

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

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THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY.

BEING

A HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORAL CULTURE.

BY

C. STANILAND WAKE,

AUTHOR OF "CHAPTERS ON MAN," ETC.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

VOLUME I.

LONDON:
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PREFACE.

THE present work has been written with the object of showing how far the doctrine of "Evolution" is applicable to the field of morals. As applied to this subject, the use of the term "evolution" is intended to convey that certain principles of man's being are brought into active operation in the particular line or direction which is denoted by the phrase "moral." This direction is guided by external influences in a mode analogous to that of the development of the forces of material nature. In the latter case the determining agencies are physical, whilst in the former, social influences are those which chiefly operate. Moral Evolution is therefore the development of the principles or faculties of man's nature in response to the action of social influences, the result being what is called "morality." How far the title of the book is well chosen, the writer must leave others to judge. It is a generalized expression of the conclusion which he has sought to establish, but he is well aware that the performance has fallen far short of the intention. A more scientific form might perhaps have been given to the work by more strictly observing

the divisions of the subject—if the principles of man's nature on the one hand, and the social forces on the other, had been more exactly and fully treated of before showing the "moral" result of their co-action. The idea, however, was to treat the subject historically as far as possible, showing first of all the moral ideas entertained by peoples of different degrees of culture, and then endeavouring to explain the origin of those ideas. In carrying out the first part of this plan, it was found that the morality of all primitive peoples has much in common; and as no general and connected description of it has appeared elsewhere, it was determined, at the risk of interfering with the general aim of the work, to supply this deficiency, rather than to select examples merely. As this aim is to trace the general progress of moral development, and not to explain perfectly the special phases of it exhibited by different peoples, (although this has been done where necessary), certain apparent omissions may be accounted for. Thus the more cultured Mohammedan peoples are only slightly referred to, and Mohammedanism itself is not specially treated of. The explanation of this is that the system established by the Arabian prophet did not introduce any new moral feature. In fact, so far from being an advance, it was rather a perpetuation of, or reversion to, an older type,* having reproduced the Semitic phase

* This is shown by Mr Bosworth's admirable Lectures, which appeared while the present work was passing through the press.

of morals, instead of continuing the development of the purely Oriental system which Christianity adopted and improved. Any special examination of the moral teachings of Greek philosophy has been omitted for another reason. However profound may be many of the ideas there preserved, it is doubtful how far they directly influenced the popular morals. Indirectly, as in the cultivation of human sympathy, Greek philosophy had doubtless much influence, and this is considered when treating of the formation of the idea of "humanity."

Some explanation is perhaps due why sexual morality has not been more fully considered in the following pages. Its phenomena are frequently referred to when describing the character of particular peoples, but the subject embraces so wide a range that it was found impossible to do it justice in the present work. Moreover, as most of those phenomena are wanting in an element, "injury to others," which is essential to the idea of immorality, they are better fitted for independent enquiry; as they have become in modern thought almost a separate branch of morals. It might be thought that in a history of moral culture, special consideration would be given to the origin and nature of moral evil and the "Fall." I had prepared chapters on these subjects, but they were omitted because the former subject is too speculative for a work like the present, and the latter is more fitted for treatment in connection with sexual morality. The chapter on the doctrine of emanations,

however, throws great light on the question of the Fall, which is deserving of a much fuller discussion than it has yet received.

In conclusion, it may be remarked that the present work has no pretension to be other than a study. It contains a large collection of facts, and it endeavours to interpret those facts in accordance with the principles of moral evolution, besides giving an historical account of several special phases of moral culture. Whether that aim has been satisfactorily accomplished or not, the author will consider that his labour has not been in vain if he leads others to follow in his footsteps to a more successful issue. In the later chapters something more has been attempted. Although it would be a hopeless task to endeavour to explain the phenomena presented by the religious and moral phases of modern peoples without a clear knowledge of the experiences of past ages, the value of this knowledge would be comparatively slight if it did not at the same time throw light on the future advance of mankind in the path of religious and moral culture. In the chapter on "Religion and Morality," the probable line of that advance has been pointed out. The *rapprochement* of religion and morality there insisted on is what all advanced thinkers of the present day look forward to. Unfortunately the unanimity of opinion is not so great as might be supposed, owing to the different explanations given of the term "religion." With some writers it is used as almost synonymous with

morality, a view in opposition to which the chapter on Positivism in the present work was written. To ensure that the system of M. Comte should be represented as fairly as possible, the MS. of that chapter was submitted to the criticism of several of the advocates of his views, whom I have to thank for their kindness in thus aiding in the carrying out of the author's intention.

While the present work has been passing through the press, several important volumes bearing on the question of morals have appeared, among the rest, Mr Moncure D. Conway's "Sacred Anthology," Dr J. F. M'Lennan's "Studies in Ancient History," and Dr George Harris' "Treatise on Man," reference to which would have been necessary had they appeared earlier. I cannot refrain from mentioning also the excellent Manuals of Hinduism, and Buddhism, recently published by the Society for promoting Christian Knowledge.

CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

INTRODUCTION.

MODERN THEORIES OF MORALS.

	PAGE
The Conception of Moral Obligation,	1
Distinction between the Criterion of Morality and the Theory of Moral Sentiments,	3
The Intuitive and Inductive Theories of Morals,	4
The Intuitive School—Cudworth and Clarke,	7
Stewart,	8
Malebranche and Edwards,	9
Adam Smith,	10
Butler and Hutcheson,	12
Mackintosh,	14
Consciousness and Conscience,	16
Intellectual Element in Conscience,	19
The Inductive School—Mill,	22
Bain,	26
Spencer,	30
Darwin,	48
Transcendental Morality,	57
Kant,	59

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

THE SENSE OF RIGHT.

The Moral State of Primeval Man,	63
Existing Races—Australians,	66
Tasmanians,	76

PAGE

Existing Races—Polynesians, ... 78
Papuas and Negritos, ... 95
Boomeas of India—
Dravidians, ... 109
Kolarians, ... 133
The Assam Tribes, ... 145

CHAPTER II.

THE SENSE OF RIGHT—(*continued*).

Existing Races—The Madecasses, ... 152
Africans—East Africans, ... 158
West Africans, ... 162
Ashantees 168
Kafirs and Bechuanas, . . . 174
Foulahs and Mandingos, . . 182
Bornuese and Fezzanese, . . 184
Berbers, ... 188
Abyssinians, ... 191
Gallas and Latookas, . . . 195
Wahŭma, ... 198
Monbuttu and Zandey, . . 200
Hottentots and Bosjesmans, . . 203

CHAPTER III.

THE SENSE OF RIGHT—(*continued*).

Existing Races—*South Americans.*
Indians of the Amazon, ... 210
„ Brazil, ... 212
„ Paraguay, ... 214
„ Patagonia, ... 216
„ Peru, ... 218
„ Guiana, ... 222
Existing Races—*North Americans.*
Indians of Virginia, ... 225
„ Louisiana, ... 226
„ the Missouri, ... 227
The Kristeneaux and Chepewyans, . . 230

Existing Races—*North Americans*—(*continued*). PAGE
Indians of the Columbia River, ... 232
„ Mexico, ... 239
General Character of the American Indians, . 242
Eskimos, ... 244
Greenlanders, ... 251
Tchuktchis and Koraks, ... 259

CHAPTER IV.

THE SENSE OF RIGHT—(*continued*).

Existing Races—*Siberian Tribes*—The Aleuts, . . 262
Kamtschatkans, ... 263
Jakuts, ... 264
Samoyedes, ... 265
Lapps, ... 266
Ostiaks, ... 268
Kalmuks, Mongols, and Thibetans, . . 269
Malays—Sumatrans, ... 278
Dyaks, ... 283
Javanese, ... 287
Punishment for Crime among Uncultured Peoples, . 293
Absence of the Idea of Immorality, ... 295
The Sense of Right founded on the idea of "Property" . 296
Development of the Idea of Right, . . . 297
The Instincts of Sociability, ... 299
The Idea of "Property" founded in the Instinct of Self-Preservation, ... 301
The Family *versus* Communalism, ... 302

CHAPTER V.

GENESIS OF THE MORAL IDEA.

Interference with Personal Rights, . . . 308
Generalised Idea of Right, ... 309
Fear of Retribution, ... 311
The "Rights of the Dead," 311
Burial and Adoption, ... 316
Totemism, ... 318
Earliest phase of the Moral Sense, ... 319

PAGE

Belief in Retributive Agency of Spirits entertained by Australian Aborigines, ... 319
Ditto, by Polynesians, ... 321
Punishment has no relation to "Immorality," . . 322
Idea of Morality among the South Africans, . . 327
Idea of Morality among the Madecasses, . . . 329
Dread of Spirit Retribution for Social Offences necessary to constitute them "wrong," 331
Subjective Moral changes, ... 333
Genesis of the Idea of Moral Obligation, . . . 335
Tribal and non-Tribal or external Morality, . . 337
The *lex talionis*, ... 338
Enforcement of the *lex talionis* by tribal authority, . 339
Supernatural agency invoked, ... 341
Divination, ... 341
Sorcery and Disease, ... 342
Ordeals and Oaths, ... 343
Supernatural sanction to Moral Conduct, . . . 346
The influence of Custom, ... 348

CHAPTER VI.

GENESIS OF THE MORAL IDEA—(*continued*).

Negative character of early Morality, ... 351
Moral progress accompanies General Culture, . . 352
Due to the ancestors of the latest-born races, . . 353
Moral condition of the ancient Thracians and the modern Mainotes, ... 353
The *lex talionis* among the modern Slavonians, . . 355
The *lex talionis* among the Circassians, Afghans, and Bedouins, 356
The influence of the right of Feud over Teutonic legislation, 357
Substitution of Fines for Blood Revenge, . . . 358
Mode of ascertaining Compensation among the Scandinavians, 360
Ditto among the Abyssinians, Germans, . . . 361
The Saxon law of *Wergyld* and Irish *Eric*, . . . 362
The liabilities of the "Fine," or Family, . . . 363
The Saxon system of Suretyship and Gilds, . . 365
Moral phenomena among the peoples above mentioned, . 368
Brigandage considered meritorious, ... 368
Hospitality highly esteemed, ... 371
Improved condition of Woman, ... 375

	PAGE
Establishment of the Paternal authority,	384
The Tribe *versus* the Clan,	385
Supernatural sanction for punishment of Social Offences,	388
Clan Morality founded on the idea of Brotherhood,	391
Moral result of the application of the idea of Brotherhood to the Tribe,	391
General character of the Afghans and Bedouins,	394
" " Uzbeks,	397
" " Germans and Saxons,	398
" " Celts,	390
" " Scandinavians,	401
The Development of the sense of Manliness,	402
Source in the recognition by the father of his true relation to the Family,	407
Influence of "Manliness" over moral conduct,	408
Moral Strength the attribute of Predatory Peoples,	410

CHAPTER VII.

THE ALTRUISTIC SENTIMENT.

The distinction between active and passive Duties,	411
Origin of the idea of duty in relation to "Benevolence,"	412
Genesis of Emotions secondary to that of Ideas,	415
The relation of Sympathy to the Social Affections,	415
The Altruistic Sentiment based on the Sexual Instinct through the Maternal Instinct,	418
Antagonism between the Maternal Instinct and the Instinct of "Self-preservation,"	419
Infanticide, its origin and moral consequences,	419
Sympathy towards strangers exhibited by women among uncultured peoples,	424
Mildness of manners appreciated by Savages,	426
Enlightened Chiefs,	427
Influence of Woman over Conduct,	429
Criticism of Adam Smith's explanation of "Sympathy,"	430
Development of the feeling of general Benevolence,	432
Admission into the Tribe, and Tribal Initiation,	433
Consequences of establishment of Paternal authority,	437
Ancestor-worship and the Social Affections,	438
The Madecasses,	440

PAGE

Genesis of the Altruistic Sentiment, . . . 443
Man the chief instrument in the development of Altruism, 445
The system of "Brotherhood," 445
Artificial modes by which the Fraternal engagement is entered into, ... 446
Sacred nature of the "Brotherhood" engagement, . . 451
Duty to the Stranger Suppliant among the Greeks, . 452
Fraternal Associations, ... 454
The Indian "Lodge," 455
The Areoi Institution of the Pacific, . . . 456
Secret Societies of the American aborigines, . . 459
The ancient "Mysteries," 460
Benevolence among the Greeks and Romans, . . 461
Religious origin of the idea of General Benevolence, . 462
The Mexicans, ... 463
The Buddhists of Southern India—Siamese, . . 467
" " Burmese, . . 469
The Hindus, ... 471
The Mohammedans—Arabs and Bedouins, . . 474
" " Persians and Turks, . . . 476
Selfish motive of Eastern Altruism, . . . 479

INTRODUCTION.

MODERN THEORIES OF MORALS.

Before entering on the consideration of the process by which man has come to recognise certain fixed principles, according to which it is necessary that his moral conduct should be guided, it is advisable to examine somewhat at large the opinions hitherto held on this subject. Prof. Whewell, in his preface to Mackintosh's "Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy," observes that it is allowed on all sides that we have a conception of moral obligation. This is admitted by Mr Mill who says:—"The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same—a feeling in our own mind;" and he adds, "this feeling, when disinterested, and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of Conscience."[1] Whether or not man originally had any conception of moral obligation will have to be considered hereafter. It is a weakness in the argument of most writers that they have never thought of asking this question, it being assumed that man's faculties are now the same as they have ever been. In the comparison of opposing systems however, this is of little moment,

[1] "Utilitarianism," 2nd Ed., p. 41.

since it vitiates more or less all alike. All are agreed, moreover, in the recognition of certain general truths, or principles of right moral conduct. There is little difference of opinion among modern philosophers as to the moral nature of particular actions. The question on of which they differ relates, not so much to the criterion morality, as to that which gives actions their special quality. Granting that the mind recognises the moral propriety or otherwise of certain conduct, what is the ground on which that character is assigned to it? Mr Mill states this very clearly when he says that the intuitive, no less than the inductive school of ethics, recognises "to a great extent the same moral laws; but differ as to their evidence, and the source from which they derive their authority. According to the one opinion, the principles of morals are evident *à priori*, requiring nothing to command assent, except that the meaning of the terms be understood. According to the other doctrine, right and wrong, as well as truth and falsehood, are questions of observation and experience."[1]

In this passage we have a classification of the several opinions that have been formed as to the source of the idea of morality. The *eternal reason*, or *fitness* of Cudworth and Clarke, the *love of order* and *the love of being* of Malebranche and of Edwards, the *moral sense* or *conscience* of Butler, Hutcheson, and Mackintosh, the *sympathy* of Adam Smith, and the intellectual recognition of *moral beauty* of Stewart, all are based on the notion of intuition. To the inductive school belong the several phases of the "happiness" or "utilitarian" theory held by Cumberland, Leibnitz, Hartley, Paley, and Jeremy Bentham, and by recent or living writers, as Comte, Mill, Bain, Herbert Spencer, and Darwin. Before critically examining the systems represented

[1] *op. cit.* p. 3.

by this dual series of thinkers, it may be well to consider the value of Mackintosh's oft repeated accusation, that most metaphysicians have "blended the inquiry into the nature of our moral sentiments, with that other which only seeks a criterion to distinguish moral from immoral habits of feeling and action." Mackintosh illustrates the distinction between the *Criterion of Morality* and the *Theory of Moral Sentiments* here enforced, by reference to Paley's representation of the principle of a moral sense as being opposed to that of utility. On this he observes, "it is evident that this representation is founded on a confusion of the two great questions which have been stated above. That we are endued with a moral sense, or, in other words, a faculty which immediately approves what is right and condemns what is wrong, is only a statement of the feelings with which we contemplate actions. But to affirm that right actions are those which conduce to the wellbeing of mankind, is a proposition concerning the outward effects by which right actions themselves may be recognised. As these affirmations relate to different subjects, they cannot be opposed to each other, any more than the solidity of earth is inconsistent with the fluidity of water; and a very little reflection will show it to be easily conceivable that they may be both true. Man may be so constituted as instantaneously to approve certain actions, without any reference to their consequences, and yet reason may nevertheless discover, that a tendency to produce general happiness is the essential characteristic of such actions." After referring to the fact, that Bentham contrasts the principle of utility with that of sympathy, of which he considers the moral sense as one of the forms, Mackintosh continues :—"As these celebrated persons have thus inferred or implied the non-existence of a moral sense, from their opinion

that the morality of actions depends upon their usefulness, so other philosophers of equal name have concluded, that the utility of actions cannot be the criterion of their morality, because a perception of that utility appears to them to form a faint and inconsiderable part of our moral sentiments, if indeed it be at all discoverable in them."[1]

It is important to consider the distinction thus insisted on by Mackintosh, since it is endorsed by Whewell, who sees in it a ground on which the intuitive and the inductive schools may to a great extent be reconciled. The latter infers, that "if we could take into due account the whole happiness produced by virtuous feelings, we could commit no practical error in making the advantageous consequences of actions the measure of their morality."[2] Whewell adds, on the other hand, that if a reverence for general maxims of morality, and a constant reference to the common precepts of virtue, take the place in the utilitarian's mind, of the direct application of his principle, there will remain little difference between him and the believer in original moral distinctions; for the practical rules of the two will rarely differ, and in both systems the rules will be the moral guides of thought and conduct."[3] This would no doubt be admitted by both schools, since Mr Mill affirms, that to do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as one's self, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.[4] But, although there may be a *practical* agreement between the intuitive and inductive systems, there is an essential difference between them which can be bridged over only by the adoption on the part of the latter of the fundamental idea, somewhat modified it may be, on which the former

[1] *op. cit.* pp. 63, 64.
[2] *loc. cit.* p. 27.
[3] Do. p. 29.
[4] *op. cit.* p. 24.

is based. It is true that Mr Mill, while personally believing that the moral feelings are acquired and not innate, yet asserts that it is not necessary for the purpose of his argument, to decide whether the feeling of duty is innate or implanted. But, from the explanation given of the nature of this feeling, it is evident that the notion of "duty" can be attached to it only by a forced application of that term. Thus, Mr Mill supposes the innate feeling, if there be such, a regard to the pleasures and pains of others.[1] Elsewhere he refers to a desire to be in unity with our fellow-creatures,[2] or the natural want felt by every individual "that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow-creatures," a conviction which is declared to be the ultimate sanction of the "greatest happiness" morality.[3] Such a feeling as this, however, is totally distinct from that which the thinkers of the intuitive school understand by "duty." This is an obligation, consequent on the moral character of the actions considered, and is comparable neither to a regard to the feelings of others nor to the desire to be in harmony with such feelings. It is difficult to understand how, according to the utilitarian system, the idea of duty can be formed, although its advocates admit, as the phenomena require them to do, the existence of the moral conscience. Nor could it well be otherwise, considering what constitutes the chief point of difference between the intuitive and the inductive schools. According to the latter, right and wrong are questions of observation and experience, actions "being right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." There is no room here for the recognition of any original quality iu actions apart from their consequences, or at all events

[1] *op. cit.* p. 44. [2] Do. p. 46. [3] Do. p. 50.

from the intention which induced them, and hence, although the distinction enforced by Mackintosh between the two parts of moral philosophy,—the theory of moral sentiments and the criterion of morality,—is a just one, its recognition has not the practical value which appears to be claimed for it. Whewell is quite correct when he says, that "we may hold that morality is an original quality of actions, and may still form our rules of morality by tracing the consequences of actions."[1] But a thinker of the inductive school could not admit that actions have any such original quality; and therefore, although the intuitionists are by no means justified in affirming that utility cannot be the test of moral propriety, yet their opponents may say that the standard supplied by utility may be safely applied "without acknowledging the independent value of morality," and moreover that, since "the morality of the action depends entirely upon the intention—that is, upon what the agent *wills to do*,"[2] there is no such independent value to acknowledge. It is evident that the advocates of the inductive theory are not fairly liable to Mackintosh's censure for not implicitly attending to the distinction between the *theory of moral* sentiments and the *criterion of morality*, seeing that the truth of their theory requires the non-existence of an innate moral sense. They affirm that actions are right *because* they "conduce to the well-being of mankind," whereas their opponents, while admitting the same criterion of morality, affirm that actions have an original quality which is indicated immediately by the conscience. The great value of the distinction pointed out by Mackintosh, consists in the fact that it reveals nearly the fundamental difference between the two schools, one of which is founded on the primary impor-

[1] *loc. cit.* p. 24. [2] Mill, *op. cit.* p. 27, *note.*

tance of recognising an innate moral sense, while the other, ignoring this, admit only the existence of a criterion of morality founded on the teachings of experience, or, at most, a faculty which has been organised as the result of them.

It was said above, that the *eternal reason* or *fitness* of Cudworth and Clarke, the *love of order* and the *love of being* of Malebranche and of Edwards, the *moral sense* or *conscience* of Butler, Hutcheson, and Mackintosh, the *sympathy* of Adam Smith, and the intellectual recognition of *moral beauty* of Stewart, all are based on the idea of intuition. By this is meant the notion that the mind, by virtue of its own innate powers, at once passes judgment on the moral quality of any action brought within its cognisance. The belief in the existence of a special moral sense, which shows its activity in the minds of all men, as conscience, was the necessary result of the speculations which had preceded those of Butler. The distinction between right and wrong was supposed, by Cudworth and Clarke, to be discerned by reason, and hence it was said that "morality is the practice of reason."[1] But then, according to the former, the ideas of duty formed in the mind are necessary. The distinction between right and wrong has existed eternally in the Divine mind, and hence, when an action is performed; its moral character as thus established is at once discerned by human reason.[2] The Platonic *ideas* of Cudworth are exchanged by Clarke for the *relations* of objects, but otherwise their views of morality do not differ. The relations of all things to each other have always been present to the Eternal mind, which is determined in its

[1] See Mackintosh, *op. cit*, p. 147.

[2] "The Intellectual System of the Universe," (2nd ed.), p. 888, *seq*.

choice by the *fitness* or *unfitness* of things to each other. The eternal differences of relation on which depend this fitness or unfitness, render it proper that man should so act. Moreover, as he can conceive nothing without at the same time conceiving its relations to other things, "those differences are necessarily discerned, and, being eternal, they lay an obligation on man so to act independent of the will of God."[1] These theories are vitiated by what Mackintosh calls "the abusive extension of the term *reason* to the moral faculties," but they clearly possess the intuitive element which is at the base of the system of Butler and Hutcheson, although they steer clear of the difficulties attendant on the doctrine of the moral sense.

Dugald Stewart's system constitutes a considerable advance on those just considered, but while describing the moral faculty as an original principle of man's nature,[2] it refers the origin of our moral ideas to the intellect. Thus, "right, duty, virtue, moral obligation, and the like, or the opposite forms of expression, represent, according to him, certain thoughts, which arise necessarily and instantaneously in the mind (or in the reason, if we take that word in the large sense, in which it denotes all that is not emotive), at the contemplation of actions, and which are utterly incapable of all resolution, consequently of all explanation, and which can be known only by being experienced. These thoughts or ideas, or whatever other name they may be called, are followed, as inexplicably but as inevitably, by pleasurable and painful emotions, which suggest the conception of *moral beauty*, a quality of human actions distinct from their adherence to, or deviation from, rectitude,

[1] "A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God" (6th ed.), vol. i., pp. 106, 115.

[2] "Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man," vol. i. p. 171.

though generally coinciding with it."[1] The connection between this theory and the theories of Cudworth and Clarke is evident. The introduction, however, of the conception of moral beauty derived from pleasurable and painful emotions, sufficiently distinguishes Stewart's views from those of his predecessors, although it does not meet the difficulties which render the theories they formed untenable.

Malebranche and Jonathan Edwards differ widely from the intellectual school of moralists. With them emotion takes the place of reason as the guiding principle of action. The observations of Mackintosh on these two thinkers are so just that they can hardly be omitted. He says :—" They both introduce an element into their theory foreign from those cold systems of ethical abstraction, with which they continued in other respects to have much in common. Malebranche[2] makes virtue consist in the love of *order*, Edwards[3] in the love of *being*. In this language we perceive a step beyond the representation of Clarke, which made it a conformity to the relations of things; but a step which cannot be made without passing into a new province; without confessing, by the use of the word *love*, that not only perception and reason, but emotion and sentiment, are among the fundamental principles of morals."[4] Apart from the fact, that it cannot be shown that the mind has any special love of order or being, it is an objection to the systems of both Edwards and Malebranche, that morality contains an element which love,

[1] Mackintosh, *op. cit.*, p. 331; Stewart, *op. cit.*, vol. i., pp. 262, 270 *seq.*

[2] Malebranche says, that the knowledge of the truth and the love of virtue constitute the union of mind with God, and when we love truth according to the rules of virtue, we love God, who is always governed by order. *De la Recherche de la Verité*, Liv. Cinqme. chap. 5.

[3] See "An Essay on the Nature of Virtue," p. 7 *et seq.*

[4] *op. cit.*, p. 184.

whatever its objective operation, cannot supply. This is no less true even if love be resolved into sympathy, of which it is evidently only a specialised form. In this fact we have the great defect of Adam Smith's theory of moral sentiments. Mackintosh says: "That mankind are so constituted as to sympathise with each other's feelings, and to feel pleasure in the accordance of these feelings, are the only facts required by Dr Smith, and they certainly must be granted to him."[1] The great merit of this system is, as pointed out by Mackintosh, that, whereas Butler, Hutcheson, and Hume in his later writings, derived sympathy from benevolence, Smith inverted the order, making the latter dependent on the former. Its defect is that, like so many other systems, it provides no real basis for a perfect morality. Benevolence, which is only sympathy in action, is no doubt essential to a high morality, but some other source is required for the feeling of obligation which is essential to the moral idea. Mackintosh saw this defect, and although, as we shall see, he was not successful in remedying it, yet his criticism, that "in many, nay in most, cases of moral approbation, the adult man approves the action or disposition merely *as right*, and with a distinct consciousness that no process of sympathy intervenes between the approval and its object,"[2] reveals the great difficulty which has formed the stumbling-block of all moralists. It is on that moral quality obligation is founded, and Smith was not successful in explaining its origin. It is quite true that "the man of the most perfect virtue, the man whom we most naturally love and revere the most, is he who joins, to the most perfect command of his own original and selfish feelings, the most exquisite sensibility to the original and sympathetic feelings of

[1] *op. cit.*, p. 234. [2] *op. cit.*, p. 240.

others."[1] But the supposition on which the explanation of this fact is based is far from admissible. When man was formed for society, he certainly was not endowed "with an original desire to please, and an original aversion to offend his brethren," nor with the desire to be what others ought to approve of, or "what he himself approves of in other men."[2] Whatever it may be in after-times, in the early conditions of society to which we must trace the roots of morality, such feelings have very little influence over human conduct. The great error which Smith makes is in supposing that pleasure and pain are the real objects of desire and aversion. Undoubtedly man wishes for pleasure and eschews pain, but he in reality seeks, not the pleasure, but that which gives it. Smith confounds the two, as is evident when he says, "Pleasure and pain are the great objects of desire and aversion: but these are distinguished not by reason, but by immediate sense of feeling. If virtue, therefore, be desirable for its own sake, and if vice be in the same manner the object of aversion, it cannot be reason which originally distinguishes those different qualities, but immediate sense and feeling."[3] Here, first pleasure and then virtue is said to be the object of desire, and hence, although feeling distinguishes between pleasure and pain, it by no means follows that it also distinguishes between vice and virtue. These in themselves are purely relative terms, and under the influence of sympathy they have been too often inverted in their application to authorise us to look to that emotion as the true basis of morality. In combination with some other principle it may be effective; alone its action might be pleasurable, but could never give the idea of duty.

[1] "Theory of Moral Sentiments" (Bohn), p. 214.
[2] Do., p. 170. [3] Do., p. 471.

The only other writers of the intuitive school necessary to be here referred to, are Butler, Hutcheson, and Mackintosh. The emotional part of man's nature had gradually been taking the place of the intellect as the supposed source of moral distinctions, although even the later writers could not but admit that reason was largely concerned in the origin of moral ideas. With Butler, benevolence guided by reason includes all virtues, and therefore "a disposition and endeavour to do good to all with whom we have to do, in the degree and manner which the different relations we stand in to them require, is a discharge of all the obligations we are under to them."[1] Coincident with benevolence is self-love, which leads man "to attain the greatest happiness he can for himself in the present world." In addition, however, to these principles and certain passions and affections, man possesses a principle of reflection, "by which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions."[2] This is conscience, which not only has influence like the passions and appetites, but is superior to them, "as from its very nature manifestly claiming superiority over all others; insomuch that you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty itself; and to preside and govern, from the very economy and constitution of man, belongs to it."[3] Butler's idea as to the nature of conscience is, as Mackintosh points out, somewhat vague; and it was reserved for Hutcheson to express clearly the nature of that principle, which he characterised, following Lord Shaftesbury, as the *moral sense.* By this was meant a natural sense of immediate excellence in certain affections, and actions consequent

[1] Sermon XII. (Bohn's ed.), p. 509.
[2] Do., p. 392. [3] Do., p. 406.

thereupon.[1] According to this view, conscience is an independent faculty, and not, as Butler perhaps supposed, a state or act of the understanding. Hutcheson agreed with Butler in regarding universal benevolence as the object of moral approbation, and in viewing disinterested affections as essential parts of human nature.[2] But both Hutcheson and Butler are declared by Mackintosh to be chargeable with a vicious circle, "in describing virtuous actions as those which are approved by the moral sense," while at the same time the moral sense is described as "the faculty which perceives and feels the morality of actions."[3] How far, however, the charge is well founded is questionable. It is probable that the disregard of the distinction between the two divisions of moral philosophy alluded to in this passage was intentional. The moral quality of an action does not actually depend on that—utility for example—which is employed as the test of morality. Thus, conduct may be proper as giving happiness, but it is not moral merely *because* it has that effect. Instead, therefore, of dwelling on the standard of virtue, which Butler described as "justice, veracity, and regard to common good,"[4] the writers in question went at once to the source of the moral attribute. Thus Butler declared that virtue consists in following human nature,[5] and although in the sense intended by him this assertion is not correct—seeing that as human nature is a variable term, virtue also must be variable—yet it marked an approach to the truth. In fact, if the progressive development of man's nature be supposed, and if agreement with the universal conscience of humanity were substituted for that with the individual conscience, as the ground of moral attribution, the vicious circle com-

[1] "A System of Moral Philosophy," vol. i., p. 58.
[2] Do., p. 62 *seq.*
[3] *op. cit.*, p. 206.
[4] Dissertation "Of the Nature of Virtue."
[5] *op. cit.*, p. 408.

plained of by Mackintosh would be avoided; while, as we shall see, Butler's definition of virtue would express the exact truth.

In considering Mackintosh's system of morals, it will be advisable to keep in view the distinction drawn by him between the two branches of enquiry—the Theory of Moral Sentiments, and the Criterion of Morality. As to the latter, he says:—"All virtuous acts are admitted to be universally beneficial; morality and the general benefit are acknowledged always to coincide. It is hard to say, then, why they should not be, reciprocally, tests of each other, though in a very different way;—the virtuous feelings, fitted as they are by immediate appearance, by quick and powerful action, being sufficient tests of morality in the moment of action, and for all practical purposes; while the consideration of tendency to general happiness—a more obscure and slowly discoverable quality—should be applied, in general reasoning, as a test of the sentiments and dispositions themselves. It has been thus employed, and no proof has been attempted, that it has ever deceived those who used it in the proper place."[1] While thus admitting the utilitarian criterion of morality, Mackintosh agreed with Butler and Hutcheson, in considering the benevolent affections to be disinterested, and in asserting the independent existence and the supremacy of the moral faculty, or conscience. His Theory of Conscience is, however, much more precise than that of either of his predecessors. According to it "the moral faculty consists of a class of desires and affections which have dispositions and relations for their sole object," the conscience resulting from "the composition of *all* those sentiments, of which the final object is a state of the will, intimately and inseparably blended, and held in a perfect state of solution;

[1] *op. cit.*, p. 356.

and the conscience, being thus represented as analogous to the desires, it implies, in the same way as other desires, a *sense* of what is grateful, and a faculty of dwelling in thought, on the gratification so obtained."[1] In thus making conscience analogous to desire, or rather resolving the moral faculty into a class of desires and affections, it is a question whether its value, as a ruling principle of moral obligation, is not destroyed. When speaking of utilitarianism, Whewell objects that "a persuasion that a moral good is something different from, and superior to, mere pleasure, is requisite, to give our preference of it that tone of enthusiasm and affection which belongs to virtuous feeling. . . . . . The moral faculty converts our perception of the quality of actions into an affection of the strongest kind. Nor can we be satisfied with any account of our moral sentiments which excludes this feature in the process. Thus, as we hold the affections to be motives of an order superior to the desires which have reference to ourselves only, we maintain the moral faculty, the conscience, the affection towards duty, to be a principle of action of an order superior both to the desires and to the other affections."[2] But to reduce conscience to an emotion or feeling, even though it amount to a strong affection, as distinguished from thought, seems to remove that directive element, which is so essential a part of the conscience and moral sense of Butler and Hutcheson. It may be said that the emotive part of man's nature, which is brought into activity by the association of thoughts and emotions, supposed by Mackintosh, has, by virtue of its affective character, supreme influence over the conduct. This may be true, and yet the authority exercised be quite different from that supposed in the idea of duty or moral obligation. The latter is founded on the notion of *right*,

[1] Whewell, *loc. cit.*, p. 38. [2] *loc. cit.*, p. 303.

and not on that of pleasure or gratification, which may be derived from the performance of a duty, without being sufficient to enforce such performance. As Butler well saw, conscience would be powerless, unless it had associated with it judgment and direction, or rather, unless these, in some sense, actually formed part of the faculty itself. It is here that Mackintosh's scheme is defective, arising from a desire to distinguish too exactly between the intellectual and the emotive, or affective, part of man's being.

This mistake, which is due to a misapprehension of the relation between thought and emotion, is indeed inseparable from the opinion that man possesses a special moral sense or faculty. The distinction between intellectual and moral ideas is perfectly well founded; but when it is asserted that there is a separate element in the mind specially concerned with the latter, an inference is made which the phenomena will not justify. The existence of an actual moral faculty cannot be allowed, if the operation of that which is concerned with intellectual ideas is sufficient to explain the formation of those which are classed as moral. But the latter is thus sufficient, as may be shown by reference to the ordinary action of consciousness. Every impression upon the organism which produces a change in the state of the mind, may be said to give rise to a pleasurable or painful feeling. If the mind, thus aroused into activity, concentrates its attention on the objective source of the impression as existing, or on the mode of its own activity, the feeling, or sensation, as it is termed, leads to the formation of a sensible or intellectual idea. If, on the other hand, the mind fixes its attention on its own condition, as being pleasurable or painful, or on the external object, viewed as giving rise to that condition, the feeling, or sentiment, as it may then be named, results

in the formation of a moral or æsthetic idea. In this case the feelings may be described as emotive, or emotional, as being those which accompany "our affections, our moral judgments, and our determinations in matters of taste."[1] Viewed as related to the sentimental side of man's nature, moral ideas may thus be said to be emotional, as distinguished from intellectual ideas which are sensational. But in their origin, as dependent on the feelings, both classes of ideas are expressions of the same subjective condition, although representing different phases of it. The distinction, in relation to ideas, between moral and intellectual, as between sensible and æsthetic, is, in reality, purely objective. It originates in the recognition of different classes of objects, the resulting ideas, however different, being associated with the same subjective condition, a state of feeling which is either sensational or sentimental, according to its objectivity. Although, therefore, Hutcheson was justified in applying the term "moral" to a particular class of ideas, he could not consistently affirm that there is a special moral *sense*, without, at the same time, supposing the existence of a special sense concerned with each particular class of ideas. This has, indeed, been done by writers who suggest the existence of an æsthetic sense.

If conscience is not a state or act of the understanding, the existence of two or more elements in the human mind can hardly be denied. But conscience may have its source in the understanding, while not being merely a state or an act of it. It has been sometimes thought that consciousness is a particular faculty of the mind, but it is now generally acknowledged to be "the universal condition of intelligence, the fundamental form of all the modes of our thinking activity." Viewed, therefore, as "the common condition under which all our faculties are

[1] Reid's "Intellectual Powers," Essay i., chap. 1, sec. 12.

brought into operation,"[1] even the moral faculty, if such exists, must be only a modification of consciousness. It is undeniable that, "as, on the one hand, we cannot think or feel, without being conscious, so, on the other hand, we cannot be conscious without thinking or feeling." All feeling, therefore, must be a mode of consciousness, as well that which, through sensation, gives rise to intellectual ideas, as that which, as sentiment, results in the formation of the ideas of morality. The moral sense, like the intellectual faculties, would seem thus to be simply a modification of consciousness, which, because it relates to moral ideas, is distinguished as *conscience.* This term has not, however, necessarily any such limitation. It is true that, as Fleming mentions, the term *conscience,* and the phrases moral faculty, moral judgment, faculty of moral perception, moral sense, susceptibility of moral emotion, have all come to be applied to that "faculty, or a combination of faculties, by which we have ideas of right and wrong in reference to actions, and correspondent feelings of approbation and disapprobation." But "right" and "wrong" express, in regard to moral conduct, the same ideas as "true" and "false," in relation to intellectual conduct. In fact, right is moral truth, and conscience may be simply and truly defined as consciousness in a moral relation. Logically, the existence of an æsthetic, or of an intellectual conscience, may be affirmed no less truly than that of a moral one. The term *conscience* has certainly received a conventional limitation, but its definition as "the instinct of duty," shows that it has a fundamental connection with the ordinary mental faculties. Conscience is, indeed, only a phase of instinct, resembling, however, habit, which is the result of repeated experience, rather than instinct, so far as this can be said to precede all

[1] Fleming's "Vocabulary of Philosophy" (1857).

experience. By the influence of habit in the formation of conscience, may be explained the fact that its dictates vary among distant peoples and in different ages. The fundamental instinct is the same, but it has been developed under different conditions, and therefore the phenomenal results revealed in the habitual activity of conscience are dissimilar. An analogous state of things is observable in matters of taste, showing that the æsthetic conscience is capable of education, in like manner as that which deals with questions of morals. The reason why there is not the same discrepancy between the ideas formed from time to time as to intellectual truths, is to be sought in the fact that these have to do with the objective phenomena in themselves, whether viewed as external to, or in, the mind; whereas, moral and æsthetic ideas are concerned with the condition of the mind, as pleasurable or painful, or with the objective phenomena, as giving rise to that condition. It is evident that the latter ideas are much more liable to vary than the former. The mind has to do in the one case with simple perceptions or sensations; while, in the other, it is concerned with its own condition, which must influence the resultant ideas, these, in their turn, affecting the condition to be observed.

This fact constitutes an objection to the emotional theory of conscience which is insuperable. In the absence of an intellectual element, such as that supplied by an instinct of right or propriety, independent of the mere pleasure or delight attendant on acting in a particular way, the constant recurrence of the same moral or æsthetic ideas would so warp the mental constitution as to render hopeless any attempt to amend it, or to replace those ideas by others. It is, in fact, only because there is an intellectual element at work in the moral and æsthetic consciences, that their teachings are liable to

change, and that they are able to attain to more perfect action. Hence the remark of Butler that conscience implies judgment, and his description of it as a principle of reflection, are perfectly just. Therefore it is that the education of the mental faculties has in itself a tendency to improve the moral conduct, since the reflection which is aroused, although at first concerned with intellectual ideas, is finally brought to bear on moral questions, leading to the improvement of the conscience by recognition of truth, in its moral relations, as well as in its intellectual bearings. Thus, we see that every great increase in the activity of the reason, whether exhibited in the domain of letters or of science, has been accompanied with, or followed by, an improvement of the moral tone of society.

The important position assigned in the moral systems of Cudworth and Clarke to reason is a great point in their favour. They erred, however, as much on the rational side, as other systems have failed in the contrary direction. If moral distinctions are discernible only by reason, they must have been foreign to the mind of man up to a comparatively recent period in the world's history; since they could be discovered only when the mental faculties had undergone considerable development. No doubt, as soon as the words *right* and *wrong* can be defined, the distinction between the ideas expressed by them will be at once recognised. This, however, requires a preceding education, during which the distinction has been gradually learned. Otherwise, the words could not be defined. The fact is, that the knowledge of moral distinctions is acquired, as the result of the affection of the instinctive principle, by experience, the interpretation of which may, in some sense, be said to be dependent on the exercise of reason. With Cudworth, however, reason had so wide a sense, that it may be thought to embrace

every phase of mental activity, including instinct itself. This seems, indeed, to be required by the system of Dr. Clarke, who, in founding moral obligation on the relations of things, and asserting that man cannot conceive anything without conceiving its relations, makes the recognition of the principles of morality instinctive, although they are rational. The fact that uncultured peoples can be said to have only the faintest knowledge of the distinction between right and wrong, shows that, even although "reason" be interpreted in the widest possible sense, the intellectual school of moralists have ascribed far too much to its influence as a source of moral ideas. It may be said, however, in the words of Mackintosh, that "Clarke more especially, instead of substituting social and generous feelings for the selfish appetites, endeavoured to bestow on morality the highest dignity, by thus deriving it from reason. He made it more disinterested; for he placed its seat in a region where interest never enters, and passion never disturbs. By ranking her principles with the first truths of science, he seemed to render them pure and impartial, infallible and unchangeable."[1] This is high praise, and none the less so that it unwittingly draws attention to an important feature in the speculations of the intellectual school of moralists. Mackintosh appears to have overlooked that, besides the questions relating to the Criterion of Morality, and the nature of the distinction between right and wrong in human conduct, there is the further one as to the *source* of that distinction. This question is usually answered by a reference to the will of God; but Cudworth and Clarke, much more sensibly, find the ultimate sanction for morality in the Eternal Reason, or the Eternal fitness of things. Viewed in this light, the appeal to reason is not so irrational as Mackintosh supposes. From

[1] *op. cit.*, p. 148.

this stand-point, the test of morality and the authority of conscience, are seen to be simply the objective and subjective expressions of a generalization, which embraces truth under all its aspects.

I have now discussed the ideas entertained by the intuitive school of moralists, rather as to the "theory of moral sentiments" than as to the "criterion of morality," two branches of enquiry which, as we have seen, its supporters are apt to confound. It has already been pointed out that, while the intuitive school are more immediately concerned with the former branch of enquiry the inductive school are in reality limited to the latter. By its very title, "utilitarianism" seems to admit this limitation. Not that its advocates deny the existence of the moral faculty. Thus Mr Mill says, "The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same—a feeling in our own mind. . . . This feeling, when disinterested and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of conscience." [1] The moral faculty as thus explained is not, however, supposed to be innate, at all events *as such*. Mr Mill thinks the moral feelings are acquired, but that if there is anything innate it is only a regard to the pleasures and pains of others.[2] We shall see that other inductive moralists find another foundation for the moral sense, to which, however, Mr Mill perhaps refers when he says that utilitarianism is founded in the social feelings.[3] This would seem nevertheless to be somewhat inconsistent with the statement that the moral faculty is a branch of our reason and not of our sensitive faculty; [4] although by this may be meant only that the

[1] *op. cit.*, p. 41.
[2] *op. cit.*, p. 44.
[3] do., p. 46.
[4] do., p. 3.

abstract doctrines of morality which find expression in the conscience are the generalizations of reason.

Utilitarians hold "that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."[1] The enjoyment of pleasure and the negation of pain intended by happiness, has reference, however, rather to mankind in general than to the individual, although the happiness of all implies that of each. The aim of utilitarianism is thus the universal good of mankind, its standard of morality consisting of "the rules and precepts for human conduct by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be, to the greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind, and not to them only, but so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation."[2] Considered as a simple collection of rules as a guide to right conduct, there is little, if anything, in this system of morals to object to. Judged of, however, as an expression of the ultimate object of human action, the "greatest happiness" principle is by no means perfect. It may be true that the promotion of happiness is "the test by which to judge of all human conduct," but it by no means follows that "happiness is the sole end of human action."[3] All right conduct may be accompanied mediately or immediately by such a result, but its real aim be far otherwise. The view entertained by utilitarians as to the object of virtue would seem, indeed, to cut off any higher motive for right action. It is true that they "not only place virtue at the very head of the things which are good as means to the ultimate end, but they also recognise as a psychological fact the possibility of its being, to the individual, a good in itself, without looking to any end beyond it."[4] This, however, is not

[1] *op. cit.*, p. 9. [2] *op. cit.*, p. 17.
[3] do., p. 58. [4] do., p. 54.

a regard for virtue for its own sake, but simply the result of habit, as a consequence whereof that which was at first willed because it was desired, comes to be desired because it is willed.[1] In fact, virtue is not desired, except as an aid to happiness or as a part of it, until it has become habitual; in which case it is still not desired for itself, but only because its practice gives the pleasure accompanying all action which has become habitual, that is, performed without thought or exertion. The value of this condition of mind—including that instance of it which, according to the utilitarian philosophy, is exhibited in the desire of virtue irrespective of its pleasurable consequences—is, says Mr Mill, that without habit "the influence of the pleasurable and painful associations which prompt to virtue is not sufficiently to be depended on for unerring consistency of action. . . . This state of the will is a means of good, not intrinsically a good, and does not contradict the doctrine that nothing is a good to human beings, but in so far as it is either itself pleasure, or a means of attaining pleasure or averting pain."[2] It may be doubted, however, whether the virtuous habit could be formed under the conditions supposed. If pleasurable and painful associations do not necessarily lead to virtuous action, or at least to a consistent course of conduct, habit could not improve the result. Virtuous conduct if persistent will have a tendency to become habitual, and such will be the case also with vicious action. But the absence of persistence, attendant on a condition in which pleasurable or painful associations do not always lead to the same result, is unfitted for the existence of such a tendency or at least for its continuance, since it would be neutralised or destroyed before it could be fixed as habit.

[1] *op. cit.*, p. 59. [2] do., 61.

Little has yet been said as to the sufficiency of the utilitarian hypothesis to account for the existence in the mind of the idea of duty. It is perfectly true, as Mr Mill asserts, that "the internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same —a feeling in our own mind."[1] Nor can much objection be made to the statement that the binding force of obligation "consists in the existence of a mass of feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right, and which, if we do nevertheless violate that standard, will probably have to be encountered afterwards in the form of remorse."[2] The question, however, is not as to the *existence* of the feeling, which is equivalent to the moral faculty, but as to its origin. If innate, utilitarianism differs little from the intuitional system of morals, and if the feeling be not innate it is for the inductive philosophy to explain how it can have been acquired. Although Mr Mill asserts, and justly so, that the moral faculty is susceptible of being cultivated in almost any direction, yet he believes that it is not innate, although natural.[3] It is natural, moreover, in the sense that it is founded on the social feelings of mankind. As Mr Mill expresses it :— "The deeply rooted conception which every individual even now has of himself as a social being, tends to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow-creatures. . . . This conviction is the ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality."[4] Whether we have here a sufficient explanation of the phenomena presented by the moral faculty or conscience is very questionable, but the consideration of this point may be reserved until we come to treat of the particular phases

[1] *Supra*, p. 1.
[2] *op. cit.*, p. 42.
[3] *op. cit.*, p. 45.
[4] do., p. 50.

of utilitarianism supported by Mr Herbert Spencer and Mr Darwin.

It is advisable, first, however, to consider the views entertained by Mr Bain. As to the ultimate *criterion of morality*, this writer differs little from others of the inductive school, although he has gone further than his predecessors in showing its origin. With him the real moral standard consists in "the enactments of the existing society, as derived from some one clothed in his day with a moral legislative authority."[1] Elsewhere Mr Bain says that, when, for some reason or for none, a majority of fellow-citizens so intensely dislike a particular line of conduct as to employ their power to absolutely prevent it, a new article in the moral code of the community is set up.[2] There must, however, be some ground on, or principle according to, which such moral enactments are determined, and Mr Bain points out an important distinction. Thus, according to him, "the moral rules found to prevail in most, if not in all communities, are grounded partly on utility and partly on sentiment."[3] It is evident, however, that the latter from their very nature are of only temporary authority, and that they cannot really enter into a true system of morality. The restraints which are traceable to a sentimental origin have "no reference, direct or indirect, to the maintenance of the social tie, with all the safeguards implied in it. Certain things founded in taste, liking, aversion, or fancy, have in every community known to us, got themselves erected into the dignity of authoritative morality, being, so to speak, terms of community, and enforced by punishment."[4] Those rules which are founded on utility, and which may be described as strictly moral, as distinguished from those which are

[1] "The Emotions and the Will" (2nd ed.), p. 280.
[2] do., p. 291. [3] do., p. 277.
[4] do., p. 269. For examples see pp. 278-280.

sentimental, have for their end *public security*, and they are grounded in "a tolerably uniform sense of the necessity of recognising some rights of individuals living together in society, and of the obligation of civil obedience, which is merely another form of respecting those rights."[1] What these utilitarian rules are it is not necessary here to consider.[2] The important question is, that which concerns the *theory of morals*. Mr Bain's opinion on this point is shown by his statement that morality, duty, obligation, or right, refer to "the class of actions enforced by the sanction of punishment;" *conscience* being "an ideal resemblance of public authority, growing up in the individual mind," and working to the same end as law and society, in imposing an obligatory sanction.[3] The *self-formed* or *independent conscience*, as distinguished from the *religious conscience*, "is not influenced either by fear of, or reverence to, any superior power whatever. . . . . The sentiment is at first formed and cultivated by the relations of actual command and obedience," and comes at last to stand upon an independent foundation. "Regard is now had to the intent and meaning of the law, and not to the mere fact of its being prescribed by some power."[4] This is founded on the view of "association" enforced by Mackintosh. The tendency of association is "to erect new centres of force, detached from the particulars that originally gave them meaning; which new creations will sometimes assemble round themselves a more powerful body of sentiment than could be inspired by any one of the constituent realities." Such is the case in relation to the sense of duty in the abstract, under which a man performs all his recognised obligations without referring to any special motive.[5]

[1] "The Emotions and the Will" (2nd ed.), p. 269.
[2] See do., p. 277. [3] do., p. 254. [4] do., p. 288. [5] do., p. 290.

The law of association by which conscience is thus explained, would seem to have been suggested by what has been observed in physics, that when two or more chemical atoms unite, the resulting compound possesses properties which none of the separate units themselves exhibit. It should not be lost sight of, however, that the latter process is founded on the activity of a force —chemical affinity — and the analogy requires that there should be some mental force or principle, the operation of which causes the association supposed in conscience. Mr Bain might be thought to refer to this when he states, that the agreement between those who have different standards of morals is emotional.[1] But there is evidently no definite sense attached to this phrase, and it might with more justice be said that such agreement instead of being emotional is really intellectual. It may be true that "all we understand by the authority of conscience, the sentiment of obligation, the feeling of right, the sting of remorse, is nothing else than so many modes of expressing the acquired aversion and dread towards particular actions associated in the mind with certain consequences."[2] But this only relates to the existence of an *organised* conscience or moral faculty, and it leaves unexplained the ultimate principle, call it emotional or otherwise, which gives form to the teachings of experience, and which is the operating force in the association of moral ideas. Mr Bain does admit that there are "primitive impulses of the mind disposing us to the performance of social duty (just as there are also other primitive impulses which dispose us to perform acts forbidden by social duty), of which the chief are (1.) Prudence, or self-interest; and (2.) Sympathy, which prompts to disinterested conduct." But he goes on to declare that "the peculiar quality or

[1] "The Emotions and the Will" (2nd ed.), p. 267. [2] do., p. 286.

attribute that we term conscience is distinct from all these, and reproduces, in the maturity of the mind, a facsimile of the system of government as practised around us."[1] In thus dealing with conscience—severing all connection between it and self-interest and sympathy—Mr Bain really removes the very foundation of morality. He leaves nothing but an indefinite emotional something, which accompanies obedience to the will of another,[2] which is wholly insufficient to account for the phenomena in question. The defect in Mr Bain's system is shown, moreover, in his distinguishing between the *religious* and the *self-formed consciences.* The former is said to be "characterised by the presence and predominance of the religious sentiment of mingled love and fear towards the Deity; and owes all its power to this circumstance. The feeling of disapprobation would thus resolve itself into the pain of displeasing an object of intense reverence."[3] But little consideration is required to see that this explanation of what is called the religious conscience is not sufficient. The displeasure supposed can be the result only of disobedience to the command of a superior whose power to punish will furnish the primary motive for obedience, although love or veneration may ultimately operate in the same direction. In the absence of the sense of duty, however, the dislike to displease a divine being, that is one who is simply the object of reverence, would be of little influence. The practical test of a religious life is really that which is supplied by morality itself, and whatever may be the origin of the *self-formed,* is also that of the *religious,* conscience. To this may be added certain feelings—the wonder, love, and awe, which, according to Mr Bain, make up the religious sentiment,[4] but it is

[1] "The Emotions and the Will" (2nd ed.), p. 283.
[2] do., p. 284. [3] do., p. 287. [4] do., p. 90.

evident that these have no special relation to religious emotion, any more than they could of themselves ever give rise to conscience. So far as those feelings are concerned with this operation, they depend on that principle of sympathy which Mr Bain declares to be wholly distinct from conscience, and to be an intellectual endowment, flourishing only under a certain development of intelligence,[1] although described as a primitive impulse.[2] It will be shown hereafter that, as religion and morality attain to perfect development, they become more and more identified with each other, and hence the distinction made by Mr Bain between the *religious* and the *self-formed* consciences, constitutes a serious objection to his "theory of morals," quite irrespective of the defect that it supplies no source for the idea of duty or right which is at the foundation of all morality.

In the hands of Mr Herbert Spencer, the inductive system of morality has arrived at that stage of development where it can no longer be said that it simply supplies a criterion of morality. Mr Spencer has, indeed, been said to belong to the intuitive school, but this he justly disclaims. In doing this, he says, "My dissent from the doctrine of utility as commonly understood, concerns not the object to be reached by men, but the method of reaching it. While I admit that happiness is the ultimate end to be contemplated, I do not admit that it should be the proximate end."[3] Again, "the objection which I have to current Utilitarianism, is, that it recognises no more developed form of morality—does not see that it has reached but the initial stage of moral science."[4] It would be difficult to rebut this accusa-

[1] "The Emotions and the Will" (2nd ed.), p. 87. [2] do., p. 283.
[3] See Bain's "Mental and Moral Science" (2nd ed.) p. 721.
[4] do., p. 722.

tion, and Mr Spencer sets himself to remove the stigma thus cast on the inductive philosophy. He starts with the broad principle that the good and bad results of human conduct "cannot be accidental, but must be the necessary consequences of the constitution of things."[1] What is intended by this is shown by the further proposition that "corresponding to the fundamental propositions of a developed moral science, there have been, and still are, developing in the race, certain fundamental moral intuitions, and that though these moral intuitions are the result of accumulated experiences of utility, gradually organised and inherited, they have come to be quite independent of conscious experience."[2] The genesis of the moral sentiments thus enunciated is an important modification of the utilitarian system, and it is necessary that it should be considered at greater length than has been thought requisite in relation to the theory of any preceding writer.

"The emotions," says Mr Spencer, "given to the young savage by the natural language of love and hate in the members of his tribe, gain first a partial definiteness in respect to his intercourse with his family and playmates; and he learns by experience the utility, in so far as his own ends are concerned, of avoiding courses which call from others manifestations of anger, and taking courses which call from them manifestations of pleasure. Not that he consciously generalises. . . . . What happens is, that having, in the way shown,[3] in-

[1] See Bain's "Mental and Moral Science" (2nd ed.), p. 721."

[2] do., p. 722.

[3] In the past experieuce of the human race, smiles and gentle tones in those around have been the habitual accompaniments of pleasureable feelings; while pains of many kinds, immediate and more or less remote, have been continually associated with the impressions received from knit brows and set teeth, and grating voice. Much deeper down than the history of the human race must we go to find the beginnings of these connections."—*Fortnightly Review*, 1871, (p. 425).

herited this connection between the perception of anger in others and the feeling of dread, and having discovered that particular acts of his bring on this anger, he cannot subsequently think of committing one of these acts without thinking of the resulting anger, and feeling more or less of the resulting dread. He has no thought of the utility or inutility of the act itself; the deterrent is the mainly vague, but partially definite, fear of evil that may follow. . . . . On passing from the domestic injunctions to the injunctions current in the tribe, we see no less clearly how these emotions produced by approbation and reprobation come to be connected in experience with actions that are beneficial to the tribe, and actions that are detrimental to the tribe, and how there consequently grow up incentives to the one class of actions, and prejudices against the other class. From early boyhood the young savage hears recounted the daring deeds of his chief—hears them in words of praise, and sees all faces glowing with admiration. From time to time also he listens while some one's cowardice is described in tones of scorn, and with contemptuous metaphors, and sees him meet with derision and insult wherever he appears. That is to say, one of the things that comes to be strongly associated in his mind with smiling faces, which are symbolical of pleasures in general, is courage; and one of the things that comes to be associated in his mind with frowns and other marks of enmity, which form his symbol of unhappiness, is cowardice. . . . Similarly there are produced in him feelings of inclination or repugnance towards other lines of conduct that have become established or interdicted, because they are beneficial or injurious to the tribe; though neither the young nor the adults know why they have become established or interdicted."[1] There are,

[1] *Fortnightly Review*, p. 427.

however, other incentives and restraints derived from these. The dead chief is supposed to become a demon. Hence, among other agents whose approbation or reprobation are contemplated by the savage as consequences of his conduct, are the spirits of his ancestors. . . . . The consciousness that such a chief, dreaded by neighbouring tribes, and dreaded, too, by members of his own tribe, may reappear and punish those who have disregarded his injunctions, becomes a powerful motive. But it is clear, in the first place, that the imagined anger and the imagined satisfaction of this deified chief are simply transfigured forms of the anger and satisfaction displayed by those around; and that the feelings accompanying such imaginations have the same original root in the experiences which have associated an average of painful results with the manifestation of another's anger, and an average of pleasurable results with the manifestation of another's satisfaction. And it is clear, in the second place, that the actions thus forbidden and encouraged, must be mostly actions that are respectively detrimental and beneficial to the tribe; since the successful chief is usually a better judge than the rest, and has the preservation of the tribe at heart. Hence, experiences of utility, consciously or unconsciously organised, underlie his injunctions, and the sentiments which prompt obedience are, though very indirectly, and without the knowledge of those who feel them, referable to experiences of utility."[1]

The sentiments hitherto evolved are what Mr Spencer calls "ego-altruistic." But during the progressive growth of civilisation "there have been slowly evolving the altruistic sentiments. Development of these has gone on only as fast as society has advanced to a state in which the activities are mainly peaceful. The root of

[1] *Fortnightly Review*, p. 428.

all the altruistic sentiments is sympathy, and sympathy could become dominant only when the mode of life, instead of being one that habitually inflicted direct pain, became one which conferred direct and indirect benefits, the pains inflicted being mainly incidental and indirect." Sympathy, moreover, is the concomitant of gregariousness, the two all along increasing by reciprocal aid, and thus "sympathy becomes developed into a more and more important element of human nature," being checked, however, by its dependence on intelligence, and by the antagonism, especially during the predatory stages of human progress, of "the immediate needs of self-preservation." Mr Herbert Spencer affirms, nevertheless, that even sympathy, and the sentiments that result from it, are due to experiences of ability. "If we suppose," says he, "all thought of rewards or punishments, immediate or remote, to be left out of consideration, it is clear that any one who hesitates to inflict a pain because of the vivid representation of that pain which rises in his consciousness, is restrained not by any sense of obligation, or by any formulated doctrine of utility, but by the painful association established in him. And it is clear that if, after repeated experiences of the moral discomfort he has felt from witnessing the unhappiness indirectly caused by some of his acts, he is led to check himself when again tempted to those acts, the restraint is of like nature. Conversely with the pleasure-giving acts, repetitions of kind deeds, and experiences of the sympathetic gratifications that follow, tend continually to make stronger the association between such deeds and feelings of happiness."[1]

Mr Herbert Spencer's explanation of the genesis of moral sentiments has been thus fully set forth, because, although the criterion of morality is strictly utilitarian,

[1] *Fortnightly Review*, p. 430.

the explanation is intended to supply a satisfactory theory of morals. It is on this ground that Mr Spencer's opinions claim special attention. Stated in a few words, it is that experiences of utility give rise to certain emotions which become, consciously or unconsciously, organised as moral intuitions. It is only when these intuitions have been formed that the *intellectual* recognitions of utility are possible, and that the experiences of utility are consciously generalised.[1] It is on this ground apparently that Mr Spencer asserts the existence of a primary basis of morals, "independent of, and in a sense antecedent to, that which is furnished by experiences of utility, and consequently independent of, and in a sense antecedent to, those moral sentiments which I conceive to be generated by such experiences."[2] For he objects to Mr Hutton's assertion that he recognises "no parentage for morals beyond that of the accumulation and organisation of the effects of experience;" stating that Mr Hutton "has assumed that in the genesis of moral feelings as due to inherited experiences of the pleasures and pains arising from certain modes of conduct, I am speaking of reasoned-out experiences—experiences consciously accumulated and generalised."[3] But how there can be a primary basis of morals antecedent to experiences of utility, when the moral sentiment is the result of the organisation of such experiences, it is hard to discover. Of course, the experiences of utility here intended are those which are supposed by Mr Spencer to be unconsciously organised, and it is only by reference to the later ones that are "consciously accumulated and generalised," that it can be said in any sense that the moral sentiment precedes experiences. It is evident that the experiences of utility are wholly different in these two cases, the one class being un-

[1] *Fortnightly Review*, p. 431. do., p. 421. [3] do., p. 422.

consciously organised, and preceding the moral sentiment, and the other "reasoned-out," and coming after it.

The only real basis of morals according to Mr Herbert Spencer's theory, is to be found in the emotional nature, which is affected by the experiences from which the moral sentiment is developed. This is shown by the nature of such experiences as those "which become registered in the shape of associations between groups of feelings that have often recurred together, though the relation between them has not been consciously generalised." That the source of such association is often not perceivable is owing to its being concerned with the emotional nature. For, as Mr Spencer states, "in the genesis of an emotion the successive experiences so far differ that each of them, when it occurs, suggests past experiences which are not specifically similar, but have only a general similarity; and at the same time, it suggests benefits or evils in past experience which likewise are various in their special natures, though they have a certain community of general nature. Hence it results that the consciousness aroused is a multitudinous, confused consciousness, in which, along with a certain kind of combination among the impressions received from without, there is a vague cloud of ideal combinations akin to them, and a vague mass of ideal feelings of pleasure or pain that were associated with these."[1] This is the explanation of the genesis of emotions, as distinguished from that of ideas, and the complex process thus revealed being that which gives form to the organised experiences out of which the moral intuitions have been developed, the emotional nature must be the real source of such intuitions.

It is quite true that if, as Mr Spencer asserts, it is necessary to seek much deeper down than the history of the

[1] *Fortnightly Review*, p. 423.

human race, for the beginning of that association of pleasurable feeling, with smiles and gentle tones, and of pain, with knit brows and grating voice, which is at the root of emotional development, we should expect that those experiences may have already been unconsciously organised, to a certain extent, before the human race itself was developed. In that sense, certainly it might be said that there existed in man "a primary basis of morals, independent of, and in a sense antecedent to, that which is furnished by experiences of utility." This may appear to be in support of Mr Spencer's theory, but, in reality, it is far otherwise. Before considering this point, it may be advisable to refer to a more prominent objection to that theory. It cannot be denied that Mr Spencer has satisfactorily explained the operation by which certain moral ideas, or particular lines of conduct, come to be viewed with inclination or repugnance by the youthful mind, and thence to regulate the whole future life. In other words, the moral sentiment having been once formed, there is no difficulty in understanding how certain ideas, approved or disapproved of by it, may have been handed down from generation to generation ; or even how the moral sentiment itself may have undergone a phenomenal modification by the organization of fresh experiences. It is evident, however, that the emotions which are developed, as the result of those experiences, depend, for their moral efficacy, if not for their existence, on a series of incentives and restraints, the progressive strength of which Mr. Spencer has ably sketched. Moreover, the origin of the definite notions of right and duty must be traced to such incentives and restraints. From Mr Spencer's observation that those sentiments, when the conceptions of Deity were still anthropomorphic, referred, "so far as they have become developed," mainly to divine commands and interdicts, and had little reference to the natures of the acts

commanded or interdicted,[1] it would seem, indeed, that he considers that, at that stage of moral progress, the ideas of right and duty were scarcely framed. But the former idea, at least, must have been associated with the moral sentiment from the earliest stage of its development. This does not consist merely of certain "incentives to the one class of actions and prejudices against the other class," but of a feeling that one class is wrong, and the other right. If, however, there is so intimate a connection between this feeling and the moral sentiment, it must have been present from the first appearance of those organized experiences out of which Mr Spencer supposes the moral sentiment to have been developed. It is evident, moreover, that the further back we go towards the origin of the human race, the weaker must become the incentives and restraints on which the sentiment of right depends, until they almost reach the vanishing point. But it must not be supposed that the idea of right will undergo a proportionate diminution in strength. If "right" were nothing more than a sentiment, as Mr Spencer calls it, no doubt this would be so. But it will be shown hereafter that, although the notion itself may at first be indefinite, the element of "right" enters into the standard of human conduct from the very earliest stage of man's social existence. Moreover, the idea would become definitely formed long before the incentives and restraints on which we have supposed the sentiment of right to depend, had attained any considerable influence. It cannot be objected that this assumes the conscious accumulation and generalization of experiences at a too early stage of human progress. For, as we shall see, the notion of right was formed instinctively on the presentation of certain social phenomena. Mr Spencer himself even supposes that the injunctions of the chief, which supply incentives and re-

[1] *loc. cit.*, p. 429.

straints for the guidance of the conduct of the young savage, may have been founded on consciously organised experiences of utility,[1] and the genesis of an idea is so simple a process, as compared with the genesis of an emotion,[2] that the idea of right may well have been formed long before any of such experiences had undergone conscious organization.

Mr Herbert Spencer's theory is, then, defective, inasmuch as it does not allow for the element of "right," which is essential to the moral sentiment, not now only, but at every step, from the period when that sentiment was first developed. This is strictly the same objection as that urged by Mr R. H. Hutton, to the effect that "we cannot inherit more than our ancestors *had.* No amount of experience of fact, however universal, however completely without exception, can give rise to that particular characteristic of intuitions and *à priori* ideas, which compels us to deny the possibility that, in any other world, however otherwise different, our experience could be otherwise."[3] For this characteristic is due to that element of propriety, which was supposed above to be essential to the moral sentiment, and which, in fact, is founded, as will hereafter be shown, on an instinct common to man and animals. However the judgment in relation to the morality of particular actions may change from time to time, there is always a belief that those actions which recommend themselves to the mind are "right." It is this belief, which no amount of experience, however highly organized, can give, and which, therefore, we must suppose to be dependent on some innate property of the mind itself. It is true that at first the idea is of very limited application. The rights of self, and those of others, do not, in the earliest stage, equally recommend themselves

[1] *loc. cit.*, p. 428. [2] See do., p. 422.
[3] *Macmillan's Magazine*, vol. xx. (1869), p. 269.

to the mind, but they are fundamentally the same, as depending on the same instinct.

The utmost, then, which could result from experience, accompanied, even as it might be, with retribution for interference with the rights of others, would, according to the utilitarian hypothesis, be the formation of a judgment of expediency, or a sense of prudence, and the fact that there is more than this, is proof that some other element has operated. And the result would be the same, however highly organized the experience may have become. Nor could it be otherwise. Right action is supposed to have originated in a vague sense of utility, and although emotional experiences are affirmed to give rise to certain moral intuitions, quite irrespective of any recognition of the utility of such action, yet, as Mr Herbert Spencer says, there may "come to be distinctly recognised the truths that the remoter results are respectively detrimental and beneficial—that due regard for others is conducive to ultimate personal welfare, and disregard for others is conducive to ultimate personal disaster."[1] Utility is thus supposed to be the beginning and ending of all moral conduct, even where there may result "a deliberate pursuit of the sympathetic gratifications." Taking "welfare" and "disaster" in the utilitarian sense, it may be asked how can actions, according to such a view, possess any moral element at all? To say that an action is good, because it agrees with the organised experiences of utility, is to say that it is good, because it is useful. But none of these terms have the positive element which is implied in the idea of morality—that is, of "right." The only positive element they possess is expediency, which is exactly that which enters into the calculation of the child while its moral sense is yet undeveloped. Nor is the case altered by the fact that "approbation and reprobation, divine and

[1] *loc. cit.*, p. 431.

human, come to be associated in thought with the sympathetic and unsympathetic actions respectively." Nor because, as Mr. H. Spencer says, "the commands of the creed, the legal penalties, and the code of social conduct, unitedly enforce them, and every child, as it grows up, daily has impressed on it, by the words, and faces, and voices of those around, the authority of these highest principles of conduct." It is evident that, by themselves, all these influences combined cannot do more than add to the expediency or prudence of pursuing a particular line of conduct. They operate as so many deterrents from doing that which is not "useful," but they add no element of morality, and hence conduct would still be governed wholly by expediency. No doubt, in most cases, the influences supposed would be sufficient to lead those subject to them to govern their actions in accordance with the laws of morality, but let them lose their authority, and the power necessary to restrain from actions injurious to self and society is gone. We see this continually happening, when the sanctions of religion have ceased to have any influence over those whose sense of "duty" is imperfect, and, in fact, the recognition of this phase of human life is at the foundation of the teaching of all religions which have a moral element. Even Christianity itself forms no exception, and, so far as it is founded on expediency or mere prudence, it partakes of the weakness of the utilitarian philosophy.

It is time now, however, to refer to another objection to Mr Herbert Spencer's theory which will be found to be intimately connected with that which has just been considered. It was shown that the only real sense in which, according to that theory, it can be said that there existed in man "a primary basis of morals independent of, and antecedent to, that which is furnished by experiences of utility," depends on the notion that such

experiences were unconsciously organised to some extent before the human race itself was developed. This is, of course, on the assumption that man has been derived from a lower animal form ; and I think it can be shown that the notion is really destructive of Mr Herbert Spencer's theory. It must be assumed that the experiences thus organised were of the same emotional character as those which are supposed to have given rise to the moral sentiment in man. That they must thus have been is, indeed, shown by their nature. Mr Spencer explains the presence in the infant man of the partially-established nervous structure which is concerned in pleasurable or painful emotions, by the fact that "in the past experiences of the human race, smiles and gentle tones in those around have been the habitual accompaniments of pleasurable feelings; while pains of many kinds, immediate and more or less remote, have been continually associated with the impressions received from knit brows, and set teeth, and grating voice." Mr Spencer adds, "much deeper down than the history of the human race must we go to find the beginning of these connections. The appearances and sounds which excite in the infant a vague dread, indicate danger; and do so because they are the physiological accompaniments of destructive action—some of them common to man and inferior mammals, and consequently understood by inferior mammals, as every puppy shows us."[1] This is quite true, but we must go much lower than the lowest mammal to find the origin of that association. Mr Spencer says, "what we call the natural language of anger, is due to a partial contraction of those muscles which actual combat would call into play; and all marks of irritation, down to that passing shade over the brow which accompanies slight annoyance, are incipient

[1] *loc. cit.*, p. 425.

stages of these same contractions."[1] Now there are two actions which among the lower animals call forth the expressions of anger and lead to actual combat sooner than any other. These are, interference with the food or other property, such as the nest, which an animal has obtained or formed, or with the female to which it has attached itself. As actions of this character lead to combat, we must believe them to arise from that emotional disturbance which we call anger. But it is not only among the Vertebrates that such actions are accompanied by similar results. They are in fact, found among animals, such as the spider, for instance, which can hardly be said to exhibit "emotion" of any kind, much less such a specialised form as anger. We can only refer the pugnacity of those creatures under certain circumstances to the peculiar state of feeling aroused by certain actions which they instinctively resent. The emotions, however, are only highly organised states of feeling, and the "resentment" which the spider may be said to entertain, we must suppose is only an organised form of a still lower phase of feeling. But when we proceed still further down the scale of being, we find that the only mode of action which animals exhibit is an instinctive response to certain stimuli, external or internal. Moreover, the only object of such action is self-preservation, or the satisfaction of the sexual instinct. Leaving the latter out of view, as secondary to the individual, we may say that the activity of the lowest form of animal organism has for its chief aim the acquirement of something which it instinctively recognises as necessary for its self-preservation. Higher in the scale of being the action is also instinctive and its object is still the same. Even among the Vertebrates we find the same aim

[1] *loc. cit.*, p. 425.

originated by a similar instinct, although there may be added a certain amount of rational thought as to the means by which the end is to be attained. With them, as with the lowest animal organism, the chief object of all action is the satisfaction of the bodily wants. Among the former alone, however, we see that phase of feeling which is aroused when anything which has been acquired for the purpose of satisfying such wants is interfered with. The explanation of this is doubtless that with the Invertebrates, for instance, feeling is not sufficiently organised to rank as emotion. But this is merely because their structure is comparatively so simple. If they were to be organically raised they would become capable of feelings relatively higher. The same remark must be made as to the purely instinctive creatures whose organic structure is the most simple of all. It follows, however, that all animals alike resent interference with that which they have acquired for the purpose of self-preservation, according to their capacity for so doing. If, owing to their simplicity of organisation, they have not the capacity, of course they cannot entertain resentment ; but it is none the less clear that the same instinct operates throughout them all, although with varying accompaniments. What that instinct is may be judged of by the aim towards which its operation is directed. This is the supply of the wants of the physical organism, and hence it may be called the instinct of self-preservation. But that is only the *general* result sought to be attained, and something else is necessary for it to have the required effect. In fact, the acquisition of food is what is more immediately desired, and that which is common to all animals alike whether they can resent interference with it when obtained or not. In man the same feeling shows itself as what may be termed an instinct of "property," and this it is

which, as we shall see, gives rise to that sense of right which leads not only man but animals to defend what they have acquired or possess.

We are thus brought back again to that point which was reached when considering another objection to Mr Spencer's theory—the ultimate association of the idea of right with the moral sentiment. It was stated, that in the primitive stage of man's existence, this idea would be indefinite. The instinct of "property" would then amply suffice to call into play the combative faculty, and it could have been only after the property was interfered with that the definite idea of right was formulated. It is clear that there is no real mental difference in relation to property between the animal and man in his primitive condition. Both have the sense of right, founded on the instinct of self-preservation, which leads them to resist the appropriation of that which they have acquired, but that alone. This is an extremely important fact. For, we have seen that the same sense, or the instinct of self-preservation of which it is the expression, is exhibited in action by all animals, however simple their organisation. Being thus constant and universal, it is difficult to see how the conclusion can be escaped that the sense of right is the most essential element in those phenomena which accompany the action of the moral faculty in its rudimentary form among primitive peoples. It is true that interference with property gives rise to emotional experiences, and that those experiences become organised, but it is evident that the sense of right underlies them all, and that without it they could not exist. Further, the emotion is in reality purely secondary. However intense may be the anger aroused, and however dire may be its consequences, its only real value is as evidence of the intensity of the idea or feeling of right

in which it has orginated. In fact, the organization of experiences which has resulted in the formation of the moral sense has not been so much emotional as ideal. That which has been generated has been a more and more definite idea of right, which has continually increased its objective range, while subjectively establishing itself as a principle of pure reason instead of a simple natural instinct.

This brings us to another ground of objection to Mr Herbert Spencer's theory. It is clear that there is little room in the genesis of emotions on which that theory is basis for the exercise of thought. There may ultimately be the intellectual recognition of utility, but the moral sentiment is supposed to precede such recognition and to make it possible. Mr Spencer says, in fact, that the young savage does not consciously generalise. "He does not at that age, probably not at any age, formulate his experiences in the general principle, that it is well for him to do things which bring smiles from others, and to avoid doing things which bring frowns. . . . . He has no thought of the utility or inutility of the act itself; the deterrent is the mainly vague, but partially definite, fear of evil that may follow."[1] But the fact is that the savage is by no means devoid of thought on matters with which the moral sense is concerned. Not, certainly, as to the utility or otherwise of his actions, nor as to the emotions the actions of others may arouse in himself. His thought has relation to the infringement of his rights about which the savage is very jealous. This is the origin of all the wars and blood-feuds which occur among peoples of a low civilisation, as, indeed, it is of most of the wars of peoples of the highest culture. Mr Herbert Spencer's theory provides no place for that

[1] *loc. cit.*, p. 427.

thought, and hence it is useless as an explanation of the moral sense, which is more a development of the sense of right of which such thought is the expression than the result of the genesis of emotion. If sentiment be distinguished from obligation, Mr Spencer's theory may explain the existence of certain ideas founded on organised emotional experiences ; but, as already shown, these cannot give rise to any feeling but that of expediency. Indeed, in some of the illustrations given by Mr Spencer, there is no room for the exercise of a moral sense. Thus, he says, "from early boyhood the young savage hears recounted the daring deeds of his chief—hears them in words of praise, and sees all faces glowing with admiration. From time to time also he listens, while some one's cowardice is described in tones of scorn, and with contemptuous metaphors. That is to say, one of the things that comes to be strongly associated in his mind with smiling faces, which are symbolical of pleasures in general, is courage, and one of the things that comes to be associated in his mind with frowns and other marks of enmity, which form his symbol of unhappiness, is cowardice."[1] Now, it might be objected to this reasoning that bravery and cowardice are dependent on other circumstances than smiles and tones of scorn, and that, in fact, their basis is chiefly physical. The exigencies of savage life are such, that quite irrespective of the influence of example, and the desire of emulation, which is no doubt usually very strong, men must be brave. If, contrary to the rule of savage life, a man be not brave, the fact is sure to have a physical cause, which no amount of social influence will neutralise.[2] Example and emulation will not make a man positively brave,

[1] *loc. cit.*, p. 427.

[2] A recognised class of "effeminates" appears to exist among many of the tribes of North America and Eastern Asia.

but only render him more or less so than some one else, and in reality the most influential man among savage peoples is as often he who is most cunning, as the one who is the greatest warrior. Bravery and cowardice are in fact simply matters of expediency, having nothing whatever of the moral element. They may affect the action of the moral sense, but in no other way have they any relation to it. The young savage may be convinced that the only way to attain to eminence, or to obtain property is to be brave, that is, bravery is necessary for such a purpose. If, therefore, he wishes to be eminent or rich, he will be convinced of the expediency of bravery. But supposing the savage to care for neither of these results, he will not necessarily be so convinced, although if he have to defend his own property, or even to aid the tribe generally against a foreign foe, he may display great bravery. If he be constitutionally a coward, the savage may, indeed, attain an eminence equal to that of his bravest associates, by taking to the arts of a sorcerer. Courage may be a virtue in the sense in which this term was used by the Romans, but it certainly has no moral element, and hence its genesis has no bearing on the question of the origin of the moral sense.

The theory propounded by Mr Herbert Spencer fails, just where every form of utilitarianism fails, in its inability to account for the idea of right or obligation which is essential to the moral sense. Mr Darwin has been no more successful than others of his school in overcoming this difficulty. In attempting, however, to discover what light the study of the lower animals will throw on the question of the origin of the moral sense, he has adopted a mode of inquiry which is a great advance on that of any of his predecessors of either school of morals, and one which must be attended with

very important results. It is true that Mr Darwin agrees with those writers "who maintain that, of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense, or conscience, is by far the most important."[1] To this, nevertheless, is added, as highly probable, the proposition, that "any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers had become as well developed, or nearly as well developed, as in man." Assuming the propriety of Mr Darwin's explanation of the moral sense, this proposition, however, is almost a truism. Given the same instincts and the same intellectual powers, the effect of their co-operation must be the same; that is, there would necessarily be the formation of a moral conscience, which would differ from the human conscience only in its application, as the latter presents various objective phases among different peoples. It is useless, however, to discuss the circumstances under which animals would acquire a moral sense. It is more to the point when we are told that "dogs possess something very like a conscience,"[2] This is a question, the answer to which must depend on what is meant by the term "conscience;" but even if, as Mr Darwin supposes, conscience be a feeling of dissatisfaction at having sacrificed the ever-enduring social instincts to the temporary impulses of passion and desire,[3] the dog has not been proved to possess such a feeling. Its use of self-command restraining it from taking food in the absence of its master, certainly shows the possession of one of the elements necessary to the operation of conscience, but, before the existence of this faculty can be admitted, it must also be shown that the

[1] "The Descent of Man," vol. i., p. 70. [2] do., vol. i., p. 78.
[3] See *infra*.

dog has a feeling of dissatisfaction when it has allowed its self-command to be overcome by the attractions of the food committed to its care. Mr Darwin, speaking of the triumph of the migratory instincts of birds over the maternal instincts leading them to desert their unfledged young, seems to think that they might, under certain circumstances, possess conscience. He says, "When arrived at the end of her long journey, and the migratory instinct ceases to act, what an agony of remorse each bird would feel, if, from being endowed with great mental activity, she could not prevent the image continually passing before her mind of her young ones perishing in the bleak north from cold and hunger."[1] This is very true, but seeing that neither the bird nor any other animal is endowed with the great mental activity supposed, and from their constitution as animals could not exercise it, the picture drawn by Mr Darwin, although beautiful, cannot be utilised in argument.

Leaving at present the question, whether the moral sense can have had the origin supposed for it by Mr Darwin, let us see what are the social instincts which he refers to as being possessed in common by man and the lower animals. The leading instinct is sociability. Many kinds of animals live in companies, and these perform mutual services, and even defend each other against attacks. Social and other animals sympathise with each other's distress or danger. Mr Darwin even affirms as certain, "that associated animals have a feeling of love for each other which is not felt by adult and non-social animals."[2] Before this can be admitted, however, it must be ascertained what is meant by "love." Mr Darwin's opinion of it may be gathered from his assertion, that "the all-important emotion of

[1] *op. cit.*, i. p. 91. [2] do., p. 76.

sympathy is distinct from that of love."[1] But this can hardly be true in the larger sense of the former term. Although a mother who loves her infant cannot justly be said to have sympathy *for* it, she is certainly in sympathy *with* it. Love indeed, seems to be merely an intense form of sympathy—combined, it is true, in its higher phases with other feelings—and viewed in that light the dog may undoubtedly be said to love its master. The dog, moreover, can, as we have seen, exercise a certain amount of self-control; but if this is not wholly the result of fear, yet, at the utmost it could arise only from a feeling that such an action would be unpleasing to its master. The dog's own organised experience, however, would, without calling in any other cause, be amply sufficient to account for the phenomenon in question.

Thus far the social instincts exhibited by animals. How have those instincts arisen? Mr Darwin says that such animals are in most cases "impelled by the same sense of satisfaction or pleasure which they experience in performing other instinctive actions, or by the same sense of dissatisfaction, as in other cases of prevented instinctive actions."[2] As to the origin, however, of the parental and filial affections, "which apparently lie at the basis of the social affections," Mr Darwin thinks "it is hopeless to speculate; but we may infer that they have been to a large extent gained through natural selection."[3] Certain social instincts are supposed to be "persistently followed from the mere force of inheritance, without the stimulus of either pleasure or pain;"[4] while others "are the indirect result of other instincts and faculties, such as sympathy, reason, experience, and a tendency to imitation, or the result of long-continued habit."[5] Mr Darwin believes it to be in many cases im-

[1] *op. cit.*, i., p. 81. [2] do., p. 79. [3] do., p. 80. [4] do., p. 79. [5] do., p. 82.

possible to decide how these instincts have been acquired; but supposing it is said, almost in the words of Mr Herbert Spencer used in relation to man's moral sense, that "certain experiences organised and consolidated through all past generations, have produced corresponding modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in certain animals what we call social instincts," no real light has been thrown on the origin of these instincts. I shall hereafter have occasion to show that they are intimately connected with, and have probably sprung from, the sexual instinct, which is of great importance in relation to the question of morals, since on it depends the existence of the active virtues. But the social instincts alone do not furnish a sufficient foundation for morals. Mr Darwin, by limiting his inquiry in relation to the moral sense to them, has, therefore, necessarily failed in showing its true origin. Like Mr Herbert Spencer, he has almost lost sight of the instinct of self-preservation, which, by giving rise to the sense of right, is really at the foundation of all morality.

It is advisable, however, to examine somewhat more in detail, the explanation given by Mr Darwin of the nature and origin of the moral sense. According to him, man has retained from an extremely remote period a certain degree of "instinctive love and sympathy for his fellows." As a social animal, "he would inherit a tendency to be faithful to his comrades. . . . He would in like manner possess some capacity for self-command, and, perhaps, of obedience to the leader of the community. He would, from an inherited tendency, still be willing to defend, in concert with others, his fellowmen, and would be ready to aid them in any way which did not too greatly interfere with his own welfare or his own strong desires."[1] Instinctive sympathy would,

[1] *op. cit.*, i., p. 85.

moreover, "cause him to value highly the approbation of his fellow-men," and, "as the feelings of love and sympathy, and the power of self-command, become strengthened by habit, and as the power of reasoning becomes clearer, so that man can appreciate the justice of the judgments of his fellow-men, he will feel himself impelled, independently of any pleasure or pain felt at the moment, to certain lines of conduct."[1] There is much truth in this description, but as yet there is nothing to show that these various feelings possess any moral element. Man may have certain instinctive sympathies, but other instincts may be stronger than they are. Mr Darwin says, indeed, that "it cannot be maintained that the social instincts are ordinarily stronger in man, or have become stronger through long-continued habit, than the instincts, for instance, of self-preservation, hunger, lust, vengeance, &c."[2] He supposes, however, that the latter are only temporary, or, at least, only temporary in their determining influence, and in this Mr Darwin sees the source of the moral element in actions. For, "as man cannot prevent old impressions continually re-passing through his mind, he will be compelled to compare the weaker impressions of, for instance, past hunger, or of vengeance satisfied, or danger avoided at the cost of other men, with the instinct of sympathy and good-will to his fellows, which is still present, and ever in some degree active in his mind. He will then feel in his imagination that a stronger instinct has yielded to one which now seems comparatively weak, and then that sense of dissatisfaction will inevitably be felt with which man is endowed, like every other animal, in order that his instincts may be obeyed."[3] It is in this feeling of dissatisfaction, and in the resolve with which it is accompanied to act differently for the

[1] *op. cit.*, i., p. 86. [2] do., p. 89. [3] do., p. 90

future, that Mr Darwin sees what is known as *conscience*, "for conscience looks backwards, and judges past actions, inducing that kind of dissatisfaction which, if weak, we call regret, and if severe, remorse."[1] Consistently, therefore, it is added, that "the imperious word *ought*, seems merely to imply the consciousness of the existence of a persistent instinct, either innate or partly acquired," serving man as a guide, though liable to be disobeyed.[2]

Several objections maybe urged against this explanation of the origin of the moral sense. Supposing it to be admitted that the social instincts might, under certain conditions, give rise to the idea of moral duty, yet, as will be shown hereafter, this could be only at a very late stage of human progress. During a very long period of his history, the moral sense, which is distinctive of man, would not have existed. Even assuming man to have inherited from his ape-like ancestors certain social instincts which ultimately became nearly all-powerful over human action, they can at first have exercised but little, if any, influence. By the very necessities of his position, primeval man would be compelled to cultivate the instinct of self-preservation and those feelings to which it would give rise, to the almost total exclusion of the sympathies of which his nature might be capable. His intellectual faculties would be developed at the expense of the emotional part of his being, which would be very limited in its range of expression, and very evanescent in its phenomena. Such, indeed, is the case with the most uncultured races of man at the present day. The Australian native, who may be taken as representative of the lowest type of man now existing, is undoubtedly capable of considerable emotional feelings. Mr Eyre, in describing the reception received by his native guide

[1] *op. cit.*, i. p. 91. [2] do., p. 92.

on his reaching King George's Sound, at the termination of the extraordinary journey round the head of the Great Bight, says, "Affection's strongest ties could not have produced a more affecting and melting scene —the wordless weeping pleasure, too deep for utterance, with which he was embraced by his relatives, the cordial and hearty reception given him by his friends, and the joyous greeting bestowed on him by all, might well have put to the blush those heartless calumniators who, branding the savage as the creature only of unbridled passions, deny to him any of those better feelings and affections which are implanted in the breast of all mankind, and which nature has not denied to any colour, or to any race."[1] Mr Eyre is no doubt quite right in this expression of opinion, but the moral phenomena exhibited by uncivilised man show that his affections have little influence over his general character. To take the case of the very people just referred to, there can be no question, from the facts which will be detailed in the succeeding pages, that they are in a state of the lowest moral degradation. Many other facts besides those there stated might be cited in support of this assertion,[2] but I will only quote the following passage referring to the customs which are so influential over Australian native society. The aborigines, says Sir George Grey, reject "all idea of the equality of persons or classes. . . . The whole tendency of their superstitions and traditional regulations, is to produce the effect of depriving certain classes of benefits which are enjoyed by others." The favoured classes are the old or the strong, who obtain their advantages at the expense of the female sex, the young, and the weak, who are condemned to "a hopeless

[1] "Journals of Expeditions of Discovery into the interior of Central Australia," vol. ii., p. 109.

[2] For further particulars on this subject, see a paper by the author in the "Journal of the Anthropological Institute," (1871), p. 74, *seq.*

state of degradation."[1] No wonder that Mr Gideon Lang should declare that the character of nearly all the male natives, at least, is one of "unmitigated selfishness."[2]

It is impossible to suppose that such a people as this can have "the ever-enduring social instincts" developed so strongly that a sense of dissatisfaction will be felt when the passionate instincts have been given way to. The passage in Mr Darwin's own work, in which the condition of man in primeval times is compared with that of his uncultured descendants, whose intellectual powers have been developed at the expense of their instincts,[3] furnishes a strong argument against the position that the social instincts are sufficiently influential over uncivilized man, or were so over his savage ancestors, as to give rise to the feeling of dissatisfaction expressed in conscience. There is a reason, apart from the phenomena which mark the savage life, why this should not be so. Mr Darwin supposes the feeling of dissatisfaction to arise, as the result of a comparison of past with present actions, the capacity for doing this being peculiar to man.[4] It is quite true that man, and he alone, has the power of reflection which such a comparison implies ; but does the savage exercise it in the way supposed ? Does he think about his actions in relation to the moral satisfaction or dissatisfaction they give him, or, in other words, about their moral quality ? Judging from what we know of savage life and character, it must be replied, most certainly not. That the native Australian, for instance, has a keen perceptive power and an active intellect, within a limited range, is undoubtedly true. But these powers are directed, not towards the mental or moral propriety of his actions, but towards their

[1] "Journal of two Expeditions of Discovery," ii., p. 218.

[2] "The Aborigines of Australia," p. 32.

[3] See *infra*.

[4] *op. cit.*, i., p. 88.

logical propriety, if it may be so expressed—their fitness to effect the particular end had in view—that is, the satisfaction of the animal instincts, which are so constant and so powerful in their action, that they leave little room for the social instincts mentioned by Mr Darwin to have any moral influence.

It is true that, when, in pursuance of these animal instincts, the uncivilized man performs an act which injures one of his fellows, he will reflect on the consequences which may ensue. These consequences, however, have nothing to do with the conflict of weaker and stronger instincts. They are the results of the retribution he has to expect, the anticipation of which may be accompanied by a feeling of dissatisfaction, but only because of the physical evils with which it is sure to be attended. If, therefore, the savage has any reflection on the actions springing from his animal instincts, it has relation, not to their being in conflict with his social instincts, but to the retaliation he has to expect from those whom he has injured.

Before bringing this introductory notice to a close, reference may be made to an explanation of the nature of morality, which somewhat differs from any that has been already examined. It is that of the writer of an article in *The North British Review,* entitled, "Moral Theories and Christian Ethics." After describing what he terms the appetitive and prudential stages of human nature, the writer continues :—"Reflection cannot stop at the idea of merely personal good, for it sees that there are other beings of the same nature and desires as ourselves, who have each a self-interest of their own, as well as we. But, as the personal good of others deserves as much respect, it ought to be as sacred in our eyes as our own. So we rise to feel that, above our sensitive and individual life, there is a higher, more universal order, to which we, and all individual souls, even now belong;

that this higher order secures and harmonises the ultimate good of all rational beings; and that the particular good of each, though in harmony with this order, and an element of it, must be subordinated to it. To realise this spiritual order, and be a fellow-worker with it, is felt to be the absolute, the moral good, an end in itself higher and more ultimate than all other ends. This idea, this end, this impersonal good, once conceived, comes home to us with a new and peculiar consciousness. In its presence, we, for the first time, become aware of a law which has a right to command us, which is obligatory on us, which to obey is a duty. . . . This consciousness it is which makes us moral agents. Only in the idea of such a transcendent law above us, independent of us, universal, and of a will determined by it, does morality begin. All other elements of our nature are called moral, only as they bear on this, the overruling moral principle."[1]

It was said that this view of morality differs from that of preceding writers, but it is evident that it has much in common with that of the intellectual school who look to the Divine Reason for the source of the moral idea. Where it differs is in its making man a moral agent only when he attains to the consciousness that there is a transcendental law of morality, an overruling moral principle above and independent of man. This appears to be directly contrary to the conclusions of Cudworth and Clarke, who taught that if man would act in pursuance of the dictates of right reason he would be in accord with the eternal law of right, thus constituting man a moral agent at every stage of his progress. Whether it is so or not, however, is doubtful, since we are afterwards told that "the moral law must be either a self-existing entity, like to our highest

[1] "North British Review" (1867), p. 9.

nature, or must inhere in one who possesses all that we have of reason and will, only in an infinitely greater degree," of which will and reason "the moral law is the truest and most adequate exponent we have."[1] Practically, this differs little from the teaching of Kant who, while affirming that reason cannot demonstrate the existence of God or the substantiality, free agency, and immortality of the soul, yet declares that the moral law stands forth as a *categorical imperative* (an absolute Ought), which is revealed by practical reason. This reason limits our will by the motives of right and duty, and the subordination of our inclinations to it constitutes virtue. Virtue thus essentially consists in obeying the dictates of duty, or in other words in subordinating our inclinations to reason. Morality in this sense is not happiness, it only makes us worthy of being happy.[2] The practical reason revealing the law of duty expresses itself as conscience, which cannot be acquired. It is therefore not a duty to acquire a conscience, but every man considered as a moral being *has* one in himself. Conscience is practical reason acquitting or condemning man in every law of duty. "When it is therefore said, 'this man has no conscience,' it is merely meant that he does not mind its dicta. . . . An erring conscience is a non-entity. We may err objectively whether or not something is or is not a duty, but not subjectively. When one is conscious to have acted according to his conscience, no more can be demanded of him. But it is his duty to enlighten his understanding as to what is duty and what is not."[3] The formal principle of duty as a *categorical imperative*, according to the philosophy of Kant, is "act in such a manner that the maxim of

1 "North British Review" (1867), p. 30.
2 See Kant's "Die Metaphysic der Sitten."
3 *id.* Part ii., Introduction, p. 37.

thy action might become a universal law," and every maxim repugnant to this supreme principle of ethics is immoral.[1]

It is interesting to compare the teaching of Kant with that of Mr Herbert Spencer. In his essay entitled "Prison Ethics," Mr Spencer says, "granted that we are chiefly interested in ascertaining what is *relatively right*, it still follows that we must first consider what is *absolutely right*, since the one conception presupposes the other. That is to say, though we must ever aim to do what is best for the present times, yet we must ever bear in mind what is abstractedly best; so that the changes we make may be towards it, and not away from it. Unattainable as pure rectitude is and may long continue to be, we must keep an eye on the compass which tells us where it lies, or we shall otherwise be liable to wander in some quite opposite direction."[2] Mr Bain points out that the word *absolute* as here used does not mean to imply a right and wrong apart from humanity and its relations. By "absolute," as distinguished from "relative," morality, Mr Spencer means "the mode of conduct which, under the conditions arising from social union, must be pursued to achieve the greatest welfare of each and all. He holds that the laws of life, physiologically considered, being fixed, it necessarily follows that when a number of individuals have to live in social union, which necessarily involves fixity of conditions in the shape of mutual interferences and limitations, there result certain fixed principles by which conduct must be restricted, before the greatest sum of happiness can be achieved. These principles constitute what Mr Spencer distinguishes as Absolute Morality, and the absolutely moral man is the man who conforms to these principles, not by external

[1] *op. cit.*, Part ii., Introduction, p. 8. [2] Essays, 2d series, p. 257.

coercion nor self-coercion, but who acts them out spontaneously."[1] The purely humanitarian view as to the origin of morality here stated, is so divergent from what may be termed the supernatural view of Kant, that it appears to be almost impossible to reconcile them. There is but one mode of doing this. To show that what is called morality is the product of the evolution of the divine idea in man under the conditions imposed by his present life, to be perfected only when man's higher being has proved itself victor in the conflict it is ever sustaining with the malign influences of material existence.

1 "Mental and Moral Science" (2d edition), p. 723.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

THE SENSE OF RIGHT.

IN the introduction an examination has been made of the opinions entertained by the leading writers of the intuitional and utilitarian schools of moralists, and we have seen that, so far as concerns the mere criterion of morality, there is not necessarily any great difference between them. It is true that, as Mr Bain observes,[1] the rational moralists of the intuitive school gave no account of the "final end" of morality. This was, however, because they considered that right conduct was required for its own sake as being alone consistent with eternal reason, and in accordance with this principle they must have looked for the same result as that supposed by utilitarians—the "greatest amount of happiness altogether." On the other hand, it has been shown that the inductive school has little claim to do more than establish a criterion of morality. The moral faculty of the utilitarians is in reality only a sense of expediency or prudence, even when it takes the form of the organized experience of Mr Herbert Spencer.[2] Mr Darwin has approached the nearest of any writer belonging to the inductive school to the perception of

[1] "The Emotions and the Will" (2d edition), p. 257.
[2] See *supra*, p. 30 *seq.*

the true basis of morals in human nature. His explanation of the origin of conscience is, however, not satisfactory, since the social instincts which he regards as at the foundation of all morality, are wholly insufficient to originate the idea of right which is essential to the moral faculty.

The hypothesis of Mr Darwin is certainly a great advance on the ordinary form of utilitarianism, and he is superior to both the inductive and the intuitional school in the plan he has pursued for discovering the real origin of the moral sense. He has traced what he conceives to be its beginnings in the animal mind, and hence, even supposing his account of such origin to be incorrect, a true theory of moral development may well take for its starting-point that which Mr Darwin's hypothesis requires, supplying, however, certain data which it does not embrace. Whatever may have been man's origin, he must, *as man*, have had certain faculties when he first appeared on the earth. If he were derived by "the operation of natural selection" from a lower animal form, his faculties, moral and intellectual, must have reached a certain stage of progress at that particular point at which he could be described as human. This is just the point, however, from which, supposing man to have suddenly appeared on the earth, he would probably have started in his advance towards the high development now exhibited by particular races. It is evident, therefore, that the question of man's origin is of secondary importance in the enquiry as to the actual evolution of morality, although it is intimately connected with that as to the *source* of man's moral nature.

Let us see then what was the moral state of primeval man. Mr Darwin says:—"In order that primeval man, or the ape-like progenitors of man, should have

become social, they must have acquired the same instinctive feelings which impel other animals to live in a body; and they no doubt exhibited the same general disposition. They would have felt uneasy when separated from their comrades, for whom they would have felt some degree of love; they would have warned each other of danger, and have given mutual aid in attack or defence. All this implies some degree of sympathy, fidelity, and courage."[1] In another place, when speaking of sexual selection, Mr Darwin says that in primeval times man would probably have lived "either as polygamists or temporarily as monogamists. Their intercourse, judging from analogy, would not then have been promiscuous. They would, no doubt, have defended their females to the best of their power from enemies of all kinds, and would probably have hunted for their subsistence, as well as for that of their offspring. . . . They would have been governed more by their instincts, and even less by their reason than are savages at the present day. They would not at that period have partially lost one of the strongest of all instincts common to all the lower animals, namely, the love of their offspring; and, consequently, they would not have practised infanticide. There would have been no artificial scarcity of women, and polyandry would not have been followed; there would have been no early betrothals; women would not have been valued as mere slaves."[2] This description is founded, however, on the idea that mankind is derived from more than one pair of ancestors, otherwise much of it is inapplicable. Supposing the first progenitors of mankind to have consisted of a single pair, the only social instincts they could have exercised would be "the parental and filial affections, which apparently lie at the basis of the social affections."

[1] "The Descent of Man," i., 161. [2] do., ii., 367.

These, however, might be resolved into the simple sympathy which is at the root of all sociability, and which would not only lead to fidelity, but would also give nerve to the courage of primeval man in his contests with wild animals rather than with his fellows. But these so-called social instincts must have been subsidiary to that of self-preservation, on which the idea of property is founded, and to that which gives rise to the desire of revenge to be exerted when that property was injured or appropriated. It is these instincts which do not enter into Mr Darwin's scheme of moral development, and which yet are by far the most important elements in the formation of the moral sense.

If it is necessary to the due understanding of this subject that we should ascertain whether the elements of the moral faculty can be discovered in the animal mind, it is no less necessary if we would trace the development of that faculty to examine the moral phenomena presented by the more uncivilized races of mankind. The lower we descend in the scale of existing humanity, the nearer may we, *primâ facie*, expect to approach to the condition of primeval man.[1] Not that the ideas of any present race, however uncultured, can exactly reproduce those of the first children of humanity. Allowance must be made for the influence of many ages of social experiences, the constant repetition of which would be necessary before a code of morals, even the most imperfect, could have been formed. There will be no difficulty, however, in discovering, by an examination and comparison of the actions of primitive peoples, the principles which govern them, and thus to

[1] Reference may be made to Mr Tylor's work on "Primitive Culture" for a resumé of the arguments in support of the opinion that primeval man was in a low state of civilisation. Chapter—"The Development of Culture."

show the condition in which such peoples must have been at the commencement of their moral progress.

THE AUSTRALIANS AND TASMANIANS.

When the phenomena presented by the native inhabitants of the several great divisions of tho earth's surface are compared, it is seen that the aborigines of Australia are on the whole the most barbarous. Both physically and mentally, indeed, they may be supposed to approach as near to the condition of primeval man as any other people now existing. They are not, however, without considerable intelligence. Sir Thomas Mitchell says of them—"They have been described as the lowest in the scale of humanity, yet I found those who accompanied me superior in penetration and judgment to the white men composing my party. Their means of subsistence and their habits are both extremely simple, but they are adjusted with admirable fitness to the few resources afforded by such a country in a wild state."[1] Elsewhere the same traveller remarks in relation to them—"The quickness of apprehension of those in the interior was very remarkable, for nothing in all the complicated adaptations we carried with us either surprised or puzzled them. They are never awkward; on the contrary, in manners and general intelligence, they appear superior to any class of white rustics that I have seen. Their powers of mimicry seem extraordinary, and their shrewdness shines even through the medium of imperfect language, and renders them in general very agreeable companions."[2] Much the same testimony is borne by other travellers as to the intellectual characters presented by the Australian natives.

[1] "Journal of an Expedition into the Interior of Tropical Australia," &c., p. 412.

[2] "Three Expeditions into the Interior of Eastern Australia," vol. ii., p. 334.

That their mental capacity is higher than might be expected from the low position assigned to them in the scale of humanity is true, but it is not surprising when we consider the conditions of aboriginal life in Australia. These are such that the mental faculties are required to be in almost constant exercise. The intellectual activity is, however, confined within a very limited range, and its value may easily be exaggerated, while the moral phenomena presented by the Australians sufficiently justify us in treating them as the least advanced of all human races.[1] This cannot be shown better than by comparing their conduct with the simple standard furnished by the Hebrew Decalogue.

Let us take the honouring of parents, and see whether this is recognised among them as praiseworthy? Mr Eyre states that the Australian natives are very fond of their children, "and often play with them and fondle them."[2] On the other hand, Admiral Wilkes, of the United States Exploring Expedition, declares that so far as his observation went, the women appeared to care little for their children.[3] This opinion, however, is hardly consistent with the observations of other travellers, and probably Mr Wood's estimate is the true one (namely), that when a child is allowed to live, "the Australian mother is a very affectionate one, tending her offspring with the greatest care, and in her own wild way being as loving a parent as can be found in any part of the world."[4] This is well shown by the jealousy with which she guards the relics of her dead

[1] *Comp.* a memoir by the present writer on "The Mental Characteristics of Primitive Man, as exemplified by the Australian Aborigines," in the "Journal of the Anthropological Institute," vol. i. (1871); critically reviewed by Dr Paul Topinard, in the "Revue d'Anthropologie," vol. i., p. 313, *seq.*

[2] "Expedition into Central Australia," vol. ii., p. 214.

[3] Vol. ii., p. 195.

[4] "Natural History of Man," vol. ii., p. 74.

child, carrying about with her its skin or mummified body for months or years.[1] It is to be anticipated that there is a response to this feeling, and that the child displays real affection for its parents. Such, indeed, appears to be the case, but this simple emotion can hardly be said to partake of the sentiment of honour. Among the Australian natives, as among other uncultured peoples, children are seldom if ever corrected, and the consequence is that boys, to whom the command of the Hebrew decalogue may be supposed to refer more especially, far from honouring their parents, take little heed of them, especially of their mothers, over whom they often tyrannize.[2]

But, perhaps, the precept which forbids homicide, is more agreeable to the customs of the Australian aborigines. It is not necessary to dwell on the many treacherous, and apparently unprovoked murders of white settlers which have from time to time been perpetrated; for there may possibly have been reasons sufficient in the native mind at least to justify those acts.[3] There are, however, certain other occasions of taking human life not attended with the same extenuating circumstances, which, as judged of from the Mosaic stand point, must undoubtedly be declared to be infringements of the law against homicide. According to Sir George Grey, the Australian natives have no idea of death from mere

[1] As to this and allied customs, see authorities cited in a paper by the present writer on "Australian Tribal Affinities" in the "Journal of the Anthropological Society" (1870), p. xx.

[2] "The Aborigines of Australia," by Gideon S. Lang (1865), p. 34. Mitchell declares that respect for old age is universal. But this most probably arises from the privileges they possess. See Mitchell's "Three Expeditions &c.," vol. ii., p. 340; also Eyre, *op cit.*, vol. ii., p. 316, where it is said, as soon as a "grey-head" becomes a drag he is cast off to perish. Such is the case also with the sick and helpless. See p. 321.

[3] For an account of the origin of the "wars" between the natives and the settlers, see Lang, *op. cit.*, p. 37, *seq.*

natural causes,[1] and they believe that where not caused by violence, it is due to the secret sorcery of their enemies. Consequently, it generally happens that the death of one person leads to that of another. The sorcerer has to be discovered and killed, or if death has resulted from violence, the murderer must pay the penalty with his own life.[2] There are other occasions of taking human life which have not the excuse even which may be furnished by the promptings of superstition, or the requirements of the custom of blood revenge. Mr Oldfield, speaking of the western natives, says—"One article in the creed of the Watchandies, and probably admitted by every other Australian tribe, and one that tends to incite them to murder, is this:—The spirit of the first man slain by anyone, leaving the body of the dead man, enters that of his slayer by the fundament, and taking up its abode in the vicinity of the liver, henceforth acts as the tutelary guardian of his welfare. When any danger threatens the murderer, this warning spirit (woo-rie) informs him of it by a kind of scratching or tickling sensation in those regions, thus returning good for evil.'"[3] This is only one of various practices which show how slight is the compunction among the native Australians at taking human life. Mr Angas asserts that the tribes on the Murray River were accustomed to bait their fish-hooks with fat taken from the bodies of little boys whom they killed for the purpose.[4] Mr Eyre refers to an analogous custom,[5] and Mr Wood states that human fat is used for rubbing over the body.[6]

[1] This statement probably requires some qualification. See Oldfield, "Transactions of the Ethnological Society," vol. iii., 3d series, p. 245.

[2] "Journals of Two Expeditions of Discovery in Australia," vol. ii., p. 337.

[3] *loc. cit.*, p. 240.

[4] "Savage Life and Scenes in Australia and New Zealand" (1847), p. 73.

[5] *op. cit.*, ii., 314.

[6] *op. cit.*, ii.. 59.

There are two other practices which come under the category of murder, and which appear to be universally recognized by the Australian tribes. Such is infanticide. Mr Eyre says, as to the southern natives, that the first three or four children are often killed, and he accounts for the practice, "by the desire the woman has to get rid of the trouble of rearing children, and to be able to follow her husband about in his wanderings, which the encumbrance of a child would prevent."[1] Probably this custom is universal throughout Australia, as in the following pages we shall see reason to believe it is among all peoples at certain states of their development. In New South Wales the birth of the child was not waited for. To prevent the necessity of having to carry infants about with them, the women resorted to abortion.[2]

How far cannibalism is practised by the Australians as a burial custom is uncertain.[3] That it is often preceded by murder, cannot be doubted, if we believe the testimony of various writers. Thus Mr Oldfield says, in relation to their cannibal feasts, that the natives show a decided preference for the flesh of females, and he adds, that "in all such tribes as are not under the immediate control of Europeans, no female is permitted to attain such an age that she becomes useless to the males, always being slain on some emergency of famine."[4] The same writer states, that a man will, when he has no other resource, even kill his child to satisfy his hunger. In these cases "the mother is not permitted

[1] *op. cit.*, i., 324.

[2] Collins' "Account of New South Wales," vol. ii., p. 124.

[3] See Lang's "Queensland," p. 355, *seq*. *Comp.* with Mr Donald's curious account of the mode of preparing the dead among the natives of Queensland.—"Jour. of Anthrop. Inst.," vol. i., p. 214., *seq.*

[4] *loc. cit.*, p. 288. This used to be the case in Queensland also, until recently, according to Mr M'Donald.—Jour. of Anthrop. Inst., vol. ii., p. 179.

to make loud lamentation, else she is beaten. She may, however, express her grief by uttering low, stifled moans, but how great soever her sorrow for the loss of her child may be, it becomes somwhat assuaged when the head of the victim, the mother's legal perquisite in all such cases, is thrown to her, and this she proceeds to eat, sobbing the while."[1]

Thus far as to homicide. Perhaps it will be found that the aborigines of Australia are less prone to the commission of those acts usually supposed to be included by the Hebrew writer under the term "adultery." In its widest conventual sense, this term embraces all illicit connection between the sexes. Restricting it for the present to cases in which marriage forms an ingredient, let us see in what light the Australian natives view adultery. Sir G. W. Grey declares, that the younger women are much given to intrigue, and will run the risk of a spear through the leg, or even of a more severe punishment at the hands of her husband, to gratify the propensity.[2] Mr Oldfield says, indeed, the old men must often be aware of the fact of their wives having lovers, and wink at it.[3] This is not at all improbable, as it is unquestionable that the natives occasionally give or lend their wives to their friends.[4] The natives have at times, however, to part with their wives against their own wishes. Many of the inter-tribal disputes are occasioned by men appropriating married women belonging to other tribes. Sir George Grey says, "The early life of a young woman at all celebrated for beauty, is generally one continuous series of captivity to different masters, of ghastly wounds, of wanderings in strange

[1] *loc. cit.*, p. 286. As to Australian cannibalism, see "Jour. Anth. Soc." (1870), p. xxi.

[2] *op. cit.*, ii., 253. [3] *loc. cit.*, p. 251.

[4] Eyre, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., 318. Wilkes' "Narrative of the United States' Exploring Expedition," vol. ii., p. 195.

families, of rapid flights, of bad-treatment from other females amongst whom she is brought a stranger by her captor, . . . and many a female thus wanders several hundred miles from the home of her infancy, being carried off successively to distant and more distant points."[1] It may be said, perhaps, that the appropriation of the woman, in each case, breaks the marriage tie previously subsisting. Such an observation will not apply, however, to the other facts above mentioned, the significance of which is apparent from the statement of Mr Eyre that no such virtue as chastity appears to be recognized among the Australian aborigines, women prostituting themselves freely throughout their whole lives.[2] Collins asserted the same of the native women of New South Wales, although he added, that they appeared sometimes to learn to be ashamed of their conduct while in the presence of white people.[3] If the women have no idea of the virtue of chastity, certainly the men have not.[4] Mr Eyre affirms, eveu that among many tribes it is customary for the youth of both sexes to lie indiscriminately together, apparently on their arriving at the age of puberty ;[5] while parents and husbands often prostitute their wives or children.[6]

The ideas of the Australian aborigines on the subject

[1] *op. cit.*, ii., 249. [2] *op. cit.*, i., 320. [3] *op. cit.*, i., 560.

[4] See facts bearing on this subject mentioned by Mr Oldfield, *loc. cit.*, p. 251. It is hardly necessary to remark that polygamy is universally practised by those who can afford the luxury of more wives than one.

[5] Mr Eyre adds the following curious information in a Latin note:—"Temporis quinetiam certis, machina quædam ex ligno ad formamovi facta, sacra et mystica, nam fœminas aspicere haud licitam, decem plus minus uncias longa et circa quatuor lata insculpta ac figuris diversis ornata, et ultimam perforata partem ad longam (plerumque e crinibus humanis textam) inscrendum chordam cui nomen 'Mooyumkarr,' extra castra in gyrum versata, stridore magno e percusso aere facto, liberatem coeundi juventuti esse tum concessam omnibus indicat." See also Laug, *op. cit.*, p. 38. [6] *op. cit.*, i., 320.

of theft are no further advanced than those which they hold in relation to chastity. Collins said of the natives of New South Wales, that they were great thieves, stealing things even of which they could not know the use.[1] The same testimony is borne by Sir Thomas Mitchell[2] and Mr Stuart,[3] as to natives of Eastern and Southern Australia, and notwithstanding certain apparent exceptions (arising perhaps from a want of curiosity), the thieving propensity would appear to be almost universal.[4] The same must be said as to lying. The old writer already quoted as to the natives of New South Wales asserts that they were "adepts in the art of evasion and lying."[5] It is true that much of what is called evasion is the result, not of intentional deceit, but of the wish, so common among uncultured peoples when they come into contact with persons belonging to a superior race, to say what they think will be pleasing to them. This in itself, however, is evidence of a state of mind, which, under other circumstances, will inevitably lead to the practise of deceit. Judging from the general character of uncultured peoples, we cannot expect that truth is much regarded by the natives of Australia. Of acted, as distinguished from spoken, deception, travellers on that continent have almost universally complained. Dr Leichhardt, when speaking more especially of the natives of the north-east, says, that all the coast blacks are treacherous;[6] while Commodore Stokes declares that the Australian aborigines generally, "like all savages," are treacherous.[7] Sir Thomas Mitchell met with an apparently friendly

[1] *op. cit.*, i., 600. [2] "Three Explorations &c.," vol. i., p. 251.
[3] "Explorations in Australia," p. 212.
[4] See Wood, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 3. The friendly natives of Fowler's Bay on the Great Bight are described by Mr Eyre as being honest.—*op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 223. [5] Collins, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 600.
[6] "Journal of an Overland Expedition in Australia," p. 507.
[7] "Discoveries in Australia," vol. i., p. 59.

tribe on the Murray River, but he afterwards found that they had planned a sudden attack on the party, which, to allay suspicion, they had accompanied unarmed.[1] Not long before the same traveller had encountered natives, of whom he says, that he never saw "such unfavourable specimens of the aborigines as the children of the smoke (referring to the dust they had raised by their movements); they were so barbarously and implacably hostile and shamelessly dishonest, and so little influenced by reason, that the more they saw of our superior weapons and means of defence, the more they showed their hatred and tokens of defiance.[2] Mr Eyre, who takes a more favourable view of the native character than most writers, himself relates an instance of treacherous conduct, accompanied by the basest ingratitude, on the part of a boy whom he had protected, which had nearly cost the traveller his life.[3] It is true that Commodore Stokes ascribes much of the conduct complained of to suspicion rather than to treachery.[4] The latter is based on the former, however, and it is just that state of mind which renders treacherous conduct always possible. The natives suspect in others what they feel themselves capable of, and the slightest cause will often lead to a complete change in their manner. The desire to possess the property of their white visitors is, however, undoubtedly the source of many of the acts of treachery of which the natives have been guilty. The custom, moreover, found among all the tribes of concealing spears in the grass and drawing them along the ground with the toes, is evidence of the existence in the native character of both cunning and suspicion,[5] a com-

1 "Three Explorations &c.," vol. ii., p. 112. 2 do. vol. i., p. 251.
3 *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 58, 4 *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 88.
5 "Narrative of a Survey of the Coasts of Australia." By Capt. King, vol. i., pp. 115, 370.

bination of qualities to which the white man has in too many cases fallen a victim.

Little proof need be given of the existence of covetousness in the savage mind. It is true that the possessions of the native Australian are usually very scanty. If they have a hut, they have at least neither ox nor ass. In their wives, however, they have what is more valuable than either, and it is the "coveting" of these by others which leads to constant tribal quarrels and bloodshed.

It has been shown that the Australian aborigines exhibit in their social relations a constant infringement of the rules of the Mosaic Decalogue. It is by no means intended to affirm, however, that they are altogether vicious. They are certainly not devoid of natural affection, although its ties are usually very weak. It is said by M. Neumayer that their good faith and fidelity can be trusted to; that they are obedient, obliging, and contented with little; and that it is only necessary not to ill-treat them.[1] This testimony is no doubt perfectly true, and evidence might be furnished of the performance of many acts of kindness and disinterestedness by natives of Australia, but the fact remains that their moral condition is very degraded. Dr Paul Topinard, who questions whether their morals are of so primitive a character as stated above, is constrained to admit that "all which concerns the family is odious. The woman is considered as property—as a slave; she carries the burdens, receives blows with a tomahawk or spear for the least offence, and is lent, or disposed of, by her husband with the utmost indifference. In the practice of infanticide, they hesitate only to sacrifice males. The Australian loves his children—even spoils his boys, but cares little for the others. As to his ideas of chastity,

[1] "Zeitschrift für Ethnologie" (1871), p. 69. Similar testimony by Mr Eyre will be found *supra*, Introd., p. 55.

they are wanting; the woman prostitutes herself from the age of ten or twelve years."[1] In a later chapter we shall see reason to believe that it is very doubtful whether the Australian aborigines have any definite idea of morality, and if this be so, we must refer actions such as those mentioned by M. Neumayer rather to a goodness of disposition than to any fixed moral principles.

It must not be thought that the Australian aborigines form an exceptional case. It is easy to furnish abundant evidence that they differ little, morally, from most other peoples of a low degree of culture. In some particulars it has been thought that the Tasmanians, now all but extinct, were morally superior to the native Australians. Yet the evidence of this having been the case is very slight. Homicide, apart from blood revenge, may not have been so frequent; but infanticide was practised. New-born infants were often buried alive with their deceased mothers, and fathers, when enraged with their wives (lubras), would sometimes snatch up and kill their children. Few women bore children until several years after their marriage, abortion being practised, to preserve the figure, and save the mother the troubles of maternity. When allowed to live, however, the children were objects of affection to their mothers; although the attention due to them was interfered with by a love for puppies, which women have been known to suckle, to the neglect of their infants. Mr Bonwick states, on the authority of Mr G. A. Robinson and Mr Catechist Clark, that the young females were modest, but elsewhere he remarks that the immoral life they led after marriage,[2] "from choice, as well as compulsion,

[1] "Revue d'Anthropologie" (1872), p. 315.

[2] Mr Bonwick admits that Truganina, the Tasmanian heroine, was far from being a model of chastity, although he says of her:—"Fertile in expedient, sagacious in council, courageous in difficulty, she had

operated prejudicially to their maternal instincts." From this it appears that the husband considered that he had a property in the virtue, as well as in the person, of his wife; hence, when a woman permitted improper liberties without her husband's consent, she was thought to have committed adultery, and was punished accordingly. Prostitution to Europeans was, however, approved, and it was deemed an honour to have a child by a white man. It is not surprising, therefore, that a husband could not only sell, but lend his wife. The position of the women was one of extreme hardship, their influence as arbiters of peace and war, when old, being but a slight recompense for the hardships they suffered.[1] As a set-off against the moral defects which the Tasmanians thus exhibited, they appear to have been far less licentious than the Australians. They were not a bloodthirsty race, and their wars terminated after a short conflict. They seldom committed crimes against each other. "Faults," says Mr Bonwick, "were soon forgotten. The camp was commonly a scene of affectionate regard. The parental relation was seen in pleasing exercise. Many bore testimony to their love of children. Their friendship was limited by no distance of time, nor arrested by death. Their grief was sincere and expressive. In sickness they attended with affectionate solicitude, and at bereavement cherished the memory of the absent by ever-present memorials of their being"[2]—these, according to the usual custom of savages, consisting, however, of some of the bones of the deceased.

the wisdom and the fascination of the serpent, the intrepidity and nobility of the royal ruler of the desert."—"The Last of the Tasmanians," p. 217.

[1] Bonwick's "Daily Life and Origin of the Tasmanians," p. 55, *seq.*

[2] Do. p. 7, *seq.* For an account of the Tasmanians, see a paper by Mr J. E. Calder in the Journal of the Anthropological Institute (1873), p. 7 *seq.*

POLYNESIANS.

The moral condition of other primitive peoples, such as the Polynesian islanders, the Papuas, the negroid tribes of Africa, and the aborigines of America, differ little from that already described. As to the first named of these peoples, the honouring of parents could hardly be expected when the treatment of their children is considered, Mr Ellis says, that in Tahiti "no regular parental discipline was maintained in the native families. If ever control was attempted, it was only by the father, the mother was always disregarded, and the father has often encouraged insult and violence, while all interference of the mother has been resisted by the child."[1] No wonder that old age was more often treated with contempt and cruelty than with respect.[2] Of course this referred to the times preceding the introduction of Christianity. At that date it is evident that the taking of human life was considered by the peoples of the Pacific as of very little moment. Infanticide was an ordinary custom, and Mr Ellis states, that "it was probably practised to a greater extent, and with more heartless barbarity, by the South Sea Islanders, than by any other people with whose history we are acquainted."[3] This custom was intimately connected with the Areoi institution, which was of great influence in the Georgian and Society Islands, and probably in other groups, and which required of its regular members that they should destroy their offspring.[4] Mr Ellis says

[1] "Polynesian Researches," vol. i. p. 261. [2] Do., vol. iii. p. 48.

[3] *op. cit.*, vol. i. p. 249. The Rev. George Turner says, that abortion took the place, in Samoa, of the infanticide of other parts of Polynesia. "Nineteen Years in Polynesia" (1861), p. 175. According to Mr W. T. Pritchard, the systematic destruction of children before birth is common to the inhabitants of the Samoan, Tongan, and Fijian groups.—"Polynesian Reminiscences" (1866), p. 393.

[4] Ellis, *op. cit.*, vol. i. p. 239.

of these islanders, in relation to infanticide, that "without reference to other deeds of barbarism, they were in this respect a nation of murderers," a title which, indeed, they deserved on other grounds. This was shown by their treatment of the sick, who, when recovery appeared to be hopeless, were often killed by their friends "with heartless and wanton barbarity," or even buried alive.[1]

The relations between the sexes, in Polynesia, were extremely loose. Infanticide was ascribed by Mr Ellis, in a certain measure, to the weakness and short duration of the marriage tie, owing to which fidelity was seldom maintained. The matrimonial engagement "was dissolved whenever either of the parties desired it, and though amongst their principal chiefs it was allowed nominally to remain, the husband took other wives and the wife other husbands."[2] Moreover, those in the middle or higher ranks who practised polygamy, allowed their wives other husbands. The exchange of wives between brothers, or members of the same family, would seem to have been not uncommon, and a man's wife was also considered the wife of his *taio* or friend.[3] Mr Ellis says little otherwise of the state of sexual morality among the women. It may perhaps be judged of, however, by the statement, that the Tahitian chiefs prohibited tatooing on account of the immoral practices invariably connected with it.[4] From other travellers, we learn that female chastity before marriage is little regarded in many of the Pacific Islands. Short-

[1] Ellis, vol. iii. p. 48.

[2] *op. cit.*, i. 265. See also Dieffenbach's "Travels in New Zealand," vol. ii. pp. 25-6. In this island abortion appears to have been practised in the same mode as in Eastern Australia.

[3] Ellis, *op. cit.*, vol. iii. p. 124.

[4] Do., vol. i. p. 266. This is related also by Mr Turner, who affirms that chastity, although ostensibly cultivated, is "more a name than a reality" (*op. cit.*, pp. 183-4).

land, particularly, says as to the New Zealanders, that "before marriage the greatest license is permitted to young females. The more admirers they can attract, and the greater their reputation for intrigue, the fairer is the chance of making an advantageous match."[1] From certain particulars furnished by Mr Pritchard,[2] it would appear to be somewhat different in Samoa, but a late writer declares, that chastity is unknown eastward of that island. This writer, while giving the Polynesian credit for bravery, honesty, generosity, good nature, and courtesy, adds, "that three women out of four, from the island queen downwards, had not the smallest notion of chastity, shame, or common decency; that the people were in the constant habit of going off in groups of fifty or sixty for the purpose of drinking themselves mad with orange rum, and committing the most fearful bestialities."[3]

With reference to theft, Mr Ellis states that, among the South Sea islanders no moral delinquency was attached to the practice,[4] although it was committed more generally against foreigners than against the natives themselves; only, however, because the culprits were more likely to avoid detection. Thieving was indeed sanctioned by the gods; Hiro, a son of the great deity Oro, being called the god of thieves. "The aid of this

1 "Traditions and Superstitions of the New Zealanders," 2d ed. p. 142; also Mariner's "Tongans," p. 164.

2 Memoirs of the Anthropological Society, vol. i. p. 326. Mr Pritchard says, that in the presence of his sister the wildest rake was always modest and moral. "Polynesian Reminiscences," p. 125. The Penrhyn islanders appear to have similar ideas to the Samoans on the question of sexual morality. Lamont says, that until marriage their women are models of purity. "Wild Life among the Pacific Islanders" (1867), p. 197.

3 "South Sea Bubbles" (1872), 4th ed., pp. 281, 294, 303.

4 See also Mariner's "Tongans," p. 153. The Samoans have a fiction that a chief cannot steal. He is considered, says Pritchard, to *take* what he covets ("Polynesian Reminiscences," p. 104).

god," says Mr Ellis, "was invoked by those who went on expeditions of plunder, and the priests probably received a portion of the spoil."[1] We learn little from this writer as to the truthfulness or otherwise of the South Sea islanders. If we may judge by the example of the New Zealanders, however, their character in this respect cannot have been very high; although Mariner's statement, that the Tongan chiefs pride themselves on their generous and honourable dealings with each other should not be omitted.[2] Their neighbours the Samoans would seem not to act in the same spirit. The murders of chiefs and disputed succession to chieftianship, are prolific sources of war among them, and in case of a dispute the man who is evidently wrong will resort to any strategy to prolong discussion.[3] The New Zealander has been spoken of by a late writer in anything but favourable terms. He says that, in spite of his Christianity the Maori seems to possess all the vices of both the western and eastern Polynesians, without any of their virtues, except their bravery. He is "as idle, immoral, and useless as a Tahitian, without his perfect manners, unselfish generosity, and general kindliness. As snobbish, untruthful, and avaricious as a Tongan, without his constructive and inventive power, he is a savage to the backbone, liking fighting better than any other occupation, and living a much better life when he is fighting than at any other time."[4] Probably this summary of the character of the South Sea islanders is, on the whole, correct; and as to the New Zealanders, it is confirmed generally by Mr Wood's statement, that they present a curious mixture of wildness and ferocity,

[1] *op. cit.*, iii. 125. As to the New Zealanders, see Shortland, *op. cit.*, p. 240; but comp. Dieffenbach, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

[2] *op. cit.*, pp. 144-8.

[3] Pritchard's "Polynesian Reminiscences," pp. 55, 83.

[4] "South Sea Bubbles," p. 305.

affection and fickleness, benevolence and vengefulness, hospitality and covetousness.[1] The chief virtue of the Maori was his hospitality, but this would seem to have been affected by contact with the European.[2] The Samoans are morally superior to most of the other peoples of the South Seas. They are described as marvellously honest, very hospitable and courteous, affectionate and much attached to children.[3] They are also very humane in their treatment of the sick.[4] And yet the Samoan character is not without many of the defects usually presented by the savage. He is excessively vain and often fickle in his dealings with the other sex, and not free from the taint of cannibalism.[5] He is, moreover, barbarous in his conduct during warfare, taking no male prisoners, sometimes even killing the women, and cutting off the heads of the slain.[6] It is true that when the Samoan eats the body of his enemy, it is as a mark of contempt or as a signal act of vengeance,[7] and partly, perhaps, as with the New Zealanders,[8] to obtain certain qualities thought to belong to the victim, but morally (if this term can be so applied) the practice is equally reprehensible, whether it has either of those objects, or is merely a gratification of the appetite, as with some others of the Pacific islanders. Probably the cannibal habit had the same origin in either case, and although the eating of human flesh cannot be said to be in itself an immoral act, yet it must always be taken to be a sign of low moral culture.

The estimate formed by the members of the United States Exploring Expedition of the character of the

1 "Natural History of Man," ii. p. 141.
2 Do., p. 143.
3 Do., p. 343.
4 Pritchard's "Polynesian Reminiscences," p. 146.
5 Wood, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 358.
6 Pritchard, *op. cit.*, pp. 57, 61.
7 Do., p. 125.
8 Wood, *op. cit.*, ii. p. 152.

Polynesian Islanders differs little from that of other observers. Admiral Wilkes describes the Samoans as being, on the one hand, "kind, good-humoured, intelligent, fond of amusements, desirous of pleasing, and very hospitable," and as showing great love for their children and respect for old age; on the other hand, they were indolent, covetous, fickle, deceitful, and little deserving of confidence, while there was often more show than reality in their offers of hospitality. As to sexual morality, Wilkes qualifies the good character which otherwise he gives the Samoans, by saying that intercourse with a transient foreigner before marriage is not a matter of reproach. Moreover, the dances of the girls among the heathen natives were very lascivious in their movements. The women were held in much consideration, and their labour was restricted to indoor occupations and the manufacture of mats and tapa. Notwithstanding their moral superiority to other Polynesians the *lex talionis* was, in cases of murder, enforced by retaliation, not merely on the offender himself but on his friends and relatives and their property. If any delay took place in seeking revenge, it was considered a sign that compensation for the injury would be accepted, and negotiations were entered into for the settlement of the matter. The Samoans believed in a future state of existence, and in a heaven where the spirits are waited on by beautiful damsels; but their notions on the former subject were somewhat vague, as they thought that some spirits die while others are immortal, and that others dwell in caves and are eaten by the gods.[1] Admiral Wilkes bears testimony to the benefits conferred by missionary labour on the Tahitians, who are said by him to be honest, well-behaved, and obliging, and not given to drunkenness or rioting. Although licentiousness

[1] "Narrative," vol. ii., p. 126, *seq.*

exists among them, they are not worse in this respect than many other peoples, and foreign residents are in great degree the cause of its continuance. The missionaries evidently thought, however, that the reformation of manners was only superficial, as all social amusements were prohibited under severe penalties. They generally complained, indeed, that sincere piety was rarely to be found among the natives.[1] The only other characteristic referred to by Admiral Wilkes necessary to be mentioned here is the want of reserve exhibited by all the Tahitians. None of them could keep a secret, and crimes therefore were divulged almost as soon as committed. This shows a want of character, and the want of moral principle is betrayed by the fact that for a small reward they would become informers against their nearest relatives and friends.[2] As to the New Zealanders, Admiral Wilkes points out that there is much difference of opinion. An informant who knew them well, and on whose judgment reliance could be placed, gave them credit for intelligence and generosity, and said that "they are hospitable and confiding to strangers, persevering where the object concerns themselves, strongly attached to their children, and extremely jealous of their connubial rights. . . . They are crafty, but not overreaching in their dealings, covetous for the possession of novelties, although trustworthy when anything is placed under their immediate charge, but not otherwise over-honest." On the other hand, they appeared to the American navigator to be vindictive, adepts in trickery, suspicious in their dealings, and "destitute of any of the higher feelings, such as gratitude, tenderness, honour, delicacy, &c." They were,

1 "Narrative," ii., p. 13.

2 Do., ii., p. 12, *seq.* Wilkes, when describing the natives of the Sandwich Islands, says that all the Polynesians are alike in their inability to conceal crimes (iv., p. 301). In this respect they resemble the Kolarian tribes of India.

moreover, "extremely indolent and dirty, disgusting in their habits, and carry on the infamous practice of traffic in women, which even the highest chiefs are said to be engaged in, openly and without shame." They have great command of temper when insulted, but are extremely revengeful, and their treachery has been established by too many acts of massacre of Europeans to be doubted. Finally, the modesty of the young girls was not great, judging from the gestures made use of in their dances. It was not necessary, says Wilkes, "to understand their language to comprehend their meaning; and it is unnecessary to add, that their tastes did not appear very refined, but were similar to what we have constantly observed among the heathen nations of Polynesia."[1]

Admiral Wilkes gives an interesting account[2] of the Kingsmill Islanders, who resemble in many particulars the natives of Samoa, from whom they are supposed to have sprung, although they are said to be more like Malays in appearance than Polynesians. They exhibit several peculiarities in their customs, one being a curious extension of the right of hospitality. Not only might a man who was without food "join the meals of a more fortunate neighbour," but if any one were in want of a particular article he might ask for it of some other person, and the gift was seldom refused, it being generally understood that such favours would be returned. When a fisherman arrived with a well-loaded canoe, he might find himself worse off than his neighbours, for they assembled round him, "selecting and taking away such as they please, leaving the man nothing in return but the satisfaction of knowing, that on a similar occasion he has a like privilege to help himself." This privilege was the mark of the free man, that is, of a man who was the owner of land, who could always call upon others to provide him

[1] "Narrative," ii., p. 396, *seq.* [2] Do., vol. v.

with a house, canoe, and the necessaries of life. The slave had no such privilege, and could hold no property whatever. Women appear to have been treated with much consideration, and the same mark of respect was shown to them as to the chiefs—leaving the path and standing aside when they passed. They could, moreover, inherit property, and there were heiresses among them, "whose wealth allured many suitors." The Kingsmill Islanders appear to have had little notion of sexual morality. Chastity before marriage was not considered any recommendation in the choice of a wife, and after marriage fear of punishment alone would seem to have kept the women from intrigues. A woman had never more than three living children. Abortion was resorted to to prevent a further increase, and it was practised also by the unmarried females, but a child was never destroyed after birth. Occasionally persons think to punish those who have offended them by committing suicide. No doubt this arises generally from their tendency to despondency, but, says Wilkes, "the motive to this act is generally the treatment they have received, or offence taken at the conduct of some person, whom affection or fear renders them unwilling to injure; the mortification and grief produced thereby leads them at last to suicide, which is considered by them as a remedy for their evils, as well as a severe revenge upon those who had ill-treated them." The Kingsmill Islanders believe in a state of existence after death, but those only who are tatooed can reach the Kainakaki heaven.[1] The idea of moral fitness for residence in elysium never appears to have entered their minds. This is proved by

[1] The tatoo is probably a tribal mark of identification. The curious belief mentioned in the text is entertained by various peoples of the Pacific area, and will probably be found to be the cause of the tatooing practised by the Aïnos of Japan, who no doubt belong to the bearded race of that area.

their notion that to be considered an accomplished man of the world is the highest mark of ambition. They have a word in their language (manda) which, says Wilkes, "expresses one thoroughly instructed in all their arts, a good dancer, an able warrior, versed in all their knowledge and sports, who has mixed in life, enjoyed its highest excitements and delights, both at home and abroad. Such a man, in their estimation, is the most exalted in character, and is fully qualified on dying to enter at once upon the enjoyments of elysium." Such a notion as this, no doubt gave birth to the Areoi institution of the Georgian and Society Islands.

Of all the peoples of the Pacific the Sandwich Islanders are the most interesting, owing to the advance in culture they have made since their reception of Christianity. That advance is indeed great, although civilization has not been to them an unalloyed good.

Whether or not at the time of their discovery by Captain Cook the natives of the Sandwich Islands were accustomed to eat human flesh is somewhat uncertain. Mr Anderson came to the conclusion that they were, but Captain King gives reasons for believing that they had then at least ceased to be guilty of the practice, although sometimes in their rage they tore the flesh of their enemies with their teeth.[1] The offering of human sacrifices was undoubtedly practised by the Sandwich Islanders, and such sacrifices were more frequent among them than with any other of the peoples visited by Cook. Not only were they offered at the commencement of war and before any great undertaking, but also on the death of any chief of consequence.[2] Nevertheless, Captain Cook was very favourably impressed with the general character of those islanders.[3] Even after the unfortunate

[1] "Voyage to the Pacific in 1776," &c., iii. p. 132, *seq.*
[2] Do., p. 161. [3] See do., ii. pp. 192, 229.

death at their hands of the great English navigator, his successor Captain King declared of them that "it must be acknowledged that they are of the most mild and affectionate disposition, equally remote from the extreme levity and fickleness of the Otaheiteans, and the distant gravity and reserve of the inhabitants of the Friendly Islands. They appear to live in the utmost harmony and friendship with one another. The women who had children were remarkable for their tender and constant attention to them; and the men would often lend their assistance in those domestic offices with a willingness which does credit to their feelings." They were, moreover, extremely kind and hospitable to their European visitors, the old people especially welcoming them with tears of joy, and all endeavouring to show their respect in some manner or other.[1] One old man, who had been made prisoner in the course of the fighting which took place on the death of Captain Cook, was released after having been taken on board ship, and he showed his gratitude by frequently afterwards sending presents of provisions, and by other services.[2] The priests,[3] in particular, exhibited the utmost friendship and hospitality, and many of them did all in their power to put a stop to the hostilities caused by the murder of the English commander, and to restore the good feeling which had before existed. Two of them, at the risk of their lives, visited at night the English vessels to bring from the chief of the priests, as a proof of his innocence and attachment, the piece of Captain Cook's flesh which had been allotted to him, and to warn the English against the designs of their countrymen. Another of them went on board the *Resolution* and expostulated with the Euro-

[1] "Voyage to the Pacific," iii. p. 129, *seq.* [2] Do., p. 75.
[3] It is remarkable that at no place in the Pacific but in Owhyhee did Captain Cook find any regular society of priests, (iii. p. 159).

peans on their want of friendship and ingratitude in burning the huts of the priests when the neighbouring village was destroyed. He said that, relying on the promises made them, "they had not removed their effects back into the country, with the rest of the inhabitants, but had put everything that was valuable of their own, as well as what they had collected from us, into a house close to the *Morai*, where they had the mortification to see it set on fire by ourselves." No sooner was a reconciliation effected, and a request made that the people should bring provisions as usual, than the ships were surrounded by canoes, "and many of the chiefs came on board, expressing great sorrow at what had happened, and their satisfaction at our reconciliation." Notwithstanding the loss sustained by the natives in the course of the quarrel, they bid farewell to their visitors with every mark of affection and good-will. Captain King mentions as an extraordinary fact, although it gave evidence of great heartlessness, that, amidst all the disturbances, the native women who were on board the vessels did not show "the smallest apprehensions either for themselves or their friends ashore. So entirely unconcerned did they appear that some of them who were on deck when the town was in flames seemed to admire the sight, and frequently cried out that it was *maitai*, or very fine."[1] Notwithstanding the superiority of the

[1] "Voyage to the Pacific," iii. p. 75, *seq.* Various facts show that Captain Cook and his companions were looked upon as superior beings, and the former was, indeed, treated as a sacred person, and appears to have been actually adored as such. After his murder (which was due partly to their anger at Captain Cook endeavouring to decoy the king on board his vessel, and partly to the fact of a chief being killed by a shot from one of the English boats), his bones were distributed among the chiefs, no doubt, as amulets, and a native asked "when the *Orono* would come again? What he would do to them on his return?" (Do., iii., pp. 6, *seq.*, 68, *seq.*) As to the god Orono, and for the native account of Cook's death, *see* Ellis' "Polynesian Researches," iv., p. 131, *seq.*

weapons of their opponents, the natives displayed great bravery in the desultory fighting which took place between them and the English. The conduct of one of them must have been governed by something more than bravery, and was probably due to the requirements of the oath of brotherhood which has so powerful an influence among uncultured peoples. While endeavouring in the midst of the firing to carry off one of his companions who had fallen, "a wound which he received made him quit the body and retire; but in a few minutes he again appeared, and being again wounded, he was obliged a second time to retreat." He returned, however, a third time, when "he was suffered to carry off his friend, which he was just able to perform, and then fell down himself and expired."[1]

The chief weakness in the character of the Sandwich Islanders, as observed by the English voyagers, would seem to have been their proneness to theft. Nor was this restricted to the common people, since those who had before shown no such propensity quite changed their conduct when their chiefs appeared, and Captain Cook says that, "generally tracing the booty into the possession of some men of consequence, we had the strongest reason to suspect that these depredations were committed at their instigation."[2] The Hawaiians, like most of the other Pacific Islanders, were found to be great gamblers, and, besides various games in the course of which they could indulge in betting, they got up racing matches, not between horses, but between boys and girls.[3] We learn little from Captain Cook's experiences as to the sexual morality of the Hawaiians. As at most of the islands, the sailors had no difficulty in meeting with female companions. Captain King says, however, such women were probably all of the lower

[1] "Voyage to the Pacific," iii., p. 58. [2] Do., p. 4. [3] Do., p. 145.

class, and he believed that hardly any of the women of rank were seen by the travellers.[1] An unique instance of jealousy which was observed among those people was thought to show that "not only fidelity, but a degree of reserve, is required from the married women of consequence." A chief, whose wife was very handsome, ordered her to withdraw from a boxing entertainment which had been provided for the Europeans, but she refused to do so. After the entertainment the woman asked for a present, and was walking with the travellers to their hut to receive it, when her husband seized her by the hair and began to beat her severely with his fists. The next day they appeared to be again on quite friendly terms, and the woman would not suffer the Europeans to remonstrate with her husband for his conduct towards her, and she told them that he had only done what was proper.[2] Captain King remarks that less respect was paid to women at Hawaii than at any of the other Pacific Islands—"they are not only deprived of the privilege of eating with the men, but the best sorts of food are *tabooed*, or forbidden them. They are not allowed to eat pork, turtle, several kinds of fish, and some species of the plantains: and we were told that a poor girl got a terrible beating for having eaten, on board our ship, one of these interdicted articles. In their domestic life they appear to live almost entirely by themselves, and though we did not observe any instances of positive ill-treatment, yet it was evident they had little regard or attention paid them."[3]

Cook and his companions had not the opportunity of acquiring a complete knowledge of the social habits of the Sandwich Islanders, but on comparing their narrative with the particulars furnished by later writers, we can hardly doubt that the national character deteriorated

[1] "Voyage to the Pacific," iii., p. 130. [2] Do., p. 165. [3] Do., p. 130.

after the commencement of constant intercourse with Europeans, although possibly its defects only then became known. An American missionary—the Rev. Henry F. Cheever—ascribes the change to the abolition of the restraints of tabu, the example of a profligate king, and intercourse with "abandoned" foreigners. According to his authorities, almost every ship which anchored near the Islands became a floating brothel, and the leading women set the example of hiring themselves as prostitutes. Modesty was quite unknown, women of rank, when calling on the missionaries to show their friendship, not thinking it necessary to add to their natural covering. Infanticide and abortion were extremely common, mothers regarding "the care of children as a burden that contracted their pleasures and impaired their personal beauty." Even if allowed at first to live, infants were so little cared for by their parents that most of them afterwards died. In addition, unnatural crimes were practised, "as well as polygamy, polyandry, robbery, murder, burying the aged alive, killing offenders without trial, and various other savage usages." The drunken orgies in which sometimes whole villages indulged, led to quarrelling and fighting, and the people would, for revenge, set fire to each other's canoes or houses, steal their goods, or destroy their crops. The art of easily killing a man by strangulation, breaking his bones, or by a blow of the fist, was taught by professed adepts. Assassination was frequent, and often a man would be suddenly disembowelled by the professed friend with whom he was talking, who had for the purpose concealed a dagger made of a hog's tusk under his *kapa*. Add to these things the constant practice of gambling, and we have a picture of moral depravity which it would be difficult to surpass.[1]

[1] Cheever's "The Island World of the Pacific," (1851), p. 92, *seq.*

Great as have been the moral advantages which have accrued from the introduction of Christianity, probably the Sandwich Islanders will be extinct before the full effect hoped for by its teachers is attained. Its influence over the social life of its native professors is evidently in many cases very weak, and the motives for seeking admission to the church are often of a very questionable character.[1] Expulsions or suspensions of members appear to be frequent, and "almost all the suspensions have been on account of adultery, and the illicit intercourse of the unmarried, some of them under circumstances painfully polluting." Mr Cheever adds that a people with the social habits of the Hawaiians "cannot be virtuous and pure, how far soever they may be Christianized."[2] Sexual immorality is, in fact, the great curse of the Sandwich Islands, and disease resulting from it deplorably prevalent. The whole blood of the people appears to be diseased, and Mr Cheever declared in 1851 that "unless there speedily ensue a great change in the habits of the people, unless the youth be kept from early vice and untimely marriages, and the married learn chastity, the race *will* run out and cease to be."[3] Indolence appears to be almost as prolific of evil as vice, and Mr Cheever seems inclined to ascribe the wasting away of the people rather to the former than to the latter.[4] He says that even mothers,

[1] Cheever's "The Island World of the Pacific," pp. 156, 173.

[2] Do., pp. 175, 177.

[3] Do., p. 209. According to the Report of the Minister of Public Instruction, out of 3173 convictions for crime (nearly two-thirds of which were, however, at the two chief sea-ports), 1059 were for drunkenness and 860 for fornication and adultery. Attempts had been made, but without success, to introduce a bill to discourage prostitution by preventing young females from the inland districts from visiting the sea-ports without a pass. This Report speaks of prostitution as "fast consuming the native race," and of the immorality caused by the frequent practice of divorce. — (See *Na Motu*, by Edward T. Perkins (1854), p. 407, *seq.*, *appendix*).

[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 223, 393.

while professing to be Christians, will sometimes rather let their children die of want and neglect than labour and take care of them.[1] The ancient hospitality of the people is decaying, and probably this is no evil, as they were so improvident in gratifying the desires of their *maka-makas*, or "friends," that they were generally poor; while, on the other hand, to the wants of strangers the Hawaiians were apparently utterly indifferent, and they are so now unless the stranger happens to be the bearer of a certificate of church-membership.[2] In individual cases, no doubt, Christian teaching has resulted in the formation of pure moral character, and sometimes in the development of true nobility and heroism, as in the case of Kapiolani, the woman who defied the goddess Pele, and destroyed her *tabu*.[3] Admiral Wilkes, however, came to the conclusion that the Sandwich Islanders do not possess much natural affection. Not only were they without domestic happiness, but parents of all classes displayed a want of attachment to their children.[4]

In justice, moreover, to the Hawaiians, the brighter side of their character should be noticed. Mr Perkins says as to Honolulu :—"Her Christian associations of various denominations, her united charitable institutions, literary society, diffusion of knowledge by the press, and the association for the development of agricultural resources, and, above all, the impartial administration of justice in her courts, are not only evidences of the constituent elements of society, but they give Hawaii preeminence over all other kingdoms whose resources are confined to as limited territorial dominions. Already, from her own contributions, has a mission been established in Micronesia, which has been warmly welcomed

[1] *op. cit.*, p. 394. [2] Do., p. 271.
[3] Cheever's "The Island World of the Pacific," p. 237, *seq.*
[4] "Narrative," vol. iv. p. 45.

by the natives of those groups, and she has thrown out, as it were, a band of pioneers to explore the field of the Marquesas. The hospitality of her citizens to those whom shipwreck and misfortune have thrown upon her shores has been frequently noticed; and, though abounding in vicious temptations, the seamen who roam the streets can offer no excuse for their indulgence. There is a library, appropriated exclusively for their benefit, and there are those whose duty it is to offer the consolations of spiritual advice to such as may require them."[1]

PAPUAS.

It is a pity that Mr Wallace has not, in his valuable work on the Indian Archipelago, given a more particular explanation of the moral ideas of the dark, or Papuan race, of the Indian Archipelago, the more so, as but little, comparatively, is yet known on that subject. Probably, however, they do not differ much in character from the Fijians, who have been described by many travellers. Of this race Dr Seemann speaks very highly in many respects, notwithstanding their cannibal propensity. They appear to be capable of great affection, men having frequently killed themselves on the death of a beloved wife. Commonly, "on the death of a near relative, people will cut off joints of their fingers, in order to demonstrate their grief, and they will mourn for a long time for their lost ones. The sentiment of friendship is strongly developed, and there is scarcely a man who has not a bosom friend, to whom he is bound by the strongest ties of affection. The birth of a child is a perfect jubilee, and it is touching to see how parents are attached to their children, and children to their parents."[2] And yet it appears that among the Fijians,

[1] *op. cit.*, p. 117. [2] "Viti" (1862), p. 192.

as with the Samoans and Tongans, children are systematically destroyed before birth.[1] Colonel Smythe, in his Report, declares that among the unchristian Fijians cannibalism, strangulation of widows, infanticide, and other enormities, prevail to a frightful extent.[2] It is not surprising that such is the case, considering that the Fijian child receives no moral training, "unless encouragement of every bad passion may be called by that name. Revenge is impressed upon the child's mind from its earliest infancy, and most horrible are the means which are sometimes employed for this purpose. In riper years the duty of revenge is kept always before his eyes. Should one man insult another, the offended individual keeps himself constantly reminded of the occurrence, by placing some object in his sight, and not removing it until he has avenged himself."[3] The putting to death of the favourite wives and attendants of a dead chief is, however, prompted by the same feeling of kindness as that which leads them to strangle, or bury alive, their aged parents. What with such voluntary deaths, and those caused by perpetual feuds, cannibalism, the strangling of the sick, and the neglect of children, few Fijians would seem to have died of natural causes.[4] Wives were often strangled at the graves of their husband, from an idea that their companionship was necessary to enable him to reach the native heaven, Burotu.[5] As to sexual matters, polygamy is universally practised, a man's social position depending on the number of his wives.[6] Women are little respected, and the position of the wife, as among most other uncultured

[1] *Suprà*, p. 78 *note*; and see Pritchard's "Viti," in The Memoirs of the Anthropological Society, i., p. 203.
[2] Seemann's "Viti" (Appendix), p. 428.
[3] Wood, *op. cit.*, ii., p. 283; Wilkes' "Narrative," iii., p. 76.
[4] Wood, *op. cit.*, ii., p. 294-7; and see Wilkes' "Narrative," iii., p. 94, *seq.*
[5] Pritchard's "Polynesian Reminiscences," p. 372. [6] Do.

peoples, is a hard one. Notwithstanding the slight value set upon woman,[1] adultery is considered highly criminal, and is usually punished with death.[2] Prostitution is not unknown to Fiji. Probably it has the same source there as that to which it is ascribed by Mr Pritchard among the Samoans. According to this writer, nearly all the women who are wives of white men become prostitutes when their husbands leave the island, as they have a decided repugnance to take native husbands. Moreover, there are certain free hotels established in Samoa, to which are attached women, who are understood to be at the service of travellers. These women, says Pritchard, "are generally the cast-off wives of young chiefs, who, by the rights of polygamy, may have as many wives at a time as they please, and may change them by putting away, and taking others when they can, and who, while young, and not invested with tribal honours and power, make their selection from among the daughters of the commoners—girls of lower rank than themselves." When, however, a woman has once been the wife of a chief, she cannot marry another man during his life, and hence she can only attach herself to an hotel, or *fale-tele*.[3] It may be added, to the credit of the Fijians, that Dr Seemann coincides with Captain Cook's opinion that the thievish propensities of the light-coloured Polynesians, are, on the whole, wanting among the dark-coloured tribes.[4] As a set-off, however, it should be stated that Mariner believed the Tongans to have learned their treacherous habits from the Fijians,[5] who are much given to plotting, and who do not scruple

1 A woman and a pig appear to be of equal value.—Wood, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 287. At the time of Admiral Wilkes' visit a musket or a whale's tooth was the usual price of a wife.—"Narrative," iii. p. 92.

2 Seemann, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

3 Memoirs of the Anthropological Society, i., p. 324.

4 *op. cit.*, p. 47.

5 *op. cit.*, i., p. 241.

to carry out their designs, when necessary, by the aid of poison.[1] Admiral Wilkes, on the other hand, affirms that not only are the Fijians treacherous in the extreme, and ferocious although cowardly, but also addicted to stealing. This must be so if covetousness be, as he states, one of the chief features of their character, and the incentive to many of their crimes of violence. Adroit lying appears to be looked upon as a great accomplishment. Notwithstanding his many faults, the Fijian is very hospitable, and while in his house a guest is perfectly safe, although he may be murdered on going or returning, for the sake of a knife or a hatchet![2] To this it may be added that human sacrifices were so frequent as to be a preliminary to almost every undertaking, and that cannibalism was so firmly established among the Fijians as to have become a settled institution of the country. Traditionally it is said to have originated from the command of the gods that all strangers who drifted to Fiji should be killed and eaten.[3] This explanation cannot, however, be accepted as having any authority, although the idea that all foreigners are a lawful prey would account for the many instances of treacherous massacre of Europeans, of which both Papuas and Polynesians have been guilty. Cannibalism appears to be practised by nearly all the peoples belonging to the Papuan stock, and to be indigenous among them. Dr Pickering, indeed, supposes that it was derived from them by the Polynesians, and to have been "co-extensive with the race, while the surrounding islanders, though often in a less advanced state

[1] Pritchard's "Polynesian Reminiscences," p. 327.

[2] "Narrative," iii., p. 76. For a curious picture of the manners of the Fijians, see the "Narrative" in the Appendix to Captain Erskine's "Journal of a Cruise in the Western Pacific" (1853).

[3] Pritchard, *op. cit.*, p. 380, *seq.*; Wilkes, *op. cit.*, iii., pp. 97, 101.

of society, as generally held it in horror."[1] It would seem, therefore, as though cannibalism were a primitive custom of the Papuan race. Strangely enough, the inhabitants of the most fertile islands are the most inveterate man-eaters.[2] The origin of the practice it is, perhaps, now impossible to ascertain, but it probably was introduced at a time when the moral sense was almost unformed, under the influence of the instinct of self-preservation. The taste may have been acquired at a time when the conditions of life were not so favourable as they are now. It is difficult, however, to understand how, under any circumstances, a father and mother could, as among the Kanakas of New Caledonia, after having determined the fate of their expected child, treat it as any other animal, and, after having carefully washed it, cook it in the ordinary mode, with taros and ignamas ![3]

When first discovered, the natives of New Caledonia[4] were probably somewhat less civilized than the Fijians, although morally there could not have been much difference between them. Even the former, naked savages as they were, had attained to a considerable skill in cultivation, which they had carried in terraces up the sides of the mountains. In character they showed considerable diversity. The grown-up Kanakas, as a rule, displayed but little alarm at the sight of their white visitors when New Caledonia was visited by D'Entrecasteaux's expedition. Occasionally, however, under circumstances which led them to think

1 "The Races of Man" (Bohn), pp. 171, 173.

2 See a Paper by Mr A. H. Kiehl, in *Anthropologia*, i. (1874), p. 137.

3 Voyage autour du Monde (Océanie), Par Jules Garnier (1871), p. 104.

4 Labillardière affirmed that in general cast of countenance they much resembled the Tasmanians. "Voyage in Search of La Perouse" (Eng. Trans.), vol. ii., p. 194.

that they were to be killed or eaten, they showed fear, and then their tears quickly flowed. The good character for honesty which the Papuas usually receive was certainly not applicable to the New Caledonians. They were found by the French navigator to be most daring and pertinacious thieves. On one occasion several of the natives were killed when attempting to carry off the axes of the ship's woodcutters. This unfortunate incident did not, however, prevent a continuance of the friendly intercourse which had previously taken place, although, on the following day, while one party of natives manifested no hostile disposition, another was endeavouring to capture one of the boats. The New Caledonians were too impudent to lay themselves open to the accusation of treachery, unless the burning of dry grass in the path of the Europeans could be so stigmatised. It should be noted that some of the natives professed to be much annoyed at the depredations committed on the Europeans; and one of them, having found a pistol left on the sands, was at the trouble of following them for an hour's distance to restore it. Labillardière expresses his surprise that the chiefs appeared to have little authority over the natives, and yet that they generally seized upon such articles as the latter received from the travellers. As to sexual morality, the French writer relates facts which show that, whatever restraint may be placed on the married women, the younger ones are not overburdened with modesty. The most striking characteristic of the New Caledonians was their cannibalism. Various signs of the existence of this practice were observed, and the natives tested the muscular development of the Europeans in a very suspicious manner. The latter were invited to partake of the cannibal repasts, and the whole process of dismembering a human body was explained to them by one of the

natives. Labillardière said that it was difficult to describe the ferocious avidity with which the savage showed the manner in which the flesh of the victim was devoured by them, after being broiled on a fire of charcoal. Cannibalism (although probably only enemies, and perhaps under special circumstances their own dead, were eaten) was evidently a matter of taste. The native tombs were ornamented with the skulls or bones of the deceased; and some of them appear to have been under tabu, but occasionally the travellers were able to purchase the human relics.[1] The character above given to the New Caledonians is on the whole confirmed by later travellers. The report of Captain Laferriere shows that they are inveterate and dexterous thieves.[2] M. Jules Garnier has recently given the fullest account of the natives of the French penal colony. Their cannibalism is fully established by his statements, and it is evident that it arises from a depraved taste as much as from a feeling of vengeance. The latter may account for the eating of enemies,[3] but not for that of Europeans who have done nothing to incur such enmity. The treacherous massacre of the crews of two French vessels and their subsequent fate at the hands of the cannibal Kanakas is fully detailed by M. Garnier.[4] The sagacity or cunning of this people appears to be equal to their treachery. During the expedition undertaken to revenge the death of the crew of the *Secret*, it was either almost impossible to get within shooting distance of them, or their movements were so rapid that they were able to escape the shot destined for them.[5] In other respects, besides their treachery and cannibalism, the Kanakas

1 Labillardière, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 194, *seq.*

2 Migne's "Encyclopedie Dict. d'Ethnographie Moderne," 1853, p. 1357.

3 "La Nouvelle Calédonie," 1871, pp. 251, 347.

4 "Océanie," p. 209, *seq.*

5 Do., p. 247.

resemble the Fijians. If a sick person eats nothing for three days, he is put to death by his relations; and the same fate befalls the aged when they become helpless, and is accepted with the utmost stoicism.[1] The character of the Kanak is, however, more open than, and on the whole superior to, that of the Fijian. M. Garnier affirms that those who treat them kindly have rarely to complain of them, and he bears the same testimony as Captain Cook to their frankness and good-will.[2] He mentions that an English trader obtained great influence over the Kanaks by his honesty and generosity, and that several years after his death they loved to speak in praise of him.[3] Their sobriety is remarkable, as was noticed by Captain Laferriere;[4] and M. Garnier states that they will never touch brandy.[5] The position of woman among the Kanakas is one of considerable hardship, and she is as much the servant of her husband as his wife. She does most of the laborious out-door work as well as attend to the household duties. Moreover, wives are not allowed to sleep under the same roof as their husbands; and when they die, they are buried with but slight ceremony. Nevertheless, M. Garnier affirms that they appear to be very well satisfied with their condition.[6] Captain Laferriere adds, that although polygamy is practised, the chiefs have a head wife, who has a hut of her own. The wives of chiefs are declared tapu, and it is rare that they are interfered with by other natives. The women appear, to be less dissolute than is usual among the Polynesian islanders, in which also they agree with the Fijians. The Kanakas are extremely superstitious, having great dread of spirits; but the only trace of religious

[1] "La Nouvelle Calédonie," p. 236, *seq.*
[2] Do., pp. 225, 247.
[3] "Océanie," p. 169.
[4] *loc. cit.*, p. 1357.
[5] "La Nouvelle Calédonie," p. 333.
[6] "Océanie," p. 186; Laferriere, *loc. cit.*, p. 1357.

sentiment they exhibit is in connection with the dead, whom, says Garnier, they honour more than the living.[1] As to a future life, they believe that after death they go to a place above the earth, where food is very abundant and fishing always successful, and where the women are always young, beautiful, and agreeable. There the young will become men and the old men young; and they will spend their time chiefly in dancing, but sometimes at night they will return to earth and torment and punish their still living enemies.[2]

The natives of Port Dory, on the northern coast of New Guinea, are the best known of the Papuas of the Indian Archipelago. They have been well described by Mr Bruijn Kops, who states that in general they "give evidence of a mild disposition, of an inclination to right and justice, and strong moral principles." They were at first very distrustful of strangers, the women being excessively timid, but this feeling gradually wore off. "Respect for the aged, love for their children, and fidelity for their wives," says Mr Kops, "are traits which reflect honour on their disposition. Chastity is held in high regard, and is a virtue that is seldom transgressed by them. A man can only have one wife, and is bound to her for her life. Concubinage is not permitted; adultery is unknown among them." When it is added that theft is treated as a very serious offence, and is of rare occurrence, the character of the Papuas of New Guinea may seem to be almost perfect. It is not, however, without flaw. Excessive indulgence in intoxicating liquors is very prevalent, and slavery is equally so. Kidnapping human beings is a recognised practice, and therefore not dishonourable, and dealing in slaves is

1 "La Nouvelle Calédonie," p. 315. Their villages are ornamented with the skulls of their enemies fixed on long poles. Ditto, pp. 251, 338.

2 "Océanie," p. 187.

a regular branch of commerce. Nevertheless, the captives are well treated as a rule, and are released on payment of a ransom. In sexual matters also, morality appears to be somewhat lax. In cases of adultery, although the male offender may be put to death by the husband, the female is not punished, and no infamy attaches to unchaste conduct in women before marriage. The usual price for a wife was ten slaves, and if a man violated a girl, he was compelled to pay the dowry and marry her.[1] The natives of Dory are very superstitious, and "invariably carry about with them amulets consisting of carved pieces of wood, bits of bone, quartz, or some other trifle, to which an imaginary value is attached."[2] The character ascribed to these Papuas is probably applicable to most of the inhabitants of New Guinea and of the neighbouring islands. The natives of Outanata, on the south-west coast, are described as being good-natured and very honest,[3] and the Arru islanders, who have much in common with the Outanatas, receive the same character. Of the latter Mr Kolff says, "it is certainly worthy of remark, that these simple Alfoers without the hope of reward or fear of punishment after death, livein such peace and brotherly love with one another, and that they recognise the right of property in its fullest sense of the word, without their being any other authority among them than the decisions of their elders, according to the customs of their forefathers, which are held in the highest regard." The Arru islanders would seem to be very jealous in relation to their women. It is not lawful for a man to enter the house of a neighbour during his absence, and merely to touch the wife of another, even by accident, has to be atoned for by a heavy fine. In proof, however, of the mildness of their laws, Mr Kolff refers to

1 "Tijdschrift," p. 185, *seq.*; Earle's "Papuans," p. 80, *seq.*
2 Earle, *op. cit.*, p. 84. 3 Do., p. 49.

the case of a married woman, who having eloped during her husband's absence, stated, when her husband demanded an enormous fine, that she had made the first advances to her seducer through gratitude for his assistance in her distress. The elders taking into consideration "that it was very difficult for any one to withstand a declaration of love from a young woman," overlooked "the severe laws respecting the conduct of men towards married women, and determined that the offender should only pay a small fine, and advised the husband never again to leave his wife at home without provisions."[1] This account of the moral character of the Papuas of the Indian Archipelago may be closed by the observations of Mr J. Beete Jukes, the naturalist attached to the Surveying Expedition of H.M.S. "Fly." Mr Jukes writes—"Most of the accounts of these people describe their honesty as superior to that of the Polynesian race, and they seem to be less eagerly addicted to pilfering; they are, however, commonly much more hostile and ferocious, sometimes waging open warfare, sometimes having recourse to the grossest treachery. . . . In one respect they seem to be most strikingly contrasted with the Polynesian race, namely, in the reserve and chastity of their women towards strangers, but whether their manners are as strict among themselves, or would continue so to Europeans on a longer acquaintance, may perhaps be doubted. As far as our personal observation went, they are to be mentioned honourably for their treatment of their women. We never, among the Torres Strait islanders, saw a woman beaten or abused; and in all the harder kinds of work the men appeared to take their fair share of labour. Their care and affection for their children seemed always great. Although wanting in the engaging liveliness and fascinating manners which

[1] Kolff, "Voyage of the Dourga;" Earle, *op. cit.* p. 104, *seq.*

are described as characteristic of some of the eastern Polynesian nations, the Torres Strait islanders are of a cheerful disposition, readily engaging in sports and amusement, and their curiosity was easily excited by anything interesting or uncommon. They evinced also considerable perseverance both in their efforts to gain information from us, and to impart instruction to us respecting their language or other matters. They did not exhibit either much cupidity or great generosity, but were always ready to enter into trade, and stood out for what they considered a fair equivalent for their merchandise."[1] Nothing need be added to this description but a reference to the cannibalism which, although not universal, is yet so common as to be almost a characteristic of the Papuan race.

Before leaving this part of our subject, some reference may be made to the small brachycephalic negroid race of the Indian Archipelago, although it cannot be said to be physically connected with the Papuan stock. Of that race the best known representatives are the so-called Negritos, or Actas of the Philippines, and the Mincopies of the Andaman Islands. As to the Actas, our information is yet very scanty. Dr C. Semper, who visited them a few years ago, affirms that they are nearly allied in physical characteristics, and in many of their manners and customs, to the Papuas and the Fijians, although standing on a much lower moral scale. He says, however, that the character of the Actas is better than their reputation. By nature they are confiding, open-hearted, and candid, being mistrustful only in their intercourse with Christians. They are persevering, and much more courageous than their Malay neighbours. With an irrepressible love of individual liberty, and a wandering life, they are yet quite willing

[1] "Voyage of H.M.S. Fly," (1847), ii., p. 247.

to serve in what they are accustomed to do. There is little sign of tribal organisation among them, and small groups of six or eight families wander together about the mountains and glens, or on the sea-shore, in search of their favourite food.[1] According to M. Mallat, however, they have chiefs, whose dignity is marked by a feather stuck in their thick hair. In evidence of their untameable nature, this writer refers to the story of a Negrito youth who was carefully educated and ordained as a priest by the Archbishop of Manilla, but who suddenly threw off his cassock and fled to his native mountains. They appear to be extremely superstitious, and, like the Australian aborigines, they always ascribe death to the machinations of their enemies. Every death, therefore, has to be avenged, and a member of the deceased's family vows that he will kill a certain number of the "Indians." He accordingly "ascends a tree to spy out the habitation of an Indian, or a river where they bathe, and there he watches until he kills one or more with his poisoned arrows."[2] If such be the Acta custom, it is not surprising that their neighbours treat them with little humanity when they come within their reach.

Not much more is known as to the manners and character of the Andaman islanders than as to the Actas. Nearly all that has been written on the subject has been recently brought together and critically considered by the eminent French anthropologist, M. A. de Quatrefages, and the following are the conclusions he has arrived at as to their character:—As spoilt children, "ils sont sujets aux caprices, et il est prudent d'être sur ses gardes avec eux comme avec tous les sauvages. Mais ces enfans ont certainement le bon caractère que leur reconnaissait

[1] "Der Philippinen und ihre Bewohner" (1869), p. 48, *seq.*
[2] "Les Philippines" (1846), vol. ii., p. 93, *seq.*

déjà Blair, le premier explorateur sérieux de ces îles. Cette population est gaie, rieuse, amie du chant et dela danse. Bien loin d'être intraitable et féroce, elle s'est montrée humaine et hospitalière, dès qu'elle a cru ne pas avoir d'attaques à redouter. En même temps elle est courageuse, dure aux travail, adroite, extrêmement active, et sous l'influence de civilisation, elle deviendrait intelligente et industrieuse."[1] In this respect, as in some others, they appear to resemble the *Boomeas* of India rather than the wild Negritos of the Philippines. As a proof of their irritability, Mr Francis Day mentions an instance of a boy only eight years of age shooting a girl much older than himself for not fetching him some drinking water immediately he ordered her to do so.[2] This case rather proves the "savage" mode in which their children are brought up. Tattooing, the completion of which is a sign of manhood, begins at eight years of age,[3] and perhaps the child referred to by Mr Day had undergone the first operation, and wished to show that he was already a man. This is consistent with the statement of Mouat's sepoy informant, that parents are very affectionate to their children, and that children are equally attached to their parents.[4] In sexual matters, there seems reason to believe that the Andaman islanders partake of the comparative chastity which characterises most of the members of the Papuan race before marriage, and which distinguishes this race from the Polynesians. Moreover, wives would appear to remain faithful to their husbands.[5] Woman is allowed among the Mincopies a position somewhat superior to that which she occupies among some other peoples of a

[1] "Revue d' Anthropologie," tom i. (1872), p. 212.

[2] Observations on the Andamanese, "Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal" 1870, p. 155. [3] Do., p. 159.

[4] "Adventures among the Andaman Islanders" (1863), p. 295.

[5] De Quatrefages, *loc. cit.*, p. 208.

similar degree of culture. Most of the labour, except that of making canoes, devolves on the wife, yet women are treated with great respect, and seem almost to command the men.[1] The Mincopies would seem to have a kind of nature-worship, which consists chiefly in singing songs to calm the rage of the evil storm-spirit, and some indefinite notion as to a future life. The dead are thought to be pleased if their bones are taken care of by the living, and therefore, after the body has been buried for a year, necklaces are made of the smaller bones, and the skulls are carried in baskets strung over the shoulder.[2] This curious custom is practised more or less by both Polynesian and Papuan peoples, and it may have led the old Arabian travellers to report that the Andaman islanders were the wildest cannibals. Occasionally human bones have been found in the kitchen-middens on the islands, but there is not sufficient evidence to support the charge of cannibalism.[3]

THE BOOMEAS OF INDIA.

The *Boomeas*,[4] or people of the soil, of India, cannot be omitted from a description of the moral characteristics of primitive peoples, although their manners have as yet been very imperfectly studied. The difficulty of the task caused by defective materials is increased by the number of the tribes into which the original race has become split up, and the variety observable in their customs. We are not concerned here, however, with the question of

1 De Quatrefages, *loc. cit.*, p. 203.

2 Do., p. 205, *seq.* Day, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

3 See "Notes on the Kjokken-Möddings of the Andaman Islands," by Dr Stoluzka, "Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal" (1870), p. 20.

4 This convenient term is due to Mr Justice Campbell. See his "Ethnology of India," published with the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, No. 136 (1866) pp. 30, 51.

race affinity, and the simplest plan for our present purpose will be to accept the ordinary division into the southern aborigines, or *Dravidians,* and northern aborigines, or *Kolarians,* confining the examination to the best known tribes of each division, and we cannot do better than follow the order in which they are mentioned in the "Ethnology of India." Beginning with the tribes of the west side of the Peninsula, we meet with the Carambers, or Kurumbas, and the Irulas of the Nilgiri Hills. Of these tribes, and of the *Maleasurs,* or hill-men, of the Pulney Hills and the Western Ghats, Campbell says—"These seem to be tribes in the very lowest stage of savageness, with, in fact, scarcely any agriculture, mere men of the woods. They are represented as of very diminutive stature, with thickly matted locks and supple limbs, living under trees, in caverns, or in the rudest wigwams, keeping sheep or collecting forest produce, very stupid, but also very mild and inoffensive,[1] except that they have a great reputation as sorcerers, and themselves believing in a religion of demons and witchcraft, are by their neighbours believed to be highly gifted that way."[2] This account agrees well with that given by Major Ross King, who says, moreover, that neither the Kurumbas nor the Irulas have any notion of marriage, men and women cohabiting promiscuously, except that among the Irulas, the two classes into which, curiously enough, they are divided, remain separate. This charge of "communal marriage" must, however, be received with caution, and if true, the practice may be a modern innovation.[3] Notwithstanding their sexual

[1] This seems to be the general character of the wilder tribes of Southern India. See Dubois' "People of India," p. 476.

[2] *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[3] Sir Henry Maine, referring to the reported existence in India of such phenomena of barbarism as that mentioned in the text, says, "practices represented as of immemorial antiquity, and universally

and moral degradation, both the Irulas and Kurumbas have a form of religion, their chief god being Rangasawmie, who is represented by a stone, to which small offerings of plaintain or grain are made.[1] Dr Shortt refers to the Irulas as being a branch of an aboriginal race spread over the whole of southern India, and in other places known as Yenadies (the Yendes of Campbell), Villees, Veders, and Maravers, These tribes present little, if any, difference in manners, as to which, however, not much is known. Theft seems to be thought little of. Polygamy is practised, the women among the Yenadies exceeding the men in number. When a man dies, his widow is taken by someone else as a concubine. Marriage rites are very simple, if it be true that if a girl has been seduced, she may live with her lover unmolested after he has been beaten by her parents, and received over his person a mixture of cow-dung. Primitive as are their morals these aboriginal tribes are not without religion. The Yenadies worship once or twice a month a household god named Chuncha Davadu, to whom they make offerings of cooked food, cocoa-nut, or flowers. They are said, however, not to have any notion of a future state.[2] A reference to the Yenadies and the Irulas is to be met with in a Telugu manuscript, giving an account of the first settlement of the Hindus in the district of Sri-hari-cotta, near Madras. The wild aborigines are there classed as Chenju-Vandlu, Yanadula, Coya-Vandlu, and Irala-Vandlu.[3] Another manuscript

characteristic of the infancy of mankind, have been described to me as having been for the first time resorted to in our own days through he mere pressure of external circumstances or novel temptations."—*Village Communities* (1871), p. 16.

[1] Journal of Anthropology (1870), p. 44, *seq.*

[2] Transactions of the Ethnological Society, iii. (1865), p. 373, *seq.*

[3] See Prichard's "Researches into the Physical History of Mankind" (3d Ed.), iv. p. 181.

describes the Vedars and Kurumbars as inhabiting the country near Madras. The latter are said to have come from the Kanataka country and to have been Jains.[1]

How far the slave tribes of Wynaud and Malabar, the Chermars, Koombers, Niades, and Panirs, can be classed as aborigines is doubtful. If, as Major Bevan asserts, their religion is a form of Hindooism, and its rites somewhat like those of the Nairs of Malabar, they would seem rather to be outcasts. They are usually attached to the soil as serfs, and pass with it on alienation, or are employed by farmers or traders to carry grain and other produce to market, and they are supposed by the Hindus to have been slaves from time immemorial. Major Bevan thus describes the appearance, manners, and character of these Hindu slaves: "They intermarry *exclusively* among themselves. Their moral habits arise more from the dictates of nature and fear than from innate principle. They will pilfer, if it can be done so as to escape detection. Perhaps this may be owing to their degraded state. Their general character is patient and unoffending, pusillanimous, ignorant, superstitious, and listless. Their physical power, weak; appearance, diminutive; very dark, rather flat features, and thick black matted hair; the tone of their voice guttural and disagreeable. Their actions are guided more through natural instinct; few will wait the approach of a European, being in such an uncivilized state as to dread their sight."[2] This degraded people believe themselves to have been given to their superiors by a deity

[1] Prichard's "Researches," iv., p. 182. The statement that the Kurumbars were Jains, deserves consideration. Metz thinks they once cultivated the plateau now occupied by the Todas, and that the cairns and cromlechs now found there, were constructed by their ancestors. "Tribes Inhabiting the Neilgherry Hills," p. 122, *seq.*

[2] "Thirty Years in India." By Major H. Bevan (1839), ii. Appendix, p. 359, *seq.*

named *Ishbunam*, who, according to their traditions, rescued Malabar from the ocean.[1]

Mr Justice Campbell refers to two tribes, who are mixed with the general population of the centre and west of the peninsula, under the names of Dhers and Ramooses. Of the latter, an account has been published by Captain Mackintosh, who describes them as having originally emigrated from some part of the ancient kingdom of Telingara, probably east or south-east of the present town of Hyderabad, but as now residing chiefly in the outskirts of towns and villages in the vallies of the Maun, Neera, Bhema, and Pera rivers, and in adjoining plains and highlands within the districts of Satara, Poona, and Ahmednuggur. The character of the Ramoossies, as described by Captain Mackintosh, is not pleasing.[2] He affirms that they are "an extremely hardy, active, and enterprising people, but at the same time covetous, rapacious, and treacherous—in fact they possess many bad, and few good qualities, their passions being in general unrestrained by any correct moral principles."[3] They are nearly all thieves, those who do not join in extensive robberies, committing petty thefts, at which they are very expert. They place great faith in fortune, and often speak of their *Kuppal, Dyah, Nusseeb,* that is trusting to fate, destiny, and chance.[4] They are not without religion; they make offerings to the deities worshipped by the inhabitants of the Dekkan, their principal god being *Khundy Row* or *Martinda,* an incarnation of Mahadeva.[5] According to Captain

1 "Thirty Years in India," ii., p. 205. For an account of the Chandalas, slaves sprung from the union of Sudras with Brahmani women, see Dr Shortt's "Hill Ranges of Southern India." Part iv., p. 15, *seq.*

2 "An Account of the Origin and Present Condition of the Tribe of Ramoossies" (1833), pp. 1, 7.

3 Do., p. 50. 4 Do., pp. 38, 40. 5 Do., 51.

Mackintosh, the Ramoossies are notorious for establishing illicit sexual connections with the wives and daughters of the Koonbies (farmers) and others;[1] although unfaithfulness by their own wives was formerly, at least, punished very severely, death sometimes being inflicted. The women are described as showing great affection for their offspring, and as being considered "comparatively good and faithful wives." Captain Mackintosh, however, appears to doubt whether this is the result of any sense of moral propriety, and he suggests that it is most likely due to dread of the correction which would attend a different course of conduct.[2] He declares, indeed, that "the native women of all classes, high or low, rich or poor, with very few exceptions, are the most frail and mercenary creatures imaginable." How far this sweeping charge is well-founded it is difficult to say, and the question will be considered at a later page. Sufficient reason is adduced, however, for supposing that it may be true. One source of the frailty of the Hindu women, according to Captain Mackintosh, is their great vanity, which "renders them inordinately fond of ornaments and fine clothes, and making a show beyond their means." Another source is their naturally warm temperament, added to which, they are married when mere children, so that they are not consulted in the choice of a husband. Moreover, they are without the advantages of education, and "their conversations, their songs, their numerous romantic, lascivious, and love-sick stories, of heroes, heroines, demi-gods, and goddesses, which are familiar to them all, and which they are in the habit of hearing recited in the porches of their temples, and frequently in their own houses by professed itinerant story tellers, and expounders of their legends, may partly

[1] "An Account of the Origin and Present Condition of the Tribe of Ramoossies," p. 53. [2] Do., p. 50.

account for the state of morality among the Hindoo community of India."[1]

The Ramoossies have come to occupy a peculiar position. Formerly they were a confraternity of thieves, but now they employ themselves in the protection of property. A general council is formed which has agencies in every town, and these furnish Europeans and others with Ramoossies to take care of their property, and who engage in case of theft to indemnify them from loss. This is practically, however, only a system of blackmail, since if anyone endeavours to do without their aid, he is robbed by the Ramoossies themselves.[2]

There are other "robber tribes" in Southern India besides the Ramoossies, and Justice Campbell says of them, that they seem for the most part to have robbed themselves into a respectable and even aristocratical position. One of those tribes, the Beders, form a considerable portion of the population in some parts of Mysore, and have many Polygarships.[3] The abominable practice of Thuggee which was at one time so rife in the Central Provinces was not confined to any particular tribe or caste.[4] Many of the murderers when not engaged in its pursuit employed themselves as agriculturists, and when too old for thuggism they settled down as farmers or labourers without their former conduct being suspected. Their accomplices often passed for men of wealth and respectability, and many of them were *Faquirs* or religious mendicants.[5] The system pursued by the Thugs resembled in many respects that which is still in operation

[1] "An Account of the Origin and Present Condition of the Tribe of Ramosssies," p. 53.

[2] See Louis Rousselet's "Tableau des Races de l'Inde Centrale," in the "Revue d'Anthropologie," ii. (1873), p. 270. [3] *loc. cit.*, p. 30.

[4] According to Dr Shortt, the Brinjaries or Indian carriers, who appear not to belong to the aboriginal stock, are in some districts addicted to thieving and thuggery. "Hill Ranges of Southern India." Part iii., p. 21. [5] Bevan, *op. cit.*, i., p. 260.

among the Roomassies, and it is well described by the Marquis of Hastings. He says, that the fraternity of Thugs "amounting, by the best information, to above a thousand individuals, was scattered through different villages, often remote from each other; yet they pursued, with a species of concert, their avocation. This was the making excursions to distant districts, where, under the appearance of journeying along the high roads, they endeavoured to associate themselves with travellers, by either obtaining leave to accompany them, as if for protection, or when the permission was refused, keeping near them on the same pretext. Their business was, to seek an opportunity of murdering the travellers when asleep or off their guard. In this three or four could combine, without having given suspicion of their connection. Though personally unacquainted, they had signs and tokens by which each recognised the other as of the brotherhood; and their object being understood without the necessity of verbal communication, they shunned all speech with each other, till the utterance of a mystical term or two announced the favourite moment and claimed a common effort."[1]

The higher ranges of the Nilgiris are occupied by a tribe which, although probably not belonging to the aboriginal stock, cannot well, owing to the peculiar character of its institutions, be passed over. The Todas, the tribe referred to, claim to be the original and hereditary lords of the soil and owners of the whole of the Nilgiris, a claim which is admitted by the neighbouring tribes. They appear to be a simple-minded, peaceful people, retaining their preeminence by mere moral force. They possess no implements of warfare, and even do not carry any weapons for defence against wild animals, although these are numerous on the hills. It

[1] Bevan, i., p. 302.

is possible that the Todas represent a very early wave of migration from central Asia, and that their peculiar marriage customs, for which they are best known, may have been handed down from a very distant epoch. There is a probability that the early Hindu Aryans generally were polyandrists, a woman being the wife of several brothers,[1] and such is the case with the Todas, the woman cohabiting with each of her husbands for a month in turns. Major Ross King says, indeed, that this arrangement is carried among them still further, and that "such young men as, by the paucity of women among the tribe, are prevented from obtaining a share in a wife, are allowed, with the permission of the fraternal husbands, to become temporary partners with them."[2] The polyandry of the Todas is, no doubt, connected with the scarcity of women, and is partly due also to the strong desire for children, which, says Colonel Marshall, engrosses the Toda mind more than any other, and may be described as his "ruling passion." The term *barudi* has the triple sense of old woman, widow, and barren woman; *baruda* having an analogous sense as applied to a man; and, so great is the disgrace attached to those epithets, as applied to young married people, that "the husband would connive at any steps his wife might take to obtain children."[3] The Todas have an especial craving for sons, not, as with the Hindus, that their funeral obsequies may be properly performed, but apparently from a mere pride in male children.[4] The scarcity of women among the Todas was caused by the practice of female infanticide, and to this may, therefore, probably be traced their

[1] See the case of the five Pandavas discussed in Mr Talboys Wheeler's "History of India," i. p. 115.

[2] Journal of Anthropology (1870), p. 32.

[3] "A Phrenologist among the Todas" (1873), p. 207, *seq.*

[4] Do., p. 171.

polyandry. Formerly, no more than one girl, or occasionally two, in each family was allowed to live. The infants were smothered by an old woman immediately after birth and buried, instead of being burned as is the case with adults, and this was done with the willing consent of both father and mother. The object appears to have been to keep down the number of unproductive members of the family; but it may be doubted whether, as Colonel Marshall supposes, the Todas ever formed the conception, that infanticide was necessary to save the race from destruction by excessive expansion.[1] The chief objection urged by the Todas against relinquishing the practice, when pressed by Mr Sullivan to do so, was, according to the missionary Metz, that they should never be able to support more than one girl in a family.[2] The motive was purely a "selfish" one. The girl who is allowed to live is well cared for, and, although she is sold in marriage by her father, yet she has a right to decide ultimately whether she will accept the husband chosen for her. When the bargain has been struck, the proposed husband and wife are shut up together for a day and night on trial, and on the expiration of that period the girl has to decide whether she will accept or reject the suitor. If she refuse him, "he goes away the subject of depreciatory remarks. If, on the contrary, she should tell her mother that she will have him, the pair are now held to be man and wife."[3] The condition of woman among the Todas compares favourably with that which is exhibited among more civilised peoples. Wives are treated with great respect and are allowed much freedom. A wife performs the same

[1] "A Phrenologist among the Todas," chap. 23, Infanticide.
[2] Dr Shortt's "Tribes inhabiting the Neilgherry Hills," p. 17.
[3] Marshall, *op. cit.*, p. 211. The custom mentioned in the text is not unlike the "bundling" of Celtic peoples.

domestic offices as women are concerned with in Europe,[1] and "by the great tolerance and moderation of the men, aided by a very sufficient mental power and mastery of her subject, she maintains a good position in the house." Moreover, through their husbands and children, women possess a certain amount of influence in the community.[2] Nevertheless, their inferiority to men is shown by their not being allowed to be present at the yearly eating of flesh, which is only partaken of by male adults.[3] Metz states, that sexual immorality was very prevalent among the Todas, adultery being common, and only punished when the female was the wife or daughter of an influential man. The women, generally, are very unfaithful to their husbands, and very bold and indelicate in their demeanour towards strangers.[4] In other respects, the Todas do not present any very high degree of moral culture. Formerly, at least, they were great wife-stealers, not on their own account, but for their neighbours the Badagas, who hired them for the purpose.[5] The Todas, moreover, do not appear to be very veracious, especially in their relations with Europeans, whose questions they reply to in the manner which they conceive will be the most pleasing to the inquirer.[6] Nevertheless, in the neighbourhood of the dairies containing relics of their ancestors, which are looked upon as shrines, they are careful to speak to truth, and this feeling is taken advantage of by oaths being sworn in its presence.[7] Colonel Marshall thus sums up the general character of the Todas,—"Singularly frank, affable, and self-possessed, cheerful yet staid; respectful, seemingly from a sense of conscious inferiority rather than from an active principle; fearless,

[1] Marshall, p. 43. [2] Do., p. 218. [3] Do., p. 81.
[4] Shortt, *op. cit.*, p. 24. [5] Do., p. 75. [6] Do., p. 13.
[7] Marshall, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

from small cause for fear more than from the stimulus of a latent power of opposiveness; communicative, yet watchful and shy, as if their natures impelled them to divulge what their natures also prompted them to maintain quiet; willing to take money, yet accepting what is proffered with callousness, allowing it to lie on the ground or their children to play with it." Theft and acts of violence are not frequent, and their most criminal actions "appear to consist in struggles to avoid payment of their debts for money borrowed on bonds from the Badagas," struggles which are not without parallel in the experience of other uncultured peoples. Colonel Marshall adds, that in their private life they are probably "less bounded by acknowledged rule than by the gentleness and simplicity, though rude nature, of their character."[1] They have a word for sin, but the notion has little, if any, influence over them,[2] and they not only have the most perfect confidence in a life beyond the grave, and their own immortality, but a complete absence of apprehension as to their future condition.[3] This, they believe, will be exactly the same as the present, their buffaloes accompanying them to *amnôr*, the next world, to supply them with milk. The buffalo, as the giver of the "divine fluid," milk, is looked upon to a certain extent as sacred, and is treated with a kind of adoration. The milking of the cows and the charge of the dairy is esteemed as one of the highest occupations, and the care of the sacred herds is confided to men taken from the *Peiki* clan, the members of which call themselves *Dêr mokh*, sons of God. The pâlâl, or "ascetic milkman," is indeed regarded as himself a god. The only approach to idols which the Todas possess are certain ancient cattle-bells, which are venerated as divine, probably in the same sense as the relics preserved in the

[1] *op. cit.*, p. 45. [2] Do., p. 126. [3] Do., p. 161.

sacred dairy-shrines.[1] They do not appear to have any form of religious worship, but Major King states, that occasionally individuals pray to the Supreme Being for recovery from sickness or preservation of health.[2]

The description of the Todas may be considered a digression. Returning to the consideration of the so-called aboriginal peoples, and crossing the Godavery, we find a large district, between that river and the Mahanaddi, occupied towards the West by the Gonds, and towards the East by the Khonds or Kandhs, both of whom belong to the Dravidian stock. The former importance of the Gonds is shown by the great extent of Gondwana, the province to which they have given the name, although they are now confined to a comparatively small portion of it; and to the fact that they still give chiefs and large zemindars to several considerable districts.[3] At the present day the Gonds are a people of semi-nomad habits, cultivating the soil, but migrating to a fresh locality every few years. They would seem to be a simple race, very superstitious—deifying the small-pox, cholera, and fever, and also the tiger, and believing that certain ceremonies are required to prevent persons killed by the tiger from themselves becoming tigers, and ravaging the country.[4] According to Colonel Dalton, the Gonds of Sirgúja formerly offered human sacrifices to their chief deity, Búra Deo. They are firm believers in witchcraft and the evil eye, and when death is suspected to have been thus caused, the burning of the body of the deceased is delayed until the person by whom the spell has been cast is found out. The Gonds have the common Dravidian custom of making all the unmarried men sleep in a general dormitory. In Bastar they have preserved a custom which much resembles the simplest

[1] Marshall, p. 128, *seq.*
[2] *loc. cit.*, p. 28.
[3] Campbell, *loc. cit.*, p. 32.
[4] Rousselet, *loc. cit.*, p. 276 *seq.*

form of "marriage by capture." Colonel Dalton says that, "when the bridegroom goes with his friends to fetch his bride, the shrinking maiden seeks refuge in a friend's house, and hides herself amongst the rafters, from whence, when found, she is ruthlessly dragged down, and borne away to her fate." The same writer affirms that socially, the Hinduised, or semi-Hinduised, Gonds are "the least interesting of the great families of the aborigines of India. They have none of the lively disposition of the Oráons, or of the free, dignified demeanour which characterises many of the Singbhúm Kols. They are in character reserved, sullen, and suspicious." They appear to be inferior to the Oráons and Kols, no less in physical features than in character, seeing that they often resemble the lower negro type. Colonel Dalton thinks, nevertheless, that the wild hill Gonds are not devoid of the traits which make the hill tribes agreeable objects of study. He quotes the description given by Mr Grant of the Dhúr Gonds, as proving that they have much in common with other tribes of Central India:—"A true Gond will commit a murder, but he will not tell a lie. Though skilled in medicinal herbs, in illness he prefers trusting to fate. He will not turn from a tiger, but will fly from cholera. Like a dog, he sets fidelity above all other virtues, and will, without hesitation, take life at the bidding of his master."[1] According to Lieutenant Pendergast, the Binderwurs, a Gond tribe near the source of the Nerbuddah, kill and eat their relations when sick and unlikely to recover, and also the aged, thinking this cannibalism to be an act of kindness, and acceptable to the goddess Kali.[2] Towards the east the Gonds are known as *Gours*, and, from the similarity of name, we

1 "The Ethnology of Bengal" (1872), p. 275 *seq.*
2 See Prichard, *op. cit.*, iv., p. 175.

may suppose the Sours[1] of Orissa to be a branch of the same people. Like the Gonds, the Sours carry as their distinctive weapon a short axe, and they are described as, in general, a harmless, peaceable race, but "so destitute of moral sense, that, at the order of a chief, they will as readily kill a man as a beast."[2]

From the description given by Colonel Dalton of the Oráons of the Rajmahal hills, and of the Chútiá-Nagpúr plateau, we must suppose them to belong to the same small dark stock as the Gonds and Sours. The Oráon is described as having the lively, happy disposition of the negro. He is "fond of gaiety, decorating rather than clothing his person, and, whether toiling or playing, is always cheerful." He is not so truthful as his Kol neighbours, probably owing to his habit of wandering about the country in search of employment, in the course of which his character becomes much deteriorated. In common with the other tribes, the Oráon is very affectionate in his conduct towards his fellows. Dalton says:—"I never saw girls quarrelling, and never heard them abuse each other. They are the most unspiteful of their sex; and the men never coarsely abuse, and seldom speak harshly of the women."[3] An Oráon village consists of a street or court of small, untidy-looking huts, in which their families live, "very promiscuously." In every village of old standing there is a house, called the "Dhúmkúria" (bachelor's hall), in which all the unmarried men and boys are obliged to sleep, under the penalty of a fine, in case of absence. In the Dhúmkúria a regular system of fagging is pursued. "The small boys have to shampoo the limbs of their luxurious masters, and obey

[1] Probably we have the same word in "Sorah," a name which was anciently given to the Tamil people.—Campbell, *loc. cit.*, p. 37.

[2] Prichard, *op. cit.*, iv., p. 177.

[3] "Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal," No. 136 (1866), pp. 196-7.

all orders of the elders, who also systematically bully them, to make them, it is alleged, hardy." In some villages the unmarried girls have a house to themselves, under the charge of an old woman, who is always armed with a stick, to keep off the boys.[1] The Oráons of the Rajmahal hills have a kind of "bundling" custom, such as is practised by the Todas, which allows the young couple to sleep together before marriage. This act would be thought by the Nagpúr Oráons very indecorous; but with them an important sequel of marriage is the public recognition that the husband and wife have afterwards slept together.[2] In some of the Sirgúja villages the boys and girls all sleep together in the Dhúmkúria; but the elders affirm that the practice does not lead to promiscuous intercourse. Colonel Dalton declares that the young Oráon girls are "modest in demeanour, their manner gentle, language entirely free from obscenity, and, whilst hardly ever failing to present their husbands with a pledge of love in due course *after* marriage, instances of illegitimate births are rare, though they often remain unmarried for some years after reaching maturity." The art of courtship is well understood by them, and strong attachments are not at all uncommon, although it is not usual for such attachments between girls and boys of the same village to end in actual marriage engagements.[3] The girls are very affectionate among themselves, and they have established a custom by which "the ties of friendship are made as binding as those of marriage." Colonel Dalton, describing the custom, says:—"Two girls feel a growing attachment for each other. They work together, sing together, and strive to be always together, till they grow so fond that a sudden thought strikes one or other of

[1] "Journal of the Asiatic Society Bengal," p. 175.
[2] Do., p. 172. [3] "The Ethnology of Bengal," p. 248.

them to say, 'Let us swear eternal friendship.' . . . . Then each plucks flowers, and neatly arranges them in the other's hair. They exchange necklaces, and embrace, and afterwards jointly, from their own means, prepare a little feast, to which they invite their friends of their own sex, who are made witnesses to the compact, and this ceremony is considered complete. From that hour they must never address, or speak of each other, by name. The sworn friend is 'my *gui*,' or my flower, or something of the kind. They are as particular on this point as are Hindu women, not to mention the names of their husbands."[1] The Oráons appear to believe in a Supreme God, adored as Dharmi, or Darmeth, the Holy One, who is thought to be a perfectly pure and beneficent being, whose will is thwarted, however, by evil spirits, whom it is consequently necessary to propitiate. Colonel Dalton supposes that they have no notion of punishment for sin. "It is not because they are wicked that their children or their cattle die, or their crops fail, or they suffer in body; it is only because some malignant demon has a spite against them, or is desirous of fleecing them. Their ideas of sin are limited. Thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour, is about as much of the Decalogue as they would subscribe to. It is doubtful if they see any moral guilt in murder, though hundreds of them have suffered the extreme penalty of the law for this crime. They are ready to take life on very slight provocation, and, in the gratification of their revenge, an innocent child is as likely to suffer as the actual offender."[2] The Oráons are a remarkably cheerful people, and they are evidently fond of work when the labour is not too severe. Those who are placed in the labouring gangs, as the punishment for

[1] "The Ethnology of Bengal," p. 253. [2] Do., p. 256.

criminal offences, go cheerfully about their work, "and, after some nine or ten hours of toil (seasoned with a little play and chaff amongst themselves), they return blithely home, in flower-decked groups, holding each other by the hand, or round the waist, and singing."[1]

The Rajmahal hill country, between the Ganges and the Bráhmani river, is the place of abode of an aboriginal people, who declare that the human race first made its appearance in that locality. In this, however, the Málers, or Pahárias of Rajmahal, do not agree with the Oráons, who claim to be related to them, and who say that the whole nation were originally inhabitants of the Western Gháts. There would seem to be considerable difference in the manners of the Málers and the Oráons, owing probably to the foreign influences to which they have both been subjected since their separation. The former, however, like the latter, have the institution of the "bachelor's hall," and the unmarried women, as well as the unmarried men, have their general dormitory. The Málers practice polygamy, and if a man leaves several widows, they are distributed among his brothers and cousins, one to each person. Formerly, they were much given to carrying off wives from the plains, but their customs do not seem to show any trace of "marriage by capture." They are capable of forming very romantic attachments, if separated for only an hour they are miserable; but, says Colonel Dalton, "there are apparently few obstacles to their enjoyment of each other's society, as they work together, go to market together, eat together, and sleep together! But if it be found that they have overstepped the prescribed limits of billing and cooing, the elders declare them to be out of the pale, and the blood of animals must be shed at their expense, to wash away the indiscretion

[1] "Ethnology of Bengal," p. 262.

and obtain their readmission into society." The Málers seem to be extremely shy or timid and inhospitable to strangers, but Colonel Dalton supposes this to be due only to want of intercourse, and that they will in time become as sociable as the Oráons, who were at first equally reserved. An account of the religion and ethics of the hillmen of Rajmahal was given by Lieutenant Shaw in the *Asiatic Researches*, from which it appears that they were taught that the will of God required them not to injure, abuse, beat, or kill any one; not to rob, steal, waste food or clothes, or quarrel, but to praise God morning and evening, which the women were to do too. The reward of such a good life is a temporary sojourn with God, and the subsequent return of the spirit to earth as a Raja or chief, or in some position higher than that which he has previously occupied; an evil life entailing the opposite result. "The abuse of riches or other good gifts is often punished in this world. The riches disappear, or calamity befalls the offender. Concealment of crime, as murder or adultery, is looked on as a great aggravation of the offence. It becomes still more heinous, if the object of the concealment is to throw blame on another. God sees all that is done, and though mortals may be deceived, and punishment fall on the innocent, the really guilty is sure in the end to suffer a greater calamity than he inflicts. Suicide is a crime in God's eyes, and the soul of one who so offends shall not be admitted into heaven, but must hover eternally as a ghost between heaven and earth, and a like fate awaits the soul of the murderer." Colonel Dalton very properly throws doubt on the impartiality of Lieutenant Shaw's informant, who probably obtained many of his ideas from Mr Cleveland —the reclaimer of the Málers—whose protegé he had been. Before their submission to Mr Cleveland, they

had subsisted chiefly on plunder, encouraged by their lowland neighbours, who received a share of the spoil. Among themselves, if a man of one village could not obtain satisfaction of a claim which he had against any one subject to a different chief, "he made application to his own chief, who assembled his vassals and seized the offender, often plundering the village in which he resided. The plunder was appropriated by the chief and his followers. The accused was detained until his relations paid what had been originally claimed, with costs; the costs including full compensation to the persons who, in the raid on the village, had been pillaged."[1] Bishop Heber speaks highly of the truthfulness of the Málers, who say that a lie is the greatest of all crimes. He adds, that they are great believers in witchcraft, and every pain, disappointment, or calamity is thus explained and traced to the malicious influence of some old witch. Finally, the women are generally chaste, and are very industrious, although the men dislike hard work.[2]

Among the aboriginal tribes dwelling to the east, in the highlands between the Godavery and the Mahanaddi, the Kandhs belong to the Dravidian stock, if, indeed, they are not of the same branch as the Gonds,[3] already described. Of their character little was known up to a recent period, beyond the fact that they were very wild and uncultured, and that they were accustomed, on certain occasions, to offer human sacrifices, to propitiate

[1] "The Ethnology of Bengal," p. 263, *seq.*

[2] Journal, i. p. 127, *seq.* In this, and in several other particulars, the Rajmahalers agree with the Malliallies of the Shervaroy Hills in the Madras Presidency, an account of whom is given by Dr Shortt. See "The Hill Ranges of Southern India," part ii. p. 35, *seq.*

[3] M. Rousselet speaks of the god "Boural Pen" of the Gonds (*loc. cit.*, p. 277), and the Supreme Deity of the Kandhs is "Boora Pennu." The French writer, however, does not mention the Kandhs, and he may therefore have confounded them with the Gonds.

the earth goddess. Prichard cites the oath administered among the Kandhs, as characteristic of their savage state. It is: "Oh! Father, I swear, and if I swear falsely, may I become shrivelled and dry like a blood-sucker, and die; may I be killed and eaten by a tiger; may I crumble away like the dust of this ant-hill; may I be blown away like this feather; may I be extinguished like this lamp."[1] The most complete description of the Kandhs is given by Major Macpherson,[2] who was instrumental in putting a stop to human sacrifices among them. These were offered to Tari-Pennu, the earth goddess, not only at the fixed festivals for ensuring good crops, but also on special occasions, when many deaths had occurred, either by disease or wild animals, or in case of family misfortunes. The victim was regarded through life as a consecrated being, whose privilege it was to suffer for the good of the people, in return for which he would become a god after death, and he was treated with great affection and reverence. Children who had been obtained for that office were often permitted to live until they had married and reared a family of children, who, in their turn, would be offered as sacrifices. Macpherson says that after the offering had been made, the flesh of the victim was stripped off, and divided into portions for the different villages, and carried home, wrapped in the leaves of the googlut-tree. When it arrived at the village, the portion was divided in two, and one-half buried in the ground; the rest was divided between the heads of houses, each of whom took his morsel, and buried it in his fields, placing it in the earth behind his back, without looking. In some dis-

[1] *op. cit.*, iv., p. 179 *seq.*
[2] "Memorials of Service" in India; an interesting account of the "Meriah" sacrifice will be found in Dr Shortt's "Hill Ranges of Southern India," part iii., p. 13 *seq.*

tricts the victim was put to death with great barbarity, being cut to pieces while alive, or slowly burnt to death, for the purpose of drawing from him as many tears as possible, in the belief that the earth goddess would send a proportionate supply of rain. The worshippers of Boora Pennu, the god of light,[1] although they abhor human sacrifices, are much given to female infanticide. For this practice they believe they have the sanction of the gods, Boora having repented after creating the first woman, and therefore giving them permission to bring up only so many females as they should find required for the good of society. They say that by the death of female infants "the lives of men without number are saved, and we live in comparative peace," referring to the quarrels which arise from marriage arrangements, women having much influence and many privileges among the Kandhs. According to Captain M'Neill, however, the cause of infanticide was to be sought in the superstition of the Kandhs, who consulted astrologers to ascertain whether the new-born child was likely to prove a blessing to its parents, or the reverse. If the latter, it was forthwith buried alive. The primitive habit of wife-purchase is practised among this people, the father of the girl receiving the arranged price from the father of the youth, the marriage ceremonies being wound up with a pretended capture and a mock fight for the possession of the bride. Colonel Dalton says that most of the hill tribes appear to have found it necessary "to promote marriage by stimulating intercourse between the sexes at particular seasons of the year." Thus, at one of the Kandh festivals in November, all the boys and girls assemble, and a bachelor is then allowed to elope with any unmarried girl he can persuade to

[1] Lieut.-Colonel Marshall states that the Todas worship "light" (*op. cit.*, p. 143).

accompany him; but he must afterwards pay her price to her father. As among other Dravidian tribes, a house is set apart in each village for the bachelors, and another as a dormitory for the unmarried women; but, says Colonel Dalton, "as it is said that chastity is not one of their virtues, and that free intercourse between the sexes is not discouraged, it may be assumed that the separation contemplated in this arrangement is not very rigidly enforced." At the chief Boora festival, there is much dancing, feasting, and drinking, and also much licentious indulgence. The only heinous crimes of which the Kandhs are guilty are homicides, committed in drunken broils, or in disputes about land. According to their code, "serious offences against the person, homicide, and severe wounding, are regarded as private wrongs, and compensations may be adjudged. In murder cases all the property of the murderer may be made over to the family of the deceased. In cases of wounding, any portion of the offender's goods may be awarded to the injured party, and he is further bound liberally to provide for all the wants of the wounded man till his recovery. The code on the subject of unfaithfulness of wives is contradictory. In one place we are told that the husband may put the adulterer to death; in another that the latter has only got to make good the amount paid for the girl when she was asked in marriage."[1]

Before leaving the Dravidian peoples for those of the Kolarian stock, a short description may be given of the moral characteristics of the Bhúiyas, a tribe who form a large section of the population of Singbhúm, and from whom it is supposed that some of the noblest families in Bengal have sprung. Tradition asserts that they were at one time dominant in western and southern Sing-

[1] The above particulars are taken from "The Ethnology of Bengal," p. 285 *seq.*

bhúm, before the Hos (Kols) there established themselves. They are remarkable for having many legends relating to the hero of the Rámáyana, and Colonel Dalton asserts that "they were the veritable monkeys that aided Rama in his invasion of Lanka." He describes the hill Bhúiyas in Bonai, as having a good character, and as being singularly truth-loving, simple, and "amenable," but, like some other Dravidian tribes, they appear to have been addicted to human sacrifices, which were offered once in three years. The same custom as to the separation of the unmarried men exists as among the Oráons, and in some villages the unmarried women also have a house to themselves. The latter appear to have little supervision, and "slips of morality, so long as they are confined to the tribe, are not much heeded." The young men of one village visit the girls of another, who, in their turn, visit the young men. On these occasions, after dining, "they dance and sing, and flirt all night together, and the morning dawns on more than one pair of pledged lovers." The Bhúiyas of the Keonjhur Hill, known as Pawris, claim to have preceded even the Juangs as settlers there, and assert that they have the prerogative of creating the Raja of the country.[1] Mr Justice Campbell seems to accept the view that the Bhúiyas are the aboriginal inhabitants of Bengal, and that they are related to the Garos of Assam;[2] while Colonel Dalton, with more probability, classes them with the Dravidians, and looks upon the Kocchs of Assam as a branch of the great Bhúiya family, whose rule was once established there.[3]

Having thus described the character of the most prominent members of the Dravidian stock, let us now turn to the northern group of peoples classed as

1 "The Ethnology of Bengal," p. 139 *seq.*
2 *loc. cit.*, p. 53. 3 *op. cit.*, p. 92.

Kolarian. Mr Justice Campbell, after saying that he could not distinguish any marked features distinguishing the Dravidians and the Kolarians, adds, "but a marked difference in habits, manners, and national characteristics has been found to exist where the two classes are in the closest contiguity." Reference is made to religious beliefs and rites, those of the Dravidians seeming "to deal in demonology, fetishism, frantic dances, bloody and even human sacrifices, in a way which reminds us of the worst African types; while several different accounts of northern aborigines, in widely different parts of the country, represent them as reverencing in an inoffensive way the sun, moon, and lord of tigers, and mild and innocent Bhoots or household spirits."[1] The Santals of Bhaugalpore are said to be "among the most shy and socially-isolated"[2] of the Kolarian stock; and they are the most likely therefore to have preserved their primitive manners unchanged. This people have been carefully described by Mr Hunter, who affirms that "the Santal possesses a happy disposition, is hospitable to strangers, and sociable to a fault among his own people. Every occasion is seized upon for a feast, at which the absence of luxuriousness is compensated for by abundance of game, and liquor made from fermented rice. In the southern country each house has its 'stranger's seat' outside the door, to which the traveller, whatever be his creed or colour, is courteously invited as soon as he enters the village."[3] The Santals do not care to see strangers, however, and they live as separate as possible from the Hindus, whose encroaching disposition they too well know. The oppressions of the Hindu money lenders drove them into rebellion in 1855, when the Santals proved that they are as brave as under ordinary

[1] *loc. cit.*, pp. 28, 29. [2] do., p. 35.
[3] The "Annals of Rural Bengal," (3d ed.), p. 215.

circumstances they are inoffensive. In their engagements with the English sepoys, as long as their national drums beat, the whole party would stand and allow themselves to be shot down. They fought bravely for the redress of their grievances, but they always said that if an Englishman who understood their wrongs had been sent among them, there would have been no war.[1] Mr Hunter has very graphically described the ceremonies which constitute the most important events in the history of the Santal. He speaks of them as admission into the family, admission into the tribe, admission into the race, union of his own tribe with another by marriage, formal dismission from the living race by incremation, and lastly, reunion with the departed fathers. No man is allowed to marry within his own clan, but his children belong to the same clan as himself. The family feeling is so strong, says Mr Hunter, "that expulsion from the clan is the only form of banishment known. Like the Roman *aquæ et ignis interdictio,* to which it bears a strange resemblance, it amounts to loss of civil rights, for other clans will not receive the outcast; and the idea of the ties of kindred being destroyed between the individual and the race is insupportable to the Santal."[2] Although polygamy is not unknown under special circumstances, the Santals are usually content with one wife. Divorce is rare, and can be obtained only with the consent of the husband's clansmen.[3] The first wife is honoured as the head of the house, and the female members of the family are always treated with respect. They are allowed to join in festivities, and the only mark of superiority which the husband exhibits is finishing his meals before his wife begins. The Santal women are "modest but frank." They converse intel-

[1] "The Annals of Rural Bengal," p. 236 *seq.* [2] do., p. 202.
[3] do., p. 208.

ligibly with strangers, and perform the rites of hospitality to their husband's guests.[1] Mr Hunter states that the village government among the Santals is purely patriarchal. "Each hamlet has an original founder (the Manjhi-Hanan), who is regarded as the father of the community. He receives divine honours in the sacred grove, and transmits his authority to his descendants." This authority is exercised by the head man of the village or his deputy. The village also has a watchman, but among the pure Santals, says Mr Hunter, crime and criminal officers are almost unknown.[2] This speaks well for their natural disposition, but it can hardly be taken as showing that they have any very definite notion of moral duty, seeing that the most intelligent Santals "seemed to think that uncharitable men and childless women were eaten eternally by worms and snakes, while good men entered into fruit-bearing trees."[3] The Santal has no idea of a supreme beneficent God, but he has "a multitude of demons and evil spirits, whose spite he endeavours by supplications to avert." Every house has its own deity, besides which each family worships its own ancestors," whose ghosts require to be pacified in many ways." If not appeased, they send cramp, leprosy, and crooked limbs. Moreover, the Santals find ghosts everywhere, river-demons, well-demons, tank-demons, mountain-demons, forest-demons, and ghouls who eat men. The national god of the Santals is the Great Mountain, which forms "the most perfect type of the household god." Mr Hunter, also finds traces among them of sun-worship, and he concludes that the Santal religion consists of "a mythology constructed upon the family basis, but rooted in a still more primitive system of nature worship."[4]

[1] "The Annals of Rural Bengal," p. 217.
[2] do., pp. 216, 217. [3] do., p. 210. [4] do., p. 181, *seq.*

Large districts in Bengal are chiefly occupied by Kolarian tribes supposed to be allied to the Santals, such as the Múndas of Chútiá-Nagpúr, the Bhúmij of Mánbhúm, and the Hos of Singbhúm, who are said by Colonel Dalton to have been the earliest settlers in the Gangetic valley that tradition speaks of, and who were probably inhabitants of Bihár (the ancient Magadha) at the date of the birth of Gautama Buddha.[1] From thence they were expelled by Dravidian invaders represented now by the Kocch tribe of Bihár, the Rajmahal Highlanders, the Oráons, and the Bhúiyas.[2] The Hos are supposed to have retained the primitive manners of the race with less change than the other tribes, and they may probably be accepted as representative of this branch of the Kolarian stock. In their manners they appear to be gentle and kind, and they have introduced, says Colonel Dalton, the pleasing custom of naming their children after persons they like, irrespective of creed or race, and that as a spontaneous act of the unconverted Hos. Wives are purchased, and a phase of the "marriage by capture" is used by them, but the young men and women have no lack of opportunity for courting, and the latter are not at all averse to flirting. This is not carried too far, however, the girls having "innate notions of propriety that make them modest in demeanour, though devoid of prudery, and of the obscene abuse so frequently heard from the lips of common women in Bengal, they appear to have no knowledge." Things are very different, however, during the Mágh Parab, a festival held when the granaries are full. Then the natives seem "to undergo a temporary

[1] Buchanan supposes the Cheros, who formed the chief portion of the inhabitants, to have accepted Gautama's doctrines, while the Kols did not. Both Kols and Cheros are classed by Dalton as the "snake" race.

[2] "The Ethnology of Bengal," p. 163.

change. Sons and daughters revile their parents in gross language, and parents their children; men and women become almost like animals in the indulgence of their amorous propensities." During the festival parents never attempt to exercise any restraint, and the utmost liberty is given to girls, who sometimes pair off with the young men of a neighbouring village, and absent themselves together for several weeks. Such adventures, however, generally end in marriage. The Hos excuse their conduct at the Mágh Festival by saying that they are then so full of devilry, "that it is absolutely necessary for the safety of the person to let off steam by allowing for a time full vent to the passions." At other times, says Colonel Dalton, they are quiet and reserved in manners, and gentle and decorous in their demeanour towards women. They are nevertheless very impulsive, "easily excited to rash, headstrong action, and apt to resent imposition or oppression without reflection, but the retaliation, which often extends to a death-blow, is done on the spur of the moment and openly, secret assassination being a crime almost unthought of by them." The Hos are peculiarly sensitive to harshness of language, and this often results in self-destruction. Colonel Dalton remarks that "if a young girl appears mortified by anything that has been said, it is not safe to let her go away till she is soothed," and he adds that a reflection on a man's honesty or veracity may induce him to commit suicide. Like all peoples of inferior culture, the Hos are very superstitious. All disease, whether in animals or in man, is ascribed either to the wrath of some evil spirit, or to sorcery. In the latter case, the sorcerer has to be discovered and killed, and under such circumstances, the Hos lose all their mildness. They believe that witchcraft is in the blood, and the sorcerer and his whole family were formerly put to

death without mercy. Omens have great influence over their conduct, and are always studied before any important step in life is taken. This is particularly the case when a marriage is being arranged, numerous omens then having to be observed. On burning the bodies of the dead, the Hos throw money, food, and the weapons and clothes of the deceased on the flames, but this is done not because it is thought that the dead will benefit by those things, but because the living "are unwilling to derive any immediate benefit from the death of a member of their family." They do not appear to have any very definite notion of a future life, although they believe that the shades of the dead wander about, and to these they make offerings. The character given of the Hos is applicable on the whole to the Múndas, who are not, however, so truthful and open as their kinsmen, probably, Colonel Dalton thinks, because they have for ages had to maintain a continual struggle against the encroachments of their superior neighbours, who treat them as a degraded race. Finally, the Hos seem to be more susceptible of improvement than other Kolarians tribes. While still retaining the traits which favourably distinguish the Indian aborigines, "a manner free from servility, but never rude, a love, or at least the practice, of truth, a feeling of self-respect rendering them keenly sensitive under rebuke, they have become less suspicious, less revengeful, less blood-thirsty, less contumacious, and in all respects more amenable to the laws of the realm, and the advice of their officers." Moreover, they have begun to take considerable interest in education, and both they and the Múndas are gradually embracing Christianity.[1] The Hos, like their brethren the Múndas and Bhúmij, still retain the primitive village system, according to which a district was divided into groups of

[1] "The Ethnology of Bengal," p. 184, *seq.*

twelve or more villages called *Parhás or Pirhis*, each under a headman, and each village having its hereditary public officers under a chief or Moondah.[1]

The wildest and most savage of the Múndah tribes are dreaded as great sorcerers, and are believed both by the more civilized Kols, and by the Hindus settled in the country, to have the power of transforming themselves into tigers and other beasts of prey.[2] The Kharriás of Singbhúm, who, notwithstanding their Kol affinities, resemble the Dravidian tribes in some of their customs, are the most noted for witchcraft, probably on account of their extreme wildness. Colonel Dalton believes, however, that the Kharriás had at one time a village system similar to that of the Múndas, although it has now quite disappeared. The primitive nature of their social culture is shown by the fact, that they have borrowed the word to denote the ceremonies of marriage from their Hindu neighbours. The Kharriás were not, however, without marriage, although its preliminary observances consisted merely of a dance and a feast when the bride was taken by her relatives to the house of her husband. Colonel Dalton says, that "the nuptial dances of the Kharriás are very wild, and the gestures of the dancers and the songs all bear more directly than delicately on what is evidently considered the main object of the festivities, the public recognition of the consummation of the marriage."[3] A curious tribe, supposed to be closely allied to the Kharriás, and known as *Juangs*, or leaf-wearers, are described by Colonel Dalton as being in their habits and customs the most primitive people he had met with or read of. Before the advent of

1 "The Ethnology of Bengal," p. 168.

2 "Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal" (1866), Special No., Ethnology, p. 158, and see p. 187.

3 "The Ethnology of Bengal," p. 158, *seq.*

foreigners they had no knowledge of metals, and they must have used stone weapons or none; and Colonel Dalton suggests that, as they occupy a hill country in which such weapons are found, we have in the Juangs "representatives of the stone age *in situ*." They do, indeed, claim to be the first produced of the human race, and to be autochthones in Keonjhur, where they reside. However this may be, the Juangs are undoubtedly a very primitive race. The men wear a very small piece of cotton cloth round the loins, but the women are "clothed" simply in a girdle of beads, from which hang, before and behind, young shoots of the asan, or any other tree with long soft leaves.[1] The use of this style of dress they account for by the opinion that fashion should never change, and that for women especially it should be simple and cheap! The Juangs have a rude kind of cultivation, but they live largely on wild roots and fruits, and they are not at all scrupulous as to the animal food they make use of. They are said indeed to eat all sorts of flesh, including tigers, snakes, and vermin, and even offal. Their dwellings are small, and all the family sleep in one compartment, except the boys, who have a place to themselves.[2] Their marriage ceremonies are as simple as those of the Kharriás, and they can have as many wives as they can afford,[3] but none of them ever venture on more than two at a time. The Juangs appear to be an artless race, and like all the Kols very fond of dancing. The dances, which usually represent the actions of animals, are chiefly performed,

[1] The Koragars, a tribe of Chandalas or outcasts, are required by custom to wear a leaf girdle. See Dr Shortt's "Hill Ranges of Southern India," part iv., p. 24.

[2] Dr Shortt says that all the youths and widowers sleep together in one hut, and that the unmarried women occupy another hut. Journal of the London Anthropological Society (1865), p. cxxxvii.

[3] Dr Shortt states that polygamy is allowed only where a man has not any family by his first wife (*loc. cit.*, p. cxxxvii.).

however, by the girls, who display a great anxiety that their leaves should not be disarranged. They refused to go through one dance called "the Cocks and Hens," on the ground that it was too much of a romp for a day performance, and that "it was impossible to keep the leaves in proper position whilst they danced it." The girls are described as being extremely shy and timid. Colonel Dalton relates that the Juangs came to his tent at noon, and that whilst he conversed with the males on their customs, language, and religion, "the girls sat nestled in a corner, for a long time silent and motionless as statues, but after an hour or two had elapsed the crouching nymphs showed signs of life and symptoms of uneasiness, and more attentively regarding them, I found that great tears were dropping from their downcast eyes like dew-drops on the green leaves. On my tenderly seeking the cause of their distress, I was told that the leaves were becoming dry, stiff, and uncomfortable, and if they were not allowed to go to the woods for a change, the consequences would be serious, and they certainly could not dance." After having renewed their leaves, the Juang girls went through their dancing performance, which was a very interesting "ballet." Colonel Dalton says, that the Juangs appear to be free from the belief in witchcraft, and not to have any reputation for sorcery, such as is enjoyed by the Kharriás. They have, moreover, no term in their language for *God, heaven,* or *hell,* and no idea of a future state, so far as could be ascertained. However, "they offer fowls to the sun when in distress, and to the earth to give them its fruits in due season." On these occasions an old man, who is called Nágam, officiates as priest, but they have not any obligatory religious ceremonies.[1] According to Dr Shortt, the Juangs have an

[1] "The Ethnology of Bengal," p. 152, *seq.*

indefinite notion of a Supreme Being, who is supposed to be present everywhere. This writer states that they are of a peaceful character, their only weapons being the bow and arrow, and the *tanghee*, or axe for cutting wood, and that they are very fond of animals. The sick are carefully attended to, and different kinds of roots and shrubs are administered by those who profess a knowledge of their virtues—usually old women. As to sexual matters, Dr Shortt affirms that chastity is encouraged, adding, however, somewhat indefinitely, "to a certain extent," and that adultery is rare. When it occurs, the woman is punished and her husband takes another wife.[1]

The Kolarian peoples are found on both sides of the Indian continent, but the Dravidian Gonds now separate the Kols of the east from those of the west. The latter are located chiefly in the Bombay Presidency, all the aborigines of which, Mr Justice Campbell thinks, are comprised in the two tribes of Kúlís and Bhíls. These tribes, although now quite distinct, owing probably to the fact that the Kúlís have been more affected by Aryan blood and civilization, he supposes to have had a similar origin.[2] The Kúlís are the aborigines of Goozerat, and of the hills adjoining that province, and though most of them are now quiet agriculturists and labourers, the wilder tribes are still predatory in their habits. Forbes described them as "of diminutive stature, with eyes which bore an expression of liveliness and cunning, clothes few, arms bows and arrows, habits swift and active, bold in assault, but rapid in flying to the jungles, independent in spirit, robbers, averse to industry, addicted to drunkenness, and quarrelsome when intoxicated; formidable in anarchy, but incapable of

1 "Journal of the London Anthropological Society" (1865), where a very interesting account of the Juangs is given by Dr Shortt.

2 *op. cit.*, p. 42.

uniting among themselves."[1] This description, Mr Justice Campbell thinks, applies well to the wild Bhíls of the present day. Although the Bhíls are considered outcasts by the Hindus, they are not looked upon by the Rajpoots as impure, and there is evidence that at one time they were a prosperous people, dwelling in towns and occupying the whole of Rajpootana. They are very warlike and courageous, and when they have no general enemy to attack, neighbouring tribes fight among themselves.[2] The more settled Bhíls appear, however, to be of a kind disposition and not given to bloodshed. Bishop Heber says of the Bhíls, that their avowed profession, from the remotest antiquity, has been plunder. He adds, however, that they appear to be on the whole a better race than their conquerors—the Rajpoots. "Their word is more to be depended on, they are of a franker and livelier character, their women are far better treated and enjoy more influence, and though they shed blood without scruple in cases of deadly feud, or in the regular way of a foray, they are not vindictive or inhospitable under other circumstances." Moreover, when trusted, they are "the trustiest of men, and of all sentries the most wakeful and indefatigable;"[3] nevertheless, the wilder Bhíls are very inaccessible, and much more difficult to reclaim than kindred tribes.[4] M. Rousselet refers to several barbarous tribes which appear to be more or less closely connected with the Bhíls. Such are the Dhêrs,[5] the Holars, and the Mangs, who form an intermediate group between the Bhíls and the Mahars or Varalis of

[1] Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
[2] Rousselet, *loc. cit.*, p. 59, *seq.*
[3] Journal, ii. pp. 496, 538. [4] Do., iii. pp. 23, 122.
[5] The Dhêrs are mentioned in connection with the Chandalas in the Memoirs on the Origin of Slaves, given by Dr Shortt. "The Hill Ranges of Southern India," part iv. p. 16.

the Konkan. Of the former of these tribes, M. Rousselet says, that they present the most inferior type of the human race on the western coast of India; while they and the Varalis represent the dominant type of the country before the invasions of the Turanians and Aryans. The Varalis pay great respect to the name of Ravàna, the adversary of Rama, and consider him the founder of their race;[1] while the Bhíls, like the Bhúiyas, reverence most highly Rama's auxiliary Hunouman.[2] Colonel Dalton remarks, that a thin line of aboriginal tribes, who appear to be more allied to the Santals than to the Múndas, are traceable all through Gondwana and across the continent until the Bhíls are reached.[3] Of these tribes the Korwás of Barwah are the most characteristic, and the Hill-Korwás are said to be the most savage-looking of all the Kolarian tribes. The Korwás of the Kharia plateau are but little less savage in appearance, and in character would seem to be equally so, since they live in small detached hamlets, or quite separate from each other, owing to their attempts to form communities being always attended by bloody brawls.[4] The Korwás of the highlands of Sirgúja are sometimes very lawless. According to Colonel Dalton, they were at one time organized marauders, and appear to have subsisted wholly by pillage, which was often accompanied by murder. For some years, however, they have been well conducted, many of their leaders having been induced to settle in the plains. We learn rom the same source, that the Korwás have "shown great cruelty in committing robberies, putting to death the whole of the party attacked, even when unresisting, but they have what one might call the savage virtue of truthfulness to an extraordinary degree, and, rightly

1 Rousselet, *loc. cit.*, p. 69.
2 Do., p. 61.
3 "The Ethnology of Bengal," p. 231.
4 Do., p. 227.

accused, will at once confess and give you every required detail of the crime." Colonel Dalton says, that when several are implicated in one offence, he has found them "most anxious that to each should be ascribed his fair share of it, and no more, the oldest of the party invariably taking on himself the chief responsibility as leader or instigator, and doing his utmost to exculpate as unaccountable agents the young members of the gang."[1]

The regard for truth which distinguishes so many of the aboriginal tribes of India, is one of the most curious moral phenomena presented by uncultured peoples, the more so as, notwithstanding Colonel Dalton's opinion to the contrary, veracity is not a savage virtue. It arises, no doubt, from some peculiarity, either in the organization or the history of the Indian aborigines, which it would probably be a hopeless task to endeavour to discover. That it is not a sign of advanced moral culture, is evident from the fact that it is exhibited by peoples who commit the most heinous crimes without hesitation. Extreme veracity would seem to be no less a trait of some of the tribes of the Assam highlands. Thus, of the Garos, in whom Colonel Dalton sees the primitive type of the great Mech Kachari, or Bodo, nation, it is said—"They are lively, good-natured, hospitable, frank and honest in their dealings, till contaminated by their intercourse with Bengalis,[2] and they possess that pearl of great price so rare amongst Eastern nations—a love of truth. They will not hastily make engagements, because, when they do make them, they intend to keep them. They are affectionate fathers and

1 "The Ethnology of Bengal," p. 230.

2 Mr Hodgson, while agreeing on the whole in the character he ascribes to the Bodo with that given in the text, says that they are a pleasing medium between the unsophisticated roughness of their highland neighbours, and the very artificial smoothness of their neighbours of the plains. ("Aborigines of India," p. 189.)

kind husbands, and their conduct generally towards the weaker sex is marked by consideration and respect.[1] Notwithstanding the lavish exposure of their persons, the women are chaste, and make good, steady wives." And yet it was formerly customary with the Garos, whenever the death of a great man occurred amongst them, "to send out a party of assassins to murder and bring back the head of the first Bengali they met. The victims so immolated would, it was supposed, be acceptable to their gods, and the clans preserved the skulls, as the proudest trophies they could adorn their halls with."[2] This conduct is on a par with what is related of their blood feuds, which were pursued with the most savage vengeance, women and children, as well as men, being the victims. When a quarrel occurred between two Garos, each of them planted a tree bearing sour fruit, and swore that they would eat the fruit with the juice of his enemy's head. The feud might be handed down to the children of those originally implicated, and the person who "eventually succeeds in revenging himself upon his antagonist, cuts off his head, summons his friends, with whom he boils the head along with the fruit of the tree, and portions out the mixed juice to them, and drinks of it himself. The tree is then cut down, and the feud is at an end."[3] The practice of head-taking is not unusual among many of the tribes of south-eastern Bengal, such as the Nagas, the Kukis, and the Loshais, and it appears, as with the Dyaks of Borneo, to be looked upon as a test of manhood.[4] Thus, among the Nagas of Upper Assam, the taking of a human skull or scalp is necessary before the rite of tattoo can be performed. It

1 The maiden has the privilege of proposing marriage.
2 "The Ethnology of Bengal," p. 68.
3 "Journal of the Anthropological Institute" (1878), p. 395.
4 Do. (1874), p. 477.

need not be that of an enemy, and, although acquired by the blackest treachery, "so long as the victim was not a member of the clan, it is accepted as a chivalrous offering of a true knight to his lady."[1] The Kachu Nagas do not appear to be head hunters, but they exhibit their barbarous nature in other ways. Quarrels between members of the same clan are restrained by fear of the consequences which flow from blood feuds, and to furnish a means of giving an opportunity to people to give vent to their fighting propensities, a meeting is held once or twice a year, when a general *melée* takes place, the combatants not being allowed any weapons. In wars between different tribes much treachery is displayed, and neither sex nor age is spared.[2] The Kukis of Kachar are nearly as barbarous, but they preserve and adopt the children of their enemies. They also take the heads of those whom they slay, presenting them before one of their deities, and they believe that in the next world they will be attended by such persons as slaves. With the Kukis treason is the only crime punished with death. In cases of homicide the murderer and all his family become the slaves of the Raja. The most esteemed accomplishment amongst them is dexterity in thieving, which is condemning only when the thief is caught at the act, when he becomes a slave. Adultery or seduction is punished by the father or husband aggrieved at his discretion; but "all the women of the village, married or single, are at the pleasure of the Raja."[3] Nevertheless, Major Macdonald affirms that the Kukis are far more civilized than any of the aboriginal races of India, and that no happier people can be found in the world.[4]

[1] "The Ethnology of Bengal," p. 40.
Do., pp. 42, 44. [3] Do., p. 45.
[4] "Journal of the Anthropological Institute" (1873), p. 64.

Before closing this long account of the manners of the aborigines of India, reference may be made to several tribes whose affinities, like those of the Nagas, are more Mongolian than Negroid.[1] Among the Abors, a people allied to the Tibetans, the Pádam would appear to be the most cultured. They have reached the stage at which certain actions are regarded as crimes against the State, as much as against the individual; or rather, they are considered public pollutions, which require a public sacrifice to be atoned for. The culprit, however, has ultimately to suffer, and this he is made to do in a curious manner. When such a sacrifice is ordered, the community seizes the first animal of the kind required which comes to hand, and the owner is at liberty to fix his own value on it, and recover the amount from the person whose conduct led to the seizure. This roundabout way of punishing crime may have become established through the weakness of public authority. There is no power in the community to inflict bodily or capital punishment on a free-born person, although slaves may be put to death. The Morong, or Town Hall, is occupied at night by the unmarried men of the village. The Pádam are superior to many uncultured tribes in the treatment of their women. Probably this is due to the same cause as that to which is ascribed their abhorrence of polygamy—a natural dislike of quarrelling and dissensions. Marriage is usually preceded by courtship, and, to their credit be it said, that it would be considered an indelible disgrace to barter a child's happiness for money. The Pádam women would seem not to be overburdened with modesty. Colonel Dalton relates that on one occasion he witnessed a dance, in which they divested themselves of everything but their

[1] Colonel Dalton's "Dhoba Abor," (plate xii.), would, however, in physiognomy, pass well for a Kafir.

hip belts, composed of metal plates, and behaved in a very indecorous manner.[1] The Miris of the plains, who are closely allied to the Pádam, resemble them in this respect. The girls "dance the somewhat sensual Bihu dance with great spirit." Before marriage they are allowed much freedom, and at a particular season of the year "the adult unmarried males and females of a village spend several days and nights together in one large building, and if couples manage thus to suit each other, they pair off and marry." Among the hill Miris polygamy is practised by the chiefs, and when a man dies his wives descend to his heir, who becomes the husband of all the women except his own mother. Among the poorer classes, owing to the cost of a wife, instances of polyandry are occasionally to be met with, two brothers buying a wife between them. The women make faithful and obedient wives, and they express their astonishment "at the unbridled license of an Asamese woman's tongue, even in addressing her husband. They are trained never to complain, or give an angry answer, and cheerfully do they appear to bear the hard burden imposed upon them, which includes nearly the whole of the field labour, and an equal share of the carrying work of their journeys to the plains." In warfare both Arbors and Miris fight by nocturnal surprises, and if successful they massacre indiscriminately men, women, and children. The Tenae tribe are said to form an honourable exception to this rule. They make open warfare, and inflict no injury on non-combatants.[2]

The Mishmis of the Brahmaputra Valley, another semi-Mongolian people, are usually quiet and inoffensive, but are keen traders. Like the Abors, they practise polygamy, having as many wives as they can afford to purchase, all of whom, on a man's death, descend to his

1 "The Ethnology of Bengal," p. 24 *seq.* 2 Do., p. 29 *seq.*

heir.[1] This is the case also with the Chalikata, or crop-haired Mishmis, some of whose chiefs have as many as sixteen wives. Incontinency is, however, not considered a crime, and husbands take no cognizance of the *liasons* of their wives, so long as they retain their services; but should a woman leave her husband, he takes prompt vengeance on her seducer for the injury thus sustained. The Chalikata Mishmis are extremely deceitful, and are given to kidnapping women and children from the villages in the plains. Their chiefs have no power to punish the crimes of their subjects. The rule is that "if an injury is inflicted on one of them by a member of another tribe, it is incumbent on the tribe of the injured party to avenge it. If one of his own tribe offend, it is the business of the person offended only." Colonel Dalton states that although the Chalikatas propitiate spirits, they have no notion of a future state, or of immortality. They declare that the spirits are mortal like themselves, and "though they admitted there must have been a creator, they flatly denied that the being who called into existence their hills, rocks, rivers, forests, and ancestors, could still be alive." The food, weapons, and clothes which they deposited on the graves of the dead, were placed there only as a mark of affection, and from a feeling of indisposition to use what had belonged to him, and thus benefitting by his death.[2]

The Singphos of Assam are of comparatively recent introduction into that province, and belong to the Burmese Ka-Khyen race. They appear to be treacherous, their warfare consisting chiefly of night surprises. Polygamy is fully established among them. Before marriage the girls are allowed much freedom, and it has been said that in some villages they live together in a common house, where they receive visits from the young men.

[1] "Ethnology of Bengal," pp. 15, 16. [2] Do., p. 13 *seq.*

Colonel Dalton states, however, that if such an institution exists, it is not shown to strangers. The Singphos have an indefinite idea of a Supreme Being, but they only propitiate evil spirits, called Nats. They entertain the curious notion that a sacrifice is required if a man dies by violence, but not if he dies a natural death, on the ground that, in the latter case, "the gods took him at their own good time, and do not need propitiation."[1] The Singphos are interesting, owing to their relationship with the Karens of Burmah, of whom much has been written. Certain ideas held by the latter, which were at one time thought to be due to early Christian teaching, are now supposed to have been derived from a Jewish source. Their belief is that every object has its La, or Kelah. The Kelah of each man "existed before him, comes with him into the world, and lives with him till his death; but the Kelah does not die with him. Some Las, thus separated from the body which they have inhabited, remain on earth, and become mischievous spirits. Some go to hades, some (thence ?) to hell, some to heaven. But besides this *alter ego* that each man possesses, bad passions, reckless folly, and madness, have each their Kelah, aud a man ails, or appears according to the La of the kind that seizes him. The moral soul, principle, or soul, is called 'Thah.' When we do good, or when we do evil, it is the Thah that does it. The head is the abode of a deity called Tso (conscience ?); so long as he keeps his seat, no Kelah (evil propensity ?) can do any mischief."[2] Some of the Karens appear to be robbers and kidnappers by profession;[3] but others probably more nearly resemble in character and manner the Múnda tribes of Chútiá Nágpúr.

1 "The Ethnology of Bengal," p. 9 *seq.*
2 Do., p. 117. 3 Do., p. 118.

CHAPTER II.

THE SENSE OF RIGHT—*Continued.*

MADECASSES.

WHAT has been said in the preceding chapter of the moral character of the islanders of the Pacific might almost be repeated of the inhabitants of Madagascar,[1] although it must be admitted that in some particulars the latter present certain improvements, while in others they appear to less advantage than some of the Polynesian peoples. Mr Ellis assures us that nothing can exceed the affection with which children are treated by their parents and by other members of the family, amounting, however, to an excessive indulgence, which allows of no restraint on their inclinations. Parents, nevertheless, sometimes exercise their power of selling their children, when persistently disobedient, into slavery. Children, on their part, show great affection for their parents, and do not, as is often the case among uncultured peoples, cease to respect them when old. On the other hand, the ties of kindred are easily broken, and for the most trivial reasons. Family feuds are common, and although both custom and law give a man, when in need, a claim for assistance on the other members of his

[1] It should be mentioned that the particulars given in the text concern chiefly the Hovas, the ruling tribe of Madagascar, and the people more immediately subject to them. The difference between the Hovas and the dark coast tribes is probably analogous to that between the Hottentots and Kafirs of the neighbouring continent. See this subject considered in a paper by the present writer on "The Race Elements of the Madecasses" in The Journal of the Anthropological Society, 1870.

family; yet the obligation thus constituted can be got rid of by previously disowning the relationship.[1] The kind and careful manner in which the sick are treated is a pleasing feature in the native character.[2] The Madecasse is evidently a very affectionate being, and the force of superstition must be strong indeed to make people anxious to disown their connexion with the unfortunate victims of the tangena ordeal,[3] and to induce parents to destroy their children. When now practised, infanticide, which would seem to have existed in Madagascar from time immemorial, is usually restricted to children who are declared by the *Panandros*, or astrologers, to have been born at an unlucky time.[4] Sometimes, however, it is resorted to through the fear of having too large a family, and probably at one time the custom was as common as among the natives of Australia or Polynesia. Mild, or rather quiet and indifferent, as the Madecasses usually are in manner, when they conceive themselves injured, or their passions are aroused, they are cruel and vindictive. Mr Hastie says that they cherish, during a long period the desire for revenge for the most trifling insults, and take delight in the distress of others.[5] When any person subjected to the tangena ordeal is declared guilty, he is at once strangled, if the poison has not been immediately fatal, and his body, sometimes while still living, thrown into a grave, or left for a prey to wild animals. Sometimes it is hurled down a precipice, in the presence of a multitude of spectators, "who look on without the least emotion of pity, while the children who have mingled with the crowd amuse themselves by throwing stones at the lifeless bodies, which the dogs are rending

[1] Ellis' "History of Madagascar," i., pp. 138, 161.

[2] Do., p. 231. But formerly, when the small-pox appeared, the first person attacked was either stoned to death or buried alive, to prevent the spread of contagion. (Ellis, *op. cit.*, i., p. 227.)

[3] Do., i., p. 472. [4] Do., p. 154. [5] Do., p. 140.

to pieces."[1] These facts, with the nature of their capital punishments, some of which are very cruel,[2] show that the Madecasses are still at a low stage of moral culture.

As regards sexual morality, Mr Ellis affirms that "their sensuality is universal and gross, though generally concealed. Continence is not supposed to exist in either sex before marriage, consequently it is not expected, and its absence is not regarded as a vice."[3] There are instances, indeed, of conjugal faithfulness after marriage, but these, Mr Ellis says, are comparatively rare;[4] while, according to M. Charnay, such a state is so unlooked-for that jealousy is unknown. This French writer adds that marriage unions may be dissolved at pleasure,[5] a statement which is confirmed by the grounds of divorce mentioned by Mr Ellis. They are; if a wife be cruel towards the step-children in a family, or children by another wife, or children whom the husband may have adopted; or if she be extravagant, or idle, or inattentive to her husband; or if she be suspected of infidelity to her husband; or of gadding about too much from house to house; or of receiving attention from the other sex; or if she accuse her husband, justly or unjustly, of infidelity towards his lawful wife or wives; or if she refuses her consent to his taking another wife;—under all such circumstances, says Mr Ellis, a woman is divorced, and frequently on occasions of far less importance.[6] Such a course is permitted even for no other reason than that the woman is likely to become a mother, and public opinion does not even condemn a

[1] Ellis' "History of Madagascar," i., pp. 141, 472.

[2] Do., p. 371 *seq.*

[3] Do., p. 138. Mr Ellis states that during the period of rejoicing at the birth of Radama's daughter, the streets of the capital appeared like one great brothel. (i., p. 150).

[4] Do., p. 167.

[5] "Illustrated Travels" (Cassell), i., p. 50.

[6] *op. cit.*, i., p. 172.

man for such conduct.[1] It is hardly surprising that a considerable proportion of married people in Madagascar are childless.[2] Polygamy, which is almost universal beyond the limits of Europe, receives its highest sanction in the practice of the Sovereign, the only regulation affecting it being that he alone is allowed to have twelve wives.[3] Each Madecasse chief has at least three wives —" first, the *vadé-be*, the legitimate wife, whose children are his heirs; second, the *vadé-massaye*, whom the husband repudiates when she is past the prime of her youth and beauty; and the *vadé-sindrangnow*, a slave, who receives her freedom when she becomes a mother. The younger sisters of these three wives also belong to the husband until they are themselves married. When a woman passes to another home, she leaves her children, who are treated by her successor with the same affection as her own."[4] It is noticeable that a Queen, while unmarried, has the right of having children by any one she may choose, and their legitimacy is never called in question. Captain Oliver, who mentions this fact, adds that throughout the island immorality of every description prevails, and he refers to the curious circumstance that "whenever a vessel arrives at Tamatave, or other port on the coast, the officer of Customs enquires the number of the people on board, and shortly after canoes approach the vessel, with women corresponding in number to those of the ship's officers, crew, and passengers, who proceed to pass the night on board. Unless intercourse is allowed with these women, the ship will not be permitted water, provisions, or to traffic in bullocks, &c."[5] With regard to the rights of property, the Madecasses

1 Ellis, *op. cit.*, i., p. 149.
2 Sibree's "Madagascar and its People" (1870), p. 195.
3 Ellis, *op. cit.*, i., p. 168.
4 Charnay, *loc cit.*
5 "Memoirs of Anthropological Society," iii., p. 18.

are as careless as in the matter of chastity. Mr Ellis says that they are very daring thieves, especially in the robbing of tombs, which are violated for the purpose of stealing the small pieces of money which the non-Christian natives often place in the mouth of the corpse.[1]

Finally, the Madecasses are no less given to the practice of deceit, and cheating appears to be one of their special characteristics. Mr Ellis remarks that there are in their language more words to express the various modes of deceiving than any other vice, and that none of the popular stories are so much liked as those which "relate instances of successful deceit or fraud, though involving loss of life, as well as of property, to the injured person."[2] The practice of lying is equally common, and it is preferred, both as a matter of interest and pleasure, to speaking the truth. The constant aim of the Madecasses is, "in business to swindle, in professed friendship to extort, and in mere conversation to exaggerate and fabricate."[3] Elsewhere Mr Ellis says, that even amongst the Christian Madecasses untruthfulness, although condemned, is one of their most easily besetting sins.[4] The propensity to openly appropriate the property of their neighbours, was always strongly developed among the Madecasses until the Hovas established their supremacy, and claimed the sole right of property. In the time of Drury, the neighbouring chiefs were nearly always at war, their quarrels usually arising from the practice of cattle-lifting.[5]

[1] "Madagascar Revisited," p. 215. A man who had stolen money from the tomb of Radama was put to death with the most cruel torture. (Ellis' "History of Madagascar," i., p. 255.)

[2] "History of Madagascar," i. pp. 142-3. [3] Do., p. 143.

[4] "Madagascar Revisited," p. 314.

[5] The character of the darker Madecasses, as described by Drury, differs little from that ascribed to the Hovas, except that its bad elements were not so fully developed. See "Adventures" (Ed. 1870), pp. 183, 236, *seq.*

The inhabitants of Madagascar have latterly acquired a special interest, owing to the destruction of the national idols, consequent on the progress of Christianity, and it may be well therefore to give the general opinion originally formed as to their character by the missionaries. This we have in the words of Mr Ellis, who says:—"The moral qualities of the Malagasy are less equivocal than their mental characteristics, and far more censurable and injurious. With less that is sprightly and prepossessing in manners and address, the dark-coloured tribes possess more that is commendable and amiable in social life; and there are among them more straightforwardness and honesty than in the fairer races. The latter, with the exception of the Betsilo, exhibit, with but few traits of character that can be regarded with complacency, much that is offensive to every feeling of purity and every principle of virtue. They are often, probably under the influence of superstition and revenge, coolly and deliberately cruel towards their vanquished in war; they appear to be naturally vain, self-complacent, and indolent, unless when roused to effort by ambition, avarice, revenge, or lust: ambition and a love of domination appear inherent. They exhibit also a strong inclination, where they possess the means, to indulge in those gratifications which are the usual attendants on indolence, viz., gluttony and intemperance. From the debasing habits of inebriety the population of Ankova are restricted by the enforcement of laws which make intoxication a capital crime; but if free from the restraint these laws impose, it is supposed that no people would surrender themselves more completely to this humiliating vice than the Hovas."[1]

It would not be proper to dismiss the Madecasses without referring to certain virtues that they un-

[1] "History of Madagascar," i. p. 137.

doubtedly possess. Although there are no words in their language meaning literally "generosity" or "gratitude," yet these ideas can be expressed, and are not unknown in practice. Assisting in distress, lending and borrowing property and money, &c., are carried on, says Mr Ellis, much more commonly and freely than amongst neighbours or relatives in England.[1] The most conspicuous trait of their character is their hospitality. This virtue has been enjoined by the chiefs and by the government for their own benefit, but its universality shows that it is a native habit,[2] as, indeed, we should expect from the prevalence of the same virtue among other uncultured peoples.[3]

AFRICANS.

I have elsewhere[4] pointed out the close resemblance in manners and mental characteristics between the Madecasses and the south African peoples. If this comparison be just, we shall not be surprised to find that their moral ideas are much the same. In some respects the west African tribes are probably on a lower moral level than those of the eastern part of the continent. But the extreme depravity from which certain habits peculiar to the former spring is almost equally apparent among the latter peoples. It is true that this is sometimes ascribed to the influence of the slave trade;[5] but it must not be forgotten that such a trade can flourish only where the morality of the people more immediately concerned in it is of a comparatively low type. Few travellers have had better opportunities of judging of the

[1] "History of Madagascar," i. p. 139. [2] Do., p. 198.

[3] For further information as to the moral conduct of the Madecasses, see *infra*.

[4] "Journal of the Anthropological Society" (1870), p. xxxiv. *et seq.*

[5] Burton's "Lake Regions of Central Africa" (1860), ii. p. 340.

character of the tribes of equatorial Africa than Captain Richard Burton, and as the subject is too extensive to be treated in detail, his conclusions are the more valuable for the present purpose. Captain Burton says, as to the east African, "He is at once very good-tempered and hard-hearted, combative and cautious; kind at one moment, cruel, pitiless, and violent at another; sociable and unaffective; superstitious and grossly irreverent; brave and cowardly, servile and oppressive; obstinate, yet fickle and fond of changes; with points of honour, but without a trace of honesty in word or deed; a lover of life, though addicted to suicide; covetous and parsimonious, yet thoughtless and improvident; somewhat conscious of inferiority, withal unimprovable. In fact, he appears an embryo of the two superior races. . . . He partakes largely of the worst characteristics of the lower Oriental types, stagnation of mind, indolence of body, moral deficiency, superstition, and childish passion; hence the Egyptians aptly termed the Berbers and Negroes the 'perverse race of Kush.'" Captain Burton adds, that the main characteristic of the east African is selfishness. He is wilful, headstrong, and undisciplinable; while revenge is with him a ruling passion, "as the many rancorous, fratricidal wars that have prevailed between kindred clans, even for a generation, prove. Retaliation and vengeance are, in fact, their great agents of moral control." His cruelty and destructiveness are equally pronounced. Conscientious scruples will deter him as little from murder as from theft, if he can avoid punishment, his only dread in the former case being of the ghost of his victim. His depravity, says Burton, is "of the grossest; intrigue fills up all the moments not devoted to intoxication." We can hardly wonder, therefore, that chastity among married women is not a virtue much esteemed, although adul-

tery is punishable by fine or slavery. Divorce is at the will of the husband, the children of the divorced woman becoming the property of the father.

Finally, Captain Burton says of this race:—"Super-subtle and systematic liars, they deceive where duller men would tell the truth; the lie direct is no insult, and the offensive word, 'muongo' (liar), enters largely into every dialogue. They lie like Africans—objectlessly, needlessly, when sure of speedy detection: when fact would be more profitable than falsehood; they have not discovered, with the civilized knave, that 'honesty is the best policy;' they lie till their fiction becomes subjectively fact. With them the lie is no mental exertion, no exercise of ingenuity, no concealment, no mere perversion of the truth: it is apparently a local instinctive peculiarity in the complicated madness of poor human nature. The most solemn and religious oaths are with them empty words: they breathe an atmosphere of falsehood, manœuvre and contrivance, wasting about the mere nothings of life—upon a pound of grain or a yard of cloth—ingenuity of iniquity enough to win and keep a crown. And they are treacherous as false; with them the salt has no signification, and gratitude is unknown even by name."[1]

To this description of the east African may be added the testimony of Captain Speke. According to this traveller all women are considered as *property*, and hence marriage is a very profitable speculation for a girl's father, who puts a price on his daughter and gives her to any one who will pay it. The penalty for illicit intercourse is governed by the same rule, it being fixed according to the value of the woman, on the principle that such intercourse is a petty larceny. So also if a man divorce his wife and sends her home

[1] *op. cit.*, ii. p. 326, *seq.*

again, which he can do at will, he can claim a return of half the price he paid for her, but no more, "because as a second-hand article her future value would be diminished by half." Polygamy is of course generally practised, and to this Captain Speke traces the disorganization of the country caused by war. Half-brothers quarrel among themselves, and fight for the right of succession to their father. Their chief aim is the acquisition of slaves and cattle, and slavery, a second source of war, "keeps them ever fighting and reducing their numbers." The east African is wonderfully superstitious, and the belief in sorcery is so strong that the property derived from people condemned for its practise is spoken of as a source of revenue. The sorcerer is either burnt or speared and thrown into the jungle, where his body becomes food for the wild beasts. The *Mganga*, or magician, sometimes has recourse to a human sacrifice. This is only on special occasions, as when by divination he finds that war is impending. The magician then flays a young child and lays its body lengthwise on the path, that the warriors may step over it on their way to battle, and thus ensure victory. Theft and homicide among themselves are, of course, disapproved of. Pilfering is punished by a fine equivalent to the theft, but irreclaimable thieves and murderers are killed, and dealt with in the same way as sorcerers. One of the worst features of the negro character, as described by Captain Speke, is his want of hospitality. This, says the traveller, "only lives one day." Among the freed slaves much kindness and affection, with great bravery, will sometimes be met with, but these qualities are very inconstant. At another time, the same men will, without cause, "desert, and be treacherous to their sworn friends in the most dastardly manner." They are absolutely without

economy, care, or forethought, and rather than take the trouble to look for his own rope, a bearer will steal that of his comrade, or even cut off his mater's tent-ropes.[1]

The difference between the peoples of East Africa and the negro tribes of the western coast is not great morally, although it may be questioned whether among the former (unless it be with the *Wahuma* of Uganda) there is anything to compare with the utter contempt for human life exhibited in the blood "Customs" of Dahomey, which were justified by the king on the ground of duty to his ancestors.[2] The cruelty of the negro, says Captain Burton, "is like that of the schoolboy, the blind impulse of rage combined with the want of sympathy." In the curious mixture he presents of cowardice and ferocity he resembles the East African, whose utter selfishness he also possesses, added to which is a delight in the torments and the destruction of others. While desiring children for himself, the negro, nevertheless, believes that propagation injures his tribe. He has "an instinctive and unreasoning aversion to increasing population, without which there can be no progress. A veritable Malthusian, he has a variety of traditions justifying infanticide, ordeal, and sacrifice, as if, instead of being a polygamist, he were a polyandrian."[3] The

[1] Speke's "Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile," *Introduction*, p. 18, *seq*.

[2] "A Mission to Gelele, King of Dahomey," ii. p. 214. See also "Dahomey and the Dahomans," by Comm. Forbes, i. p. 32, ii, p. 152, *seq*. It is remarkable that the general internal morality of the Dahomans is, on the whole, far superior to that of most negro tribes. Chastity is highly prized by the Amazons (i. p. 134), and a man who seduces a girl is obliged to marry her. Treason, murder, adultery, cowardice, and theft are punished with death (p. 26). Drunkenness is not allowed (p. 30). All the energies of the Dahomans appear to be concentrated in plundering and enslaving their neighbours, and in the cruelties attendant on such a condition of life. (See Forbes, *op. cit.* i. p. 132, *seq.*)

[3] "A Mission to Gelele," ii. p. 200, *seq*.

low moral condition ascribed to the peoples of West Africa by Captain Burton is amply confirmed by other travellers.[1] Probably the character given to them by Durand is about correct. He declares that "the character of the blacks is nearly the same everywhere: they are indolent, except when animated by the desire of vengeance; implacable, perfidious, and dissimulating when they have received an injury, in order that they may find an opportunity of avenging it with impunity. On the other hand, they are gentle and hospitable to every one, but inclined to larceny, and remarkable for an extreme inconsistency of taste and conduct."[2] Durand adds, that "the women behave with great propriety, and fulfil all domestic duties with the utmost attention."[3] That propriety does not, however, seem to extend to all points of morality. Chastity in the unmarried women is no doubt highly esteemed by some of the tribes at least; but from the moment of marriage, says Durand, "it is a trait of unpoliteness and want of education in the woman to resist the solicitations of a lover; she would, indeed, be punished if discovered, but her reputation would remain unsullied." Our traveller adds, "in the black savages of Africa we find the customs which are prevalent in Italy and Spain; for each negro lady has a cisisbeo or cortéjò,

[1] The old traveller, Bosman, says quaintly as to the natives of the Guinea coast, "murder, adultery, thieving, and all other such like crimes, are here accounted no sins, because they can expiate them with money." The actions accounted sinful are the non-observance of holy-days, the eating of forbidden meats, and false swearing. ("The Coast of Guinea." Pinkerton's "Voyages and Travels," xvi. p. 401.)

[2] Clapperton, in like manner, remarks as to the people of Nyffé, that, while they are liars, cheats, drunkards, and unchaste, yet they are very kind and hospitable. ("Journal of a Second Expedition," p. 143.)

[3] "A Voyage to Senegal," by J. P. L. Durand (A Collection of Modern Voyages and Travels, 1806), iv. p. 99.

whom she makes choice of and takes with her on all occasions. The husband is obliged to tolerate this intercourse in silence; nevertheless the laws are not wanting in severity towards the adulterer; but they are of little effect unless the complainant is a man of great power."[1] The description of the moral character of the negro given above, may be completed by reference to the estimate formed of it by M. Pruner Bey, whose opinion will carry much weight. This eminent French anthropologist says, "the capacity of the negro is limited to imitation. The prevailing impulse is for sensuality and rest. No sooner are the physical wants satisfied than all physical effort ceases, and the body abandons itself to sexual gratification and rest. The family relations are weak; the husband or father is quite careless. Jealousy has only carnal motives, and the fidelity of the female is secured by mechanical contrivances. Drunkenness, gambling, sexual gratification, and ornamentation of the body, are the most powerful levers in the life of the negro."[2]

It is hardly a matter of surprise, judging from these facts, to be told that the European traveller is expected by the negroes of West Africa "to patronise their wives and daughters, and these unconscious followers of Lycurgus and Cato feel hurt, as if dishonoured, by his refusal to gratify them. The custom is very prevalent along this coast.[3] At Gaboon, perhaps, it

[1] "A Voyage to Senegal," &c., p. 105.

[2] Cited by Dr James Hunt in "The Negro's Place in Nature," "Memoirs of the Anthropological Society of London," i. p. 49; and see M. Pruner Bey, "Sur les Nègres" in the Mémoires de la Société d'Anthropologie, t. i., p. 330, *seq.*

[3] The Portuguese traveller Merolla says, that the natives of Congo allow their wives to submit to the embraces of the strangers who stay with them. He adds, that the princesses have the right to choose for themselves what man they please, whether noble or plebeian. (Pinkerton's "Voyages and Travels," xvi. p. 272.) Clapperton refers

reaches the acme; there a man will in one breath offer the choice between his wife, sister, and daughter. The women, of course, do as they are bid by the men, and they consider all familiarity with a white man as a high honour."[1] This custom, which is common to so many semi-civilized peoples, is probably founded on the idea that such a sexual connection establishes a kind of relationship, as Bruce affirmed of a similar custom among the Gallas.[2]

That the character of the West African has not been painted in too dark colours by the writers already quoted, is evident from the information furnished by Du Chaillu, whose description concerns tribes of whom little was previously known. The adult negro is described by this traveller as being habitually fond of idleness and chicanery.[3] Wars are frequent, quarrels and palavers being the result of bad faith in trade, intrigues with women of a strange tribe, desire for slaves, wanton or vindictive accusations of sorcery, and often mere jealousy of a neighbour's prosperity.[4] In war, although some of the tribes are brave, they usually prefer cunning to valour, and endeavour to overcome their enemies by treachery rather than by an open attack. They have no mercy on the vanquished, and do not spare even women and children. Du Chaillu says that, with the exception of the Fans and Osheba, the warriors "applaud tricks that are inhumanly cruel and cowardly, and seem to be quite incapable of open hand-to-hand fight. To surprise man, woman, or child in sleep, and kill them then; to lie in ambush in the woods for a solitary man,

to the latter custom among the negroes of Youriba. ("Journal of a Second Expedition," p. 46.) And we have seen it to exist also in Madagascar. (*Supra*, p. 155.)

[1] "Wanderings in West Africa," ii. p. 24.

[2] "Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile," (3d ed.), v. p. 470.

[3] "Explorations in Equatorial Africa," p. 21. [4] Do., p. 330.

and kill him by a single spear-thrust before he can defend himself; to waylay a woman going to the spring for water, and kill her; . . . . these are the warlike feats I have heard most praised, and seen oftenest done in this part of Africa."[1] The cruelty of the negro character is the most strongly pronounced in his treatment of those accused of sorcery or witchcraft, and, as death is always supposed to be thus occasioned,[2] it has abundant opportunity of displaying itself. No punishment is thought too cruel to be inflicted on a wizard, and when the frenzy into which they work themselves has abated, they show no regret for the inhuman conduct of which they have been guilty.[3] What is said of the Shekianis, is true of the other tribes, that they are not really bloodthirsty, but "simply careless of human life, passionate and revengeful."[4] Polygamy is universal, and wives, who are kept only "to minister to the pride, influence, pleasure, and sloth," of their husbands, are regarded as merchandise, and treated more harshly than the slaves.[5] The inhabitant of the sea-coast will barter the virtue of his wife, sister, or daughter,[6] and it is a common custom among all the tribes for a guest to be offered a temporary female companion as a mark of respect.[7] The women do not appear to be averse to this arrangement, and they are, in fact, so much given to intrigue, that Du Chaillu speaks of chastity as an unknown virtue among them.[8] But, although chastity is not esteemed, yet adultery, at least among townsmen, is considered a serious offence, and is punished by a fine according to the wealth of the offender.[9] Du Chaillu declares that intrigues with the women of other tribes is the

[1] "Explorations in Equatorial Africa," p. 100. [2] Do., p. 338.

[3] Do., p. 40; a little boy was cut to pieces for having "made a witch," p. 280.

[4] Do., p. 161. [5] Do., pp., 51, 333. [6] Do., p. 51.

[7] Do., p. 47. [8] Do., p. 334. [9] Do., pp. 162, 51.

cause of nearly all the palavers, fights, and wars in Africa.[1] These wars would not, however, seem to be very fatal, judging of the explanation given elsewhere by the same writer of the causes of the decrease of population in Western Africa. This is ascribed to the slave trade, polygamy, barrenness of the women, deaths among the children, plagues, and witchcraft; the last named "taking away more lives than any slave trade ever did."[2]

Notwithstanding certain examples to the contrary, the West African generally cannot now be accused of cannibalism, whatever may have been the case formerly, and it must not be thought that he is absolutely devoid of all good qualities. The inhabitants of Corisco, a small island near the coast, are described by Du Chaillu as being quiet, peaceable, hospitable to strangers, and fond of white men.[3] The traveller was treated with kindness and hospitality wherever he went, even when it was known that he could make little return, and with touching faithfulness.[4] Many incidents which he relates justify his assertion that everywhere in his travels he met with men and women, "honest, well-meaning, and, in every way, entitled to respect and trust."[5] These good points, however, only bring out more strongly the serious moral defects in the African character, which, on the whole, presents a remarkable analogy to that of the inhabitants of Madagascar as described in the preceding pages. The latter, however, would seem to be without any trace of the cannibal habit which so disgraces the tribes of the Guinea Coast,[6] and of some other parts of the African continent.[7] On the other

[1] "Explorations in Equatorial Africa," p. 51.
[2] "A Journey to Ashango-Land," p. 435.
[3] "Equatorial Africa," p. 25. [4] Do., pp. 104, 307. [5] Do., p. 21.
[6] Hutchinson's "Ten Years' Wanderings among the Ethiopians," p. 60, *seq.*
[7] Du Chaillu "Equatorial Africa," p. 88. See also Burton's "A Day among the Fans" (Anthrop. Rev., vol. i., p. 48). As to Cannibalism in East Africa and South Africa, see *infra.*

hand, the mild relations which usually subsist between the master and his slaves among the Madecasses,[1] no less distinguish the "domestic institution" in Africa,[2] except in certain countries where the cruel traits of the negro character have become predominant. Even among the Ashantees, where a man can kill his own slave with impunity, the good treatment of slaves is secured to a certain extent by the liberty they are allowed of transferring themselves to a new master. This they effect by invoking the death of the person chosen for this office if he do not make them his property, an appeal which is all powerful.[3]

The West African character may be illustrated by reference to the last-mentioned people, who can hardly be described as inferior in morality to the generality of African peoples. A nation of warriors and slaves, the Ashantees possess the virtues and vices usual among uncultured peoples under such circumstances. The manners of the higher orders of captains, says Bowdich, are always dignified, and they are courteous and hospitable in private, though haughty and abrupt in public. "They consider that war alone affords an exertion or display of ability, and they esteem the ambition of their king as his greatest virtue. They have no idea of the aggrandisement of a State by civil policy alone. They are candid in acknowledging their defeats, and just to the prowess of their enemies; but they possess little humanity, and are very avaricious and oppressive. They listen to superstition with the most childish credulity, but they only cultivate it for the preservation of life and the indulgence of passion. . . . They are neither curious nor anxious about a future State, pre-

1 Sibree, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

2 Hutchinson, *op. cit.*, p. 6; Du Chaillu, "Equatorial Africa," p. 331.

3 Bowdich's "Mission to Ashantee" (1819), pp. 258, 260.

tending to it from rank and achievement rather than domestic virtue."[1] The lower order of Ashantees are described as ungrateful, insolent, and licentious, and the king himself repeatedly said to the English traveller that he "believed them to be the worst people existing, except the Fantees, and not comparable with many of their inland neighbours."[2] They are very revengeful, and will not hesitate to sacrifice their own lives to ensure the destruction of their enemy by bringing a "palaver" on him. That is effected by a man swearing on the king's head that the person to be affected must kill him; and if he do not, the whole of his property, and probably his life also, will be forfeited.[3] False accusations appear to be common, and to put a check on them, if in a case of treason the accused is acquitted, the accuser is put to death. This punishment is inflicted also for cowardice, and for adultery with the wife of a man who has been punished for stealing the king's property, or for intriguing with the female attendants of the royal family.[4] A man who is disgraced by the king commits suicide, on the principle that "none but the basest spirits can endure life after severe disgrace.[5] Suicide is also allowed to a great man who kills his equal in rank. The murder of an inferior is compensated by a fine to the family of the deceased equal to seven slaves. If the slave of another be killed, his value must be paid to his master. A man may kill his own slave with impunity, but not his wife or child.[6] Persons accused of witchcraft or of having a devil are tortured to death.[7] Howdich states that a girl was beheaded for insolence to one of the king's sons, and a man for picking up gold which he had dropped in the market-place.[8] This act would be

[1] Bowdich's "Mission to Ashantee" (1819), p. 249. [2] Do., p. 250.
[3] Do., p. 256. [4] Do., p. 257. [5] Do., p. 129.
[6] Do., p. 258. [7] Do., p. 260. [8] Do., p. 76.

looked upon as a theft of the king's property, as all gold that falls in the market-place is allowed to accumulate until the soil is washed on State emergencies. Serious thefts are sometimes punished with death. This, however, depends on the culprit's family, who are bound to compensate the injured person, and may punish the thief as they think fit. Trifling thefts are thought to be sufficiently punished by the exposure of the offender in various parts of the town while the theft is proclaimed.[1]

The sexual morality of the Ashantees may be judged of by the reason given for the custom, common to them with so many other uncultured peoples, according to which the king's sons are excluded from the succession to the throne in favour of his brother or his sister's son. Its object is to secure a true succession, and it is supported by the argument, that "if the wives of the sons are faithless, the blood of the family is entirely lost in the offspring; but should the daughters deceive their husbands, it is still preserved."[2] The sisters of the king have the privilege of marrying or intriguing with whom they please, provided that the man be strong or handsome; but unless he was originally a man of rank, he is considered as a slave to his wife, and must kill himself if she dies before him. He must do the same in case of the death of their only male child. Adultery by the wife of a captain may be punished by death, but he must accept a liberal offer of gold in compensation if offered by her family.[3] If her friends are too powerful for her husband to venture to put her to death, he cuts off her nose and gives her for wife to one of his slaves.[4] The offence of intriguing with a wife of the king is punished with death. Bowdich relates that one of the king's wives had an intrigue with a captain who was

[1] Bowdich's "Mission to Ashantee," p. 259.
[2] Do., p. 234. [3] Do., p. 260. [4] Do., p. 302.

beheaded for it, but "the woman possessing irresistible art in practising upon the numerous admirers of her beauty, the king spared her life, and employed her thenceforth to inveigle those distant caboceers whose lives or properties were desirable to him."[1] This is quite in accordance with African usage. The Ashantees object so strongly to female infidelity, that it is forbidden to praise another man's wife, this being "intrigue by implication."[2] They are not so careful, however, of the chastity of their daughters. Prostitutes are numerous, the reason being that no Ashantee forces his daughter to become the wife of the man he wishes; but, says Bowdich, he "instantly disclaims her support and protection on her refusal, and would persecute the mother if she afforded it;" thus abandoned, the daughter has no resource but prostitution.[3] The fetish women appear to be licensed prostitutes both before and after their marriage. They are frequently vowed to the service of the fetish before their birth.[4] During the Yam Custom, which is held in the early part of September, at the maturity of that vegetable, no notice is taken of theft, assault, or intrigue, and the grossest license then prevails, every one abandoning himself to his passions. Men, women, and children, all get drunk together.[5] Although polygamy is allowed, most of the lower order of freemen have only one wife, and very few of the slaves any at all. The higher classes, however, have many wives.[6] The king is permitted to have 3333, which number is carefully kept up, in order that the king may be able to present women to those of his subjects who distinguish themselves.[7] The position of woman among the Ashantees is not very enviable. The wife who be-

[1] Bowdich's "Mission to Ashantee" (1819), p. 28.
[2] Do., p. 259. [3] Do., p. 302. [4] Do., pp. 264, 265.
[5] Do., pp. 274, 278. [6] Do., p. 317. [7] Do., p. 289.

trays a secret loses her upper lip, and an ear if she is discovered listening to a private conversation of her husband's.[1] Only a captain, however, can sell his wife, and he is bound to accept payment of the marriage fee in redemption for her if offered by her family. If a woman dislikes her husband, or is ill-treated by him, her friends may tender to him the marriage fee, which he must receive, and his wife is then entitled to return home, but she cannot marry again. Moreover, the property of a wife belongs to her independently of her husband, and on her death it goes to the king.[2]

That which has made the Ashantees so notorious is their practice of human sacrifice. The occasions on which these sacrifices are used are known as "Customs." The chief of these would seem to be the Yam Custom, at which about a hundred persons, chiefly criminals, were, formerly at least, sacrificed at Coomassie. Several slaves also were sacrificed at Bantama, the royal burial-place, over a large brass pan, " their blood mingling with the vegetable and animal matter within (fresh and putrefied), to complete the charm and produce invincible fetish." All the chiefs killed several slaves, whose blood was made to flow into the hole whence the new yam was taken.[3] Customs are also made at the funerals of chiefs and others. Mr Bowdich gives a graphic account of the horrible proceedings which took place on the death of the mother of one of the great chiefs, Quatchie Quofie. Three young girls were sacrificed immediately after the woman's death, that she might not be in want of attendants until the great custom was made. After the usual firing and dancing, the other victims were sacrificed. " The executioners wrangled and struggled for the office, and the indifference with which the first poor

[1] Bowdich's " Mission to Ashantee" (1819), p. 302.
[2] Do., p. 260. [3] *Op. cit.*, p. 279.

creature looked on, in the torture he was from the knife passed through his cheeks, was remarkable; the nearest executioner snatched the sword from the others, the right hand of the victim was then lopped off, he was thrown down, and his head was sawed rather than cut off; it was cruelly prolonged, I will not say wilfully. Twelve more were dragged forward, but we forced our way through the crowd, and retired to our quarters." The traveller adds, "Other sacrifices, principally female, were made in the bush where the body was buried. It is usual to 'wet the grave' with the blood of a freeman of respectability. All the retainers of the family being present, and the heads of all the victims deposited in the bottom of the grave, several are unsuspectingly called on in a hurry to assist in placing the coffin or basket, and just as it rests on the heads or skulls, a slave from behind stuns one of these freemen by a violent blow, followed by a deep gash in the back part of the neck, and he is rolled in on the top of the body, and the grave instantly filled up."[1] On the death of the king these ceremonies are observed with "every excess of extravagance and barbarity." To increase their importance, all the Customs which have been made for the subjects who have died during the king's reign must be at the same time repeated. Moreover, the brothers, sons, and nephews of the king, "affecting temporary insanity, burst forth with their muskets, and fire promiscuously amongst the crowd; even a man of rank, if they meet him, is their victim, nor is their murder of him or any other, on such an occasion, visited or prevented."[2] In addition to the ordinary customs, human sacrifices are frequent at Bantama, in order to "water the graves" of the kings.[3] This constant taking of human life and exhibitions of bloodshed must have a very degrading effect on the

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 287. [2] Do., p. 288. [3] Do. p. 289.

popular character. At funerals the men besmear themselves with the blood of the victims, whilst the women, in imitation, daub their faces, arms, and breasts with red earth.[1] This, and other facts, would seem to show that savage cruelty is engrained in the hearts of the Ashantees. Thus their most noted generals were distinguished by names which designated their manner of destroying their prisoners. One was called Aboäwassa, because he cut off their arms; another, Sheäboo, as he beat their heads to pieces with a stone; a third, Abiniowa, because he cut off their legs.[2] The practice of cannibalism by such a people cannot be surprising, and we are informed by Bowdich that it was usual under certain circumstances. In time of war, all those who had never killed a foe had to eat a portion of an enemy's heart, which was cut into small pieces, and with great ceremony mixed with blood and various consecrated herbs. If this were not done, it was thought that the spirit of the deceased would secretly exhaust their vigour and courage. One man was described as always eating the heart of every enemy whom he killed with his own hand. The heart of any celebrated foe was said to be eaten by the king and his chief officers. This is not improbable, and undoubtedly they wore the smaller joints and bones, and the teeth of the monarchs whom they had overcome and slain.[3]

The moral character of the inhabitants of the equatorial parts of the African continent have been dwelt on at considerable length, because they would seem to present less intermixture with a foreign element than the peoples of more northern and southern regions. Among the latter, the tribes belonging to the great Bântu family are probably somewhat further advanced in moral culture, although in many of their characteristics

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 284. [2] Do., p. 300. [3] Do., p. 284.

they differ little from the true Negro. As to the Bechuanas, who, although inferior in courage and perhaps in humanity to the allied Kafir tribes, may be taken as average specimens of the members of that family in South Africa, it cannot be said that they present any very high moral type. They have little regard for human life[1] especially for that of a woman, and the killing of a wife appears to be too common an occurrence for it to attract much attention.[2] The Bechuanas, moreover, remove to a distance from their towns and villages any one who has been wounded, leaving them with a little food, which is renewed daily, and with a fire which is lit at night to keep off the beasts of prey.[3] It is probable that the sick and aged were formerly also abandoned, as is customary with the Hottentots, and the practise may have arisen from a superstitious horror of touching a human corpse.[4] The tribes more generally known as Kafirs undoubtedly practise the latter barbarity, and they are equally careless about the sacrifice of human life;[5] this is indeed so insecure, owing to the despotic power of the chiefs that the Kafir is perfectly indifferent about the future.[6] Both they and the Bechuanas sometimes commit

1 Burchell's "Travels in Southern Africa," vol. ii. p. 554.

2 Moffat's "Missionary Labours," p. 464. The same was true also of the Zulus, and young boys were even allowed to kill their mothers, if these attempted to chastise them. (Thompson's "Travels in Southern Africa," vol. ii., p. 417-418.)

3 Moffat, *op. cit.* 465. Mr Baines gives an instance of most heartless conduct by a Damara mother towards her sick daughter. "Explorations in South West Africa," p. 24.

4 Do., p. 306. Among the Kafirs, and also the Bechuanas, only the chiefs, and their principal wives, and perhaps also infants, are buried. Kay, "Travels in Caffraria," p. 194; Thompson, *op. cit.*, vol. i. p. 337. The exposure of the bodies of the dead has some connection with "rain-making." (See Moffat, *op. cit.*, p. 306.)

5 Shooter's "Kafirs of Natal, &c.," pp. 84, 92, &c.; Kay, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

6 Grout's "Zulu-Land," p. 181.

the most horrible cruelties on their wounded foes, and on the women and children of a vanquished opponent who fall into their hands.[1] Infanticide is not unknown among the Kafirs and neighbouring tribes, although it appears to be customary only when twins are born, or a child is deformed, or in some other cases when the child is thought to give evidence of "transgression" or ill-luck;[2] or when the mother dies in child-birth. In this case the infant is buried with her.[3] Abortion also is not unfrequently practised.[4] The noted Zulu chief Tchaka determined that he would have no children to succeed him, and to attain this object, not only would he never raise any one of his numerous concubines to the position of wife, but if any of them became *enceinte*, they were arrested on some trivial pretence, and summarily executed.[5]

Nothing shows better the utter disregard for human life usually exhibited by the African than the account given by Mr Fynn of the proceedings at the burial of Mnande, the mother of Tchaka. On the day after her death, upwards of 60,000 people assembled at the Kraal where Mnande died, and joined in the fearful lamentations which had been going on during the whole of the preceding night. "At noon the whole force formed a circle, with Tchaka in their centre, and sang a war song, which afforded them some relaxation during its continuance. At the close of it, Tchaka ordered several men to be executed on the spot, and the cries became, if possible, more violent than ever. No further orders were needed; but, as if bent on convincing

[1] Thompson, *op. cit.* vol. i. p. 299 *seq.*; Kay, *op. cit.*, p. 332. For an account of the tortures inflicted by the Kafirs on criminals, see Kay, *op. cit.*, p. 178 *seq.*

[2] Livingstone's "Missionary Travels in South Africa," p. 577.

[3] Shooter, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

[4] Thompson, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 351.

[5] Wood, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 72.

their chief of their extreme grief, the multitude commenced a general massacre; many of them received the blow of death while inflicting it on others, each taking the opportunity of revenging his injuries, real or imaginary. Those who could no more force tears from their eyes—those who were found near the river, panting for water—were beaten to death by others mad with excitement. Towards the afternoon, I calculated that not fewer than 7000 people had fallen in this frightful indiscriminate massacre. The adjacent stream, to which many had fled exhausted to wet their parched tongues, became impassable from the number of dead corpses which lay on each side of it; while the kraal in which the scene took place was flowing with blood. On the second day after Mnande's death, her body was placed in a large grave, near the spot where she had died, and ten of the best looking girls in the kraal were enclosed alive in the same grave. 12,000 men, all fully armed, attended this dread ceremony, and were stationed as a guard over the grave for a whole year. . . . . Extravagant as were these rites, they did not quite satisfy the people, and the chiefs unanimously proposed that further sacrifices should be made. They proposed that every one should be killed who had not been present at Mnande's funeral, and this horrible suggestion was actually carried out, several regiments of soldiers being sent through the country for the purpose of executing it. . . . The last and most astounding suggestion was, that if during the ensuing year any child should be born, or even if such an event was likely to occur, both the parents and the child should be summarily executed. As this suggestion was, in fact, only a carrying out, on a large scale, of a principle followed by Tchaka in his own households, he readily gave his consent, and during the whole year there was much inno-

cent blood shed. After the year had expired, Tchaka determined upon another expiatory sacrifice as a preliminary to the ceremony by which he went out of mourning. This, however, did not take place, owing to the remonstrances of Mr Fynn, who succeeded in persuading the despot to spare the lives of his subjects. One reason why Tchaka acceded to the request, was his amusement at the notion of a white man pleading for the life of 'dogs.'" [1]

In other respects, the Zulu Kafir would seem to be morally superior to the Bechuana. The former is not seldom guilty of the crime of cattle stealing, but otherwise "he is honourable and straightforward, and with one whom he can trust his words will agree with his actions.[2] It should be added, however, that, according to Mr Grout (and there is too much ground for believing his statement to be true), the Kafir is far from being as straightforward in word as in act. He is described as being a consummate hypocrite, and of so perverse a nature that he cannot be straightforward, or speak the whole truth.[3] Nevertheless the Zulus are not so bad as the Bechuanas, of whom it is said that "no one who knows them can believe a word that they say, and they will steal everything that they can carry.[4] They are accomplished thieves, and the habit of stealing is so ingrained in their nature, that if a man is detected in the act, he feels not the least shame, but rather takes blame to himself for being so inexpert as to be found out."[5] Theft is common also in the south of Kafirland,[6]

[1] Shooter, *op. cit.*, p. 242 *seq.*; Wood, *op. cit.*, vol. i. p. 222 *seq.*

[2] Wood, *op. cit.*, i. p. 5.

[3] Zulu-Land, p. 175.

[4] Thompson, who ascribes to the Bechuanas a very despicable character, says, however, that they neither rob nor ill-use travellers. *op. cit.* vol. i., p. 338.

[5] Wood, *op. cit.*, vol. i. p. 316; Burchell, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 553.

[6] Kay, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

but it is not so prevalent among the Zulus, apparently owing, however, only to the fact that by their laws the crime is punished with death.[1] The chief virtue of the Kafir—but not of the Bechuana, who is selfish and pleads poverty[2]—would seem to be hospitality,[3] although he will seldom meet with it out of his own tribe.[4] Otherwise, he is extremely avaricious, the great aim of his life being to save for the purpose of buying cows.[5] These are valuable, not merely for their own sake, but because they form the medium of exchange for the acquisition of women, who appear nevertheless to be much less thought of by all the South African peoples than cattle.[6]

A Kafir may have as many wives as he likes, and he takes as many as he can manage to keep. These he always buys, and the girls pride themselves on the high price which they fetch.[7] Women are thus valued in cattle; "each wife costs so many head of cattle, and each daughter will sell for so many, ten, twenty, or fifty, according to their rank, ability, and beauty." [8]

Not much can be said for the sexual morality of either Bechuanas or Kafirs. Mr Moffat speaks of the former as being *thoroughly sensual* beings.[9] Among the latter, a custom allied to the "bundling" of the Celtic peoples is permitted during courtship.[10] After marriage, there would seem to be little reason for a man's infidelity, seeing that there is no limit to the number

1 Grout, *op. cit.*, p. 119. 2 Burchell, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 554.
3 Kay, *op. cit.*, p. 103. 4 Shooter, *op. cit.*, p. 228.
5 Grout, *op. cit.*, p. 176.
6 Kay, *op. cit.*, p. 20; Thomson, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 312 *n.*
7 Grout, *op. cit.*, i. p. 5. 8 Do. p. 116. 9 *op. cit.*, p. 236.
10 This fact is stated on the authority of a gentleman many years resident in Natal. It is strange how widespread is the custom referred to in the text. According to Mr Horace St John, it is practised by the Dayaks of Borneo (*Life in the Forests of the Far East* vol i., p. 64), and we shall meet with it again among the Afghans.

of wives he can have, and that when he is tired of a wife he can repudiate her, and retain her as a slave.[1] Mr Kay says, however, in relation to the Southern Kafirs, that "No man deems it any sin whatever to seduce his neighbour's wife: his only grounds of fear are the probability of detection, and the fine demanded by law in such cases."[2] The husband who thus secures a few head of cattle considers the circumstance a fortunate one, and he soon becomes as friendly as ever with the seducer. The punishment of the woman is usually divorce or personal chastisement.[3] Rape, which appears to be a common crime, is punished with the fine of two or three head of cattle, unless it escapes notice altogether.[4] The having a child before marriage does not bring any disgrace on the mother, although her father can require satisfaction from her paramour, who must either marry her, or pay a heavy fine. If the latter is done, the girl's relations are satisfied, and the man may at any time afterwards claim the child.[5] The Kafir women would seem to be almost devoid of modesty, and will state and describe "circumstances of the most shameful nature before an assemblage of men."[6] This is not surprising, when the baneful influence exercised by the Kafir chief over the morals of his people is considered. Mr Kay affirms that "seldom or never does any young girl, residing in his immediate neighbourhood, escape defilement after attaining the age of puberty. Indeed, numbers of these poor children may often be seen about the habitations of the chiefs, where they are kept for the very basest of purposes."[7]

The Kafirs, as may be said also of the Bechuanas, are extremely superstitious, and firm believers in the power

[1] Grout, *op. cit.*, p. 166. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 113. [3] Do. p. 158. [4] Do. p. 187. [5] Do. p. 157. [6] Do. pp. 113, 157. [7] Do., p. 187.

of witchcraft. The sorcerers and chiefs take advantage of this circumstance to destroy any person who is obnoxious to them, or whose wealth is coveted. The life of every man is thus at the mercy of the wizard.[1] The Kafirs, nevertheless, have the light-heartedness of the African race. They are, moreover, sociable and polite, but appear to be quarrelsome as well as talkative. According to Mr Grout, they "easily take offence, and their most usual mode of settling the dispute in such cases is to club each other fiercely." Their anger is then "blind and unreasoning rage," but they are not, as a rule, vindictive.[2] It is partly for this reason, and partly from the natural cowardice of the Kafirs, that murder by violence is not frequent among them.[3] Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that secret poisoning is very prevalent, and that the so-called "prophets" are addicted to the practice.[4] The moral character of the Kafir evidently forms a curious compound of good and evil, in which the latter greatly predominates. It is the same with that of the neighbouring allied peoples. The Bechuanas are described as frank and sociable, not owing to "a benevolence of disposition so much as from a degree of etiquette and habits, arising from relationship and locality." Mr Moffat adds that he has sometimes been perfectly astounded to see that individuals, "who he had supposed were amiable and humane, when brought into certain positions, would, as if in their native element, wallow in crimes which he expected they would naturally shudder to perpetrate. But although revenge-

[1] Kay, *op. cit.*, p. 127. [2] Grout, *op. cit.*, p. 176-7.

[3] Shooter, *op. cit.*, p. 137. Fleming says, however, that although, if they have given cause of offence, they will receive abuse without murmuring; yet, if they are falsely accused, they will never forgive and will nurse their revengeful feelings for years afterwards. *Op. cit.*, p. 230.

[4] Do., p. 142, *seq.*

ful to the last degree, if an offender propitiate the injured party by a gift, at the same time confessing his error, or, as is common, put the blame on his heart, the most perfect unanimity and cordiality succeeds."[1] Probably many of the atrocities which the Kafir has been charged with having committed against the Cape colonists, were simply retaliations for injuries he had received from them; and it speaks well for him that when the chief Seko and his men were murdered by the Dutch Boers in 1830, although "there were some dozen missionaries, with their wives and children, and upwards of a hundred colonial traders, at the mercy of the Kafirs, yet not one of them was so much as placed in peril."[2]

There are certain peoples in Northern Africa who are thought by various writers to be closely allied to the Kafir tribes of the South,[3] and it may be advisable to refer shortly to their moral character, the more so as they have come under the influence of Mohammedanism. Judging from the description of them given by Caillié, it may be doubted whether the *Foulahs* have gained much morally from their reception of the Arabian faith. The French traveller says of the Foulahs of Fouta that they are "haughty, distrustful, and of very questionable veracity. They are also accused of indolence, and of a disposition to pilfering. They are, however, sober, and support the greatest privations with fortitude. Like all Mussulmans, they are very superstitious, and have great confidence in their *grigris*, and when they go to war they are covered with these charms."[4] The Foulahs are a warlike race, and ardently love their country. They practise polygamy, limiting themselves, however, to the orthodox number of four wives, although appa-

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 254.

[2] Pringle's "African Sketches," p. 495.

[3] See Barth's "Travels in North and Central Africa," vol. iv., p. 149.

[4] "Travels through Central Africa," vol. i., p. 225.

rently the number of concubines allowed is unlimited,[1] The women are subject to the will of their husbands, with whom they dare not take the slightest liberty.[2] If we may judge from the example of the *Agades*, described by Dr Barth, the Foulah women cannot be models of chastity.[3] Of the Fulbe, the Foulahs of Central Africa, Dr Barth says that intelligence and vivacity is the amiable side of their character, but that they have a great natural disposition to malice, and are not by any means so good-natured as the real Blacks.[4] This was also the experience of Clapperton and Landor as to the Foulahs of the Soudan. Probably this is partly owing to the influence of Mohammedanism. The Foulahs have the same contempt for unbelievers as all other followers of the Arab prophet. Of course there are many individual exceptions, as even Landor found when, almost dying of thirst by the roadside, the Foulah and Tuarick passers-by refused to sell him a drop of water, saying, "He is a Kafir, let him die."[5] According to this traveller the Foulahs of the Soudan have a very bad reputation among the negro tribes.[6]

The character given by the French traveller Caillié to the *Mandingos* is not so favourable even as that ascribed to the Foulahs. He describes them as being vindictive, inquisitive, envious, liars, importunate, selfish, avaricious, ignorant, and superstitious. They are not thieves among themselves, but they do not hesitate to steal from strangers.[7] They, moreover, show a want of hospitality; and even of the pagan Bambaras, Caillié says that they are not so hospitable as the negroes of the Senegal, and

[1] This was the case among the Mohammedan Foulahs or Fellatahs of Soccatoo. (See Clapperton's "Journal of a Second Expedition," p. 211.)
[2] Caillié, *op. cit.*, i. p. 223, 4.
[3] Barth, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 446.
[4] Do., vol. ii., p. 420.
[5] Clapperton's "Journal of a Second Expedition," p. 283.
[6] Do., p. 314.
[7] *Op. cit.*, p. 353.

that if they show kindness to strangers, it is only from interested motives.[1] The Mandingo women are slaves rather than wives. They dare not indulge in any pleasantry about their husbands, nor lift a hand against them even in self-defence.[2] It should be stated, however, that both fathers and mothers are extremely fond of their children, who, on the other hand, show great reverence for their parents. Respect for the aged is rigorously enforced.[3] Moreover, Mungo Park ascribes to the Mandingos a somewhat better character than is given to them by other travellers. He says that he met with much disinterested charity and tender solicitude from them, particularly from the women. Their chief moral defect was theft, which was practised, however, only against strangers.[4] He describes their general character as being inquisitive, credulous, simple, and fond of flattery, but he adds that they are cheerful in disposition and a very gentle race.[5] Notwithstanding the great authority possessed by the men over their wives, the English traveller did not perceive that the latter were treated with cruelty, nor did the Mandingo women seem given to intrigue.[6] Murder, adultery, and witchcraft, were the only crimes punished with slavery, and they did not appear to be common. In cases of murder, the nearest relation of the deceased could either kill the offender with his own hand, or sell him into slavery. An adulterer might either be sold by the injured husband or ransomed for such a sum as the latter thought equivalent to the injury sustained.[7]

The Bornuese of Central Africa are strict Mussulmans, performing their prayers and ablutions five times

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 332, 346. [2] Do., p. 350. [3] Do., p. 352.
[4] Park suffered greatly from this propensity in his second journey. See *Journal* (1815), p. 97, *seq.*
[5] "Travels in the Interior of Africa," p. 255 *seq.*
[6] Do., p. 261. [7] Do., p. 289.

a-day, and their punishments for crimes are summary and severe. A murderer is given up to the relations of the deceased, who kill him with their clubs. Theft, when often repeated, is punished by the loss of a hand, or by being buried up to the chin, with the head well honeyed, exposed to the sun, and to the attacks of flies and mosquitoes.[1] Adultery is not common, but if it is detected, the guilty persons are bound hand and foot, and their brains knocked out by the clubs of the husband and his relations.[2] In their wars the Bornuese are very bitter, none of their male enemies being spared but those who are reserved for the harem as eunuchs.[3] Yet they are described as being humane and forgiving. As an instance of the former quality, it is related that the Sheikh of Bornou, who was much beloved by his subjects, was compelled, by the murmurs of the men and the raillery of the women, to refrain from hanging two girls who had been guilty of frailty. On another occasion the people were so horrified at the severity with which the Sheikh punished similar conduct, that more than a hundred families left the capital and settled in other towns where so much rigour was not exercised.[4] The Bornuese, although polygamists, seldom have more than two or three wives, but these can be divorced at pleasure by simply returning the wife's dower.[5]

The inhabitants of Fezzan, who are described by Captain Lyon as being negroes, but with flatter faces and less depressed noses than usual, do not appear to have benefitted much by their reception of Mohammedanism. Falsehood is disapproved of only when discovered, and when employed in trading it is excused on the ground that it is allowed by the Koran for the

[1] "Travels in Northern and Central Africa," by Denham & Clapperton, p. 321.

[2] Do., p. 319. [3] Do., p. 215.

[4] Do., pp. 209, 277. [5] Do., p. 318.

benefit of traders! The Fezzanese are very obsequious to those whom they are subject to, or who can "repay them tenfold for their pretended disinterestedness." Capt. Lyon adds that "their moral character is on a par with that of the Tripolines, though, if anything, they are rather less insincere." They, like all Negroes and Berbers, are always open to a bribe. On the other hand, hospitality is altogether unknown among them. Probably the low moral condition of the Fezzanese is due, in great measure, to the treatment they have received from their Moorish conquerors. Possessed, says Lyon, of but little courage, spirit, or honesty, and "as completely submissive to their tyrants as oppression could wish, they seem insensible of their abject state, never having known freedom, or having been exempt from the caprice of their rulers." When to this are added the moral defects of their religious teachers, we cannot wonder at their condition. The Marābouts are described as being greater liars and rogues than their neighbours, their reputation shielding them from suspicion, and such of them as have the most cunning and hypocrisy are the only persons who attain to any eminence above the people—"they become privileged, courted, and revered while living, and prayers are addressed to them for their mediation after they are dead."[1]

Although Mohammedanism, when conveyed through such a channel as that supplied by the Moors, is of very questionable benefit; yet we cannot doubt, that on the whole, it has materially improved the moral condition of the African peoples who have been bought under its influence. Mr Winwood Reade affirms that the change for the better[2] is very marked indeed.

[1] "Travels in Northern Africa," by Capt. Lyon, p. 280, *seq.*
[2] The moral character of the lower classes cannot have undergone

In the Soudan, the towns have become merely second-hand copies of Eastern life, while "their inhabitants are happier and better men. Violent and dishonest deeds are no longer arranged by pecuniary compensation. Husbands can no longer set wife-traps for their friends; adultery is treated as a criminal offence. Men can no longer squander away their relations at the gaming-table, and stake their own bodies on a throw. Men can no longer be tempted to vice and crime under the influence of palm wine. Women can no longer be married, by a great chief in herds, and treated like beasts of burden and like slaves. Each wife has an equal part of her husband's love by law; it is not permitted to forsake and degrade the old wife for the sake of the young. Each wife has her own house, and the husband may not enter until he has knocked at the door and received the answer, *Bismillah,* in the name of God. Every boy is taught to read and write in Arabic, which is the religious and official language in Soudan, as Latin was in Europe in the middle ages; they also write their own language with the Arabic characters, as we write ours with the Roman letters. In such countries the policy of isolation is at an end; they are open to all the Moslems in the world, and are thus connected with the land of the East." [1]

However ameliorating may have been the influence of Mohammedanism over the character of the negro tribes of the Soudan, it may be doubted whether it has much

much change if Clapperton's opinion be true that no servant, who is a native of Houssa, Fezzan, or Bornou, is free from lies, ingratitude, and petty robbery. (*Journal of a Second Expedition*, p. 241.) It should be stated that the testimony of other travellers as to the ameliorating moral influence of Mohammedanism among the African tribes sometimes differs greatly from that of Mr Reade. See "The Heart of Africa," by Dr Georg. Schweinfurth (1874), vol. i., pp. 284, 346, &c.

[1] "The Martyrdom of Man" (1872), p. 282.

affected that of their Moorish neighbours. Caillié gives an interesting account of the so-called Moors or impure Berber tribes of the country north of the Senegal under the name of *Braknas*, but he does not say much as to their moral conduct. We learn from him, however, that in their warfare they attack by surprise and act with great cruelty, taking no prisoners, or if any of their enemies do fall into their hands alive, killing them immediately.[1] The Hassanes, or warriors, universally have a bad character. Polygamy is not practised, and the women who have great influence, which they frequently use for a bad purpose, would not let their husbands even have concubines.[2] Parents, as is usually the case among people of a similar degree of culture, prefer boys to girls, but the latter are treated with kindness. It speaks well for the Braknas' character that the son is always submissive to his mother and pays her great respect.[3] The Moors would seem to be of a highly nervous temperament, judging from the fact that they are very susceptible of pain. A slight headache will make a Brakna cry like a child.[4] So also a woman in labour screams in a frightful manner, at the same time assailing her husband with the most abusive and indecent language.[5] And yet they can control their grief so well that they never shed tears at a person's death, believing that his soul has at once ascended to heaven.[6] The account given by Durand [7] of the Berber tribes differs little from that furnished by Caillié. He says, however, that although much affection is exhibited between the parents and children, yet that the Moors of the Great Sahara display barbarous conduct in their families, correcting the slightest fault with

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 99. [2] Do., p. 86. [3] Do., p. 110.
[4] Do., p. 72. [5] Do., p. 97. [6] Do., p. 96.
[7] *Loc. cit.*, p. 130, *seq.*

revolting severity. He adds that girls being disliked by both parents are always ill-used. This may be so in early life, but probably it ceases as girls attain the age of maturity, when they become valuable objects. A man is esteemed wealthy according to the number of his daughters. A Moor can divorce his wife only with the general consent of the horde, which, however, is never refused. Durand says that although wives are badly used, and "though they are very indecent in their manners and gestures, they are faithful to their husbands." If the contrary should occur, the wife is driven from her home, and she is often killed for having brought disgrace on her family. The Moors look upon women as created solely for their pleasure and caprice, and value them in proportion to their stoutness. Like the Bedouins, whom they resemble in many other respects, they are extremely hospitable to strangers, although the killing of a European (when not a guest) is no greater crime among them than the slaying of a dog. The only punishments the Moors are subject to are fines, restitution, or banishment, although it cannot be doubted that the law of blood-revenge is as active with them as among all other semi-cultured peoples.

A few further particulars of the Berber character may be gathered from the valuable work of Dr Barth, who states that "the thorough-bred and free-born" Tawárek or Amóshagh is regarded by all the neighbouring tribes, whether Arab or "African," as a real demon.[1] His emblem is the sword, and his marauding character is proved by the fact that the more conscientious Arabs will not trade with him, as they know that his goods have been acquired chiefly by violent means, and are therefore *haram*, "forbidden."[2] The Tawárek women

[1] "Travels in North and Central Africa," vol. i., p. 505.
[2] Do., vol. iv., p. 350; v., p. 108.

(in whom corpulency is much prized) are allowed great liberty, but in the nobler tribes conjugal faithlessness is rare. Dr Barth adds, however, that among the degraded tribes "female chastity appears to be less esteemed, as we find to be the case among many Berber tribes at the time when El Bekré wrote his interesting account of Africa."[1] This is consistent with the fact that prostitution, as a proof of hospitality, has always been practised among them.[2] Not all the Berber tribes, however, have so bad a name as those referred to by Barth. The Berber of Algeria would seem to compare favourably even with the Arab. He is more settled, provident, industrious, and enterprising. He is bold and dignified, and disdains to speak an untruth, while the Arab is humble and arrogant by turns, and lies. The latter, in his wars, proceeds by treachery and surprises, whereas the Berber always declares war before attacking his enemy, first withdrawing his *anaya*, or word of honour, which had been exchanged as a guarantee of friendship. In cases of homicide the Arab receives the "price of blood," but among the Berbers the punishment of the murderer is an obligation which is handed down from father to son.[3] The Berber is generally monogamous, and the woman is really a wife, the mother of a family, and not an article of property or a beast of burden, as with the Arabs. Slavery is rejected by most of the industrious Berbers, although it is indispensable for the wants of the Arab family. Finally, although the Arab is hospitable, yet this is usually the result of ostentation and calculation, whilst charity to the poor and hospitality towards strangers, which centre in the mosque or caravanserai, are never wanting to a Berber tribe.[4] This

[1] "Travels in North and Central Africa," vol. v., pp. 127, 183.
[2] Do., v., p. 199.
[3] The lex talionis is, however, the more barbarous mode of procedure.
[4] The comparison in the text is taken from the recent "Instruc-

exhibits the finest trait in the Berber character. Hospitality in its highest sense is considered an imperative duty both on the individual and the community, and the poor, the unfortunate, the fugitive, and the traveller, all meet with assistance. And yet, notwithstanding their hospitality among themselves, the stranger is regarded as an enemy whom it is lawful to plunder by pillage, by theft, by fraud, or by means of false coin. "Elle a sur son propre territoire," says a late French writer, "le sentiment le plus vif de la solidarité humaine uni au respect de la liberté personelle, mais ce sentiment s'évanouit dès que les limites du sol natal sont franchies." But when, under the protection of *anaya*, even the stranger is safe. To break his *anaya* is the greatest crime a Kabyle can commit, and to allow it to be broken by another is the greatest shame. Whatever may be the cost, and whatever risks or sacrifices may be necessary to carry out the promise of safeguard which an individual or community has made, it must be rigidly observed.[1] In these respects the Kabyle is undoubtedly the Bedouin of Africa.

In the present chapter reference should be made to the only African people, besides the Christian Copts, who have long professed Christianity. Whatever moral influence this religion may originally have had over the Abyssinian mind would seem to have long since disappeared, and probably it now exhibits its native qualities with but slight admixture of ideas derived from a foreign source. Mr Bruce draws a very ingenious parallel between the manners and habits of the Abyssinians and those of the Persians,[2] but the former undoubtedly repre-

tions sur l'Anthropologie de l'Algerie" of General Faidherbe and Dr Paul Topinard.

[1] "L'Algérie," par Dr Clamageran (1874), p. 210 *seq.*; "La Kabylie et les Coutumes Kabyles," par MM. Hanoteau et Letourneux.

[2] "Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile" (3d edition), vol. iv., p. 455 *seq.*

sent a much lower phase of social progress than the latter. Bruce's account of their feasts of raw flesh, at which the men and women "sacrifice both to Bacchus and to Venus,"[1] was long thought to be a mere traveller's tale, but we cannot now doubt its truth.[2] The cruel practice of cutting flesh from the living ox, described by Bruce, appears even now, under exceptional circumstances, to be in use among the Abyssinians, and it is said to be not uncommon among the Gallas.[3] The barbarous habit of mangling the bodies of dead and wounded enemies in the manner usual among the Hebrews in the time of David, appears to have been common. After a battle the trophies were thrown down by the warriors at the feet of the sovereign, even although a woman, as tokens of their bravery.[4] The treatment of criminals among the Abyssinians as described by Bruce was equally barbarous. Prisoners were executed immediately after sentence of death, and they were killed either by crucifixion, flaying alive, or stoning to death.[5] To these modes of punishment must be added, on the authority of Lobo, burying alive and beating to death with cudgels. Lobo adds that the usual mode of putting criminals to death was by stabbing with lances, the nearest relative of the person whose death was being avenged giving the first thrust, and the others following according to their degree of kindred. This usage is evidently a relic of the old custom of blood-revenge, and Lobo states that the relatives of the criminal often took vengeance for his death, and sometimes all the persons who took part in the prosecution lost

[1] "Travels to Discover the Source of the Nile," vol. iv., p. 486 *seq.*
[2] See Parkyns' "Life in Abyssinia," pp. 213, 258.
[3] Do., p. 204 *seq.*, and see "Narrative of a Journey through Abyssinia," by Henry Dufton, p. 205.
[4] Bruce, *op. cit.*, vol. v., p. 428; vi., p. 116.
[5] Do., vol. iv., p. 471 *seq.*

their lives.[1] The bodies of those who suffered for high treason, murder, or violence on the highway, under certain circumstances, were seldom buried; and Bruce affirmed that the streets of Gondar were strewn with pieces of their carcases.[2] The plucking out the eyes described by Bruce was as severe a punishment as any inflicted. The unfortunate sufferer was turned adrift, and usually met with a terrible death.[3] Probably an improvement has taken place in the treatment of criminals, but amputation of the hands or feet is still practised in the case of sacrilegious thefts, where death itself is not inflicted.[4]

As to the general character of the Abyssinians, Mr Dufton affirms that they are excessively proud, and, moreover, "deceitful, lying, insincere; their breasts are seldom stirred by generosity towards others, or in gratitude for benefits received; and, added to all, they are inhospitable."[5] Mr Parkyns, also, says that vanity (which Mr Dufton probably intends by "pride") is the besetting sin of the Amhara soldiers, and of the towns-people, who have much intercourse with them. They are, moreover, rather cowardly, very deceitful and treacherous, grasping and covetous, vicious, debauched, and thievish. As to the Tigrèans, however, Mr Parkyns adds that the peasantry, setting aside ignorance and poverty, "have as few sins or vices to be laid to their charge as any people under the sun."[6] The anecdotes given as illustrations of Abyssinian cruelty are declared by Mr Parkyns to apply especially to the Amharas or the Gallas.[7] Nothing has yet been said with reference

[1] "Voyage to Abyssinia." See Pinkerton's "Voyages and Travels," vol. xv., p. 37.
[2] Vol. iv., p. 473.
[3] Do. As to mutilation of pretenders to the throne, see vol. iii., p. 263.
[4] Parkyns *op. cit.*, p. 368.
[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 92.
[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 350.
[7] Do., 341 *seq.* The Abyssinians have great dread of poison, and

to the sexual morality of the Abyssinians. That this is not of a very high order, may be judged of by their ideas on the subject of marriage. Mr Bruce affirmed that there was not in reality any such thing as marriage in Abyssinia "unless that which is contracted by mutual consent, without other form, subsisting only till dissolved by dissent of one or other, and to be renewed or repealed as often as it is agreeable to both parties, who, when they please, cohabit together again as man and wife, after having been divorced, and had children by others, or whether they have been married, or had children with others or not."[1] This account is confirmed by Mr Parkyns, who says that church marriages (which are indissoluble) are seldom solemnised until the decline of life. The civil marriage is dissolved from the slightest motives, and is a mere separation accompanied by a division of children and property. It is not unusual, however, for the divorced wife to be maintained by the husband in a house near his own, and for them to continue in perfect friendship after the separation.[2] Notwithstanding this, the want of family affection among relations is, says Mr Parkyns, one of the worst features in the Abyssinian character, it being due, nevertheless, rather to jealousy among the offspring of a man's several wives than to any natural want of affection, which is not exhibited among the children of the same father and mother.[3]

The principles of morality recognised in Abyssinia must, theoretically, be such as are enforced by Christianity, while those acknowledged in the Soudan are the same as the author of the Koran expounded. It may be

appear to ascribe many deaths to its use (*see.* p. 395). Probably, however, this belief is simply a relic of the old idea that disease is caused by sorcery. The Abyssinians are extremely superstitious. (Do., pp. 277 *seq.*, 300 *seq.*)

[1] *Op. cit.*, vol. iv., p. 491. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 268. [3] Do., p. 331.

doubted, however, whether in reality the Abyssinians are much superior, morally at least, to the heathen Gallas of the south. Of this people, we learn from Bruce that, although polygamy is allowed, few men have more than one wife, and he adds that with them "the love of children seems to get a speedy ascendancy over the passion of pleasure."[1] Their ideas of sexual morality are, nevertheless, not very refined, as they have the custom of offering their women as a mark of hospitality, and as a means of establishing a bond of relationship.[2] They exhibit the disregard for the sufferings of others usual among savages. Bruce quaintly remarks: "The Gallas are not like other men; they do not talk about what is cruel and what is not; they do just what is for their own good, what is reasonable, and think no more of the matter."[3] The barbarousness of this people may be judged of from the description given by Bruce of the mode of adornment used by the chief of the Eastern Gallas.[4] This was much the same as that which, according to the Rev. J. L. Krapf, is practised by the Galla wizards, who go about with goats' intestines twisted round their necks.[5] We learn from this writer that the Gallas are not unacquainted with the nature of an oath, and that friendship is treated as sacred. Friends and relations are faithful to each other, although continual feuds appear to exist among the various tribes. Killing an enemy confers great honour, but killing a Galla is to be atoned for by the payment of a fine to the relations of the person slain.[6] The Gallas have some notion of a future state of rewards and punishments, according to the conduct of man in this life,[7] although it does not

[1] Bruce, *op. cit.*, vol. iii., p. 245. [2] Do., vol. v., p. 470.
[3] Do., p. 228. [4] Do., vol. vi. 43.
[5] See Krapf's "Elements of the Galla Language," Introd., p. 7.
[6] Ditto. [7] Ditto, p. 8.

appear what actions are thought to be rewarded and which punished. They pay great reverence to the serpent, which they consider the mother of the human race, and view the tree Worka (*ficus sycamorus*) as sacred, but they appear to believe in a supreme deity, *Waka*, to whom they offer a yearly sacrifice, and pray to the following effect :—" O Wak, give us children, tobacco, corn, cows, oxen, and sheep. Preserve us from sickness, and help us to slay our enemies who make war upon us, the Sidama (Christians) and the Islama (Mohammedans). O Wak, take us to thee, lead us unto the garden, lead us to Setani, and not unto the fire." [1]

That the Gallas are more widely spread in Eastern Africa than was formerly supposed is very probable. Capt. Speke thinks that the Wahŭman kingdom of Kittara was founded by them,[2] and Sir Samuel Baker believes that an invasion by the Gallas originated the settlement of the *Latookas* on the White Nile.[3] These people are described as a fine, frank, and warlike race, and instead of being morose like their neighbours, are " excessively merry, and always ready for either a laugh or a fight."[4] Notwithstanding their frankness, the Latookas would appear to differ little from other African tribes in moral character. Sir Samuel Baker says that their obtuseness was so great that he could " never make them understand the existence of good principle,—their own idea was 'power'—force that could obtain all—the strong hand that could wrest from the weak." He adds: " Human nature, viewed in its crude state as pictured amongst African savages, is quite on a level with that of the brute, and not to be compared with the noble character of the dog. There is neither gratitude,

[1] Krapf's " Travels, Researches, and Missionary Labours." London, 1860, p. 77. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 248.
[3] " The Albert N'Yanza," vol. i., p. 204. [4] Do., p. 207.

pity, love, nor self-denial; no idea of duty; no religion; but covetousness, ingratitude, selfishness and cruelty. All are thieves, idle, envious, and ready to plunder and enslave their weaker neighbours.[1] Among the Latookas, as with nearly all African peoples, women are viewed as property, and a good-looking, strong, young girl will sell as a wife for ten cows. This is a considerable price, considering that, as Sir Samuel Baker remarks, "a savage holds to his cows and his women, but especially to his cows."[2] Of course, under these conditions, polygamy is general. Notwithstanding the moral obtuseness of the natives of the White Nile,[3] some of them are not wanting in mental acuteness.[4] The reasoning of Commoro, the Latooka chief, against the resurrection of the body was worthy of a Kafir or a Madecasse. Referring to the growing of corn from the seed, he said: "the

1 "The Albert N'Yanza," vol. i., p. 241. Elsewhere Sir Samuel Baker justly says that "it is as absurd to condemn the negro *in toto*, as it is preposterous to compare his intellectual capacity with that of the white man" (p. 288). The opinion expressed in the text must, however, be accepted as a correct generalization.

2 *Op. cit.*, p. 220. Schweinfurth affirms that a Dinka will redeem his cattle, when stolen, by the heaviest sacrifices, "for they are dearer to him than wife or child." *The Heart of Africa*, vol. i., p 164.

3 Sir Samuel Baker states that the black boys at the Khartoum Mission, who had been collected from among the White Nile tribes, repaid the kindness bestowed upon them by stealing everything they could lay their hands on. It was found to be so utterly impossible to improve them that the chief of the mission at last turned them all adrift (vol. i., p. 118). Herr Morlang, an Austrian Missionary, who had worked for many years among the Kych tribe, described them as being far below the brutes. They were completely devoid of gratitude and given to lying and deceit in a superlative degree. Among this tribe, when a man becomes too old to pay sufficient attention to his young wives, his eldest son becomes his substitute. (Vol. i., pp., 74, 78.)

4 Pallme, however, says of the negroes of Kordofan, that their mental faculties are so limited that they should be treated like children. (*Travels in Kordofan*, 1844, p. 108.) He gives a similar character to the Shilluks and Denkas (p. 148); and also to the Nuba and other negro peoples of the White Nile (p. 164).

original grain does *not* rise again; it rots like the dead man, and is ended; the fruit produced is not the same grain that we buried, but the *production* of that grain: so it is with man,—I die, and decay, and am ended; but my children grow up like the fruit of the grain. Some men have no children, and some grains perish without fruit, then all are ended."[1]

A short account may be given of the character of other East African peoples recently visited by Europeans. Such are the curious peoples met with by Speke and Baker on the eastern shore of the Albert N'Yanza, and called by the former, *Wahŭma*, and thought by him to be allied to the Gallas. The barbarous character of the Wahŭma is exemplified by the custom, followed in Uganda, of all the princes but two (who were reserved in case of accident) being burnt alive when the prince-elect has attained the age of manhood, and been crowned. All officers are required to attend at court as often as possible, and to be extremely attentive to their dress, for neglect of which life may be forfeited. If an officer salutes informally, he is condemned to death, and at once bound with cords and dragged off to execution. If a man "exposes an inch of naked leg whilst squatting, or has his *mbŭgŭ* tied contrary to regulations," he is dealt with in the same summary way. Should one of the king's wives commit any indiscretion, however trifling, in word or act, the pages are at once directed to bind her and take her away to execution.[2] So, also, the looking upon the king's women, or touching his clothes, even by accident, is punished by death. Consistently with these arbitrary and barbarous practices, the king is adored as a deity, and everything that

[1] Baker, *op. cit.*; do., p. 251.

[2] Capt. Speke says that nearly every day he saw one or more of the palace women led away to execution.

comes from a royal personage, whether by accident or design, is regarded with reverence. Human life appears to be as of little value among the Wahŭma as with the Dahomans of Western Africa. Probably of the two peoples, the former are the more cruel. On one occasion, to make a severe example, it was decreed that several men who had transgressed should not be put to death at once, but "being fed to preserve life as long as possible, they were to be dismembered bit by bit, as rations for the vultures, every day, until life was extinct." The superstition of the Wahŭma is as great as their cruelty. If the king dreams that his father tells him that anybody is dangerous and directs him to be killed, the order is strictly carried out. Although women are not regarded by the Wahŭma exactly as property, their condition among these people would seem to be inferior, after marriage at least, to what it is with the negro tribes. Wives, if guilty of slight offences, are sometimes sold into slavery, while, at other times, they are flogged or made the menial servants of the household. The Wahŭma do not appear to have any marriage customs. Many men obtain wives by exchanging daughters with each other. The Wakungŭ, or governors of districts, are presented with women by the king, "according to their merits, from seizures in battle abroad, or seizures from refractory officers at home." The royal harem is supplied by the Wakungŭ, who present their pretty daughters to the king in atonement for some offence, or by the neighbouring chiefs, whose daughters may be demanded in tribute. It is remarkable that the king's valets are full-grown women, who perform their office in a state of nudity.[1]

It is not improbable that other peoples of Galla infinity, besides the Wahŭma, will be found to exist in

[1] As to the Wakŭma, see Speke, *op. cit.*, p. 250, *seq.*

East Central Africa. Such possibly are the Monbuttu recently discovered by Schweinfurth in the region between 3° and 4° north latitude and 28° and 29° east longitude from Greenwich. In their features this people somewhat resemble the Fulbe, and their language appears to belong to the Nubia-Lybian group. The Monbuttu, without having been in contact with Christian or Mohammedan civilisation, have attained to a considerable degree of culture. They excel all other peoples of the continent met with by Schweinfurth in smith work, and also in every other branch of their manufactures, not excepting the Mohammedan peoples of Northern Africa. The Monbuttu are described by the traveller as a noble race of men, having a certain national pride, and being endowed in a higher degree with understanding and reason than any other of the inhabitants of the African wilderness. Moreover, the Nubians are loud in their praise for their reliableness in friendly intercourse, and for the order and safety which is supplied by their political government. And yet the Monbuttu have the unenviable notoriety of being the most thorough-going cannibals in the world. They have no domestic animals except the dog and the fowl, but their raids on their negro neighbours and the chase provide them with an ample supply of animal food. Their cannibalism can only arise, therefore, from a depraved appetite, and this leads them to make war on their neighbours for the sole object apparently of obtaining human flesh. The bodies of the slain are divided among the victors on the field of battle, and the flesh dried for home consumption. The living victims are driven before their captors like a flock of sheep to be used for food as occasion requires.[1]

[1] *Op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 92, *seq.*; and see the *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie* (1873), p. 1, *seq.*

The Zandey, or Niam-Niam, who occupy the country north and north-west of the Monbuttu, are no less remarkable than this people for possessing certain good traits of character. This is shown particularly in the relation between the sexes. On this subject Schweinfurth says:—"The social position of the Niam-Niam women differs materially from what is found amongst other heathen negroes in Africa. The Bongo and Mittoo women are on the same familiar terms with the foreigner as the men, and the Monbuttu ladies are as forward, inquisitive, and prying as can be imagined; but the women of the Niam-Niam treat every stranger with marked reserve. . . . . This reserve may have originated from one of two opposite reasons. It may on the one hand have sprung from the more servile position of the Niam-Niam women themselves; or, on the other, it may have been necessitated by the jealous temperament of their husbands. It is one of the fine traits in the Niam-Niam that they display an affection for their wives, which is unparalleled among natives of so low a grade, and of whom it might be expected that they would have been brutalized by their hunting and warlike pursuits. A husband will spare no sacrifice to redeem an imprisoned wife, and the Nubians, being acquainted with this, turn it to profitable account in the ivory trade. They are quite aware that whoever possesses a female hostage can obtain almost any compensation from a Niam-Niam."[1] Notwithstanding the conjugal affection exhibited by the Niam-Niam, marriage is of the simple character ordinary among African peoples. Unlimited polygamy is universally practised, and the property right over the wife is shown by the punishment of death being inflicted for unfaithfulness.[2]

1 "The Heart of Africa," vol. i., p. 471-2.
2 Do., vol. ii., p. 27-28.

Female prostitution is not unknown among the Zandey, and the name given by them to those who practise it is the same as that by which they designate the travelling minstrels.[1]

The Zandey, notwithstanding their good qualities, have acquired notoriety for a habit which has always been looked upon as a mark of extreme moral depravity. The name Niam-Niam, given to them by the Nubians, is applied indiscriminately to all the cannibal peoples of East Africa, and it would seem to be an onomatopæia derived from the smacking of the lips. It is true that, according to Schweinfurth, some of the Zandey "turn with such aversion from any consumption of human flesh that they would peremptorily refuse to eat out of the same dish with any one who was a cannibal." But on the other hand, the traveller was told that in times of war people of all ages, more especially the old, owing to their inability to escape, were eaten, and that "at any time, should any lone and solitary individual die, uncared for and unheeded by relatives, he would be sure to be devoured in the very district in which he lived." Some of the natives admitted, moreover, that no bodies were rejected for food except those of persons who had died from some loathsome cutaneous disease. The general cannibalism of the Zandey, would, indeed, seem to be confirmed by the fact, mentioned by Schweinfurth, and which can hardly be explained in any other way, that they wear strings of human teeth round their necks, and that human skulls are placed on stakes about their dwellings.[2] The existence of cannibalism among peoples so advanced in various other respects as the Zandey[3] and the Monbuttu is a curious phenomenon, but its

[1] *Nzangah*, no doubt allied to the *Ganga* of South Africa.—*Schweinfurth*, vol. ii., p. 31.

[2] Do., vol. ii., p. 18.

[3] The Zandey are clever ironworkers, potters, woodcarvers, and basketmakers. *Schweinfurth*, vol. ii. p. 25.

significance is rather intellectual than moral. Traces of it are found in so many parts of the African continent, that we may well suppose the habit to have been at one time general among its inhabitants. Although those who practise it can hardly exhibit a high moral culture, yet at the same time it is by no means a sign of special moral depravity.

Finally, some account should be given of the character of the primitive people of South Africa known to us as Hottentots, but called by themselves *Quaiquæ,* this probably being the general name of the tribes about the Cape of Good Hope, when the Dutch first settled there. As described by Sir John Barrow, they compare favourably in many respects with their darker neighbours the Kafirs. This traveller says that "they are a mild, quiet, and timid people; perfectly harmless, honest, faithful; and though extremely phlegmatic, they are kind and affectionate to each other, and not incapable of strong attachment. A Hottentot would share his last morsel with his companions. They have little of that kind of art or cunning that savages generally possess. If accused of crimes of which they have been guilty, they divulge the truth. They seldom quarrel among themselves, or make use of provoking language."[1] Elsewhere the same writer says that he never found an act of kindness or attention thrown away upon a Hottentot, who could appreciate a benevolent action, and feel a satisfaction in being able to pay a debt of gratitude.[2]

Thomson describes the Korannas, who were superior to the other Hottentots, as being mild, indolent, and unenterprising, friendly to strangers, and inclined to

[1] "Travels in Southern Africa," vol. i. p. 151. On the whole this character agrees with that assigned by Le Vaillant to the natives of the Cape. "Travels" (Eng. Trans.), vol. ii. pp. 235, 362; iii. pp. 65, 283.

[2] Do. vol. ii., p. 108.

cultivate peace with all the tribes around them, except the Bushmen—"towards whom they bear inveterate animosity, on account of their continual depredations on their flocks and herds."[1] The Namaquas would seem to be of the same mild and indolent disposition.[2] They are said by Sir J. E. Alexander to be a "good people," neither vindictive nor bloodthirsty. Strangers who visit them are usually treated with kindness, and the Namaqua, who eats, drinks, and smokes alone, is held in great contempt. The last-named writer, however, refers to several instances of vindictiveness and treachery on the part of the Great Namaquas, and he states that the forbearance of the people is not to be too much trusted by the traveller, "if they think they can easily overpower him, or may not be afterwards called to account for his death."[3] It is evident, indeed, that the morality of the Hottentots is of a somewhat negative character, or rather that they have no very positive ideas on the subject at all. This is very noticeable in relation to sexual matters. The Namaquas have a curious combination of polygamy and polyandry, which consists of two chiefs having four wives between them.[4] They are not very particular, however, in such matters, chastity being little regarded among them. Sir J. E. Alexander states that when the chiefs go to the sea-coast, they "lend their wives to the white men for cotton handkerchiefs, or brandy; and if the husband has been out hunting, and on his return finds his place occupied, he sits down at the door of his hut, and, the paramour handing him out

[1] *Op. cit.* vol. ii., p. 32. [2] Thomson, vol. ii., p. 60.

[3] "Expedition into the Interior of Africa," 1838, vol. i. pp. 99, 193.

[4] Do., p. 169. Thunberg remarks that Hottentot women have frequently a real husband, and also a *locum tenens*, or substitute (*Pinkerton's Voyages and Travels*, vol. xvi., p. 89). Le Vaillant's followers had no difficulty in hiring wives among the Hottentots, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. 230, 293.

a bit of tobacco, the injured man contentedly smokes it till the other chooses to retire.[1] The Bosjesmans made no scruple in offering their women to strangers, treating them as mere animals,[2] and the Hottentots were not much better. They confessed that they cared more for their sheep than for their women,[3] and they would not hesitate to give up either wives or daughters for tobacco.[4] Nor were the women at all shy in their advances. One of the prettiest Namaqua girls that the traveller had met with north of the Orange River paid him a visit, and offered to marry him for a cotton handerkchief.[5] And yet the Hottentots are capable of jealousy, and they retain their feelings of revenge for a love disappointment until it can be safely gratified, even though this may not be for many years, as a tragical incident narrated by Sir J. E. Alexander shows.[6] Moreover, they are not slow to avenge in a deadly manner the affront, if strangers interfere with their wives without their permission.[7]

Like all savages, the Hottentots practise the custom of blood-revenge,[8] but they appear to be, on the whole, honest and trustworthy.[9] They differ considerably, however, in this respect. Sir J. E. Alexander states with reference to the Namaquas at Kanus, that he "heard everywhere complaints of them, of their plundering their neighbours of cattle, of their violating the wives of strangers who visited the Bath, of their robbing single travellers, of their having attacked the kraals of those

[1] *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 196. [2] Do. vol. ii., pp. 23, 147.

[3] The Koraquas, says Le Vaillant, would willingly barter a daughter for a cow, *op. cit.*, vol. iii., p. 17.

[4] Alexander, vol. i., pp. 98, 173.

[5] Do. p. 265. Le Vaillant describes the unmarried girls among the Great Namaquas as being very amorous, but the married women were said to be very modest and reserved, *op. cit.* vol. ii., p. 229.

[6] Vol. i., p. 265. [7] Do. vol. ii., p. 80.

[8] Alexander, i. p. 210. [9] Do., i. p. 166 ; ii. p. 47.

with whom they had quarrelled, and mercilessly burning the huts with the women and children in them, and such like stories."[1] But the atrocities perpetrated by Africaner before his conversion, and by other Hottentot robbers, referred to by Mr Moffat,[2] can hardly be cited as evidence of natural moral depravity. It is very doubtful whether, in the absence of the oppression exercised by the European colonists,[3] such a career of crime would have originated, at least in the case of Africaner himself.[4] A native told Mr Moffat that he had been taught from infancy "to look upon Hatmen (hat-wearers) as the robbers and murderers of the Namaquas," and this sufficiently explains many actions which are otherwise almost unaccountable in a people so mild as the latter are said to be. The conduct of the Namaquas to the Damaras,[5] and also to the Bosjesmans, shows, however, that, in the absence of restraining influences, the former can become as cruel and bloodthirsty as the other peoples of South Africa. Their conduct, moreover, in abandoning their aged parents to perish, and laughing when remonstrated with on the subject,[6] exhibits a heartlessness which may well lead us to believe that their usual mildness of disposition is rather the result of temperament than of goodness.[7]

Even the degraded Bosjesmans—who are supposed by Mr Moffat to bear the same relation to the Hottentots as do the *Balala*, or "poor" natives, to the other

[1] Do., i. p. 218. [2] *op. cit.*, pp. 77, 493.

[3] Le Vaillant gives examples of this on the part of the Dutch. *op. cit.*, ii. p. 72 ; iii. p. 262, *seq.*

[4] Moffat, p. 73, *seq.*

[5] Mr Baines says, that "a Hottentot thinks as little of a lie as he does of a Damara's life." ("Explorations in South-West Africa," p. 96.)

[6] Moffat, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

[7] The Hottentots appear to be gradually disappearing under the influence of spirit-drinking and dacca-smoking.

Bechuanas[1]—are capable of appreciating kindness and of bestowing sympathy on others.[2] To their enemies, however, they are implacable, and towards the Hottentot servants of the Dutch farmers especially, they show extreme cruelty, putting them to death with every conceivable torment.[3] Doubtless much of their ferocity is to be ascribed to the treatment they themselves receive from their neighbours, but it is difficult to believe that the extreme moral depravity which they exhibit can have *originated* in such a manner, or even from the hardships they have had to endure. Mr Kircherer says of the Bosjesmans, "they are total strangers to domestic happiness. The men have several wives, but conjugal affection is little known. They take no great care of their children, and never correct them except in a fit of rage, when they almost kill them by severe usage. In a quarrel between father and mother, or the several wives of a husband, the defeated party wreaks his or her vengeance on the child of the conqueror, which in general loses its life. Tame Hottentots seldom destroy their children, except in a fit of passion; but the Bushmans will kill their children without remorse, on various occasions; as when they are ill-shaped, when they are in want of food, when the father of a child has forsaken its mother, or when obliged to flee from the farmers or others; in which case they will strangle them, smother them, cast them away in the desert, or bury them alive.[4] There are instances of parents throwing their tender offspring to the hungry

[1] *Op. cit*, p. 7, *seq.* [2] Do., pp. 63, 156.
[3] Barrow, *op. cit.* pp. 285, 400.
[4] A similar statement is made by the Rev. Fras. Fleming, who says that mothers will kill their children as a means of revenging themselves on the father. The same writer speaks of the deadly and cruel hatred of the Bosjesmans for the coloured peoples around them. ("Southern Africa," 1856, pp. 167, 169.)

lion, who stands roaring before their cavern, refusing to depart till some peace-offering be made to him. In general their children cease to be the objects of a mother's care as soon as they are able to crawl about in the field. In some few instances, however, you meet with a spark of natural affection, which places them on a level with the brute creation."[1] When to this is added the utter disregard which, as we have seen, the Bosjesmans exhibit for female chastity, it is difficult to conceive a condition of greater moral depravity.

Whether the real Bosjesman is capable of being permanently raised from his condition of degradation, so as to enjoy the amenities of civilized life is questionable. It would seem, however, to be different with the Hottentots, who, when brought under proper influences, show considerable aptitude for improvement. In 1829 a number of Hottentots were settled by the Cape Government in the mountain basin of the Kat river. The people, whose number quickly increased to 4000, immediately set to work to cultivate the land, and by 1833 they had actually made 20,000 yards of canals for the purpose of irrigation. The success of the settlement depended greatly on the judicious management of the superintendent Captain Stockenstrom, the missionary Mr Read, and the pastor Mr Thompson; but Mr Pringle ascribes it chiefly "to the industry and docility of the people themselves, and to their manly determination to prove themselves worthy of their newly-acquired privileges." The Hottentots, moreover, exhibited the greatest anxiety to have schools established among them, and to prevent the sale of intoxicating liquors in the settlement. It was remarked at the beginning of 1833 that, among the 4000 inhabitants, there was no resident magistrate, nor a single police officer, and yet that better order was

[1] Moffat, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

preserved there than at the seat of magistracy at Graham's Town.[1] This change, which, like all such social improvements among primitive peoples, is due to the influence of a more civilized race, shows that the Hottentots are not incapable of a certain degree of culture. Much, no doubt, must be ascribed to the influence of Christian teaching, which never had a greater triumph than in the wonderful change effected in the character of Africaner, of whom a farmer, when told of it by Mr Moffat, said, "I can believe almost anything you say, but *that* I cannot credit; there are seven wonders in the world, that would be the eighth." Of the once dreaded freebooter, the missionary declares that it may emphatically be said, "that 'he wept with those that wept, for wherever he heard of a case of distress, thither his sympathies were directed; and notwithstanding all his spoils of former years, he had little to spare, but he was ever on the alert to stretch out a helping hand to the widow and fatherless."[2]

[1] Pringle's "African Sketches," p. 401, *seq.* Lieutenant-Colonel Sutherland, writing in 1847, said that there were many respectable Hottentot landholders at the Kat River Settlement. "Memoir on the Kafirs, &c., of South Africa," p. 443, *note.* It must be added that, during the war of 1850, the settlers joined the Kafirs and expelled the missionaries, and the Kat River district is now inhabited by a mixed population of Hottentots, Fingoes, and Europeans.

[2] Moffat, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

CHAPTER III.

THE SENSE OF RIGHT—(*continued.*)

SOUTH AMERICANS.

WHEN we consider the low degree of intellectual culture presented by the aborigines of America, except those of the highlands of the western side of the continent when first visited by Europeans, we cannot be surprised at their exhibiting a very imperfect phase of morality. This might be expected from the numerous points of resemblance between the American tribes and many of the peoples described in the preceding pages. The former, however, are not all equally degraded, even when living side by side. Some of the natives of South America, such as the *Caishánas* and the *Múras*, are, says Mr Bates, little removed in their social condition, "from that of the brutes living in the same forests."[1] So also the *Pararanátes* of the Tapajos are a tribe of intractable savages,[2] probably much resembling in their manners the uncivilised tribes of the far interior, many of whom would seem to be cannibals.[3] Mr Bates, however, says that "the points of resemblance between all the tribes inhabiting the region of the Amazons are so numerous and striking that, notwithstanding the equally

[1] "The Naturalist on the R. Amazon," vol. ii., p. 373.

[2] Do., vol. i., p. 126.

[3] Do., vol. ii., p. 406; see also Brett's "Indian Tribes of Guiana," p, 340, *note*. Cannibalism is reported also of several of the tribes in the interior of Peru. See the fine work of M. Paul Marcoy, "Voyage à travers 'Amérique de Sud." Tom. ii., pp. 92 *seq.*, 238, &c.

striking points of difference which some of them exhibit," they have all had a common origin.[1] This opinion is confirmed by what is known of the former habits of the *Mundurucús.* This people, who are said to be now entitled to a higher title than that of savages, by "their regular mode of life, agricultural habits, loyalty to their chiefs, fidelity to treaties, and gentleness of demeanour," in their former wars exterminated two of the neighbouring peoples, and were accustomed to place the heads of their slain enemies around their houses as trophies. Intercourse with Europeans would thus seem to have softened their manners, although they still make an annual expedition against the wild tribes of the neighbouring territory.[2] Most of the Indians of the Amazon valley appear to agree with the Mundurucús in general character, this being far from wholly depraved. But their goodness, says Mr Bates, "consisted perhaps more in the absence of active bad qualities, than in the possession of good ones; in other words, it was negative rather than positive. Their phlegmatic, apathetic temperament; coldness of desire, and deadness of feeling; want of curiosity and slowness of intellect, make the Amazonian Indians very uninteresting companions anywhere.[3] Their imagination is of a dull, gloomy quality, and they never seem to be stirred by the emotions—love, pity, admiration, fear, wonder, joy, enthusiasm. These are characteristics of the whole race." Mr Bates adds that the good-fellowship of the Cucámus seemed to arise, "not from warm sympathy, but simply from the absence of eager selfishness in small matters."[4] It is doubt-

[1] "The Naturalist on the R. Amazon," vol. ii., p. 134; vol. i., p. 329.

[2] Do., vol. i., p. 131-2.

[3] Mr Wallace speaks of a diffidence, bashfulness, or coldness, which affects all their actions.—("Narrative of Travels on the Amazon," p. 518).

[4] *Op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 161.

less owing in great measure to this want of sympathy that the Brazilian aborigines have never had any notion of domesticating animals for use.[1] The West African, fails in such domestication apparently for the same reason.[2]

The description given by Drs Von Spix and Von Martius of the character of the Coroados tribes on the Rio Xipoto in Brazil, probably answers to that of most of the aborigines of South America, and it agrees well with the accounts supplied by other travellers. They say: "The temperament of the Indian is almost wholly undeveloped, and appears as phlegm. All the powers of the soul, nay, even the more refined pleasures of the senses, seem to be in a state of lethargy. Without reflection on the whole of the creation, or the causes and internal connection of things, they live with their faculties directed only to self-preservation. They scarcely distinguish the past and the future, and hence they never provide for the following day. Strangers to complaisance, gratitude, friendship, humility, ambition, and in general to all delicate and noble emotions which adorn human society, obtuse, reserved, sunk in indifference to every thing, the Indian employs nothing but his naturally acute senses, his cunning, his retentive memory, and that only in war or hunting, his chief occupations. Cold and indolent in his domestic relations, he follows mere animal instinct more than tender attachment, and his love to his wife shows chiefly only in cruel jealousy which, with revenge, is the only passion that can rouse his stunted soul from its moody indifference."[3] Like some of the islanders of the Pacific, he keeps himself isolated and separated from his family

[1] Do., vol. i., p. 191. Some of the Peruvian tribes are, however, peculiarly apt at taming animals. See Marcoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 564.
[2] Burton's "Mission to Gelele," vol. ii., p. 201.
[3] "Travels in Brazil in the years 1817-1820," vol. ii., p. 241.

and he seldom troubles himself about his descendants or their disputes. It is not surprising, therefore, that family ties are very loose, and that the aged are not treated with the respect which they usually enjoy among uncultured peoples. The Indian takes as many wives as he wishes for, or can afford to keep, and he divorces them at pleasure, and the woman then looks out for another husband. It is not unusual, however, for a man to have only one wife at a time. Marriage between near relations appears not to be known, but unnatural vices were practised among some of the tribes.[1] What we understand by modesty is hardly observable, the naked women alone showing it by the manner in which they walk in the presence of strangers. On the other hand, the Indian is described as being neither thievish nor deceitful, and generally abstemious in matters relating to the stomach, showing excess only in the drinking of his vinhassa, or of brandy, when he can obtain it.[2] The intellectual development of the Indian is on a par with his moral culture, and it is not surprising that he is grossly superstitious. He wears round his neck strings of the eye-teeth of ounces and monkeys, of certain roots, fruits, shells, and stones, to protect him against disease and the attacks of wild beasts. Misfortunes, sickness, and death are ascribed to the influence of the wizard-doctors, who are often put to death by the suffering persons. The Indian has a great dread of spirits, with whom the *Paje* or wizard is thought to hold direct intercourse, or from whom he receives intelligence through the medium of the goat-sucker and the screaming vultures, caracarai and caoba. It is doubtful whether he has any original idea of a Good Spirit, but he believes in the existence of an Evil-principle, "which meets nim sometimes in the form of a lizard, of a man with stag's

[1] "Travels in Brazil, &c.," ii., p. 346. [2] Do., p. 242.

feet, of a crocodile, or an ounce; sometimes transforms itself into a swamp, &c., leads him astray, vexes him, brings him into difficulty and danger, and even kills him."[1]

It is evident, from the very interesting account given by the missionary Dobrizhoffer of the Abipones, that the aborigines of Paraguay then differed little, in moral characteristics at least, from most of the other South American tribes. So long as the Abipones were sober, homicide and theft were almost unknown among them, although children would pilfer fruit from the gardens and chickens from the yards of the mission, but only, as Dobrizhoffer says apologetically, because they thought these were free to all.[2] Parents displayed great affection for their children, the fathers instructing the boys, and the mothers the girls, in their various pursuits. Children, however, were never corrected, and consequently they became insolent to their parents.[3] The women were somewhat given to infanticide, the object of the inhuman practice being to escape repudiation by their husbands. Dobrizhoffer says on this subject: "The mothers suckle their children for three years, during which time they have no conjugal intercourse with their husbands, who, tired of this long delay, often marry another wife. The women, therefore, kill their unborn babes through fear of repudiation, sometimes getting rid of them by violent arts, without waiting for their birth." He adds that "mothers spare their female offspring more frequently than the males, because their sons, when grown up, are obliged to purchase a wife, whereas daughters, at an age to be married, may be sold to the bridegroom at almost any price."[4] Polygamy was

[1] "Travels in Brazil, &c.," p. 243.
[2] "An Account of the Abipones of Paraguay" vol. ii., p. 148.
[3] Do., p. 214. [4] Do., p. 97.

allowed, but not much practised; and it was thought to be both wicked and disgraceful to have illicit connection with other women than their wives; so that adultery was almost unheard of among them.[1] Nevertheless, divorce was very common, and took place at the will of the husband, and on the slightest occasion. "If their wives displease them," says our author, "it is sufficient; they are ordered to decamp. No further cause or objection is sought for; the will of the husband who dislikes his wife, stands in the place of reason. Should the husband cast his eyes upon any handsomer woman, the old wife must remove merely on this account, her fading form or advanced age being her only accusers, though she may be universally commended for conjugal fidelity, regularity of conduct, diligent obedience, and the children she has borne."[2] This treatment is the more unreasonable, as the women are described as being very chaste,[3] but it is that to which they are subjected among nearly all the Indian tribes, with whom woman is the creature of man's passions and caprice. Towards their enemies the Abipones were savage, inhuman, and ferocious, cutting off the heads of the slain, or removing the skin with the hair from the skull, to be kept as trophies. Sometimes the skull was used as a drinking cup on festive occasions.[4] They appear, however, to have treated their captives more kindly than was customary among other tribes, and even with indulgence. Dobrizhoffer says that many of them "display the tenderest compassion, kindness, and confidence towards their captives. To clothe them they will strip their own bodies, and though very hungry, will deprive themselves of food to offer it them if they stand in need of it."[5] The women especially may

[1] "An Account of the Abipones of Paraguay," vol. ii., p. 138.
[2] Do., ii., p. 211.
[3] Do., p. 153.
[4] Do., pp. 141, 408.
[5] Do., p. 142.

be supposed to perform these good offices, and yet they are said to have been much given to quarrelling among themselves, their disputes leading to bloodshed on the most trivial occasions. The quarrels were joined in by all the women, who "fly at each other's breasts with their teeth like tigers, and often give them bloody bites. They lacerate one another's cheeks with their nails, rend their hair with their hands, and tear the hole of the flap of the ear, into which the roll of palm-leaf is inserted."[1] Both the men and women display great endurance and fortitude, and the former will suffer the most acute pain without uttering a sigh.[2] On the other hand, they appear, according to the account given by Dobrizhoffer, to be liable to attacks of madness much resembling the "muck" insanity of the Malays, impelling them to bloodshed.[3] The Abipones have the same fear of spirits and belief in sorcery which is found among all other uncultivated peoples,[4] and from Dobrizhoffer's remark that the only way to correct them is to give them clothes and food,[5] they are probably equally incapable of being truly civilised.

In some respects the Patagonians would seem to compare advantageously with the natives of Brazil, from a moral standpoint. Captain Masters describes them as being "kindly, good-tempered, impulsive children of nature, taking great likes or dislikes, becoming firm friends or equally confirmed enemies." They are suspicious of strangers, especially those of Spanish origin, owing to the treachery and cruelty with which they have been dealt with by invaders and colonists. Among themselves the Tchuelches are honest, but they will "not scruple to steal from any one not belonging to

[1] "An Account of the Abipones of Paraguay," vol. ii., p. 155.
[2] Do., p. 151. [3] Do., p. 233 *seq.*
[4] Do., p. 270. [5] Do., p. 133.

their own party." Captain Musters was, however, treated by them with fairness and consideration, and by his example they were led even to give up when dealing with him their usual habit of untruthfulness. To each other they nearly always lie in *minor* matters, even inventing incidents for mere amusement; but so long as faith is kept with them, they are declared to be very truthful in matters of importance. Captain Musters affirms that the Tchuelches are not naturally treacherous,[1] nor are they habitually cruel even to their slaves or captives. They are polygamous, but display great love for their wives and children. Wife-beating is unknown, and matrimonial disputes are rare. When a wife dies the husband is affected by the most intense grief, which he usually exhibits by destroying all his stock and burning his property.[2] Captain Musters relates such an instance, where a wealthy Indian ruined himself on the death of his wife, and in despair took to gambling and drinking. Parents show great affection for their children, who are never corrected, however, for any misconduct. Those who have no children sometimes adopt a little dog "on which they lavish their affections, and bestow horses and other valuables, which are destroyed in case of the owner's death." We learn little from Captain Musters as to the sexual habits of the Patagonians, beyond that he observed little immorality amongst them whilst in their native wilds, although, when debased by intoxication in the settlements, they are "depraved and loose in their ideas." He adds that at a subsequent period, on the entry of the Indians into the settlements of the Rio Negro, most of the young women and girls were left

[1] He says, however, that they sometimes use poison for secretly taking off an enemy (p. 183).

[2] When a child dies all the things belonging to it are burnt, and the parents throw their valuables into the fire to show their grief (p. 178).

with the toldos beyond the Traversia, "to be out of the way of temptations." The Patagonians are inveterate gamblers, and extremely superstitious. They have great dread of evil spirits, to whom, or to the influence of witchcraft, they appear to usually ascribe sickness. Sometimes a dying man will declare that his death is due to the incantations of some person whom he names, and in such a case the supposed wizard, and occasionally his whole family, are killed.[1]

Before leaving the South American continent, some particulars may be given of the moral conduct of the less cultured Indians of Peru and Guiana. The Aymaras are probably but little altered since their conquest by the Incas of Peru. Their character is described by Mr David Forbes as being, on the whole, not bad; "for it is rare to find any of the greater vices much developed amongst the pure Indians; murder is extremely rare, and theft, except of a petty character, is not common." This may be partly owing to the listlessness which distinguishes the Aymaras no less than the Indians of Brazil. They seem, says Mr Forbes, "to have a natural preference for solitude; and it is strange to come suddenly upon solitary Indians, as it were ruminating for hours together, when unobserved, in some out-of-the-way spot in the mountains, or to see the Indian women sitting crowded up the whole day, as if motionless, on the top of some heap of stones or other elevation, herding their llamas."[2] This is hardly consistent, however, with the further statement, that although the Aymaras put on an expression of stolid indifference and stupidity immediately they come in contact with a white man, they are seldom or never idle amongst themselves. They do not, at least, leave all work to

[1] Musters' "At Home with the Patagonians" (1871), p. 180 *seq.*
[2] "Journal of the Ethnological Society of London" (1870), p. 228.

be done by the women, and at home, although never animated or merry,[1] the Indian "is apparently sociable, and probably even amiable in his family relations."[2] The sexual morality of the Aymaras is of a very questionable character. They have a marriage ceremony, but they are compelled to borrow a Spanish word to express its performance, their own language not having a word signifying the act of marriage.[3] During their religious feasts, which retain traces of the native customs before their "conversion" to the Roman Catholic faith, great drunkenness and immorality occur. In the midst of the dances, says Mr Forbes, "men and women are frequently seen to exchange head-gear, by which is understood a mutual arrangement to become partners for the night of the feast."[4] What would be their moral condition if it were not for the dread which they have of the Christian God and their priests, may be judged of by the fact, that they think any crime short of murder may be committed on Good Friday with impunity, "as on that day God was dead, and consequently could not possibly on the next day remember anything that happened the day before!" Mr Forbes was told that instances are known where Aymaras have on Good Friday "violated their own daughters in the presence of their mothers;" and his informant, "a trustworthy Indian of Omasuyos," assured him, that it would not be a sin, as God was then dead.[5] Probably Garcilasso de la Vega referred to the Aymaras when he said, that in many provinces of the Collas,[6] "the women were allowed to act as shamefully as they liked with their persons, and

[1] Even when dancing they never smile or become animated, p. 234.
[2] Do., p. 229. [3] Do., p. 238 [4] Do., p. 235 n.
[5] Do., p. 232.
[6] This name, according to Mr Forbes, embraces all the Indian peoples in the southern division of the Peruvian empire, *loc. cit.*, p. 305.

the most dissolute were most sought after in marriage."[1] Elsewhere this old writer says, that many nations of the Indians "cohabited like beasts, without any special wife, but just as chance directed. Others followed their own desires, without excepting sisters, daughters, or mothers. Others excepted their mothers, but none else. In other provinces it was lawful, and even praiseworthy, for the girls to be as immodest and abandoned as they pleased, and the most dissolute were more certain of marriage than those who were faithful. At all events the abandoned sorts of girls were held to be more lusty, while of the modest it was said that they had had no desire for any one because they were torpid. In other provinces they had an opposite custom, for the mothers guarded their daughters with great care; and when they were sought in marriage, they were brought out in public, and, in presence of the relations who had made the contract, the mothers deflowered them with their own hands, to show to all present the proof of the care that had been taken of them."[2] The facts mentioned by Mr Forbes must lead us to believe that the Indians of Peru have not undergone any very great improvement in their sexual morality since the days of the Incas. They are probably now, however, strangers to the unnatural vices which Garcilasso declared to be very prevalent, although secretly practised, in some of the Peruvian provinces.[3]

The tribes of the interior of Peru would seem to differ little in moral culture from the Aymaras. The Antis, who, according to M. Paul Marcoy, are allied to the Quechua, seldom practise polygamy, but this has nothing to do with morality. They keep as many wives as they can provide for, and the difficulties

[1] "Commentaries of the Incas" (Hakluyt Society), i. p. 169.
[2] Do., i. p. 58. [3] Do., i. p. 59; ii. p. 442.

attendant on procuring food compel them to be satisfied with a single one. The Antis, like the Aymaras, are fond of quietude, living either alone or in isolated couples, or with only their own families. They follow the example of other Indian tribes, in leaving all the home work to the women, and when a woman is confined, which takes place in a detached hut, her husband pays no attention to her, but quietly reclines on his hammock, smoking and drinking with his friends. A similar carelessness is exhibited by children towards their parents when the former have attained to the age of manhood. Fathers and mothers are then thought little of, and when old they feather arrows for their children, and become the carriers of wood and water for their households. On the death of an Antis, his relations throw the body into the river, destroy his hut, and all his implements and utensils, cut down the trees he had planted, and do everything possible to make his existence forgotten. It is probable, considering the indifference for their fellows exhibited while living, that the treatment of the dead arises as much from want of sympathy as from superstition. The Antis appear to have some idea of future retribution, but it is limited to the belief that after death the "good" man inhabits the body of a jaguar, a tapir, or a monkey, while the wicked lives again as a reptile or a parroquet![1] The character ascribed by the French traveller to the Antis is applicable, with but slight alteration, to most of the other Indian tribes of Peru. All are equally primitive in their ideas of morality, and all equally uncultured in their manners. Among several of them, such as the Conibos and the Ticunas, young girls on attaining the age of puberty have to undergo a curious and barbarous ceremony, intended as an introduction to the mysteries of

[1] "Voyage à travers l'Amérique du Sud," i., p. 578, *seq.*

marriage.[1] It must be mentioned in favour of the Peruvian tribes, that their old spirit of warfare, ferocity, and destruction appears to have subsided, and that they, in general, now live in peace with their neighbours. M. Paul Marcoy is probably right, however, in his opinion, that the apathy which has ensued is rather the sign of the coming destruction of the race, than of the dawning of its civilization.[2]

The moral character of the Indians of Guiana, as described by the Rev. W. H. Brett, agrees, on the whole, with that of most other South American tribes. That writer dwells on their extreme indolence, and also on their apathy, although much of this is assumed. They have a great love of liberty, and are extremely independent in their mode of life. Strict observers of the savage virtue of hospitality, they nevertheless always expect similar entertainment in return. Although they can scarcely be said to possess any active virtues, yet their vices are not numerous. Theft is unusual. Polygamy is practised, but instances of conjugal attachment are not infrequent. The worst feature in the Indian character, says Mr Brett, is his proneness to blood revenge, which is closely connected with the system of sorcery. Death is supposed to be caused by the witchcraft of an enemy, who, after he has been discovered by certain incantations, has to be slain, with circumstances of cruelty, by a near relative of the deceased, under the influence of the destroying spirit Kanaima.[3] According to Mr Brett, the native ideas of propriety require that Arawak women should not converse with strangers of the opposite sex, and we may believe, therefore, that wives are generally faithful to their husbands. Pro-

[1] "Voyage à travers l'Amérique du Sud," i., p. 667, *seq.*; ii., p. 317, *seq.*
[2] Do. i. p. 674.
[3] "The Indian Tribes of Guiana," p. 343, *seq.*

bably this, however, arises from the coldness which appears to characterize most of the American natives. Faithfulness by the wife is quite consistent with her prostitution by the husband, a custom which is almost universal among the aborigines from Esquimaux land to Patagonia.[1] As to the Indians of Guiana themselves, Depous says, that they exchange wives for a time,[2] and de Lery tells us, that although the natives of Brazil consider adultery by a wife disgraceful, yet that fathers and relations will prostitute girls to the first comer.[3] Mr Brett states, however, that in general the Arawaks are "faithful and attached to their wives, with whom they live very happily, except when polygamy is practised. They are also fond of their children, and so indulgent that they very rarely indeed chastise them. Little reverence is consequently paid by the child to its parents; the boys, in particular, are so little controlled by the mother, as to be remarkable for their disregard of her."[4]

There appears to be a difference in some respects between the Caribs and other natives of the northern regions of South America. Probably Depous refers to the former when, after stating that "laziness, taciturnity, a paucity of ideas, and a strong propensity to falsehood and deceit, may be ranked among the characteristic traits of the South American Indians," and that those who live in the interior are less cruel than the inhabitants of the coast, he remarks that the latter were vindictive and ferocious. His statement that "deceit and treachery were ranked by them among the first of military virtues,"[5] is no doubt applicable no less to the

[1] See Falkner's "Description of Patagonia" (1774), p. 126.
[2] "Travels in South America" (Collection of Modern Voyages an Travels, 1806), iv. p. 55.
[3] "Histoire d'un Voyage" (1600), p. 339. [4] *op. cit.*, p. 99.
[5] *Loc. cit.*, p. 49.

Caribs than to the other tribes, although the former used to pride themselves on their bravery in attacking their enemies openly. This was not, however, their general custom, since, when they had a dispute with another tribe, they used to surround its villages in the night, and make the inhabitants prisoners, killing all the men, and reserving the women and children for sale as slaves.[1] The account given by De Rochefort of the Caribs[2] of the Antilles agrees well with that furnished by other travellers of the natives of South America. He says that they lived very amicably together, but that if once offended, either by a native or by a stranger, their enmity was implacable.[3] They were civil and courteous, and paid great respect to old men. Theft was viewed as a great crime, and it was rarely committed. Both men and women were naturally chaste, but the latter were ordinarily more amorous than the former.[4] They were, however, cannibals, and their fierceness in war was shown by their having destroyed all the original inhabitants of the Antilles except the women, whom they kept for wives.[5] The anthropophagus character of the Caribs was doubted by Humboldt, who declares that they were less liable to that reproach than any nation of the new Continent.[6] The same traveller states that they exercised great influence throughout the countries towards the equator by their daring, warlike enterprise, and mercantile spirit. Their countenances denote intelligence, and they have the gravity in their manners, and the sadness of aspect which distinguishes many other native

[1] Brett, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

[2] He says the word is really Caraïbes, *i.e.*, warlike people.

[3] De Lery refers to the peculiar vindictiveness of the natives of Brazil, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

[4] "Historie Naturelle et Morale des Iles Antilles" (1665), p. 459, *seq.*

[5] Do., p. 344-9.

[6] "Personal Narrative," vol. vi., p. 33. Whether the Caribs were cannibals or not, matters little from a moral point of view.

inhabitants of America. To this they add a pride which leads them to isolate themselves from other tribes.[1]

NORTH AMERICANS.

According to an authority quoted by De Rochefort,[2] the Caribs originated in Florida, among the Appallachians, and there is no doubt that their moral qualities were much the same as those exhibited by the nations not only of Florida, but of the greater part of the North American continent. Accepting the evidence of Captain Smith as more reliable than that of Fenimore Cooper, we find the Virginians described as being "inconsistent in everything but what fear constraineth them to keep," savage, crafty, timorous, quick of apprehension, and very ingenious; moreover, soon moved to anger, and "so malicious that they seldom forget an injury." They did not thieve from each other, "lest their conjurors should reveal it, and so they be pursued and punished,"[3] but theft from strangers does not appear to have been uncommon.[4] Smith gives several examples of the murderous and deceitful conduct of the Virginian natives towards both their fellow-countrymen and the settlers. On one occasion upwards of 347 European men, women, and children were most treacherously massacred.[5] As to sexual morality, it would seem that regular prostitutes existed among them, and although wives were faithful to their husbands, yet this was only so long as the latter withheld their permission to act otherwise.[6] The ideas of uncultured peoples in relation to sexual matters are evidenced by its having been cus-

[1] "Personal Narrative," vol. vi., pp. 11 *seq.*, 40.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 351, *seq.*
[3] "History of Virginia" (Pinkerton, vol. xiii.), p. 35.
[4] Do., pp. 59, 93, 143. [5] Do., pp. 43, 87, 145. [6] Do., pp. 35, 43.

tomary with the Virginian natives, when one chief visited another by night, "to set a woman fresh painted red with pocones and oil, to be his bedfellow."[1] Perhaps this custom throws light on the statement of Depous, that a law of hospitality among the natives of South America requires women to paint themselves afresh when a stranger arrives at a dwelling.[2] The character of the New England aborigines, as described by Captain Smith, differs little from that of the Virginians. He speaks of their power, dexterity, treachery, and inconstancy. They practised polygamy and divorce, and Smith says, quaintly, "they have harlots and honest women, the harlots never marry, and are widows."[3]

The moral condition of the native inhabitants of the various parts of the North American continent has a remarkable general similarity. Peculiar features are sometimes observable, but they are probably due to the influence of special conditions affecting only particular tribes, or of exceptional operation. Thus Du Lac says of the *Chawanons* of Upper Louisiana, that although they are generally mild and humane, treating their prisoners with kindness and compassion,[4] yet, during their war with the Americans, "they burned great numbers, after causing them to endure every torture which revenge or hatred could suggest."[5] In the heat of action, the Chawanons, like many other tribes, appear to have indiscriminately massacred the men, women, and children, whom they had surprised by their tactics.[6] The ruling passions of the Indians of Louisiana were hatred of their

[1] "History of Virginia," p. 38. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 56.
[3] "History of New England," *loc. cit.*, pp. 226, 242, 245.
[4] This agrees with Dobritzhoffer's testimony as to the Abipones. See *supra*.
[5] "Travels through the two Louisianas" (a collection of modern Travels and Voyages), vol. vi., p. 46. [6] Do., p. 75.

enemies, and desire for vengeance, the old men and mothers constantly reminding their children of those who had been killed by another tribe, and exhorting them to be brave and seek revenge.[1] It was urged as a justification for the non-correction of children, that the beating of a child deprived him of the spirit necessary for a warrior.[2] In return, children, instead of respecting their fathers, often ill-treated them with impunity.[3] Women were thought to be inferior beings, created only for the wants and pleasures of man, and they were treated in accordance with that idea.[4] As among uncultured people generally, women were freely lent by their husbands to others, and Du Lac relates that the chiefs of the Kanees offered him their daughters.[5] There appears to have been no limit to the number of wives a man might have, and a Chawanon had the privilege either of marrying all his wife's sisters as they attained puberty, or of disposing of them to whom he pleased. "But," adds the traveller, "the young savage seldom lives long with his first wife. Often before the age of thirty or thirty-five, he married and abandoned at least a dozen.[6]

Probably the Shoshones may be taken as representative of the Indians of the Upper Missouri. They are described by Lewis and Clarke as being honest, and decent, and proper in their conduct.[7] They did not, however, treat their old people with much respect, and they would seem, like the other hunting tribes, to have

[1] "Travels through the two Louisianas," pp. 66, 69.

[2] The same remark is made by Lewis and Clarke in their account of the Shoshones of the Upper Missouri.

[3] Du Lac, *op. cit.*, p. 68. [4] Do., p. 68. [5] Do., p. 51.

[6] Du Lac, *op, cit.*, p. 47. For information as to the character of the Creek Indians, see "Traits of Indian Character," by G. Turner (1835); See also Halliday Jackson's "Sketch of the Manners of the Seneca Indians," (1830).

[7] "Travels to the Source of the Missouri River," vol. ii., p. 156.

abandoned the aged when the means of subsistence had to be sought at a distance. On the other hand, some of their feasts were chiefly for the benefit of the old and infirm.[1] The position of the women was not more favourable than is usual among uncultured peoples. The mass of them spent their lives in the lowest and most laborious drudgery. A man might have several wives at the same time, who were usually sisters, and they and his daughters were at his absolute disposal. For a small gift a husband would "lend his wife for a night to a stranger, and the loan may be protracted by increasing the value of the present." This shows that female chastity was not much regarded, and yet a connection of that kind without the consent of the husband, was treated as very offensive.[2] A recent American writer, the first volume of whose exhaustive work has appeared while this was passing through the press, speaks of the lower tribes of the Shoshones as the most degraded of human beings, while the better ones are "thieving, treacherous, cunning, moderately brave after their fashion, fierce when fierceness will avail them anything, and exceedingly cruel." The Utah tribes practise great cruelty towards their slaves, and not only do they steal their neighbours' wives and children, to sell into slavery, but they will dispose of their own wives and children for a few trinkets.[3]

The estimate formed by Catlin of the native character may seem to be at variance with the opinions of other travellers. He says: "The North American Indian is everywhere, in his native state, a highly moral and religious being, endowed by his Maker with an intuitive

[1] "Travels to the Source of the Missouri River," vol. ii., pp. 180, 421-2. [2] Do., 164-5.

[3] "The Native Races of the Pacific States," by H. H. Bancroft (1875), vol. i., p. 435 *seq.*

knowledge of some great author of his being and the universe, in dread of whose displeasure he constantly lives, with the apprehension before him of a future state, where he expects to be rewarded or punished according to the merits he has gained or forfeited in this world."[1] The Mandans, and other tribes visited by Catlin, no doubt are sincere in their conduct, and pass through their exercises of self-denial with a belief that these are pleasing to the Great Spirit, but whether they are what we should call "moral" must be judged of by their actions. Catlin agrees with Lewis and Clarke, when he says that by nature the natives are decent and modest. He adds that they are unassuming and inoffensive, and that all history "proves them to have been found friendly and hospitable on the first approach of white people to their villages on all parts of the American continent."[2] This is, on the whole, no doubt true, but such conduct is consistent with the exhibition of a very different spirit. Thus cruelty is one of the leading traits of the Indian character. It is shown especially in the treatment of prisoners, who are usually made to undergo the most appalling tortures; although Catlin seeks to palliate this conduct, on the ground that the cruelties are practised only by way of retaliation, and to appease the manes of those of their friends who have been before similarly treated. When this has been done by the sacrifice of a sufficient number of prisoners, the remainder are adopted into the tribe by marrying the widows of those who have fallen in battle.[3] Moreover, the custom of exposing aged people is admittedly practised by all the tribes who roam over the prairies. This, however, Catlin thinks is inevitable, and readily ac-

[1] "Illustrations of the Manners, &c., of the North American Indians," vol. ii., p. 246.

[2] Do., p. 245.

[3] Do., vol. ii., p. 240.

quiesced in by the unfortunate victims.[1] The naturally cold temperament of the American Indian probably accounts for the fact that "no instance has been known of violence to their captive females."[2] There is no evidence that the tribes visited by Catlin are superior to the others in sexual morality. Lewis and Clarke say, with reference to the Mandans particularly, that "the stealing of young women is one of the most common offences against the police of the village, and the punishment of it always measured by the power or the passions of the kindred of the female."[3] Catlin, indeed, refers to practices among the Mandans compared with which the loaning of a wife or daughter may be considered innocent.[4] He elsewhere states, that it is not true that the Indians are "in the least behind us in conjugal, in filial, and in paternal affection." This is, however, quite consistent with the practice of sexual hospitality which we should expect to be known even to the Mandans, considering the inferior position occupied among them by women, and the prevalence of unlimited polygamy.[5]

The character ascribed by Mackenzie to the *Knisteneaux*, of the country about Lake Winipic, differs little from that of the majority of the Indian tribes. Notwithstanding their warlike habits, they are mild and affable, generous and hospitable, extremely good-natured, and, like most savages, "indulgent to their children to a fault." They would seem to be just in their dealings, both among themselves and with strangers. The life of their women is one of continued toil, and this doubtless has something to do with infanticide and abortion being common among them Polygamy is allowed, and a man may marry his wife's sister. Chastity is not considered

[1] "Illustrations of the Manners, &c., of the North American Indians," vol. i., p. 217.
[2] Do., vol. i., p. 240.
[3] *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 231.
[4] *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 168; vol. ii., p. 214-15.
[5] Do., vol. i., p. 118 *seq.*

a virtue, and though it sometimes happens that a wife's infidelity is punished by the husband with the loss of her hair or nose, and perhaps of her life, "such severity proceeds from its having been practised without his permission; for a temporary interchange of wives is not uncommon, and the offer of their persons is considered as a necessary part of the hospitality due to strangers." Nor are they without certain depraved habits referred to previously in connection with the Mandans and various South American tribes.[1]

The *Chepewyans*, or Athabascas, who inhabit a large tract of country to the north-west of the Great Lakes, are in some respects inferior, and in others superior, to the tribes already described. They are timorous and vagrant, "with a selfish disposition which has sometimes created suspicions of their integrity." They are subject to fits of jealousy, and for very trifling reasons treat their wives with such cruelty as occasionally to cause death. The women are at the "absolute disposal of the men, fathers selling their daughters, not, however, as slaves, but as companions to those who are supposed to live more comfortably than themselves." Wives are very submissive, but they are said, nevertheless, to be consulted by their husbands, and to have much influence over them. The Chepewyans are very sober, and they are declared by Mackenzie to be the most peaceable people in North America; yet they make war on the Esquimaux and kill them without mercy, taking no prisoners. They are very patient under severe treatment when they are conscious that it is deserved, but "they will never forget or forgive any wanton or unnecessary rigour." The Chepewyans, like so many tribes in a similar condition, abandon the infirm; but

[1] "Voyages from Montreal through the Continent of North America." By Alex. Mackenzie. Introd., p. xcvi. *seq.*

Mackenzie excuses this habit, and that of not burying the dead, by the necessities of their wandering life and the severity of the climate, which prevents the opening of the ground.[1]

The tribes met with by Lewis and Clarke on the Columbia River, in the course of their journey to the Pacific, presented considerable differences of character. Thus the *Sokulks* are described as being of a mild and peaceable disposition, showing respect for age, practising monogamy, and the husband assisting his wife in her labour.[2] The *Chopunnish* tribes also displayed in their conduct a disposition superior to that of the generality of American Indians.[3] Other travellers have borne the same testimony as to the inland tribes on the Columbia River. Thus Mr Ross Cox speaks of the unsuspicious confidence, kindness, and chastity of the Wallah-Wallah tribe, although it should be added that the allied *Chohoptins* or *Nez Percés* Indians were not so friendly. The latter are described, however, as being fond of their children, and attentive to the wants of their old people.[4] The *Spokan* tribe were found to be quiet, honest, and inoffensive. The women are "good wives, and most affectionate mothers; the old cheerful, and complete slaves to their families; the young lively and confiding; and whether married or single, free from the vice of incontinence."[5] The men, although indulgent fathers, are despotic husbands, treating their wives almost as slaves. They are, moreover, extremely jealous, and punish their wives severely for infidelity. Nevertheless, they allow

[1] *Op. cit.*, Introd., p. cxix. *seq.* The *Tinneh*, who may be classed with the Chepewyans, agree with them in character, on the whole, but are milder and more hospitable. All alike appear to have little regard for truth. For authorities see Mr Bancroft's "Native Races of the Pacific States," vol. i., p. 135 *seq.*

[2] *Op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 249. [3] Do., vol. iii., pp. 182, 201.

[4] "The Columbia River." By Ross Cox (1832), vol. i., pp. 132, 135. [5] Do., vol. i., p. 182.

themselves great freedom of conduct, forcible ravishment of women being no uncommon occurrence.[1] Gambling is, however, their besetting vice, and they are so completely its slaves as frequently to lose all their horses at play.[2] Mr Cox gives an account of a Spokan chief who was remarkable not only for certain sexual peculiarities, but also for his intelligence and moral superiority to the ordinary Indian, whose follies he ridiculed in "the most philosophical manner." He spoke strongly against gambling, and the thoughtlessness of the Indians in not providing dried fish during the summer and autumnal months for the season of scarcity. He was, moreover, free from the hypocrisy which is common among them. This chief was usually attended by several children, to whom he gave portions when they were marriageable, and dismissed them. If, however, any of them told a lie, or in the least prevaricated, the offender was "punished by a flogging and sent home, after which no consideration whatever would induce him to take back the delinquent." These peculiarities, with his solitary habits, were sufficient to cause him to be regarded with fear and awe, and both men and women considered him more than human.[3]

The people of British Columbia who exhibited the most pleasing traits of character, were the so-called *Flat-heads* [4] of the interior. Mr Cox speaks of them as having fewer failings than any of the tribes he ever met with. They were "honest in their dealings, brave in the field, quiet and amenable to their chiefs, fond of cleanliness, and decided enemies to falsehood of every description." The women, who are free from the vice of backbiting, so common among the lower tribes, were remarkably faithful to their husbands, and made good

[1] "The Columbia River," vol. ii., p. 129.
[2] Do., vol. i., p. 182. [3] Do., vol. i., p. 327 *seq.*
[4] Mr Cox says that these Indians did not flatten the head like the coast tribes (vol. i., p. 233).

wives and mothers. A young woman who was taken as a wife by a Canadian half-breed, was exhorted by her relatives to be chaste, obedient, industrious, and silent. The Flat-heads believe in a future state of rewards and punishments, and they say that "honesty, bravery, love of truth, attention to parents, obedience to their chiefs, and affection for their wives and children, are the principal virtues which entitle them to the place of happiness, while the opposite vices condemn them to that of misery." They look upon the beavers as a race of Indians who have been condemned to take that shape by the Great Spirit for their wickedness. These people are undoubtedly superior in morality to their neighbours, and yet it is difficult to reconcile this fact with their conduct towards the members of hostile tribes who fell into their hands. One of their male prisoners was put to death with the most cruel and lingering tortures. Different parts of his body were first burned with red-hot iron, and then his finger-nails were pulled out, the fingers themselves being cut off joint by joint. The victim during the whole time taunted his enemies, and finally, after suffering other barbarities, he was shot by the chief whose passion had been aroused by a reference to his wife. The cruelties inflicted on the female prisoners were still more atrocious. It is only fair to add that they justified their conduct by that of their enemies, and that they promised to give up their cruel customs if the *Blackfeet* would do the same. They were even induced to send home some of their prisoners, in the hope that it would lead the Blackfeet to follow their example.[1]

[1] See Cox, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 212 *seq.* Speaking of the inland tribes, the Nez Percés, the Flatheads, and the Kootenais, Mr Bancroft says that, as compared with the average American aborigines, they are honest, intelligent, and pure in morals, and "probably come as near as it is permitted to flesh-and-blood savages to the traditional noble redman of the forest, sometimes met in romance," *op. cit.*, i., p. 290.

A curious change in the character of the natives takes place as the Columbia river is descended towards the coast. Above the rapids female unchastity is said to be unknown; but when they are passed it becomes more and more perceptible. The general morality of the tribes nearer the coast is also inferior. Thus Lewis and Clarke said of the *Skilloots* and *Enceshurs* that they were "inhospitable and parsimonious, faithless to their engagements, and, in the midst of poverty and filth, retain a degree of pride and arrogance which render our numbers our only protection against insult, pillage, and even murder."[1] Pride is the most prominent trait in the character of the *Tsimsheeans,* a coast tribe.[2] In other particulars, however, they do not seem to differ from their neighbours. Revenge is so determined, that "many years and change of circumstances cannot extinguish it." All are treacherous both among themselves and to white men.[3] The *Chinnooks,* and other coast tribes of Columbia agree with the generality of Indians in the custom of lending a wife or a daughter in return for a small present, and Lewis and Clarke state that "nothing seemed to irritate both sexes more than our refusal to accept the favours of the females, who were by no means backward in offering them."[4] This agrees perfectly with the testimony of Commander Mayne, who refers to an *Okanagan* girl as exhibiting an unique instance of chastity, being regarded from any other point of view than expediency.[5] Intrigue with the women of other tribes is mentioned as being one of the commonest causes of quarrel among the Indians.[6] Probably the character of the natives on the coast has been somewhat deteriorated by the slave trading which they extensively

[1] *Op. cit.*, iii., p. 139.
[2] Mayne's "Four Years in British Columbia," p. 294.
[3] Do. p. 246.
[4] *Op. cit.* vol ii., p. 416-7.
[5] Do. p. 300.
[6] Do. p. 276.

engage in. It can hardly do otherwise than breed distrust, and lead to a disregard for human life. Crimes are sometimes atoned for by a present of three or four slaves, who are put to death on the spot.[1]

Mr Ross Cox remarks as to the Indians about the mouth of the Columbia River, all of whom are in the habit of flattening the head,[2] that they differ little in manners, but that if he were to make a distinction, he would say that "the *Cathlamahs* are the most tranquil, the *Killymucks* the most roguish, the *Clatsops* the most honest, and the *Chinooks* the most incontinent." He adds that their good qualities are industry, ingenuity, patience, and sobriety; whilst, on the other hand, they are thievish, deceitful, unchaste, cruel, and given to gambling. They are also great hypocrites, making a show of friendliness, and at the same time indulging in back-biting. They are most impudent thieves, and if detected in the act laugh and pretend it is a joke, but they do not resist if summary chastisement is inflicted. Slaves are well treated when able to work, but when they fall sick or become incapable, they are left to perish. Polygamy is commonly practised, and the women live together in harmony, many of them making very good wives. Formerly if a woman was unfaithful after marriage (without permission) she was put to death, but unchastity before marriage was thought little of.[3] Now, mothers prostitute their daughters, and husbands their wives, to the sailors and *voyageurs* who visit the settlement. The Coast Indians are inveterate gamblers, and will often play away all their property, even to their

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 243.

[2] The reason given for this custom by the natives is that it is used to distinguish them from their slaves (vol. i., p. 276).

[3] This phase of immorality is greatly aided by the open way in which Indian mothers speak before their children about sexual matters. (*See* Cox, vol. ii., p. 298.)

fishing nets. Their sobriety is a valuable redeeming feature in their character. Like the Spartans, they think that drunkenness is fit only for slaves. Moreover, in their warfare they do not exhibit the treachery and cruelty usual among the American tribes. They give previous notice to their opponents of an intended attack, and they endeavour to arrange the matter in dispute without coming to blows. The fighting generally takes place in canoes, and if the assailants are unsuccessful they return without redress; but if conquerors, they receive various presents from the vanquished party in addition to their original demand. The serious causes of quarrel are murders and the abduction of women, the latter being not uncommon. As to the ideas entertained by these tribes with reference to a future state, Mr Cox says that they differ little from the natives of the interior. The people who go to the place of happiness are those who have not committed murder, who have been good sons, fathers, and husbands, and who have been good fishermen. The wicked are thought to subsist on bitter fruit and salt water.[1]

The tribes along the course of the Columbia River as far as the rapids, differ little from the coast natives, and those on the upper part of the Fraser River, who are allied to the Chepewyans, would also seem to agree with the latter in their customs and moral ideas. Gambling and feasting are the great amusements of the *Talkotins*, while in sexual matters they are very depraved. Prostitution is extremely prevalent among the unmarried

[1] *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 274 *seq.* For further particulars as to the character of the Chinooks, and other coast tribes, see Mr Bancroft's work, vol. i., p. 241 *seq.* The Nootkas differ little in moral conduct from the other Columbian tribes, except in their more savage mode of warfare, and perhaps in their greater regard for chastity.—Bancroft, *op. cit.*, i., pp. 189, 195 *seq.*, and authorities there cited.—Sproat's "Scenes and Studies of Savage Life."

females, giving rise to much disease, and abortion is frequently practised. The women lead very laborious lives, bear few children, and appear to be subject to depression of spirits, arising either from sickness or excessive labour, under the influence of which many of them commit suicide.[1] The Talkotins are also described as being incorrigible thieves and liars. Like other Indians, they are cruel and bloodthirsty towards their enemies, but what is far worse, they appear to be almost devoid of natural affection. The old and infirm are frequently left by their children or relations to starve, even when food is abundant. Mr Cox says on this point:—"We have repeatedly afforded relief to numbers who were dying from starvation or disease, and who, but for our assistance, would have perished; yet ingratitude is so strongly implanted in their savage nature, that these very individuals in periods of plenty, have been the first to prevent us from taking a salmon; and whenever a dispute or misunderstanding arose between our people and the natives, these scoundrels have been seen brandishing their weapons, and urging their countrymen to exterminate us."[2] To this stock appear to belong the *Yukons* of Alaska described by Mr Whymper, who says that they constantly reminded him of Catlin and the older writers, and almost appeared like old friends. They have a wild and ferocious cast of countenance, and are much feared by neighbouring tribes. They exhibit all the treachery generally of the Indian tribes towards their enemies, and homicide would seem to be not unfrequent among themselves. They are cheerful and merry, however, and judging from the playfulness of the women, these cannot be treated very harshly. Mothers

[1] This may partly be explained by the great hardships which widows have to endure for several years after their husbands' deaths.
[2] Cox, *op. cit.* vol. ii., p. 327 *seq.*

appear to be fond of their children, whom they amuse by means of dolls made in imitation of themselves.[1]

The Tinneh family of tribes to which the Chepewyans belong is of great interest, owing to the fact that its members are allied by language to tribes on the Pacific who have no doubt at one time played an important part in the history of Mexican civilisation. These are the Apaches of New Mexico, Arizona, and Texas, of one branch of whom it has been said, "if the blood of the Aztecs still exists unmixed in America, it must flow in the veins of the Comanches." Certainly the Aztecs could scarcely surpass them in fierceness and cruelty. The Apaches usually attack their enemies by surprise, and carry off men, women, and children as prisoners. These are cruelly treated, some being scalped, and others burned at the stake; if hotly pursued after an attack, they kill their male prisoners on the spot, a fate which sometimes attends also the women and children. The Comanches are braver than the Apaches, and they usually kill their male prisoners, but the women are carried off to be taken as wives or servants for the captors, and the children are adopted into the tribe. This is, however, somewhat inconsistent with the statement that all these tribes hold captives as slaves. Slavery is undoubtedly practised, and "nothing short of crucifixion, roasting by a slow fire, or some other most excruciating form of death," can atone the crime of attempting to escape from it. It is said that not only do the Apaches steal children from other tribes and sell them, but that they dispose of their own offspring, over whom they have absolute control until the age of puberty. Among the Comanches the administration of justice is vested in the

[1] Whymper's "Travel and Adventure in Alaska," pp. 182 *seq.*, 234. As to the Kutchins of the Yukon, see further, Bancroft, *op. cit.*, i., p. 127 *seq.*

Council of the Nation, whose decisions are governed by their ancestral customs and traditions. Murder, adultery, theft, and sedition are punished by death or public exposure, unless privately settled. The lex talionis appears to be strictly enforced in cases of homicide. Polygamy is practised, and womankind, says Mr Bancroft, "is at a discount. The female child receives little care from its mother, being only of collateral advantage to the tribe. Later she becomes the beast of burden and slave of her husband," who may beat, mutilate, or even put her to death. Divorce is of course a very simple matter, and among the Navajos the wife even may abandon her husband, in which case the latter has to get rid of the disgrace by killing somebody! The sexual morality of all these tribes, except the Apaches proper, is very loose. A woman who is unfaithful to her husband is punished by the loss of her nose or ears, but wives are often bartered or lent, it being considered a part of hospitality to supply a guest with a temporary wife, and unnatural crimes are practised. Mr Bancroft thus sums up the character of the Comanches, who, although not so mild as the Navajos, Mojaves, and Tamajabs, are a fair specimen of the natives of New Mexico:—"The Comanches are dignified in their deportment, vain in respect to their personal appearance, ambitious of martial fame, unrelenting in their feuds, always exacting blood for blood, yet not sanguinary. They are true to their allies, prizing highly their freedom, hospitable to strangers, sober yet gay, maintaining a grave stoicism in presence of strangers, and a spartan indifference under severe suffering or misfortune. Formal, discreet, and Arab-like, they are always faithful to the guest who throws himself upon their hospitality. To the valiant and brave is awarded the highest place in their esteem. They are extremely clannish in their social relations.

Quarrels among relatives and friends are unheard of among them."[1] Of the Mexican tribes, those mentioned by the old Spanish writers under the name of Chichimecs deserve some notice. This race, whose identity it is now difficult to establish, but who were probably allied to the Comanches or Apaches, are described as being very warlike, and also as very barbarous, scalping or beheading their slain enemies, and putting their prisoners to death with great cruelty. The young children were sometimes adopted into the tribe, in which case, in order to "eradicate all feelings of affection towards their own kindred," they were made to drink the blood and brains of their slaughtered parents. When to this is added that they were "rude, revengeful, dull, irreligious, lazy, and given to robbery, plunder, and murder," the description of the Chichimecs as ferocious savages would seem to be justified. In sexual matters they agreed with the generality of Indian tribes. A girl could not marry without the consent of her parents, and anyone taking a girl without their consent was put to death. But sexual immorality and prostitution appear to have been extremely prevalent, and to have been practised under its worst forms.[2] A proneness to sexual excesses would seem to be almost general among these Pacific tribes. At least it is so with the natives of Lower California, who hold feasts at which promiscuous intercourse is practised,[3] and among the Northern Californians, who perform a Thanksgiving or Propitiation Dance once a year, which is followed by general debauchery.[4] In Southern California the Spanish missionaries, on their first arrival, "found men dressed as women, and perform-

[1] *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 496 *seq.*

[2] Bancroft, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 629 *seq.* As to male prostitution among the northern Mexicans, Central Americans, see further pp. 585, 774.

[3] Do., i., p. 566.

[4] Do., i., p. 352.

ing women's duties, who were kept for unnatural purposes. From youth up they were treated, instructed, and used as females, and were even frequently publicly married to the chiefs or great men."[1]

There appears to be, on the whole, a great resemblance in mental and moral characteristics among the aborigines of the American continent. They are all equally indolent, thoughtless, and improvident. Of a naturally cold temperament, they are usually reserved, if not sullen, enduring, hard of heart, often insensible to natural affection, savage and treacherous in warfare, cruel to their prisoners, and implacable in revenge. This is their most dominant passion, and the inciting cause of most of their wars. Animated with exhortations to revenge, says Robertson, "the youth snatch their arms in a transport of fury, raise the song of war, and burn with impatience to embrue their hands in the blood of their enemies. Private chiefs often assemble small parties, and invade a hostile tribe, without consulting the rulers of the community. A single warrior, prompted by caprice or revenge, will take the field alone, and march several hundred miles to surprise and cut off a straggling enemy."[2] The same feeling of revenge has given rise to the cruelty usually exhibited by the aborigines of North America towards those of their enemies who have had the misfortune to fall into their hands, and who are destined to be put to death.[3] These prisoners "are tied naked to a stake, but so as to be at liberty to move round it. All who are present, men, women, and children, rush upon them like furies. Every species of torture is applied that the rancour of

[1] Bancroft, *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 415.
[2] "History of America" (Works, ed. Lond. 1817) vol. ix., p. 151.
[3] The others are adopted into the tribe to take the place of its warriors who have fallen in the conflict.

revenge can invent. Some burn their limbs with red-hot irons, some mangle their bodies with knives, others tear their flesh from their bones, pluck out their nails by the roots, and rend and twist their sinews." These torments are often prolonged for several days, until some chief in a rage at the taunts of the prisoner puts an end to them by killing him with his club or dagger.[1] Among the natives of the Southern Continent it was formerly not unusual for prisoners to undergo a different but no less barbarous fate. They were kindly treated for a time, but only that they might be the better prepared for sacrifice. On the appointed day the prisoner was brought before the assembled tribe, and killed with a single blow. "The moment he falls, the women seize the body, and dress it for the feast. They besmear their children with the blood, in order to kindle in their bosoms a hatred of their enemies, which is never extinguished, and all join in feeding upon the flesh with amazing greediness and exultation."[2] The fortitude exhibited by the American aborigines under the torture inflicted on them by their enemies is as remarkable as these tortures are cruel. The more these are increased, the more undaunted the sufferer becomes, and he provokes by threats and insults his tormentors to do their worst. This peculiar power of endurance is owing to the special training the American aborigines receive. It

[1] "History of America," vol. ix., p. 161, *seq.*

[2] Do., ix., p. 165. This reminds us of the cannibal customs of the Mexicans. It is, evident from the authorities cited by Robertson, that cannibalism was at one time widely spread among the natives of both North and South America; but only prisoners of war were thus treated, p. 163 *seq.* This is asserted of the natives of some parts of California. The aborigines of this part of the American Continent must rank very low indeed if, as stated by a late writer, they "have no morals, nor any religion worth calling such." Bancroft, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 325 *seq.* Reference will be made to the Mexican and allied tribes in a future chapter.

is customary among most of the tribes for the youths to submit themselves to pain for the purpose of testing their patience and constancy under sufferings, and thus gradually to learn to bear the most severe trial without complaining. As Robertson says—"All the trials customary in America, when a youth is admitted into the class of warriors, or when a warrior is promoted to the dignity of captain or chief, are accommodated to this idea of manliness. They are not displays of valour, but of patience; they are not exhibitions of their ability to offend, but of their capacity to suffer."[1] This self-discipline might be thought to be especially fitted to prepare the natives of America for civilisation, but hitherto they have not shown much capacity for its reception. That tribes such as the Mundurucus of Brazil and the Mayas of Mexico have lost much of their savage nature is true, but the mildness of the Indian is too often, it is to be feared, a sign of decadence rather than a mark of culture.

ESKIMOS AND GREENLANDERS.

This account of the morals of the native inhabitants of the American continent may fitly be terminated by some reference to the tribes who occupy the more northern regions. It might be thought that as these live under conditions so different from those to which the generality of the American natives are subject, their manners would present many peculiarities. Sir John Lubbock, indeed, declares that "there is perhaps no more moral people on the face of the earth" than the

[1] "History of America," vol. ix., p. 167. For a general estimate of the character of the American Aborigines, see Robertson, vol. ix., p. 226 *seq.*

Eskimo, or *Innuit* as they call themselves.[1] Such an assertion could not be made as to any portion of the true American race, and if it be true in relation to the Eskimo, these must be widely distinguished from their neighbours. Sir John Lubbock's remark is no doubt supported, to some extent, by the testimony of Sir John Ross. This traveller says with reference to natives met with in the Gulf of Boothia, "with the exception of the adventure consequent on the boy's death [referring to an incident showing the superstitious character of the Eskimo], in which the mistake was afterwards fully rectified and atoned for, and excepting also some sufficiently pardonable and not very serious pilfering, we found every reason to be pleased with the character and conduct of this tribe, not only to us, but towards each other. I have given several instances of their kindness, in their dragging the helpless on sledges, and the care of their children; and if they seemed an affectionate and good-tempered people, so did they appear to live together in perfect harmony, and to be free of selfishness, even on the subject of that great article, food, which constitutes the whole, it may almost be said, of a savage's enjoyments."[2] Elsewhere we are told, that these Eskimo "were not only kind, but as Falstaff says of wit, they were the cause of kindness in those around them, including ourselves."[3] The travellers had much experience of the special virtue of uncultured peoples, hospitality,[4] and they appear even to have met with a display of gratitude such as is not very common among tribes in a similar condition. This, however, was accompanied by reference to an act of entertainment on the part of the travellers,[5] showing that it was looked upon as in some

[1] "Journal of the Anthropological Institute," i. p. 20.
[2] "Narrative of a Second Voyage in Search of a North-West Passage," p. 441. [3] Do., p. 591. [4] Do., p. 428. [5] Do., p. 430.

sort a return such as most savages usually make for a gift, that they may not remain under an obligation. There was certainly a native politeness mixed with their attention, which rendered it very pleasing, the hosts continually thanking their guests for the honour they had conferred on them by eating in their huts. This politeness was shown on the first visit of the natives to the ship, when they professed to like the preserved meat placed before them, although on inquiry they admitted that such was not the case.[1] The Eskimo, moreover, exhibited a certain gallantry, as Sir John Ross terms it, towards their females, such as is met with among few uncultured peoples. They were particularly pleased when gifts were made to their wives, and they treated their women well, although this appears not to be the universal rule among even the Eskimo.[2] Old people were cared for and supported by their children as a matter of course. This was so even when the latter were only step-children, or simply adopted. Hence a widow, with several children, immediately obtained a fresh husband.[3]

The facts mentioned by Sir John Ross are no doubt reliable, but his deductions from them are apt to mislead those who do not inquire further. A writer who can speak of Boothia as a blessed country, and who can reason as though eating and sleeping constitute the *summum bonum* of human happiness,[4] cannot be relied on as a safe guide in questions of moral philosophy. The Eskimo must, according to that principle, be a happy creature indeed. For, as Sir John Ross remarks, with them the occupation of eating is never neglected as long as there is anything to eat,[5] and even

[1] "Narrative of a Second Voyage in Search of a North-West Passage," p. 246.

[2] Do., p. 578. [3] Do., p. 515-6. [4] Do., p. 579. [5] Do., p. 310.

he cannot help calling them "disgusting brutes," when referring to their gorging themselves with food until they could literally eat no more.[1] On another occasion, when speaking particularly of this subject, our traveller affirms that "the Esquimaux is an animal of prey, with no other enjoyment than eating; and, guided by no principle and no reason, he devours as long as he can, and all that he can procure, like the vulture and the tiger."[2] It would be surprising if a people of their animal character could display any very refined feelings of morality. Although Sir John Ross apologises for the pilfering habits of the Eskimo, yet he admits that "their opinion seemed to be, that although it was wrong to steal, no harm was done if the owner did not miss the property,"[3] and this idea is confirmed by the fact that the detection of pilfering generally produced laughter.[4] Much the same may be said as to lying, the merit or demerit of which depended on detection or otherwise.[5] The ideas of the Boothian Eskimo on sexual matters, moreover, were not of a very high order. Simple polygamy might be expected to occur among so rude a people, but they practice polyandry also. Sir John Ross refers to several instances of two brothers having a wife in common.[6] The travellers were on one occasion visited by a strange native, whose female companion had left her husband to live with him, a usage recognised by Eskimo custom. The old man was accompanied by this wife and two grown up youths. Sir John Ross gives some curious particulars as to this family. He says, "the wife was a young one; but we found that he had another, while the two young men had but one between them; the whole probably living together. There was also an old

[1] "Narrative of a Second Voyage in Search of a North-West Passage," p. 358. [2] Do., p. 448.
[3] Do., p. 323. [4] Do., p. 288. [5] Do., p. 331. [6] Do., p. 356.

woman with two husbands, uniting to form this strange polygamous family, and we were assured that matters went on with perfect harmony."[1] The marriage tie appears to rest very lightly on the inhabitants of Boothia Felix, and it is hardly surprising that Sir John Ross should suggest that "concubinage, and not of a remarkably strict nature, is a more fitting term than marriage, for the species of contract under which the parties in question are united.[2] To complete this picture of social morality, it may be added that it was the universal practice among the natives to occasionally exchange wives.[3] Well may the traveller add, that the Eskimo women were considered merely as property or furniture, although the remark proves a somewhat strange commentary on the designation, *Felix,* bestowed by him on the desolate region which he describes.

Instead of being a very moral people, it is evident that the morality of its inhabitants is, to say the least, extremely imperfect. This opinion is confirmed by the observation of other travellers. The Eskimo are not given to quarrelling, and murder is almost unknown, but they appear to be sulky and treacherous,[4] and they have the inhuman practice, so common among the American tribes, of leaving the sick to take care of themselves and to die unattended.[5] When near death, women are entombed alive in a new *igloo,* or snowhouse, having an opening made at the back, which is walled up when she has breathed her last.[6] The superstition of the Eskimo is remarkable, and their magicians (whose name *Angeko,* means "he is great") have wonderful influence over them.[7] Probably the honesty which they exhibit among

[1] "Narrative of a Second Voyage in Search of a North-West Passage," p. 373. [2] Do., p. 356. [3] Do., p. 432.
[4] "Life among the Esquimaux," by Captain C. F. Hall, ii. pp. 317, 144. [5] Do., i. p. 103. [6] Do., p. 197. [7] Do., p. 173-4.

themselves[1] is owing to their fear that theft would be discovered by the angeko. They are particularly sensitive to any interference with their superstitious customs.[2] In all things, especially with regard to food, the Eskimo are extremely improvident and thoughtless, and their gluttony is in proportion. Captain Hall relates an instance of an *angeko* eating at one sitting meat enough to have killed six white men.[3] They appear to have no adequate idea of sexual morality. An *angeko* offered the traveller the choice of his two wives, and the women were evidently not at all unwishful that the offer should be accepted.[4] Divorce is at the will of either husband or wife. Captain Hall met with one man who had thirteen wives, one of whom, however, he had left because she bore him no children, and some of the others had deserted him for other husbands.[5] There is evidence, nevertheless, that the Eskimo has the capacity, so rare even among Eastern peoples, of entertaining the emotion of love. A native, known as "Blind George," always retained his original love for the mother of his child notwithstanding her faithlessness, and when she died he gave way to uncontrollable grief.[6] It is possible that, as the Eskimo is usually stoical under all circumstances,[7] this may have been a somewhat exceptional case, arising from the peculiar concentration of feeling on one object consequent on the man's physical infirmity, but no doubt it reveals the existence of an emotional nature,[8] which is the best trait in the Eskimo character. Thus Captain Hall says, that "the affection of the parents for their children is very great, and disobedience on the part

[1] Hall's "Life Among the Esquimaux," ii., p. 312.
[2] Do., p. 197. [3] Do., p. 229.
[4] Do., p. 176. [5] Do., p. 100.
[6] Do., p. 241. [7] Do., p. 112.
[8] An instance is related of a man weeping because his wife was indifferent to him. (Do., ii. p. 261.)

of the latter is very rare." Physical chastisement is never inflicted on them, but the mothers speak to them when they are calmed.[1] No people have more kindness of heart than they exhibit among themselves, and although love always, if at all, comes after marriage, yet there is usually a "steady but undemonstrable" affection between man and wife.[2] They have, moreover, the reputation of being worthy of great credit, and like some of the American Indian tribes, they shun a liar.[3] Captain Hall remarks, that it is impossible to place any great dependence on the Eskimo in keeping faith as to time or one's wishes on a journey. This is partly because they *will* give chase if they see any animal that may serve for food;[4] and partly, no doubt, owing to their inability to estimate the value of time to the traveller. As a race, they are described as being naturally reticent. "They are often distant and reserved, and only by kindness, tact, and gradually leading up to a subject, can any information be obtained from them."[5] Finally, the Eskimo appear to distinguish between the condition of the "good" and that of the "bad" in the unseen world, but their ideas on the subject are somewhat imperfect. The *good* are those who have been kind to the poor and hungry, and also all who have been happy on earth, or are killed by accident, or die by suicide; while the *bad* are the unkind and the unhappy. These do not furnish very favourable tests of fitness for heaven or hell, but even they are not always applicable, for the women obtain an entrance to the abode of happiness if they are tatooed on the forehead, cheeks, and chin, it being thought that this tatooing "will be regarded in the next world as a sign of goodness."[6]

[1] "Life Among the Esquimaux," ii., p. 314.
[2] Do., pp. 312, 313.
[3] Do., p. 312.
[4] Do., i., p. 313.
[5] Do., p. 319.
[6] Do., ii., pp. 315, 317. The Western Eskimo and the allied

Judging from the description given by Egede of the Greenland natives, their general character is much the same as that of the Eskimo. The Danish missionary says that they are of a cold nature, and of an unsensible and indolent mind. They have no laws, but they live peacefully together. If murder is committed, no notice is taken of it except by the next of kin to the dead, who, if strong enough, will avenge his relative's death.[1] They have a great abhorrence of stealing from each other, but this does not hinder them from thieving from strangers. They make use of no salutation when they meet, but only by custom, and not through any incivility. They are very hospitable, both to strangers, and to the poor among themselves.[2] In general, they are chaste in their conduct, but at certain festivals it is considered becoming for men to make a temporary exchange of wives. Women think themselves very fortunate if, on these occasions, they have an *angeko* for their partner.[3] Incontinence in unmarried women is reckoned "the greatest of infamies," and a woman who has many children is compared to a dog. Men not seldom beat their wives, and often put them away and marry others.[4] They have great love for their children, but never correct them, and these consequently show little respect for their parents.[5] Finally, their manner of living is so slovenly, nasty, and filthy,[6] that it would

Kadiaks appear, on the whole, to agree in character with the Eskimo of the Eastern part of the Continent. (Bancroft, *op. cit.*, i., pp. 65, 81.) The same may be said of the Aleuts (Do., p. 92), who would seem, however, to resemble in feature some of the South American tribes rather than the Eskimo. The Aleuts and the Kadiaks are given to the vice of male concubinage, which is not unknown to other American tribes, and which we shall meet with also in Eastern Asia.

[1] It is the same among the Eskimo. (Hall, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 317).

[2] Egede, "A description of Greenland," (Eng. Trans.), p. 122 *seq.*

[3] Do., p. 142.

[4] Do., p. 145.

[5] Do., p. 148.

[6] See p. 127-8.

be difficult to find a people who surpass them in this respect.

The testimony of Egede is supported by that of Crantz, the historian of Greenland, who explains the reason why opinions differ so much as to the character of the natives of that country. He says that—"at the first view of this untaught people, we discern so many lovely and laudable qualities, as may in truth put our Christendom to the blush, in its present state of excellent knowledge!" but he adds, that "some who know the Greenlanders better than they do other nations, will allow of nothing good in them, and reckon them among the most savage, abominable, and viciously-disposed nations." Neither of these estimates is the true one, for the latter gives the Greenlanders no credit for the many "good" actions which they undoubtedly perform, whereas the former takes no notice of the motives which govern their conduct, and by which alone morality can be judged of. Crantz declares that "their moral actions proceed more from an internal natural instinct, common in many respects with irrational animals, than from principles. And this instinct manifests itself in a quick sensibility on the head of self-love, profit, fear, and shame." He continues—"The fear for the retaliation of evil restrains them from many vices, and the dread and shame of a bad name from more. A Greenlander dare not rob, murder, strike another, nor vent his anger in word or deed, because it might cost him or his dearest friend his life. Again, they must demean themselves regularly, decently, and peaceably towards one another, or else their bad name would be echoed by common fame, and they would be drummed out of the ring at the next singing-combat. The young people must treat one another with decency and due reserve, or they would forfeit their good name and fortune. Their love to one another,

known or unknown, their sociable, amicable disposition, and obliging services in domestic life, and their hospitality and open house towards strangers, does not issue from a native benevolence, or compassion towards the helpless (we shall see the reverse presently), but from self-love and interest. It is their interest to impart of their abundance to the rest of the house, that they may give to them again when they have nothing. They must help their neighbours, that their neighbours may help them again. They must be hospitable to strangers, that their name may be extolled all over the country, and that they may be treated the same when, according to custom, they travel all round the land, and have no time to procure provisions for themselves."[1]

It may be thought that Crantz has not here done the Greenlanders justice, but the facts he cites fully support his view of their character. Notwithstanding their hospitality, if a stranger dies, and leaves no near relations, or sons nearly grown up, no one will supply his family with either food or shelter. The consequence is that, under such circumstances, children grow up uncared for, and many of them, especially girls, die through hunger and cold, although, probably the chattels belonging to their father have all been appropriated by those who professed to condole with them on his death. The Greenlanders appear, indeed, to be so insensible to the sufferings of others, that they would watch with "a certain entertainment" the struggles of a drowning man rather than attempt to save him. "So little compassion and sympathy," says Crantz, "is found among them, that it does not show itself even in the sex that is commonly soft and tender by nature."[2] Again, judging from the mildness of their manners, it might be supposed

[1] "History of Greenland" (1767), vol. i., p. 187.
[2] Do., pp. 189, 192.

that homicide was un unfrequent crime among the Greenlanders. This would appear, however, not to be the case. The burying alive of a baby, who has lost its mother, either in the same grave with her, or when the father finds he cannot sustain it, or even of a sickly old widow who has no rich relations willing to support her, and whose children are tired of doing so,[4] may, perhaps, be capable of apology. So also may be the stoning, drowning, or hacking to pieces of old women supposed to be witches, this being done under the influence of superstition and passion.[5] Such would seem to have been the common fate of the old women, who bring it on themselves by being "generally instruments of mischief, who betake themselves to lying, backbiting, match-making, witchcraft, and the like, for a livelihood."[1] If, however, the woman put to death has any near relations, they seek to avenge her, and this gives rise to a series of bloody retaliations. The same is the case where a murderer is killed by the friends of his victim. Usually this punishment is "again revenged with death, either on the executioner himself or his children, cousins, or other relations; and if they cannot come at these, upon some acquaintance that lives in the same neighbourhood." This blood-revenge is the chief cause of murder, but not unfrequently it is perpetrated through mere envy of another man's dexterity or good fortune. In this case, the crime is committed in the most treacherous manner, either by upsetting the victim's *kajak*, and drowning him, or by harpooning him in the back. No time will efface the desire for vengeance from the minds of the relations of the murdered man, and it will be communicated to their children and grand-children, until it be gratified. If very much provoked, they cut the murderer to pieces,

[1] "History of Greenland," vol. i., p. 238.
[2] Do., p. 194. [3] Do., p. 166.

and "swallow a bit of his heart or liver, because they think his relations will by that means lose their courage to fall upon them."[1] The murder of Europeans for the sake of plunder appeared to be thought nothing of, if it could be done with impunity. Crantz says that Europeans "have been decoyed ashore, and then basely murdered and robbed of their goods."[2] He adds that theft from a foreigner, whether by craft or by force, is a "feather in their cap."

It does not appear that unmarried women among the Greenlanders often prostitute themselves. Crantz observes, however, that their modesty is chiefly "outside," and that as for the married people, "they are so shameless, that, if they can, they break the matrimonial obligation on both sides without a blush."[3] Moreover, it is not unuusal for a divorced wife, or a young widow, to bear children, and though she may be despised, yet "she many times makes her fortune by selling her children to one that has none, or being taken into the family of such a one, if he does not even marry her."[4] Polygamy is by no means universal, but not only may a man have several wives, but a woman may have two husbands. Greenlanders seldom marry first cousins, or those with whom they have been brought up as adopted children, but sometimes a man will marry two sisters together, or a mother and daughter. When a young woman is asked in marriage, she professes great bashfulness, tears her ringlets, and runs away. Her parents do not interfere in the matter, but the old women who have negotiated the match, search for the daughter, and drag her by force into the house of the suitor, where she sits for some days dejected, with dishevelled hair, and without eating anything; and

[1] "History of Greenland," vol. i., p. 193.
[2] Do., p. 191; see also vol. ii., p. 42, *n.*
[3] Do., p. 191. [4] Do., p. 157.

when no kind and courteous persuasion will avail, she is compelled by force, nay, sometimes by blows, to change her state." Occasionally, however, a girl who has really great repugnance to her suitor, will betake herself to the barren mountains, or will cut off her hair, this being a sign that she has determined never to marry. Divorce is not attended with much ceremony. If a man gives his wife a cross look, and goes out, not returning for several days, she puts together her clothes, and returns home to her friends. Sometimes, if a wife cannot agree with the other women in the house, she runs away of her own accord. Separation seldom takes place, however, after children have been born of the marriage. These always go with the mother, and even after her death, they will never return to support their father in his old age.[1]

The condition of woman among the Greenlanders is such as would be expected from their general character. According to Crantz's description, it is not an enviable one, at least not after they cease to live with their parents. "From the twentieth year to their death," says that writer, "their life is a concatenation of fear, indigence, and lamentation. If the father dies, their supplies are cut off, and they must serve in other families. It is true they will not want victuals as long as the host has any, but there will be a deficiency of clean and decent clothing. And for want of that, especially if they be not handsome in person, or dexterous at their work, they must remain single. Should anyone take them to wife (in which they cannot often have their own choice, as was mentioned before), they fluctuate between hope and fear for the first year lest they be put away again, especially if they have no children; and should they be repudiated, their character and

[1] "History of Greenland," vol. i., p. 158, *seq.*

regard is lost, they must return to servitude, or perhaps purchase the support of life at a scandalous price. If the husband retains them, they must often take a black eye in good part, must submit to the yoke of the mother-in-law like common maids (who are often better off), or must submit to his having another wife or two. If the husband dies, the widow has no other jointure but what she brought with her, and for her children's sake must serve more submissively than a single woman, who can go when she will. But if she has any up-grown sons, she is then better off than any married women, because she can regulate the domestic affairs as she pleases. If a woman advances to a great age and has not a family who keep up her respect, she must pass for a witch, and sometimes they like to be reputed as such, because it is attended with some profit. But commonly, in the end, upon the least suspicion of having bewitched somebody, such a one is stoned, precipitated into the sea, stabbed, or cut to pieces. Should she escape this fatality, but still grow a burden to herself and others, she is buried alive, or must plunge herself into the ocean. The pretended motive is compassion, but the true one is covetousness."[1]

The most pleasing trait in the Greenlanders' character is their love for their children, who when young are carried about by their mothers wherever they go. A woman has been known to drown herself because her child has been drowned.[2] There is also a natural mildness in their manners, which, from whatever cause it may have arisen, is very engaging. Crantz says that "they are assiduous to please, or rather are cautious of displeasing each other, and do not love to excite the least thought or sensation that may give uneasiness." This seems to be the source of the greatest part of their actions, and

[1] "History of Greenland," vol. i., p. 165. [2] Do., pp. 162, 189.

therefore they expect to be treated by others according to the same rule.[1] Such a disposition enables several families to live together, as is their custom, in peace, and should one "imagine himself injured by the others, he only removes to another house without saying a murmuring word."[2] They are, indeed, never easily moved to anger, but when irritated, they become sullen, and seek to be revenged when a favourable opportunity occurs.[3] This revenge, however, is often of a very harmless kind, consisting of what is called a *singing-combat,* which takes place at a meeting for dancing, called together for the purpose, answering somewhat to the Australian *corroborie.* The person who considers himself aggrieved publicly challenges his adversary to sing against him. At the appointed time, the audience sit in a circle, and "the accuser begins to sing his satire to the beat of the drum, and his party in the auditory back every line with the repeated *Amnah aiah,* and also sing every sentence with him; and all this while, he discharges so many taunting truths at his adversary, that the audience have their fill of laughing. When he has sung out all his gall, the defendant steps forth, answers the accusation against him, and ridicules his antagonist in the same manner, all which is corroborated with the united chorus of his party, and so the laugh changes sides. The plaintiff renews the assault, and tries to baffle him a second time; in short, he that maintains the last word wins the process, and acquires a name. At such opportunities they can tell one another the truth very roundly and cuttingly, only there must be no mixture of rudeness or passion. The whole body of beholders constitute the jury, and bestow the laurel, and afterwards the two parties are the best friends." Crantz remarks

[1] "History of Greenland," vol. i., p. 170.
[2] Do., p. 169. [3] Do., p. 136.

that this "merry revenge," the meetings for which are used for enforcing good morals, keeps many persons from injuring others, or even committing murder; but he adds that after all, "the chief ingredient in the whole affair is a voluble tongue; therefore it is common among the Greenlanders that the most celebrated satirists and moral philosophers behave the worst.[1]

A comparison has been drawn by Mr Whymper between the *Malemutes* or *Tchuktchis* of Alaska and the *Eskimos* of Greenland, whom he says they resemble in many particulars. Thus they have the same simple and harmless character, and exhibit the same improvident generosity in the distribution of their goods.[2] They are a good-humoured people, and although they put the old and feeble to death, it is only with their own consent.[3] Although the *Ingeletes* of Unalachleet speak a language closely allied to that of the Co-Yukon, and are said to be rather like them in feature, their character resembles rather that of the Eskimo. They are described as being cowardly, a bruise on falling being thought a serious matter, and the appearance of a few drops of blood causing the women to put their hands over their eyes "as though it were something too terrible to behold." Polygamy is practised, and it is accompanied by the usual weakness of the marriage tie. Barrenness is considered a good ground of divorce, and a man will sometimes send away his wife if she has many female children, as girls are thought little of. Although greedy, they appear to be singularly honest.[4]

The *Ingeletes* are said to be a "fine stout race," and so, also, the *Malemutes* are spoken of as being taller and stouter than the Eskimo[5] (whom they closely resemble in

[1] "History of Greenland," vol. i., pp. 178-9.
[2] Whymper, *op. cit.*, p. 252, *seq.*
[3] Do., pp. 89, 90.
[4] Do., p. 153, *seq.*
[5] Do., pp. 135, 143.

habits), some of the men being above six feet in height. The *Tchuktchis* of the Asiatic continent have similar physical characters, and both they and the *Koraks*, who belong to the same stock, exhibit in their high cheekbones, quick eyes, and straight black hair, a striking likeness to the North American Indian.[1] The former, however, have a frank expression of countenance which is wanting to the latter, although there are exceptions, the settled Koraks of Penzhinsk Gulf being described as stolid, brutal-looking men.[2] The wandering Koraks and Tchuktchis are as superior in character to the settled tribes as they are in personal appearance. It is true that among the former the old and sick are put to death when they have become unable to bear the hardships of a nomadic life. But the victims are usually quite contented with their fate, having looked forward to such a death, which is inflicted in the presence of the whole band with elaborate ceremonies.[3] Notwithstanding this custom, Mr Kennan says that "the natural disposition of the wandering Koraks is thoroughly good. They treat their women and children with great kindness. . . . . Their honesty is remarkable. Frequently they would harness up a team of reindeer after we had left their tents in the morning, and overtake us at a distance of five or ten miles, with a knife, a pipe, or some such trifle which we had overlooked and forgotten in the hurry of departure. Our sledges, loaded with tobacco, beads, and trading goods of all kinds were left unguarded outside their tents; but never, so far as we knew, was a single article stolen. We were treated by many bands with as much kindness and generous

[1] Kennan's "Tent Life in Siberia" (1871), pp. 117, 219.
[2] Do., p. 155.
[3] Do., p. 167. According to Sarytschew, the Tchuktchis had the same barbarous custom, and he adds that they killed children for any defect (*Collection of Voyages and Travels*), vol. i., p. 50.

hospitality as I ever experienced in a civilised country and among Christian people; and if I had no money or friends, I would appeal to a band of wandering Koraks for help with much more confidence than I would ask the same favour of many an American family. Cruel and barbarous they may be according to our ideas of cruelty and barbarity, but they have never been known to commit an act of treachery.[1]" The difference in character between the wandering and the settled Koraks is extraordinary, and it appears to have been occasioned wholly by change of mode of life and by association with members of civilised nations. The latter have received from the Russian traders and the American whalers the vices but not the virtues of civilisation. From the Russians, says Mr Kennan, they have learnt to lie, cheat, and steal; and from the whalers, to drink rum and be licentious. They have consequently become "cruel and brutal in disposition, insolent to everybody, revengeful, dishonest, and untruthful," and they are now the most degraded of the native inhabitants of North-Eastern Siberia.[2] According to Sarytschew, the wandering tribes are not without moral defects, and he said, indeed, that the Tchuktchis were inferior in manners to their neighbours. Besides putting to death their sick and infirm relations, they were vindictive and cruel to those who offended them, without regard to relationship or friendship, and the Russian traveller instances the case of a son having killed his father for charging him with cowardice and awkwardness.[3]

[1] "Tent Life in Siberia," p. 150. The marriage ceremonies of the Koraks exhibit a curious form of the "marriage by capture," the origin of which is so difficult to explain. See p. 134 *seq.*

[2] Do., p, 159. [3] *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 50.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SENSE OF RIGHT—(*continued*).

Siberian Tribes.

THE less-cultured peoples of Northern and Central Asia are closely allied, in mental characteristics at least, with many of the American tribes. This applies especially to their temperament and to their moral ideas, as described by early travellers. Thus, according to Sarytschew, the *Aleuts* "never betray any vehement emotions, nor do their countenances ever indicate either vexation, melancholy, or joy, on any occasion, however extraordinary. On the return of a relative from a distance, he is received with as much unconcern as if he had never been absent." They are, however, very hospitable, and not thievish, their only evil propensities, says Sarytschew, being indolence and ingratitude. Formerly they used to shew their friendship towards each other in a peculiar manner. When a man had been long absent, on his return he was allowed to sleep one night with every female, married and unmarried, in the *jurt*. This custom is now lost, but a man may resign his wife to another, either permanently or for a term of years, although he cannot sell her without her own consent. Polygamy is of course practised. Among the presents sometimes given for a bride are *Kalga*, that is, prisoners taken in warfare and condemned to slavery, or destitute orphans who have been consigned to a rich man to labour

for their sustenance, and who may be transferred to another on the same conditions.[1]

The account given by Steller of the moral character of the *Itelmen* of Kamtschatka is very curious. The chief of the Ostrog, or family group, had little actual power except as an adviser. He could inflict corporal punishment or death. If one native killed another, the relatives of the latter avenged his death by slaying the murderer. They went to the Ostrog where the culprit was, and demanded his surrender. If he was given up, he was slain forthwith in the same manner as he had killed his victim. If he was not surrendered, and the Ostrog approved his deed, war ensued. Whichever party conquered slew all the males among their opponents, and took the women and girls as concubines.[2] Steller says that homicide was not considered by the Itelmen a crime in itself, and this is proved by the frequency of infanticide. Many of them were no doubt very fond of their children, but when a child was born in stormy weather, which was held to be an unfortunate sign, it was often strangled or exposed, or even thrown "to the dogs." The women were much given to the practice of abortion, which was caused by internal applications or by external pressure, the latter being performed by old women, who appeared to act professionally.[3]

The sexual relations among the Itelmen were of a primitive character. The customs of courtship will hardly bear description, but sometimes the suitor served the father of the admired one for several years without making any progress. On the successful termination of his courtship, however, he did not care much about

[1] G. Sarytschew's "Voyage of Discovery to the North-East of Siberia" (*loc. cit.*), vol. ii., p. 76, and *seq.* As to the Aleuts, see further, Bancroft, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 87 *seq.*

[2] "Beschreibung von dem Lande Kamtschatka," v. G. W. Steller (1774), p. 293.

[3] Do., p. 349.

the virginity of his wife. He was, in fact, rather pleased than otherwise if he found that she had prostituted herself. If a husband detected his wife in the act of adultery, he took little notice of it if he was not much attached to her. If he loved her he gave her a good beating, and struck the adulterer on the head with an instrument made of the antlers of the rein-deer, then dismissing him with a caution.[1] The Itelmen followed the American custom of lending their wives to their friends. They resembled the native Americans also in other habits, Steller having met with men in women's clothes, giving evidence of the existence of certain unnatural alliances which at one time were very common.[2] The great god of the Itelmen, Kutka, or Kutga, is described as the grossest sensualist,[3] and the actions ascribed to him sufficiently show the moral character of the people themselves.

The *Jakuts* would seem to differ little morally from the peoples above described. Bell states that, although otherwise humane, they abandoned aged or incurably sick persons, even though these were their own parents. They were placed in a hut near a river, with some provisions, and were seldom visited afterwards. The humanity of the Jakuts, moreover, allowed them to sell their children to the Russians.[4] They seem not to have had any idea of the wrongfulness of stealing, if we may judge from Sarytschew's statement that they practised petty theft on each other, apparently of food, when their own stock was exhausted.[5] Sarytschew thinks that the Jakuts are descended from an ancient race of

[1] "Beschreibung von dem Lande Kamtschatka," p. 347.
[2] Do., p. 349.
[3] See Klemm's "Culturgeschichte der Menschheit" (1843), vol. ii., p. 324.
[4] "Travels to Various parts of Asia." By Jno. Bell (Pinkerton), vol. vii., p. 344.
[5] *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 48.

Tartars before the conversion of the latter to Mahommedanism.[1]

The *Samoyedes* of the shores of the Frozen Sea are supposed by Castrén to have been derived from the Altai,[2] but they must be treated as a Siberian people. Their character constitutes a curious compound of good and evil. They have no clear notion of a future life, and they believe that retribution takes place on earth in the form of poverty and a premature death. They therefore abhor sin (*hœbea*), homicide, murder, perjury, and adultery. Female unchastity is thought to be punished by premature delivery. Although great drunkards, they consider excess a sin; hence they call the Christian Sunday the *day of sin*, because it is the custom in the Tundra to indulge on Sundays and festivals in excess of all kinds.[3] Castrén says that the Samoyedes have much in common with the Finns. They are extremely cautious, reticent, suspicious, obstinate, and capricious, deliberate in their undertakings, and persevering in execution. Like the Lapps, they are capricious and deceitful—qualities, however, belonging rather to the Kani-Samoyedes than to the Samoyedes in general. One characteristic which belongs in common to them all, is the gloomy view which they take of human life and its relations. Were they possessed of violent passion, says Castrén, the Samoyedes would constitute one of the most savage peoples on earth; but as it is, they view all things with the greatest indifference. One of the most important questions of life, according to their ideas, is a good meal, and they like, still more, the pleasure of getting drunk. The Samoyedes, although usually calm, will nevertheless be roused to fury if they find them-

[1] "Travels to Various Parts of Asia," p. 9.

[2] "Ethnologische Vorlesungen über die Altaischen Völker" (1857), vol. i., p. 84.

[3] Do., vol. i., p. 199.

selves to be overreached, or if their bodily safety is threatened.[1]

We may mention here, although they can hardly be described as a Siberian people, the Lapps, or *Samiladz,* the name by which they are known among themselves. This people are compared by Castrén with the Samoyedes, with whom they are on much the same level of morality, although in some respects inferior to them. The information given by travellers as to the moral character of the Lapps is very scanty. They are described by Scheffer as abhorring theft—so much so, that merchants "only cover their goods when they have occasion to leave them, and at their return are sure to find them safe." Yet they are somewhat inconsistently said to be notorious cheats, and industrious to overreach each other in bargaining. The explanation given of the inconsistency is, that they had learnt cheating from the foreigners with whom they dealt. They are, moreover, described as being charitable to the poor, civil, and hospitable to strangers. They seldom violate marriage, which they highly esteem. Nevertheless their lust is immoderate, which Heberstein thinks strange, considering their diet. Scheffer ascribes it to their promiscuous and continual lying together in the same hut, without any difference of age or sex.[2] A more recent traveller asserts that the principal feature in the Lapp character is distrust of his wife and children, to which must be added an inordinate love for silver coin and brandy.[3] That distrust is hardly to be wondered at, when the conditions of life in Lapland are considered. To maintain a family of four persons, at least four hun-

[1] "Ethnologische Vorlesungen über die Altaischen Völker," p. 228.
[2] "The History of Lapland." By John Scheffer (1674), p. 14.
[3] "A Winter in Iceland and Lapland." By the Hon. Ar. Dillon (1840), vol. ii., pp. 214, 215.

dred reindeer are necessary. There is every motive, therefore, for getting rid of useless mouths; and probably it is this, as much as a desire to be relieved of trouble, which leads to the cruelty frequently shown to old people. Count Goblet D'Alviella states that "if an old man falls sick while a tribe is moving, his children frequently forsake him, leaving him with some provisions at the foot of a tree, or on the edge of a stream, without any other prospect than that of dying of starvation or becoming a prey to wild beasts."[1] This traveller gives a pleasing account of the manners of the settled Lapps. He found the primitive custom of hospitality still flourishing among them in full force. "In their eyes the stranger is a guest sent by the Lord, and not a prey to be instantly put to ransom at their discretion. At every stage the whole family gathered round us, some endeavouring to find out our least wishes, others studying the details of our equipment, and even the cut of our clothes, with childish curiosity." Their honesty was equal to their hospitality, the traveller's luggage, and even provisions, being consigned without fear to the care of the first chance comer.[2] The Lapps are now Christians, but they still retain many of their superstitious beliefs; and when these are brought into play, they exhibit a treachery and ferocity which might be thought inconsistent with their natural mildness. Count Goblet D'Alviella refers to an occurrence which happened in 1852, when a band of wandering Lapps, incited by "religious feuds, envenomed by private differences," attacked a small Norwegian settlement, murdered the *länsman* and the storekeeper, setting fire also to their houses, and cruelly beat the pastor and women, under pretext of driving the devil out of them, after having tied them up with ropes in the

[1] "Sahara and Lapland" (Eng. Trans.), 1874, p. 190.
[2] Do., p. 150.

middle of the dining-room. Probably all would have been murdered if unexpected assistance had not arrived.[1] The Lapps appear to have been formerly much addicted to magic, their witches especially having acquired great fame. A writer who visited Lapland at the beginning of the present century states that the *runic drum* was always consulted by the Lapp before setting out upon a journey. "He places a ring, used for this purpose only, upon the drum, and strikes upon it a smart stroke with a small hammer; the ring is driven from side to side, which, as it touches certain figures of good or bad omen, he conceives the better or worse opinion of his success in what he is about to undertake."[2]

Of the *Ostiaks*, who belong to the same stock as the Turks, Castrén speaks more highly than does Pallas. The former says fear, superstition, simplicity, and good nature, are qualities common to all the savage peoples of Siberia. One quality overlooked by Pallas, and which advantageously distinguishes the Ostiaks, is their serviceableness and honesty. The Ostiak does not abandon his friend when in distress; he shuts not his door to any one that knocks; what he possesses he readily shares; the rich considers it his duty to help the poor. Theft rarely, if ever, occurs. The house is always unlocked; property is frequently left exposed in the middle of the Tundra. The Ostiaks entertain no suspicion against each other, but live together as brothers.[3] If we may judge from the fact that witnesses are never sworn, but are believed on their word, this people must be truthful. The only oath they use is that which a man takes while dividing the muzzle of a bear with a knife, saying, "May the bear devour me if my oath proves false." This is

[1] "Sahara and Lapland," p. 192 *seq.*

[2] "Travels through Sweden, Finland, and Lapland." By Joseph Acerbi (1802), vol. ii., p. 307.

[3] Castrén, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 127.

used also by the Samoyedes, and it is rather a clearing ordeal than an oath. If any one is devoured by a bear, or is drowned or burnt, it is often said that he must have committed perjury.[1] Polygamy is occasionally practised by the Ostiaks, but not frequently, as wives are expensive. A man may marry several sisters, and a younger brother is bound to marry the widow of an elder brother.[2]

Innocent as is the conduct of these people in many respects, the treatment received by their wives and daughters shows that it is not from any high moral principle. They act towards wives as though they were slaves. Castrén says that he has been frequently roused from sleep among them by the cries of ill-treated women, and sometimes a man will literally beat his wife to death. The Ostiaks, moreover, carry on a disgraceful trade with their daughters. The girls are well nurtured and brought up, treated that is as the Ostiak treats his foxes. If well fed they will fetch a good price. The girls are sold to the highest bidder. The usual price for a wife on the Irtysch is from two hundred to three hundred roubles, but on the Obi it is considerably higher. Sometimes, however, a bachelor, if he has not the means to buy a wife, will, after gaining the affections of a girl, carry her off in his canoe, and marry her in the nearest church.[3]

KALMUCKS AND MONGOLS.

The Kalmucks, although they have long been followers of the Lama creed, still exhibit traces of the moral condition in which they were before they were brought under the influence of Buddhism. They are

[1] Castrén, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 116. [2] Do., p. 119.
[3] Castrén's "Reiseberichte und Briefe aus den Jahren 1845-53," p. 56.

described by Pallas as being sociable, hospitable, open-hearted, and obliging, and, although of a somewhat warm temperament, they live in concord with each other. Their continual merriment distinguishes them from the phlegmatic Kirghis. On the other hand, they are dirty, idle, and cunning. They are liberal in dividing with their friends things that can be consumed, but no further. They have been accused of thievishness, but Pallas says that the robberies they commit are not so much for the purpose of acquisition as by the way of revenge.[1] That theft among themselves is considered very heinous, is evident from the infliction of heavier fines for it than for any other crime. Besides the restitution of the stolen objects, and a fine in cattle, the thief is to loose a finger of the hand unless he redeems it with five large deer. A person thrice convicted of theft is deprived of all he possesses.[2] That the moral ideas of the Kalmucks are not, however, of a very refined type, is shown by the fact that adultery and crimes against nature are punished by very moderate fines, as is the case also with fornication. Homicide is not punished with death, even where the victim is a parent, but a very large fine is inflicted. If a person is killed in a tumult those present are fined a horse, and should a man be killed in gambling, the homicide must take the wife and children of the deceased into his own house. The fines for blows and wounds are fixed, so much for an ear, for each finger of the hand, &c. Even parents or relatives who strike children without cause are punished. It is remarkable that the Kalmuck princes have had written laws ever since the reign of Tschingis Khan. The popular code of laws is in the Mongol writing, and was composed and accepted under

[1] "Merkwürdigkeiten der Mordüanen," &c. (extracted from Pallas' Travels), vol. i., p. 165. [2] Do. p. 207.

Galdan Khan by twenty-four Mongol and Uiraetsch princes in the presence of three Kutuchtes or high priests. Pallas says :—" There is not to be found in it any playing with human life, no torture to force the innocent to confess crimes they have never thought of. On the other hand, all crimes which it is possible to commit, considering the mode of life of the Kalmucks, are touched upon and fines fixed, and corporeal punishment awarded accordingly." Provision is made for the infliction of fines on princes for treachery and for hostilities among themselves, and on those who stay away from war expeditions, or for behaving badly in battle.[1]

The Mongols as described by the Abbé Huc have much in common with the Kalmucks of Pallas. The former declares that, notwithstanding his rough and unprepossessing exterior, " the disposition of the Mongol is full of gentleness and good-nature ; he passes suddenly from the most rollicking and extravagant gaiety to a state of melancholy, which is by no means disagreeable. Timid to excess in his ordinary habits, when fanaticism or the desire of vengeance arouses him, he displays in his courage an impetuosity which nothing can stay ; he is candid and credulous as an infant, and he passionately loves to hear marvellous anecdotes and narratives." The Mongol is generous, frank, and hospitable, and, although inclined " to pilfer little things which excite their curiosity," yet " by no means in the habit of practising what is called pillage and robbery." When murder and theft occur they are punished very severely if the perpetrator is prosecuted before the public tribunals by the injured person or his relations, otherwise no notice is taken of the offence however atrocious, as it is merely a private and not a public

[1] See do., p. 204 *seq.* Also Pallas' "Samlungen historischer Nachrichten über die Mongolischen Völkerschaften," 1776, vol. i., p. 193 *seq.*

injury.[1] The establishment of public tribunals shows that the Mongols have advanced out of the earliest stage of culture, but mentally they are still little more than children. Their simplicity is remarkable. The Chinese cheat and fleece them with impunity. Should they be travelling in China, they are made to pay money on all sorts of pretences. Designing persons call them brothers and friends, and warn them against others who want to rob them. "Should this method," says Huc, "not effect an unloosening of the purse-strings, the rascals have recourse to intimidation, frighten them horribly with visions of Mandarins, laws, tribunals, prisons, punishments, threaten to take them up, and treat them, in short, just like mere children."[2] The Chinese traders take advantage of their simplicity by selling them goods on credit, and charging them 30 or 40 per cent. interest on the price. The interest is not paid, and when it amounts to a good sum, the trader goes for it, and not obtaining the money, he seizes all the cattle, sheep, and horses he can get hold of for the interest, leaving the principal with further accumulations of interest for payment at a future time. The Abbé's informant might well say that "a Tartar debt is a complete gold mine!"[3] It is the same when a Mongol goes to a town to dispose of the goods which he has for sale. He is cheated on every side by the dealer into whose hands he falls, "but so plausible is the Chinese, and so simple is the Tartar, that the latter invariably departs with the most entire conviction of the immense philanthropy of the former, and with a promise to return when he has other goods to sell, to the establishment where he has been treated so fraternally."[4] The

[1] "Travels in Tartary, Thibet, and China." Translated by W. Hazlitt. Vol. i. p. 254 *seq.*

[2] Do., vol. i. p. 278. [3] Do., p. 130. [4] Do., p. 114.

Chinese traders speak the truth when they call themselves, as they term also the travelling Lamas, "Tartar-eaters."

The devotion of the Mongols is as great as their simplicity. They are continually undertaking religious pilgrimages, and no distance, expense, danger, or privation, deters them from such an undertaking. Huc explains this phenomenon by reference to the essentially religious character of the people. He says, "With them the future life is everything; the things of this world, nothing. They live in the world as though they were not of it; they cultivate no lands; they build no houses; they regard themselves as foreigners travelling through life; and this feeling, deep and universal, developes itself in the practical form of incessant journeys."[1] It should rather be said that these journeys are due to the essentially nomadic character of the people, who, in accepting Buddhism, have made it fit on to their old habits of life. The Mongols still retain many primitive superstitions in connection with their Lamaism. A Thibetan Lama, when discussing Christianity and Buddhism with the Abbé, said, "You must not confound religious truths with the superstitions of the vulgar. The Tartars, poor simple people, prostrate themselves before whatever they see; everything to them is Borhan. Lamas, prayer-books, temples, Lamaseries, stones, heaps of bones,—'tis all the same to them! down they go on their knees, crying, Borhan! Borhan!"[2] Heaps of stones, surmounted with dried branches of trees, from which hang bones and strips of cloth, inscribed with verses in the Thibet and Mongol languages, are numerous; and to these *Obos*, as they are called, pilgrimages are made, apparently with the object of propitiating the

[1] "Travels in Tartary, Thibet, and China," vol. i., p. 41.
[2] Do., p. 126.

spirits of the localities where they are placed.[1] The Mongols retain the primitive notion of sickness being caused by the visitation of a demon, although the first step towards its expulsion used by the Lama doctors is the application of a medical remedy, the second being a process of exorcism. If the doctor does not happen to have the proper medical substance, its name written on paper, and swallowed by the patient, is considered equally efficacious.[2]

The Mongols are very listless and lazy, spending most of the day, after having led the flocks and herds to pasture, in their tents, dozing, drinking tea, or smoking. They are, however, capable of fatigue, which they sometimes undergo in pursuit of cattle which have strayed, or in hunting the roebuck or the fox. The household and family cares devolve entirely on the women. "It is she," says Huc, "who milks the cows, and prepares the butter, cheese, &c.; who goes, no matter how far, to draw water; who collects the argol fuel, dries it, and piles it around the tent. The making of clothes, the tanning of skins, the fulling of cloth, all appertains to her; the sole assistance she obtains in these various labours being that of her sons, and these only while they are quite young."[3] This is very fitting in the eyes of people among whom women are the objects of bargain and sale. This is so only in the case of marriage, but then there is no concealment of the matter. Marriages are arranged by parents without consulting the parties chiefly concerned, and when everything is settled, they say, "I have bought for my son the daughter of so-and-so," or, "we have sold our daughter to such-and-such a family." When the price has been paid, the daughter becomes the pro-

[1] "Travels in Tartary, Thibet, and China," vol. i., p. 25.
[2] Do., vol. i., p. 75. [3] Do., p. 52.

perty of the purchaser, but she remains with her family until the time for performance of the marriage ceremonies, which includes the "capture" of the bride by the friends of the bridegroom.[1] If wives are in one sense the slaves of their husbands, all the Mongols who do not belong to the patrician caste, as descendants of the royal family founded by Tchengis Khan, are in absolute subjection to the noble owners of the soil, who have over them the right of life and death. If, however, a slave is put to death by his master, the matter is investigated by the public tribunal, and if death has been inflicted unjustly, the master is himself punished. Slavery among the Mongols has much in common with the former serfdom of the Russians. Besides paying certain rents and taxes, the slaves are bound to keep their master's flocks and herds; but they may also breed sheep and cattle for themselves, and many slaves are richer than their masters. They associate on almost equal terms, and the master calls his slaves *brothers*. "Slavery," says Huc, "is with the Mongols even less oppressive, less insulting to humanity, than the bondage of the middle ages." Lamas belonging to slave families are almost free. They are liable neither to pay rent, nor to involuntary labour, and, unlike other Mongols, they can leave the country whenever they please.[2] The abject condition of the Mongols is shown by the custom still practised, according to M. Huc, of children of both sexes being killed on the burial of deceased kings and placed in his grave around his corpse, that they may continue to serve him in the future life.[3]

The Thibetans, as described by the Jesuit missionary, would seem to differ little from the Mongol, either in appearance or in character. They have the same gene-

[1] "Travels in Tartary, Thibet, and China," vol. i., p. 185.
[2] Do., vol. i., p. 171-2. [3] Do., p. 80.

rosity and frankness, and are equally religious, without being so credulous.[1] The Thibetans, however, do not compare so advantageously in sexual morality, there being much licentiousness among them. The curious custom which the women have of blackening their faces, and which is said to have originated in an edict of a Lama king, issued about two hundred years ago, having for its object the reformation of Thibetan manners, appears to have had only partial success.[2] The women enjoy much freedom, and lead an active and laborious life; "besides fulfilling the various duties of the household, they concentrate in their own hands all the petty trade of the country, whether as hawkers, as stall-keepers in the streets, or in the shops. In the rural districts, it is the women who perform most of the labours of agriculture."[3] The Thibetans exhibit in their funeral customs a curious relic of ancient manners. The bodies of the dead are either burnt, thrown into a river or lake, exposed on the summit of a mountain, or, which is preferred, cut in pieces and given to the dogs with which the country is overrun. Dogs are kept in all the Lamaseries, that their services may be thus utilised, but the bodies of the poor are thrown to vagabond dogs of the locality.[4] This custom is due to the veneration with which the dog is regarded by the Thibetans, as it was by the ancient Persians,[5] and other peoples of antiquity. Rubruquis said that formerly the Thibetans used to eat the bodies of their deceased relations, and that although they had given up the custom, because it

[1] "Travels in Tartary, Thibet, and China," vol. ii., p. 141.
[2] Do., p. 142. [3] Do., p. 143.
[4] Do., p. 199. According to Friar Odoric, the bodies are eaten by eagles and vultures. See Yule's "Cathay, and the way thither," vol. i. p. 151.
[5] Is there any reference in the name *Hormousdha*, applied by the Mongols to the Supreme Being (Huc, *op. cit.*, vol. i., 215) to *Ormuzd?*

made them odious to other nations, yet they still made drinking cups of the skulls of their parents, so that these might, even in the midst of festivity, be brought to remembrance.[1] Marco Polo ascribed to the people of Eastern Thibet another custom equally peculiar. It is that which he relates also of the inhabitants of Kamul,[2] of whom he says, "if a foreigner comes to the house of one of these people to lodge, the host is delighted, and desires his wife to put herself entirely at the guest's disposal, whilst he himself gets out of the way, and comes back no more until the stranger shall have taken his departure. The guest may stay and enjoy the wife's society as long as he lists, whilst the husband has no shame in the matter, but, indeed, considers it an honour."[3]

[1] The remarkable Travels of Wm. de Rubruquis (Pinkerton) vol. vii., p. 54. See also Yule's "Cathay," *Note*, p. 150-1. The curious practice referred to in the text is founded on the same idea as that which led to the custom so common among uncultured peoples, of preserving a portion of the body of a dead person. It is analogous also to scalping,* and to the taking of the heads of enemies, which the Mongol devastators of the Middle Ages carried out on such a gigantic scale. Timour Beg ordered four towers to be built of the heads of "White Tartars" whom his army killed, and the heads were plastered together with mud. See "Embassy of Ruy Gonzales de Clavijo to the Court of Timour" (Hakluyt Society), p. 102. Vambery, when in Khiva, saw human heads emptied out of sacks like potatoes, and treated as unceremoniously.—"Travels in Central Asia," p. 140. Forming the skull of an enemy into a drinking vessel appears to have been practised by the early Scythians, and was not unknown to the peoples of northern Europe, who are sometimes thought to have been derived from them. The aborigines of Australia, like the Thibetans, use the skulls of their relations for the same purpose. See Dr Barnard Davis' "Thesaurus Craniorum," for the representation of such an Australian drinking vessel.

[2] The Hami of the Chinese, and the station at which the routes eastwards from the north and south sides of the Thian Shan converge.—Yule's "Cathay," vol. ii., p. 390, *n.*

[3] "The Book of Sir Marco Polo, the Venetian, newly translated and edited with notes by Col. Henry Yule" (1871), vol. i., p. 189, and see *note*. A similar custom to that mentioned in the text is said by the

* For an account of this practice among Asiatic and European peoples, see an article by Captain R. F. Burton, in the *Anthropological Review*, vol. ii. (1864), p. 49.

A similar custom is spoken of by Marco Polo as being prevalent among a people living to the west of Thibet. He says that the woman who has received the most favours from the other sex, is sought after the most eagerly in marriage, and that mothers bring their marriageable daughters to strangers to enjoy their company during their stay. The traveller adds that this prostitution to strangers is thought to be acceptable to idols;[1] but although, like the sacred prostitution of the Babylonians, it may have had some religious association,[2] yet it was most probably derived from the analogous custom which, as we have seen, is so common among uncultured peoples.[3]

MALAYS.

A comparison of their mental and physical characters, has led some writers to the conclusion that a racial connection exists, through the Siamese and other monosyllabic speaking peoples of South-Eastern Asia, between the Thibetans and the natives of the Malay Archipelago. The Sumatrans undoubtedly show in

Afghans to be in use among the Siaposh Kafirs (Masson's "Journeys in Balochistan," vol. i., p. 227). Burnes mentions, only to contradict, a similar belief as to the Huzaras, a Tartar people of Afghanistan, whose women, however, he admits are not very chaste ("Travels in Bokhara," vol. i., p. 178). Among the Merekedes, a tribe on the frontiers of Yemen, custom requires, says Burckhardt, "that the stranger should pass the night with his host's wife, whatever may be her age or condition. Should he render himself agreeable to the lady, he is honestly and hospitably treated; if not, the lower part of his *albu* or cloak is cut off, and he is driven away with disgrace ("Notes on the Bedouins," p. 102).

[1] Porter describes the practice in the text as being usual among the Armenians of Persia. See *infra.*

[2] See a memoir by the present writer on "Sacred Prostitution," in "Anthropologia" (1874) vol. i., p. 156 *seq.*

[3] A curious variety of this custom is referred to by an old Italian traveller as prevalent in the kingdom of Tenasserim. See "The Travels of Ludovico Di Varthema" (Hakluyt Society), p. 202.

their manners a great resemblance to the more uncultured peoples of Northern Asia, with whom the Thibetans seem to be allied. Mr Marsden divides the inhabitants of the great island of Sumatra into those of the *coast*, or Malays, and those of the *interior*, although he declares that they differ more in character than in person, the former having an air of degeneracy which is wanting to the latter. Of the coast Malays, Marsden says: "They retain a strong share of pride, but not of that laudable kind which restrains men from the commission of mean and fraudulent actions. They possess much low cunning and plausible duplicity, and know how to dissimulate the strongest passions and most inveterate antipathy, beneath the utmost composure of features, till the opportunity of gratifying their resentment offers. Veracity, gratitude, and integrity are not to be found in the list of their virtues, and their minds are almost strangers to the sentiments of honour and inferiority. They are jealous and vindictive. Their courage is desultory, the effect of a momentary enthusiasm which enables them to perform deeds of incredible desperation. . . . . Yet it must be observed that, from an apathy almost paradoxical, they suffer under sentence of death in cases where indignant passion could not operate to buoy up the mind to a contempt of punishment with astonishing composure and indifference."[1] It may be doubted whether the character of the natives of the interior, as described by Mr Marsden, differs more from that of the Malay than might be expected from the difference in their circumstances. Of the former, we are told that he "possesses many exclusive virtues, but they are more properly of the negative than of the positive kind. He is mild, peaceable, and forbearing, unless his anger be aroused

[1] "History of Sumatra," p. 207.

by violent provocation, when he is implacable in his resentments. He is temperate and sober, being equally abstemious in meat and drink." Mr Marsden continues: "Their hospitality is extreme, and bounded by their ability alone. Their manners are simple; they are generally, except among the chiefs, devoid of the Malay cunning and chicane, yet endued with a quickness of apprehension, and on many occasions discovering a considerable degree of penetration and sagacity. In respect to women, they are remarkably continent, without any share of insensibility. They are modest, particularly guarded in their expressions, courteous in their behaviour, grave in their deportment, being seldom or never excited to laughter, and patient to a great degree. On the other hand, they are litigious, indolent, addicted to gaming, dishonest in their dealings with strangers, which they esteem no moral defect; suspicious, regardless of truth, mean in their transactions, servile, though cleanly in their persons; dirty in their apparel, which they never wash. They are careless and improvident of the future, because their wants are few, for though poor, they are not necessitous, nature supplying, with extraordinary facility, whatever she has made requisite for their existence."[1] In the matter of female chastity, they appear to be more advauced than some other peoples of a similar degree of culture. Adultery seldom occurs, but when it does, it is punished by fine. If a girl is seduced, her father can oblige the man to marry her, and pay the *jujur* or money consideration for a wife, or, if he prefer, he may retain his daughter, the seducer making good the loss he has caused in her value, and also a fine for "removing the stain from the earth."[2] This reference to the value of the daughter shows the real source of the regard for female chastity. A man

[1] "History of Sumatra," p. 208. [2] Do., pp. 261-2.

may take as many wives by purchase as he can obtain or afford to keep, although poverty usually compels them to be content with one.[1] Wives thus obtained become, if the *full* "jujur" is paid—which, from motives of delicacy or friendship, is seldom the case—the absolute property of their husbands. They are, in fact, slaves, whom the husband has an absolute right to sell, with the restriction only that he must make the first offer to her relations.[2] Slavery is not commonly practised among the natives of the interior, but it is recognised, and it is not unusual among the Malays.[3] The natives of Lampong, although they do not appear otherwise to materially differ from the inhabitants of Sumatra previously described, are said to be more licentious than the latter. Loss of female chastity before marriage is little regarded, and it is not an uncommon result of the liberty of intercourse allowed between the young people of different sexes.[4]

The *Battas* are described by Mr Marsden as being remarkably unlike the other Sumatrans in their customs and manners.[5] Probably this idea arises chiefly from the existence among them of cannabalism. Detestable as this habit is, it would seem to be considered by the Battas as meritorious rather than the reverse. In fact, the eating of human flesh is, with them, a "species of ceremony." It is practised "as a mode of showing their detestation of certain crimes by an ignominious punishment, and as a savage display of revenge and insult to their unfortunate enemies." Besides prisoners of war and their own slain, offenders condemned to capital punishment, especially those convicted of adultery, are reserved for that fate.[6] It does not appear that in other respects the Battas differ much

[1] "History of Sumatra," p. 270. [2] Do., p. 257.
[3] Do., p. 253. [4] Do., p. 298. [5] Do., p. 365. [6] Do., p. 391.

from the Sumatrans generally. They practise polygamy, and their marriage customs are the same as those of other parts of the island. As elsewhere, daughters constitute a man's wealth. The position of women is that of slaves, and husbands have the power to sell not only their wives, but also their children.[1] Theft amongst themselves is very uncommon. The punishment for capital crimes may be commuted for a fine, even when the offender has been condemned to be eaten.[2] The *Achinese*, who are thought to be related to the Battas, are noted for the severity with which they punish criminals. Thus robbery on the highway, and housebreaking, are punished by drowning and exposure of the body for some days on a stake, and by burning alive if the crime has been committed against a priest. A man convicted of adultery or rape is placed in a circle formed of his friends, and being armed with a large weapon called a *gadubong*, if he can force his way through them and escape, he is not liable to further prosecution. If he should be killed in the attempt, he is buried by his relations without funeral rites. Mr Marsden adds that the Achinese are unanimously declared by travellers to be "one of the most dishonest and flagitious nations of the East."[3]

Mr Wallace describes the Malay as impassive, and as exhibiting "a reserve, diffidence, and even bashfulness, which is, in some degree, attractive, and leads the observer to think that the ferocious and blood-thirsty character imputed to the race must be grossly exaggerated.[4] He is not demonstrative. His feelings of surprise,

[1] "History of Sumatra," p. 382. [2] Do., p. 391. [3] Do., p. 404-5.

[4] Mr Marryat speaks of the Malays of the Coast of Borneo (except those of Sarawak) as "a cruel, treacherous, and disgusting race of men, with scarcely one good quality to recommend them." They strongly resemble the monkey in face, "with an air of low cunning and rascality most unprepossessing."—"Borneo and the Indian Archipelago," p. 99.

admiration, or fear are never openly manifested, and are probably not strongly felt. He is slow and deliberate in speech, and circuitous in introducing the subject he has come expressly to discuss. These are the main features of his moral character, and exhibit themselves in every action of his life."[1] The same writer compares the Malays and the Papuas with considerable advantage to the former. He says that the Papua is "impulsive and demonstrative in speech and action. His emotions and passions express themselves in shouts of laughter, in yells, and frantic leapings." While superior, apparently, in intellect to the Malays, the Papuas are deficient in the affections and moral sentiments. "In the treatment of their children, they are often violent and cruel; whereas the Malays are almost invariably kind and gentle, hardly ever interfering at all with their children's pursuits and amusements, and giving them perfect liberty at whatever age they wish to claim it. But these very peaceful relations between parents and children are, no doubt, in a great measure, due to the listless and apathetic character of the race, which never leads the younger members into serious opposition to the elders."[2]

How far we are justified in classing the Dyaks of Borneo with the Malays, is questionable; but these peoples certainly possess various mental features in common. The head-hunting propensity appears to be of comparatively modern growth, although it was probably founded on some ancient practice, such as the taking of the heads of enemies slain in battle, which denoted a ferocity like that of which the Malay is capable when his anger is aroused. It was perhaps also connected with the custom of blood-revenge, which it does so much to perpetuate.

[1] "The Malay Archipelago," vol. ii., p. 442.
[2] Do., p. 446-7.

In the course of the head-taking expeditions, much cunning and treachery is often displayed. Villages are attacked at night, and frequently every adult, including women and grown girls, are killed, the children alone being preserved for slaves. Sometimes the Dyaks, like the aborigines of America, exhibit great cruelty towards their captives, torturing them until they are dead.[1] The natives of Borneo have much the same ideas on the subject of sexual morality as the Sumatrans. Those of Sibuyan appear to be the most strict in this respect. They believe "that immorality is an offence against the higher powers, and that if a girl become a mother before she is married, she angers the deities of the tribe, who show their wrath by visitations upon the whole of the tribe." The lovers are heavily fined, and a pig is sacrificed to the offended spirit; and even then any one becoming sick, or meeting with an accident within a month afterwards, "has a claim on them for damages, as having been the cause of the misfortune; while, if any one has died, the survivors claim compensation for the loss of their relative." Among the Dyaks of the Batang Lupar, on the other hand, a girl is seldom married until she gives promise of being a mother.[2] But then the lover marries her as a matter of course,

[1] See Wood's "Natural History of Man," vol. ii., p. 477 *seq.* Mr Frank Marryat compares the Dyaks with the North-American Indians, whom in their war customs they closely resemble, the whole head being the trophy, however, instead of the simple scalp. The greater the number of heads piled up in the audience-house of a Dyak village, the more celebrated as warriors are its inhabitants.—("Borneo and the Indian Archipelago," p. 81.)

[2] Rajah Brooke says that it is considered no disgrace for a Dyak young woman "to live on terms of intimacy with a youth of her fancy till she has an opportunity of selecting a suitable helpmate." Only one wife is allowed, and after marriage infidelity on either side is punished by a fine.—"Narrative of Events in Borneo and Celebes, &c., from the Journals of James Brooke, Rajah of Sarawak," by Captain R. Munday (1848), vol. ii., p. 2.

and if he "denies his complicity, and the girl is unable to prove it, she is so bitterly scorned and reproached by her kindred, that she generally runs away from the village." Occasionally, under such circumstances, the unfortunate girl poisons herself. In any case, the disgrace she has brought on the family requires to be removed, and "her parents sacrifice a pig to the higher powers, and wash the door of the house with its blood, in order to propitiate the offended deities." Adultery appears to be uncommon, but this is accounted for by the fact that divorce is very easy, and frequently resorted to. Many men and women are married seven or eight times before they finally settle down. This usually happens when a child is born, and the fickleness so often displayed by the Dyak is quite consistent with extreme jealousy, a passion which is not confined to the men. It is understood that "whenever a wife detects her husband in flirting, she may beat her rival to her heart's content, provided that she uses nothing except a stick; and if the woman be married, her husband may beat the disturber of his domestic peace if he can." The man generally takes to the bush on a head-hunting expedition until his wife is appeased, and "his success as a warrior ensures a condonation for his shortcomings as a husband."[1]

In general character the Dyak Darrat, or Land Dyaks, have much in common with the Boomeas, or aborigines, of India, particularly those of the north-eastern part of the continent, and bear a closer resemblance to them than to the Malays, with whom they agree in language. Captain Keppel says that the Dyak "is mild and tractable, hospitable when he is well used, grateful for kindness, industrious, honest, and simple; neither treacherous

[1] Wood, *op. cit.*, p. 488-9. The taking of the head of an enemy was considered a sign of manhood, Brooke, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 200 *seq.*

nor cunning, and so truthful that the word of one of them might safely be taken before the oath of half a dozen Borneans. In their dealings they are very straightforward and correct, and so trustworthy that they rarely attempt, even after a lapse of years, to evade payment of a just debt. On the reverse of this picture there is little unfavourable to be said; and the wonder is they have learned so little deceit or falsehood where the examples before them have been so rife. The temper of the Dyak inclines to be sullen; and they oppose a dogged and stupid obstinacy when set to a task which displeases them, and support with immovable apathy torrents of abuse or entreaty. They are likewise distrustful, fickle, apt to be led away, and evasive in concealing the amount of their property; but these are the vices rather of situation than of character, for they have been taught by bitter experience that their rulers set no limits to their exactions, and that hiding is their only chance of retaining a portion of the grain they have raised. . . . The manners of the Dyaks with strangers are reserved to an extent rarely seen amongst rude or half-civilised people; but on a better acquaintance (which is not readily acquired) they are open and talkative, and when treated with their favourite beverage lively, and evincing more shrewdness and observation than they have gained credit for possessing."[1] The "peaceful and gentle aborigines," as Rajah Brooke termed the Dyaks, thus possess all the good points and features of the character of the Indian Boomeas, with whom probably they are allied through the tribes of the Indo-Chinese Peninsula.

[1] "The Expedition to Borneo of H.M.S. Dido," vol. ii., p. 184 *seq.*

JAVANESE.

From the long-continued influence of Hindu institutions in Java,[1] we may expect to find that the inhabitants of this island are somewhat further advanced in moral culture than any of the Malayan peoples, to whom, nevertheless, they would seem to be closely related. Of the natives of the Teng'ger Mountains, who appear to have retained the rites of Hinduism, Sir Stamford Raffles speaks in the highest terms. He says, indeed, that theft, adultery, or other crimes, are unknown among them.[2] An almost equally good character is given to the Javanese peasantry generally. In these people, says our authority, " we observe all that is simple, natural, and ingenuous; in the higher orders we sometimes discover violence, deceit, and gross sensuality. Where not corrupted by indulgence on the one hand, or stupefied by oppression on the other, the Javans appear to be a generous and warm-hearted people. In the domestic relations they are kind, affectionate, gentle, and courteous; in their public they are obedient, honest, and faithful. In their intercourse with society they display, in a high degree, the virtues of honesty, plain dealing, and candour."[3] Like the Kolarians of India, the Javans are extremely sensitive to praise or shame; and this may have something to do with the readiness with which they practise hospitality.[4] They endure privations with fortitude, probably from a natural apathy, but their want of energy does not hinder them sometimes from displaying "a remarkable perseverance in surmounting obstacles or enduring labours." Their credulity is extraordinary, not merely in relation to omens and prognostics, and other superstitious matters, but also in

[1] On this subject see Raffles' "History of Java," vol. i., p. 269.
[2] Do., pp. 329, 332. [3] Do., p. 248. [4] Do., p. 249.

every-day affairs. "Susceptible," says Raffles, "of every impression that artifice may attempt to make upon them, and liable to every delusion propagated by the prejudiced or designing, they not inaptly compare themselves to a piece of pure white cloth, on which any dye or shade of colour may be laid."[1] Living in almost patriarchal simplicity, they appear to have retained many of the virtues usually ascribed to such a state. Such are "the veneration they pay to age, the respect and acquiescence with which they receive the maxims or the counsels of experience, the ready, contented submission which they show to the commands of their immediate superiors,[2] the warmth of their domestic attachments, and the affectionate reverence with which they regard and protect the tombs and the ashes of their fathers."[3]

It must not be thought, however, that the character of the Javan is perfect. His virtues, indeed, are probably rather negative than positive, and many of his actions show that he has serious moral defects. It is perhaps not surprising that the inhabitants of the towns are often profligate and corrupt, "exhibiting many of the vices of civilisation without its refinement."[4] The former part of this description, however, would seem to apply to the Javans in general. Thus Sir Stamford Raffles says that, although prostitution[5] is common only in the capital, yet "that no strictness of principle nor strong sense of moral restraint prevails in the intercourse of the sexes."[6] Marriage relations are entered into simply for convenience, and for little more than the

[1] "History of Java," vol. i., pp. 244-5.

[2] Reverence for authority is carried to an absurd extent (Raffles, vol. i., p. 308 *seq.*).

[3] Do., p. 247.

[4] Do., p. 247.

[5] As usual in the East, the common dancing girls are all prostitutes (vol. i., p. 342).

[6] Do., p. 71.

gratification of an appetite.[1] Such unions can hardly be expected to be permanent, and in fact divorce appears to be very frequent. A man may at any time send away his wife on making a sufficient allowance for her support. On the other hand, the wife may, by paying her husband a sum of money—the amount of which is fixed by custom—demand a dissolution of the marriage. The husband need not accept the price of divorce unless he wishes, but he usually does so "from a consideration that the opinions and customs of the country require it; that his domestic happiness would be sacrificed in a contest with his reluctant companion; and that, by continuing his attachment, he would incur the shame of supporting one who treated him with aversion or contempt."[2] Although divorce is resorted to by the Javans on the very slightest occasions, yet they are extremely jealous; and Sir Stamford Raffles asserts that this is the only passion which can incite them to vengeance or assassination.[3] When, indeed, their passions are aroused, they can be guilty of great barbarity, such as decapitating their enemies and using their heads as footballs. Finally, in war and politics, stratagem and intrigue are preferred to courage and good faith.[4]

If the morals of a people could be judged of by the teachings of their sacred or popular writings, the Javans would stand high in the scale. The moral lessons taught by the *Níti Sástra,* an ancient work evidently of Hindu origin, are often of a very elevated character. The following are a few of the maxims contained in that book:—

"A man who cannot regulate his conduct according to circumstances, and to the situation in which he may be placed, is like unto a man who has lost the senses of

[1] Raffles, vol. i., p. 253. [2] Do., p. 320.
[3] Do., p. 250. [4] Do., p. 252.

taste, and enjoyeth not the advantage of siri (betel), for such a man doth not shine in the world, however fair may be his appearance."

"It is the duty of the chief of the nation to inquire into every thing which can affect his subjects; and know whether they are prosperous or not, if every one attends to his duty, if they are skilful in the execution of it or not, and in all cases to take measures accordingly, never losing sight of justice. He must, as far as possible, be lenient in the punishment of the guilty, and liberal in the reward of the deserving."

"The most formidable enemy of a man is his own conscience, which always brings his crimes before his eyes, without leaving him the means of avoiding it."

"No man can be called good or bad until his actions prove him so."

"It is well known that a man cannot take the goods of this world with him to the grave. . . . Happy is the man who divides his property equally between himself and the indigent, who feeds the poor, and clothes the naked, and relieves all who are in distress; he has hereafter to expect nothing but good."

"Riches only tend to torment the mind of man, and sometimes even to death, they are therefore, with justice, disregarded and despised by the wise. They are collected with pain and troubles in afterwards administering them; for if we neglect to watch them properly, thieves will come and steal, and the loss occasions as much grief as the point of death."

These maxims, relics of a bygone era, have probably as little influence over Javan manners as the teachings of Confucius over the moral conduct of the Chinese, and probably not so much. Perhaps, however, they express pretty nearly the ideas still entertained as to woman, who is accredited with much the same character

throughout most parts of the East. The Javan book of ethics says, indeed, that "a woman, however low her birth, if her manner be amiable and her person good, may without impropriety be made the wife of a great man." But a good wife would seem to be difficult to find. After showing that woman was the first cause of war, it is said, "even as the roots of trees and the course of rivers cannot run straight, but wind here and there, so cannot a woman be upright: for the saying is, that a raven can sooner turn white, and the *tanjang*-plant (a water lily) grow from a rock, than a woman be upright." The qualities necessary to constitute a good housewife are:—She must be well-made and well-mannered, gentle, industrious, rich, liberal, charming, of good taste, and humble. But, says the Javan maxim, "a man must, on no account, listen to the advice of a woman, be she ever so good; for the end of it will be death and shame: but he must always consult his own mind in what he has to do or not to do."[1]

We have seen that the moral ideas which govern the conduct of peoples of a low degree of culture are very different from those which are recognised by man in his most advanced stage. Such actions as murder, adultery, and theft, are, indeed, not wholly uncondemned even by the most uncivilized peoples. It may be considered quite proper to rob or kill an enemy, or one who is a stranger to the tribe. But for those who are closely united by social ties thus to act towards one another, is differently estimated. A life for a life is the almost universally recognised rule, but until a considerable degree of culture has been attained the punishment is left to be inflicted by the persons more immediately concerned, the friends of the murdered individual.

[1] Raffles, *op. cit.*, i. p. 256, *seq.*

Hence the "law of retaliation" of all peoples among whom the state has not taken the place of the individual as the avenger of injuries. Doubtless a relic of that primitive system is to be seen in the custom, still met with among the Abyssinians[1] and certain other peoples, in accordance with which the accused, if found guilty, is given up to the friends of the deceased to be put to death. But murder is not the only crime which is punished with death. Theft is as severely recompensed. Thus, among the South Sea Islanders, the thief, if detected, might be killed on the spot, and if found out afterwards, was often either killed or severely wounded. Sometimes, adds Ellis, "they bound the thief hand and foot, and putting him into an old rotten canoe, towed him out to sea, and there left him adrift, to sink in the ocean, or become a prey to the sharks."[2] The most frequent punishment for theft and other offences, however, among the lower class, was the seizure of all the property of the culprit, the injured person going to his house and carrying away every article worth possessing, and destroying the rest.[3] So also among the Madecasses, until a very recent date, persons detected in the act of stealing in the public markets, by cutting off the lamba in which money is usually tied up, were mobbed by the populace and killed on the spot.[4] Similar punishment for theft is inflicted, as we have seen, by uncultured peoples in other parts of the world,[5] and we shall meet with it again when speaking of races more advanced. Adultery, also, is usually treated as a crime. Fear is said to restrain the Kafirs from the act, as, according to Mr Isaacs, it is punished by "instant dismissal of the unfaithful wife, if not by

[1] Parkyn's "Life in Abyssinia," p. 344, *seq.*
[2] "Polynesian Researches," iii. p. 125. [3] Do., p. 126.
[4] Sibree, *op. cit.*, p. 305. [5] *Supra*, pp. 170, 179, &c.

her death, the latter fate invariably befalling the erring wife of a chief. As for the other culprit, the aggrieved husband has him at his mercy, and sometimes puts him to death, but sometimes commutes that punishment for a heavy fine."[1] Mr Grout says, however, that among the Zulus a few head of cattle will generally settle any case of adultery, rape, arson, homicide, or assault.[2] In the South Seas, notwithstanding the moral laxity of the natives in other particulars, "the least familiarity with the wife, unauthorized by the husband, even a word or a look from a stranger, if the husband was suspicious or attributed it to improper motives, was followed by instant and deadly revenge."[3] The offending woman was often punished by death.[4] The Australian aborigines also, although, like the natives of America, they do not object at times to lend their wives, yet can be very jealous, and they object to have them taken away without their consent. The recognized punishment for stealing or running off with another man's wife, is spearing in the calf of the leg,[5] or being made the target for the spears of the offended tribe, a shield being, however, allowed as a protection, and it is usually an efficacious one.[6] The woman is dealt with at the discretion of her husband, and sometimes, says Oldfield, "she is delivered up to the tender mercies of the other women of the tribe, who, seizing and throwing her down, sit upon her body, which they scarify in a dreadful manner with sharp flints."[7] Among most uncultured peoples, indeed, unfaithfulness of a wife to a husband is treated as a crime, and punished with more or less severity.[8]

It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that

[1] Wood, *op. cit.*, i. p. 86; Shooter, *op. cit.*, p. 86.
[2] *op. cit.*, p. 120.
[3] Ellis, *op. cit.*, iii. p. 124, *seq.*; Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 185.
[4] As to the New Zealanders, see Dieffenbach, *op. cit.*, ii. p. 37.
[5] Oldfield, *loc. cit.*, p. 250.
[6] Wilkes, *op. cit.*, ii. p. 195.
[7] *loc. cit.*, p. 250.
[8] See Index, "Adultery."

actions which such peoples declare to be punishable as crimes, are so treated because they are thought to be "immoral," as we understand the term. This is evident from the general character of the people themselves, which, as appears from the preceding pages, is in most cases such as entirely to preclude any such idea. Mr Ellis, speaking of the Tahitians, says:—"Awfully dark, indeed, was their moral character, and notwithstanding the apparent mildness of their disposition, and the cheerful vivacity of their conversation, no portion of the human race was ever perhaps sunk lower in brutal licentiousness and moral degradation, than this isolated people."[1] Bishop Williams declares that the New Zealanders could not understand the doctrine that it is wrong to indulge in evil propensities.[2] Probably, however, the aborigines of Australia must be given the preeminence in general depravity, their conduct showing that the moral nature is with them as yet almost in its earliest stage of development. The treatment to which the women are subjected, which in itself goes far towards proving the truth of the statement, confirms the conclusion to be deduced from the facts detailed in the preceding chapter. By both their husbands and their relatives, the native Australian women are "beaten about the head with waddies in the most dreadful manner, or speared in the limbs, for the most trivial offences."[3] Woman is in fact a mere chattel among the Australian natives, and no one thinks of taking her part, however severe her punishment, although it may be for an imaginary offence. A man may even beat the wife of another without retaliation on himself, but his own wife may expect in her turn to receive a beating at

[1] *Op. cit.* vol. i. p. 97. Much the same same testimony is borne by the Rev. Geo. Turner, *op. cit.* pp. 184, 188.

[2] *Op. cit.* p. 21.

[3] Eyre, *op. cit.* vol. i. p. 322.

the hands of the husband of the woman first maltreated.[1] The only excuse, if such it be, for this conduct, is to be found in the character of the women themselves. According to Sir George Grey, "the ferocity of the women, when they are excited, exceeds that of the men; they deal dreadful blows at one another with their long sticks, and if ever the husband is about to spear or beat one of his wives, the others are certain to set on her, and treat her with great inhumanity."[2] The exhibition of extreme cruelty by one wife towards another is often observable among the Kafirs,[3] and other African peoples, and it is not merely a result of polygamy. It is only one of the accompaniments of the low state of moral culture of the people who exhibit it, and which is evidenced also by the refined cruelty so often practised on prisoners and criminals under the influence of passion or superstition. That which has been said as to the absence from the minds of the primitive peoples of Australia and Polynesia of any notion of morality or immorality, as we understand these terms, is true also of the aborigines of India.[4] and of most of the native inhabitants of the African and American continents. Certain actions may sometimes be considered inexpedient, but as to being "wrong" in the abstract, it is impossible to believe that such a notion could be entertained, except, perhaps, occasionally by individuals far superior to their fellows, who do undoubtedly sometimes make their appearance among uncultured peoples. The subject will be considered further in the next chapter, but to show how inde-

[1] Sir Geo. Grey, *op. cit.* ii. p. 254. [2] Do. ii., 314.

[3] Shooter, *op. cit.* p. 79.

[4] Some of these aboriginal tribes make the nearest approach perhaps of any existing people to the "innocence of Eden," but a consideration of the phenomena they present shows clearly that their actions are not governed by notions of morality.

finite is the idea of "immorality" usually entertained by such peoples, reference may here be made to the Aymara notion, that it could not be a sin for a man to commit incest on Good Friday, "as on that day God was dead, and consequently could not possibly on the next day remember anything which happened the day before."[1]

That the condemnation of certain actions is not due to any sense of moral wrong is shown conclusively, moreover, by the fact that it is only under certain conditions that they are disapproved of. Severely punished when perpetrated against a member of the tribe, unless (as in the case of adultery) by consent; they are considered innocent, or if condemned at all only as inexpedient, when directed against a stranger. To what cause, then, are we to refer this distinction? It can only have arisen from the idea of personal right. When considering the instincts of animals, it was shown that one of the most important in relation to the moral sense, is that which is at the foundation of the notion of property. The bird which has built a nest, or obtained certain food, instinctively feels that it has secured an exclusive interest in the object as against all other creatures. It can easily be shown that the instinct which thus operates must in the human mind give rise to the sense of right, with the co-relative feeling of wrong. That which I have acquired a property in, I intuitively feel that I have a right to retain, and, therefore, that it is wrong for anyone else to deprive me of. Animals instinctively act on this principle, and it must have been that which guided primeval man, as it does the lowest savages of the present day, when they repel invasions on their property, and revenge the injuries they sustain at the hands of others by inflicting similar

[1] See *supra*, p. 219.

injuries on the offender. It cannot be objected that property acquired may have been wrongfully taken from others; since in this case the sense of right could not be aroused against the original owner, but only in opposition to a third person, as against whom the claim of the intruder would be perfectly legitimate. The latter has acquired a certain "property" in the object, although it may be only temporary, and liable at any moment to be defeated.

The sense of right, arising from the possession of property, entertained by one individual, is perfectly consistent with the recognition of an analogous right in others. The notions of right and wrong are dependent on each other, and they may in fact be taken as two phases—the affirmative and the negative—of but one idea. Thus, the savage who has certain "property," which implies a right, would instinctively judge that it is not right to interfere with such property. This negative idea must indeed have been formed in the mind before its affirmative co-relative. No doubt, when property was first acquired in pursuance of a primitive instinct, a dormant sense of right would accompany its possession. In the absence, however, of antagonism, there would not necessarily be any actual formation of the idea of "property" as clothed with a certain right. In fact, there could not be the formation of any such idea until what might be termed the instinct of right was interfered with, by the attempt to appropriate the property which it sanctioned. Nor would the positive idea of right be even then immediately formed. The first thought which would instinctively be entertained would relate to the negative phase of that idea, that is the notion of not-right, or wrong, would be the first to be formed. Of course, the affirmative idea of "right" would instinctively be associated with its

negative—since the latter derives all its force from the instinct, from the operation of which the former arises—but there could be no definite notion of right in the absence of wrongful interference with the property to which it has relation.

When once, however, the idea of wrong was entertained, there would be a link to connect the right of self with that of others. Hitherto there was no ground for believing it wrong to appropriate the property of another; as, by the requirements of the selfish nature of primitive man, the only right he could recognise was personal. When, however, this appropriation aroused in the minds of others a sense of wrong leading to retribution, which in its turn formed the same idea in the mind of the original offender, it is clear that there would not be much difficulty in transferring the correlative idea of right from self to others. Sooner or later the inference would be sure to be made that, if it is wrong for others to interfere with the property of self, it must be wrong to interfere with that of others, and therefore that others have rights analogous to those which self possesses. That the notion of morality is really founded on that of property rights, is evident enough from the fact that, among peoples of a comparatively high degree of culture, nearly all crimes have a material price, the payment of the fine fixed for the offence being considered a sufficient satisfaction.[1] The case of adultery may be thought to differ from others. It is, however, not so; since it is only at an advanced stage of social progress that woman, whether a wife or daughter, is viewed as anything more than the "property" of the husband or father. Interference with it is no doubt sometimes punished with death,[2] but this only because woman is

[1] See *supra*, p. 270 and *infra*.
[2] Theft is usually punished equally severely.

usually considered to be the most valuable property that a man possesses; and although she may be bartered, she is not allowed to be appropriated without the consent of her proprietor.

Although the formation of the idea of right, and the recognition of the rights of others which succeeds it, was thus founded on the instinct of "property," yet the latter at least would be aided by the operation of the social instincts. Man is unquestionably a social being. It is true that the semi-civilised man not unfrequently spends much of his time away from his fellows. Such is the case with many of the wild Indians of South America, such as the *Caishánas*, of the forest of the Tunantins, described by Mr Bates. But even these men are not really exceptions to the rule of human sociability. Notwithstanding their low social condition, they have regular meetings for festival-keeping. Moreover, they can be said to live a "solitary" life only in a relative sense of the word. Although they do not live in villages, like the more cultivated peoples belonging to the same stock, yet the solitary hut shelters a family, and abundant opportunity is thus provided for the gratification of the social wants of so mild a people as the Caishánas.[1]

Dr Semper has some remarks on the apparent unsociability of man in his primitive state, in relation to the *Irayas* of the Philippines, which are deserving of being quoted. He says:—"Great, unconquerable love for their homes and for their wandering life, is frequently expressed in the narratives of the Spaniards concerning negroes caught and educated in Manilla. Yet we should probably err if we regarded this untame-

[1] Bates, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 373. For other examples of "unsociability" among the Indians of South America, see Marcoy, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 578, as to the Antis, and *supra*, p. 218, as to the Aymaras.

able impulse for rambling about in the mountains, and on the shore of the sea, to be the essential attribute of these needing little children of nature. It rather appears that the unquestionable disposition to it has been developed by the old persecution for centuries on the part of Malays, and afterwards of Christians, and especially by the evermore increasing separation of any political connection among the individual clans of the Negro race in their present extremity. All so-called wild people have a certain tendency to isolation. And where the close connection of the clans with one another, which, in the primitive state and in scattered populations, is never very intimate, is forcibly lost, and only inimical races interpose between them, which cut off every possibility of intercourse, there will this love of independency of individuals ever more arise, and the little need of union of great masses in like forms of society must necessarily die out."[1] This is probably as applicable to the natives of many parts of the American continent as to the Pacific negroes, although the tendency among the former is usually rather to politic independence of the individual than to social isolation. Assuming man, therefore, to be naturally inclined to associate with his fellows, he would quickly learn that if he would do this he must grant to them the same rights—those of property—which he claims for himself. Even if his desire to appropriate the property of others was at first stronger than the restraining influence of the thought that, if he attempted to give effect to such desire, he would certainly suffer in return; it would not be long before the several motives affecting his conduct would operate so as to prevent him from interfering with the rights of his neighbours, unless, indeed, he could do so with impunity.

[1] Cited in the "Journal of Anthropology" (1870), p. 137.

Whence comes the instinct of "property," which has so intimate a connection with the origin of the moral idea, is a question easily answered. Mr Herbert Spencer, in his "Social Statics," states, that a desire for property is one of the elements of man's nature, and he places at the foundation of the social institution an *instinct of personal rights*, that is a feeling which leads every man "to claim as great a share of natural privilege as is claimed by others; a feeling that leads him to repel anything like an encroachment upon what he thinks his sphere of original freedom.[1] This instinct of rights is, however, entirely selfish, and therefore it "merely impels its possessor to maintain his own privileges. Only by the sympathetic excitement of it, is a desire to behave equitably to others awakened; and when sympathy is absent, such a desire is impossible.[2] Taken alone, it might be supposed that we have here that instinct of property to which I have referred the origin of the idea of "right" in the human mind. That it is not so, however, is evident from the nature of the first principle which Mr Herbert Spencer deduces as the basis of society. "Every man has freedom to do all that he wills, provided that he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man."[3] It is clear that this freedom, although it implies the right to acquire property, is strictly personal, and the instinct on which it is based, is therefore, quite distinct from that which was predicated above as the starting point of moral progress. The "instinct of personal rights," supposed by Mr Herbert Spencer, is the real basis of what he calls "the fundamental truth of which the moral sense is to give an intuition, and which the intellect is to develop into a scientific morality,"—the law of liberty of each limited only by the like liberty of all.[4] The instinct of "pro-

[1] Social Statics, p. 93. [2] Do. p. 100. [3] Do. p. 103. [4] Do. p. 90.

perty," which is essential to the moral idea has relation, however, rather to existence than to liberty. It is, in fact, only a development or expression of the more simple instinct of self-preservation. In the earliest stage of human progress, everything is subservient to the preservation of the individual or the continuance of the race. All the simple property which the savage possesses, has more or less direct connection with the former. It is either necessary for the preservation of life, or life has been endangered, or at least partly spent, in its appropriation. The instinct of self-preservation therefore, directly leads to that of property, and to the sense of right which is associated with it. It is exactly the same instinct which, as we have already seen, leads an animal to defend the food it has obtained, or the habitation it has formed. It is the law of self-preservation which is operative with the minutest animal organism as with man himself, giving rise in both to the instinct of "property," although in the latter alone can it become developed into the sense of "right which is necessary to the formation of the moral idea."

It may, perhaps, be objected that the notion of individual right could not have arisen in the way supposed, because in the earliest stage of human progress man has no personal or private property. This notion depends on the view which has recently met with several advocates, that among savages the individual life is almost wholly subordinated to that of the tribe. It is stated in its most extreme form by an able writer in the *North British Review*, who says, "at first a man has hardly any personal rights. He has no private property. He is not free to leave his brethren without their consent. He cannot take a wife without their permission, and if he does marry, his wife is not exclusively his own. Even his children belong to the tribe as well as himself,

and for the good of the tribe they may be enslaved or put to death. Nay, his very life is not his own, and it may be sacrificed as a peace-offering to the angry gods that have sent a drought upon the herbage, or smitten the cattle with death,"[1] According to this view, a man gains individual rights only by "disintegration" of the tribe, the institution of private property resulting in the speedy severance of the family ties which bound the sept together; "the tie between buyer and seller is added to that of blood, and tribes which can minister to each others want are knit in the bonds of a new unity. Once began, the process goes on with ever quickening speed. . . . The movement is powerfully aided by war. . . . Quicker and quicker becomes the process until it is checked by the barrier of race or language, or religion or climate, or distance, or impassable mountain frontiers.[2]"

Now, ingenious as this hypothesis is, it is founded on a wholly imaginary basis. The assumptions that, during his earliest tribal condition, man is so far advanced as to be the domesticator of cattle, or the framer of gods who require human sacrifices, are alone fatal to it. Moreover, the "disintegration" of the tribes supposed by the reviewer is as unreliable as are the facts on which the idea of a purely tribal organisation in primeval times is founded. The truth is, that in the very earliest stage of human culture of which we have any knowledge—that represented by the native Australians—the right of private property is distinctly recognised, and the idea has been developed so far that not only has it been extended to immovable property, such as land and trees, but on the owner's death, these descend to his heirs.[3] That a man is not allowed to leave his brethren without their con-

[1] "North British Review," vol. xlvii., p. 388.
[2] Do. p. 389. [3] Grey, *op. cit.* vol. ii., p. 232, *seq.*

sent *may* theoretically be true, although hardly consistent with the subordination of tribal duties to those of clanship observed among the Australian aborigines ;[1] but in tribal life such as that of the Kaffirs, it is a common incident, and one which materially restrains the chiefs from acting in a too arbitrary manner towards their subjects. Moreover, the idea that a man's children belong to the tribe, has little, if any foundation in fact. The evidence that the tribe as such takes any cognisance of the existence of children until they attain the age of puberty, and are admitted to the tribal rights, is very slight. The almost universal existence of infanticide among uncultured peoples, and the despotic authority exercised by the father over his household, are inconsistent with the notion that children belong to the tribe. The evidence in favour of the opinion that in primeval times man had a community of wives, although accepted by Mr M'Lennan, Sir John Lubbock, Mr Morgan, and other writers, is very weak.[2] Mr Darwin, with better reason, regards that evidence as inconclusive, remarking, that " if we look far enough back in the stream of time, it is extremely improbable that primeval men and women lived promiscuously together. Judging from the social habits of man as he now exists, and from most savages being polygamists, the most probable view is that primeval man aboriginally lived in small communities, and with as many wives as he could support and obtain, whom he would have jealously guarded against all other men," [3]

The fact is, that the primitive tribe is merely a union of separate families, all the rights belonging to which

[1] Grey, *op. cit.*, p. 230-1.
[2] The subject is fully discussed by the present writer in " Anthropologia " (1874), vol. i. p. 197 *seq.*
[3] *Op.-cit.*, vol. ii. p. 362.

are preserved almost intact. Although the head of the family would doubtless claim all the property possessed by it as his own, yet each separate family of which the tribe came to be composed, would have its own independent property. This is only saying that, as each man set up for himself, taking a wife and establishing his own household, he would consider himself entitled to his wife and children, and to his slaves, when such property was established, with the other effects acquired by his own exertions. As the number of families increased, migratious would take place, and it would only be when by pressure from the new centres thus created, members of a community found themselves liable to be crushed from without, that they would gradually assume among themselves a tribal "organization." This result may, however, have been aided somewhat by the internal dissensions which would doubtless spring from the formation, side by side, of separate clans, owing to the operation of the primitive rules, which require children to take the family name of their mother, and forbid the intermarriage of persons bearing the same clan name. That organization would necessitate the giving up of a certain amount of individual freedom; but, as shown by the case of the aborigines of America, this sacrifice need be extremely slight. No doubt the tribal organization would afterwards be affected by other causes, especially those having a superstitious origin, but instead of its being weakened by them it is in reality strengthened. The very case supposed by the writer in the *North British Review*, the weakening of "the family ties which bound the *sept* together," would really have the contrary effect from the supposed disintegration of the tribe. In reality the "*sept*," as identified with the family, is wholly distinct

from the tribe proper. The latter is usually made up of representatives of various families or clans, who may be spread throughout several tribes. Every member of the same clan, however, to whatever tribe he may belong, is considered to be related, and this family tie is even stronger than the tribal one, as is shown by the fact, that among the Australians, if a dispute takes place between neighbouring tribes, all the members of one clan take the same side, whichever tribe they may belong to.[1]

This is almost conclusive proof that the family took precedence of the tribe, and, therefore, that individual rights—those of the head of the family, and when its members became separated, then the head of each branch of it—were recognized before those of the tribe. So also the individual comes before the family, and hence it is the sense of personal right, aroused by the operation of the instinct of self-preservation, which first shows itself. This, moreover, must have been in relation to the individual, and not to the tribe, as the *North British Reviewer* seems to suppose when he says, that "the instinct of self-preservation is sufficient to account for the knowledge that stealing and murder are sins. The first aim of a tribe or family being to guard its life and its property, it must prevent secession and quarrelling at all hazards."[2] The universal prevalence of the law of private retaliation shows that this view is not supported by facts.

In the powerful assertion of the instinct of right, or rather that of "property" on which the right is based, we see the insufficiency of those systems which would trace the origin of the moral sense to the operation of

[1] Grey, *op. cit.*, ii. p. 230. [2] *loc. cit.*, p. 383.

sympathy, or the strength of the social instincts. These may, at a certain stage of human progress, furnish the motive force to action, but the idea of obligation connected with it, rests solely on the sense of right springing from the instinct which urges to self-preservation as the first law of sentient nature.

CHAPTER V.

GENESIS OF THE MORAL IDEA.

In the preceding chapter it was shown that the moral ideas of peoples who have attained to but a slight degree of culture are closely connected with the rights of property. That this is so in relation to murder and theft, is proved by the different opinion entertained of these actions when directed against strangers to the tribe, and when members of the same tribe are concerned. The absence of any moral element from the offence of adultery, is proved by the condition of woman and her character as a chattel, the criminality or otherwise of actions in relation to her depending on the consent of her husband. It has been shown, moreover, that the possessory rights, the interference with which constitutes the offences of savage life, may be traced to the instinct of self-preservation. The activity of this instinct necessarily leads to the formation of property, a term which primarily includes everything which has been obtained for the purpose of self-preservation, and it is on interference with the property thus acquired that the idea of right is founded. It is evident that we have here but little, if any, place for the action of what is called the moral sense; since the propriety of an action is determined, not by reference to a particular standard of morality, but by observing whether or not it interferes with certain acquired rights.

If, as is sometimes asserted, these rights are originally tribal and not personal, there could be no such thing as

interference with individual rights. This notion is inconsistent, however, with the practice, universal among uncultured peoples, of revenge for crimes being exercised by the individuals who suffer by them. The fact is, that among such peoples the social unity of the family or clan is the most important, the political unity of the tribe having almost purely *external* relations.

It has now to be shown how certain actions come to be clothed with an ethical character, that is, to be treated as good or bad in themselves, irrespective of their consequences. The first thing to be observed on this point is, that those actions which had the most striking consequences would be the first to be thus affected, and that, as interference with what is directly or indirectly required for self-preservation is the evil most to be dreaded in the primitive condition of mankind, such actions as have that effect would be the most likely to first acquire an ethical character. The first stage in the change thus supposed would undoubtedly be one of generalization. It would not require much mental effort for the savage, who feels that it is wrong for another on a particular occasion to deprive him of his property, to infer that it is wrong for such other person at any time, or for any body else, thus to act. There would not at first be the actual formation of an abstract idea, but only an increased activity or a more acute feeling of the sense of wrong, resulting in the formation of a broader or more generalized idea of right. This would be at a stage of human progress of which probably no trace has survived to the present time, seeing that all peoples now existing appear to have some notion, however vague, of abstract right. In this, however, there is not necessarily the recognition of an ethical element. The idea formed as the result of the perception that a *series* of actions having similar conse-

quences partake of the same character, as being injurious to the rights of another, need not differ from the first simple notion thus formed. It is evident, moreover, that there may be a still further extension of the idea without there being any recognition of a moral quality as belonging to those actions. The interests of the individual[1] are more or less those of the tribe to which he belongs, and, as tribal union becomes perfected, each member of the tribe will consider every action criminal which is directed against the rights of any other member, just as though he himself were personally concerned. This has relation, however, usually to injuries from without, and it is rather a generalization, so to speak, of individuals—those who form the tribe—than of ideas. It is, in fact, merely a recognition that every act which would be criminal if directed against self, is equally so when the rights of any other member of the tribe are interfered with. There is here no idea of "morality," and it is doubtful whether such an idea would ever be formed unless another element were introduced. What this element is may be shown by reference to the origin of the earliest notion of criminality in relation to the actions of self.

[1] The term "individual" is here equivalent to "family," seeing that in the tribe the family is represented only by its head. When a family has several branches it becomes a clan, the members of which, owing to their blood-relationship, form a kind of brotherhood, originally perhaps having property in common, but at all events having common rights. Hence the rule which requires all the members of a clan to join in avenging a wrong sustained by any of them, and which renders each of them alike liable to account for a wrong inflicted by a fellow-clansman. Among primitive peoples the ties of clanship are so much stronger than tribal ties that, as previously mentioned in the case of public quarrels, all the members of a clan are bound by custom to take the same side, although they may belong to hostile tribes. This fact explains the immunity often allowed in warfare to women who, belonging by birth to one opposing tribe, and by marriage association to the other, are permitted to have free intercourse with both.

This notion arose from the antecedent sense of right in which the instinct of "property" revealed itself, but it was formed only after experience taught that interference with the property of others met with resistance and revenge. We see here the influence of the fear of retribution, and we can hardly doubt that to an analogous influence was due the first idea that an act has a moral quality apart from its consequences. Mr Herbert Spencer says that "the primitive belief is that every dead man becomes a demon, who remains somewhere at hand, may at any moment return, may give aid or do mischief, and is continually propitiated."[1] The savage is not able to form the idea of death,[2] and, therefore, he believes that the buried man is still alive, in the sense that he, as distinguished from his material organism, is active and capable of appearing and again interfering in the affairs of life. Thus all the ordinary ghosts or *Ing-nas* of the Australian aborigines are the spirits of dead men.[3] It does not appear, however, that these spirits are "propitiated," or that their aid is ever sought, unless it be in the practices of sorcery. No doubt, food and other things are presented to the dead, at particular periods, for the purpose of satisfying them, and thus to prevent them from coming back and annoying the living. The time when the ceremony or rite takes place sufficiently shows its object. There is some reason to believe that all peoples, however uncivilized, have at a former period, if they do not do so now, held a yearly festival at which offerings were made to the dead.[4]

[1] *loc cit.*, p. 428.
[2] There is much evidence that the savage supposes even animals to have an invisible existence after they have been killed. See Tylor's "Primitive Culture" i., p. 422, *seq.*; ii., p. 209, *seq.*
[3] Oldfield, *loc. cit.*, p. 236, *seq.*
[4] See Tylor's "Primitive Culture," vol. ii., p. 26, *seq.* and authorities there cited; also Haliburton on The Festival of the Dead, in "Life at the Great Pyramid," by C. Piazzi Smyth, vol. ii., p. 371, *seq.*

There is more certainty, however, that it is an almost universal custom to place various articles belonging to the deceased, and also food, either in or on his grave at the time of burial.[1] Among most uncivilized peoples, moreover, there is a further step to be taken. Death is usually supposed to have been caused by an enemy, if not openly, yet by the arts of sorcery. According to the custom of blood-revenge, it is necessary that the sorcerer should be slain. This is required, not so much to gratify the revenge of the relatives of the deceased, as to satisfy the dead man himself, whose rest it is thought will be disturbed until the required sacrifice has been made to his manes. The slaying of the sorcerer is, therefore, considered by the survivors as a duty owing to the deceased, and one the non-performance of which will cause them to incur his displeasure.

The consequence supposed by Mr H. Spencer to accompany the belief that dead men continue to exist as demons is somewhat different. He says that "among other agents whose approbation or reprobation are contemplated by the savage as consequences of his conduct, are the spirits of his ancestors."[2] This, no doubt, is true to some extent of various semi-civilized peoples, but not of the Australian aborigines and peoples in an almost equally primitive condition. Their only concern is, while gratifying their own feeling of revenge, to satisfy what may be called the "rights of the dead,"[3]

[1] Colonel Dalton states that he was assured by the Chalikata Mishmis of Upper Assam, and also by the Kols of Bengal, that they burn all the personal effects of a deceased owing to their unwillingness to benefit by his death (*Ethnology of Bengal*, p. 205). This shows much good feeling, but it does not follow that they would not fear retribution if the act were neglected. The Kols, indeed, provide for the return of the spirit of the dead, after the funeral rites have been performed (*Ibid.*, p. 206.)

[2] *loc. cit.*, p. 428.

[3] This is well shown in the belief, general among peoples of a low culture, that diseases, where not due to the influence of sorcery, are

compliance with which is considered a sacred duty. A curious instance of the force which this compound feeling has over the mind of the Australian savage is given by Mr Gideon Lang, and the narrative having value on other grounds may be given at length. "About eighteen years ago," says Mr Lang, "when upon an overland journey, I remained for some time at Mr Templar's station, Nanima, near Wellington, in New South Wales, where there had been for many years, and until some three years preceding my visit, a party of Moravian missionaries, who had been very successful in civilizing the blacks. They had taken charge of the natives, almost from infancy, and trained them up apparently free from the vices and barbarities of the tribes. While at Nanima, I constantly saw one of these blacks, named Jemmy, a remarkably fine man, about twenty-eight years of age, who was the 'model Christian' of the missionaries, and who had been over and over again described in their reports as a living proof that, taken in infancy, the natives were as capable of being truly Christianized as a people who had had eighteen centuries of civilization. I confess that I strongly doubted, but still there was no disputing the apparent facts. Jemmy was not only familiar with the Bible, which he could read remarkably well, but he was even better acquainted with the more abstruse tenets of Christianity; and so far as the whites could see, his behaviour was in accordance with his religious acquirements. One Sunday morning, I walked down to the black fellows' camp, to have a talk with Jemmy, as

caused by spirits whose claims have not been properly attended to. Many examples of such a belief are given by Tylor, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 115, *seq.* Among the aborigines of India all diseases are ascribed to the influence of evil spirits or the spell of a sorcerer. For an interesting account of the proceedings of a Kol witch-finder, see Dalton, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

usual. I found him sitting in his gunyah, overlooking a valley of the Macquarrie, whose waters glanced brightly in the sunshine of the delicious spring morning. He was sitting in a state of nudity, excepting his waist-cloth, very earnestly reading the Bible, which indeed was his constant practice; and I could see that he was perusing the Sermon on the Mount. I seated myself, and waited till he concluded the chapter, when he laid down the Bible, folded his hands, and sat with his eyes fixed abstractedly on his fire. I bade him 'good-morning,' which he acknowledged without looking up. I then said, 'Jemmy, what is the meaning of your spears being stuck in a circle round you.' He looked me steadily in the eyes, and said solemnly and with suppressed fierceness, 'Mother's dead!' I said that I was very sorry to hear it; 'But what had her death to do with the spears being stuck around so?' 'Bogan black-fellow killed her!' was the fierce and gloomy reply. 'Killed by a Bogan black!' I exclaimed, 'why, your mother has been dying a fortnight, and Dr Curtis did not expect her to outlive last night, which you know as well as I do.' His only reply was a dogged repetition of the words: 'A Bogan black-fellow killed her!' I appealed to him as a Christian—to the Sermon on the Mount, that he had just been reading; but he absolutely refused to promise that he would not avenge his mother's death. In the afternoon of that day, we were startled by a yell which can never be mistaken by any person who has once heard the wild war-whoop of the blacks when in battle array. On rushing out, we saw all the black-fellows of the neighbourhood formed into a line, and following Jemmy in an imaginary attack upon an enemy. Jemmy himself disappeared that evening. On the following Wednesday morning, I found him sitting complacently in his gunyah, plaiting a rope of human

hair, which I at once knew to be that of his victim. Neither of us spoke; I stood for sometime watching him as he worked with a look of mocking defiance of the anger he knew I felt. I pointed to a hole in the middle of his fire, and said, 'Jemmy, the proper place for your Bible is there.' He looked up with his eyes flashing as I turned away, and I never saw him again. I afterwards learned that he had gone to the district of the Bogan tribe, where the first black he met happened to be an old friend and companion of his own. This man had just made the first cut in the bark of a tree, which he was about to climb for an opossum; but on hearing footsteps he leaped down and faced round, as all blacks do, and whites also when blacks are in question. Seeing that it was only Jemmy, however, he resumed his occupation, but had no sooner set to work, than Jemmy sent a spear through his back, and nailed him to the tree." [1]

In this case, no doubt, the most influential motive was revenge for a personal loss, but it was intensified by the custom which required that the manes of the dead should be satisfied with the blood of the supposed sorcerer. That this is the real source of the Australian system of *vendetta*, is shown by the substitution for it, by some of the native tribes of East and South Australia, of a sham-fight or a mock duel at the funeral of the deceased for the purpose of drawing blood.[2] The rights of the dead are recognised in various ways by all uncultured and semi-civilised peoples, and this is the origin of most of their more important funeral customs.

[1] "The Aborigines of Australia" (1865), p. 15.

[2] See authorities referred to in a paper on "Australian Tribal Affinities," by the present writer, in the Journal of the Anthropological Society (1870). Catlin states that among the Indians the relations of deceased persons cut their flesh with knives "to appease the spirits of the dead, whose misfortunes they attribute to some sin or omission of their own."—*North American Indians*, i., p. 90.

Burial itself has, indeed, such an origin, and is founded on the notion that the dead man requires a suitable dwelling-place, and that if this is not provided, his spirit—the Australian *Ing-na*—will wander about and revenge himself on the living for the neglect to grant him the rights of the dead.[1] The Madecasses have retained a remembrance of the latter idea in their custom of erecting, besides the ordinary graves, "a kind of vacant tomb or cenotaph for those who have gone to a distance and fallen in war . . . . and it is believed that these pseudo-tombs will afford a resting-place for the *fanàhy* of the departed, although his body may remain unburied. Otherwise it would have to associate with wild cats, owls, and other creatures of ill-omen."[2]

The latter notion is evidently an addition to the primitive belief. The Madecasse custom referred to is strangely like that of the ancient Greeks and Romans, who built tombs on the sea-shore for those who were drowned, and it is in the spirit of the belief of most primitive peoples.[3] The curious funeral ceremonies performed among the Chinese are supposed to be necessary to aid the spirits of the dead in their passage to the spirit-world, and to obtain for them a favourable reception there,[4] and they are evidently founded on the primitive notion relating to the "rights of the dead" under consideration. The same idea is at the foundation of the custom of adoption so commonly practised among the Hindus and other Eastern peoples.

[1] The Greenlanders have great dread of a class of spirits called *Ingnersoit*, whom they believe to have been "the inhabitants of the earth before the Deluge; and when the globe turned upside down in the waters, they were metamorphosed into flames, and sheltered themselves in the cliffs."—*Crantz*, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 208.

[2] Sibree, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

[3] See Tylor, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 24 *seq.*

[4] An elaborate description of these ceremonies will be found in Doolittle's "Social Life of the Chinese" (1868), p. 125 *seq.*

Mrs Manning, on the authority of Sir Thomas Strange,[1] says that the Indian law of inheritance cannot be understood without reference to the belief of the Hindoo, that his future happiness depends "upon the performance of his obsequies, and the payment of his [spiritual] debts by a son." Hence, to have a son was to him "a duty no less binding than sacrifices to the gods, or the acquisition of sacred knowledge. It was a link in that chain by which a mortal secured immortality," and, if a Hindu had no son by his wives, he adopted one, that his obsequies might be properly performed.[2] The ancient Greeks and Romans had similar ideas on this subject.[3]

The attention to the rights of the dead depends, however, on the superstitious fear which all primitive peoples have of the spirits of the deceased, and compliance with those rights becomes a duty only as the effect of that fear.[4] The dread of spirit retribution is

[1] "Principles of Hindu Law" (1864), chap. iv., *On Adoption.* A son is called *Puttra*, because his offerings deliver from Put, a place of horror, to which the manes of the childless are supposed to he doomed.

[2] "Ancient and Medieval India," vol. i., p. 322 *seq.*, and see "A Manual of Hindoo Law," by Thomas Lumsden Strange (1863), chap. *Adoption.*

[3] Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities," Art. "*Adoptio.*" M. Baudry says: L'adoption était, dans la constitution de la famille antique, une ressource offerte par la religion et les lois à celui qui n'avait pas d'héritier naturel afin de perpétuer sa descendance et par là d'assurer la continuité du culte domestique et la transmission des biens," "Dictionnaire des Antiquités Grecques et Romaines," (1873), Art. *Adoptio.*

[4] This would explain the conduct of the Bechuanas in relation to the bodies of their dead. They appear to have little idea of a future life, and therefore do not fear the (common ?) dead. This, however, hardly justifies Mr Moffat's remark, that, "in their ceremonies connected with burying the dead, there is no reference to pleasing the spirits of the dead." This is disproved by the fact that the funeral rites of a chief are attended to with scrupulous care, and that the corpse is addressed apparently with the intention of satisfying the dead man. In the course of the ceremony men and women shout

shown in various other customs of savage and semi-civilized life. This is doubtless the source of the extreme care which is often taken not to do certain acts which, in themselves, cannot possibly have any moral quality, while actions which are, to us, extremely sinful, are performed without hesitation. Such is the scrupulous abstention, common to all peoples of a low degree of culture, from eating certain plants or the flesh of particular animals. That such a practice is connected with the belief in spiritual agency is proved by the fact that the animal or plant which is *kobong* [1] to the Australian, or *roondah* to the African,[2] is supposed to be a protection to the person who has chosen it. This is well shown by the analogous superstition common to the native tribes of North America, relating to that which acts as their "medicine" or "mystery."[3] It has been said that sometimes the Indian who, by mistake, kills the animal which has become his "medicine" or *totem*, will go home and die for fear of the consequences which he thinks must ensue through the anger of his guardian spirit.[4]

pùla, pùla, rain, rain, as though asking the deceased for this benefit (*op. cit.*, p. 306, *seq.*). It is probable that the belief in spirit existence was once universal, but that now it has relation to the chiefs alone, owing, perhaps, to these only being feared during life.

[1] Kobong means "friend" or protector, and it is remarkable that the Japanese use the term *kobong* to denote a sort of superstitious tie or friendly agreement between two persons, like that referred to in the text between man and the inhabitants of the spirit world (Dickson's "Japan," p. 407). So, also, the clan name which, among the Mandingoes of Northern Africa, every individual has besides his proper name, is called *kontong* (Mungo Park, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 263). This probably refers to the *totem* of the clan.

[2] See Du Chaillu's "Equatorial Africa," p. 306. [3] See *infra.*

[4] On the influence of *Totemism*, see an interesting article, by Mr J. F. M'Lennan, in the Fortnightly Review for 1869, p. 407, *seq.* It is a phase of the curious custom of *Tabu*, according to which certain things are set apart as sacred. Tabu, like totemism, has not any distinctly moral element. See Ellis' "Polynesian Researches," iv., p. 385, *seq.*

Strange as it may seem, this feeling is undoubtedly closely connected with what we call conscience, and it may, indeed, be made to supply the moral element which we saw to be wanting to those ideas of right which are formed from the association of human retribution with wrongs perpetrated on others. The savage who fears the anger of a spirit, on whom he cannot retaliate, if he performs or does not perform a certain act, feels it a *duty* to do what the spirit is thought to require.

This is not, however, founded merely on the fear of retribution. It has reference to the supposed *rights* of the spirit, which furnish the basis for the co-relative duty. The existence in the mind of the savage of such a notion, limited as its application may be, is especially interesting, as it is the budding germ of the moral sense, the genesis of which it is our object to trace. Few, if any, of now existing peoples are wanting in this primitive phase of the moral sense. That the Australians possess it is shown by Collins, when he says, in relation to the natives of New South Wales : " On our speaking of cannibalism, they expressed great horror at the mention, and said it was *wee-re* (bad). On seeing any of our people punished or reproved for ill-treating them, they expressed their approbation, and said it was *bood-yer-re* (good), it was right. Midnight murders, though frequently practised among them whenever passion or revenge was uppermost, they reprobated, but applauded acts of kindness and generosity, for of both these they were capable."[1] Collins adds significantly, " but their knowledge of the difference between right and wrong certainly never extended beyond their existence in this world."

The natives of New South Wales had evidently

[1] *Op. cit.*, i., 549.

reached the stage where they ascribed to actions, the tendency of which was to injure or benefit the tribe, the like character as was supposed to belong to actions which were required or forbidden by the spirits they so much feared. It may be questioned, however, whether there was any actual idea of morality attached to the former. There is nothing said of retribution in case the evil instead of the good is perpetrated, and hence there would seem to have been no idea of *duty*, which is of the essence of morality, associated with such actions. That idea, which, however, seldom expresses itself other than negatively, is best seen exhibited among the Australian natives in connection with the "kobong" superstition. It took another form in the incident, mentioned by Mr G. Fletcher Moore, the late Judge Advocate of Western Australia, where a native declared that a heavy shower of rain had been sent by *Julagoling*, the planet Venus—who curiously enough is supposed to be a beautiful young woman[1]—as a sign of her anger at her name having been mentioned. Mr Darwin relates that, when the surgeon on board the Beagle shot some young ducks, a Fuegian, who was known by the name of "York Minster," said solemnly, "Oh! Mr Bynoe, much rain, much snow, blow much." This Mr Darwin thinks was "a retributive punishment for wasting human food,"[2] but it is more likely to have had connection with some superstition associated with the birds which were killed.[3] Dr Maudesley has well described the moral condition of the Australians, in connection with their cerebral development. He says:—"The native Australian, who is one of the lowest existing savages, has no words

[1] See Mr Moore's "Descriptive Vocabulary" of the language of Western Australia.

[2] *Op. cit.*, vol. i. p. 67.

[3] Mr Oldfield relates that the women of Shark's Bay, in Western Australia, wept bitterly when a kite was shot. *Loc. cit.*, p. 225.

in his language to express such exalted ideas as justice, love, virtue, mercy; he has no such ideas in his mind, and cannot comprehend them. The muscular neurine which should embody them in its constitution and manifest them in its function, has not been developed in his convolutions; he is as incapable therefore of the higher mental displays of abstract reasoning and moral feeling as an idiot is, and for a like reason. Indeed, were we to imagine a person born in this country, at this time, with a brain of no higher development than the brain of an Australian savage or a Bushman, it is perfectly certain that he would be more or less of an imbecile. And the only way, I suppose, in which beings of so low an order of development could be raised to a civilised level of feeling and thought would be by cultivation continued through several generations; they would have to undergo a gradual process of humanisation, before they could attain to the capacity of civilisation."[1]

The Polynesian islanders undoubtedly think that certain actions will bring down upon them the wrath of their deities. Thus, Mr Shortland declares, that "the gods whom the New Zealanders fear are the spirits of the dead, who are believed to be constantly watching over the living with jealous eye, lest they should neglect any part of the law relating to persons or things subject to the sacred restriction called *tapu*." This is punished by mischievous spirits (usually those of children) being sent into the bodies of the offenders to cause sickness.[2] Mr Ellis also says, "every disease was supposed to be the effect of direct supernatural agency, and to be inflicted by the gods for some crime against the tabu, of which the sufferers had been guilty, or in consequence of some offering made by an enemy to procure their de-

[1] "Body and mind," (1870) p. 56. [2] Shortland, *op. cit.*, pp. 81, 114.

struction."[1] The latter is equivalent to the Australian idea of sorcery for the purpose of ensuring the death of a victim, showing that such sorcery is supposed to be effective through the agency of spirits. It would seem, however, that none of these peoples have any notion of the moral depravity of actions, irrespective of their effect as interfering with the rights of the denizens of the spirit world. It is true that among the Society Islanders rebellion, withholding supplies, or speaking contemptuously of the king or his government, were considered highly criminal. But even this had superstitious associations. The heinousness of disloyalty was such that a human sacrifice was required to be offered to atone for the guilt, and appease the displeasure of the gods against the people of the land in which it had been committed.[2] It is evident that the crime was supposed to be against the gods, whose sanction the king had for his authority, the notion itself being supported by the semi-divine nature which is usually ascribed to the chief himself. As to ordinary actions, Mr Ellis, when speaking of the opinions entertained by the Polynesians with relation to the abodes of departed spirits, remarks that "the misery of the one, and enjoyments of the other, debasing as they were, were the destiny of individuals, altogether irrespective of their moral character and virtuous conduct. The only crimes that were visited by the displeasure of their deities were the neglect of some rite or ceremony, or the failing to furnish required offerings."[3] This agrees with Bishop Williams' remark as to the New Zealanders, that to be told that it was wrong to indulge in their evil propensities, and that God would be angry with them, was a doctrine they could not understand.[4] So, also, Dr

[1] "Polynesian Researches," i. p. 395. [2] Do., vol. iii., p. 123.
[3] *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 397.
[4] "Christianity among the New Zealanders," p. 21.

Seemann says as to the Fijian belief, that there does not seem to be any separation between the abodes of the good and the wicked, nothing that corresponds to our heaven and hell.[1] It is true that some women are supposed to be scraped with oyster shells in the next world, and to become bread for the gods, but this punishment is only for not having been tattooed.[2] Men, also, are sometimes condemned to beat dirt with their clubs—"the most degrading punishment the native mind can conceive,"—because they have used their clubs to so little purpose in this life, as not to have killed an enemy.[3] The account given by Mariner of the Tongans shows them to be much like the other islanders of the Pacific in their moral ideas. They have no belief in a future state of retribution, reward and punishment being inflicted in this life. Thus, says Mariner, the Tongans "firmly believe that the gods approve of virtue and are displeased with vice; that every man has a titular deity, who will protect him so long as he conducts himself as he ought to do, but, if he does not, will leave him to the approaches of misfortune, disease, and death."[4] But the moral value of such belief does not appear to be great, when we consider that theft, revenge, rape, and murder, were under many circumstances not held to be crimes; and that the Tongans had no independent words to express such ideas as *virtue, justice, humanity, vice, injustice, cruelty,* and that the only word to denote *chastity* was one meaning "fixed or faithful," which was applied also to denote loyalty to a chief.[5]

Much the same has been remarked in relation to un-

[1] "Viti," p. 400.

[2] It is interesting to note that the Eskimo women have the same idea as to the efficacy of tattooing. (See *supra*, p. 250).

[3] Seemann, *op. cit.*, p. 401.

[4] *Op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 141.

[5] Do., p. 139, *seq.* As to the moral ideas entertained by the Greenlanders, see *supra*, p. 252.

cultured peoples in other parts of the world. There is seldom a disbelief in a future state, but no element of what we understand by morality ever enters into the ideas entertained as to its character. Thus, according to the natives of America, different fates "awaited the departed souls, but these rarely, if ever, were decided by their conduct while in the flesh, but by the manner of death, the punctuality with which certain sepulchral rites were fulfilled by relatives, or other similar arbitrary circumstance beyond the power of the individual to control."[1]

We can well believe, therefore, that when the sick Takahli Indian made a full confession of sins, he did not mention a murder, although committed without provocation, and however unnatural, it not being considered a crime. Brinton adds that "scenes of brutal licentiousness were approved and sustained throughout the continent as acts of worship; maidenhood was in many parts freely offered up or claimed by the priests as a right; in Central America twins were slain for religious motives; human sacrifice was common throughout the tropics, and was not unusual in higher latitudes; cannibalism was often enjoined, and in Peru, Florida, and Central America, it was not uncommon for parents to slay their own children at the behest of a priest."[2] In fact, with the Americans, as with other uncivilized peoples, conscience has no relation to morality properly so called, the ideas which are essential to the existence of a moral sense not having been definitely formed. It may be that some tribes, like the *Tsimsheeans* of British Columbia, believe that after death the morally good go to a good place, and the morally bad to a bad place,[3] but the value of the belief depends entirely on

[1] Brinton's "Myths of the New World," (1868), p. 243.
[2] Do., p. 290. [3] "Mayne's Four Years in British Columbia," p. 293.

the ideas which go to make up the notion of morality. When referring to motive, disposition, or feelings, the North-West-Coast Americans always use the word "heart,"[1] and they probably speak of a man having a bad heart; but judging from their actions, we must believe that, if any moral idea is associated with the expression, it is of the most indefinite character. This is consistent with Com[r] Mayne's opinion, that the inland tribes of British Columbia, who were said to be more virtuous than the coast tribes, were so "owing to force of circumstances rather than to any fixed principle."[2] Among the wild Indians of Guiana, to say that a man is *bad*, is almost equivalent to a curse, but the expression would seem to be used when one person simply offends another,[3] showing that it has little moral significance. Even the Christian Aymaras have so indefinite a notion of right and wrong, that they think any crime but murder may be committed with impunity on Good Friday, because God is dead on that day, and therefore cannot know what is then done ! [4]

The negro peoples of Africa differ little from races in a similar state of civilization in their ideas as to moral responsibility. Mr Wilson says, in relation to the *Mpongwe* of the Gaboon, that certain words in their language have great latitude of meaning, "in consequence of the defective views that are entertained by the people on the subject of morals, as well as their want of discrimination in metaphysical science." Thus the term *mbia* is used indiscriminately for good, handsome, kind, generous, just, benevolent, lenient, and whatever conveys a pleasing impression to the mind; while the term *mbe* is used to express bad, severe, unrelenting, vengeful,

[1] Mayne's "Four Years in British Columbia," p. 281.
[2] Do., p. 300. [3] Brett, *op. cit.*, p. 103.
[4] *Supra*, p. 219.

unfortunate, ugly, malignant, mischievous, and whatever else conveys the idea of unpleasantness.[1] If we examine the proverbs of the West African, we find no more definite notion of morality. Except among the tribes who have been brought under Moslem influence, there is little reference to the necessity of right conduct in the popular proverbs. Captain Burton says that the natives of the Gold Coast have even borrowed many of their sayings from Europeans.[2] The Yoruba proverbs are the most advanced, but many of them are referred by Captain Burton to a Mohammedan source. Thus they say[3]—

> A contemptuous action should not be done to our fellow-man.
>
> He who injures (or despises) another, injures (or despises) himself.
>
> He who forgives gains the victory in the dispute.
>
> If God should compare our sins we should perish.
>
> Peace is the father of friendship.
>
> The evil doer is ever anxious.

Certain sayings which counsel truthfulness and patience are probably native ones, since they appear to be found among most of the tribes. Thus, the Yoruba proverb says, "A long timé may pass, before one is caught in a lie," and, "A witness speaks the truth; a witness does not take (the liar's) part." The Wolof saying is, "Liars, however numerous, will be caught by truth when it rises up," and "No good without truth." The Kanuri proverb declares that "it is forbidden to tell anything that has no foundation." Captain Burton explains the existence of the Yoruba proverb by the fact

[1] "Grammar of the Mpongwe Language" (1847), p. 51. According to Du Chaillu, the natives of Western Equatorial Africa have no religious *belief*, and do not believe in the continued existence of the soul for any considerable time after death (*op. cit.*, p. 335).

[2] "Wit and Wisdom from West Africa," p. 136.

[3] Do., p. 198, *note*.

that the people are such "awful liars,"[1] and the Efik or Old Calabar saying, "many destroy themselves by falsehood," would seem to support that notion. Again, while the Wolof proverb declares that "patience is good," the Kanuri saying is, "at the bottom of patience there is heaven." The Yorubas say, "anger does nobody good: patience is the father of dispositions," showing doubtless that this quality is far from common among the West Africans. The proverbs, "it is the heart that carries one to hell or heaven," and, "if one does good, Allah will interpret it to him for good,[2] are evidently due to Moslem influence. Probably the ordinary moral phase of the West African cannot be better exhibited than in the Ashanti proverbs, which are of a very simple character. Thus, "a poor man has no friend,"—"if the child does not honour the aged, it will call a palm branch 'haha,'" *i.e.*, will be guilty of any absurdity,—"though you dislike your relation, you will not deliver him to the army (of the enemy)." [3]

Some of the South African tribes would appear to have advanced further in morality than the inhabitants of the Western Coast. Livingstone says, that "on questioning intelligent men among the Bakwains as to their former knowledge of good and evil, of God, and the future state, they have scouted the idea of any of them ever having been without a tolerably clear conception on all these subjects. Respecting their sense of right and wrong, they profess that nothing we indicate as sin appeared to them as otherwise, except the statement that it was wrong to have more wives than one." [4] He adds, that "the want of any form of public worship, or of idols, or of formal prayers or sacrifices, make both Cafres and Bechuanas appear as amongst the most

[1] "Wit and Wisdom from West Africa," p. 265, *note*.
[2] Do., p. 46-7. [3] Do., p. 67, *seq.* [4] "Missionary Travels," p. 158.

godless races of mortals known anywhere." It is very questionable, indeed, whether the Bakwains had really any very definite notion of what we understand by "morality." Uncivilized peoples are always prone to appropriate the ideas which they have derived from others, and to return them as their own. It is difficult to understand how, in the absence of any notion of retribution, other than that arising from the action of his fellow-men, in return for injury he has inflicted, the Bakwain could have any real sense of moral obligation. Casalis, than whom no one could better judge of the native character, declares that, although the Kafir or Mochuana who has a bad thought knows perfectly well that the thought is bad, yet that he does not at all reproach himself for it so long as it is not acted on. It is doubtful, indeed, whether he experiences remorse, such as follows from an immoral act which does not advance his interests or his reputation. Casalis adds that the Kafirs and Bechuanas do not deny that actions are wrong in themselves, but, seeing that the doer of them easily forgives himself, the feeling of remorse (if it can be so called) which ensues cannot be very definite.[1] It is evident that the moral element would not weigh with the Kafir if he had to determine on a line of conduct. The effect on his interests would be the real point for consideration, and what decision he should come to would be wholly a question of expediency.

Casalis' opinion agrees substantially with that of Mr Moffat, who says of the Bechuanas, that when the missionaries "attempted to convince them of their state as sinners, they would boldly affirm, with full belief in their innate rectitude, that there was not a sinner in the tribe, referring us to other nations whom they dreaded, or with whom they were at war; and especially

[1] "Les Bassoutos," p. 316.

the poor, despised Bushmen. That they are less ferocious than some tribes [the Zulus] we admit; but this is saying little in commendation of those who could with impunity rob, murder, lie, and exchange wives. No matter how disgraceful the action might be, or what deceit, prevarication, duplicity, and oaths, were required to support it, success made them perfectly happy in a practice in which most were adepts."[1] It is somewhat amusing to hear that the brighter Bechuanas, after making various speculations as to the reason why the missionaries settled in South Africa, came to the conclusion that it must be because they had run away from their own country to escape punishment for some crime of which they had been guilty.[2]

The remark made by Mr Wood, that "a religion which conveys any sense of moral responsibility, seems to be incomprehensible to the ordinary Kaffir, and even his naturally logical mind inclines him to practical atheism,"[3] appears to express the truth. The like remark might be made as to the Madecasses described by Drury, who agree curiously with the Kafirs in that respect.[4] This is quite consistent, however, with the existence of an indefinite moral sense, such as we have seen the Australians to evidence when they spoke of certain actions as being good or bad. The coast tribes of Madagascar described by Drury, notwithstanding their many failings, were not without such a general sense of moral propriety.[5] The Hovas, judging from the proverbs current among them, would seem to have the moral sense more fully developed. Thus they say, "God beholds from on high, and sees that which is con-

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 254. [2] Do., p 297.
[3] *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 183. See this subject discussed by Mr Moffat (*op. cit.*, p. 257, *seq.*).
[4] Drury's "Adventures in Madagascar" (Ed. 1807), p. 183.
[5] See do., pp. 221, 236.

cealed;" and, "There is nothing unknown to God." Mr Sibree, who gives several other Madecasse proverbs of the same character, says: "That God is the ruler and disposer of events is acknowledged in another proverb, 'The wilfulness of man can be borne by the Creator, for God alone bears rule.' His justice is taught by the saying, 'God hates evil; God is not to be blamed, the Creator is not to be censured;' while His approval of the good-doer, though He may wait long, is embodied in another proverb, 'Though men wait not for God, yet will I wait for Him.' That God punishes the evil-doer, is involved in the saying, 'Better be guilty with men than guilty before God.'"[1] It may be questioned, however, whether the Madecasses attach any very definite ideas to these sayings; and, in fact, they have a proverb which declares that "there is no retribution"—adding, however, "still the past returns" (*ny atòdy tsy misy, fa ny ataó mivèrina*)—a notion which we shall meet with again among the Chinese, and which appears to embody the very essence of Buddhistic fatalism.[2]

The Tongans, if we receive the statement of Mariner, exhibit the influence of moral conscience over the actions of life. He says that many of the chiefs, when asked, "What motives they had for conducting themselves with propriety, besides the fear of their followers in this life?" replied, "The agreeable and happy feeling which a man experiences within himself when he does any good action, or conducts himself nobly and generously, as a man ought to do."[3] The absence, however, of any reference, such as we should expect to find associated with it, to retribution for evil conduct, throws doubt on the statement of Mariner; and it can

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 379.

[2] Can the Madecasses, like the Peruvians and Mexicans, have derived their more elevated thoughts from an Asiatic source?

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 141.

hardly be received as evidencing the recognition by the Tongans of moral obligation. Uncultured peoples may look for *present* punishment for neglecting the rights of the denizens of the spirit-world ;[1] but, in the absence of the fear of retribution for acts of mere social impropriety, no notion of morality can attach to them, even though there is a feeling that particular conduct is praiseworthy or otherwise. Probably such a feeling as this exists with respect to actions which affect the general welfare at first of the clan and afterwards of the tribe, in relation to life and property ; and, therefore, to some extent, or rather in the most advanced minds, with the more serious social offences, such as robbery, murder, and adultery. When once the idea has been formed that these offences, against whomsoever directed, are disgraceful or blameworthy, it is evident that, although they are not considered morally wrong, they might soon come to be so treated, if, like actions which are infringements on the rights of the spirit-world, they were forbidden by a competent authority, especially if this were clothed with a superstitious character. Such a result is the more likely to be reached when we recollect that robbery, murder, and adultery possess that characteristic—the interference with a right—which constitutes the essence of all offences against the spirit-world. If, in the latter case, a wrong calling for retribution is

[1] Dr Seemann gives instances of supposed retribution met with by sceptical Fijians (*op. cit.*, p. 401). As to want of belief in a future state of retribution, see Tylor's "Primitive Culture," vol. ii., p. 83, *seq.* The aborigines of India, whose moral sense we have seen to be so imperfect, have not as a rule any such belief. The Málers of Rajmahal are more advanced, but probably owing to Hindu influence (see Dalton's "Ethnology of Bengal," p. 267). The allied Oraons would seem not to have any idea of punishment for "sin" (do., p. 256). It appears to have been a general Kol belief that each head of a family is bound to make a certain number of offerings to the supreme Sun deity during his lifetime, and he may "clear the account" as soon as he pleases (do., p. 186).

perpetrated, there is no reason why it should not be so in the former, nor why it should not be a duty, as much in the one case as in the other, to abstain from the performance of the wrongful act. The only distinction which originally subsists between them, apart from the question of moral obligation, lies in the element of retribution—not mere revenge at the hand of a fellow-man—which one of them possesses and not the other. Let this element, then, be added, and it will come to be considered no less a duty to abstain from robbery, adultery, or murder, than to observe the absurd requirements of a debased spiritism.

Strange that these requirements should be more binding on the conscience than the obligations of a true morality! And yet at a much later period, as Mr Herbert Spencer remarks, "the sentiments of right and duty, so far as they have become developed, refer mainly to divine commands and interdicts, and have little reference to the natures of the acts commanded or interdicted. In the intended offering-up of Isaac, in the sacrifice of Jephthah's daughter, and in the hewing to pieces of Agag, as much as in the countless atrocities committed from religious motives by other early historic races, we see that the morality and immorality of actions, as we understand them, are at first little recognised; and that the feelings, chiefly of dread, which serve in place of them, are feelings felt towards the unseen beings supposed to issue the commands and interdicts."[1] This criticism is perfectly just, but it should be observed that those actions were performed because they were thought to be right, and not because they were useful; and even in them, therefore, may be traced the influence of that principle which we have hitherto seen to be at the basis of all morality. The same superstitious notions, com-

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 429.

bining in their action with that of man's intellectual faculties, have resulted in still further developments of the primitive sense of right; and we have now to show how this has given rise to the moral intuitions of civilized peoples, which exhibit their activity in conscience.

It requires but slight consideration to perceive that the *external* sanctions of morality can gain little strength or authority beyond what they from the first possess in the mind of the savage. The dread of the inhabitants of the spirit-world is developed to an extraordinary extent among most uncivilized peoples, and, as we have seen, the moral sense is first aroused in response to that dread. It may be thought, perhaps, that as this feeling has relation only to the present life, it must be less powerful than that which is aroused by contemplation of the punishment for wrong-doing awaiting man after death. This is not so, however; for owing to the indefinite idea which the uncultured mind can form of life after death, dread of present evil necessarily affects the mind much more than that which is to be endured only in a future state. Moreover, all peoples who have any sort of religion, as distinguished from the purest superstition, think that certain actions are punished after death in some way or another. It is true that these actions have reference chiefly to the duties which man owes to the gods; but until the idea of obligation is attached to the other actions under consideration, those which have come to be recognized as essential to the healthy condition of the social organism, any sanction derived from a future state of punishment would be powerless to enforce their performance.

Although, however, we cannot look for the further development of the moral sense to the strengthening of external sanctions, the same result may be attained by those sanctions becoming widened in their application,

through the enlightenment of that from which they take their rise. The god or demon of the uncultured man is supposed to view with jealousy any infringement of his rights, and to punish in this world or the next those who thus offend him.[1] This notion gives rise in the mind of his votary to the idea of duty, as attaching, nevertheless, only to the actions which he supposes to be agreeable to his deity. It is evident, however, that if by any means the spirit comes to be thought to look with disfavour on actions which interfere with the rights of other *men*, or to be pleased with actions beneficial to them, the idea of duty may in course of time attach to the performance or non-performance of such actions. But how can such a moral change as that supposed take place, or, assuming that the gods of the heathen have an actual existence as denizens of the spirit-world, how could the knowledge of that change be communicated to their worshippers? There is but one way by which the change contemplated could be effected. Mr Herbert Spencer, referring to the moral influence brought to bear on the mind of the young savage, derived from the remembrance of a dead, but once powerful chief, remarks that "the imagined anger and the imagined satisfaction of this deified chief are simply transfigured forms of the anger and satisfaction displayed by those around."[2] The idea embodied in this statement has a still wider application. Every act which the savage supposes to be disliked by the spirit he fears, is one which has in some way become equally distasteful to his own mind. Thus it is with the primitive notion that

[1] The law of *Tabu* is founded on this notion. See Ellis' "Polynesian Researches," vol. i., p. 395. On the other hand, resentment towards a deity is shown by putting off or shortening the periodical tabu owing to him. See Vancouver's "Voyage of Discovery" (1798), vol. iii., p. 13 *seq.*

[2] *loc. cit.*, p. 428.

burial is essential to the welfare of the dead; which probably arose from the feeling of the living savage that, when he entered on the new phase of existence we call death, he would like to be thus treated. Doubtless many of the superstitious customs which have so marvellous an influence over the savage mind, have been introduced, gradually perhaps, by designing men who saw in them advantage to themselves. But they must have chimed in with the feelings of those who became subject to their influence, and they unquestionably originated in some idea already formed in the minds, not merely of the sorcery doctor or the chief, but of the general body of the tribe. It may indeed be said with truth that the gods of uncivilized men, or at least the moral qualities which they are supposed to possess, are a reflex from the minds of their worshippers. A people, for instance, who see no immorality in stealing, may have a god of theft; and it may safely be judged, therefore, that the existence of such a deity in the Pantheon of any nation is proof that originally, at all events, honesty was not one of their characteristics. When, however, it comes to be recognised that it is not right to appropriate the property of others, the moral character of the deity himself will be raised, and from being the guardian of thieves he may become the patron of merchants, and the god of commerce instead of cheating.[1]

But the sense of wrong formed in the mind of man, and thus transferred to the deity, is not attended by any idea of duty in relation to the actions condemned. In

[1] The Chinese "God of thieves," *Ngu Hieng*, is now worshipped by traders (Doolittle, *op. cit.*, p. 215.) The Greek Hermes and the Roman Mercury appear to have been of the same character. The Polynesian god Hiro was said to be the patron of thieves, and he would doubtless have undergone a similar transformation if the Polynesians had become civilized without being converted to Christianity.

fact, in accordance with the opinion that the genesis of the moral sense is connected with the dread of spirit retribution, such an antecedent recognition of moral obligation could not take place. The notion of duty arises from the action of that dread on the sense of wrong, and it is the latter and not the notion of duty which is transferred by the human mind to that of the deity. The idea of moral obligation is, indeed, incapable of being thus transferred, since it is entirely absent from the human conception of a deity. However wrong it may be thought that a god should do what his worshippers consider not to be right, it is never conceived to be his *duty* to do right, morally speaking. If the god does not bestow on his worshippers what they think they deserve, they may abandon his worship, but they do so only because he has not granted them their desire, which may itself be wrong.

The question here arises, how is the idea of immorality, in relation to actions which have been sanctioned, or at least not condemned, by gods and men for all past generations, to be originated in the human mind? The sense of "wrong" which gave birth in the mind of primitive man to that of "right" in relation to property, was instinctively generated by interference with such property. The conditions in the case now supposed, are, however, quite different. The tendency resulting from organized experiences, and the influences of education, may be said in some sense to take the place of the primitive instinct, but the idea of wrong which is required to be generated is on the other side. The source of this idea has already been indicated,[1] and it is clear that some other agent than that which originated the sense of wrong in relation to self, must be called into operation to account for the further development. To understand

[1] *Supra*, p. 297 *seq.*

the process by which this change has been brought about, it will be necessary to refer more particularly to the distinction between internal or tribal and external or non-tribal morality. To a European the notion that actions depend for their moral character on the relation in which the persons affected by them stand to the agent is absurd, that is, it would be thought absurd to distinguish between the murder of a neighbour and that of a stranger, and while stigmatizing the former act as a crime, excuse the latter. Of course circumstances may make homicide justifiable, as where it is necessary for the protection of one's own life, in which case the natural law of self-preservation authorises a man to do what under other circumstances would be unlawful. He, in fact, reverts to the condition in which mankind was primitively placed when the *lex talionis* was in full force; except that his action is limited to defence and not allowed to proceed to offence, unless where it is necessary to prevent property already seized being fully appropriated. This exceptional action in civilized societies is valuable as illustrating the general conduct among primitive peoples. To them all persons outside of the tribe stand in the same relation to its members as the burglar does to the householder whose goods he seeks feloniously to appropriate. Every tribe, except where special alliances have been formed, is looked upon by its neighbours as a band of robbers ready, when a favourable opportunity occurs, to seize their property, and accordingly each tribe considers itself justified in so acting towards its neighbour. The stealing of cattle or other property, often combined with homicide, and the interference with women, are in fact the source of most of the wars among primitive peoples. A person who considers, if he has any thought about it at all, that he is justified in killing or robbing

the member of a neighbouring tribe, may not think it right to treat his immediate neighbour in the same way, but he cannot have any very clear notion of moral obligation. The probability is that if he could act with impunity he would make no distinction between neighbour and enemy. If, however, a man does thus distinguish, he has made a certain advance in moral development. This may, indeed, be rather negative than positive—a recognition of its being not right to injure his neighbour without any perception of its being wrong so to do. Moreover, the advance in such a case is due to political causes rather than to any moral agency. Originally, each family of which the tribe was composed, exercised without restraint the natural right conferred by the *lex talionis.* The exercise of this right necessarily leads to inter-tribal feuds which, if perpetuated, must have the most disastrous effect on the power of the tribe as an organisation for defence and offence against its neighbours. A remarkable instance of the deplorable consequences of allowing family feuds to become hereditary, was exhibited by the Mainotes of Greece, even down to the beginning of the present century.[1] Various means have accordingly been resorted to by primitive peoples to prevent feuds from becoming hereditary. Even the aborigines of Australia have recognised the evils of blood-revenge, and have sought to limit them by establishing a system of duelling, for the purpose of letting blood as an atonement for death.[2] The Garos, a head-taking tribe of Asam, have a more barbarous mode of terminating such disputes. When the customary revenge has been taken by an act of cannibalism, the tree of bitterness is cut down and the feud is at an end.[3]

[1] Lord Carnarvon's "Reminiscences of Athens and the Morea," p. 136 *seq.* [2] See *Supra*, p. 315. [3] *Supra*, p. 134.

The prosperity of the tribe requires, however, that the right to *enforce* the lex talionis shall be taken out of the hands of the clan or individual and be vested in the tribal authority. Probably the first step towards this end would be the sanction given by the people generally to the exercise of the lex talionis by the individual injured. Such a social phase was exhibited among the Society Islanders before their conversion to Christianity. Thus, with them *haru raa*, or seizing all the property of delinquents, was the most frequent retaliation among the lower class, for theft and other crimes. "This retaliation," says Ellis, "was so generally recognized as just, that, although the party thus plundered might be more powerful than those who plundered them, they would not attempt to prevent the seizure: had they done so, the population of the district would have assisted those, who, according to established custom, were thus punishing the aggressors."[1] A still further advance would be where the injured persons are allowed themselves to act as the executioners of justice, after the chief or other tribal authority has decided the guilt of the accused. We have an example of this practice presented by the Abyssinian custom, according to which "a murderer when convicted is given up to the relations of his victim, of whom the nearest of kin puts him to death with the same kind of weapon as that with which he had slain their relative."[2] Down to the present century a similar custom was observed even among the Persians, as will be noticed hereafter.

A more decided advance in the establishment of tribal authority in this direction is where not only the offence is adjudicated on by the tribunal having cognizance of criminal offences, but the sentence is carried out

[1] "Polynesian Researches," iii., p. 126.
[2] Parkyn's "Life in Abyssinia," p. 344.

by its officers. Such would seem to be the case among the Boomeas, or "people of the soil," of India, who are entitled to a higher place in the scale of civilized peoples than is usually accorded to them.[1] Even the Kandhs of Orissa have a developed village system of government. Each village is presided over by an elder or Abbaye, and a number of adjacent villages by a district Abbaye. Above these is a federal Abbaye, the representative, says Colonel Dalton, of a superior chief, formerly selected to superintend the affairs of as extensive a tract of country as could be conveniently placed under him. The Kandhs are devotedly attached to their federal Abbaye, who has the power of convening, when he thinks fit, a council of the heads of the people. At this council, "disputes regarding property and offences of all kinds are inquired into, and witnesses are examined on oath." Compensations are adjudged for homicide and severe wounding, and all, or a portion of the property of the offender made over to the injured person or the family of the deceased.[2] Colonel Dalton states that the social organization and government of the Máliah Kandhs very closely resemble the ancient polity of the Múndas. According to this polity, the country was divided into groups of twelve or more villages, called Parhás, each under a head man called the Múnda, or, as among the Kolhán of Singhbúm, a Mánki, and all questions affecting the social relations of the people are determined in the Tarhá assembly.[3] The Kafirs of South Africa have made about an equivalent advance, although their system of government is different. The administration of justice is committed to the chiefs, but, says Casalis, the idea of wrong to the individual is that

[1] M. De Charencey affirms, indeed, that they were more civilised than their Aryan conquerors. "Revue de Philologie" (1875), p. 171.
[2] "Ethnology of Bengal," p. 294; *suprà*, p. 119.
[3] "Ethnology of Bengal," p. 168.

which governs their action in relation to crime, the punishment for which depends on the social position of the offender and the kind of satisfaction which the aggrieved party desires.[1]

When offences come to be taken cognizance of by the tribal authority, the weakening influence of clanship arising from its perpetuation of blood feuds within the tribe, is almost entirely got rid of. So long, however, as crimes continue to be treated merely as offences committed against the individual,[2] there will not be any moral impropriety attached to them. How then is this important element to be introduced? Doubtless it would be aided by various superstitious practices which possess great influence over the minds of primitive peoples. Ellis asserts that among the Polynesians "no event of importance was determined, nor any enterprise of hazard or consequence undertaken, without, in the first instance, inquiring of the gods its result." In all matters of great or national importance, the gods were consulted by the dedicated hog, from the appearances presented by which, on being sacrificed, the diviners declared whether the omens were good or bad.[3] Divination was practised in various modes and for different purposes, especially for the discovery of the perpetrators of theft and other crimes.[4] Under some form or other, it appears to be used by all primitive peoples, and its virtue evidently depends on the agency of the denizens of the spirit world.[5] The belief in the reality of the agency of demons in the affairs of men

[1] "Les Bassoutos," p. 237.

[2] Even in China crimes are not taken cognizance of unless a complaint is made to the magistrate. As to the similar Mongol practice, see above, p. 271.

[3] "Polynesian Researches," i., p. 371. [4] Do. i., p. 378.

[5] For a curious account of divination as practised among the Kafirs, see Canon Calloway's "Religious System of the Amazulu," part 3.

under certain conditions is probably universal, and in nothing is it more readily recognised than in sorcery. The aborigines of Australia ascribe death to the arts of the sorcerer by which he influences the Ingnas, or spirits of the dead.[1] The Polynesians were subject to a perfect "demon tyranny." Sorcery and witchcraft were extensively practised, and by them certain malignant beings or *oramatuas* were supposed to be induced to enter into the bodies of the victims. Incantations, which commenced with a curse, denounced in the name of the gods of the offended person, or the king, or of some oramatua, were much dreaded, and they were generally considered fatal unless their effects could be counteracted by the agency of a more powerful demon. Hence, when a person was affected by incantations, he sought the services of another sorcerer who had first to discover the author of the incantations under which he was suffering, and then "to engage the aid of his demons, that the agony and death they had endeavoured to inflict upon the subject of their malignant efforts might revert to themselves; and if the demon employed by the second party was equally powerful with that employed by the first, and their presents more valuable, it was generally supposed that they were successful.[2]" The aborigines of India have much the same belief as to the connection between sickness and sorcery as the Polynesians. With the former, says Colonel Dalton, "all disease in men or animals is attributed to one of two causes—the wrath of some evil spirit who has to be appeased, or to the spell of some witch or sorcerer, who should be destroyed or driven out of the land. In the latter case, a 'Sokha,' or witch-finder, is employed to divine who has cast the spell, and various modes of divination are resorted to." When the sorcerer has been

[1] *Suprà*, p. 311. [2] "Polynesian Researches," i., p. 363, *seq.*

denounced, he is brought before the sufferer and ordered to remove the evil spirit. If he professes to do this, and the sick person shows signs of recovery, he is allowed to depart; "but if there is no amelioration in the condition of the sick person, the chastisement of the sorcerer is continued till he can bear no more, and not unfrequently he dies under the ill-treatment he is subjected to, or from its effects."[1]

All African peoples have the utmost dread of sorcery,[2] and thousands of persons fall victims every year to the belief in its use. Du Chaillu says that the African has the most terrible and debasing fear of death, and that he firmly believes it to be always due to an enemy. Where there is no apparent violence, he ascribes death to witchcraft, the belief in which is the greatest curse of the whole country. When once the African thinks that he is bewitched, his whole nature seems to change, and he becomes suspicious of his dearest friends.[3] It does not appear that the African associates with sorcery the idea of the agency of spirits, but he seeks their aid in discovering the wizard. The West African has invented ordeals for this purpose, the most important of which is the *mboundou* poison. Great numbers of persons fall victims through drinking this poison to prove their innocency of sorcery,[4] under the cloak of which, says Du Chaillu, more lives have been sacrificed than have been taken away by any slave trade.[5] The Madecasses, in their horror of witchcraft, also introduced a poison-ordeal, the noted *tangèna,* which, until abolished, had been used from time immemorial. M. Sibree says that "such was the national feeling of its infallibility as a test

[1] "Ethnology of Bengal," p. 199.
[2] This appears to be especially true of the Kafirs. See Casalis, "Les Bassoutos," p. 289.
[3] "Equatorial Africa," p. 338. [4] Do., p. 339.
[5] "A Journey to Ashango Land," p. 435.

of guilt, that innocent people would not only submit to it, but even demand that it should be given them in cases where the slightest suspicion could be attached to them. It was believed that the spirit or genus of the tangèna was a kind of 'searcher of hearts,' and that he would enter with the poison into the stomach of the accused, punishing the evil-doer, while the innocent could escape." It is calculated that the tangèna ordeal caused the death of three thousand persons every year.[1]

Ordeals, which are used by all peoples who have attained to a similar degree of culture to that reached by the African negroes, are of the nature of an oath. The Australians do not appear to have either ordeals or oaths, except so far as the initiatory ceremonies of manhood[2] can be said to include them. Those ceremonies undoubtedly have a superstitious significance, and the importance attached to the observance of the *kobong* would seem to show that it is placed under a supernatural sanction. As we shall see, the American aborigines have analogous customs, which are unquestionably connected with a belief in the agency of spirits in human affairs. Judging from the fact that no provision for the taking of oaths was made, on the framing of the code of laws introduced at Tahiti after the establishment of Christianity,[3] we may suppose that oaths were unknown to the islanders of the South Seas. But the Polynesians, as well as the Australian and American aborigines, had some form or other of the curious custom of brotherhood, which, as will be shown in a

[1] "Madagascar and its People," p. 383.

[2] As to these, see *infrà*, ch. vii., and authorities referred to; also, Wood's "Natural History of Man," ii., p. 75 *seq.*

[3] Ellis' "Polynesian Researches," iii., p. 196. No oath of allegiance seems to have been taken on the inauguration of a monarch to the regal office. Ellis speaks of the *tribute* of allegiance, iii., pp. 113, 114. Yet the rulers were looked upon as almost divine. See p. 101 *seq.*

future chapter, had the binding nature of an oath. Probably the simplest form of the oath is that which it still retains among the Hill tribes of India. Colonel Dalton says that when the Ho swears, the oath has no reference to a future state. He prays that "he may suffer the loss of all his worldly wealth, his health, his wife, his children, that he may sow without reaping, or reap without gathering, and finally, that he may be devoured by a tiger."[1] The oath, nevertheless, has a superstitious sanction. This is evident from the form it takes among the Kandhs, another of the Indian hill tribes. Among this people "the litigants are forced to put into their mouths rice moistened with the blood of a sheep, which has been sacrificed to the earth goddess, and this it is supposed will inevitably cause the death of the person so sworn who swerves from the truth. If the dispute is about land, a morsel of the soil similarly placed has the same effect." The Kandhs are also sworn "on the skin of a tiger, like the Kols; on the skin of a lizard (invoking scaliness of skin on the false witness; on the earth of an anthill; and on a peacock's feather."[2] Among the Madecasses the oath of allegiance, which contained allusions to all that was considered sacred, appears to have been the only one used, but in criminal cases the accused was sometimes compelled to submit to the tangèna ordeal.[3]

Both oaths and ordeals must be looked upon as an invocation to some supernatural being to attest the innocence of the persons taking or submitting to them. There would originally be no thought as to whether the being invoked approved or disapproved of the conduct

[1] "Ethnology of Bengal," p. 204.

[2] Do., p. 294; the uncultured Juangs swear on earth from an ant-hill (p. 158). Colonel Dalton does not explain the meaning of this oath, or that of the peacock's feather.

[3] Sibree's "Madagascar and its People," pp. 302, 323.

in question. The oath as well as the ordeal would, however, be employed only in relation to the most criminal actions, and their use would have a tendency to clothe such actions with an immoral character. Crimes which the gods are called to witness have not been committed, must in course of time come to be looked upon, if not morally, yet socially wrong. Moreover, the spirits invoked, instead of being merely thought to punish perjury, would come to be considered as condemning the conduct to which the oath has relation. There would then remain the further step of recognising the duty of abstaining from the actions which are now thought to be disapproved by the gods. There would, however, be no difficulty in making this further advance. The necessity, or at least advisability, of satisfying the rights of the denizens of the spirit-world, is one of the earliest opinions formed in the savage mind, and the compliance with what are supposed to be their requirements soon acquires all the force of obligation. But if it is a duty to perform what the gods desire, it can be no less a duty to abstain from what they disapprove of. Action contrary to what they approve must be equally wrong in either case, and equally worthy of punishment. When this point has been reached, morality has obtained a supernatural sanction, and it is prepared to undergo those developments which mark the various phases of man's progressive culture. Some of the aborigines of India and Assam appear to have made a near approach to the point where morality is placed under the sanction of the gods. For example, the Pádam Abors look upon crimes as public pollutions, which require to be washed away by a public sacrifice, although the culprit is ultimately made to pay the cost.[1]

[1] *Supra*, p. 136. This is in the nature of a fine which, as soon as the tribal authority has become firmly established, is usually substituted for the logical penalties of the *lex talionis*.

How far there is here any notion of moral pollution may, perhaps, be questioned, as the same kind of thing occurs among the Garos of Asam, under circumstances where there could be no question of morality. It is customary for the girls to propose marriage, and if a young man were to take the initiative, it would be looked upon as an insult, and "a stain only to be obliterated by the blood of pigs, and liberal libations of beer at the expense of the *mahari* to which the man belongs."[1] It is, however, uncertain whether "blood of pigs" is here used in the sense of *sacrifice*, and the Pádam Abors have by some means reached a moral standard superior to their neighbours; as shown by the fact that when, on sickness or death, a mithun or a pig is offered to the gods, no one is allowed to partake of its flesh but the old and infirm, who live in the morang at the public expense.[2] Of the peoples described in the preceding pages, the Tibetans and other tribes who have been brought under the influence of Buddhism, must be supposed to recognise the duty of living a life of morality. The races, however, who the best illustrate this phase of moral development at its earliest stage are the Mexicans and Peruvians of the era preceding the Spanish conquest. The former, as we shall see hereafter, were a simple-minded people, who were taught by the priests certain moral duties that were placed under the sanction of a religion which had an almost unparalleled influence over its followers. The Peruvians were equally tractable, and they were no less under the influence of religious feeling. The moral law, however, received its sanction from the kingly authority rather than from that of religion, its requirements being observed because it was the law of the Inca, and not because it was agreeable to the gods. The difference, nevertheless, is more

[1] "Ethnology of Bengal," p. 64. [2] Do., p. 25.

apparent than real. The Peruvian rulers, as descendants of the Sun God, were looked upon as divine, and their commands, therefore, had the double sanction of human and supernatural authority.

It is evident that the gradual development of the moral idea as above traced must be largely due to the exercise of the faculty of reflection.[1] The chief who was wishful for the sake either of himself or his people to make his tribe strong and prosperous, would seek for means to substitute the action of the tribal authority for that of the individual or family, at first in the awarding and then in the infliction of punishments. For the discovery of the truth and the sustaining of the tribal authority, ordeals and oaths would be introduced, either by the priests alone in pursuance of their sacred office as revealers of the will of the gods or demons, or by the chief in conjunction with the priests, who are often little more than instruments in the hands of the chief for supporting his authority. At this point reflection would be aroused in the minds of the people, resulting in a feeling that actions which called into requisition so solemn a procedure as the taking of an oath or undergoing an ordeal could not be right, and finally that they must be disapproved of by the supernatural beings who were invoked to witness to the innocence of the accused. The progress here supposed would no doubt be very gradual. It would probably be many ages before each decided step in advance would be made, and it may have been only under special conditions that it was possible. A late writer, when speaking of the influence among primitive peoples of *custom,* and its long continuance, says: "The first history delineates great monarchies, each composed

[1] For the present writer's view as to the true nature of this faculty considered in relation to man's culture, and its operation in the formation of conscience, see "Chapters on Man," pp. 24, *seq.*, 44, *seq.*

of a hundred customary groups, all of which believe themselves to be of enormous antiquity, and all of which must have existed for very many generations. The first historical world is not new-looking but a very ancient, and according to principle it is necessary that it should exist for ages. If human nature was to be gradually improved, each generation must be born better tamed, more calm, more capable of civilisation—in a word, more *legal* than the one before it, and such inherited improvements are always slow and dubious. Though a few gifted people may advance much, the mass of each generation can improve but very little on the generation which preceded it; and even the slight improvement so gained is liable to be destroyed by some mysterious atavism—some strange recurrence to a primitive past. Long ages of dreary monotony are the first facts in the history of human communities, but those ages are not lost to mankind, for it was then that was formed the comparatively gentle and guidable thing which we now call human nature."[1] The benefit of custom as a moral influence may, however, be easily exaggerated. No doubt as a people become habituated to control, they are more easily governed. But this is usually only within the limits of the custom itself, and it may have perpetuated, and by its long continuance rendered almost unchangeable, practices which are grossly immoral. Probably *Deb* or custom was never more powerful than with the Bedouins and the predatory tribes of Central Asia, people who live by plundering their neighbours. Custom perpetuates and strengthens habits of any kind, be they good or bad, and before it can be of service as a moral agent, a tendency to good must have become established. It would seem, indeed, as though "the gentle and guidable" nature which Mr Bagehot supposes that custom would form must be sup-

[1] "Physics and Politics," by Walter Bagehot, (1872), p. 218.

plied at the beginning, if this is to have any ameliorating influence. With such a nature much might be done towards developing the sense of moral propriety. Something more than a guidable nature, would, however, be required. A solution ready to crystallise may require the introduction of a foreign body before the crystallising force can exert its energy; and so a people may be prepared to undergo a moral transformation when some one appears to give the tendency shape and direction. The traditions of all the civilised peoples of the Western side of the American continent pointed to the advent of such a leader, whose teaching must have had much the same effect as that of Gautama Buddha on the simple-minded aborigines of India. By reflecting on the ills of humanity, the great Hindu teacher acquired the resolve to find a remedy for them, and this remedy was elevation to a higher moral plane, and the recognition of the duty of "living well." To such a one as Gautama must have been due the most important of all advances in human culture, the definite conception and expression of the idea of duty in relation to moral conduct.

CHAPTER VI.

GENESIS OF THE MORAL IDEA (*continued*).

THE moral change which has been sketched in the preceding chapter need not necessarily have been a violent one at any stage, nor, notwithstanding its importance, would it, when completed, be in reality so great as might be supposed. This is evident from the consideration that the simplest phase of social morality requires only an abstinence from evil-doing and no exercise of active virtue. It is noteworthy that the only active social duty which is taught by the Hebrew Decalogue, is the honouring of one's parents, all the rest being the passive or negative ones of abstaining from injuring others. It is to the latter, and not to the active virtues, that the teaching of the moral reformer would first extend; the honouring of father and mother having no doubt long before that period been spontaneously developed, in response, not so much to parental kindliness, as to the exercise of the authority which the father, more especially, possesses as head and ruler of the family. The practical aim, therefore, of his teaching would be to enforce respect for the rights of *property*, using this term in its widest sense. The 'burden of his complaint' would, in fact, be "Thou shalt not murder"—take the life of another; "Thou shalt not steal"—appropriate his goods; "Thou shalt not commit adultery"—rob him of his wife or concubine. The woman being viewed by uncivilised peoples as a slave, or as a chattel which may be dealt with at the discretion of its owner—her husband; to commit

adultery is as much to appropriate or injure the property of the husband as though his goods were stolen, or his life, the most valuable of all his possessions, were taken away.

That such a change, in relation to those particular points of morality, as that just indicated, has really taken place, is proved by the fact that, while among savages no idea of moral wrong-doing is connected with any of the acts above specified, among peoples advanced to any considerable degree of culture, they are treated as proofs of a nature more or less depraved. Of the peoples already described, those who have been brought under the influence of Christianity or Mohammedanism in Africa, and of Buddhism in Asia, might probably be placed in the latter category; although the effect produced over them by those systems has been theological rather than moral. Their moral improvement has, indeed, been extremely superficial, and either the character of the people was originally but little affected, or else its chief features reasserted themselves as religious teaching lost its vitality. To be permanent, moral improvement must take place under ordinary conditions, and free from the forcing influence exerted by contact with a greatly superior race. If attained to gradually, by a process of growth such as we have now more fully to trace, each successive advance would become a firm ground of departure for still further progress. A race requires a moral training as much as an individual, and hence we must look for a recognition of the law of duty, not among primitive peoples who represent the childhood of mankind perpetuated down to the present epoch, but among those nations which have attained to a certain degree of general culture. This view is consistent with the opinion that we are indebted to the Hebrews for the first great lessons in moral conduct, an

opinion which assumes that morality is a race character. It is probably, however, more true that to the mysterious race which, before the dawn of history, gave birth to both the Semite and the Aryan, the kindling of the divine spark of moral illumination must be traced. If this be so, it is among the descendants of the Scyths, to use a convenient term to denote the common ancestors of the latest born and the most civilized races of mankind, we may expect to meet with proofs of man's continued progress in moral culture. And yet, when we survey antiquity, it is surprising to see what little evidence there is that even the most highly civilized peoples attached any real moral guilt to such acts as robbery and adultery, or even homicide. When directed against members of the same community they may have been condemned as inconsistent with the welfare of the State, but otherwise those crimes had by no means the same moral complexion as they now possess. Some peoples having Aryan affinities had not reached even that stage until a comparatively very recent period in the world's history. Herodotus says of the Thracians: "They sell their children to traders. On the maidens they keep no watch, but leave them altogether free, while on the conduct of their wives they keep a most strict watch. Brides are purchased of their parents for large sums of money. Tattooing among them marks noble birth, and want of it low birth. To be idle is accounted the most honourable thing, and to be a tiller of the ground the most dishonourable. To live by war and plunder is of all things the most glorious." With some of them, at least, the favourite wife was sacrificed on the grave of her husband, exclusion from such a fate being considered a disgrace.[1] This example shows that however perfect may be man's *capacity* for moral culture it

[1] Rawlinson's "Herodotus," iii., p. 117.

must, even with the Aryan race, lie dormant until the conditions proper for its activity are brought into existence.

It is possible that the description given by Herodotus of the moral and social culture of the ancient Thracians may have been somewhat exaggerated, but nothing which he relates is incredible. The worst trait—the sale by parents of their children—is merely an application of the principle which was conceded among all the peoples of antiquity among whom the absolute authority of the head of the family was established. In other things the Thracians differed little morally from certain modern European peoples probably allied to them. It is difficult to imagine that they can have been more barbarous in some respects than the inhabitants of the Maina, the southern province of the Morea, down to the time of the Greek revolution. Among these modern inhabitants of Greece, says Lord Carnarvon, "the right of the strongest, tempered by the observance of certain chivalrous customs, growing out of their warlike habits, and respected for the sake of general convenience, was the only acknowledged law." Murder was almost "the organised and formulated expression of the national life," and this was revenged by the injured family, not only upon the murderer, but upon all his kinsmen. An insult or wrong offered to any member of a clan entailed a common feud—"jealousy, a quarrel upon some delicate point of honour, a supposed slight offered to a woman, the carrying off of a betrothed, were frequent and deadly causes of animosity." This was so strong, that men, going out singly or in pairs, would wait in ambush for days together to shoot any person with whom they were at enmity who might pass by. Women and girls were spared, but boys above eight years of age were mercilessly slain.[1]

[1] "Reminiscences of Athens and the Morea," p. 136, *seq.*

The practice of private blood revenge is not unknown to other peoples of Southern Europe.[1] The two principal tribes into which the Albanians are divided, the Toskes and the Guegues, live in a state of constant feud.[2] Among the Morlacchi, the Slavonian population of Dalmatia, justice and vengeance have, says the Abbé Fortis, the same meaning, and therefore the Morlach does not know how to forgive injuries. Quarrels are thus almost inextinguishable. "They pass from father to son, and the mothers do not forget to inculcate in their children, while still of tender age, the duty of revenging a father who has been slain, and often to show them, with this object, the bloody shirt or the arms of the dead."[3] Sir Gardner Wilkinson says of the inhabitants of the neighbouring district of Montenegro, that the love of revenge is their ruling passion, and that the custom of blood-feud was universal, quarrels extending from families to villages, until whole districts were sometimes involved in hostilities with their neighbours.[4] In the year 1831 the government attempted to abolish the *lex talionis*, but it had the utmost difficulty to induce the people to forego the practice of blood-revenge for murder.[5] Whether this custom has existed among the Slavonians of Southern Europe from time immemorial, or whether it has been introduced in comparatively modern times, owing to the difficulty in obtaining redress through the state for private injuries, may perhaps be doubtful. Among certain Asiatic peoples of much the same degree of culture as the Montenegrins, it has

[1] The blood-feud would seem to be still active among the people of the Two Sicilies, as among the Corsicans.

[2] Hahn's "Albanesische Studien" (1854), p. 13.

[3] Lettre de M. L'Abbé Fortis à Mylord Comte de Bute sur les mœurs et usages des Morlaques (1778).

[4] Dalmatia and Montenegro (1848), vol. i., p. 457.

[5] Krasinski's "Montenegro and the Slavonians of Turkey" (1853), p. 73.

probably always existed. Pallas says of the Circassians, or Tscherkess, that they most scrupulously adhered to the custom of blood-feud. The murder of any one was required to be avenged by the next heir, even though at the time he should be an infant, and he would have been treated as an outcast from society if he did not use every endeavour to avenge himself on the murderer, either publicly or clandestinely. All the relations of a murderer were considered equally guilty with himself, and the feuds engendered were perpetuated through succeeding generations, unless peace could be purchased, or obtained by intermarriage between the rival families. No prince or knight would, however, accept the "price of blood."[1] Elphinstone makes much the same remarks as to blood-feud among the Afghans. Although private revenge is forbidden by the government and preached against by the Mollahs, retaliation on an aggressor is considered by the people both lawful and honourable.[2] The *Eusofyzes,* who boast of their freedom, are described by Elphinstone as being in a state of continual feud among themselves. He says: "Scarce a day passes without a quarrel; if there is a dispute about water for cultivation, or the boundaries of a field, swords are drawn and wounds inflicted, which lead to years of anxiety and danger, and end in assassination. Each injury produces fresh retaliation, and hence arise ambuscades, attacks in the streets, murders of men in their houses, and all kinds of suspicion, confusion, and strife. As these feuds accumulate, there is scarce a man of any consequence who is not upon the watch for his life."[3] The *lex talionis* is usually stringently enforced among the Bedouins of Arabia, who consider it a point of

[1] "Travels through the Southern Provinces of the Russian Empire" (Eng. Ed. 1812), i., p. 390.
[2] "Account of the Kingdom of Caubul," (1815), p. 166.
[3] Do., p. 339.

honour to be revenged for the death of a relative. Only those persons, however, within the fifth generation from the common ancestor of themselves and the person slain are within the feud, and the man who slays the seducer of his wife is exempt from retaliation.[1]

If the recognised right of private revenge for injuries has been perpetuated to the present day among the peoples above mentioned, it would be surprising if such a custom had not been in operation among the primitive nations of ancient Europe. Mr Kemble points out, in fact, that the *right of feud* lies at the root of all Teutonic legislation, and that it is recognised especially by the early English law, which "admits, as its most general term, that each freeman is at liberty to defend himself, his family, and his friends; to avenge all wrongs done to them, as to himself shall seem good; to sink, burn, kill, and destroy, as amply as a royal commission now authorises the same in a professional class, the recognised executors of the national will in that behalf."[2] The strict application of the *lex talionis,* which is expressed with such exactness among the Mosaic regulations (Exodus xx.), has however been felt by most peoples who have attained to even a moderate degree of culture as a great evil, and various attempts have been made from time to time to moderate its inconveniences. Even the aborigines of Australia, among whom, as with all other savages, the right of private revenge is fully recognised, have endeavoured to mitigate the evils

[1] Burckhardt, "Notes on the Bedouins" (1830), pp. 84, 159. This traveller says that the custom referred to in the text has, more than any other, prevented the Arab tribes from exterminating each other, showing that, like modern duelling, it is not an unmitigated evil.

[2] "The Saxons in England" (1849), vol. i., p. 268. "The Story of Burnt Njal," a tale (translated by Dr Dasent) of Icelandic life towards the end of the tenth century, forms a fitting commentary on the statement in the text.

attendant on its exercise. The duty of shedding blood in case of death as a kind of atonement is enforced, but various plans have been invented by which that duty may be performed without giving rise to a blood feud.[1] This is strictly an application of the *lex talionis,* but among peoples of a more advanced culture, attempts are made to dispense altogether with the taking of blood revenge.[2] It is assumed that every injury can be valued, and on payment of the agreed fine, however this is ascertained, the injury is considered as atoned for. At first the acceptance of such an atonement is wholly at the discretion of the party injured or his relatives, in cases of homicide. Thus, among the Afghans, notwithstanding the persistence of blood feuds, an offender, even if he have committed homicide, may, by supplicating pardon of the person injured, through the intercession of some powerful man of the tribe, obtain forgiveness after passing through a certain ceremony, and making the agreed compensation.[3] The authorities intervene, if at all, only by way of mediation. In Beluchistan, the friends of a murdered man may insist on the criminal being put to death, and in this case he is delivered to them to do with him as they please.[4] Usually, however, they accept a heavy fine, or they keep the offender as a slave at hard labour. An exception is made where the person slain is a foreigner, in which case every one concerned in his death is immediately executed,[5] probably

[1] *Supra*, p. 315, and see authorities referred to.

[2] The acceptance by the Zulus of compensation in cases of homicide (*Supra*, p. 293) arises in some measure from their slight regard for human life, and their greediness for cattle.

[3] Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

[4] This was the custom in Persia down to the present century, when the offender was allowed to compound for his life by the payment of a sum of money to the family of the deceased. Porter's "Travels in Georgia, Persia, &c." (1821), vol. ii., p. 75.

[5] Pottinger's "Travels in Beloochistan and Sinde" (1816), p. 292.

because there is no one to accept compensation. Among the Bedouins, homicide may usually be atoned for by a pecuniary fine paid to the relatives of the deceased, and even occasionally the offence is pardoned without any satisfaction, if the culprit throws himself on their magnanimity.[1] The Slavonians of Southern Europe also sometimes accept fines, by way of compensation, for homicide, and among the Morlacchi the amount of the fine is determined by a court of arbitration. The offender has publicly to beg pardon with certain ceremonies, somewhat resembling those practised among the Afghans under the like circumstances, and which are thus described by Krasinski :—" The judges and spectators form a large circle, in the midst of which the culprit, having suspended from his neck a gun or a poniard, must creep on his knees to the feet of the offended party, who taking the weapon from his neck, raises him, and embraces him, saying, 'God pardon you!' The spectators congratulate, with joyous acclamation, the reconciled enemies, who not only forgive their mutual injuries, but often become sincere friends. This ceremony, which is called 'the circle of blood,' is concluded by a feast, given at the expense of the guilty party, of which all the spectators partake." [2]

The mode of ascertaining the compensation payable in cases of homicide among the Morlacchi, would appear to have been that adopted among the ancient peoples of Europe. The Roman Legis Actio Sacramenti presupposed a quarrel and its reference to an arbitrator, and the old Irish law of Distress, which occupied a large space in the Senchus Mor, had a similar origin. Sir Henry

[1] Mayeux, " Les Bédouins " (1816), tom. ii., p. 100. According to Burckhardt, where a small fine is accepted, the offender must acknowledge himself and his family to be *khasnai* to the other person, *i.e.*, in a state of obligation, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

[2] *op. cit.*, p. 13.

Maine, in referring to those facts, after observing that the progress towards a complete administration of justice is usually slow and gradual, well remarks that "the Commonwealth at first interfered through its various organs rather to keep order and see fair play in quarrels, than took them, as it now does always and everywhere, into its own hands."[1] The manners of the old Norsemen, as displayed in the Icelandic Sagas, throw great light on the steps by which the right of private revenge was gradually lost. The law of retaliation was fully recognised, but it had become customary, in cases of homicide even, to accept a compensation in goods or money. Sometimes one of the parties to the quarrel claimed himself to award the compensation to be made, and it was esteemed a great honour to be allowed thus to act. At other times, the terms were fixed by an arbitrator, whose decision was formally accepted by both parties. If the wrongdoer refused to make compensation, and the injured party decided not to exercise his right of private revenge, the matter might be dealt with at law before the Thing. Should the judgment of the court be in favour of the complainant, and his opponent not pay the fine and fees to which he had thus become liable, judgment might be followed by outlawry. A suit for homicide was seldom, however, in early times, carried to that length, as, says Dr Dasent, "the tendency of the whole Icelandic legislation was not to put forth the full force of the law, but rather to make matters up." For this end the more enlightened chiefs were always ready to terminate, by peaceful means, a suit which might possibly end in bloodshed, if even the proceedings were not forcibly put a stop to. In fact, all the suits mentioned in the Njal's Saga were settled "by the award of daysmen and arbitrators, who laid down such

[1] "Early History of Institutions" (1875), p. 279, *seq*.

terms they thought would meet the justice of each particular case."[1]

Down to a time but little preceding the introduction of Christianity in Iceland, the system of trial was extremely defective, and the award of the court could not be enforced without much difficulty. Probably the defects were due chiefly to the fact that the system was established among men who, having abandoned their native country as a protest against authority, were not yet prepared to abdicate their natural rights into the hands of the state, although they might in the abstract recognise the value of such a course. The Icelandic Law Court would doubtless, therefore, be an institution peculiar to that country. The Thing, however, was perhaps common to all the Scandinavians, and in the first instance it would seem to have represented the authority of the chief. Whether a ruler or only a leader, the head man would usually be looked to for the settlement of disputes among his followers, either as judge, by virtue of his office, or as arbitrator. Among the Abyssinians, if two persons have a dispute, one of them proposes to refer it to the chief, or *dainya*, a mode of settlement which the other usually accepts, and after hearing the statements of the parties and their witnesses, the chief decides the question.[2] In cases of homicide or bodily injury, however, the offender is brought before the chief, as the judge who is to take cognizance of the offence, and where fines, or *dainyet*, are inflicted, half of the sum paid is received by the chief.[3] Probably something analogous to this obtained among the Germanic tribes in the time of Cæsar. According to Tacitus, offences deemed heinous, which included homicide, adultery, and theft, were compensated for by fines of

[1] "The Story of Burnt Njal," Dr Dasent's Introduction, p. 140, *seq.*
[2] Parkyn's "Life in Abyssinia," p. 329, *seq.* [3] Do., p. 362.

horses and cattle, part of which went to the State, and part to the persons injured. It was the State to which was committed, says Kemble, "the duty of compelling the injured person to receive, and the wrongdoer to pay, the settled amount," although the right of feud continued in full force where the State either could not or would not perform that duty.[1] The early English had not only progressed so far in the mode of enforcing the fines inflicted for injuries, but they had established a fixed scale by which all fines were to be ascertained. This was the law of *wergyld* which, in some sort, forms a key to Saxon institutions. Mr Kemble, who has so profoundly studied those institutions, compares the wergyld fixed by the laws of the different Saxon kingdoms, and describes its origin and operation. He says:—"A sum, paid either in kind or in money, where money existed, was placed upon the life of every free man, according to his rank in the State, his birth, or his office. A corresponding sum was settled for every wound that could be inflicted upon his person; for nearly every injury that could be done to his civil rights, his honour, or his domestic peace; and further fines were appointed according to the peculiar adventitious circumstances that might appear to aggravate or extenuate the offence. From the operation of this principle no one was exempt, and the king as well as the peasant was protected by a wergyld, payable to his kinsmen and his people. The difference of the wergyld is the principal distinction between different classes; it defined the value of each man's oath, his mund[2] or protection, and the amount of his fines or his exactions."[3]

[1] *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 269, *seq.*

[2] This reminds us of the *munda* or head man of the Indian aborigines, *supra*, p. 139.

[3] "The Saxons in England," vol. i., p. 276. Mr Kemble elsewhere (p. 153) says that the main distinction between even the king and the rest of the people, consisted in the difference of their wergyld.

The Irish *eric* answered to the Saxon *bōt*, and was the fine which criminals were condemned to pay, and which varied in amount according to the nature of the offence. In cases of homicide, the wife or children of the deceased received the greater part of the fine, showing that the remainder went either to the tribe or the judge, and if the murderer fled or could not pay the Eric, it had to be paid by the "tribe" to which he belonged.[1] It is one of the principles of the barbarous *lex talionis*, that every person within a certain degree of relationship to the original offender is within the feud. Moreover, among primitive peoples all blood relations belong to a common clan, quite apart from the tribe as members of which they may happen to be numbered. The clan being only an extension of the family, consisting indeed of several families who trace their descent from a common ancestor, it is not to be wondered at that when a fine, enforcable by the State, is substituted for private revenge as a punishment for homicide or other offences, the clan assumes the liabilities which the "family" of the offender had previously incurred. The institutions of the early Irish, as exhibited in the Brehon Laws retained evident traces of that early condition of society. It is true that Sir Henry Maine supposes the Irish "family," in its political sense, to have been constituted in a manner quite different, from what we can conceive as growing out of blood-relationship. It was distributed into four divisions, having altogether seventeen members, the junior of which, the Geilfine division, consisted of five persons, and the others of four each. On the birth of a new member in the Geilfine class, its eldest member was

[1] O'Reilly's Prize Essay "On the Nature and Influence of the ancient Irish Institutes, commonly called Brehon Laws, &c." Trans. of the Roy. Irish Academy, vol. xiv. (1825), p. 188.

transferred to the next grade, and so on, the oldest member of the highest class ceasing to belong to the organisation. Sir Henry Maine explains this peculiar system by reference to the Roman Patria Potestas, and he suggests that it was founded on the order of emancipation from paternal authority. The Geilfine, the hand-family, "consists of the parent and the four natural or adoptive sons immediately under his power. The other groups consist of emancipated descendants, diminishing in dignity in proportion to their distance from the group which, according to archaic notions, constitutes the true or representative family."[1] The persons who were from time cast off from this organisation did not, however, lose all relationship with its members. Sir Henry Maine points out that the same word "Fine" or Family, is applied to all the subdivisions of Irish society, and he supposes that the "Fine" is not the tribe, nor yet the modern family, but the Sept, "a body of kinsmen whose progenitor is no longer living, but whose descent from him is a reality, and neither a myth nor a fiction." This Tribe or Sept is a "corporate, organic, self-sustaining unit," whose continuity depends on the land which it occupies, and which possesses chattels distinct from those of its individual members. Apart from this possession of common property, it is evident that the Irish Sept has much in common with the clan of still uncultured peoples, and betokens a primitive condition of society in which blood-relationship is the most important element in social organisation. The responsibility of the Sept for the conduct of its members has its

[1] "The Early History of Institutions," p. 208, *seq.* Have we not in the system referred to in the text, something analogous to the "Grades of Relatives" of the Chinese, and the Primitive Classificatory System of Relationships which its discoverer, Mr Morgan, has elaborated in his very valuable work, "Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity of the Human Family"?

counterpart in the duties of the *mægscraft* or kinship among the English Saxons. In their legislation as to wergyld, the liability of a man's relatives to make compensation for his wrongful act is fully recognized.[1] Mr Kemble states that the duties of the mægscraft are developed with considerable detail, so late even as the laws of King Alfred. He adds that "the most general regulation is that which acknowledges the right of a man to have the aid of his kindred in all those excepted cases where the custom and the law still permitted the waging of fæhthe or private war."[2] It would seem, however, that a man's relatives might, by refusing to abet him in his feud, escape the liability to make compensation for his wrong-doing, in which case they lost all claim to his wergyld, and he himself was reduced to serfage.[3]

Among the Saxons, in England at least, the "family" as a political element was gradually replaced by an institution better fitted for the requirement of a people who were becoming consolidated into a nation. That was the system of suretyship, according to which every man in the kingdom was required to have a *borh*, or surety, for his good conduct. Formerly a man's relations were practically bound for him, as they were responsible in case he failed to pay the fines incurred by his wrongful act, and there would seem to have been little difference between the earlier and later systems beyond the substitution of a man's neighbours for his relations. Thus it was provided that, where a man, guilty of theft, was found to have no lord, his relatives should find a lord for him, under the penalty of his being declared an outlaw. Moreover, if a lord had so many dependants that he could not exercise per-

[1] Kemble, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 259.
[2] Do. i., p. 261.
[3] Do. i., p. 263.

sonal supervision over them, he was to appoint bailiffs to be answerable to him, and a bailiff was, if he could not trust any man, to cause twelve of this man's relatives to become surety for his good conduct.[1] To carry out the system of suretyship all the people were arranged into tithings and hundreds, and it was declared by a law of Cnut that no freeman should be entitled to wer or to any free rights unless he were a member of a hundred or a tithing. This is explained by the laws of Edward the Confessor, which enact that throughout the whole kingdom "all men are bound to be in a guarantee by tens, so that if one of the ten men offend, the other men may hold him to the right."[2] At an earlier period this institution would seem to be mentioned under the term *Gegyldan*, fellows, brothers of the gyld, which is mentioned in such a way that we must suppose every individual to have belonged to some gyld or association, as a member of which he was called gegylda.[3] The tithing was responsible for all the individuals of which it was composed and in theory no arrangement could be more effective for obtaining the desired end. Not only, says Mr Kemble, were the gyldmen bound to present their fellows before the court of the freemen when specially summoned, but "they found their own advantage in exercising a kind of police-surveillance over them all: if a crime were committed, the gyld were to hold the criminal to his answer; to clear him, if they could conscientiously do so, by making oath in his favour; to aid in paying his fine if found guilty; and if by flying from justice he admitted his crime, they were to purge themselves on oath for all guilty knowledge of the act, and all participation in his flight; failing which, they were themselves to suffer mulct in proportion to his offence.

[1] Kemble, *op. cit.*, i. p. 263;
[2] Do. i. p. 249; [3] Do. i. p. 239.

On the other hand, they were to receive at least a portion of the compensation for his death, or of such other sums as passed from hand to hand during the progress of an Anglo-Saxon suit."[1]

How far the Saxon city gylds were imitations of or connected with the country tithings is doubtful. The latter were political associations for securing the good conduct of its members towards their neighbours and the State at large, while the former were "sworn brotherhoods between man and man, established and fortified upon 'ath and wed,' oath and pledge; . . . . alliances offensive and defensive among the free citizens, and in the strict theory possessed all the royalties, privileges, and rights of independent government and internal jurisdiction." Mr Kemble adds in a note that "the principle of all society during the Saxon period is that of free association upon terms of mutual benefit."[2] Mallet, moreover, affirms that such association was almost universal among the ancient Scandinavians.[3] Wilda, who studied the subject closely, appears to have sought for the origin of the Gild in the Scandinavian sacrificial festivals, at which the affairs of the community were discussed, and at which alliances were made for purposes of plunder and warfare. Those feasts were called Gilds, from the sacrificial meal presented by the freemen who attended them, and there two warriors "were wont to confederate for life or death, for common enterprises and dangers, and for indiscriminate revenge when one of them should perish by a violent death."[4] It is more probable, however, that the Gilds were developments rather of these sworn confederacies than of the feasts

[1] Kemble, *op. cit.*, vol. i. p. 252.
[2] *op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 309 *seq.*
[3] "Northern Antiquities," ch. xii.
[4] See Toulmin Smith's "English Gilds," Introductory Essay by Dr Brentano, 1870, p. lxvii.

at which they were entered into; and Dr Brentano, although he supposes the family to have been "the original and pattern type, after which all the later Gilds were formed,"[1] yet admits that "the essence of the Gild" existed in the older associations for acquiring riches and fame, and that therefore the attempt to bring these into connection with the Gilds ought not to be rejected without further counter proofs.[2] The fact would seem to be, that such associations as those entered into by the old Scandinavian warriors, were themselves formed in imitation of the family, "brotherhoods" for mutual aid and protection, and that the Gilds, although perpetuating the idea of the family, did so only because they were extensions or developments of the earlier and more simple brotherhoods, or imitations of the clan, which is itself based on kinship.

We may have occasion to refer again to the Saxon Gilds when treating of the development of the altruistic sentiments. It is now necessary to consider what was the general moral condition of those peoples among whom the right of private feud was abandoned or modified as above mentioned. The very fact that all crimes had a price, the payment of which absolved the offender, apparently without affecting his social position, is inconsistent with the supposition that those peoples had any very definite idea of moral guilt. Moreover, the actions condemned as offences requiring the payment of compensation when performed to the injury of members of the community, were under other conditions esteemed quite differently. Formerly the Morlacchi of Dalmatia were noted for their dexterous and impudent thefts, although only the Haiduks, who are described as a band of banditti and pirates, re-

[1] See Toulmin Smith's "English Gilds," Introductory Essay by Dr Brentano, 1870, p. lxx.

[2] Do., p. lxxi.

sorted to violence.[1] So also the Montenegrins, while protecting the life and property of travellers through their territory, thought little of plundering their neighbours.[2] The manners of the Afghans agree well in that particular with the habits of the semi-cultured Slavonians of southern Europe. Elphinstone declares that where the government is weak, the Afghans "seem to think it a matter of course to rob a stranger, while in all other respects they treat him with kindness and civility." They do not, however, add violence to their robberies, and the traveller is never killed unless it be in defending his property.[3] In this the Afghans resemble the Bedouin Arabs, who although, according to Burckhardt, a "nation of robbers," never kill an unresisting foe, unless to avenge the death of some relation.[4] Mayeux affirms that brigandage is highly meritorous, and the surprise of a caravan, or the plundering of a village without discovery, is considered a feat worthy of great praise.[5] This writer states that alliances are sometimes made between the Bedouin tribes and neighbouring villages, but the oath of alliance only affects the persons and the "bagage" of those parties to it. "Les biens fonciers, les propriétés casanières ne demeurent point sous sa sauvegarde, et l'Arabe dévastera sans scrupule, sans crime, surtout aux yeux des siens, la maison isolée de son frère en Dieu; il dépouille son verger, mange sa moisson, égarge ses troupeaux: il ferait pis s' il était possible."[6] The Toorkmuns may be termed the Bedouins of Central Asia. Like these, they are born robbers. Until recently, not satisfied with ordinary plunder, they undertook expeditions for the express purpose of manstealing.

[1] Wilkinson *op. cit.*, vol. ii. pp. 173, 365. [2] Do., i. p. 44.
[3] "Account of the Kingdom of Caubul," p. 228.
[4] "Notes on the Bedouins," pp. 81, 90.
[5] "Les Bédouins," tom. ii. p. 125. [6] Do., ii. p. 63.

To this kind of pursuit they were brought up from their earliest years, and it was a proverb among them, showing its demoralizing influence, that "a Toorkmun on horseback knows neither his father nor his mother." They professed to believe that the murder of a heretic is grateful to the Almighty, and they generally killed most of the old persons who fell into their hands on their marauding expeditions, as a propitiatory offering to Him.[1]

The ancient peoples of Europe differed little in their conduct towards those outside the tribe from the predatory nations of Western and Central Asia. Cæsar says of the Gauls that the nobles spent their time chiefly in war with their neighbours, either inflicting injuries, or repelling those inflicted on them, the power of doing this through the greater number of their retainers being the only influence they acknowledged.[2] Of the Germans, he states that robbery outside of the territory of the tribe was considered meritorious,[3] while Tacitus affirms that they were a very warlike race, and that during peace they spent whole days and nights alternately feasting and sleeping, their festivities often terminating in abusive language and bloodshed.[4] The Scandinavian Norsemen were a nation of pirates, who under the dreaded name of Vikings,[5] created terror from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, and their Icelandic descendants followed in their footsteps. Yet, notwithstanding their defective morality in their dealings with foreigners, all the peoples whose manners have been

[1] Burnes' "Travels into Bokhara" (1834), vol. ii. pp. 64, 251.

[2] "De Bell. Gall." lib. vi., ch. xv. [3] Do., ch. 21.

[4] Germania, ch. xv.

[5] For an interesting account of the Vikings, see Dr Dasent's Appendix to "The Story of Burnt Njal." Dr Henry gives a curious account of the piratical Danish invaders of Britain, whose cruelty was only equalled by their insolence.—"The History of Britain," vol. ii. p. 535 *seq.*

compared in this chapter show in their general character a great advance over peoples of an earlier stage of culture. Thus the Icelanders, although fond of good cheer, were "a simple sober people, early to bed and early to rise." They were great at work, all alike taking part in the labour which was required by the rigour of the climate. To do something and to do it well was, says Dr Dasent, the Icelander's aim in life.[1] Moreover, although he had no compunction in taking a man's life when he desired to gratify the feeling of revenge, yet he did it manfully, openly, and without shame for what he had done. "To kill a man and say that you had killed him, was manslaughter; to kill him and not to take it on your hand was murder. To kill men at dead of night was also looked on as murder," as was the slaying of a foe, and leaving his body without the covering of sand or gravel, which was the usual mode of burial. It was strength of character rather than goodness which governed the Icelander in his conduct towards his fellows, but his "virtue" must have had at least an element of good, seeing that it led him "to do what lay before him openly like a man, without fear of either foes, friend, or fate; to hold his own and speak his mind, and seek fame without respect of persons; to be free and daring in all his deeds." To his friends and kinsmen he was to be gentle and generous, and to turn no man from his door who sought food or shelter, even though he were a foe.[2] Hospitality was no less esteemed among the ancient Germans than by the Scandinavians. Tacitus states that it was thought by the Germans wrong to refuse the rights of hospitality to any human being, and that no difference was made in this respect between a friend and a stranger. The guest was presented with

[1] *op. cit.*, Introd., pp. 113, 115.
[2] Do., p. 33 *seq.*

anything he desired, although he was expected to give in return whatever he was asked for. The Germans were, moreover, very faithful in the maintenance of their family friendships, although not so much so, apparently, in the observance of their treaty engagements.[1] The ancient Irish would seem also to have been remarkable for their hospitality. According to Leland it was their most striking virtue, the lowest of the people claiming reception and refreshment " by an almost right." The historian says that even in his day a wandering beggar entered the house of a farmer or gentleman with as much freedom as an inmate.[2] The curious custom of *fosterage*, which according to Sir Henry Maine, was widely diffused among Aryan communities,[3] and which had an extraordinary development among the Irish, may probably be taken as evidence that family alliances and the ties of friendship were no less valued by them than by the Germans.

Curiously enough, we find among the modern nations who have been compared with the ancient peoples of Europe the development of the very same traits of character as those for which the latter were distinguished. The most sacred virtue of the sanguinary Mainote was hospitality. A poor man had been known to kill his only mule to provide supper for a stranger. " Any stranger," says Lord Carnarvon, " who places himself upon a bench in the church, which is understood to indicate that he is friendless, is immediately received by some chief, and tended with every care during his stay in the country; and any one who should dare to inflict wrong or insult upon him while

[1] Germania, ch. xxi.

[2] " History of Ireland," vol. i. Prel. Disc. p. xxx.

[3] " The Early History of Institutions," p. 241. Among the Circassian nobles on the birth of a child it was immediately consigned to a chief to be brought up.—See Pallas' " Travels," vol. i. p. 406.

enjoying such protection, would call down upon himself the full vengeance of the clan."[1] The character ascribed by Fortis to the Morlacchi is of the same nature. They are generous and hospitable, opening their poor cabins to the stranger, and never ask, and often obstinately refuse to accept, any recompense. They are as ready to relieve the wants of their neighbours as to aid the passing traveller. Friendship is a sacred duty when once its obligations are entered into. The engagement is made at the foot of the altar, the union of two male or female friends being blessed by the priest before the assembled multitude.[2] If we pass into Asia we find the most warlike and turbulent peoples acknowledging the most perfectly the law of hospitality. Pallas describes the Circassian princes and knights as following no other occupation but war, pillage, and the chase, but among them the right of hospitality called *kunak*, was established on certain principles which were sacredly observed. The person subject to its protection was perfectly secure from all injury, as in case of attack he would be defended with the whole power of his host and those related to him. The murder or injury of a guest was avenged with as much severity as the death of a relative by consanguinity.[3] It is the same with the "pirate of the desert," who will perish rather than abandon the traveller who has confided himself to his protection and eaten of his bread and salt.[4] Even by the Toorkmuns —of whom according to Burnes,[5] their neighbours say, "A Toorkmun is a dog and will only be kept quiet with a bit of bread, like a dog: give it then, is the doctrine of the traveller, and pass on unmolested"—hospitality is considered a sacred duty.[6] Burnes affirms that this

[1] *op. cit.*, p. 147.
[2] *op. cit.*, p. 19 *seq.*
[3] *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 404.
[4] Mayeux, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 59.
[5] *op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 43.
[6] Do. vol. i. p. 341.

practice is spontaneous to the Toorkmuns and to all the other Mahommedan peoples of Central Asia,[1] and this would certainly seem to be the case with the Afghans. When referring to a man's want of hospitality, they say that he has no *Pooshtoonwullee* (nothing of the customs of the Afghans). To rob a man of his guest is considered a most grievous affront. A stranger who enters the house of an Afghan is under his protection so long as he remains in the village. The protection does not continue, however, beyond the village lands, or perhaps those of the tribe, and hence the traveller may be plundered by the very persons whose guest he had just been. A man's bitterest enemy, however, is safe so long as he is under his roof. Custom requires that protection should be granted to the suppliant even more readily than to the guest. In pursuance of *nannawautee,* as it is called, "a person who has a favour to ask, goes to the house or tent of the man on whom he depends, and refuses to sit on his carpet, or partake of his hospitality, till he shall grant the boon required. The honour of the party thus solicited will incur a stain if he does not grant the favour asked of him; and, so far is the practice carried, that a man over-matched by his enemies, will sometimes go nannawautee to the house of another man and entreat him to take up his quarrel, which the other is obliged to do, unless he is utterly unable to interfere with effect, or unless some circumstance renders his interference obviously improper."[2] The practice of hospitality is particularly noticeable among the *Doorraunees.* A stranger, whether an Afghan or not, is everywhere well received and provided with food and

[1] *op. cit.*, i. p. 20.

[2] Elphinstone *op. cit.* p. 226 *seq.* This writer very properly compares the custom mentioned in the text with an analogous custom of the Greeks and Romans in relation to suppliants (see *infra*).

lodging. Each camp, however poor, has its arrangements for the entertainment of guests. The traveller is supplied in times of scarcity either by a subscription from the inhabitants generally or by the person whose turn it is to do so, and no difference is made although it is known that he is a Christian.[1]

The predatory nations of Central and Western Asia show a remarkable agreement with the ancient peoples of North-Western Europe in another particular besides the strict recognition of the laws of hospitality and friendship, and one which no less betokens a general amelioration of manners. We refer to the social condition of woman and the intercourse between the sexes. That wives should continue to be acquired by purchase in accordance with the practice of most primitive peoples is not to be wondered at, seeing that the marriage price is too valuable a property to be hastily abandoned by a parent. Marriage has ceased, however, to be a mere matter of bargain and sale, and the wife, instead of being little better than the slave, has become the companion of her husband. Among the Afghans a man may, by cutting off a lock of his sweetheart's hair, snatching away her veil, or throwing a sheet over her, declaring at the same time that she is his affianced wife, secure her as his wife, although he must pay the usual price for the bride.[2] Marriages of affection are by no means rare, and the sentiment of love appears to be strongly developed among them, most of their songs and tales speaking of it in the most glowing and romantic language. Elopements and secret engagements, where a man has not sufficient property to pur-

[1] Elphinstone *op. cit.*, p. 419 *seq.*
[2] Do., p. 181.

chase[1] the object of his affections, are not uncommon. The tender passion having so much to do with the union of the sexes, it is hardly surprising that wives often exercise great influence in the household, the husband, indeed, sometimes sinking into a secondary place.[2] Marriages founded on the affections are no less common with the predatory Toorkmuns, owing no doubt to the freedom of intercourse allowed between the sexes, and the necessity of paying a high price for a bride leads also among them to frequent elopements. Such a mode of ending the courtship may perhaps be looked upon as the example of the so-called marriage by capture.[3] The parents and relatives, however, pursue the lovers, who have made for the nearest camp and become indissolubly united, and "the matter is adjusted by an intermarriage with some female relation of the bridegroom, while he himself becomes bound to pay so many camels and horses as the price of the bride. The young lady, after her Gretna Green union, returns to the house of her parents, and passes a year in preparing the carpets and clothes, which are necessary for a Toorkmun tent, and on the anniversary of her elopement, she is finally transferred to the arms and house of her gallant lover."[4]

As with the Afghans and Toorkmuns, women among the Bedouins enjoy a considerable degree of liberty, and hence, although wealth frequently overbalances in the eyes of parents the claims of affection, their marriages are

[1] According to Mr Elphinstone, the expense of obtaining a wife led to the curious practice of the fines levied for serious offences being calculated in women, who were to be given in marriage to the person aggrieved and his relations. See *op. cit.*, p. 168 *n.*

[2] Do., pp. 181 *seq.*, 418.

[3] Vambery asserts that this marriage ceremonial called Kökburi (green wolf) is in use among all the Nomads of Central Asia (*op. cit.* p. 323).

[4] Burnes, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 55, *seq.*

often governed by choice.[1] Burckhardt goes so far as to say that the Bedouins are perhaps the only Eastern people who can be entitled lovers.[2] This we have seen to be incorrect, but that marriages of affection are not rare, among the Syrian Bedouins at least, may be inferred from the fact that they think it scandalous to demand the "daughter's price."[3] Moreover, woman is highly respected, and is treated after marriage as a companion rather than as a slave.[4] This respect is exemplified by the fact that, if a homicide can succeed in concealing his head under the sleeve of a woman and cry *fy ardhék* ("under thy protection,") his safety is insured. The woman at once by her cries brings together all those who are at the encampment, and says, "Arabs, in the name of God and by the head of my husband, let none of you strike this man, not even with roses." After this imprecation no one dare lift a hand against him.[5] Mayeux adds, "le droit de faire grace est si bien établi en faveur des femmes, que dans quelques tribus où elles ne se montrent jamais aux hommes, et dans quelques autres, lorsqu' elles sont occupées chez elles, un criminel peut échapper au supplice, si, étant près de leur tente, il s' écrie tout à coup : 'Je suis sous la protection du *harem.*' A ces mots, toutes les femmes répondent sans paraître : *loin de lui ;* et fût il condemné à mort par le prince même, et par le conseil des principaux de la tribu, la peine de

[1] Mayeux, *op. cit.*, iii., p. 143. [2] Do., *op. cit.*, p. 155.

[3] Do., p. 62. This is probably a later refinement, as in Arabia the more general custom would seem still to continue, *see* p. 154.

[4] Mayeux, *op. cit.*, iii., p. 151. Burckhardt however says that the Bedouin woman is regarded as much inferior to man, and when once married she becomes a mere servant, *op. cit.*, p. 199.

[5] Mayeux *op. cit.*, ii. p. 101. The Circassians have a custom strikingly like that mentioned in the text. Pallas says, "a stranger who intrusts himself to the patronage of a woman, or is able to touch with his mouth the breast of a wife, is spared and protected as a relation of the blood, though he were the enemy, nay, even the murderer of a similar relation," *op. cit.* vol. i. p. 404.

son crime lui est remise sans restriction sur-le-champ, et il s'en va où bon lui semble."[1] Social position does not affect this protecting power in favour of offenders, the poorest old woman having the same influence as the wife of the chief. The Bedouins are very jealous, but they do not prevent their wives from laughing and talking with strangers. Should a man strike his wife, which seldom happens, "she calls loudly," says Burckhardt, "on her *wasy* or protector, who pacifies the husband, and makes him listen to reason."[2]

The semi-cultured Slavonians of Southern Europe do not compare favourably with the Mohammedan nations of Western Asia in their treatment of woman. Thus the Albanians consider that as they purchase their wives they have despotic power over them, and that they may not only beat them at pleasure, but dismiss them on paying a fixed sum. A wife must not speak to her husband in the presence of others, at all events not until she has borne him a child. Nor must a husband pay any attention to his wife before others, and she would, indeed, consider him degraded if he were to do so.[3] The Morlacchi show great regard for women before marriage, but they treat their wives with great contempt, and, as if to justify this conduct, the latter abandon themselves to extreme slovenliness.[4] The position of woman is much the same among the natives of Montenegro. According to Sir Gardner Wilkinson, although in some sense her husband's companion, yet as the performer of the most arduous labours, she is "his working beast of burden." The men suppose that they maintain their own dignity "by reducing women to the condition of slaves." A Monte-

[1] Mayeux, *op. cit.*, ii. p. 102.
[2] Do., *op. cit.*, p. 106. For an account of the institution of *wasy* or guardianship, see p. 74.
[3] Hahn's "Albanesische Studien," (1854), p. 143 *seq.*
[4] Fortis *op. cit.*, p. 37.

negrin will apologise if he has to mention his wife to a stranger, and he requires her to approach him with an air of humility. It is not surprising that, as the writer just referred to states, "attachment which a better treatment would insure, is often wanting," and that the wife's services "were performed as a duty, rather than from motives of affection."[1]

In this particular most of the ancient peoples of North Western Europe agree much closer with the Bedouins and other predatory Asiatic races, than with the Christian Slaves of the south. It is true that among the Gauls men had the power of life and death over their wives as over their children, and sometimes they were put to death at their husband's grave. Moreover, if a man of position died, under what were considered suspicious circumstances, his wives were examined by torture, and if found guilty of their husband's death, killed with a refinement of cruelty. Nevertheless the condition of woman among the Gauls does not appear to have been of special hardship. Husbands, instead of paying for their wives, are said to have received a dowry with them, to which they added a like amount of their own property. Of this joint fund an account was kept, and the profits laid by until the husband or wife died, when the whole belonged to the survivor.[2] From the regulation of the Brehon laws, that a woman could not buy or sell, or enter into contracts, without the consent of her *head,* the guardian or other person under whose control she was, it is evident that she was treated as in a condition of dependence. But this condition cannot have been one of much inferiority, as, with such consent, a woman *could* enter into contracts to dispose publicly of whatever was lawfully hers to dispose

[1] *op. cit.*,. vol. i. p. 421; *et. seq.*
[2] Cæsar, "De Bell. Gall." lib. vi., ch. xix.

of.[1] Sir Henry Maine states indeed that wives undoubtedly "had some power of dealing with their own property without the consent of their husbands."[2] Elsewhere the same learned writer, referring to the fact that temporary cohabitation of the sexes[3] was assumed by the tract on "Social Connections" to be part of the accustomed order of society, adds that, "on this assumption it minutely regulates the mutual rights of the parties, showing an especial care for the interests of the woman, even to the extent of reserving to her the value of her domestic services during her residence in the common dwelling."[4] The high position which the ancient Germans assigned to women is well known. Tacitus affirms that not only did husbands leave to their wives the management of their family affairs, but also the care of their houses and lands. He declared moreover that the Germans looked upon women as having a superior nature, and that the safest mode of binding them to their engagements was to require as hostages women of noble birth.[5] Mr Kemble has described in eloquent language their ideas in relation to the female sex. He says: "The German house was a holy thing; the bond of marriage a sacred and symbolic engagement; holy above man was woman herself. Even in the depths of their forests the stern warriors had assigned to her a station which nothing but that deep feeling could have rendered possible; this was the sacred sex, believed to be in nearer communion with divinity than men. In the superstitious tradition of their mythology, it was the young and beautiful Shield-mays, the maiden Wælcyrian, who selected the champions that had deserved to become the guests of Woden. The matrons presided over the rites of religion, conducted

[1] O'Reilly, *op. cit.*, p. 215.
[2] "The Early History of Institutions," p. 324.
[3] Such connections are still recognised in Persia.
[4] *op. cit.*, p, 59.
[5] Germania.

divinations, and encouraged the warriors on the field of battle; Valedas and Aurinias, prophetesses in the bloom of youth and beauty, led the raw levies of the North to triumph over the veteran legions of Rome. Neither rank nor wealth could atone for violated chastity; nor were in general any injuries more severely punished than those which the main strength of man enabled him to inflict on woman." [1]

Mallett affirms that among the Scandinavians women were treated with as much consideration as with the Germans, and he adds that the Northmen were always attended by their wives, "even in their most distant expeditions, hearing them with respect, and after a defeat more afraid of their reproaches than of the blows of the enemy." [2] So, also, in Iceland, although marriages were matters of bargain and sale, and were seldom love matches, women appear to have been treated as almost on an equality with their husbands. Wives were certainly sometimes beaten, and they could be put away for very slight reasons, but the privilege of divorce was possessed also by the woman herself, it being considered that neither party should be compelled to live with the other against his or her will. Moreover, women were often well provided for by their marriage contracts, and as widows they had the same right of holding property as their husbands; [3] while, as shown by the incidents of the feud between the households of Gunnar and Njal, it is evident that even during the lives of their husbands, they enjoyed great influence, which they too often used for evil purposes. Flosi, when abjured by Hildigunnar, the widow of Hauskuld, to avenge his death, said

[1] "The Saxons in England," vol. i. p. 232.
[2] "Northern Antiquities," ch. xii.
[3] Dasent *loc. cit.*, p. 119, *seq.* For a case of separation by a wife, see "Njal's Saga," ch. vii.

"women's counsel is ever cruel."[1] Judging from the Saga of Njal there was in the character of the women of the north, features which would go far towards accounting for the esteem in which they were held by the Scandinavians and the allied German race, without supposing them to have been "divine" in the modern acceptation of this phrase.

It would seem that woman occupied an inferior position among the early English as compared with the Germans or Scandinavians. This fact may probably be explained by the circumstances under which the former were placed. It is not likely that the Saxon invaders of England came accompanied by their families, and probably, as supposed by Mr Thrupp,[2] their wives were the women whom they took from the conquered natives, while the women brought to this country by the Northmen after their piratical voyages were captives. If this were the case, it would not be surprising if at first the condition of woman among the early English was little better than one of servitude. After they had become settled, however, they did not differ from other peoples of a similar degree of culture in the practice of wife-purchase, which is referred to in the laws of Aethelbirht as though it were the usual custom. The principal ceremony of marriage was *hand-faestnung* or pledging hands, which was done in the presence of the friends of the bridegroom and bride, and then the former received his wife from her father in return for the price which had previously been agreed upon. The mercantile nature of the transaction was afterwards sought to be concealed by calling the sum paid by the husband *foster-lean*, as though it were a return for the father's expense in providing food and education for his daughter, and it was expected to

[1] "Njal's Saga," ch. cxiii.
[2] "The Anglo-Saxon Home" (1862), p. 318.

be paid at the time of espousals instead of marriage.[1] In like manner, the *morgen-gifn*, or morning gift, the amount of which was ultimately stipulated before the marriage ceremony took place, was originally "a mere voluntary gift, made on the morning after the wedding, to testify the degree of satisfaction of the husband with his wife."[2] If a man found, after marriage, that he had been deceived, he was entitled to send back his wife to her parents, and claim a return of the money he had paid for her. The original position of woman among the early English was such as might be expected from these primitive manners. Her sphere was essentially that of home. Mr Wright supposes that the inferiority and subjection of the wife to the husband was more in theory than in practice,[3] but this could be true only of a later period, when the condition of woman was undoubtedly much improved. Mr Thrupp refers to the crowning of Judith, the wife of Ethelwulf, which took place in A.D. 856, as fixing the period when the great improvement in that condition took place, as up to that time the West Saxons had refused to tolerate a crowned wife. The same writer thus sums up his enquiries into the social status of woman among the Saxons in England:—"In the ninth and tenth centuries women ceased to be bartered away by their fathers, and acquired the right to dispose of themselves in marriage; they ceased to be liable to repudiation at the will of their husbands; acquired separate property, handsome wardrobes, and distinct keys; ceased to be liable to be punished for their

[1] "Womankind in Western Europe," by Thomas Wright (1869), p. 54, *seq.*

[2] Do., p. 57.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 58. It is improbable that the position of a wife was much better than that of a child. In the earlier Anglo-Saxon period a father could sell or otherwise dispose of his child as he thought fit. A child could be sold into slavery for the payment of penalties incurred by his father (Thrupp, *op. cit.*, p. 109.)

husbands' crimes; and queens acquired their right to be so called, and to be solemnly and publicly crowned. These were very important facts in the history of the social position of the sex, and mark a great advance in civilisation."[1]

The position occupied by women among the ancient peoples of North Western Europe and the predatory races of Western Asia is not only evidence of their social progress, but it furnishes a key to the development of their moral culture. We have seen that in a primitive condition of society, the clan, representing the family from which it has arisen, is the chief unit of organisation. It was the clan which was liable in case of the wrongdoing of any of its individual members, and on which it was incumbent to enforce compensation for any loss or injury its members might sustain. Of the family from which the clan was derived the most important unit was originally the woman. Among primitive peoples almost universally a man's children took the family name of their mother, and became members of the clan to which she belonged. Hence the curious facts that the maternal uncle had as much if not more authority over a man's children than he himself had, and that a man's property descended not to his sons but to his nephews. The time arrived, however, when the true relation of a man to his family was recognised, and then, instead of taking the name of their mother and belonging to her clan, children would follow the clan of their father. The father, as the head of the family, would now become invested with all the authority which had before been divided between himself and the maternal uncle of his children. The nature of that authority we see in the fact that the father had in the early days of Greece and Rome the power of life and death over his

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 71.

children. This was the case also with the Scandinavian inhabitants of Iceland, among whom the exposure of infants to perish was common. The children who survived were emancipated from their father's power only when they ceased to form part of his household.[1] Among the Saxons in England the right of a father to dispose of his offspring was fully recognised, and it was confirmed nearly a hundred years after their conversion to Christianity, although it was then restricted to children under seven years of age.[2] Neither infanticide nor the enslavery of fellow religionists is permitted by the Koran, and therefore the predatory peoples of Western Asia do not carry the paternal authority so far as it formerly extended. The Bedouin parent, however, demauds reverence from his sons so long as they continue to reside in his tent, and as the young Arab is very impatient of restraint his great aim is to emancipate himself from his father's control by obtaining a tent of his own.[3]

The recognition of the authority of the father as the head of the family had an important consequence in the tribe. When children followed the clan of their mother their blood relations had, owing to the rule that a man could not marry a woman of the same clan name as himself, usually to be sought outside of the tribe in which they lived. A tribe was thus made up of the members of various clans which were spread through several tribes, and consequently it had but little internal cohesion, and no real central authority beyond that which was exercised by the council of "greybeards," chiefly in relation to the external affairs of the community. The substitution of the father for the mother as the chief

[1] Njal's Saga., Introd., p. 24, *seq.*
[2] Kemble, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 1.
[3] Burckhardt, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

unit of the family, led to a complete change in the internal organisation of the tribe. All the children born within the tribe now belonging to their father's clan, the tribe itself lost its chief source of weakness. It might consist of more than one clan, but as all the members of its several clans were to be found within the tribe itself, its internal cohesion became much increased. Disputes might occur between the members of the clans of which it was composed, but as against an external enemy all would unite and this would necessitate the introduction of some kind of tribal authority. The Arabs furnish a fitting illustration of this stage of political progress. Burckhardt says of the Bedouins that they are a perfectly free nation, so far as they can be considered a nation at all. The only authority the Sheikh or Emir exerts is due to the influence of his personal character, and it is the counterpoise of the different families of which it is composed which maintains peace within the tribe.[1] There is not even any legal authority to enforce penal sentences, the fines awarded by the judges for offences being payable only by immemorial usage.[2] But although the Arab tribe can hardly be said to have a political head, yet it possesses a military head, the Agyd, who is absolutely obeyed in actual warfare. The office of Agyd, which is hereditary in a particular family, possesses, curiously enough, a religious character. "The person of the Agyd," says Burckhardt, "and still more his office, is regarded with veneration. He is considered by the Arabs as a kind of augur or saint. He often decides the operations of war by his dreams, or visions, or forebodings; he also announces the lucky days for attack, and names other days that would be unlucky." The Arabs never refuse to follow him, and they believe that even a child of the

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 66. [2] Do., p. 70.

Agyd family is a proper leader, "supposing him to act by a kind of heavenly inspiration."[1]

The love of personal independence which characterises the Bedouin would prevent the active authority of the Agyd from becoming perpetuated after the occasion which called it forth had ceased. This could occur, however, and it is not difficult to understand how the leader against the external enemy might become the recognised agent for insuring internal peace. We see something of this kind among the Kafirs of South Africa, who make an approach to the Arabs in various particulars, but the Kafir king or head chief is a pure despot whose rule is concerned more with his own aggrandisement than with the improvement of the tribal condition. We must seek for the true development of the tribal authority among a people of more peaceful habits than the Kafirs, and therefore on a higher moral scale. The Icelanders probably furnish the necessary instance. The office of Thing, which appears to have been that of a judge, gave considerable influence, and the holder of it became a kind of chief within his own district. He was more than a chief, however, as he also performed the functions of the priestly office, which added weight to his decisions. Disputes might be carried further to the Althing, the establishment of which was a true step towards the organisation of the state on the tribal basis, notwithstanding the defective power which it at first exercised.[2]

Something analogous to the system which existed among the Scandinavian settlers in Iceland, would appear to have been established among the Gauls. The nobler classes among this people consisted of the warriors and the priests or Druids. The former were engaged chiefly with the external relations of the state. The Druids,

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 168, 169. [2] Dasent's Introd., pp. 140, 153.

on the other hand, who officiated in sacred things, conducted the public and private sacrifices, and expounded religious matters, had left to them the decision of almost all public and private disputes. If any crime had been committed, or murder perpetrated, or if there were a question about an inheritance, or concerning boundaries, they decided it; they fixed the retribution to be exacted, and assigned punishments. If any one, either in his public or private capacity, did not submit to their decree, they interdicted him from the sacrifices, which was the severest penalty amongst them. Those who had been thus interdicted were classed as impious and criminal; all shunned them, shrank from their society and conversation, lest they should receive hurt from their contact. Justice was not administered to them when sued for, nor was any dignity bestowed upon them. Cæsar adds that the Druids had a central seat where they assembled at stated periods of the year from all parts of Gaul, and thither all persons who had disputes resorted to obtain their decisions and decrees.[1]

In the preceding chapter it was said that actions such as robbery, murder, and adultery, might soon come to be treated as morally wrong if they were forbidden by a competent authority, especially if this were clothed with a superstitious character. The influence of superstition over the minds of primitive peoples in what might be called their "clannish" state, is too well known to be further insisted on, and it has equal influence over the conduct at a higher stage of social development. It would seem, indeed, to be almost essential as an instrument for the proper organisation of the tribe in substitution for the clan. The peoples among whom the paternal authority is fully established at first think more of plundering surrounding peoples than of improving their

[1] "De Bell. Gall.," Book vi., ch. xiii.

own moral and social condition. Among such a race, unless some restraining influence were applied, the violence usually expended against external foes might turn inwards, and all the evils of the primitive blood feud be reproduced with tenfold force. That influence could at first be exerted only by the men of peace, those who being engaged in the sacred duties of religion, and therefore not actively concerned in the operations of war, were more likely than others to view with dislike the display of internal violence. Their efforts to restrain the angry passions of men would no doubt be aided by the more intelligent of the warrior class, but their most powerful instrument would undoubtedly be that which they derived from their sacred office. Primitively the vengeance of the denizens of the spirit-world is dreaded for some interference with their rights, but the mere infliction of injury on a human being is not thought worthy of their notice. There is in the early stages of human progress a complete divorce between religion, or superstition, and morality. Curiously enough, the phase of immorality which, among some uncultured peoples, would seem to be viewed the soonest with displeasure by the gods is that which they might be thought to have the least concern with. Thus the Sibuyan of Borneo regard sexual immorality as an offence against the deities of the tribe, and if a girl becomes a mother before she is married, their anger would be shown against the whole tribe if a pig were not sacrificed to them.[1] The Malays of Sumatra would appear to entertain a similar idea, as with them the man who seduces a girl must not only make good the loss her father has thus sustained, but also pay a fine "for removing the stain from the earth."[2] Even among the aborigines of India such a notion can be traced. The Pahárias of Rajmahal

[1] *Supra*, p. 284. [2] *Supra*, p. 280.

allow to lovers before marriage a licence which is not exceeded in the "bundling" of more civilised communities, but if the "prescribed limits" are over-stepped, they are declared out of the pale of society, and cannot be re-admitted until their indiscretion has been atoned for by the appointed sacrifice.[1] The Pádam Abors, a Mongoloid tribe of Assam, have advanced still further in that direction, and probably they nearly represent the stage of progress which the ancient inhabitants of Europe had reached before their separation into distinct nationalities. With them actions treated as crimes are regarded as pollutions of the tribe, and therefore as requiring a public atonement.[2] The Pádam have no central authority which can inflict punishment on a free-born member of the tribe, and it is evident that the aid of religion is called in to supplement the defective civil power in restraining conduct detrimental to the public interest. We shall meet with the same notion as to crime being an offence against religion among the early Greeks and Romans, and such, no doubt, was the source of the restraining influence which was exerted among the ancient inhabitants of north-western Europe.

The value and importance of the influence thus exerted by the ministers of religion in relation to the welfare of the state is evident. The weakening of the family ties which bind the clan together must tend towards the disintegration of the tribe itself. Some counteracting force is therefore necessary if the individual members of the tribe are not to revert to a state of nature. The authority of the father or head of the family will exert such a counteracting force to some extent, but within a very limited range. The members of each family may thus be kept together, but the various families have to be moulded into a tribe and this can

[1] *Supra*, p. 126. [2] *Supra*, p. 148.

be effected only by some general controlling authority. When such an authority is once established it must practically represent within the tribe the constraining power in the more primitive clan. At first it will not act so effectively, but by the combined aid of the civil and religious authorities it will ultimately do so, and then the tribe will become the perfect substitute of the clan, without the limitations which this, from the nature of its origin, was affected by. We have seen that the social organisation of the ancient Irish still retained traces of the clan. Sir Henry Maine when speaking of the primitive character of land tenure as exhibited in the Brehon laws, says that, although "the form of private ownership in land which grew out of the appropriation of portions of the tribal domain to individual households of tribemen is plainly recognised by the Brehon lawyers; yet the rights of private owners are limited by the controlling rights of a brotherhood of kinsmen."[1] The fundamental idea of the clan, was, owing to its nature as derived from the family, that of brotherhood, and when the tribe is substituted for the clan the same idea must be as perfectly operative in it, if the new organisation is to be equally effective. In the clan, even the *feeling* of brotherhood is very imperfect, and the idea has no relation to duty. The only object which the organization has in view, apart from its bearing on the devolution of property, is the enforcing of the rights which the members of the clan possess as against each other or against the members of other clans. When therefore, the idea of brotherhood is first applied to the tribe, which must be considered as having all the characteristics of the clan only without the blood relationship on which the latter is based, we shall not necessarily find any great moral improvement.

[1] "The Early History of Institutions," p. 105.

The system of tithings and hundreds established in England under the Saxon kings was intended to have the same social results in the enlarged tribe, to which the nation answered, as the system of clanship which it replaced had previously had. The tithing was doubtless intended as an imitation of the family and the hundred of the clan, and that they truly represented the earlier organisations, is evident from the fact that the later Christian gilds, which were true brotherhoods in the widest sense of the term, resembled the tithing and the hundred as nearly as the difference of circumstances would allow. Curiously enough an analogous system has had a wide extension among an Asiatic people who can hardly be said to have any other point of resemblance with the early English. The formation of associations for various purposes would seem to be peculiarly fitted for the genius of the Chinese.[1] Why this should be so is not apparent, unless it is due to the establishment among them of the system of clanship. The people are divided into a certain number of families, and persons bearing the same surname are not permitted to intermarry. The Chinese, however, have lost the primitive notion of relationship through the mother and recognise the father as the head of the family. The operation of the rule as to marriage leads to members of the same clan residing together in villages of which they are the only inhabitants, but otherwise the system of clanship would seem to have lost its vitality. The state however is fully organised, with the family as its social unit, and it may be said to have become as a whole a perfect substitute for the primitive clan. The Chinese state may indeed be described as a gigantic brotherhood, the head of the state being by a fiction regarded as the father of the people, who are therefore

[1] See *infra*.

brethren. A similar, although not exactly the same result, is reached among all other peoples when the state is fully organised. The supreme head, or king, is always regarded by his subjects as in some sense a father. In the early formula, which to some minds has hardly yet lost its truth, "the king can do no wrong," we have the complete expression of the still earlier notion as to the unlimited authority of the head of the family. Absolute despotism whether of the father or the monarch is equally objectionable, and the reproduction of the brotherhood of the clan in that of the people as a whole is a true moral progression, although it is an appropriation of an idea developed among primeval races.

Reverting now to the statement before made that we shall not, when the idea of brotherhood is first applied to the tribe, as distinguished from the clan, necessarily meet with any great moral improvement beyond what was observable before the system of clanship has been superseded, let us see what are the phenomena presented by the peoples whom we have taken as examples of the phase of moral progress under consideration. In relation to other peoples the idea of moral obligation is not, as we have seen, at all developed. Every one outside of the tribe or nation is lawful prey, unless special engagements have been entered into restraining the exercise of the natural right. Even in relation to the members of the same tribe, the sense of moral obligation is very imperfect. The story of Burnt Njal shows how difficult it was for the Northmen to restrain their passions, and how lightly actions which would now ensure the greatest infamy were thought of. The very fact that in England every man was compelled to find a surety for his good behaviour, shows how unsatisfactory was the moral character of the Saxons. The extreme prevalence of

robbery appears to have been from an early date a crying evil, and it evidently was regarded by the people at large with the same leniency as brigandage is still treated in various parts of southern Europe. Dr Lingard observes that theft and homicide were the crimes to which the Anglo-Saxons were especially addicted, and that the former prevailed among every order of men. "We meet with it in the clergy as well as in the laity; among thanes no less than ceorls. These depredators frequently associated in bands. Within the number of seven they were termed in law theofas; above that number, but below thirty-six, they formed a hlothe; if they were still more numerous they were denominated an army; and to each of these different designations a different punishment was assigned."[1] According to an earlier writer, perjury, the prevalence of which he ascribes to the multiplicity and consequent diminishing of the solemnity of oaths, was one of the national vices of the early English. He adds that the bribing of judges and even of kings to influence their judgments was very common, and he refers to the mention made in an award by Edward the Confessor of a handsome bribe which he had received from one of the parties, as one of the grounds of the decision.[2] Dr Henry elsewhere cites the testimony of Bishop Lupus as to the deplorable moral condition of the English at the beginning of the eleventh century. The character of the Afghans is described by Elphinstone as being debased by their love of gain, which is their ruling passion, and he states that they are also revengeful, rapacious, envious, and with slight regard for truth, although they are, on the other hand, faithful to their friends, kind to their dependents, hospitable, brave, hardy, laborious, frugal,

[1] Lingard's "History of England," vol. i., p. 414.
[2] Henry's "History of Great Britain," vol. ii., p. 554.

and prudent.[1] The Toorkmuns are said to be perfidious and treacherous, " the men insensible to pity, the women indifferent to chastity."[2] The character of the Bedouins agrees on the whole with that of the Afghans. According to Mayeux the difference between our ideas and those of the Bedouins concerning good and evil, is as great as the resemblance between our customs and theirs is small. He adds, that qualities which are thought little of by Europeans, are often those which are the *ne plus ultra* of virtue with the inhabitants of the desert. Among them are bravery, generosity, ability in the exercise of brigandage, diplomatic address, knowledge of the desert, the possession of these characteristics constituting the great man. The qualities which confer an inferior reputation, are the art to tell a story well, the ability to count beyond a hundred, good memory, and the gift of improvising, this last being common among women.[3] Burckhardt declares that the constant object of the Bedouin is gain, and interest the motive of all his actions. " Lying, cheating, intriguing, and other vices arising from this source, are as prevalent in the desert as in the market towns of Syria."[4] The worst feature of the Bedouin character is the constant quarrelling between parents and children, arising probably from the father's love of authority clashing with the son's impatience of restraint. Sometimes a Bedouin will allow his father to be supported by the alms of the camp while he is in affluence, although generally parents when old are supported by their children.[5]

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 249, 253.

[2] Burnes, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., 43, 58. Vambery however declares that owing to the influence of *Deb*, or custom, so long as enmity is not openly declared, " *less robbery and murder*, *fewer breaches of justice and morality*, take place amongst them than amongst the other nations of Asia whose social relations rest on the basis of Islam civilisation."—" Travels in Central Asia," (1864), p. 310.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 104. [4] *Op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 122 *seq.* [5] Do., p. 201.

With all its defects, however, the character of the peoples among whom the tribal authority has been substituted for that of the clan has undoubtedly undergone great improvement. It has indeed acquired an elevation of tone quite foreign to the conduct of more primitive peoples. We have seen this in relation to the Afghans, and it is no less true of the Bedouins. Burckhardt speaks highly of the latter people. He says—"The social character of the Bedouin, when there is no question of profit or interest, may be described as truly amiable. His cheerfulness, wit, softness of temper, good nature, and sagacity, which enables him to make shrewd remarks on all subjects, render him a pleasing, and often a valuable companion. His equality of temper is never ruffled or affected by fatigue or suffering; in which respect he differs materially from the Turk, who is of a changeable, fickle, and capricious disposition. The finest trait in the character of the Bedouin (next to good faith) is his kindness, benevolence, and charity,—his peaceful demeanour whenever his warlike spirit or wounded honour does not call him to arms. Among themselves the Bedouins constitute a nation of brothers;[1] often quarrelling, it must be owned, with each other, but ever ready, when at peace, to give mutual assistance. Not accustomed to the cruel scenes of blood which harden the hearts of Turks from their very youth, the Bedouins delight to foster within their breasts those sentiments of mercy and compassion, which often cause them to forget that an unfortunate person is, perhaps, an enemy."[2] Moreover, the Bedouin is abstemious and moderate in the supplying of his bodily wants, and although polygamy is allowed, he is generally content with

[1] This would seem to be their own feeling; as when they exact tribute from a village, this becomes the "sister" of the head man who receives the tribute, which is called *khoue*, a "brotherhood."—*Burckhardt*, p. 110.

[2] Do., p. 208.

one wife, to whom he is seldom unfaithful, while public prostitution is unknown in the Arab camps.[1] Of the Uzbeks of Khiva, who are allied to the fierce Toorkmuns, Burnes affirms that their manners present a "tissue of contrarieties." Attention to religious duties is strictly enforced, the habitual neglect of the daily prayers being punished with fines and imprisonment, yet, says Burnes, "there are bands of the most abominable wretches who frequent the streets at evening for purposes as contrary to the Koran as to nature."[2] Poisoning was said to be very common, and the traveller was cautioned against eating any food which was presented to him until the giver had himself partaken of it. Slavery was extensively practised at Bokhara, but Burnes found that slaves were kindly treated,[3] and he states that the Uzbeks believed that they were conferring a benefit on a Persian when they purchased him and saw that he renounced his heretical opinions.[4] Finally the traveller affirms that the code of laws, although sanguinary, is not unjust.[5] He adds, "When we place the vices of Bokhara in juxtaposition with its laws and justice, we have still much to condemn, but the people are happy, the country is flourishing, trade prospers, and property is protected. This is no small praise under the government of a despot."[6]

The Slavonians of Southern Europe who do not compare on the whole very favourably with the Afghans and Bedouins, are yet not without certain estimable traits of

[1] *Burckhardt*, p. 106. [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 284.

[3] Such is the case also among the Afghans.—Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, p. 244.

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 283.

[5] Vambery, when speaking of the horrible treatment of prisoners at Khiva, says, "In Khiva, as well as in the whole of Central Asia, wanton cruelty is unknown; the whole proceeding is regarded as perfectly natural, and usage, law, and religion all accord in sanctioning it."—(*Op. cit.*, p. 139.)

[6] *Op. cit.*, p. 310.

character, as was seen when treating of the practice of hospitality. The same may be said of the ancient peoples of North Western Europe. Thus Cæsar affirms of the Germans that all who sought refuge with them were sure of hospitality and protection.[1] They appear to have been chaste in their sexual relations, and polygamy was practised only by the noble or wealthy. According to the statement of Cæsar they esteemed the most those who longest restrained their sexual passions,[2] and it is not surprising, therefore, that the offence of adultery was rare. If a woman thus offended she was punished at the discretion of her husband, who usually stripped her in the presence of her relations, and expelled her from his house. Moreover, the practice of infanticide was very unusual among the Germans, the destruction of children either before or after birth being considered disgraceful. Slavery was an established institution among this people as with all others of a similar degree of culture, and if a master happened to kill his own slave no one took any notice of the fact. But slaves were usually well treated, and in early life little difference was made between the bond and the free. They lie together, says Tacitus, "amidst the same cattle, upon the same ground, till age separates, and valour marks out, the free born."[3]

The general character of the English Saxons was much the same as that of the Germans. Probably the following summary by a recent writer may be accepted as giving a just description of it. Mr C. H. Pearson, after referring to the use of human sacrifices, proceeds: "but except on those occasions he was not cruel; he never learned from the Roman to fight man against man for the pastime of a holiday; he was greedy for money, and fought for land and soil, but not in

[1] "De Bell. Gall.," Bk. vi., ch. 21.
[2] Do. ch. 19.
[3] Germania, ch. xxv.

wantonness; he never made the duel a legal process;[1] he admitted the unarmed suppliant to peace; in his war poem he praised the king who was careful of a man's life (Beowulf i., 147); in his mythology he made the gods spare the lives of the very foes who were one day to destroy him (Prose Edda 34-50). He had the vices of a barbarian—gluttony, drunkenness, and the coarser sins of the flesh, but he was not immoral in lightheartedness or on principle; he respected marriage and womanly purity, he never sang the praises of illicit love."[2] The degraded condition of the English slaves and the development of the slave traffic[3] were probably due to the position of the Saxons in England as conquerors, and afterwards to the loosening of social bonds consequent on the continual incursions of the Danes.

As to the character of the ancient Celts much diversity of opinion is entertained. Dr Thurnam, the coadjutor of Dr Barnard Davis, was led by a careful review of the statements of the older authorities to agree with the view that the Britons were extremely barbarous in warfare, cruel to their prisoners, and probably cannibals, and that they were very lax in their sexual morals.[4] Strabo accused the Irish of eating the bodies of their deceased parents, and of lying with their mothers and sisters.[5] There is more certainty as to the use by the Gauls of human sacrifices, which were offered either for public pur-

[1] This was the case, however, among the Scandinavians, and, according to Tacitus, the Germans used to judge whether an intended war was likely to be propitious or not by the result of a duel between a warrior of their own and a prisoner taken from the enemy.

[2] "History of England during the Early and Middle Ages," 1867, vol. i. p. 109.

[3] As to Saxon Serfage see Mr Kemble's work, vol. i. p. 185 *seq.*; also Lingard's "History of England," vol i. p. 420.

[4] "Crania Britannica," (1865), p. 68, *seq.*

[5] Book iv.

poses or by individuals in pursuance of vows made to the gods in time of danger. The deities were supposed to prefer criminals, which speaks well for the moderation of the priests, but if necessary other victims were obtained.

The only safe guide as to the morals of the ancient Irish which we possess are the fragments which have been preserved to us of their written laws. Sir Henry Maine thinks that the Senchus Mor, or Great Book of the Ancient Law, was probably compiled during the fifth century, although the ancient Irish laws may have been reduced to writing soon after the introduction of Christianity.[1] According to O'Reilly the Irish had Breitheamhuin or judges, and Reachtairidh, or lawgivers, from the earliest period of their history.[2] He adds that the office of Brehon or judge was hereditary and that the judge was always attended by a Filé or Bard who was well skilled in the Dlighe Filidheachta, that part of the law which was preserved in poetry or verse, and that to ensure impartiality of judgment the unjust judge was directed to be branded on the cheek.[3] As the result of his study of the Brehon fragments, O'Reilly affirms that "it appears that fraud, falsehood, or the subornation of falsehood, theft, lies, treachery, or robbery deprived a prince of his right to inherit the sovereignty of his nation, and that no power ecclesiastical or lay could screen from the vengeance of the law, the adulterous woman, the deserter from his tribe, the persons, male or female, who were insensible to the calls of nature and fled from their parents in the hour of distress."[4] In sexual matters the Irish laws would seem not to have been very exacting, except in cases of adultery. The ancient Britons were said by Cæsar to have their wives and children in common, or, what

[1] "The Early History of Institutions," p. 13.
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 145. [3] Do., p. 167 *seq.* [4] Do., p. 195.

is more probable, to practise polyandry.[1] It is quite evident from the Brehon tracts that temporary cohabitation of the sexes was part of the accustomed order of society. Sir Henry Maine in referring to this subject states that "the common view seems to have been that chastity was the professional virtue of a special class," as the tracts "speak of irregularity of life in a monk or bishop with the utmost reprobation and disgust."[2] It is not improbable that the custom of bundling allowed down to a very recent period among Celtic peoples to unmarried couples, is a relic of such a condition of things as that which was prevalent among the ancient Irish. Curiously enough the same custom is yet to be met with among some of the peoples with whom the inhabitants of Western Europe have been compared.[3]

Reference to the general character of the Scandinavians has been reserved to the last, as it throws great light on the moral condition of the European and allied peoples at the dawn of history. In sexual matters the Northmen were probably not very strict, except in the case of adultery. Queen Gunnhilda, who perhaps had a general privilege, said to Hrut, when he parted with her on his return to Iceland, "I lay this spell on

[1] "De Bell. Gall," Bk. v. c. 14.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 59. Even so late as the reign of Queen Elizabeth, a correspondent of the Council, reported that the Irish did not commonly commit adultery: "not for that they profess or keep chastity, but that they seldom or never marry." *Irish MSS. Rolls House*, 1559, quoted in Froude's "History of England," vol. viii. p. 3 *seq.*

[3] For instance, the Morlacchi, see Fortis, *op. cit.* p. 36. Among the Afghans the practice referred to in the text is known as "the sports of the betrothed," Elphinstone *op. cit.*, p. 182, *seq.* Probably the curious custom which Pallas found existing among the Circassians of a husband, during the first twelve months of marriage or until the birth of the first child, visiting his wife secretly through the window of her room, had the same origin. Pallas states also that the Circassian was never present when strangers visited his wife, (*op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 406) which is no doubt a relic of the equally primitive custom of providing sexual hospitality for a guest, referred to *supra*, p. 277.

thee that thou mayest never have any pleasure in living with that woman on whom thy heart is set in Iceland, but with other women thou may'st get on well enough."[1] We learn little of the sexual morality of the Icelanders from the Njal's Saga, but we hear of an illegitimate son of Njal's, whose relationship to the great chief appears to have been fully recognised. In other respects our information is more exact, and we have seen that they had great independence and openness of character. The idea of manliness would almost seem to have been essential to the Icelandic conception of virtue, in the same way as it constituted the chief element in the moral conduct of the early Romans. Thus we are told that "robbery and piracy in a good straightforward, wholesale way, were honoured and respected; but to steal, to creep to a man's abode secretly at dead of night and spoil his goods, was looked upon as infamy of the worst kind." A man was to be no truce-breaker nor tale-bearer, nor backbiter; even towards his foes he was "to feel bound to fulfil all bounden duties; to be as forgiving to some as he was unyielding and unforgiving to others." The Icelander was taught moreover to be hospitable to all men,[2] whether friends or foes, and in seasons of scarcity the man of liberal mind supplied the need of his friends and neighbours, forgetful even of his own wants.[3]

If there is one feature which more than any other is distinctive of the characters of the various peoples who have been chosen as representing the social phase which results from the substitution of the tribal authority for the system of clanship, it is the manliness which the Northmen so highly esteemed. By this is understood something more than the courage which no less marks

[1] "Njal's Saga," ch. vi.
[2] Do., Introd., p. 33, *seq.*
[3] Do., p. 112.

the daring warrior among less cultured peoples, or the self-reliance which may be exhibited in a remarkable degree by races who, like the aborigines of America, prefer cunning to courage in their dealings with their enemies. Both those qualities are, indeed, essential to manliness, and they were certainly not wanting to the ancient inhabitants of Europe, any more than they now are to the predatory nations of Asia. The special characteristic of these various peoples as freebooters, whether on land or at sea, was due in the first place to their courage and self-reliance. But they exhibited in their conduct something more than these qualities. The ancient Germans were not merely warlike, but they felt poignantly the disgrace of defeat. The loss of their shields was thought so great an ignominy that sometimes it led them to commit suicide. They showed similar feeling in other respects. They were much given to gambling with dice, and would stake even their own persons on the throw. If this went against them, they went patiently into servitude, considering, says the historian, that they were thus paying a debt of honour.[1] The ancient Celts were probably affected by similar sentiments. A witness of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, an English schoolmaster resident at Limerick named J. Good, says of the inhabitants of the wild Irish districts, that in general they "are robust and remarkably nimble, of bold and haughty spirits, sharp-witted, lively, warlike, prodigal of life, patient of want, heat, and cold, of an amorous complexion, hospitable to strangers, constant in

[1] Tacitus' "Germania."—We cannot be surprised that Gerlach should declare in relation to this work; "to study it, to throw light upon its obscurities, is the sacred duty of German scholars, and therefore we shall never rest until it has become the book of our youths, so that they may learn and follow up the virtues of their forefathers, by which alone the proud structure of a German empire can rest on a sure foundation."—*Philolog. Trans. Hanover* (1865), p. 104.

their attachment, implacable in their resentments, credulous, greedy of glory, impatient of reproach and injuries, and, as Giraldus formerly represented them, violent in all their passions; no people worse than the bad among them, nor better than the good."[1] This description would doubtless be equally applicable to the early Irish, and it exhibits the spirit of independence and high sense of honour on which both the Germans and Scandinavians prided themselves. The development of the system of *fosterage* among the ancient Irish shows the existence of feelings much finer than would be possessed by a nation of mere barbarians, as they have been sometimes styled, and we can believe with Leland that "an impartial and unprejudiced inquirer may still discover many traces of the equity, the rectitude, the benevolence, and generosity of the ancient Irish in their different septs."[2] In the minds of the semi-cultured Slavonian peoples of Southern Europe we see the operation of much the same principles as those which influenced the ancient peoples of the North-West. The Morlacchi of Dalmatia were described by Fortis as being not only generous and hospitable, but also sincere, honest, and trustworthy; and although strictly enforcing the right of private revenge, nevertheless wishful to act rightly towards their fellowmen, and to show their gratitude for the least benefits.[3] The Montenegrins are spoken of as being hospitable and courteous to strangers, and as having "a friendly feeling towards those who sympathise with their high notions of independence and devotion to their country."[4]

Probably we have in the character and conduct of the Bedouin Arabs the best modern example of the

[1] Camden's "Britannia," (Trans. by Gough), vol. iii., p. 667, *seq.*
[2] History of Ireland, Prel. Disc., vol. i., p. xli.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 18 *seq.*
[4] Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 441 *seq.*

"manliness" which was so well displayed by the ancient peoples of Europe. The Bedouin, when once freed from parental control, "listens to no advice, nor obeys any earthly command but that of his own will." His independence is combined with great pride, which, says Burckhardt, is one of the most striking features of the Bedouin character. "In the most desperate circumstances, without camels or sheep, a Bedouin is always too proud to show discontent, or much less to complain. He never begs assistance, but strives with all his might, either as a camel-driver, or shepherd, or a robber, to retrieve his lost property. Hope in the bounty of God, and a perfect resignation to his divine will, are deeply implanted in the Arab's breast; but this resignation does not paralyse his exertions as much as it does those of the Turks."[1] The generosity of the Bedouin is no less remarkable than his self-reliance. He will strip himself of his garments to give to another, be he a stranger or not, and he will take the food from his mouth to relieve the wants of the distressed.[2] Burckhardt asserts that the man most honoured is he who exhausts his substance in hospitality, and in ministering to the needs of others.[3] The Bedouin, moreover, can display a magnanimity which occasionally gives proof of the possession of true greatness of soul. This, says Mayeux, "désarme leur colère dans son plus violent accès, prévient leur vengeance, enfante de belles actions, répare quelquefois les mauvaises; elle change les Arabes du noir au blanc."[4] The most efficacious way of obtaining from them the greatest or the least favour is to pique their self-love, their generosity, or their honour.[5] The Bedouin is governed by the same principles in his

[1] Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 140.
[2] Mayeux, *op. cit.*, tom. ii., p. 68.
[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 41.
[4] Do., ii., p. 99.
[5] Do., ii., p. 106

dealing with offences against chastity as with those which affect his honour. Adultery is esteemed a sacrilege, and the most horrible crime which it is possible to commit.[1] The appearance even of an affront is sufficient to authorise deadly vengeance. Not only is it unpardonable by the husband, or by the relations of the unfaithful wife, but it is a duty in any one who witnesses the crime to act as "the avenger of chastity." This shows, says Mayeux, that honour rather than jealousy is the source of its detestation.[2] Not only is female chastity highly regarded, but not to respect it, is considered a crime. The man to whom the least suspicion of such conduct attaches receives the title of *corrupter*, *shameless*, or *impure*, and sometimes he is driven from the tribe.[3] It is not speaking very highly, however, for the self-control of the Arab women to liken them to "tinder which the least spark will set on fire," as did Daher-Omar, when he ordered a young prince to be executed for asking a maiden, whom he met near a lonely fountain, whether she was not afraid of being outraged.[4]

The manliness of the Bedouin and the Scandinavian has this in common with the sense of right of the savage, that both are concentrated in self. They differ however still more widely than they agree; seeing that while in the latter case self is the *object* of thought, in the former case it is the *subject*. The manliness of the peoples whose character we have just been considering springs indeed from intense self-consciousness. This is the result of a process of intellectual genesis, the tracing of which is not difficult. It has already been shown that the development of the authority of the tribe was preceded by the weakening of that of the clan. The latter

[1] Burckhardt says that the father or brother of a woman convicted of adultery will cut her throat, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

[2] *Op. cit.*, tom ii., p. 84, *seq.*

[3] Do., ii. p. 80.

[4] Do. ii. p. 82.

was founded on the idea of blood relationship being traceable solely through the mother, and it was only when this idea was abandoned, and that relationship came to be traced through the father, that the tribe as a homogeneous whole was possible. The recognition of his true relation to the family acted as a revelation to man. As its head and source he was entitled to exercise authority over it without interference from those who had previously claimed to share it with him.[1] The exercise of that authority would gradually give rise to a sense of dignity and a feeling of self-constraint, which are the essential conditions of manliness. This intellectual genesis was accompanied by a moral genesis. The subjective change supposed would show itself in relation to external action. The conduct of the savage is governed by what he considers are his rights, that of the "man" by his thought of what is consistent with his own personal dignity and feeling of propriety. There is not necessarily any very great moral improvement, although there is undoubtedly an objective change. The tribe has been substituted for the clan, and hence the members of the common tribe instead of those of the clan are to be respected as brethren; but foreigners are still regarded as lawful prey, showing that actions have not yet come to be judged wrong in themselves. In relation to members of the tribal brotherhood, however, the subjective change supposed has important results. Dignity and self-control occasionally not only give rise to a feeling of magnanimity, but naturally tend to the formation of a sense of personal honour. This is probably the first stage in the development of the true sense of moral obligation. The standard is not high and is too purely subjective to be of much value at first. It is

[1] According to Tacitus, the maternal uncle still exercised some authority over his sister's children among the Germans of that period.

something however to have a standard of moral conduct of any kind; when, as in this case, it is based on "manliness" it is not to be despised. If a man refrains from conduct because it is unmanly or dishonourable, he is not far from the point where he abstains because it is "wrong," and *vice versa*. The practical value of the manliness of the predatory peoples we have seen in their fidelity to their guests. It is still more apparent perhaps in their conduct towards women, seeing that their manliness has led them to recognise the "womanliness" of woman, and thus to treat her as an equal instead of as an inferior. As between individual men it also had important consequences. In respecting himself man began to respect his fellow and to perceive that others are of equal dignity with himself. The idea of "humanity" began to dawn upon him, with what result we see among the ancient Germans and Saxons. Dr Brentano when enquiring into the origin of Gilds says: "The Northern historians in answer to the question whence the Gilds sprang, refer above all to the feasts of the German tribes from Scandinavia, which were first called Gilds. Among the German tribes, every occurrence among the more nearly related members of the family required the active participation in it of them all. At births, marriages, and deaths, all the members of the family assembled. Banquets were prepared in celebration of the event, and these had sometimes even a legal signification, as in the case of funeral banquets, namely, that of entering on an inheritance; and when they concerned kings that of a coronation. Wilda narrates in detail the circumstances of a banquet of this kind, at which the son and heir, in the midst of his own and father's companions, toasted his father's memory, and vowed to imitate his worthy deeds; the companions took similar vows upon themselves. Further, great social banquets took place on occasion of

the sacrificial assemblies at the great anniversary festivals, which coincided with the national assemblies and legal assizes, and on occasion of important political events; and at the same time the common concerns of the community were deliberated on at these banquets." Every freeman was obliged to attend the feasts, which were called Gilds,[1] and which were practically assemblies of *freemen* who thus met to discuss affairs of family interest, or such as concerned the general welfare. Those gatherings or the alliances there entered into may or may not have been the origin of the later Saxon Gilds, but the latter were at least formed in the same spirit. This was a spirit not merely of independence but also of mutual help, such as "also made our old English fathers join together in the 'Frith-borh,' or peace-pledge, the institution which lies at the very root and foundation of modern civil society."[2]

It is noteworthy that the "frith-borh" was a binding together of all the inhabitants of a place for the purpose of keeping the peace to each other and towards the State. It implied, therefore, that such a bond was necessary to the preservation of the peace,[3] just as in an earlier stage of society the blood ties of the clan were required for the same object. The superiority in the former case is that the obligation was entered into between freemen, and in some sense voluntarily. It was possible only among a people who had reached the manhood stage in the development of humanity, and whose conduct, if not governed by the principles of morality, was at least affected by a certain nobility of character which was the fruit of their "manliness."

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 67, and *supra*, p. 367.
[2] Introd. to "English Gilds," p. 15.
[3] The Saxon laws which have come down to us show that society was still in a very rude condition. See Thorpe's "Ancient Laws and Institutions of England" (1840).

Moral strength rather than moral goodness was the attribute of the ancient peoples of Western Europe, as it is at the present day of the predatory races of Asia. Without the former, however, there can be no real progress; and those peoples possessed, therefore, what is essential to the development of a true morality. We have an analogous case in the ancient Romans, who also possessed the quality of "manliness" in a high degree. This quality was to them the sum of all morality—to which, indeed, they gave the name of "virtue"—meaning, literally, *strength*, as applied to conduct. The "virtue" of the Romans and of the ancient peoples of Europe was thus originally the same quality; and it possessed with each the same possibility of acquiring a true ethical sense. What would have been the result if the latter had been able to frame a test of moral propriety other than that supplied by the idea of "manliness," we cannot say;[1] but as a fact it was reserved to the Greeks and Romans among European peoples to develop for themselves a positive phase of morals.

[1] The predatory peoples of Asia test all conduct by *Deb* (custom), which thus becomes an actual moral standard.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ALTRUISTIC SENTIMENT.

It has been shown in a preceding chapter how the simple sense of wrong, in relation to certain actions of social life, has been transmuted into one of duty. These actions are such as in their performance would injure others, and they may be described simply as those which are forbidden by the second table of the Hebrew Decalogue. It is necessary now to trace the further development of the moral idea—the formation of which, even in the Hebrew mind, was very incomplete.

The distinction already hinted at between active and passive duties may first be referred to. It is evident that there is a great difference between the performance of certain actions because they are right, and the abstaining from others because they are wrong. Both may indeed arise from the existence of the same condition of mind—the love of one's neighbour and regard for his happiness. It is true, moreover, that in one sense the abstaining from injuring others may be said to denote a certain state of action; for it implies the exercise of a restraining power over the selfish instincts. But in the ordinary sense, it is none the less certain that obedience to the commands of the Hebrew Decalogue, which forbid interference with the rights of others, must be a state of passivity. These negative actions may therefore, as being the first to acquire a moral obligation, be distinguished by the name of *duties*; positive actions, those which are really per-

formed for the benefit of others, or rather the mental qualities from which they spring, being called *virtues.* No doubt the performance of the former class of actions is usually accompanied by a virtuous condition of mind, but this is not necessarily so; while on the other hand, it is only in a relative sense that the latter can be said to possess moral obligation. Butler remarks that "benevolence, and the want of it, singly considered, are in no sort the whole of virtue and vice."[1] From this it may be well seen what is intended by the distinction between *duties* and *virtues*—the latter being exactly covered by the term "benevolence," that state of mind which prompts us to seek the good of others.

A little consideration will show that there is a real moral distinction between the two classes of actions referred to. The terms "duty," and "right," are correlative, but the obligation is concerned with some individual other than he to whom the right belongs. Every man is morally bound to respect the rights of others, and the term "duty" is therefore properly applied to those negative actions which result in the non-injury of others. What are characterised as *virtuous* actions are, however, totally different from this in nature as well as in aim; which, instead of being purely negative, is to ensure positive good. Hence, if they are to be treated as duties, it must be on some other ground than that above described. It will not do to object that all such actions as those under discussion are obligatory because they are right, although this would seem to be the general opinion of writers on ethics. The contrary can be established by an examination of the nature of such actions. Their general aim is the good of others, in the large sense required by Christian "charity," which, as synonymous with benevolence,

[1] Dissertation II. (Bohn), p. 340.

includes every form of active virtue. But if we ask what is meant by "good," we find that it is closely connected with the "property" to which the passive actions or *duties* have relation. The term "property" must, however, be taken in a wider sense, and be used to denote not merely a man's possessions, but also his bodily organism, and even his mind; everything in fact that can in any way be said to belong to or to be connected with him. When, therefore, the "good" of others is spoken of, it has reference not only to their material but to their mental concerns. Benevolent actions, in fact, are those which actively minister to a body or mind in need. Thus, while having a certain objective analogy, they differ essentially both in motive and aim from the actions required by the merely passive duties. These are founded on the right which all men have to the possession of their "property;" whereas benevolent actions are not founded on any such right, although their practical effect is to confirm it. Their object in fact is, instead of abstaining from interference with a man's possessions, to aid in preserving them—and this in the largest sense as including body and mind, material and immaterial. But how can the latter be described as morally obligatory in the same sense as the former? Non-performance of the duties of passive morality necessarily results in the infliction of immediate and positive injury, whilst the immediate consequences of a neglect of the active virtues are purely negative. Moreover, the obligation to aid others must have been preceded by a recognition of the wrongfulness of not so doing, and this again by the feeling that it was wrong in others not to have rendered such assistance when required by self—notions that are much beyond the range of man's primitive ideas. It is evident from these considerations that the active duties or virtues, notwith-

standing they are demanded by the rules of an absolute morality, cannot primarily have any idea of obligation attached to them.

It by no means follows, however, that such an idea is not connected with the active duties at a later date, and by tracing their origin we shall see, in fact, that "virtuous" actions do ultimately become recognised as obligatory. How does this take place? We have hitherto been considering what may be called developments of the sense of "right." This has relation primarily to "property," which in its primitive meaning is a man's material life, and that which he has acquired to satisfy its wants and gratify its instincts. Such property every man has a natural right to preserve without interference, so long as he does not, by the way in which he uses it, or otherwise, interfere with the analogous rights of others. In course of time the recognition of these rights becomes transmuted into a feeling of obligation to abstain from interfering with them, resulting finally in the formation of a moral intuition or sense of obligation. Henceforth the passive duties receive the sanction of conscience, and they are performed because it is felt to be proper to observe the rights of others. No doubt the mental development thus exhibited has been largely aided by the fear of retribution, and by the external sanctions of law and religion. The emotions have thus been strongly acted on. Yet it is evident that the beginning and the end of the process has been in consciousness, and that what has taken place is the genesis of an idea. From the simple feeling of right has been evolved the sense of obligation, which has finally become recognised as a law of our nature. It is true that there has also been a genesis of emotions, but this is merely secondary, its chief effect, so far as the emotions are connected with

the idea, being to give the latter a clearer definition, and thus to increase its moral influence. Mr Herbert Spencer very justly says, "The genesis of emotion is distinguished from the genesis of ideas in this: that whereas the ideas are composed of elements that are simple, definitely related, and (in the case of general ideas) constantly related, emotions are composed of enormously complex aggregates of elements which are never twice alike, and that stand in relations which are never twice alike."[1] When, however, Mr Spencer traces the origin of the moral sentiments to the genesis of the emotions, he loses sight, as was previously shown,[2] of that element of "right" which runs throughout them, and which marks the genesis of an idea.

But if the idea of duty in relation to what has been called negative action has had this origin, it is no less true that *benevolence*, that condition of mind which accompanies "virtuous" action, is due to the genesis of emotions. We have here the altruistic sentiments of Mr Herbert Spencer, which he affirms are grounded in sympathy. This is undoubtedly true; but when Mr Spencer adds that this sympathy and the sentiments which spring from it are due to experiences of utility,[3] he is no less incorrect than when he derived the moral sentiments from such experiences. Sympathy would seem to be the last thing that should be referred to such a source as utility, even in the wide sense in which this term is used by Mr Spencer. Pleasurable or painful associations may give rise to a feeling of sympathy, but they could never have first originated sympathy itself. We must look for its origin to a source as fundamental as that from which the idea of right was derived,—in fact, to an instinct of our nature closely connected with the instinct on which that idea is based. Adam

[1] *Loc cit.*, p. 422. [2] *Supra*, p. 39. [3] Do., p. 34 *seq.*

Smith seems to have considered sympathy as originally the same with pity or compassion, "the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner;"[1] the emotion being ascribed to the association in our minds of that misery with our own former states of pain or sorrow. This seems to make sympathy instinctive, and such would appear to have been the intention of Adam Smith when he says, at the opening of his chapter *Of Sympathy,* "how selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion." Mr Darwin, also, is of opinion that sympathy is an instinct "especially directed towards beloved objects, in the same manner as fear with animals is especially directed against certain enemies;" although, following Mr Bain, he thinks the instinct may have originated in "our strong retentiveness of former states of pain or pleasure."[2] Mr Darwin thus appreciates the importance of sympathy, but that he does not see the full extent of its relations is evident from his statement that "with respect to the origin of the parental and filial affections, which apparently lie at the basis of the social affections, it is hopeless to speculate."[3] His not having recognised the fact that these affections are rooted in sympathy, is due to his supposing the latter to be wholly distinct from the emotion of love. A mother, says Mr Darwin, "may passionately love her sleeping and passive infant; but she can then hardly be said to feel sympathy for it." This is perfectly true, but she

[1] "Theory of Moral Sentiments" (Bohn), pp. 3, 5.
[2] "Descent of Man," vol. i., p. 82. [3] Do., p. 80.

is none the less *in* sympathy *with* it, and this is no less the explanation of the love of a man for his dog and of the love of a dog for his master, both of which are equally phases of sympathy. The pity or compassion with which Adam Smith identifies sympathy in its earliest form is also in reality a special phase of this emotion, drawn out towards objects of a particular description. Love and pity are, therefore, intimately allied as manifestations of sympathy, differing between themselves only in the intensity of the emotion, or in the conditions under which it is called into active exercise.

If this be so, the social affections which Mr Darwin says are based on the parental and filial affections, must also be intimately connected with sympathy. But it must be noted that none of those feelings can actually spring from sympathy. This is really an emotion of which such affections are varying phases, and although they are thus intimately related, yet there must be something else by which even sympathy itself is preceded. This can only be an instinct, a mental phase which differs from an emotion in that, while the latter is an actual affection of the mind, the former is only a tendency. Sympathy, therefore, is not, as Mr Darwin supposes, an instinct, although it must be referred to one, and if we would find the source of that condition of benevolence which shows itself in "virtuous" action, we must seek for the instinct of which sympathy is the expression. This is analagous to the course adopted, when the idea of duty or moral obligation was traced through the sense of "right" to the instinct of self-preservation. And let it be noted that in its simplest form the sympathy on which the altruistic sentiments are founded appears, if not quite as early as the sense of right itself, yet as nearly so as the difference between

the objects with which they are concerned will allow. The latter is associated with self, and therefore shows itself in germ with the most simple animal organism; while the former is directed towards others, and, therefore, it must be preceded by the recognition of others, not merely as independent existences, but as standing in the particular relation required to call forth the expression of sympathy.

What then is the simple instinct called into activity by objects outside of self on which the altruistic sentiments are based? It can be none other than the maternal instinct. Mr Darwin has referred to the agony of remorse a bird possessing the migratory instinct would feel when arrived at the end of her journey, "if from being endowed with great mental activity, she could not prevent the image continually passing before her mind of her young ones perishing in the bleak north from cold and hunger." It has been already shown that this is conditioning an impossibility,[1] but the imaginary case is none the less valuable as bearing on the importance of the maternal instinct, which, in another place, Mr Darwin says, is so strong that it leads "even timid birds to face great danger, though with hesitation, and in opposition to the instinct of self-preservation."[2] Elsewhere Mr Darwin speaks of the love of offspring as "one of the strongest of all instincts, common to all the lower animals."[3] So powerful an instinct must be as prominent as that with which it contends, and we may expect, therefore, to find that it is capable of an equally important development. This is so, and its development has now to be traced, commencing at that stage which the maternal instinct must have reached when man first appeared, supposing him to have been derived from a lower animal form, or

[1] *Supra*, p. 50. [2] *Op. cit.*, vol. i., 13. [3] Do., vol. ii., 367.

which it must have exhibited, assuming that when he was specially created he was endowed with the powers and faculties necessary for him to gradually advance towards civilization. We might, indeed, begin at a point still further back; seeing that the maternal instinct itself is based on an earlier natural tendency, the sexual instinct. This, which has the same relation to the race as the instinct of self-preservation has to the individual, is the true starting-point of the development resulting in the formation of the altruistic sentiments. The sexual instinct is, however, among the primitive races of mankind so purely physical, and its satisfaction is attended by so little emotion other than what can be traced to a merely physical source, that in treating of the natural history of morals, it will be sufficient to start with the maternal instinct as the earliest phase in the development of those sentiments.

On any available hypothesis the maternal instinct must have been exhibited among mankind from its very first appearance, but in the earliest stages of human progress it would be partially quenched or rendered nugatory by "the immediate needs of self-preservation," interpreting self-preservation in its widest sense. It is possible that among some uncivilized peoples, as Mackenzie supposes with regard to the Knisteneaux of North America,[1] mothers destroy their infant female children on account of the hardships they will have to bear if they are permitted to grow up. Even Mackenzie, however, allows another motive—the troubles of maternity—which leads the woman to practice abortion, and this appears to be the chief reason for infanticide among uncivilised peoples. It is not, however, the only one. Mr Darwin, indeed, seems inclined to assign for its origin, the difficulty barbarians have to support themselves and

[1] "Voyages from Montreal through North America," (1801) p. xcviii.

their children.[1] But he adds, that "the trouble experienced by the woman in rearing children, their consequent loss of beauty, the higher estimation set on them and their happier fate when few in number, are assigned by the women themselves, and by various observers, as additional motives for infanticide." It will be well to state shortly the actual motives which, according to various authorities, govern certain uncivilised or semi-civilised peoples in the practice of infanticide, a custom so opposed to the instinct of maternity. As to the Australians, Mr Eyre refers the practice to "the desire the woman has to get rid of the trouble of rearing children, and to be able to follow her husband about in his wanderings, which the encumbrance of a child would prevent."[2] The reasons for infanticide among the Polynesian Islanders are more complicated. Mr Ellis assigns them first to the regulation of the Areoi institution, which required its members to destroy all children born to them. Another cause is found in "the weakness and transient duration of the conjugal bond, whereby . . . fidelity was seldom maintained;" the offspring of other unions, in the higher ranks at least, made after the dissolution of that bond being invariably destroyed. Mr Ellis gives as another cause which induced much infanticide the shameless idleness of those who practised it, which led them thus to avoid "the trifling care and effort necessary to provide for their offspring." Finally, the degradation of the Polynesian women was not seldom the determining motive to infanticide. Mr Ellis says: "If the purpose of the unnatural parents had not been

[1] *Op. cit.*, ii., p. 363. This was the reason assigned by the Todas of Southern India for the destruction of their female children. Marshall, *op. cit.*, p. 194.

[2] *Supra*, p. 70. Abortion was practised by the Tasmanian women to escape the troubles of maternity and to preserve their good figures. See Bonwick's "Daily Life, &c.," p. 76.

fully matured before, the circumstance of its being a female child, was often sufficient to alter their determination. Whenever we have asked them, what could induce them to make a distinction so invidious, they have generally answered, that the fisheries, the service of the temple, and especially war, were the only purposes for which they thought it desirable to rear children; but in these pursuits women were comparatively useless; and, therefore, female children were frequently not suffered to live."[1] Another cause leads to the same result among the Chinese—the greater value for certain social requirements of boys over girls,[2] a fact which would prevent the general practice among Eastern peoples of male infanticide. On the other hand, among pastoral races, such as, for example, the Zulus and other Kafir tribes of South Africa, girls being exchangeable for cows are a source of wealth,[3] and are carefully reared accordingly. The chief ground of infanticide among this race is a superstitious feeling which leads them to consider the birth of twins unlucky, a notion which is entertained by other African tribes, among whom sometimes one and sometimes both of the twins are killed.[4] A cause is assigned by Dobrizhoffer for infanticide among the Abipones of Paraguay, which probably has much influence with most uncultured peoples. He says, that during the three years following the birth of a child the husband is not permitted to

[1] *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 255 *seq*; See also Turner's "Nineteen Years in Polynesia," p. 175, and Dieffenbach's "Travels in New Zealand," vol. ii., p. 25.

[2] Doolittle's "Social Life among the Chinese," p. 495.

[3] So also among the Moors of the Great Sahara, he who has the most daughters is the richest man. Durand's "Voyage to Senegal," in "A collection of Modern Voyages," (1806) vol. iv., p. 130. The "marriage price" would probably have great influence in restraining female infanticide with peoples among whom children follow the father's clan. With such peoples poverty or superstition would be the chief cause of infanticide.

[4] Wood, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 10.

have conjugal intercourse with the mother,[1] and he therefore often marries another wife. This leads the women to resort to the practice of abortion, to escape repudiation. It is noticeable that the female children are the most frequently spared by the Abipones for the reason given when speaking of the Kafirs—the exchangeable value of girls.[2] In Madagascar an analogous superstition requires, as we have seen,[3] that all children born on what are thought to be unlucky days should be destroyed. In these cases, probably the custom of infanticide has continued after the original conditions under which it arose have ceased, and hence it has been connected with a superstitious motive. In India, where this custom was formerly very prevalent, although it probably originated in the wish to be free from the trouble and cost of rearing girls, yet among the higher classes it was due to the expense of obtaining husbands for them. The Rajputs considered it a dishonour to have unmarried daughters, and their marriage was attended with such expense and humiliation that the Hindu preferred to escape both evils by the practice of infanticide.[4] This sometimes acquired a religious sanction. Under certain circumstances female children were sacrificed in the temple of Genesa, while in Eastern Bengal they were thrown into the Ganges as offerings to the goddess Ganga.[5]

The moral consequences of infanticide are for the present purpose of more importance than the question

[1] This is one great source of African polygamy. *See* Livingstone's "Last Journals" (1874), vol. i., p. 51.

[2] "Account of the Abipones," (Eng. trans.) vol. ii., p. 97.

[3] *Supra*, p. 153.

[4] This is happily now altered. See "Indian Infanticide," by J. C. Browne, M.A., 1857.

[5] Ward's "History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindus," ii., p. 122 *seq.*

of its origin.[1] As to the former point, although the prevalence of the practice is evidence of a weakening of the maternal instinct, yet this instinct is not destroyed. It is merely lulled to sleep, and is ready at any moment to spring into full activity. It is not improbable that this may have something to do with the existence of the custom of abortion, which is no less general among uncultured peoples than infanticide itself, being indeed only a form of the latter practice. The sight of the breathing infant might be too much for the maternal feeling, and therefore its life is destroyed before it sees the light. So, the curious refinement of cruelty, often practised in putting the infant to death, may really arise from the same feeling—as though the parents would crush the pity in their own hearts by the suffering they inflict on their offspring. That the maternal instinct does not cease to exist, is evident enough from the conduct of the mother to the children whom she permits to live. This might be expected in those cases where infanticide is due to the influence of superstition—as with the Madecasses, by whom children are much prized. But even among the Polynesian islanders, who were formerly at least so reckless in the destruction of infant life, the maternal instinct was by no means lost. If, from any motive, says Mr Ellis, the child was permitted to live for a short period, " it was safe; instead of a monster's grasp, it received a mother's

[1] Mr M'Lennan declares that infanticide "is everywhere referrible to the struggle for existence required by the hard conditions of nature to which savage man is subjected."—(" Primitive Marriage," p. 165). He is of opinion, moreover, that the widespread idea of kinship through females, on which the classificatory system of relationship appears to be founded, arose from the practice of polyandry, and that this again was a modification of promiscuous intercourse between the sexes, resulting from the scarcity of females caused by infanticide. The idea referred to is more likely to have originated in the belief that the mother, as the " womb-man," is more nearly related to her children than the father.

caress and a mother's smile, and was afterwards nursed with solicitude and tenderness. The cruel act was indeed often committed by the mother's hand; but there were times when a mother's love and a mother's feelings overcame the iron force of Pagan custom, and all the mother's influence and endeavours have been used to preserve the child."[1] Nor is it different among the aborigines of Australia. With them the vitality of the maternal instinct does not cease with the death of the object which has drawn it forth; since the mother will often carry on her back the mummified body of her child for many months after that event.[2] This reminds us of the conduct of the Mandan woman, who visits the burial place of the dead that she may hold converse with the skull of her husband or child.[3]

The expression of the maternal instinct is merely the earliest and most simple phase of that sympathy which is the foundation of all the actions of benevolence; which differ, indeed, from the care and solicitude which the mother shows for her infant only in being directed towards other objects. Strange as it may seem, the display of sympathy for strangers is not seldom witnessed among those peoples who the most continually violate the natural instinct of maternity. Touching instances of this have been known to occur among the aborigines of Australia. Although Mr Gideon Lang justly ascribes to the native Australian race the character of "unmitigated selfishness," yet he expressly excepts the women from this charge. He says, "White men are continually being saved from intended massacre, more particularly

[1] *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 255. This agrees with Dieffenbach's observations as to the New Zealanders, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 26.

[2] Mitchell's "Journal of an Expedition, &c.," p. 109.

[3] Catlin's "Manners and Customs of the North American Indians," vol. i., p. 90.

if there is a white woman on the station, through the warnings given by the native women, always at great danger to themselves, and on one occasion within my own knowledge a woman was punished by death." Mr Lang relates an incident which shows, moreover, that they will make great efforts to save even native men from slaughter. On one occasion "some blacks were attacked by hostile natives, when three were unable to get away, and to save them the women pushed them down and threw themselves over them in a heap. The men dragged the women off, beating them with their waddies and tomahawks till they were covered with blood, but as fast as they were dragged off they returned, until the ferocity of the men was allayed."[1] Nor is this conduct to be wondered at. The women among savage peoples are so harshly treated, and their maternal sympathetic feeling has so little opportunity of exercising itself towards those who are its most natural objects, that when the opportunity offers it will find some other outlet.

The "benevolence" which the Australian savage thus knows how to exercise, can be no less strongly displayed by the women of other barbarous or semi-civilized peoples. The story of Pocahontas, the Virginian "princess,"[2] no less than that of the nameless woman who so opportunely relieved the wants of Mungo Park,[3] is almost classic. These cases could be paralleled by others derived from the history of travel and adventure in every land. Drury pathetically relates that he perceived, as his master's wife listened to the story of the misadventures of himself and his companions, that tears frequently stood in her eyes, and she did what was in

[1] "The Aborigines of Australia," p. 33.

[2] For this story see Smith's "History of Virginia," Pinkerton's "Voyages and Travels," vol. xiii., p. 54, *seq.*

[3] "Travels in Central Africa," vol. i., p. 193.

her power to alleviate his misfortunes.[1] This experience agrees with that of Mungo Park, who declared that he did not recollect a single instance of hard-heartedness towards him in the Mandingo women. "In all my wanderings," he says, "I found them uniformly kind and compassionate."[2] So also, Du Chaillu affirms that "women are ever kind and ready to help the helpless, even in brutalised Africa." [3]

It is evident that the sympathetic feeling which agitates the female bosom at the sight of objects of helplessness and distress is capable of almost endless development. It is true that, as Mr Herbert Spencer remarks, "Sympathy could become dominant only when the mode of life, instead of being one that habitually inflicted direct pain, became one which conferred direct and indirect benefits; the pains inflicted being mainly incidental and indirect." [4] But, long before it became dominant, sympathy would be gradually widening its range and extending its influence. Man, in the earlier stages of uncivilised life, trained in the severe school of nature, looks upon the shedding of human blood with utter unconcern, and but too often, in addition, takes a pleasure in witnessing the sufferings of his enemy. There can be no wonder, then, that the treatment which the wife of the savage receives at his hands is usually severe and in many cases wantonly cruel. Severity, moreover, is the policy among uncultured peoples, since it is difficult to rule except by fear where there is little sense of right other than that conferred by might. A milder rule can, however, be appreciated by the savage, and none the less so when it forms an exception to his ordinary experience. It is extremely improbable that

[1] "Adventures in Madagascar," (1807 Ed.), p. 65.
[2] *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 257.
[3] "Equatorial Africa," p. 463.
[4] *Loc. cit.*, p. 430.

the moral superiority exhibited by Mohammed A'skia, "the greatest sovereign that ever ruled over Negroland," is to be ascribed wholly to the influence of Mohammedanism. Although apparently of pure negro descent, he was highly esteemed and venerated by the most learned and rigid Mohammedans. Dr Barth supposes that he exhibited an example "of the highest degree of development of which negroes are capable,"[1] and we may well believe that he was one of those superior men who from time to time appear within the bosom of all races not immersed in absolute barbarism.

Probably the existence among semi-civilised peoples of such men is less uncommon than we are accustomed to suppose. Such a one was the native of Glass Town mentioned by Du Chaillu in the following terms:—"Though not a professing Christian, . . . he was really, in manners and conduct, a black gentleman; genial, affable, polite, kind, and benevolent. . . . As an extraordinary proof of his benevolence and enlightenment, with his last words he forbade strictly that any of his slaves should be killed over his grave: unlike one of his fellow-chiefs, Toko, who, dying but a little while before, had a great number of poor wretches tortured and killed at his funeral."[2] The old chief Quenqueza, another West African friend of Du Chaillu, notwithstanding his extreme superstition, evidently possessed a certain elevation of mind. Such also must be said of the Basouto chief Mosheshe,[3] and of the Bechuana, Molehabangue, who, says Mr Moffat, was universally spoken of as being "a superior man, distinguished as a statesman as well as a warrior. His kindness to strangers was also proverbial, a trait of character not always very

[1] *Op. cit.*, vol. iv., p. 414, *seq.*
[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 21.
[3] See Moffat, *op. cit.*, p. 609, *seq.*

conspicuous among savages."[1] Mungo Park relates an instance of African magnanimity which could only spring from a true nobility of soul. The territories of Damel, a Jaloff king, had been invaded without provocation by a Mohammedan Foota chief, who was, however, defeated and taken prisoner. The prisoner expected to be put to death according to native custom; but when he was brought into the presence of Damel, the Jaloff king, while upbraiding him, spared his life, and said, "I will retain you as a slave until I perceive that your presence in your own kingdom will no longer be dangerous to your neighbours, and then I will consider of the proper way of disposing of you." Some time afterwards the prisoner was released on the entreaty of his subjects.[2] Somewhat of the same spirit was exhibited by the Mandan chief who, instead of taking away the life of one of his wives, who returned to him after having gone away with a man who could not maintain her, sent for her lover, and finding that they were really attached to each other, presented him not only with the woman, but with three horses for their support.[3] Men of a superior character were probably by no means rare among the American tribes,[4] or among the islanders of the Pacific.[5]

What is the actual cause of the appearance from time to time of men who differ so much by their mildness or nobility of character from the type usually presented by

[1] Do., p. 215. As to the Bechuana chief Sechele, see Livingstone's "Missionary Travels," p. 16.

[2] *Op. cit.* vol. i., p. 334.

[3] Lewis and Clarke's "Travels to the Source of the Missouri River" (Ed. 1815), vol. i., p. 232.

[4] For several examples among the tribes of the North-West, see Ross Cox, *op. cit.* vol. i.. p. 222, vol. ii., p. 17, and *supra* p. 233.

[5] Such was Kaméhaméha I. of the Sandwich Islands. Mariner says that the Tongan chiefs exhibited a keen sense of honour, and that they had a "high admiration of what is generous and liberal in sentiment and conduct," *op. cit.*, vol. ii., pp. 144, 148.

their fellows, we can but surmise. Considering, however, the analogous result exhibited among more cultured peoples as the effect of maternal influence, we can hardly be wrong in supposing that woman has much to do with the amelioration of manners even among savages. We know, at least, that what is meant by "a mother's love" is by no means unappreciated by the African peoples. Among the negro tribes, especially, the mother is loved far more than the father; and the greatest affront, says Mungo Park, which can be offered to a negro, is to reflect on her who gave him birth.[1] A West African proverb is, "a mother's love is best of all."[2] Dr Livingstone also remarks, that among the non-Bechuana tribes of South Central Africa, children cleave to the mother in cases of separation between the parents, or removal from one part of the country to another. It is quite different with the Bechuanas, who care nothing for their mothers, but cling to their fathers, especially if there is a chance of heirship to their cattle.[3] This difference of feeling in relation to parents agrees with the ideas entertained as to woman in general, the more Northern tribes paying much more respect to her than those of the South.[4] The mother, doubtless, has greater influence for good over her son than his wife possesses, although in the latter case it is sometimes by no means slight. Thus among the Kafirs, young

[1] *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 258.

[2] Burton's "Wit and Wisdom," p. 129, *note*. The Damara is said to swear "by the tears of my mother." Among the Hindus, "O my mother!" is used, especially by women, as a common exclamation of sorrow, surprise, fear, and other emotions. Capt. Burton's "Vikram and the Vampire" (1870), Pref. p. xi.

[3] "Missionary Travels," p. 309. But among the Zulus, when a woman's strength fails, if her son is grown up, she goes to live with him. Grout's "Zululand," p. 416.

[4] Livingstone, *op. cit.*, p. 219. According to Burckhardt, the Arabs have great respect for women, and a son will more readily support his mother in old age than his father.

women not only often manage to have their own way in the choice of a husband; but even after marriage, if the wife happens to possess an intellect superior to that of her husband, she will sometimes gain a thorough ascendancy over him, "guiding him in all his transactions, whether of peace or war." [1]

Although among uncultured peoples woman's influence is too often exercised rather for evil than for good, yet it cannot be doubted that to the sympathy springing from the maternal instinct must be traced much of the "benevolent" action of more cultured peoples. Nor is it difficult to ascertain the stages of such a development. The maternal instinct differs from the instinct in which originates the sense of right, in that, while the latter has relation primarily to self, the former is directed towards some one else. The feeling to which the exercise of the maternal instinct gives rise is personal, but the simple emotion becomes sympathy only when it is drawn out towards another. Nor is the feeling thus expressed merely a reproduction, as Adam Smith appears to have supposed, of an emotion which has been previously aroused in our minds as the result of our own experience. It is true that we can form no definite idea of the manner in which other men are affected, except "by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation." It is true, also, that "as to be in pain or distress of any kind excites the most excessive sorrow; so, to conceive or to imagine that we are in it, excites some degree of the same emotion, in proportion to the vivacity or dulness of the conception." It may be admitted, also, that "whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spec-

[1] Wood's "Natural History of Man," i. p. 80.

tator."[1] But let it be noticed that this by no means requires that any sympathy for the sufferer should accompany such emotion. If the perception of sorrow in others arouses only an analogous emotion in ourselves, it can do no more than create in us also a feeling of sorrow. This, however, is not in itself sympathy; and at the utmost, the feeling could only recall an analogous state of mind which we had before experienced, with its associated circumstances. Even the conception, however vivid, that we are in the same mental condition as the person whose sufferings we are viewing, could have no other effect by itself than to make our own feeling the more acute. Adam Smith, indeed, is half-conscious that there is something more in sympathy than he allows. Thus, he says that "upon some occasions sympathy may seem to arise merely from the view of a certain emotion in another person. The passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be transferred from one man to another, instantaneously, and antecedent to any knowledge of what excited them in the person principally concerned."[2] He adds, however, that this sympathy is always extremely imperfect. "General lamentations," he says, "which express nothing but the anguish of the sufferer, create rather a curiosity to inquire into his situation, along with some disposition to sympathize with him, than any actual sympathy that is very sensible." He concludes, therefore, that sympathy "does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it."[3] No doubt our sympathy is imperfect until we know what gives rise to the passion which has aroused it, but not in the sense that Adam Smith supposes. The imperfection is not in the emotion, which retains its character from the first view of the passion of another, but in our knowledge. Instead of

[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 1, *seq.* [2] *Op. cit.*, p. 6. [3] Do., p. 7.

being subjective, it is objective. When we are informed of the cause of grief or joy in another, our sympathy becomes definite and thence intensified, owing to its being directed in a particular channel; but it is always the same emotion. Adam Smith's own words almost require this, since he admits that there is a disposition to sympathize with another before the cause of his lamentations is known. Moreover he does not deny that there is actual sympathy, but only that there is any "that is very sensible." But if there is sympathy in any degree, however indefinite, the emotion clearly does not arise primarily from the view of "the situation which excites it." This gives it a definite direction and expression; but the view of the passion first arouses the sympathy, rendering it evident that this is not a mere reproduction of an emotion which has previously affected our own minds as the result of our own sufferings. We have no pity or compassion for ourselves when we are in sorrow, and the more intense our grief the less are we able to exercise any such pity. Even the contemplation of our own past sorrow arouses no emotion of pity or compassion for ourselves. When, therefore, the contemplation of the misery of others calls forth such an emotion, it cannot, as Adam Smith supposes, be through any exercise of the imagination. It can only be through the force of some instinct which leads us to pity or compassionate others in affliction, the sight of their passion being sufficient to arouse the feeling of sympathy which is its simplest expression.

We have now to trace the developments of sympathy and to show how it comes to exhibit itself as the active virtue of benevolence. Mr Herbert Spencer remarks that the development of sympathy is dependent on reflection.[1] This must be admitted, but in its earlier

[1] *Loc. cit.*, p. 430.

stages at least, it is largely dependent on some other cause. No amount of reflection alone will widen the range of sympathy or increase its force. It must be attended by a moral amelioration at the social centre from which the sympathy itself has its source. This is first shown in the development of the family idea, the formation of which is absolutely necessary before any feeling of general benevolence can be generated. Among most, if not all primitive peoples, as we know them, the family relationships are already recognised, whatever may be the terms in which such relationships are expressed.[1] The idea of the "family" was originally founded on the relationship between the mother and her child, an opinion which is consistent with the fact of the maternal instinct being the earliest phase of the altruistic sentiment which is developed. Owing no doubt in great measure to the nature of the primitive family, its ties, as distinguished from those of the clan, were weak, and there is no wonder therefore that when, on attaining to manhood, the males are admitted to the rights of the tribe, their tribal relations should become stronger than those of blood, except where the interests of the clan are concerned. Mr Hunter refers to the admission into the tribe as one of the great events in the life of the Santal,[2] and such would seem to be the case among all primitive peoples. Thus among the Australian aborigines the young men are required to undergo certain initiatory rites before they are admitted to the privileges of the tribe. The initiation is marked by an outward sign and by the communication of certain ideas which are retained with great secrecy.[3]

[1] The most primitive phase of the classificatory system has the terms *brother* and *sister*.

[2] *Supra*, p. 134.

[3] The ceremonies on initiation among the natives of New South Wales are minutely described and illustrated by Collins. See his "Account of the English Colony in New South Wales," vol. i., p. 565, *seq*. See also Lang's "Queensland," p. 342, *seq*.

Whatever may be the nature of these ideas they are probably accompanied by symbolic representation. The tribe thus becomes a kind of secret association, embracing all the male members of the tribe who have attained to manhood, and the priests of which are those who perform the initiatory rites. The same mode of association evidently exists among the aborigines of North America. Each tribe has its lodge, admission to which can be obtained only after certain rites have been duly observed, their performance conferring certain privileges.[1]

The ceremonies performed among the Mandans of North America and some neighbouring peoples, as described by Catlin,[2] are very peculiar, but their object is without doubt that which is attained by other tribes in a simpler mode—the initiation of the young men into the privileges of manhood and the rights of the tribe, accompanied by acts of self-denial and physical endurance. Humboldt relates that among the Caribs of South America, the young chiefs, and also the young men desirous of marrying, have to undergo very severe fasts and penances; are purged with the fruit of Euphorbiaceæ; are placed on hot stoves; and take medicines prepared by the sorcery doctors, the *Marirris* or *Piaches*, answering to the war-physic of the northern natives.[3] Among the North American tribes every Indian must "make mystery" or obtain the protection of some mysterious power which is supposed to be connected with the mystery bag. This is considered to be the gift of the Great Spirit, and hence is viewed with the highest degree

[1] Many of the tribal privileges relate to food, the right to use particular kinds of flesh, &c., being restricted to certain members of the tribe. As to this subject, in connection with the Australian aborigines, see Mitchell's "Journal of Two Expeditions," vol. ii., p. 237.

[2] "North American Indians," vol. i. p. 157, *seq.*, 232, *seq.*, and see *infra*.

[3] "Personal Narrative," vol. vi., p. 42.

of superstitious regard, to the extent even of sacrifices being made to it. The rites attending the obtaining the "mystery" have evidently much the same significance as those above mentioned.[1] When a boy has attained the age of fourteen or fifteen years, he absents himself for several days from his father's lodge, "lying on the ground in some remote or secluded spot, crying to the Great Spirit, and fasting the whole time. During this period of peril and abstinence, when he falls asleep, the first animal, bird, or reptile, of which he dreams, (or pretends to have dreamed, perhaps) he considers the Great Spirit has designated for his mysterious protector through life. He then returns home to his father's lodge, and relates his success, and after allaying his thirst and satiating his appetite, he sallies forth with weapons or traps until he can procure the animal or bird, the skin of which he preserves entire, and ornaments it according to his own fancy, and carries it with him through life, for good luck (as he calls it): as his strength in battle and in death his guardian spirit, that is buried with him, and which is to conduct him safe to the beautiful hunting grounds, which he contemplates in the world to come."[2] Initiatory customs, which are intended to teach the duties as well as the rights of manhood, are not unknown to the African peoples. Among the pastoral tribes of the South especially they are almost universal, and appear to be connected with the practice of circumcision (*boguera*).[3] The custom of general fraternity among all the adult male members of the tribe would

[1] Like the Australian *kobong*, the American *totem* forms a bond of association between the individual and the "mystery" spirit, in the same way as the tribal ceremonies operate as a bond of connection between the initiated and the other members of the tribe.

[2] Catlin, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 36; vol. ii., p. 247.

[3] Livingstone's "Missionary Travels," p. 146; also Casalis' "Les Basoutos," p. 271, *seq.*

seem, however, to have given place among the negroes of Guinea to an institution more analogous to modern freemasonry, "although in reality having little in common with this system."[1] At Abeokuta the African "freemasonry" is known as *Ogbomi*, the *Egbo* of the Bonny River.[2] Mr Hutchinson says that in Kameroons and Kalabar there is an Egboship among the freemen and also two orders of Egbo, called *Mikuka* and *Bangolo*, to which freemen and slaves are alike admitted. The slaves have also orders of their own. All the Egbos are kept as secret as freemasonry, but they are more analogous to political and trade associations and are used chiefly as engines of oppression.[3]

A similar institution has been described by various travellers as existing among the peoples of Senegal, under the name of *porra*. As known to the Gallinas of Sierra Leone it is of two kinds, the religious and the political. The former appears, like the *boguera* of the Bechuanas, to be connected with the initiation of the young men into the rights of manhood, the essential preliminary being the performance of circumcision. Mr J. M. Harris in describing this institution,[4] says that the person to be admitted into the religious *porra* "must also live in the porra bush, apart from the rest of the population, for a certain time, during which time no female must set eyes on him; and he is supposed, in country *parlance*, to have been eaten by the porra devil. After his initiation, when he is about to be released from the porra bush, a porra name is given to him, such

[1] Burton's "Abeokuta and the Cameroon Mountains," vol. i., p. 257, *seq*.

[2] Hutchinson's "Impressions of Western Africa," p. 141, *seq*.

[3] Hutchinson's "Ten Years' Wanderings among the Ethiopians," (1861), p. 4.

[4] A similar institution is described by Caillié as existing among the tribes of the Rio Nuñez, and also among the Bambaras and Timanees (*op. cit.*, pp. 153, *seq.* 400).

as *Banna Cong*, &c., &c., and he is then supposed to have been delivered from the belly of the porra devil." This porra has its counterpart in an institution among the women called *boondoo*,[1] initiation into which is always preceded by *excision*. The political rather than the religious *porra* would seem to answer to the *Egbo* of the negro tribes. Whatever its origin, it is now chiefly used, says Mr Harris, "for the purpose of arranging the affairs of the nation, settling disputes between different tribes or sections of tribes, and also for enforcing the laws of the country in cases of dissensions among the people. It immediately stops any quarrel which is supposed to be taken in hand by the chiefs for settlement, and the matter in dispute is then to be argued in the *barry*, by both parties, before the chiefs and headmen, who sit as a jury. This porra frequently meets in cases of war between two tribes, with which, however, it has no connexion, and steps in between the belligerents to settle the dispute and stop the war. The people comprising the porra deputation are always held sacred; and should any of them be injured by either party, the whole of the tribes would take the matter up."[2]

It is probable that the tribal initiation was originally introduced as a means of counteracting the disintegrating tendency which accompanied the operation of the rule of relationship through the mother. With the establishment of the paternal authority, however, and the consequent following by the children of the clan of their father,[3] the occasion for such initiation would gradually be lost.

[1] The South African *tapu* is called *boonda*. In North Africa the term *toong*, "sealed up by magic," is used. See Mungo Park, *op. cit.*, vol ii., p. 18.

[2] "Memoirs of the Anthropological Society of London," vol. ii., p. 31, *seq.*

[3] This would seem to be the universal rule among the aboriginal tribes of India.

The tribal authority may still be weak owing to the rivalry or disputes of the several clans of which it is composed, but it will usually be found that in the presence of external danger, the clans sink their differences, and unite against the common enemy. Moreover, when the father takes his proper position, not merely as the head, but as the source of the family, new emotions will be aroused. Although perhaps not so strong nor so constant in its activity as the maternal instinct, the paternal instinct undoubtedly shows itself at an early stage of culture among primitive peoples. As the paternal authority becomes established it is possible that the sympathy between the father and his children, as a mere feeling of affection, may be somewhat weakened. It would be replaced however to some extent by a feeling of fear, which under certain conditions would be resolved into awe, and finally into veneration, responding to the sense of dignity which the head of the family has acquired. The respect for old age which is commonly shown among uncultured peoples would already have prepared the way for such a result. The reverence for the head of the family which is thus developed may continue after the death of him who has called it forth, and with those who have attained a certain degree of culture, it exhibits itself as ancestor-worship. Among such peoples, therefore, we shall expect to find the idea of the family in its modern sense fully recognised. No doubt, a phase of ancestor-worship is traceable among the Polynesian islanders, but it is of that indefinite kind which has for its object the satisfaction of what were before termed "the rights of the dead," rather than actual worship, and the domestic habits of that people are eminently unsocial, and their family ties very loose.[1] Much the same must be said as to the social

[1] Ellis, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 128.

customs of the aboriginal inhabitants of the American continent and of Western Africa, who can hardly be said to have yet advanced beyond the lowest phase of *spiritism.* A nearer approach to ancestor-worship than any of those peoples exhibit is found among some of the South African tribes.[1] The spirits of the dead are thought to retain power over the affairs of those whom they have left behind, a father, however, limiting his attention to his own family, and a chief to the affairs of his tribe, the consequence being that no Kafir shows any respect for the ancestral spirits of others.[2] Sacrifices are made to the spirits to avert an evil, as in case of sickness, barrenness of wife, serious accident—or to procure a blessing, and sometimes as a thank offering.[3] Mr Shooter asserts, and no doubt truly, that to sacrifice is simply in the nature of a gift, and the worship with which it is associated has little of the reverential spirit. There is still too much of the element of fear which marks the propitiation of the ancestral manes found among the Polynesian islanders. Agreeably with this view, although the Kafir is remarkably domestic and sociable, and very fond of his children, yet his regard for human life is so slight, that he cannot be expected to display much external benevolence. He is, nevertheless, extremely hospitable, not only to white men, but to his fellows, as "on a journey, any one may go to the kraal of a stranger, and will certainly be fed and lodged, both according to his rank and position."[4] Woman, too, would seem to occupy a higher position among the Kafirs than among the native Ameri-

[1] As to the ancestor-worship of the Amazulu, and its connection with serpent-worship, see Canon Calloway's "Religious System of the Amazulu," Part ii.

[2] Shooter, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

[3] Do., p. 163, *seq.*, Wood, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 186.

[4] Wood, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 7.

can tribes, or the peoples of Polynesia. Moreover, although her position is one of great inferiority, and often of extreme hardship, yet she usually possesses certain rights of property which may give her considerable influence.[1]

The Madecasses, or at least the ruling tribe among them, the Hovas, have a more developed form of ancestor-worship[2] than that of the Kafirs, and their social condition is also more advanced. They highly honour their departed ancestors, showing them respect by spending large sums over their funeral rites. One of the chief objects of a man's life is the construction of his own tomb, while sometimes he will completely impoverish himself and his family in celebrating the observances and feasts required on the death of a parent or other relation.[3] These things testify, says Mr Sibree, "to the honour in which they hold the dead, and this respect increases instead of diminishing with lapse of years. In some undefined and misty way, the spirits of the deceased relatives are supposed still to watch over and protect those who are left behind; prayers are offered to them, their assistance is supplicated, certain offerings are made at their tombs, and any command or wish of their ancestors is remembered and obeyed with scrupulous care."[4] Agreeably to this reverential feeling towards the dead, we see among the Madecasses a corresponding improvement in social life as compared with the allied peoples of South Africa. Evidence of family affection is furnished

[1] Shooter, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

[2] See Ellis's "History of Madagascar," vol. i. p. 401. The reverence for the memory of the Vazimba, (*see* vol. i. p. 424, *seq.*), would seem to shew that these were the ancestors of the Hovas. The father of Ralambo, from whom the Hova monarch must always be able to trace his descent, is expressly said to have been a Vazimba (do. vol. ii., p. 117).

[3] Do. vol. i., p. 243 *seq.*; Sibree, *op. cit.*, p. 246.

[4] Do. p. 393.

by the pleasing custom of young peoples presenting to their mothers a piece of money, called *fòfon damòsina*, "fragrance of the back," as a token of gratitude for the maternal care, and in remembrance of the time when they were "carried in the folds of their parent's lamba." [1] The domestic sociality of the Madecasses is evidenced by the fact that married sons frequently reside close to their parents, their dwellings, with the houses of the slaves and other outbuildings, being within a common enclosure.[2] The mildness of the Madecasses when not excited by passion is exhibited in their system of slavery. This appears to be, as Mr Sibree remarks, really a "domestic institution." Unkind treatment is very rare, and slaves are even coaxed and flattered when they are wanted to work. They are addressed as "friends" and "relatives," while the older slaves are called the "fathers" and "mothers" of the household. They can, however, be sold, but this is very unusual, and it is seldom that a family is divided. Slaves can accumulate money and may hold positions of trust and confidence, and "there seems little of that sharp line of separation between them and free people which one would have supposed, or any feeling of prejudice against them." [3] Finally the social superiority thus exhibited by the Madecasses, is confirmed by the position woman holds among them. She appears not to be a mere slave and drudge, nor is she treated as essentially inferior to man. Owing to the husband having an almost absolute power of divorce, the condition of the wife is capable of improvement; yet, says Mr Sibree, "public opinion acts as a restriction upon such power being very arbitrarily exercised ; and women have an influence and position of considerable importance." This

[1] *Supra*, p. 195. [2] Do., p. 210.

[3] Do. 242. Mr Ellis' account of Madecasse state slavery is not so favourable ; "History of Madagascar," vol. i., p. 192, *seq*.

is well shown by the fact that they have often exercised great power as chiefs,[1] and that they are allowed to occupy the throne. It is thus evident that the Madecasses have made a considerable advance in the development of those social feelings of which benevolent action is the expression.[2] The sympathy on which the social instincts are founded, expresses itself, moreover, in that general mildness of manner for which the Madecasses are undoubtedly, notwithstanding some appearances to the contrary, distinguished.

Although the Madecasses certainly show considerable social improvement, the attention to the feelings or wants of others which they exhibit can hardly be said to be founded on the sense of duty. The idea of moral obligation seems, indeed, to have but slight influence over the Madecasse mind, even in relation to actions which interfere with the rights of others,[3] and it is not likely, therefore, to have much to do with actions which have no such foundation, but spring only from sympathetic instinct. This opinion is confirmed by Mr Ellis's statement that "no impressions exist respecting moral responsibility and its specific moral obligations." He adds: "the exercise of the domestic, social and civil virtues depends upon the frail basis of the customs of antiquity, and the established usages of the country. These at least serve as their guide and standard while they are enforced by the sanction of the law, and the enactments of the sovereign. Hence it may easily be inferred how egregiously erroneous will be the comparative scale of virtues and vices as drawn by a Malagasy. Chicanery, lying, cheating, and defrauding, are mere trifles compared with the enormous offences of trampling

[1] *Supra*, p. 188.
[2] Drury spoke highly of their humanity, as well as of their love, tenderness, and generosity, "Adventures," p. 221.
[3] *Supra*, p. 157.

or dancing upon a grave, eating pork in certain districts where it is prohibited, running after an owl or a wild cat, or preparing enchantments."[1]

It is at this stage that the exercise of reflection is required, and until this faculty is called into play, sympathy can have no further development. The genesis of the altruistic sentiment presents a perfect analogy to that of the moral intuitions, although differing in its origin and in the phenomena which accompany the process. The ideas of morality are founded on the instinct of self-preservation, which social experiences develop into a sense of right, followed by the recognition of the rights of others. The benevolent emotions spring from the social instincts, which are based, through its maternal and paternal developments, on the sexual instinct, and their influence is seen in a more satisfactory condition of the family relations, and a great improvement in the general conduct towards society at large. It is necessary, however, before the idea of right which comes to be attached to virtuous actions can be transformed into a sense of duty, that the actions which are recommended by social usage should be commanded under some stronger sanction. This sanction could be none other than such a one as that under which, as we have seen, the abstaining from interference with the rights of others became recognised as a moral obligation. By an analogous process must the simple sympathy, which underlies the social instincts, be transmuted into the benevolence which reveals itself in the active duties of social life. A religious sanction is, indeed, more necessary for the latter object than for the former; since the passive duties through being based on the instinct of self-preservation, which finally expresses itself as a sense of right, already possess an element of obligation.

[1] "History of Madagascar," vol. i., p. 394.

Such a religious sanction as that just referred to was supplied by Buddhism, which has an extraordinary influence over the religious ideas of its followers, and which has also done much towards establishing altruistic morality on a positive basis. Of Buddhism as a developed system we shall have to treat fully in a future chapter. The moral ideas of the peoples of Central Asia who are subject to that phase of it which is known as Lamaism have been already considered.[1] It is in South-Eastern Asia, however, that the teachings of Gautama have borne their chief fruit, and the social phenomena presented by the Chinese and allied peoples require more careful attention. That Buddhism influenced the moral ideas and the manners of the civilized nations of the American continent is often asserted, and we shall find that those nations were not wanting in the altruistic sentiment. As a system of morals Mohammedanism is perhaps not so advanced as Buddhism, but its ameliorating influence over the social manners of the peoples who have embraced it, is by no means slight. Much depends on the agency by which it is propagated,[2] but the active virtues of the Mohammedan nations of Asia will, on the whole, compare favourably with those of the followers of Gautama, whatever may be said as to the development of the passive or positive virtues. Before treating, however, of the moral influence of advanced religious systems such as those just mentioned, it will be necessary to refer to certain earlier phenomena which have not only been very widely spread, but which would seem to have been essential to the development of systematic altruism. It has already been shown that, as the ties which bound together the primitive "family"

[1] *Supra*, p. 269 *seq.*

[2] This will explain the difference of opinion as to the character of the influence exerted by Mohammedanism over the African peoples, see *supra*, p. 187.

or clan became weakened, the authority of the tribe was established, for the enforcement between the various individuals composing it of those simple moral obligations which had been previously recognised as binding on the members of the same clan. The action of the tribal authority had relation, however, only to the negative side of morals, the passive duties of the social life. The altruistic sentiment which reveals itself in the active virtues is not very strongly developed during the early stage of society represented by the clan, but still it exists, and analogy would require that it should become at least as influential within the tribe as it had been within the clan. And such was undoubtedly the case. Founded as they are originally in the maternal instinct, the benevolent phase of morals may be said to represent the feminine side of man's nature. Yet, perhaps the most important instrument in its development has been man rather than woman. This we might expect from the somewhat passive nature of the latter. With highly cultured peoples, among whom man occupies comparatively slight social advantages, woman often exhibits great energy in the furtherance of benevolent objects. Under less favourable conditions it is different, and to man must we look for the practical development of the active virtues. Proof of the truth of this statement may be found in the significant custom of "brotherhood," traces of which are to be met with among peoples in every part of the world, however uncultured. Whatever may be the ceremony performed, the object of it in all cases is to establish a certain special and intimate relation, almost sacred in its character, between the parties to it. Even the Australians are fond of making *kotaiga*, or brotherhood, with strangers, the parties to which are considered "as having mutual responsibilities, each being bound to forward the welfare of the other."[1] Probably

[1] Wood's "Natural History of Man," vol. ii., p. 81.

one of the most primitive ceremonies of this description is that practised in Madagascar. There the alliance is made between two, or it may be three or four persons, "by a small portion of blood being drawn from the bosom near the heart, and each party swallowing some of that taken from his friend. By this solemn act it is thought that each partakes to some extent of the very life of the other, and is henceforth one with him. A long form of oath is repeated, binding the covenanting parties to help each other at all needful times with property, exertion, and even life, if necessary, and imprecating fearful calamities upon their heads should the vow be broken."[1]

This *covenant of blood* is practised by the Balondo[2] and other African tribes,[3] as well as by the Kayans of Borneo, who either mix the blood with water or draw it in with the smoke from a cigar, invoking God and the spirits of good and evil to witness the ceremony.[4] In the South Sea Islands, if one of two brothers or intimate friends was slain in battle, the survivor dipped his hand in the blood of the dead one, and rubbed it over his own body, "to manifest his affection, alleviate his grief, and stimulate to revenge."[5] Among the Zacatecas of Mexico the blood of a third person was used to cement friendship between neighbouring tribes. The ears of the victim were pierced with a sharpened bone, and the contracting parties anointed themselves with the blood which flowed from the wounds.[6] There are various

[1] Sibree, *op. cit.*, p. 240; Ellis' "History of Madagascar," vol. i., p. 187, *seq.*

[2] Livingstone's "Missionary Travels," p. 488.

[3] See Speke, *op. cit.*, 515; Baker, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 53.

[4] St John's "Forests of the Far East," vol. i., p. 116; also Ellis, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 191, *n.*

[5] Ellis, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 290.

[6] Bancroft's "Native Races of the Pacific States of North America," vol. i., p. 636.

other modes by which this covenanted relationship may be entered into. For instance, among the aborigines of North America, smoking through the same pipe is considered as having such an effect.[1] Smoking together is, as mentioned above, combined with the covenant of blood among the natives of Borneo. With some primitive peoples the mere exchange of names is considered as establishing a close bond of friendship. Such is the case among the Manganja of Southern Africa,[2] and also in America, among the Shoshones of the Missouri Valley, who think that to give to a friend one's own name is "an act of high courtesy, and a pledge, like that of pulling off the moccasin, of sincerity and hospitality."[3] The exchange of names is thought by the South Sea Islanders to establish a kind of relationship, not only between the persons themselves, but also between their people generally.[4] Lamont describes the *pehu* ceremony which was performed by the Penrhyn Islanders in honour of their white visitors, and which he found was a form of *adoption*, each of the white men "becoming from that time forth the chosen child of some leading man in the place; standing in the same position to all his relations as his own children, and even enjoying some additional privileges."[5] Among the tribes of North America many of the prisoners taken in their savage warfare were saved from the torture and death to which they would otherwise have been doomed, by adoption into families which had lost one of their members

[1] See *infra*.

[2] Livingstone's "Expedition to the Zambezi," p. 149. The inhabitants of Car Nicobar are fond of changing names with visitors. See "The Journal of the Anthropological Institute" (1873), p. 5.

[3] Lewis and Clark, *op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 182.

[4] Lamont's "Wild Life among the Pacific Islanders," p. 33.

[5] Do., p. 125; an analogous custom is found in Abyssinia, where grown-up persons practise what is called *tout-lidge*, or child-adoption. Parkyns, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

in the conflict. The persons thus adopted were received as members of the tribe, and became absolutely incorporated with it.[1] Adoption is by no means an uncommon practice among primitive peoples, and Sir John Lubbock explains its frequency, and the fact that "it is often considered to be as close a connection as real parentage," by the prevalence of social conditions arising out of "communal marriage."[2] The reverse of this, however, is nearer the truth; as the binding nature of adoption proves how fully recognised is the force of the blood-tie which it imitates.

Among the ancient Romans, probably, as among the Greeks,[3] there was a feeling of attachment, or rather perhaps of duty arising from kinship, which led clansmen to recognise the obligation of uniting in self-defence and revenging any injury done to an individual member of the clan. This is one of the most common rules of conduct among uncultured peoples, arising from the idea of a certain blood relationship subsisting between all persons bearing the same family or clan name, although ultimately the mere fact of the same name being borne by several persons may come to be considered, as among the Chinese, a sufficient proof of relationship without reference to blood. If this be so, we can the better understand how it is possible for peoples to think that engagements can be entered into by persons who are in no wise related, which shall be equally binding as though they were united by the strongest ties of blood. Nor are such ideas confined to uncultured races. They have been handed down to the present day among the predatory nations of Asia, and even the peoples of South-Eastern Europe. Artificial kinship is thus constituted

[1] See Scaver's interesting account of the Experiences of Mary Jemison, entitled, "Deh-He-Wa-Mis."

[2] "The Origin of Civilization" (3rd ed.), p. 88.

[3] *Op. cit.*, i., p. 476.

by the Morlacchi with whom two male friends entering into the bonds of a solemn engagement are called *Pobratimi, i.e.*, half-brothers, female friends thus united being termed *Posestremé*, or half-sisters.[1] According to the Abbé Fortis, these unions are made before the altar in the presence of the congregation, and are blessed by a fitting formula contained in the ritual.[2] Those who are thus allied by the sacred ties of friendship will assist each other in every danger, and often has a Morlacche been known to give his life to save that of his *pobratime*.[3] Almost exactly the same custom was noted by Lewis and Clarke as existing among the Sioux and Kite Indians of the Missouri, with whom young men "associate together, bound to each other by attachment, secured by a vow never to retreat before any danger, or give way to their enemies," a vow which they faithfully observed.[4] The influence of such a custom can alone account for the self-sacrifice recorded by Captain King of a Sandwich Islander.[5] We have a still closer analogy with the artificial blood-ties of the Morlacchi in the "friendships" of the ancient Scandinavians, among whom two warriors would "confederate for life or death, for common enterprises and dangers, and for indiscriminate revenge, when one of them should perish by a violent death." [6]

Another simple ceremony by which a close friendship may be instituted is eating or drinking together.[7]

[1] It is strange to find a similar custom among the aborigines of India. Oraon maidens form ties of friendship which are almost as binding as those of marriage, "Dalton's Ethnology of Bengal," p. 253.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 23. The Abbé Fortis compares the Morlacchi Pobratime with the Italian *Fratelli Giurati*, or "sworn brothers."

[3] See further on this subject in Wilkinson's "Dalmatia and Montenegro," ii., p. 178.

[4] *Op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 82.

[5] *Supra*, p. 90.

[6] *Supra*, p. 367.

[7] The eating together of *jaka* is considered among the Madecasses as a sacred bond of friendship and concord. (Ellis's "History of Madagascar," vol. i., p. 366). May not eating together by the bride

This is the most important of all modes of creating that relation, owing to its being so widely practised among peoples of a comparatively high degree of culture. Hospitality is, as repeatedly shown in the preceding pages, by no means confined to civilised races, and in fact it is one of the most primitive practices of mankind. Goguet may be correct in assigning to it in many cases a selfish origin, but in others it cannot well be thus accounted for. In its more developed phase, "hospitality" becomes an actual virtue. It is exhibited in a special manner by the peoples among whom the "family" in its modern sense has been developed, and it is intimately connected with that social feature. By the side of the early family or clan-relationship represented by the mother, originated the simple brotherhood, in which the savage sought to satisfy his self-interest whilst gratifying his feelings of sympathy. When the father has become the recognised head of the family, and has gained the manliness and sense of dignity which results from the exercise of authority, the brotherhood connection acquires a more elevated character. It is entered into by a simpler rite, and at the same time its engagements are enforced by a higher motive. Self-interest gives way to a sense of honour, and the desire to gratify an emotion is replaced by a feeling of obligation, which has almost the force of conscience. When once the virtue of hospitality has been exercised, a special relation is created between the entertainer and his guest. Thus, the stranger who eats bread and salt with a Bedouin at once secures a most potent defender against the perils of the desert. All the Arabs of the same tribe regard him as a fellow-countryman and a brother.[1]

and bridegroom, which often forms one of the marriage rites, be looked upon as a kind of "brotherhood" engagement? The Sindur dan, or marking with vermillion, of the Hindus, is equivalent to the "covenant of blood."

[1] *Supra*, p. 396.

The eating of bread and salt together thus operates as an oath of friendship, and constitutes a bond of fraternity of the most enduring kind. The rights of hospitality are almost exactly the same among the Afghans and Circassians as with the Bedouins, and with the modern Slavonians as among the ancient inhabitants of Europe.[1] It is important to notice, moreover, that in all cases the alliance entered into, and this, whether between the entertainer and guest, or simply between two friends, is placed under a superstitious sanction. When tracing the genesis of the idea of duty in relation to the simple requirements of passive morality, it was seen that the most important element in the process was the sanction of the denizens of the spirit world to the ideas sought to be clothed with moral obligation. The cementing of the tie of fraternity by an oath was the first step towards attaining the same end in relation to the active virtues. Probably for this reason it is that such unions are often more durable than the natural ones of blood and kindred.[2] They are supposed to place the persons affected in the same relation as members of a common family, but the fact of the engagement being solemnly entered into invests it with a seriousness which natural alliances do not possess. Hence, they are regarded with an air of superstition, the ceremony by which the covenant is ratified being equivalent to an oath, because supposed to be performed in the presence of the household or family gods. It is very probable indeed that the rite is always actually looked upon as an oath, as it certainly is in the Made-

[1] *Supra*, p. 371 *seq.*

[2] Mr Elphinstone says of the *Goondee* alliances of the Afghans, which he likens to the Sodalitia of the Saxons, that such a connection is reckoned stronger than that of blood. Two persons thus united are bound to give up all they have, and even their lives for each other. A Goondee between two chiefs revives even after a war between their tribes. (*Op. cit.*, p. 326).

casse *covenant of blood,* although the engagement may be entered into, as Burchell supposes of the alliance made by the Bechuanas with the Hottentots, simply as a matter of convenience.[1] The Scythian mode of pledging faith is strictly an oath cemented by blood. The ceremony as described by Herodotus is as follows: "A large earthen bowl is filled with wine, and the parties to the oath, wounding themselves slightly with a knife or an awl, drop some of their blood into the wine; they then plunge into the mixture a scymitar, some arrows, a battle-axe, and a javelin, all the while repeating prayers; lastly, the two contracting parties drink each a draught from the bowl, as do also the chief men among their followers." The Lydians, Assyrians, Armenians, and Iberians appear to have had modified forms of the same ceremony, which is practised also by the Tatars.[2]

The manners of the ancient Greeks furnish valuable evidence of the mode in which the sacredness of hospitality, and the obligatory nature of the duties entailed by it, were established. As we might anticipate, we find that the family relations are set forth in the Homeric legends "as the grand sources of lasting union and devoted attachment. The paternal authority is highly reverenced: the son who lives to years of maturity, repays by affection to his parents the charge of his maintenance in infancy, which the language notes by a special word; whilst, on the other hand, the Erinnys, whose avenging hand is put in motion by the curse of a father and mother, is an object of deep dread."[3] Outside of the family there is little evidence of any feeling

[1] *Op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 555.

[2] Rawlinson's "Herodotus," (bk. iv., ch. 70), vol. iii., p. 58, and note. The Siamese and Madecasse oaths of fealty bear a curious resemblance to the ceremony referred to in the text in most of its features. See "Race Elements of the Madecasses."—"Journal of the Anthropological Society of London" (1870), p. xxxix.

[3] Grote's "History of Greece" (ed. 1862), vol. i, p. 475.

of sympathy with others. This could, however, be exhibited under certain conditions, and Mr Grote says, that "the generous readiness with which hospitality is afforded to the stranger who asks for it, the facility with which he is allowed to contract the peculiar connection of guest with his host, and the permanence with which that connection, when created by partaking of the same food and exchanging presents, is manifested, even through a long period of separation, and even transmitted from father to son—these are among the most captivating features of the heroic society."[1] In this we evidently have a development of the primitive custom of "brotherhood." Of more primitive communities, the historian adds, that "onerous as such special tie may become to him, the chief cannot decline it, if solicited in the proper form: the ceremony of supplication has a binding effect,[2] and the Erinnys punish the hard-hearted person who disallows it."[3] We see here the introduction of that divine sanction which is as necessary to the development of the moral idea in connection with the active as with the passive virtues. How this divine sanction was brought to bear, can best be described in the words of Mr Grote. After referring to the necessity of the oath as a restraint from violence, he proceeds—"Even in the case of the stranger suppliant, in which an apparently spontaneous sympathy manifests itself, the succour and kindness shown to him arise mainly from his having gone through the consecrated formalities of supplication, such as that of sitting down in the ashes by the sacred hearth, thus obtaining a sort of privilege of sanctuary. That ceremony exalts him into something more than a mere suffering man,—it

[1] Grote's "History of Greece," vol. i., p. 476.

[2] The Kabyles of Northern Africa have a similar custom. See *supra*, p. 191.

[3] Do., p. 477.

places him in express fellowship with the master of the house, under the tutelary sanctions of Zeus Hiketêsios."[1] Thus Zeus himself becomes the "witness and guarantee," and also the avenger, if the solemn engagement entered into is broken. The engagement of hospitality entered into by the Mariote chief is in the presence of God, the being to whom the church is dedicated, and an analogous incident attends the custom as practised in all ages among peoples of different religions.

There is a great and, at the first glance, an irreconcilable difference between the feeling which prompts the savage to revenge for the loss of a friend, and that which leads to the performance of benevolent actions having for their object the preservation of the life of an enemy. The real difference is, however, not so much in the feeling as in the objects with which it is concerned. The idea of "brotherhood" is at the foundation of both classes of actions,[2] and it does not appear to be difficult to trace the gradual development of the system itself until it comes to embrace all mankind within its limits. There is no reason why the artificial tie of fraternity should not embrace any number of persons, the same as the natural family is gradually extended into the clan. But the tribal organisation which ultimately replaces the clan has a political rather than a moral aim, even when it deals with the infringements by its members of the law of passive morality. We cannot expect, therefore, the tribe to take cognizance of the active virtues. The members of the tribe as individuals may however thus act, and fraternal associations may even include members

[1] *Op. cit.*, i., p. 472.

[2] Is it not also, as suggested at an earlier page, at the foundation of the Christian idea of the marriage relation? Even among many non-Christian peoples the union of husband and wife, as of one flesh, has a spiritual as well as a material significance. The wife thenceforth becomes a member of her husband's family or clan instead of belonging to that of her father.

of different tribes, as in the case of the primitive clan organisation. Such associations are not unknown to semi-cultured peoples, as for example, the Madecasses, whose "covenant of blood" was not necessarily limited to two persons.[1] The Japanese have or had *Otokodaté*, or associations of brave men bound together by an obligation "to stand by one another in weal or woe, regardless of their own lives." The principle which, according to Mr Mitford, governed the Otokodaté was "to treat the oppressor as an enemy, and to help the feeble as a father does his child. If they had money, they gave it to those who had none, and their charitable deeds won for them the respect of all men. The head of the society was called its father."[2] The Indian *lodge* has undoubtedly somewhat of the character of a fraternal association. It is supposed to be under the guardianship of the Great Power of the universe, which is propitiated by the sacred incense fumes of the tobacco plant. The stem of the medicine pipe is looked upon as "the palladium, on which depends its safety in peace and its success in war," and hence it is esteemed as especially sacred.[3] The smoking through it by members of the lodge, when summoned together by the chief, dissipates all disputes between them.[4] Lahontan affirms, indeed, that an Indian having a calumet in his hand may travel in safety wherever he wishes.[5] The tobacco pipe thus becomes the symbol of peace and good will to men, but we know too little of the working of Indian institutions to

[1] See *supra*, p. 446.
[2] Mitford's "Tales of Old Japan," (1871) p. 98.
[3] Wilson's "Prehistoric Man," (1862) vol. ii., p. 26. The pipe of the American mounds has no stem, which Dr Wilson thinks is characteristic of the northern tribes represented by the modern Indians, (*loc. cit.*, p. 13).
[4] Mackenzie's "Voyages through North America," (1801) p. cii.
[5] "Travels in Canada," Pinkerton's "Voyages and Travels," vol. xiii., p. 274.

say how far the fraternal feelings of the lodge are perpetuated beyond its walls.

The Areoi institution of the South Sea Islanders, when first established, probably resembled more closely than the Indian lodge the extended brotherhoods of which we have been speaking. Like as in the secret societies of the American Indians, to which reference will be made shortly, numerous ceremonies, followed by a protracted noviciate, attended admission to its privileges, the superior grades being attained only by progressive advancement.[1] The Areoi society was however a real "fraternity" quite independent of the tribal association. It did not include all the male members of the tribe, although it was not confined to any particular rank or grade, or even to the men, but was composed of individuals from every class, the wife of each Areoi being also a member of the society.[2] At the time when it first became known to Europeans it had undoubtedly become an institution having mere pleasure for its object, the Areois being, as Mr Ellis describes them, "a sort of strolling players, and privileged libertines, who spent their days in travelling from island to island, and from one district to another, exhibiting their pantomimes, and spreading a moral contagion throughout society."[3] But it is difficult to believe that such an institution as this could be "held in the greatest repute by the chiefs and higher classes," and that the grand masters, or members of the first order, whom Mr Ellis describes as "monsters of iniquity," should be regarded as a sort of superhuman beings, and treated with a corresponding degree of veneration, even by the vulgar and ignorant, unless it had originated in something besides the love of pleasure and licentiousness. Not

[1] Ellis, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 239, *seq.*
[2] This advanced feature belonged also to the Saxon Gilds.
[3] Ellis, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 234.

only was it believed that those who became Areois were inspired to do so by the gods, but the institution is said by the popular legends to have been established under the express sanction of the powerful deity Oro.[1] The respect with which its members were viewed shows the low moral condition of the Society Islanders, but there is not sufficient ground for supposing that the Areoi institution—"a master-piece of Satanic delusion and deadly infatuation," could have been intentionally invented for the purposes of licentiousness. The legend which describes the origin of the institution is quite consistent with this conclusion. The two younger brothers of Oro, Urutetefa and Orotetefa, descending by the rainbow to earth in search of him, "alighted on the earth near the base of the red-ridged mountains, and soon perceived their brother and his wife in their terrestrial habitation. Ashamed to offer their salutations to him and his bride without a present, one of them was transformed on the spot into a pig, and a bunch of *uru*, or red feathers. These acceptable presents the other offered to the inmates of the dwelling as a gift of congratulation. . . . Such a mark of attention on such an occasion was considered by Oro to require some expression of his commendation. He accordingly made them gods, and constituted them Areois, saying, *Ei Areoi orua i te ao, nei, ia noaa ta orua huhaa,* 'Be you two Areois in this world, that you may have your portion,' (in the government, &c)." Urutetefa and Orotetefa then, by direction of Oro, nominated certain persons in the several islands to form the first society, and authority was delegated to them to admit all who, being wishful to join it, consented to murder their infants.[2] The simple explanation of the legend would appear to be that the persons named associated themselves together in a kind

[1] Ellis. *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 233. [2] Do., p. 231, *seq.*

of brotherhood. The institution being placed under the special patronage of Oro, its origin would come to be referred to him, and the fact of the deities Urutetefa and Orotetefa being brothers, would seem to show its original character. Celibacy was probably the condition which the founders of the association at first proposed for its members. Only at a later date, and when married men sought admission to the society, would the murder of children be introduced. Being married they could not fulfil the condition of celibacy, but they were admitted on their destroying the children which they then had and agreeing to do the same with those which might afterwards be born to them. When once married men were thus rendered admissible, it could not be long before all the members would be permitted to marry on the same condition. The condition of admission instead of being celibacy, would thus finally come to be the destruction of offspring. Possibly, when this custom was first established the children of those admitted to the society were sacrificed to Oro, the presiding deity, but the presentation to the god of the pig and the bunch of red feathers, may have referred to the hospitality on which the institution was based. Even in the form which it ultimately assumed in the Georgian and Society Islands, the Areoi institution, which was known under the name of *Uritoy* to the natives of the Caroline or Ladrone Islands,[1] retained some of the features of the primitive "brotherhood," from which it probably sprang. All its members were brethren, although distributed into different grades. The admission of the wives of Areois to membership is still more significant;[2] and it is not unlikely that the destruction of their offspring may have

[1] Ellis, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 230.

[2] See do., p. 243, as to removal of *tabu* from females at Areoi festivals.

originally been connected with the idea that their unions should resemble those of the original Areois in being one of friendship rather than of matrimony. The institution was at first placed under the divine sanction, and its members being regarded as sacred, came to be considered by the people as "a superior order of beings closely allied to the gods, and deriving from them direct sanction." It is not surprising, therefore, that, among an ignorant and by no means highly moral people, when the institution lost its first beneficent character, the licentious and abominable conduct of its members was thought to be no less pleasing to the gods, whose character would thus suffer along with that of the favoured Areois.

The Areoi institution is remarkable as having been in some sense national, as distinguished from tribal, and it doubtless had its secret signs, the use of which would have ensured fraternal treatment wherever they were recognised, that is wherever the institution extended. Whether the secret associations which existed among the American aborigines had the same character is perhaps doubtful. Judging from what we know of their nature, they would seem to have been political rather than social. The tribal organization was controlled by them, and they were formed, says Mr Brinton, of "societies of different grades of illumination, only to be entered by those willing to undergo trying ordeals, whose secrets were not to be revealed under the severest penalties. The Algonkins had three such grades, the *waubeno*, the *meda*, and the *jossakeed*, the last being the highest. To this no white man was ever admitted." According to Schoolcraft, who refers to the three Algonkin grades, the *meda* (*meddwin*) is the art of medical magic, the *wabeno*, a modification of the *meddwin*, and the *jossakeed* (*jeesukdwin*) the art of prophecy. He

adds, "The whole tendency of the Indian secret institutions is to acquire power, through belief in a multiplicity of spirits; to pry into futurity by this means, that he may provide against untoward events; to propitiate the class of divine spirits, that he may have success in war, in hunting, and in the medical art; or by acceptable sacrifices, incantations, and songs, to the class of malignant spirits that his social intercourse and passions may have free scope. It is to the latter objects that the association of the *wabeno* is directed."[1] There is much in this description of the American magical ceremonies which reminds us of the Tantra rites of the Sivaites of India and the Buddhists of Central Asia, and like these they can have little relation to the exercise of the active virtues to which the altruistic sentiment gives rise. Curiously enough there is not a little in the secret associations of the American tribes which might be taken as showing that in some way or other they were connected with the religious institutions which, under the name of "mysteries," were anciently so influential in Asia and Europe. We shall have to consider this important religious phase at large when we come to treat of systematic morality, and it may be advisable then to refer to certain apparent points of connection. It may be stated here, however, that the rites of the mysteries, like those of other secret associations, constituted a paternal relationship between its members. Moreover, from the nature of the spiritual idea, that of the new birth, on which the mysteries were based, we cannot doubt that such relationship required a certain exercise of the altruistic sentiment. We shall see reason to believe, however, that they were concerned chiefly with the passive duties of morality, the active virtues being only accidentally required. If the exer-

[1] "Indian Tribes of the United States," vol. i., pp. 358, *seq.*, 368.

cise of the active virtues had been especially insisted on in the mysteries, that teaching would have undoubtedly shown its influence in the development of benevolent action among the nations of antiquity. The absence of such action may be taken therefore as evidence that it was not specially enforced in the mysteries. Not that the exercise of charity was actually unknown to the ancients. M. Havet points out that Homer speaks of the unfortunate who asks for charity as sent by Jupiter, and as being respected by the Gods.[1] He refers also to the fact that among the private expenses of a Greek citizen mentioned by Lysias, is money devoted to charity, as in dowering girls on their marriage, ransoming prisoners, and burying the dead.[2] These were the usual modes of dispensing charity among the Greeks. Both the Greeks and Romans had gilds or friendly societies which provided relief for sick and infirm members.[3] Among the latter, the support of poor children would seem to have been the favourite form of charity, and it was practised on a large scale by the state after the reign of Nerva, to whom its systematic adoption was due. The gratuitous distribution of food to the people which, after the time of Caius Gracchus, gradually grew to such enormous dimensions that it became " the leading fact of Roman life," cannot be properly described as charity. It was, in fact, as Mr Lecky remarks, merely a political device, " dictated more by policy than benevolence, and the habit of selling young children, the innumerable expositions, the readiness of the poor to enrol themselves as gladiators, and the frequent famines, show how large was the measure of unrelieved distress.[4] Whatever the motive for the

[1] "Le Christianisme et ses Origines" (1872), vol. i., p. 17.
[2] Do., i., p. 112.
[3] Lecky's " History of European Morals," vol. ii., p. 83.
[4] Do., ii., p. 78, *seq.*

public "benevolence" at Rome which had so demoralising a tendency, it would doubtless lead to private imitations, and prepare the way for the teachings of the Stoics and the Christians, to which the extraordinary development of the altruistic sentiment in the Roman world at a later date was due. Nevertheless, we must affirm that the exercise of private charity was exceptional with the classical peoples, and that, although the practice of hospitality was placed under the special protection of the supreme deity, "the active, habitual, and detailed charity of private persons, which is so conspicuous a feature in all Christian societies, was scarcely known in antiquity."[1]

Under what circumstances and in what favoured locality the duty of acting towards one's neighbour as to one's self, not merely because he is a member of the same lodge or fraternity, but because he is one's neighbour, was first proclaimed, it is not possible to decide. No people, however, could have recognised the duty unless they had undergone a previous training of a special character, and it is far from improbable that Central Asia, which has been the seat of so many changes, was the place where the duty of general benevolence was first promulgated. The Buddhist peoples of the present day are, on the whole, mild and tractable; and such, as a rule, is the case also with the Kolarian peoples of India, among whom the great Apostle of Buddhism is supposed to have first laboured. Whether Gautama, or a still earlier Reformer, was the evoker of the spirit of charity which, under the influence of religious teaching, Buddhist or Mohammedan, has since permeated more or less the mass of Asiatic society, there can be no doubt that such a movement has been originated at a past epoch; and it would seem to have affected peoples not only

[1] Lecky's "History of European Morals," vol. ii., p. 84.

throughout Asia, but also on the American continent. Probably the most influential belief entertained by the followers of Gautama, as well as by the Brahminical Hindus, is that of transmigration of souls. This belief was anciently universal among Oriental peoples; and we shall show in a subsequent chapter how intimately connected it was with the progress of moral development. It is evident how useful the dread of being born again into the world, which accompanied that belief, might be made for the purpose of enforcing the teachings of a moral reformer. In the mysteries, those who pass through the initiations and ordeals which are supposed to ensure the requisite purification of the soul, were said to have secured freedom from material re-birth. That purification had relation to the positive side of morality, or the passive virtues; the active or altruistic phase of virtue being almost lost sight of, and a wide field of operations was therefore left for the religious reformer. This appears to have been recognised by Gautama, the object of whose teaching was undoubtedly to enable mankind to escape from re-birth, and whose system was almost purely altruistic. The principles of Buddhistic teaching will be considered at large hereafter, but a short sketch may be given here of the conduct towards their fellow-men of the peoples who have accepted them.

Whether or not the ancient Mexicans were affected by the teaching of Buddhist missionaries is doubtful, but they certainly recognised the propriety of the active virtues. In the confessional, which, with baptism and circumcision, occupied an important place in the Mexican religious cult, the priest enforced charity to the poor, saying, "Clothe the naked and feed the hungry, whatever privations it may cost thee; for remember their flesh is like thine, and they are men like thee."[1] This

[1] Prescott's "Conquest of Mexico" (1843), vol. i., p. 62, note.

was accompanied, however, by the direction to instantly procure a slave for sacrifice to the Deity; than which nothing could be more opposed to the spirit of Gautama's teaching. It is more in accordance with the ideas perpetuated in the serpent-cult, out of which Buddhism itself is sometimes thought to have sprang. Perhaps the curious mixture of ideas accredited to the Mexican priests may be due to the influence of opposing religions, one of which finally succumbed in the struggle, but left traces of its former presence in the doctrines of the victorious cult.[1] Perhaps to the teaching of the defeated faith may have been due the practice of establishing hospitals for the sick, as well as for disabled soldiers.[2] Prescott remarks that we are reminded of Christian morals in more than one of the prayers used by the Mexican priests. Thus they said, "Wilt thou blot us out, O Lord, for ever? Is this punishment intended, not for our reformation, but our destruction?" Again, "Impart to us, out of thy great mercy, thy gifts, which we are not worthy to receive through our own merits." Another of their sayings was, "Keep peace with all, bear injuries with humility; God, who sees, will avenge you." Prescott finds a striking parallel with Scripture in the declaration, "He who looks too curiously on a woman, commits adultery with his eyes."[3] The ceremonies on the birth of a child partook, moreover, rather of a Christian than of a Buddhist character. After the midwife had bathed it, she said, "May this both cleanse the spots which

[1] In the tradition of the compulsory abandonment of the country by the benevolent deity Quetzalcoatl, through having incurred the wrath of another deity, we may have a reference to such a struggle between rival religions, in which the milder cult was overthrown.

[2] Prescott, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 43. The influence may have been Buddhist or Christian, or even pre-Buddhistic. The Mexican "eaters of vegetables," and "grand master of relics" (Bancroft's "Native Races of the Pacific States," vol. ii., pp. 202, 205), have certainly, however, a strong savour of Buddhism.

[3] *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 58.

thou bearest from the womb of thy mother, purify thy heart, and give thee a good and perfect life." Afterwards, in baptising the child, the midwife said, "May the invisible God descend upon this water, and cleanse thee of every sin and impurity, and free thee from evil fortune."[1] The prayer, however, which the priest addressed to the Deity, on giving absolution to a man who made confession of sins, if of Christian origin, has an element derived from some other source. He said, "Oh, merciful God, thou who knowest the secrets of all hearts, let thy forgiveness and favour descend, as the pure water of Heaven, to wash away the stains from the soul. Thou knowest that this poor man has sinned, not of his own free-will, but through the influence of the sign under which he was born."[2] This expression is in accordance with the ancient Eastern philosophy which made man subject to planetary influences, and which was connected with the idea of the impurity of matter. The latter notion gave rise to the opinion that celibacy was essential to perfect spiritual purity, an opinion which was evidently entertained by the Mexican priests, as strict continence was imposed on those who assumed a religious life of asceticism.[3] The value of celibacy as an aid towards attaining salvation was strongly insisted on by the Buddhist teachers, but the idea was probably derived by them from a still earlier source, along with the desire to escape from the "circle of existence."

To that source, most probably, the Mexicans were indebted for many of their religious and moral ideas, and they were on the whole well fitted to receive them.

[1] Clavigero's "History of Mexico" (1787), vol. i., p. 315.
[2] Prescott, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 62, note.
[3] See Bancroft's "Native Races of the Pacific States," vol. ii., p. 204, *seq.*

Notwithstanding certain appearances to the contrary,[1] they were undoubtedly a mild and simple-minded people. This is well shown in the exhortations by Mexican parents to their children, which have been handed down by the Spanish historians. It is proved also by their customs in relation to slavery. The labour exacted from their slaves was moderate, and it was by no means uncommon for persons overtaken by poverty to resign their freedom, as well as for parents, under the like circumstances, to sell their children into slavery. The contract of sale, says Prescott, was "executed in the presence of at least four witnesses. The services to be exacted were limited with great precision. The slave was allowed to have his own family, to hold property, and even other slaves. His children were free. Slaves were not sold by their masters, unless when these were driven to it by poverty. They were often liberated by them at their death, and sometimes, as there was no natural repugnance founded on difference of blood and race, were married to them."[2] The mildness of the Mexican nature was exhibited also in the position awarded to woman. Although polygamy was allowed, women were treated by their husbands with great consideration. Among the higher classes their time was passed in indolence, except when engaged in spinning, embroidery, and similar occupations, and they were present with their husbands at social festivities and entertainments, although at table the women sat apart from the men.[3] Their natural mildness of manner would no doubt under other circumstances have led to a considerable development among the Mexicans of the social affections. But their institu-

[1] The cannibalism which the Mexicans practised had no doubt a religious origin, and it was probably, like their human sacrifices, connected with the serpent-worship which was prevalent among them.

[2] Prescott, *op. cit.*, vol. i. p. 33. [3] Do. i. p. 137.

tions tended to arouse into activity the passions rather than the affections, especially among the Aztecs, whose priests and rulers thought more of increasing the power of the state and the grandeur of religious worship than the moral improvement of the people. The Mexicans would seem to have possessed the gentleness and goodness of disposition which characterised the peoples among whom the founder of Buddhism laboured. Instead of, however, the altruistic sentiment being with them, as with the latter peoples, aroused into activity by the voice and example of the moral reformer, it was stifled by the cruel rites which they were required by their religion to be parties to, and which must have more or less affected their whole nature. They were not, however, wholly devoid of the social affections. On various occasions, such as marriage, death, or the birth or baptism of a child, it was customary for the Mexicans to make visits of congratulation or condolence which, "though regulated with all the precision of Oriental courtesy, were accompanied by expressions of the most cordial and affectionate regard."[1]

The Buddhist peoples of Southern Asia exhibit a curious agreement with the ancient Mexicans in general disposition and manners. We learn from Sir John Bowring that the groundwork of all Siamese institutions and habits is reverence for authority. This is shown in the relations between the various grades of society, no less than in the respect for parents, the honouring of whom is habitual and constant.[2] Parents, on the other hand, have much affection for their children, and treat them with great kindness.[3] The same mildness of disposition appears in the treatment of woman, whose condition in

[1] Prescott, *op. cit.*, vol. i., p. 135.
[2] "The Kingdom and People of Siam" (1857), vol. i., p. 124, *seq.*
[3] Do., i., p. 105.

Siam is said to be better than in most Oriental countries. Bigandet affirms, indeed, as to the women of both Siam and Burmah, that "their social position is more elevated in every respect than that of the persons of their sex in the regions where Buddhism is not the predominating creed. They may be said to be men's companions, and not their slaves."[1] But slavery itself is in Siam of a very mild description. According to ancient law a master can sell his servant, just as a husband could sell his wife, and a parent his child. The right would seem, however, not often to be exercised. A writer, quoted by Sir John Bowring, says, "in small families, the slaves are treated like the children of the masters; they are consulted in all matters, and each feels that as his master is prosperous, so is he. The slaves, on the other hand, are faithful, and when the master is poor, will devote every *fuang* they can beg or steal to his necessities, and, as long as he will keep them, will pass through any amount of hardship."[2] This, no doubt, springs from a true feeling of attachment, and it is consistent with the conduct of the Siamese under analogous circumstances. Not only are they very hospitable to strangers,[3] but they exhibit much benevolence towards each other. Finlayson says, indeed, that they appear "to take delight in assisting the needy, feeding the hungry, and helping the wretched. . . . . . . Wherever want exists, wherever distress is observed, there aid is freely bestowed."[4] In this respect the Siamese would seem to live up to the precepts of Gautama, nor is their charitable feeling restricted in its display to their fellowmen. Rich men sometimes buy live fish in order to return it to the sea, this being considered a meritorious action, and Siamese in the service

[1] Bowring, *op. cit.*, vol. i. pp. 119, 309.
[2] Do., i. p. 189 *seq.* [3] Do., i. p. 107.
[4] Mission to Siam and Hue, p. 243.

of Europeans will quit them rather than destroy reptiles or vermin. Animal hospitals do not appear to exist in Siam as in China, but Sir John Bowring remarks, that "no doubt the temples are the recipients of a multitude of living creatures—peacocks, geese, ducks, fowls, pigs, fish, apes, beetles, crocodiles—whose lives are safe and sacred, unless under strong temptation." Numerous dogs and cats are kept within the temple inclosures.[1] In addition to a general dislike to taking life, the Siamese have a superstitious objection to the killing of buffaloes, and it is considered a sin "to eat of the flesh of man, elephant, horse, serpent, tiger, crocodile, dog, or cat."[2]

The Burmese do not, in general character, compare favourably with the Siamese. It is true that the former exhibit great respect for old age, and reverence for authority. Moreover, slavery with them, as with the Siamese, is very mild. They have equal care, also, of animal life. A strict Burmese will not kill any wild animal.[3] So great is the fear entertained by the Burmese priests of killing even insects, that they will not dig except in a sandy soil, and even human life is looked upon as worthy of being saved. At one time the execution of criminals was rare, as the priests and their disciples used to rescue them from the hands of the officers of justice, and by shaving their heads and other ceremonies, absolve them and make them unpunishable. This conduct was thought to be an act of piety; for as their religion "forbids them to kill any living thing, even though it be hurtful to man, such as serpents or mad dogs, they think that it must, on the other hand, be meritorious to preserve the lives of others, although by so doing, they inflict a grievous injury on society."[4]

[1] *op. cit.*, i. p. 334.
[2] Do., i. pp. 225, 330.
[3] Sangermano's "Description of the Burmese Empire" (1833), p. 125.
[4] Do., p. 91 *seq.*

The chief virtues of the Burmese would seem to be generosity and hospitality. It is believed that every good work will be rewarded in future transmigrations, and hence the Burmese seek to be public benefactors, by aiding in building a convent, a pagoda, a hall, a portico, a bridge, a pond, or a well, to do which they often perform acts of self-denial. If they cannot do anything else, they will place vessels of water with a cup by the wayside, that passers-by may quench their thirst.[1] It is true that the Burmese priests, in their sermons, speak little of the duty of bestowing alms on any one but themselves.[2] In this respect, however, they depart from the precepts of Gautama, who is said to have expounded the five rules for alms, as "hospitality to our guests, and to travellers, ministering to the wants of sick Talapoins, and, in times of scarcity, to those of all persons, and finally the payment of first-fruits of rice and fruit to the Talapoins."[3] A practical form of charity, or rather of mutual assistance, practised by the Burmese, is that known as Sanenchienzù, that is, "society of friends." This is a kind of brotherhood entered into by a hundred or more heads of families, with the object of rendering mutual assistance to each other, especially at funerals, the expenses attending which, on the death of a member, are almost entirely covered by the contributions of the other members of the fraternity.[4] Colonel Symes, indeed, bears the same testimony to the charitable conduct of the Burmese, as Finlayson does to that of the Siamese. He says, that although the Burmese act very savagely towards their enemies, at home they exhibit benevolence by aiding the infirm, the aged, and the sick; "a common beggar is nowhere to be seen; every individual is certain of receiving sustenance,

[1] Sangermano's "Description of the Burmese Empire," p. 121.
[2] Do., p. 94. [3] Do., p. 103. [4] Do., p. 136.

which, if he cannot procure it by his own labour, is provided for him by others."[1]

How far the manners of the modern Hindus are influenced by the teachings of the great religious reformer, Gautama, may be questioned. Buddhism could not have been the national religion of a large portion of India without leaving its impress on the character of its people; but, on the other hand, its moral ideas may have been, and probably were, derived from an earlier source. It would seem, indeed, to have given special prominence to a special class of ideas, and thus to have led to the development of the moral phase to which they relate, rather than to have originated those ideas. Undoubtedly the active virtues are strongly insisted on by the sacred books of the Hindus, and a consideration of their conduct will show that such teaching is not without practical result.

Hospitality to strangers is one of the virtues most strongly inculcated,[2] and it is extensively practised among the Hindus, who do not limit their hospitality to the casual reception of a guest. It was formerly, and probably still is, the custom for wealthy men to erect large buildings by the side of the public roads, where travellers could obtain accommodation.[3] Bishop Heber says that these *serais* are "generally noble monuments of individual bounty, and some were in ancient times tolerably endowed, and furnished supplies of grain, milk, and grass, gratis to the traveller, as well as shelter."[4] These

[1] "Embassy to the kingdom of Ava" (1800), ii. p. 389.

[2] Mr Ward says that, according to Hindu teaching, if a person refuse to entertain a stranger, all the sins of the proposed guest become his, and all his merits are transferred to the stranger, and should he be too poor to provide proper entertainment, he is directed to beg what is necessary.—"History, Literature, and Mythology of the Hindus," vol. ii. p. 80 *seq.*

[3] Do., p. 84.

[4] "Journal of a Journey through the Upper Provinces of India," vol. ii. p. 27.

houses are no doubt often for the use of travellers of any description, but according to Dubois, a lodge or house of charity called *Chhatra,* was erected at nearly every stage on the highways for the use of Brahmins alone.[1] The feeding of pilgrims, or even of ordinary travellers, appears to have long been an ordinary custom at various Hindu temples,[2] this being amply provided for, however, by the offerings made by the devotees. At Tirnpati, in the Carnatic, the revenues derived from that source were sufficient to maintain several thousands of persons who were employed about the temple.[3] Here the distinction of caste would not seem to be observed, and this is the case also at the famous temple of Jagannath or Jugernaut, where nearly 10,000 Brahmins and assistants are said to be employed in preparing food for the pilgrims who attend the annual festival of the god.[4] A very common work of charity is to entertain a great number of Brahmins at a feast, and to dismiss them with presents of money or cloth. The making of gifts to the Brahmins is in fact considered a religious duty, and it is one of their privileges to be allowed to ask for alms.[5] These are freely dispensed not only to religious mendicants, but also to the beggars of other castes. Bishop Heber remarks on this point that, as the existence of large numbers of wandering beggars implies that they receive some relief, it "may seem to exculpate the mass of Hindus from the charge of general inhumanity and selfishness so often brought against them."[6]

Charity takes other forms amongst the Hindus besides the mere giving of food. The planting of trees by the

[1] "Description of the People of India," p. 176.
[2] See Tavernier's "Travels in India," (1678), pp. 70, 97, 174.
[3] Do., p. 417.
[4] Bevan, "Thirty Years in India," vol. ii. p. 233.
[5] Dubois, *op. cit.*, p. 104, *seq.;* Ward, *op. cit.*, vol. iii., p 87.
[6] *Op. cit.*, vol. i. p. 225; and see vol. iii., p. 263.

road side for the purpose of affording shade from the rays of the sun, is a work of merit. Sometimes fruit-trees are planted, that the traveller may have not only shelter, but also a delicious food. The providing of water for the traveller is considered no less charitable an act. Large tanks are often dug, and wide ranges of steps built, for the purpose of reaching the water.[1] If a widow were not permitted to die with her husband, it was formerly usual for her to devote herself to a life of charity and penance, sitting by the road side to supply travellers with boiled rice and beans, or with fire to enable them to ignite their tobacco.[2]

It would be a mistake to think that the active or altruistic virtues which are practised by the Hindus, furnish evidence, as a rule, of any high notions of morality. They are, undoubtedly, a mild and gentle race, a fact to which the Abbé Dubois[3] in the south, and Bishop Heber[4] in the north, bear testimony. The Hindus are, moreover, essentially a religious race, but, on the other hand, their ideas of morality are extremely defective. Even as to their acts of charity, it is but too certain, notwithstanding the many examples of noble and disinterested benevolence which might be cited to the contrary, that they have a purely selfish motive. If it were not so, such a rule could not exist as that which requires the devotee who treads the sacred road round Benares, not to give, while on the journey, anything, even food or water, to a fellow traveller, though he should be starving. "The pilgrim," says Sherring, "is so intent on the acquisition of merit, that he cannot bring himself to share it with anyone." This writer adds, "such is the hard selfishness of Hinduism. Indeed, selfishness is the very root of Hinduism, is its sap and life, is its branches,

[1] Ward, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 82.
[2] Tavernier, *op. cit.*, p. 97, 169.
[3] *op. cit.*, p. 10.
[4] *op. cit.*, vol. iii. p. 255.

and blossoms, and fruit."[1] The view taken above as to the place occupied by acts of charity in the moral system of the Hindus, is confirmed by the statement of Dubois, that when united to other remedies such as drinking the Panchakaryam, bathing in sacred water, or reciting the Mantras, they enhance the efficacy of such remedies, and contribute greatly to "the cleansing of the soul from recent stains, as well as from those which have adhered to it from its former existence."[2] It is evident from this, that however useful such acts may be under certain circumstances, they are not really essential to the acquirement of a state of salvation. The fact that they are considered meritorious is, of course, a favourable feature of the Brahminical religious teaching, but even this has a selfish side, as the good works enforced are such as the Brahmins would especially benefit by. In that respect the Hindu religion falls short of the teaching of Gautama, although we cannot well deny that the altruism which he enforced differs little in its aim from that of his rivals.

When we come to treat of Buddhism as a system of morality, we shall see that the popular morals of its followers do not come up to Gautama's ideal. Much the same verdict must be passed on the morality of the Mohammedan peoples. Weil, when speaking of the Koran, affirms that its ethics must be considered the most perfect part of its teaching. "The finest moral principles pervade, like gold threads, the whole tissue of superstition. Injustice, revenge, pride, falsehood, hypocrisy, slander, vanity, are all denounced as sin; benevolence, philanthropy, modesty, patience, perseverance, sincerity, honesty, chastity, truthfulness, are recommended as godly virtues."[3] As a moral system, that of the

[1] *op. cit.*, p. 177. [2] *op. cit.*, p. 127.
[3] "Historisch-Kritische Einleitung in den Koran" (1844) p. 119.

great Arabian prophet would thus seem to have been perfect, and yet Burckhardt declares that he was much less successful in enforcing his laws among his own people than in establishing them by Arab aid among neighbouring nations.[1] This applies probably less to the active than to the passive virtues, as the writer just cited elsewhere affirms that "charity towards the poor is more generally practised in all parts of the East than in Europe." He adds, however, that "on the other hand, an honest but unfortunate man, ashamed to beg, yet wanting more than a scanty dish of rice, will probably find assistance in Europe sooner than in the East."[2] Among the Arabs themselves there is a difference in that respect, some of the tribes being considered "stingy," while others have the national reputation of being generous.[3] The Arab would seem, moreover, to display in his charity a nobler spirit than some of his Mohammedan neighbours. "He pities and supports the wretched," says Burckhardt, "and never forgets the generosity shown to him even by an enemy."[4] Nevertheless, the generosity of the Arab has often something of self-interest in it. The mere possession of wealth does not give influence in the desert. In fact, a poor man may be more influential than a rich one, and hence policy as well as liberality leads the Arab to dispose of his property in "profuse hospitality," and to spend his last penny "to honour his guest or relieve those who want."[5]

Although the Afghans are not so profuse in their hospitality and generosity as the Bedouins, yet those traits are by no means wanting to them.[6] The

[1] "Notes on the Bedouins," p. 215. Much the same testimony is borne by Vambery in relation to the nomads of middle Asia. "Travels in Central Asia," p. 312.

[2] *Op. cit.*, p. 193. [3] Do., p. 197. [4] Do., p. 104, and see p. 192.

[5] Do. p. 41. [6] See *Supra*, p. 374.

practice of hospitality is particularly noticeable among the *Dooraunees.* A stranger, whether an Afghan or not, is everywhere well received and provided with food and lodging. Each camp, however poor, has its arrangements for the entertainment of guests. The traveller is supplied in times of scarcity either by a subscription from the inhabitants generally, or by the person whose turn it is to do so, and no difference is made although it is known that he is a Christian.[1] Money spent in hospitality is reckoned by the countrypeople as charity, and as a fulfilment of the injunction of the Mohammedan religion, that a portion of a man's income should be employed in alms. The giving of alms to beggars takes the place in towns of the practice of hospitality as an act of charity, under which head is included also the making of presents to holy men, and paying the regular salaries of the Moollahs.[2] The Eusofzyes, although not so noted for hospitality as the western tribes, exhibit a very creditable spirit in the relief of their poor clansmen. If a man who is brave and respected should be reduced to poverty, and is observed to become dejected, a subscription is at once made for him, that he may be enabled to remain at home without shame. A man may also always obtain relief by going round the villages near to where he resides, and waving his *loongee.* The signal immediately brings him a contribution. This practice is not, however, much pursued, as it is considered degrading.

Hospitality, says Burnes, is a spontaneous act with the fierce Toorkmuns, as among the other Mohammedan peoples of Asia.[3] This is certainly true of the Persians, who are not only cheerful and free in their social inter-

[1] Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, p. 419. [2] Do., p. 214.
[3] *Op. cit.*, vol. ii., p. 20.

course, but are universally hospitable.[1] The Persians are not strangers to acts of benevolence, but they are too fond of display in connection with them. Hence they find more pleasure in founding public works than in private beneficence. Chardin affirmed that when the Persians lay out their money in charity, they usually begin by building a caravanserai for the use of poor travellers ; they afterwards erect a bagnio, a coffee-house, a bazaar or market-place, and garden, the revenues arising from the letting of which they devote towards the building and endowing of a college.[2] Sir R. K. Porter has some judicious remarks in relation to Eastern charity, which may be quoted here with propriety. He says: "We see poverty and distress in the Christian countries of Europe ; but must come to the East to witness the one endured without pity, and the other only noticed to have fresh afflictions heaped upon it. I do not mean to say that there are not amiable exceptions to this remark, but where charity is not a leading principle of duty, the selfishness of human nature readily turns from the painful or expensive task of sympathising with the miserable. General hospitality and universal benevolence arise from totally different motives, and are, often, as completely distinct in their actions. The one is bestowed on grounds of possible reciprocity of benefit; the other, when not commanded by religion, can only arise from the compassion of a disinterested heart. Hence, though we find individual instances of this species of benevolence in all countries, it is only where Christianity prevails that care of the poor is practised as a national concern."[3]

[1] Fraser's "Historical and Descriptive Account of Persia" (1834), p. 384. Herodotus describes the ancient Persians as being generous, warm-hearted, and hospitable. See Rawlinson's "Five Great Monarchies," vol. iii., p. 167.

[2] Harris' "Voyages," vol. ii., pp. 892, 905.

[3] "Travels in Georgia, Persia, &c." (1821), vol. ii., p. 267.

These observations are justified by a consideration of Turkish manners. It is true that a modern writer affirms that in no country is charity more extensive or more constant than in Turkey; adding, that this virtue is "enforced with rigorous exactitude not only by canonical law, but by strict social regulations."[1] We see here, however, the weakness of the altruistic sentiment, as displayed among Eastern peoples. In being enforced by ecclesiastical law, and not coming spontaneously from the heart, it loses its chief subjective value, and becomes an act of religious rather than moral obligation. Burckhardt compares the Turks with the Arabs in connection with this subject, much to the disadvantage of the former. He says: "As the Turks possess very few good qualities, it would be unfair to deny that they are in a certain degree charitable—that is, they sometimes give food to hungry people; but even this branch of charity they do not extend so far as the Bedouins, and their favours are bestowed with so much ostentation, that they lose half their merit. After an acquaintance of two or three days, a Turk will boast of the many unfortunate persons whom he has clothed and fed, and the distribution of his alms in the feast of Ramadhan, when both law and fashion call upon him for charity; and he offers a complete picture of the Pharisee in the temple of Jerusalem."[2] A late writer, nevertheless, declares that benevolence and kindness are the principal characteristics of both sexes among the Turks, and that she never saw even a child ill-treat an animal.[3] This may be due partly to the natural mildness of Turkish manners; but their kindness to animals, especially birds, dogs, and camels, was noted, at a time when they may

[1] "Three Years in Constantinople" (1845), vol. i., p. 26.
[2] *op. cit.*, p. 192.
[3] "Turkish Harems and Circassian Homes." By Mrs Harvey (1871), p. 89.

be supposed to have as yet been but little affected by Western culture, by a traveller who confessed that he could not "applaud the generality of this people with so high encomiums" as he had read in the books of some ingenious travellers, and that he believed, "without partiality, that they came short of the good nature and virtues to be found in most parts of Christendom."[1]

It is not difficult to form a proper estimate of the moral value of the altruistic phenomena observable among the various peoples referred to in the preceding pages. The followers of Gautama Buddha are, on the whole, mild in manner, and of a kindly disposition. The charitable precepts of the founder of their religion are to some extent in accordance with their natural feelings. They are, moreover, extremely superstitious, and, like the Hindus, slaves to a belief which has the most potent influence over their actions. The doctrine of the transmigration of souls, which was universal in the ancient world, has retained its full force in the Oriental mind; and as "re-birth" is the most dreaded of all fates, both Buddhists and Brahminists will do anything to escape from it. The ideas entertained by these religionists as to the necessity of the active virtues, depends on their belief as to the best mode of attaining that end. Acts of charity have a certain value to the Hindus, as they add to the efficacy of religious rites and formula; but as these are actually sufficient in themselves, those acts are supererogatory. The Buddhists, on the other hand, place great reliance on benevolent action, this being considered the surest mode of escaping the dreaded "circle of existence;" except perhaps the practice of strict celibacy. It is evident that, notwithstanding the different value ascribed by the Brahminists and the Buddhists to

[1] "The Present State of the Ottoman Empire." By Paul Rycaut (1668), p. 66.

altruism, they agree in the fact that it is judged of from a purely selfish standpoint. Good actions have not, except to a few superior minds, any worth in themselves. They are performed, not for the benefit of the recipient, but for that of the doer. Viewed in this light, such actions do not possess the true altruistic element. Those who are objectively affected by them receive the benefit, but the real object of them is self. Nor is it different with Mohammedan peoples. Hospitality, and a readiness to help one's fellow-men, may be exhibited more or less strongly, but the systematic charity which is exercised has usually a purely selfish aim. It is enforced as a religious duty, and it has a religious motive, in the absence of which we can hardly doubt that the active virtues would find less place in the popular morals. Mohammedan charity is, moreover, too often limited to the "faithful," thus showing its superstitious origin. True benevolence is no respecter of persons, and in this particular Christianity is in advance of all rival religions. Buddhism which approaches Christianity so closely in many ways, is perhaps hardly less catholic in that respect than the later faith. They differ subjectively rather than objectively, but this difference is one of great importance, and by its comparative unselfishness Christianity alone, among ancient religions, has the right to be classed as a system of true altruism.

INDEX.

Abipones, the, 214, 421
Abors, the, 148, 346
Abortion, practice of, among the Abipones, 422; Australian aborigines, 70; Fijians, 96; Itelmen, 283; Kaffirs, 176; Knisteneaux, 230, 419; Polynesians, 78, 79 *n.*, 86; Talkotius, 238; Tasmanians, 76, 420 *n.*; motives for, among primitive peoples, 419, 423
Absolute Morality, Mr H. Spencer's opinion as to, 60
Absolution (religious), use of, among ancient Mexicans, 465
Abyssinians, the, 191, 339, 361; comparison of the, with the Persians, 191
Achinese, the, 282
Actas, the. [*See* Phillipines]
Actions, change in moral character of, how effected, 336, 341; condemnation of certain, by spirits invoked in oaths and ordeals, 346
Adoption, practice of, by the American Indians, 239, 241, 242 *n.*; object of, among eastern peoples, 316; among the Greeks and Romans, 317 *n.*
Adultery [*see* Sexual Morality]; punishments for, 170, 180, 292, 293; primitive notion as to, 351
Aesthetic conscience, the, 18
Affection, marriages of, among the Afghans, 375; Bedouins, 377; Toorkmuns, 376
Affectionate disposition of the Australian aborigines, 54; Fijians, 95; Hottentots, 203; Madecasses, 440; Zandey, 201.
Affections, slight influence of the, among primitive peoples, 55; family, [*see* Family Affections]; social, [*see* Social Affections]
Afghans, the, 356, 358, 369, 374, 375, 394, 475
Africa, natives of, 158 *seq.*, 318, 325, 421, 426, 427, 429, 435 *seq.* [*see* Abyssinians, Amharas, Amoshagh, Arabs, Ashantees, Bakwains, Bechuanas, Berbers, Bornuese, Bosjesmans, Congo, Dahomans, Damarae, Dinkas, Fans, Fantees, Fezzanese, Foulahs, Gallas, Gallinas, Guinea, Hottentots, Kabyles, Kafirs, Kych, Latookas, Mandingos, Mpongwe, Monbuttu, Moors, Negroes, Nyffé, Osheba, Soudan, Wahŭma, Zandey, Zulus]; comparison of, with Madecasses, 158, 167; (East), natives of, 158, 162; (North), natives of, 182 *seq.*; (South), natives of, 327, 439; (West), natives of, 158, 162, 326, 439
Agades, the, 183
Aged, abandonment of the, by the Chepewyans, 231; Jakuts, 264; Lapps, 267; Prairie Indians, 229; Shoshones, 228; Talkotins, 238; put to death among the Fijians, 96; Koraks, 260; Tchuktchis, 259, 261
Agyd, the, or military head of the Bedouins, 386
Alaska, natives of, 259
Albanians, the, 378
Aleuts, the, 262; comparison of the, with the Eskimos, 251 *n.*
Alfred (King), laws of, 365
Allegiance, oath of, of the Madecasses, 345; tribute of, among the Polynesians, 344; (family), fidelity to, of the ancient Germans, 372; of the ancient Irish, 372
Alms-giving, precepts of Gautama as to, 470; religious nature of, among the Afghans, 476; among the Hindus, 472 *seq.*
Althing, the Icelandic, 387
Altruism (true), absence of, from Eastern religions, 480; teaching of Buddhism as to, 463
Altruistic sentiments, 33, 411 *seq.* [*see* Benevolence, Charity, Virtues, (active)]; relation of, to sympathy

415, 417, 432; to the sexual instinct, 419; to the maternal instinct, 419, 430; dependence of the development of, on the family idea, 433, 445; genesis of, 443; influence of reflection over development of, 443; of the religious sanction over the, 443
Amazons, common origin of the natives of the, 210
America, aborigines of, 242, 344, 425, 428, 434, 439; (North), aborigines of, 225 *seq.*, 284 *n.*, 315 *n.*, 318, 324 [*see* Alaska, Aleuts, Apaches, Appalachians, Aztecs, Californians, Cathlamahs, Chawanons, Chepewyans, Chichimecs, Chinnooks, Comanches, Chohoptins, Chopunnish, Clatsops, Creeks, Eskimos, Flatheads, Fraser River Indians, Greenlanders, Inceshurs, Ingeletes, Kadiaks, Killymucks, Knisteneaux, Kootenais, Louisiana, Mandans, Mayas, Mexicans, New England, Nootkas, Senecas, Skilloots, Sokulks, Spokans, Takahli, Talkotins, Tchuktchis, Tinneh, Tsimsheeans, Utah, Virginia, Wallah-Wallah, Yukons]; comparison of, with Dyaks, 284 *n.*
America (South), aborigines of, 210 *seq.* [*see* Abipones, Amazons, Antis, Arawaks, Aymaras, Brazil, Caisháuas, Caribs, Conibos, Coroados, Cucámas, Guiana, Mundurucús, Múras, Paraguay, Purananátes, Patagonia, Peru, Quechuas, Tehuelches, Ticunas]; civilised peoples of, 350, 444
Amharas, the. [*See* Abyssinians]
Amóshagh, the. [*See* Berbers]
Ancestor Worship, development of, 438; association of, with full recognition of the family, 438; practised by the Kafirs, 439; Madecasses, 440; Santals, 135; Zulu, 439 *n.*
Andaman Islands, natives of the, 107; resemblance of the, to Papuas, 106
Animals, emotions of, similar to those of man, 42; supposed possession of moral conscience by, 49; supposed continued existence of, after death, 311; kind treatment of, by the Burmese, 469; Juangs, 142; Siamese, 468; Turks, 478; superstitious regard for particular, 318, 320; ideas as to, among the American aborigines, 435; Burmese, 469; Siamese, 469
Anthill, oath by, 345
Antiquity, civilised peoples of, immorality among, 353; development of paternal authority among, 354
Antilles, Caribs of the, 224
Antis, the, 220
Apaches, the, 239
Apathetic temperament of the Aleuts, 262; Amazon Indians, 211; American aborigines, 212, 242; Aymaras, 218; Dyaks, 286; Greenlanders, 251; Guiana Indians, 222; Javanese, 287; Malays, 279, 283; Mongols, 274; Peruvian Indians, 222. [*See* Despondent, Indolent, Reserved]
Appalachians, the, 225
Arabs [*see* Bedouins]; comparison of the, with the Berbers, 190; with the Turks, 478
Arawaks, the, 222
Arbitration, court of, among the Morlacchi, 359; reference of quarrels to, among the Abyssinians, 361; Irish (ancient), 359; Norsemen, 360; Romans, 359
Areoi Association, the, 78, 87, 420; nature and origin of the, 456, 457
Armenians, oath of friendship of the, 452
Arru Islands. [*See* New Guinea]
Aryan peoples, immorality of some ancient, 353
Ashantee, natives of, 168, 170
Asia, peoples of, 262 *seq.*; predatory races of [*see* Afghans, Bedouins, Circassians, Toorkmuns]; (Southern), peoples of, 467 *seq.*
Assam, hill tribes of, 145 *seq.*, 346. [*See* Abors, Chalikatas, Garos, Karens, Miris, Mishmis, Pádam, Singphos]
Association of moral ideas, 27, 36
Associations (Fraternal) [*see* Brotherhood Alliances]; (Free) among the Scandinavians, 367; (Political) among the early English, 366; (Religious) among the West Africans, 436; (Secret) among the West Africans, 436; among the American Indians, 459; comparison of, among the American Indians, with the ancient mysteries, 460
Assyrians, oath of friendship of the, 452
Astrology, influence of, among the Madecasses, 153
Athabascas, the. [*See* Chepewyans]
Atonement, blood-shedding of the *lex talionis* a kind of, 358
Australia, aborigines of, 54 *seq.*, 66 *seq.*, 293, 304, 312 *seq.*, 318, 319 *seq.*, 338, 342, 344, 357, 420, 424, 433
Authority, influence of, in relation to

moral development, 331 ; reverence for, among Burmese, 469 ; Javanese, 288 ; Siamese, 467 ; (Paternal) [*see* Paternal Authority]
Avaricious disposition of the Afghans, 394 ; Bedouins, 395 ; Fijians, 98 ; Lapps, 265
Aymaras, the, 218, 296, 325
Aztecs, the, 239

Badagas, the, 119, 120
Bain, Mr, his theory of morals, 28 *seq.*
Bakwains, the, 327
Balala. [*See* Bechuanas]
Bambaras. [*See* Mandingos]
Bântu family of African peoples, 174
Baptism, use of, among the ancient Mexicans, 463, 464
Battas, the, 281
Beaver, superstitious ideas as to the, 234
Bechuanas, the, 175, 182, 206, 317 *n.*, 328, 429
Beders, the, 115
Bedouins, the, 349, 356, 359, 369, 373, 376, 385 *seq.*, 395 *seq.*, 404, 429 *n.*, 475, 478 ; comparison of the, with the Moors, 189 ; with the Turks, 396, 405
Beloochs, the, 358
Benevolence [*see* Altruistic Sentiments, Charity, Virtues (active)] ; nature and phenomena of, 10, 12, 412 *seq.* ; practice of, among uncultured peoples, 427 ; practice of, by the Abors, 347 ; Afghans, 476 ; Bedouins, 396 ; Berbers, 190 ; Burmese, 470 ; Greeks, 461 ; Hindus, 471 ; Japanese, 455 ; Lapps, 266 ; Ostiaks, 268 ; Romans, 461 ; Shoshones, 228 ; Siamese, 468 ; Turks, 478 ; due to the genesis of emotions, 415 ; relation of, to the maternal instinct, 430 ; foundation of, on the social instincts, 443 ; (Christian), superiority of, over Buddhist, 480 ; (Turkish), religious origin of, 478 ; (Universal), recognition of duty of, 462 ; wide-spread spirit of, 462
Benevolent deity of the ancient Mexicans, 464
Berbers, the, 187 *seq.* ; comparison of the, with the Algerian Arabs, 190 ; with the Moors, 189. [*See* Moors]
Bhíls, the, 142
Bhúiyas, the, 131 ; former wide extension of the, 132
Bhûmij, the, 138
Binderwurs, the, 122
Blood-feuds, recognition of, by the European peoples, 357 ; existence of, among the Afghans, 356 ; the Africans (East), 159 ; Apaches, 240 ; Australian aborigines, 69, 315, 357 ; Bedouins, 356 ; Berbers, 190 ; Bhíls, 143 ; Circassians, 356 ; Comanches, 240 ; Corsicans, 355 *n.* ; Fijians, 96 ; Garos, 146 ; Greenlanders, 251, 254 ; Guiana Indians, 222 ; Hottentots, 205 ; Itelmen, 263 ; Kandhs, 131 ; Mainotes, 354 ; Montenegrins, 355 ; Moors, 189 ; Morlacchi, 355 ; Nagas, 147 ; Negritos, 107 ; Norsemen, 360, 371 ; Oráons, 125 ; Polynesians, 83 ; Sicilians, 355 *n.* ; Tasmanians, 76 ; means to prevent, employed by the Australian aborigines, 357 ; by the Nagas, 147 ; modes of terminating, 338. [*See* Blood-revenge, Feuds (hereditary)].
Blood-relationship, importance of, in relation to social organization, 364
Blood-revenge [*see* Blood-feuds] ; compensation in lieu of, among the Afghans, 358 ; Bedouins, 359 ; Beloochs, 358 ; Morlacchi, 359 ; Norsemen, 360; in case of ordinary death, 312
Blood-shedding of the *lex talionis*, an atonement, 358
Bodo, the, 145
Bones (human). [*See* Human bones]
Boomeas of India. [*See* India, aborigines of]
Borneo, natives of. [*See* Dyaks, Sibuyan]
Bornuese, the, 184 *seq.*
Bosjesmans, the, 204, 205, 206, 329 ; hatred shown to the, by the Hottentots, 204
Brahmins, gifts to, a religious duty, 472
Brain development of the Australian aborigines, 321
Braknas, the. [*See* Berbers]
Bravery displayed by the Caribs, 225 ; Comanches, 240 ; Foulahs, 182 ; Osheba, 165 ; Sandwich Islanders, 90; the predatory races, 403 ; origin of the regard for, among savages, 47
Brazil, natives of, 212 *seq.*, 223
Brehon laws, the, 363, 391, 400
Bribery, prevalence of, among the Berbers, 186 ; English (early), 394 ; Fezzanese, 186 ; Negros, 186
Brinjaries, the, 115 *n.*
British Columbia, natives of, 232, 236, 237 *n.*, 324
Britons (ancient), the, 399

Brotherhood, an imitation of the clan, 368; idea of, in the clan, 391; idea of, essential to organisation of the tribe, 391, 407, 434; application of the idea of, to the nation, 393; the Bedouins constitute a, 396; the Chinese empire considered as a, 392; extension of the principle of, 454
Brotherhood alliances, [*see* Friendship engagements, Gilds]; entered into among the American Indians, 455, 459; Bedouins, 395 *n.*; Berbers, 191; Burmese, 470; Chinese, 392; English (early), 367, 392; Gallas, 195; Germans (ancient), 409; Japanese, 318 *n.*, 455; Kabyles, 191; Madecasses, 455; Norsemen, 367; Oráons, 124; Polynesians, 90, 94, 420, 456 *seq.*; supernatural sanction to, 344; (clan) absence of idea of duty in relation to, 391.
Brotherhood associations, relation of, to moral development, 409; formation of, 454; the ancient mysteries considered as, 460
Brotherhood custom, influence of, among the Sandwich Islanders, 90, 94.
Brotherhood relationship in the clan, 310 *n.*, 391
Brothers of the gild, 366
Buddha (Gautama), 444, 462, 470, 474
Buddhism, altruistic nature of moral teaching of, 463; influence of (supposed), over Mexican moral teaching, 464; influence of, over Hindu morality, 471; moral influence of, compared with Mohammedanism, 444; moral difference between, and Christianity, subjective, 480; (modern) slight moral influence of, 352
Buddhists, 460, 462, 467, 479
Buffalo, superstitious regard for the, among Siamese, 469; Todas, 120
Bundling custom, existence of, among the Celts, 179, 400; Circassians, 401 *n.*; Dyaks, 179 *n.*; Indian aborigines, 390; Kafirs, 179; Morlacchi, 401 *n.*; Oráons, 124; Todas, 118
Burial of attendants with the dead, 177, 275; origin of the practice of, 316. [*See* Funeral rites].
Burmese, the, 469
Bushmen, the. [*See* Bosjesmans]

Caishánas, the, 210, 299
California, Indians of, 241, 243 *n.*
Cannibalism, moral significance of, 82, 203; motives assigned for, by the Ashantees, 74; Battas, 281; origin of, 99; practice of, among the Africans (West), 167; among the American aborigines, 210, 243, 324; the Andaman Islanders, 109; Ashantees, 174; Australian aborigines, 70; Binderwurs, 122; Caribs, 224; Celts (ancient), 399; Fijians, 98; Garos, 338; Greenlanders, 255; Mexicans (ancient), 466 *n.*; Monbuttu, 200; New Caledonians, 100, 101; Papuas, 106; Polynesians, 82, 87, 98; Thibetans, 276; Zandey, 202
Capture. [*See* Marriage by capture, Wife stealing]
Caribs, the, 223, 225, 434
Caroline Islanders, the, 458
Cathlamahs, the, 236
Cattle, highly valued by the Bechuanas, 179; Dinkas, 197 *n.*; Kafirs, 179, 180; Latookas, 197
Celibacy, practice of, among the Polynesians, 458; enforced by Mexican religious teaching, 465; considered essential to spiritual purity, 465; moral efficacy of, according to Buddhism, 479
Celts, 399. [*See* Britons, Gauls, Irish]
Ceremonies, on initiation. [*See* Manhood, Tribe]
Chalikatas, the, 150, 312 *n.*
Chandalas, the, 113, 140 *n.*, 143 *n.*
Charity [*see* Almsgiving, Benevolence, Compassion, Altruistic sentiments, Virtues (active)]; acts of, among the Burmese, 470; Greeks (ancient), 461; Hindus, 471 *seq.*; Persians, 477; enforced in the religious teaching of the early Mexicans, 463; general practice of, in the East, 475; hospitality considered as, among the Afghans, 476; life of, dedication of widows to, among the Hindus, 473; ostentation of Turkish, 478; religious efficacy of, among Hindus, 474, 479; selfish nature of, among Eastern peoples, 480; Hindus, 473: to strangers, displayed by the Mandingos, 184; (Christian) nature of, 412, 477; (Eastern) comparison of, with that of Christian peoples, 477; (public) among the Romans, 461
Chastity, sacrifice for offence against, among the Dyaks, 284, 285, 389; Indian aborigines, 389; Málers, 126; Sumatrans, 280
Chawanons, the 226

Cheerful disposition of the Andamaners, 108; Bedouins, 396; Garos, 145; Kalmucks, 270; Mongols, 271; Oráons, 123, 125; Papuas, 283; Santals, 133; Siberian peoples, 268; Yukons, 238
Chepewyans, the, 231, 237, 238
Cheros, the, 136 *n.*
Chichimecs, the, 241
Chiefs, administration of justice by, among the Kafirs, 340; authority of, among the Abyssinians, 361; Kafirs, 387; Norsemen, 361, 387; Polynesians, 80 *n.*, 97; deification of, after death, 33, 344; enlightened, among uncultured peoples, 427; among Spokan Indians, 233; influence of, on moral development, 348
Childhood, of mankind, represented by existing primitive peoples, 352
Children, treatment of, among the Abipones, 214; Arawaks, 223; Australian aborigines, 67, 68; Bosjesmans, 207, 208; Braknas, 188; Chawanons, 227; Chohoptins, 232; Eskimos, 250; Fijians, 95; Greenlanders, 251, 257; Kafirs, 439; Knisteneaux, 230; Madecasses, 152; Malays, 283; Moors, 188; Papuas, 283; Polynesians, 78; Siamese, 467; Tasmanians, 76, 77; Tehuelches, 217; Yukons, 239
Children, desire for, among Todas, 117; descent of, primitively traced from the mother, 384; authority over, of father, 304, 384; of maternal uncle, 384; emancipation of, from authority of father, 385; sale of, among Apaches, 239; English (early), 385; Jakuts, 264; Thracians, 353; among civilized peoples of antiquity, 354; spirits of dead, 321; support of, among ancient Greeks and Romans, 461; tribal claim to (supposed), 304
Chinese, the, 316, 341, 364 *n.*, 392, 421, 444, 448; empire, based on the family, 392; traders, cheating by, 272; God of thieves of, 335 *n.*
Chinnooks, the, 235, 236, 237 *n.*
Chohoptins, the, 232
Chopunnish, the, 232
Christian charity, nature of, 412, 477
Christianity, influence of, among uncultured peoples, 81, 93; over the Hottentots, 209; Australian aborigines, 313; (slight) over African peoples, 352; (supposed) over ancient Mexican moral teaching, 464; a system of true altruism, 480; the difference between, and Buddhism, subjective, 480
Christians, native, of Africa, 191
Circassians, the, 356, 372 *n.*, 373, 377 *n.*
Circumcision, practised by the South Africans, 435; West Africans, 436; ancient Mexicans, 463
Cisishee, the, known to West African peoples, 163
Civilization, capacity for, shown by the Hos, 138; Hottentots, 208; incapacity for, of the American Indians, 244
Civilized peoples of antiquity, charity of, 461; immorality of, 353
Claims, curious mode of enforcing, used by the Málers, 128
Clan, distinct from the tribe, 305; formation of the, 305, 310 *n.*; fraternal relation of the, 310 *n.*; foundation of the, on the family, 363; brotherhood the fundamental idea of the, 391; imperfect feeling of brotherhood in the, 391; liability of the, for acts of its members, 363; members of the, spread through different tribes, 385; of mother, children primitively belonged to the, 384; of father, children afterwards belong to the, 384; characteristics of the, reproduced in the tribe, 391; decay of authority of the, consequent on the establishment of tribal authority, 445; expulsion from the, practised by the Santals, 134; the family as chief unit of social organization, represented by the, 384; the Chinese empire considered a development of the, 392
Clan organization, objects of, 391.
Clan, relationship, influence of, among primitive peoples, 304, 306, 310 *n.*; the Australian aborigines, 304, 306; the Comaches, 240; a bar to marriage, 385; existence of, among the Chinese, 392
Classificatory system of relationships, 433 *n.*, 364 *n.*
Clatsops, the, 236
Cnut (King), laws of, 366
Collas, the. [*See* Aymaras]
Columbia, British. [*See* British Columbia]
Comanches. [*See* Apaches]
Communal marriage, supposed existence of, in primeval times, 304; among the Aymaras, 220
Compassion, relation of, to sympathy, 416; towards prisoners, shown by

the Abipones, 215; Chawanons, 226; to strangers, shown by women among primitive peoples, 425 *seq*.
Compensation for homicide, among the Abyssinians, 361; Afghans, 358; Arabs (Algerian), 190; Ashantees, 169; Bedouins, 359; Beloochs, 358; Gallas, 195; Morlacchi, 359; Norsemen, 360; Persians, 358; Samoans, 83; Slavonians (southern), 359; Zulus, 358 *n*; for injuries, among the English (early), 362; Germans (ancient), 361; Irish (ancient), 363; Kandhs, 131; Mandingos, 184; acceptance of, in discretion of person injured, 358; how ascertained among Morlacchi, 359; Norsemen, 360. [*See* Fines]
Confederacies (sworn) among the Scandinavians, 367. [*See* Associations, (fraternal)]
Confession of crimes, ready, by the Hottentots, 203; Korwas, 145; Polynesians, 84
Confessional, use of the, among the ancient Mexicans, 463, 465
Congo, natives of, 164 *n*.
Conibos, the, 221
Conscience, 1, 2, 12, 14, 17, 18, 27, 28, 49, 59, 319, 324; relation of, to consciousness, 18; influence of habit in formation of, 19, 24; formation of, in relation to passive duties, 414; distinction between the religious and self-formed, 27, 29
Consciousness, nature of, 17; moral development in relation to, 414
Cook, Captain, death of, 88, 89 *n*.; sacred character ascribed to, 89 *n*.
Corisco, natives of, 167
Coroados, the, 212
Corpulency in women valued by Moors, 189; Tuaricks, 190
Corsicans, the, 355
Courage. [*See* Bravery]
Courtship practised among the Hos, 136; Málers, 126; Pádam, 148
Covetousness. [*See* Avaricious]
Cowardice among savages, origin of, 47; of West Africans, 162, 165; punishment for, after death among the Fijians, 323
Credulity of the Javanese, 287; Mongols, 271
Creek Indians, the, 227 *n*.
Crimes [*see* Adultery, Compensation, Fines, Homicide, Offences, Theft] considered as offences against the individual, 341; against spirits 322; against religion, 390; public pollutions, 148, 346, 390; punishments for, among the Abyssinians, 192; Achinese, 282; Bornuese, 185; Kafirs, 340; Pádam, 148; punishment of, by public tribunals, 339; not punished among Chinese except on complaint, 341; use of divination to discover offenders, 341
Criminality, origin of idea of, 311
Criterion of Morality, 3, 5, 14, 26
Cruel character of West African customs, 162, 172; of religious rites among ancient Mexicans, 467
Cruelty exhibited by the Abyssinians, 192, 193; Africans (East), 159; Africans (West), 162, 166; American aborigines, 229, 242; Apaches, 239; Ashantees, 174; Australian aborigines, 293; Bechuanas, 176; Blackfeet, 234; Bornuese, 185; Braknas, 188; Chichimecs, 241; Columbia River Indians, 236; Dyaks, 284; Flatheads, 234; Gallas, 192, 193, 195; Greenlanders, 253; Kafirs, 176; Madecasses, 154, 155, 157; Namaquas, 206; Talkotins, 238; Wahŭma, 199; wanton, unknown in Central Asia, 397 *n*.
Cucámas, the, 211
Culture, high degree of, exhibited by the Monbuttu, 200; Zandey, 202 *n*.
Cunning disposition of the American aborigines, 212; Kalmucks, 270; Malays, 279; New Caledonians, 101
Cunning, influence of, among savages, 48
Custom, influence of, among the Afghans, 374; Arru Islanders, 104; Bedouins, 386; Madecasses, 442; Toorkmuns, 395; considered as a standard of morals, 348, 410 *n*.
Customs (Blood) of the Ashantees, 172 *seq*.; Dahomans, 162

Dahomans, the, 162
Dalmatia, natives of. [*See* Slavonians]
Damaras, the, 175 *n*., 206, 429 *n*.
Dancing much practised by the Kolarian tribes, 140
Dancing girls in Java, 288 *n*.
Danes (ancient), 370
Darwin (Mr), his theory of the moral sense, 52 *seq*., 64
Daughters valued as articles of barter, 421, 422
Dead, blood revenge a duty to the, 312, 315; bodies of the, exposed by the Bechuanas and Kafirs, 175 *n*.; bones of the, preserved among pri-

mitive peoples, 109; continued influence of the, over the living, 439, 440; destruction of property of the, 312 *n.*; fear of the spirits of the, 311, 312, 316, 317, 319, 321; prayers to the, at funerals, 317 *n.*; reverence for the, shown by the Andamaners, 109; Chalikatas, 150; New Caledonians, 103; rights of the, 311, 312, 315 *seq.*, 319, 321, 438, 439; sacrifices to appease the, 229, 315, 439, 440; treatment of the, among the Antis, 221; yearly festival of the, 311

Death [*see* Blood-Revenge, Disease] ascribed to sorcery, 107, 312, 315, 342 *seq.*; inability of the savage to form idea of, 311; fear of, exhibited by Africans, 343; punishment after, 333; punishment of, 162 *n.*, 169, 240.

Deb, 349. [*See* Custom]

Decalogue, Hebrew, 351, 411.

Deceitful disposition of the Australian aborigines, 73; British Columbia Coast tribes, 236; Fezzanese, 185; Fijians, 98; Madecasses, 156; Malays, 279; Polynesians, 81; Samoyedes, 265

Demons. [*See* Spirits]

Despondent disposition of the Mongols, 271; Samoyedes, 265

Devil. [*See* Evil Being]

Dhers, the, 113, 143

Dignity, sense of, consequent on feeling of paternal authority, 407; attendant on manliness, 407; gives rise to sense of personal honour, 407

Dinkas, the, 197 *n.*

Disease ascribed to sorcery, 313 *n.*, 315, 342 *seq.*; to action of spirits, 313 *n.*, 321. [*See* Death]

Dishonesty of the Achinese, 282; Virginian Indians, 225. [*See* Theft]

Disposition. [*See* Affectionate, Apathetic, Avaricious, Cheerful, Cunning, Deceitful, Despondent, Fearless, Forgiving, Frank, Generous, Gloomy, Irritable, Jealous, Kind, Magnanimous, Mild, Noble, Passionate, Patient, Proud, Quarrelsome, Religious, Reserved, Selfish, Sensitive, Social, Suspicious, Timid, Treacherous, Unsocial]

Disputes, reference of, to arbitration among the Abyssinians, 361; secret associations among West Africans for settling, 437. [*See* Compensation]

Dissatisfaction, supposed origin of conscience in feeling of, 53; slight influence of feeling of, with primitive man, 56

Distress, Irish law of, 359

Divine sanction to hospitality among ancient Greeks, 453; Mainotes, 454

Divination, practice of, among the Kafirs, 341 *n.*; Polynesians, 341

Divorce, frequency of, among the Dyaks, 285; Javanese, 289; grounds of, among the Abipones, 215; Madecasses, 154.

Domestic animals, absence of, among the Brazilian aborigines, 212

Domestication of animals by Peruvian aborigines, 212 *n.*

Dogs, affection for, among the Tchuelches, 217; superstitious notions as to, 276

Dooraunees, the, 374, 475

Dormitory (general) for unmarried persons among the Indian aborigines, 121, 123, 126, 131, 132, 140; the Pádam, 148

Dravidians, the, 109 *seq.* [*See* India, aborigines of]

Dreams, importance ascribed to, by the Wahŭma, 199

Drowned, tombs for the, erected by the Greeks and Romans, 316

Druids, influence of the, 387

Drunkenness, prevalence of, among the Madecasses, 157; Samoyedes, 265

Duel, use of the, as a legal process, 399

Duties, negative actions first recognised as, 411; passive actions first recognised as, 351, 411; passive and active, distinction between, 411. [*See* Virtues]

Duty, distinction between, and virtue, 412 *seq.*; absence of idea of, in relation to clan brotherhood, 391; nature of idea of, 5; origin of idea of, 25, 37, 319; formation of idea of, in relation to moral conduct, 333 *seq.*; importance of conception of, in relation to human culture, 350 [*see* Moral Obligation]; (Social) honouring parents the earliest, 351.

Dwelling-place required by the dead, 316

Dyaks, the, 283; comparison of, with the North American aborigines, 284 *n.*; with the Boomeas of India, 285

Edward the Confessor, laws of, 366; bribery of, 394

Effeminates, class of, among uncultured peoples, 47 *n.*, 241, 242, 264
Ego-altruistic sentiments, 33
Emancipation of children from paternal authority, 385; among the ancient Irish, 364
Emotion, considered as the guiding principle of action, 9; want of, by the Aleuts, 262; Amazon Indians, 211; South American Indians, 212
Emotional nature, original subordination of the, to the intellectual nature, 54; of the Australian aborigines, 55; Eskimos, 249; Fijians, 95
Emotions, importance of the, in genesis of moral ideas, 31, 35, 36, 42, 45
Emotions, genesis of the, 36, 39; secondary nature of, 414; distinction between, and that of ideas, 415; gives rise to benevolence, 415
Endurance, practice of, on initiation into the tribe, 434, 459
Enemies, [*see* Prisoners]; cruel conduct towards, of the Abipones, 215; Bechuanas, 175; Kafirs, 175; (dead), mangling of the bodies of, practised by the Abyssinians, 192; Gallas, 192; Hebrews, 192
English (early), 335, 365 *seq.*, 382, 393, 398, 408; legislation, recognition by, of right of feud, 357, 362
Enlightened individuals among uncultured peoples, 427, 428
Erinnys, the, 452
Eskimos, the, 244 *seq.*; killed by the Chepewyans, 231
Eternal fitness, Clarke's theory of, 7
Eternal reason, Cudworth's theory of 7, 58
Ethics, the intuitive and inductive schools of, 2 *seq.*, 22; Hindu work on, preserved by the Javanese, 289
Etiquette, importance attached to, among the Wahŭma, 198
Europe, ancient peoples of, 357, 370 *seq.*, 379 *seq.*, 390, 398 *seq.*
Europeans, familiarity with, highly esteemed by West Africans, 165; intercourse with, effect of, over manners of Koraks, 261; of Mundurucus, 211; Sandwich Islanders, 93; oppressions by, over Hottentots, 206
Eusofyzes, the, 356, 476
Evil Being, dread of the, among the South American Indians, 213; connection of the, with the secret associations of West Africans, 436
Excision, practised by West African peoples, 437
Expediency the positive element of Utilitarianism, 40, 47, 62
Experience, dependence on, of the knowledge of moral distinctions, 20, 31, 34; influence of, in the formation of moral ideas, 311
Experiences of utility, organisation of, 31, 35, 42
External offences treated as tribal, 310

Faithlessness of the Enceshurs, 235; Skilloots, 235
Family, association of ancestor-worship with full recognition of the, 438; foundation of "brotherhoods" on the, 368; the chief unit of social organisation, 384; recognition of the father's true relation to the, 384, 407; relation of the, to the clan, 363; to the tribe, 304; to the gild, 368; woman the most important unit of the, 384
Family affection, displayed by the Andaman Islanders, 108; Australian aborigines, 67, 75; Eskimos, 249; Flatheads (inland), 234; Garos, 145; Greeks (ancient), 452; Guiana Indians, 223; Javanese, 287, 288; Madecasses, 152, 440; Mandingos, 184; Papuas, 103; Spokan Indians, 232; Tchuelches, 217; want of, among the Abyssinians, 194; American Indians (South), 212; Bosjesmans, 207; Talkotins, 238; relation of, to sympathy, 416
Family alliances among the ancient Germans, 372; Irish, 372
Family feuds common among the Madecasses, 152
Family, head of the, absolute authority of, 304, 351, 354; development of reverence for, 438; entitled to its property, 305; considered its representative; 310 *n.* [*See* Father]
Family idea, dependence on the, of the development of the altruistic sentiments, 433; founded on maternal relationship, 433; influence of the, among the Bedouins, 386; Santals, 134, 135
Family organization, political constitution of the ancient Irish, 363; relation, importance of the, among the Chinese, 392; relations, subordination of, to those of the tribe, 433; ties, weakness of, among the Africans, 161, 164; Madecasses 153
Fans, the, 165

Fantees, the, 169
Father, absolute authority of, over the family, 304, 351, 354; among the early English, 383 *n.;* among the Gauls, 379; clan of, children belong to the, 384; kinship through the, recognised by the Indian aborigines, 437 *n.;* by the Santals, 134; influence of recognition of, over tribal organization, 437; recognition of true relation of, to the family, 384, 407; reverence for, development of, 438. [*See* Paternal Authority]
Fearless disposition of the New Caledonians, 99, 100
Feeling, organization of, as emotion, 43
Fellatahs. [*See* Foulahs]
Female children, preference for, by pastoral races, 421
Ferocity exhibited by the Caribs, 223; Chawanons, 226; Chichimecs, 241; Dyaks, 284; Javanese, 289
Festival, yearly, of the dead, 311
Festivals, sacrificial, of the Scandinavians, 367
Feud, right of, disastrous social effect of exercising, 338; influence of, over Teutonic legislation, 357, 365; recognised by early English law, 357
Feuds (hereditary) among the Afghans, 356; Bedouins, 356; Circassians, 356; Mainotes, 354; Montenegrins, 355; Morlacchi, 355; (private) [*see* Blood-Feuds, Blood-Revenge]
Fezzan, natives of, 185
Fidelity of the Bhils, 143; Comanches, 240; Gonds, 122; Javanese, 287
Fidelity to family alliances among the ancient Germans, 372; Irish, 372
Fierceness, exhibited by the Chichimecs, 241; Yukons, 238
Fighting, mode of, practised by the coast tribes of British Columbia, 237
Fig-tree, the sacred, 196
Fijians, the, 78 *n.;* 95 *seq.;* 323, 331 *n.*
Filthiness of the Greenlanders, 251
Fines, inflicted for crimes, 298, 346; among the Battas, 282; Kalmucks, 270; Moors, 189. [*See* Compensation]
Finns, the, compared with the Samoyedes, 265
Flat-heads, the, 233
Food, superstitious ideas as to use of certain kinds of, 318, 434 *n.*
Foreigners considered lawful prey among predatory peoples, 407; homicide of, cannot be compounded for among Beloochs, 358. [*See* Strangers]
Forgiving disposition of the Bechuanas, 182; Bornuese, 185
Fortitude displayed by the Abipones, 216; American Indians, 243; Comanches, 240; Foulahs, 182; Javanese, 287; Mandans, 229
Fosterage, 372, 404
Foulahs, the, 182, 183
Frank disposition of the Latookas, 196; New Caledonians, 102
Fraser River, natives of the, 237
Fraternal Association, the tribe considered as a, 434. [*See* Brotherhood alliances, Gilds].
Freemasonry (African), 436
Freemen, assemblies of, among the ancient Germans, 409; sssociations of, among the early English, 409
Friendly Islanders, the, 88
Friendly societies, existence of, among the ancient Greeks and Romans, 461
Friendship Engagement, sacred nature of the, among the Afghans, 374; among the Armenians, 452; Assyrians, 452; Bedouins, 373; Circassians, 373; Mainotes, 372; Morlacchi, 373; Toorkmuns, 373. [*See* Brotherhood alliances].
Fulbe, the, 183, 200. [*See* Foulahs]
Funeral Rites, among the Ashantees, 172; Australian aborigines, 315; Bechuanas, 317; Kafirs, 176; Madecasses, 440; Thibetans, 276 [*see* Burial]; importance of, in relation to the future life, 316, 317, 324; object of, among the Bechuanas, 317 *n;* Chinese, 316; Hindus, 317
Future Life, ideas as to the, entertained by the Africans (West), 326 *n.;* American Indians (North), 129; Antis, 221; British Columbia (coast tribes of), 237; Chalikatas, 150; Eskimos, 250; Fijians, 323; Flatheads (inland), 234; Gallas, 195; Hos, 138; Juangs, 141; Karens, 151; Kingsmill Islanders, 86; Mâlers, 127; Mongols, 273; New Caledonians, 103; Polynesians, 322; Samoans, 83; Samoyedes, 265; Santals, 135; Todas, 120; Tongans, 323; Tsimsheeans, 324; importance of burial in relation to, 316, 317; universality of belief in, 324; absence of moral element in relation to notions of, 324

Gallas, the, 192, 195, 196
Gallinas, the, 436
Gambling, practice of, by British Columbian tribes, 236; Germans

(ancient), 403; Polynesians, 92; Spokan Indians, 233; Sumatrans, 280; Talkotins, 237; Tchuelches, 218
Garos, the, 145, 338, 346
Gauls, the, 370, 379, 387
Gautama. [*See* Buddha]
Gegyldan, the, 366
Generalization, the first stage in the genesis of the moral idea, 309
Generalization of individuals, 310
Generous disposition of the Arabs, 475; Eusofyzes, 476; Madecasses, 158; Tchuktchis, 259
Genesis of moral ideas, 16, 31, 308 *seq.;* of ideas in relation to moral conduct, 414
Genesis of emotions, distinction between, and that of ideas, 415; secondary character of, 414; gives rise to benevolence, 415
Genesis of the altruistic sentiment, 443
Gentleness exhibited by the Norsemen, 371
Georgian Islanders, the, 78, 458
Germans (ancient), the, 361, 370, 380, 398, 403, 407 *n.*, 408.
Ghosts, belief in, by uncultured peoples, 311
Gilds (Saxon), 366; considered as Christian brotherhoods, 392; origin of the, 367; relation of, to the family, 368; resemblance of, to tithings and hundreds, 392; resemblance to, of Chinese associations, 392; among the ancient Germans, 408; ancient Greeks and Romans, 461
Girls, exchangeable value of, among the Kafirs, 421; Moors, 189, 421 *n.*
Girls (Oráon), "brotherhood" alliances formed between, 124
Gloomy disposition of the Samoyedes, 265
Gluttony of the Eskimos, 246, 249; Samoyedes, 265
Gods, duties to the, 333; moral character of the, same as that of their worshippers, 335
Gonds, the, 121
Good, meaning of term, 413; transcendental law of, 57
Good nature. [*See* Cheerful]
Gours, the. [*See* Gonds]
Grades of initiation in the secret associations of the American Indians, 459
Grades of relatives among Chinese, 364 *n.*
Gratitude exhibited by the Eskimos, 245; the Hottentots, 203; want of, shown by the Aleuts, 262; the Talkotins, 238
Great Spirit, the, of the American Indians, 434, 455
Greenlanders, 251 *seq.;* 316 *n.*
Greeks, the ancient, 316, 317 *n.*, 354, 384 [*see* Mainotes]
Greybeards, influence of, in the tribe, 385
Guest and Host. [*See* Host and Guest]
Guiana, Indians of, 222, 325
Guinea, natives of, 163 *n.*, 436

Habit, influence of, over moral conduct, 349; in formation of conscience, 19, 24
Haiduks, the, of Dalmatia, 368
Happiness, tendency of certain actions to produce, 3; tendency to promote, the test of right actions, 23, 62
Hawaiians, the. [*See* Sandwich Islanders]
Head of the Family. [*See* Family, head of the]
Head-flattening, practice of, by tribes of British Columbia, 236
Head-taking, practice of, by the Dyaks, 283, 285; Garos, 146; Javanese, 289; Khivans, 277 *n.;* Kukis, 146; Loshais, 146; Mongols, 277 *n.;* Nagas, 147; superstitious origin of custom, 146, 147; a test of manhood, 146, 285 *n.*
Heartlessness exhibited by the Greenlanders, 253; Namaquas, 206
Hebrew Decalogue, 351, 411
Hebrews, moral influence ascribed to the, 352, 357
Hill tribes of India. [*See* India, Aborigines of]
Hindu Institutions, influence of, in Java, 287
Hinduism, moral ideas of, 471 *seq.;* 479
Hindus, the, 114, 117, 316, 422, 429, 471, *seq.*, 479; (early) supposed to have been polyandrists, 117
Hiro, the Polynesian god of thieves, 80
Hog, sacrifice of the, among the Polynesians, 341. [*See* Pig]
Holars, the, 143
Homeric Legends, the, 452
Homicide [*see* Compensation, Fines, Murder], prevalence of, among the English (early) 394; Greenlanders, 254; Mainotes, 354; Yukons, 238; punishment for, among the East

Africans, 161; Kalmucks, 270; Kukis, 147; Persians, 339; punishment for, inflicted by aggrieved persons, 339; among the Abyssinians, 192; Bornuese, 182; Mandingos, 184; suit for, among the Icelanders, 360; when justifiable, 337

Honesty of the American Indians (South), 213; Caribs, 224; Dyaks, 285; Flat-heads, 233; Garos, 145; Guiana Indians, 222; Hottentots, 205; Ingeletes, 259; Javanese, 287; Knisteneaux, 230; Koraks, 260; Lapps, 266, 267; Ostiaks, 268; Papuas of New Guinea, 103, 104; Shoshones, 227; Spokans, 232

Honour, blood-revenge a point of, 354 *seq.;* sense of, displayed by Tongan chiefs, 81; word of, among Algerian Berbers, 190, 191; (personal), sense of, among predatory peoples, 402 *seq.;* importance of, in relation to moral development, 407; origin of sense of, 407

Hormousdha, a Mongol deity, 276 *n.*

Hos, the, 136, 345

Hospitality, practice of, among the Afghans, 374, 475; Africans (West), 163, 167; Aleuts, 262; Andamaners, 108; Arabs (Algerian), 190; Ashantees, 168; Bedouins, 373, 405, 475; Berbers, 190; Burmese, 470; Circassians, 373; Comanches, 240; Eskimos, 245; Fijians, 98; Garos, 145; Germans (ancient), 398; Greenlanders, 251, 253; Greeks (ancient), 453; Guiana Indians, 222; Hindus, 471; Hottentots, 203, 204; Irish (ancient), 372; Javanese, 287; Kafirs, 439; Kalmucks, 270; Knisteneaux, 230; Koraks, 260; Lapps, 266, 267; Madecasses, 158; Mainotes, 372; Mandingos, 184; Mongols, 271; Montenegrins, 404; Moors, 189; Morlacchi, 373, 404; New Zealanders, 82, 84; Norsemen, 371, 402; Persians, 476; Samoans, 83; Sandwich Islanders, 88; Santals, 133; Siamese, 468; Sumatrans, 280; Tinneh, 232 *n.;* Toorkmuns, 373, 476; Wallah-Wallah, 232; considered as charity among the Afghans, 476; hereditary nature of ties formed by, among the ancient Greeks, 453; moral consequence of refusing, among the Hindus, 471; rights of, among the Kingsmill Islanders, 85; sacredness of, among the ancient Greeks, 452, 453; the Mainotes, 454; want of, exhibited by Abyssinians, 193; Africans (East), 161; Bechuanas, 179; Enceshurs, 235; Fezzanese, 186; Mandingos, 183; Skilloots, 235; (sexual) [*see* Sexual Hospitality]

Hospitals, establishment of, among the ancient Mexicans, 464

Host and Guest, sacredness of relation between, among the Afghans, 354; Bedouins, 373; Circassians, 373; Greeks (ancient), 453; Mainotes, 372, 454; Morlacchi, 373; Toorkmuns, 373. [*See* Hospitality]

Hottentots, the, 203, 208

Hounouman, connection of, with the Indian aboriginal race, 132, 144

Hovas, the. [*See* Madagascar, natives of]

Human bones, preserved by primitive peoples, 109. [*See* Skulls]

Human life, disregard for, shown by the Africans (East), 159; Ashantees, 169, 172 *seq.*; Australian aborigines, 68; Bechuanas, 175; Dahomans, 162; Fijians, 96; Gonds, 122, 123; Kafirs, 175 *seq.*, 178, 439; Kandhs, 131; Korwás, 144; Mongols, 277*n.*; Norsemen, 371; Oráons, 125; Polynesians, 78, 92; Toorkmuns, 370; Wahŭma, 198, 199; regard for, shown by the Afghans, 369; Bedouins, 369

Human mind, influence of, over the moral ideas of the spirit world, 334

Human sacrifices, offering of, among the Africans (East), 161; American Indians, 324; Ashantees, 172 *seq.*; Bhuîyas, 132; English (early), 398; Fijians, 98; Garos, 146; Gauls, 399; Gonds, 121; Kandhs, 128, 129; Mexicans (ancient), 464, 467; Sandwich Islanders, 87; Society Islanders, 322; on death, offered among the Ashantees; Mongols, 275; Zulus, 176

Humanity, idea of, among the predatory peoples, 408; origin of the, in the sense of manliness, 408

Hundreds (Saxon), 366, 392

Hypocrisy, exhibited by the British Columbia Coast Tribes, 236; Kafirs, 178

Iberians, oath of friendship of the, 452

Icelanders, the. [*See* Scandinavians]

Icelandic legislation, tendency of, 360; Sagas, 360

Ideas, genesis of, in relation to moral conduct, 414; distinction between,

and that of emotions, 415; notion of right essential to, 415
Ideas (moral). [*See* Moral Ideas]
Immorality, primitive notions as to, entertained by the Africans, 295; Australian aborigines, 294; Indian aborigines, 295; Tahitians, 294; New Zealanders, 294; origin of idea of, 336; development of idea of, in relation to actions disapproved of by spirits, 346; of the civilised peoples of antiquity, 353
Improvement, moral, slow progress of, 348
Improvidence exhibited by the South American Indians, 212; Sumatrans, 280
Impulsive nature of the Papuas, 283
Impurity of matter, idea of the, 465
Incantations, use of, by the Polynesians, 342
Incas, divinity of the Peruvian, 348
Inceshurs, the, 235
Independent character of the Bedouins, 386, 395; Eusofyzes, 356; Guiana Indians, 222; Icelanders, 361
India, aborigines of, 109 *seq.*, 313 *n.*, 331 *n.*, 340, 345, 346, 350, 389, 437 *n.* [*See* Badagas, Beders, Bhils, Bhúiyas, Bhúmij, Bodo, Brinjaries, Chandalas, Cheros, Dhers, Gonds, Holars, Hos, Irulas, Juangs, Kandhs, Kharrias, Kols, Korwás, Kukis, Kúlis, Kurumbas, Looshais, Malers, Mangs, Maravers, Mundas, Nagas, Oráons, Paharias, Ramooses, Santals, Sours, Thugs, Todas, Varalis, Veders]; early Hindu references to, 111; former wide extension of, 131, 136, 143
India (Southern), slave-tribes of, 112
Indians (American). [*See* America, aborigines of]
Indifference to suffering shown by the Madecasses, 153
Individual, crimes considered as offences against the, 341
Individuals, generalisation of, 310; moral improvement of, 348; rights of, among the Kafirs, 304; rights of, precede those of the tribe, 306
Indolent disposition of the Sumatrans, 280
Inductive school of ethics, 2, 6, 62
Infanticide, practice of, among the Abipones, 214, 421; Africans, 162, 421; Australian aborigines, 70, 420; Chinese, 421; Greenlanders, 254; Hindus, 422; Itelmen, 263; Kafirs, 176, 421; Kandhs, 130; Knisteneaux, 230, 419; Madecasses, 153, 422; Polynesians, 78, 420, 458; Rajputs, 422; Tasmanians, 76; Todas, 117, 420; Zulus, 421; moral consequences of, 423; motives for, among primitive peoples, 118, 214, 419, 423 *n.*; wide prevalence of, 304
Ingeletes of Alaska, comparison of, with the Eskimos, 259
Ingnas, Australian ghosts, 311
Ingnersoit, spirits feared by the Greenlanders, 316 *n.*
Inhumanity displayed by the Foulahs, 183; Greenlanders, 253; Tuaricks, 183
Initiation (tribal), rites of, among African tribes, 435; American Indians, 434; Australian aborigines, 433; Santals, 433; origin of, 437; grades of, among the American Indians, 459
Injuries, rule as to avenging, among the Chalikatas, 150; valuation of, 358. [*See* Compensation, Fines]
Innuit. [*See* Eskimos]
Insincerity of the Abyssinians, 193; Fezzanese, 186
Instinct of property, 296, 301, 306; of right, 297; of personal rights, 301; of self-preservation [*see* Self-preservation]
Instinct, (maternal) [*see* Maternal Instinct]; (paternal) [*see* Paternal Instinct]; (sexual) [*see* Sexual Instinct]
Instincts (personal), strength of, compared with social instincts, 53, 56; (selfish) [*see* Selfish Instincts]; (social) [*see* Social Instincts]
Intellectual element in conscience, 19, 348
Intellectual faculties, development of, with primitive man, 54
Intellectual ideas, nature of, 17
Intelligence displayed by the Fulbe, 183; Latookas, 197; Monbuttu, 200; Zandey, 202
Intuitions (moral), origin of, according to Mr Herbert Spencer, 31, 35
Intuitive school of ethics, 2, 6, 62
Intoxication, prevalence of, among the Papuas of New Guinea, 103
Irayas, the. [*See* Philippines]
Irish (ancient), 359, 363, 372, 379, 399, 400, 403
Irritable disposition of the Andamaners, 108
Irulas, the. [*See* Nilgiri Hills]
Itelmen, the. [*See* Kamtschatka]

Jains, the Kurumbas, thought to be, 112
Jakuts, the, 264
Japanese, the, 455
Javanese, the, 287 *seq.*
Jealous disposition of the Arru Islanders, 104; Australian aborigines, 293; Cheppewyans, 281; Dyaks, 285; Hottentots, 205; Javanese, 289; Malays, 279; Spokans, 232
Juangs, the, 139, 345
Judge, office of, among the Norsemen, 387; exercised by the Druids, 388.
Judges, hereditary, among the ancient Irish, 400
Justice, administration of, among the Apaches, 239; regard for, among the ancient Irish, 400

Kabyles, the, 191, 453. [*See* Berbers]
Kadiaks, the, 251 *n.*
Kafirs, the, 175, 292, 304, 328, 340, 387, 421, 429, 439. [*See* Zulus]
Kalmucks, the, 269 *seq.*
Kamtschatka, natives of, 263
Kanakas, the. [*See* New Caledonia]
Kandhs, the, 121, 128, 340, 345
Karens, the, 151
Kat River Settlement, 208
Kharriás, the, 139
Killymucks, the, 236
Kin, liability of, for acts of wrong-doer, 363, 365; aid of, allowed where right of feud recognised, 365; punishment for homicide inflicted by, 339. [*See* Homicide]
Kind disposition of the Bosjesmans, 207; Eskimos, 245, 246; Greenlanders, 251; Turks, 478
Kindness, appreciated by savages, 426
King, divinity ascribed to, among the Wahúma, 198; moral characteristics required of a, by the ancient Irish, 400; paternal character of, 393
Kingsmill Islanders, the, 85
Kinship through mother, origin of, 423 *n.*; disintegrating tendency of rule as to, 437; through father, recognition of, by Indian aborigines, 437 *n.*; influence of recognition of, over tribal organisation, 437
Knisteneaux, the, 230, 419
Kobong, the, of the Australian aborigines, 318, 320, 344, 435 *n.*
Kolarians, the, 110, 133, *seq.* [*See* India, aborigines of]
Kols, the, 122, 312 *n.*, 331 *n.*
Kootenais, the, 234 *n.*
Koraks, the, 260; (settled), degraded character of, 261
Koran, moral teaching of the, 474
Korannas. [*See* Hottentots]
Korwás, the, 144
Kukis, the, 146, 147
Kúlis, the, 142
Kurumbas. [*See* Nilgiri Hills]
Kutchin, the. [*See* Yukons]
Kych, the, 197 *n.*

Ladrones. [*See* Caroline Islanders]
Lamaism, 273, 444
Lampong, natives of, 281
Land, ownership of, the mark of freedom, 85
Lapps, the, compared with the Samoyedes, 265, 266
Latookas, the, 196
Leaf-wearers of India, 139, 140. [*See* Juangs]
Lex talionis, 291, 337 *seq.* [*see* Blood-revenge]; enforced by Mosaic law, 357; beneficial action of the, among the Bedouins, 357 *n.*; blood-shedding of the, an atonement, 358; evils attending action of the, 357; means used to mitigate evils attending the, 357; tribal sanction to exercise of the, 339
Liberty, the law of, according to Mr Herbert Spencer, 301
Licentiousness of the Ashantees, 168, 171; West Africans, 164; of the members of the Areoi Association, 456
Life, superstitious objection to taking, among the Burmese, 469
Lively disposition. [*See* Cheerful]
Lizard, oath by the, 345
Lodge, the American Indian, 455
Loshais, the, 146
Louisiana, Upper, Indians of, 226
Love, explanation of the feeling of, 50; relation of sympathy to, 416
Love of being, theory of, 9
Love of order, theory of, 9
Lupus, Bishop, quoted, 394
Lying, proneness to, of the Africans, (East), 160; Africans (West), 326; Arabs (Algerian), 190; Bechuanas, 178; Chepewyans, 232 *n.*; Eskimos, 247, 250; Foulahs, 182; Hottentots, 206; Mandingos, 183; Talkotins, 238; Tchuelches, 217; Tinneh, 232 *n.*; Todas, 119

Mackintosh, moral theory of, 14 *seq.*
Madagascar, natives of, 152, 292, 316, 329, 422, 423, 425, 440 *seq.*; dark and light tribes of, 156 *n.*, 157

Madness, not uncommon among the Abipones, 216
Magadha, the Kols the primitive inhabitants of, 136
Magical ceremonies practised among the American Indians, 460; of the Buddhists and Sivaites, 460
Magnanimous conduct among uncultured peoples, 428; disposition of the Bedouins, 359, 465
Mahars, the, 144
Mainotes, the, 338, 354, 372, 453
Malays, the, 278 *seq.*; comparison of, with the Papuas, 283; of Sumatra, 389
Male children, preference for, among eastern peoples, 421. [*See* Sons]
Malemutes, the. [*See* Tchuktchis]
Málers, the, 126, 331 *n.*
Malliallies, the, 128 *n.*
Man (primeval), moral condition of, 63, 65, 304; uncultured state of, 65; (primitive), activity of instinct of self-preservation with, 54, 65; influence of superstition over, 388; influence of, in the development of the altruistic sentiment, 445; moral condition of, 196, 291; motives for practice of abortion assigned by, 419, 423; social instincts inherited by, 52; strength of the maternal instinct with, 423; sympathetic nature of women with, 424 *seq.*
Mandans, the, 229, 424, 428, 434
Mandingos, the, 183, 318 *n.*, 426
Mangs, the, 143
Manhood, ceremonies on initiation into, among Africans, 435; American Indians, 344, 434 *seq.*; Australian aborigines, 344, 434; Santals, 134, 433
Mankind, original race of, claims to be the, 126, 140
Manliness, regard for, among the American Indians, 244; a characteristic of the Bedouins, 405; Germans (ancient), 403; Irish (ancient), 403; Norsemen, 371, 402; Romans, 410; Slavonians, 404; essential conditions of, 407; origin of, in self-consciousness, 406; moral genesis consequent on sense of, 407, 408, 409; moral value of, 407, 410; nobility of character due to sense of, 409
Man-stealing, practice of, by the Toorkmuns, 469
Marabouts, Mahommedan, bad character of, 186
Maravers, the, 111
Marriage, absence of native word for, among the Aymaras, 219; ceremonies among the Kharrias, 139; Juangs, 140; clan relationship a bar to, 385; festivals for promoting, among the Indian aborigines, 130; proposal of, made by girls, among the Garos, 146 *n.*; ideas as to, entertained by the Afghans, 375; Bedouins, 376; English (early), 382; Gauls, 379; Germans (ancient), 379; Norsemen, 381; Irish (ancient), 379; Slavonians (Southern), 378; Toorkmuns, 376; ceremonies of, among the Afghans, 375; Gonds, 122; Greenlanders, 255; Hos, 136; Kandhs, 130; Koraks, 261; Málers, 126; Toorkmuns, 376
Marriage by capture [*see* Wife-stealing]
Marriage (communal), 304; supposed existence of, among the Aymaras, 220
Maternal instinct, ethical importance of the, 418, 430; antagonism between, and the instinct of self-preservation, 419, 430; development of the, 418; relation of the, to sympathy, 418, 430; to the sexual instinct, 419; to the altruistic sentiments, 419, 430; strength of the, with primitive peoples, 423
Maternal relationship, idea of the family founded on, 433
Maternal uncle, authority of the, over children, 384, 407 *n.*
Matter, doctrine of the impurity of, 465
Mayas, the, 244
Mech Kachari, the. [*See* Bodo]
Mental capacity of the Australian aborigines, 66
Merit (religious), acquisition of among the Hindus, 473
Mexicans (ancient), the, 463 *seq.*
Mexico, Indians of, 241, 243 *n.*, 244, 347
Mild disposition of Bhíls, 143; Bhúiyas, 132; Dyaks, 285, 286; Flatheads (inland), 233; Greenlanders, 257; Hos, 136; Hottentots, 203, 204; Indian aborigines, 110, 112, 116, 462; Knisteneaux, 230; Madacasses, 153, 442; Mexicans (ancient), 466; Mishmis, 149; Oráons, 123; Pádam, 149; Santals, 133; Sokulks, 232; Spokan Indians, 232; Sumatrans, 279; Tchuktchis, 259; of the Buddhist peoples, 462, 479

Mildness of disposition the result of temperament, 206
Mill, Mr J. S., utilitarian theory of, 22 *seq.*
Mimicry, power of, displayed by the Australian aborigines, 66
Mincopies, the. [*See* Andaman Islands]
Miris, the, 149
Mishmis, the, 149
Modesty of unmarried females among the Oráons, 124; of the Zandey women, 201
Mohammedan peoples, morality of the, 474
Mohammedanism, 474 *seq.*, 480; influence of, among the African peoples, 182, 183, 186, 187 *n.*, 326, 352; and Buddhism, moral influence of, compared, 444
Mojaves, the. [*See* Apaches]
Monbuttu, the, 200
Money-lending, evils attending, 120, 133
Mongols, the, 271 *seq.*; code of laws of, 270; oath of friendship of, 452
Montenegrins, the, 355, 369, 378, 404
Moors, the, 189, 421 *n.*; [*see* Berbers]
Moral and intellectual ideas, distinction between, 17, 19
Moral beauty, conception of, 8
Moral character, how actions acquire, 309; what actions first gain, 309
Moral conscience [*see* Conscience]
Moral culture, position of woman in relation to, 384; importance of the paternal instinct in relation to, 438
Moral decadence of the American aborigines, 244
Moral depravity of the natives of Equatorial Africa, 148
Moral development, progress of, 348
Moral difference between Christianity and Buddhism, subjective, 480
Moral faculty, nature of the, according to utilitarianism, 22
Moral genesis, consequent on sense of manliness, 407
Moral ideas, genesis of, 16, 31, 308 *seq.*; comparison between, and genesis of altruistic sentiments, 443; of the spirit world affected by the human mind, 334; of Mohammedan peoples, 474; of Hinduism, 471 *seq.*, 479
Moral maxims of the Javanese, 289 *seq.*
Moral obligation absent from the conception of Deity, 336; development of sense of, 407, 414; formation of the idea of, 5, 10; genesis of idea of, in relation to virtues, 413; opinions as to the source of, 2 *seq.*; origin of, in relation to actions disapproved of by spirits, 346. [*See* Duty]
Moral progress, conditions necessary to its permanence, 352; importance in relation to, of sense of personal honour, 407; of brotherhood associations, 409; supposed influence of the Hebrews over, 352; relation to, of tribal organisation, 396; slowness of, 348
Moral results arising from the sense of manliness, 408
Moral sense, 3, 6, 12, 14, 16, 46, 49; genesis of the, 319, 333 *seq.*; importance in relation to, of notion of "property," 296; influence of superstition in formation of, 341; origin of, according to Mr Darwin, 52, 54; traces of, among the Australian aborigines, 319
Moral sentiments, theory of, 3, 14; formation of, according to Mr Herbert Spencer, 31, 37
Moral standard among the predatory peoples, 410
Moral strength, the attribute of the predatory peoples, 410
Moral teaching of the ancient Mexicans, 463; of the Koran, 474
Moral training, necessity of, to a race, 352
Morals, modern theories of, 1 *seq.*
Morality, original absence of idea of, in relation to actions, 332; (absolute), Mr Herbert Spencer's view of, 60; of actions, change in, how effected, 336; (Buddhist) altruistic nature of, 463; criterion of, 3, 5, 14, 26; development of, 311, 331, 348, 441; influence over, of authority, 331; of oaths and ordeals, 346; of priests and chiefs, 348; of superstition, 388; of religious sanction, 443; divine origin of, 61; ideas as to, entertained by uncultured peoples, 291; [*see* Index, *passim*]; (negative) of the Amazon Indians, 211; the tribal authority concerned with negative, 445; negative and positive morality, distinction between, 411; race elements in phenomena of, 353; and religion, divorce between, 389; standard of, according to Mr Bain, 26; supernatural sanction to, how obtained, 346; (transcendental), 57 *seq.*; tribal and non-tribal, 310, 337

Morlacchi, the, 355, 359, 368, 373, 378, 404
Mother, clan of, children originally belonged to, 384; disregard for, shown among the Arawaks, 223; Bechnanas, 429; Kafirs, 429; kinship through, origin of, 170, 423 *n.*; disintegrating tendency of rule as to kinship through, 437; reverence for, shown among the Arabs, 429 *n.*; Braknas, 188; Damaras, 429 *n.*; Greenlanders, 256; Hindus, 429; Madecasses, 441; Negro peoples, 429; Zulus, 429
Mpongwe, the, 325
Múndas, the, 138, 410
Mundurucús, the, 211
Muras, the, 210
Murder of Europeans, considered no crime by the Moors, 189; of strangers among the Greenlanders, 255; a private offence among the Mongols, 271; (organised) among the Hindus, 115. [*See* Homicide]
Mystery (American), 318; superstitious ideas connected with, 434
Mysteries (ancient), based on the idea of the new birth, 460, 463; comparison of the, with secret associations of the American Indians, 460; considered as brotherhood associations, 460; spiritual purification in the, 463

Nágam, the name of a priest among the Juangs, 141
Nagas, the, 146
Namaquas. [*See* Hottentots]
Name, superstition as to mentioning the, 125
Nation, the idea of brotherhood, reproduced in the, 393
Nats, evil spirits, 151
Navajos, the. [*See* Apaches]
Negative morality. [*See* Morality (negative)]
Negritos. [*See* Philippines]
Negros, the, 186, 427, 429. [*See* Africa, natives of]
Nephews, descent of property to, 384
New birth, ancient mysteries based on idea of, 460, 463
New Caledonia, natives of, 99; comparison of, with the Fijians, 102
New England, Indians of, 226
New Guinea, Papuas of, 103, 104
New South Wales, aborigines of, 319
New Zealanders, 79 *n.*, 80, 81, 82, 84, 321
Nez Percés, the. [*See* Chohoptins]
Niam-Niam, the. [*See* Zandey]
Nilgiri Hills, tribes of the, 110 *seq.*
Noble disposition of the Arab, 475
Nobility of character, connection of, with manliness, 409
Non-burial, effect of, over the spirit of the dead, 316
Non-tribal morality, 337
Nootkas, the, 237 *n.*
Normans, the, 384, 402, 410
Norsemen, the. [*See* Scandinavians]
Nyffé, the, 163 *n.*

Oath, absence of the, among the Polynesians, 344; administered among the Kandhs, 129; by the anthill, 345; by the bear, 268; by the peacock's feather, 345; by the tiger, 345; of allegiance among the Madecasses, 345; of alliance used by the Bedouins, 369; of friendship among the Armenians and Assyrians, 452; influence of the, in relation to moral development, 346 *seq.*; invocation of spirits in the, 345; nature of an, 345; necessity of the, as a restraint on violence among the ancient Greeks, 453; ordeals used as an, 344; simple form of the, among the Indian aborigines, 345
Obligation, moral. [*See* Moral obligation]
Offences, fines for, absence of authority to enforce, among the Bedouins, 386; punishments for, left to persons aggrieved, 292; among uncultured peoples, 292; (external) those against the tribe, 310. [*See* Compensation, Crimes]
Offerings to the dead, 311, 312, 439, 440
Offerings, to spirits among the Society Islanders, 322; as satisfaction for offences, 346, 347; for offences against chastity, 126, 280, 284, 285, 389
Okanagans, the. [*See* Chinnooks]
Old age. [*See* Reverence]
Omens, influence of, over the Hos, 138; Javanese, 287; Lapps, 268; Polynesians, 341
Oppression, effects of, over moral character, 186
Orâons, the, 122, 123, 126, 331 *n.*
Ordeals, influence of, in relation to moral development, 346, 348; invocation of spirits in, 345; nature of, 344, 345; use of, among the American Indians, 459; (poison) use of, for sorcery, 153, 343, 345

Oriental peoples, moral ideas of, 463
Osheba, the, 165
Ostiaks, the 268
Outanata, the. [*See* New Guinea]

Pádam, the, 148; Abors, the, 390
Pahárias, the, of Rajmahal, 389
Papuas, the, 78 *n.*, 95 *seq.*, 99 *seq.*, 103 *seq.*, 203, 283, 331 *n.*; comparison of, with the Polynesians, 105; with the Malays, 283
Paraguay, natives of, 214 *seq.*
Parananatés, the, 210
Parents, absolute power of, over children in Madagascar, 152; reverence for, the earliest active virtue, 351. [*See* Father, Reverence]
Passionate disposition of the Norsemen, 393
Passive duties, formation of conscience in relation to, 414. [*See* Duties]
Patagonia, natives of, 216 *seq.*
Paternal authority [*see* Father]; early development of, 351; effect of, in relation to tribal organisation, 385, 407; emancipation from, among the ancient Irish, 364; feeling of, gives rise to sense of dignity, 407; nature of, among the ancients, 384, 407; predatory character of peoples first fully recognising, 388
Paternal character of the head of the state, 393
Paternal instinct, influence of, in moral development, 438
Patient disposition of the Bedouins, 405; Chepewyans, 231
Patriotism of the Foulahs, 182
Peace-pledge of the early English, 409
Peacock, oath by the feather of, 345
Penrhyn Islanders, 80 *n.*
Perjury, condemned by the Ostiaks, 269; prevalence of, among the early English, 394
Persians, the, 339, 358 *n.*, 476; and Abyssinians, comparison between, 191
Personal instincts, comparison of the, with social instincts, 53, 56
Personal right, idea of, 296, 306, 308
Peru, natives of, 212 *n.*, 218 *seq.*, 347
Philippines, natives of the, 106 *seq.*, 299
Pig, sacrifice of the, 284, 285, 341, 347, 389. [*See* Hog]
Pilfering habits of the Foulahs, 182; of the Mongols, 271
Piracy practised by the Haiduks, 368
Pity, common want of, among Eastern peoples, 477
Planets, superstitious notions as to influence of, 465
Plants, superstitious regard for particular, 318
Pleasure and pain, ethical relations of, 8, 11, 16, 23, 42, 416, 430
Pocahontas, 425
Poison, use of, as an ordeal for sorcery, 153, 343, 345
Poisoning, secret, practised by the Kafirs, 181; Tchuelches, 217; Uzbeks, 397
Politeness exhibited by the Eskimos, 245
Pollutions (public), crimes, treated as, 148, 346, 390
Polyandry, the early Hindus supposed to have practised, 117
Polygamy, motive for practice of, 422 *n.* [*See* Sexual morality]
Polynesians, the, 78 *seq.*, 92, 97, 292, 293, 321, 341, 344, 420, 423, 428, 438; [*see* Caroline Islanders, Friendly Islanders, Georgian Islanders, Kingsmill Islanders, New Zealanders, Penhryn Islanders, Philippines, Samoans, Sandwich Islanders, Tahitians, Tongans]; comparison of, with the Papuas, 105; God of thieves of, 335 *n.*
Port Dory. [*See* New Guinea]
Positive morality, 411
Prayers, use of, by the ancient Mexicans, 464
Predatory habits of the Afghans, 369; Bedouins, 369; Berbers, 191; Bhils, 143; Chalikatas, 150; Circassians, 373; Dahomans, 162 *n.*; Gauls, 370; Germans (ancient), 370; Korwás, 144; Kulís, 142; Montenegrins, 369; Morlacchi, 368; Norsemen, 370, 402; Tawáreks, 189; Thracians, 353; Toorkmuns, 369; of peoples first fully recognising the paternal authority, 388
Predatory peoples, 349, 384; comparison of, with the Romans, 410; moral attributes of the, 410. [*See* Predatory habits]
Predatory tribes of India, 113, 115, 125, 142, 143
Priestly office, exercise of the, among the Norsemen, 387
Priests, influence of, in moral development, 348; influence of, among the Gauls, 387; society of, in the Sandwich Islands, 88
Primeval man. [*See* Man, primeval]
Primitive man. [*See* Man, primitive]
Princes, royal, destruction of, among the Wahumas, 198

Princess, right to choose husband allowed to, among the Ashantees, 170; Congoese, 164 *n.*; Madecasses, 155; Yourihas, 165 *n.*
Prisoners, kind treatment of, by the Abipones, 215; Chawanons, 226; cruel treatment of, by American Indians, 226, 229, 234, 239, 241, 242; Dyaks, 284. [*See* Enemies]
Private injuries become public when tribal union perfected, 310
Private revenge, right of, how lost among ancient peoples, 360
Property, definition of, in its moral relations, 413; descent of, to nephews, 384; instinct of, 19, 44, 45, 296, 301, 302, 306; origin of, 301; importance of idea of, in relation to origin of the moral sense, 296, 298, 308; interference with, origin of moral idea in, 336; private, recognised by primitive peoples, 303; subordination of desire for, to social instincts, 300; right of, 414; the earliest right enforced, 351; women included with, among primitive peoples, 298, 309
Prostitution, prevalence of, among the Ashantees, 171; Kafirs, 180; Virginian Indians, 225; (male) [*see* Vices, unnatural]; (sacred), 171, 278
Protecting Spirits, 318, 323
Protection (spirit) in Totemism, 435 *n.*
Proud disposition of the Bedouins, 405; Enceshurs, 235; Skilloots, 235; Tsimsheeans, 325
Proverbs of the West Africans, 326, 327; Madecasses, 329
Puberty, admission into the tribe at age of, 433 *seq.*; ceremony on attaining, practised among the Indians of Peru, 221
Public authority, intervention of, by way of mediation, 358; to enforce fair play, 360
Public tribunals among the Norsemen, 360
Punishment [*see* Adultery, Crimes, Offences, Homicide, Theft]; after death, 333. [*See* Future Life]
Purification (spiritual) in the Mysteries, 463; means of, according to Hinduism, 474; the active virtues valued as means of, 479; celibacy essential to, 465

Quaiquæ. [*See* Hottentots]
Quarrels, how dealt with among the Norsemen, 360
Quarrelsome disposition of the Bedouins, 395; Kafirs, 181; of women among the Abipones, 216
Quechuas, the, 220

Race, moral training necessary to a, 352
Race, elements in moral phenomena, 353
Rajmahal, the hill tribes of. [*See* Málers]
Rajpouts, the, 422
Rama, reverence for, by Indian aborigines, 132, 144
Ramooses, the, 113, 115
Ravana, reverence for, by Indian aborigines, 144
Reason, importance of, in relation to moral development, 20
Re-birth, material, 463, 479
Reflection, influence of, over moral development, 348, 443
Relationships, classificatory system of, 364 *n.*, 433 *n.*
Relatives, grades of, among the Chinese, 364 *n.*
Religion, crimes treated as offences against, 390; ideas as to, entertained by the Gonds, 121; Indian aborigines, 111, 113, 120 *seq.*; Juangs, 142; Málers, 127; Oráons, 125; Santals, 135; Singphos, 151; Todas, 120, 130 *n.* [*see* Superstition]; morality placed under the sanction of, among the ancient Mexicans and Peruvians, 347; and morality, divorce between, 389
Religious absolution, use of, among the ancient Mexicans, 465
Religious associations among the West African peoples, 436
Religious disposition of the Bornuese, 185; Hindus, 473; Mongols, 273; Uzbeks, 397
Religious efficacy of acts of charity among the Hindus, 474, 479
Religious excommunication among the Gauls, 388
Religious merit, acqnisition of, among the Hindus, 473
Religious nature of the Agyd Office among the Bedouins, 386
Religious origin of Mohammedan benevolence, 478, 480
Religious rites among the ancient Mexicans, cruelty of, 467
Religious sanctions, influence of, over moral development, 414, 443
Remorse, non-possession of, by animals, 418

Resentment aroused by interference with property, 43
Reserved disposition of the Dyaks, 286; Eskimos, 250; Malays, 282. [*See* Apathetic, Despondent]
Resignation. [*See* Patient]
Resurrection, reasoning of the Latookas as to the, 197
Retaliation, fear of, shown by the Greenlanders, 252; (private) precedes that of the tribe, 306, 309
Retribution, influence of fear of, over moral conduct, 32, 57; over moral development, 298, 300, 319, 414; importance of, in relation to moral development, 332 *seq.*; (moral) absence of, 328, 331; (spirit) fear of, 284, 311, 316 *seq.*, 320 *seq.*, 331, 332
Revenge, foundation of, in property rights, 296; curious mode of, among the Greenlanders, 258. [*See* Blood Revenge]
Revengeful disposition of the Afghans, 356; Africans (East), 159; Africans (West), 163; American aborigines, 212, 242; Ashantees, 169; Bedouins, 356; Bosjesmans, 207; Caribs, 224; Chawanons, 227; Chepewyans, 231; Chichimecs, 241; Circassians, 356; Fijians, 96; Greenlanders, 254; Hottentots, 205; Kafirs, 181, 182; Madecasses, 153; Malays, 279; Mandingos, 183; Montenegrins, 355; Morlacchi, 355; Sumatrans, 279; Tchuktchis, 261; Tsimsheeans, 235; Virginian Indians, 225
Reverence for old age, 438; shown by the Chohoptins, 232; Javanese, 288; Mandingos, 184; Papuas of New Guinea, 103; Sokulks, 232
Reverence, for authority exhibited by the Burmese, 469; Javanese, 288; Siamese, 467; for head of family, development of, 438; for human victims sacrificed among the Kandhs, 129; for members of the Areoi Institution, 456; for mother [*see* Mother]; for parents among the Eskimos, 246; Greeks (ancient), 452; Irish (ancient), 400; Siamese, 467; the earliest active virtue, 351
Reverence, want of, exhibited by the American Indians (South), 213; Antis, 221; Chawanons, 227; Greenlanders, 251, 254; Polynesians, 78; Shoshones, 227
Right, idea of, essential to morality, 15, 19, 38, 45, 332, 415; origin of, 45, 297, 298, 308; extension of, 298; and duty, relation between, 412; and wrong, distinction between, 5, 7, 18, 20; source of, 21; (personal) idea of, 296, 306, 308
Right, sense of, 62 *seq.*, 414; possessed by animals, 45
Rights, of the dead, 311, 312, 315 *seq.*, 319, 321, 438 *seq.*; interference with, resented by savages, 46; importance of, in relation to moral development, 331; (individual) precede those of the tribe, 306
Rites (funeral) [*see* Funeral Rites]; tribal. [*See* Initiation]
Romans, the, 316, 317 *n.*, 359
Roondah, the, of African tribes, 318

Sacred Office, internal influence of the. 389, 390
Sacredness of hospitality among the ancient Greeks, 452
Sacrifices [*see* Offerings]; (human) [*see* Human Sacrifices]
Safety, oath of, used among the Kabyles, 191
Samiladz. [*See* Lapps]
Samoans, the, 78 *n.*, 80 *seq.*, 96, 97
Samoyedes, the, 265; compared with the Finns and Lapps, 265, 266
Sanctions of morality, the, 333; (religious) value of, in relation to moral development, 414, 443
Sandwich Islanders, the, 87 *seq.*, 92, 94
Santals, the, 133, 144, 433
Savage condition of the South American aborigines, 210
Savages, moral ideas of, 196, 291. [*See* Man, primitive]
Saxon Gilds. [*See* Gilds]
Saxon law of Wergyld, 362
Saxons. [*See* English, early]
Scalping, 277 *n.*
Scandinavians, the, 360, 367, 370, 381, 385, 387, 393, 401
Scyths (ancient), moral illumination of the, 353
Secret Associations. [*See* Associations, Secret]
Self-consciousness, origin of manliness in, 406
Self-constraint, consequent on sense of manliness, 407
Self-denial, practice of, on initiation into the tribe, 434
Self-preservation, instinct of, 43, 52, 306, 308; activity of the, with primitive man, 54, 65; antagonism between, and the maternal instinct, 419, 430; actions relating to, first

acquire an ethical character, 309; law of, 302, 337
Self-reliance exhibited by the predatory peoples, 403
Selfish disposition of the Africans (East), 159; Africans (West), 162; Australian aborigines, 55; Bechuanas, 179; Chepewyans, 231; Greenlanders, 253; Mandingos, 183
Selfish instincts, the, 411
Selfish nature of Hindu charity, 473; of Eastern charity, 480
Senecas, the, 227 *n.*
Senegal, natives of, 436
Sensitive disposition of the Hos, 136; Javanese, 287
Sentimental morality, 26
Sentiments, the altruistic. [*See* Altruistic Sentiments]
Sept, the Irish, 364; identified with the family, 305
Serfdom among the Mongols, 275
Serpent-superstition, existence of the, among the Gallas, 196; ancient Mexicans, 464, 466
Severity, customary among uncultured peoples, 426
Sexual hospitality, practice of, among the Africans (West), 164; Apaches, 240; Bosjesmans, 205; Circassians, 401 *n.*; Chawanons, 227; Chinnooks, 235; Congoese, 164 *n.*; Gaboon tribes, 165, 166; Gallas, 165; Hottentots, 205; Huzaras, 278 *n.*; Knisteneaux, 231; Madecasses, 155; Mandans, 230; Merekedes, 278 *n.*; Shoshones, 228; Siaposh Kafirs, 278 *n.*; Tawáreks, 190 *n.*; Tenasserimese, 278 *n.*; Thibetans, 277; Virginian Indians, 226; probable origin of, 165
Sexual immorality, superstitions as to, 126, 280, 285, 389
Sexual instinct, 43, 52; relation of the, to the maternal instinct, 419; to the altruistic sentiments, 419
Sexual morality, habits relating to, among the Abipones, 215; Abyssinians, 192, 194; Africans (East), 159, 160; Africans (West), 162 *seq.*, 166; Aleuts, 262, &c., &c. [*see* Index, *passim*]; of primeval man, 64, 304. [*See* Adultery, Bundling, Celibacy, Cisisbeo, Chastity, Circumcision, Communal Marriage, Effeminates, Excision, Marriage, Prostitution, Puberty, Sexual Hospitality, Vices (unnatural), Wife-lending, Wife-purchase, Wife-stealing, Woman]
Sham-fight at funerals among the Australian aborigines, 315
Sheikh, Arab, authority of the, 386
Shoshones, the, 227
Siamese, the, 467
Siberia, natives of, 262 *seq.*, 268
Sibuyan, the, of Borneo, 389
Sicilians, the, 355
Sick, societies for the relief of the, among the ancient Greeks and Romans, 461; treatment of the, among the Bechuanas, 175; Damaras, 175 *n.*; Eskimos, 248; Jakuts, 264; Juangs, 142; Kafirs, 175; Koraks, 260; Madecasses, 153; New Caledonians, 102; Polynesians, 79
Sickness. [*See* Disease]
Simplicity displayed by the Dyaks, 285; Hottentots, 203; Javanese, 287, 288; Juangs, 140; Korwas, 145; Mongols, 272; Polynesians, 84; Siberian peoples, 268; Sumatrans, 280
Singing-combat, the, of the Greenlanders, 252, 258
Singphos, the, 150
Sivaites, the, 460
Skilloots, the, 235
Skulls, human, use of, for decoration by the Mundurucus, 211; Zandey, 202; as drinking vessels, 215, 277. [*See* Human Bones]
Slave trade, carried on by the early English, 399; existence of the, in Equatorial Africa, 158, 161; British Columbia, 235; New Guinea, 103
Slave tribes of Southern India, 112, 113 *n.*
Slavery (domestic), of the African tribes, 168; Ashantees, 168; Madecasses, 168; Mongols, 275; existence of, among the Aleuts, 262; Apaches, 239; Algerian Arabs, 190; British Columbians, 236; Burmese, 469; Caribs, 224; Chinnooks, 236; Dahomans, 162 *n.*; Dyaks, 284; Germans (ancient) 398; Malays, 281; Siamese, 468; Sumatrans, 281; Utah Indians, 228; Uzbeks, 397; but little practised among the Berbers, 190; the punishment for crimes, 184
Slaves, secret associations of, among the West Africans, 436; treatment of, among the Afghans, 397; English (early), 399; Germans (ancient), 398; Madecasses, 441; Mexicans (early), 466; Mongols, 275; Uzbeks, 397
Slavonians (Southern), the, 355, 359, 397, 404

Snake-race of India, the Kols and Cheros classed as the, 136 *n.*
Sobriety of the British Columbia coast tribes, 237; New Caledonians, 101; Sumatrans, 280
Sociability of man, 299; [for apparent exceptions to, *see* Unsociable disposition]
Social disposition of the Aymaras, 219; Dyaks, 286; Kafirs, 439; Madecasses, 441; Persians, 476
Social Affections, relation of the, to sympathy, 417; development of the, among the Madecasses, 442; Mexicans, 467
Social condition of the natives of the Soudan, 187
Social duty, the honouring of parents the earliest, 351.
Social instincts, 49, 50, 299; possessed by animals, 50; origin of the, 51, 54; permanent influence of the, 53, 56; resolvable into sympathy, 65; restraint exercised by the, on the desire for property, 300; defective nature of the, as a foundation of morals, 306; foundation of benevolence on, 443
Social isolation of the Irayas, origin of the, 299
Social organisation, among the early English, 365; the family or clan, the chief unit of, 384
Society, condition of, among the early English, 409
Society Islanders, 78, 322, 339, 458
Sokulks, the, 232
Solitude, love of, shown by the Antis, 221; Aymaras, 218
Sons, practice of adoption connected with necessity of, 317; preference for, among Eastern peoples, 421
Sorah, ancient name for the Tamil people, 123 *n.*
Sorcery, agency of spirits in, 322; death supposed to be occasioned by, 107, 312, 315, 342 *seq.*; influence ascribed to, by the Abipones, 216; Africans, 166, 343; American Indians (south), 213; Australian aborigines, 69, 342; Gonds, 121; Guiana Indians, 222; Hos, 137; Indian aborigines, 342; Madecasses, 343; Málers, 128; Mundas, 139; Negritos, 107; Polynesians, 342; Tchuelches, 218; poison ordeal for, 153, 343, 345
Sorrow, distinction between, and sympathy, 431
Soudan, natives of the, 187
Soul, purification of the, in the mysteries, 463; the active virtues considered as means of, 479; celibacy considered essential to the, 465; means of, according to Hinduism, 474
Souls, transmigration of, 463, 479
Sours, the, 123
South America, natives of. [*See* America]
South Sea Islanders. [*See* Polynesians]
Spencer, Herbert, theory of moral sentiments of, 35 *seq.*
Spirit protection in Totemism, 435 *n.*
Spirit retribution, fear of, 284, 311, 316 *seq.*, 320 *seq.*, 331, 332; value of, in relation to moral progress, 331 *seq.*, 334, 336
Spirit sanction, necessity of, 331, 334
Spirit (Supreme), the, of the North American Indians, 229, 434
Spirit world, ideas of the, affected by the human mind, 334; rights of the, 319, 321, 331, 334
Spirits, agency of, in divination, 341; in human affairs, 341 *seq.*; in sorcery, 322; curious notions of the Karens as to, 151; development of idea of immorality in relation to actions disapproved of by, 346; disease ascribed to agency of, 313 *n.*, 321 [*see* Sorcery]; dread of, shown by the Abipones, 216; South American Indians, 213; Greenlanders, 316; duty of observing the requirements of, 346; indifference of, to actions affecting human beings, 389; invocation of, in oaths and ordeals, 345; propitiation of, among the American Indians, 460; (protecting), 318, 435; (tribal), sexual immorality a sin against, 389 [*see* Chastity]
Spirits of the dead, influence of the, over the living, 439, 440; fear of the, 311, 312, 316, 317, 319, 321; sacrifices to appease, 229, 315, 439, 440
Spiritual purity. [*See* Soul]
Spokans, the, 232
State, actions treated as crimes against the, 148; duty of the, in relation to offences among the ancient Germans, 362; head of the, regarded as a parent, 393; organization of the, on tribal basis, 387; welfare of the, test of moral propriety, 353
Strangers, cheated by the Sumatrans, 280; murder of, among the Green-

landers, 255; non-criminality of offences against, 291, 296, 308, 337, 353; sympathy for, among primitive peoples, 424 *seq.;* theft from, practised by the Afghans, 369; Eskimos, 246; Greenlanders, 255. [*See* Foreigners, Hospitality]
Strength, moral, the attribute of the predatory peoples, 410
Stupidity of the negroes of the White Nile, 197 *n.*
Submissive disposition of the Fezzanese, 186
Suicide, prevalence of, among the Ashantees, 169; Germans (ancient), 403; Hos, 137; Talkotins, 238; as a punishment of others, among the Kingsmill Islanders, 86
Suit for homicide among the Icelanders, 360
Sumatra, natives of, 278
Sun God, descent of the Incas, from the, 348
Supernatural sanction, to manhood ceremonies, 344; to laws among the early Mexicans and Peruvians, 347
Superstition, influence of, over moral development, 341, 388; among primitive peoples, 388; over tribal organization, 388; and morality, divorce between, 389. [*See* Religion]
Superstitious nature of the Abyssinians, 194 *n.;* American Indians, 213, 434; Ashantees, 168; Bedouins, 386; Eskimos, 248; Foulahs, 182; Gauls, 388; Javanese, 287; Lapps, 267; Madecasses, 442; Mandingos, 183; Mongols, 273; Papuas, 104; Tchuelches, 218; Wahuma, 199; of the Buddhist peoples, 479
Superstitious obervances in relation to sexual conduct, 389
Suppliants, aid to, among the Afghans, 374; Greeks (ancient), 453; Mainotes, 372
Supplication, ceremonies of, in case of homicide among the Afghans, 358; Morlacchi, 359
Suretyship, system of, among the early English, 365, 393
Suspicious disposition of the Australian aborigines, 74; Dyaks, 286; Foulahs, 182; Lapps, 266; Samoyedes, 265; Sumatrans, 280; Tchuelches, 216
Sympathy, altruistic developments of, 432 *seq.;* defective nature of, as the foundation for morals, 306; defective development of, among the ancient Greeks, 452; development of influence of, 426; distinction between, and sorrow, 431; nature of, 415, 431; origin of, 415; according to Mr H. Spencer, 34; principle of, in morals, 3, 10, 30, 34, 51 *seq.*, 65; relation of, to the altruistic sentiments, 415, 417, 432; to the family affections, 416; to love, 416; to the maternal instinct, 418, 430; to pleasurable and painful emotions, 416; to the social affections, 417; shown by women among primitive peoples, 425 *seq.;* supposed origin of, in experiences of utility, 415; want of, displayed by the Greenlanders, 253

Tabu, 318 *n.;* 321, 334 *n.;* 458 *n.;* existence of, among the African peoples, 437; New Caledonians, 101, 102; Polynesians, 91
Tahiti, natives of, 78, 79, 81, 83, 88, 344
Takahli, the, 324
Talkotins, the, 237
Tamajabs, the. [*See* Apaches]
Tamils, ancient name of the, 123 *n.*
Tangena ordeal, 153, 343, 345
Tantra rites, 460
Tapu. [*See* Tabu]
Tartar-eaters, Chinese traders so called. 273
Tartars. [*See* Mongols]
Tasmanians, the, 76, 77, 420; resemblance of the, to New Caledonians, 99 *n.*
Tattooing, practice of, by the Andamaners, 108; Eskimos, 323; Fijians, 323 *n.*; Nagas, 146; relation of, to the condition in the future life, 86, 323
Tawárek. [*See* Berbers]
Tchuelches, the, 216
Tchuktchis, the, of Alaska, comparison of, with the Eskimos, 259
Terra del Fuego, natives of, 320
Teutonic legislation, influence of right of feud over, 357, 362
Theft, dexterity in, esteemed by the Kukis, 147; not much practised by the Fijians, 97; practice of, by the Africans, 159, 163; Australian aborigines, 73; Bechuanas, 178; Chichimecs, 241; British Columbia coast tribes, 236; Eskimos, 247, 248; Greenlanders, 251; Indian aborigines, 111. 113, 128; Jakuts, 264; Madecasses, 156; Mandingos, 183, 184; New Caledonians, 100, 101; Polynesians,

80, 90; Talkotins, 238; Tehuelches, 216; White Nile tribes, 197 *n.;* prevalence of, among the early English, 394; a private offence among the Mongols, 271; punishments for, among the Africans (East), 161; Ashantees, 170; Kalmucks, 270; Madecasses, 292; Polynesians, 292, 339
Theft, gods of, 80, 335
Thibetans, the, 275
Thieves, confraternities of, in India, 113, 115
Thing, the Scandinavian, 360, 387
Thracians, the, 353
Thugs, the, of Southern India, 115, 116
Ticunas, the, 221
Tiger, oath by the, 345
Tigrèans. [*See* Abyssinians]
Timid disposition of the Chepewyans, 231; Malers, 127; Mongols, 271; Papuas (Port Dory), 103; of the Juang women, 141
Tinneh, the, family of North American Indians, 239; allied to the Chepewyans, 232 *n.*
Tithings, Saxon, 366, 392
Tobacco, use of, a sacred rite among the American Indians, 455; pipe, a symbol of peace among the American Indians, 455
Todas, the, 116 *seq.;* 420
Tombs, the dwelling-places of the dead, 316; for the drowned, 316
Tongans, the, 78 *n.;* 81, 96, 323, 330
Toorkmuns, the, 369, 373, 376, 395, 476
Totemism, 318, 435
Transcendental morality, 57 *seq.*
Transmigration of souls, doctrine of, 453, 479
Travellers, protection of, by the Montenegrins, 369
Treacherous disposition of the Abors, 149; Africans (East), 160, 161; Africans (West), 165; Apaches, 239; Australian aborigines, 73; Braknas, 188; Caribs, 223; Chalikatas, 150; Dyaks, 284; Enceshurs, 235; Eskimos, 248; Fijians, 97; Greenlanders, 254; Hottentots, 204; Miris, 149; Nagas, 147; Shoshones, 228; Singphos, 150; Skilloots, 235; Toorkmuns, 395; Virginian Indians, 225; Yukons, 238
Trials of endurance among the American Indians, 244
Tribal authority, among the Bedouins, 386; establishment of, in relation to offences, 339, 348; origin and development of, 386 *seq.;* relation of, to the negative phase of morals, 445
Tribal duties, subordination of, to the ties of clanship, 304
Tribal initiation, ceremonies on, 433 *seq.;* origin of, 437
Tribal morality, 296, 310 *seq.*, 319, 337
Tribal offences, external nature of, 310
Tribal organisation, influence over, of recognition of paternal authority, 385, 407; of kinship through father, 437; of superstition, 388, 390; of moral development, 396
Tribal relations, superiority of, to those of the family, 433
Tribal rights, subsequent to those of the individual, 306
Tribal spirits, sexual immorality a sin against the, 389. [*See* Chastity]
Tribe (the) authority of, established as that of the clan decayed, 445; composed of several clans, 385; crimes treated as pollutions of, 390; distinct from the clan, 305; relation of to the family or clan, 306, 391; a fraternal association of individuals attained to manhood, 391, 434; members of, form a common brotherhood, 407; nature of the primitive, 304; slight internal cohesion of, 385; rites on admission into, at puberty, 433 *seq.;* supposed subordination to, of individual rights, 302
Tribunals (public), punishment of crimes by, 339
Tribute of allegiance among the Polynesians, 344
Tripoli, inhabitants of, 186
Truthfulness of the American Indians, 213; Assamese, 145; Berbers (Algerian) 190; Bhils, 143; Bhúiyas, 132; Dyaks, 286; Flatheads (inland), 233; Garos, 145; Gonds, 122; Indian aborigines, 145; Korwas, 144; Málers, 128; Ostiaks, 268
Tcherkess. [*See* Circassians]
Tsimsheeans, the, 235, 324
Tuaricks. [*See* Berbers]
Turks, the, 478; comparison of, with the Bedouins, 396, 405, 478
Twins, superstitious notions as to, 176, 421

Uncle (maternal), authority of the, over children, 384, 407 *n.*
Unnatural Vices. [*See* Vices, unnatural]
Unsociable disposition of the Africans (West), 439; American Indians, 439; Antis. 221, 299 *n.;* Aymaras,

218; Caishánas, 299; Irayas, 299; Polynesians, 438
Utah, tribes of, 228
Utilitarian morality, what constitutes the ideal perfection of, 423; failure of, to account for the idea of right, 39, 48
Utility, principle of, in morals, 3, 22, 27, 30; experiences of, supposed origin of sympathy in, 415
Untruthfulness [*See* Lying]
Uzbeks, the, 397

Varalis, the, 144
Vazimba, the, of Madagascar, 440 *n.*
Veders, the, 111
Vendetta. [*See* Blood-feud, Blood-revenge]
Veneration. [*See* Reverence]
Vengeance [*see* Revenge, Retribution]; (divine) for breach of rites of hospitality among ancient Greeks, 453
Veracity [*see* Truthfulness]; consistency of, with low moral culture, 145; want of [*see* Lying]
Vice. [*See* Immorality.]
Vices, unnatural, practised by the Aleuts, 251; American Indians (North), 230, 231; American Indians (South), 213, 220; Apaches, 240; Californian Indians, 241; Chichimecs, 241; Itelmen, 264; Kadiaks, 251
Vikings, the Scandinavian, 370 *n.*
Village system of the Kandhs, 340; Kols, 138; Mundas, 340; Santals, 135
Villees, the, 111
Vindictiveness. [*See* Revengeful]
Violence, necessity of the oath as a restraint from, among the ancient Greeks, 453
Virginia, Indians of, 225
Virtue, nature of, 9, 13; the idea of manliness essential to, among the predatory peoples, 402 *seq.*; among the Romans, 410; relation between, and duty, 412. [*See* Morality]
Virtues (active) [*see* Altruistic Sentiments, Benevolence, Charity]; late development of, 351; slight development of the, among ancient peoples, 461 *seq.*; practice of the, by the Hindus, 471; by the Mexicans, 463; obligatory nature of, 413; origin of idea of duty in relation to, 414; value of the, as means of spiritual purification, 479; comparative value ascribed to the, by the Hindus and Buddhists, 479
Virtues (passive) the first to be recognised, 351; and active, distinction between, 411
Virtues (positive) actions considered as, 412

Wahŭma, the, 162, 196, 198
Wak, the supreme deity of the Gallas, 196
Wallah-Wallah, the, 232
Warfare, causes of, among primitive peoples, 337; cruelty in, of the Itelmen, 263. [*See* Enemies]
Wergyld, the law of, 362
White Nile Valley, natives of the. [*See* Dinkas, Kych, Latookas]
Widows, dedication of, to a life of charity among the Hindoos, 473; hardships endured by, among the Eskimoa, 527; Talkotins, 238
Wife, qualities of a good, according to the Javanese, 291
Wife-lending, prevalence of, among the Aleuts, 262; Apaches, 240 Australian aborigines, 293; Chawanons, 227; Chinnooks, 235; Eskimos, 247; Greenlanders, 251; Guiana Indians, 223; Itelmen, 264; Knisteneaux, 231
Wife-purchase, practice of, by the Abipones, 214; Afghans, 375; Bedouins, 377; Bechuanas, 179; Hos, 136; Khands, 130; Latookas, 197; Mongols, 274; Ostiaks, 269; Slavonians (South), 378; Sumatrans, 281; Toorkmuns, 376; Thracians, 353
Wife-stealing, practice of, by the Australian aborigines, 71, 75, 293; British Columbia coast tribes, 237; Mandans, 230; Spokan Indians, 233; [*see* Marriage by capture]; punishment for, among the Australian aborigines, 293
Will of God (the), 21
Witchcraft, prevalence of, among the Africans (East), 161; Africans (West), 167; Bechuanas, 180; Greenlanders, 254, 257; Kafirs, 180; Lapps, 268. [*See* Sorcery]
Wives, community of, supposed in primeval times, 304; influence of, among the Chepewyans, 231; Kafirs, 429. [*See* Woman]
Woman, condition of, among primitive peoples, 55, 298, 308, 351, 426; among predatory peoples, 408; among Buddhist peoples, 468; among the Abipones, 215; Afghans, 375; Africans (East), 160; Africans

(West), 166; Albanians, 378; American Indians, 215; Andamaners, 108; Antis, 221; Apaches, 240; Arabs (Algerian) 190; Ashantees, 171; Australian aborigines, 71, 75, 294; Battas, 282; Bechuanas, 179; Bedouins, 376; Berbers, 190; Chawanons, 227; Chepewyans, 231; English (early), 382; Eskimos, 246, 248; Fijians, 96; Foulahs, 182; Gauls, 379; Germans (ancient), 380; Greenlanders, 251, 256; Hottentots, 205; Irish (ancient), 379; Kafirs, 175, 420, 439; Kingsmill Islanders, 86; Knisteneaux, 230; Koraks, 260; Latookas, 197; Madecasses, 441; Mandingos, 184; Mexicans (early), 466; Miris, 149; Monbuttu, 201; Mongols, 274; Montenegrins, 378; Moors, 189; Morlacchi, 378; New Caledonians, 102; Norsemen, 381; Ostiaks, 269; Padam, 148; Polynesians, 78, 83, 91; Santals, 134; Shoshones, 228; Siamese, 467; Sokulks, 232; Spokans, 232; Talkotins, 238; Tasmanians, 77; Tuaricks, 190; Thibetans, 276; Todas, 118; Toorkmuns, 376; Wahuma, 199; Yukons, 238; Zandey, 201; as furnishing the key to moral culture, 384; influence of, among the Afghans, 376; Bedouins, 377; Braknas, 188; Circassians, 377 *n.*; Germans (ancient), 380; Norsemen, 381; over the manners of primitive peoples, 429; Javanese ideas as to, 291; the most important unit of the family, 384; recognition of the true position of, arising from the sense of manliness, 408

Women, admission of, to the Areoi Association, 450, 458; immunity of, in warfare, 310 *n.*; interference with, source of wars, 337; sympathy shown by, among primitive peoples, 424 *seq.*; Abipones, 215; Mandingos, 184

Worship of ancestors. [*See* Ancestor Worship]

Wrong, moral, idea of, in relation to active virtues, 413; the negation of right, 297; notions entertained as to, by uncultured peoples, 295; origin of the idea of, 296; sense of, 309, 335, 336; transferred to the mind of the deity, 335

Wrong-doing, abstinence from, the earliest moral phase, 351; detection the test of, among the Eskimos, 247

Yenadies, the, 111

Yoruba proverbs, 326

Yukons, the, 238, 239 *n.*

Zandey, the, 201

Zulus, the, 293, 358 *n.*, 421, 429 *n.*

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