TIGHT BINDING BOOK

Text fly book

GEORGE BERKELEY

Three Dialogues

BETWEEN

Hylas and Philonous

WITH

AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

SATISH CHANDRA BANERJI, M. A., LL. B.

PREMCHAND ROYCHAND SCHOLAR IN ENGLISH AND PHILOSOPHY,

SOMETIME LECTURER, HUGHLI COLLEGE; ETC.

SECOND EDITION.

INDIAN PRESS: ALLAHABAD

MDCCCXCVII.

To

The Honourable

SIR JOHN EDGE, KT., Q. C.,

Chief Justice of Her Majesty's High Court,

N.-W. P.

&

Vice-Chancellor of the University of Allahabad,

who takes a deep interest in the advancement

of higher education in this country,

this small book

is

with his kind permission,

dedicated

as a poor token

of

profound respect and gratitude

by

the Editor.

PREFACE.

—:o⁀o:—

DR. Alexander Campbell Fraser says, "English philosophical literature contains no work in which literary art and a pleasing fancy are more attractively blended with ingenious metaphysical thought than in" the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. It is a pity that no edition of this, suitable for use in Colleges, has yet been published. The purpose of this small volume is to supply this want.

The three dialogues have been prefaced by an introduction which professes to furnish brief prolegomena to Berkeley's philosophy. Of course, the present editor had nothing particularly fresh to say; he ventures to hope, however, that it may be of use to a student beginning his study of the writings of the amiable Bishop of Cloyne. The text has been carefully collated with that of Dr. Fraser (4 Vols., Clarendon Press, 1871). The notes at the end are mainly explanatory, though efforts have been made to make them suggestive.

The various critics of Berkeley whose works I have read and profited by, it is needless to enumerate here, as the names of them will be found frequently enough in the following pages. There is one, however, to whom not only my, but every Berkeleian student's, thanks are due,—I mean the emeritus professor of Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. My indebtedness to him will be apparent on every page. I shall only express my hope here that every student of the *Dialogues* will not fail to study at least his smaller monograph on Berkeley and his *Selections* from his works—two ripe books which it would be impertinent in me to praise.

I must take this opportunity of congratulating the University of Allahabad on its having seen that it is far more necessary and useful to introduce its undergraduates to the "mighty minds of old" directly than to cram them with compilations. I hope that the same wise plan will commend itself to the other universities in India.

CALCUTTA, *June*, 1893. S. C. B.

The second edition has been carefully revised. Not only have some additions been made to the introduction and notes, but parts have been recast and rewritten. An index has been inserted at the end. No examination papers have been added as a full set of questions will be found in the Rev. W. A. Mansell's *Notes and Questions on Mental and Moral Science* (Lucknow, 1895).

I must here record my thanks to my kind critics for the indulgence with which they received this little book. I hope they will find the present edition even worthier of their approval.

ALLAHABAD, *March*, 1897. S. C. B.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION.

—:-o-:—

I. BERKELEY'S LIFE.

George Berkeley was born in a cottage near Dysert castle, in the county of Kilkenny, on the 12th of March, 1685 N. S. His parents were Irish people of English descent, about whom very little is known. Nor is much more known of the childhood of the future philosopher. He grew up, it seems, "a romantic boy with sympathy for nature and natural religion." "I was distrustful at eight years," he said afterwards, "and so by nature disposed for the new doctrines." At eleven he went to Kilkenny School, where, among others, Congreve and Swift had preceded him. He seems to have been unusually precocious, as he was placed at once in the second class. In March 1700, Berkeley proceeded to matriculate at Trinity College, Dublin, which was to be his home for the next thirteen years. In 1704 he graduated, and three years later took his Master's degree. He was presently admitted to a fellowship, and became Greek lecturer and junior dean. In 1709 he took orders. His "Commonplace Book," lately discovered, and published by Dr. Fraser in 1871, throws a flood of light on Berkeley's mental growth during his college days. The influences that worked on him in that period were Locke's *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, and, to a smaller degree, the personal influence and writings of Dr. Peter Browne, the then Provost of the College, and literary opponent of the free-thinker Toland. It seems that so early as 1705 Berkeley had been

led to the phenomenal conception of material reality, which was to form the central idea of his future philosophy. In 1707 he published anonymously two mathematical tracts in Latin. But it was not till two years later that he made public a part of the great "world-transforming thought," with which he felt himself burdened. Then was published the *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision*, which was dedicated to his friend and patron, Sir John Percival, and in which was investigated the real significance of the phrase "seeing a thing." This was followed in 1710 by the first part of a '*Treatise concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*, wherein the chief Causes of error and difficulty in the Sciences, with the grounds of Scepticism, Atheism and Irreligion, are inquired into.' In this he clearly laid down his position that existence consists in perception and that material substance is an inconsistency and an impossibility. The theory was misunderstood and ridiculed in various quarters. Dr. Samuel Clarke thought Berkeley was "a fair arguer and a clear writer," "an extraordinary genius in fact," but considered his first principles false, and regretted that he had taken to metaphysics. No more detailed or explicit criticism could be drawn from him. In January 1713, Berkeley came over to London to publish his *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, which contained a more popular and entertaining exposition of his views With this book the first period of Berkeley's authorship may be said to close.

He was very well received by the London society. Richard Steele was one of the first to welcome him; Swift took to him kindly, and introduced him to many "men of merit." His prepossessing appearance and charming manners were an unfailing recommendation, and among the many friends he made were

Addison, Arbuthnot, Atterbury and Pope. The last protested that "to Berkeley every virtue under heaven" had been given. He contributed several papers against the free-thinkers to *Guardian*, and he attended in Addison's company the first night of *Cato*. In October 1713, he was appointed chaplain to Lord Peterborough, on Swift's recommendation, and accompanied him through France and Italy to Sicily. Lord Peterborough was a great political figure and a brilliant wit, and Berkeley spent ten months under exceptional auspices. He is supposed to have met Malebranche in Paris on this occasion. The two next years he spent in London; but again went to Italy as a travelling tutor in November 1716. Malebranche died at Paris in October 1715, and legend has associated Berkeley's name with this event in a strange fashion. I quote De Quincey's picturesque account: "Berkeley, when a young man, went to Paris, and called on Pére Malebranche. He found him in his cell cooking. Cooks have ever been a *genus irritabile*; authors still more so: Malebranche was both: a dispute arose; the old father, warm already, became warmer; culinary and metaphysical irritations united to derange his liver: he took to his bed and died." * There, however, seems to be no foundation for this story. In this trip Berkeley enjoyed much the beautiful scenery of Italy, especially Ischia. He was not altogether idle, however. The second part of the *Treatise* appears to have been written in Italy, and the manuscript lost there. He also seems to have competed unsuccessfully for a prize essay proposed by the French Royal Academy on the "cause of motion" (*De Motu*). He returned to London about the end of 1720.

* *On Murder considered as one of the Fine Arts* (Vol. IV. p. 24, A & C. Black, 1885).

He was much affected by witnessing the misery consequent upon the collapse of the South Sea Bubble. He was also shocked by the prevailing corruption of society. His fervid spirit found vent in an *Essay towards preventing the Ruin of Great Britain*, in which he preached simplicity of life, public spirit, religious trust and reverence.

After an absence of nearly eight years he returned to Dublin. He was first appointed to the deanery of Dromore, and in 1724 received his patent for the much richer deanery of Derry. His heart was however set on a gigantic philanthropic scheme for civilising and educating the American Indians by establishing a Christian University in the Bermuda islands. An unexpected legacy of half of the considerable fortune left by Mrs. Hester Vanhomrigh (Swift's "Vanessa") to whom Berkeley in his own words was "a perfect stranger," came as a god-send. He went over to London, and the magic of his presence and influence won over all men of consequence to his scheme. The subscriptions soon amounted to £5000, and a bill for a public grant of £20,000 was carried almost unanimously in the House of Commons (May, 1726). He was the lion of London for four years, and united among his admirers persons so different as Voltaire and Queen Caroline. He married, and set sail for Rhode Island in September, 1728, on his "mission of God-like benevolence." He thus expressed himself "on the prospect of planting arts and learning in America" in a poem, which is all the more interesting because it is his only production of the kind.

> The Muse, disgusted at an age and clime
> Barren of every glorious theme,
> In distant lands now waits a better time,
> Producing subjects worthy fame.

In happy climes, where from the genial Sun,
And virgin earth such scenes ensue,
The force of art by nature seems outdone,
And fancied beauties by the true:

In happy climes, the seat of innocence,
Where nature guides, and virtue rules,
Where men shall not impose for truth and sense
The pedantry of courts and schools;

There shall be sung another golden age,
The rise of empire and of arts,
The good and great inspiring epic rage,
The wisest heads and noblest hearts;

Not such as Europe breeds in her decay;
Such as she bred when fresh and young,
When heavenly flame did animate her clay,
By future poets shall be sung.

Westward the course of empire takes its way;
The first four acts already past,
A fifth shall close the drama with the day;
Time's noblest offering is the last.

Berkeley's hopes were, however, doomed to disappointment. He landed at Newport in January, 1729, bought an inland farm, built upon it a house which he named Whitehall, and passed a couple of years in studious retirement. But Sir Robert Walpole had resolved that the plan for an endowed university should come to nothing. So the philosophical recluse returned with family to London in January, 1732. He left a disciple in Samuel Johnson of Yale College, through whom his influence was transmitted to the subtlest of American metaphysicians, Jonathan Edwards. He also brought with him the manuscript of another series of Platonic dialogues, seven in number, against the free-thinkers, said to have been written in a cave on the shore of Rhode Island. This was published soon afterwards under the title *Alciphron, or the*

Minute Philosopher. This the longest was the most popular of Berkeley's works. His *Theory of Visual Language Vindicated and Explained*, in reply to an anonymous letter in the *Daily Post-Boy*, followed. The second period of his authorship may be said to close with the publication of the *Analyst* in 1734, the aim of which was to show that mathematical axioms are as inexplicable as theological assumptions, and which raised a great dust of controversy.

Third Period. In May 1734, Berkeley returned to Ireland as Bishop of Cloyne—a small city destined to be his home for the next eighteen years. His life was an unusually quiet one, devoted to philosophic meditations, the alleviation of the miseries of the Irish, and the education of his children. Meditation on the misfortunes of Ireland led to the publication of the *Querist* (1735), in which much sound political economy was expounded forty years before Adam Smith's epoch-making work appeared. A fever epidemic directed his attention to medicinal remedies, and he was led to adopt the Indian panacea, tar water. He conceived this to be charged with "pure invisible fire, the most subtle and elastic of bodies." He opened a distillery at his own place, and in the spring of 1744 published *Siris* or 'A Chain of Philosophical Reflections and Inquiries' in which investigations about Tar-water curiously intermingle with deliberations about the universalising Reason. He had been studying Plato and the Neo-Platonists and his opinions had undergone considerable modifications. Tar-water, which was said "to cheer but not inebriate,"* became the fashion everywhere, and gave rise to a medical controversy.

Berkeley received a great shock in the death of his second son in 1751. Next year he resolved to shift his quarters, for

* A phrase echoed by Cowper, *The Task*, Book IV, line 39.

an academico-philosophical life, to Oxford. George II. refused to accept his resignation, vowed that he should die a bishop, but permitted him to live wherever he liked. He came over to his new retreat in August with family, and there peacefully passed away on January 14, 1753. Six days after, he was buried in the Christ Church Cathedral.

Berkeley was a handsome person "of middle stature, of an agreeable, pleasant, and erect aspect". He had a noble, though impetuous nature, and catholic sympathies; he "was the first eminent Protestant, after the unhappy contest at the Revolution, who avowed his love for all his countrymen" (Mackintosh). The charming amiability of his manners is testified to by the grim Bishop of Rochester: "so much understanding, so much knowledge, so much innocence, and such humility, I did not think had been the portion of any but angels, till I saw this gentleman." A philosopher of his calibre, and a writer of his eminence, England can not boast many.

II. STYLE.

Mr. Saintsbury calls George Berkeley the "greatest master of English philosophical style." * It will be profitable therefore to analyse his style briefly. The following short account follows the lines laid down in the Introduction to Minto's "Manual of English Prose Literature."

1. *Elements of Style. Vocabulary.* Berkeley's vocabulary is not so rich as that of many another master of style, yet it must be acknowledged that his command of language is sufficient for his purpose. What is required in a philosophical exposition is not a deluge of words, for that would produce confusion, but a selection of clear and definite words

* Saintsbury, *Specimens of English Prose Style*, p. 159.

used in their right places. Berkeley's meaning is never obscured for want of words, and he excels in the language of melodious and polished simplicity.

The Sentence. Berkeley is neither strikingly periodic, nor strikingly loose, nor strikingly condensed. His sentences are generally well constructed, and his grammar as often not impeachable. And though there are sometimes clumsy constructions, yet Berkeley is never inconsecutive, and seems to have attended to the unity of sentence and attempted to place the different parts according to their due importance.

The Paragraph. Berkeley's paragraphs are not so well constructed as they might have been, and if measured by Dr. Bain's criterions will be found wanting in several respects. Still it may be claimed that they are generally free from digressions and breaks in the thought.

Figures of Speech. Berkeley is usually a plain writer and does not much affect figurative language. Still he sometimes does use figures of similitude to illustrate his thought or impress his meaning. Among such is his constant comparison of sensible things to a Divine language. The following passage is also remarkable :—

"In vain do we extend our view into the heavens and pry into the entrails of the earth, in vain do we consult the writings of learned men and trace the dark footsteps of antiquity—we need only draw the curtain of words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose fruit is excellent, and within the reach of our hand." *

2. *Qualities of Style.* To us it seems that Berkeley is both *simple* and *clear*. Any person who is not frightened

* *Principles of Human Knowledge*, Introduction, § 24.

by the mere name of philosophy, will find his meaning clear and definitely expressed. In his younger days, especially, Berkeley saw his point distinctly and hit hard. If there is ever a suspicion of confusion, its origin should be traced to some defect in his analysis of the contents of our knowledge, and not to any failing in his power of lucid expression.

Of *emotional qualities*, strength may be attributed to Berkeley's style,—not the energy of Macaulay or the stateliness of De Quincey, but animation and vivacity to no small degree. Berkeley unites grace with nerve, fulness with delicacy, and is never effiminate.

His elegant diction is, moreover, sweetly *melodious*, and his felicitous phrases are modelled according to a correct *taste*.*

3. *Kinds of Composition.* Berkeley has not produced any professed piece of *description*, but passages are not infrequent in his works, especially the dialogues, which bear witness to considerable love for, and sympathetic observation of, nature, in an age when such affection was held rather in discount.

Berkeley's work really lay, however, in the department of *exposition*. And though he does not consciously follow any definite rules like those laid down by Dr. Bain, yet we do not believe that taken all in all he will be found wanting. Take, for instance, his *Principles of Human Knowledge*. He clears his ground by demolishing the abstract ideas which he conceives to lie at the bottom of the faulty philosophy he contends against. He then states clearly the current definition of Matter, and lays down his own position in broad

* A more than ordinarily ornate passage is to be found in the beginning of the *Second Dialogue*, § 4.

and distinct lines. This he enforces by iterations, both direct and obverse, and illustrates with a multitude of applications. Nor is he less aware of the importance of "imparting extraneous human interest to science." He follows the example of Plato in order "to introduce the action and reaction of personalities in abstract discourse," and evolves philosophic principles from dialogues, enlivened with considerable art and fancy.

In conclusion, we adopt unhesitatingly Mr. Gosse's characterisation of Berkeley as "the most polished writer of his age." * Among his philosophic predecessors, Hobbes had a certain "nervous bull dog strength," † admirably matched to his matter, but somewhat bald and dry; Locke was plain, almost wooden, and his manner gained dignity chiefly from the importance of his matter. Among his successors, Butler drags his slow length heavily along, and Hume, while clear, pregnant and occasionally witty, wants colour and sometimes becomes rather too ornate. Coming to the present century, Sir William Hamilton is pithy, methodical, a master of exposition and controversy; John Stuart Mill is fluent and perspicuous; Mr. Herbert Spencer also deserves praise. Berkeley, however, seems to us not to have been yet surpassed, inasmuch as "saying nothing but what he means, he says it in language that is all fire and crystal." ‡

III. PHILOSOPHY.

Problem of Philosophy. Philosophy may be roughly described as the "thinking consideration of things." § As

* Gosse, *Eighteenth Century Literature*, p. 197.
† Saintsbury, *Elizabethan Literature*, p. 350.
‡ Gosse, *loc. cit.*, p. 277.
§ Schwegler, *Hist. of Phil.* (Stirling's Tran.), p. 1.

Plato said, it has its origin in wonder. The human mind at first notices that various kinds of phenomena are continually passing on the inner stage. By and by it grows weary of merely watching them; for it comes to feel that it does not understand them, and fancies there is more than it sees. When with a spirit of ridding itself of this ignorance, the mind proceeds to inquire whence the phenomena come, and learns to recognise an independence in its own self, it is said to rise to philosophy. The perennial question of philosophy is," How is the universe of existence related to the individual Mind?" Every experience of ours appears to testify to two sets of things; every bit of knowledge seems to be constituted of two elements. *I have a perception*: here a relation is expressed between two things, which are at the same time distinguished from one another; there is an *I* and there is a *perception*, or to put in technical language, a subject and an object, an ego and a non-ego. Now thinking men have asked from the most ancient days, what am I? What is the world that I perceive? What relation subsists between the world and me, and how is it brought about? These questions in some form or other are proposed for solution in every philosophy. "Philosophy," as Prof. Adamson admirably remarks, "is the rethinking of experience,—the endeavour to construct by rigid and methodical analysis that which to ordinary consciousness presents itself as a completed and given whole." * It must be borne in mind that the province of science does not include that of philosophy. As has been acutely said by M. Paul Janet, "Science thinks of the world; philosophy thinks of the thought of the world." † Science only attempts an ex-

* *Fichte* (Blackwood), p. 122; the whole chapter (v.) is excellent.
† *Revue Philosophique*, Vol. XVIII, ii.

planation of the facts as given by experience ; philosophy probes deeper and seeks to discover the very conditions of experience. Science deals with parts, philosophy with wholes. Its concern is with the underlying principle which gives harmony to, and rounds off into, a coherent totality, the different branches of experience investigated by different sciences.* And if philosophy can never be final, it is because the questions it deals with are such that no final words can be said on them ; they ever crop up anew under changing conditions in the human mind, and every generation has the same problems to solve, though under different surroundings and from different standpoints. It has been well said that "in philosophy, art and morality, man immediately expresses himself ; his products are the direct manifestation of his own ideal of truth, beauty and goodness." "We have no right to demand finality in an object whose essence is development and whose development is realised in successive individuals each of which must begin his task at the beginning."†

Some Solutions of Philosophy.—Philosophy, as indicated above, arises out of an endeavour to understand and explain our common experiences. These experiences to ordinary consciousness further seem to involve a duality, which is popularly described as that of Mind and Matter. Thinking men, while accepting this ordinary consciousness, reflect upon it and seek to make clear within themselves the full

* It may be useful to note here that what is generally called Philosophy is by some thinkers broadly divided into three departments, *viz.* Psychology, which is said to deal with the self and its conscious states, 2. Epistemology, which deals with the world and our knowledge of it, and 3. Metaphysics, which deals with God. (See Prof. A. Seth's article, *Philosophical Review*, Vol. I. p. 129.) This division is not quite logical or accurate, but it roughly indicates the leading problems.

† Prof. H. Jones in *Mind*, N. S. Vol. II. p. 172.

significance of the dualism it testifies to. And what the character of all thinking is will appear from a little consideration of the nature of cognition. Cognition or knowledge is essentially a process of unification. Knowledge of any particular object is made up of manifold elements. These elements must be brought together, must be synthesised into a whole, and must be referred to a place in the unitary system of my knowledge, before I can be said to know that particular object. Thus all philosophic thinking strives at reaching a unity, the one ultimate in which all the apparently conflicting factors of our existence as knowing subjects merge, in which both Mind and Matter with their multifarious and seemingly discordant modes find their absolute truth and final reality. That is the aim of philosophy, the goal towards which all highest thought approximates. But human thought has to pass through various stages in the meantime, and different conclusions mark the different stages. The first unreflective view is based upon the dualism of Mind and Matter. That is, to quote Kant, the "dogmatic" stage. Man has advanced just enough to learn the use of 'I' and 'me,' but he has not advanced sufficiently to question the competency of his intellect for the solution of all mundane problems. With the happy consciousness of power that comes of inexperience, he proceeds to investigate into this fundamental duality and invest the Subject and the Object with parallel rights. This, however, is gradually seen to be an imperfect and inadequate solution. If you mark off the realms from one another in that way, it will be difficult to bridge the gulf between. Later and more daring thinkers try to cut the Gordian knot by reducing one end of the antithesis to the vanishing point. Thus with the Materialists all is matter or its product; with the Spiritualists only mind

with its phenomena remains. These are all incomplete, one-sided views, and great is the conflict generated thereof. Perplexed with metaphysical subtleties, the more sober-minded and less speculative spirits are led to eschew all excess, and, disclaiming any knowledge of supersensible reality, take shelter in agnosticism. But this agnosticism is not a soul-satisfying creed, and the human mind, baffled but unwearied, again sets out on the holy quest (for the search being for true knowledge is really for God). The "critical" stage is reached, and an enquiry is made into the necessary limitations of the human faculties, the necessary conditions of human knowledge. And a higher philosophy reasserts spiritualism by affirming the idealistic proposition that the whole universe is rational and in fundamental unity with the reason that manifests itself in us. Matter and Mind are not *separate*, but only *distinguishable*; intelligence is one, existence is one; and reason is the guiding principle, it is our light and our end. Dualism* has again and again returned to the attack. In fact, it must, because it marks a transition stage, when the concrete details of every-day life seem yet to hide the immanent unity underneath. And it does so with infinite advantage to Idealism, for that theory thereby continually grows in fulness. Human thought developes by antagonism. But the last word, if any, of each cycle in philosophy has been idealistic.† And Berkeley has been here selected for special study because his work marks an important epoch in the history of Idealism.

---

* We have avoided using the word "Realism," which Dualists make a controvertible term, because thereby the inexperienced reader is often led to go away with the impression that Idealism has not much to do with reality. See, however, p. 49 below.

† The student is recommended to read in this connection Prof. Watson's *Comte, Mill and Spencer*, ch. viii.

Transition to Modern Philosophy. In the infancy of the world the attention of man was naturally more directed to outer than to inner phenomena. So we find the ancient Greeks more curious about the Universe than about Man. Hence their philosophy may generally be characterised as an *objective* explanation of the universe. They sought to investigate the laws and relations of outward phenomena, and then to apply the conclusions thus arrived at to the little world within us. And it must be borne in mind that the great antithesis to them was not that between the subject and the object, but that between the phenomena and the essence, the fleeting appearances which we perceive and the permanent substance they bear witness to. At length the subject began to assume more independence than had been assigned to it before, and after a desperate attempt to unite the two by ecstatic means (made by the Neo-Platonists), ancient philosophy may be said to have collapsed. The new thought that followed had received a deep tinge from Christianity; its great problem was to reconcile dogma with reason, its great mystery was human nature as estranged from divine, and its great aim was to unite man with God, to absorb the finite in the infinite. *Credo ut intelligam* was the watch-word of the schools as first laid down by Anselm. Mediæval Philosophy hence may with greater truth be styled Theology. Advancing thought and scientific progress demonstrated that dogma and reason did not necessarily coincide. The Renaissance and the Reformation were farther blows to the orthodoxy of the schoolmen, and reason shook itself free of dogma. A new era of philosophic thought now began, which is known as the Modern. The importance of the subject as opposed to the object was brought to the forefront; self-consciousness was made the basis of philosophic investi-

Locke. The development of Cartesianism, however, with which we are more particularly concerned here, is that which through sensationalism and idealism finally led to Nihilism. JOHN LOCKE (1632-1704) as the founder of the first, is perhaps the most important figure after Descartes in the history of philosophy. The design of his *Essay concerning Human Understanding* (1690) was to inquire in a "historical plain method" into the "origin, certainty, and extent of human knowledge; together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent." Its motive was practical; it was a protest against the bondage of unproved assumptions and of empty words, "a plea for the intellectual freedom of the individual mind from whatever is found by experience to obstruct the light of truth."* So Lord Bacon had protested against "idols," and the influence of the earlier thinker may further be traced in the stress which Locke laid upon experience. He began his enquiry with an analysis of the contents of consciousness, having, like Descartes, assumed the existence of a thinking being to be intuitively given. He said that the human mind in the beginning is like a *tabula rasa*, which is written over by impressions only received afterwards. There are no "innate ideas", *i. e.*, general principles native in the mind from the birth. There are only two windows which let light into the dark chamber of the mind, *viz.*, sensation and reflection. All our simple ideas are derived from impressions made on the senses, and by reflection on these. We get ideas from no other sources. All our concepts are either "qualities of external things" or "operations of our own mind." Compound and complex ideas we form by combining our simple ideas in various ways. These complex ideas

* Fraser, *Locke* (Blackwood), p. 105.

are three, *viz.*, (1) modes, (2) individual substances, (3) relations between substances. "Simple ideas are found to exist in several combinations united together, but the mind has power to consider them separately." There are some ideas, which do not represent individual sense-impressions or their mental copies. These are abstract or general ideas, which are neither obvious nor easy to the unexercised mind. They are formed by the mind when it takes notice of a certain number of ideas which go constantly together, and consequently calls them by one name. For instance, "the general idea of a triangle" is "neither oblique, nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once."* Most momentous in its issues on future philosophic thought was, however, the complex and abstract notion of substance. "Taking notice," Locke says, "that a certain number of simple ideas always go together, and not imagining how they can subsist of themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from whence they do result." Of this substratum he can give no more definite description than that it is "an uncertain supposition of we know not what (*i. e.* of something whereof we have no particular, distinct, positive idea)." † Nor has Locke any theory of perception to propose. He accepts the fact that without ideas referable to either, "things of sense" as well as "operations of mind" would be non-existent for us.

For Locke, as for Descartes, there were three ontological realities. (1) As has been already said, Locke held that each man is intuitively conscious of his individual existence. "If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me to perceive my own existence and will not suffer me to doubt of

*Locke, *Essay*, Bk. IV ch. vii. § 9. † *Ibid*, Bk. I. ch. iv. § 18.

that." * (2) The existence of God is proved by Demonstration. My individual conscious existence implies necessarily One Supreme Reason and Will.† This cosmological argument, Locke considers, supports "the most obvious truth with evidence" equal to mathematical certainty. (3) Matter is made known to me by sense-ideas. "It is the actual receiving of ideas from without that gives us notice of the real existence of other things; and makes us know that something doth exist at that time without us which causes that idea in us—though perhaps we neither know nor consider how it does it." This perception involves "an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge or certainty."‡ Our presumptions about absent realities can, however, be only probable. Matter, according to Locke, has two kinds of qualities:§ (1) *primary, real,* or *original. viz.*, size, figure, motion, impenetrability, and divisibility, which really and invariably exist in the bodies as perceived; and (2) *secondary* or *derived, viz.*, colours, sounds, tastes, and odours, which are only individual sensations, probably correlated with particular modifications in the primary atoms constituting the body. A thing must necessarily be extended but not, say, hot; nor is the heat I feel felt by the unthinking atoms. From the subjective character of the secondary qualities it will be apparent that connections of natural phenomena can never be necessary to us; they are arbitrary inasmuch as they might have been different; fire that burns to-day may not burn to-morrow; consequently a science of nature, in the strict sense, must be pronounced "impossible." ‖ It may be added that Locke

* Locke, *Essay* Bk. IV. ch. ix.§ 3.
† *Ibid.* Bk. IV. ch. x.§ 6.
‡ *Ibid,* Bk. IV. ch. xi.§§ 2-3.
§ *Ibid,* Bk. II. ch. viii.§ 8 *seq.*
‖ *Ibid,* Bk. IV. ch. iii.§26, ch. xii. §10.

makes a reserve in favour of moral truths; a lie, for instance, can never be virtuous.

Berkeley. Berkeley (1685-1753) had grown up under the influence of Locke, but his course of thought had also been modified by reaction against the atomic materialism in vogue at his time. He found Locke's account of our "obscure and relative" idea of Matter defective. "We have no other idea or notion of Matter," Locke had said, "but something wherein many sensible qualities which affect our senses do subsist," but what this "something" is we know not. While defining knowledge in general as "nothing but the perception of the connection and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our ideas," "Locke found knowledge of real existence in the agreement of an idea *with an object*.* He, in his cautious way, did not follow Descartes and Malebranche in ascribing all power to spirits *only*, but conceived Matter as the physical occasion of our sensations. Hobbes, Gassendi, and their followers, on the other hand, found power in Matter only. Spinoza found it in a mutilated form in the Divine Substance alone, for thought and extension were to him the necessary attributes of this One Substance, which seems to want true moral agency. Berkeley felt it necessary to examine once more what real existence meant, and in what sense power and reality could be ascribed to Matter. The result of his analysis was, we shall find, that he refunded all power into spirits, though he recognised personality, and distinguished individual spirits from the Supreme Spirit, God.

Berkeley on Vision. Berkeley first addressed himself to the question of Vision,—what do we primarily see by the

* *Essay*, Bk. IV. Ch. I. §§ 2, 7. Berkeley saw that this "object" was an intruder. It must be either an idea or unknown.

eye ? to what sense do we owe the perception of the primary qualities of things ? how far does the sense of Touch aid the sense of Sight ? Berkeley's conclusion is that by sight we perceive immediately colour only, and this result he reaches by an analysis of our perception of Distance, Magnitude, and Situations of objects.

First. Distance, he says, can not immediately be seen, for being a line directed endwise to the eye, only one point lies in the retina, and the other extremity is necessarily invisible.* But we see it ; then it must be through *suggestion* to the mind, by the mediation of some other idea, for the mind perceives through ideas alone. No angles formed by the optic axes (the prevalent scientific explanation of the time) will avail, because we are conscious of none such when we perceive distance. "The judgment we make of the distance of an object viewed with both eyes is entirely the result of experience" (§ 12). (1) The muscular sensation of adjustment in the eye, (2) "an habitual connexion in the mind between the several degrees of confusion and distance" due to the constant perception that the obscurity of an object varies with its distance from the eye, and (3) a sense of straining in the eye in order to distinct vision, are among the suggestions which bring "the idea of greater or lesser distance into the mind." If a man born blind was made to see, he "would have at first no idea of Distance by sight: the sun and stars, the remotest objects as well as the nearer, would all seem to be in his eye, or rather in his mind" (§ 41). The original perception of sight is only colour. It no more gives us a perception of distance than Hearing does ; in both cases the distance is suggested by previous associations of touch.

* *Essay towards a New Theory of Vision*, § 2. The following references are to the same book.

"Having of a long time experienced certain ideas perceivable by *touch*—as distance, tangible figure, and solidity—to have been connected with certain ideas of sight, I do, upon perceiving these ideas of sight, forthwith conclude what tangible ideas are, by the wonted ordinary course of nature, like to follow....So that in truth and strictness of speech, I neither see distance itself nor any thing that I take to be at a distance" (§ 45). The extension and figure that I *see* by sight are quite distinct from those that I *feel* by touch. The former are purely mental and may be found to disagree with the latter. [Berkeley yet does not inquire whether tactual extension and figure are not also mental.]

Second. "As we see distance so we see magnitude" (§ 65). The visible magnitude, which is found constantly to change as we vary our position with regard to the object of perception, suggests to us the tangible magnitude, which alone is real. (1) The magnitude or extension of the visible object, (2) the confusion or distinctness of its outlines, (3) the vigorousness or faintness of its colours, (4) the figure, number, and situation of intermediate objects, and (5) the sensations accompanying the particular disposition of the eye are the visive signs which forewarn creatures "what damage or benefit is like to ensue upon the application of their own bodies to this or that body which is at a distance" (§ 59). This connection between visual signs and tangible magnitudes is not necessary *a priori*. We do not see the actual size of a thing, we see only *minima visibilia* or coloured points whose number in the field of vision is always the same.

Third. The actual situations of extra-organic bodies are also originally invisible. It has been often asked, How is it that though the retinal images are inverted yet we see objects erect? The difficulty proceeds from our not seeing that

"there is no resemblance between the ideas of sight and things tangible" (§ 117). "That which I *see* is only variety of light and colours. That which I *feel* is hard or soft, hot or cold, rough or smooth. What similitude, what connection have those ideas with these?" (§ 103). We come to distinguish between 'up' and 'down,' 'high' and 'low' by touch. There is no confusion in the image inasmuch as it presents the visible feet nearest to, and the visible head farthest from, the visible earth (§§ 113-115). These visual sensations suggest by custom the corresponding tactual. Inasmuch as objects painted on the lower part of the eye are distinctly seen by turning the eye up we consider them uppermost; "likewise they that are painted on the highest part of the eye shall be distinctly seen by turning the eye down and are for that reason esteemed lowest" (§ 98).

Berkeley sums up his theory by proving that "the extension, figures, and notions perceived by sight are specifically distinct from the ideas of touch, called by the same names; nor is there any such thing as one idea, or kind of idea, common to both senses" (§ 127). For "I *see* nothing but light and colours, with their several shades and variations," and these are never "ideas of touch" (§ 130). Nor can we "add a *visible* line or surface to a *tangible* line or surface," which proves that they are distinct (§ 131). If a blind man was restored to sight, he would not immediately recognise objects familiar to his touch. "Visible figures are the marks of tangible figures" (§ 140), and may be likened to words, which by convention we make to stand for our ideas. This language of Nature is, however, "constant and universal," being learnt very early, and was given to guide us "in all the transactions and concerns of life" (§ 147). Sight is really fore-sight. Through Divinely instituted laws of

nature visible phenomena come to be reliable signs of past and future tactual experiences This knowledge of the meaning of visive signs is not instinctive, but is gradually learnt and suggested to the imagination by past associations of the two kinds of sensations.

On Matter. Berkeley had demonstrated that our so-called visual perception of things at a distance is an illusion ; our eye gives us no direct perception of distance. all that it does is to suggest some tactual (and muscular) sensations, which we interpret in the conventional language of distance. Further cogitation led to further developments of the theory ; he matured the doctrine of his student days that not only was distance as given in visual perception a mere inference, but the so-called material world as supposed to be ordinarily perceived was also nothing more. This development of Berkeley's theory was destined to influence future philosophic thought in a remarkable manner, and deserves careful consideration.

The " Principles of Human Knowledge," in which the new doctrine was first worked out opens with a vigorous attack on the theory of abstract ideas. I can not realise in imagination any general notion formed by abstraction from particulars ; nor can I "abstract from one another, or conceive separately those qualities which it is impossible should exist so separated." For instance, I can not conceive an abstract idea of man ; I can imagine a black man or a fair man, a short man or a tall man, and so on, but I can not conceive a man who is neither black nor fair, neither short nor tall, &c. Nor can I form any abstract idea of a quality separated from all others, *e. g.*, motion distinct from the body moving, and which is neither swift nor slow, neither curvilinear nor rectilinear. Consequently abstract notions (as generally understood) are impossible .

This much being premised, Berkeley proceeds to examine the grounds of External Reality as popularly believed. What the human mind immediately perceives are *ideas*—mere phenomena. Mind can not have cognizance of any thing else. I see extended coloured surfaces, but these are only my mental affections. I have no grounds for supposing that there is any substratum which underlies and gives objective reality to my ideas, and which is yet not perceived. Any thing that is real must be perceived. Every unthinking solid thing is dependent in its very nature upon some percipient mind. Neither our thoughts, nor passions, nor ideas formed by the imagination can exist without the mind. "And to me it is no less evident," says Berkeley, "that the various SENSATIONS, or *ideas imprinted on the sense*, however blended or combined together (that is, whatever *objects* they compose), can not exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them." "As to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their *esse* is *percipi*, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them" (§ 3). You speak of matter, *an inert, senseless substance, in which*, you say, *extension, figure, and motion do actually subsist.* This is a senseless abstraction. There is no other substance than spirit. The ideas have no independent existence. They are but sensible qualities, and they can not exist in any unperceiving substratum. It is no use pleading that ideas are copies or resemblances of an extra-mental unthinking substance; an idea can be only like an idea, a colour or figure like another colour or figure. Locke has said that the "secondary qualities" of matter, *viz.*, colours, sounds, heat, cold, &c., are mental sensations, but figure, motion and other "primary qualities" exist

without the mind. But it is impossible "by any abstraction of thought, to conceive the extension and motion of body without all other sensible qualities" (§ 10). Moreover they appear various with changing circumstances, and therefore "can not be the images of anything settled or determinate without the mind" (§ 14).

But then you might ask, what do I mean by *real things*? how do I distinguish them from concepts formed by my imagination?—Things we actually perceive are (1) independent of our will, they appear involuntarily, (2) they are more regular, vivid, and constant than their copies in imagination, and (3) they are units in the universal system called nature. There is a *rerum natura*, but the *real things* and *chimeras* "both equally exist in the mind, and in that sense are alike ideas" (§ 34). Both are notional things, only the first are more complex than the second. What Berkeley abolishes is the philosophical abstraction called Matter. Our ideas are the "things which we perceive immediately by our senses."

But you might argue that if the objects of sense exist only when they are perceived, then it follows that things are every moment annihilated and created anew. Our premises, however, do not warrant any such conclusion. When I do not perceive them there may be some other spirit that does so. for by mind I do not mean this or that particular mind, but *all minds whatsoever* (§ 48). You ask how am I to explain the uniformity of the laws of nature on my principles? My answer is that God, the Omnipotent Infinite Spirit who presides in the world of spirits, has fixed and constantly maintains a regular order according to which ideas are imprinted on our senses (§ 62). The 'laws of nature' are principles in conformity with which He instils

ideas into us with absolute impartiality and absolute immutability. Hence the ideas are same to all minds and at all times. If Active Reason had not established regular uniform laws (discovered by us through experience), we should have been "eternally at a loss," without any foresight enabling us to regulate our actions for the benefit of life (§ 31).

The sensible qualities exist in the mind as *ideas*, not as *modes* or *attributes*. "To me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are termed its modes or accidents. And to say 'a die is hard, extended and square' is not to attribute those qualities to a subject distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning of the word *die*" (§ 49).

There is no taking away of true causes, though Natural and Corporeal causes are done away with. Ideas are by their very nature passive and inert; spirits alone can be active, and they are the only causes. "The connection of ideas does not imply the relation of *cause* and *effect*, but only of a *mark* or *sign* with the *thing signified*" (§ 65).

Matter you define by negatives,—an inert, senseless, unknown occasion of ideas in us. Since it supports nothing, the description approaches that of a nonentity. "I would fain know how anything can be present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense nor reflexion, nor capable of producing any idea in our minds, nor is at all extended, nor hath any form, nor exists in any place. The words 'to be present,' when thus applied, must needs be taken in some abstract and strange meaning, and which I am not able to comprehand" (§ 68).

Matter, abstract and unperceivable, has been the source of errors innumerable. Berkeley believes that his immateri-

alism will silence the atheists and sceptics. Human knowledge consists of two heads, *Ideas* and *Spirits*. We can have no 'ideas' of other spirits (though we may have 'notions' of them). Our knowledge of other individuals is derived from inference based partly on our own self-consciousness and partly on the *signs* of a similar self-conscious life in them implied in the ideas excited in us by their corporeal actions. God who "maintains that intercourse between spirits whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each other" is immediately and continuously known through his regulating influence on our ideas. Everything we see, hear, feel, or anywise perceive by sense, is a sign or *effect* of the power of God (§ 148). The universe is a moral government (§ 155). We live in a sensible world which has its being in Mind.

Divine Visual Language. In his next philosophical works, we find Berkeley engaged in a theological controversy. J. S. Mill has said that "the leading purpose of Berkeley's career as a philosopher" was to demolish the free-thinkers. Whatever may be thought of the first period of his philosophical work, there is no doubt that as he aged, his thoughts turned more and more to the theistic question. How do we know God? and what do we know of Him? are the questions that lie at the basis of *Alciphron* as well as that of *Siris*. Berkeley argues that the existence and character of God may be proved in the same manner as the existence and character of our fellow-men. "Vision is the language of the Author of Nature".* The constant significant connection of visible phenomena with tactual sensations implies an unphenomenal Rational Cause. There is no similitude, no necessary connection, it is the arbitrary imposition of Providence. Man knows man by his speech and action manifested in sense; man

* Berkeley, *Vindication of the Theory of Vision*, § 37.

knows God by His divine visual language. "Since you can not deny that the great Mover and Author of nature constantly explaineth Himself to the eyes of men by the sensible intervention of arbitrary signs, which have no similitude or connexion with the things signified; so as, by compounding and disposing them, to suggest and exhibit an endless variety of objects, differing in nature, time and place; thereby informing and directing men how to act with respect to things distant and future, as well as near and present. In consequence, I say, of your own sentiments and concessions, you have as much reason to think the Universal Agent or God speaks to your eyes, as you can have for thinking any particular person speaks to your ears" * God is not an unknown and unknowable entity. He is an intelligence whose qualities we analogically deduce by considering our own spiritual though very imperfect nature. For Berkeley, sensible things are no longer the great reality; much more important and real is the unphenomenal cause of those phenomena, "the active conscious Reason of the universe."

Criticism of Immaterialism. A few words may be said here about the immaterialism sketched above. As has been already said, it was this portion of Berkeley's philosophy which affected later thought, and consequently demands some attention.

We have indicated before the conditions amidst which Berkeley's thought was moulded. Controversy over abtract ideas like cause, substance, matter, was leading to speculative excesses. Berkeley pointed out that before any conclusions could be drawn from those abstract ideas, the preliminary question was to be answered, *viz.*, what is the

* *Alciphron*, Dial. IV.

actual significance of these words, *i. e.* what within our mind does correspond to them ?* He saw that these ideas, if supposed to represent something which existed absolutely independent of all knowledge of it, involved a contradiction ; and his answer was that the universe was inconceivable apart from mind. That is the real meaning of Berkeleian metaphysics. We have got to examine what inner strength the system possesses.

Berkeley starts with the theory which has been often ascribed to Locke (though he sometimes at least works himself free from it †), that our knowledge consists of ideas, perceived individually as such. Now, this is an imperfect analysis of the ultimate elements of sensation and perception. Such an unrelated unit is not an object of knowledge, but a mere abstraction.

This fallacy of the unrelated particular has been christened by Reid "the ideal theory," and will be found to pervade the meditations of all earlier thinkers and vitiate their procedure. Knowledge is of relations ; any thing that that stands by itself and apart from its surroundings can not be known. An object is known by means of its properties, and with its properties. Now none of these properties or qualities is singular. An object is what it is, because it is related, by way of likeness or unlikeness, to an infinity of other objects through these qualities. Nor can it be said to be properly known till it is recognised as a part of the *one* world of space and time that we know, and an item for the *one* self that knows. Thus the particular is known through the universal, by means of certain general principles which flow from the very nature of our consciousness, and

* Prof. R. Adamson on Barkeley, *Encyc. Brit.*, 9th ed., vol. iii, p. 591.
† Cf. Fraser, *Locke* (Blackwood) pp. 128-130.

its relation to object in general; and it is only by abstraction, by a special mental exertion, that we can take the so-called things apart, and examine them as discrete individuals.

Berkeley sees, however, that every fact for philosophical enquiry must be a fact for some conscious subject. Such a fact alone is an intelligible fact. Hence Berkeley is led to acknowledge *notions* of realities and relations not given *in ideas*. Foremost among these is the notion of myself as a spirit; then a notion of other spirits, and finally of God. As Reid acutely remarks, "This account of ideas is very different from that which Locke has given. In his system we have no knowledge where we have no ideas. Every thought must have an idea for its immediate object. In Berkeley's, the most important objects are known without ideas."* And if certain combinations of ideas warrant me in assuming the existence of a Spirit (not perceived as an *idea*), why may not certain other combinations of ideas indicate as truly the existence of a Body? Berkeley assumes that ideas are interpretable without having yet advanced to a rational conception of the universe. In the *Principles*, for instance, he distinguishes between relations and ideas, and seems to think that ideas may be known as sense-atoms.

Berkeley argues that what I immediately perceive are my ideas; consequently "the object and the sensation are the same thing and can not be abstracted from each other." † *Ergo*, the object exists only so for as perceived. "When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies we are all the while only contemplating our own ideas." ‡ Now how can the *esse* of an object be the *percipi*, unless our *percipi* be assumed to limit the existence of the object to a *percipi*?

* *Works* (ed. Hamilton), p. 288.

† Berkeley, *Principles*, § 5. The sentence was withdrawn in the second edition.

‡ *Ibid*, § 23.

This is a very bold saying. The vulgar believe that what they see and feel are the real things. The philosophers hold that what men see and feel are their own ideas. Berkeley pretends to reconcile these views by maintaining that my sensations are the real things. As Ueberweg has seen, in this lurks the fallacy of four terms; for 'what I see and feel' means with the vulgar the supersensible things-in-themselves, with the philosophers the sensuous phenomena. The word 'idea' is ambiguous. The object perceived is not the same as the act of perception. How do I know then that it does not exist independent of the act of the perception ?

The real point is that Berkeley, starting with the doctrine that no object can exist unrelated to a subject, could not abolish the object altogether. Locke had tried to divest external things of all that was mental, and, separating the secondary from the primary qualities, had reduced the world to a universe of mere matter and motion. Berkeley corrected this abstraction by pointing out that for a sensitive subject no such world could be known to exist apart from its own affections. But he fell into the converse error of reducing the inner life to mere sensations. A purely sensitive being only feels and has no inner life; it is only the self-conscious being that has an inner life—a life of perceptions or ideas, which refers to external objects. A subject can be conscious of itself only as it is conscious of objects. Mere subjectivism really destroys the subject by making it cease to be an object to itself. As Dr. E. Caird puts it, "the subject which is conscious of its ideas as its own, and refers them to objects, is not the individual sensitive subject as such, but an ego which, as it is conscious of itself only in distinction from, and in relation to, objects, can not reject the consciousness of objects as unreal.....If Berkeley had realised this, he would

have seen that the true meaning of the reflexion that objects exist only for a subject is, not that objects are reducible to the sensations through which we know them, but that we know no objects except those which are relative to a self, which therefore require to be contemplated in that relation in order that their true nature may be seen".*

Berkeley's analysis of the object is in several ways defective. First, I know it as external to me. Berkeley makes externality equivalent to distance in space, and proves that distance is not an immediate cognition, but suggested to sight by previous associated tactual [and muscular] sensations. But distance is very different from externality, inasmuch as I have a sense of outness even where there is no appreciable distance. In fact, distance presupposes externality, and measures its degrees. Second, Berkeley goes too far when he abolishes all difference between the so-called 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities of matter, and makes them both equally mental. Suppose I take an orange (I borrow the illustration from Prof. Veitch). † Among the various sensations I receive are the sensation of extension and the sensation of taste. Now, can the second be said to be permanent and independent of me in the same sense as the first? Is not the taste a purely personal sensation within my mouth?

Space and time Berkeley reduces to successions of ideas. But are they not rather the necessary preconditions which make those successions intelligible to us? Also, does not this immaterialism logically involve the subjectivity of physical and mathematical Science? The fact is that Berkeley

---

* *Critical Philosophy of Kant* vol. I., p. 420; see also pp. 642-5.

† *Hamilton*, (Blackwood), p. 189. The chapter VII will repay perusal.

institutes no enquiry into "the nature of the notions necessarily implied in the simplest knowledge of a *thing* as distinct from mere sense-feeling." "The necessity and universality of the judgements of causality and substantiality are taken for granted; and there is no investigation of the place held by these notions in the mental constitution." *

Even if it be allowed that I know only my ideas, it may be argued, how do you know that there is nothing beyond, for man is not the measure of all things?

The great difficulty on Berkeley's system, however, is to explain the permanence of things, since our sensations are intermittent. Berkeley argues that when I do not see, somebody else sees, and when all human eyes are closed, there is still God in whose mind they eternally exist as ideas. Are objects then created anew if after being lost for a time they are recovered? And in the divine archetypes have we not "the things as they are" of the metaphysicians again? Does it not also follow from this that the objects of sense are eternal, and being Divine ideas we perceive them only so far as we participate in the Divine Intellect?† Berkeley admits that "sameness" with him means only similarity and not numerical identity. Then it follows at once that what I am accustomed to call the same object must be a new object for me every time that I perceive. Moreover, how can such an object be an adequate means of intercommunion between individual spirits? Berkeley never seems to consider that unless the phenomenal

* Adamson in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 9th edition, vol. III, p. 591.

† Later Idealism conceives the universe as an unchanging order of relations of facts, which require a consciousness alike to present them as facts and to unite them in relation, and explains the attainment of knowledge as a reproduction of itself, in the human soul, by the eternal consciousness for which the cosmos of related facts exists—a reproduction of itself, in which it uses the sentient life of the soul as its organ. See Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, pp. 72-7.

signs are numerically the same, such spirits can not communicate. No expectation due to association can explain permanence. Berkeley says that though I am only seeing a tree now, the sight suggests other associated sensations, which are at present in abeyance. But does not association itself presuppose permanence? I can only expect that past associations will be realized in future experience by assuming the permanence of the qualities thus associated.

Berkeley's procedure is vitiated by his taking the only means of knowledge as a means for debarring that knowledge. I can know an object only through perception, and you say perception cannot make known anything but phenomena. Hence "that I perceive = that I do not perceive!" *

Berkeley lays great stress on Personality, but as has been indicated above, is he not bound to reject spiritual substance on the same ground as he rejects corporeal substance? Hume is more logical in this respect. Again, Berkeley rejects an unknown substratum of qualities on the ground of parsimony, but is not Hamilton justified in applying the same law against his theory of Divine interposition "to perform a petty miracle on each representation of each several mind?"

What does the whole Berkeleian argument amount to? I quote Dr. Stirling's graphic language. "*Without* is *within*, says Berkeley. Let it be so, says Hegel, and philosophy has still to *begin*. The same things that were called *without* or *nountenal* are now called *within* or *phenomenal*, but call them as you may, it is their *systematic explanation* that is wanted. Such systematic explanation embracing man and the entire round of his experiences, sensuous, intellectual,

* Schwegler, *Hist. of Phil.*, Stirling's annotations, p. 419.

moral, religious, æsthetic, political, &c., is alone philosophy, and to that no repetition of *without is within*, or *matter is phenominal* will ever prove adequate. "†

Nor is Berkeley's theological idealism sufficient. He only substitutes God for Matter, and the theory is not changed that my experience is due to some action from without. Now, if I start with subjective states only, I can have no conception of action from without, no perception of externality, and no recognition of myself as finite acted upon by the infinite God. Berkeley assumes throughout that matter is impotent and inert, and in order to make the agency of the Creator more simple and direct lays down that our ideas are produced in conformity with the so-called laws of nature, which have been arbitrarily imposed by God. Now, since nothing but what is active can exist independently, must not our spirits be passive, and so material, when we receive 'ideas' from God? Moreover, Berkeley says, nothing can give what it has not itself. Now since it is also asserted that God's ideas are not like ours, how can He produce ideas in us different from His own? The theory of Divine Visual Language is again based upon an assumption, *viz.*, that the Power which speaks to us is trustworthy. This Berkeley nowhere proves, as indeed a system starting with phenomena can not demonstrate the immanency of reason. He is fond of speaking of the laws of nature as arbitrary. This arbitrariness is rational, inasmuch as though the present laws might have been different, yet some laws there must have been to render our experience intelligible.

It may be added here that Berkeley's theory of vision was a most significant psychological move, and its fundamental

† Schwegler, *op. cit.*, Sterling, p. 419.

position yet remains unshaken. Our visual perception of things in space is admittedly an acquired growth, though it must be acknowledged that it is considerably aided by heredity, and though it may be questioned if extension (in a crude form) be not an original datum of sight.*

Berkeley and Leibniz. It would be interesting to compare Berkeley with LEIBNIZ (1646-1716). The system of the great founder of German philosophy was an attempt at reconciling the mechanical theory of science with the teleology and idealism of prevalent philosophy. His great problem was, "May not mechanism be itself of metaphysical origin?" He conceives the universe as constituted of a system of monads or *individua* each of which is different, indivisible, and a centre of living activity. None stands in total isolation; each mirrors the universe, though one reflects better than another. The Monad is a unity which perceives, involves effort, and has also a 'passive force' It is "endued with an organic body by the instrumentality of which it perceives and desires." Each monad develops automatically, and in the Monad of Monads, Absolute Unity and Absolute Force, it acts and moves and lives. Body is not an external impression; "we ourselves are representations of bodies, and the idea of a body, therefore, is given in the same act with ourselves, with our very being, and has its original in it alone: the idea not being evoked in us by external substances, but being our own spontaneous production." This sounds very much like Berkeley, but the Monad produces the world of things by an evolution of its own *quasi*-mental force, and not from divinely impressed ideas. Moreover, as

* More recently Abbott (*Sight and Touch*) and James (*Principles of Psychology*, II. ch. XX.) have attempted to show that vision furnishes us with the perception of space in three dimensions.

Prof. Wallace puts it, "our 'monad' is but one amongst an infinite variety of others,—aspects, like ours; and like ours, persistent in the infinite activity of God." * Leibniz does not advance so far as Berkeley, for his universe is one of *quasi*-spirits only, not all his substances have the power of thought and will. Berkeley's idealism is more complete and more consistent. In another sense, however, Leibniz's idealism is more far-reaching than Berkeley's, for according to him everything in the world, man, animal, plant or mineral, has a spiritual content; wherever there is existence, there is perception.† But the Berkeleian spirits can be made to resemble the monads, if we take the involuntarily received sense-phenomena (supposed *real* things) to be the unconscious products of the personal activity of each spirit ‡

Final Development of Berkeley's Philosophy.—Berkeley's thought was continually led more and more from his youthful question about the phenomenal world to the supersensible reality beyond. Even so early as in his essay on *Motion*, he had maintained that *Mens agitat molem* [A mind moves

* *Mind*, N. S. vol. II. p. 230.

† Leibniz conceives the mechanical and the spiritual to be related as the conditioned and the conditioning. The true meaning of the "pre-established harmony" is that "we can not find some things that occur physically, and others that occur supernaturally; everything that occurs has its sufficient mechanical antecedents, but all that occurs has its signifiance, its purpose, in something that does not occur, but that eternally is—Reason" (Dewey, *Leibniz's Human Understanding*, p. 260).

‡ Erdmann says that with Berkeley as with Leibniz God has nothing to do; since He never varies in his procedure, "His place can easily be supplied, if the law of association of ideas be substituted for Him who has once for all laid it down" (Vol. II. p. 266). But Berkeley always speaks of a 'constant creation.'

We have space only to mention here that Arthur Collier published in 1713 a demonstration of the impossiblity of an external world under the title *Clavis Universalis*. His method is widely different from Berkeley's, and his system attracted little notice. He is more closely connected with Malebranche and his point is that since the ideas of bodies in God are the common original of the production of actual bodies as well as of their ideas in finite minds, a corporeal world, unknowable and invisible, is a mere surplusage.

matter]. In *Alciphron* our knowledge of self, acknowledged to be not from an 'idea,' is made the basis of theism. In *Siris* we have the results of his thought matured and modified by a study of Greek philosophy, especially of Plato and his school. It contains essentially a philosophy of causation. All *causes* in the phenomenal world are only phenomenal *effects*; no phenomenon is the final or efficient cause of another phenomenon; all agents are incorporeal. Everything is bound by a chain which by gradations leads up to the final conscious active Reason. Berkeley now holds that sense knows nothing, for all its knowledge is of shifting phenomena. "Sense and Experience acquaint us with the cause and analogy of appearance or *natural effects*. Thought, Reason, Intellect introduce us into the knowledge of their *causes*" (§ 264). Mind is not a *tabula rasa*, as Aristotle holds; "there are properly no *ideas*, or passive objects in the mind but what were derived from sense: but that there are also besides these her own acts or operations; such as notions" (§ 308). He yet sometimes reverts to his old position, and quotes Parmenides approvingly that to *understand* and to *be* are the same thing. But what he seeks in past philosophers is testimony to the existence of the Supreme Intellect and Will. When man is born, "sense at first besets and overbears the mind;" our constant effort should be to "recover the lost region of light." "Theology and philosophy gently unbind the ligaments that chain the soul down to the earth, and assist her flight towards the sovereign Good" (§ 302). "The perceptions of sense are gross.....By experiments of sense we become acquainted with the lower faculties of the soul; and from them, whether by a gradual evolution or ascent we arrive at the highest.—Sense supplies images to memory. These become subjects for fancy to

work upon.—Reason considers and judges of the imaginations. And these acts of reason become new objects to the understanding.—In this scale, each lower faculty is a step that leads to one above it. And the uppermost leads to the Deity; which is rather the object of intellectual knowledge than even of the discursive faculty, not to mention the sensitive.—There runs a chain throughout the whole system of beings. In this chain one link drags another. The meanest things are connected with the highest" (§ 303). We must find space for another quotation in which Berkeley indicates which he has now come to regard as 'the true system of world,' and of which the Pythagoreans and Platonists had a notion. "They allowed of mechanical principles, but actuated by soul or mind: they distinguished the primary qualities in bodies from the secondary, making the former to be physical causes, and they understood physical causes in a right sense: they saw that a mind infinite in power, unextended, invisible, immortal, governed, connected, and contained all things: they saw there was no such thing as real absolute space; that mind, soul, a spirit truly and really exists: that bodies exist only in a secondary and dependent sense: that the soul is the place of forms: that the sensible qualities are to be regarded as acts only in the cause, and as passions to us: they accurately considered the differences of intellect, rational soul, and sensitive soul, with their distinct acts of intellection, reasoning, and sensation; points wherein the Cartesians and their followers, who consider sensation as a mode of thinking, seem to have failed. They knew there was a subtle æther pervading the whole mass of corporeal beings, and which was actually moved and directed by a mind: and the physical causes were only instruments, or rather

marks and signs" (§ 266). If Berkeley in his early philosophy is disposed to lay greater stress on sense, and its antithesis to self, in his matured philosophy, he traces with firmer hand the harmony due to immanent Reason, recognises the constitutive power of Intellect in the formation of knowledge, and conceives sensible things as an instrument, through scientific research, for educating reason in the individual mind.

Hume. The later developments of Berkeley's metaphysics, however, had almost no influence on future philosophic thought, and seem to have been first brought forward and clearly defined but recently by Dr. A. C. Fraser. It was only the negative aspect of his theory that bore immediate fruit in moulding the meditations of DAVID HUME (1711-1776). We have space here but to indicate the principal points of his system. According to him our knowledge consists of impressions and ideas, *i. e.*, sense-phenomena and "faint images of these in thinking and reasoning." He greatly applauded Berkeley's phenomenalistic nominalism, accepted his immaterialism, but, ignoring all reference to the immanent Reason which rationalises phenomena, conceived sensible things as unrelated and distinct units. As has been already said a system which begins with such units for its original elements of knowledge can never advance any further. Hume reduced the mind to a bundle of sensations in a perpetual flux, and said that *I* means any particular impression or idea that may be present in consciousness. The question concerning the substance of the soul is as "absolutely unintelligible" as the question concerning the substance of matter. Since I have no impression of the ego, how can I have an idea of it? The identity we ascribe to ourselves as well as to objects is a union of the imagination, and our notions of personal iden-

tity are all due to "the smooth and uninterrupted progress of thought along a train of connected ideas." It is an illusion which has memory for its chief source. Similarly I have no impression of power; consequently my idea of causal connection is an idea of a certain antecedent phenomenon followed by a certain consequent phenomenon. I can not ascribe the co-existences and sequences constituting the phenomenal world to an Active Mind, as I have no evidence to base such an inference upon, and shall be going out of my depth. "We surely comprehend as little of the operations" of bodies as of a mind. These co-existences and sequences are inexplicably arbitrary. "Whatever is *may* not be. No negation of a fact can involve a contradiction." Again, "if we reason *a priori* anything may appear able to produce anything. The falling of a pebble may, for aught we know, extinguish the sun; or the wish of a man control the planets in their orbits."* We perceive certain things to happen together. The mind by the force of association of ideas is led to fancy a necessary connection between them. Thus by the alchemy of the mind *conjunction* is transmitted into *connection*, and the fictitious idea of necessity generated. All our knowledge will be found constituted of beliefs inexplicably evolved through custom from inexplicable conjunctions of impressions. Such was Hume's "sceptical solution of sceptical doubts."

Reid and Kant. Thus the movement set a-going by Locke ended in nescience; matter and mind were pronounced equally phenomenal, and our deepest convictions arbitrary and inexplicable. This philosophic despair roused THOMAS

* *Inquiry*, § 12, pt. 3.

REID (1710-1796) and IMMANUEL KANT (1724-1804) from their "dogmatic slumbers," and led them to reconsider the fundamental principles once more. Reid protested in the name of common sense, and by a new analysis of the constituents of human experience proceeded to show that it involved principles often latent, which Locke had implicitly assumed without explicit recognition. The data of sense are perceived things and not isolated ideas as the Cartesians had supposed. Kant proceeded by transcendental method to investigate the conditions which render experience possible, and established by criticism the necessary activity of speculative and practical reason in the constitution of intelligible experience. Reid's positions are to some extent foreshadowed in Berkeley's *Alciphron* and *Vindication*; the rudiments of Kant's idealism may be traced in *Siris*.

Idealism: Berkeley and Kant. Idealism has been divided into several classes.* Berkeley's has been called *dogmatic* idealism, because it gives no proof of its assertion that all reality is spiritual. Kant's is the *critical* or *transcendental* idealism, because the result of his critical inquiry into our faculties is said to demonstrate the existence of a transcendental element in our experience,—"an element that lay in us but still came to us *in* experience." The idealism of Fichte is *subjective* inasmuch as he is said to have endeavoured to construct *a priori* all knowledge from the ego. Schelling, on the other hand, placed subject and object on an equal level, though still on an idealistic base, and consequently his is the *objective* idealism. Hegel's explanation of all existence in the perfect unity of the creative

* Schwegler, *Hist. of Phil.*, Stirling's annotations, pp. 419-420.

thought may be termed *absolute* idealism. As Prof. Adamson* observes, it would be interesting to compare Berkeley with Kant. Both reduce the sensible order of things into phenomena, which condition the individual mind in a particular way, and which have almost the appearance of being creations of each individual mind. But Kant's system has the advantage of pointing, at any rate, "the way to an objective view of things" by demonstrating that the fluctuating impression is not the ultimate fact, but is only known under certain necessary conditions of thought and under certain relations to what may be called the objective system of things. He secures 'reality' for his phenomena by showing that space and time are not mere empirical representations, but the necessary and universal forms of our perception. Permanence being the necessary condition of change, we can form a notion of it only in space, and from the fact that all our experience is comprised in one time. Kant further guards himself against positively denying the existence of things *per se*.†

Realism. Hume said that Berkeley's arguments were irrefutable, but they produced no conviction. If we grant Berkeley's premises, there apparently seems no escape from idealism, if not scepticism. But, as Reid insisted, his premises are not beyond question. What we know immediately is not an idea, a sense-atom, but a perceived thing, a thing known in its relations and its attributes. Unless I start from this hypothesis, I can never be able to vindicate that dualism which mankind at large seems naturally to believe in. The non ego is not given to me as an inference, but I perceive it, I feel it, I know it. Whenever I try to put

* *Philosophy of Kant*, p. 147. For a fuller discussion reference may be made to Mahaffy and Bernard's *Kant's Critical Philosophy*, Vol. I., pp. 204-214.

† Cf. Kant's *Prolegomena*, Mahaffy and Bernard, Vol. II., p. 147.

forth some muscular effort and am resisted, I have an immediate perception of something resisting. This something is beyond me, and can not be identified with the muscular contraction. In fact, the two are known through different sets of nerves. I do not infer the object as the cause of my sensation, I do not suppose it as like to my sensation, I do not believe it as an inexplicable necessity. My perception immediately makes it known to me as not a mode of myself. It is no passing mood of my sensibility, but a revelation of something beyond. I do not create it; I have no reason to conclude that its existence is limited to my perception. Rather the evidence is on the other side, as the same percept recurs. All that Realism contends for is that the extension I perceive, the resistance I feel, are not qualities of me; and we believe that SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON (1788—1856) has here at least very nearly reached the truth, even if the whole truth must be pronounced to be yet "behind the veil."

Final Words In conclusion it is hardly necessary to point out how much philosophy is indebted to the amiable Bishop of Cloyne. The subtlety of his genius, the daring originality of his speculations, require no comment at so late a day. In Berkeley we have the empirical philosophy of youth maturing into the rationalistic philosophy of age. At twenty-five, his impetuous nature propounded revolutionary doctrines calculated to set men seriously thinking; at sixty, through a chain of calm and sober reflections he sought to lead man's mind from the vain shows of things to the Supreme Creator. His philosophy has been misunderstood, and made to serve as a butt to wits. Lines like Byron's

> When Bishop Berkeley said there was no matter,
> And proved it,—'twas no matter what he said,*

* *Don Juan*, XI. 1.

are perhaps sparkling conceit, but were never meant to be tested under the ruthless wheel of logic. Berkeley's pre-eminent merit is to have called men's attention away from empty abstractions, and to have emphasised the reality of what they can form distinct images of. The teaching of his life was that the only real world is a world of free and independent spirits, who act and react upon one another, and live and move and have their being in the Supreme Mind, that operating on the finite intelligences produces the world of sense-phenomena. We must keep clear of the futile permanent possibilities of sensation offered to us as solutions of Matter and Mind by latter-day thinkers who profess to follow Berkeley by degrading and eviscerating him. That great thinker had meditated much upon God, the human mind, and the *summum bonum*, and dedicated "his age as well as youth, the later growth as well as first fruits, at the altar of truth."* Whatever might be our individual philosophic creeds, however strong our objections to what we are pleased to call discrepancies in his work, we must all gladly and gratefully acknowledge that Berkeley's writings have given body and vitality to our thoughts all for the better, and have thrown a light upon many problems that were dark before.

IV. HYLAS AND PHILONOUS.

Berkeley's *Principles of Human Knowledge* gave rise to many misunderstandings. He was called a sceptic, a vain seeker after originality, one whose views were calculated to subvert the Mosaic account of creation, etc. Consequently Berkeley thought it would be better if he gave a more popular exposition of his views. For this purpose no

* *Siris*, § 368.

form was better suited than that used with such success by Plato, *viz.*, the form of dialogue. In 1713 was published the *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.* These form perhaps the most charming philosophical discourse in the English language, and are deservedly famous among Berkeley's works. They unite polished diction with graceful fancy; they combine lucidity of expression with originality of thought. But what is perhaps most noticeable is the life that seems to be in them. They present to us an evenly maintained controversy between two well cultured gentlemen, one of whom, Hylas, represents the plain man who believes in the independent existence of matter, and the other, Philonous, is an expounder of the new theory of Immaterialism that Berkeley desired to preach. It is not an one-sided contest (as occasionally even in Plato), and the interest never flags; the way in which Hylas again and again returns to the attack is very human and lifelike. We append below an analysis of the three dialogues.

Analysis of the First Dialogue. [The common philosophical opinion discussed.]

§§ 1-3. Introductory. Hylas meets Philonous (representing Berkeley), and inquires if he is a sceptic and holds that there is no such thing as *material substance* in the world.

4. What is a *sceptic*? (1) One who doubts of everything; then Philonous is not a sceptic since he positively denies material substance.

5. (2) Also one who denies the reality and truth of things. But if it can be proved that material substance does not exist, then Hylas is the sceptic.

6-7. Consequently they proceed to analyse what is meant by sensible things. Sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense. Thus they do not include their causes.

8. Therefore they are merely combinations of sensible qualities.

9-14. Now Philonous proceeds to analyse how far an extra-mental reality can be attributed to sensible things. He takes the qualities of Matter one after another, and shows that they have no 'real existence' in the sense of a subsistence independent of a perceiving mind. (1) *Heat* does not really exist in any object, because intense heat is a sensation of pain, and gentle warmth one of pleasure, and sensations can not exist in an unperceiving substance. Similarly *cold*. Further, a thing may seem cold to one hand and hot to another at the same time; consequently these qualities do not exist in the object, but in the mind.

16. (2) *Tastes*. (i) A sweet taste is a pleasant sensation, bitterness some kind of uneasiness. (ii) Tastes also differ on different palates.

20. (3) *Odours* (i) Mere pleasant or unpleasant sensations; (ii) filth does not smell the same to a swine as to us.

21. (4) *Sounds* as perceived by us are mere sensations. Any vibrations in the air are not perceived by us, and so are irrelevant. In fact, any supposed external cause of our sensations, inasmuch as unperceived, does not concern the point at issue (§§ 17-18). Moreover, to *motion* we can not apply qualities of sound, *viz.*, loud, sweet, acute, or grave. Hence the so-called 'real' sounds are never heard.

22. (5) *Colours*. No visible object can be said to have the colour we see in it, because then it will not be possible

to maintain that corporeal substance is distinct from sensible qualities. Further, colours vary or vanish when we approach or recede from them, when we view them through a microscope or with our naked eyes, when our eyes are affected (*e.g.*, by jaundice) or healthy, when we change our point of view or the medium of vision. Colours, as immediately perceived, can not exist in extra-mental corporeal light.

26. Hylas admits that the *secondary qualities* of matter have no extra-mental existence, as indeed Locke had admitted before him. But the primary qualities, Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest, do really exist in bodies. Philonous, however, maintains that the same arguments hold against the primary as against the secondary qualities.

27-28. (1) *Extension* and *Figure.* (i) These, as perceived by us and as perceived by a mite must differ. (ii) Also there can be no super-sensible extension or figure in an object, because to the naked eye it may appear little, smooth, and round, when at the same time to an eye looking through a microscope it appears great, uneven and angular.

29. (2) *Motion*, as perceived by us, is always relative, either swift or slow, because in some minds ideas succeed one another more rapidly than in others; thus the same thing compared to one standard is swift, to another slow. Now a body can not have contradictory qualities, therefore motion does not exist in substances.

30. (3) *Solidity.* If this means any sensible quality, it must mean hardness or resistance as perceived by us, and so, as existing in our mind.

31. Why then do philosophers attribute an external reality to the primary qualities? Among other reasons, be-

cause the secondary qualities are easily perceived to be agreeable or disagreeable *sensations*, whereas the primary qualities are not so directly connected with pleasure or pain.

32-34. Hylas objects that there is a distinction between *absolute* and *sensible* extension or *absolute* and *sensible* motion. To absolute extension or motion relations like great and small, swift and slow, do not apply. Philonous replies that every thing which exists is particular, and that we can form no distinct abstract image of absolute extension or absolute motion. Mathematicians take no notice of sensible qualities because irrelevant, but they can not conceive abstract figures. *Pure intellect* is of no help, for abstract ideas can not be conceived (in imagination). The primary qualities always exist closely connected with the secondary qualities.

36-39. But is there no difference between a *sensation* and an *object*, between the act of the mind perceiving and the something perceived? If so, then in every perception there are two elements, a mental action and a non-mental something. This action must exist in some thinking thing; the non-active something may exist in an unthinking thing. Now the perception of a smell or a colour does not depend upon my will; I cannot regulate what particular odour or colour I shall perceive at any time. Consequently there is no mental action involved in these perceptions. *Ergo* these perceptions may exist in an unperceiving substance, which is absurd. Consider again, pain. However little active, it can not exist in senseless matter.

40. Is there, then, no *material substratum*—a something that supports modes (extension, &c.)?—No, for this substratum in order to support extension must be extended itself; this extension must have another extended substratum beneath, and so on *ad infinitum*, which is repugnant to sense.

41. But suppose *substratum* means *substance*, what stands under accidents.—This contention is also open to the same objections. A 'material support' is thus something that you can not conceive!

42-43. Nor does it help to argue that the qualities all together may have an external existence. For, have we not proved that they were not *at all* without the mind? And can we conceive any combination of qualities to exist without the mind? If I can imagine any sensible thing to exist unperceived, it does not prove that it exists independent of mind, for all the while I am conceiving it in my own mind.

44-48. Do not I *see* things at a distance?—No, the eye does not give us any immediate perception of distance. Because (1) visible size and figure are not constant, they change as we approach or recede; (2) distance is a line turned endwise to the eye, and so can not be seen; (3) colours are seen to co-exist with figures, then how can the latter be extra-mental when the former are not? The fact is that visual sensations are associated (by experience) with various muscular and tactual sensations. So, when we have any visual sensation, it suggests to us the associated set of sensations, which we may expect to be affected with, after a certain succession of time and motion. And even if distance were immediately perceived, still, as such, it would only be an idea, and could have no objective existence.

49-58. But may there not be two kinds of objects, (1) ideas, immediately perceived, (2) external objects, perceived by the mediation of ideas representing them? *E. g.*, I see a picture (immediately), and recognise it as Julius Cæsar's (mediately).—But another person, with equally good sight may see the picture, but not see it as Cæsar's, if he does not happen to know how the great Roman looked.

Consequently it does not appear that anything is perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived. Again, our ideas are in a perpetual change, but real things are said to have a fixed and real nature unaffected by changes in our sensations. Now, how can our fleeting ideas be copies of any permanent existence? Further, since material objects are insensible, because not immediately perceived, how can our sensible ideas be like them?

65. Hence sensible things have no absolute existence exterior to the mind, for no idea can exist without the mind.

Analysis of the Second Dialogue. [Explanations of Absolute Matter reviewed.]

2-3. Philonous' arguments seem irrefutable, but is the ordinary scientific explanation of our perceptions untenable? Are not impressions communicated to the brain through the nerves; and do not the traces thus caused there occasion our ideas?—The brain, however, is a sensible thing, an immediate perception, and according to this hypothesis, all our ideas must be produced by some alterations in an idea. Also, if all ideas are occasioned by impressions in the brain, it follows that ideas imprinted in an idea cause that same idea, which is absurd. Moreover, what connection is there between a neural change and a mental sensation?

4-8. All the glorious firmament above, all the beautiful world below, how exquisitely constructed, with what infinite wisdom contrived,—can you conçeive that these have no reality?—No, they are sensible things, and inasmuch as we do see, hear, touch, and feel them immediately, they must exist. They do not depend upon my mind, it is true, I can not produce them at will, but they are not independent of all minds.

They exist only so far as they are perceived. Consequently *there must be some other mind where they exist*, an infinite mind which is God. Is not this an adequate proof of the being of God, calculated to overthrow all atheism? This is not, however, equivalent to saying that we see all things in God. My direct perceptions are only ideas or sensations, which must exist in a spirit. Hence I conclude, there is a Mind, wise, powerful, and good beyond comprehension, which affects me every moment with all the sensible impressions I perceive. I do not see things by perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible substance of God. There can be no homogeneity between my passive and inert ideas and the impassive, indivisible, pure, and active essence of God. (The ideas that I myself create are not so strong, vivid, and permanent as the *real* ones which I perceive).

9-10. We may admit that God is the supreme and universal Cause, still there may be a *subordinate cause* of our ideas which we call Matter.—But Matter can be a cause of thought only when it ceases to be inactive and unthinking, *i.e.*, when it becomes a spirit. If you say that matter is not wholly without action, it can *move*, I must refer you back to where I have already proved that motion is only a sensible quality, and that there is no action besides volition.

11-12. May not Matter be an *instrument* subservient to the Supreme Agent in the production of our ideas?—Besides the inconceivability involved in the notion of an unknown kind of instrument, it may be urged against this hypothesis, that an instrument is only used where we can not perform a thing by the mere act of our will. Is not, then, God's will sufficient for the creation of everything? Surely, He needs no instruments.

13 Still Matter may be an inactive unthinking *occasion* at the presence whereof God excites ideas in our minds.—But surely, God needs no unthinking substance to be influenced, directed, or put in mind by. Also, how does it affect the present discussion, if there be ideas in the mind of God which we do not and can not perceive ?

15-17. Yet Matter may be something in general, which simply *exists*, neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is perceived.—But if you do not know how and where it exists, nor can form any abstract notion of entity, you must allow me to say that your conception of Matter very closely approaches that of Nothing.

19. Is not the existence of Matter a necessary pre-supposition when we maintain the reality of things ?—But things are sensible, and how can what is insensible and unintelligible be a proof that something sensible and intelligible exists ?

20. The existence of Matter is improbable, but it is possible.—Yes, as that of a centaur or a golden mountain. As ordinarily understood, however, it has been already proved that Matter can not exist without the mind.

22. It can not be proved impossible in the most obscure, abstracted and indefinite sense, because no repugnancy can be demonstrated between our ideas, when we have no ideas at all.

Analysis of the Third Dialogue. [Further objections to the New Theory of Sensible Things considered.]

1-3. It seems to Hylas that Philonous' doctrines lead to scepticism and unsettle all beliefs and opinions. We can know nothing, for all our knowledge is only of phenomena. We are ignorant of the real nature of things, nay, have no

reason even to assume their existence. This scepticism, Philonous contends, is due to Hylas' supposing that there is a material substance beyond what we immediately know. Sensible things do most certainly exist, because I directly perceive them by my senses. They are ideas in my own mind. What else may be beyond them is a philosophical fiction. The affirmation of absolute Matter is a self-contradictory hypothesis; its negation simply a falling back on the facts of experience.

4. But if sensible things can not exist without the mind, would they cease to exist if you were annihilated?—No, there would still be the omnipresent eternal Mind, who exhibits them to us according to rules called the 'laws of nature.'

5·6. Are not ideas passive and God active? How then can there be an idea representing the nature of God? And if we have no idea of the mind of God, how do I know that things exist there?—I have no idea of a spirit, but I have a notion; I know him mediately, by an act of reasoning. Myself I know immediately, and by reflecting upon my soul, exalting and perfecting it, I can form a notion of God. Also, from my own being and dependency, I infer the existence of the Supreme Creator. Matter, on the other hand, I know neither immediately nor mediately, and infer its non-existence, because an inconsistency, like unphenomenal phenomena or inactive cause, can not exist.

7. Still there is no ground to suppose that *you* are not a system of floating ideas only, that a spiritual substance has more meaning than a material substance.—But I *know* that *I* exist, that I am distinct from my ideas; my memory testifies to my own personality and identity. Can a colour or sound perceive another sound or colour? I perceive both.

8-9 But can 'existence' be equivalent to being perceived? —Ask any ordinary man; the only reason that he can assign for his belief in the existence of anything is that he perceives it. And not simply must the thing be perceivable, it must always be actually perceived in order to exist. Does not the infinite mind of God comprehend it when human eyes are absent?

10. How do you then distinguish between real things and imaginary ideas?—The latter are faint and indistinct, and they depend on our will; the former are more vivid and clear, also imprinted on the mind by another spirit independently of our will.

11. True, 'ideas' for 'things' sounds odd, but the former word better expresses the necessary relation to the mind, and so is adopted here.

12. Then you abolish all physical or corporeal causes? —Yes, for nothing can give to another that which it has not itself; how then can inert Matter be a cause? And does not the Bible authorise us to say that a Spirit is the immediate cause of all natural phenomena?

13. If so, then, must not God be the author of all heinous sins?—(1) He must be equally so if He was the mediate, instead of being the immediate, cause. (2) But moral turpitude does not consist in the outward action, but in a faulty internal spring of action. (3) We possess limited powers, ultimately derived from God, by which we determine our own actions.

14. There can be no other *substratum* of our perceptions but spirit, in which they exist, not by way of mode or property, but as a thing perceived in that which perceives it. This view is really consonant with the ordinary belief of mankind, unbiassed by a learned education.

15. If men judge of the reality of things by their senses, how can they be mistaken when they perceive not aright ?—But we do perceive aright though we often mistake in our inferences ; *e. g.*, the oar in water I do *see* crooked, but I make a mistake when I infer that it will also be crooked to my touch.

17-18. The dispute is not simply about words. For any substratum we may suppose must be unextended and active. Matter, as ordinarily understood, is not so. Nor can it be a *third nature* distinct from spirit. For sensible things exist without my mind ; they are ideas, *ergo* they exist in an understanding ; they are effects, actions imply volitions, *ergo* they proceed from a will. Now will and understanding constitute a spirit.

19. God is perfect. He, you say, affects us with ideas, among them pain. He must then have the idea of pain. Is not that an imperfection ?—But God does not receive His ideas through sense. He knows pain, but we can not say that He has the sensation of pain.

20-21. Have the natural philosophers then been dreaming all this while ?—No, their labours are concerned with sensible things, so abstract Matter does not affect them. Their business is to elucidate phenomena, *i. e*, to show the cause of our ideas and explain their order ; by observation and reasoning they discover the laws and methods of nature.

22. Is not there a wide-spread belief in the existence of Matter ? Has then God deceived mankind ?—But do men, except a few philosophers, really believe in Matter as something distinct from what we perceive ?

23-24. Should not your views be discountenanced for their novelty ?—True views, even if novel, should be coun-

tenanced ; otherwise arts and sciences could not progress. My standpoint is that of common sense, you are the innovator. I trust my senses and believe in the reality of my perceptions ; you call them empty appearances, and assume an unknown substrate.

25-26. Why then do our perceptions differ ?—Strictly speaking, what I see is not the same as what I touch. Ideas which we find connected, are, for convenience sake, constituted into one object. Further, if we use mechanical means (*e. g.*, a microscope), it is not to aid our perception, but to investigate the connection between our ideas (as received through different channels), and thus to understand better the nature of things. And even if perceptions differ, with what can they be proved inconsistent, since no unknown substrate exists ? Moreover, since our perceptions are continually changing, how can they represent unknown originals ? How can we then have any real knowledge at all ?

28-30. Since each of us is cognisant only of his perceptions, does it not follow that no two of us see the same thing ?—Yes and no ; yes, if by ' same ' be meant ' similar' ; ' no,' if ' same ' means ' identical. ' It is only a verbal difference. The objection applies equally to the materialistic position, on which also it is supposed that our immediate perceptions are ideas. An unknown archetype can not give identity to our perceptions. And if you want something *external*, a common substrate, is not there God ? It is sufficient to know that we really see, hear, feel.

31. How can ideas of extended things exist in unextended mind ?—As has been already said, the mind perceives them, it has not them as its properties. We should not interpret in a gross literal sense terms applied to the mind.

32. How do you reconcile your theory with the Scripture account of the creation? Does Moses speak of a *creation of ideas?*—Moses speaks of things of sense, immediate objects of the understanding. These you may call 'ideas' or 'things' as you please, only you should bear in mind, when using the latter word, that solid corporeal substances are not meant.

34-35. But still is there not a repugnancy between the Mosaic account and your notions?—No; things have been existing from eternity in the mind of God; creation, therefore, means making them perceptible to other spirits. I accept the Mosaic account, for I believe that had I been present at the creation, I should have seen things produced into being, *i. e.*, become perceptible, in the order detailed there. This does not imply that man must have been created before other things, and that they had at the beginning only a relative and hypothetical existence. For how do you know that man had not been preceded by any order of created intelligences, in whose minds they first became perceptible? The actuality of absolute existence is, moreover, an unmeaning phrase.

36-41 Were not all things eternally in the mind of God? How could such eternal things be then created in time?—But may we not suppose that such creation was only in respect of finite spirits? This what you call a relative existence, redounds more to the immensity and omniscience of God than the other theory, which would make the created universe extrinsic to His mind. Other objections, *e. g.*, concerning a change in God at the time of creation, are irrelevant and carry us into theological ground. If you can conceive the creation on any hypothesis, why not on this, in which no sensible thing is taken away? It is the Materialist who destroys Moses' sense by denying real existence

to sensible things. Absolute existence is unintelligible, and has supplied plausible arguments to atheists and sceptics. It is only prejudice which leads men to cling to old notions.

42-48. Among the many advantages which follow from Immaterialism are (1) in Theology, clear proof of the existtence of God and the incorruptibility of the soul; (2) in Natural Philosophy, clearing of many obscurities (due to the perplexing notion of Matter), produced by the substitution therefor of an Intelligent cause; (3) in Metaphysics of various difficulties, and closing of many idle controversies; (4) in Mathematics, considerable simplification consequent upon the abolition of absolute and abstract notions. No novelty is claimed for this theory. It is only the reconciliation of the vulgar belief that the things immediately perceived are the real things, with the philosophical opinion that we immediately perceive only our ideas. You may still use the term *Matter*, perhaps that will be more agreeable to some persons, but you must always bear in mind what sense you are using it in. And in making objections to the new doctrine you should also see whether your objections do not apply equally to the old doctrine, and whether you are not committing any logical fallacy. Then you will find that the same principles, which at first view, lead to scepticism, pursued sufficiently, bring men back to Common Sense.

THREE DIALOGUES

BETWEEN

HYLAS AND PHILONOUS,

THE DESIGN OF WHICH IS PLAINLY TO DEMONSTRATE THE REALITY AND PERFECTION OF

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE,

THE INCORPOREAL NATURE OF THE

SOUL,

AND THE IMMEDIATE PROVIDENCE OF A

DEITY:

IN OPPOSITION TO

SCEPTICS AND ATHEISTS;

ALSO TO OPEN A METHOD FOR RENDERING THE SCIENCES MORE EASY, USEFUL, AND COMPENDIOUS.

To the Right Hon'ble

The Lord Berkeley of Stratton,

MASTER OF THE ROLLS IN THE KINGDOM OF IRELAND, CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LANCASTER, AND ONE OF THE LORDS OF HER MAJESTY'S MOST HON'BLE PRIVY COUNCIL.

My Lord,

The virtue, learning, and good sense which are acknowledged to distinguish your character, would tempt me to indulge myself the pleasure men naturally take in giving applause to those whom they esteem and honour: and it should seem of importance to the subjects of Great Britain that they knew the eminent share you enjoy in the favour of your Sovereign, and the honours she has conferred upon you, have not been owing to any application from your lordship, but entirely to Her Majesty's own thought, arising from a sense of your personal merit, and an inclination to reward it. But, as your name is prefixed to this treatise with an intention to do honour to myself alone, I shall only say that I am encouraged by the favour you have treated me with, to address these papers to your lordship. And I was the more ambitious of doing this, because a Philosophical Treatise could not so properly be addressed to any one as to a person of your lordship's character, who, to your other valuable distinctions, have added the knowledge and relish of Philosophy.

I am, with the greatest respect,

My Lord,

Your lordship's most obedient and most humble servant,

GEORGE BERKELEY.

THE PREFACE.

1. THOUGH it seems the general opinion of the world, no less than the design of nature and providence, that the end of speculation be Practice, or the improvement and regulation of our lives and actions; yet those who are most addicted to speculative studies, seem as generally of another mind. And, indeed, if we consider the pains that have been taken to perplex the plainest things—that distrust of the senses, those doubts and scruples, those abstractions and refinements that occur in the very entrance of the sciences; it will not seem strange that men of leisure and curiosity should lay themselves out in fruitless disquisitions, without descending to the practical parts of life, or informing themselves in the more necessary and important parts of knowledge.

2. Upon the common principles of philosophers, we are not assured of the existence of things from their being perceived. And we are taught to distinguish their real nature from that which falls under our senses. Hence arise Scepticism and Paradoxes. It is not enough that we see and feel, that we taste and smell a thing: its true nature, its absolute external entity, is still concealed. For though it be the fiction of our own brain, we have made it inaccessible to all our faculties. Sense is fallacious, reason defective. We spend our lives in doubting of those things which other men evidently know, and believing those things which they laugh at and despise.

3. In order, therefore, to divert the busy mind of man from vain researches, it seemed necessary to inquire into the source of its perplexities; and, if possible, to lay down such Principles as, by an easy solution of them, together with their own native evidence, may at once recommend themselves for genuine to the mind, and rescue it from those endless pursuits it is engaged in. Which, with a plain demonstration of the Immediate Providence of an all-seeing God, and the natural Immortality of the soul, should seem the readiest preparation, as well as the strongest motive, to the study and practice of virtue.

4. This design I proposed in the First Part of a treatise concerning the *Principles of Human Knowledge*, published in the year 1710. But, before I proceed to publish the Second Part, I thought it requisite to treat more clearly and fully of certain Principles laid down in the First, and to place them in a new light—which is the business of the following *Dialogues*.

5. In this treatise, which does not presuppose in the reader any knowledge of what was contained in the former, it has been my aim to introduce the notions I advance into the mind in the most easy and familiar manner; especially because they carry with them a great opposition to the prejudices of philosophers, which have so far prevailed against the common sense and natural notions of mankind.

6. If the principles which I here endeavour to propagate are admitted for true, the consequences which, I think, evidently flow from thence are, that Atheism and Scepticism will be utterly destroyed, many intricate points made plain, great difficulties solved, several useless parts of science re-

trenched, speculation referred to practice, and men reduced from paradoxes to common sense.

7. And, although it may, perhaps, seem an uneasy reflection to some that, when they have taken a circuit through so many refined and unvulgar notions, they should at last come to think like other men; yet, methinks, this return to the simple dictates of nature, after having wandered through the wild mazes of philosophy, is not unpleasant. It is like coming home from a long voyage: a man reflects with pleasure on the many difficulties and perplexities he has passed through, sets his heart at ease, and enjoys himself with more satisfaction for the future.

8. As it was my intention to convince Sceptics and Infidels by reason, so it has been my endeavour strictly to observe the most rigid laws of reasoning. And, to an impartial reader, I hope it will be manifest that the sublime notion of a God, and the comfortable expectation of Immortality, do naturally arise from a close and methodical application of thought—whatever may be the result of that loose, rambling way, not altogether improperly termed Free-thinking, by certain libertines in thought, who can no more endure the restraints of logic than those of religion or government.

9. It will perhaps be objected to my design that, so far as it tends to ease the mind of difficult and useless inquiries, it can affect only a few speculative persons; but, if by their speculations rightly placed the study of morality and the law of nature were brought more into fashion among men of parts and genius, the discouragements that draw to Scep-

ticism removed, the measures of right and wrong accurately defined, and the principles of Natural Religion reduced into regular systems, as artfully disposed and clearly connected as those of some other sciences—there are grounds to think these effects would not only have a gradual influence in repairing the too much defaced sense of virtue in the world; but also, by shewing that such parts of revelation as lie within the reach of human enquiry are most agreeable to right reason, would dispose all prudent unprejudiced persons to a modest and wary treatment of those sacred mysteries which are above the comprehension of our faculties.

10. It remains that I desire the reader to withhold his censure of these *Dialogues* till he has read them through. Otherwise he may lay them aside, in a mistake of their design or on account of difficulties or objections which he would find answered in the sequel. A treatise of this nature would require to be once read over coherently, in order to comprehend its design, the proofs, solution of difficulties, and the connexion and disposition of its parts. If it be thought to deserve a second reading, this, I imagine, will make the entire scheme very plain; especially if recourse be had to an Essay I wrote some years since upon *Vision*, and the Treatise concerning the *Principles of Human Knowledge*—wherein diverse notions advanced in these *Dialogues* are further pursued, or placed in different lights, and other points handled which naturally tend to confirm and illustrate them.

THREE DIALOGUES

BETWEEN HYLAS AND PHILONOUS, IN OPPOSITION TO SCEPTICS AND ATHEISTS.

THE FIRST DIALOGUE.

1. *Philonous.* Good morrow, Hylas: I did not expect to find you abroad so early.

Hylas. It is indeed something unusual; but my thoughts were so taken up with a subject I was discoursing of last night, that finding I could not sleep, I resolved to rise and take a turn in the garden.

Phil. It happened well, to let you see what innocent and agreeable pleasures you lose every morning. Can there be a pleasanter time of the day, or a more delightful season of the year? That purple sky, those wild but sweet notes of birds, the fragrant bloom upon the trees and flowers, the gentle influence of the rising sun, these and a thousand nameless beauties of nature inspire the soul with secret transports; its faculties too being at this time fresh and lively, are fit for these meditations, which the solitude of a garden and tranquillity of the morning naturally dispose us to. But I am afraid I interrupt your thoughts: for you seemed very intent on something.

Hyl. It is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you if you will permit me to go in the same vein; not that I would by any means deprive myself of your company, for my thoughts

always flow more easily in conversation with a friend, than when I am alone: but my request is, that you would suffer me to impart my reflections to you[1].

Phil. With all my heart, it is what I should have requested myself if you had not prevented me.

2. *Hyl.* I was considering the odd fate of those men who have in all ages, though an affectation of being distinguished from the vulgar, or some unaccountable turn of thought, pretended either to believe nothing at all, or to believe the most extravagant things in the world. This however might be borne, if their paradoxes and scepticism did not draw after them some consequences of general disadvantage to mankind. But the mischief lieth here; that when men of less leisure see them, who are supposed to have spent their whole time in the pursuits of knowledge, professing an entire ignorance of all things, or advancing such notions as are repugnant to plain and commonly received principles, they will be tempted to entertain suspicions concerning the most important truths, which they had hitherto held sacred and unquestionable.

Phil. I entirely agree with you, as to the ill tendency of the affected doubts of some philosophers, and fantastical conceits of others. I am even so far gone of late in this way of thinking, that I have quitted several of the sublime notions I had got in their schools for vulgar opinions. And I give it to you on my word, since this revolt from metaphysical notions, to the plain dictates of nature and common sense, I find my understanding strangely enlightened, so that I can now easily comprehend a great many things which before were all mystery and riddle.

3. *Hyl.* I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I heard of you.

Phil. Pray, what were those?

Hyl. You were represented in last night's conversation, as one who maintained the most extravagant opinion that ever entered into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such thing as *material substance*[2] in the world.

Phil. That there is no such thing as what Philosophers call *material substance*, I am seriously persuaded: but, if I were made to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I should then have the same reason to renounce this that I imagine I have now to reject the contrary opinion.

Hyl. What! can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant to common sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than to believe there is no such thing as *matter*?

Phil. Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that you, who hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinion, a greater sceptic, and maintain more pradoxes and repugnances to common sense, than I who believe no such thing?

Hyl. You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater than the whole, as that, in order to avoid absurdity and Scepticism, I should ever be obliged to give up my opinion in this point.

4. *Phil.* Well then, are you content to admit that opinion for true, which, upon examination, shall appear most agreeable to common sense, and remote from Scepticism?

Hyl. With all my heart. Since you are for raising disputes about the plainest things in nature, I am content for once to hear what you have to say.

Phil. Pray, Hylas, what do you mean by a *sceptic*[3]?

Hyl. I mean what all men mean—one that doubts of everything.

Phil. He then who entertains no doubt concerning some particular point, with regard to that point cannot be thought a sceptic.

Hyl. I agree with you.

Phil. Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the affirmative or negative side of a question ?

Hyl. In neither ; for whoever understands English, cannot but know that *doubting* signifies a suspense between both.

Phil. He then that denieth any point, can no more be said to doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of assurance.

Hyl. True.

Phil. And, consequently, for such his denial is no more to be esteemed a sceptic than the other.

Hyl. I acknowledge it.

Phil. How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you pronounce me a *sceptic*, because I deny what you affirm, to wit, the existence of Matter ? Since, for aught you can tell, I am as peremptory in my denial as you in your affirmation.

5. *Hyl.* Hold, Philonous ; I have been a little out in my definition ; but every false step a man makes in discourse is not to be insisted on. I said indeed that a *sceptic* was one who doubted of everything ; but I should have added, or who denies the reality and truth of things.

Phil. What things ? Do you mean the principles and theorems of sciences ? But these you know are universal intellectual notions, and consequently independent of Matter ; the denial therefore of this doth not imply the denying them.

Hyl. I grant it. But are there no other things ? What think you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of sensible things, or pretending to know nothing of them ? Is not this sufficient to denominate a man a *sceptic* ?

Phil. Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest ignorance of them ; since, if I take you rightly, he is to be esteemed the greatest *sceptic* ?

Hyl. That is what I desire.

6. *Phil.* What mean you by Sensible Things ?

Hyl. Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can you imagine that I mean anything else ?

Phil. Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to apprehend your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry. Suffer me then to ask you this farther question. Are those things only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately ? Or, may those things properly be said to be *sensible* which are perceived mediately, or not without the intervention of others ?

Hyl. I do not sufficiently understand you.

Phil. In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the letters, but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, &c Now that the letters are truly sensible things, or perceived by sense, there is no doubt : but I would know whether you take the things suggested by them to be so too.

Hyl. No certainly ; it were absurd to think *God* or *virtue* sensible things, though they may be signified and suggested to the mind by sensible marks with which they have an arbitrary connexion.

Phil. It seems then, that by *sensible things* you mean those only which can be perceived *immediately* by sense ?

Hyl. Right.

7. *Phil.* Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one part of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth thence evidently conclude there must be some cause of that diversity of colours, yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or perceived by the sense of seeing ?

Hyl. It doth.

Phil. In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet I cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds ?

Hyl. You cannot.

Phil. And when by my touch, I perceive a thing to be hot and heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel the cause of its heat or weight ?

Hyl. To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell you once for all, that by *sensible things* I mean those only which are immediately perceived by sense, and that in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive immediately: for they make no inferences. The deducing therefore of causes or occasions from effects and appearances, which alone are perceived by sense, entirely relates to reason.

8. *Phil.* This point then is agreed between us—that *sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense.* You will farther inform me whether we immediately perceive by sight anything beside light, and colours and figures ; or by hearing, anything but sounds ; by the palate, anything beside tastes ; by the smell, beside odours ; or by the touch more than tangible qualities.

Hyl. We do not.

Phil. It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible qualities, there remains nothing sensible ?

Hyl. I grant it.

Phil. Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities ?

Hyl. Nothing else.

9. *Phil.* *Heat* then is a sensible thing ?

Hyl. Certainly.

Phil. Doth the reality of sensible things consist in being perceived ? or, is it something distinct from their being perceived, and that bears no relation to the mind ?

Hyl. To *exist* is one thing, and to be *perceived* is another.

Phil. I speak with regard to sensible things only : and of these I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence exterior to the mind, and distinct from their being perceived ?

Hyl. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without any relation to their being perceived.

Phil. Heat[4] therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must exist without the mind ?

Hyl. It must.

Phil. Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally compatible to all degrees of heat, which we perceive; or is there any reason why we should attribute it to some, and deny it to others ? and if there be, pray let me know that reason.

Hyl. Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it.

Phil. What ! the greatest as well as the least ?

Hyl. I tell you, the reason is plainly the same in respect of both : they are both perceived by sense ; nay, the greater degree of heat is more sensibly perceived ; and consequently, if there is any difference, we are more certain of its real existence than we can be of the reality of a lesser degree.

10. *Phil.* But is not the most vehement and intense degree of heat a very great pain ?

Hyl. No one can deny it.

Phil. And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or pleasure ?

Hyl. No, certainly.

Phil. Is your material substance a senseless being, or a being endowed with sense and perception ?

Hyl. It is senseless without doubt.

Phil. It cannot therefore be the subject of pain ?

Hyl. By no means.

Phil. Nor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by sense, since you acknowledge this to be no small pain ?

Hyl. I grant it.

Phil. What shall we say then of your external object ; is it a material substance. or no ?

Hyl. It is a material substance with the sensible qualities inhering in it.

Phil. How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own it cannot in a material substance ? I desire you would clear this point.

Hyl. Hold, Philonous. I fear I was out in yielding intense heat to be a pain. It should seem rather, that pain is something distinct from heat, and the consequence or effect of it.

Phil. Upon putting your hand near the fire, do you perceive one simple uniform sensation, or two distinct sensations ?

Hyl. But one simple sensation.

Phil. Is not the heat immediately perceived ?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. And the pain ?

Hyl. True.

Phil. Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived at the same time, and the fire affects you only with one simple or uncompounded idea,[5] it follows that this same simple idea is both the intense heat immediately perceived, and the pain ; and, consequently, that the intense heat immediately perceived, is nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain.

Hyl. It seems so.

11. *Phil.* Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can conceive a vehement sensation to be without pain or pleasure.

Hyl. I cannot.

Phil. Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible pain or pleasure, in general, abstracted from every particular idea of heat, cold, tastes, smells, &c. ?

Hyl. I do not find that I can.

Phil. Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is nothing distinct from those sensations or ideas—in an intense degree ?

Hyl. It is undeniable ; and, to speak the truth, I begin to suspect a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving it.

Phil. What ! are you then in that *sceptical* state of suspence, between affirming and denying ?

Hyl. I think I may be positive in the point. A very violent and painful heat cannot exist without the mind.

Phil. It hath not therefore, according to you, any real being ?

Hyl. I own it.

12. *Phil.* Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in nature really hot ?

Hyl. I have not denied there is any real heat in bodies. I only say, there is no such thing as an intense real heat.

Phil. But do you not say before that all degrees of heat were equally real ; or, if there was any difference, that the greater were more undoubtedly real than the lesser ?

Hyl. True : but it was because I did not then consider the ground there is for distinguishing between them, which I now plainly see. And it is this :—because intense heat is nothing else but a particular kind of painful sensation ; and pain cannot exist but in a perceiving being ; it follows that no intense heat can really exist in an unperceiving corporeal

substance. But this is no reason why we should deny heat in an inferior degree to exist in such a substance.

Phil. But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of heat which exist only in the mind from those which exist without it ?

Hyl. That is no difficult matter. You know the least pain cannot exist unperceived ; whatever, therefore, degree of heat is a pain exists only in the mind. But, as for all other degrees of heat, nothing obliges us to think the same of them.

13. *Phil.* I think you granted before that no unperceiving being was capable of pleasure, any more than of pain.

Hyl. I did.

Phil. And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat than what causes uneasiness, a pleasure ?

Hyl. What then ?

Phil. Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in an unperceiving substance, or body.

Hyl. So it seems.

Phil. Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that are not painful, as those that are, can exist only in a thinking substance ; may we not conclude that external bodies are absolutely incapable of any degree of heat whatsoever ?

Hyl. On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that warmth is a pleasure as that a great degree of heat is a pain.

Phil. I do not pretend that warmth is as great a pleasure as heat is a pain. But, if you grant it to be even a small pleasure, it serves to make good my conclusion.

Hyl. I could rather call it an *indolence* [6] It seems to be nothing more than a privation of both pain and pleasure. And that such a quality or state as this may agree to an unthinking substance, I hope you will not deny.

14. *Phil.* If you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or a gentle degree of heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to convince you otherwise, than by appealing to your own sense. But what think you of cold ?

Hyl. The same I do of heat. An intense degree of cold is a pain ; for to feel a very great cold, is to perceive a great uneasiness : it cannot therefore exist without the mind ; but a lesser degree of cold may, as well as a lesser degree of heat.

Phil. Those bodies, therefore, upon whose application to our own, we perceive a moderate degree of heat, must be concluded to have a moderate degree of heat or warmth in them ; and those, upon whose application we feel a like degree of cold, must be thought to have cold in them.

Hyl. They must.

Phil. Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man into an absurdity ?

Hyl. Without doubt it cannot.

Phil. Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing should be at the same time both cold and warm ?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other cold, and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in an intermediate state ; will not the water seem cold to one hand, and warm to the other[7] ?

Hyl. It will.

Phil. Ought we not therefore, by your principles, to conclude it is really both cold and warm at the same time, that is, according to your own concession, to believe an absurdity ?

Hyl. I confess it seems so.

Phil. Consequently, the principles themselves are false, since you have granted that no true principle leads to an absurdity.

15. *Hyl.* But, after all, can any thing be more absurd than to say, *there is no heat in the fire*?

Phil. To make the point still clearer; tell me whether, in two cases exactly alike, we ought not to make the same judgment?

Hyl. We ought.

Phil. When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend and divide the fibres of your flesh?

Hyl. It doth.

Phil. And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any more?

Hyl. It doth not.

Phil. Since, therefore, you neither judge the sensation itself occasioned by the pin, nor anything like it to be in the pin; you should not conformably to what you have now granted, judge the sensation occasioned by the fire, or anything like it, to be in the fire[8].

Hyl. Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this point, and acknowledge that heat and cold are only sensations existing in our minds. But there still remain qualities enough to secure the reality of external things.

Phil. But what will you say, Hylas, if it shall appear that the case is the same with regard to all other sensible qualities, and that they can no more be supposed to exist without the mind, than heat and cold?

Hyl. Then indeed you will have done something to the purpose; but that is what I despair of seeing proved

16. *Phil.* Let us examine them in order. What think you of *tastes*—do they exist without the mind, or no?

Hyl. Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is sweet, or wormwood bitter?

Phil. Inform me, Hylas, is a sweet taste a particular kind of pleasure or pleasant sensation, or is it not ?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or pain ?

Hyl. I grant it.

Phil. If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking corporeal substances existing without the mind, how can sweetness and bitterness, that is, pleasure and pain, agree to them ?

17. *Hyl.* Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was deluded me all this time. You asked whether heat and cold, sweetness and bitterness, were not particular sorts of pleasure and pain ; to which I answered simply, that they were. Whereas I should have thus distinguished :—those qualities, as perceived by us, are pleasures or pains ; but not as existing in the external objects. We must not therefore conclude absolutely, that there is no heat in the fire, or sweetness in the sugar, but only that heat or sweetness as perceived by us, are not in the fire or sugar.

What say you to this ?

18. *Phil.* I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded altogether concerning sensible things, which you defined to be, *the things we immediately perceive by our senses.* Whatever other qualities, therefore, you speak of, as distinct from these, I know nothing of them, neither do they at all belong to the point in dispute. You may, indeed, pretend to have discovered certain qualities which you do not perceive, and assert those insensible qualities exist in fire and sugar. But what use can be made of this to your present purpose, I am at a loss to conceive. Tell me then once more, do you acknowledge that heat and cold, sweetness and

bitterness (meaning those qualities which are perceived by the senses), do not exist without the mind ?

Hyl. I see it is to no purpose to hold out, so I give up the cause as to those mentioned qualities. Though I profess it sounds oddly, to say that sugar is not sweet.

19. *Phil.* But, for your farther satisfaction, take this along with you : that which at other times seems sweet, shall, to a distempered palate, appear bitter[9]. And, nothing can be plainer than that divers persons perceive different tastes in the same food ; since that which one man delights in, another abhors. And how could this be, if the taste was something really inherent in the food ?

Hyl. I acknowledge I know not how.

20. *Phil.* In the next place, *odours* are to be considered. And, with regard to these, I would fain know whether what hath been said of tastes doth not exactly agree to them ? Are they not so many pleasing or displeasing sensations ?

Hyl. They are.

Phil. Can you then conceive it possible that they should exist in an unperceiving thing ?

Hyl. I cannot.

Phil. Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure affect those brute animals that feed on them out of choice, with the same smells which we perceive in them ?

Hyl. By no means.

Phil. May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the other forementioned qualities, that they cannot exist in any but a pereeiving substance or mind ?

Hyl. I think so.

21. *Phil.* Then as to *sounds*, what must we think of them: are they accidents really inherent in external bodies, or not ?

Hyl. That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain from hence; because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of an air-pump sends forth no sound. The air, therefore, must be thought the subject of sound.

Phil. What reason is there for that, Hylas?

Hyl. Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we perceive a sound greater or lesser, according to the air's motion; but without some motion in the air, we never hear any sound at all.

Phil. And granting that we never hear a sound but when some motion is produced in the air, yet I do not see how you can infer from thence, that the sound itself is in the air.

Hyl. It is this very motion in the external air, that produces in the mind the sensation of *sound*. For, striking on the drum of the ear, it causeth vibration, which by the auditory nerves being communicated to the brain, the soul is thereupon affected with the sensation called *sound*.

Phil. What! is sound then a sensation?

Hyl. I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular sensation in the mind.

Phil. And can any sensation exist without the mind?

Hyl. No, certainly.

Phil. How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in the air, if by the *air* you mean a senseless substance existing without the mind?

Hyl. You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as it is perceived by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is the same thing) between the sound we immediately perceive, and that which exists without us. The former, indeed, is a particular kind of sensation, but the latter is merely a vibrative or undulatory motion in the air.[10]

Phil. I thought I had already obviated that distinction,

by the answer I gave when you were applying it in a like case before. But, to say no more of that, are you sure then that sound is really nothing but motion?

Hyl. I am.

Phil. Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with truth be attributed to motion?

Hyl. It may.

Phil. It is then good sense to speak of *motion* as of a thing that is *loud*, *sweet*, *acute*, or *grave*.

Hyl. I see you are resolved not to understand me. Is it not evident those accidents or modes belong only to sensible sound, or *sound* in the common acceptation of the word, but not to *sound* in the real and philosophic sense; which, as I just now told you, is nothing but a certain motion of the air?

Phil. It seems then there are two sorts of sound—the one vulgar, or that which is heard, the other philosophical and real?

Hyl. Even so.

Phil. And the latter consists in motion?

Hyl. I told you so before.

Phil. Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think you, the idea of motion belongs? to the hearing?

Hyl. No, certainly; but to the sight and touch.

Phil. It should follow then, that, according to you, real sounds may possibly be *seen* or *felt*, but never *heard*.

Hyl. Look you, Philonous, you may, if you please, make a jest of my opinion, but that will not alter the truth of things. I own, indeed, the inferences you draw me into sound something oddly; but common language, you know, is framed by, and for the use of the vulgar: we must not therefore wonder, if expressions adapted to exact philosophic notions seem uncouth and out of the way.

Phil. Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself to have gained no small point, since you make so light of departing from common phrases and opinions; it being a main part of our inquiry, to examine whose notions are widest of the common road, and most repugnant to the general sense of the world. But, can you think it no more than a philosophical paradox, to say that *real sounds are never heard*, and that the idea of them is obtained by some other sense? And is there nothing in this contrary to nature and the truth of things?

Hyl. To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And, after the concessions already made, I had as well grant that sounds too have no real being without the mind.

22. *Phil.* And I hope you will make no difficulty to acknowledge the same of *colours*.

Hyl. Pardon me: the case of colours is very different. Can anything be plainer than that we see them on the objects?

Phil. The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal substances existing without the mind?

Hyl. They are.

Phil. And have true and real colours inhering in them?

Hyl. Each visible object hath that colour which we see in it.

Phil. How! is there anything visible but what we perceive by sight?

Hyl. There is not.

Phil. And, do we perceive anything by sense which we do not perceive immediately?

Hyl. How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing? I tell you, we do not.

Phil. Have patience, good Hylas; and tell me once

more, whether there is anything immediately perceived by the senses, except sensible qualities. I know you asserted there was not; but I would now be informed, whether you still persist in the same opinion.

Hyl. I do.

Phil. Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible quality, or made up of sensible qualities?

Hyl. What a question that is! who ever thought it was?

Phil. My reason for asking was, because in saying, *each visible object hath that colour which we see in it*, you make visible objects to be corporeal substances; which implies either that corporeal substances are sensible qualities, or else that there is something beside sensible qualities perceived by sight: but, as this point was formerly agreed between us, and is still maintained by you, it is a clear consequence, that your corporeal substance is nothing distinct from sensible qualities.

Hyl. You may draw as many absurd consequences as you please, and endeavour to perplex the plainest things; but you shall never persuade me out of my senses. I clearly understand my own meaning.

Phil. I wish you would make me understand it too. But, since you are unwilling to have your notion of corporeal substance examined, I shall urge that point no farther. Only be pleased to let me know, whether the same colours which we see exist in external bodies, or some other.

Hyl. The very same.

Phil. What! are then the beautiful red and purple we see on yonder clouds really in them? Or do you imagine they have in themselves any other form than that of a dark mist or vapour[11]?

23. *Hyl.* I must own, Philonous, those colours are not

really in the clouds as they seem to be at this distance. They are only apparent colours.

Phil. *Apparent* call you them? how shall we distinguish these apparent colours from real?

Hyl. Very easily. Those are to be thought apparent which, appearing only at a distance, vanish upon a nearer approach.

Phil. And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which are discovered by the most near and exact survey.

Hyl. Right.

Phil. Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help of a microscope, or by the naked eye?

Hyl. By a microscope, doubtless.

Phil. But a microscope often discovers colours in an object different from those perceived by the unassisted sight. And, in case we had microscopes magnifying to any assigned degree, it is certain that no object whatsoever, viewed through them, would appear in the same colour which it exhibits to the naked eye.

Hyl. And what will you conclude from all this? You cannot argue that there are really and naturally no colours on objects: because by artificial managements they may be altered, or made to vanish.

Phil. I think it may evidently be concluded from your own concessions, that all the colours we see with our naked eyes are only apparent as those on the clouds, since they vanish upon a more close and accurate inspection which is afforded us by a microscope. Then, as to what you say by way of prevention: I ask you whether the real and natural state of an object is better discovered by a very sharp and piercing sight, or by one which is less sharp?

Hyl. By the former without doubt.

Phil. Is it not plain from *Dioptrics* that microscopes make the sight more penetrating, and represent objects as they would appear to the eye in case it were naturally endowed with a most exquisite sharpness?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Consequently the microscopical representation is to be thought that which best sets forth the real nature of the thing, or what it is in itself. The colours, therefore, by it perceived are more genuine and real than those perceived otherwise.

Hyl. I confess there is something in what you say.

24. *Phil.* Besides, it is not only possible but manifest, that there actually are animals whose eyes are by nature framed to perceive those things which by reason of their minuteness escape our sight. What think you of those inconceivably small animals perceived by glasses? Must we suppose they are all stark blind? Or, in case they see, can it be imagined their sight hath not the same use in preserving their bodies from injuries, which appears in that of all other animals? And if it hath, is it not evident they must see particles less than their own bodies, which will present them with a far different view in each object from that which strikes our senses? Even our own eyes do not always represent objects to us after the same manner. In the *Jaundice* every one knows that all things seem yellow.[12] Is it not therefore highly probable those animals in whose eyes we discern a very different texture from that of ours, and whose bodies abound with different humours, do not see the same colours in every object that we do? From all which, should it not seem to follow that all colours are equally apparent, and that none of those which we perceive are really inherent in any outward object?

Hyl. It should.

Phil. The point will be past all doubt, if you consider that in case colours[18] were real properties or affections inherent in external bodies, they could admit of no alteration without some change wrought in the very bodies themselves: but, is it not evident from what hath been said that, upon the use of microscopes, upon a change happening in the humours of the eye, or a variation of distance, without any manner of real alteration in the thing itself, the colours of any object are either changed, or totally disappear? Nay, all other circumstances remaining the same, change but the situation of some objects, and they shall present different colours to the eye. The same thing happens upon viewing an object in various degrees of light. And what is more known than that the same bodies appear differently coloured by candle-light from what they do in the open day? Add to these the experiment of a prism which, separating the heterogeneous rays of light, alters the colour of any object, and will cause the whitest to appear of a deep blue or red to the naked eye And now tell me whether you are still of opinion that every body hath its true real colour inhering in it; and, if you think it hath, I would fain know farther from you, what certain distance and position of the object, what peculiar texture and formation of the eye, what degree or kind of light is necessary for ascertaining that true colour, and distinguishing it from apparent ones.

23. *Hyl.* I own myself entirely satisfied, that they are all equally apparent, and that there is no such thing as colour really inhering in external bodies, but that it is altogether in the light. And what confirms me in this opinion is that in proportion to the light colours are still more or less vivid; and if there be no light, then are there no colours per-

ceived. Besides, allowing there are colours on external objects, yet, how is it possible for us to perceive them? For no external body affects the mind, unless it acts first on our organs of sense. But the only action of bodies is motion; and motion cannot be communicated otherwise than by impulse. A distant object therefore cannot act on the eye, nor consequently make itself or its properties perceivable to the soul. Whence it plainly follows that it is immediately some contiguous substance, which, operating on the eye, occasions a perception of colours: and such is light.

Phil. How! is light then a substance?

Hyl. I tell you, Philonous, external light[14] is nothing but a thin fluid substance, whose minute particles being agitated with a brisk motion, and in various manners reflected from the different surfaces of outward objects to the eyes communicate different motions to the optic nerves; which being propagated to the brain, cause therein various impressions; and these are attended with the sensations of red, blue, yellow, &c.

Phil. It seems then the light doth no more than shake the optic nerves.

Hyl. Nothing else.

Phil. And, consequent to each particular motion of the nerves, the mind is affected with a sensation, which is some particular colour.

Hyl. Right.

Phil. And these sensations have no existence without the mind.

Hyl. They have not.

Phil. How then do you affirm that colours are in the light; since by *light* you understand a corporeal substance external to the mind?

Hyl. Light and colours, as immediately perceived by us, I grant, cannot exist without the mind. But, in themselves, they are only the motions and configurations of certain insensible particles of matter.

Phil. Colours then, in the vulgar sense, or taken for the immediate objects of sight, cannot agree to any but a perceiving substance.

Hyl. That is what I say.

Phil. Well then, since you give up the point as to those sensible qualities which are alone thought colours by all mankind beside, you may hold what you please with regard to those invisible ones of the philosophers. It is not my business to dispute about them; only I would advise you to bethink yourself, whether, considering the inquiry we are upon, it be prudent for you to affirm—*the red and blue which we see are not real colours, but certain unknown motions and figures, which no man ever did or can see, are truly so.* Are not these shocking notions, and are not they subject to as many ridiculous inferences as those you were obliged to renounce before in the case of sounds?

26. *Hyl.* I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to stand out any longer. Colours, sounds, tastes, in a word all those termed *secondary qualities*, have certainly no existence without the mind. But, by this acknowledgment I must not be supposed to derogate anything from the reality of Matter or external objects; seeing it is no more than several philosophers maintain, who nevertheless are the farthest imaginable from denying Matter. For the clearer understanding of this you must know sensible qualities are by philosophers divided into *primary* and *secondary*.[15] The former are Extension, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest. And these, they hold, exist really in bodies. The latter are those above

enumerated; or, briefly, all sensible qualities beside the Primary, which they assert are only so many sensations or ideas existing nowhere but in the mind. But all this I doubt not, you are apprised of. For my part, I have been a long time sensible there was such an opinion current among philosophers, but was never thoroughly convinced of its truth until now.

Phil. You are still then of opinion that *extension* and *figures* are inherent in external unthinking substances?

Hyl. I am.

Phil. But what if the same arguments which are brought against Secondary Qualities will hold good against these also?

Hyl. Why then I shall be obliged to think, they too exist only in the mind.

27. *Phil.* Is it your opinion the very figure and extension which you perceive by sense exist in the outward object or material substance?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Have all other animals as good grounds to think the same of the figure and extension which they see and feel?

Hyl. Without doubt, if they have any thought at all.

Phil. Answer me, Hylas. Think you the senses were bestowed upon all animals for their preservation and well-being in life? or were they given to men alone for this end?

Hyl. I make no question but they have the same use in all other animals.

Phil. If so, is it not necessary they should be enabled by them to perceive their own limbs, and those bodies which are capable of harming them?

Hyl. Certainly.

Phil. A mite therefore must be supposed to see his own foot, and things equal or even less than it, as bodies of some considerable dimension ; though at the same time they appear to you scarce discernible, or at best as so many visible points?

Hyl. I cannot deny it.

Phil. And to creatures less than the mite they will seem yet larger ?

Hyl. They will.

Phil. Insomuch that what you can hardly discern will to another extremely minute animal appear as some huge mountain ?

Hyl. All this I grant.

Phil. Can one and the same thing be at the same time in itself of different dimensions ?

Hyl. That were absurd to imagine.

Phil. But, from what you have laid down it follows that both the extension by you perceived, and that perceived by the mite itself, as likewise all those perceived by lesser animals, are each of them the true extension of the mite's foot ; that is to say, by your own principles, you are led into an absurdity.

Hyl. There seems to be some difficulty in the point.

28. *Phil.* Again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent property of any object can be changed without some change in the thing itself ?

Hyl. I have.

Phil. But, as we approach to or recede from an object the visible extension varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred times greater than at another. Doth it not therefore follow from hence likewise that it is not really inherent in the object ?

Hyl. I own I am at a loss what to think.

Phil. Your judgment will soon be determined, if you will

venture to think as freely concerning this quality as you have done concerning the rest. Was it not admitted as a good argument, that neither heat nor cold was in the water, because it seemed warm to one hand and cold to the other?

Hyl. It was.

Phil. Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude, there is no extension or figure in an object, because to one eye it shall seem little, smooth, and round, when at the same time it appears to the other, great, uneven, and angular?

Hyl. The very same. But does this latter fact ever happen?

Phil. You may at any time make the experiment, by looking with one eye bare, and with the other through a microscope.

Hyl. I know not how to maintain it, and yet I am loath to give up *extension*; I see so many odd consequences following upon such a concession.

Phil. Odd, say you? After the concessions already made, I hope you will stick at nothing for its oddness. [But, on the other hand, should it not seem very odd, if the general reasoning which includes all other sensible qualities, did not also include extension? If it be allowed that no idea nor anything like an idea can exist in an unperceiving substance, then surely it follows that no figure or mode of extension, which we can either perceive or imagine, or have any idea of, can be really inherent in Matter; not to mention the peculiar difficulty there must be in conceiving a material substance, prior to and distinct from extension, to be the *substratum* of extension. Be the sensible quality what it will—figure, or sound, or colour; it seems alike impossible it should subsist in that which doth not perceive it.[16]]

Hyl. I give up the point for the present, reserving still a

right to retract my opinion, in case I shall hereafter discover any false step in my progress to it.

29. *Phil.* That is a right you cannot be denied. Figures and extension being despatched, we proceed next to *motion*. Can a real motion in any external body be at the same time both very swift and very slow ?

Hyl. It cannot.

Phil. Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal proportion to the time it takes up in describing any given space ? Thus a body that describes a mile in an hour moves three times than it would in case it described only a mile in three hours.

Hyl. I agree with you.

Phil. And is not time measured by the succession of ideas in our minds ?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. And is it not possible ideas should succeed one another twice as fast in your mind as they do in mine, or in that of some spirit of another kind ?

Hyl. I own it.

Phil. Consequently, the same body may to another seem to perform its motion over any space in half the time that it doth to you. And the same reasoning will hold as to any other proportion : that is to say, according to your principles (since the motions perceived are both really in the object) it is possible one and the same body shall be really moved the same way at once both very swift and very slow. How is this consistent either with common sense, or with what you just now granted ?

Hyl. I have nothing to say to it.

30. *Phil.* Then as for *solidity* ; either you do not mean any sensible quality by that word, and so it is beside our

inquiry: or if you do, it must be either hardness or resistance. But both the one and the other are plainly relative to our senses: it being evident that what seems hard to one animal may appear soft to another, who hath greater force and firmness of limbs. Nor is it less plain that the resistance I feel is not in the body.

Hyl. I own the very sensation of resistance, which is all you immediately perceive, is not in the *body*; but the cause of that sensation is.

Phil. But the causes of our sensations are not things immediately perceived, and therefore not sensible. This point, I thought, had been already determined.

Hyl. I own it was; but you will pardon me if I seem a little embarrassed: I know not how to quit my old notions.

Phil. To help you out, do but consider that if *extension* be once acknowledged to have no existence without the mind, the same must necessarily be granted of motion, solidity, and gravity—since they all evidently suppose extension.[17] It is therefore superfluous to inquire particularly concerning each of them. In denying extension, you have denied them all to have any real existence.

31. *Hyl.* I wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true, why those philosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any real existence, should yet attribute it to the Primary. If there is no difference between them, how can this be accounted for?

Phil. It is not my business to account of every opinion of the philosophers. But among other reasons which may be assigned for this, it seems probable that pleasure and pain being rather annexed to the former than the latter may be one. Heat and cold, tastes and smells, have something more vividly pleasing or disagreeable than the ideas of extension,

figure, and motion affect us with. And, it being too visibly absurd to hold that pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving substance, men are more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the Secondary than the Primary Qualities. You will be satisfied there is something in this, if you recollect the difference you made between an intense and more moderate degree of heat; allowing the one a real existence, while you denied it to the other. But after all, there is no rational ground for that distinction; for surely an indifferent sensation is as truly *a sensation* as one more pleasing or painful; and consequently should not any more than they be supposed to exist in an unthinking subject[18].

32. *Hyl.* It is just come into my head, Philonous, that I have somewhere heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible extension[19]. Now though it be acknowledged that *great* and *small*, consisting merely in the relation which other extended beings have to the parts of our own bodies, do not really inhere in the Substances themselves; yet nothing obliges us to hold the same with regard to *absolute extension*, which is something abstracted from *great* and *small*, from this or that particular magnitude or figure. So likewise as to motion; *swift* and *slow* are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our own minds. But, it doth not follow, because those modifications of motion exist not without the mind, that therefore absolute motion abstracted from them doth not.

Phil. Pray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or one part of extension, from another? Is it not something sensible, as some degree of swiftness or slowness, some certain magnitude or figure peculiar to each?

Hyl. I think so.

Phil. These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible

properties, are without all specific and numerical differences, as the schools call them[20].

Hyl. They are.

Phil. That is to say, they are extension in general, and motion in general.

Hyl. Let it be so.

Phil. But it is a universally received maxim that *Every thing which exists is particular*[21]. How then can motion in general, or extension in general, exist in any corporeal Substance[22]?

Hyl. I will take time to solve your difficulty.

Phil. But I think the point may be speedily decided. Without doubt you can tell whether you are able to frame this or that idea. Now I am content to put our dispute on this issue. If you can frame in your thoughts a distinct abstract idea of motion or extension; divested of all those sensible modes, as swift and slow, great and small, round and square, and the like, which are acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point you contend for. But, if you cannot, it will be unreasonable on your side to insist any longer upon what you have no notion of.

Hyl. To confess ingenuously, I cannot.

33. *Phil.* Can you even separate the ideas of extension and motion from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make the distinction term *secondary*?

Hyl. What! is it not an easy matter to consider extension and motion by themselves, abstracted from all other sensible qualities? Pray how do the mathematicians treat of them[23]?

Phil. I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form general propositions and reasonings about those qualities, without mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to consider

or treat of them abstractedly. But, how doth it follow that, because I can pronounce the word *motion* by itself, I can form the idea of it in my mind exclusive of body? Or, because theorems may be made of extension and figures, without any mention of *great* or *small*, or any other sensible mode or quality, that therefore it is possible such an abstract idea of extension, without any particular size or figure, or sensible quality, should be distinctly formed, and apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity, without regarding what other sensible qualities it is attended with, as being altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. But, when laying aside the words, they contemplate the bare ideas, I believe you will find they are not the pure abstracted ideas of extension.

34. *Hyl.* But what say you to *pure intellect*? May not abstracted ideas be framed by that faculty?

Phil. Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is plain I cannot frame them by the help of *pure intellect*; whatsoever faculty you understand by those words. Besides, not to inquire into the nature of pure intellect and its spiritual objects, as *virtue*, *reason*, *God*, or the like, thus much seems manifest—that sensible things are only to be perceived by sense, or represented by the imagination. Figures, therefore, and extension, being originally perceived by sense, do not belong to pure intellect: but, for your farther satisfaction, try if you can frame the idea of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of size, or even from other sensible qualities[24].

Hyl. Let me think a little—I do not find that I can.

35. *Phil.* And can you think it possible that should really exist in nature which implies a repugnancy[25] in its conception?

Hyl. By no means.

Phil. Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind to disunite the ideas of extension and motion from all other sensible qualities, doth it not follow, that where the one exist there necessarily the other exist likewise?

Hyl. It should seem so.

Phil. Consequently, the very same arguments which you admitted as conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are, without any farther application of force, against the Primary too. Besides, if you will trust your senses, is it not plain all sensible qualities coexist, or to them appear as being in the same place? Do they ever represent a motion, or figure, as being divested of all other visible and tangible qualities[26]?

Hyl. You need say no more on this head. I am free to own, if there be no secret error or oversight in our proceedings hitherto, that all sensible qualities are alike to be denied existence without the mind. But, my fear is that I have been too liberal in my former concessions, or overlooked some fallacy or other. In short, I did not take time to think.

Phil. For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time you please in reviewing the progress of our inquiry. You are at liberty to recover any slips you might have made, or offer whatever you have omitted which makes for your first opinion.

36 *Hyl.* One great oversight I take to be this—that I did not sufficiently distinguish the *object* from the *sensation*. Now though this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it will not thence follow that the former cannot.

Phil. What object do you mean? The object of the senses?

Hyl. The same.

Phil. It is then immediately perceived?

Hyl. Right.

Phil. Make me to understand the difference between what is immediately perceived, and a sensation.

Hyl. The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; besides which there is something perceived; and this I called the *object*. For example. there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip[27].

Phil. What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which you see?

Hyl. The same.

Phil. And what do you see beside colour, figure, and extension?

Hyl. Nothing.

Phil. What you would say then is that the red and yellow are coexistent with the extension; is it not?

Hyl. That is not all; I would say they have a real existence without the mind, in some unthinking substance.

Phil. That the colours are really in the tulip which I see is manifest. Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist independent of your mind or mine; but that any immediate object of the senses—that is, any idea[28], or combination of ideas—should exist in an unthinking substance, or exterior to all minds, is in itself an evident contradiction. Nor can I imagine how this follows from what you said just now, to wit, that the red and yellow were on the tulip *you saw*, since you do not pretend to *see* that unthinking substance.

Hyl. You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our inquiry from the subject.

37. *Phil.* I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. To return then to your distinction between *sensation* and *object*; if I take you right, you distinguish in every perception two things, the one an action of the mind, the other not[29].

Hyl. True.

Phil. And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any unthinking thing; but, whatever beside is implied in a perception may?

Hyl. That is my meaning.

Phil. So that if there was a perception without any act of the mind, it were possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking substance?

Hyl. I grant it. But it is impossible there should be such a perception.

Phil. (When is the mind said to be active?)

Hyl. (When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, anything.)

Phil. Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything, but by an act of the will?

Hyl. It cannot.

Phil. The mind therefore is to be accounted *active* in its perceptions so far forth as *volition* is included in them?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. In plucking this flower I am active; because I do it by the motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition; so likewise in applying it to my nose. But is either of these smelling?

Hyl. No.

Phil. I act too in drawing the air through my nose; because my breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of my volition. But neither can this be called *smelling*: for, if it were, I should smell every time I breathed in that manner?

Hyl. True.

Phil. Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. But I do not find my will concerned any farther. Whatever more there is—as that I perceive such a particular

smell, or any smell at all—this is independent of my will, and therein I am altogether passive. Do you find it otherwise with you, Hylas?

Hyl. No, the very same.

38. *Phil.* Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open your eyes, or keep them shut; to turn them this or that way?

Hyl. Without doubt.

Phil. But, doth it in like manner depend on your will that in looking on this flower you perceive *white* rather than any other colour? Or directing your open eyes towards yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid seeing the sun? Or is light or darkness the effect of your volition?

Hyl. No, certainly.

Phil. You are then in these respects altogether passive?

Hyl. I am.

Phil. Tell me now, whether *seeing* consists in perceiving light and colours, or in opening and turning the eyes?

Hyl. Without doubt, in the former.

Phil. Since therefore you are in the very perception of light and colours altogether passive, what is become of that action you were speaking of as an ingredient in every sensation? And, doth it not follow from your own concessions, that the perception of light and colours, including no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance[30]? And is not this a plain contradiction?

Hyl. I know not what to think of it.

39. *Phil.* Besides, since you distinguish the *active* and *passive* in every perception, you must do it in that of pain. But how is it possible that pain, be it as little active as you please, should exist in an unperceiving substance? In short,

do but consider the point, and then confess ingenuously, whether light and colours, tastes, sounds, &c., are not all equally passions or sensations in the soul. You may indeed call them *external objects*, and give them in words what subsistence you please. But, examine your own thoughts, and then tell me whether it be not as I say ?

40. *Hyl.* I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair observation of what passes in my mind, I can discover nothing else but that I am a thinking being, affected with[31] variety of sensations ; neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation should exist in an unperceiving substance.—But then, on the other hand, when I look on sensible things in a different view, considering them as so many modes and qualities, I find it necessary to suppose a *material substratum* without which they cannot be conceived to exist.

Phil. *Material substratum* call you it ? Pray, by which of your senses came you acquainted with that being ?

Hyl. It is not itself sensible ; its modes and qualities only being perceived by the senses.

Phil. I presume then it was by reflection and reason you obtained the idea of it ?

Hyl. I do not pretend to any proper positive idea of it. However, I conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be conceived to exist without a support.

Phil. It seems then you have only a relative notion of it, or that you conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving the relations it bears to sensible qualities ?

Hyl. Right.

Phil. Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that relation consists.

Hyl. Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term *substratum* or *substance* ?

Phil. If so, the word *substratum* should import that it is spread under the sensible qualities or accidents ?

Hyl. True.

Phil. And consequently under extension ?

Hyl. I own it.

Phil. It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely distinct from extension ?

Hyl. I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is something that supports modes. And is it not evident the thing supported is different from the thing supporting ?

Phil. So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, extension is supposed to be the *substratum* of extension ?

Hyl. Just so.

Phil. Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without extension ? or is not the idea of extension necessarily included in *spreading* ?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under anything, must have in itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under which it is spread ?

Hyl. It must.

Phil. Consequently, every corporeal substance being the *substratum* of extension must have in itself another extension, by which it is qualified to be a *substratum*: and so on to infinity ? And I ask whether this be not absurd in itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now, to wit, that the *substratum* was something distinct from and exclusive of extension ?

41. *Hyl.* Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not mean that Matter is *spread* in a gross literal sense under extension. The word *substratum* is used only to express in general the same thing with *substance*[32].

Phil. Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the term *substance*. Is it not that it stands under accidents ?

Hyl. The very same.

Phil. But, that one thing may stand under or support another, must it not be extended ?

Hyl. It must.

Phil. Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity with the former ?

Hyl. You still take things in a strict literal sense ; that is not fair, Philonous.

Phil. I am not for imposing any sense on your words : you are at liberty to explain them as you please. Only, I beseech you, make me understand something by them. You tell me Matter supports or stands under accidents. How ! is it as your legs support your body ?

Hyl. No ; that is the literal sense.

Phil. Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you understand it in. . . How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas ?

Hyl. I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I understood well enough what was meant by Matter's supporting accidents. But now, the more I think on it the less can I comprehend it ; in short I find that I know nothing of it.

Phil. It seems then you have no idea at all, neither relative nor positive of Matter ; you know neither what it is in itself, nor what relation it bears to accidents ?

Hyl. I acknowledge it.

Phil. And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how qualities or accidents should really exist, without conceiving at the same time a material support of them ?

Hyl. I did.

Phil. That is to say, when you conceive the real existence of qualities, you do withal conceive something which you cannot conceive ?

42. *Hyl.* It was wrong I own. But still I fear there is some fallacy or other. Pray what think you of this ? It is just come into my head that the ground of all our mistake lies in your treating of each quality by itself. Now, I grant that each quality cannot singly subsist without the mind. Colour cannot without extension, neither can figure without some other sensible quality. But, as the several qualities united or blended together form entire sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may not be supposed to exist without the mind.

Phil. Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad memory. Though indeed we went through all the qualities by name one after another ; yet my arguments, or rather your concessions, nowhere tended to prove that the Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by itself; but, that they were not *at all* without the mind. Indeed, in treating of figure and motion we concluded they could not exist without the mind, because it was impossible even in thought to separate them from all secondary qualities, so as to conceive them existing by themselves. But then this was not the only argument made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass by all that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will have it so) I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it actually to be so[38].

43. *Hyl.* If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What more easy than to conceive a tree or house

existing by itself, independent of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive them existing after that manner.

Phil. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time unseen?

Hyl. No, that were a contradiction.

Phil. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of *conceiving* a thing which is *unconceived*?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. The tree or house therefore which you think of, is conceived by you?

Hyl. How should it be otherwise?

Phil. And what is conceived is surely in the mind?

Hyl. Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.

Phil. How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever?

Hyl. That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me into it.—It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in a solitary place where no one was present to see it, methought that was to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of—not considering that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly see that all I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may, indeed, conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house or a mountain, but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can conceive them *existing out of the minds of all Spirits*[64].

Phil. You acknowledge, then, that you cannot possibly conceive how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in a mind?

Hyl. I do.

Phil. And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which you cannot so much as conceive?

44. *Hyl.* I profess I know not what to think; but still there are some scruples[35] remain with me. Is it not certain I *see* things at a distance? Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for example, to be a great way off? Is not this, I say, manifest to the senses?

Phil. Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects?

Hyl. I do.

Phil. And have they not then the same appearance of being distant?

Hyl. They have.

Phil. But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be without the mind?

Hyl. By no means.

Phil. You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are without the mind, from their appearance or manner wherein they are perceived.

Hyl. I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in those cases?

Phil. By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately perceive, neither sense nor reason informs you that it actually exists without the mind. By sense you only know that you are affected with such certain sensations of light and colours, &c. And these you will not say are without the mind.

Hyl. True: but, beside all that, do you not think the sight suggests something of *outness* or *distance*?

Phil. Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible size and figure change perpetually, or do they appear the same at all distances?

Hyl. They are in a continual change.

Phil. Sight therefore doth not suggest[36] or any way inform you that the visible object you immediately perceive exists at a distance, or will be perceived when you advance farther onward; there being a continued series of visible objects succeeding each other during the whole time of your approach.

Hyl. It doth not; but still I know, upon seeing an object, what object I shall perceive after having passed over a certain distance: no matter whether it be exactly the same or no: there is still something of distance suggested in the case.

45. *Phil.* Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point, and then tell me whether there be any more in it than this:—From the ideas you actually perceive by sight, you have by experience learned to collect what other ideas you will (according to the standing order of nature) be affected with, after such a certain succession of time and motion[37].

Hyl. Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else.

Phil. Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born blind was on a sudden made to see, he could at first have no experience of what may be suggested by sight[38]?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. He would not then, according to you, have any notion of distance annexed to the things he saw; but would take them for a new set of sensations existing only in his mind?

Hyl. It is undeniable.

46. *Phil.* But, to make it still more plain: is not *distance* a line turned endwise to the eye?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. And can a line so situated be perceived by sight ?

Hyl. It cannot.

Phil. Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not properly and immediately perceived by sight [59] ?

Hyl. It should seem so.

47. *Phil.* Again, is it your opinion that colours are at a distance ?

Hyl. It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind.

Phil. But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting in the same place with extension and figures ?

Hyl. They do.

Phil. How can you then conclude from sight that figures exist without, when you acknowledge colours do not; the sensible appearance being the very same with regard to both ?

Hyl. I know not what to answer.

48. *Phil.* But, allowing that distance was truely and immediately perceived by the mind, yet it would not thence follow it existed out of the mind. For, whatever is immediately perceived is an idea : and can any *idea* exist out of the mind ?

Hyl. To suppose that were absurd : but inform me, Philonous, can we perceive or know nothing besides our ideas ?

Phil. As for the rational deducing of causes from effects, that is beside our inquiry. And, by the senses you can best tell whether you perceive anything which is not immediately perceived. And I ask you, whether the things immediately perceived are other than your own sensations or ideas ? You have indeed more than once, in the course of this conversation, declared yourself on those points; but you seem, by this last question to have departed from what you then thought.

49. *Hyl.* To speak the truth, Philonous, I think there are two kinds of objects :—the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called *ideas*; the other are real things or external objects, perceived by the mediation of ideas, which are their images and representations[40]. Now, I own ideas do not exist without the mind; but the latter sort of objects do. I am sorry I did not think of this distinction sooner; it would probably have cut short your discourse.

Phil. Are those external objects perceived by sense, or by some other faculty?

Hyl. They are perceived by sense.

Phil. How! is there anything perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived?

Hyl. Yes, Philonous, in some sort there is. For example, when I look on a picture or statue of Julius Cæsar, I may be said after a manner to perceive him (though not immediately) by my senses.

Phil. It seems then you will have our ideas, which alone are immediately perceived, to be pictures of external things: and that these also are perceived by sense, inasmuch as they have a conformity or resemblance to our ideas[41]?

Hyl. That is my meaning.

Phil. And, in the same way that Julius Cæsar, in himself invisible, is nevertheless perceived by sight; real things, in themselves imperceptible, are perceived by sense.

Hyl. In the very same.

Phil. Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of Julius Cæsar, do you see with your eyes any more than some colours and figures, with a certain symmetry and composition of the whole?

Hyl. Nothing else.

Phil. And would not a man who had never known anything of Julius Cæsar see as much?

Hyl. He would.

Phil. Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, in as perfect a degree as you?

Hyl. I agree with you.

Phil. Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to the Roman emperor, and his are not? This cannot proceed from the sensations or ideas of sense by you then perceived; since you acknowledge you have no advantage over him in that respect. It should seem therefore to proceed from reason and memory: should it not?

Hyl. It should.

50. *Phil.* Consequently, it will not follow from that instance that anything is perceived by sense which is not immediately perceived. Though I grant we may, in one acceptation, be said to perceive sensible things mediately by sense—that is, when, from a frequently perceived connexion, the immediate perception of ideas by one sense suggests to the mind others, perhaps belonging to another sense, which are wont to be connected with them. For instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately I perceive only the sound; but, from the experience I have had that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the coach. It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strictness, nothing can be *heard* but *sound*; and the coach is not then properly perceived by sense, but suggested from experience. So likewise when we are said to see a red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not the object of sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour and figure which are properly perceived by that sense. In short, those things alone are actually and strictly perceived by any

sense, which would have been perceived in case that same sense had then been first conferred on us. As for other things, it is plain they are only suggested to the mind by experience, grounded on former perceptions. But, to return to your comparison of Cæsar's picture, it is plain, if you keep to that, you must hold the real things or archetypes of our ideas are not perceived by sense, but by some internal faculty of the soul, as reason or memory. I would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from reason for the existence of what you call *real things* or *material objects*. Or, whether you remember to have seen them formerly as they are in themselves; or, if you have heard or read of any one that did.

Hyl. I see, Philonous, you are disposed to raillery; but that will never convince me.

Phil. My aim is only to learn from you the way to come at the knowledge of *material beings*. Whatever we perceive is perceived immediately or mediately: by sense; or by reason and reflection. But, as you have excluded sense, pray shew me what reason you have to believe their existence; or what *medium* you can possibly make use of to prove it, either to mine or your own understanding.

51. *Hyl.* To deal ingenuously, Philonous, now I consider the point, I do not find I can give you any good reason for it. But, thus much seems pretty plain, that it is at least possible such things may really exist. And, as long as there is no absurdity in supposing them, I am resolved to believe as I did, till you bring good reasons to the contrary.

Phil. What! is it come to this, that you only believe the existence of material objects, and that your belief is founded barely on the possibility of its being true? Then you will have me bring reasons against it: though another would

think it reasonable the proof should lie on him who holds the affirmative. And, after all, this very point which you are now resolved to maintain, without any reason, is in effect what you have more than once during this discourse seen good reason to give up. But, to pass over all this; if I understand you rightly, you say our ideas do not exist without the mind; but that they are copies, images, or representations, of certain originals that do?

Hyl. You take me right.

Phil. They are then like external things?

Hyl. They are.

Phil. Have those things a stable and permanent nature, independent of our senses; or are they in a perpetual change, upon our producing any motions in our bodies—suspending, exerting, or altering, our faculties or organs of sense?

52. *Hyl.* Real things, it is plain, have a fixed and real nature, which remains the same notwithstanding any change in our senses, or in the posture and motion of our bodies; which indeed may affect the ideas in our minds, but it were absurd to think they had the same effect on things existing without the mind.

Phil. How then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting and variable as our ideas should be copies or images of anything fixed and constant? Or, in other words, since all sensible qualities, as size, figure, colour, &c., that is, our ideas, are continually changing upon every alteration in the distance, medium, or instruments of sensation; how can any determinate material objects be properly represented or painted forth by several distinct things, each of which is so different from and unlike the rest? Or, if you say it resembles some one only of our ideas, how shall we be able to distinguish the true copy from all the false ones[42]?

Hyl. I profess, Philonous, I am at a loss. I know not what to say to this.

53. *Phil.* But neither is this all. Which are material objects in themselves—perceptible or imperceptible?

Hyl. Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but ideas. All material things, therefore, are in themselves insensible, and to be perceived only by our ideas.

Phil. Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes or originals insensible?

Hyl. Right.

Phil. But how can that which is sensible be like that which is insensible? Can a real thing, in itself *invisible*, be like a *colour*; or a real thing, which is not *audible*, be like a *sound*? In a word, can anything be like a sensation or idea, but another sensation or idea[48]?

Hyl. I must own, I think not.

Phil. Is it possible there should be any doubt on the point? Do you not perfectly know your own ideas?

Hyl. I know them perfectly; since what I do not perceive or know can be no part of my idea.

Phil. Consider, therefore, and examine them, and then tell me if there be anything in them which can exist without the mind? or if you can conceive anything like them existing without the mind?

54. *Hyl.* Upon inquiry, I find it is impossible for me to conceive or understand how anything but an idea can be like an idea. And it is most evident that *no idea can exist without the mind.*

Phil. You are therefore, by your principles, forced to deny the reality of sensible things; since you made it to consist in an absolute existence exterior to the mind. That is to

say, you are a downright sceptic. So I have gained my point, which was to shew your principles led to Scepticism.

55. *Hyl.* For the present I am, if not entirely convinced, at least silenced.

Phil. I would fain know what more you would require in order to a perfect conviction. Have you not had the liberty of explaining yourself all manner of ways? Were any little slips in discourse laid hold and insisted on? Or were you not allowed to retract or reinforce anything you had offered, as best served your purpose? Hath not everything you could say been heard and examined with all the fairness imaginable? In a word, have you not in every point been convinced out of your own mouth? and, if you can at present discover any flaw in any of your former concessions, or think of any remaining subterfuge, any new distinction, colour, or comment whatsoever, why do you not produce it?

Hyl. A little patience, Philonous. I am at present so amazed to see myself ensnared, and as it were imprisoned in the labyrinths you have drawn me into, that on the sudden it cannot be expected I should find my way out. You must give me time to look about me and recollect myself.

56. *Phil.* Hark; is not this the college bell?

Hyl. It rings for prayers.

Phil. We will go in then, if you please, and meet here again to-morrow morning. In the meantime, you may employ your thoughts on this morning's discourse, and try if you can find any fallacy in it, or invent any new means to extricate yourself.

Hyl Agreed.

THE SECOND DIALOGUE.

1. *Hylas.* I beg your pardon, Philonous. for not meeting you sooner. All this morning my head was so filled with our late conversation that I had not leisure to think of the time of the day. or indeed of anything else.

Philonous. I am glad you were so intent upon it. in hopes if there were any mistakes in your conc essions, or fallacies in my reasonings from them, you will now discover them to me.

Hyl. I assure you I have done nothing ever since I saw you but search after mistakes and fallacies, and, with that view, have minutely examined the whole series of yesterday's discourse: but all in vain, for the notions it led me into, upon review, appear still more clear and evident; and, the more I consider them, the more irresistibly do they force my assent.

Phil. And is not this. think you, a sign that they are genuine, that they proceed from nature, and are conformable to right reason? Truth and beauty are in this alike, that the strictest survey sets them both off to advantage; while the false lustre of error and disguise cannot endure being reviewed, or too nearly inspected.

2. *Hyl.* I own there is a great deal in what you say. Nor can any one be more entirely satisfied of the truth of those odd consequences, so long as I have in view the reasonings that lead to them. But, when these are out of my thoughts, there seems, on the other hand, something so satisfactory, so natural and intelligible, in the modern way of explaining things that, I profess, I know not how to reject it.

Phil. I know not what way you mean.

Hyl. I mean the way of accounting for our sensations or ideas.

Phil. How is that?

Hyl. It is supposed the soul makes her residence in some part of the brain, from which the nerves take their rise, and are thence extended to all parts of the body; and that outward objects, by the different impressions they make on the organs of sense, communicate certain vibrative motions to the nerves; and these being filled with spirits propagate them to the brain or seat of the soul, which, according to the various impressions or traces thereby made in the brain, is variously affected with ideas[1].

Phil. And call you this an explication of the manner whereby we are affected with ideas?

Hyl. Why not, Philonous; have you anything to object against it?

Phil. I would first know whether I rightly understand your hypothesis. You make certain traces in the brain to be the causes or occasions of our ideas. Pray tell me whether by the *brain* you mean any sensible thing.

Hyl. What else think you I could mean?

Phil. Sensible things are all immediately perceivable; and those things which are immediately perceivable are ideas; and these exist only in the mind. Thus much you have, if I mistake not, long since agreed to.

Hyl. I do not deny it.

Phil. The brain therefore you speak of, being a sensible thing, exists only in the mind. Now, I would fain know whether you think it reasonable to suppose that one idea or thing existing in the mind occasions all other ideas. And, if you think so, pray how do you account for the origin of that primary idea or brain itself?

Hyl. I do not explain the origin of our ideas by that brain which is perceivable to sense—this being itself only a combination of sensible ideas—but by another which I imagine.

Phil. But are not things imagined as truly *in the mind* as things perceived ?

Hyl. I must confess they are.

Phil. It comes, therefore, to the same thing; and you have been all this while accounting for ideas by certain motions or impressions of the brain, that is, by some alterations in an idea, whether sensible or imaginable, it matters not.

Hyl. I begin to suspect my hypothesis.

Phil. Besides spirits, all that we know or conceive are our own ideas. When, therefore, you say all ideas are occasioned by impressions in the brain, do you conceive this brain, or no ? If you do, then you talk of ideas imprinted in an idea causing that same idea, which is absurd. If you do not conceive it, you talk unintelligibly, instead of forming a reasonable hypothesis[2].

Hyl. I now clearly see it was a mere dream. There is nothing in it.

3. *Phil.* You need not be much concerned at it; for after all, this way of explaining things, as you called it, could never have satisfied any reasonable man. What connexion is there between a motion in the nerves, and the sensations of sound or colour in the mind ? Or how is it possible these should be the effect of that[3]?

Hyl. But I could never think it had so little in it as now it seems to have.

Phil. Well then, are you at length satisfied that no sensible things have a real existence[4]; and that you are in truth an arrant *sceptic* ?

Hyl. It is too plain to be denied.

4. *Phil.* Look! are not the fields covered with a delightful verdure? Is there not something in the woods and groves, in the rivers and clear springs, that soothes, that delights, that transports the soul? At the prospect of the wide and deep ocean, or some huge mountain whose top is lost in the clouds, or of an old gloomy forest, are not our minds filled with a pleasing horror? Even in rocks and deserts is there not an agreeable wildness? How sincere a pleasure is it to behold the natural beauties of the earth! To preserve and renew our relish for them, is not the veil of night alternately drawn over her face and doth she not change her dress with the season? How aptly are the elements disposed! What variety and use [in the meanest productions of nature!] What delicacy, what beauty, what contrivance, in animal and vegetable bodies! How exquisitely are all things suited, as well to their particular ends, as to constitute opposite parts of the whole! And, while they mutually aid and support, do they not also set off and illustrate each other? Raise now your thoughts from this ball of earth to all those glorious luminaries that adorn the high arch of heaven. The motion and situation of the planets, are they not admirable for use and order? Were those (miscalled *erratic*[6]) globes ever known to stray, in their repeated journeys through the pathless void? Do they not measure areas round the sun ever proportioned to the times? So fixed, so immutable are the laws by which the unseen Author of nature actuates the universe. How vivid and radiant is the lustre of the fixed stars! How magnificient and rich that negligent profusion with which they appear to be scattered throughout the whole azure vault! Yet, if you take the telescope, it brings into your sight a new host of stars that escape the naked eye. Here they seem contiguous

and minute, but to a nearer view immense orbs of light at various distances, far sunk in the abyss of space. Now you must call imagination to your aid. The feeble narrow sense cannot descry innumerable worlds revolving round the central fires; and in those worlds the energy of an all-perfect Mind displayed in endless forms. But, neither sense nor imagination are big enough to comprehend the boundless extent, with all its glittering furniture. Though the labouring mind exert and strain each power to its utmost reach, there still stands out ungrasped a surplusage immeasurable. Yet all the vast bodies that compose this mighty frame, how distant and remote soever, are by some secret mechanism, some Divine art and force, linked in a mutual dependence and intercourse with each other, even with this earth, which was almost slipt' from my thoughts and lost in the crowd of worlds. Is not the whole system immense, beautiful, glorious beyond expression and beyond thought! What treatment, then, do those philosophers deserve, who would deprive these noble and delightful scenes of all reality? How should those Principles be entertained that lead us to think all the visible beauty of the creation a false imaginary glare? To be plain, can you expect this Scepticism of yours will not be thought extravagantly absurd by all men of sense[8]?

Hyl Other men may think as they please; but for your part you have nothing to reproach me with. My comfort is, you are as much a sceptic as I am.

Phil. There, Hylas, I must beg leave to differ from you.

Hyl. What! have you all along agreed to the premises, and do you now deny the conclusion, and leave me to maintain those paradoxes by myself which you led me into? This surely is not fair.

5. *Phil.* I deny that I agreed with you in those notions that led to Scepticism. You indeed said the *reality* of sensible things consisted in an *absolute existence* out of the minds of spirits, or distinct from their being perceived. And, pursuant to this notion of reality, you are obliged to deny sensible things any real existence: that is, according to your own definition, you profess yourself a sceptic. But I neither said nor thought the reality of sensible things was to be defined after that manner. To me it is evident, for the reasons you allow of, that sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I conclude, not that they have no real existence, but that, seeing they depend not on my thought, and have an existence distinct from being perceived by me, *there must be some other mind wherein they exist.* As sure, therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an infinite omnipresent Spirit, who contains and supports it[9].

Hyl. What! this is no more than I and all Christians hold; nay, and all others too who believe there is a God, and that He knows and comprehends all things.

6. *Phil.* Aye, but here lies the difference. Men commonly believe that all things are known or perceived by God, because they believe the being of a God; whereas I, on the other side, immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by Him.

Hyl. But, so long as we all believe the same thing, what matter is it how we come by that belief?

7. *Phil.* But neither do we agree in the same opinion. For philosophers, though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be perceived by God, yet they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatever, which I do not. Besides, is there no

difference between saying, *There is a God, therefore He perceives all things*; and saying, *Sensible things do really exist; and, if they really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite mind: therefore there is an infinite mind, or God?* This furnishes you with a direct and immediate demonstration, from a most evident principle[10], of the *being of a God*. Divines and philosophers had proved beyond all controversy, from the beauty and usefulness of the several parts of the creation, that it was the workmanship of God. But that—setting aside all help of astronomy and natural philosophy, all contemplation of the contrivance, order, and adjustment of things—an infinite mind should be necessarily inferred from the bare *existence* of the sensible world, is an advantage to them only who have made this easy reflection: that the sensible world is that which we perceive by our several senses; and that nothing is perceived by the senses beside ideas; and that no idea or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than in a mind. You may now, without any laborious search into the sciences, without any subtlety of reason, or tedious length of discourse, oppose and baffle the most strenuous advocate for Atheism: those miserable refuges, whether in an eternal succession of unthinking causes and effects, or in a fortuitous concourse of atoms[11]; those wild imaginations of Vanini[12], Hobbes[13], and Spinoza[14]: in a word, the whole system of Atheism, is it not entirely overthrown, by this single reflection on the repugnancy included in supposing the whole, or any part, even the most rude and shapeless of the visible world, to exist without a mind? Let any one of those abettors of impiety but look into his own thoughts, and there try if he can conceive how so much as a rock, a desert, a chaos, or confused jumble of atoms; how anything at all, either sensible or imaginable, can exist independent of a mind, and he

need go no farther to be convinced of his folly. Can anything be fairer than to put a dispute on such an issue, and leave it to a man himself to see if he can conceive, even in thought, what he holds to be true in fact, and from a notional to allow it a real existence[15] ?

8. *Hyl.* It cannot be denied there is something highly serviceable to religion in what you advance. But do you not think it looks very like a notion entertained by some eminent moderns, of *seeing all things in God*[16] ?

Phil. I would gladly know that opinion : pray explain it to me.

Hyl. They conceive that the soul, being immaterial, is incapable of being united with material things, so as to perceive them in themselves ; but that she perceives them by her union with the substance of God, which, being spiritual, is therefore purely intelligible. or capable of being the immediate object of a spirit's thought. Besides, the Divine essence contains in it perfections correspondent to each created being ; and which are for that reason, proper to exhibit or represent them to the mind.

Phil. I do not understand how our ideas, which are things altogether passive and inert, can be the essence or any part (or like any part, of the essence or substance of God, who is an impassive, indivisible, pure, active being. Many more difficulties and objections there are which occur at first view against this hypothesis ; but I shall only add that it is liable to all the absurdities of the common hypothesis. in making a created world exist otherwise than in the mind of a Spirit. Beside all which it hath this peculiar to itself—that it makes that material world serve to no purpose. And, if it pass for a good argument against other hypotheses in the sciences that they suppose nature or the Divine wisdom

to make something in vain, or do that by tedious round-about methods which might have been performed in a much more easy and compendious way, what shall we think of that hypothesis which supposes the whole world made in vain?

Hyl. But what say you, are not you too of opinion that we see all things in God? If I mistake not, what you advance comes near it.

Phil. [[17]Few men think, yet all have opinions. Hence men's opinions are superficial and confused. It is nothing strange that tenets, which in themselves are ever so different, should nevertheless be confounded with each other by those who do not consider them attentively. I shall not therefore be surprised if some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche; though in truth I am very remote from it. He builds on the most abstract general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an absolute external world, which I deny. He maintains that we are deceived by our senses, and know not the real natures or the true forms and figures of extended beings; of all which I hold the direct contrary. So that upon the whole there are no principles more fundamentally opposite than his and mine. It must be owned that] I entirely agree with what the holy Scripture saith, 'That in God we live and move and have our being[18].' But that we see things in His essence, after the manner above set forth, I am far from believing. Take here in brief my meaning.—It is evident that the things I perceive are my own ideas, and that no idea can exist unless it be in a mind. Nor is it less plain that these ideas or things by me perceived, either themselves or their archetypes[19], exist independently of my mind; since I know myself not to be their author, it being out of my power to determine at pleasure what particular ideas I

shall be affected with upon opening my eyes or ears. They must therefore exist in some other mind, whose will it is they should be exhibited to me. The things, I say, immediately perceived are ideas or sensations, call them which you will. But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or be produced by, anything but a mind or spirit ? This indeed is inconceivable; and to assert that which is inconceivable is to talk nonsense : is it not ?

Hyl. Without doubt.

Phil. But, on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they should exist in and be produced by a Spirit[20]; since this is no more than I daily experience in myself, inasmuch as I perceive numberless ideas; and, by an act of my will, can form a great variety of them, and raise them up in my imagination: though, it must be confessed, these creatures of the fancy are not altogether so distinct, so strong, vivid, and permanent, as those perceived by my senses—which latter are called *real things*[21]. From all which I conclude, *there is a Mind which affects me every moment with all the sensible impressions I perceive.* And, from the variety, order, and manner of these, I conclude the Author of them to be *wise, powerful, and good, beyond comprehension.* Mark it well; I do not say, I see things by perceiving that which represents them in the intelligible Substance of God. This I do not understand; but I say, the things by me perceived are known by the understanding, and produced by the will of an infinite Spirit. And is not all this most plain and evident ? Is there any more in it than what a little observation in our own minds, and that which passeth in them, not only enableth us to conceive, but also obligeth us to acknowledge ?

9. *Hyl.* I think I understand you very clearly; and own the proof you give of a Deity seems no less evident than

surprising. But, allowing that God is the supreme and universal Cause of all things, yet, may there not be still a third nature besides Spirits and Ideas? May we not admit a subordinate and limited cause of our ideas? In a word, may there not for all that be *Matter*[22]?

Phil. How often must I inculcate the same thing? You allow the things immediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere without the mind; but there is nothing perceived by sense which is not perceived immediately: therefore there is nothing sensible that exists without the mind. The Matter, therefore, which you still insist on is something intelligible, I suppose; something that may be discovered by reason[23], and not by sense.

Hyl. You are in the right.

Phil. Pray let me know what reasoning your belief of Matter is grounded on; and what this Matter is in your present sense of it.

Hyl. I find myself affected with various ideas, whereof I know I am not the cause; neither are they the cause of themselves, or of one another, or capable of subsisting by themselves, as being altogether inactive, fleeting, dependent beings. They have therefore some cause distinct from me and them: of which I pretend to know no more than that it is *the cause of my ideas*. And this thing, whatever it be, I call Matter.

Phil. Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a liberty to change the current proper signification attached to a common name in any language? For example, suppose a traveller should tell you that in a certain country men pass unhurt through the fire; and upon explaining himself, you found he meant by the word *fire* that which others call *water*: or, if he should assert that there are trees that walk upon two legs, meaning

men by the term *trees*. Would you think this reasonable?

Hyl. No, I should think it very absurd. Common custom is the standard of propriety in language. And for any man to affect speaking improperly is to pervert the use of speech, and can never serve to a better purpose than to protract and multiply disputes where there is no difference in opinion.

Phil And doth not *Matter*, in the common current acceptation of the word, signify an extended, solid, moveable, unthinking, inactive Substance?

Hyl. It doth.

Phil. And hath it not been made evident that no such substance can possibly exist? And, though it should be allowed to exist, yet how can that which is *inactive* be a *cause*; or that which is *unthinking* be a *cause of thought*? You may, indeed, if you please, annex to the word *Matter* a contrary meaning to what is vulgarly received; and tell me you understand by it—an unextended, thinking, active being, which is the cause of our ideas. But what else is this than to play with words, and run into that very fault you just now condemned with so much reason? I do by no means find fault with your reasoning, in that you collect a cause from the *phenomena*: but I deny that the cause deducible by reason can properly be termed Matter[24].

10. *Hyl.* There is indeed something in what you say. But I am afraid you do not throughly comprehend my meaning. I would by no means be thought to deny that God, or an infinite Spirit, is the Superme Cause of all things. All I contend for is, that, subordinate to the Supreme Agent, there is a cause of a limited and inferior nature, which concurs in the production of our ideas, not by any act of will or spiritual efficiency, but by that kind of action which belongs to Matter, viz. *motion*.

Phil. I find you are at every turn relapsing into your old exploded conceit, of a moveable, and consequently an extended, substance existing without the mind. What! have you already forgotten you were convinced, or are you willing I should repeat what has been said on that head? In truth this is not fair dealing in you, still to suppose the being of that which you have so often acknowledged to have no being. But, not to insist farther on what has been so largely handled, I ask whether all your ideas are not perfectly passive and inert, including nothing of action in them.

Hyl. They are.

Phil. And are sensible qualities anything else but ideas?

Hyl. How often have I acknowledged that they are not.

Phil. But is not motion a sensible quality?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Consequently it is no action?

Hyl. I agree with you. And indeed it is very plain that when I stir my finger it remains passive; but my will which produced the motion is active.

Phil. Now, I desire to know, in the first place, whether, motion being allowed to be no action, you can conceive any action besides volition: and, in the second place, whether to say something and conceive nothing[25] be not to talk nonsence: and, lastly, whether, having considered the premises, you do not perceive that to suppose any efficient or active cause of our ideas, other than *Spirit*, is highly absurd and unreasonable?

11. *Hyl.* I give up the point entirely. But, though Matter may not be a cause, yet what hinders its being an *instrument* subservient to the supreme Agent in the production of our ideas?

Phil. An instrument say you; pray what may be the figure, springs, wheels, and motions, of that instrument?

Hyl. Those I pretend to determine nothing of, both the substance and its qualities being entirely unknown to me.

Phil. What! You are then of opinion it is made up of unknown parts, that it hath unknown motions, and an unknown shape?

Hyl. I do not believe that it hath any figure or motion at all, being already convinced, that no sensible qualities can exist in an unperceiving substance.

Phil. But what notion is it possible to frame of an instrument void of all sensible qualities, even extension itself?

Hyl. I do not pretend to have any notion of it.

Phil. And what reason have you to think this unknown, this inconceivable Somewhat doth exist? Is it that you imagine God cannot act as well without it; or that you find by experience the use of some such thing, when you form ideas in your own mind?

Hyl. You are always teasing me for reasons of my belief. Pray what reasons have you not to believe it?

Phil. It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of anything, if I see no reason for believing it. But, not to insist on reasons for believing, you will not so much as let me know what it is you would have me believe; since you say you have no manner of notion of it. After all, let me entreat you to consider whether it be like a philosopher, or even like a man of common sense, to pretend to believe you know not what, and you know not why.

12. *Hyl.* Hold, Philonous. When I tell you matter is an *instrument*, I do not mean altogether nothing. It is true I know not the particular kind of instrument; but, however, I have some notion of *instrument in general*, which I apply to it.

Phil. But what if it should prove that there is something, even in the most general notion of *instrument*, as taken in a

distinct sense from *cause*, which makes the use of it inconsistent with the Divine attributes ?

Hyl. Make that appear and I shall give up the point.

Phil. What mean you by the general nature or notion of *instrument* ?

Hyl. That which is common to all particular instruments composeth the general notion.

Phil. Is it not common to all instruments, that they are applied to the doing those things only which cannot be performed by the mere act of our wills ? Thus, for instance, I never use an instrument to move my finger, because it is done by a volition. But I should use one if I were to remove part of a rock, or tear up a tree by the roots. Are you of the same mind ? Or, can you shew any example where an instrument is made use of in producing an effect immediately depending on the will of the agent ?

Hyl. I own I cannot.

Phil. How therefore can you suppose that an all-perfect Spirit, on whose will all things have an absolute and immediate dependence, should need an instrument in his operations, or, not needing it, make use of it ? Thus, it seems to me that you are obliged to own the use of a lifeless inactive instrument to be incompatible with the infinite perfection of God; that is, by your own confession, to give up the point.

Hyl. It doth not readily occur what I can answer you.

Phil. But, methinks you should be ready to own the truth, when it hath been fairly proved to you. We indeed, who are beings of finite powers are forced to make use of instruments. And the use of an instrument sheweth the agent to be limited by rules of another's prescription, and that he cannot obtain his end but in such a way, and by such conditions. Whence it seems a clear consequence, that the

supreme unlimited Agent useth no tool or instrument at all. The will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no sooner exerted, than executed, without the application of means—which, if they are employed by inferior agents, it is not upon account of any real efficacy that is in them, or necessary aptitude to produce any effect, but merely in compliance with the laws of nature, or those conditions prescribed to them by the First Cause, who is Himself above all limitation or prescription whatsoever.

13. *Hyl.* I will no longer maintain that Matter is an instrument. However, I would not be understood to give up its existence neither; since, notwithstanding what hath been said, it may still be an *occasion*.

Phil. How many shapes is your Matter to take? Or, how often must it be proved not to exist, before you are content to part with it? But, to say no more of this (though by all the laws of disputation I may justly blame you for so frequently changing the signification of the principal term,)—I would fain know what you mean by affirming that matter is an occasion, having already denied it to be a cause. And when you have shewn in what sense you understand *occasion*, pray, in the next place, be pleased to shew me what reason induceth you to believe there is such an occasion of our ideas?

Hyl. As to the first point: by *occasion* I mean an inactive unthinking being, at the presence whereof God excites ideas in our minds.

Phil. And what may be the nature of that inactive unthinking being?

Hyl. I know nothing of its nature.

Phil. Proceed then to the second point, and assign some reason why we should allow an existence to this inactive, unthinking, unknown thing.

Hyl. When we see ideas produced in our minds after an

orderly and constant manner, it is natural to think they have some fixed and regular occasions, at the presence of which they are excited.

Phil. You acknowledge then God alone to be the cause of our ideas, and that He causes them at the presence of those occasions.

Hyl. That is my opinion.

Phil. Those things which you say are present to God, without doubt He perceives.

Hyl. Certainly; otherwise they could not be to Him an occasion of acting.

Phil. Not to insist now on your making sense of this hypothesis, or answering all the puzzling questions and difficulties it is liable to: I only ask whether the order and regularity observable in the series of our ideas, or the course of nature be not sufficiently accounted for by the wisdom and power of God; and whether it doth not derogate from those attributes, to suppose He is influenced, directed, or put in mind, when and what He is to act, by an unthinking substance? And, lastly, whether, in case I granted all you contend for, it would make anything to your purpose—it not being easy to conceive how the external or absolute existence of an unthinking substance, distinct from its being perceived, can be inferred from my allowing that there are certain things perceived by the mind of God, which are to Him the occasion of producing ideas in us[26]?

Hyl. I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of *occasion* seeming now altogether as groundless as the rest.

Phil. Do you not at length perceive that in all these different acceptations of *Matter*, you have been only supposing you know not what, for no manner of reason, and to no kind of use?

14. *Hyl.* I freely own myself less fond of my notions since they have been so accurately examined. But still, methinks, I have some confused perception that there is such a thing as *Matter*.

Phil. Either you perceive[27] the being of Matter immediately, or mediately. If immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it. If mediately, let me know by what reasoning it is inferred from those things which you perceive immediately. So much for the perception.—Then for the Matter itself, I ask whether it is object, *substratum*, cause, instrument, or occasion? You have already pleaded for each of these, shifting your notions, and making Matter to appear sometimes in one shape, then in another. And what you have offered hath been disapproved and rejected by yourself. If you have anything new to advance I would gladly hear it.

Hyl. I think I have already offered all I had to say on those heads. I am at a loss what more to urge.

15. *Phil* And yet you are loath to part with your old prejudice. But to make you quit it more easily I desire that, beside what has been hitherto suggested, you will farther consider whether, upon supposition that Matter exists, you can possibly conceive how you should be affected by it? Or, supposing it did not exist, whether it be not evident you might for all that be affected with the same ideas you now are, and consequently have the very same reasons to believe its existence that you now can have?

Hyl. I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things just as we do now, though there was no Matter in the world; neither can I conceive, if there be Matter, how it should produce any idea in our minds. And, I do farther

grant you have entirely satisfied me that it is impossible there should be such a thing as Matter in any of the foregoing acceptations. But still I cannot help supposing that there is *Matter* in some sense or other. What that is I do not indeed pretend to determine.

Phil. I do not expect you should define exactly the nature of that unknown being. Only be pleased to tell me whether it is a substance—and if so, whether you can suppose a substance without accidents; or, in case you suppose it to have accidents or qualities. I desire you will let me know what those qualities are, at least what is meant by Matter's supporting them?

16. *Hyl.* We have already argued on those points. I have no more to say to them. But, to prevent any farther questions, let me tell you I at present understand by *Matter* neither substance nor accident, thinking nor extended being, neither cause, instrument, nor occasion, but something entirely unknown, distinct from all these.

Phil. It seems then you include in your present notion of matter nothing but the general abstract idea of *entity*.

Hyl. Nothing else, save only that I superadd to this general idea the negation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas, that I perceive, imagine, or in anywise apprehend.

Phil. Pray where do you suppose this unknown Matter to exist?

Hyl. Oh Philonous! now you think you have entangled me; for, if I say it exists in place then you will infer that it exists in the mind, since it is agreed that place or extension exists only in the mind: but I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not where it exists; only I am sure it exists not in place. There is a negative answer for you.

And you must expect no other to all the questions you put for the future about Matter.

Phil. Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to inform me after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what you mean by its *existence*?

Hyl. It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is perceived.

Phil. But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its existence?

Hyl. Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive notion or meaning at all. I tell you again, I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not what is meant by its *existence*, or how it exists.

Phil. Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part, and tell me sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of Entity in general, prescinded from and exclusive of all thinking and corporeal beings,[28] all particular things whatsoever.

Hyl. Hold, let me think a little——I profess, Philonous, I do not find that I can. At first glance, methought I had some dilute and airy notion of pure Entity in abstract; but, upon closer attention, it hath quite vanished out of sight. The more I think on it, the more am I confirmed in my prudent resolution of giving none but negative answers, and not pretending to the least degree of any positive knowledge or conception of Matter, its *where*, its *how*, its *entity*, or anything belonging to it[29].

Phil. When, therefore, you speak of the existence of Matter, you have not any notion in your mind?

Hyl. None at all.

17. *Phil.* Pray tell me if the case stands not thus:—at first, from a belief of material substance, you would have it

that the immediate objects existed without the mind; then that they are archetypes; then causes; next instruments; then occasions: lastly, *something in general*, which being interpreted proves *nothing*. So Matter comes to nothing. What think you, Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding?

Hyl. Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that our not being able to conceive a thing is no argument against its existence[30].

Phil. That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other circumstance there may reasonably be inferred the existence of a thing not immediately perceived; and that it were absurd for any man to argue against the existence of that thing, from his having no direct and positive notion of it, I freely own. But, where there is nothing of all this; where neither reason nor revelation induces us to believe the existence of a thing; where we have not even a relative notion of it; where an abstraction is made from perceiving and being perceived, from Spirit and idea: lastly, where there is not so much as the most inadequate or faint idea pretended to—I will not indeed thence conclude against the reality of any notion, or existence of any thing; but my inference shall be, that you mean nothing at all; that you employ words to no manner of purpose, without any design or signification whatsoever. And I leave it to you to consider how mere jargon should be treated.

Hyl. To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments seem in themselves unanswerable; but they have not so great an effect on me as to produce that entire conviction, that hearty acquiescence, which attends demonstration[31]. I find myself still relapsing into an obscure surmise of I know not what, *matter*.

18. *Phil.* But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things must concur to take away all scruple, and work a plenary assent in the mind? Let a visible object be set in never so clear a light, yet, if there is any imperfection in the sight, or if the eye is not directed towards it, it will not be distinctly seen. And, though a demonstration be never so well grounded and fairly proposed, yet, if there is withal a stain of prejudice, or a wrong bias on the understanding, can it be expected on a sudden to perceive clearly and adhere firmly to the truth? No, there is need of time and pains: the attention must be awakened and detained by a frequent repetition of the same thing placed oft in the same, oft in different lights. I have said it already, and find I must still repeat and inculcate, that it is an unaccountable licence you take, in pretending to maintain you know not what[32], for you know not what reason, to you know not what purpose. Can this be paralleled in any art or science, any sect or profession of men? Or is there anything so barefacedly groundless and unreasonable to be met with even in the lowest of common conversation? But, perhaps you will still say, Matter may exist; though at the same time you neither know what is meant by *Matter*, or by its *existence*. This indeed is surprising, and the more so because it is altogether voluntary [[33]and of your own head], you not being led to it by any one reason; for I challenge you to shew me that thing in nature which needs Matter to explain or account for it.

19. *Hyl.* The reality of things cannot be maintained without supposing the existence of Matter. And is not this, think you, a good reason why I should be earnest in its defence?

Phil. The reality of things! What things, sensible or intelligible?

Hyl. Sensible things.

Phil. My glove for example?

Hyl. That or any other thing perceived by the senses.

Phil. But to fix on some particular thing;—is it not a sufficient evidence to me of the existence of this *glove*, that I see it, and feel it, and wear it[84]? Or, if this will not do, how is it possible I should be assured of the reality of this thing, which I actually see in this place, by supposing that some unknown thing, which I never did or can see, exists after an unknown manner, in an unknown place, or in no place at all? How can the supposed reality of that which is intangible be a proof that anything tangible really exists? Or, of that which is invisible, that any visible thing, or, in general of anything which is imperceptible, that a perceptible exists? Do but explain this and I shall think nothing too hard for you.

20. *Hyl.* Upon the whole, I am content to own the existence of Matter is highly improbable; but the direct and absolute impossibility of it does not appear to me.

Phil. But, granting Matter to be possible, yet, upon that account merely, it can have no more claim to existence than a golden mountain or a centaur[85].

Hyl. I acknowledge it; but still you do not deny it is possible; and that which is possible, for aught you know, may actually exist.

Phil. I deny it to be possible; and have, if I mistake not, evidently proved, from your own concessions, that it is not. In the common sense of the word *Matter*, is there any more implied than an extended, solid, figured, moveable substance existing without the mind? And have not you acknowledged, over and over, that you have seen evident reason for denying the possibility of such a substance?

21. *Hyl.* True, but that is only one sense of the term *Matter.*

Phil. But, is it not the only proper genuine received sense? and, if Matter in such a sense be proved impossible, may it not be thought with good grounds absolutely impossible? Else how could anything be proved impossible? Or, indeed, how could there be any proof at all one way or other, to a man who takes the liberty to unsettle and change the common signification of words?

Hyl. I thought philosophers might be allowed to speak more accurately than the vulgar, and were not always confined to the common acceptation of a term.

Phil. But this now mentioned is the common received sense among philosophers themselves. But, not to insist on that, have you not been allowed to take Matter in what sense you pleased? And have you not used this privilege in the utmost extent, sometimes entirely changing, at others leaving out or putting into the definition of it whatever, for the present, best served your design, contrary to all the known rules of reason and logic? And hath not this shifting, unfair method of yours spun out our dispute to an unnecessary length; Matter having been particularly examined, and by your own confession refuted in each of those senses? And can any more be required to prove the absolute impossibility of a thing, than the proving it impossible in every particular sense that either you or any one else understands it in?

22. *Hyl.* But I am not so thoroughly satisfied that you have proved the impossibility of matter, in the last most obscure abstracted and indefinite sense.

Phil. When is a thing shewn to be impossible?

Hyl. When a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended in its definition.

Phil. But where there are no ideas, there no repugnancy can be demonstrated between ideas ?

Hyl. I agree with you.

Phil. Now, in that which you call the obscure indefinite sense of the word *Matter*, it is plain, by your own confession, there was included no idea at all, no sense except an unknown sense, which is the same thing as none. You are not, therefore, to expect I should prove a repugnancy between ideas, where there are no ideas ; or the impossibility of Matter taken in an *unknown* sense, that is, no sense at all. My business was only to shew you meant *nothing* ; and this you were brought to own. So that, in all your various senses, you have been shewed either to mean nothing at all, or, if anything, an absurdity[36]. And if this be not sufficient to prove the impossibility of a thing, I desire you will let me know what is.

23. *Hyl.* I acknowledge you have proved that Matter is impossible ; nor no I see what more can be said in defence of it. But, at the same time that I give up this, I suspect all my other notions. For surely none could be more seemingly evident than this once was : and yet it now seems as false and absurd as ever it did true before. But I think we have discussed the point sufficiently for the present. The remaining part of the day I would willingly spend in running over in my thoughts the several heads of this morning's conversation, and to-morrow shall be glad to meet you here again about the same time.

Phil. I will not fail to attend you.

THE THIRD DIALOGUE

1. *Philonous.* Tell me, Hylas, what are the fruits of yesterday's meditation? Hath it confirmed you in the same mind you were in at parting? or have you since seen cause to change your opinion?

Hyl. Truly my opinion is that all our opinions are alike vain and uncertain. What we approve to-day, we condemn to-morrow. We keep a stir about knowledge, and spend our lives in the pursuit of it, when, alas! we know nothing all the while: nor do I think it possible for us ever to know anything in this life[1]. Our faculties are too narrow and too few. Nature certainly never intended us for Speculation.

Phil. What! say you we can know nothing, Hylas?

Hyl. There is not that single thing in the world whereof we can know the real nature, or what it is in itself.

Phil. Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or water is?

Hyl. You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and water fluid; but this is no more than knowing what sensations are produced in your own mind, upon the application of fire and water to your organs of sense. Their internal constitution, their true and real nature, you are utterly in the dark as to *that.*

Phil. Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, and that which I see before my eyes to be a real tree?

Hyl. Know? No, it is impossible you or any man alive should know it. All you know is, that you have such a certain idea or appearance in your own mind. But what is this to the real tree or stone? I tell you that colour, figure, and

hardness, which you perceive, are not the real natures of those things, or in the least like them. The same may be said of all other real things or corporeal substances which compose the world. They have none of them anything of themselves, like those sensible qualities by us perceived. We should not therefore pretend to affirm or know anything of them, as they are in their own nature.

Phil. But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example, from iron: and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly was?

Hyl. Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish between your own ideas. That yellowness, that weight, and other sensible qualities, think you they are really in the gold? They are only relative to the senses, and have no absolute existence in nature. And in pretending to distinguish the species of real things, by the appearances in your mind, you may perhaps act as wisely as he that should conclude two men were of a different species, because their clothes were not of the same colour.

Phil. It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the appearances of things, and those false ones too. The very meat I eat, and the cloth I wear, have nothing in them like what I see and feel.

Hyl. Even so.

Phil. But is it not strange the whole world should be thus imposed on, and so foolish as to believe their senses? And yet I know not how it is, but men eat, and drink, and sleep, and perform all the offices of life, as comfortably and conveniently as if they really knew the things they are conversant about.

Hyl. They do so: but you know ordinary practice does not require a nicety of speculative knowledge. Hence the

vulgar retain their mistakes, and for all that make a shift to bustle through the affairs of life. But philosophers know better things.

Phil. You mean, they know that they *know nothing*[2].

Hyl. That is the very top and perfection of human knowledge.

Phil. But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world? Suppose you are going to write, would you not call for pen, ink, and paper, like another man; and do you not know what it is you call for?

Hyl. How often must I tell you, that I know not the real nature of any one thing in the universe? I may indeed upon occasion make use of pen, ink, and paper. But, what any one of them is in its own true nature, I declare positively I know not. And the same is true with regard to every other corporeal thing. And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the true and real nature of things, but even of their existence. It cannot be denied that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas; but it cannot be concluded from thence that bodies really exist. Nay, now I think on it, I must, agreeably to my former concessions, farther declare that it is impossible any real corporeal thing should exist in nature.

2. *Phil.* You amaze me. Was ever anything more wild and extravagant than the notions you now maintain: and is it not evident you are led into all these extravagances by the belief of *material substance*? This makes you dream of those unknown natures in everything. It is this occasions your distinguishing between the reality and sensible appearances of things. It is to this you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else knows perfectly well. Nor is this all: you are not only ignorant of the true nature of everything,

but you know not whether any thing really exists, or whether there are any true natures at all; for asmuch as you attribute to your material beings an absolute or external existence, wherein you suppose their reality consists. And, as you are forced in the end to acknowledge such an existence means either a direct repugnancy, or nothing at all, it follows that you are obliged to pull down your own hypothesis of material Substance, and positively to deny the real existence of any part of the universe. And so you are plunged into the deepest and most deplorable *Scepticism* that ever man was[3]. Tell me, Hylas, is it not as I say?

Hyl. I agree with you *Material substance* was no more than an hypothesis, and a false and groundless one too. I will no longer spend my breath in defence of it. But, whatever hypothesis you advance, or whatsoever scheme of things you introduce in its stead, I doubt not it will appear every whit as false: let me but be allowed to question you upon it. That is, suffer me to serve you in your own kind, and I warrant it shall conduct you through as many perplexities and contradictions, to the very same state of Scepticism that I myself am in at present.

3. *Phil.* I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any hypothesis at all[4]. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion that the real things are those very things I see and feel, and perceive by my senses. These I know, and, finding they answer all the necessities and purposes of life, have no reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings. A piece of sensible bread, for instance, would stay my stomach better than ten thousand times as much of that insensible, unintelligible, real bread you speak of. It is likewise my opinion that colours and other sensible

qualities are on the objects[5]. I cannot for my life help thinking that snow is white, and fire hot. You indeed, who by *snow* and *fire* mean certain external, unperceived, unperceiving substances, are in the right to deny whiteness or heat to be affections inherent in them. But I, who understand by those words the things I see and feel, am obliged to think like other folks. And, as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of things, so neither am I as to their existence. That a thing should be really perceived by my senses, and at the same time not really exist, is to me a plain contradiction; since I cannot prescind[6] or abstract, even in thought, the existence of a sensible thing from its being perceived. Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like things, which I name and discourse of, are things that I know. And should not have known them but that I perceived them by my senses: and things perceived by the senses are immediately perceived; and things immediately perceived are ideas; and ideas cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore consists in being perceived[7]; when, therefore, they are actually perceived there can be no doubt of their existence. Away then with all that Scepticism, all those ridiculous philosophical doubts. What a jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible things, till he hath it proved to him from the veracity of God[8]; or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of intuition or demonstration[9]! I might as well doubt of my own being, as of the being of those things I actually see and feel.

4. *Hyl.* Not so fast, Philonous: you say you cannot conceive how sensible things should exist without the mind. Do you not?

Phil. I do.

Hyl. Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you conceive it possible that things perceivable by sense may still exist?

Phil. I can; but then it must be in another mind. When I deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean my mind in particular, but all minds[10]. Now, it is plain they have an existence exterior to my mind; since I find them by experience to be independent of it. There is therefore some other mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the times of my perceiving them[11]: as likewise they did before my birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation. And, as the same is true with regard to all other finite created spirits, it necessarily follows there is an *omnipresent eternal Mind*[12], which knows and comprehends all things and exhibits them to our view in such a manner, and according to such rules, as He Himself hath ordained, and are by us termed the *laws of nature.*

5. *Hyl.* Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert beings? Or have they any agency included in them?

Phil. They are altogether passive and inert[13].

Hyl. And is not God an agent, a being purely active?

Phil. I acknowledge it.

Hyl. No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the nature of God?

Phil. I cannot.

Hyl. Since therefore you have no idea of the mind of God, how can you conceive it possible that things should exist in His mind? Or, if you can conceive the mind of God, without having an idea of it, why may not I be allowed to conceive the existence of Matter, notwithstanding I have no idea of it?

Phil. As to your first question: I own I have properly no *idea*, either of God or any other spirit; for these being active cannot be represented by things perfectly inert, as our ideas are. I do nevertheless know that I, who am a spirit or thinking substance, exist as certainly as I know my ideas exist[14]. Farther, I know what I mean by the terms *I* and *myself*; and I know this immediately, or intuitively, though I do not perceive it as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound. The Mind, Spirit, or Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks, acts, and perceives. I say *indivisible*, because unextended; and *unextended*, because extended, figured, moveable things are ideas; and that which perceives ideas, which thinks and wills is plainly itself no idea, nor like an idea. Ideas are things inactive, and perceived. And Spirits a sort of beings altogether different from them. I do not therefore say my soul is an idea, or like an idea. However, taking the word *idea* in a large sense, my soul may be said to furnish me with an idea, that is an image or likeness of God—though indeed extremely inadequate. For, all the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting on my own soul, heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections. I have therefore, though not an inactive idea, yet in *myself* some sort of an active thinking image of the Deity[15]. And, though I perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him, or know Him by reflection and reasoning. My own mind and my own ideas I have an immediate knowledge of; and, by the help of these, do mediately apprehend the possibility of the existence of other spirits and ideas. Farther, from my own being, and from the dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do by an act of reason, necessarily infer the existence of a God, and of all created things in the mind of God[16]. So much for your first question. For the second:

I suppose by this time you can answer it yourself. For you neither perceive Matter objectively, as you do an inactive being or idea; nor know it, as you do yourself, by a reflex act; neither do you mediately apprehend it by similitude of the one or the other; nor yet collect it by reasoning from that which you know immediately. All which makes the case of *Matter* widely different from that of the *Deity*.

6. [[17]*Hyl.* You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of an idea or image of God. But, at the same time you acknowledge you have, properly speaking, no *idea* of your own soul. You even affirm that spirits are a sort of beings altogether different from ideas. Consequently that no idea can be like a spirit. We have therefore no idea of any spirit. You admit nevertheless that there is spiritual Substance, although you have no idea of it; while you deny there can be such a thing as material Substance, because you have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair dealing? To act consistently, you must either admit Matter or reject Spirit. What say you to this?

Phil. I say, in the first place, that I do not deny the existence of material substance, merely because I have no notion of it, but because the notion of it is inconsistent; or, in other words, because it is repugnant that there should be a notion of it. Many things, for ought I know, may exist, whereof neither I nor any other man hath or can have any idea or notion whatsoever. But then those things must be possible, that is nothing inconsistent must be included in their definition. I say, secondly, that, although we believe things to exist which we do not perceive, yet we may not believe that any particular thing exists, without some reason for such belief: but I have no reason for believing the existence of Matter. I have no immediate intuition thereof:

neither can I immediately[18] from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or passions, infer an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance—either by probable deduction, or necessary consequence. Whereas the being of my Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or thinking principle, I evidently know by reflection. You will forgive me if I repeat the same things in answer to the same objections. In the very notion or definition of *material Substance* there is included a manifest repugnance and inconsistency. But this cannot be said of the notion of Spirit. That ideas should exist in what doth not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act, is repugnant. But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving thing should be the subject of ideas, or an active thing the cause of them. It is granted we have neither an immediate evidence nor a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of other finite spirits; but it will not thence follow that such spirits are on a foot with material substances: if to suppose the one be inconsistent, and it be not inconsistent to suppose the other; if the one can be inferred by no argument, and there is a probability for the other; if we see signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like ourselves and see no sign or symptom whatever that leads to a rational belief of Matter. I say, lastly, that I have a notion of Spirit, though I have not, strictly speaking, an idea of it[19]. I do not perceive it as an idea, or by means of an idea, but know it by reflection.

7. *Hyl.* Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, according to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles, it should follow that *you* are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them. Words are not to be used without a meaning. And, as there is no more meaning in *spiritual*

Substance than in *material Substance*, the one is to be exploded as well as the other[20].

Phil. How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own being; and that *I myself* am not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas[21]. I know that I, one and the same self, perceive both colours and sounds: that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a sound a colour: that I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from colour and sound; and, for the same reason, from all other sensible things and inert ideas. But, I am not in like manner conscious either of the existence or essence of Matter. On the contrary, I know that nothing inconsistent can exist, and that the existence of Matter implies an inconsistency. Farther, I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual substance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas. But, I do not know what is meant when it is said that an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports either ideas or the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon the whole no parity of case between Spirit and Matter.[22]]

8. *Hyl.* I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you in earnest think the real existence of sensible things consists in their being actually perceived? If so; how comes it that all mankind distinguish between them? Ask the first man you meet, and he shall tell you, *to be perceived* is one thing, and *to exist* is another.

Phil. I am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world for the truth of my notion. Ask the gardener why he thinks yonder cherry-tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell you, because he sees and feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his senses. Ask him why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and he shall tell you,

because he does not perceive it. What he perceives by sense, that he terms a real being, and saith it *is* or *exists*; but, that which is not perceivable, the same, he saith, hath no being[23].

9. *Hyl.* Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing consists in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.

Phil. And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea exist without being actually perceived? These are points long since agreed between us.

Hyl. But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny it is shocking, and contrary to the common sense of men. Ask the fellow whether yonder tree hath an existence out of his mind: what answer think you he would make?

Phil. The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth exist out of his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say, the real tree, existing without his mind, is truly known and comprehended by (that is, *exists in*) the infinite mind of God. Probably he may not at first glance be aware of the direct and immediate proof there is of this; inasmuch as the very being of a tree, or any other sensible thing, implies a mind wherein it is. But the point itself he cannot deny. The question between the Materialists and me is not, whether things have a *real* existence out of the mind of this or that person, but, whether they have an *absolute* existence, distinct from being perceived by God, and exterior to all minds[24]. This indeed some heathens and philosophers have affirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to the Holy Scripture will be of another opinion.

10. *Hyl.* But, according to your notions, what difference is there between real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a dream—since they are all equally in the mind?

Phil. The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct; they have, besides, an entire dependence on the will. But the ideas perceived by sense, that is, real things, are more vivid and clear; and, being imprinted on the mind by a spirit distinct from us, have not the like dependence on our will. There is therefore no danger of confounding these with the foregoing: and there is as little of confounding them with the visions of dream, which are dim, irregular, and confused[25]. And, though they should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by their not being connected, and of a piece with the preceding and subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily be distinguished from realities. In short, by whatever method you distinguish *things* from *chimeras* on your scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon mine. For, it must be, I presume, by some perceived difference; and I am not for depriving you of any one thing that you perceive.

11. *Hyl.* But still, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in the world but spirits and ideas. And this, you must needs acknowledge, sounds very oddly.

Phil. I own the word *idea*, not being commonly used for *thing*, sounds something out of the way. My reason for using it was, because a necessary relation to the mind is understood to be implied by that term; and it is now commonly used by philosophers to denote the immediate objects of the understanding[26]. But, however oddly the proposition may sound in words, yet it includes nothing so very strange or shocking in its sense; which in effect amounts to no more than this, to wit, that there are only things perceiving, and things perceived; or that every unthinking being is necessarily, and from the very nature of its existence, perceived by some mind; if not by a finite created mind, yet certainly by the infinite

mind of God, in whom 'we live, and move, and have our being'. Is this as strange as to say, the sensible qualities are not on the objects : or that we cannot be sure of the existence of things, or know anything of their real natures—though we both see and feel them, and perceive them by all our senses ?

12. *Hyl.* And, in consequence of this, must we not think there are no such things as physical or corporeal causes[27] ; but that a Spirit is the immediate cause of all the phenomena in nature ? Can there be anything more extravagant than this ?

Phil. Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say—a thing which is inert operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving is the cause of our perceptions, [without any regard either to consistency, or the old known axiom, *Nothing can give to another that which it hath not itself*[28]]. Besides, that which to you, I know not for what reason, seems so extravagant is no more than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred places. In them God is represented as the sole and immediate Author of all those effects which some heathens and philosophers are wont to ascribe to Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking principle. This is so much the constant language of Scripture that it were needless to confirm it by citations[29].

13. *Hyl.* You are not aware, Philonous, that, in making God the immediate Author of all the motions in nature, you make Him the Author of murder, sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins[30].

Phil. In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation of guilt is the same, whether a person commits an action with or without an instrument. In case therefore you suppose God to act by the mediation of an instrument, or occasion, called *Matter*, you as truly make Him the author of sin as

Phil. He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives, but in the inferences he makes from his present perceptions[85]. Thus, in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right. But, if he thence conclude that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken. In like manner, if he shall conclude from what he perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards the moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas, he is mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately and at present (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that), but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be connected with those immediately perceived: or, concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in other circumstances. The case is the same with regard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any motion of the earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, in case we were placed at as great a distance from that as we are now from the other planets, we should not then perceive its motion.

16. *Hyl.* I understand you; and must needs own you say things plausible enough: but give me leave to put you in mind of one thing. Pray, Philonous, were you not formerly as positive that Matter existed, as you are now that it does not?

Phil. I was. But here lies the difference. Before, my positiveness was founded, without examination, upon prejudice; but now, after inquiry, upon evidence.

17. *Hyl.* After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than things. We agree in the thing, but differ in the

name. That we are affected with ideas from without is evident; and it is no less evident that there must be (I will not say archetypes, but) powers without the mind, corresponding to those ideas. And, as these powers cannot subsist by themselves, there is some subject of them necessarily to be admitted, which I call *Matter*, and you call *Spirit*. This is all the difference.

Phil. Pray, Hylas, is that powerful being, or subject or powers, extended?

Hyl. It hath not extension; but it hath the power to raise in you the idea of extension.

Phil. It is therefore itself unextended?

Hyl. I grant it[36].

Phil. Is it not also active?

Hyl. Without doubt: otherwise, how could we attribute powers to it?

Phil. Now let me ask you two questions: *First*, whether it be agreeable to the usage either of philosophers or others to give the name *Matter* to an unextended active being? And, *Secondly*, whether it be not ridiculously absurd to misapply names contrary to the common use of language?

18. *Hyl.* Well then, let it not be called Matter, since you will have it so, but some *third nature* distinct from Matter and Spirit. For what reason is there why you should call it spirit? Does not the notion of spirit imply that it is thinking, as well as active and unextended?

Phil. My reason is this: because I have a mind to have some notion of meaning in what I say: but I have no notion of any action distinct from volition, neither can I conceive volition to be anywhere but in a spirit; therefore, when I speak of an active being, I am obliged to mean a spirit.

Beside, what can be plainer than that a thing which hath no ideas in itself cannot impart them to me; and, if it hath ideas, surely it must be a spirit. To make you comprehend the point still more clearly if it be possible – I assert as well as you that, since we are affected from without, we must allow powers to be without, in a being distinct from ourselves. So far we are agreed. But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful being[37]. I will have it to be spirit, you Matter, or I know not what (I may add too, you know not what) third nature. Thus, I prove it to be spirit. From the effects I see produced I conclude there are actions; and, because actions, volitions, and, because there are volitions, there must be a will. Again, the things I perceive must have an existence, they or their archetypes, out of my mind: but, being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an understanding[38]; there is therefore an understanding. But will and understanding constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit[39]. The powerful cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a *spirit*.

19. *Hyl.* And now I warrant you think you have made the point very clear, little suspecting that what you advance leads directly to a contradiction. Is it not an absurdity to imagine any imperfection in God?

Phil. Without a doubt.

Hyl. To suffer pain is an imperfection?

Phil. It is.

Hyl. Are we not sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness by some other being?

Phil. We are.

Hyl. And have you not said that being is a spirit, and is not that spirit God?

Phil. I grant it.

Hyl. But you have asserted that whatever ideas we perceive from without are in the mind which affects us. The ideas, therefore, of pain and uneasiness are in God; or, in other words, God suffers pain: that is to say, there is an imperfection in the Divine nature, which, you acknowledge, was absurd. So you are caught in a plain contradiction.

Phil. That God knows or understands all things, and that He knows, among other things, what pain is, even every sort of painful sensation, and what it is for His creatures to suffer pain, I make no question. But, that God, though He knows and sometimes causes painful sensations in us, can Himself suffer pain, I positively deny. We, who are limited and dependent spirits, are liable to impressions of sense, the effects of an external agent, which, being produced against our wills, are sometimes painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we do, whose will is absolute and independent, causing all things, and liable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing; it is evident, such a Being as this can suffer nothing, nor be affected with any painful sensation, or indeed any sensation at all[40]. We are chained to a body, that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal motions. By the law of our nature, we are affected upon every alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body; which sensible body, rightly considered, is nothing but a complexion[41] of such qualities or ideas as have no existence distinct from being perceived by a mind: so that this connexion of sensations with corporeal motions means no more than a correspondence in the order of nature between two sets of ideas, or things immediately perceivable[42]. But God is a pure spirit, disengaged from all such sympathy or

natural ties. No corporeal motions are attended with the sensations of pain or pleasure in His mind. To know everything knowable is certainly a perfection; but to endure, or suffer, or feel anything by sense, is an imperfection. The former, I say, agrees to God, but not the latter. God knows or hath ideas; but His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are. Your not distinguishing, where there is so manifest a difference, makes you fancy you see an absurdity where there is none.

20. *Hyl.* But, all this while you have not considered that the quantity of Matter hath been demonstrated to be proportioned to the gravity of bodies. And what can withstand demonstration?

Phil. Let me see how you demonstrate that point.

Hyl. I lay it down for a principle that the moments or quantities of motion in bodies are in a direct compounded reason[43] of the velocities and quantities of Matter contained in them. Hence, where the velocities are equal, it follows the moments are directly as the quantity of Matter in each. But it is found by experience that all bodies (bating the small ineqalities, arising from the resistance of the air) descend with an equal velocity; the motion therefore of descending bodies and consequently their gravity, which is the cause or principle of that motion, is proportional to the quantity of Matter; which was to be demonstrated.

Phil. You lay it down as a self-evident principle that the quantity of motion in any body is proportional to the velocity and *Matter* taken together; and this is made use of to prove a proposition, from whence the existence of *Matter* is inferred. Pray is not this arguing in a circle?

Hyl. In the premise I only mean that the motion is proportional to the velocity, jointly with the extension and solidity.

Phil. But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence follow that gravity is proportional to *Matter* in your philosophic sense of the word; except you take it for granted that unknown *substratum*, or whatever else you call it, is proportional to those sensible qualities; which to suppose is plainly begging the question. That there is magnitude and solidity, or resistance, perceived by sense, I readily grant; as likewise, that gravity may be proportional to those qualities I will not dispute. But that either these qualities as perceived by us, or the powers producing them, do exist in a *material substratum*; —this is what I deny, and you indeed affirm, but, notwithstanding your demonstration, have not yet proved.

21. *Hyl.* I shall insist no longer on the point. Do you think, however, you shall persuade me the natural philosophers have been dreaming all this while? Pray what becomes of all their hypotheses and explications of the phenomena, which suppose the existence of Matter[44]?

Phil. What mean you, Hylas, by the *phenomena*?

Hyl. I mean the appearances which I perceived by my senses.

Phil. And the appearances perceived by sense, are they not ideas?

Hyl. I have told you so a hundred times.

Phil. Therefore, to explain the phenomena is to shew how we come to be affected with ideas, in that manner and order wherein they are imprinted on our senses. Is it not?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Now, if you can prove that any philosopher hath explained the production of any one idea in our minds by the help of *Matter*, I shall for ever acquiesce, and look on all that hath been said against it as nothing; but, if you cannot, it is vain to urge the explication of phenomena. That a being

endowed with knowledge and will should produce or exhibit ideas is easily understood. But, that a Being which is utterly destitute of these faculties should be able to produce ideas, or in any sort to affect an intelligence, this I can never understand. This I say—though we had some positive conception of Matter, though we knew its qualities, and could comprehend its existence—would yet be so far from explaining things, that it is itself the most inexplicable thing in the world. And yet, for all this, it will not follow that philosophers have been doing nothing; for, by observing and reasoning upon the connexion of ideas, they discover the laws and methods of nature[45], which is a part of knowledge both useful and entertaining.

22. *Hyl.* After all, can it be supposed God would deceive all mankind? Do you imagine He would have induced the whole world to believe the being of Matter, if there was no such thing?

Phil. That every epidemical opinion arising from prejudice, or passion, or thoughtlessness may be imputed to God, as the Author of it, I believe you will not affirm. Whatsoever opinion we father on Him, it must be either because He has discovered it to us by supernatural revelation; or because it is so evident to our natural faculties, which were framed and given us by God, that it is impossible we should withhold our assent from it. But where is the revelation? or where is the evidence that extorts the belief of Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter, taken for something distinct from what we perceive by our senses, is thought to exist by all mankind[46]; or, indeed, by any except a few philosophers, who do not know what they would be at? Your question supposes these points are clear; and, when, you have cleared them, I shall think myself obliged to give you another answer. In

the meantime let it suffice that I tell you, I do not suppose God has deceived mankind at all.

23. *Hyl.* But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty! There lies the danger. New notions should always be discountenanced; they unsettle men's minds, and nobody knows where they will end.

Phil. Why the rejecting a notion that hath no foundation, either in sense, or in reason, or in Divine authority, should be thought to unsettle the belief of such opinions as are grounded on all or any of these, I cannot imagine. That innovations in government and religion are dangerous, and ought to be discountenanced, I freely own. But, is there the like reason why they should be discouraged in philosophy? The making anything known which was unknown before is an innovation in knowledge: and, if all such innovations had been forbidden, men would have made a notable progress in the arts and sciences. But it is none of my business to plead for novelties and paradoxes. That the qualities we perceive are not on the objects: that we must not believe our senses: that we know nothing of the real nature of things, and can never be assured even of their existence: that real colours and sounds are nothing but certain unknown figures and motions: that motions are in themselves neither swift nor slow: that there are in bodies absolute extensions, without any particular magnitude or figure: that a thing stupid, thoughtless, and inactive, operates on a spirit: that the least particle of a body contains innumerable extended parts:—these are the novelties, these are the strange notions which shock the genuine uncorrupted judgment of all mankind; and being once admitted, embarrass the mind with endless doubts and difficulties. And it is against these and the like innovations I endeavour to vindicate Common Sense[47]. It is true, in

doing this, I may perhaps be obliged to use some *ambages*[48], and ways of speech not common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly understood, that which is most singular in them will, in effect, be found to amount to no more than this:—that it is absolutely impossible, and a plain contradiction, to suppose any unthinking being should exist without being perceived by a mind. And, if this notion be singular, it is a shame it should be so at this time of day, and in a Christian country.

24. *Hyl.* As for the difficulties other opinions may be liable to, those are out of the question. It is your business to defend your own opinion. Can anything be plainer than that you are for changing all things into ideas? You, I say, who are not ashamed to charge me with *scepticism*. This is so plain, there is no denying it.

Phil. You mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas, but rather ideas into things[49]; since those immediate objects of perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of things, I take to be the real things themselves.

Hyl. Things! you may pretend what you please; but it is certain you leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the outside only which strikes the senses.

Phil. What you call the empty forms and outside of things seem to me the very things themselves. Nor are they empty or incomplete, otherwise than upon your supposition—that Matter[50] is an essential part of all corporeal things. We both, therefore, agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms: but herein we differ, you will have them to be empty appearances, I real beings. In short, you do not trust your senses, I do.

25. *Hyl.* You say you believe your senses; and seem to applaud yourself that in this you agree with the vulgar,

According to you, therefore, the true nature of a thing is discovered by the senses. If so, whence comes that disagreement? Why, is not the same figure, and other sensible qualities, perceived all manner of ways? And why should we use a microscope the better to discover the true nature of a body, if it were discoverable to the naked eye?

Phil. Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object that we feel; neither is the same object perceived by the microscope which was by the naked eye. But, in case every variation was thought sufficient to constitute a new kind or individual, the endless number or confusion of names would render language impracticable. Therefore, to avoid this as well as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought, men combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers senses, or by the same sense at different times, or in different circumstances, but observed, however, to have some connexion in nature, either with respect to co-existence or succession—all which they refer to one name, and consider as one thing. Hence, it follows that when I examine by my other senses a thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand better the same object which I had perceived by sight—the object of one sense not being perceived by the other senses. And, when I look through a microscope, it is not that I may perceive more clearly what I perceived already with my bare eyes; the object perceived by the glass being quite different from the former. But, in both cases, my aim is only to know what ideas are connected together; and the more a man knows of the connexion of ideas, the more he is said to know of the nature of things[51]. What, therefore, if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are not in all circumstances affected with the same appearances? It will not thence follow they are not to be trusted, or that they

are inconsistent either with themselves or anything else; except it be with your preconceived notion of (I know not what) one single, unchanged, unperceivable, real nature, marked by each name: which prejudice seems to have taken its rise from not rightly understanding the common language of men, speaking of several distinct ideas as united into one thing by the mind. And, indeed, there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits of the philosophers are owing to the same original: while they began to build their schemes not so much on notions as words, which were framed by the vulgar, merely for conveniency and dispatch in the common actions of life, without any regard to speculation.

Hyl. Methinks I apprehend your meaning.

26. *Phil.* It is your opinion the ideas we perceive by our senses are not real things, but images or copies of them. Our knowledge, therefore, is no farther real than as our ideas are the true representations of those originals. But as these supposed originals are in themselves unknown, it is impossible to know how far our ideas resemble them: or whether they resemble them at all. We cannot, therefore, be sure we have any real knowledge. Farther, as our ideas are perpetually varied, without any change in the supposed real things, it necessarily follows they cannot all be true copies of them: or, if some are and others are not, it is impossible to distinguish the former from the latter. And this plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty. Again, when we consider the point, we cannot conceive how any idea, or anything like an idea, should have an absolute existence out of a mind: nor consequently, according to you, how there should be any real thing in nature. The result of all which is that we are thrown into the most hopeless and abandoned Scepticism.

Now, give me leave to ask you, First, Whether your referring ideas to certain absolutely existing unperceived substances, as their originals, be not the source of all this Scepticism? Secondly, Whether you are informed, either by sense or reason, of the existence of those unknown originals? And in case you are not, whether it be not absurd to suppose them? Thirdly, Whether, upon inquiry, you find there is anything distinctly conceived or meant by the *absolute or external existence of unperceiving substances*? Lastly, Whether, the premises considered, it be not the wisest way to follow nature, trust your senses, and, laying aside all anxious thought about unknown natures or substances[52], admit with the vulgar those for real things which are perceived by the senses?

27. *Hyl.* For the present, I have no inclination to the answering part. I would much rather see how you can get over what follows. Pray are not the objects perceived by the senses of one, likewise perceivable to others present? If there were a hundred more here, they would all see the garden, the trees, and flowers, as I see them. But they are not in the same manner affected with the ideas I frame in my imagination. Does not this make a difference between the former sort of objects and the latter?

Phil. I grant it does. Nor have I ever denied a difference between the objects of sense and those of imagination. But what would you infer from thence? You cannot say that sensible objects exist unperceived, because they are perceived by many.

28. *Hyl.* I own I can make nothing of that objection: but it hath led me into another. Is it not your opinion that by our senses we perceive only the ideas existing in our minds?

Phil. It is.

Hyl. But the same idea which is in my mind cannot be in yours, or in any other mind. Doth it not therefore follow from your principles, that no two can see the same thing? And is not this highly absurd?

Phil. If the term *same* be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it is certain (and not at all repugnant to the principles I maintain) that different persons may perceive the same thing; or the same thing or idea exist in different minds[53]. Words are of arbitrary imposition; and, since men are used to apply the word *same* where no distinction or variety is perceived, and I do not pretend to alter their perceptions, it follows that, as men have said before, *several saw the same thing*, so they may, upon like occasions, still continue to use the same phrase, without any deviation either from propriety of language, or the truth of things. But, if the term *same* be used in the acceptation of philosophers. who pretend to an abstracted notion of identity, then, according to their sundry definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed wherein that philosophic identity consists), it may or may not be possible for diverse persons to perceive the same thing. But whether philosophers shall think fit to call a thing the *same* or no, is, I conceive, of small importance. Let us suppose several men together, all endued with the same faculties, and consequently affected in like sort by their senses, and who had yet never known the use of language; they would, without question, agree in their perceptions. Though perhaps, when they came to the use of speech, some regarding the uniformness of what was perceived, might call it the *same* thing: others, especially regarding the diversity of persons who perceived, might choose the denomination of *different* things. But who sees not that all the dispute is about a word? to wit, whether

what is perceived by different persons may yet have the term *same* applied to it? Or, suppose a house, whose walls or outward shell remaining unaltered, the chambers are all pulled down, and new ones, built in their place; and that you should call this the *same*, and I should say it was not the *same* house:—would we not, for all this, perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house, considered in itself? And would not all the difference consist in a sound? If you should say, We differ in our notions; for that you superadded to your idea of the house the simple abstracted idea of identity, whereas I did not; I would tell you, I know not what you mean by the *abstracted idea of identity*; and should desire you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you under stood yourself.—Why so silent, Hylas? Are you not yet satisfied men may dispute about identity and diversity, without any real difference in their thoughts and opinions, abstracted from names? Take this farther reflection with you—that whether Matter be allowed to exist or no, the case is exactly the same as to the point in hand. For, the Materialists themselves acknowledge what we immediately perceive by our senses to be our own ideas. Your difficulty, therefore, that no two see the same thing, makes equally against the Materialists and me.

29. *Hyl.* [54Ay, Philonous.] But they suppose an external archetype, to which referring their several ideas they may truly be said to perceive the same thing.

Phil. And (not to mention your having discarded those archetypes) so may you suppose an external archetype on my principles;—*external*, I mean, to your own mind; though indeed it must be supposed to exist in that mind which comprehends all things; but then, this serves all the ends of *identity*, as well as if it existed out of a mind. And I am sure you yourself will not say it is less intelligible.

Hyl. You have indeed clearly satisfied me—either that there is no difficulty at bottom in this point; or, if there be, that it makes equally against both opinions.

Phil. But that which makes equally against two contradictory opinions can be a proof against neither.

30. *Hyl.* I acknowledge it. But, after all, Philonous, when I consider the substance of what you advance against *Scepticism*, it amounts to no more than this:—We are sure that we really see, hear, feel; in a word, that we are affected with sensible impressions.

Phil. And how are we concerned any farther? I see this *cherry*, I feel it, I taste it: and I am sure *nothing* cannot be seen, or felt, or tasted: it is therefore *real*[55]. Take away the sensations of softness, moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the *cherry*. Since it is not a being distinct from sensations; a *cherry*, I say, is nothing but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by various senses: which ideas are united into one thing (or have one name given them) by the mind;—because they are observed to attend each other. Thus, when the palate is affected with such a particular taste, the sight is affected with a red colour, the touch with roundness, softness, &c. Hence, when I see, and feel, and taste, in sundry certain manners, I am sure the *cherry*, exists, or is real; its reality being in my opinion nothing abstracted from those sensations. But if, by the word *cherry* you mean an unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by its *existence* something distinct from its being perceived; then, indeed, I own, neither you nor I, nor any one else, can be sure it exists.

31. *Hyl.* But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the very same reasons against the existence of

sensible things in a mind, which you have offered against their existing in a material *substratum*?

Phil. When I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to say to them.

Hyl. Is the mind extended or unextended?

Phil. Unextended, without doubt.

Hyl. Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind?

Phil. They are.

Hyl. Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible impressions?

Phil. I believe you may.

Hyl. Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is possible there should be room for all those trees and houses to exist in your mind. Can extended things be contained in that which is unextended [56]? Or, are we to imagine impressions made on a thing void of all solidity? You cannot say objects are in your mind, as books in your study: or that things are imprinted on it, as the figure of a seal upon wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to understand those expressions? Explain me this if you can; and I shall then be able to answer all those queries you formerly put to me about my *substratum*.

Phil. Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in the mind, or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood in the gross literal sense—as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them; and that it is affected from without, or by some being distinct from itself. This is my explication of your difficulty; and how it can serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material *substratum* intelligible, I would fain know.

32. *Hyl.* Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be made of it. But are you not guilty of some abuse of language in this?

Phil. None at all. It is no more than common custom, which you know is the rule of language, hath authorized: nothing being more usual, than for philosophers to speak of the immediate objects of the understanding as things existing in the mind. Nor is there anything in this but what is conformable to the general analogy of language; most part of the mental operations being signified by words borrowed from sensible things; as is plain in the terms *comprehend*, *reflect*, *discourse*, &c., which being applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross original sense [57].

33. *Hyl.* You have, I own, satisfied me in this point. But there still remains one great difficulty, which I know not how you will get over. And, indeed, it is of such importance that if you could solve all others, without being able to find a solution for this, you must never expect to make me a proselyte to your principles.

Phil. Let me know this mighty difficulty.

Hyl. The Scripture account of the creation is what appears to me utterly irreconcilable with your notions [58]. Moses tells us of a creation: a creation of what? of ideas? No certainly, but of things, of real things, solid corporeal substances. Bring your principles to agree with this, and I shall perhaps agree with you.

Phil. Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth and sea, plants and animals. That all these do really exist, and were in the beginning created by God, I make no question. If by *idea* you mean fictions and fancies of the mind, then these are no ideas. If by *ideas* you mean immediate objects of the understanding, or sensible things which

cannot exist unperceived, or out of a mind, then these things are ideas [89]. But whether you do or do not call them *ideas* it matters little. The difference is only about a name. And, whether that name be retained or rejected, the sense, the truth, and reality of things continues the same. In common talk, the objects of our senses are not termed *ideas* but *things*. Call them so still—provided you do not attribute to them any absolute external existence—and I shall never quarrel with you for a word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been a creation of things, of *real* things. Neither is this in the least inconsistent with my principles, as is evident from what I have now said; and would have been evident to you without this, if you had not forgotten what had been so often said before. But as for solid corporeal substances, I desire you to shew where Moses makes any mention of them; and, if they should be mentioned by him, or any other inspired writer, it would still be incumbent on you to shew those words were not taken in the vulgar acceptation, for things falling under our senses, but in the philosophic acceptation, for Matter, or *an unknown quiddity, with an absolute existence*. When you have proved these points, then (and not till then) may you bring the authority of Moses into our dispute.

34. *Hyl.* It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear. I am content to refer it to your own conscience. Are you not satisfied there is some peculiar repugnancy between the Mosaic account of the creation and your notions?

Phil. If all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter of Genesis may be conceived as consistently with my principles as any other, then it has no peculiar repugnancy with them. But there is no sense you may not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, besides spirits, all you

conceive are ideas; and the existence of these I do not deny. Neither do you pretend they exist without the mind.

Hyl. Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in.

Phil. Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I should have seen things produced into being—that is become perceptible—in the order prescribed by the sacred historian. I ever before believed the Mosaic account of the creation, and now find no alteration in my manner of believing it. When things are said to begin or end their existence, we do not mean this with regard to God, but His creatures. All objects are eternally known by God, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal existence in His mind: but when things, before imperceptible to creatures, are, by a decree of God, perceptible to them, then are they said to begin a relative existence, with respect to created minds. Upon reading therefore the Mosaic account of the creation, I understand that the several parts of the world became gradually perceivable to finite spirits, endowed with proper faculties; so that, whoever such were present, they were in truth perceived by them. This is the literal obvious sense suggested to me by the words of the Holy Scripture: in which is included no mention or no thought, either of *substratum*, instrument, occasion, or absolute existence. And, upon inquiry, I doubt not it will be found that most plain honest men, who believe the creation, never think of those things any more than I. What metaphysical sense you may understand it in, you only can tell.

35. *Hyl.* But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that you allow created things, in the beginning, only a relative, and consequently hypothetical being: that is to say, upon supposition there were men to perceive them, without which they have no actuality of absolute existence wherein

creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly impossible the creation of any inanimate creature should precede that of man? And is not this directly contrary to the Mosaic account?

Phil. In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin to exist in the mind of other created intelligences beside men. You will not therefore be able to prove any contradiction between Moses and my notions, unless you first shew there was no other order of finite created spirits in being before man. I say farther, in case we conceive the creation, as we should at this time a parcel of plants or vegetables of all sorts produced, by an invisible power, in a desert where nobody was present—that this way of explaining or conceiving it is consistent with my principles, since they deprive you of nothing, either sensible or imaginable; that it exactly suits with the common, natural, and undebauched notions of mankind; that it manifests the dependence of all things on God; and consequently hath all the good effect or influence, which it is possible that important article of our faith should have in making men humble, thankful, and resigned to their [[60]great] Creator. I say, moreover, that in this naked conception of things, divested of words, there will not be found any notion of what you call the *actuality of absolute existence*. You may indeed raise a dust[61] with those terms, and so lengthen our dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you calmly to look into your own thoughts, and then tell me if they are not a useless and unintelligible jargon.

36. *Hyl.* I own I have no very clear notion annexed to them. But what say you to this? Do you not make the existence of sensible things consist in their being in a mind? And were not all things eternally in the mind of God? Did

they not therefore exist from all eternity, according to you? And how could that which was eternal be created in time? Can anything be clearer or better connected than this?

Phil. And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all things from eternity?

Hyl. I am.

Phil. Consequently they always had a being in the Divine intellect.

Hyil. This I acknowledge.

Phl. By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new, or begins to be, in respect of the mind of God. So we are agreed in that point.

Hyl. What shall we make then of the creation?

Phil. May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said to begin their existence, or be created, when God decreed they should become perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner which He then established, and we now call the laws of nature? You may call this a *relative.* or *hypothetical existence* if you please. But so long as it supplies us with the most natural, obvious, and literal sense of the Mosaic history of the creation; so long as it answers all the religious ends of that great article; in a word, so long as you can assign no other sense or meaning in its stead; why should we reject this? Is it to comply with a ridiculous sceptical humour of making everything nonsense and unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory of God. For, allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable that the corporeal world should have an absolute existence extrinsical to the mind of God, as well as to the minds of all created spirits; yet how could this set forth either the immensity or omniscience of the Deity, or the

necessary and immediate dependence of all things on Him? Nay, would it not rather seem to derogate from those attributes?

37. *Hyl.* Well, but as to this decree of God's for making things perceptible, what say you, Philonous—is it not plain, God did either execute that decree from all eternity, or at some certain time began to will what He had not actually willed before, but only designed to will? If the former, then there could be no creation or beginning of existence in finite things. If the latter, then we must acknowledge something new to befall the Deity; which implies a sort of change: and all change argues imperfection.

Phil. Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident this objection concludes equally against a creation in any sense; nay, against every other act of the Deity, discoverable by the light of nature? None of which can we conceive, otherwise than as performed in time, and having a beginning. God is a Being of transcendent and unlimited perfections: His Nature, therefore, is incomprehensible to finite spirits. It is not, therefore, to be expected, that any man, whether *Materialist* or *Immaterialist*, should have exactly just notions of the Deity, His attributes, and ways of operation. If then you would infer anything against me, your difficulty must not be drawn from the inadequateness of our conceptions of the Divine nature—which is unavoidable on any scheme, but from the denial of Matter, of which there is not one word, directly or indirectly, in what you have now objected.

38. *Hyl.* I must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned to clear are such only as arise from the non-existence of Matter, and are peculiar to that notion. So far you are in the right. But I cannot by any means bring

myself to think there is no such peculiar repugnancy between the creation and your opinion : though indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctly know.

Phil. What would you have ? Do I not acknowledge a twofold state of things—the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal ? The former was created in time ; the latter existed from everlasting in the mind of God [62]. Is not this agreeable to the common notions of devines ? Or is any more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation [63] ? But you suspect some peculiar repugnancy, though you know not where it lies. To take away all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider this one point. Either you are not able to conceive the creation on any hypothesis whatsoever ; and, if so, there is no ground for dislike or complaint against any particular opinion on that score : or you are able to conceive it ; and, if so, why not on my principles, since thereby nothing conceivable is taken away ? You have all along been allowed the full scope of sense, imagination, and reason. Whatever, therefore, you could before apprehend, either immediately or mediately by your senses, or by ratiocination from your senses ; whatever you could perceive, imagine, or understand, remains still with you. If, therefore, the notion you have of the creation by other principles be intelligible, you have it still upon mine; if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion at all ; and so there is no loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very plain that the supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown and inconceivable, cannot serve to make us conceive anything. And, I hope it need not be proved to you that if the existence of Matter doth not make the creation conceivable, the creation's being without it inconceivable can be no objection against its non-existence.

Hyl. I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this point of this creation.

39. *Phil.* I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied. You tell me indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and Immaterialism : but you know not where it lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas ? Can you expect I should solve a difficulty without knowing what it is ? But, to pass by all that, would not a man think you were assured there is no repugnancy between the received notions of Materialists and the inspired writings ?

Hyl. And so I am.

Phil. Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a plain obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the way ?

Hyl. In the plain sense, doubtless.

Phil. When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having been created by God ; think you not the sensible things commonly signified by those words are suggested to every unphilosophical reader ?

Hyl. I cannot help thinking so.

Phil. And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be denied a real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist ?

Hyl. This I have already acknowledged.

Phil. The creation, therefore, according to them, was not the creation of things sensible, which have only a relative being, but of certain unknown natures, which have an absolute being, wherein creation might terminate ?

Hyl. True.

Phil Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter destroy the plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their notions are utterly inconsistent; and instead of it obtrude on

us I know not what, something equally unintelligible to themselves and me?

Hyl. I cannot contradict you.

Phil. Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? of unknown quiddities, of occasions, or *substratum*? No, certainly; but of things obvious to the senses. You must first reconcile this with your notions, if you expect I should be reconciled to them.

Hyl. I see you can assault me with my own weapons.

40. *Phil.* Then as to *absolute existence*;—was there ever known a more jejune notion than that? Something it is so abstracted and unintelligible that you have frankly owned you could not conceive it, much less explain anything by it. But, allowing Matter to exist, and the notion of absolute existence to be as clear as light, yet, was this ever known to make the creation more credible? Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and infidels of all ages with the most plausible arguments against a creation? That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence without the minds of spirits, should be produced out of nothing, by the mere will of a Spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing so contrary to all reason, so impossible and absurd, that not only the most celebrated among the ancients, but even divers modern and Christian philosophers have thought Matter co-eternal with the Deity[64]. Lay these things together, and then judge you whether Materialism disposes men to believe the creation of things.

41. *Hyl.* I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the *creation* is the last objection I can think of; and I must needs own it hath been sufficiently answered as well as the rest. Nothing now remains to be overcome but a sort of

unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself towards your notions.

Phil. When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of the question, can this, think you, be any thing else but the effect of prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted notions[65]. And indeed in this respect I cannot deny the belief of Matter to have very much the advantage over the contrary opinion, with men of a learned education.

Hyl. I confess it seems to be as you say.

42. *Phil.* As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us throw into the scale the great advantages that arise from the belief of Immaterialism, both in regard to religion and human learning.—The being of a God, and incorruptibility of the soul[66], those great articles of religion, are they not proved with the clearest and most immediate evidence? When I say the being of a *God*, I do not mean an obscure general cause of things, whereof we have no conception, but *God*, in the strict and proper sense of the word; a Being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence, omniscience, infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous as the existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding the fallacious pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) there is no more reason to doubt than of our own being.—Then, with relation to human sciences: in Natural Philosophy, what intricacies, what obscurities, what contradictions hath the belief of Matter led men into! To say nothing of the numberless disputes about its extent, continuity, homogeneity, gravity, divisibility, &c.—do they not pretend to explain all things by bodies operating on bodies, according to the laws of motion? and yet, are they able to comprehend how one body should move another? Nay, admitting there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an inert being with a

cause, or in conceiving how an accident might pass from one body to another; yet, by all their strained thoughts and extravagant suppositions, have they been able to reach the mechanical production of any one animal or vegetable body? Can they account, by the laws of motion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours, or for the regular course of things? Have they accounted, by physical principles, for the aptitude and contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts of the universe? But laying aside Matter and corporeal causes, and admitting only the efficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not all the effects of nature easy and intelligible? If the *phenomena* are nothing else but *ideas*; God is a *spirit*, but Matter an unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they demonstrate an unlimited power in their cause; God is active and omnipotent, but Matter an inert mass. If the order, regularity, and usefulness of them can never be sufficiently admired; God is infinitely wise and provident, but Matter destitute of all contrivance and design. These surely are great advantages in *physics*[67]. Not to mention that the apprehension of a distant Deity naturally disposes men to a negligence in their moral actions, which they would be more cautious of, in case they thought Him immediately present, and acting on their minds, without the interposition of matter, or unthinking second causes.—Then in *metaphysics*[68]: what difficulties concerning entity in abstract, substantial forms[69], hylarchic principles[70], plastic natures[71], substance and accident[72], principle of individuation[73], possibility of Matter's thinking[74], origin of ideas, the manner how two independent substances so widely different as *Spirit* and *Matter*, should mutually operate on each other? what difficulties, I say, and endless disquisitions, concerning these and innumerable other the like points, do we escape, by supposing only Spirits and ideas?—Even the *mathematics*

themselves, if we take away the absolute existence of extended things, become much more clear and easy; the most shocking paradoxes and intricate speculations in those sciences depending on the infinite divisibility of finite extension, which depends on that supposition[75].—But what need is there to insist on the particular sciences? Is not that opposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and modern Sceptics, built on the same foundation? Or can you produce so much as one argument against the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of that avowed utter ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose their reality to consist in an external absolute existence? Upon this supposition, indeed, the objections from the change of colours in a pigeon's neck, or the appearance of the broken oar in the water, must be allowed to have weight. But these and the like objections vanish, if we do not maintain the being of absolute external originals, but place the reality of things in ideas, fleeting indeed, and changeable;—however, not changed at random, but according to the fixed order of nature. For, herein consists that constancy and truth of things which secures all the concerns of life, and distinguishes that which is *real* from the irregular visions of the fancy[76].

Hyl. I agree to all you have now said, and must own that nothing can incline me to embrace your opinion more than the advantages I see it is attended with. I am by nature lazy; and this would be a mighty abridgment in knowledge. What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusements, what fields of disputation, what an ocean of false learning may be avoided by that single notion of *Immaterialism*!

43. *Phil.* After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done? You may remember you promised to embrace

that opinion which upon examination should appear most agreeable to Common Sense and remote from Scepticism. This, by your own confession, is that which denies Matter, or the absolute existence of corporeal things. Nor is this all; the same notion has been proved several ways, viewed in different lights, pursued in its consequences, and all objection against it cleared. Can there be a greater evidence of its truth? or is it possible it should have all the marks of a true opinion and yet be false?

Hyl. I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects. But, what security can I have that I shall still continue the same full assent to your opinion, and that no unthought-of objection or difficulty will occur hereafter?

44. *Phil.* Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point is once evidently proved, withhold your consent on account of objections or difficulties it may be liable to? Are the difficulties that attend the doctrine of incommensurable quantities, of the angle of contact, of the asymptotes to curves, or the like, sufficient to make you hold out against mathematical demonstration? Or will you disbelieve the Providence of God, because there may be some particular things which you know not how to reconcile with it? If there are difficulties attending *Immaterialism*, there are at the same time direct and evident proofs of it. But for the existence of Matter there is not one proof, and far more numerous and insurmountable objections lie against it. But where are those mighty difficulties you insist on? Alas! you know not where or what they are; something which may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a sufficient pretence for withholding your full assent, you should never yield it to any proposition, how free soever from exceptions, how clearly and solidly soever demonstrated.

Hyl. You have satisfied me, Philonous.

45. *Phil.* But, to arm you against all future objections, do but consider—that which bears equally hard on two contradictory opinions can be proof against neither. Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try, if you can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the *Materialists*. Be not deceived by words; but sound your own thoughts. And in case you cannot conceive it easier by the help of *Materialism*, it is plain it can be no objection against *Immaterialism*. Had you proceeded all along by this rule, you would probably have spared yourself abundance of trouble in objecting; since of all your difficulties I challenge you to shew one that is explained by Matter: nay, which is not more unintelligible with than without that supposition, and consequently makes rather *against* than *for* it. You should consider, in each particular, whether the difficulty arises from the *non-existence of Matter*. If it doth not, you might as well argue from the infinite divisibility of extension against the Divine prescience, as from such a difficulty against *Immaterialism*. And yet, upon recollection, I believe you will find this to have been often if not always the case. You should likewise take heed not to argue on a *petitio principii*. One is apt to say, the unknown substances ought to be esteemed real things, rather than the ideas in our minds: and who can tell but the unthinking external substance may concur as a cause or instrument in the productions of our ideas? But, is not this proceeding on a supposition that there are such external substances? And to suppose this, is it not begging the question? But, above all things, you should beware of imposing on yourself by that vulgar sophism which is called *ignoratio elenchi*. You talked often as if you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible Things:—whereas

in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of their existence than I am: and it is you who doubt; I should have said, positively deny it. Everything that is seen, felt, heard, or any way perceived by the senses, is on the principles I embrace, a real being, but not yours. Remember, the Matter you contend for is an unknown somewhat (if indeed it may be termed *somewhat*), which is quite stripped of all sensible qualities, and can neither be perceived by sense, nor apprehended by the mind. Remember, I say, that it is not any object which is hard or soft, hot or cold, blue or white, round or square, &c.;—for all these things I affirm do exist. Though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct from being perceived; or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever. Think on these points; let them be attentively considered and still kept in view. Otherwise you will not comprehend the state of the questions; without which your objections will always be wide of the mark, and, instead of mine, may possibly be directed (as more than once they have been) against your own notions.

46. *Hyl.* I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from agreeing with you more than this same *mistaking the question*. In denying Matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the things we see and feel: but, upon reflection, find there is no ground for it. What think you, therefore, of retaining the name *Matter*, and applying it to *sensible things?* This may be done without any change in your sentiments: and, believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them to some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in opinion.

Phil. With all my heart: retain the word *Matter*, and apply it to the objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them any subsistence distinct from their

being perceived. I shall never quarrel with you for an expression. *Matter* or *material substance*, are terms introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort of independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a mind: but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the names of all particular things, with the terms *sensible*, *substance*, *body*, *stuff*, and the like, are retained, the word *Matter* should be never missed in common talk. And in philosophical discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite out: since there is not, perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved bent of the mind towards Atheism than the use of that general confused term.

47. *Hyl.* Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the notion of an unthinking substance exterior to the mind, I think you ought not to deny me the privilege of using the word *Matter* as I please, and annexing it to a collection of sensible qualities subsisting only in the mind. I freely own there is no other substance, in a strict sense, than *Spirit*. But I have been so long accustomed to the term *Matter* that I know not how to part with it. To say, there is no *Matter* in the world, is still shocking to me. Whereas to say—There is no *Matter*, if by that term be meant, an unthinking substance existing without the mind; but if by *Matter* is meant some sensible thing, whose existence consists in being perceived, then there is *Matter*:—this distinction gives it quite another turn; and men will come into your notions with small difficulty, when they are proposed in that manner. For, after all, the controversy about *Matter* in the strict acceptation of it lies altogether between you and the philosophers: whose principles, I acknowledge, are not near so natural, or so

agreeable to the common sense of mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours. There is nothing we either desire or shun but as it makes, or is apprehended to make, some part of our happiness or misery. But what hath happiness or misery, joy or grief, pleasure or pain, to do with Absolute Existence; or with unknown entities, abstracted from all relation to us? It is evident, things regard us only as they are pleasing or displeasing: and they can please or displease only so far forth as they are perceived. Farther, therefore, we are not concerned; and thus far you leave things as you found them. Yet still there is something new in this doctrine. It is plain, I do not now think with the philosophers, nor yet altogether with the vulgar. I would know how the case stands in that respect; precisely, what you have added to, or altered in my former notions.

48. *Phil.* I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions. My endeavours tend only to unite and place in a clearer light that truth which was before shared between the vulgar and the philosophers:—the former being of opinion, that *those things they immediately perceive are the real things*; and the latter, that *the things immediately perceived are ideas which exist only in the mind.* Which two notions put together, do, in effect, constitute the substance of what I advance[77].

Hyl. I have been a long time distrusting my senses; methought I saw things by a dim light and through false glasses. Now the glasses are removed and a new light breaks in upon my understanding. I am clearly convinced that I see things in their native forms, and am no longer in pain about their *unknown natures* or *absolute existence.* This is the state I find myself in at present; though, indeed, the course that brought me to it I do not yet thoroughly comprehend. You set out upon the same principles that

Academics, Cartesians, and the like sects usually do, and for a long time it looked as if you were advancing their Philosophical Scepticism; but, in the end, your conclusions are directly opposite to theirs.

Phil. You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is forced upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which it breaks, and falls back into the basin from whence it rose: its ascent as well as descent proceeding from the same uniform law or principle of *gravitation*. Just so, the same principles which, at first view, lead to Scepticism, pursued to a certain point, bring men back to Common Sense[78].

NOTES.

——:o:——

THE PREFACE.

Section 3. The prevalent views among philosophers lead to scepticism and paradoxes. They suppose that our sensations are due to some *unknown substance*, whose nature, *unperceived* and *unperceiving*, can not but be a great source of perplexity to all inquirers. Consequently Berkeley thinks that a careful investigation about this *substance* is necessary, in order to save us from vain pursuits and perplexities. The task that he proposes to himself is stated in section 3, and the consequences which he expects to follow from the principles that he hopes to establish are enumerated in section 6.

Berkeley protests against all empty abstractions, speculations without any practical bearing, and hopes by establishing correct ideas as to the true nature of things, the all-pervading existence of God, and the immortality of the human soul, to promote the cause of virtue and religion (Section 9).

The preface appears in the first and second editions only.

THE FIRST DIALOGUE.

1 Note the art with which the subject is introduced. Hylas is deeply engrossed in thought. The subject is one of such importance that even his sleep in the night has been disturbed. And all the sights and sounds of a charming morning fail to attract him. He would not even have his friend interrupt the flow of his meditations. Note the further art shown in making the vulgar conception of Berkeley's own thesis, *viz.*, there is no such thing as Matter, the cause of this mental perturbation.

2 'Material substance.' It should be clearly understood what Berkeley is arguing against here. It is the belief that our sensations and perceptions represent some *extra-mental reality*, that, *e. g.*, what we see does not exist only as a sensation, but as an existence beyond and quite independent of my or any mind. This reality we never come in contact with, but it nevertheless exists. The qualities that we become acquainted with have a *substratum* in which they

inhere, of which they are the qualities. This *substratum*, however, is not an object of immediate perception. Berkeley contends that this substratum is something abstract, and consequently an uncalled-for and unauthorised assumption. He admits the reality of *sensible things*, he denies that of *abstract Matter*. (Cf. *Principles*, § 35.)

3 'Sceptic.' This word literally means 'one reflecting.' Berkeley here attributes two significations to it, *viz.*, (1) one who holds his mind in suspense and can not decide positively, (2) one who denies the reality and truth of things. Hence, according to the first interpretation, a person who denies the existence of Matter absolutely, can not be a 'sceptic'; according to the second, if it can be proved that Matter does not exist, then a person maintaining that it does exist, will properly be a 'sceptic'.

4 Here begins the proof that all sensible things are mental. This thesis is proved by taking several instances of so-called sensible things and demonstrating that they are mere forms of pleasure and pain, which as such can not exist in any *senseless unthinking* substratum. The student should consider whether all our sensations can be resolved into feelings of pleasure and pain. A sensation of heat may be attended with a feeling of pain, but does that warrant us to conclude that the sensation and the feeling are identical? (See Sully, *The Human Mind*, vol. II., p. 7 ff.)

5 It is doubtful psychology to speak of a mental state as 'simple' or 'uncompounded.' It is essentially a complex process, though it is grasped as a unity. (In fact, our conscious life is a continuous flow of changes, a *stream*, as Prof. James happily terms it, and each concrete mental state is a "triple process" in which the three functions of knowing, feeling, and willing cooperate and interact. Sully, *The Human Mind*, vol. I., p. 69). A feeling as such is simple, but so also is the sensation which it accompanies. The difficulty in this case arises from the word *heat* being ambiguous; cf., *e.g.*, the two expressions, 'Fire is *hot*' and 'I am *hot*.'

The following extract from Wundt is pertinent: "It seems to have been regarded as a difficulty that one and the same simple process should be called both sensation and feeling. But it has been forgotten that joy and sorrow, hope and anxiety, and all the other 'feelings' are really states of mind which are affective only so far as they have reference to the feeling subject; while in other respects they depend upon ideas which objectively regarded are entirely empty of feeling. The simple sense-feeling in particular is contained *in* the sensation; and it is just as incorrect to say, 'Feelings alone are primitive,' as to say, 'We have at first simply sensations.' The ultimate fact is, that we

sense and feel. The logical separation of feeling from sensation can only come about after we have distinguished subject from object. Then, and then only, is the elementary process of sensation analysed into a subjective factor, the feeling, and into an objective factor, the sensation. The sense-feeling may in this way be considered as an integral element of the sensation itself; and for that reason it is also termed the *affective tone of sensation.*" *(Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology*, Creighton and Titchener, p. 212).

As for *idea* used in the meaning of 'sensation,' see note 28 below.

6 'Indolence,' *i.e.*, a neutral state of feeling, which is neither pleasurable nor painful. Whether there is any indifferent feeling is a point of controversy. (Cf. Bain, *The Emotions and the Will*, p. 13 ff.; Ladd, *Elements of Physiological Psychology*, p. 509 ff. Prof. Sully also refers to *Mind*, XIII. p. 80 ff., p. 248 ff., XIV. p. 97 ff.) Does the contention that warmth is an 'indolence,' and not a pleasure, save Hylas' point?

7 But a standard may be found in a third thing, *e. g.*, in a thermometer. In this we measure heat by motion. With Berkeley, however, the motion and the sense of heat are equally subjective (phenomenal).

8 The pin causes a pricking sensation, but the sensation is not in the pin. Now, why does the pin prick, and why does not this table, *e. g.*, prick? You say, it pricks because it has a particular form. But is that form merely mental? Again, I touch a wall now, it is cool; I touch it after an hour, it is hot. Of course, there is a difference between my two sensations; does not this justify me in supposing that there is some objective alteration corresponding to that mental difference?

9 Cf. *Principles*, § 14. Is it not possible to argue that it is the affection of the palate which changes the taste? So Aristotle says, "everything seems bitter to the sick because the tongue with which they taste is filled with flavour of this bitter character" (*Psychology*, Wallace, p. 117). See *Siris*, § 311.

10 Is sound "merely a vibrative or undulatory motion in the air," or is that motion the cause of the sound? The vibrations alone cannot be called 'sound,' as indeed Hylas has to admit further on.

11 Cf. *Alciphron*, Dialogue IV.:

"*Euphranor.* For your further conviction, do but consider that crimson cloud. Think you that, if you were in the very place where it is, you would perceive anything like what you now see?

Alciphron. By no means. I should perceive only a dark mist."

12 The student will remember Pope:—

All seems infected that th' infected spy,
As all looks yellow to the jaundiced eye.

Essay on Criticism, 558—9.

With what precedes cf. *Essay on Vision*, § 80.

13 Some philosophical writers incline to think that colour has a reality outside the mind. Dr. McCosh thinks that it is "an extraorganic cause of an organic affection." In *Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation* (p. 165), he points to "a number of phenomena, which seem to show that colour is a reality in the object, which reality is made known to us by means of the reflection of the beam by the colour. When the undivided beam falls on the green leaves of a plant, the green beam is reflected and reaches our eye, and the red is absorbed, not to be lost, but to come out in russet bark, or red flower, or berry." (*Intuitions of the Mind*, pp. 122-3.) The same thing appears *red* to me which appears *green* to another person (suppose colour-blind). Can there be then any real (extra-phenomenal) colour there? Cf. Huxley's *Lay Sermons*, pp. 233-4.

14 The old idea regarding light (propounded by Newton, and called the 'corpuscular theory') was that it consisted of very minute particles emitted by a luminous body, and propagated in right lines with an almost infinite velocity. But men of science in modern times have come unanimously to the conclusion that it consists of waves which traverse an extremely subtle, elastic medium pervading space and called the luminiferous ether. This theory is known as the 'undulatory,' and was first adopted and advocated by Young. Thus the propagation of light is effected not by "a motion of *translation* of particles of light thrown out by the luminous body, as a bullet is discharged from a gun;...there is no progressive motion of the particles themselves, but only of the state of disturbance which was communicated by the luminous body; it is a motion of *oscillation*, and, like the propagation of waves in water, takes place by a series of vibrations." (Ganot.)

15 The Qualities of Matter were divided into *primary* (called also *objective* and *mathematical*) and *secondary* by Locke. See *Essay*, Bk. II. Chap. viii. The *primary* are found in body in whatever state it be (Locke), and they are so called because our senses give us a direct knowledge of them (Reid). The *secondary* qualities are organic affections implying by inference an extra-organic cause (McCosh). The first are not dependent upon our perception; they make known to us, and are in, the external reality. The second exist simply in our animated and sentient frames, and indicate to us their states. The primary qualities ac-

cording to Locke are solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number. (See also Introduction.) Modern realists generally reduce the number to two, Extension and Resistance. Berkeley here tries to prove that the primary, no less than the secondary, qualities are but mental affections.

Sir W. Hamilton in his edition of Reid divides the qualities of Matter into primary, secundo-primary, and secondary (Note D. pp. 825-75). Prof. Monck gives the following brief account: "The primary are all resolvable into, and deducible from, the fundamental element, *occupation of space;* and space being *a priori* as well as empirical, they are to a great extent *a priori* and dependent on the intellect alone. We perceive them in our organism. The secundo-primary qualities are all reducible to resistance to our locomotive volition, and are perceived by means of the locomotive faculty. They alone are immediately perceived, according to Hamilton, in extra-organic bodies. The secondary qualities, like the primary, are affections of our organism, but when taken alone do not include any direct reference to space, and are perceived in the organism rather as a sensitive or animated, than as an extended or material, organism." (*Sir William Hamilton*, p. 189.)

16 Cf. "But it is evident, from what we have already shown, that extension, figure, and motion are only ideas existing in the mind, and that an idea can be like nothing but another idea, and that consequently neither they nor their archetypes can exist in an unperceiving substance." (*Principles*, § 9.)

17 Here Philonous suggests that extension is the original and fundamental quality of matter. This was in accordance with the prevailing Cartesian philosophy. Descartes defined Matter as the extended substance. But other philosophers have laid more stress on Force or Energy, and described this as the primordial element. Even Locke says, "powers make a great part of our complex ideas of substances" (*Essay*, II. xxiii, 7-10). Leibniz worked out the theory fully; he found extension could not explain the phenomena of motion and inertia, and declared the nature of substance to consist in self-active power and individuality; his monads are centres and bearers of force, and exist only as points in the physical world of space. In our own days, Herbert Spencer will be found to emphasise the "persistence of force." The Scottish philosophers generally solve the difficulty by recognising Extension and Resistance as co-ordinate qualities. (Cf., *e. g.*, McCosh's *Intuitions, passim.*) The point is that Forceless Matter as well as Formless Matter is a non-entity.

18 Here Berkeley seems to recognise the distinction between sensation and feeling that we have indicated in notes 4 and 5 above. A sensation does not necessarily connote pleasure or pain.

19 For Absolute Motion and Space, cf. *Principles*, §§ 111-7, *Siris*, § 270.

20 *I. e.* all differences of species and number, to use the language of the mediæval philosophers. Things would tend to assimilate under a common abstract form if differentiating features did not keep them apart as individuals.

21 'Everything which exists is particular.' A scholastic maxim, maintained by Roscellinus. In the Middle Ages one of the great problems was, 'How far can reality be attributed to our general notions?' The Nominalists, headed by the philosopher named, ascribed substantiality only to the individual, and held universal notions to be mere names, *flatus vocis (universalia sunt post res)*. The Realists, headed by Anselm (? 1035-1093), on the other hand, maintained the objective reality of the universals (*universalia sunt ante res*). An intermediate theory was started by Abelard (b. 1079), who held that while the universal existed only in thought, it had also an objective reality in the things themselves (*universalia sunt in rebus*). See Erdmann, *History of Philosophy*, Vol. I., §§ 158—60. Cf. *Principles*, Intro. 15. The controversy is not yet obsolete. The Realists maintain to-day as stoutly as ever that the individual alone is real. But the idea which underlies an individual and is permanent seems to be *real* in a higher sense than any temporary and necessarily imperfect embodiment of it can possibly be.

22 Berkeley argues that we know Extension or Motion only relatively; our knowledge is either of the great or small, either of the swift or slow. And as nothing can be composed of such contradictory qualities no absolute Extension or Motion exists. Cf. *Principles*, § 11. Does it follow, however, "that the Extension, which, viewed apart from the sense-perceptions of individual sentients, is 'neither great nor small' imaginably; or the Motion which, so viewed, is neither swift nor slow, must absolutely, or in the light of perfect intelligence, be 'nothing at all'?" Also, "can the idea of motion be resolved into experience of *successive* phenomena of any kind?" (Fraser.)

23 'The possibility of abstract geometry, or a necessary science of the laws of space' was the question which led Kant to analyse perception and give an account of Space in his 'Æsthetic.' For further remarks by Berkeley on this subject, see *Principles*, Intro. 15—6, §§ 118—32, *Essay on Vision*, § 124, &c. According to him the geometer does not abstract, but considers only particular figures and extends his proof to all that may be similar.

24 Berkeley argues against abstract ideas that they are impossible, since we can form no mental pictures of them. Abstract ideas are, however, intellectual relations, and as such can not be realised either in perception or in imagination. But they are none the less based upon reality. In Dr. Carus's

words, "the facts of nature are specie and our abstract thoughts are bills which serve to economise the process of an exchange of thought" (*Fundamental Problems*, p. 18). The question is a large one. (Cf. Mansel, *Metaphysics*, pp. 214-20.) It may be yet noted here that there seem to be some *generic* ideas as distinguished from *specific* ideas. One probably often has a concept in his mind, which contains "no attribute which is incompatible with the intuitive presentation of its object" (Mansel). For instance, I may form an idea of an animal, which is "no copy of any one specimen, but more or less, a mean of the series," something like a composite photograph. See Huxley's *Hume*, pp. 95-7; Prof. Sully refers us to F. Galton's *Inquiries into Human Faculty*, Appendix, "Generic Images." For Berkeley's view, the student should read the Introduction to the *Principles of Human Knowledge*. This exposure by Berkeley of the absurdity of abstract ideas (= images), Hume called "one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that has been made of late years in the republic of letters."

25 'Repugnancy' = Contradiction.

26 It is, of course, true that extension or motion is never known as divested of all other sensible qualities. But is it not possible that there may be some *potential* existence independent of our ideas, to which when *actualised* in sense the primary qualities are attributed? Cf. *Siris*, § 312.

27 Hylas is not quite clear about 'sensation' and 'object.' The act of perceiving a colour is not the same as the sensation of that colour, nor is the tulip the same as the sensation. To speak unphilosophically, there is a tulip, something in it produces a sensation of colour in me, and I perceive it.

It may be here added that Berkeley does not seem to distinguish between the sensation and the percept. *E. g.*, the smell of a rose signifies two things, "first a sensation, which can have no existence but when it is perceived, and can only be in a sentient being or mind; secondly, it signifies some power, quality, or virtue in the rose, or in effluvia proceeding from it, which hath a permanent existence, independent of the mind, and which, by the constitution of nature, produces the sensation in us. By the original constitution of our nature, we are both led to believe that there is a permanent cause of the sensation, and prompted to seek after it; and experience determines us to place it in the rose." (Reid, *Inquiry*, ch. II., §§ 8-9.) Cf. *Vindication*, § 9.

28 'Idea.' This word has been the source of much confusion in philosophy. It would be interesting to trace the different significations in which it has been used by different thinkers. With Plato *ideas* meant the fundamental essences, the constitutive archetypes of things, in virtue of which they are what

they are. Gradually this sense was lost, and with Descartes and Locke the word came to be used indefinitely for any sense-phenomena or mental affection present in consciousness. (See note in Veitch's *Descartes*.) Berkeley in his earlier works accepted this significance; but in *Siris* he, in a Platonic spirit, made *ideas*='universal relations', and restricted *phenomena* to mean 'sensations' or "appearances in the soul or mind" (§ 251).

29 Perception is the process of objectifying and localising a sensation. Prof. Sully analyses it into 1st. the differentiation and assimilation of a particular sensation, 2nd. a process of integrative association, 3rd. a germ of representation or ideation. (*The Human Mind*, Vol. I., p. 209 ff.) Locke and Berkeley regard 'perception' as simply equivalent to phenomena, mental or material. Berkeley develops this into (acquired) perception of things in space, by the aid of 'suggestion,' and still higher, into scientific induction. In *Essay*, Bk. IV., Locke uses 'perception' to signify a knowledge of relations.

It may be questioned if a sensation is purely mental, without any 'external' reference. (Cf. note 27 *ante*.) Are we not conscious in every act of sensation, not merely of the mind as affected, but of an organic affection, which we localise in perception? "I hold," says Hamilton, "with Aristotle—indeed with philosophers in general—that sensation is an affection neither of the body alone nor of the mind alone, but of the composite of which each is a constituent." (*Reid's Works*, p. 884.)

30 But are we altogether passive in our perception of light? Does the mind not act at all when we have such a perception? Is not mind implied in every perception? Does not the mind recognise each as *its* perception? With Ferrier the object of knowledge "always is, and must be, the object with the addition of one's self,—object *plus* subject—thing, or thought, *mecum*" (*Institutes of Metaphysics*, prop. ii). Some German idealists seem so to emphasise the activity of the ego as hardly to leave room for anything else.

Further, the perception of a smell or colour depends upon the mind, but the particularity of the smell or colour is independent of it. And the true question is not whether the perception of that smell or colour exists in any external substance, but whether there is anything in that substance which can cause in us the perception, and cause it to be of this particular sensation and not of that.

31 'With variety of sensation.' We should now say, 'with *a* variety.'

32 'Substance' (Lat. *substantia*)—may be "viewed as derived from *subsistendo*, and as meaning *ens per se subsistens* [being existing of itself]; or it

may be viewed as the basis of attributes, in which sense it may be regarded as derived from *substando*, and *id quod substat accidentibus*." (Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysics*, VIII.) Spinoza's definition is historically important: "I understand by substance that which is in itself, and conceived by itself; that is to say, that of which the concept can be formed without having need of the concept of any other thing." (*Ethics*, p. 1., def. 3.)

33 One of the most important questions raised by Berkeley is, supposing there were no perceiving subjects, would there be any 'object' at all. The vulgar belief is that the material world is quite independent of perceiving mind, and would continue to exist as now if all minds were to be annihilated. I can not, however, conceive anything existing solitary and unperceived, Berkeley argues, for *I* am conceiving it all the while that I suppose it to exist so. Cf. *Principles*, § 23.

34 Cf. *Principles*, § 23. As Dr. Fraser suggests, there seems to be a confusion of existence in *sense* with existence in *imagination* here; "what we imagine exists, but it exists only subjectively—not as part of the universal system of ordered or objective things."

35 'Scruples remain,' *i. e.*, scruples *which* remain.

36 'Suggest.' This word does not seem to have been here used in its more usual sense, which, *e. g.*, it seems to bear further on in § 50. Of course, there is a sense in which we may speak of our visual sensations *suggesting* our tactual sensations (on Berkeley's own principles). But Berkeley does not seem to recognise any intimations that "result from the original frame of the human mind" (Stewart), and with him, Fraser says, "'suggestion' means *Habit*, but implies habit that is unconsciously rational." Prof. Seth distinguishes between 'suggestion' as used by Berkeley and as used by Reid, *Scottish Philosophy*, pp. 79—80.

37 Berkeley's theory of vision has been sketched in the Introduction. The following sentence from the *Principles* will be illustrative as well as explanatory. "Visible ideas are the language whereby the Governing Spirit on whom we depend informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in case we excite this or that motion in our bodies" (§ 44). It has been already pointed out in the Introduction that Berkeley's identification of outness with distance is a fatal flaw in his doctrine. Have I not a sense of outness when, say, my hand is in immediate contact with a table (without any appreciable distance between)? Further, "distance means degree of outness of one thing from another; but it presupposes outness as a fact and a conception" (Veitch, *Hamilton*, p. 187).

38 These remarks have been borne out by the observation of persons born blind whose eyesight was subsequently restored by means of operation. In one case, Dr. Cheselden's, the patient "thought all objects whatever touched his eyes, as what he felt did his skin," and could not distinguish the shapes of objects by sight alone. Dr. Franz's patient could not distinguish solids from planes, and took a sphere for a disc. Cases will be found collected in Hamilton, *Lect. on Met.*, II., p. 176 *seq.* See also Abbott's *Sight and Touch*. These observations seem to establish that the eye takes in surface and superficial figure at once, but can not discern solid objects at definite distances as normal adults see them. Prof. James has recently vigorously contended that distance is a genuinely optical feeling, and visual experience alone is adequate for its measurement (*Principles of Psychology*, II., ch. xx).

39 Cf. *Essay on Vision*: "It is, I think, agreed by all that Distance of itself, and immediately, can not be seen. For distance being a line directed endwise to the eye, it projects only one point in the fund of the eye—which point remains invariably the same whether the distance be longer or shorter" (§ 2). But this applies only to space in its three dimensions. The eye does not immediately perceive *depth* or *thickness*. The case, however, of superficial extension is different, for there the line forms an angle not right with the eye.

40 This latter hypothesis is what is known as the Ideal or Representative theory of External Perception. We do not see the real object itself; we only perceive a *tertium quid* (a third something), an idea which represents the unperceived externality.

41 This is a crude form of the Ideal Theory. But it has the sanction of Locke, who speaks of our ideas of the primary qualities of Matter being "resemblances" of these qualities. (*Essay*, II., viii., § 15).

M. Binet, in a suggestive article on "Sensation and the Outer World," says, "Nothing resembles less the external object than the excitation it propagates in our nervous substance. What resemblance is there, for example, between the head of a pin that lies beneath my finger, and the physico-chemical phenomenon that passes through the sensitive fibres of my hand and that reaches my brain through the spinal marrow, where it gives rise to the conscious perception of a pin. Plainly, here are phenomena entirely dissimilar. It follows, therefore, that if there is a fact, at the present day, firmly established, it is that the sensations we experience upon contact with external objects are in no particular the copy of those objects. There is nothing outside of my eye that is like colour or light, nothing outside of my organ of hearing that is like noise or sound, nothing outside of my sense of touch that is like hardness or softness or resistance, nothing outside of my sense of smell that is like a perfume,

nothing apart from my sense of taste that is like a flavour." (*Open Court*, No. 83.) The nervous system, however, must preserve certain features of the phenomena it makes us aware of, otherwise different objects would be indistinguishable.

42 The theory that our perceptions are likenesses or pictures of the things perceived presents a further difficulty, which is well brought out by G. H. Lewes. "Perception is the the identity (in the metaphysical sense of the word) of the ego and the non-ego—the *tertium quid* of two united forces: as water is the identity of oxygen and hydrogen. The ego can never have any knowledge of the non-ego, in which it (the ego) is not indissolubly bound up; as oxygen never can unite with hydrogen to form water, without merging itself and the hydrogen in a *tertium quid*. Let us suppose the oxygen endowed with a consciousness of its changes. It would attribute the change *not* to hydrogen, *but to water*, *i. e.*, to hydrogen and oxygen: because it could only know the hydrogen. In its consciousnesses it would find the state named water (perception), which would be very unlike its own state (the ego): and it would suppose that this state, so unlike its own, was a representation of that which caused it. . . . We say then that although the hydrogen can only exist to the oxygen (in the above case) in the identity of both, as water; this is no proof that hydrogen does not exist under some other relations to the *other* forces. So although, the non-ego cannot exist in relation to mind otherwise than in the identity of the two (perception); there is no sort of proof that it does not exist to other beings under quite different relations." (*Biog. Hist. of Phil.* Series II. Fourth Epoch, chap. 3.)

43 Cf. *Principles*, § 8. Berkeley assumes to have proved that there is no difference between the primary and the secondary qualities. He now argues that external things must be *like* our ideas (of secondary qualities). But ideas alone are like ideas. Consequently external things are ideas. The assumption that lies at the basis here is that the cause must be *like* its effect.

THE SECOND DIALOGUE.

1 It is an old belief that the brain is in some sort or other the organ of the mind. It has been called the centre of intelligence in us. Every impression on the afferent nerves is transmitted to the brain, and the reaction there is followed (or accompained) by sensations in the mind. Attempts have also been made to localise our various faculties in different parts of the brain, and Descartes even went so far as to fix on the pineal gland as the seat of the soul. See note 3 below.

2 The argument is this: The brain is either a sensible thing or not. In

the latter case it is inconceivable. In the former case it is an *idea* ; consequently all so-called impressions on it are ideas imprinted on an idea, and these can not possibly cause *all* ideas (including that of the brain itself).

3 The position here controverted is that of the materialist, and it is practically accepted by the biological school of philosophical writers at the present time. "You reason too hastily," says David Hume in his *Treatise on Human Nature*, "when, from the mere consideration of ideas, you conclude that 'tis impossible motion can ever produce thought, or a different position of parts give rise to a different passion or reflection. Nay, 'tis not only possible we may have such an experience, but 'tis certain we have it ; since every one may perceive that the different dispositions of the body change his thoughts and sentiments. And should it be said that this depends on the union of soul and body I would answer, that we must separate the question concerning the substance of the mind from that concerning the cause of its thought ; and that confining ourselves to the latter question, we find by the comparing their ideas, that thought and motion are different from each other, and by experience, that they are constantly united ; which, being all the circumstances that enter into the idea of cause and effect, when applied to the operations of matter, we may certainly conclude that motion may be, and actually is, the cause of thought and perception." It, however, does not follow, because molecular changes of the nervous apparatus are correlated with mental operations, that "the materials of consciousness are *products* of cerebral activity." As Prof. Sully well says, "the phenomena of consciousness are *sui generis*," the mind is not a function of the brain. Moreover, if it be conceded that neural concomitants sometimes determine our mental states, it must be admitted that our volitions and feelings are also responsible for changes in our bodily organism. This causal interaction is well brought out by Ladd in his *Elements of Physiological Psychology*, Pt. iii., ch. iii. For theories of body and mind, the student may consult, among others, Bain and Calderwood.

4 'Real' = "*absolute, i. e.* unperceived and unimagined in any mind" (Fraser).

5 'In stones and minerals' in first and second editions (Fraser); whom we have followed in placing later additions and omissions within square brackets.

6 'Erratic' = Wandering (Latin sense). Common, among others, in Shakspere and Milton.

7 'Which was almost slipt from my thoughts.' We should probably now say *had slipt*.

8 This beautiful passage one should have expected to make against

Berkeley's position. Berkeley, however, holds that his theory alone helps our belief that all we perceive is *real*. For, are not all sensible things immediately perceived and must not all that is immediately perceived be really existent? If you say that the true reality is an unknown and unknowable substance, of which our ideas are representations, then do you not reduce the reality of sensible things to a phantom? It must, however, be clearly understood that the sensible things, the reality of which Berkeley upholds, are our ideas, and nothing more.

9 The argument is that sensible things have reality, and that they are not dependent on my will: consequently, since ideas must be perceived in order to exist, these exist in the mind of a perceiving spirit. This spirit is God. Therefore the very existence of sensible things is a direct proof of the existence of God. This proof Berkeley considers conclusive against atheists and sceptics. Cf. *Principles*, §§ 29-33, 90-4, 146-8; also the Dialogue on 'Divine Visual Language' in *Alciphron* (IV).

10 'Most evident principle,' viz., 'sensible things do *really* exist,' and are *external* and *permanent*.

11 Atheism may result either from a misapplication of the law of causation, or from an attempt at a material construction of the world. People have argued that everything must have a cause, every cause a cause, so that we can never reach a final cause, but are landed in an infinite regress of causes. This is the Sceptical belief in the progression of all reasoning to infinity.

The Atomists, on the other hand, "derived all phenomenal specific quality from a primeval infinitude of original constituents, which alike in quality, were unlike in quantity" (Schwegler). These atoms fill the infinite void, and by their chance collisions and combinations form worlds. Democritus is the most considerable Atomist philosopher, Lucretius the best known.

12 Vanini, Lucilio (1586-1619), an Italian philosopher, who had a pantheistic enthusiasm for nature, and, *inter alia*, wrote "Of the wonderful secrets of the Queen and Goddess of Mortals, Nature." He also maintained against the Schools, that it was possible for the same thing to be at once true to the dogma and false to reason. He was accused of heresy and perished at the stake.

13 Hobbes, Thomas (1588-1679.) His system has been considered akin to the Atomist theory. He conceives the world as a *plenum*, constituted by solid visible bodies and minute particles (both moving), and a most fluid ether which does not move. It is the atoms, invisible in themselves, by whose

aggregation visible bodies must be supposed compounded. As Erdmann puts it, "Not only in the case of beings without sensation, but also in the case of those so endowed, all phenomena are only differently complicated movements." "Philosophy is only concerned with the corporeal as the only kind of existence." Incorporeal substances are four-cornered circles; and though he admits a seed of religion in all, he denies God to be an object of knowledge or philosophy, apart from the fact that men of great piety have ascribed corporeality to Him. Cf. Robertson's *Hobbes* (Blackwood), pp. 98-9, a book where the student will find an excellent summary of this philosophy.

14 Spinoza, Baruch (1632-1677). He reduced Descartes' views to monism, held that two *finite substances* were contradictory, and strove to prove that Extension and Thought were but necessary attributes of the *unica substantia*, God. How far his pantheism can be identified with atheism (as has been done by Hume and others), this is not the place to discuss. It will be sufficient for our present purpose to quote two well-weighed sentences from Dr. Martineau: "Spinoza knows no God other than the total extension and thought of the universe of extended and thinking beings." "His guarded language can not disguise the fact that, for him, it is not Mind that gives birth to Nature but Nature that gives birth to Mind."

15 "The present existence of something implies the eternal existence of Mind, if Something must exist eternally, and if Being, as such, involves Mind. Berkeley's Natural Theology comes to this, grounded as it is in the very *existence* of sensible things, apart from marks of design" (Fraser).

16 This principle of Malebranche is frequently referred to with disapprobation by Berkeley. Cf. for instance, *Alciphron*: "I was aware, indeed, of a certain metaphysical hypothesis of our seeing all things in God by the union of the human soul with the intelligible substance of the Deity, which neither I nor any one else could make sense of." (Dial. IV.) Descartes had held that Matter and Mind were two quite distinct substances. To explain how the latter communicated with the former, Malebranche argued that since in God, the Creator, all ideas subsist, and because God is in intimate omnipresence with our minds, we see all things in Him; He is the place of all spirits, as space is the place of all bodies. (See Introduction.) With Berkeley, we do not perceive things by perceiving God, but we perceive phenomena which appear to us in an ordered succession determined by the will of God. The phenomena 'suggest' to him God. Malebranche seems to merge individuality into the Divine substance. Berkeley recognises the independence of individual spirits; we do not see the same archetypal ideas in the mind of God, but

the numerically distinct though similar perception in the mind of each person. Cf. Fraser's *Berkeley* (Blackwood), pp. 110-2. Both are at one, however, in holding that God alone is the active force in the world, and that no individual thing is efficiently operative (Windelband, *Hist. of Phil.*, p. 471), and in *Siris*, Berkeley will be found to approach Malebranche's standpoint even closer.

17 First added in the third edition.

18 A favourite text with Berkeley (*Acts*, XVII. 28). Dr. Fraser notes on another passage: "Because, on the view of things here mentioned, God really animates the whole sensible universe, like as a man animates the movements of his own body; and God uses the physical system too as the subordinate symbol or sacrament of the spiritual agency that is externalised in it, all its 'natural' changes being resolved into the Supreme Will. The course of nature would thus be throughout supernatural."

19 Berkeley nowhere maintains that my individual percepts exist independently of me or any perceiving agent. They may be *signs* of power without us.

20 I can imagine other spirits, finite and Infinite, because I am spiritual; but unperceived and unperceiving Matter is contrary to my nature and inconceivable. The *existence* of God I infer from what I suppose the permanent existence of Matter; the *character* of God I infer from the Divine language constituted by sensible phenomena. Cf. *Theory of Vision Vindicated, passim.*

21 "The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively and distinct than those of the Imagination; they have likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular train or series" (*Principles*, § 30, also § 33). The difficulty is that if our experience is only of *transient* sensations how do we get the conviction of "steadiness, order, and coherence"? Kant points out that with Berkeley all experience becomes illusion, because there is nothing *a priori* at the basis of its phenomena (*Prolegomena*, Mahaffy and Bernard, p. 147). As Caird puts it, "because [Berkeley] has not seen that particular facts *as known* presuppose universal principles, he has left himself no criteria to distinguish reality from illusion. It is obvious that if particular perceptions are not referred to anything beyond themselves, they can not be regarded as revealing to us any objective reality". (*Crit. Phil. of Kant*, I, p. 620.)

22 In this and the following sections, Hylas advances several what may be called 'desperate' hypotheses about Matter: (1) Is it not possible that it is a subordinate cause of our ideas? No, if taken in the ordinary sense, for nothing unthinking and unspiritual can be a cause. (2) May it not be an instru-

ment in the hands of the Deity for exciting ideas in us? No, a perfect being does not require any instruments. (3) But perhaps it is an occasion to God at the presence of which He excites ideas in us. No again, for God is perfect, and does not require any such notes to be reminded of His work. Moreover, it is idle for us to discuss what ideas, unperceivable by us, exist in the mind of God.

The impotence of things of sense *per se* is the burden of much of Berkeley's philosophy. But is any such impotence incompatible with *actuality?* The sense-phenomena by themselves do not exist without, but do not their characteristics and steady order imply a thing-in-itself? For this thing-in-itself Berkeley substitutes God. His system has been well called an 'ideal sense-realism.' Cousin's view of an external cause may be contrasted with Berkeley's: "It is reason and reason alone which knows and knows the world; and at first it knows it only by the name of cause; at first it is for us only the cause of phenomena of sensation which we can not refer to ourselves; and we should not look for this cause and consequently we should not find it, if our reason were not provided with the principle of causality, if we could suppose that a phenomenon can begin to appear on the stage of consciousness, time or space, without having a cause. Then the principle of causality, I do not hesitate to say, is the parent of the external world, so far from its being possible to take it away from it, and make it come from sensation" (Deux Ser. tom. iii. lec. 19).

We may note here that Berkeley recognises power in causation, and consequently denies that inert matter can be a cause. He seems to derive this notion of power from our consciousness of free voluntary activity, and only in *Siris*, does he make our consciousness of responsibility more prominent. Causality in the material world is no more than customary though arbitrary connection among sensible things, imposed and maintained by God. The things of sense are mere signs, the only true cause is a spirit. He takes no account, however, "of rational necessity as the explanation of the *invariability* of that order, and as thus our justification in refunding effects into physical causes that are adequate in their nature to yield *such* effects" (Fraser). Hume resolved all causal connection into that of antecedence and succession, and maintained that anything might be the cause of anything.

23 'Reason'=Reasoning. So in other places. Cf. Cousin: "If we look for the origin of the idea of phenomena, of quality, of attribute, it is given us only by the senses, if it is an attribute of exterior substance that is concerned; by the consciousness, if it is an attribute of the soul. As for substance, whether it is material or mental, it is given us neither by the senses nor by

consciousness, it is a revelation of reason in the exercise of the senses and of consciousness." (Ser. II. t. iii. lec. 19.)

24 According to Berkeley the cause of our ideas must be the Rational Will; but, since we know only sensible *effects*, how can we discover their *cause*, for science knows only of co-existent and successive phenomena?

25 *I. e.*, to speak of motion without allowing any volition (which bespeaks an intelligent cause) is to talk unintelligibly.

26 Cf. *Principles*, §§ 67—72, especially the following: "As the notion of matter is here stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence of a thing distinct from *Spirit* and *idea*, from perceiving and being perceived; but whether there are not certain ideas, of I know not what sort, in the mind of God, which are so many marks or notes that direct Him how to produce sensations in our minds in a constant and regular method—much after the same manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce that harmonious strain and composition of sound which is called a tune, though they who hear the music do not perceive the notes, and may be entirely ignorant of them. But this notion of Matter (which after all is the only intelligible one that I can pick from what is said of unknown occasions) seems too extravagant to deserve a confutation. Besides, it is in effect no objection against what we have advanced, viz. that there is no *senseless unperceived* substance."

27 Perception, as Berkeley has already distinguished at the close of Dial. I., is either immediate or mediate, either a consciousness or an inference from a consciousness.

28 *I. e.*, all spirits and ideas.

29 Cf. *Principles*, §§ 80—1. As to abstract *entity*, we can not know Being separate from a concrete existence, though the Neo-Platonists claimed to be able to discover it. Still we are constrained to form an abstraction for philosophical purposes, and this was done so early as the age of the Eleatics.

30 This argument is a favourite one with Sir W. Hamilton.

31 So Hume says of Berkeley: "Most of the writings of that very ingenious author form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted...That all his arguments, though otherwise intended, are in reality, merely sceptical appear from this—that they admit of no answer, and produce no conviction. Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion, which is the result of scepticism." (*Essays*, vol. II, Note N.)

32 'You know not what.' A phrase popularised by Locke: "If any one

will examine himself concerning his notion of pure substance in general, he will find that he has no other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of *he knows not what* support of such qualities which are capable of producing simple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents" (*Essay*, II. xxiii. 23). Descartes also speaks of "je ne sais quoi dans les objects."

33 "Omitted in last edition" (Fraser).

34 If the existence of the *glove* consists in my perception, does it not follow that I have only an *idea* on my hand (which, be it remembered, is also an idea)? So I may be said to eat ideas, wear ideas, and so on. Berkeley means that "we are fed and clothed with those things [=phenomena] which we perceive immediately by our senses" (*Principles*, § 29). Still what does eating and wearing phenomena present in sense mean? And may not *I* be equally phenomenal? But of this hereafter.

35 The existence of a centaur is extremely improbable but can not be said to be impossible. Such an animal will present an organisation violating several so-called anatomical and physiological laws, and it is the belief in the uniformity of nature that makes us reluctant to accept any such anomaly as fact. If any such creature, however, be ever found, it will entail a revision and amendment of the fore-mentioned laws. (Cf. Huxley's *Hume*, pp. 134—6.)

36 Cf. *Principles*, §§ 23-4. Berkeley professes to demonstrate not only that the absolute existence of a material world is unproved, but impossible inasmuch as unintelligible.

THE THIRD DIALOGUE.

1 Hylas here professes a form of agnosticism. All his beliefs are in an unsettled state. He fancies that Philonous has proved that matter does not exist. If a primitive cognition like this be unreal, how can our other cognitions stand?

2 The oracle at Delphi declared that Socrates was the wisest man in Greece. The sage explained because he knew that he knew nothing. A learned ignorance, according to Hamilton, is the end of philosophy and the consummation of knowledge. (*Discussions*, pp. 634-49.)

3 Philonous' argument is that it is only the belief in a *material substance* which leads to scepticism. If I were to admit that any such absolute existence is impossible, that what I immediately perceive is the only reality, then all difficulty would be gone. There is no true nature in fire or snow other than what I perceive: what I perceive is alone the real nature. A theory of Representative Perception opens the door to scepticism. But even on Berkeley's hypothe-

sis are not many phenomena inferred from suggestions of particular senses? The doctrine here criticised is the theory of the Relativity of Knowledge, which has once more been brought to the front by Kant and Hamilton. It is maintained that all our knowledge is only of relations; we know the subject knowing and the object known as related to one another, and do not know either of them individually in its absolute essence. (Cf., *e. g.*, Hamilton, *Discussions*, p. 608.) See also *Principles*, § 101, where Berkeley says that sceptics, in order "to depreciate our faculties and make mankind appear ignorant and low," argue "that we are under an invincible blindness as to the *true* and *real* nature of things." "We are miserably bantered, say they, by our senses, and amused only with the outside and show of things." This is hardly the place to discuss the Relativity Theory. The student may consult with advantage Seth's *Scottish Philosophy*, Lect. V., and Veitch's *Hamilton*, Chap. IX. It will be sufficient to remark that we can not be said to be ignorant of what we can never know, and if it be argued that our knowledge is inadequate as the expression of all reality, the reply is that though we have not *all* knowledge, a complete acquaintance with all particular aspects and phenomena, yet it is possible for us to grasp the principles which express the true nature of things, the fundamental lines on which only our knowledge can extend. *E. g.* many things may not now be known, which will perhaps be discovered hereafter, but they must all be, when found, in space (which is already known). Cf. Watson, *Comte, Mill, and Spencer*, Ch. ii.

4 "He assumes the common belief on which all interpretation of natural language proceeds—that sensible phenomena are evolved in a uniform and rational order, which is independent of, and in that respect external to, the will of the percipient." (Fraser.)

5 'Objects,' *i. e.*, the sensible objects which I perceive.

6 'Prescind,' literally 'to cut off,' *i. e.*, to consider by a separate act of attention or analysis.

7 That is, it exists only so far forth as it is actually perceived in sense. Berkeley often repeats that 'the existence of an idea consists in being perceived' (see *e. g.*, *Principles*, §§ 2, 6). Now, since everything that exists is either an idea or a spirit, does this dictum coincide with Hegel's identification of Being and Knowing?

We may admit the phenomena of sense necessarily depend on a percipient mind; but, as Ueberweg acutely suggests, may there not also be external things, which exist independently of my perception, but which so operate on my senses that through the consequent organic agitation, the spirit animating the

organism is enabled to have the perceptions? "Our sensations depend upon a previous affection of the organs of sensation, and this affection depends on the existence of intrinsically real external objects" (*History of Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 89).

8 Descartes said, "The first property of God which we have here to consider consists in this, that He is absolutely true, and the Giver of all light. It is therefore impossible that He should deceive us, in the literal or in the positive sense, be the cause of our errors, to which, as experience shows, we are subject." Now we have belief in a body, (with which the soul can not directly communicate), but which the Divine veracity guarantees to be true. Cf. § 22 below.

9 So Locke, *Essay*, Bk. IV. Chap. xi.

10 Cf. *Principles*, § 48. Dr. Fraser quotes from Berkeley's *Commonplace Book:* "You ask me whether we are not in the wrong in imagining things to exist when they are not perceived by the senses. I answer no. The *existence* of our ideas consists in their being sensibly perceived, imagined, or thought on. Whenever they are imagined or thought on they do exist. Whenever they are mentioned, they are imagined or thought on...Bodies, taken for powers, do exist when not perceived; but this existence is not actual. When I say a *power* exists, no more is meant than that *if*, in the light, I open my eyes, and look that way, I shall see the body...Bodies do exist whether we think of them or no—they being taken in a two-fold sense for (1) collections of thoughts or perceptions; (2) collections of powers to cause these thoughts. *These latter exist;* though perhaps it may be one simple perfect power—the Divine Will." But if things are merely phenomenal, why *must* I conceive them as having a continuous existence (in some mind or other)? Do mere sensations involve any notion of *permanence* in them? Moreover, even supposing that they exist in a Divine mind, *how* do they exist there? Are the Divine ideas like ours? And since we never perceive them, how do we know that they exist there? Again, if sensible things exist only potentially in the mind of God when unperceived by us, and become actual for us only when we perceive them, then since our perceptions are often interrupted, must not what we call the *same* thing be for each of us *many* things, each annihilated when our senses are closed and created anew when we perceive again? "Did the Herculanean manuscripts," Ueberweg asks, "not exist actually during the centuries in which they were buried, and shall we say that when they were discovered God created them anew?"

11 The difference between Berkeley and a sensationalist like J. S. Mill should be carefully noted. With the former there is a Divine ground of sensi-

ble things; with the latter, Matter is only a "permanent possibility of sensation." I believe in its continuity because custom teaches me that, with a change in my surroundings and circumstances, I might have the same sensation again. This difference has been often lost sight of; see *e. g.*, Ribot's *English Psychology*, pp. 120-1.

12 There is a similar passage in Vijnana Bhikshu's commentary on the Sánkhya Sutras. In reply to the objection that a jar should come to an end with the surcease of the 'intellect' of the potter, he suggests that the self-consciousness of the Deity, and not the self-conciousness of the potter &c., is the cause why jars and the like continue to exist. See Ballantyne's *Sankhya Aphorisms*, pp. 76-7. Of course, Kapila's 'intellect' and 'self-consciousness' have a peculiar meaning. Cf. also Green, *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 74.

13 Cf. *Principles*, § 25.

14 Is this equivalent to Descartes' famous dictum, *Cogito ergo sum*, 'I think, therefore I exist'?

15 'Active thinking image of the Deity.' In what sense is this image distinguished from the '*inactive* idea'?

16 According to Berkeley, there are two grounds from which we infer the existence of God, *viz.*, 1st. our sense of personal dependence; 2nd. our faith in the continuity of what we call sensible things. (See Dial. II., note 20 *ante*.)

'Reflex act'=an act of reflection, not a mechanical motor reaction, as in modern psychology. (See Ziehen, *Phys. Psych.*, ch. i.) Does this imply that we are not immediately conscious of 'our own being?' "We comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or reflexion, and that of other spirits by reason" (*Principles*, § 89).

17 The important passage within brackets was first added in the third edition (1734).

18 'Immediately.' So Fraser prints. But should it not rather be 'mediately'?

19 The distinction between a notion and an idea, on account of which the former is confined to intellectual processes, is a later addition in Berkeley's psychology. *E.g.* the following passage was first inserted in the second edition of the *Principles*: "In like manner, we know and have a *notion* of relations between things or ideas—which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without perceiving the former. To me it seems that *ideas*, *spirits*, and *relations* are all, in their respective kinds, the object of human knowledge and subject of discourse, and that the term *idea* should be improperly extended to signify *everything* we know or have any notion of" (§§ 89). See § 142. Cf. also *Siris*, § 302.

20 This objection very exactly anticipates Hume's development of Berkeley's views. "There are," says Hume, "some philosophers, who imagine we are every moment *conscious* of what we call our SELF; that we feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity.....Unluckily all these positive assertions are contrary to that very experience, which is pleaded for them...For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure (*i. e.* on something merely phenomenal and transitory). I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the (transitory) perception. When any perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of *myself*, and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by death, and I could neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate, after the dissolution of my body, I should be entirely annihilated; nor do I conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect nonentity". (*Treatise on Human Nature*, Bk. I. pt. iv. § 6.) Berkeley in his youthful days was led nearly to the same conclusion. In his *Commonplace Book* he says: "The very existence of ideas constitutes the soul. Mind is a congeries of perceptions. Take away perception, and you take away mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind." (*Works*, Fraser, Vol IV., p. 438.) Kant also confines our knowledge to the empirical ego, and considers the spiritual substance transcendent. (Cf. Caird, *Crit. Phil.*, II., 26 *seq.*)

21 Berkeley never clearly states if the soul is always conscious. Is existence the antecedent condition of being conscious, or is consciousness implied in the permanent existence of Self? And if to exist is to be conscious, what about temporary fits of unconsciousness?

22 Berkeley's argument is that I have an immediate consciousness of the Ego, but have no such perception of abstract Matter. There is further an inconsistency in the very conception of the latter, inasmuch as unphenomenal phenomena can not exist. Of Hume we may ask, do we not know our impressions and ideas as *ours*? If so, whence does this consciousness of *ours* come? Does it not postulate a substrate in each individual, which unifies his impressions and focusses them for him? J. S. Mill followed Hume in his psychological theory of Mind, and explained it as a permanent possibility of successive states of consciousness. The theory, however, presented 'intrinsic difficulties,' which gave him pause, and he sought the solution of "the paradox that something, which *ex hypothesi* is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series" in the inexplicability of ultimate facts. (*Examination of Hamilton*, chap. XII.)

Kant argues that we must have the notion of the subject in order to have any experience, but that we can never determine whether the subject exists as substance or as attribute. (*Kritik*, B. II., Dial. ii.)

23 Suppose that there is a bird sitting on the tree, also that the gardener is short-sighted. Now if he fails to see the bird, will the bird be non-existent at the time? Berkeley would reply that it would exist as other minds would perceive it, but it would be non-existent for the unperceiving gardener. Is Berkeley's notion equivalent to our conception of the objectivity of the bird? If existence be identified with perception, what reason has the gardener to suppose that the bird exists when he does not see it? How can he know that other spirits perceive it? Why must he assume that when unperceived by all, there is still the Divine Mind looking at it?

24 An important sentence, which explains Berkeley's purpose and position.

25 Compare *Principles*, § 33. See Dial. II., note 21, *supra*.

26 For further remarks on the propriety of using 'idea' for 'thing,' see *Principles*, §§ 38-9.

27 Compare *Principles*, §§ 51-3. The Cartesians had also held that since Matter and Mind are quite heterogeneous substances, they do not act and react upon each other, and consequently there are no corporeal causes. Some remarks by Hume on the "theory of the universal energy and operation of the Supreme Being" may be quoted here. "It is too bold," he says, "ever to carry conviction with it to a man sufficiently apprised of the weakess of human reason. Though the chain of arguments which conduct to it were ever so logical, there must arise a strong suspicion, if not an absolute assurance, that it has carried us quite beyond the reach of our faculties, when it leads to conclusions so extraordinary and so remote from common life and experience. We are got into fairy-land long ere we have reached the last step of our theory; and there we have no reason to trust our common methods of argument... Our line is too short to fathom such immense abysses." (*Inquiry into Human Mind*, § 7.)

28 Cf. "De nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti" (*Persius*). This is one of those fundamental presuppositions which are common to all schools of thought. So Kapila says, "A thing does not proceed from nothing" (*Sánkhya Sutras*, I. 78.) "The words within brackets are omitted in the last edition" (Fraser).

29 Cf. *Principles*, § 150, where the following texts are quoted: Jerem. X. 13, Amos. V. 8, Psal. LXV.

30 The like objection has been brought against Spinoza and other pantheists. The student would do well to study the difference in the moral standpoints of Berkeley and of Spinoza.

31 Granting that material occasions may lead us to sin, does it follow that Matter is the author of sin? I may be influenced by extraneous agents, by various motives, but am *I* not responsible for *my* act? Berkeley corrects his position lower down, when he admits that our powers, though ultimately derived from God, have some degree of limited freedom. It may be noted here that Berkeley does not sufficiently recognise our responsibility, and never sees how our moral constitution bears upon the question of the existence of God.

32 This is an important principle, which is not sufficiently appreciated by some moralists. What we judge morally "is always," well says Dr. Martineau, "the *inner spring* of an action, as distinguished from its outward operation." (See *Types of Ethical Theory*, vol. II., pp. 24-7.) What is ethically important is the *motive*, which Mr. Muirhead defines as "the idea of the object which, through congruity with the character of the self, moves the will" (*Elements of Ethics*, p. 60). The *act*, however, often serves as an index to the *will*. Cf. an interesting discussion in Ferrier's *Lectures on Greek Philosophy*, pp. 401-5.

33 'Indifferent'=Impartial, unbiassed. So used by Locke also. Katherine speaks of "no judge indifferent" (*Henry VIII.*, II. iv. 17).

34 Cf. *Principles*, § 49.

35 Cf. *Alciphon*, Dial. IV. 9. Greek philosophers before Aristotle generally held that our senses deceive us. The Stagirite, however, pointed out that our original perceptions may always be depended upon; it is only our derivative and inferred perceptions that lead us astray. Prof. Sully's volume on *Illusions* contains an interesting and instructive study of the subject.

36 But can Matter be unextended? Can we reduce any centre of force to a mathematical point?

37 This presents the gist of the question. How are sensible phenomena produced? By the agency of a third unknown substance, say the Materialists; by that of Rational Will, says Berkeley; and, it may be added, they are facts whose origin we do not and need not know, say Hume and Comte.

38 Berkeley said several years after that he had "no objection to calling the Ideas in the mind of God archetypes of ours." In fact, according to him all efforts in science to arrive at the laws of nature are but endeavours to reach the Divine Ideas. So with him, as Dr. Fraser points out, the assertion that 'the

material world exists' is equivalent to saying that 'what we perceive at any moment in sense is part of an interpretable universe.'

39 Compare *Principles*, § 27.

40 Philonous' argument is that God surely has an *idea* of pain, but no *sensation* of it. He *knows* what it is, but he never *feels* it. Impressions of sense received against our will produce sensations of pain in us. But God does not require any sense to know things by. (Cf. *Siris*, § 289.) Is Berkeley's explanation of pain adequate? Are all pains contra-voluntary (if the word may be used)? Do the organic and the mental pains stand on the same footing?

41 'Complexion'=Complex.

42 The language here suggests Leibniz's theory of pre-established harmony, only that the German philosopher does not resolve the oraganism into subjective phenomena. He compared body and mind to two clocks, which had been wound together and always showed the same time. (This simile, as Merz points out, is not to be taken too literally; for no two phenomena are exactly alike, and Leibniz's problem was to explain harmony and agreement, not likeness. *Leibniz*, St. Blackwood, p. 178.)

43 'Reason,' *i.e.*, ratio. The argument here is again mentioned in *Siris*, § 319.

44 Cf. *Principles*, § 58.

45 "Now the set rules or established methods wherein the Mind we depend on excites in us the ideas of sense, are called the *laws of nature*; and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the ordinary course of things." (*Principles*, § 30. Also see § 105. Also *Dial.* III., 4.) But if experience is only of *transient* phenomena, how do we get the conviction of *universality*?

46 Berkeley throughout supposes that his conception of Matter coincides with the vulgur idea. But it may really be questioned if the vulgar do not believe that Matter has quite an independent reality, which will not be affected even if all percipient minds were to be annihilated. (See Dial. I., note 28 *ante*). And the philosophers (*e.g.* Reid), who have appealed to common sense in proof of the existence of Matter, had this belief in view. The common sense that Berkeley speaks of in the next section is slightly different—a more learned and reasoned sort of common sense.

47 The student should clearly realise Berkeley's purpose, *viz.*, to vindicate common sense. As Mansel points out the systems of Reid and Berkeley,

however wide their differences, are "in truth sister streams, springing from the same source, and flowing, though by different channels, to the same ocean. The aim of both alike was to lay a sure foundation for human knowledge in principles, secure from the assaults of scepticism; the method of both alike was to appeal to the common consciousness of mankind, as a witness to the existence of certain primary and ineradicable convictions on which all others depend, and to disencumber these convictions from the rash hypotheses and unwarranted deductions with which they had been associated and obscured in previous systems of philosophy. Both, in short, though with very different results, were united in appealing from the theories of metaphysicians to the common sense of men." *Letters, Lectures, and Reviews*, p. 382.

48 'Ambages'=Circuitous or indirect modes of speech.

49 Cf. *Principles*, § 38. As Dr. Fraser well says, "Berkeley is not for making things *subjective*, but ideas *objective*."

50 'Matter,' *i.e.*, absolute Matter.

51 Berkeley argues that we do not strictly see the same object by the different senses. For convenience sake we form several perceptions into one object, when we find that those perceptions are connected either through co-existence or succession. If you examine an object of sight by touching it or through the microscope, it is not to know it better, but to understand how our ideas are connected together. But is this the view that is taken generally when I inspect, say, a wing of a fly through a microscope? And can I maintain that the wing thus viewed is not the same as that seen by the naked eye? Cf. *Essay on Vision*, §§ 49, 85.

52 'Unknown natures,' *i. e.*, noumena, things-in-themselves.

53 Berkeley's contention is that 'sameness' consists in phenomenal similarity, and not in numerical identity. Two persons may be said to see the *same* object, because their perceptions are *similar*. Dr. Fraser quotes Collier: "Two or more persons who are present at a concert of music may indeed in some measure be said to hear the *same* notes; yet the sound which the one hears is not the very same with the sound which another hears, because the souls or persons are supposed to be different; therefore the sound which Peter hears is external to, or independent on, the soul of John" (*Clavis Universalis*, 6). It may be here noted that Berkeley has also left the question of personal identity hazy. Cf. *Siris*, § 347, &c.

54 "Omitted in last edition" (*Fraser*).

55 What is Reality? and how do we know it? are two of the most difficult

questions of philosophy. Berkeley here seems to make sensibility the test of reality,—whatever I can see, feel, or taste is real. This is only a rough test, for it may be asked how shall we then distinguish dreams and hallucinations from the actual objects of our waking consciousness? And it should be further remembered that, on Berkeley's own showing, all the qualities are not perceived simultaneously, some of them are known at the moment only inferentially. Prof. James finds the test in practical value, "that is adjudged real which has intimate relation to our emotional and active life" (*Prin. of Psych.*, Vol. II, 295). The ultimate criterion probably is intelligibility, "coherence of my thinking with that of others." The ink-stand before me, *e.g.*, is real not simply because it occupies space, but because it has a place in the "social consciousness," it is significant for the thought of more than one human being. Prof. Ritchie says, "the agreement between the inferences drawn from the experience of our different senses, the agreement between the judgments of different persons, and the harmony of present experience with the results of our and their previous experience, constitute between them the test of reality" (*Philosophical Review*, Vol. I., 267).

56 If the only intelligible existence of extension is in and through the percipient mind, then the mind must be extended and material. Berkeley answers that extension is not an attribute of the mind, but only a perception; also that the mind is not to be identified with its perceptions.

57 The mind understands things, but does not 'comprehend' in the sense that one body does another; it considers them, but does not 'reflect' as a plain surface 'reflects' light: it reasons about them, but does not 'discourse' or talk.

58 This objection was first raised by the lady of Sir John Percival, a friend and patron of Berkeley's, on the publication of the *Principles of Human Knowledge*. "My wife," wrote Sir John, "who has all the good esteem of you that is possible, from your just notions of marriage and happiness, desires to know, if there be nothing but Spirit and ideas, what you make of that part of the six days' creation that preceded man." It has been often argued against phenomenalistic theories that they are inconsistent with the modern scientific conception that the origin of the world dates long before the origin of man. Berkeley's reply to Sir John was as follows: "As to your lady's objection, I am extremely honoured by it. I must beg you to inform her ladyship I do not deny the existence of the sensible things which Moses says were created by God. They existed from all eternity in the Divine Intellect, and then became perceptible (*i. e.* were created) in the same manner and order

as is described in Genesis. For I take creation to belong to things only as they respect finite spirits, there being nothing new to God. Hence it follows that the act of creation consists in God's willing that those things should become perceptible to other spirits which before were known only to Himself. Now both reason and Scripture assure us that there *are* other spirits besides men, who, 'tis possible, might have perceived this visible world as it was successively exhibited to their view before man's creation. Besides, for to agree with the Mosaic account of the creation, it's sufficient if we suppose that man, in case he was created and existing at the time of the chaos of sensible things, might have perceived all things formed out of it in the very order set down in Scripture, all which is no way repugnant to my principles." (Fraser's *Berkeley*, Chap. V.)

59 Berkeley distinguishes between the popular and the philosophical meaning of the word 'idea.'

60 'Great.' In first and second editions only (Fraser).

61 Cf. "Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way of knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves—that we have first raised a dust and then complain we cannot see." (*Principles*, Intro. § 3)

62 Cf. *Siris*, § § 347-9.

63 "Conceive" is a word frequently in Berkeley's mouth, but it may be questioned if he always does distinguish between the two senses of the word, *viz.*, (1) to picture, and (2) to think or apprehend. *E. g.*, we can 'conceive' a flower in the first sense, *i.e.*, image it in our mind; whereas we can 'conceive' the class of flowers only in the second sense, *i.e.* form a notion of it. The student should reflect if "nothing conceivable is taken away" by Berkeley's philosophy.

64 The reference is to the so-called Immanental Theory, according to which Nature is every way co-extensive with God, and which may be traced back through Hylozoism and the Manichean doctrines to Aristotle and Plato.

65 Compare *Principles*, §§ 55-6

66 "We have shown that soul is indivisible, incorporeal, unextended, and it is consequently incorruptible." (*Principles*, § 141).

67 The advantages that follow in Natural Philosophy from Berkeley's doctrines are brought out at greater length in *Principles*, § § 101-17. With what follows may be compared § 155: "A clear view of which great truths

[concerning 'the intimate presence of an All-wise Spirit, who fashions, regulates and sustains the whole system of beings'] cannot choose but fill our hearts with awful circumspection and holy fear, which is the strongest incentive to VIRTUE and the best guard against VICE." *Anent* second causes, the great difficulty with theistic philosophers is that if they apply the notion of causation in the proof of the existence of God, they must deny all causes in the world of sense. Hence Berkeley, as well as Malebranche, does not consider a secondary cause to be strictly a cause at all. The only secondary cause Berkeley seems to recognise is a finite spirit. Cf. Flint's *Theism*, p. 126.

63 Further remarks on the application of the new theory to philosophical and ontological subjects will be found in *Principles*, §§ 85-100, 137-56. The philosophical terms here mentioned are mostly borrowed from the schoolmen.

69 The 'substantial form' was regarded as that occult principle which, actuating, as it were, matter, produced the distinctive manifestations of any particular class of substances. Thus the 'rational soul' (*anima rationalis*) is the 'substantial form' of man. (Fowler.) Cf. Erdmann, Vol. I., § 163.3.

70 'Hylarchic principles.' Hylism was the theory which regarded matter as the original principle of evil. See Erdmann, Vol. I., § 184.2.

71 'Plastic natures.' A phrase of Cudworth's, who followed the Greek philosopher Strato (287 B. C.) in endowing the primitive particles with life (Hylozoism). Democritus had deduced everything from existences that were simply extended (Atomism). Strato, on the contrary, explained the ordered movement of the universe by ascribing "to the several parts of matter an inward plastic life, whereby they could artificially frame themselves to the best advantage according to their several capabilities without any conscious or reflective knowledge" (Cudworth, *Works*, I., p. 149). Cudworth believed that this theory combined with theology was the only one which could save theologians from the absurd doctrine of continual and direct Divine interference everywhere. So he attributed to every component part of the physical world a 'plastic nature,' the essence of which was thought, though not necessarily conscious. Erdmann, Vol. II., p. 101.

72 'Accidents' are the phenomenal manifestations as opposed to the unchanging essence ('Substance'). Cf. Dial. I., note 32 *ante*.

73 'Principle of individuation.' Aquinas' *Principium individuationis*, according to which every *ens*, except the absolutely simple being, has two elements, which in material beings are *forma* and *materia*. The participation in the same form is the ground, and the temporal and spatial determinate-

ness of the parts of the material is the principle of individuality. See Erdmann, Vol. I., § 203. 5; Windelband, pt. III., ch. ii., § 27.

74 Even Locke admitted that Matter might think if God would superadd to it another substance with a faculty of thinking, "since we know not in what thinking consists nor to what sort of substances the first eternal thinking Being has been pleased to give that power." See *Essay*, Bk. IV., Chap. iii. § 6. Such a theory abolishes all difference between the substance of Matter and the substance of Spirit.

75 Compare *Principles*, §§ 118-134.

76 This may be compared with the more transcendental doctrine expounded in *Siris*, *passim*.

77 Matter as conceived by the vulgar and the philosophers is explained also in *Principles*, § 51. Men find that they have many perceptions of which they themselves are not the authors, and they attribute to these perceptions a reality independent of their minds. Philosophers, on the other hand, plainly see that the *immediate objects* of perception do not exist without the mind, nor do they depend upon it; hence they suppose that our ideas are the copies of extra-mental objects having a subsistence distinct from being perceived. Berkeley says that he has combined these two views. "Berkeley's 'external world,' resulting from two factors, Divine and human, is causally independent of each finite mind; but neither causally nor substantially independent of Mind. And in what other meaning of the term is 'independence' of the percipient act intelligible?" (Fraser.)

78 This sentence seems to be an echo of Bacon's famous lines, with which fitly these Notes may close: "It is true, that a little philosophy inclineth man's mind to atheism, but depth in philosophy bringeth men's minds about to religion; for while the mind of man looketh upon second causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them, and go no further; but when it beholdeth the chain of them confederate, and linked together, it must needs fly to Providence and Deity." (*Essays*, Atheism.)

END.

INDEX.

[*The reference is to pages, the thicker numerals indicating those of the text.*]

SOME OPINIONS ON THE FIRST EDITION.

Prof. A. C. FRASER (Edinburgh):

"I have read your Introduction, etc., with great interest, and appreciate it as among the best and truest expositions of the subject that I have anywhere met with..... I hope your book may be widely known and read."

Prof. J. SULLY (London):

"It ought to prove an interesting introduction to the study of modern philosophy. Your introduction strikes me as clear and to the point."

Prof. J. E. CREIGHTON (Cornell), in THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW (Vol. II., pp. 749-750):

"The editor of this book merits our thanks for doing for these *Dialogues* what Prof. Fraser did for the *Principles* and the other writings of Berkeley contained in [his *Selections*]..... The Introduction also gives an exceedingly good analysis of Berkeley's most important treatises, ... a first-rate exposition of Berkeley's doctrines.....The notes, too, are just what notes to a philosophical work should be,—short, clear, and suggestive, rather than exhaustive, whenever the subject requires personal reflection on the part of the student."