

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



BORDER ISSUES OF SOVIET SUCCESSOR
STATES IN ASIA

EDITED BY
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**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA**

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FIELD	GROUP	SUBGROUP												
19. ABSTRACT <i>(Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)</i> This report is result of a research round table held in June 1992 at the Asilomar Conference Center, Pacific Grove, CA, along with an introduction and concluding chapters. The objective was to examine the situation of the successor states of the Soviet Union in Asia in the light of cross-border issues, historical conflicts and the present potentials of these states as they establish and renew their international relations. The interests of regional bordering states and of the United States in the emergence of these new states is examined, along with issues for future research														
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BORDER ISSUES OF SOVIET SUCCESSOR STATES IN ASIA

PROCEEDINGS OF A RESEARCH ROUND TABLE
ASILOMAR CONFERENCE CENTER
PACIFIC GROVE, CALIFORNIA - JUNE 1992

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BORDER ISSUES OF SOVIET SUCCESSOR STATES IN ASIA-AN INTRODUCTION

Ralph H. Magnus, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey

In October 1992, as if to confirm the direction of the discussions presented here, the three Central Asian republics bordering on China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, as well as Uzbekistan, sent representatives to Beijing to begin to settle the outstanding border issues left unresolved after three decades of Sino-Soviet negotiations. Disputed as having been imposed by “unequal treaties” in the nineteenth century, Beijing now faces several weak neighbors of negligible military standing instead of the Soviet superpower across the negotiating table. What cards do these newly independent republics hold? What is the future of international borders in this region? The Beijing border negotiations may well be just the tip of the iceberg.

The dismantlement of the Soviet empire in 1991 has thus forced the re-emergence of political issues which had lain dormant since the beginning of this century. Many of these involved the demarcation of former Soviet borders in Asia inherited from the old

Tsarist imperial arrangements of the nineteenth century. In the course of this century and after World War II in particular, the states bordering on the former Soviet empire have gained in political prestige and international standing. They are a long way from the unequal Soviet-Iranian Treaty of 1921, which granted the Soviets the unilateral right of military intervention in Iran should they feel threatened on their southern border. This article 6 was no mere historical curiosity, for despite its repudiation by Iran the Soviet government continued to assert its validity down to the end of the 1980s.

Added to such international issues, the new states of Central Asia are forced into the position of creating viable nation-states to replace the nominal identity they held as Soviet Socialist Republics in the old Soviet Union. In most serious issues, they were mere ciphers for the dictates of the Soviet central government and the Politburo of the CPSU in Moscow. As pointed out in the epilogue to this study, the ethnic-nationality Soviet republics were a kind of Soviet "mandate system" of colonial divide and rule, which gave some cultural autonomy to capture the support of local elites, but which lacked even the formal goal of the League of Nations mandate

system of preparation for full independence. Rather the Soviet system aimed at the replacement of all ethnicity with unity and with the new "Soviet man".

Today, we see the bordering states and the renewed Chinese Central Asian imperial system acting to revive historical ties and ambitions severed for over seven decades. We also have in Central Asian states themselves the legacy of seven decades of the existence of ethnically-based entities which has, if nothing else, created separate groups of political, economic and social elites. In this process of restoring ties and historical consciousness political awareness of the separation of current ethnic groups, past territorial claims, and a sense of unity stemming from an awareness of the common heritage of past history, culture and religion, are leading to the questioning of the validity of current international borders.

Simultaneously, and not unrelated events surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been the fact that similar issues have been raised in the Middle East proper in the defeat of Iraq by a international coalition in 1991, following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. These events reopened one of the major ethnic

issues arising from the post-World War I settlements, that of the Kurds, but it created a new involvement of the international system as a whole in the form of United Nations resolutions and the deployment of United Nations military observers, relief workers, etc. in the Kurdish regions of Iraq.

To explore some of these issues, even though they are scarcely formed as issues much less having solutions at hand, the U.S. Army War College sponsored the convening of a conference, under the chairmanship of Ralph H. Magnus of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, at the Asilomar Conference Center, Pacific Grove, California, in June 1992. The preparations for the meeting, including topics and possible participants was done in collaboration with Dr. Eden Naby of the Harvard University Center for Middle Eastern Studies, who had just returned from two extended periods of residence in Tajikistan. We decided to have the conference as small as possible to cover the major issues and geographic areas involved. The participants were invited to make their comments on their topics as formally or informally as they wished, allowing most of the time for mutual interchanges with other participants. A small

number of interested scholars from the Naval Postgraduate School were invited to join in the discussions. The readers, of course, will judge for themselves, but the format proved to be interesting and provocative. Although not all participants had known each other, except by reputation, before these three days of informal and formal meetings, all felt very well acquainted with the others' views when we parted. One difficulty, to which the reader might be alerted, is that as much of the conference involved exchanges of views by the participants instead of formal papers, as editor I have endeavored to preserve this flavor by only slightly editing the remarks of the speakers. Thus, as many ideas of the presenters of the topics were interrupted by questions, discussions of interesting issues that had been raised, and relationships that seemed to have arisen to earlier topics and discussions, the reader might feel somewhat at a loss to follow the argument. Yet, given the fluidity of all of these issues and the scholarly qualifications of the participants, the editor feels that the major issues covered by each of the participants are eventually presented as their authors have wished and the discussions reproduced here are germane and enhance the readers' knowledge of the topic of Asian borders of the former

Soviet Union as a whole.

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Conference Observers

Claude A. Buss

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Kamil T. Said

Mikhail S. Tsyarkin

David B. Winterford

CHINESE CENTRAL ASIAN BORDERS

June Teufel Dreyer, University of Miami, Florida

Recent events in both China and former Soviet Central Asia have made it more difficult for China to keep control of Xinjiang. There will certainly be a looser relationship and more bargaining to get Xinjiang to accept China's rule.

In 1977 there were major separatist movements in both Chinese and Soviet Central Asia. Many in Soviet Central Asia in the 1970s had hoped that the Chinese would be their savior from Soviet rule. However, both China and the Soviets became more balanced in their relationship; both felt themselves vulnerable. Their hostility became more sniping at one another. By 1980-81, they became more friendly and neither had an incentive to upset the other.

This did not mean that all was well on the Chinese side of the border. There is a Chinese saying that there is a small revolt in Xinjiang every three years and a big revolt every five. But from the 1980s to today it has been more like a revolt every year. They have also been widespread geographically. Seemingly with a number of "causes" (at least as officially reported), most of them appear to be

relatively minor but always spreading. In 1980 the Kashgar "counter-revolutionary" elements were to blame. In 1981 there seems to have been a more serious proximate cause. The People's Liberation Army had taken over some land and a Uighur man walking on the PLA land was shot and killed after a guard's warning. This was a particularly large revolt. The PLA agreed to have the guard stand trial, but the army freed him from prison and bombarded the local party secretariat. Outside troops had to be brought in to restore order. In 1985 a revolt centered on nuclear testing at Lop Nor, spreading to the minority community in Beijing. In 1988 there were two revolts, in Kashgar and in the Ili valley. Their cause was given as an obscenity written on the door of a university dormitory. In 1989 another revolt was attributed to attacks made on the conduct of Muslims during the Haj, which the rumors said included sexual orgies. In 1990 the cause of the revolt was given as protests against the authorities razing "illegal" mosques. The imams of the mosques were also accused of "forcing" people to believe in Islam, thus violating the Chinese constitution's guarantee of "freedom" of religious belief. In Kyrgyz areas it was charged that the people were being forced to send their children to mosque schools. In 1991

a revolt began over the attempted enforcement of the policy of family planning (which had been promoted, at least in posters, from 1985) to the minorities. The Uighur were supposed to be limited to four children instead of the Chinese standard of one. In China, as a norm, many policies are announced but not enforced; in fact there is a lot of "live and let live" accommodation in the provinces.

What this record tells us is that there have been a number of revolts over large areas and for a variety of causes. The Chinese have a contradictory nationalities policy, calling for "flexibility" and usually allowing local authorities to avoid Beijing's directives by one means or another. In the 1950s there was a liberal party secretary in Xinjiang (Yang En-lo). He was an ex-military man and reasonably tolerated by the ethnic minorities. Secretary Yang openly resisted the policies of the Cultural Revolution and threatened to seize the nuclear testing site at Lop Nor unless they left him alone. Eventually, he was purged in the Cultural Revolution and a Uighur party secretary (who had been educated in the USSR) was installed. But in 1978 the liberal secretary Yang was brought back to power.

What does this recent history tell us relevant to the new situation following the collapse of the USSR? If the Soviets are no

longer a threat, does this mean that the Chinese will be able to do whatever they wish in Xinjiang? In fact, this is not so.

The entire situation was changed by Deng himself in 1978 when Beijing came out in favor of decentralization, especially in the economy. This reversed the Maoist policy of redistribution of wealth in which the rich provinces subsidized the poorer ones....basically, the east subsidizing the west. But the policies of equalization were bad for rapidly increasing the GNP. After 1978 the decentralization of investments favored the coastal provinces and caused their incomes to rise sharply. But Xinjiang did not experience the same income growth; instead it had to cope with greater inflation. In fact, the real incomes went down although there was some nominal income gain on paper. Xinjiang has little local manufacturing; it ships out raw materials and brings in manufactured goods. If was forced to sell its raw materials for whatever it could get. Not unnaturally, the provincials view this as exploitation. Poor provinces, not only Xinjiang, bitterly complained, but were told by Beijing that this was only temporary.

In 1984-85, as relations with the USSR improved somewhat, the

poor provinces were granted a form of relief by being encouraged to trade across international borders....Xinjiang with Soviet Central Asia, Tibet with Nepal, etc. Trade did increase rapidly and Xinjiang sought Middle Eastern investment from the Saudis and Turkey. The Haj was also opened. As part of this trade, there was a considerable amount of arms smuggling from Afghanistan, Soviet Central Asia and Pakistan. Much of the trade was by Muslims, including caravans, trucks and railroad. It was difficult to control an area as large as Xinjiang and impossible to check every truck or railraod car without destroying the economic benefit of the new trading policy.

The internal situation of the Chinese military makes it difficult to reverse the current trends. The PLA is reluctant to take action agianst any demonstrations anywhere. The armies are becoming more regionalized and less willing to take orders from the central government. Even the finances of the army are becoming regionalized. As a result, it would be difficult for Beijing to order the army into action if, hypothetically, they wished to move the Guangdong forces against Hong Kong.

Stephen Blank: Does the military have large local reserves?

June Teufel Dreyer: The reserves are really provincial as well. What

we are seeing in Xinjiang is not yet a true "autonomous" republic, but the trends are clearly towards looser control. The Beijing government is genuinely worried about whole provinces, not just local revolts. The state sector in China is now smaller than the private sector. There have been waves of strikes and even sabotage against state enterprises. The whole command structure is deteriorating. Clandestine trade unions appear and there is even a resurgence of the clan and the secret society organizations of the pre-1949 period. Some of these in Yunnan are now engaged in drug-running across the international borders.

Stephen Blank: We see some similar things in the new Central Asian states. There, the local communist parties (some renamed, of course) have a basis in local clans and regional interests. Nabeyev was kept in power in Tajikistan largely to appease the northern areas that are the center of his power base.

June Teufel Dreyer: Xinjiang has gold and has allowed local entrepreneurs to exploit it. A large number of the "floating population" joined in the gold rush. It is estimated that at least 70 percent of the revenue never appears officially. As the local party organizations are taken over by local ethnics they don't answer to a

national constituency. The people usually blamed for inciting revolts are the Hui, the ethnic Chinese Muslims, leading to the saying: "The white hats (Hui) are inciting the flower hats (Uighur) to rebellion, but the big hats (Han) win." The moral of the story being that the Uighur get hurt.

Eden Naby: Today there are about a million Kazakhs in Xinjiang. It would have to be Kazakhs, Uighur and Hui to come together on a basis of Muslim identity to pose a threat to Kazakhstan.

Stephen Blank: The Chinese are not as interested in the area as are the Russians. Yet, without the oil of Kazakhstan they would not be interested at all. The communications are very difficult.

Stephen Blank: The Russians clearly don't want instability, thus they favor the Chinese now. They would be very much against any of the CIS republics getting involved in the dismantling of China.

Graham Fuller: Clearly, the Central Asian republics cannot control their own fate. Where would they side in the event of a Russian-Chinese clash? Now, they have national sovereign governments and will not act like the old dynastic regimes.

Mikhail Tsyarkin: Xinjiang has both nuclear research and development as well as testing near Lop Nor, but their nuclear assembly is done

next door in Ningxia province.

Graham Fuller: What could happen in the case of a new regime in Beijing? Could there be major rebellions and true separatism?

June Teufel Dreyer: The problem with the "new regime" scenario is that the old regime doesn't all die off at once. There are some leaders in their 60s and 70s, not just in their 80s. Behind them are a number of younger sons. One of this "prince" faction is already holding the governorship in Guangdong, where he has the additional local tie of being from the Hakka minority. The party and Beijing could slide into irrelevance.

Siddieq Noorzoy: For the long term, we have to look at the fact that the private sector is now superior. This means that the economic basis of the communist state is declining.

Graham Fuller: The ethnic makeup of Xinjinag is still a matter of dispute over the reliability of the statistics. Could this prevent a break-away?

The population is usually given as 16 million. Clearly, there is a non-Han majority, but the Han would probably outnumber the Uighur population alone.

CENTRAL ASIA AS VIEWED BY RUSSIA
Stephen Blank, U.S. Army War College

There are two general aspects to examine in the view of Central Asia from Moscow: Russian relations with the Middle East and ethnic conflicts within the former USSR. We will focus on defense and security issues. Basic to this is the emergence of the CIS into full-fledged statehood, with consequences that are impossible to project. There is no longer an Anglo-Russian "Great Game", as in the 19th century, but much more of a multi-lateral competition with the Central Asian states both as agents and objects of other powers, including China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Russia, Turkey and perhaps even Afghanistan. One party is certainly the United States in particular and the West in general.

This competition takes various forms. In Washington, the only alternative to the CIS is considered to be Iran. The view is that this will happen unless the West, especially Turkey, get involved. Lacking this, they will all become clones or at least satellites of Iran.

My own view is that this is very wrong and demonstrates no feeling for the local conditions or understanding of Islam. There are

multiple identities in Central Asia, i.e., Muslims, Shia, Sunni, Turks, Iranians etc. There is not a specifically Iranian identification and the defeat of Iran in the war with Iraq has demonstrated that the revolutionary Islam from Iran doesn't travel well.

India is especially active in Kyrgyzia and Kazakhstan. It is very concerned over a monolithic Islamic bloc. India, like the old USSR, is a multi-ethnic secular state. Thus, the events so far have clearly helped Pakistan. India hopes to counter this by getting in on the ground floor with economic and technological benefits. In this they are following the traditional strategy of the British Raj in trying to deny the northwest frontier to a hostile power. This implies an active Indian policy in Afghanistan as well.

Pakistan wants to cement more ties with Central Asia to create a kind of influence and camaraderie. They also seek to develop overland transport routes, both via China and Afghanistan.

The Iranians wish to develop religious, cultural, economic and energy ties, but even in Tajikistan their policy has been very cautious. They are not trying to overthrow governments or to interfere in border areas. There is a faction that feels it is their

duty to provide aid to Muslim elements. There was a severe press attack by the radicals, led by former deputy foreign minister Larijani, against government caution. At the recent meeting between Velayati and the Indian foreign minister a joint statement spoke of the need to find an honorable solution to the worsening plight of the world's Muslims. Iran is looking out for security the Gulf and traditional Iranian interests. It feels threatened and is not offensive in its orientation. This might be called into question by its \$14 billion arms acquisition plan over five years. The situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan becomes more difficult for both Iran and Turkey the longer it persists.

Turkey has taken the lead in sponsoring the modernization of the Central Asian states, but is now finding that it might be going too far. It is under pressure from events in Azerbaijan and Bosnia and is at the limit of its economic resources. They also are not going to sacrifice current good relations with Moscow. Now, they want to secure a beachhead in Central Asia.

The Central Asian republics are very divided:

- 1) The economic subsidies and trade links still make them very dependent on Russia.

2) We can see the beginnings of full sovereignty including armed forces. For now, they can't afford a large military, but by the end of the decade they could have genuine armies.

3) For now, they are all dependent for their security on Russia.

However, all are eager to court anyone able to do business and to diversify their ties to such countries as China, India, Israel, the Saudis, and the United States (as seen in the deal between Chevron and Kazakhstan).

It is hard to see Russia being satisfied with its much diminished size, especially when there is a Russian diaspora of between 25 and 30 million people. This could create a climate for renewed imperialism with demands for their "humanitarian" right to intervene to protect the Russians. This could lead to a repeat of the 1920s and 1930s, where the protection of co-ethnics, whether Germans, Slavs, Poles, etc. resulted in conflict in Eastern Europe.

The Central Asians, at least the governments, don't want to see the Russians leave as their economies are too dependent on their skills. Russia has pledged to defend them militarily if necessary, but the state of the army is so poor that it is questionable if it could go into action to suppress ethnic conflicts. If it does, it will

probably mean the end of the current liberalism in Russia. Thus, the main goal of the Yeltsin government is stabilization. Even beyond their territorial borders they seek to reopen their role in the Persian Gulf. Foreign Minister Kozyrev in his recent tour of the Gulf made a clear effort to set out an independent position for Russia in the Middle East. In the Arab-Israeli conflict they want good relations with both sides and there is talk of them selling arms to the Israelis. They have associated themselves in the U.S.-sponsored talks, but might pursue their own aims there as well. In the Gulf, it is clear that they want good relations with all, but Kozyrev made it clear that Russia regards Iran as the key. They see Iran as a "normal" state and hope to promote cooperation, but this does not preclude cooperation with Iraq as well if it reforms its behavior. Even though Central Asians have tried to warn Russia that Iran could be a threat, they don't see it in that light. Relations with Iran have continued arms sales at a very high rate, including three submarines, SU 27s and tanks. These sales could give Iran the capability of interdicting the Gulf, even against the United States. They are willing to sell to all parties and hope not to have to choose sides. A political aim in this policy is to get others to endorse the integrity

of Russia (possibly, versus Tatar, Chechen and other Muslim claims).

For both Russia and Iran the other is their most favored nation.

This can lead to tension with the United States, which doesn't view Iran as a "normal" state.

I don't see the Iranian "model" being followed in Central Asia.

Their elites have a good deal of experience in the handling of religion. They are all faced with domestic problems. Finally, multi-lateral competition will work to contain Iranian domination.

Siddieg Noorzoy: The subsidies from the center to the republics are notoriously difficult to quantify...under the old system it was impossible to tell. We don't see today that these are in cash. Are they in materials? Have they been deliberately concealed?

Graham Fuller: There are inefficient industries that are subsidized, but these are being cut. Energy is very important, and Yeltsin has suspended the freeing of energy to the market.

Eden Naby: Are the energy subsidies continuing? Certainly, they are paying for defense. Transportation has now been divided up, including Aeroflot.

Stephen Blank: Agriculture has not yet been freed. Subsidies are

still intact.

Graham Fuller: There is a new military situation. The republics are paying for their own internal defense needs.

Eden Naby: There were heavy subsidies from Moscow, but these have now gone. Even in the USSR, there were local cries of exploitation by the system. The center did pay a high price for cotton and kept food prices low.

Siddieq Noorzoy: Production was subsidized throughout the USSR. This did not mean that these were being given directly to the republics.

Eden Naby: Can Russia pay subsidies to maintain the status quo? Or do they wish to create economic dependencies? Do they really want to help them develop as viable independent states? We see in the Baltics and Ukraine many economic and military problems making it difficult to let them go. There is ambivalence in the Central Asian states, as Azerbaijan now says that it wants out of the CIS completely. The very purpose of the Russian state has been imperialism and they will try to expand to their 1921 borders.

Stephen Blank: When Russia recovers its nerve, it will attempt to dominate, although not necessarily militarily. They can't maintain

themselves in their current borders.

Graham Fuller: With their southern borders of Central Asia open to free access, these states will be at least as heavily oriented towards the south. It is doubtful if the old orientation towards the north can be restored; perhaps there will something like a British Commonwealth.

Stephen Blank: They all agree that they don't want anybody to dominate and the foreign influences will act to cancel each other out.

Graham Fuller: There is ambivalence on the part of people in the region because Russia under certain circumstances could be useful in coming in to defend them. But it is at least as likely that Russian troops would come in to secure their own interest or to play sides against one or the other. Thus you see all of them intensely interested in creating their own security forces.

Stephen Blank: Yes, but they can't afford it.

Graham Fuller: They will make it their top priority, at any costs. It is a very high priority. This is one of the reasons why Azerbaijan wants out now. They are not sure one what side the CIS forces would support, Azerbaijan or Armenia.

Stephen Blank: The head of the Oriental Institute of Moscow at a talk two weeks ago at the Institute for Defense Analysis mentioned that Armenian nationalists were working with tribes in the area of Nagorno-Karabakh trying to detach parts of Azerbaijan. There is a collective security treaty between Russia and the other republics of the CIS, but Russia has made it clear to Armenia that they don't want to send troops if Armenia is attacked by Turkey. Marshal Shaposhnikov has said that this could lead to a world war. Turkey is a NATO ally. They also believe the Armenians have brought it on themselves. And third, bringing the army back into action for this purpose means the end of Yeltsin's liberal reform policy. If it has to be reconstituted as a real fighting force to fight foreigners who are attacking the CIS, or in defending Russians abroad, this would necessitate restoring the military-industrial complex. It doesn't have to be an autocratic action, but these industries have to be very heavily subsidized. These might even be officially "private industries".

Eden Naby: Why is that a threat to Yeltsin's democracy?

Stephen Blank: Historically, the greatest enemy of democracy in

Russia is the army.

Eden Naby: It could do a lot to revive the Russian economy.

Stephen Blank: Yes, but under whose auspices?

Graham Fuller: I think your argument was valid at an earlier period when the democrats said that if we try to keep the empire by force it will be by autocratic means, but I'm not sure if that follows today.

Claude Buss: It did not follow in the British Empire.

Stephen Blank: The British Empire has a very different history than the Russian. Historically, every attempt at reform in Russia has faltered over the nationalities issue. The Decemberists couldn't work with the Poles. It continued through the Soviet revolution, which tried to maintain the Russian empire territorially. The attempt to use the Russian (or CIS) army to intervene where Russians are threatened means the destruction of any notion that these territories are sovereign states. It will unite the population around the nationalist alternative. If it is Yeltsin, it won't be a liberal Yeltsin.

Eden Naby: But that is different to coming to the aid of Armenia against Turkey, for instance.

Stephen Blank: Azerbaijan is a member of the CIS, yet it feels under threat and feels that the security treaty is worthless. No one is going to defend them. When they asked Yeltsin if the CIS could defend them, he answered that he wants to get the army out of the trans-Caucasus as soon as he can. Armenia is now much better armed and organized than Azerbaijan, so Azerbaijan looks at this treaty and says it want to get out.

Graham Fuller: There is also the problem of the presence of Russian troops seen as preserving the status of the old style nomenklatura. This is another grounds for local nationalists in not wanting Russian troops.

Stephen Blank: There is an article in The Journal of Soviet Military Studies (No. 2, 1992) by a CIA analyst. He writes about operation "Ring" in Azerbaijan and the Black Berets in Azerbaijan. Up to 1991 the Soviet goverment under Gorbachev, with Kryuchkov and Yazov taking the lead, sent in Russian troops to maintain both Nagorno-Karabakh, keep the old regime of Mutalibov in power and suppress the reform movement in Azerbaijan to prevent it from leaving the union. They moved into these areas with Azerbaijan troops, committed atrocities and tried to expel Armenians. This collapsed

due to Armenian resistance and to the failure of the coup in Moscow. Now the reformers have come to power in Baku. The Russian army was not happy about being used in this situation and is trying to get out of it. The Armenians who organized and resisted are now advancing, which has created Azerbaijan's internal strife.

Edward Olsen: Why would you call the struggle today a new "Great Game". The essence the old great game was that there were great powers engaged. Today you find that the remaining great powers, perhaps the United States and Japan, are not directly engaged.

Stephen Blank: The Japanese are certainly interested. But I want to focus on the metaphor of the game, rather than on the "great" clash of empires. What we have is the fact that outside powers are attempting to expand their influence into a third state. What we have is the competition between India, Pakistan, China, Turkey, etc.

Stephen Pelletiere: What you do when you use a term like "the Great Game" is that you create a mental image that things are being orchestrated and run by someone to a purpose. In point of fact, you have a chaotic situation in which things are happening and changing from one day to the next.

Ralph Magnus: Could it be a balance of power?

Stephen Blank: It is not a balance of power, but there is an attempt to create an order.

Eden Naby: What you have is a vacuum that everyone is attempting to fill.

Graham Fuller: These are states that were essentially without normal geopolitical orientations that are in the process of finding these orientations,

Stephen Blank: The acquisition of a geopolitical orientation is a tortuous process complicated by outside involvement and competition.

Stephen Pelletiere: Is that the main thing that is going on, or is it the main thing the fact that these entities are trying to define themselves?

Eden Naby: What this conference is about is to try to see if there are border issues in this process. I would like to ask if you think there are border issues involved in northern Kazakhstan?

Stephen Blank: I think this is just what worries the Kazakh government. There are forces in Russia that want to detach northern Kazakhstan. This area is heavily Russian and the most industrialized

part of the republic. Solzenitsyn in his pamphlet openly calls for this. Demographically, Kazakhstan is balanced, about 40 percent Kazakh and 40 percent Russian, and Nazerbayev is attempting with great skill to keep everybody happy and to prevent these questions from being brought up. This is why he wants to stay in the CIS... to stabilize it and make it work. If this question is raised, and I am afraid it will be (partially dependent on the outcome of the Crimea, where there is a plebiscite scheduled for August 2nd), all hell will break out. This would effectively undermine the basis for the CIS and for the Central Asian republics staying in the CIS. If their republic borders can not be guaranteed, it makes Russia a threat. The CIS stands or falls on the perception that Russia is no longer a threat. The moment that it starts raising border issues the notion that the CIS represents something new in Russian history collapses. All these peoples will feel threatened and will start looking for an alternative.

Eden Naby: But the Crimean situation will bring all that up soon.

Stephen Blank: It depends on how that situation is resolved. I

expect the plebiscite to vote for Russia, but what happens then?

The Ukraine could say that they would give a lot of autonomy as long

as you stay in the Ukraine. The Ukraine, as I see it, is trying to get out of the CIS, because Yeltsin in August 1991 raised the issue of borders. All of these borders are not strictly international borders; to raise these things is to threaten the status quo of a very fragile state system.

Lewis Madden: Is there any evidence of the return of the Russian diaspora?

Stephen Blank: Russians from Central Asia are returning to Russia, although the local governments are trying to keep them there for good economic and political reasons. I have not seen Ukrainians in Central Asia. A lot of evidence suggests that Ukrainians outside of the Ukraine assimilated into a larger Russian culture. This was part of Stalin's objective. I don't know if they count themselves as Russians or Ukrainians.

Eden Naby: They are listed for demographic purposes as Ukrainians.

Stephen Blank: They are functionally Slavs, but what do they see themselves...

Eden Naby: They see themselves as Ukrainians, but whether there is a movement to return is uncertain.

Lewis Madden: They might want to return because they have a little

better situation to return to.

Stephen Blank: A lot of Ukrainians intermarried with Russians. It is a common situation.

Graham Fuller: Most Russians are getting nervous; a lot of people are leaving and Moscow has accepted this as a fait accompli. Unless there are Russians being slaughtered in the streets of Central Asia the Russians would be extremely hard put to do anything. The big problem for the Russians is finding places to put all of them.

Although the Central Asian leaders talk a good line that they want to keep them, they also need to have them gone...there is the question of housing and jobs, for instance.

Stephen Blank: They need to have them gone, but they would like them to go quietly and without panic.

Eden Naby: In some cases there is panic already.

Graham Fuller: I don't think that these overseas Russians are going to be the instrument for the extension of Russian power.

Stephen Blank: I wouldn't say they're the instrument; they are the pretext.

Graham Fuller: The idea that the Red Army, or whatever you call it, is going to come in and take it over all again is to my mind

inconceivable.

Lewis Madden: How could they not support the Russians if they were being abused. Politically, Yeltsin could not abandon these people.

Stephen Blank: It is clear that Yeltsin is adopting an increasingly tough line on these issues. They won't even give back the Kurile islands to Japan for fear of arousing nationalist opposition. If there is a real threat to Russian people, so far this has not happened in Central Asia, the government will have to take some action. This will not have to be military action.

Eden Naby: There are two other issues involved here. There are certain parts of the old Soviet Union where Moscow could and would act more easily. Central Asia has a much lower priority for that list than in the west. There is another fact in Central Asia. This is that the international borders of Central Asia, whether towards China or to the south, are guarded by non-ethnic military forces. In the case of Tajikistan there is a very heavy presence of Russians in the border areas of Badakhshan with China and Afghanistan. This military is not leaving and they are quite happy to stay. They could respond to a threat to other ethnic Russians.

Stephen Blank: It depends on the threat to Russians. No one is threatening them today.

Siddieq Noorzoy: All of these governments are basically the old party regimes. They are all facing democratic and indigenous movements that could make life miserable for the Slavs.

Stephen Blank: If that came to pass, the Russian government would have to start doing things politically to protest that. We see that they are taking a very tough diplomatic line against the Baltic states. In Moldova they have resorted to force. An actual physical threat to Russians will force the Yeltsin government to take action in order to maintain itself.

Graham Fuller: I think a little terrorism goes a long way. But I could see the scattered Russians being concentrated in capitals prior to evacuation and the Russian military intervening to secure this.

Stephen Pelletiere: The focus seems to be on the way it was and the assumption is that it is going back to the way it was. It won't be exactly the same, but it will look like what it was before the whole thing fell apart.

In fact, we may be missing the boat completely. It won't go back the

way it was and we need to look at what is happening on the ground without putting interpretations on it.

Stephen Blank: I have been trying to make the point that Central Asia will maintain its independence if it can successfully multilateralize its development and play this game to its advantage. There is a trend towards greater association of the five republics and perhaps a broader organization.

I also think that Russia is once again, however, going to try to establish a political connection. It won't necessarily look like the Tsarist empire, but I'm certain that some kind political and defense arrangement will be worked out with the Central Asian republics.

Eden Naby: But you have to see why they went into Central Asia and why they would want to do it again. They went into Central Asia specifically because of British advances in South Asia. If Central Asia can be maintained as a buffer between China and Russia, because South Asia is certainly no longer a threat, it could serve Russian security.

Stephen Blank: I disagree with you. They didn't go into Central Asia because the British were in India. They went in because they were an imperial state, the territory was there, and the states were

weak. The British were thousands of miles away. They might have been a justification, however.

Mikhail Tsypkin: I have a more general question. What is the value of history in trying to forecast current events? I admit I constantly overuse history. You can always find something in history; its just like quoting Lenin. Maybe they lost their imperialist instinct. What if something has changed in their political development?

Stephen Blank: I think a lot has changed, but I also remember that historically the liberals were always good nationalists and patriots in Russia. I read all these wonderful statements that the Black Sea Fleet is a strategic asset that defends the CIS. That is a reasonable argument. Then Yeltsin makes a speech in Novorossiysk saying that the Black Sea Fleet is Russian, was Russian and will be Russian. That kind of thinking makes me suspect that they haven't kicked the imperialist habit. If something happens to arouse them through threats to Russian people in these areas, then actions will be taken. They may not be military actions; they may evacuate the Russians. I find it difficult as a historian to accept that the Russian government and people will settle for their boundries. The Ukraine is the

window on Europe. Central Asia was taken because it was there and Russia was an expansionist power with very few obstacles in its path. I'm not sure what happened overturned this. What really happened was that you had a failed coup which opened the way to the new government. You didn't have a revolution, although it was a revolutionary situation. There are a lot of people around Yeltsin, and perhaps Yeltsin himself, who are not immune to this kind of thinking. Can they really accept the consequences of the new geopolitical situation, as Graham said? It going to be very hard for them to let Central Asia go its own way.

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE BREAK-UP OF IRAQ
Stephen C. Pelletiere, U.S. Army War College

There is an Arab dimension to the problems of Central Asian borders as well as Russian and Chinese dimensions. The Kurds are definitely part of Central Asia and they are part of the Arab world as well. Were they to create a separate state in northern Iraq it would have severe implications for the Arab world. It would finish Arab nationalism (even though some think it is already dead). The Israelis would not have to worry about any threat or check from the Arabs because the Egyptians have already left the struggle. Syria was never a genuine threat to the Israelis. The only current real threat to Israel is Iraq.

Eden Naby: I would disagree with the characterization of the Kurds as part of Central Asia, however they are very important to the border issues there.

Stephen Pelletiere: I will try to explain how I feel they are part of the picture. They are a link between Central Asian and Arab politics. If you leave the Kurdish situation out you also leave a major factor in United States security concerns in the region. How are they part of Central Asia?

If you are including the Azerbaijanis as part of the Central Asian region, you have to include the Kurds. There is a long and close connection between the Azeris and the Kurds. They were two break away regions setting up "independent republics" in Iran in 1945. Part of the area claimed by the Azerbaijanis is also claimed by the Kurds as well. The Kurds have a long history of cooperation with the Armenians in the pursuit of common goals.

At the end of World War I, they both wished for their republics to be established from the remains of the Ottoman empire, and these were promised in the abortive peace treaty of Sevres, which was then overturned by the treaty of Lausanne following the victory of the Turkish nationalists under Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Kemal Ataturk). As recently as the 1980s the Kurdish terrorists affiliated with the PPK cooperated with the Armenians to assassinate Turkish diplomats. Both were based in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon.

One of the concerns discussed earlier was the Turkish reaction should the Azeris find themselves losing a conflict to the Armenians. It would be very difficult for them to stand by and do nothing. What, then, would be the position of the Turkish government

should the one-third of Anatolia in the southeast of Turkey break away to join their Kurdish brothers in Iraq?

Stephen Blank: Both Graham Fuller and I feel that the Turkish leaders are being subject to an intense crisis all the way from Bosnia to Alma Ata.

Stephen Pelletiere: You also have to speculate what the Iranians would do if an independent Kurdish state was established in northern Iraq and there was an attempt by the Turkish Kurds to associate themselves with it. There are about 4 million Iranian Kurds. They had a nationalist movement that was crushed by the Iranians in 1983. We may assume that this would revive and, indeed, may see its revival now in reaction to events in northern Iraq. The Kurds can go back and forth across borders with ease.

Graham Fuller: It is a question if there is not now an independent Kurdish entity in Iraq, especially with the holding of elections there.

Stephen Blank: In a broader perspective, it is a fact that due to the recent events such as the Gulf War, the collapse of the USSR, and the revived Arab-Israeli peace process the dimensions of the Middle East are no longer what they were. Central Asia is part of this expanded Middle East. The creation of a new state could upset the equilibrium

of existing states causing a chain reaction throughout the region.

Stephen Pelletiere: I agree. There is another aspect in the effect on Syria, were there suddenly to be no Iraq. Would they not open their doors to the surviving Iraqi Baathists?

Stephen Blank: Can the Kurds by themselves create a state?

Stephen Pelletiere: No, they can't. Someone has to give it to them. The Arabs view this as a plot. It is an attempt by the West to remove the Arab nation as a factor in world politics. I tend to agree with this, even though its dangerous to go along with conspiracy theories. At least, if not a conspiracy, there is a tendency on the part of certain interests to exploit certain situations. In the history of the Kurdish issue, certain interests have always been involved with them, particularly the Israelis, the British and the Iranians.

Eden Naby: Which Arab view are you talking about; is this the Saudi view?

Stephen Pelletiere: No, I know that the Saudis are now supporting it at the moment; they are supporting a position that could lead to the break up of Iraq. I'm talking about Arab intellectuals. They feel that the Kurds are always manipulated by outsiders. We tend to look on it as a human rights issue.

Lewis Madden: To draw an analogy to the creation of Israel, do you think that the creation of a Kurdish state may serve as a pretext for the unification of the states around it?

Stephen Pelletiere: I don't think so, because you would have the banding of three peoples, Iranians, Turks and Arabs, who have no particular reason for getting together, whereas the Arabs around Israel did all feel themselves as Arabs. There appears to me to be a campaign now in the United States, mainly in the media, with the aim of creating a Kurdish state to hurt Iraq. There are varying degrees of this. Some feel that helping the Kurds would not lead to the breakup of Iraq. Others are vaguely aware that a Kurdish state would bring into question the future viability of Iraq, but they don't want to deal with it. Then there are those who know very well that this would result in the collapse of Iraq, and this is what they want.

Graham Fuller: There is, perhaps, a fourth point of view. That is that it is just the nature of the issue, which is going to come about anyway.

Stephen Pelletiere: I see articles in the press, television programs, and moves in Congress for the United States to take certain actions

which, I believe, would inevitably lead to us taking military action in Iraq. It seems to me, as a former professional journalist, that this kind of campaign has some kind of direction. The same thing happened at the end of Iran-Iraq war. If we keep up the kind of pressure we have on Iraq now, if the Saudis continue to give money to the Kurds to keep the movement going on, if we continue to pay off the Turks to allow our planes in Turkey to secure northern Iraq, ultimately the Iraqi regime will collapse.

The next question is what would be the consequences of this? The Iraqi Baath Party is the best organized party in the Arab world. With them you find an individual who is primarily identified by his Baathist commitment and career. Perhaps they are identified with it more as a corporate environment and culture than as an ideology. They have a great respect for a scientific and organizational method. The results are showing in the success of the regime in rebuilding the country under very stressful conditions. This could not be done without effective and dedicated Baathists. Were Saddam Hussein to be removed the Baath would not survive, because the conditions causing his removal would mean that we would be in a position to

dictate his successor, or at least have a veto. If we were to do this, the Baath Party would fall apart. All the leading Baathist are the same. Rahmadan, Ibrahim, Aziz, Majid, etc. are the same as Saddam.

Eden Naby: But if the party is so effective a socializing agent, why is it necessary that if the head is removed the whole party must fall?

Stephen Pelletiere: The only way to remove Saddam would be at the dictation of the United States, and this would cause the party to lose all of its intensity and coherence. If they were to decide on their own to remove Saddam as a liability, the party could survive. But any one the party would put in by themselves would be unacceptable to us, because they would be little different from Saddam. The ones foremost in this campaign want the destruction of the Baath Party, not just of Saddam Hussein. I put much less weight on the power of the Takritis and more on the characteristics of the party as a highly organized and centralized force. It is something of a unique feature in Arab political parties. Their "scientific methods" are best described as a tendency to look for formulas that will yield good results in certain situations, rather than operating on an ad hoc basis. They work out in advance their doctrine, goals

and methods. Given the character of the party, there is a good argument that the destruction of the party means that the country falls apart. This is complemented by an examination of the history of Iraq before the Baath came to power. It was closely approaching anarchy before they appeared. They were always difficult to govern, certainly under the monarchy. There were terrible riots in Kirkuk and Mosul after the monarchy was overthrown. The Iraqis were noted in the Middle East for their violent and ungovernable behavior. Thus, a large part of the success of the Baath was that their rule gave a relief from anarchy. One reason the Iranian regime never had much appeal to the Iraqis is that they saw and recognized the internal conflicts in the early years of the Islamic republic. Were the Baath to disappear the various groups would quickly slide back into anarchy.

To elaborate on this theme, I suggest the following scenario of the likely consequences stemming from an independent Kurdistan breaking away from Iraq. The Baath would become so weakened as to lose its grip and Iraq would fall apart. The Iranians would invade the south, even though they would not be welcomed, even by the Iraqi Shia. Until the late 1960s this part of Iraq was essentially

controlled by the Iranians. There were many Iranian residents, they supported the shrines and the economy. During the war, there were many attempts to seize Basra. As soon as that happens the Turks will take Mosul. This is part of their record. They feel they lost Mosul after World War I by British tricks. Presently, the Turks are under severe constraints on their action, but these would disappear should the Iranians move into the south. They could justify themselves before world opinion. They would also not allow the Kurds to hold the Kirkuk oil fields.

United States security would be effected. The two countries would each have major oil fields and both would be hawks within OPEC, because they are both developing states that need the money. I don't think the United States could afford to see the Saudis loose control of OPEC, because their oil policies agree with those of the United States.

Siddieq Noorzoy: Why would that situation you project be any different from what we have now? Both Iran and Iraq are already in OPEC and they are both already hawks on pringing.

Stephen Pelletiere: The difference is that since the late war, Saudi

Arabia clearly dominates OPEC by its own market share. It naturally wants what is best for it and this happens to be what is best for us, that is to keep oil around 17 to 18 dollars. This might also lead to clashes between Iran and Turkey. The United States would not be in any position to defend the oil fields. We may pull CENTCOM out or even break it up and absorb it in the European command. The Iranians would be in effective control. There would be constant cross border conflicts, raids, etc. This is the factor most important to the United States is the very real threat to us. What is now going on in Washington is a major factor, the essential factor, in bringing this about.....the undermining of Iraq.

Ralph Magnus: If this is the case, why do you think that the Saudis are seemingly acting against their own best interests in supporting such an outcome?

Stephen Pelletiere: I don't really understand it. I heard two things on my recent trip to Riyadh. One was that the Saudis were extremely anti-Jordanian because of their historic enmity with the Hashemites. Thus, they are challenging the Hashemite control over the Dome of the Rock. Also, it makes no sense that they have cut off support to the Palestinians. Even if they have a real grievance,

they have to realize that their best interests are in creating stability. The PLO, however, clearly has the capacity to make trouble. Recently, the Saudis appear to be giving large sums to the Talabani Kurds, who are adamantly opposed to a deal with Saddam. They also received the Iraqi Shia leader Bakr al-Hakim, long in exile in Iran. I can only feel that we have been crediting them with more sense than they possess.

Stephen Blank: As an agreement between the Arabs and Israelis becomes more feasible, this Saudi policy is a way of establishing themselves in the equation vis-a-vis both the Jordanians and Palestinians.

Kamil Said: What is the place of the London based Iraqi opposition. We have a lot of contacts with them. They have a lot of contacts with Iranian based opposition and with the Iraqi army.

Graham Fuller: I think it is interesting that there is an Iraqi opposition now. Whether they can come to power in Baghdad or not is a different matter, and probably highly dubious. Yet there is something new. They have been able to meet with each other as they never have before, and there are something like fifty opposition newspapers. There is more substantive discussion among them than

ever about the future of Iraq. It is not all negative.

Eden Naby: What is the alternative to not allowing a Kurdish state to come into being? The problem is not going to go away.

Stephen Pelletiere: In effect, the Kurds do "go away". If you look at their record, they always attack when there is an opportunity for a victory. As soon as the situation becomes untenable, they come to terms at least temporarily.

Eden Naby: But there is an ethnic problem in Iraq that keeps coming up.

Graham Fuller: I think that you fail to acknowledge any process of historical evolution in nationalism. Look at the evolution of Palestinian nationalism, for instance.

Stephen Pelletiere: There is no significant development of a nationalist movement. That is not to say that they don't have a strong feeling for the existence of a Kurdish nation and what it means to be a Kurd. They are still in the "clan" stage of development. What is the Kurdish movement today? It is the KDP (Kurdish Democratic Party) which is essentially the Barzani tribe. They are in a constant nomadic quest to get back their land. Then you have the PUK (Popular Union of Kurdistan), which is essentially

Jelal Talabani, who has no tribal associations and no real base.

However, he has good international contacts and serves as their international representative from his base in London. Beyond this, they have a lot of unemployed Kurds who will enlist in the Pesh Merga to get money.

Eden Naby: This does not mean that there is not a large Kurdish minority in Iraq that will always be a sorepoint.

Stephen Blank: If politics is the art of the possible, we have to acknowledge that there are some problems beyond political solution because they are impossible to solve. We can only hope to manage them.

Graham Fuller: I support the view that we have two price hawks in Iran and Iraq, but beyond that there has never been anyone in the region who wanted to cut off oil.

Stephen Pelletiere: The world economy is so interdependent that it doesn't take much to set off panics in the oil and financial markets.

Graham Fuller: We had the major interruption of the market in the war and the continued removal of Iraq as an exporter, and nothing has happened.

Stephen Pelletiere: This is because the Saudis had a tremendous increase in their production, and they are now aiming to increase their capacity even more. This buffered the market.

Mikhail Tsyarkin: Does this mean that we should facilitate the Russian and CIS in its efforts to increase production of oil?

Stephen Pelletiere: As a non-economist, I don't know. But this is something that Russian specialists should think about. There is a real possibility of the disruption of Middle Eastern production.

June Teufel Dreyer: How much initiative do we have now? We have taken a couple of initial steps toward the formation of a Kurdish state-supporting the elections, etc. President Bush has been under heavy fire for abandoning the Kurds a year ago. He will find it hard to do this again in an election year. The Saudis seem to want to get rid of Saddam Hussein. Everyone seems to agree that the Saudis cannot play a military role in stabilizing the region. Nobody but the United States seems capable of this military role, but we are uncomfortable with it. What do you think can be the United States' role?

Stephen Pelletiere: I am in the difficult position of trying to work this out in a study for CENTCOM, but I'm still trying to get my

thoughts in order. What we have to recognize is that the major new factor is that of United States hegemony replacing the former bipolar competition. Then we have to find how we can support this by military means. There may be a saving grace due to the fact that we are in an election year, and a lot of what we see in Washington may be posturing to satisfy certain groups. If Bush wins, he could back away. If someone else wins, he would have to start from the beginning and Kurdistan probably won't be at the head of the agenda. We are going to have to pull out of northern Iraq, for Turkey's sake if nothing else. It is too dangerous for Turkey and it can't go on forever.

Siddieq Noorzoy: My concern about OPEC is that you don't have to have a political solution of the problem. You could have a cartel of consumers.

Alternative sources of energy could develop to serve as a threat to keep the prices stable.

Lewis Madden: Currently the price of oil is low enough and production elsewhere high enough so the absence of Iraqi production is not affecting the market. You are assuming the take over of this production by Turkish and Iranian hawks would push prices up. A

possible counter to this would be to help increase the production of the former Soviet fields. We have the industrial capacity as yet underutilized that could do this. The reports that are coming back are that the infrastructure in the oil and gas fields are not as bad as was feared.

Stephen Pelletiere: One of the features of the new hegemonic system is that we are controlling it to an extent. It could develop in any of a number of ways. It has been assumed by all interested parties that the dependence on the Middle East for oil is a given. If it were to be put in second place by Russian or CIS oil this would have a tremendous effect.

Lewis Madden: It will come on line in any case, but given sufficient incentives it could come on line in about five years.

Mikhail Tsyarkin: Things are moving very slowly there. You have a system being run by former provincial party secretaries and assistant professors of Marxism-Leninism. To look at your scenario, might the impact of hawkishness be upset by the impact of Iraqi oil on the market? In the short term, at least, they will have to want to sell this oil, which currently is not a part of the world supply.

June Teufel Dreyer: We should not exaggerate the impact of Kazakh

oil. There are a lot of internal needs as well.

Stephen Pelletiere: You also have to speculate on the effect of oil on Turkey, which could become a world power. It has the human resources, but it would then have a viable economy.

Graham Fuller: I see that there is some evolution in the world regarding nationalism. Even the Kurds are ultimately going to become more assertive over time. They are eventually destined to develop their nationalism, probably first in Iraq and perhaps sweeping into Turkey and Iran as well.

The Shiite majority in Iraq certainly doesn't want to separate (which is where Washington had it wrong). They are Iraq, and they want to take it over. They are the majority of the country and are even about 60-65 % of the population of Baghdad. Neither the Iranians or anybody else is going to be allowed to take it over.

Stephen Pelletiere: What concerns me is that when you say "not be allowed", the reality is that we are the people who would have to stop this, and it would have to be by armed force. You would have another Lebanon.

Graham Fuller: You might, but the warnings from the United States

to Iran would be very high that they would not be allowed to do it.

Stephen Pelletiere: I'm sure there would be warnings. But without a strong central government in Baghdad to get them out, the Iranian revolutionary guards would move in as would the Bakr al-Hakim group.

Graham Fuller: In the long term, the Iraqis might be very lucky in a democratic, federal state. It is intolerable for the Iraqis to be condemned to live forever under the Baathi state.

Stephen Pelletiere: At the end of Desert Storm, at the same time we were appealing to the Iraqi military to overthrow Saddam, we were appealing to the Kurds to advance their interests. It was self-defeating.

Graham Fuller: The demographic composition of Iraq makes it likely that, in the long term, they are not going to be able to keep the Kurds in by force and, ultimately, the Shiites are going to be running the state.

Stephen Pelletiere: You are overlooking the fact that during the Iran-Iraq war the Baath was very successful in moving the Shia officers up the ladder.

At the end of the war they had at least two corps commanders and

many division commanders. The army was a vehicle for upward mobility and the situation of 1980 is no longer the case in the officer corps. In 1982, when the Iranians almost took Basra and the Baath held a congress in Baghdad. This congress demonstrated that there were shifts in the political leadership of the regime. Shias held the majority of top positions in both the regional command and the revolutionary command. The assumption that the Shias feel themselves to be discriminated against by the Sunni Baath leadership will have to be tested.

Graham Fuller: The Iraqi leadership is terrified of the Shia now; they fear that they are going to turn on them and kill every last one of them because they represent the Baath and Saddam Hussein. There is still a sense of ethnicity and hostility greater than ever before. We should not confuse Baathi rhetoric with the facts.

Eden Naby: Isn't this attempt to integrate the Shias into the system similar to the attempt to integrate the Kurds in the 1970s, which was a failure?

Stephen Pelletiere: My discovery in studying Iraq has been the different interests of the Shia and the Kurds. In part because they are Arabs, the Shias are susceptible to an argument by the Sunnis on

the basis of nationalism. There were attempts made to coopt the Kurds as well. After 1982 the Kurds were not drafted into the Iraqi army, instead they were organized into local foces. After the end of Desert Storm, however, they got a better offer from the United States

Graham Fuller: The argument that a certain number of high positions are held by Shias or Kurds doesn't mean that the Shias or Kurds consider the Baathis to be representative of their interest. The whole of Central Asia is full of ex-communist apparatchiks who happen to be ethnics and who are not very highly regarded.

Stephen Pelletiere: This ignores the intensity of the Baathi indoctrination and control process through a series of education and testing.

Eden Naby: I wonder whether integration works or not. Look at Yugoslavia or the creation of "the Soviet man" in Central Asia. They tried everything...education, language reform, economic reform, it just didn't work.

Ralph Magnus: I have a student now who was born an Egyptian, spent many years in Iraq working for the Iraqi merchant marine and is now

a United States Navy officer. He is writing a paper on the indoctrination of the Iraqi Baathists, quoting many original sources as well as his contacts and experiences. He was impressed with what they were doing in creating a new kind of "homo Baathist." However, in his opinion, they have been corrupted by power, are overbureaucratized and, versus the old revolutionary generation, are being taken over by opportunists. These view the party as a joke and a ticket to getting a good job. If they pay off the right people they don't have to go to all those silly indoctrination classes.

Stephen Pelletiere: I think we do have a problem of the lack of hard data.

Eden Naby: I think you have made a good argument for the preservation of Iraq. But I'm not sure if you are being realistic about the possibilities for it to continue.

Stephen Pelletiere: I've tried to present a view that I think has been neglected or not even considered at all.

Siddieq Noorzoy: I think it is valid that we should not push the Kurds any further than they have gone and rather to push them towards compromise.

There are a number of key issues at stake, including the future of

Turkey.

But there is a question of how to generate this type of pressure and how to fine tune the policy to achieve your ends.

Graham Fuller: Another point you made early is an interesting broad philosophical issue. You stated that the disappearance of Iraq would mean the final demise of Arab nationalism. I'm increasingly moving towards the view that the "classic" Arab nationalist movement has been one of the most destructive features of modern Arab politics. I don't say this because I'm hostile to all of their goals and merely want to see them destroyed. It has become a contest among Arab states to show they are the more authentic Arab nationalist than their rival, and thus challenge that state's legitimacy. Nasser worked this game, as did Saddam. In nearly every case it has been an excuse for dictatorship and brutality. You probably have more aggressive behavior to their neighbors, and not only their Israeli neighbor, from these types of regimes. It has meant the death of any possibility of democratic movements, human rights, civil rights or stability. All of these are critically necessary to the evolution of a more normal Middle East. If this is to be the kind of Arab nationalism that will perish, I welcome that.

Stephen Pelletiere: I think you also have to take into account the situation of the Arabs in the 1950s when this movement began to attain power. Then it served a function of mobilizing the population to oppose colonialism.

Graham Fuller: I would accept this, and I agree that there is a place for pan-Arabism in a cultural sense. But essentially it has been an instrument of abuse and distortion in Arab politics and I see Iraq as the worst representative of this now.

Stephen Pelletiere: One of the things I am firmly convinced in is the fact that the Iraqi Baath under Saddam turned resolutely away from pan-Arabism. That is why the Syrians never forgave them. By concentrating on the Gulf and on their own oil production (as in the Algiers agreement with Iran in 1975), they were out for their own self-interest in building up Iraq.

Stephen Blank: It is clear that the Arab nationalist role played by Saddam in the war was a tactical one. It was not wholly so under Nasser. Political Islam has a similar role. If you look at the history of Soviet-Iraqi relations from the 1960s on you see that the Soviets always saw Iraq playing a certain evolution for them. They should be more involved in the struggle against Israel. They should

compose their differences with Iran. They should solve the Kurdish problem. But the Iraqis always followed a "real-politic" kind of policy in their national interest.

Kamil Said: The only person who was able to unite all the Iraqis was King Faisal I. He was able to go to the Shiites and say he was related to them as he came from the family of the Prophet. He told the Kurds that he was one of them because he was a descendent of Salah-al-Din Ayyubi. He was a Sunnite as well. He united them. The whole nation mourned his death. His son, Ghazi, was not a leader. He did not understand Arab nationalism. The Ummah Party was the leading nationalist party then and very active in the schools. In 1936 we had the coup of Bakr Sidqi, who was a Kurd who had no concept of politics. After that, especially under Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein, there was no concept of nationalism. He divided the people. He even divided the members of the family against each other.

Stephen Pelletiere: My point is during the Iran-Iraq war the Iraqi people made themselves into a nation by defeating the Iranians...not because of Saddam. That is why you have a nation in Iraq today, except for the Kurds. The Shias and Sunnis, the Arab community, is a

nation.

Ralph Magnus: How many of the Iraqi prisoners refused to return?

Stephen Pelletiere: Look at what they were put through. Many were imprisoned for eight years, a lot made accommodations and will never come back.

Graham Fuller: What about the Shia uprising in the south after the war?

Stephen Pelletiere: I don't think there was one. I think the Iranians invaded. Given the chaos that prevailed in southern Iraq at the time, if that "revolt" had been backed by all the Shias, it could not have failed. The Republican Guard, even after their pounding in the war, was able to put that rebellion down and then turn north to deal with the Kurds.

Graham Fuller: And yet today in the south reports are that the Revolutionary Guard rules by day only. The revolt was put down with exceptional brutality. They had all the heavy weapons.

Stephen Pelletiere: In 1984, when Hakim made the case he could develop a fifth column in Basra, Khomeini gave him enormous resources. There was constant propagandizing aimed at the Shia. There was an invasion coordinated with internal rebellion, but

nothing happened internally. Khomeini took all resources away from Hakim and he lapsed into obscurity, only to reemerge at the end of the recent war. He has no resources or support in the south. He is appealing to the Arab Shias to support the Iranian Shias, but their antagonism is too great, even if they are not committed supporters of the Baath regime. They have not been given a sufficiently attractive alternative to what they have now.

Eden Naby: You made the point that Iran would move into the Shia areas of Iraq, and took this as a given. My trip this spring to Iran it was clear that the foreign policy establishment was facing a choice to go towards the Gulf or towards Central Asia.

Stephen Pelletiere: What I am working with is what would be the power politics in the light of the scenario of the emergence of a Kurdish state in Iraq. Then the policy makers would have a vague goal in Central Asia versus the prize of prizes in southern Iraq. The largest Shia community in the Arab world, the Shia shrines, large oil fields would be too valuable a prize, with nobody to stop them as chaos comes to Iraq.

Stephen Blank: Another key point in your scenario would be the Turkish seizure of the Kurdish state in the north. Would this be

supported, or would the world look upon this as a beginning of a steep slide?

Stephen Pelletiere: My view is that there are strong restraints as of now on Turkey, but that these would disappear with the break up of Iraq. They would not give it up to the Iranians or the Kurds, and they view it as their own territory anyway.

Eden Naby: It is a big assumption to say that Iran is going to go in.

Ralph Magnus: We discussed other changes earlier, including those caused by the emergence of Azerbaijan and the effect this might have in Iranian Azerbaijan. Perhaps the Iranians will not be worrying about advancing into Central Asia or into Basra, but in trying to defend Tabriz from the Azeris. Here we have a more credible scenario.

Stephen Blank: A recent article by Shireen Hunter in the Washington Post raised the point that Iran feels threatened. There is a big struggle going on in Tehran between schools of foreign policy. Some want to concentrate on Central Asia, others on their traditional interests in the Gulf. Larijani, the former deputy foreign minister wrote in a recent article that the CIS republics were going to fall

apart in 1992 and Iran has to be ready to act.

Siddieq Noorzoy: I would like to suggest another alternative.

Looking at the Iranian behavior in Afghanistan and Lebanon you see them try to extend their influence gradually over any area that might appear promising, rather than get involved in an invasion of southern Iraq that might lead to a confrontation with the United States. They have learned a lot of lessons about the dangers of war and see they can get a lot of advantages by operating short of war. This might be more realistic.

Eden Naby: I think a good point has been raised about the preservation of the status quo in the border situation. None of the southern tier countries would be willing to risk anything to change borders, because it would threaten borders everywhere. What is amazing is how similar the situation is all the way from Yugoslavia to China.

INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF CENTRAL ASIA BORDERS

Graham E. Fuller, RAND Corporation

Let me start with China. I have a number of questions. When talking of borders, I think that revision of borders is the most critical issue. From our discussion of Xinjiang, I don't think that anyone has any understanding of the demographics of Xinjiang. What areas would be most likely to go and are highly vulnerable to separatism.? In which areas is the Han population out of the picture or is sufficiently distant that they would be unlikely to influence it. Could chances of big trouble in China that would allow breakaway groups inspired by other groups to feel that there is a good chance that certain areas, such as the Uighur and Kazakh to break away? Irredentism is a critical factor. Would this be irredentism on the part of the region that is currently run by that ethnic group in the former Soviet Central Asian states? Or would it be an action of a minority that would want to join a greater brotherhood?

We do know in the case of the Kazakhs that the Kazakhs are calling in their countrymen from the whole world and its clear that

they need to rectify their minority status in their own republic of roughly forty percent. Hence, they are calling them home from China, Mongolia, Turkey, Russia and everywhere. We need to think in terms of potential revision of borders along the Chinese area. But there is also a lot of interest in the Chinese economic role in the development of Central Asia. Here there are a lot of possible trade-offs. Will these overcome, or least temporarily allay the desire to play an ethnic card? Not the least of China's cards is the railway and road links. The roads are not good but they come through. There are a lot of consumer goods coming in and people are coming in too with their purchases. There are flights as well. I think that the Turks fly into Tashkent and on to Urumchi. There is an interesting undertone to some discussions you can have with Central Asians. They are rethinking their own ethnic identities. On my last visit, even after heavy propagandizing by Turkey, they were looking more to Asia. Probably they are grossly overestimating that economic potential of ties with China, but it may cause them to downplay the irrendentism and separtism right on their borders. My feeling is that ethnic passions overcome economic rationale almost any day in the year.

Eden Naby: Who would be the most likely breakaway group?

Graham Fuller: I would think that it would be the Kazakhs.

Eden Naby: In that case, would it be irrendentism or a feeling that they would like to shift over? That area of northern Xinjiang is not a native Kazakh area.

Graham Fuller: It doesn't need to be if there is an interest in it. It is an interesting point that you raise. What if the Chinese want to get rid of all these Muslims. The Kazakhs might be delighted to have them.

Eden Naby: What we are assuming is that viable republics in these areas must have an ethnic majority of that eponymous republic. Ideally, then we could redraw the region and give northern Kazakhstan to the Russians and the Kazakhs of Xinjiang to Alma Ata, and so forth. Is this the basis we are coming from, which is basically a Soviet one?

Graham Fuller: Yes, but the case of Kazakhstan is special. They have a desperate need for demographic strength.

June Teufel Dreyer: The future revision in Xinjiang is not merely a Kazakh one, but one of Turkestan, linking a number of ethnic groups. This was the movement from the 1880s onward, with martyrs, etc.

Graham Fuller: That is true, but in more recent experience, with a lot of help from Lenin and Stalin, they have been moving away from a broader sense of Turkestani identity. I have struggled and been looking with a magnifying glass to find something like Turkestan and I haven't found it. In China, as time goes, the change is that Xinjiang will be affected by the differentiation of nationalities. It doesn't have to be hostile, but each would have their home base. The Kazakhs are certainly not thinking of Uighurs and Uzbeks coming into their area, they want only the Kazakhs.

The Chinese are going to have to decide what are their goals in Central Asia. Are they going to use economics to gain influence to cut off any ethnic irredentism? Or are they going to entice them and maybe play a card against Russia?

Graham Fuller: Turkey has no direct border issue relating to the former USSR except Nakhichevan. More important is Turkey's participation and involvement in border issues raised by the new situation. There are six million Azeri Turks in Azerbaijan and twelve million or so in Iran. There is a great debate as to whether these people are really Iranians who happen to speak a Turkish

dialect for historical reasons, or whether they are really Turks.

Eden Naby: What about the Azeri population in eastern Turkey?

Graham Fuller: On the other hand there is a flicker interest in the situation of the Alavi Shia of eastern Turkey. All Turks are suddenly getting interested in their ethnic origins. For the first time it is permissible to talk about this. Most of them in Turkey tend to be Sunni. Even about twenty five percent of the Azeris in Azerbaijan are Sunni.

A possible border rectification that essentially springs from the end of the Soviet Union, could be the breakaway of the Iranian Azeris to join the Baku Azeris. This is especially relevant with the new government in Baku, and Elcibey has talked about this openly. He says that ultimately there will be unification of the two Azerbaijanians. At the same time he remarked on the short lived character of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Whatever happens with the Azeris, the Iranians are going to blame the Turks. The Turks are obviously very happy over having a pro-Turkish regime in Baku. I sense that the Turks and Iranians are headed for a collision course. The fear for Turkey in the current situation is that it will be forced to come down on the side of Azerbaijan versus the Armenians, and

this will upset world opinion, Turkish role as a responsible regional power and can do little to help Turkey.

The major factor in Turkey is a series of exclusions from participation in Europe being exacerbated by the Kurdish issue in Turkey, which is now emphasizing racism in Turkey for the first time since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. New vistas are opening in the Caucasus and Central Asia, thus fulfilling in principle the old Soviet specter of Pan-Turanism, which had no real prospects before.

Stephen Blank: Now Turkey and Bulgaria are very close against Greece and Serbia. Demirel understands the dangers, but he might not be able to do anything about them.

Eden Naby: What has happened on the World War I claims of Armenia... say reparations or even territorial claims?

Graham Fuller: This had been almost utterly shelved. Even eight months ago Turkish-Armenian relations were moving ahead by leaps and bounds. Armenia had cancelled the commemoration of the "genocide". Turkey was in the process of opening up a land corridor to give the Armenians access to the port of Trabzon and they were being included as an "honorary Black Sea power" in regional talks.

There was much that was very promising there that could be disasterously damaged. In the past six months Turkey and Armenia moved ahead on establishing good relations. Ter-Petrossian has publically called for friendly relations and would like to open a corridor to the Black Sea.

The Azeris are a threat to Iran. A year ago I talked to the Azeri national front people about the dangers to Iran, the fact that this could lead to the break up of Iran. One of them replied: "That's tough, but this isn't the era of empires anyway." Thereby assigning Iran to the category, which is not totally inaccurate, of an empire. A likely Iranian retaliation would be for them to aid the Kurds in Turkey. All of this is a spin-off from the emergence of Azerbaijan as an independent nation. Rational Armenians realize that they live in a sea of Turks and the Turks are the people they are going to have to come to terms with. The Armenians had been used by the Russians as pawns against the Turks. The Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the ugliest legacies of Stalinism, but it is all coming to a head now, involving the Armenians, Turkey and the Kurds - even Iraq indirectly. It has all been kicked off by the emergence of Azerbaijan and by the Gulf War, which accelerated the timetable. Turkey's role

in Central Asia has undergone some modification in the past nine months. Turkey was viewed with great delight and enthusiasm in Central Asia. Their first image was one of the big (and rich) brother. The new image is still warm but also more realistic: "Let's not put all our eggs in one basket; Turkey is very far away and we were never part of the Ottoman Empire." As well as, "How can the Turks help us get into Europe when they can't do it themselves?" Finally, "We are at least as much an Asian people." In other words, they have seen the downside of Turkish ties. I found a sense that there was an open market for them. The Indians had suggested they were unhappy that the Turks were getting too much favorable publicity. Even though it was not a religious tie, but an ethnic tie, they were nervous. They are especially interested in the Kazakhs as secularists. For a great economic power right in the region, India looks pretty good. India has always been involved, with traditional ties with Uzbekistan

Eden Naby: India has been sending in food to Central Asia throughout the Soviet period, by both land and air. Now the air routes are continuing and have to be subsidized. India has shown its

willingness to subsidize its Central Asian trade by air routes for political reasons. Is there an economic use for India in Central Asia when the bridge has to be Afghanistan?

Graham Fuller: They are thinking markets. Here, cheap goods from India would be practical. Pakistan wants to have Islamic strategic depth and has geostrategic arguments for alliances with China and Islam. Its very important for India that this not be realized. India hopes to recreate its USSR alliance with ties to Central Asia.

Stephen Blank: There were two geostrategic arguments for the Indo-Soviet alliance. One was China and the other was Pakistan and Islam.

Graham Fuller: There was also the third world tie, with India serving as the entry for the Soviets.

Eden Naby: India would not be interested in seeing any regional economic development as we have seen talked about in the past six months.

Siddieq Noorzoy: It's one thing to trade certain commodities with each other. Every country in the world has some kinds of these ties, but it is another thing to use for political pressure.

Stephen Blank: This is just what they are trying to do and both sides

are aware of this.

Eden Naby: India may well be interested. However, there has been a clear lessening of India's economic presence in Tashkent recently. There stores have been closing down, and they have been there for the past five years.

Graham Fuller: Yes, and the Afghan ones are growing. To finish on the Turkish side, we have to realize the incredible infamy of geopolitical views in Central Asia today. To rethink the Turkish role is certainly not something shocking; it's more a realization that there is a big world out there and we have many options. If we think of the initial Russian turnabout in the late Gorbachev era in their views of the Turks there was a view that they didn't need to worry about pan-Turkism any more. The view was that the Turks were good and their bilateral relations should be models of perestroika. The Russians were writing lots of articles that the Turks were good economic models and were bringing in secularism. Nine months later things had changed. When Demirel went to Central Asia recently, he made one very provocative remark, I think it was in Kyrgyzstan. He said not only had they suffered for years, but they were still tied to the ruble zone. He didn't carry it any further, but

there was the idea that perhaps they ought to be "liberated". The Turks have proposed a union of Turkish states and a currency union. This is obviously a direct threat to Russian economic interests at least. It doesn't have to be geostrategic. Maybe the Russians will have to rethink their relations with Turkey. This could be associated with their recent tilt towards Iran recently. When Jim Baker was going through the area and saying: "Turkey good, Iran bad", this has provoked a little reaction. They don't want Turkey to take the place away from them in orientation. The United States' anti-Iranian position makes Russia think twice about appearing too pro-Turkish.

Stephen Pelletiere: I would like to know what they are talking about in Turkey towards Iraq and the Kurds. There has to be some sort of nationalist feeling boiling up in Turkey, as you said, over seeing the Azeris being beaten by the Armenians.

Graham Fuller: There is a great deal of anguish in Turkey over the de facto creation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. What the implications of this for Turkey are quietly being discussed in elite circles, but it hasn't really hit the press as yet. There is awareness

of the possibility of a federated Turkey, or at worst case of a Kurdish breakaway from Turkey. On the popular level there is a good deal of anger at the Kurds. It is not that they are going to come down to seize northern Iraq. But the best Turkish political thinkers, those who are trying to make the best of a bad situation, are examining the possibility of becoming the de facto protectors of an independent Kurdistan. The future Kurdish state will be linked somehow to Turkey.

Stephen Pelletiere: The people the Kurds hate the most are the Turks.

Graham Fuller: Now, the Kurds are being well-integrated in Turkey, especially in the economically developed areas. Are they going to look around to choose Iraq or Iran? In western Turkey they are very well integrated. Half of Izmir is Kurdish. If they look around to find a state where they have the possibility of a good life...and I agree that living in Diyarbakir is not a great life, it is Turkey. They have ability to live anywhere in Turkey This is where they are most advanced and educated. Kemal was deadset against Kurds, but this Kemalist legacy is dying daily. This new thinking is shown by the fact that in December 1991 the military endorsed Demirel's

recognition of the Kurdish language. The chief of the general staff was there.

June Teufel Dreyer: Is Turkey involved in secret operations in Xinjiang? There are several groups that could be involved in rebellions as there are always charges of "foreign involvement" made by the Chinese.

Graham Fuller: I don't think that this is an object of the Turkish government, though they might have some intelligence collection. They actually blame the Saudis and that is more plausible. They have been sending in financial support and Qur'ans.

June Teufel Dreyer: We need not think that only one foreign power is involved. For instance, in the 1959 rebellion in Tibet, the CIA, Indian intelligence and Taiwan were all involved.

Graham Fuller: If it were true that Turkish intelligence was involved in Xinjiang rebellions, it would have come out by now.

Stephen Blank: My sense of Turkey is like yours. The government and Demirel realizes that if Turkey sends in troops to the Caucasus there would be no end in sight. "Do we really want increased tensions with Russia?", is his view. But they are being pulled into all these Islamic trouble spots, and feel they have to go with the

tide.

Eden Naby: What is the tide?

Stephen Blank: The tide is all of these break away movements.

Muslims are being attacked in Bosnia and Nagorno-Karabakh, and the feeling in the public that we have to go in and protect our co-religionist. Demirel said it correctly when he warned that if they went into the Caucasus militarily, they would still be there twenty years later. Do they want a Northern Ireland on their borders? That is the real question.

Graham Fuller: The Kemalist legacy has been to stay away from foreign adventures and pan-Turanism.

Eden Naby: They had to because they had the Soviets on their northern borders, but they are no longer there.

Graham Fuller: I don't think that there is any danger of Iranian irredentism towards Central Asia. There has not been a hint of this in anything the Iranians have written at any point. They have potential problems with the Turkmen tribes on both sides of the border. Whatever Jim Baker has to say about Iran being bad, and the ruling circles in Central Asia are well aware of the dangers of "fundamentalism", they still see that if they want access to the

West it would have to be through Iran. No Central Asian state is going to place into danger their opening to the West, the Gulf, and even to Turkey. This is the important geopolitical card for Iran, vis-a-vis Turkey, even though in the cultural context they might be losing. Finally, the Islamic influence from Iran to Central Asia is still powerful. It is the concept of political Islam, symbolized by Iran, and it is potent even in Sunni areas and despite the Iran-Iraq war. But this doesn't have to be "made in Iran", rather it is a way of getting power for those who lack it and for uniting people domestically and internationally. Iran is still an important example. The Iranians are in a triple dilemma; are they to emphasize their Persian, Shia or Islamic political identities? They have never sorted this out, and they may try to do all of them.

Stephen Pelletiere: The radical leadership in Iran is still all there, despite having lost the elections. Look at all the rioting following the election. Rafsanjani can initiate a lot of moves, but if he can't clear it with the radicals can he be effective? The clerical regime has had twelve years to deliver on their social promises and they haven't.

Graham Fuller: They haven't really had twelve years. You have to excise eight years of the war. Now they are much more cautious than two years ago. But in Central Asia, the prospects for Islam are wide open, whether or not Iran is involved. Historically, the Central Asian officials have been able to "take care" of Islam, and to put it in a box. But current officials can't judge strength of political Islam. Even the Uzbeks can't understand that the days of manipulation of "official" Islamic institutions under state control is ineffective versus revolutionary Islam if there is no distance between the state and official Islam. None of them understand it, although not all are currently confronted with it. Certainly, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan it is very weak. In Uzbekistan they were utterly in panic, which they hadn't been nine months before. They have a lot of learning to do, and they need to study the examples of the Middle East, such as Pakistan, Algeria, Turkey, Egypt and Jordan.

Stephen Blank: Should a political Islamic movement come to power, would it be unique or would it follow the Iranian model? Is Iran a political threat by virtue of its military-political power, or is it an ideological threat?

Graham Fuller: No one knows completely, but I would guess that it would follow its own historical pattern. But the pattern of political Islam in there and elsewhere is undeniable. Iran, by its very existence, is a threat to Gulf security. It's not that they are going to attack their neighbors like Iraq. They are exporting an idea primarily. What could they do...export revolution and create instability.

Eden Naby: The existence of Iran legitimizes Islam by revolution.

Stephen Pelletiere: The eight years of war demonstrated that the Iraqi Shia didn't want to have anything to do with the Iranian Islamic regime.

Graham Fuller: I disagree. There is a fairly powerful movement linked to Iran among the Shia of Iraq. It has immense power in the south.

Siddieq Noorzoy: Supposing you have an Islamic state. Just what is its threat? Is it going to limit the economic gains of the West, or of Japan? Or are they going to export revolution? Are they going to create instability within the region therefore you have to get involved militarily?

Stephen Blank: One of the things we would be worried over the

situation in Egypt. If Egypt were to go Islamic, our situation in the Middle East would be seriously undermined.

Eden Naby: You are assuming that Islam is against us.

Stephen Pelletiere: What we see in the case of Algeria is a kind of urban protest movement of unemployed youth. What is really worrisome is that the same group would take power in Tunisia and would move against Egypt. If we were to have an unfriendly regime in Egypt, we would lose a base for maneuvers. We would have to be worried about passage through the Suez Canal.

June Teufel Dreyer: We would lose the Camp David Agreement, would we not?

Graham Fuller: That is not for sure. But Steve is correct in that that kind of political Islam tends to link economic dissatisfaction with the concept of Western exploitation. It would move in an undesirable direction. This would have an impact in Central Asia. They could feel they were not being treated well as part of the third world exploited by the West. The security situation would be linked to economic disappointment. To finish on the Iranian point. I had talked about the three strategic options that Iran faced, namely

universal Islam, Shia Islam or "Perisanism". The "Persian" option is still possible for Iran. They could work to break away northern Afghanistan and form an ethnic belt. I don't say it is likely, but it is conceivable given the way other empires have gone, and Afghanistan is in a way a mini-empire. At least a portion of the Tajik population would be very favorable in that this would provide them with the demographic depth of face the Turkic peoples. I could image Iran being interested, putting aside religion, could be looking at essentially an ethnic belt that would take them from the borders of China through Tajikistan, across northern Afghanistan, and into the Hazara region, which is not only Persian speaking but Shia. This is one version of things reaching a highly consolidated state of ethnicity as the determining element.

Siddieq Noorzoy: Dustam (the ethnic Uzbek general) goes to Kabul, he doesn't stay in Mazar-i-Sharif. Why does he go there- because it is the center. There are a lot of Pushtuns there as well. Ahmad Shah Mas'ud has no idea of breaking-up Afghanistan. He has not associated himself with Iran, or for that matter with north of the border.

Graham Fuller: That is a rational argument. But the Pushtuns could

loose the game by overplaying their hand and deny what the Uzbeks and Tajiks feel they deserve in the long course of the jihad. In the old days, you could say that they had nowhere else to go. It is a rich agricultural region and in theory could be the transportation hub of routes from the north. The notion of an independent northern Afghanistan is no longer unthinkable. Now the non-Pushtuns of the north have an alternative.

Siddieq Noorzoy: When Najib was in power there was talk that he could shift the base of power to the north and split up the country. They would not do that. Nobody in Afghanistan is remotely thinking of this.

Eden Naby: All along in the jihad, since 1978, there has been a theme in the mujahidin literature that they are fighting the Russians now in Afghanistan, and once we get done with this we fight the Russians to the north. The idea is of Bokhara as a symbol of colonial conquest. Now that the Russian colonialism in Bokhara is removed, what does Bokhara symbolize now for the Afghan mujahidin? Is it now free, and not an object for liberation anymore?

Siddieq Noorzoy: It is now an independent new country and is going to be helped to find its way along what the new Afghan leadership

feel is a cooperative manner.

Ralph Magnus: The Afghans are thinking that their jihad liberated Bokhara as well as it disintegrated the Soviet Union, so they are all allies now. I recall a recent quote of an Ayatollah at Friday prayers in Tehran to the effect that now that the Afghans have won this war, Islam has won the war, and the Afghans should thus acknowledge the true leader of the entire Islamic world, Ayatollah Khomeine'i, the "Faqih" of Iran.

Eden Naby: Now that the Russians are no longer the imperialists in Bokhara, what is the conflict? There are two things: there could be a secularist government in Tashkent that could suppress Islamic activity; the second is suppose you get an Uzbek-Tajik conflict in Bokhara. Then what is the Kabul government going to do? If we get a major repression of Islam in Central Asia, then I think the Afghans might have something to say.

Graham Fuller. One of the fears in northern Afghanistan was that the ethnic tensions between Uzbek and Tajik in Central Asia would spill over there, where it had not been much of a problem before. To take this scenario to its end in examining the border implications These are very clear with a domino effect. We see the breakup of

the Iranian empire with the Azeris being the linchpin. They leave, the Kurds leave, the Turkmen are uncertain.

If Afghanistan becomes truncated you are left with a rump Pushtun state, and the whole Pushtunistan issue comes right back into play, despite the hopes of the Pakistanis that they had put the issue to final rest by aiding the mujahidin all those years. The Baluch would feel that it would be their turn and in theory. You lose Pakistan as a viable state.

Stephen Blank: Maybe Pakistan has come to realize that the only way it can survive is for Afghanistan to survive as a state. If Hekmatyar wins and tries to establish a Pushtun Afghanistan, would that mean protracted war within Afghanistan?

Siddiq Noorzoy: This is a much overplayed scenario in the press. The war has been fought by a cross section of Afghanistan. In Hekmatyar's hospital I visited in Peshawar in 1980, one saw a cross section of the people, from the Hazarajat, from Koh-i-Dahman, Pushtun, and no one made any distinction as to what language one was speaking, or whether you were Sunni or Shia. The reason that one sees this kind of a statement is that others have made counter-

statements that it is our turn to take over the government now, or the Shias are claiming that they are thirty percent of the population. But if you look at the development of the jihad you see universalistic and egalitarian expectations. The idea is that all people have to play a role. That is the attitude of all the commanders I have spoken to.

Stephen Blank: But if Hekmatyar comes to power.....

Siddieq Noorzoy: He cannot come to power. He knows that and everyone else knows it. When he was offered the post of prime minister in the interim government, he declined, but proposed a Tajik from the north for the post.

Graham Fuller: I hope that you are right and you probably are right. I just think we would be remiss in not raising this prospect so we could be sensitized to signals that that event might be happening. The Indians have to be ambivalent to the prospect of the break up of nations, even of Pakistan. Short sightedly, India has been accused all along of wanting to prove that Paksitan was never viable and they will all have to return to the Indian motherland. But the example of Kashmir and the "intifadah" is going on now questions this. The critical question is thus: "Is India exempt from dangers of

breakaway nationalism because of the relatively democratic character of its regime?"

We all agreed that China was in very risky shape, not only because of ethnic problems but because of the legacy of brutal repression and fifty years of communism. Is India going to be able to survive because of its democratic character?

Stephen Blank: You already have a situation in which two prime ministers have been killed because of ethnic terrorism- there is no way they are immune. They may not be destroyed and they may be able to ride it out, but they will have to live with it.

CULTURAL FACTORS IN CENTRAL ASIA BORDER ISSUES
Eden Naby, Harvard University

I wish to concentrate on the cultural aspects of the borders, especially international issues but also the borders between the Central Asian republics. I will probably stray away from the cultural aspects to touch on economics, because this is my new interest and I believe economics lies at the heart of the success or failure of these states. I hold that both internal and international borders are highly susceptible to change. I will begin with Azerbaijan and make a sweep to Kazakhstan. I want to look at the constraints and incentives to these changes from their internal aspects rather than outside interference, especially as they relate to language, religion and ethnicity.

Language has a number of aspects. One category is actual language use and dominance and secondly in terms of alphabet. A very good model that my husband, Richard Frye, has written about and facilitates his study of the ancient period can be applied here. What we have today in Central Asia and what we always have had is various levels of language. First there is a family language that is used in the village that is used for casual conversation; it is

considered the mother-tongue. Second is the literary language, which may or not be the same language, but often a quite different dialect. Then, there is a working or professional or merchant language. And finally there are dialects which may or not be understandable to everyone.

These categories help to clarify whether Russian is a usable working language now versus local ones. It helps us to examine how Turkish language may work out, and the importance of the "created" nationality languages in the area. For most of urban Central Asia and for most professional people Russian is still an indispensable language. It continues to be important for people who are at their most productive stages of their lives, between 25 and 65. They use it to communicate professionally, particularly outside their own republics. Even with two Uzbeks or two Tajiks who know their native languages perfectly well, you find them conducting professional discussions in Russian. However a very important language is emerging for international aspects as they need something other than Russian, and English is beginning to fill that gap. But the language for most of the people is their family ethnic

language, except in Kazakhstan. Outside of the city this is even more true, even in professions.

There has been a strong attempt to make the literary language the same as the ethnic language, but it has failed thus far. This is a very important thing to remember when you try to look at how important is Turkish for the Turkic speaking areas. In the last 15 to 20 years we have seen a great change in the literary language. This is particularly true from professional intellectuals who have been able to leave to travel. They have gone to Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. Afghanistan has has a great effect on the languages of Central Asia as they have come into contact with literary languages which are similar to their own and they have begun to adapt their own literary languages. Today's Tajik newspapers written in the Cyrillic alphabet are virtually unintelligible to people in the villages. They are copying Iranian Persian and eliminating Tajik usages that had been forced into the language, particularly after World War II. These changes are thus bringing the literary languages much closer to those outside of the Soviet Union...Turkish and Persian. The change is not only in syntax, but also in vocabulary. The adoption of Persian journalist usages means a lot more Arabic

and a lot less Turkic. Many of the usages that were identified by Soviet linguists as being particularly "Tajik", and predating new Persian, are being dropped. A lot of this is coming from many Central Asians who served in Afghanistan, not all of them in the military, but as translators and in cultural jobs from two to four years. Now they say that they really learned the Tajik language from the Afghan Tajik speakers. The standard of purity is no longer the Soviet Tajik that was set up for Tajikistan in the 1930s, but more and more standard Persian, whether you want to call it the Dari (Afghan) version or the Iranian version. This is a real cultural shift, even excluding the question of alphabet.

It is surprising to find how many people know the Arabic alphabet, people who never admitted knowing the Arabic alphabet. They know it well enough to place in the fourth or fifth level of teaching or they are able to come forth as teachers. There are now numerous articles appearing revealing how the language had been taught in families and through hidden books. In fact schools are being set up in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to teach at the beginning level. It has now moved into the educational system. We already have a breakdown in cultural borders occurring in Central Asia with

the rest of the Middle East.

The whole alphabet issue is still unsettled except in Tajikistan, where the eventual adoption of the Arabic alphabet is accepted. In other areas it is complicated by the religious issue. The religious elements want to have the adoption of the Arabic alphabet, but they are constrained by the argument that it is easier to learn in an alphabet that has the short vowels, which are not present in Arabic. If they are going to be trained in the Latin alphabet they will have easier access to Turkish publications. Azerbaijan has taken the leap, and in several stages has accepted the Latin alphabet and Tajikistan has settled on the Arabic alphabet. However, this is something for the future, not even in the next five years. When they are talking about converting government documents into local languages, this means local languages written in the Cyrillic alphabet. Is there to be a direct translation from Russian to these forms (postal, passports, etc.), or are they to go to international forms and rewrite these into local languages? My understanding as of the time I left in March that the issue had not been settled, although there are commissions in all of the Central Asian republics to deal with the problem.

Overall, the language barriers which were created to separate peoples who were similar or essentially the same across international boundaries are breaking down. The boundary with Xinjiang is not going to be affected by this, as the Uighurs and Kazakhs there use a modified Arabic alphabet, not the standard Arabic alphabet that it used in Arab countries, Iran and Afghanistan. It was developed in Baku in 1923 and was adopted in Xinjiang in the mid-1970s, where it replaced a Latin alphabet. This modified Arabic alphabet drops those consonants that are not pronounced in Uighur or Kazakh and it has added short vowels. It is very difficult to read for people who know the standard Arabic alphabet. There are at least five new letters that are unrecognizable to anyone outside of Xinjiang, whether literate in Arabic or Turkic languages. This alphabet was used in Central Asia from 1923 to 1928. Thus, while the language barriers of Central Asia with the south seem to be breaking down, this is not necessarily true with Xinjiang. In fact, the alphabets have changed so often that whole generations have become illiterate overnight.

Ralph Magnus: Could you say that there is anything like "pure"

Arabic; is there in other words what might be called a "religious" language?

Eden Naby: There is an Arabic religious language that is emerging as a taught language in madrasses. It had always been taught in the two official madrasses in Bokhara and Tashkent, and there are now official madrasses being set up in many other places. But what is really interesting is the large number of unofficial madrasses being set up by many communities.

Sometimes they have taken over the original madrasses. Usually these need a lot of restoration and the question arises of who is going to pay for it. In several instances I noted in Uzbekistan the locals have argued that that the restored madrasses will become tourist attractions and therefore the local government should share in the cost. The use of Arabic now is very much as in the pre-Soviet period. It is a written and read language not a spoken language.

When you have students from the madrassas being sent abroad to study (many to Pakistan, funded by the Saudis) the language that they need is English. And English is being taught in the madrassas in addition to Arabic as the language of international communication.

Siddique Noorzoy: This is the same situation as in Iran.

Eden Naby: Yes, but in Iran there is a major effort to get Arabic to be a spoken language as well. To go on to religion, we see that Sunni Islam is almost universal in Central Asia (though not in Azerbaijan). However, there is a very important non-Sunni and non-Twelve Shia group in Tajikistan, which is critical to understanding the political developments there...the Isma'ilis.

All religion in the Soviet period was regulated but it has taken virtual free reign and the powers of the established religious groupings has broken down a great deal. Very important in this has been the emergence of the Islamic Renaissance Party, which began in Astrakhan as an all Soviet Union party with branches in each of the republics. Except in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, this was illegal. The party became legal in Tajikistan directly after the elections in November 1991. It gained the opportunity for organization, publications, etc., and is capable of wielding direct political power. Nabyev made it legal after the elections for several reasons, including the fact that it helped to splinter the Islamic movement. In Uzbekistan, Karimov has never allowed the party to be legal. He has tried to make sure that the official Islamic directorate does not play a political role either. This is a very difficult thing to keep a

lid on, and I suspect it will boil over if there are other conditions that break down. In Tajikistan, the party is legal and able to vent its grievances without violence. If this is so, why do we have the demonstrations there? This is due to the existence of the Isma'ilis. They have a long history in Central Asia. They are a cross border people living in the Pamirs and in Badakhshan. They are closely related historically and in actual family relations to Isma'ilis living across the border in Afganistan, in Pakistan and in China. The whole Pamir knot is virtually exclusively Isma'ili, along with scattered groups of Kirgiz that have immigrated into the area that are not too active politically. They have maintained their ties with one another, although those in the USSR were not able to send their tribute to the Agha Khan, their spiritual leader or Imam, since 1927. Those outside of Tajikistan have benefitted from their ties to the Agha Khan and his fortune, in areas such as agricultural development, tourism, etc. In the Pamir areas of Pakistan that had been neglected by the government these have a great impact. Those in Tajikistan have made some effort to attract the attention of the Agha Khan. There are some other Isma'ilis in other parts of the former Soviet Union,

including Bokhara, Samarkand in Uzbekistan, and in other parts of Tajikistan. In China, the entire community that is called Tajik is Isma'ili.

All these Isma'ilis are not really Tajik. They are not Persian speaking. They have several languages in the Iranian family...not just dialects.. about five languages including Wakhi, that are not mutually intelligible. There was an effort by the Soviets in the 1930s to try to write these, but they are not written. In Afghanistan these languages were never written and the Isma'ilis were probably the most oppressed of all the groups in the country. Thus, after 1978, the Isma'ilis of Afghanistan were one of the few ethnic groups that backed the Kabul regime. During this period they were able to build closer ties to the Isma'ilis of Tajikistan. This may lead to the two Badakhshans of Tajikistan and Afghanistan getting together. In the recent demonstrations in Tajikistan and in the previous election the Isma'ilis functioned as "The Democratic Party". Their candidates and membership tended to be regional, with a strong presence in Dushanbe. In the 1950s they had been promoted by Moscow against other regions of Tajikistan. In the elections of November, the two Sunni groups of the official establishment and the Renaissance Party

cooperated, the Isma'ilis withdrew. With Nabiyeu coming from the north, in a mixed area of Uzbeks and Tajiks with many Isma'ilis as well, they were able to throw their strength to Nabiyeu because they didn't want the Sunni groups to be in power. We have in Tajikistan not a religious unity, but a very strong Isma'ili group which crosses the border. However, they are divided by the fact that they don't have a common language. They also use Persian instead of Arabic as their religious language. In Dushanbe they strongly supported Persian. If there is any change for Tajikistan to break up into an Uzbek section, an Afghan section, etc., the Isma'ilis are going to oppose this. They are also the most strongly anti-Uzbek group in Tajikistan. They are traditional enemies as the Uzbek khans enslaved them. You will not find Uzbek-Tajik bilingualism among the Isma'ilis, as you find among many Sunni Tajiks.

Siddieq Noorzoy: There were numbers of Isma'ili militia, reported at 10,000 that took part in the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif that precipitated the fall of the Najibullah regime.

Eden Naby: The Agha Khan send a representative last year to Samarkand, but he didn't send one to Tajikistan because he didn't want to become embroiled in their political controversies. This year

he is going officially to Samarkand for the Agha Khan annual awards for Islamic architecture. He has helped the communities in Pakistan and China and there is a good chance that he will be able to help the Isma'ili areas of Central Asia

Because all these people have been cut off from each other across international borders statistics are even harder for them to acquire than for us. Particularly in Soviet Central Asia have very exaggerated notions as to how many of their co-ethnics live across international borders. They seem to think that they have huge numbers of co-ethnics around them, along with great expectations that, first of all, they are going to be helped by them and, second, that somehow they are going to eventually have closer dealings with them. Some Uzbeks feel that northern Afghanistan was part of the Uzbek domains and might be again in the future. The reality is that northern Afghanistan is a mixture of various ethnic groups.

Siddieq Noorzoy: Most of the Uzbeks, over 200,000 of them, are refugees from the Soviets in the 1920s.

Eden Naby: A lot of them were, but I don't know about most of them. Certainly, much of northern Afghanistan was part of the Bokhara

emirate, but it would be re-writing history to claim that this state was wholly Uzbek; it was also Tajik.

The second issue that confounds the ethnic issue is the question as to what is the ethnic identity of people who live outside of the Soviet borders, or for that matter, of those who live inside. Many have identities that are confused. A sedentary, de-tribalized Turkic speaking person in northern Afghanistan does not necessarily identify himself as an Uzbek, where that person in Tashkent would so identify himself. Thus, the creation of an Uzbek identity in the Soviet period has warped peoples' ideas of who they are and their relationship with people outside. The relationship of Uzbeks to Uighurs in Xinjiang is similarly confused. Where does Uzbek and Uighur identity come from? They were all more or less similar sedentary Turkic peoples strongly influenced by Iranian culture. During the Soviet period they tried to create identities for themselves historically that separated them.

In Afghanistan, if you asked them what language they speak, they would say "Turki". After 1978 the Taraki regime tried to say that "you are an Uzbek and you are a Turkmen" and they created a

nationality policy...but it failed. The government published newspapers and maybe fifty years from now somebody will look at that and say: "Yes, there were Uzbeks living in northern Afghanistan." In fact that was a government policy set up in Kabul with people from Tashkent running those newspapers.

There are people who have been educated to believe in the Uzbek or Uighar identity, but outside the cities these identities often have no meaning. It is possible that they may fade away. It will be the result of the outcome of the power struggle between the urban elites, basically the nomenklatura, and the countryside. Of course, there is the whole issue of Islam that ties the Uighur and Uzbeks together as Sunnis. If there are any people who are persecuted in Xinjiang it is the Isma'ilis because they are not Sunni.

The other issue to keep in mind in Central Asia, particularly between Uzbeks and Tajiks is the fact that many lived in bilingual and bicultural areas. In Bokhara, Samarkand and the valley stretching from Samarkand eastward, including Kojand. You find families where one full brother is Tajik and the other is Uzbek. Depending on the political pressures at the time of birth one is registered as one or the other. There are brothers who do speak a

different language, yet their identities tend not to be rooted in culture. This will take some time to iron out in Central Asia. In Dushanbe you have 23% of the population listed as Uzbek, but they all speak Tajik... though they may speak Uzbek too. There has to be some mechanism for people to re-identify themselves ethnically, as was done in Bokhara and Samarkand, or some other way to sift out their identities.

Graham Fuller: I remember a good friend in Moscow who was the leading translator of Dari to Russian. He said that he was struck by the fact that the Soviet Tajiks in Afghanistan often preferred to be mistaken for Soviet Uzbeks, because this gave them greater prestige. If not prestige, at least power.

Eden Naby: The Uzbeks would certainly have greater numbers. The Turkmen are different because they have kept their tribal identities, even when sedentarized. But this has little effect on non-tribal Tajiks and Uzbeks.

Who are these people? There is a great deal of fluidity in the internal borders, at least between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan there is some fluidity in international borders. A great deal depends on how the situation in Afghanistan works out. In northern Afghanistan

works out. In northern Afghanistan you have representation of all of them. And it is northern Afghanistan that has held the key to Central Asian ethnic and cultural aspects.

These relationships also have a positive aspect, making the area susceptible to economic and other cooperative efforts....such as between Uzbeks, Uighurs and with Afghanistan in terms of trade and with South Asia in term of religion.

ECONOMIC FACTORS IN CENTRAL ASIAN BORDER ISSUES

M. Siddieq Noorzoy, University of Alberta

We don't know very much of what the economies of the Central Asia states are or can be. There are two unknowns operating to hinder the emergence of any new model. These republics have been part of the Soviet economy. We don't know, for example, what the GDP would be in Tajikistan. Thus, individually, we don't know much about their industrial structures. The other problem is that there is so much political confusion as to what may transpire. Any economic arrangements for the future would have to follow political arrangements. Economic integration as a goal would have to come either from governments or from pressure from the private sector. There could be gains from economies of scale, freeing labor movements or freeing technology or capital. Since we don't know what these political arrangements might be we can only make some broad generalizations.

There are five scenarios for future development, any one of which could be viable:

- I. Existing arrangements from the USSR status quo could be

maintained.

2. There could be a political framework in the CIS, but with different arrangements of redistribution, income, output, investments, etc. In this they would not feel exploited as they feel they have been. There would be more equality in allocating income and costs. One of the glaring examples of this exploitation has been the destruction of the Aral Sea due to the agricultural policies imposed by the USSR on the region.

3. They could form their own organization for economic cooperation, without giving up their individual newly found international economic ties. We know something about their populations and resources, though less about their incomes. Their resources are largely mineral and agricultural. This could have a customs union, a common market and conditions to attract foreign investments.

4. They could each go along with ties to outside organizations with their Muslim neighbors to the south. There is a framework that has existed for some time between Iran, Turkey and Pakistan in the Organization for Economic Cooperation, of which some have joined and others have attended the February Tehran meeting in the status

of observers. At the same time an Islamic Common Market was proposed.

5. Each state could open up and generate its own trade, investment, aid, etc., decisions not just in the region or in the CIS. The decision makers will be those officials who buy up the current state properties. They will be open to the world, i.e., Japan, the West, etc., and would join international organizations such as GATT and the World Bank the Asian Development Bank. If the status quo cannot be maintained , arrangements with Russia are unworkable, and if they feel the size of their economies are too small and their resources are too scattered, they could act as normal members of the international system.

Any one of these might be viable, depending on the political assumptions one is willing to make. For example, if the status quo should be maintained, the existing elites would have a vital interest in this This might not be uniform, however, Kazakhstan might attract much more investement and Tajikistan's elites might want to opt for different arrangements to maintain their power. Secondly, one has to assume for this to continue it would first require that Russia would be able to maintain its subsidies and to

keep Russian troops in the region. They would have to use the ruble, but this might not have the same effect should the ruble become convertible. Now, dependence on the ruble is an obstacle to any other arrangement that might be attempted, such as arrangements with other Muslim countries. A third assumption would be that although the rest of the world might have their own interests in this area they would maintain a hands off policy. Japan, for instance, might be able to offer a much better deal to Central Asians than could the Russians. They could offer direct investments to help secure their entry into what could be a sizable market in the future. All of the players in Central Asia have a stake in what they might see emerge.

An "Islamic Common Market" has been suggested by Pakistan as a possible scenario, but it is not viable as of now. There are a variety of reasons why this is so, but I would like to mention two of them here. The "Islamic Republics" of the world have yet to resolve all the issues involved as to what can be considered an Islamic economic system. This is particularly true of the issue of interest. In the Holy Qur'an and traditions riba (literally: increase) is

is forbidden as usury, but the precise interpretation of what is or is not riba is the subject of a huge body of the Shariah.

A second issue is that kind of Common Market along European lines as a trading arrangement is not what Islamic states are seeking. The European process was an evolutionary one from 1957 to 1992, which only recently in the Maastricht agreement have they come to the core of harmonizing their monetary and fiscal policies in seeking a common currency. Initially, they were a free trade area on the model of the United States. They particularly wanted to achieve economies of scale. The EEC moved into political statements only in 1985 and 1991, but this is not fully resolved as yet as witnessed in the Danish vote rejecting the Maastricht agreement.

There are other trading arrangements which might prove more attractive models. The APEC (Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation) is one. This was formed in 1980 (the United States, Canada, Japan, China, Taiwan, Australia, Hong Kong and the ASEAN states) and has moved to increase trade volume and to reduce tariffs.

Graham Fuller: Do you mean states with a Muslim majority are Islamic Republics, or is there a specific model or models of self-

conscious "Islamic Republics"?

Siddieq Noorzoy: In the initial stage it was Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, but the Central Asians were invited as well. An "Islamic Common Market" was proposed in Tehran in February 1992. At most it envisages a free trade area along the lines of APEC, although it has discussed direct investments and technology transfers. This is the most they could hope for now...not a common market.

June Teufel Dreyer: How is APEC actually run? Have they really reduced tariffs?

Siddieq Noorzoy: Within the framework of GATT, they have.

June Teufel Dreyer: China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong are not members of GATT, they are observers.

Siddieq Noorzoy: The volume of their trade has significantly increased because of the formation of APEC. Also, the Japanese investments have increased. The data since 1980 shows that.

Eden Naby: The fact is APEC reduces tariffs among themselves and this is a model that could be applied in Central Asia. What other aspects of APEC could you see as applicable to Central Asia?

Siddieq Noorzoy: The issues of direct investments and transfer of technology, without political ramifications necessarily, are others.

Eden Naby: What we have in Central Asia, particularly with Iran and Turkey, is direct investments and technology transfer. Iran is also talking about reducing tariffs.

Stephen Blank: The Central Asians are interested in diversifying their economies, and outsiders are interested in getting in so others can't close them out. Political interests in the future are certainly a viable reason for all to get involved economically.

Siddiq Noorzoy: As I mentioned in the beginning, you have to make certain political assumptions before you can then generate certain economic scenarios. Certainly, if the United States were to invest a couple of billion dollars there we don't want the rise of a Russian Empire that would nationalize investments as they did after 1917. There is also the possibility of influencing a country politically so you can generate the conditions for economic investment. This is an issue for all countries carrying out trading and investments in Central Asia. You can assume that all countries will do that, openly or not.

June Teufel Dreyer: To what extent are the Central Asian economies complementary or, even if they are not, can they manage to specialize in different industries, such as in ASEAN?

Siddieq Noorzoy: From what we know of the structure of production and distribution they tend to be primary producers, some manufacturing in textiles, but largely minerals and agriculture. They are competitive not in their domestic economies, but in third country markets. For instance, Turkemistan and Kazakhstan would compete with each other in marketing gas. There is complementarity of goods produced there with their southern neighbors from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Turkey.

Eden Naby: Doesn't the fact that they are geographically contiguous make the issues of complementarity and competitiveness different? The very fact of competitiveness could serve production as they could transport across their areas much more easily and rapidly than could outsiders.

Siddieq Noorzoy: One of the things they could borrow from the Common Market is the allocation and reallocation of investments. Small plants producing the same commodities in different countries could consolidate and achieve economies of scale. This is also an argument for economic integration between Canada and the United

Eden Naby: Isn't this the very problem we are facing with the break-

up of the USSR in that all production of certain goods was centered in a single area, for instance all sugar in the Ukraine? This could lead to inefficiency rather than competitiveness.

Siddieq Noorzoy: The economies of scale vary from product to product, thus each industry has an optimum plant size. For example, a steel mill's optimum size is about a million tons. If there isn't a market for this, or if the plan is faulty as were most Soviet plans, you lost the efficiency of scale. When market forces are doing their job, it is different.

Stephen Blank: I see a difference. Central Asia has no outlets to the sea and a poor transportation system oriented only towards Russia. They are still going to rely on somebody to enter the world economy...they need transit routes. That kind of economic dependence eventually turns into political dependence.

Eden Naby: This is not true if they have alternative routes, such as through Afghanistan, Iran, China, etc. You don't have political obligations.

Stephen Blank: You have less. You've multilateralized your political obligations. That is the most they can hope for.

Siddieq Noorzoy: Afghanistan is another land-locked country. Its

trade used to take place largely through Pakistan and Iran. For the last fifteen years it has been diverted to go through the Soviet Union at subsidized rates. Now, the Afghan government is saying that they want to get the same low rates or they will not continue these trade routes. There is now an agreement between Pakistan and Tajikistan for the transfer of electric power

Eden Naby: Some of these investments will come from Iran and Turkey.

June Teufel Dreyer: One country with an enormous amount available for investment is Taiwan. There is about ninety billion dollars available.

Stephen Blank: There is an overall shortage of capital world wide, and it is going to go where it feels it has the best chance of making money. This is not likely to be Central Asia, particularly when you look at their infrastructure, health systems, and structure of the labor force.

Eden Naby: It is surprising which countries are making investments. Israel has made quite a few investments.

Graham Fuller: The Central Asians have this sense, I fear, that the world is looking upon them as them greedily as an incredibly rich

place. It is fairly modest in its resources and politically difficult to get into. I would guess that they are not going to be the objects of intense competition.

Ralph Magnus: Investors are always interested in how they are going to get their money out. As long as they are part of the ruble zone, this might be difficult.

Eden Naby: The Israelis are investing and they have good plans on how they are going to get their money out by exporting products their factories produce. They have the manpower and the knowledge to make money in Central Asia.

ASIAN BORDER ISSUES AND UNITED STATES INTERESTS
Ralph H. Magnus, Naval Postgraduate School

An interesting way of approaching the current situation is to draw historical parallels, which I would like to do here. Another issue is the role of the United States in the current situation. A few months ago at a conference I attended dealing with roughly the same subject matter...the emergence of Central Asia, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, Afghanistan, etc....we were treated to excellent papers about things going on in the area, but nobody looked at what was, could be or should be the policy of the United States toward all of this. The impression given was that these were things that were happening to which we would have to react. In fact, as Steve Pelletiere brought out regarding the Kurdish question, we can see that the United States is probably the most important actor, certainly the most important outside actor, involved there. This is not to say that we could do whatever we wish to do.

If we look to historical parallels, we can see that we are in a similar position to that of Britain in the post-World War I era. All their enemies were destroyed...the Ottoman, German and Habsburg empires - even the Russian empire that was their ally in the Great

War but their traditional enemy in the Middle East and Central Asia. They were in control from Egypt to China, if they wanted to be. They could rearrange whatever borders they wished to, and of course they did so. They also had the League of Nations, conquerable to the United Nations but in fact under their control - partly because the United States chose not to join.

Out of these peace settlements of post-World War I were created many of the problems we are still dealing with today. Artificial boundaries and whole artificial states were established. Whether they could have done anything differently is another matter, but what they did do created, for instance, the Kurdish problem among others.

In 1947 there was a similar situation. Here you had the post-World War II situation, with the great effects on the Middle East and Afghanistan of the disintegration of the British Indian empire. This was supposedly voluntary, and this brought us such situations as Bangladesh, Kashmir and Pushtunistan.

Today there is an conquerable situation, albeit not exactly the same. This is the reorganization of a major area of Asia including

Central Asia, South Asia and West Asia. Perhaps, indeed, we are into a re-ordering of all of Asia as we have already discussed the involvement of China, India, Israel, Iran, and Pakistan. What we need in this situation is more of an idea of what we want in this re-ordering. What I see now is a total lack of vision in Washington of anything regarding this. People there not only lack any vision of what we want here, they don't even realize the situation we are in. The poverty of United States policy making is glaringly obvious. For example, we supported Gorbachev to to the end, with a view of keeping the Soviet empire together in the name of stability. Now we have administration's policy of keeping the Chinese empire together under its current leadership because it too is stable. Maybe we don't want it stable. An empire is not necessarily a bad idea, indeed, we could look at an empire as one of the preferred political means for organizing the Middle East. Certainly, it was an effective way of handling ethnic issues. If an empire had an overarching imperial idea,. you could have Kurds, Arabs and Turks together under the aegis of a "Good Sultan". Thus, they could have a common ideological value for society. As we look today at Central Asia or the Caucasus, could we find any ideological value that could allow people to live

together so that it would make little difference whether a person was an Uzbek living in Tajikistan or the reverse? If we look purely at nation states and fixed political borders, and have to carve up everyone into the categories of national self-determination, we face the question of deciding when and where to stop and what impossible borders we will arrive at. This should raise the possibility of creating some broader kinds of groupings.

We need to consider the importance of United States policy and its potential to be an important or even decisive actor - if we wanted to be. We are occupying the same role that the British did in 1918 and which they fulfilled, in their own self-interest, of course. In the post World War II period they fulfilled a similar role, with less immediate success in the breakup of their Indian empire.

Stephen Pelletiere: What I see as a difference is that Britain after World War I had a definite policy under its foreign secretary, Lord Curzon. Especially with regard to Iran, they weren't completely alone in deciding the issues. Russia in the form of Soviet power re-emerged. I agree that we not only don't know what we want but we don't know the situation either. The difference is that we don't have a policy as did Curzon.

Stephen Blank: I like the idea of historical parallels. We are basically a status quo power. After the Congress of Vienna in 1815 Metternich has a similar policy of stasis, in contradiction to the British policy. This was truly conservative but could accommodate change and even revolution. If a people wanted to change their form of government as long as they didn't threaten their neighbors they could be accommodated in the international system.

Perhaps that is something we should look at if we are looking at American interests. In this region these interests are: one, the access to oil, and two, the defense of Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Other than these there is no vital interest which the United States is bound to protect.

June Teulfel Dreyer: What do you see that Israel is a vital interest?

Stephen Blank: Why? Because we have committed ourselves.

Stephen Pelletiere: We have just gone through a revolution in the region and the world. One side of the equation has collapsed. Instead of going back and saying we are doing this because we have committed to do so, we need to look anew. The big difference is that we continue to have a vital interest in the access to oil, but this doesn't involve Israel. We have to defend this ourselves, not through

surrogates, and we do it through CENTCOM. Unless you can make a strong case through sentiment, or political pressure, we have no obligation.

Stephen Blank: It is a democracy.

Stephen Pelletiere: That is another difference; ideology plays an entirely different role than in the Cold War.

Graham Fuller: Obviously, nobody in the United States wants to see Israel sink beneath the waves. But what the level of commitment needed to assure this is an entirely different thing. Israel is quite capable of defending itself, given occasional purchases of American arms.

Stephen Blank: I am not saying that we must underwrite a blank cheque to support whatever policies Israel wishes, but the basic commitment to its security is there.

Graham Fuller: The commitment to Egypt is fine, but what if a new fundamentalist government comes to power there and it is hostile to the United States?

Stephen Blank: Both Israel and Egypt are things that CENTCOM might be committed to defend. They are not going to be committed to the

Kurds or to interfere in Iran, unless Iran does something to its neighbors that effects the oil situation. There are only a limited number of scenarios that require the exercise of military force in the region.

Ralph Magnus: But our interests do not always have to be defended by military means.

Siddieq Noorzoy: We have been looking at the possible re-emergence of the Soviet empire. It is clearly in our interest that this doesn't happen.

Eden Naby: There is one reason why the United States can and should be interested in Central Asia, Iran and Afghanistan. This is because if there are major conflicts there it will draw in others on the periphery, including such large states as Russia and China, so we may have a military interest in maintaining peace. The second is the question of Israel. Whether or not we have an obligation to defend them is one thing, but if Israel is threatened and is going to use its technological options, including the nuclear option, that will involve others and we certainly have an obligation to make sure this doesn't happen.

Stephen Blank: The great question all the way across the area to

India is the development of high-tech weapons, or even of what was high-tech twenty years ago. These include nuclear, chemical, ballistic missiles, etc. in such places as Kazakhstan, Iran, Pakistan, India, Iraq, etc. Russia is irresponsibly involved in selling weapons all over the place. But the technology is world wide.

Eden Naby: But if the United States is a military power, why do we not interfere in this process?

Stephen Blank: We do it all the time.

Ralph Magnus: We have to look at what the United States role is, and I suggest that we could look at some historical analogies. In both of the instances I raised we had Democratic presidents, Woodrow Wilson and Harry Truman, and they seemed to possess (certainly in the case of Wilson) perhaps an excess of vision. This reminds me of a meeting I had in Pakistan in 1983 with a high Pakistani official when we were trying to establish a system of getting medical supplies to the Afghan mujahidin and people inside Afghanistan through Americares. This official was, and I'm sure still is, a convinced Islamist. I had been warned that prior discussing any business you had to be prepared for a thirty minute lecture, if you were fortunate, on Islam. This proved to be the case and the text of

his "sermon" was the fact that "America has not had a foreign policy worthy of its people since Woodrow Wilson...including freedom, anti-imperialism and the support of the self-determination of peoples. Why can't you have such a policy now?" I told him that we did, as demonstrated by our support of the Afghan mujahidin's struggle for freedom and self-determination. Evidently, this was the correct answer, as he agreed to help us establish our aid program.

It is interesting that Truman came up with a new policy for the Middle East, along with its moral justification, in just ten weeks in 1947. He also had a vision, based primarily I believe on his own experience in the trenches in France in World War I. He stated that the United States had gotten involved in two World Wars to defend the freedom and order of Europe. We were now facing a new potential and actual aggressor in the Middle East in the form of the Soviet Union. Therefore, we needed to support freedom in this area before it became necessary to do so by military means. Here, as with Wilson's Fourteen Points, you had a statement of principles as the basis, or at least as the justification, of policy. Recently, in the Kuwait crisis, out of President Bush's many statements there were

some points of principle made, including the support for democracy and the opposition to tyranny, but these were quickly relegated to the back burner.

Somehow, for a policy to be successful in this area and in an era when there is more popular participation than ever, you can't have an effective policy, even in the protection of your narrow self-interests, without a foundation of principle. The people of the region realize that having mere order at the expense of oppression is no longer what they want, nor do they accept that one ethnic group has a kind of divine right to rule over another.

When you have ideas, people and organizations willing to fight for their beliefs, this has to be taken into account. What principles are acceptable to both the United States and to the people of the region? Is it self-determination? Is it democracy? Is it collective security or is it even international law and support for the right of sovereign states to exist in peace and security under the United Nations' Charter? This final principle seemed at times in the Gulf War to be the official justification of United States actions. Or, does the United States merely want to create order and it doesn't matter if this is Gorbachev's order, Deng Xiao Ping's order or Saddam Hussein's

order, as long as things are stable for the United States?

Stephen Blank: There was a lot of talk of collective security during the war, but on closer examination it turns out that there was very little collective involved. Today, nobody is talking collective security in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Self-determination is a wonderful principle, but in this area it is beyond the capability of the American government, much less the American people to discriminate among rival claims.

Graham Fuller: It is not up to us to decide whose claims are or are not valid. The press of circumstances will determine this. The main argument is that we are not going to move heaven and earth to try to keep nations together when they seem destined not to stay together, and this is where I differ from Steve Pelletiere in the case of Iraq. Yes, it is a nice idea to have some kind of federation to succeed the USSR, but it might not work, as Yugoslavia didn't work since it was created at gun-point. We have to be relatively open to the idea that there may be many countries with the end of the Cold War that are going to be put in question.

Stephen Blank: It may be an argument for eclecticism. There is no principle out there that can encompass such a fluid reality.

Ralph Magnus: But in effect there is a principle, as our State Department comes down on the side of the status quo ninety-nine times out of a hundred.

Graham Fuller: These are not rival ethnic claims. A group says, "We are what we are and we want to leave."

Eden Naby: But that flexibility still has to be based on some kind of principles.

Graham Fuller: It certainly can't be based on the negation of self-determination. I don't think that self-determination on the basis of ethnicity is the greatest principle in the world. It doesn't produce governments with a high degree of tolerance, but it's what we have to work with. The critical thing is to try to find various other mechanisms by which minorities can live and be protected within states without having to declare their independence in their own state.

Ralph Magnus: Of course, the Wilsonian formula was both self-determination and minority rights guaranteed by international law and agreements. Eventually, the minority rights went by the board.

Graham Fuller: There have been some interesting recent developments in this area of international law. The concept of

sovereignty is beginning to be reinterpreted. Saddam's idea that you can't touch me because of Iraq's sovereignty seems to be challenged if the ruler is usurping his power and abusing his people...and, more importantly, his neighbors. At some point the international community can say that it is involved and he can't claim immunity based on sovereignty.

Stephen Pelletiere: The problem is that this elevates the United States to the position of a judge. We are the people with the power to do something about it, if we determine that someone is "bad" for his people.

Graham Fuller: The old rule was that the international community almost never became involved. We did not recognize this in the Kuwait crisis, which was a case of protecting one nation against another, but the protection of the Kurds is different.

Stephen Pelletiere: There was a lot of feeling in this country that the United States should go in to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

Ralph Magnus: Yes, and it was expressed by George Bush himself.

Stephen Blank: I would like to see the present and future Hitlers and

Pol Pots removed too, but in the end it is a question of power. In the United States we accommodate ourselves well to people like the Chinese leadership, which doesn't seem to treat their own people too well, feeling we have a compelling interest in a stable and integrated China. I don't like the idea of a generalized right of "humanitarian" intervention against regimes that "mistreat" their own minorities. It is open to the most grievous kinds of abuse, and be corrupted into a platform for intervention which was used by both Hitler and Stalin to "protect" minorities whenever they wanted a piece of Eastern Europe.

Graham Fuller: But this doesn't mean that we have to have a policy of military intervention. There are all kinds of other sanctions and interventions short of war.

Stephen Pelletiere: What you are overlooking, Graham, is that there can indeed be a range of techniques from sanctions, embargoes, etc., but behind these there has to be military force, which means the United States.

Eden Naby: But in the boycotting of South Africa, there wasn't a military threat.

Graham Fuller: The point is that there are other means and the

United States and other states are going to lean on those means first. There will be more of this rather than less.

Siddieg Noorzoy: I doubt very much if the United States is going to be involved in this way. You have to go through Congress and have a lobby. I look at the classic case of Afghanistan. The United States helped only selectively and when it wanted to. It was not a general movement and only succeeded because it was pushed by a few individuals, such as Senator Tsongas.

Graham Fuller: I'm not saying we can do whatever we want. It is possible to apply a range of sanctions to a number of nations that are involved in unacceptable behavior to their people.

Stephen Blank: You can surely try these, but do they change behavior?

Ralph Magnus: They haven't been too effective in changing Castro's behavior after having been applied for thirty years.

Stephen Pelletiere: Nobody is arguing that there are not a number of non-military sanctions that can be used. What we are trying is to find the principle you use to make the determination to use them. If it is merely that the people don't like their ruler and neither do his neighbors, I don't think that is too functional a principle.

Stephen Blank: Since Yeltsin came to power he advocated that the CSCE ought to have a mechanism for protecting the rights of minorities in Europe, and this may be even by force. Now we have Yugoslavia and Milosevic. What to the Russians do-they vetoed it.

Graham Fuller: Ultimately, they agreed that Serbia's conduct was outrageous and supported the sanctions now in force.

Ralph Magnus: The situation right now in the former USSR is that people are so anxious to get something out of the international community that we have a good deal of leverage, so we won't have to use force.

June Teufel Dreyer: Don't we have an international court?

Siddique Noorzoy: We need a better method of settling disputes than through the United Nations. The military position of the United States will become increasingly limited. There is growth of income elsewhere in the world at a much more rapid rate than here, and the weight of this country is going to be changing relatively. How long can you project that current military options will persist into the next century?

Stephen Blank: When the Libyan case was before the World Court a few months ago the United States announced that if it found for

Libya, we would not accept the decision.

Graham Fuller: We are just entering a new era. I agree that there isn't a glorious history of international law on these matters but, increasingly, there is an interest in developing some kind of system of the protection of minority rights as minority rights and ethnic conflict become more prominent. It will take time to develop these.

Eden Naby: How willing is the United States to become the military policeman?

Stephen Pelletiere: I think that if the United States sees its vital interests at stake it will intervene. Increasingly, because of the world economy, what affects the system affects the United States. In Desert Storm the system was threatened and we moved; in Yugoslavia the system was not threatened.

Graham Fuller: But we did opt to move very heavily against Belgrade.

Stephen Blank: And it took us two years to get even the minimal activism we now have.

Eden Naby: You mean that it has to be a direct United States interest and not a general support for world peace?

Ralph Magnus: Part of the reason the Europeans took two years to

move was that the United States was supporting the unity of Yugoslavia for two years.

June Teufel Dreyer: In the present era there is no assumption that it is in the best interest of the United States to have a stable, well-integrated country X. We need a careful determination of what vital United States interest are, and there may be one or two other than oil. We need to see what are the economic arrangements disrupted, what are the consequences of instability- are refugee flows created? We must realize that we might not be able to influence what is going on. When President Bush made the statement that it was in our best interests to have a stable, calm Yugoslavia, one group took that as an excuse to start beating up on everyone else.

Eden Naby: It seems to me that June has raised some issues which need to be taken up if we have something constructive to say.

June Teufel Dreyer: I want to know what are the criteria. It seems that we are getting lost in specific cases. I think that Steve's remark on the World Court was right on the mark. The United States also refused to submit to the judgement of the court on the mining of Nicaragua's harbors.

Eden Naby: After World War I and World War II we tried to create

some kind of world order, and now we are trying again.

Stephen Pelletiere: Look at what was created after World War I.

The mandate system proposed to offer tutelage of states to bring them into a democratic order. The imperialists using this considered it an extension of the imperialist system.

Eden Naby: It was a step out of the imperialist system, but it was not a compete one.

Ralph Mangus: It was their compromise to come up with something as a reply to Wilsonian self-determination.

Stephen Blank: There is another point from the 1918 analogy that is even more relevant to today. The British set out to impose an order all the way from Egypt to China. It proved to be beyond their power and resources. They couldn't stand it financially, and we won't be able to either. We can't underwrite a new world order when we are busy competing with everyone else for markets, resources, etc.

Graham Fuller: We are talking about mechanisms of international law and international government. We are not talking about unilateral United States intervention. Some, or much, of our military budget should go to these efforts. We could certainly afford to give a tenth of our military budget, or thirty billion, for

United Nations peace keeping. Now we don't even pay what we owe...two or three billion dollars.

Stephen Blank: Are we going to expect the Japanese to underwrite the costs of these actions and we call the shots as to where and when these troops have to go?

Siddieq Noorzoy: The whole issue is the fact that unilateral military action to solve these conflicts is not going to survive. There will be countries that will not come in. There will be countries that will coalesce against it. It will just be unworkable.

June Teufel Dreyer: The United Nations is increasingly unrepresentative of the new world order. The Chinese don't belong in the Security Council. I'm not sure Britain belongs. I see Japan financing some of these operations as a small forward step. We have to do a lot of bargaining to get the Security Council to do what we want. For example, President Bush had to promise tacitly to maintain their most favored nation status if they agreed to abstain on military action in the Gulf crisis.

Graham Fuller: These recent events were still part of the Cold War environment. They are not fast principles and there has been a

remarkable movement in a very short period. President Bush realized that he could have gone into Kuwait unilaterally, but felt there were advantages to doing this through the United Nations. It is going to be very hard to find cases for unilateral United States intervention.

Stephen Pelletiere: The United States has a repeated policy of intervening in the Middle East if it felt its oil interests were being threatened. Now, we may have been wrong as to the reality of these threats.

Graham Fuller: I don't think that our oil interests have ever been threatened. Kuwait was a very complicated case and we can't yet come to any determination as to what happened.

Stephen Pelletiere: The most persuasive line that I heard at the time was that if we allowed Saddam to control 20 percent of the world's oil, our interests were bound to be affected.

Graham Fuller: That was a potent argument. But that did not mean that Saddam wasn't going to sell us Kuwaiti oil.

Ralph Magnus: Are we applying these principles, or the lack of the same only to the Middle East? Do we have any interest in Central Asia more strictly considered?

Eden Naby: Does the United States feel that the maintenance of current international boundaries is vital to us as part of maintaining peace?

Ralph Magnus: This was certainly one of the points raised by President Bush during the Kuwait crisis as one of the five points why we should be defending Kuwait. There is the principle in international law that established borders should not be changed unilaterally and by force.

Graham Fuller: Eden, I believe that if the Nigeria-Biafra issue were to come up again that this time the world would not allow Nigeria to act in the same manner because we felt that Nigeria had to stay together and African boundaries were sacred. It is probably preferable not to change international borders, but each case has to be examined on its merits...what can we really do in any case, will it create international refugee problems....etc.

June Teufel Dreyer: I can't agree that it is preferable; it is not for us to say.

Stephen Blank: Preferable for us.

June Teufel Dreyer: But it might be preferable for us to have a border changed.

Graham Fuller: We would rather have more stability than less stability, although this was a greatly overworked virtue in the Cold War. Is there something less than these drastic changes that they and we could accept? Could the Kurds settle for less?

Stephen Pelletiere: What is really holding up a deal between Saddam Hussein and the Kurds is the status of Kirkuk. They could have a deal tomorrow, in fact Barzani has one, on autonomy for the Kurdish area. However, the Kurds claim Kirkuk and the Iraqis won't give up the oil.

Graham Fuller: Specifically, you are correct. But there is also the question that nobody believes Saddam Hussein would honor any agreement longer than he has to. But, hypothetically, we should look at changes to see if there are other means than the changing of boundaries or secession to solve these questions...could there be federalism?

Eden Naby: Where would these solutions be discussed? Would it be in the United States, in an international conference, in the United Nations?

Stephen Blank: Look at Central Asia. We have the fact that every border inside the ex-USSR is questionable, or could be. There is an enormous potential for trouble and violence, and we don't have the

foggiest idea how to deal with it.

Eden Naby: One solution would be to say that we are supporting existing borders.

Stephen Blank: But this would mean resigning ourselves to perpetual violence.

Eden Naby: I don't agree. If you are talking of military violence, there could be regional forces which wouldn't allow this. We could support this.

June Teufel Dreyer: Couldn't you add a clause that the United States supports the principle of peaceful negotiations over border issues?

Ralph Magnus: That is not necessarily a solution, however. You've had forty years of peaceful negotiations over Kashmir and nothing has been resolved except three wars with another on the horizon.

June Teufel Dreyer: You are not saying that this would work; you are just supporting the principle.

Stephen Blank: Look at Nagorno-Karabakh. In 1987 or 88 the Armenians raised the issue. In 1988 the Azerbaijanis, with Soviet support, started killing people and driving them off the land. Fighting went on for three years. In August 1991 Yeltsin comes in

and the Armenians feel they are in better shape and begin killing Azerbaijanis. Who is right? The Armenians say they want peaceful negotiations.

June Teufel Dreyer: It doesn't always work. The United States must go on to say that when violence does occur, when there is an escalation of economic and political refugees, when there are human rights violations, then we need to reevaluate our policy.

Siddieg Noorzoy: The statement that we don't know how to solve the border problems of the ex-USSR emanates from the fact that they don't know what to do about them either. They are afraid to do anything. These decisions have been taken away from a single party to a system of consensus decision making. This can guarantee the efficacy of pressure by peaceful means.

Stephen Blank: We do have examples of successful mediation of wars and conflicts, as witnessed by Camp David, Tashkent in 1965 and the Sino-Soviet border dispute. They can be mediated by a genuine third party...Peru or Ecuador for instance, not Iran, as it is trying to do in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Siddieg Noorzoy: We could use the IMF or World Bank as a workable model for these kinds of actions. The United States has a major

stake in funding and voting in them. It can influence policy but it can't guarantee 100 percent of the policy. We can exercise leadership but by consensus.

Eden Naby: Suppose we look at two hypothetical cases. In one Iran decides to take over the Turkmen gas fields. Who is going to say anything?

Siddieq Noorzoy: The Russians would say something.

Eden Naby: But they are separated geographically.

Graham Fuller: Because this was Iran's actions, it would serve as a red flag to the world.

Eden Naby: Only because it was Iran? Suppose the Afghan mujahidin decide that Bokhara ought to be part of Afghanistan? Or that it needs to be freed from the communist Karimov? Who is going to say anything?

Stephen Blank: Yeltsin would, because they have a collective security treaty.

Stephen Pelletiere: The only thing I can see as something solid is oil as a vital interest. If you can demonstrate another vital interest I would consider it. It would have to be something that would have a monumental effect on our domestic life.

Eden Naby: If Iran were to move into Turkmenistan or the Afghans into Bokhara, then Yeltsin would have a legal position for action. This could be the spearhead for the extension of Russian military power.

Graham Fuller: There would be the principle of a major military aggression and aggrandizement. This, as a general principle, is largely unacceptable in this world

Stephen Blank: We are witnessing just this right now in Serbian actions in Bosnia. We are not getting involved, as we were in Desert Storm.

Ralph Magnus: There are lesser forms of military involvement than Desert Storm. We were involved in Afghanistan militarily by giving arms through Pakistan

Graham Fuller. We are talking about a range of options short of military.

Eden Naby: You are saying that you don't see the United States acting militarily, at least in the next decade, unless it involves oil.

Stephen Pettetiere: Yes.

Ralph Magnus: What about Israel?

Stephen Pelletiere: I would assume that the context of the threat to Israel would be such that we would be forced to use military action only as a last resort. Under the old bi-polar world there was a compulsion to compete for the entire world. There are a lot of areas where people could go to one side or the other and there is no compulsion forcing us to move.

June Teufel Dreyer: What of the question of Korea. North Korea is very close to getting a nuclear capability and the government is run by an aging tyrant and his son. We have a security treaty with South Korea. Where is our vital interest? Yet, should we re-write the treaty? Should we try to destabilize North Korea before it gets nuclear capability?

Stephen Pelletiere: I would say that we would move if North Korea invaded South Korea, vital interest or not, because this would trigger a whole range of historical experience of the Korean War, and because United States troops are stationed there now.

Siddieq Noorzoy: What of the case of Turkey invading Armenia?

Stephen Pelletiere: We do nothing militarily. We could do a lot short of war, embargoes and so forth.

Eden Naby: Has nationalism provided the basis for the retention of

the current states of what used to be called "The Northern Tier"? Can they maintain themselves? Can we take them on a case by case basis? We talked about Iran, and found that this was a good question to apply to Iran in the Azerbaijan issue. Are the Iranian Azeris so integrated into Iranian culture that calls to separate from Iran would be rejected?

Graham Fuller: Afghanistan is another case. So is Turkey and the Caucasus states.

Eden Naby: Are we satisfied to say that there are a large portion of the Kurds in Turkey that are successfully integrated since the Kemalist period, so they would not want to break away to join a newly formed Kurdish state on their borders?

Ralph Magnus: We can certainly say that President Ozal's economic development policies in Southeast Turkey are aimed precisely at this goal...the integration of the Kurds into Turkey. This is a constructive way of handling ethnic issues. As we look as to what United States actions might be, other than coming in as a fire brigade to put out local conflagrations, we should look at this sort of thing. What could the United States do to promote integration, peaceful relations and so forth in Central Asia? One thing that the

United States does do well, and certainly did do in the post World War II era, was some kind of economic reconstruction, or perhaps some actual physical construction. Perhaps we should build a "Great Central Asian Freeway" from Alma Ata to Kararchi?

Stephen Blank: I agree. We did a paper for the Army in which I argued that the failure of the United States to support economic development in Eastern Europe is leading to the exacerbation of crises in such places as Czechoslovakia. To the extent that we and our allies can contribute to the economic well being across this vast area we will substantially help to mitigate nationalist conflicts by giving more people a stake in stability or, better still, in an evolutionary outcome.

Graham Fuller: Perhaps another way would be to develop "sub-threshold" arrangements for ethnic minorities what would allow them to substitute for total independence and self-determination in areas like language, human rights, etc.?

Eden Naby: Some could be on the cultural level, others would involve economic aspects.

Stephen Pelletiere: Let's look at the area to pick out what points we think have been most degraded and are most likely to slip into

violence. Then, study these on a case by case basis to see which factors are similar and operating in a number of areas. We all agree that the Armenians, Azeris and Kurds are dangerous issues.

Siddieq Noorzoy: Even these territorial issues are ultimately economic.

Graham Fuller: In a lot of cases it has been the passions of nationalism that has allowed people to ignore economic issues.

Eden Naby: There are things in Central Asia, such as water issues, that could allow them to pull together economically. These make them interdependent. Some areas are watersheds that control the water resources of an entire region.

Ralph Magnus: As Turkey does for much of the Middle East.

Eden Naby: Precisely. They might lead to an agreement for the sharing of water resources and hydroelectricity, or they might lead to conflict.

Siddieq Noorzoy: Economic issues can be targeted in terms of the problems they have or to their possible solutions. They can be attacked either unilaterally or internationally in consortiums involving Germans, Japanese, Americans, etc. This could be a

cohesive package that could appeal to the world for people to send in technicians, capital and getting involved in privatization...where nobody has a solution thus far.

Stephen Blank: These are economic problems, but there are issues in each area where a solution can either further or mitigate conflict. Still, they create opportunities as well.

Siddieq Noorzoy: But to achieve this we need a reorientation on the part of the United States. Where do we go in the next five years for aiding these states' resources for growth stimulation, market creation, privatization and encouraging local entrepreneurs?

Ralph Magnus: One the the clear things we can all agree on regarding Central Asia is that it is land-locked. The opening of routes to the sea is an important part of the solution. If Iran wanted to export everything Central Asia could produce, there would not be enough railroads, roads, ports, etc., to handle all of it. The Iranian facilities would collapse.

Stephen Blank: There is a need for visionary thinking, hypothetically a canal from the Caspian to the Gulf...which is probably impossible...could break them out of isolation and re-integrate them into the world trade routes.

Eden Naby: Transport, and perhaps even more importantly communications, is a way to integrate these areas. Communications doesn't require so much investment, it is more of a service industry.

Siddieq Noorzoy: You have to begin in areas where there are short term payoffs.

Eden Naby: Water is a potential source of conflict, and there is going to have to be a revolution in the creation of new laws as a productive way of cooling these conflicts.

Ralph Magnus: After the initial clash in Kashmir between India and Pakistan they did restore relations to a degree. Then India made unilateral developments in the Punjab watershed that adversely affected Pakistan. This was the "second shoe" after Kashmir that turned Pakistan against having genuine cooperation with India.

Stephen Pelletiere: We have to realize why we are here. The old order has disintegrated. What in the area is sufficiently important for the United States to be involved?

Graham Fuller: I have tried very hard to look at this. Oil is mostly involved indirectly, although the Tengiz field is undoubtedly important for Chevron. Most of our interest is negative. We know what we don't want and we don't want conflict that can cause the

reemergence of Russian imperialism. We don't want Chinese intervention, nor do we want Iranian domination.

EPILOGUE ON ETHNICITY AND INTERNATIONAL BORDERS

Eden Naby, Harvard University

International law regards the retention of established international borders as a critical cornerstone. Firm adherence to this position has been maintained by regional organizations throughout Africa, Europe and Latin America despite pressures which have largely emanated from ethnic forces. At present, a clear challenge to the maintenance of the status quo on international border issues is present in Eastern Europe, in the Middle East and in Asia. An outcome in any one of the critical situations throughout the globe that redraws international boundaries and succeeds in establishing stable governments will result in a major rethinking of border issues in the entire legal and political structure of the world. Just such resolutions to ethnic inspired border rearrangements appear underway in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the former Soviet Union which will certainly effect Ireland, Iraq, and possibly Afghanistan and the sub-continent of India, Iran and Russian and Chinese Central Asia. How we can anticipate the effects to world stability and progress from changes in border status quo has been the concern of the participants of this workshop on borders.

Inherent in any discussion of border issues are questions relating to the relationship between the concepts of ethnicity and nationalism, and between stability and status quo. These two sets of concepts are steeped in internal dilemmas: Must ethnicity form the basis for nationalism? Does the status quo represent forces for stability, a major condition under which political, economic and social progress can occur?

Decolonization and International Borders

In the Middle East in particular, where, in the aftermath of Ottoman disintegration and European conquest, borders were planned or drawn without regard to the principle of national self-determination the fragility of the border status quo has been highlighted by the sudden independence of neighboring Muslim republics throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia. During the decolonization period following World War II, former borders, with all their ethnic vices and historical claims conflicts were retained. Just as major ethnic groups were stranded and remain so in the Middle East after World War I, so with the formation of countries

out of the former Soviet Union, the ethnic conflict, submerged before, now thrusts itself onto the political stage by independence. To groups such as Kurds, Palestinians, and Assyrians, ignored in the struggle to create mandates, then states, which have carried forth decades of struggle for the only status, they believe, that would confer on them equality in international affairs, have been added others from former Soviet lands. These new ethnic conflicts bear directly on the viability of international borders.

Particularly affected by Soviet border issues are Iran and Afghanistan. Afghanistan especially succumbed to the dictates of imperial Russian and British forces which forged together a state without regard to the principle of national self-determination. Today the struggle in Afghanistan to a great extent is hinged on the struggle among ethnic groups which are divided across international borders with neighbors. The Afghan and Iranian situations have simmered on back burners and boiled over at critical junctures in the national histories of both countries as for example in the crises of 1944-46 in northwestern Iran and in the continuous political struggle that the Baluchistan and Pakhtunistan issues have become for Afghanistan since the formation of Pakistan in 1947.

Decolonization in the Middle East (as in Africa) has left a legacy that conferred independence without regard to self-determination.

Self-Determination and International Borders

Similar to the Middle East proper, in Central Asia, the achievement of independence also may be described as a three-staged process with an additional twist. Following imperial conquest by the end of the nineteenth century, colonial entities were formed which, in the period of decolonization retained their former borders. In Central Asia, the end of Tsarist imperialism by 1920 ushered in a period similar to the mandate stage in the Middle East and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 represents the decolonization which in the Middle East occurred after World War II. The added twist is that at the close of the second stage, Moscow retained former Tsarist lands in large part because of the application of the principle of self-determination as a means of justification for the lack of total decolonization. In general outline, during the 1920s Bolshevik planners put into effect aspects of the principle of national self-determination, a lure that attracted key ethnic groups into cooperation with Russian schemes to divide its

Central Asian domains into contending republics. National self-determination, lying at the heart of Soviet nationality policy, divided previously relatively homogeneous people into ethnic clumps hammered together as Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, Turkmen and Tajiks. Today, during this second stage of decolonization, the Soviet republics have reluctantly become independent countries. In all cases except that of the Karakalpak, the ethnic territories carved for each major ethnic group have changed now from legally sovereign Soviet republics into independent states.

However, despite the touting of the principle of national self-determination, the new current states in fact differ only in degree from those states such as Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey, to name only a few, where the self-determination principle was not considered. Therefore, despite the cynical or idealistic motives of Bolshevik planners, the borders for Central Asian republics that have changed from internal to international, also separate members of ethnic groups. From that perspective, borders are being questioned and could become a source of conflict.

For a variety of reasons, including ethnic distribution, economic viability, and deliberate machination to render weak the emerging

entity, Soviet republic borders are long, contorted and altogether not inclusive, even originally, of all the ethnic group for which a particular republic is named. Moreover as in the case of the border between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, as recently as 1962 the border was shifted essentially by Moscow dictate.

Therefore, during the second stage of the process of decolonization, several steps were taken that today complicate the internal borders of Central Asia. First, an attempt was made to apply the principle of self-determination, thought in a flawed manner. Second, because the inherited borders were changed in the past, an internal Soviet precedent exists which today can justify calls for further changes.

Setting aside for the moment the problem of international borders, as between Afghanistan and Central Asia, or Afghanistan and Pakistan, and Russian and Chinese Central Asia, all products of European imperial decisions as in the case of the Middle East proper, the internal borders of Central Asia present a glaring case of the long-term damaging effects of the application of the principle of ethnic self-determination. As issues of self-determination and the

drawing of new borders arise in Yugoslavia and in Czechoslovakia, the imperfect solution that self-determination can become is highlighted by the case of Central Asia.

The problem of internal Soviet borders that now have acquired international status is further complicated by the voluntary and involuntary movement of millions of non-Central Asians into Central Asian territories throughout the Tsarist and Soviet periods. As on the Chinese side of the border where (Han) Chinese even at present continue to immigrate into locations occupied for centuries by Uighurs and Kazakhs, the local populations of Central Asia too have been swamped or totally displaced by Russians, Germans, Ukrainians and others. This process of settlement by outsiders has further confounded any benefits that might have accrued from an ethnic-focused territorial policy.

Thus, whether as a result of long accepted imperial colonial border deliniation or as a result of Russian attempts to create ethnic based Soviet republics, the effect at present is that of new and old international boundaries that threaten the equilibrium of existing countries. Self-determination, then emerges as an imperfect solution to the problem of multi-ethnic states unless it is

accompanied by major population relocation schemes, a redrawing of all international borders, and potentially most harmful of all to world progress and the reduction of xenophobia, a prohibition of immigration. Despite such draconian measure, the potential for conflict would still exist in the form of economic disputes over natural and water resources, and perhaps even historical and cultural heritage. As Central Asia, Iran, Afghanistan and even Iraq have undergone shattering political and military experiences from 1978 to 1991, the national identities that might have been developed through integrative processes (consciousness, internal economies, bureaucracies, and especially education) have been torn to expose potential ethnic conflict. Applying the principle of self-determination to any of these cases, while a tempting solution for problems of internal struggles for equality and political power, appears, in the light of the Central Asian experience to offer little chance for a future free of ethnic conflict. This, together with the certainty that a change in one international border, such as that between Iraq, Turkey and Iran to accommodate the minimal demands for Kurdish unification, would spur desire for change along every other international border to the east of that area, gives pause to any

inclination to support the marrying of the principle of ethnic self-determination to that of international borders.

Historic Claims Across International Borders

More arcane, yet closely linked to notions of national pride are border claims that are based on historical conquest. Into this category fall all the Chinese claims to former Soviet territories, chiefly in Siberia but also in Central Asia, Israeli claims to the West Bank, and Iranian claims to the Herat region. Some claims of this nature, backed by cross-border ethnic situations carry more credence such as the Afghan support of Pakhtunistan and Uzbek support of irrendentism in northern Afghanistan. Of the many cases that may effect Central Asia, these Chinese historic claims based on the issue of unequal 19th century treaties between Russia and China, ignore the more justifiable ethnic realities of the region. Yet it appears not unlikely that, should Central Asian independence threaten the Chinese hold on Xinjiang, the Chinese will attempt to exercise historic border rights that they claim in order to threaten or suppress Central Asian sovereignty. International awareness of

this danger is critical.

Options to the "Ethnic Way to Straighten Out Borders"

The "ethnic way to straighten our borders", if ever possible, would lead through a long period of bloodshed that not only disrupts the status quo (in itself not sacrosanct), but also presents the prospects of ethnically pure but inbred and intolerant states. World progress cannot be achieved under conditions that would preserve the ethnic purity of states through international border control mechanisms detrimental to trade, communications and contact. On the other hand, the unholding of international borders at all costs could continue to result in the encouragement of dictatorial regimes which are immune to outside pressures for handling ethnic conflict without cruelty or even genocide. Here, the case of Iraq and its minority Kurds and majority Shiites, both oppressed by a Sunni minority holding political power, presents a current example in the region. But the case of Uzbekistan with its Tajik, Kirgыз and Russian populations could become a parallel in the future.

If we accept self-determination and the related notions of ethnic unity as destructive to the equilibrium of the region and not simply

a disruption of the status quo, then two other questions emerge about the future of borders: First, which principles may be encouraged to deal with the existence of minorities within existing states? That is, minorities of Uzbeks, Turkmen, Hazaras, Tajiks and Baluch in Afghanistan, Tajiks in Uzbekistan, Uzbeks in Tajikistan, and so forth are a source of instability at present, not just a threat to the status quo. Second, how can contiguous countries and the international system deal with territorial disputes along international borders which have defied settlement in the past? Particularly important appear the problem of borders between Iraq and Kuwait, Afghanistan and Pakistan, Chinese Central Asia and the new countries to the West.

Long term solutions may not lie simply in the preservation of the status quo, whether it is regimes or international borders. Rather solutions appear to lie in the easing of the tensions that lead to conflict between ethnic groups. These tensions arise from unequal distribution of rights and economic goods, and the chauvinistic domination of a state by one privileged or majority group; i.e., the Takritis in Baghdad, the Durrani Pushtuns in Afghanistan, the Khojandi Tajiks in Tajikistan and the like. Following logically from

this conclusion, three kinds of solutions, none mutually exclusive, present themselves. First, encouragement of internal state structures that promote political and economic equality. Second, allowing a natural merging of some groups such as the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz for example, or even the Uzbeks and the Tajiks. This process requires the building of trust among groups and in principle this solution harks back to the idealism of the sblizheniia/sliianiia (coming together/merging) process developed under Soviet nationality theory. Despite the current discrediting of the Soviet theory and practice, certain ideals encompass an understanding of the natural course of reality. The gradual and voluntary, rather than forced, coming together of people and cultures is apparent throughout the Western world. That it can take place elsewhere, and perhaps as a faster pace due to the rapidity of communications and growth of contact, seems highly probable given a stable world environment. The third solution lies in the formation of regional groups, supra-national organizations of contiguous states which form not for mutual defence but for mutual cooperation on many fronts, especially trade, education, investment, infrastructure (as in electric and communications grids, and very important, in the

distribution of water resources and the regeneration of the environment).

Conclusions

Briefly then, the new countries formed of Soviet republics in Central Asia represent border problems which are not substantially different from those present as a result of the much earlier decolonization of the Middle East. Though more consciously based on the spirit of national self-determination, none-the-less, these states have flawed ethnic borders both among themselves and with outside neighbors. Reconfiguring these borders appears a nearly impossible physical problem because of ethnic intermixing. From an ethnic perspective as well as from the perspective of long-term stability, the retention of the international border status quo appears the best solution despite the heightened sense of ethnic rights engendered by the principle of national self-determination so vigorously championed by Moscow over a seventy year period. Rather than dwell on ethnicity itself as a source of instability in Central

Asia (and border adjustment as the answer to the problem), the international community would do well to examine the means by which political rights, economic development and social justice can be advanced in the region as a whole.

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