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**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**RUSSIAN RESURGENCE IN PERU:
RETURN OF THE BEAR?**

by

Daniel P. Slot

December 2019

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Robert E. Looney
Thomas C. Bruneau

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REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503.			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE December 2019	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE RUSSIAN RESURGENCE IN PERU: RETURN OF THE BEAR?		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Daniel P. Slot			
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		10. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.			
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>After a military coup in Peru in 1968, General Juan Velasco Alvarado began a political, economic, and security relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This marked the first instance of the Soviet Union gaining a foothold in South America, and Peru became one of the largest purchasers of Soviet-made military equipment in Latin America. Peru and Russia have renewed their relationship in the years since 2008. This thesis compares the similarities between Soviet and contemporary Russian interaction with Peru, assesses the level of influence Russia currently has, and gauges the threat to American interests.</p> <p>Research consulted available unclassified scholarly work. It is most likely in Peru's national security interest to diversify partnerships, and to upgrade and maintain military equipment. Russia's motivations are ambiguous, and Russia may be attempting to undermine U.S. influence in Peru by increasing Peru's reliance on Moscow.</p> <p>This thesis has discovered Russia's influence does not currently rise to a significant national security threat for the United States or Peru. However, the more connected the two countries become, the more power Russia may hold over the fragile and politically chaotic state of Peru. It is critical that the United States maintains an active role in Peru and remains an engaged and reliable partner. If the United States is able to maintain a strong relationship with Peru, it will be able to lessen Russia's influence.</p>			
14. SUBJECT TERMS USSR, Russia, Peru, Soviet Union, Cold War, Latin America, South America, Velasco, security cooperation, national security, media, arms transfers, military coup		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 81	
		16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

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RUSSIAN RESURGENCE IN PERU: RETURN OF THE BEAR?

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(WESTERN HEMISPHERE)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
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ABSTRACT

After a military coup in Peru in 1968, General Juan Velasco Alvarado began a political, economic, and security relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. This marked the first instance of the Soviet Union gaining a foothold in South America, and Peru became one of the largest purchasers of Soviet-made military equipment in Latin America. Peru and Russia have renewed their relationship in the years since 2008. This thesis compares the similarities between Soviet and contemporary Russian interaction with Peru, assesses the level of influence Russia currently has, and gauges the threat to American interests.

Research consulted available unclassified scholarly work. It is most likely in Peru's national security interest to diversify partnerships, and to upgrade and maintain military equipment. Russia's motivations are ambiguous, and Russia may be attempting to undermine U.S. influence in Peru by increasing Peru's reliance on Moscow.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION.....	1
B.	SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION.....	1
C.	LITERATURE REVIEW	3
1.	The Soviets and the Third World.....	3
2.	The Soviets and Latin America	5
3.	The Soviets and Peru	7
4.	Contemporary Russia, Latin America, and Peru	9
D.	POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES	12
E.	RESEARCH DESIGN.....	13
F.	THESIS OVERVIEW	14
II.	COLD WAR PERU—SOVIET UNION RELATIONS	15
A.	DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.....	15
B.	ECONOMIC RELATIONS	18
1.	Trade.....	19
2.	Economic Cooperation	23
3.	Countertrade	25
C.	MILITARY RELATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION	27
D.	CONCLUSIONS: SOVIET—PERUVIAN TIES DURING THE COLD WAR	32
III.	CONTEMPORARY PERU—RUSSIA RELATIONS	35
A.	DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.....	35
B.	ECONOMIC RELATIONS	37
C.	MEDIA INFLUENCE AND CULTURAL INTERACTION	40
1.	Media Influence.....	41
2.	Cultural Interaction.....	42
D.	MILITARY RELATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION	44
E.	CONCLUSIONS: CONTEMPORARY PERU-RUSSIA RELATIONS.....	47
IV.	CONCLUSION	49
A.	STRATEGIC IMPACT.....	50
B.	RECOMMENDATIONS.....	53

LIST OF REFERENCES	57
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	63

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	Peru's Trade Balance with the Soviet Union (in millions of USD).....	20
Figure 2.	Key Soviet Weapon Systems in the Peruvian Armed Forces	30
Figure 3.	Peru Exports to Russia by Year (USD).....	38
Figure 4.	Peru Imports from Russia by Year (USD).....	38

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LIST OF TABLES

Table 1.	Peru's Trade Balance with the Soviet Union (in millions of USD).....	20
Table 2.	Geographical Distribution of Peru's Foreign Trade, Annual Averages.	21
Table 3.	Major Soviet Weapons and Equipment in Peruvian Inventory	31

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ALBA	Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
APEC	America Pacific Economic Cooperation
APRA	American Popular Revolutionary Alliance
BRICS	Brazil Russia India China South Africa
CELAC	Community of Latin American and Caribbean States
CMEA	Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
IPC	International Petroleum Company
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OAS	Organization of American States
PCP	Peruvian Communist Party
SIMA	Shipyards Marine Industrial Services
SITDEF	International Technology Hall for Defense and Prevention of Disasters
UNASUR	Union of South American Nations
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Thank you to Tímea, Richard Blum, Dr. Robert Looney, and Dr. Thomas Bruneau, for your support and guidance, and to my parents for teaching me the value of hard work and education.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

During the Cold War, after a coup and the installation of a military government in 1968, Peru established strong economic and military ties with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union), which could have been considered the Soviet Union's gateway into South America. In recent years, Peru has re-established ties with the Russian Federation in a fashion that echoes those Cold War relations. The questions must be asked: what were the nature and motivation for interactions from the Soviet and Peruvian perspectives? And, how do recent Peruvian-Russian relations compare to Soviet economic, military, and political ties? Are the motivations similar, and what does this entail for security and the United States' influence in the region?

B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

Russia once again started expanding its global influence around 2008. Instruments including hybrid warfare, hacking, meddling, military harassment, and territorial annexation have escalated since. Although Russia after the Cold War was opposed to the West on several issues including the Balkan conflicts, NATO expansion, accusations of human rights abuses during the Chechnyan wars, etc., serious cause for concern began with the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. Evidence of Russia as a hostile power increased during the proxy war in Ukraine along with the annexation of Crimea, and finally the 2016 United States presidential election meddling. In "Providing for the Common Defense," an unclassified assessment of the U.S. National Defense Strategy Commission, the word "Russia" is listed 110 times in 99 pages.¹ Prior Defense Secretary Jim Mattis warned that Russia desires to build its global influence over other countries'

¹ National Defense Strategy Commission, "Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of the National Defense Strategy Commission" (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, November 13, 2018), <https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-11/providing-for-the-common-defense.pdf>.

economic, political, and security decisions.² Russia is actively undermining and exploiting the global world order while simultaneously reaping its benefits.³ It seeks to undermine United States influence, make economies less open and fair, control information, and expand its military and global influence.⁴ The resurgence of Russia as a hostile threat to the United States and her allies is important to study and understand.

Current Russian activity in the context of Latin America is a little-explored topic that deserves more attention. Russian resurgence in Latin America began around the same time as the Georgian conflict, and while emphasis is often placed on Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, understanding how Russia is interacting with less newsworthy states is important in order to anticipate Russian actions in the region as a whole.⁵ Dr. Robert Evan Ellis, who has called attention to Russian resurgence, points out that U.S. foreign policy in Latin America has been largely regionally focused. Therefore, the involvement of Russian activity expands issues to the global geo-strategic.⁶ The United States' checkered past with Latin America, mainly through military intervention in Central America and the Caribbean, has left deep scars in the region that are not easily forgotten. Increased Russian influence could drive partners away from the United States and undermine U.S. relationships and future opportunities.

The choice of Peru as a case study is not arbitrary in the context of understanding recent Russian activity as compared to Soviet interaction during the Cold War. Peru was by far the largest customer of Soviet military sales in South America, and was a major trading partner with the Communist Bloc.⁷ Currently, Peru is also one of Russia's most

² Jim Mattis, "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy" (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2018), <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

³ Mattis.

⁴ Donald J. Trump, "National Security Strategy of the United States of America" (Washington, DC: U.S. White House Office, December 2017), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

⁵ Robert Evan Ellis, *The New Russian Engagement with Latin America: Strategic Position, Commerce, and Dreams of the Past* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2015), V.

⁶ Ellis, vi.

⁷ Ruben Berrios and Cole Blasler, "Peru and the Soviet Union (1969-1989): Distant Partners," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 23, no. 2 (1991): 365-84.

crucial partners in terms of arms sales and military interaction in Latin America.⁸ By exploring past Soviet influence and interaction with Peru and comparing them to current Russian activity, a better understanding of Russian goals for Peru and the region may be realized. With an increased awareness of Russian intentions, the United States will be positioned to make calculated and informed foreign policy decisions with regard to Peru and Latin America more generally.

C. LITERATURE REVIEW

In order to understand the relationship between Peru, the Soviet Union, and modern Russia, this thesis will examine a broad scope of literature. The military, economic, cultural, political, financial, and technical relationship will be examined in two timeframes: from the rise of the Velasco administration in 1968 until the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, and post-2008 Russian resurgence. Because there is very little written just on Peru, this literature review will examine Soviet policy starting from the wider perspective of the entire less-developed world, then specifically Latin America, and finally in regard to Peru. With an understanding of the Soviet policy on these three levels of analysis, policy and interests from the Peruvian perspective will be examined. Finally, the historical relationship will be compared to the post-2008 relationship and current Russian and Peruvian foreign policy goals.

1. The Soviets and the Third World

The most readily available literature is written from the perspective of Soviet foreign policy in Latin America and the larger Third World. The Soviet Union's policy regarding less-developed countries evolved over time during the Cold War as the Soviet Union expanded its area of interest from Eurasia to focus on the Third World. Francis Fukuyama argues this Soviet policy change stems from three basic structural changes in world dynamics.⁹ First, Soviet military, nuclear weapons investment, and diplomatic and political changes created an atmosphere where the Soviet Union was less concerned with

⁸ Ellis, *The New Russian Engagement with Latin America*, 55.

⁹ Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama, eds., *The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 1.

Europe and branched out to the broader globe. Second, the spread of the Soviet-dominated communist ideology had been undermined in various places around the world. Third, the Soviet Union wished to create a system where there was a more stable international environment with the West.¹⁰ Within the context of these three developments, the conclusion drawn for the Soviet pivot toward less-developed countries is that the Soviet Union wished to create a system which ultimately tilted in its favor. According to Fukuyama, less-developed countries lacked clear lines of demarcation between East and West, and were marked by political instability which proved opportune to spread Soviet influence.¹¹

Another argument for Soviet focus on the Third World is that the Soviet Union wished to spread communist ideology to less-developed countries.¹² It is apparent, early in the years following World War II, that the Soviets considered spreading socialist doctrine and propping up communist parties as a path to influence.¹³ The idea was that revolutionary governments would be more susceptible to communist inclinations, and would be amenable to Soviet allure and influence. Fukuyama expands on Soviet Third World strategy and states that promotion of communist ideals played a part in foreign policy and was admittedly a useful tool in furthering state interests, but that the Soviet Union began to move away from the strategy of promoting Marxism in foreign countries.¹⁴ An active Soviet attempt to spread communism in the less-developed world in the early days of the post-WWII Soviet Union was part of the motivation for Soviet focus on less-developed countries.

Fukuyama argues that there were four main aspects of Soviet policy with regard to the Third World. First, the Soviet Union wanted to create an enduring presence as a

¹⁰ Korbonski and Fukuyama, 1.

¹¹ Korbonski and Fukuyama, 23.

¹² “The Soviet Union and the Third World,” *Strategic Survey* 78, no. 1 (January 1977): 64–68, <https://doi.org/10.1080/04597237708460416>.

¹³ Robbin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffmann, eds., *Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World* (Berlin, NY: W. de Gruyter, 1986), 807.

¹⁴ Korbonski and Fukuyama, *The Soviet Union and the Third World*, 43.

great power, which required active expansion and self-assertion.¹⁵ Second was the desire to undermine Western influence. At times this meant replacing the West within a country, but at others the Soviet Union would be better served not filling a vacuum, but gaining an advantage or upper hand.¹⁶ Third was minimizing the Chinese role. The Soviet Union regarded China as a competitor to the Marxist model of national liberation in the Third World.¹⁷ Finally, the Soviet Union wanted to gain a voice in regional affairs. As a global power, the Soviet Union desired political influence in the Third World in order to advance its interests.¹⁸ Overall, in an international relations realist perspective, the Soviet Union sought to increase its relative power in the Third World vis-à-vis the United States militarily, economically, and politically.

2. The Soviets and Latin America

There is a fair amount of literature regarding Soviet foreign policy in Latin America specifically. Much of the broader theories overlap scholarship on the Third World, although there are minor differences. It is difficult to consider Soviet policy outside the lens of United States' interests. Latin America was considered too close geographically and economically, and strongly influenced by the United States, therefore the Soviet Union risked instigating conflict and Cold War escalation from activity in the region.¹⁹ Nonetheless, this risk was not enough to stop military sales, economic ties, and attempts at influence through soft power.

One hypothesis centers on access and influence. Cole Blasier, a prolific writer on the Soviet Union in Latin America, argues that Soviet presence in Latin America provided opportunity for information and intelligence gathering, opening communication

¹⁵ Eusebio Mujal-León, ed., *The USSR and Latin America: A Developing Relationship* (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 12.

¹⁶ Mujal-León, 15.

¹⁷ Mujal-León, 16.

¹⁸ Mujal-León, 14.

¹⁹ Laird and Hoffmann, *Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, 824; Ruben Berrios, "Soviet-Latin American Economic Relations," *Comparative Economic Studies* 31, no. Winter (1989): 85.

lines, and broader influence within institutions such as the United Nations.²⁰ Although Soviet foreign policy originally placed Latin America at the bottom of the world priority due to geographic distance, historical ties, and difficulty projecting power from afar, by the late 1960s the Soviet Union had developed a significant diplomatic presence that included commercial and cultural relations.²¹ Through access and influence, the Soviet Union sought to tip the scales in Latin America in its favor.

Soviet interest in Latin America was evidenced by increasing economic ties.²² Richard Schroeder suggests that economic interaction, while including elements of a desire for influence, also was motivated by monetary self-interest and the goal of global competition with the United States.²³ Part of the economic shift included a Soviet realization of the existence of a single world market versus two opposing economic systems, and that to be competitive, the Soviet Union needed to broaden its markets to trade with the Third World.²⁴ Although trade relations with Latin America did not to prove to be financially lucrative (the Soviet Union sustained a massive trade deficit and large lines of credit to the region), they benefited the Soviet image and established ties where the socialist doctrine was not necessarily desirable.²⁵ The Soviet Union's sales of arms to the region constituted a large portion of trade, especially with Peru. the Soviet Union sought out influence and financial footholds, but military sales were more successful in achieving an enduring presence in the form of advisors, technicians, attachés, and support facilities.²⁶ Overall, most scholars agree that in Latin America, Soviet lack of capacity and a close proximity to the United States prohibited the Soviet

²⁰ Cole Blasier, *The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin America*, Rev. ed, Pitt Latin American Series (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987), 21.

²¹ Laird and Hoffmann, *Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, 830.

²² Berrios, "Soviet-Latin American Economic Relations," 83.

²³ Richard Schroeder, "Soviets' Latin Influence," Editorial Research Reports (Washington, DC: CQ Press, March 6, 1987), <http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/cqresrre1987030600>.

²⁴ Berrios, "Soviet-Latin American Economic Relations."

²⁵ Schroeder, "Soviets' Latin Influence."

²⁶ Berrios, "Soviet-Latin American Economic Relations," 75.

Union from expending more than a small amount of resources in the region.²⁷ By design or coincidence, it has been determined that although the Soviet Union did not benefit a great deal economically, its market interaction solidified Soviet presence in the region.

3. The Soviets and Peru

Peru turned toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War following the overthrow of the civilian government by General Juan Velasco Alvarado in 1968. Ruben Berrios, who has written extensively on Latin America and Peru, argues (and other sources agree) that Peru attempted to circumvent U.S. influence through various methods, which included establishing relations with the Soviet Union.²⁸ Reasons for circumventing U.S. influence most likely stemmed from a motivation of both nationalism and anti-imperialism. Peru wished to assert its sovereignty by not necessarily taking sides with either the West or the East, as demonstrated by seeking to open its markets with any country which could be beneficial to Peru.²⁹ Russia was also able to provide quick delivery of sufficient quality military and industrial equipment at lower prices and better terms than other countries.³⁰ Peru began to seek methods of further promoting its independence by joining the United Nations Nonaligned Movement, and becoming an activist within the UN to promote a “New International Economic Order” which would increase Third World participation in decision-making in the world economy.³¹ The CIA

²⁷ Berrios, 87. The Soviet Union was more restrained in its activity in the Western Hemisphere after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

²⁸ Richard J. Walter, *Peru and the United States, 1960-1975: How Their Ambassadors Managed Foreign Relations in a Turbulent Era* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 157; George Philip, “The Soldier as Radical: The Peruvian Military Government, 1968-1975,” *Journal of Latin American Studies* 8, no. 1 (1976): 29–51; Berrios, “Soviet-Latin American Economic Relations,” 69.

²⁹ Ronald Bruce St. John, *The Foreign Policy of Peru* (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers, 1992), 188–89.

³⁰ Berrios and Blasier, “Peru and the Soviet Union (1969–1989),” 365.

³¹ James D. Rudolph, *Peru: The Evolution of a Crisis*, Politics in Latin America (NY: Praeger, 1992), 58; Central Intelligence Agency, “Peru: Prospects for Increased Soviet Bloc Influence,” CIA FOIA, November 1985, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp87t00573r001001310001-7>; Ruben Berrios, “Relations between Peru and the Socialist Countries,” *East European Quarterly*; *Boulder* 21, no. 1 (Spring 1987): 99–118.

regarded the shift to a nationalistic self-interest as rather radical.³² The literature generally agrees that a major motivation for Peru's shift toward the Soviet Union was its desire to diversify partners and distance itself from the United States.

Other sources point toward the United States' actions and reactions for Peru's pivot toward the Soviet Union. Relations with the United States had become difficult even before the 1968 coup. Earlier in the 1960s, the United States had refused to sell Peru U.S.-built F-5 fighter jets, and Peru purchased French Mirage jets instead. On top of its refusal to sell military equipment, the United States threatened to block exports from Peru after a long-running dispute over Peru's assertion of a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone for its fishing industry.³³ Velasco began nationalizing United States industries, including the International Petroleum Company, which led the United States to block military sales and economic assistance from the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Inter-American Development Bank.³⁴ The United States and Peruvian relations soured due to nationalizations of U.S.-based firms, but the quarrel with the United States predated Velasco. The idea that a turn toward the Soviet Union was directly a result of Velasco is misleading, and could be viewed instead as a turn away from the United States.

There are several possible explanations for the Soviet Union's motivation in assuming a much larger economic and military relationship with Peru. Trade increased from zero to tens and in some years hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars (USD) annually, and the Soviet Union sold Peru hundreds of tanks, helicopters, and fighter jets, among others which will be detailed in Chapter II.³⁵ Richard Schroeder argues that the Soviets saw General Velasco as a progressive, possibly socialist leader who could rally toward

³² Central Intelligence Agency, "Peru-USSR: Implications of the Military Relationship" (CIA FOIA, December 1982), 1, <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83s00855r000200150006-2>.

³³ Walter, *Peru and the United States, 1960-1975*, 38.

³⁴ Hal Brands, "The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968–1975," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 21, no. 3 (September 14, 2010): 471–90, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09592296.2010.508418>.

³⁵ Berrios and Blasier, "Peru and the Soviet Union (1969–1989)"; Central Intelligence Agency, "Peru-USSR: Implications of the Military Relationship."

Soviet ideology.³⁶ The CIA believed the Soviet Union desired to leverage trade, diplomatic relations, and aid to gain support for its international policies, respectability, institutionalization of the Peru-Soviet Union relationship, and economic benefits (though economics were thought to be secondary by some sources).³⁷ To a certain extent, the Soviet Union may have viewed Peru as a gateway into South America. Ruben Berrios and Cole Blasier argue that the Soviet Union did not have a solid foothold in South America, and required an entrance for air traffic, ports of call and infrastructure to service ships, and access to the south Pacific, and Peru was seen as a model to replicate throughout the region.³⁸ The CIA believed another motivation of the Soviets could have been covert intelligence collection, supporting radical movements, or to spread communist propaganda.³⁹ While there may have been multiple Soviet motivations for expanding the Peru-Soviet Union relationship, all sources basically agree that access and influence were top of the list.

4. Contemporary Russia, Latin America, and Peru

To understand Russian Motivations in Latin America and Peru, modern Russian foreign policy must be examined overall. Most scholars agree, including the Naval Postgraduate School's Dr. Anne Clunan, that Russia wishes to regain status as a great power on the world stage in order to legitimize geopolitical ambitions, and to manage the complicated relationship with the West—a relationship of both rivalry and cooperation.⁴⁰ In many ways, these policy goals harken to Cold War strategy, and some authors argue that Cold War tactics of ideological manipulation, disinformation, proxy war,

³⁶ Schroeder, "Soviets' Latin Influence," 4.

³⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, "Peru-USSR: Implications of the Military Relationship."

³⁸ Berrios and Blasier, "Peru and the Soviet Union (1969-1989)."

³⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, "Peru-USSR: Implications of the Military Relationship."

⁴⁰ Eugene Rumer and Julia Gurganus, "Russia's Global Ambitions in Perspective," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, February 20, 2019, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/20/russia-s-global-ambitions-in-perspective-pub-78067>.

Anne Clunan, "Russia's Pursuit of Great-Power Status and Security," in *Routledge Handbook of Russian Security*, by Roger E. Kanet (Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge, 2019), 3–16.

assassination, and intelligence have not changed but expanded.⁴¹ Russian intellectuals, such as Sergei Karaganov, specifically call not for strengthening relations with the West, but for shaping a new multipolar world order in which Western ideals and primacy are challenged.⁴²

Academic journals, think-tanks, and news agencies have begun publishing articles on the motivations behind recent Russian reemergence in Latin America. Victor Jiefets argues that Russian trade with Latin America has been on an upturn, which could imply economic reasons for Russian resurgence.⁴³ Diana Negropte argues that preferential trade with the Soviet Union undermines reliance on U.S. markets, which would bolster Russia's stance in the region.⁴⁴ She continues to explain that expanding economic relations with Latin America is also a way of sidestepping Western sanctions and diversifying Russian economic opportunity.⁴⁵ Economic interaction with the region remains extremely small at just 2% of Russia's total foreign trade, and foreign direct investment in Latin America and the Caribbean is a mere \$10 million of a total \$27 billion USD.⁴⁶ Still, Russia remains poised to offer an alternative to Latin American nations which view the United States as unreliable and uncooperative..⁴⁷

Another hypothesis for Russia's expansion into Latin America concerns Russia's desire for increased foreign influence. Dr. R. Evan Ellis has noted that Russian activity has focused on historical partners in the anti-U.S. Bolivarian Alliance for the People of

⁴¹ Rumer and Gurganus, "Russia's Global Ambitions in Perspective."

⁴² Sergei Karaganov and Dmitry Suslov, "A New World Order: A View From Russia," *Global Affairs*, October 4, 2018, <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/print/pubcol/A-new-world-order-A-view-from-Russia--19782>.

⁴³ Víctor Jiefets, "Russia Is Coming Back to Latin America: Perspectives and Obstacles," *Coordinadora Regional de Investigaciones Económicas y Sociales*, no. 11 (2015): 23.

⁴⁴ Diana Villiers Negropte, "What's Putin's Game in the Western Hemisphere?," *America's Quarterly*, Winter 2015, <https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/whats-putins-game-western-hemisphere>.

⁴⁵ Negropte.

⁴⁶ Richard Miles, "Virtual Russian Influence in Latin America," *CSIS*, May 9, 2018, 2, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/virtual-russian-influence-latin-america>.

⁴⁷ Negropte, "What's Putin's Game in the Western Hemisphere?"; Maria Gurganus, "Russia: Playing a Geopolitical Game in Latin America," *The Return of Global Russia* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 3, 2018), 11, <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/05/03/russia-playing-geopolitical-game-in-latin-america-pub-76228>.

our America (ALBA) regime.⁴⁸ He argues that Russia is more likely to gain influence in countries of historic friendly relations. Marie Gurganus from the Carnegie Endowment argues that poor relations between the United States and Latin America on disagreements in the world international forum over NATO and U.S. military conflicts, migration, and trade relations have provided an opening for Russia to exploit.⁴⁹ This is seen by some as a clear return to Cold War tactics by using power projection to diminish U.S. influence.⁵⁰

Hand-in-hand with increased influence is a theory that Russia's goals are to undermine the United States and Western influence in Latin America. Vladimir Rouvinski from the Wilson Center believes that Russia regards a move into Latin America as penetrating the United States' backyard, not unlike current NATO expansion into Eastern Europe and the Balkans.⁵¹ This hypothesis is further supported by noting Russia's support for the ALBA countries, which are generally less friendly to U.S. influence. By arming anti-U.S. regimes in Latin America and expanding influence in neutral countries, Russia may be able to isolate pro-U.S. countries like Chile and Colombia.⁵² Undermining Western influence is in line with Russia's broader foreign policy goals of regaining great power status, and recreating the current world order.

Hypotheses of Peru's motivations for increased relations with Russia are more limited in number. Ellis argues that Russian involvement seems natural in order to upgrade and service legacy Soviet military equipment.⁵³ Juan Cardenal from the National Endowment for Democracy explains that Vladimir Putin is revered as a strong-man leader in Peru, and Russian resurgence may be a form of soft influence that while not

⁴⁸ Robert Evan Ellis, "Russian Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: Return to the 'Strategic Game' in a Complex-Interdependent Post-Cold War World?," *Strategic Studies Institute*, April 14, 2015, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/articles/Russian-Engagement-in-Latin-America/2015/04/24>.

⁴⁹ Gurganus, "Russia: Playing a Geopolitical Game in Latin America."

⁵⁰ Gurganus.

⁵¹ Vladimir Rouvinski, "Understanding Russian Priorities in Latin America," *Wilson Center Kennan Institute*, Kennan Cable, no. 20 (2017): 8.

⁵² Ellis, *The New Russian Engagement with Latin America*.

⁵³ Ellis, "Russian Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: Return to the 'Strategic Game' in a Complex-Interdependent Post-Cold War World?"

holding much political sway, is symbolic of a far-flung Russian reach.⁵⁴ Most sources agree that Russian resurgence in Peru and Latin America is motivated by nationally self-interested states wishing to diversify reliance on the United States and bolster national security and a Russian desire to undermine United States influence in its near abroad.

D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES

While there are several possible explanations for Russia's resurgence into Peru, my hypotheses are the following. From Peru's standpoint, Peru has dated Soviet military equipment which needs maintenance and upgrades in order to be useful to maintain national security. In this light, it seems fairly obvious that it is in Peru's national interest to renew ties with Russia. Hence, one explanation could be that Peru is attempting to boost its national security by renewing relations with Russia. To explore this hypothesis, an investigation into Peruvian current national security concerns will be required. Economically, the Peruvian economy does not overlap markets with Russia, and expanding trade is also in Peru's national interest. Therefore, another explanation could be that working with Russia is a form of diversification of trade and security partners as undertaken in the 1970s. Alternatively, Peru may be cozying with Russia in order to balance against the United States or China. In order to explore the relationship further, current points of contention between Peru and the United States and China will be researched. In sum, it seems most likely that Peru's motivations pivot on national self-interest to increase economic opportunities and partners and to maintain familiar security relationships and military equipment dating back to the 1970s .

Russia's motivations for a renewed relationship in Peru are opaque, and beg the question if this is a return to strategic multipolar great power politics. Russia stands to gain little from renewed economic ties with Peru, and may incur financial risks similar to those in the 1980s when the Soviet Union cancelled 1/5 of Peru's debt due to the inability

⁵⁴ Juan Pablo Cardenal, "Reframing Relations in Peru," in *Sharp Power: Rising Authoritarian Influence*, ed. Juan Pablo Cardenal (Washington, DC: National Endowment for Democracy, 2017), 83, <https://www.ned.org/sharp-power-rising-authoritarian-influence-forum-report/>.

of repayment.⁵⁵ Therefore, while economic diversification is a possibility, it is unlikely. Russia's motivations may be the same old Cold War mentality—to undermine United States interests through influence, presence, economic ties, and soft-power. Moscow may hope that increased economic and political influence in Peru and Latin America help solidify Russia's claims to great power status. Russia may be attempting to re-establish a foothold in South America in order to spread pro-Russian sentiment, anti-American sentiment, to sway politics toward Russian interest, or establish clandestine listening posts and opportunity for espionage. It may be that Moscow believes expanded reach will further the worldview of Russia and undermine United States influence. While it may not be possible to learn the exact intentions of Russia's Latin America resurgence, this research hopes to shed further light on this issue.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN

This thesis utilizes a multi-front approach involving historical and current material. On the historical side, there is a wide selection of sources which cover the Peruvian, Latin American, and Communist perspectives on the Cold War and foreign policy. This research will draw upon books, journal articles, reports, and declassified documents. The material will be analyzed and studied from the perspectives of the Soviet Union, Peru, Latin America, and the United States, and will draw conclusions for each actor's motivations based on historical evidence. As some view Russian resurgence as a reversion to Cold War strategy, understanding the Soviet tactics in Peru may enlighten the current Russian strategy.

To build an understanding of Peru and Russia's current motivations may require an amount of inference based on wider Latin American samples. There is little information written on Russian intentions in Peru, therefore a wider view of Russian activity within Latin America must be studied. Then, based on the broader scope and current Peruvian foreign policy concerns, conclusions may be drawn to each country's motivations. Material to be researched will mostly rely on current news, recent journal

⁵⁵ Ruben Berrios and Josephine Olson, "Countertrade as a Form of Debt Payment; Peru's Experience with the Soviet Union and Commercial Banks," *Ibero Americana, Nordic Journal of Latin American Studies* XXV, no. 1-2 (1995): 14.

articles, unclassified government documents on policy, and think tank pieces. By focusing on Russian activity in Peru, ALBA countries, South America, and more broadly Latin America, and understanding Russian and Peruvian interests, current motivations for Russia's resurgence may be gleaned.

Once there is a strong understanding of both historic and current interest for Peru and Russia's interactions, similarities and differences can be compared. If there is a significant amount of difference, this research will inform which gaps must be filled in order to better understand Russian motivations. If there are great similarities, lessons may be learned from past actions and policies which can better inform United States and Peruvian future paths.

F. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis will be arranged chronologically from the Cold War era to today. Chapter II examines Peru-Soviet and communist block political, economic, and military ties in the 1970s after the military coup. It continues through the 1980s until the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, due to economic concerns in both Russia and Peru and the drastic situation after the breakup of the Soviet Union, there was little interaction between the two states and between Russia and Latin America in general.⁵⁶ Chapter III examines renewed Russian and Peruvian political, economic, security, media, and cultural relations in the 2000s until 2019. Chapter IV provides concluding analysis.

⁵⁶ Jeifets, "Russia Is Coming Back to Latin America: Perspectives and Obstacles," 91.

II. COLD WAR PERU—SOVIET UNION RELATIONS

Apart from Nicaragua and Cuba, the Soviet Union had closer relations with Peru in Latin America than all other countries during the Cold War. The previous chapter highlighted that this thesis will attempt to determine if Russia's resurgence in Peru is a throwback to prior Cold War strategy and tactics. To make this determination, the engagement between the Soviet Union and Peru must first be analyzed. This chapter will explore the Soviet Union along with other Warsaw Pact countries' relationship with Peru from the beginning of the Velasco regime until the collapse of the Soviet Union by focusing on the diplomatic, economic, and security dimensions.

A. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

The Peruvian Socialist Party was founded in 1928 as the first communist party in Peru, and changed its name to the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) in 1930.⁵⁷ It traditionally and consistently was loyal to the Soviet Union, but never gained a foothold in Peru as a major political party. This was partly due to competition from another left-leaning party, the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA). Both parties advocated for a Peru-centric nationalism and for indigenous rights, but APRA emphasized alliance between classes, and achieved a larger following. Like the PCP, APRA was also founded in the 1920s but by an extremely charismatic leader, Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, and from the beginning was more popular than the PCP.⁵⁸ The PCP never had charismatic leadership, and often aimed its animosity at APRA instead of right wing parties, where it frequently made concessions.⁵⁹ Finally, in 1964, the PCP split into two factions, the Marxist and the Maoist camps, with the Maoist side forming the beginnings of Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path, the infamous terrorist group, which was denounced by the Soviet Union since 1969.⁶⁰ In sum, the Peruvian Communist Party

⁵⁷ Berrios and Blasier, "Peru and the Soviet Union (1969–1989)," 378.

⁵⁸ Berrios and Blasier, 378.

⁵⁹ Berrios and Blasier, 378.

⁶⁰ Berrios and Blasier, 380.

never gained popularity because it was overshadowed by the APRA party and suffered internal struggles as well as mismanagement. Without a strong communist party for the Soviet Union to support, the Soviet Union had little means to support a rise of communism in Peru.

It is important to understand the foreign policy standpoint and mentality of the Velasco administration while considering Peru's political relationship with the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc. Velasco's self-titled "revolution" was nationalist in nature, and proclaimed an end to foreign dependence. Although to Western eyes many of the actions taken following the coup, such as the nationalization of the International Petroleum Company (IPC), seemed socialist, Velasco sided neither with communism nor with capitalism, and wished to avoid the Cold War rivalry.⁶¹ Most importantly, the regime railed against imperialism with the goal of eliminating external pressures and opening new opportunities. The regime was particularly interested in maintaining and strengthening Peruvian sovereignty, and wished to avoid entanglements which would make Peru beholden to foreign powers.

Before the coup of 1968 and the rise of General Velasco, the Soviet Union did not have a foothold in South America, and had no diplomatic relations with Peru. In 1960, the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations with just three countries in Latin America, Cuba, Brazil, and Argentina, and most Latin American states were traditionally uninterested in Soviet diplomatic relations or were pressured by the United States to keep a distance.⁶² Between 1968 and 1969, Peru opened diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania.⁶³ The first Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, was placed in Moscow in February 1969, and in 1972 diplomatic relations were established with the German Democratic Republic.⁶⁴ The

⁶¹ St. John, *The Foreign Policy of Peru*, 198.

⁶² William Luers, "The Soviets and Latin America," in *Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, ed. Robbin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffmann (New York, NY: Aldine Publishing Company, 1986), 830.

Blasier, *The Giant's Rival*, 18.

⁶³ Berrios, "Relations between Peru and the Socialist Countries."

⁶⁴ Berrios and Blasier, "Peru and the Soviet Union (1969–1989)," 368.

Soviet Union was particularly pleased that Velasco allowed the Peruvian Communist Party to continue to operate even though political parties in general were banned.⁶⁵

Most diplomatic interaction with the Soviet Union involved the signing of various agreements and increased modes of communication. Peru hoped to bolster its economy through increased interaction with the industrially strong Soviet Union. Weeks after establishing formal diplomatic relations, Peru and the Soviet Union signed a trade agreement which was hailed by Velasco as ending dependency on the United States.⁶⁶ Peru opened its seaports and airports to the Soviet Union in 1971, and ships began travelling from the Baltic to Peru twice a month, as well as the first Soviet flights to Latin America by way of the Russian airline Aeroflot in 1974.⁶⁷ In 1971, Peru and the Soviet Union signed an agreement to work on technical and economic fronts on various industrial projects.⁶⁸ The Peruvian military (especially the Navy) was expressly anti-communist, and did not fear Soviet penetration in diplomatic affairs since it currently held power in the country.⁶⁹ Peru desired a relationship with Russia to affirm its independence from the United States and to assist with bolstering the economy and security, and in return, Peru had a wealth of raw materials to offer. The diplomatic relations established opened avenues for economic and security assistance which will be discussed sections B and C.

The diplomatic opening of Peru to the Soviet Union would lead to massive economic and military interactions between the two countries which could only be compared to Cuba in the size and scale in Latin America. Peru would go on to continue its diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until the fall of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Due to the relative weakness of the Peruvian Communist Party and its lack of influence in the Velasco regime, along with the aversion of Velasco

⁶⁵ Wayne S. Smith, ed., *The Russians Aren't Coming: New Soviet Policy in Latin America* (Boulder, CO: L. Rienner Publishers, 1992), 18.

⁶⁶ Walter, *Peru and the United States, 1960-1975*, 172.

⁶⁷ Blasier, *The Giant's Rival*, 42.

⁶⁸ Blasier, 42.

⁶⁹ James D. Theberge, *The Soviet Presence in Latin America*, Strategy Paper 23 (New York: Crane, Russak & Co, 1974), 85.

to align ideologically with either great power, there is little if any evidence that the Soviet Union had strong effects diplomatically. Peru never aligned itself politically with the Soviet Union, and Moscow was never able to successfully influence Peru's internal or external political policies.⁷⁰

B. ECONOMIC RELATIONS

General Velasco made radical changes to the Peruvian economy after taking power. His goals were to gain economic independence and to seek new relationships with foreign capital by readjusting the capitalist centers of power.⁷¹ For the first time, Peru gained full control of its trade with foreign countries by nationalizing fishing, mining, and oil, three key sectors in the economy. This allowed Peru to negotiate on a direct government-to-government basis without the involvement of private local and foreign intermediaries.⁷² Peru also wished to diversify trade to gain more favorable prices, and export to markets with fewer barriers to entry.⁷³ As noted in Section A, soon after taking power, Velasco began making economic ties with the Soviet Union and Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA, the economic organization headed by the Soviet Union to promote Eastern Bloc development) countries.⁷⁴ The goal was to diversify trade dependence, broaden supply lines, open new markets for imports and exports, and to have sources for new lines of credit. Relationships took the form of traditional trade and Soviet aid such as low interest lines of credit, education for Peruvian students and technicians, and technical expertise.⁷⁵ This section will cover Peru's economic relations with the Soviet Union and eastern European countries in the form of trade, various forms of

⁷⁰ Berrios, "Soviet-Latin American Economic Relations."

⁷¹ Ruben Berrios, "Relations Between Peru and the Socialist Countries," in *Soviet-Latin American Relations in the 1980s*, ed. Augusto Varas (CO: Westview Press, 1987), 212.

⁷² Berrios, 212.

⁷³ Berrios, 212.

⁷⁴ CMEA was an economic organization formed in 1949 that included socialist countries of Europe, along with others around the world in an effort to increase economic opportunity and trade. It was also an effort to keep countries from expanding the relationship with the West.

⁷⁵ Berrios and Blasier, "Peru and the Soviet Union (1969–1989)," 366.

economic cooperation, and countertrade. Section C will cover Soviet Union transfers and sales of military equipment and other security assistance measures.

1. Trade

Peru's exports to European socialist countries focused on a small number of commodities, notably frozen fish and fishmeal, minerals, including copper, zinc, silver, iron and lead, coffee, sugar, and cotton.⁷⁶ Imports from the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance countries included medical instruments and equipment, machinery, agriculture industry products, mining equipment, electrical equipment, and military equipment (which will be covered in Section C).⁷⁷ Peru generally exported raw materials and imported finished manufactured products. The raw materials for finished products model was similar to the relationship Peru had with the United States except that the imports came from a diversified or different set of countries. Figure 1 and Table 1 show the balance of trade with the Soviet Union, and Table 2 depicts Peru's overall trade. It should be noted that while trade increased dramatically with CMEA countries, it also continued to increase with the United States and the European Economic Community (EEC). Trade with the CMEA did not result in displacement of the already established economic relationship with the West.

⁷⁶ Berrios, "Relations between Peru and the Socialist Countries," 101.

⁷⁷ Berrios, 101.



Figure 1. Peru's Trade Balance with the Soviet Union (in millions of USD).⁷⁸

Table 1. Peru's Trade Balance with the Soviet Union (in millions of USD).⁷⁹

Year	Exports	Imports
1970	0.1	0.2
1971	0.2	0.1
1972	6.1	0.1
1973	15.1	0.2
1974	2.1	1.6
1975	126.9	49.6
1976	24.6	7.3
1977	19.8	15.1
1978	21.5	19.7
1979	27.0	24.3
1980	15.9	0.9
1981	12.0	2.5
1982	8.2	3.0
1983	15.9	0.4
1984	87.3	0.8
1985	130.9	0.8
1986	84.9	5.6
1987	66.8	91.5*
1988	25.3	2.0
1989	132.9	65.7*

*Indicating significant imports of military equipment

⁷⁸ Berrios, "Relations Between Peru and the Socialist Countries."

⁷⁹ Berrios and Blasier, "Peru and the Soviet Union (1969–1989)."

Table 2. Geographical Distribution of Peru's Foreign Trade, Annual Averages.⁸⁰

	1961-1969		1970-1975		1976-1978	
	in US\$ millions	%	in US\$ millions	%	In US\$ millions	%
EXPORTS						
CMEA	13.61	2	86.07	8	145.37	9
USA	265.20	39	354.42	32	473.17	30
EEC	201.76	30	274.68	25	323.83	21
Japan	76.19	11	149.15	13	215.33	14
Latin America	60.88	9	126.62	11	244.09	16
Other	65.12	9	126.92	11	158.30	10
TOTAL	82.76	100	1,117.86	100	1,560.10	100
IMPORTS						
CMEA	2.35	0.3	13.76	1	47.10	2.5
USA	241.33	38.0	365.61	31	576.80	31.0
EEC	140.04	22.0	279.25	24	384.56	21.0
Japan	34.97	5.5	114.33	10	132.30	7.0
Latin America	89.51	14.0	206.21	17	373.35	20.0
Other	129.04	20.2	205.19	17	326.28	18.0
TOTAL	637.24	100.0	1,184.35	100	1,840.40	100.0

The levels of trade between Peru and the CMEA remained relatively low and fluctuated drastically. Both Peru and its new socialist partners were inexperienced in their trade domains. The socialist states in general were relatively new to world trade, and traditionally transnational capitalist firms had been the source of capital and trade with Peru.⁸¹ During the early 1970s, in order to more effectively govern foreign trade, Peru established administrative and legal frameworks, the CMEA sent permanent commercial representatives to Peru, and Velasco sent economic attachés to Moscow and opened a commercial office in Prague.⁸² The intent of these actions was to better facilitate the economic relationship. Ruben Berrios, the most prolific writer on Peru's relationship with the communist bloc during the Cold War, depicted the economic relationship in 1987 as follows:⁸³

1. Agreements are usually established on a bilateral basis, which sets the basic patterns and procedures for trade. Normally these agreements are

⁸⁰ Berrios, "Relations Between Peru and the Socialist Countries."

⁸¹ Berrios.

⁸² Berrios, 107.

⁸³ Berrios, "Relations Between Peru and the Socialist Countries," 217.

discussed thoroughly by a joint intergovernmental commission in order to specify areas of mutual cooperation and assure their fulfillment, discuss problems, and adopt measures designed to achieve further progress in trade.

2. Agreements are normally on a long-term basis, five years on average. Although it is possible to plan foreign trade because it contains commodity lists outlining mutual needs and guidance to specific trade transactions, this was never tried in Peru.

3. Peru has been granted most-favored-nation status. There are favorable tariff reductions, and this also includes export licenses.

4. Trade agreements stipulate that payments shall be made in convertible foreign exchange.

5. Finally, trade credits have been generous. According to one source, “the terms have been advantageous to Peru with regard to the number of years for reinvestment, rates of interest, amount, categories of goods for which the credits were available, etc.

The overall results of Peru’s new trade strategy greatly enhanced economic relations with the CMEA and the Soviet Union. As noted in the previous tables, exports from Peru in particular made a dramatic increase, even if they fluctuated from year to year. The trade agreements put in place during the Velasco regime began to show significant increases around the time General Velasco was replaced by General Morales Bermúdez in 1975. After democracy was restored to Peru in 1980, and Fernando Belaúnde Terry was re-elected to the presidency, trade with the CMEA decreased as it was redirected back toward traditional Western partners.⁸⁴ Belaúnde’s re-election was very much a backlash to the policies of the military government, and an electoral desire of the population to return to perceived political norms.⁸⁵ President Alan García assumed office in 1985 and signed a number of trade agreements and contracts with the Soviet Union, increasing trade levels until the latter half of the decade.⁸⁶ At the end of the 1980s, Peru suffered a massive financial crisis, and the communist regimes began to disintegrate, bringing an end to the Cold War relationship.

⁸⁴ Berrios and Blasier, “Peru and the Soviet Union (1969–1989),” 370.

⁸⁵ Rudolph, *Peru*, 80.

⁸⁶ Berrios and Blasier, 370.

2. Economic Cooperation

Peru and the CMEA countries had a number of economic endeavors apart from strictly trade and foreign exchange. The United States had also withheld loans and aid due to Peru's nationalization of the International Petroleum Company (IPC). The Hickenlooper Amendment allowed the United States to terminate economic assistance and block access to loans from the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank to countries which expropriated American assets.⁸⁷ Although it was never formally invoked in the case of Peru and the IPC, the United States effectively was able to withhold economic assistance throughout the 1970s. The communist countries were more amenable to funding and providing aid for projects which other creditors were more averse; hence, Peru turned toward Eastern Europe in order to obtain funding and financial assistance.

When Peru first opened economic relations with the CMEA, it signed a comprehensive approach to not just economic, but also technical and scientific cooperation.⁸⁸ Technology transfers were mostly in the form of industrial machinery, receipt of technical assistance and expertise or services, training of Peruvian students and professionals, and joint capital investment ventures. Peru had traditionally imported machinery and equipment from the West, but Soviet products came at a cheaper price while still being of sufficient quality and having easier terms of payback and credit.⁸⁹ Much of the equipment purchased was associated with various development projects, and included services such as instruction, assembly, technical advice, and training.

Many of the economic agreements signed involved development projects within Peru. These included oil exploration, hydroelectrical development, fishing complexes, mining, industrial plants, and public transportation.⁹⁰ The Peruvian shipbuilding

⁸⁷ Brands, "The United States and the Peruvian Challenge, 1968–1975," 476.

⁸⁸ Berrios, "Relations between Peru and the Socialist Countries," 108.

⁸⁹ Berrios, 108.

⁹⁰ Berrios, 108.

company, SIMA, agreed to build 80 ships for the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union agreed to build a large dry dock facility in Peru to service the soviet fishing fleet.⁹¹

Peru and the Soviet Union had a very extensive relationship in regard to fishing. The Soviet Union supported Peru's assertion of its 200-mile economic coastal water zone, while the United States traditionally had not, and Peru had seized U.S. fishing boats discovered in Peru's waters, leading to several disputes. Peru therefore allowed the Soviet Union to operate fishing boats within the economic zone, from 30 to 200 miles off the coast, the Soviet Union compensating with credit for fishing and refrigeration equipment, technical training, and construction of a fishing complex in Paita, a major seaport city in the northwest.⁹² Peru allowed Soviet vessels to dock and receive fuel, rations, and service at Peruvian ports. In exchange for fishing in Peru's waters, the Soviet Union would give a cut of its catch to the Peru state seafood company.⁹³ In many cases, Peru did not have the equipment, technology, or boats to fish in the areas that the Soviets were able to. The fishing agreements overall became extremely lucrative for Peru.

Fishing agreements were not without their drawbacks, as there was widespread opposition to Soviets fishing in Peru's waters. Pushback arose from nationalists, environmentalists, and lobbying groups, with few being anti-Soviet or ideological in nature.⁹⁴ Nationalist sentiment among the population argued that it was Peru's waters, and that it should be Peru fishing in them. Environmentalists were concerned about protecting the Peruvian waters and biomass, as well as overfishing. Lobbying groups, including the National Fisheries Society, wanted the agreement with the Soviet Union revoked, claiming that Soviets were fishing within 30 miles of the coast, even though Peruvian inspectors were required on all Soviet vessels. Overall, it seems that the Peru-Soviet Union fishing agreements were in the interest of mutual economic advancement, despite dissenters.

⁹¹ Berrios and Blasier, "Peru and the Soviet Union (1969–1989)," 372.

⁹² Berrios and Blasier, 372.

⁹³ Berrios and Blasier, 372.

⁹⁴ Berrios and Blasier, 372.

Undoubtedly, economic relations with the communist European countries increased dramatically after Velasco opened Peru to the East. Besides trade, socialist countries had construction projects, offered technology, trained Peruvian students, technicians, and professionals, and made strong ties in the fishing industry. While these advancements strengthened ties with the communist bloc and weakened ties with the United States and the West, it does not appear that Peru's relationship with the Soviet Union and the CMEA was motivated by anything other than diversification and mutual economic benefit.

3. Countertrade

The CMEA countries used several systems to offer financial assistance to Peru. Credit was provided for investment projects which were of public sector priority. Aid was also given on the condition that funds were used to purchase commodities from the country offering it. In particular, during the 1970s, Peru began using a unique type of foreign exchange in order to pay for its debt to the Soviet Union: countertrade. Countertrade is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as "International trade in which goods and services are paid for (partially or in full) by barter or other mechanisms which do not involve the exchange of money."⁹⁵ Peru began using countertrade after taking on large amounts of debt during the 1970s to the Soviet Union and CMEA countries as a method of repayment. Some of these countertrade arrangements have already been mentioned in the previous sections.

There are multiple examples of Peru using countertrade with the CMEA. In exchange for building the Paita fishing complex, Peru would repay the Soviet Union partially with fishmeal and fish products.⁹⁶ Some instances used triangular trade agreements, where three countries were involved. In one case in the early 1980s, Peru contracted a French firm to build an oil refinery which had previously built a refinery in Bulgaria. As repayment, Peru would provide some refined materials, but also Bulgaria

⁹⁵ "counter-trade, n.", OED Online, September 2019, Oxford University Press, <https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/43027?rskey=P0XQ5c&result=1> (accessed October 14, 2019).

⁹⁶ Berrios and Olson, "Countertrade as a Form of Debt Payment; Peru's Experience with the Soviet Union and Commercial Banks."

would build storage tanks at the facility to compensate its own countertrade obligations, forming a three-way economic arrangement.⁹⁷ Another example occurred in 1986 where Peru would ship goods to Nicaragua to repay its debt to the Soviet Union.⁹⁸

The economic agreements for financial assistance and trade arranged between Peru, the Soviet Union and CMEA allowed for generous grace periods, low interest rates, and generally up to ten years for repayment. Although Peru had a trade surplus with Eastern Europe, it had a growing debt which by the end of 1984 amounted to 1.2 billion U.S. dollars.⁹⁹ In the 1980s, Peru began having economic troubles and became delinquent in debt repayment to the Soviet Union and CMEA countries, which were demanding repayment. In 1983, Peru struck an agreement to repay its debt in the form of exports.¹⁰⁰ This debt for exports model is not the same type of countertrade as previously mentioned, but marked a new category for Peru.

Peru managed to persuade the Soviet Union and CMEA to accept nontraditional exports as a ratio of repayment for its debt. These were semi-manufactured or manufactured products instead of raw materials, such as shirts or cloth instead of cotton.¹⁰¹ Mostly materials were textile, metal, and fishing products. The advantage of manufactured products was that it would increase foreign trade earnings and reduce the requirement for foreign exchange.

As Peru's economy was under significant stress in the 1980s, Eastern European creditors began to realize that countertrade was perhaps the only method to collect repayment on Peruvian debts. By 1985, Peru had effectively stopped repayment on most of its debt, only making payments of small amounts on interest due.¹⁰² Ruben Berrios notes that through countertrade negotiations "between 1988 and 1990, Peru was able to cancel \$192.5 million in debt to [CMEA countries] and it received \$255.3 million in new

⁹⁷ Berrios and Olson, 8.

⁹⁸ Berrios and Olson, 8.

⁹⁹ Berrios and Olson, 11.

¹⁰⁰ Berrios and Olson, 8.

¹⁰¹ Berrios and Olson, 12.

¹⁰² Berrios and Olson, 12.

foreign exchange.”¹⁰³ Although Peru’s debt to the Soviet Union remained relatively stable, it was able to enact a creative and diverse profile of repayment.

The overall effects of Peru’s countertrade with the communist block are unclear. Communism dissolved in the early 1990s at the same time that Peru was facing economic collapse. Peru was unable to pay its debts, and resorted to adopting a neoliberal fiscal austerity program under the newly elected President Alberto Fujimori in order to qualify for Western financial assistance programs. While countertrade was a creative way of taking advantage of creditors, it does not speak to any particular national security concern. Both Peru and the CMEA seemed to choosing what appeared to be the most desirable economic options.

C. MILITARY RELATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION

The largest and most concerning aspect of Peruvian relations with the Soviet Union and communist bloc to the United States was in the form of military and security assistance. To understand the background for which Peru sought military equipment from the Soviet Union, it is important to examine the historical relationship with the United States. In the 1950s, President Dwight D. Eisenhower encouraged Latin American states to take charge of their own defense and purchase U.S. military equipment, but when John F. Kennedy was elected and launched the Alliance for Progress, the purchase of conventional military equipment was discouraged in favor of social and domestic development.¹⁰⁴ Although Latin America had fought no conventional wars between states in modern history, Peru desired security in order to defend against its better equipped rival Chile as well as Ecuador. When Peru pressed to purchase the modern U.S. F-5 supersonic jet, it was blocked and was offered outdated Korean War planes instead.¹⁰⁵ After years of haggling, Peru turned to Great Britain and eventually France. In 1967 France finally offered to sell Peru 12 Mirage 5 fighter jets, which had performed

¹⁰³ Berrios and Olson, 16.

¹⁰⁴ Francis Le Roy, “Mirages Over the Andes: Peru, France, the United States, and Military Jet Procurement in the 1960s,” *Pacific Historical Review* 71, no. 2 (May 2002): 271.

¹⁰⁵ Le Roy, 277.

remarkably well in the Israeli war against Egypt.¹⁰⁶ The purchase of French Mirage's was a telling turn. Advanced military equipment locks in external relations for decades, and Peru's decision (or U.S. restriction of options) marked a decisive turn from the Peru-United States relationship.

The second major difficulty of foreign relations between the United States and Peru which hindered military security cooperation was over fishing and Peru's assertion of a 200 mile economic zone. Although the United Nations held a conference to establish the Law of the Sea in 1958 and 1960, it did not resolve the issue of territorial waters and exclusive fishing zones, and the United States continued to operate fishing vessels within 200 miles of the Peruvian coast.¹⁰⁷ As the United States only recognized a twelve mile coastal waters, fishing boats, mostly from southern California, would frequently fish well within Peru's 200 mile limit.¹⁰⁸ The Pelly Amendment, passed in 1967, allowed the United States to sanction military assistance and sales to any country that seized U.S. fishing vessels outside of 12 nautical miles. It was enacted after Peru seized multiple tuna boats, firing upon one which refused to be boarded in February 1969 soon after Velasco had taken power.¹⁰⁹ Without the ability to purchase military equipment from the United States, Peru turned elsewhere.

From 1973 to 1980, Peru purchased a wide variety of Soviet military equipment. The Peruvian Army and Air Force were the main beneficiaries, as the Peruvian Navy remained staunchly conservative and anti-communist.¹¹⁰ According to a declassified CIA research paper from 1982, Peru purchased:

Fighter-bomber and transport aircraft, troop-carrying helicopters; medium tanks; air defense and field artillery; surface-to-air, air-to-surface, and

¹⁰⁶ Le Roy, 279.

¹⁰⁷ David Loring, "The United States-Peruvian 'Fisheries' Dispute," *Stanford Law Review* 23, no. 3 (February 1971): 406.

¹⁰⁸ Walter, *Peru and the United States, 1960-1975*, 173.

¹⁰⁹ Walter, 133, 173.

¹¹⁰ Berrios, "Relations between Peru and the Socialist Countries," 112.

antitank missiles; other combat and combat support vehicles; and related electronic and support equipment.¹¹¹

These military procurements would make Peru dependent upon the Soviet Union for maintenance, spare parts, training, and technical expertise, and locked in a relationship with Russia that exists to this day. A detailed table of military equipment sold to Peru as of 1982 can be seen in Figure 2 and Table 3. Throughout Latin America, Peru was the single largest client of Soviet military equipment apart from Cuba.

Peru had motivations for purchasing Soviet equipment, apart from those previously outlined as the United States sanctions. In addition to the difficulty of working with the United States, Velasco wished to distance Peru from the West and diversify its supplying partners in order to combat envisioned U.S. imperialism. Peru and its military wanted to modernize and expand its armed forces. Peru also had concern for its neighbor and enemy, Chile, who had a considerable armed forces which dwarfed Peru's in size and amount of modern equipment before making purchases from the Soviet Union. Moscow offered fast delivery of modern weapons at better prices, with extended credit, lengthy grace periods, and lower interest rates than any Western state.¹¹² Finally, Peru wished to exert its sovereignty.

¹¹¹ Central Intelligence Agency, "Peru-USSR: Implications of the Military Relationship," 3.

¹¹² Berrios, "Relations between Peru and the Socialist Countries," 112.















System	Description	Year Acquired by Peru	Number Acquired	Number in Total Peruvian Inventory
	SU-22 Swingwing ground attack fighter. Weapons include guns, bombs, and air-to-surface missiles (ASMs). Widely exported to Third World countries. Introduced into Soviet inventory in 1970.	1977	51	93
	MI-8 Transport helicopter. In addition to two-man crew, can carry either 28 troops or 4 tons of cargo. May be armed with up to six rocket pods and two antitank guided missiles (ATGMs).	1973	31	105
	MI-6 Transport helicopter. Can carry either 65-70 troops or 12 tons of cargo in addition to five-man crew.	1977	6	105
	MI-25 Export version of the Soviet MI-24 attack helicopter. Can carry up to 12 troops. Armament includes Gatling-type machinegun in chin turret, four rocket pods, and four ATGMs.	1983	14	105
	AN-26 Twin-engine medium transport. In addition to five-man crew, can carry 38 passengers or 5 tons of cargo.	1977	15	50
				
	SA-3 Low- to medium-altitude surface-to-air missile (SAM). Normally used for point defense of installations such as airfields. SA-3 SAM sites in Peru usually consist of three four-rail launchers with associated radars.	1977	11 sites	11 sites
	SA-7 Man-portable, shoulder-launched SAM. This heat-seeking missile is effective against helicopters and slow-flying aircraft at low altitudes.	1976	280 ^a	280 ^a
	AS-7 The first Soviet fighter-launched ASM designed specifically for a ground attack role.	1980	Unknown	
	AS-9 A short-range tactical antiradiation missile.	1981	Unknown	
	T-55 Medium tank with 100-mm gun.	1973	306	412
	ZSU 23/4 Self-propelled automatic anti-aircraft gun. Tracked vehicle carries a quad 23-mm gun.	1975	40	40 ^b
	BM-21 Towed 122-mm multiple rocket launcher, each with 40 tubes.	1975	12	12
				
		^a Estimated.		
		^b The 40 do not include other, smaller-caliber anti-aircraft guns.		

Figure 2. Key Soviet Weapon Systems in the Peruvian Armed Forces¹¹³

¹¹³ Central Intelligence Agency, "Peru: Prospects for Increased Soviet Bloc Influence," 8-9.

Table 3. Major Soviet Weapons and Equipment in Peruvian Inventory¹¹⁴

Model/Type		
Aircraft	SU-22 fighter-bomber	49
	AN-26 short-range transport	16
	MI-8 medium-lift helicopter	29
	MI-6 heavy-lift helicopter	6
Missiles	SA-3 surface-to-air (launcher)	30
	SA-7 surface-to-air	270
	AS-7 air-to-surface	NA
	AS-9 air-to-surface	18
	AA-2 air-to-air	NA
	AT-3 antitank (launcher)	99
Tanks	T-55 medium tank	300
Artillery	M-46 130-mm field gun	36
	D-30 122-mm howitzer	36
	BM-21 122-mm self-propelled rocket launcher	12
	ZSU-23-4 23-mm self-propelled antiaircraft gun	40

^a Does not include other armored vehicles, utility vehicles, smaller weapons, radars, and other equipment.

Soviet motivations for military sales, besides the obvious economic benefit, included opening new arms sales markets and bolstering common political interests.¹¹⁵ Peru was the first in South America to purchase Soviet military equipment. Through military sales, the Soviet Union was able to establish a large presence in Peru. Thousands of Peruvian military officers studied in the Soviet Union, and Soviet military equipment required Soviet technical assistance, training, and advisors on use of the equipment in country.

¹¹⁴ Central Intelligence Agency, "Peru-USSR: Implications of the Military Relationship," 3.

¹¹⁵ Berrios and Blasier, "Peru and the Soviet Union (1969-1989)," 376.

D. CONCLUSIONS: SOVIET—PERUVIAN TIES DURING THE COLD WAR

It is clear that relations between Peru and the CMEA states increased dramatically throughout the 1970s and 1980s. While this was certainly cause for concern for the United States and the West in an enduring rivalry with the Soviet Union, it does not appear that the Soviet Union was able to make significant strategic advances in Peru.

Politically, the Soviet Union had very little sway over the military government of Peru. General Velasco was neither capitalist nor communist, and wanted to remain firmly non-aligned with either power during the Cold War. The military leadership, who worked closely with Velasco, was generally anti-communist, and had no desire to adopt communist ideology. Since the Peruvian Communist Party was weak and never gained a foothold, not to mention splitting into the Maoist Sendero Luminoso (opposed by the Soviet Union), the Soviet Union was not able to use it as a political lever. Even after compiling substantial debt to the communist bloc after the departure of General Velasco and later military regimes, the Soviet Union did not use the economic coercion in order to twist Peru against the West. Overall, even if the Soviet Union had nefarious intentions in Peru during the Cold War, it was unable to make it a proxy in the fashion of Cuba or Nicaragua.

Economically, Peru certainly expanded trade and other economic relations dramatically with the Soviet Union and CMEA after the rise of the Velasco regime, but there is little evidence that it was strategically beneficial to the Soviet Union. It was in Peru's nationalist interest to diversify trading partners away from the United States to combat a perceived U.S. imperialism. While the Soviet Union may have hoped that increased economic ties would have led to a break from the West, prior economic relationships proved too strong and advantageous to cut off. Proximity to the United States, and the sustainability of the capitalist system ultimately were shown to be more robust than ties with the East. Manipulations of the Peruvian market along with a number of other domestic factors caused a severe economic downturn in the 1980s which led to a country incapable of repaying its debts, and of little use to a collapsing Soviet empire. In

sum, while the Soviet Union gained significant influence through economic relations in Peru, it was unable to capitalize on them.

The area where the Soviet Union made the most significant gains and enduring influence was security and military affairs. Advanced Soviet military equipment sold to Peru in the 1970s and 1980s is used to this day, and still requires Russian technical training, assistance, maintenance, and spare parts. The advantage of weapons systems sales is that their high price and technical requirements lock in interaction between seller and buyer for decades. Regardless, the United States set itself up for such a situation by refusing military sales to Peru on grounds of what in retrospect seem like petty quarrels. The idea that Peru was cozying to the Soviet Union in support of a global Cold War is easily refuted, but there is no doubt that Soviet arms sales to Peru tilted the strategic balance of power in South America to the Eastern advantage. As will be shown in the next chapter, Peru to this day relies on Russian assistance for its military equipment, and the effects of Soviet military assistance remain a factor in a new post-Cold War global environment.

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III. CONTEMPORARY PERU—RUSSIA RELATIONS

As noted in Chapter I, there was little activity between Russia and Latin America from the fall of the Berlin Wall to the mid 2000s. In 2008, tensions began to raise between the United States and Russia in regards U.S. support for a missile site in Poland, Russia's opposition to talk of Georgia and Ukraine joining NATO, and the West's denunciation of Russian aggression in Georgia.¹¹⁶ In November 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev conducted an historic visit to Latin America by visiting Cuba, Venezuela, Brazil, and Peru, marking a turn in international relations by demonstrating a re-engagement with the region.¹¹⁷ Since then, Peru and Russia have broadened their ties and strengthened their relationship, especially in terms of military and security issues. Based on the historic ties between Peru and Russia, it is understandable that since the countries regained an economic and political foothold after the turbulent 1990s, they would reengage their relations. This chapter will examine the contemporary diplomatic, economic, cultural, and security interactions between Peru and Russia.

A. DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

As noted, political relations were renewed between Peru and Russia during the 2008 Medvedev visit to Peru, where the Russian President was quoted saying that the Andean nation was “friends, with whom Russia maintains privileged relations.”¹¹⁸ Russia signed a series of agreements with Peru as President Alan Garcia intended to strengthen ties in military, trade, and scientific cooperation.¹¹⁹ The meeting was the start of a second chapter in relations for the two countries, with the possibility of coordination

¹¹⁶ Sara Llana, “Russia’s New Presence in Latin America—CSMonitor.Com,” *Christian Science Monitor*, November 25, 2008, <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2008/1125/p01s01-woam.html>.

¹¹⁷ Ellis, “Russian Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: Return to the ‘Strategic Game’ in a Complex-Interdependent Post-Cold War World?,” 55.

¹¹⁸ JEIFETS, “Russia Is Coming Back to Latin America: Perspectives and Obstacles,” 93.

¹¹⁹ “Latin American Herald Tribune—Peru, Russia Strengthen Relations,” November 25, 2008, <http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=321268&CategoryId=14095>.

in the fields of energy, hydrocarbons, mining, space industry, and nuclear power.¹²⁰ The overall goal was to restart economic and political ties.

The diplomatic relationship further strengthened in 2012 when Peruvian President Ollanta Humala (President from July 28, 2011—July 28, 2016) became the first Peru head of state to visit Russia by attending the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Vladivostok, Russia, where he met with President Vladimir Putin.¹²¹ Putin and Humala met again at the July 2014 BRICS summit in Brazil and at another state visit in Moscow in November 2014.¹²² In November of 2015 Russia and Peru signed a joint declaration of strategic partnership at the Paris Climate accords, intended to strengthen “political understanding between both nations and [reaffirm] their willingness to move bilateral cooperation forward.”¹²³ The declaration again stressed the engagement areas of military cooperation, economic trade, science and technology, culture and education, and nuclear power. It came as a surprising move by Peru in light of newly emplaced sanctions on the Russian Federation by Western countries due to Russia’s annexation of the Crimea. Newly elected Peruvian president Pedro Pablo Kuczynski met with Vladimir Putin at the APEC summit in Lima, Peru, in 2016, where they agreed to triple bilateral trade to \$1 billion USD over the next three years.¹²⁴ All of these state visits marked a dramatic increase in diplomatic relations from the past.

Overall, the number of high level Russian visits to Peru from 2000 to 2017 ranks sixth among all of Latin America countries, behind Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, Nicaragua, and Brazil.¹²⁵ Since 2008 the Peruvian and Russian presidents have had

¹²⁰ “Latin American Herald Tribune—Peru, Russia Strengthen Relations.”

¹²¹ Ellis, “Russian Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: Return to the ‘Strategic Game’ in a Complex-Interdependent Post-Cold War World?,” 55.

¹²² Ellis, 55.

¹²³ “Peru, Russia ink Joint Declaration on establishment of Strategic Partnership,” Andina Peru News Agency, November 30, 2015, <https://andina.pe/ingles/noticia-peru-russia-ink-joint-declaration-on-establishment-of-strategic-partnership-587233.aspx>.

¹²⁴ “Peru, Russia Leaders Agree on Increasing Trade,” Andina Peru News Agency, November 19, 2016, <https://andina.pe/ingles/noticia-peru-russia-leaders-agree-on-increasing-trade-641123.aspx>.

¹²⁵ Miles, “Virtual Russian Influence in Latin America.”

regular face-to-face meetings on a level never seen before, and have signed agreements showing intentions of drastically expanding the Peru-Russia relationship.

B. ECONOMIC RELATIONS

Although diplomatic interaction between Peru and Russia made a drastic increase since the late 2000s, evidence of planned massive trade increases and economic interaction has yet to materialize. In regard to trade, while it is true that economic interaction vastly increased after 2008, overall it levelled out well below the desired \$1 billion USD per year. Peru's exports to Russia mainly consist of edible fruit and nuts at 36% of total, mineral ore at 20%, and seafood at 16%.¹²⁶ Total exports rose steadily from about \$25 million USD in 2009 to a 2018 total of \$182 million USD in 2018, as shown in Figure 3. Peru imports a much greater amount from Russia, the majority being fertilizers at 51% and iron and steel at 27% of total.¹²⁷ Overall, imports from Russia rose from a 2009 figure of just under \$200 million USD to a near-steady average of \$300–\$350 million USD from 2011 to 2018, with outliers of about \$500 million USD in 2011 and \$450 million USD in 2018, as shown in Figure 4. These economic ties are modest, if not marginal in terms of Russian trade in the region. In 2013, Peru ranked as the 11th largest trading partner in Latin America.¹²⁸ Although trade has increased and continues to increase between the two countries, they remain minor partners dealing mainly in raw materials and Peru runs a large trade deficit with Russia, which is unique to Latin America.

¹²⁶ "Russia Imports from Peru," UN COMTRADE Data, accessed October 24, 2019, <https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/imports/peru>.

¹²⁷ "Peru Imports from Russia," UN COMTRADE Data, accessed October 24, 2019, <https://tradingeconomics.com/peru/imports/russia>.

¹²⁸ Ellis, *The New Russian Engagement with Latin America*, 58.




Figure 3. Peru Exports to Russia by Year (USD)¹²⁹




Figure 4. Peru Imports from Russia by Year (USD)¹³⁰

Peru and Russia have also collaborated in the space arena. Peru’s space agency, National Commission for Aerospace Research and Development (CONIDA), which was formally established in 1974, had its first organically designed satellites, PUCP-Sat 1 and Pocket-PUCP launched into orbit by Russia in November of 2013.¹³¹ CONIDA has

¹²⁹ “Russia Imports from Peru.”

¹³⁰ “Peru Imports from Russia.”

¹³¹ Kevin Freese, “A Small Box That’s a Big Deal: How Latin American Countries Are Using CubeSATS and Why It Matters | Small Wars Journal,” *Small Wars Journal* (blog), accessed October 24, 2019, <https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/a-small-box-that%E2%80%99s-a-big-deal-how-latin-american-countries-are-using-cubesats-and-why-it-ma>.

regularly partnered with Russia, and Russia again launched Peru's fourth satellite into orbit on a spacewalk from the international space station in August of 2014.¹³² These were observation satellites also used with the intent of advancing satellite design. Of note, the United States space agency NASA as well has assisted CONIDA in satellite launch and technical expertise. Peru also has investigated the use of the Russian satellite navigation system, GLONASS, a competitor to the Western GPS system, which would make future integrations with any U.S. electronics systems a national security threat.¹³³

Peru has set its eyes on Russian civilian airliners to replace its aging fleet of civilian transport aircraft. Of the 133 Russian-made Superjet 100 (SSJ100) regional transport jets in use, 100 are operated in Russia, and Peruvian Airlines has previously used Boeing aircraft. It is therefore notable, if not quizzical, that Peru would be one of very few countries outside of Russia to use the aircraft. In June 2018, Peruvian Airlines signed a letter of intent with Sukhoi to purchase 20 Superjet 100s and MC-21 narrow-body transports, with plans to complete the purchase in the 2020s.¹³⁴ The deal has yet to be completed.

Although Peru has had discussions with Russia in the energy sector, little has come to fruition. The Russian petroleum company Gazprom has previously shown interest in assistance with building a new gas pipeline and a liquid natural gas plant in Peru.¹³⁵ The Russian economy is mainly dependent upon the export of petroleum and energy, and it is understandable that Russia would not wish to assist potential competitors in a time when the West is discussing diverting European energy dependence from Moscow. As mentioned previously, Peru and Russia have discussed the possibility of nuclear power, but there has not been concrete action taken. Various other construction, manufacturing, and transportation projects have been discussed, but overall China has

¹³² Freese.

¹³³ Ellis, *The New Russian Engagement with Latin America*, 58.

¹³⁴ "Peruvian Airline Signs LoI for 20 Russian SSJ100 and MC-21 Aircraft—Russian Aviation News," accessed October 24, 2019, <http://www.rusaviainsider.com/peruvian-airline-signs-loi-20-russian-ssj100-mc-21-aircraft/>.

¹³⁵ Ellis, *The New Russian Engagement with Latin America*, 59.

been the major foreign actor to make inroads into Peru in the area of construction and infrastructure, not Russia.

It is clear that Peru has rebooted political relations with Russia in a dramatic way by the number of high-level visits conducted between the two states. Both countries' presidents have supported dramatically increasing economic relations as well as coordinating military and scientific cooperation. Scientific assistance has been offered to Peru as shown by the coordination in satellite and space technology, but overall it has been minor. Very minor strides have been taken by Russia in the realm of energy and infrastructure. Economic interaction has risen dramatically in recent years but has not amounted to a level which would indicate a special interest. As seen in economic relations between Peru and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the Peruvian-Russian collaboration offers an alternative to the United States led economic system amid lingering memories of painful neoliberal economic reforms undertaken by Peru to quell economic crisis in the 1990s. To date, it is not evident that economic expansion with Russia has resulted in displacing Western companies, trade, or markets.

C. MEDIA INFLUENCE AND CULTURAL INTERACTION

During the Cold War, there was little if any evidence that Soviet Union significantly influenced the population or culture in Peru. There were a number of military, technical, and academic personnel who were sponsored to study at Soviet Union and Eastern European universities and specialized schools, but beyond these exchange programs the Soviet Union had little cultural interaction. There was no Russian media in Peru and most Russians in country were there for training Peruvian personnel and technical expertise. Today, there are a few hundred Russian citizens and another 10,000 Peruvian citizens who have studied at Russian Universities that make up the direct Russian sphere of influence, not a significant number.¹³⁶ There has been little negative Peruvian press regarding Russia, even in the wake of the annexation of Crimea, and the people generally regard Vladimir Putin in a manner of great respect, even reverence as a

¹³⁶ Cardenal, "Reframing Relations in Peru," 83.

strong leader.¹³⁷ In the more globalized and interconnected modern era, there are more opportunities for Russia to influence the Peruvian people and expose the population of Peru to Russian ideals, propaganda, culture, and soft power.

1. Media Influence

One major opportunity for Russian impact is in the Peruvian media. Russia has been historically notorious and adept at spreading propaganda in its near abroad, but more recently has sought audience in regions all around the globe. As argued previously, although Russia has few commercial interests and financial resources in Peru, it still focuses on Peruvian media and desires to have a media voice. Russian media has been proactive in interacting with Peruvian outlets; during 2015 and 2016, a Russian government sponsored supplement, “Russia Beyond the Headlines,” was placed in the Peruvian newspaper, *El Peruano* on multiple occasions.¹³⁸ The Peruvian edition of the Spanish media giant *El País* distributed a Russian publication on several occasions as well.¹³⁹ The Russian inserts included information on Russian tourist destinations, geopolitical issues relevant to Moscow, and military and technological cooperation being conducted between Peru and Russia.

Russia has had success in Latin America on media platforms using television broadcasting, social media, and the internet. Russian state run news outlets including *RT*, *Sputnik Mundo*, *TASS*, and *Voices of Russia* are actively broadcast and followed throughout the region.¹⁴⁰ Latin American media outlets are often under-funded and lack resources or ability to properly fact-check, and can often be found republishing Russian content.¹⁴¹ In my research for this thesis, I personally have discovered on multiple

¹³⁷ Cardenal, 84.

¹³⁸ Cardenal, 84.

¹³⁹ Cardenal, 84.

¹⁴⁰ Vladimir Rouvinski, “Kennan Cable No.20: Understanding Russian Priorities in Latin America,” *Wilson Center*, February 3, 2017, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no20-understanding-russian-priorities-latin-america>; Miles, “Virtual Russian Influence in Latin America.”

¹⁴¹ Brian Fonseca, “Russian Deceptive Propaganda Growing Fast in Latin America,” *Global Americans*, August 7, 2018, <https://theglobalamericans.org/2018/08/russian-deceptive-propaganda-growing-fast-in-latin-america/>.

occasions Peruvian news outlets using Russian news stories as their primary source, often entirely copied and translated into Spanish. I was unable to find original reporting from Peruvian media outlets on the events covered even after multiple attempts. In Peru, RT provides free content to Peru's Channel 7 television news and broadcasts on 100 local cable TV channels around the country.¹⁴² Although it is impossible to get accurate figures, it is likely that Russian state media reaches a very large number of Peruvians using social media and internet sources as well.

Russian news media is notorious for spreading propaganda, including misleading, incomplete, or outright false news in order to undermine the United States and the West, and in Latin America there is no exception. Specifically, at a time when Peru was in the midst of an arms purchase from the United States, *RT Actualidad* published a false account of the United States establishing a secret military base in the Peruvian Amazon rainforest.¹⁴³ Inference on the timing would indicate that Russia was attempting to undermine American legitimacy and possibly hinder an international military security agreement. Although this is merely one example of Russian media propaganda attempting to undermine the West in Peru, there are countless others found around Latin America.¹⁴⁴

2. Cultural Interaction

There is a prominent presence of Russian cultural promotion in Peru with respect to the small size of the Russian expatriates. The Russian Center of Science and Culture, based in Lima, is a Russian state funded organization which promotes Russia's culture in Peru.¹⁴⁵ The official Russian Embassy website states the objectives of the center, to:

Contribute to strengthen relations between Russia and Peru in the cultural, scientific-technological, educational and humanitarian spheres;

¹⁴² Cardenal, "Reframing Relations in Peru," 85.

¹⁴³ Fonseca, "Russian Deceptive Propaganda Growing Fast in Latin America."

¹⁴⁴ Fonseca.

¹⁴⁵ Cardenal, "Reframing Relations in Peru," 85.

Contribute to the formation in Peru of an objective image of the Russian Federation as a new democratic state;

Promote in Peru knowledge of the history and culture of the peoples that make up the Russian Federation. Likewise, disseminate information about its current internal and external policy, its scientific, cultural and economic potential;

Structure, together with similar entities in Peru, programs and all kinds of activities that strengthen the humanitarian, cultural, scientific-technical and economic exchange between Russia and Peru.¹⁴⁶

In order to accomplish its objectives, the cultural center regularly holds “conferences, symposia, seminars and similar events in order to inform the Peruvian public about the challenges Russia faces ...[and] artistic and cultural events such as recitals, concerts, film cycles, photo exhibitions, painting, sculpture, crafts, etc.”¹⁴⁷ Most of these events focus on elements of Russian patriotism, including an annual event to commemorate the Russian victory in World War II and the defeat of fascism, as well as a yearly May 9th celebration of Victory Day.¹⁴⁸ Although these events have a limited interest among Peruvians, Russia is renowned in other areas such as ballet, circus, dance, and music, and which remain popular paid events in Peru. Over 225,000 Peruvians have attended Russian circus and ballet shows alone from 2011–2017.¹⁴⁹

Peru continues to maintain academic ties with Russia, as it did during the Cold War. The Russian embassy offers approximately 30 scholarships per year, and an estimated 50 Peruvian students study in Russia annually.¹⁵⁰ Generally, students studying in Russia experience a more affordable atmosphere, even those who are not studying with the benefit of a scholarship. Russia also has a program where it sponsors young leaders to visit the country for increased academic, cultural, and economic interaction and

¹⁴⁶ “Cultural Center—Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Peru,” Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Peru, accessed October 25, 2019, https://peru.mid.ru/es_ES/web/peru-es/centro-cultural.

¹⁴⁷ “Cultural Center—Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Peru.”

¹⁴⁸ Cardenal, “Reframing Relations in Peru,” 85.

¹⁴⁹ Cardenal, 85.

¹⁵⁰ Cardenal, 86.

awareness of Russian issues for the Peruvian people.¹⁵¹ As mentioned previously, Russia collaborated to launch Peru's satellite projects, and has also had several cosmonauts visit and speak at a Peruvian universities.

Media influence and cultural interaction between Russia and Peru continues to grow, but it is extremely difficult to judge the levels of reach and influence. Russia does not publish statistics on numbers of media users from Peru, and overall statistics on viewership of Russian media come from the Russian state and cannot be trusted. While Russia provides numerous opportunities for cultural and academic interaction, overall it reaches a small number of Peruvians, mainly in Lima. Undoubtedly, however, both media and cultural efforts have contributed at least slightly to a more positive view of Russia by the Peruvian people.

D. MILITARY RELATIONS AND SECURITY COOPERATION

The most notable area of cooperation between Russia and Peru and most important to United States interests and foreign policy in the region is military and security affairs; namely the sale of military equipment and continued Russian security assistance. As noted in Chapter II, Russia sold massive amounts of military equipment to Peru during the Cold War, and many of these weapons systems remain in active use today. Russia began re-engaging military interaction with Peru in 2008 along with renewed diplomatic and economic relations. This section will detail Russian military sales and security related activity within Peru since political relations were renewed.

Peru's purchases of Russian military equipment did not stop during the period after the Cold War. During the presidency of Alberto Fujimori in the 1990s, Peru purchased 24 MiG-29 fighter jets, Su-25 ground support aircraft, and Mi-25 attack helicopters.¹⁵² During the post-2008 renewal of diplomatic ties, Russia worked with Russian-friendly Peru senior military leadership to win new contracts and build military

¹⁵¹ Cardenal, 86.

¹⁵² Keir Giles and Robert Evan Ellis, *The Rise of Russia: The Turning Point for Russian Foreign Policy & the Change of Strategy* (N.p.: Madison & Adams Press, 2017), 184.

relations based on the massive Russian built Peruvian military arsenal.¹⁵³ Military contracts from 2008 to 2010 include a \$106 million USD upgrade for Peru's MiG-29 aircraft with \$400 million USD in follow on commitments to future upgrades, and a contract to restore and maintain Peru's Russian helicopter fleet.¹⁵⁴ In 2010, Peru had difficulty completing the acquisition of Chinese made tanks and that same year purchased two Russian Mi-35 and six Mi-171 helicopters to support operations against the Sendero Luminoso terrorists.¹⁵⁵

Military purchases increased dramatically in 2013. Peru purchased 24 more Mi-171 helicopters for \$528 million USD, a contract which included \$180 million USD in support of the Peruvian economy by mutual production of spare parts.¹⁵⁶ That year, the Russian minister of defense, Sergey Shoygu visited Peru, and the two countries discussed building a factory to manufacture military trucks by the Russian company Kamaz, as well as the purchase of 110 T-90S tanks to replace the Cold War era T-55s.¹⁵⁷ Neither of these possibilities have come to fruition, and Peru has yet to purchase new tanks as of writing. Peru has also discussed the purchase of man-portable air defense missiles from Russia. Military education exchanges increased as well, and in 2012 Russia sponsored 200 military officers to study at Russian universities.¹⁵⁸ Finally, in 2013 Russia agreed to assist Peru in counter-drug operations, including training, information sharing, monitoring drug trafficking, and planning and execution of joint operations.¹⁵⁹

Peru's main Russian assets are its fleet of helicopters, currently more than 100 strong, the largest Russian inventory in Latin America. Recently Russia has assisted Peru

¹⁵³ Ellis, "Russian Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: Return to the 'Strategic Game' in a Complex-Interdependent Post-Cold War World?," 56.

¹⁵⁴ Giles and Ellis, *The Rise of Russia*, 185.

¹⁵⁵ Giles and Ellis, 185. The reason for the unsuccessful purchase of Chinese tanks was unable to be found in this research.

¹⁵⁶ Giles and Ellis, 185.

¹⁵⁷ Giles and Ellis, 185.

¹⁵⁸ Ellis, *The New Russian Engagement with Latin America*, 58.

¹⁵⁹ James Bargent, "Russia Looks to Increase Influence in Latin America Drug War," *InSight Crime* (blog), March 27, 2017, <https://www.insightcrime.org/news/brief/russia-influence-latin-america-drug-war/>; Giles and Ellis, *The Rise of Russia*, 287.

by building several important maintenance facilities. As an update to the purchase of 24 Mi-171 which was completed in 2015, Peru agreed to upgrade its helicopter radio and GPS systems with a Russian model, notably incompatible with U.S. systems.¹⁶⁰ In 2018, Peru opened its first helicopter maintenance and repair center in Lima, built in coordination with Russian Helicopter Holdings, a subsidiary of the massive military equipment company, Rostec State Corporation.¹⁶¹ Peru will also open a Russian built mobile helicopter service center this year under contract with Rosoboronexport, a major Russian defense contractor and also a subsidiary of Rostec.¹⁶² These facilities are strategically important to Peru; major overhauls will no longer require shipping fuselages or engines to Russia for periodic maintenance procedures.

Every two years, Lima is host to a major Latin American military equipment exhibition, SITDEF, the International Technology Hall for Defense and Prevention of Disasters. The event hosts countries from around the Latin American region, and has limited U.S. participation. Russia uses this event as an opportunity to advertise their military products, host discussions on future military sales and cooperation, complete previous military deals, and get the public interested in Russian military equipment. Each year, Rosoboronexport brings over 200 items of military equipment, including tanks, helicopters, and jet aircraft to display.¹⁶³ At SITDEF 2017, Peru showed interest in

¹⁶⁰ Richard Tomkins, "Peru Receives Russian Radios as Part of Helicopter Deal," UPI Defense News, October 13, 2016, <https://www.upi.com/Defense-News/2016/10/13/Peru-receives-Russian-radios-as-part-of-helicopter-deal/3731476330187/>.

¹⁶¹ "Russia Opens Helicopter Repair Center in Peru," TASS, accessed October 25, 2019, <https://tass.com/defense/1035318>; Janes Stevenson, "Russian Helicopters Opens Peruvian Facility for Mi-17 Helicopters | Jane's 360," Janes Defense Industry, December 11, 2018, <https://www.janes.com/article/85135/russian-helicopters-opens-peruvian-facility-for-mi-17-helicopters>.

¹⁶² "SITDEF 2019: Russian Helicopters to Complete Service Center for Mi-171Sh in Peru | SITDEF 2019 News Official Online Show Daily Lima Peru | Defence Security Military Exhibition 2019 Daily News Category," accessed October 25, 2019, https://www.armyrecognition.com/sitdef_2019_news_official_online_show_daily_lima_peru/isdef_2019_russian_helicopters_to_complete_service_center_for_mi-171sh_in_peru.html; "Russian Helicopters to Open Mobile Service Center in Peru for Mi-171Sh Helicopters," *Vertical Magazine* (blog), May 16, 2019, <https://www.verticalmag.com/press-releases/russian-helicopters-to-open-mobile-service-center-in-peru-for-mi-171sh-helicopters/>.

¹⁶³ "Rosoboronexport Steps up Cooperation with Peru | Rosoboronexport," Rosoboronexport, May 15, 2019, http://roe.ru/eng/press-service/press-releases/rosoboronexport-steps-up-cooperation-with-peru/?from_main.

purchasing the Russian Sukhoi Su-30MKI BrahMos cruise missile, jointly developed between Russia and India.¹⁶⁴

Peruvian reliance on Russia for military sales and security assistance was solidified by major arms purchased in 1970s. The country continued to purchase some military equipment through the 1990s, and developed a large Russian-built arsenal. Maintenance, technical expertise, and equipment familiarity have kept Peru a major purchaser of Russian weapons systems, and reliant on Russia for continued security cooperation. Much of the information in this section identified plans for future Russian weapons sales which thus far have not occurred. Although Peru's continued reliance on Russia is a cause for concern, Peru also leans heavily on the United States for security cooperation in counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism efforts.¹⁶⁵ Although Russian security interactions with Peru distance the United States as a partner, diplomatic relations have continued to be cordial.

E. CONCLUSIONS: CONTEMPORARY PERU-RUSSIA RELATIONS

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia experienced turbulent economic stress while attempting to adopt capitalism and a free market system. Likewise, Peru had severe economic difficulties in the 1980s which led to adoption of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s in order to qualify for International Monetary Fund financial assistance. During the time period of the 1980s until 2008, Peru and Russia had little political interaction, but completed several large military equipment purchases. Since political re-engagement in 2008, there have been significant increases in trade and security cooperation.

¹⁶⁴ "BrahMos Cruise Missile for Peru and Chile? | April 2018 Global Defense Security Army News Industry | Defense Security Global News Industry Army 2018 | Archive News Year," Army Recognition, April 3, 2018, https://www.armyrecognition.com/april_2018_global_defense_security_army_news_industry/brahmos_cruise_missile_for_peru_and_chile_.html; Huma Siddiqui, "Chile, Peru Show Interest in BrahMos Cruise Missile," *The Financial Express*, April 3, 2018, <https://www.financialexpress.com/defence/chile-peru-show-interest-in-brahmos-cruise-missile/1119304/>.

¹⁶⁵ According to the US Department of State website, the United States has assisted Peru with counter-drug operations, the formation of police precincts, counter-money laundering operations, and customs collaboration, among others. <https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-international-narcotics-and-law-enforcement-affairs-work-by-country/peru-summary/>.

In the economic arena, Russia and Peru greatly increased trade after 2008. Imports from Russia rose and steadied off at around \$350 million USD per year, and exports remain at about \$100 million USD. Peru's trade deficit with Russia indicates that Peru's economy may not benefit financially from exports as much as from Russian imports. Peru also does not enjoy a relationship with Russia anything close to what Cuba did during the Cold War. Although there was a dramatic increase in the level of trade, desired levels of \$1 billion USD per year were never achieved.

Militarily, Peru continues to purchase equipment and services from Russia. As noted earlier, the past purchase of major weapons systems has locked in Russia as a strong security partner. Recent purchases of equipment raise the concern of corruption in a country with a historically corrupt government. Some have alleged that expensive arms purchases involve more than meets the eye. Many planned or discussed military sales and security agreements have not yet come to fruition. Next to Venezuela, Peru plays a dominant role in Russian arms purchases in South America.

Finally, in the aspect of media and cultural influence, Russia has sought to influence the Peruvian population. Culturally, Russia seeks influence with public events and shows, but the small Russian population and number of Peruvians who have interacted with Russia keeps influence to a minimum, along with events being limited to the capital of Lima. The area in which it is most difficult to gauge effectiveness, as well as being a major cause for concern, is media influence. Without knowing how many Peruvians are consumers of Russian media, or how many are persuaded by its propaganda, it is difficult to know how well Russia has penetrated. As seen in previous information operations, the Russians can be particularly effective, which should be cause for concern if Russia sees an opportunity arise in Peru.

Overall, Russia has certainly resumed relations with Peru, but perhaps not to the level of major concern. Understanding what the findings of this chapter entail is the goal of this thesis, and will be examined in the next chapter.

IV. CONCLUSION

During the Cold War, Peru dramatically expanded its relationship with the Soviet Union, causing alarm to the United States. The research outlined in Chapter II shows that Peru's motivations for the relationship were to increase its national security vis-à-vis rival neighbors, flex a nationalist sentiment by reducing reliance on the United States, and to achieve economic diversification by expanding trade partners and attempting creative economic restructuring. Soviet motivations may indeed have been nefarious in nature, perhaps to undermine the United States' influence in the region and support the move toward socialism in Peru. If these were indeed Soviet motivations, they did not amount to a successful outcome. Hindsight shows that the Velasco regime was neither socialist nor capitalist, and the Soviet Union had little political influence over Peru. Economically, the Soviet Union gained little from Peru as a trade partner. Most importantly, the sale of Russian military equipment made the Soviet Union and modern-day Russia an enduring security partner.

The contemporary relationship between Peru and Russia is marked by a similar rapid expansion much like occurred in the 1970s. Russia and Peru have opened a political dialogue, increased trade, and resumed military sales and security cooperation. Russia is using its infamous media propaganda arm to attempt to guide the Peruvian population in the direction of its preference. Overall, there is little evidence to suggest that Russian activity has pushed Peru away from the United States, or that Russian influence has made a dramatic impact in Peru. The relationship has likely advanced an overall favorable impression of Russia within the government of Peru and with the population, but it is impossible to know to what extent. So, is the current Peruvian-Russian relationship a return to Cold War tactics?

There are certainly similarities, and by comparing the conclusions from the Cold War relationship to the contemporary, there is evidence that Russia's current moves harken to the Soviet model. In both 1970 and 2008 Peru quickly moved to increase interaction with the Russian state. Both the past and modern relationships rapidly increased political, economic, and military interaction. The contemporary relationship

includes much more Russian media and cultural influence. Just as during the Cold War, Russian political and economic influence has been shown to be limited, and dwarfed by those of the United States and China. The current relationship between Russia and Peru has not pushed the United States away as a partner, and Peru and the United States maintain an excellent relationship. It is evident that Russian activity is much more prevalent in Latin American countries that do not have such a cordial relationship with the United States, such as Nicaragua, Venezuela, Argentina, and Cuba. It is important to note that open hostility in these countries toward the United States is present to the current day, unlike in Peru. Although Russia to this point has not been significantly successful at undermining United States influence in Peru, this motivation should be assumed based on recent interaction and past Russian activity around the world.

A. STRATEGIC IMPACT

Although Russian resurgence is of strategic interest, there is not much cause for economic concern. Russia is not in a position to dramatically raise its trade levels with Peru to the levels discussed in Chapter III. Sanctions have been painful to Russia, and its economy is heavily reliant on the price of energy, which is currently quite low. Russia does not have nearly the economic influence in Peru or Latin America than that of the United States or China, and Russia does not seem to be in any position to displace U.S. companies or markets. Peru will most likely maintain a close economic relationship with the United States for years to come.

Despite economic limitations, Russia's relationship with Peru and Latin America is cause for strategic concern for the United States. Russia has been openly hostile toward the United States, and since the 2016 election interference, subsequent Western sanctions, and conflict in Syria, the relationship does not seem to be improving. Latin America's proximity and historic ties with the United States make it of particular interest. Events in Latin America can directly affect the United States as seen by migration, gang violence, and drug trafficking. Peru is geographically important because it neighbors Chile and Colombia, both of which are more pro-U.S. than Peru itself. If Peru should turn further toward Russia it could impact its relationship with these strategically important

neighbors. Peru's Russian military equipment allows for an enduring security relationship and presence, which could easily translate to influence. So far, Peru has not been host to Russian warships or bombers, as recently seen in Venezuela, but if Peru were to allow more Russian military access there would be even more concern for U.S. influence and access. Importantly, beyond the scope of this thesis, Russian influence in Peru is just one marker of rising Russian influence more broadly in other areas of Latin America.¹⁶⁶

Russia's presence in Peru and Latin America has the ability to undermine the U.S. role in the region. The re-engagement by Russia with Latin America affects how the region interacts with international organizations. Dr. R. Evan Ellis names three specific categories these impact: undermining the likeliness of key actors to work with the United States within Latin America and on the world stage, isolating pro-U.S. states, and enabling and emboldening anti-U.S. regimes, namely the ALBA countries and Argentina, by allowing them to host and support Russian activity which strategically threatens the United States.¹⁶⁷ In the case of Peru, these categories loosely apply, are plausible in the future, but currently aren't of national security concern. First, Peru's inclination toward the United States has not yet been undermined, but it is certainly possible if the relationship with Russia becomes stronger in the future. Second, Peru borders the two most pro-U.S. countries in the region, Colombia and Chile. To date Russia's influence in Peru hasn't led to any sort of isolation of Chile or Peru, despite proximity. Peru has had multiple historic quarrels with Chile, and much of Colombian cocaine originates in Peru; Russia's influence is capable of undermining these historically tenuous relationships through political pressure or propaganda. Finally, although Peru is no longer an ALBA country, it has been in the past, and may consider rejoining in the future depending on the political atmosphere. While not currently a major concern, these issues are of strategic interest to the United States.

¹⁶⁶ Gurganus, "Russia: Playing a Geopolitical Game in Latin America"; Rouvinski, "Kennan Cable No.20"; Jeifets, "Russia Is Coming Back to Latin America: Perspectives and Obstacles"; Douglas Farah and Liana Eustacia Reyes, "Russia in Latin America: A Strategic Analysis," *National Defense University: PRISM* V, no. 4 (2015): 101–17.

¹⁶⁷ Ellis, "Russian Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: Return to the 'Strategic Game' in a Complex-Interdependent Post-Cold War World?," 79.

Latin America's engagement with Russia, along with other countries such as China, undermines the West's U.S.-led direction of multinational organizations. Russia has been extremely receptive to working with regional organizations like the OAS, UNASUR, CELAC, and ALBA. Russia's engagement with Latin American countries and Peru also give it more opportunities to sway opinions within the United Nations. The closer Russia becomes with Latin America, the more difficult it is for the United States to mobilize coalitions of votes within the UN and agreement on international issues. Russia was able to turn to Latin America as a food supplier because of a lack of support for Russian sanctions in response to the crisis in Ukraine.¹⁶⁸ Latin American countries have previously disagreed with United States' international actions and Russian influence in Peru will likely sway disagreement in the future.

Russia's growing activity in Peru and Latin America does not present an immediate military threat. However, Russia is capable of diverting U.S. attention and resources away from concerns in other parts of the world. The deployment of Russian nuclear-capable forces such as two strategic bomber aircraft to Venezuela in 2018 is an example of this.¹⁶⁹ Peru has had territorial disputes with Ecuador, Colombia, and Chile. In the possibility that these disputes once again rise to the threat of violence, Russia would have the opportunity of supporting military action against a U.S. ally. Willingness to work with Russia creates regional security concerns which undermine the United States.

Finally, the most foreboding and in this author's opinion the most likely possibility of the impact of the Russian-Peruvian relationship relates to Russian media influence. As discussed in Chapter III, Russia has a strong media presence in Peru and Latin America, and lessons from the 2016 U.S. presidential elections remain fresh. Russia does not have much economic or political influence in Peru and the military relationship

¹⁶⁸ Ellis, *The New Russian Engagement with Latin America*, 80.

¹⁶⁹ Andrew Osborn, "Russian Nuclear-Capable Bomber Aircraft Fly to Venezuela, Angering U.S.," *Reuters*, December 12, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-russia-airforce-idUSKBN10A23L>.

remains relatively steady, but media is an area which is low cost and could produce high payoff for undermining the United States or the West.

Peru's political climate is extremely precarious, and since the 1990s the country has seen multiple presidents accused of corruption, human rights abuses, and facing jail time or committing suicide. The current president, Martín Vizcarra dissolved congress in early October, 2019, and the country faces yet another political crisis.¹⁷⁰ Should Russia wish to capitalize on political turbulence, Peru is ripe for the taking, and Russia is fully capable of launching a propaganda attack to sway the population in a direction of its choosing. If Russia could tip the political scales in Peru, the United States might see an anti-Western government in power with the ability to damage U.S. standing in the region. It is unknown if Russia has the willpower to launch such a campaign, or if it would be worth the strategic risk, but it remains a distinct possibility.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Russia's interest in Peru should be viewed most importantly as a microcosm of its interest in Latin America as a region. The United States should understand Russia's influence not simply on economic, political, or military terms, but in how it affects the U.S. position on the world stage, in-line with Russia's strategic goals of undermining the United States and the West. Russia's activity, directly and indirectly, can harm U.S. national security and ability to influence global consensus.

The United States has viewed Latin America largely in terms of the effects of migration, disaster relief, trafficking, and crime, and often underplays its strategic importance since the end of the Cold War. Even the well-known nickname for the military headquarters, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), is "Sleepycom" due to the lack of U.S. military activity and security interest. The United States should maintain a mindset that although issues in Latin America rarely affect the United States in a major way, they have a strategic capability of threatening U.S. interest.

¹⁷⁰ "How a Political Crisis Seized Peru: Boom Times, Corruption and Chaos at the Top—The New York Times," accessed November 2, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/03/world/americas/peru-corruption-economy.html>.

The region is easily capable of shifting toward an anti-U.S. sentiment overall, and individual states such as Peru need specific attention.

The first step to understanding Russia and other regional actors' activities is in-depth analysis and consideration of how these activities may be used to undermine the United States on the strategic world stage, which is one of the objectives of this thesis. This analysis should keep in consideration how other world powers such as China would side or react in major conflicts with the United States.

Understanding the implications of the Russia-Peru relationship have revealed that although there is no immediate cause for major concern, it is important the United States makes a concerted effort to maintain strong relationships with Peru and other partner nations in Latin America. USSOUTHCOM should continue efforts in security cooperation, including U.S. hospital ship visits, staff talks, training teams and professional military education, exercises, partnering in counter-terrorism and counter-drug efforts, and intelligence sharing. If possible, the United States should pursue higher profile military sales to Peru to ween the state from reliance on Russian support. The United States should make clear to Peru and Latin America that in the long-term, it is a better and more desirable partner than Russia.

Keeping Russia economically non-viable in Latin America is also a desired method to minimize its influence in Peru. Sanctions should be maintained until Russia has proven itself as a responsible world actor. Since oil makes the Russian economy run, diversifying Western energy suppliers will keep the country from making significant economic inroads into Peru and Latin America. Low oil prices would be key in this aspect, as well as moving Europe away from Russian energy reliance.

This thesis has relied on open-source unclassified documents. It has been revealing how extremely difficult it is to find current reliable information on Russian military sales and security activity in Peru. News releases are often directly from Russian media, and U.S. media outlets simply do not cover such material. U.S. media should not expect to profit from news relating to Latin American security issues, but it is extremely important that Russian activity in Peru remains public information and is kept under a

watchful eye by the U.S. government. If the U.S. intelligence agencies or U.S. Embassy Lima are not paying close attention, they should be.

Peru is its own state and is at liberty to do what is in its best interest, but this author has one recommendation. Russia is notorious for its media propaganda, influence, meddling, and outright lies. Ukraine was the subject of a major Russian media campaign that was extremely effective, and is a model which may be replicated in other countries. Russia attempted to sway the results of the U.S. presidential election, and we should assume that it will use social and public media venues to do so again and in other countries such as Peru. As noted, it can be very difficult to find current news on security issues in Peru, even from Spanish language and local outlets. Peru should invest as much as possible in expanding its organic news and social media outlets to ensure that it maintains a free and objective press, without relying on Russia. The more Russia infiltrates the Peruvian media, the more the country is at risk to the whims of an autocratic state.

This research has revealed that Russia's recent activity certainly resemble Cold War tactics in Peru, and as in the Cold War, have not yet shown strategic effects clearly beneficial to Russia. Yet these recent developments in the Russian-Peruvian relationship present strategic issues which are capable of undermining United States' national interests and security. Peru presents a case which should be noted for its ambiguity. The military regime which took power in 1968 has been studied on many levels, but this thesis is the first to compare Peru's close ties with the Soviet Union to modern Russian interaction. The case of Peru is specifically important because it demonstrates the complexity of international relationships, and shows how countries are not motivated strictly by extra-territorial great powers. Peru maintains a good relationship with the United States, unlike during the Cold War. Loyalty is based on a great number of factors, but financial interests are often overstated, as seen by the events of the Velasco regime. Russia's influence in modern-day Peru remains minor, but it is a harbinger which may be telling of support for U.S.-led Western world norms. If Peru should turn against the United States, others in Latin America and around the world may not be far behind.

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