HOMMA should be able to throw much light on the ICL picture as a whole and on other implicated parties, including on OZAKI, his superior in the HOME Ministry, who is reported upon below.

Details re OKAZAKI Hideshiro: - (Reference: CIS File #806042, Book V.(5), Serial #2193-C (Statement by OKAZAKI) dated 25 March 1946). According to OKAZAKI's own statement, he was a career public official who entered the service of the HOME Ministry two years after his graduation from college in 1928. In the course of the ensuing 15-year period 1930/1945 the major posts he held were: Chief of the #2 Section, Special Thought Police, AIICHI Prefecture; Chief of the #2 Section, Special Thought Police, Metropolitan Police Board; Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section, Police Bureau, HOME Ministry; Chief of the Special Thought Control Section, Metropolitan Police Board; Chief of the Public Peace (Peace Preservation) Section, Police Bureau, HOME Ministry. He was suspended from office by the Allied authorities on 12 October 1945, and in March 1946 was connected with the Japan Railway and Auto Works, Tokyo.

Thus OKAZAKI, a career man, specialized in the public safety field, and, within that field, as a Policeman, he specialized in policing peoples' thoughts as a matter of peace-preservation, etc. Considered either as a suspect, which he is, or as a potential witness, he is a promising specimen: his specialized career, and the positions he held and the times and levels at which he held them obviously implicate him in the 'big picture' of the ICL tragedy, from the standpoints of policy making and enforcement, both. OKAZAKI should have specific knowledge of policy making and enforcement, both. OKAZAKI should have specific knowledge of HOMMA's doings and vice-versa, and on other implicated agencies and individuals near the top.



According to HIRABAYASHI Seichiro, the Kajima-Gumi lawyer, OKAZAKI was Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section, Police Bureau, Home Ministry, from 27 April 1943 until 2 August 1944. Just what he did between the latter date and April 1945 is not clear; in 1945, from April until his suspension by the Allied authorities in October, he was Chief of the Public Peace (or Peace Preservation) Section. Furthermore, during most of the latter period, from 12 June until the end, he also acted again as Chief of the Foreign Affairs Section which he had headed up before.

The fact that atrocities were perpetrated on ICL's at the ground level is well established; the related evidence in the sources already available in the Legal Section of this HQ is overwhelming in its indications that many of the war-crimes-related happenings at the ground-level are attributable to pressure from above, through official channels to the industrial "employers" locally handling ICL's, and that much of the bullying of "employers" and ill-treatment of ICL's came from the official peace-preservers and thought-controllers, specifically from the agents of the Home Ministry Police Bureau.

To sum up: For the reasons indicated, OKAZAKI comes through emphatically as a high-level official who occupied two specific key-positions at a critical time and actively discharged functions of peculiar significance to the basic, war-crimes-related ICL program as a whole. He is not alone in these respects. From the standpoint of future investigations, he represents a real opportunity. Through him, it should be practicable to trace the farther implications and place them where they belong, on others of his colleagues, some of them higher up the line.

It is concluded, by way of general evaluation, that all three subjects, NOGI, HOMMA and OKAZAKI are prime suspects in the basic matter here concerned. It is believed that they can and should be prosecuted and convicted. They are believed to be truly guilty in the legal sense, in a way that can be made to stick in each case, since it is believed to be inconceivable on the face of the known details that any one of these three could possibly have been a mere functionary in the Japanese machine and not be as it is believed that they were, real participants who were knowingly and actively guilty of concrete, criminal actions.

Their respective cases are obviously correlated with each other and with a larger whole. The latter may be considered as one Subject or prospective 'Case'. In other words, the basic matter which underlies these particular cases both severally and collectively is nothing less than the Criminal Importation and Exploitation of Chinese Manpower and Chinese Nationals by the Japanese Government. For the present, it is believed simpler and more practicable, and so recommended, to carry further investigations along on the present basis of Investigating individual suspects. However, it is suggested that consideration be given to the idea of eventually pooling them as one miscellaneous subject or case. This angle will be additionally recommended upon later.

The Japanese authorities have been directed to furnish the Legal Section with copies of the military and biographical histories of NOGI Ryohey, HOMMA Kyohito and OKAZAKI Hideshiro and also to have all three of them report (separately) to the Investigation Division for interview.

The immediate detention in custody as suspected war criminals of the three subject named individuals is not recommended since it is believed that, initially at least, more and better information on the background situation, that is, on the Japanese Government's national policy and formal plan and coordinated program for the exploitation of Chinese manpower by the method of importing Chinese nationals to Japan and there disposing of them as an expendible commodity on war-industrial work projects, all as part of the



Imperial aggressive war effort, and more and better information on other suspect agencies and persons who are likewise implicated in the same war-crimes-related 'ICL' enterprise, can be obtained by treating these three Subjects, for the time being, ostensible as more or less unsuspected and, one hopes, unsuspecting, witnesses, than would be obtained if they were arrested before being questioned. Recommendations as to their eventual arrest and detention will be tendered in due course.

UNDEVELOPED LEADS:

The Tokyo Office:

Will review further, and follow up on, leads contained in the References listed at the beginning of this report and in any other sources presently available in the Legal Section or elsewhere in this Headquarters.

Will interrogate locally available witnesses in the 'Chusan-Ryo' case as to any additional testimony they can provide, which will be obtained accordingly, if any, on the present Subjects, NOGI, HOMMA and OKAZAKI.

Will open investigations of, and report on, certain already known other suspects whose own cases will no doubt throw additional light on the respective cases of the three above named persons who have here been reported upon.

P E N D I N G



Mr. SMITH

This is a pre-view by way of  
high-lighting the outlook.

Truly, the range is indeed from  
'local atrocities to atrocious policies'  
and the implications go the whole road.

I will hand you a copy of the de-  
tailed background initial report, and  
discuss same with you.

RMP

*RMP*

This is my copy. Please return at leisure.



DEA minute  
Aoki, Kazuo - in jail  
1 Nov 1942 - 22 July '44

Vice minute  
Yamanoto, Kameichi  
1 Nov. 1942 - 23 Aug '44

Munitions minute  
Tojo  
Vice minutes 1 Nov. 43  
- 22 July '44.  
Kishi, Shunsuke  
in jail

Obachin