

Exhibit 2902

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Def. Doc. No. 1401-R-1

From Toyoda to Nomura
23 September 1941
No. 591

In the afternoon of 23 September, I had the reasons for the stationing of Japanese forces in China transmitted to the counsellor of the American Embassy in Tokyo, so that they might be conveyed to the American Ambassador in Tokyo and to the Secretary of State. It is requested that you, too, should promptly inform Hull of them.

Japan finds it necessary to station her forces in certain areas of China for such a period as may be necessary after the restoration of peace between Japan and China, for the sake (1) of cooperating in constructing a peaceful China, and (2) of defending the safety of Japan herself.

(1) History proves the instability of peace in China, and it is especially difficult to maintain peace and order after wars. We have seen not a few instances of foreign powers taking advantage of such a situation to menace the peace of China, which often caused China to open hostilities against Japan or some other third Power. The unstable situation within the country thus very often developed into international strife. It is also a fact patent to all that the vehement activity of the Communist Party is actually doing much harm to the maintenance of peace and order there.

If such conditions were to be repeated in future, it would be quite impossible to stabilize the life of the Chinese people and promote their happiness. The most important thing of all, therefore, is that order should be maintained after the restoration of peace between Japan and China. Accordingly, Japan desires that order should be maintained so as to have China concentrate her energies on the prompt realization of a stabilized life for her people. As Japan recognizes that it is hardly possible (besides there are reasons in (2)) in the light of the present situation in China that she undertake it herself unaided, even though Japan desires that China do so, it is intended to station the necessary number of forces for such time as may be necessary, in certain areas of China.

(2) It is self-evident that, even from an economic point of view, peace and order in adjacent areas have an important bearing upon the existence of Japan. Equally self-evident is it that the situation of China viewed from the military point of view, when peace is restored after four years of large-scale modern war, may exert a direct and immense influence upon the very existence of Japan. Now that all the world is in the throes of war, it is obvious that any sort of grave situation may be brought about on the stage of China, owing to causes within and without China. To prevent the coming about of such a situation, and also to defend the existence of Japan herself, the stationing of forces is indeed inevitable.

In brief, it is absolutely necessary for Japan to station her forces in China for the above reasons, though Japan is ready to withdraw them whenever their presence is no longer necessary.

As for such a suggestion as the creation of an international force for the maintenance of peace and order, neither public opinion in Japan nor Japan herself, directly and vitally concerned with the peace and order of China, can accept it.