

# AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT

RESTRICTED.  
(Reclassify when filled out)

## I. GENERAL

(a) Unit Reporting VT-49 (b) Based on or at USS SAN JACINTO (c) Report No. 16  
 (d) Take off: Date 10 July 1945 Time (LZT) 1314(-9) (Zone); Lat 34-02 N Long. 142-30 E  
 (e) Mission Bomb rotated, dispersed A/C at Tsukuba West, Tokyo (f) Time of Return 1736(-9) (Zone)

## II. OWN AIRCRAFT OFFICIALLY COVERED BY THIS REPORT.

TYPE (a)	SQUADRON (b)	NUMBER			BOMBS AND TORPEDOES CARRIED (PER PLANE) (f)	FUZE, SETTING (g)
		TAKING OFF (c)	ENGAGING ENEMY A/C (d)	ATTACKING TARGET (e)		
<u>TBI-3</u>	<u>VT-49</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>4-500# G.P. AR/164</u>	<u>Tail-Non-delay Nose-150-E-1</u>

## III. OTHER U. S. OR ALLIED AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED IN THIS OPERATION.

TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE	TYPE	SQUADRON	NUMBER	BASE
<u>P6F-5</u>	<u>VF-49</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>USS SAN JACINTO</u>				
<u>P6F-5(p)</u>	<u>VF-49</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>USS SAN JACINTO</u>				

## IV. ENEMY AIRCRAFT OBSERVED OR ENGAGED (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE	(b) NO. OBSERVED	(c) NO. ENGAGING OWN A/C	(d) TIME ENCOUNTERED	(e) LOCATION OF ENCOUNTER	(f) BOMBS, TORPEDOES CARRIED; GUNS OBSERVED	(g) CAMOUFLAGE AND MARKING
<u>None airborne</u>			<u>(ZONE)</u>			
			<u>(ZONE)</u>			
			<u>(ZONE)</u>			

(h) Apparent Enemy Mission(s) \_\_\_\_\_  
 Did Any Part of \_\_\_\_\_  
 (i) Encounter(s) Occur in Clouds? \_\_\_\_\_ If so, Describe Clouds \_\_\_\_\_  
(YES OR NO) (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)  
 Time of Day and Brilliance \_\_\_\_\_  
 (j) of Sun or Moon \_\_\_\_\_ (k) Visibility \_\_\_\_\_  
(NIGHT, BRIGHT MOON; DAY, OVERCAST; ETC.) (MILES)

## V. ENEMY AIRCRAFT DESTROYED OR DAMAGED IN AIR (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) TYPE ENEMY A/C	(b) DESTROYED OR DAMAGED BY:			(c) WHERE HIT, ANGLE	(d) DAMAGE CLAIMED
	TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	PILOT OR GUNNER		
<u>None</u>					







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(OMIT THIS SHEET IF NO ATTACK WAS MADE)

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## XI. ATTACK ON ENEMY SHIPS OR GROUND OBJECTIVES (By Own Aircraft Listed in II Only).

(a) Target(s) and Location(s) Tsukuba West, A/T (AAF#1472)  
140-01 E, 36-10 N, Tokyo Area (b) Time Over Target(s) 1445(-9) (Zone)  
(FOR SHIPS, INCLUDE ALL IN AREA UNDER ATTACK)

(c) Clouds Over Target None (BASE IN FEET, TYPE AND TENTHS OF COVER)

(d) Visibility of Target Clear (CLEAR, HAZY, PARTIALLY OBSCURED BY CLOUDS, ETC.) (e) Visibility 15-20 Miles (MILES)  
4-None

(f) Bombing Tactics: Type Glide (LEVEL, GLIDE OR DIVE) Bomb Sight Used 5-Mark VIII (TYPE)  
8-All

Bombs Dropped per Run 1 plane 3 (NUMBER) Spacing 200' to 300' (FEET) Altitude of Bomb Release 6,000 to 5,000 (FEET)  
Not

(g) Number of Enemy Aircraft Hit on Ground: Destroyed 5 Probably Destroyed 8 Damaged estimated.

(h) AIMING POINT	(i) DIMENSIONS OR TONNAGE	(j) NO A/C ATTACKING (k) SQUADRON	(l) BOMBS AND AMMUNITION EXPENDED, EACH AIMING POINT	(m) NO HITS On Aiming Point	(n) DAMAGE (None, slight, serious, destroyed or sunk)
1 North reveted dispersal area.	7,000 ft X 3,000 ft	6 VT-49	23-500# G.P.	19 in area	Serious.
2 S & S.E. revetements.	2,000 ft X 1,500 ft	3 VT-49	12-500# G.P.	10	Slight.
3					
4	* Both irregularly shaped target areas. These are outside dimensions.				
5					
6					
7					
8					

(o) RESULTS: (For all hits claimed on ship targets and for land targets of special interest, draw diagram, top or side view or both, as appropriate, showing type and location of hits. For all targets give location and effect of hits, and identify by numbers above. Use additional sheets if necessary).

- Exhibit (A), a pre-strike vertical, has the discovered aircraft circled in green. The burned planes crossed in red, those probably destroyed circled in red.
- Exhibit (B), a post strike vertical, shows one T/E (as shown by earlier photos) burning.
- Exhibit (C), an oblique, shows smoke at the place where four aircraft were burned.

(p) Were Photographs Taken? Yes Photographs of Damage, When Taken, Should Be Attached By Staple.



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## XII. TACTICAL AND OPERATIONAL DATA. (Narrative and comment. Describe action fully and comment freely, following applicable items in check list at left. Use additional sheets if necessary.)

### ENGAGEMENT WITH ENEMY

#### OWN AIRCRAFT

Disposition  
Altitudes  
Speeds  
Approach Tactics  
Use of Cover, Deception  
Angles of Attack and  
Their Effectiveness  
Distance of Opening Fire  
Defense Tactics and  
Their Effectiveness

#### ENEMY AIRCRAFT

Method of Locating, Distance  
Disposition  
Altitudes  
Speeds  
Approach Tactics  
Use of Cover, Deception  
Angles of Attack  
Distance of Opening Fire  
Defensive Tactics

#### COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Own Weaknesses  
Enemy Weaknesses  
Offensive Tactics, Own  
" " , Enemy  
Defensive Tactics, Own  
" " , Enemy  
Flexible Gunnery, Own  
Escort Tactics  
Fighter Direction  
Use of Radar  
Night Fighting  
Recognition, Aircraft

### ATTACK

#### OWN TACTICS

Method of Locating Target  
Approach to Target  
Altitudes, Speeds  
Approach  
Dive  
Pull-Out  
Dive Angle  
Strafing  
Retirement  
Defensive Tactics  
Use of Jamming

#### DEFENSE, ENEMY

Evasive Tactics, Ships  
Concealment  
Searchlights  
Night Fighter Tactics  
Use of Jamming

#### COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bombing Tactics  
Torpedo Tactics  
Effectiveness of  
Bombs, Torpedoes  
Selection of Targets  
Fuzing  
Strafing Tactics  
Defensive Tactics  
Use of Radar  
Reconnaissance  
Photography  
Briefing

### OPERATIONAL

Navigation  
Homing  
Rendezvous  
Recognition, Ships  
Communications  
Flight Operations  
Search and Tracking  
Base Operations  
Maintenance

A return to the scene of the morning's bombing, armed this time with more tonnage in GP bombs and with more pilot knowledge of their targets, resulted in a much more satisfactory strike on D-day afternoon north of Tokyo.

Again Tsukuba West Aircraft was the objective, but this trip the pilots had the advantage of good pilot reconnaissance from the first morning sweep, marked by the ship's P.I. to show the locations of reveted planes in both the dispersal areas adjoining the airfield. In addition, four of the Torpedo pilots had been over the field a few hours earlier, a distinct advantage to any strike.

Nine crews participated in the VT attack, launched at 1315 and led by the A.G.C. with the escort. A course inland to the target area was plotted, taking into consideration the two morning routes which did not encounter flak, also the lines used at that time for retirement to the coast.

The first two divisions, (Lts(jg) Pruitt and Austin, Lts Peters and Livingston, Ensigns Paulson and Milburn) detailed to the 1 1/2 mile long North dispersal area each located their pre-selected aiming points after entering their initial pushover from 13,500 feet, at speeds generally well over 300 knots.

Bombing was from the Northwest quadrant, and excellent coverage of the assigned areas obtained, the blast effect of the quarter tonners being enhanced by the VT fuzing.

The third division, (Lts(jg) Mac Callister and Forbert, Ensign Scheub) pushed over to hit the smaller dispersal area to the South and South East of the field where one operational plane was bombed and burned.

A/A, still inaccurate was more in evidence than earlier, but no planes were hit.

Unfortunately the only post attack photos available for damage assessment in the well stocked northern revetments were hand held K-20's. One good sized fire where pre-strike verticals locate four closely grouped reveted planes, is all that was definitely known to be burned, but bomb blasts at other points probably destroyed eight to ten more.

Two premature bursts were noted with the VT fuzing, but the above ground burst generally was very effective against the well dispersed and carefully reveted planes.

The Northern area had twin engined planes in them. Some I/E's and several gliders were found to the south. All destroyed planes were twin-engined planes. The fact that many planes failed to burn when hit was a situation reported by other strikes. It was thought that aircraft were predominantly degassed. This, in addition to the 1/2% of bomb and the VT fuzing, probably explains why more aircraft which were hit were not set on fire.

8-2-4-1-4-7



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**XIII. MATERIAL DATA.** (Comment freely on performance or suitability, following check list at left.  
Use additional sheets if necessary).

## ARMAMENT

Guns, Gunsights  
Turrets  
Ammunition  
Bombs, Torpedoes  
Bomb Sights  
Bomb Releases

**N-O-N-E**

## COMMUNICATIONS

Radio, Radar  
Homing Devices  
Visual Signals  
Codes, Ciphers

## RECOGNITION

IFF  
Signals  
Battle Lights  
Procedures

## PROTECTION

Armor; Points and Angles  
of Fire Needing Further  
Protection  
Leak Proofing

## EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT

Parachutes  
Life Belts, Life Rafts  
Safety Belts  
Emergency Kits  
Rations, First Aid

## NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

Compasses  
Driftsights  
Octants  
Automatic Pilots  
Charts  
Field Lighting

## INSTRUMENTS

Flight  
Power Plant

## OXYGEN SYSTEM

## CAMOUFLAGE AND DECEPTION DEVICES

## STRUCTURE

Airframe  
Control Surfaces  
Control System  
Dive Flaps  
Landing Gear  
Heating System  
Flight Characteristics  
At Various Loadings

## POWER PLANT

Engines  
Engine Accessories  
Propellers  
Lubricating System  
Starters  
Exhaust Dampers

## HYDRAULIC SYSTEM

## ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

Auxiliary Plant  
Lights

## FUEL SYSTEM

## FLIGHT CLOTHING

## MAINTENANCE

## BASE FACILITIES

Plane Servicing Equipment  
Personnel Facilities

REPORT PREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

Charles N. Fuller, Lt(jg), USNR., ACIO  
SIGNATURE RANK AND DUTY

Carl H. Peters, Lieut(A1), USNR, Comdg. 10 July 1945.  
SIGNATURE RANK AND DUTY DATE





EXHIBIT (A)

3-3-41-10-1





SAN JAC 8 (W JULY 10-45 1500(-9) K17 12" 13,000 TSUKUBA WEST A/F HONSHU CONF

EXHIBIT (B)

3-2-4-1-1-4





EXHIBIT (C)

5-3-4-2-8