DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775015

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PROBLEMS

Established

October 20, 1944 by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy.

Terms of Reference

1. To initiate factual studies and to formulate recommendations on commodity problems of international significance (the Commodity Problems Committee should create inter-agency subcommittees to study important commodities or groups of commodities).

2. To make recommendations to ECEFP on international aspects of commodity problems for policy decisions by ECEFP.

3. To review prior to their consideration by the ECEFP all commodity reports and recommendations referred to that Committee.

4. To consider and advise the ECEFP regarding problems arising in connection with the establishment of appropriate international machinery to deal with international commodity problems.

Membership

Department of State
Donald D. Kennedy (Chairman)
Edward G. Cale (Alternate)
William T. Phillips (Executive Secretary)
L. Ingemann Highby (Recording Secretary)

Department of the Interior
George A. Lamb
E. W. Pehrson (Alternate)

Department of Agriculture
Leslie A. Wheeler
Robert B. Schwenger (Alternate)

Department of Commerce
Herbert W. Parisius
H. B. McCoy (Alternate)

Membership--cont'd

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Membership--cont'd

United States Tariff Commission
Lynn R. Edminster
Louis S. Ballif (Alternate)

Civilian Production Administration
R. B. Whiting
David Horton (Alternate)

Bureau of the Budget
Arthur Smithies (Observer)

Technical Committees

Coffee

Department of State
Edward G. Cale (Chairman)
Perry K. Sellon (Secretary)
Charles L. Aulette

Department of the Treasury
Mrs. Marie Beardsley

Department of War
David E. Fromm

Department of Agriculture
Hugh W. Taylor
Fletcher Long

Department of Commerce
Eugene M. Braderman
Miron Burgin (Alternate)
Bela Gold (Alternate)

United States Tariff Commission
Prentice N. Dean

Office of Price Administration
Murray Squires
Ralph Koch

Bureau of the Budget
Miss Henrietta Kimbrough (Observer)

Technical Committees--cont'd

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775015

Technical Committees--cont'd

Conservation of Natural Resources

Department of Commerce
Herbert W. Parisius (Chairman)
H. B. McCoy (Alternate)
Bela Gold (Alternate)

Department of State
John A. Loftus
William T. Phillips

Department of War
Harold H. Neff

Department of the Navy
Commander George M. Prevost

Department of the Interior
George A. Lamb

Department of Agriculture
Edward C. Crafts

Department of Labor
Victor Baril

United States Tariff Commission
Lynn R. Edminster
Louis S. Ballif

Copper

Department of the Interior
Thomas H. Miller (Chairman)
Miss H. M. Meyer (Secretary)

Department of State
Samuel Lipkowitz
Charles P. O'Donnell (Alternate)

Department of War
Major H. J. Beardsley

Department of the Navy
Lt. Commander P. B. Andrew

Technical Committees--cont'd

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775015

Technical Committees--cont'd

Department of Commerce
Bela Gold
Robert M. Weidenhammer (Alternate)
Howard J. Trueblood (Alternate)

Department of Labor
Robert J. Meyers

United States Tariff Commission
F. Morton Leonard

Surplus Property Board
F. E. Berquist

Metals Reserve Company
Simon Strauss
Jesse C. Johnson (Alternate)

Civilian Production Administration
Frank H. Hayes

Cordage and Miscellaneous Fibers

United States Tariff Commission
Daniel W. Alexander (Chairman)

Department of State
William T. Phillips
James G. Evans (Secretary)

Department of War
Lt. Col. David B. Hardin

Department of the Navy
Lt. A. L. Holden

Department of the Interior
E. D. Hester
R. R. Ely (Alternate)

Department of Agriculture
Arthur W. Palmer
Charles H. Barber (Alternate)

Technical Committees--cont'd

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Technical Committees--cont'd

Department of Commerce
Bela Gold
Hiram T. Nones (Alternate)
Mrs. Charlotte Henry (Alternate)

Civilian Production Administration
F. F. Kidd

Office of Price Administration
Bert L. Willmore

Bureau of the Budget
Miss Henrietta Kimbrough (Observer)

Cotton

Department of Agriculture
A. W. Palmer (Chairman)
Maurice R. Cooper (Alternate)

Department of State
William T. Phillips
James G. Evans (Secretary)

Department of Commerce
Herbert W. Parisius
Robert Skliar (Alternate)
Bela Gold (Alternate)

United States Tariff Commission
Mrs. Evelina K. Southworth

Office of Price Administration
Walter Baldwin
Jack C. Fayssoux (Alternate)

Civilian Production Administration
Vacant

Commodity Credit Corporation
C. C. Smith

Bureau of the Budget
Miss Henrietta Kimbrough (Observer)

Technical Committees--cont'd

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775015

Technical Committees--cont'd

Sugar

Department of Agriculture
Gustave Burmeister (Chairman)

Department of State
Edward G. Cale
Mrs. Jean Mulliken (Secretary)

Department of the Interior
George A. Lamb

Department of Commerce
Herbert W. Parisius
George F. Dudik (Alternate)
Bela Gold (Alternate)

Department of Labor
Miss Faith M. Williams

United States Tarrif Commission
L. A. Morrison

Tin

Department of the Interior
George A. Lamb (Chairman)
E. W. Pehrson (Alternate)

Department of State
John W. Barnet

Department of War
Lt. Colonel Carl Rolle

Department of the Navy
Lt. Commander E. L. Beardman

Department of Commerce
Robert M. Weidenhammer
Bela Gold (Alternate)

United States Tariff Commission
F. Morton Leonard

Civilian Production Administration
Erwin Vogelsang

Technical Committees--cont'd

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Technical Committees--cont'd

Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Simon D. Strauss
Harvey J. Gunderson (Alternate)

Wool

Department of Agriculture
Leslie A. Wheeler (Chairman)
Maurice Cooper (Alternate)

Department of State
William T. Phillips
James G. Evans (Secretary)

Department of Commerce
Hiram T. Nones
Bela Gold (Alternate)

Department of Labor
Hugh G. Killough

United States Tariff Commission
L. A. Morrison
L. G. Connor (Alternate)

Office of Price Administration
Russell L. Burrus

Commodity Credit Corporation
Milton Briggs

Civilian Production Administration
F. F. Kidd

Bureau of the Budget
Miss Henrietta Kimbrough (Observer)

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COMMITTEE ON
SPECIALIZED INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS

Established

November 17, 1944 by the Executive Committeé on Economic Foreign Policy.

Terms of Reference

1. To formulate, within the framework of the proposals of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, recommendations regarding:

A. The organization of such agency or agencies as may be required to carry out the economic programs, as approved by the Executive Committee, of the Committees on Private Monopolies and Cartels, Commodity Agreements, and Trade Barriers.

B. The relationship which should be established between such agency or agencies and the Economic and Social Council proposed by the Dumbarton Oaks Conference.

C. Such relations, if any, as should be maintained between such agency or agencies and the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Labor Organization, and possible international organizations in other economic and social fields, such as aviation, shipping, communications, health, and narcotic trade.

D. Such elaboration of the proposals of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference as may be deemed desirable to facilitate any recommendations made under the above terms of reference.

2. To work closely with the Committees on Private Monopolies and Cartels, International Commodity Problems, and Trade Barriers in carrying out the above assignment.

Membership

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Membership

Department of State
Leroy D. Stinebower (Chairman)
Isaac Stokes (Vice Chairman)
John M. Leddy (Secretary)

Department of the Treasury
Harold Glasser
Raymond F. Mikesell (Alternate)

Department of Agriculture
Robert B. Schwenger

Department of Commerce
Frank A. Waring
Lewis L. Lorwin (Alternate)
Murray H. Marker (Alternate)

Department of Labor
Carter Goodrich
A. F. Hinrichs (Alternate)

United States Tariff Commission
Lynn R. Edminster

Bureau of the Budget
Arthur Smithies (Observer)

Civilian Production Administration
William L. Batt (Observer)

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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT POLICY

Established

On July 10, 1945 by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy.

Terms of Reference

1. To formulate a statement of United States policy with respect to:

United States Government foreign loans and investments, private foreign loans and investments including joint participation of American and foreign capital, treatment of American capital by foreign governments, regulation of the making of foreign loans and investments and measures to coordinate and adjust the flow of American capital, whether government or private, with domestic and international economic conditions with a view to the avoidance of disturbing fluctuations.

2. The Committee should consider the desirability of a public statement on foreign investment policy.

3. When the above task is completed the Committee should disband.

Membership

Department of State
J. P. Young (Chairman)
William Diebold, Jr. (Alternate)
Herbert B. Woolley (Secretary)

Department of the Treasury
Norman T. Ness

Department of Commerce
H. B. Lary
Lewis L. Lorwin (Alternate)

Membership--cont'd

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Membership--cont'd

Department of Labor
John H. G. Pierson

Federal Reserve Board
Walter R. Gardner

Securities and Exchange Commission
Walter C. Louchheim, Jr.

Export-Import Bank
August Maffry

Bureau of the Budget
Arthur Smithies (Observer)

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COMMITTEE ON TRADE BARRIERS

Established

June 11, 1943 in accordance with a letter from Mr. Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary of State, dated May 7, 1943 addressed to Mr. Harry C. Hawkins, Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy and Agreements, as the Special Committee on Relaxation of Trade Barriers. Reconstituted on May 5, 1944 as a subcommittee of the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy with the new title of Committee on Trade Barriers.

Terms of Reference

1. To complete the preparation of draft provisions for a proposed international multilateral policy convention to serve as a basis for future discussions with other governments.

2. To report to the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy as soon as it has completed this task, and then to be terminated.

Membership

Department of State
Winthrop G. Brown (Chairman)
John M. Leddy (Executive Secretary)
Mrs. Margaret H. Potter (Recording Secretary)

Department of the Treasury
Harold Glasser

Department of Agriculture
Robert B. Schwenger
Oscar Zaglits (Alternate)

Department of Commerce
Amos E. Taylor
H. P. Macgowan (Alternate)
Henry C. Chalmers (Alternate)
J. L. McCamy (Alternate)
Aaron Director (Alternate)

Membership--cont'd

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Membership--cont'd

Department of Labor
A. F. Hinrichs
John H. G. Pierson (Alternate)

United States Tariff Commission
Oscar B. Ryder
Lynn R. Edminster (Alternate)

Office of Price Administration
Charles J. Walsh
David W. Lusher (Alternate)

Bureau of the Budget
Arthur Smithies (Observer)

Subcommittees

A - Tariffs

United States Tariff Commission
Oscar B. Ryder (Chairman)
Benjamin B. Wallace (Alternate)

Department of State
Winthrop G. Brown
Carl D. Corse (Alternate)

Department of the Treasury
Norman T. Ness

Department of Agriculture
G. B. L. Arner

Department of Commerce
H. P. Macgowan
Aaron Director (Alternate)
Derek Brooks (Alternate)

B - Quantitative Restrictions (Import) and Export Taxes and Restrictions

United States Tariff Commission
Edgar B. Brossard (Chairman)
L. A. Morrison (Alternate)

Subcommittees--cont'd

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Subcommittees--cont'd

Department of State
Vacant

Department of Agriculture
G. B. L. Arner

Department of Commerce
Aaron Director
Henry C. Chalmers (Alternate)
Walter Freedman (Alternate)

C - Preferences and Discriminations

United States Tariff Commission
E. Dana Durand (Chairman)
Benjamin B. Wallace (Alternate)

Department of State
James A. Ross
Constant Southworth

Department of Agriculture
John L. Stewart

Department of Commerce
Aaron Director
Henry C. Chalmers (Alternate)
Murray H. Marker (Alternate)

D - State Trading

Department of Commerce
Amos E. Taylor (Chairman)
Ernest C. Ropes (Alternate)
H. P. Macgowan (Alternate)
Murray H. Marker (Alternate)

Department of State
Vernon L. Phelps (Alternate Chairman)
H. V. V. Fay

Department of the Treasury
Norman T. Ness

Subcommittees--cont'd

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Subcommittees--cont'd

Department of Agriculture
Lazar Volin

United States Tariff Commission
Louis S. Ballif

Bureau of the Budget
Arthur Smithies

F - Commercial Organization

United States Tariff Commission
Lynn R. Edminster (Chairman)

Department of State
Winthrop G. Brown
John M. Leddy (Alternate)

Department of the Treasury
S. D. Southworth

Department of Agriculture
Robert B. Schwenger

Department of Commerce
H. P. Macgowan
Murray H. Marker (Alternate)

G - Full Employment and Economic Foreign Policy

Department of Labor
John H. G. Pierson (Chairman)

Department of State
Otis E. Mulliken
Ellsworth H. Plank (Alternate)

Department of the Treasury
Miss Janet Sundelson

Department of Agriculture
Robert B. Schwenger
Oscar Zaglits (Alternate)

Subcommittees--cont'd

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Subcommittees--cont'd

Department of Commerce
Milton Gilbert
Ed Stone (Alternate)

United States Tariff Commission
L. A. Morrison

Office of Price Administration
Jacob Mosak
Michael H. Sapir (Alternate)

H - Exchange Discrimination

Department of Commerce
Amos E. Taylor (Chairman)
H. P. Macgowan (Alternate)
Max J. Wasserman (Alternate)

Department of State
Woodbury Willoughby
James Corliss
Max Gideonse (Alternate)

Department of the Treasury
Herbert May

United States Tariff Commission
L. A. Morrison

Bureau of the Budget
Arthur Smithies

I - Commercial General Provisions

United States Tariff Commission
E. G. Martin (Chairman)

Department of State
John M. Leddy

Department of the Treasury
Robert Chambers

Subcommittees--cont'd

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775015

Subcommittees--cont'd

Department of Agriculture
G. B. L. Arner

Department of Commerce
H. P. Macgowan
Aaron Director (Alternate)

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COMMITTEE ON TRADE EXPANSION

Established

February 9, 1945 by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy.

Terms of Reference

1. To examine developments in other major countries regarding the policies, programs, and instrumentalities of the governments thereof for dealing with post-war international trade and the possible effect of such developments on the content, volume, and direction of international trade and on the participation of the United States in such trade.

2. To examine, in the light of the findings and conclusions derived above, the need for, and possibilities of, taking measures, now under consideration and/or other measures:

A. To provide conditions and facilities which will promote trade between countries, including international arrangements for preventing chaotic conditions resulting from unilateral action in disposing of surplus war stocks and production facilities and in acquiring goods in short supply;

B. To assure, while permitting at the same time the greatest possible freedom to private trade, that the volume of post-war trade will be maintained at a reasonably high level and expanded as circumstances permit.

3. To report to the Executive Committee its conclusions and recommendations and in the course of its work to bring to the attention of that Committee problems which might appropriately be referred for study to other existing interdepartmental committees.

Membership

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Membership

Department of Commerce
Frank A. Waring (Chairman)
Henry C. Chalmers (Alternate)
George Bell (Alternate)
Derek Brooks (Alternate)

Department of State
Carl D. Corse
Charles P. O'Donnell (Alternate)
Darwin J. DeGolia (Secretary)

Department of the Treasury
Raymond B. Mikesell

Department of Agriculture
Mordecai Ezekiel
Oscar Zaglits (Alternate)

Department of Labor
John H. G. Pierson

United States Tariff Commission
E. M. Whitcomb

Bureau of the Budget
Arthur Smithies (Observer)

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COMMITTEE ON TRADE INFORMATION

Established

October 19, 1945 by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy.

Terms of Reference

To consider in the development of a definite program, including provisions for needed appropriations and legislation, the proposals set forth in ECEFP D-133/45 regarding

A. Measures to broaden and intensify the present provision for the stimulation of exports from the United States through trade information and service in various ways, and

B. Measures to broaden or add to the present provision for stimulation of imports into the United States through trade information and service in various ways.

Membership

Department of Commerce
E. E. Schnellbacher (Chairman)
Roger Tubby (Alternate)
D. M. Koplik (Alternate)
Department of State
Roger Townsend
Darwin J. DeGolia (Secretary)

Department of the Treasury
Raymond F. Mikesell

Department of Agriculture
A. Rex Johnson

United States Tariff Commission
E. M. Whitcomb

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COMMITTEE ON WARTIME TRADE CONTROLS

Established

On May 19, 1944 as a subcommittee of the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy. Reconstituted by the Executive Committee on July 10, 1945 and given new terms of reference.

Terms of Reference

1. The Committee should investigate the need of continuing, for the purpose of dealing with problems arising during the war or in the immediate period of transition, wartime trade controls originally undertaken by this Government unilaterally or in conjunction with other governments for direct war ends or of replacing or supplementing them with other controls for such purposes.

2. In so doing, the Committee should bear in mind the desirability of restoring private enterprise in international trade relations and of eliminating wartime trade controls as rapidly as may be consistent with the national interest and world security in the immediate period of transition. Also, in pursuing the investigation prescribed above, the Committee should consider the question of trade controls with reference to the period before V-J Day and the period immediately following. Furthermore, it should take into account, in addition to military needs for prosecution of the war with Japan, the objectives of this Government regarding the following matters, together with any others which may be considered relevant:

A. Elimination of the influence of enemy interests in allied and neutral countries;

B. procurement and allocation of supplies to meet the essential civilian requirements of allied and liberated countries;

C. our relations with neutral countries in respect of the foregoing;

D. prevention of inflation in this and other countries;

E. economic assistance to friendly countries;

F. existing international commitments.

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The term "controls" should be regarded as including the regulation directly or indirectly of exports, imports and the prices thereof, and also government subsidization and enterprise in the field of foreign trade, but it should not include any controls established under intergovernmental commodity agreements.

3. On the basis of the investigation prescribed above, the Committee should formulate for consideration of the Executive Committee general recommendations regarding the principles or criteria which should be followed in continuing, establishing, or terminating controls in question and should indicate what legislation, if any, or what changes in administrative practice or policy might be desirable or required for the purpose of carrying out its recommendations.

4. The Committee may at any time prior to a report on the final results of its work submit to the Executive Committee recommendations regarding policy to be followed in handling specific problems in urgent need of attention and may submit in installments reports on various aspects of its work as they are completed.

Membership

Department of State
Donald D. Kennedy (Chairman)
Dudley M. Phelps (Alternate)
Charles P. O'Donnell (Executive Secretary)
Miss Elizabeth A. Funge (Recording Secretary)

Department of Agriculture
D. A. FitzGerald
Robert B. Schwenger (Alternate)

Department of Commerce
Walter Freedman
Perry J. Stevenson (Alternate)
Eugene M. Braderman (Alternate)

United States Tariff Commission
Louis S. Ballif

Civilian Production Administration
Robert Turner
R. B. Whiting (Alternate)

Membership--cont'd

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Membership--cont'd

War Shipping Administration
Richard M. Bissell

Office of Price Administration
Benjamin Caplan
David W. Lusher (Alternate)

Bureau of the Budget
Arthur Smithies (Observer)

Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion
Howard S. Piquet (Observer)

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WEST INDIAN COMMITTEE

Established

September 15, 1944 by the Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy as the Committee on Recommendations of the West Indian Conference. Reconstituted by the Executive Committee on June 1 as the West Indian Committee and given new terms of reference.

Terms of Reference

1. To examine the relation of the Caribbean sugar problem to the other economic and social problems of the area, particularly employment, and to make such policy recommendations as may be necessary to supplement those of the Committee on the Recommendations of the West Indian Conference.

2. To recommend United States policy in respect to other economic and social problems of the area which require further consultation with other interested governments, and which will further implement the objectives of the West Indian Conference.

3. To make suggestions regarding the agenda of the next West Indian Conference.

Membership

Department of State
- Otis E. Mulliken (Chairman)
- Marten Estey (Secretary)

Department of the Treasury
- W. L. Hebbard
- Herbert May (Alternate)

Department of the Interior
- Edwin G. Arnold
- Jack Fahy (Alternate)
- Mason Barr (Alternate)

Department of Agriculture
- Eric Englund
- Gustave Burmeister (Alternate)

Membership--cont'd

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Membership--cont'd

Department of Commerce
Eugene M. Braderman
H. P. Macgowan (Alternate)

Department of Labor
Miss Faith M. Williams

United States Tariff Commission
Allyn C. Loosley
David Lynch (Alternate)

Subcommittees

Sugar

Department of Agriculture
Gustave Burmeister (Chairman)

Department of State
Sidney de la Rue

Department of Labor
Miss Faith M. Williams

United States Tariff Commission
Allyn C. Loosley

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SECTION III

AIR COORDINATING COMMITTEE

Established

March 6, 1945 by the Secretaries of State, War, Navy and Commerce in a joint memorandum. Liaison established with ECEFP April 27, 1945.

Terms of Reference*

1. To examine aviation problems and developments affecting more than one department or agency.

2. To coordinate the activities of the Government departments and agencies interested in this field.

3. To recommend integrated policies for and action by the departments represented on the Committee, or by the President or any other Government agency charged with responsibility in the field.

Membership

Department of State
William L. Clayton (Chairman)

Department of War
Robert A. Lovett

Department of the Navy
John L. Sullivan

Department of Commerce
William A. Burden

Membership--cont'd

* In accordance with and subject to the provisions of any present or future applicable Federal statutes.

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Membership--cont'd

Civil Aeronautics Board
L. Welch Pogue

Civil Aeronautics Administration
Theodore P. Wright (Executive Secretary)
Myron A. Tracy (Secretary)

Standing Subcommittees

Arctic

Department of Commerce
Delbert M. Little (Chairman)
Chris M. Lample (Alternate)
Lt. Comdr. Paul A. Smith (Alternate)
R. E. Spencer (Alternate)
R. W. Craig (Alternate)
Commander O. W. Swainson (Alternate)
R. D. McCree (Alternate)

Department of State
Hugh S. Cumming
Andreas G. Ronhovde (Alternate)

Department of War
Colonel P. K. Morrill
Colonel D. N. Yates (Alternate)

Department of the Navy
Admiral Richard Byrd
Commander Finn Ronne (Alternate)

Civil Aeronautics Board
David E. Postle

Aviation Meteorology

Department of Commerce
Francis W. Reichelderfer (Chairman)
Delbert M. Little (Alternate)

Department of War
Colonel D. N. Yates
Lt. Colonel L. C. Mundell (Alternate)

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Subcommittees--cont'd

Department of the Navy
Captain H. T. Orville
Commander R. H. Maynard (Alternate)
Lt. Comdr. James V. Bassett (Secretary)

Aviation Research and Information

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
Thomas L. K. Smull (Chairman)

Department of State
Edward C. Sweeney
Richard K. Waldo (Alternate)

Department of War
Colonel M. F. Cooper
Carlton W. Pierce (Alternate)

Department of the Navy
Captain D. J. Welsh
Commander C. S. Willard (Alternate)

Department of Commerce
John C. Green
Ben Stern (Alternate)

Civil Aeronautics Board
Edward A. Bolster (Secretary)

Financing Foreign Air Services and Export of Aeronautical Equipment

Department of War
Colonel John G. Salsman
Colonel George H. Gutru, Jr. (Alternate)

Department of the Navy
Captain Roy K. Callahan
William W. Fleming (Alternate)

Department of Commerce
George Burgess
Alfred S. Koch (Alternate)

Department of State
Dudley M. Phelps
Edward C. Sweeney (Alternate)

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775015

Subcommittees-cont'd

Civil Aeronautics Board
Linus H. Walker

Export-Import Bank
William F. Machold (Observer)

PICAO Matters

Department of State
Stokeley Morgan (Chairman)
Richard Waldo (Alternate)

Department of War
Colonel G. Grant Mason, Jr.
Colonel James B. Knapp (Alternate)

Department of the Navy
Captain Felix L. Baker
Commander James Q. Newton (Alternate)

Department of Commerce
T. P. Wright
Alfred J. Koch (Alternate)

Civil Aeronautics Board
George C. Neal
John Sherman (Alternate)

Technical Standards of Aeronautical Charts

Department of Commerce
Lt. Comdr. Paul A. Smith (Chairman)
Kenneth Keefe (Alternate)

Department of War
Colonel Gerald FitzGerald
L. A. Bloom (Alternate)

Department of the Navy
Commander John A. Gamon, Jr.
Lt. Comdr. J. W. Hurley (Alternate)

Civil Aeronautics Board
David Postle

Department of State
* S. W. Boggs

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* When international matters arise Mr. Boggs sits in with the subcommittee as an adviser.

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Subcommittees--cont'd

Demobilization of the Aircraft Industry

Department of War
Colonel John G. Moore
Colonel C. H. Dyson (Alternate)
Vacant (Secretary)

Department of the Navy
Captain L. D. Webb
Captain Roy Jackson (Alternate)

Department of Commerce
Theodore P. Wright
George Burgess (Alternate)

Latin American Aviation

Department of State
Ellis O. Briggs
Stokeley W. Morgan (Alternate)

Department of War
Major General R. L. Walsh
Brig. General K. F. Hertford (Alternate)

Department of the Navy
Rear Admiral W. O. Spears
Captain Joseph R. Barbaro (Alternate)
Commander G. M. Clifford (Alternate)

Department of Commerce
William A. M. Burden
Theodore P. Wright (Alternate)
A. S. Koch (Alternate)

Civil Aeronautics Board
Oswald Ryan
John Sherman (Alternate)

Office of Inter-American Affairs
Norris M. Mumper (Executive Secretary)

Surplus Property Board
William B. Harding
Harper Woodward (Alternate)

Army-Navy Liquidation Commissioner
William E. Vogelback
Robert G. McClurkin (Alternate)

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EUROPEAN NEUTRALS COMMITTEE*
(Anglo-American)

Established

January 5, 1945 by the Department of State in a letter to the British Embassy, a copy of which was sent to the Foreign Economic Administration. Liaison established with ECEFP on January 19, 1945.

Terms of Reference

To work out with the British ways and means of obtaining 1) our residual economic warfare objectives, 2) an agreement from the neutrals preventing interference with Allied procurement arrangements for materials in short supply, 3) contributions from the neutrals in proportion to their resources to supply allied and liberated area requirements.

Membership

Department of State
Donald S. Gilpatric (Chairman)
John V. Lovitt (Deputy)
Other representatives from the Department including representatives of the following divisions: NE, NOE, WE, CP, and LA
Henry D. Wyner)
Shirley H. Weber) Secretaries

Department of Commerce
Webster B. May
E. J. Rossback

British Embassy
A. F. Geolot
Ralph K. Taylor

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* Replaced the Iberian Peninsula Operating Committee, the Swiss-Swedish Committee, and the Turkish Committee.

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LIBERATED AREAS COMMITTEE
(United States side of Combined Liberated Areas Committee)

Established

May 17, 1944 by the Secretary of State. Liaison established with ECEFP July 21, 1944.

Terms of Reference*

1. To provide the forum in which various United States Government civilian agencies may formulate policies on all wartime economic problems of appropriate concern to the civilian agencies arising in areas which are, or formerly were, under enemy domination, and coordinate such policies with the War and Navy Departments.

Membership

Department of State
William L. Clayton (Chairman)
Donald S. Gilpatric (Alternate)
Marshall MacDuffie, Jr. (Formerly FEA)
Vacant (Secretary)
Miss Alice H. Babb (Recording Secretary)

Department of the Treasury
Harold Glasser
Lehman Aarons (Alternate)

Department of War
Major General J. H. Hilldring
Colonel James C. Davis (Alternate)

Department of the Navy
Rear Admiral J. J. McCrea
Lt. Comndr. E. J. Gluckstadt

The Civilian Production Administration and the War Food Administration will from time to time be represented.

Subcommittees

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* A statement of the purpose and scope of the Committee's activities was contained originally in a letter from the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador dated May 4, 1944.

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Subcommittees

French Area Committee

(United States side of Combined French Area Committee which is a subcommittee of CLAC)*

Department of State
- Camden H. McVey (Chairman)
- James C. H. Bonbright
- James Fariss
- John P. Gardiner
- Charles P. Nolan
- H. A. Quirin
- Frank Fetter
- David F. Pisik (Formerly FEA)
- Charles D. Franck (Formerly FEA)
- Durand Smith (Secretary)

Department of the Treasury
- J. H. Brooks
- Morris Friedberg

Department of Agriculture
- Vacant

War Shipping Administration
- Max Millikan

Department of Commerce
- L. Domeratsky (Observer)
- P. M. Copp (Observer)

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* There is also a subcommittee of FAC for the consideration of French Colonial Affairs.

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NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND FINANCIAL PROBLEMS

Established

By Act of Congress "to provide for the participation of the United States in the International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development" approved July 31, 1945.

Terms of Reference

To coordinate the policies and operations of the representatives of the United States on the Fund and the Bank and of all agencies of the Government which make or participate in making foreign loans or which engage in foreign financial, exchange or monetary transactions.

Membership

Department of the Treasury
- Fred M. Vinson (Chairman)
- Frank Coe (Secretary)

Department of State
- James M. Byrnes
- W. L. Clayton (Alternate)

Department of Commerce
- Henry A. Wallace
- Arthur Paul (Alternate)

Federal Reserve Board
- Marriner S. Eccles

Export-Import Bank
- Wm. McChesney Martin, Jr.

Subcommittees

Technical

Department of the Treasury
- Harry D. White (Chairman)
- E. M. Bernstein
- Ansel F. Luxford (Alternate)
- Frank Coe (Alternate)
- Richard B. Brenner (Alternate)
- Raymond F. Mikesell (Secretary)

Subcommittees--cont'd

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Subcommittees--cont'd

Department of State
E. G. Collado
John Ferguson (Alternate)
John P. Young (Alternate)
C. P. Kindleberger (Alternate)

Department of Commerce
Frank A. Waring
Hal B. Lary (Alternate)

Federal Reserve Board
Burke Knapp
Walter Gardner (Alternate)
J. Leonard Townsend (Alternate)
Miss Alice Bourneuf (Alternate)

Securities and Exchange Commission
Walter C. Louchheim

Staff

Department of the Treasury
Frank Coe (Chairman)
Norman Ness
R. L. Horne (Secretary)

Department of State
E. G. Collado
D. Maynard Phelps (Alternate)
George F. Luthringer (Alternate)
John S. Hooker (Alternate)

Department of Commerce
Amos Taylor
Hal B. Lary (Alternate)

Federal Reserve Board
Burke Knapp
Walter Gardner (Alternate)
Woodlief Thomas (Alternate)

Export-Import Bank
Wayne Taylor
August Maffry (Alternate)

Securities and Exchange Commission
Walter C. Louchheim

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775015

RECONVERSION WORKING COMMITTEE

Established

August 20, 1945 by Order of John W. Snyder, Director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, and August 11, 1945, by letter of the Director to the heads of various departments and agencies concerned with reconversion, requesting each to appoint a Deputy to represent that agency on the Committee, to attend its meetings and to participate in its work.

The Reconversion Working Committee is set up under the authority of the War Mobilization and Reconversion Act which requires that the Director of OWMR shall

"formulate or have formulated such plans as are necessary to meet the problems arising out of the transition from war to peace;

"promote and assist in the development of demobilization and reconversion plans by executive agencies; develop procedures whereby each executive agency is kept informed of proposed demobilization and reconversion plans and proposals which relate to its work and which are being developed or carried out by other executive agencies in the development and administration of such plans."

Terms of Reference

1. To assure the formulation and maintenance of integrated plans and working programs, to be carried out by the executive agencies in cooperation with management, labor, agriculture, finance, state and local governments and other representative groups, so as to assure effective and orderly reconversion.

2. To maintain a continuous and critical review of planning and operational progress under approved programs, and to recommend corrective action when required to facilitate accomplishment of such programs.

3. To provide each member agency and the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion with accurate and current information concerning the problems, policies and operations of the executive agencies and of other groups.

4. To provide a means for the coordination of agency activities with respect to reconversion planning and operations.

Membership

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Membership

Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion
Robert R. Nathan (Chairman)
C. J. Hitch (Secretary)

Department of State
W. L. Clayton

Department of the Treasury
Ansel Luxford

Department of War
Brig. General David N. Hauseman

Department of Justice
Harold Judson

Department of the Navy
H. Struve Hensel

Department of the Interior
Abe Fortas

Department of Agriculture
D. A. FitzGerald

Department of Commerce
Philip M. Hauser

Department of Labor
Albert Abrahamson

Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Charles T. Fisher, Jr.

Federal Reserve System
Ronald Ransom

Maritime Commission
Vice Admiral Howard L. Vickery

National Housing Agency
Coleman Woodbury

Veterans Administration
Col. W. C. Buell

Office of Price Administration
James G. Rogers

Membership--cont'd

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Membership--cont'd

Civilian Production Administration
Philip F. Maguire

Office of Contract Settlement
Seymour Sheriff

Office of the Stabilization Administrator
Walter S. Salant

Retraining & Reemployment Administration
James S. Taylor

Smaller War Plants Corporation
Maury Maverick

Surplus Property Board
W. Stuart Symington

Bureau of the Budget (Observer)
Richard H. Templeton, Jr.

Steering Committee of the Reconversion Working Committee

Membership

Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion
Robert R. Nathan (Chairman)
C. J. Hitch (Secretary)

Department of War
Brig. General David N. Hauseman

Department of the Navy
H. Struve Hensel

Department of Agriculture
D. A. FitzGerald

Department of Labor
Albert Abrahamson

Office of Price Administration
James G. Rogers

Office of the Stabilization Administrator
Walter S. Salant

Membership--cont'd

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775015

Membership--cont'd

Civilian Production Administration
Philip F. Maguire

Bureau of the Budget (Observer)
Richard H. Templeton, Jr.

Subcommittees

International Adjustments Subcommittee

Terms of Reference

To review plans of the interested agencies in the area of international economic relations during the reconversion period affecting the termination or maintenance of wartime controls, the discontinuance of wartime financial and commercial arrangements and the transition therefrom to interim or semi-permanent arrangements.

Membership

Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion
Harold Stein (Chairman)
William N. Lawrence (Secretary)

Department of State
Henry R. Labouisse, Jr.

Department of the Treasury
E. M. Bernstein
Harold Glasser

Department of War
Col. Charles N. Belln

Department of the Navy
Commander R. H. Love

Department of Agriculture
D. A. FitzGerald

Department of Commerce
R. Henry Rowntree

Membership--cont'd

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775015

Membership--cont'd

Federal Reserve System
Clayton Gehman

Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Stuart Barnes

Office of Price Administration
Karl Anderson

Civilian Production Administration
Robert C. Turner

Office of the Stabilization Administrator
Walter S. Salant

Bureau of the Budget (Observer)
Richard H. Templeton, Jr.

Transition Programming Subcommittee

Terms of Reference

To promote, during the reconversion period, the formulation of economic policies which are conducive to the achievement of the longer-run objectives of full production and full employment.

Membership

Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion
Everett Hagen (Chairman)
Mrs. Nora Kirkpatrick (Secretary)

Department of the Treasury
Ansel Luxford

Department of Agriculture
Lawrence Myers

Department of Commerce
M. J. Meehan

Department of Labor
Albert Abrahamson

Federal Reserve System
Woodlief Thomas

Membership--cont'd

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775015

Membership--cont'd

Federal Security Agency
I. S. Falk

Bureau of the Budget
Gerhard Colm

Office of Price Administration
Richard V. Gilbert

Civilian Production Administration
Lincoln Gordon

Office of the Stabilization Administrator
Walter S. Salant

Bottlenecks Subcommittee

Terms of Reference

To provide machinery for coordination of inter-agency activities in dealing with reconversion bottlenecks; maintain a continuing review of the plans of various agencies concerned with this problem; make recommendations to assure that all possible steps are being taken to break bottlenecks and that steps taken are consistent with each other and with the other policies of the government.

Membership

Office of the Stabilization Administrator
Philip H. Coombs (Chairman)

Department of Labor
Albert Abrahamson
E. R. Lerner

Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion
C. J. Hitch
Mrs. Orah Cooper (Secretary)

Civilian Production Administration
Philip F. Maguire

Office of Price Administration
John M. Bulkley

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INTER-AGENCY POLICY COMMITTEE ON RUBBER

Established

September 8, 1945 by Order of Mr. John W. Snyder, Director of the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion.

Terms of Reference

General:

The ultimate objective underlying the creation of the Committee is the establishment of a coordinated national policy on rubber.

Specific:

1. The Committee shall obtain and assemble pertinent statistical, technical and economic information on short- and long-term rubber requirements and supply, on production costs of natural and synthetic rubber, and related subjects, and shall make such information available to the members of the Committee.

2. The Committee shall survey plans and programs of the agencies for

a) The maintenance of a synthetic rubber industry;
b) The maintenance of stand-by rubber plants;
c) The disposal of surplus rubber plants;
d) The encouragement of rubber research and development;
e) The establishment of a strategic stockpile of rubber;
f) The development of wild and cultivated natural rubber in South America;
g) The establishment and maintenance of a mutually advantageous program for importing natural rubber from the Far East.

3. The Committee shall report to the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion on the nature of the plans and programs of the various agencies and shall advise the Director of the adequacy and consistency of proposed plans and programs.

4. The Committee shall submit recommendations to the Director on matters requiring action by him or by the President or by the Congress.

Membership

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Membership

Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion
William L. Batt (Chairman)
Howard S. Piquet (Executive Secretary)

Department of State
Will L. Clayton
Donald Kennedy (Alternate)

Department of War
Major General Sidney P. Spalding
Captain Henry Haxo, Jr. (Alternate)

Department of Justice
Wendell Berge
Ernest S. Meyers (Alternate)

Department of the Navy
Arthur M. Hill
Arthur Wolf (Alternate)

Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Charles B. Henderson
George White (Alternate)

Surplus Property Administration
W. Stuart Symington
Raymond T. Bowman (Alternate)

Rubber Development Corporation
Alan Grant

Observers

House of Representatives - U. S. Congress
Honorable Alexander J. Resa
Honorable Fred L. Crawford

Department of Agriculture
Dennis A. Fitzgerald
W. C. Dachtler

United States Tariff Commission
E. M. Whitcomb

Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Richard Baybutt

Observers--cont'd

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Observers--cont'd

Civilian Production Administration
George Emery
Robert S. Wilson

Working Group

Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion
Howard S. Piquet (Chairman)

Department of State
W. T. Phillips
J. N. DuBarry

Department of War
Captain Henry Haxo, Jr.

Department of Justice
E. Harsha
I. Lewis Markus

Department of the Navy
Arthur Wolf

Department of Agriculture
Jacob M. Schaffer

United States Tariff Commission
Serge Benson

Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Walter N. Munster

Rubber Development Corporation
Everett G. Holt
L. B. Proctor

Surplus Property Administration
Ralph F. Dimmitt
Paul T. Homan
Hugo E. Weisberger
William H. Wynne

Civilian Production Administration
J. W. Sears
R. S. Faylor
Mrs. Enid Baird

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INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON RUBBER

Established

February 12, 1945 by letters to the heads of various agencies from Mr. William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of economic affairs. Prior to this date there was an exchange of letters between Mr. Clayton and Mr. Francis A. Truslow, President of the Rubber Development Corporation, regarding the advisability of establishing a committee to provide a consultative mechanism between the agencies concerned with operating problems relating to natural rubber procurement.

Terms of Reference

To discuss operating problems and related policy questions concerning the procurement of natural rubber when the questions involved are of interest to several departments or agencies.

Membership

Department of State
Donald D. Kennedy (Chairman)
William T. Phillips (Alternate)
Joseph N. Dubarry (Secretary)

* Department of War

* Department of the Navy

Department of Commerce
Murray H. Marker

Reconstruction Finance Corporation
George White, Jr.
Richard Baybutt (Alternate)

Combined Boards
William L. Batt

Membership--cont'd

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* Representatives of Army, Navy, and the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion will attend meetings when items of interest to them are on the agenda for discussion.

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Membership--cont'd

Rubber Development Corporation
Alan Grant

* Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion

Civilian Production Administration
Robert S. Wilson

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* Representatives of Army, Navy, and the Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion will attend meetings when items of interest to them are on the agenda for discussion.

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COMMITTEE ON TRADE AGREEMENTS

Established

June 23, 1934 by letter of the Secretary of State directed to the heads of the various departments and agencies concerned with matters of foreign trade requesting each to designate representatives to serve on the Committee. Liaison with the ECEFP established May 12, 1944.

Terms of Reference

1. To serve as the central agency of the interdepartmental trade agreements organization.

2. To direct the preparation of all necessary studies.

3. To review data and recommendations of its numerous subcommittees.

4. To formulate the final recommendations regarding proposed trade agreements which are submitted, through the Secretary of State, to the President.

Membership

Department of State
Winthrop G. Brown (Chairman)
Mrs. Margaret H. Potter (Secretary)
Miss Elizabeth A. Funge (Recording Secretary)

Department of the Treasury
V. Frank Coe
Norman T. Ness (Alternate)

*Department of War
Harold H. Neff

*Department of the Navy
Commander George E. Prevost

Membership--cont'd

* War and Navy Departments were added to the membership of the Committee in accordance with the Trade Agreements Act of June 12, 1934 as amended by Congress July 5, 1945 (Public Law 130, 79th Congress).

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Membership--cont'd

Department of Agriculture
Leslie A. Wheeler
G. B. L. Arner (Alternate)

Department of Commerce
Arthur Paul
H. P. Macgowan (Alternate)

United States Tariff Commission
Oscar B. Ryder
Lynn R. Edminster (Alternate), CRI
Edward A. Yardley, CRI

Office of Price Administration
Jacob L. Mosak
Charles J. Walsh (Alternate)

Bureau of the Budget
Arthur Smithies (Observer)

Country Committees

British Empire
United Kingdom subcommittee
Canada subcommittee
USSR
France
Holland and Belgium-Luxemburg
Brazil
China
Chile
Paraguay
Mexico
Peru
Czechoslovakia
Switzerland

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SECTION IV - Telephone List

Name of Committee	Name of Secretary	Telephone Ext.
Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy		2869 State
	The Secretariat	2719 State
Subcommittees		
Agriculture (CAP)	Clarence W. Nichols	636 State
Cartels, Private Monopolies and	Robert P. Terrill	2613 State
	Roger C. Dixon	2103 State
China, Economic Policy toward (CEP)	Granville O. Woodard	406 State
Customs Procedures (CCP)	Allerton de C. Tompkins	776 State
Employment, International Co-operation with Respect to (ICRE)	Ellsworth H. Plank	2812 State
	Maurice J. Erickson	2812 State
Foreign Travel (CFT)	Darwin J. DeGolia	445 State
Import Stabilization Proposal (ISP)	William Diebold, Jr.	2957 State
Inter-American Economic Affairs (EA)	H. Gerald Smith	601 State
International Commodity Problems (CPC)	William T. Phillips	2759 State
	L. Ingemann Highby	2857 State
Technical Committees on:		
Coffee	Perry K. Sellon	2696 State
Conserv. Natural Resources	. . .	
Copper	Miss H. M. Meyer	3773 Interior
Cordage & Misc. Fibers	James G. Evans	2041 State
Cotton	James G. Evans	2041 State
Sugar	Mrs. Jean Mulliken	3080 State
Tin	. . .	
Wool	James G. Evans	2041 State
International Economic Organizations, Specialized (IO)	John M. Leddy	2088 State
Investment Policy, Foreign (FIP)	Herbert B. Woolley	2691 State
Trade Barriers (STB)	John M. Leddy	2088 State
	Mrs. Margaret H. Potter	594 State
Trade Expansion (CTE)	Darwin J. DeGolia	445 State
Trade Information (CTI)	Darwin J. DeGolia	445 State
Wartime Trade Controls (WTC)	Charles P. O'Donnell	2957 State
	Miss Elizabeth A. Funge	594 State
West Indian (WIC)	Marten S. Estey	2812 State

Other Interdepartmental Economic Committees		
Air Coordinating	Theodore P. Wright	1685 Commerce
	Myron A. Tracy	1613 Commerce
European Neutrals	Henry D. Wyner	2494 State
	Shirley H. Weber	2494 State
Inter-Agency Policy Committee on Rubber	Howard S. Piquet	72044 Natl War Agcies
Liberated Areas	Vacant	
	Miss Alice H. Babb	738 State
French Area	Durand Smith	738 State
National Advisory Council	Frank Coe	305 Treasury
Reconversion Working Committee	C. J. Hitch	4185 Natl War Agcies
Rubber, Interdepartmental	William T. Phillips	2759 State
Trade Agreements	Mrs. Margaret H. Potter	594 State
	Miss Elizabeth A. Funge	594 State

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A Brief Comment by the Survey Branch of Information Services Division on the Inaccuracy of Statesido Commercial Polls in the Presidential Election

The major commercial polls in the United States - Gallup, Crossley and Roper - rely upon what is known as "quota" sampling in making their election predictions. With quota sampling an attempt is made to secure a representative sample by interviewing the proper proportion of men and women, old and young, low income and high income, etc., in the population. The proper proportions or quotas are set from Census figures and other sources. For example, if the census shows that there are 60 per cent women and 40 per cent men in the American population, 60 per cent female interviews and 40 per cent male interviews are included in the sample. The same procedure is followed for whatever other quotas are set. It is the responsibility of the interviewers to see that these quotas are met by selecting the proper respondents to interview.

This quota method of sampling has done good work and is a far cry from the straw polls of Literary Digest days when simply numbers were amassed in the sample with no regard for the proper proportion of various groups in the population. But advanced students of polling have been pointing out for several years now that there is a serious danger in quota sampling, a danger which is avoided by strict random sampling * such as that employed by the Survey Branch. In quota sampling, the final selection of respondents is left

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* Also known as "area sampling" or "probability sampling." The mechanics of this method are briefly described later in the text.

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to the interviewers. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that under these conditions, interviewers tend to gravitate toward easier contacts — more literate people -- and the net result is to get a sample of the population which contains too high a proportion of the upper educational and economic levels. The magnitude of this upward bias in quota sampling is indicated in an educational comparison made by Donald Rugg of the Princeton Office of Public Opinion Research *. His figures follow:

Amount of Education	Proportions obtained in Gallup's Quota Sample	Census Proportions	Differences
Less than 8 years	38.5%	60.4%	-21.9%
9 thru 12 years	34.9	29.5	+ 5.4
Over 12 years	26.6	10.1	+16.5
	100.0%	100.0%	

It is evident from this comparison that a quota sample very seriously underepresents the lower educational levels and overepresents the higher.

That quota sampling shows a tendency toward a similar bias in Germany is suggested by some preliminary data gathered by the Survey Branch:

Amount of Education	Best Estimate of Correct Proportions*	Proportions Obtained by Random Sampling	Proportions Obtained by Quota Sampling
Less than 8 years	74%	73%	68%
9 thru 11 years	18	22	20
12 years and over	8	5	12
	100%	100%	100%

* These figures are based on an average of five studies done by Surveys Branch and are given here instead of Census figures because the Census group has expressed the judgment that our figures are more accurate than even the Census in respect to the educational proportions in the Amzon and Berlin population.

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* In "Gauging Public Opinion" by Hadley Cantril and Research Associates, Princeton University Press, 1944, Pg. 148.

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There is the suggestion in the above figures that just as in statesido polling German quota sampling yields too low a proportion of the lower educational levels and too high a proportion of the upper. The proportions obtained in the random sample are not entirely correct, but for the important extreme groups are closer to the figures accepted as accurate by the census. Moreover, and this is the most significant point, the random proportions could be increased in accuracy simply by enlarging the sample, but the quota errors, since they are due to a constant interviewer bias would not be diminished in any way by enlarging the sample.

Quota Sampling and Election Predictions

Now what does the upper level bias in quota sampling do to election predictions? In past weeks the Surveys Branch has been investigating voting indications in the anticipated Berlin Elections through both quota sampling and random sampling. At this time the available data allow a comparison to be made between party preference as measurd by the two methods. The comparison follows: *

Party Preference	Proportions Obtained with Random Sampling	Proportions Obtained with Quota Sampling	Differences
SPD	64%	58%	- 6%
SED	2	2	-
CDU	18	22	+ 4
LDP	5	9	+ 4
No opinion	8	3	- 5
No party preference	3	6	+ 3
	100%	100%	

* These early October statements of party preference in the three Western sectors are not to be taken as a prediction of the Berlin Elections. Such a prediction is now under consideration. However, no survey-based forecast can be made if there is an unknown vote from the Soviet Sector.

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The deviations between the above two sets of figures are very reasonably interpretable as errors in the quota measures introduced by the upper level bias that has been indicated to inhere in that method. The SPD party preference has been underestimated by 6 per cent by the quota approach because there is an improperly low proportion of the lower educational and socio-economic levels who tend to favor SPD. Parallelly, the CDU and LDP are over-estimated because of the improperly high proportions of the upper levels.

In the light of the bias that has been demonstrated to be associated with quota sampling and the effects such a bias may have upon election data, it can now be seen why stateside commercial polls were inviting disaster in their election predictions. Gallup, Crossley and Roper all rely upon quota sampling in their operations. To the pleas of academic pollers to change to more rigorous though more laborious random sampling, they have always replied that the quota method seems to work well enough. And it does generally -- but not always. In any election where the lower educational and economic strata vote quite differently from the upper strata, quota sampling, with its under-representation of the intentions of the former groups, may lead to inaccurate predictions. Certainly more information than is at this moment available is needed for the complete explanation of what happened to stateside polls, but it is very possible that it was quota sampling that in large part was responsible for the incorrect predictions. As newspaper reports have made clear, labor, under the spur perhaps of Taft-Hartley irritations, voted heavily for Truman, and labor is drawn largely from the lower educational and social

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Methods of ISD Surveys Branch

In view of the now high-lighted vulnerability of quota sampling to occasional disaster, it is gratifying to be able to state that since its inception, Surveys Branch has relied exclusively, except for methodological experiments like those cited, upon the method of random sampling in its operations. Moreover, it has been possible to apply this mode of sampling with extraordinary efficiency in Germany because, unlike most places where polling is conducted, a complete list by name of the population to be sampled can be found in a card file -- the ration list. Under such circumstances a true random sample can be rigorously obtained by selecting out every nth card in the file and instructing the interviewers to contact the people whose names

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Sex	AMZON		BERLIN	
	Proportions from Census	Proportions from Survey Br. sample	Proportions from Census	Proportions from Survey Br. sample
Men	42.6%	43.6%	37.9%	36.1%
Women	57.4	56.4	62.1	63.9
	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

The present Chief of the Survey Branch is an academician who for several years has been among those who have warned the established commercial polls of the necessity of improving their sampling methods, and more particularly of the necessity of utilizing strict random sampling. The objection to this latter has always been its greater expense as compared to quota sampling, and its greater demands in technical training. But in the opinion of the Chief, if these result in greater accuracy and dependability, they are well worth the cost.

The foregoing remarks are not to be taken as in any sense a definitive analysis of what happened to polling in the United States elections. Much more information and time will be needed for such an assessment. The present

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* For other comparisons see Report No. 124, "Social Characteristics of the German People in the American Zone and in Berlin (British and American Sectors)".

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It is perhaps worth finally pointing out that the criticisms of quota sampling which have been voiced and the confidence in random sampling are shared by the sampling experts of the United States Bureau of Census and the Department of Agriculture.

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4 November 1948

A Brief Comment by the Survey Branch of Information Services Division on the Inaccuracy of Stateside Commercial Polls in the Presidential Election

The major commercial polls in the United States - Gallup, Crossley and Roper - rely upon what is known as "quota" sampling in making their election predictions. With quota sampling an attempt is made to secure a representative sample by interviewing the proper proportion of men and women, old and young, low income and high income, etc., in the population. The proper proportions or quotas are set from Census figures and other sources. For example, if the census shows that there are 60 per cent women and 40 per cent men in the American population, 60 per cent female interviews and 40 per cent male interviews are included in the sample. The same procedure is followed for whatever other quotas are set. It is the responsibility of the interviewers to see that these quotas are met by selecting the proper respondents to interview.

This quota method of sampling has done good work and is a far cry from the straw polls of Literary Digest days when simply numbers were amassed in the sample with no regard for the proper proportion of various groups in the population. But advanced students of polling have been pointing out for several years now that there is a serious danger in quota sampling, a danger which is avoided by strict random sampling * such as that employed by the Survey Branch. In quota sampling, the final selection of respondents is left

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* Also known as "area sampling" or "probability sampling." The mechanics of this method are briefly described later in the text.

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to the interviewers. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that under these conditions, interviewers tend to gravitate toward easier contacts -- more literate people -- and the net result is to get a sample of the population which contains too high a proportion of the upper educational and economic levels. The magnitude of this upward bias in quota sampling is indicated in an educational comparison made by Donald Rugg of the Princeton Office of Public Opinion Research *. His figures follow:

Amount of Education	Proportions obtained in Gallup's Quota Sample	Census Proportions	Differences
Less than 8 years	38.5%	60.4%	-21.9%
9 thru 12 years	34.9	29.5	+ 5.4
Over 12 years	26.6	10.1	+16.5
	100.0%	100.0%	

It is evident from this comparison that a quota sample very seriously underrepresents the lower educational levels and overrepresents the higher.

That quota sampling shows a tendency toward a similar bias in Germany is suggested by some preliminary data gathered by the Survey Branch:

Amount of Education	Best Estimate of Correct Proportions*	Proportions Obtained by Random Sampling	Proportions Obtained by Quota Sampling
Less than 8 years	74%	73%	68%
9 thru 11 years	18	22	20
12 years and over	8	5	12
	100%	100%	100%

* These figures are based on an average of five studies done by Surveys Branch and are given here instead of Census figures because the Census group has expressed the judgment that our figures are more accurate than even the Census in respect to the educational proportions in the Amzon and Berlin population.

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* In "Gauging Public Opinion" by Hadley Cantril and Research Associates, Princeton University Press, 1944, Pg. 148.

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There is the suggestion in the above figures that just as in stateside polling German quota sampling yields too low a proportion of the lower educational levels and too high a proportion of the upper. The proportions obtained in the random sample are not entirely correct, but for the important extreme groups are closer to the figures accepted as accurate by the census. Moreover, and this is the most significant point, the random proportions could be increased in accuracy simply by enlarging the sample, but the quota errors, since they are due to a constant interviewer bias would not be diminished in any way by enlarging the sample.

Quota Sampling and Election Predictions

Now what does the upper level bias in quota sampling do to election predictions? In past weeks the Surveys Branch has been investigating voting indications in the anticipated Berlin Elections through both quota sampling and random sampling. At this time the available data allow a comparison to be made between party preference as measurd by the two methods. The comparison follows: *

Party Preference	Proportions Obtained with Random Sampling	Proportions Obtained with Quota Sampling	Differences
SPD	64%	58%	- 6%
SED	2	2	-
CDU	18	22	+ 4
LDP	5	9	+ 4
No opinion	8	3	- 5
No party preference	3	6	+ 3
	100%	100%	

* These early October statements of party preference in the three Western sectors are not to be taken as a prediction of the Berlin Elections. Such a prediction is now under consideration. However, no survey-based forecast can be made if there is an unknown vote from the Soviet Sector.

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The deviations between the above two sets of figures are very reasonably interpretable as errors in the quota measures introduced by the upper level bias that has been indicated to inhere in that method. The SPD party preference has been underestimated by 6 per cent by the quota approach because there is an improperly low proportion of the lower educational and socio-economic levels who tend to favor SPD. Parallelly, the CDU and LDP are over-estimated because of the improperly high proportions of the upper levels.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington 25, D. C.

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AGAO-S 334 SANA Force
Coordinating Committee
(18 Nov 47)CSGPO-M

20 November 1947

SUBJECT: Status of the Committee of Three and SWNCC Under the National Security Act of 1947.

TO: Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command
Commanding Generals,
Army Ground Forces
U. S. Army, Europe
U. S. Army, Pacific
U. S. Army, Alaska
U. S. Army, Caribbean
U. S. Army Forces in the Mediterranean
Theater of Operations
Independent Commands under the Department
of the Army.

On 4 November 1947, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force signed the following Provisional Terms of Reference of the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee:

"The State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) is reconstituted as the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC) and is designated as the agency to reconcile and coordinate the action to be taken by the Department of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force on matters of common interest, and under the Chairmanship of the Department of State will be responsible for the coordination of policy on politico-military questions referred to it.

"Action taken and decisions made by the State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee will be construed as action and decisions by and the approved policy of the Secretaries of State and Defense, as well as the Secretaries of Army, Navy, and the Air Force. Dissemination of the decisions of the Committee will be accomplished by the departments concerned for the information and guidance of all concerned and, where appropriate, with necessary instructions for action."

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

EDWARD F. WITSELL
Major General
The Adjutant General

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Chief of Staff, U.S.Air Force
Divisions of the General and
Special Staff, U. S. Army

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WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
Plans & Operations Div.
Washington 25, D.C.

P&O 091 Germany (17 Jan 47) 17 January 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, FAR EAST, TOKYO, JAPAN:

SUBJECT: Public Information Program on German Occupation Policy

1. On 16 October 1946, the State, War and Navy Departments approved SWNCC 288/1 as amended by the insertion therein of a revised page 4.

2. At its 5th Meeting on 10 December 1946, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information approved FPI 1 as amended, which, in accordance with the Subcommittee's charter, is to be implemented without further approval by the State, War and Navy Departments.

3. The inclosures are forwarded for information.

4. Similar inclosures have been sent to the Commanding General, U.S. Forces, European Theater, Office of Military Government (U.S.) Germany, U.S. Element, Allied Commission, Austria and the Army Advisory Group, for information.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS:

/s/ James L. Cantrell
JAMES L. CANTRELL
Lt Colonel, GSC
Executive Officer
Plans & Policy Group

2 Incls
1. SWNCC 288.1 w/dec amending, Cys No. 76 & 78
2. SWNCC FPI 1, Meme to Holders of SWNCC FPI 1 & corrig (10 Jan 47) to SWNCC FPI 1, Cys No. 74 & 87

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WAR DEPARTMENT
War Department General Staff
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Lt Colonel, GSC
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COPY NO. 78

17 October 1946

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

DECISION AMENDING SWNCC 288/1

MECHANISM FOR STATE, WAR, NAVY DISCUSSION AND CLEARANCE OF FOREIGN POLITICO-MILITARY EVENTS AND POLICIES

References: a. SWNCC 288 Series
b. Item 6, Minutes 50th SWNCC Mtg.

Note by the Secretaries

1. At its 50th Meeting on 16 October 1946, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 288/1 after amending.

2. Holders of SWNCC 288/1 are requested to substitute the attached revised page 4 for the one contained therein and destroy the latter by burning.

A. D. REID

V. L. LOWRANCE

RAYMOND E. COX

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SWNCC 288/1

28 August 1946

Pages 3 - 7, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

MECHANISM FOR STATE, WAR, NAVY DISCUSSION AND CLEARANCE OF FOREIGN POLITICO-MILITARY EVENTS AND POLICIES

Reference: SWNCC 288

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a report by an ad hoc Committee on the above reference, is circulated for consideration by the Committee:

A. D. REID

V. L. LOWRANCE

H. W. MOSELEY

Secretariat

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ENCLOSURE

MECHANISM FOR STATE, WAR, NAVY DISCUSSION AND CLEARANCE OF FOREIGN POLITICO-MILITARY EVENTS AND POLICIES

Report of Ad Hoc Committee

THE PROBLEM

1. To establish a mechanism and procedures among the State, War and Navy Departments that will enable them to facilitate an awareness by the public of world events and will enable the public better to judge the issues involved in actions taken by the Government in the field of foreign politico-military affairs.

DISCUSSION

2. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

3. It is concluded that:

a. A subcommittee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee should be created as a mechanism to assist in the regular and continuing consideration of information policies of the State, War and Navy Departments with respect to events and policies in the field of foreign politico-military affairs.

b. Actual dissemination of such information would be accomplished by further developing those informational activities which are primarily the responsibility of the State Department.

RECOMMENDATION

4. It is recommended that Appendix "A", a charter for the agency proposed in paragraph 3, be approved.

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APPENDIX "A"

DRAFT

CHARTER

SWNCC SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN POLICY INFORMATION

ORGANIZATION

1. The SWNCC Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information is hereby established as the agency of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) charged with the exchange of views between the three departments with respect to information to be disseminated to the public on developments and policies in the field of foreign politico-military affairs.

MEMBERSHIP

2. The SWNCC Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information will consist of:

a. Two officials of the State Department, one of whom will serve as chairman.

b. One officer of the War Department.

c. One officer of the Navy Department.

3. Whenever a member of the Subcommittee is unable to attend a meeting of the Subcommittee, he will be represented by an alternate who will act in his place.

FUNCTIONS

4. The SWNCC Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information shall:

a. Consider, regularly and continuously, questions pertaining to the prompt public release of documents and other information in the field of foreign politico-military affairs and shall exchange views with respect to the prompt release of such information in order that the public may participate constructively in the formation of policies in this field.

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b. Facilitate rapid clearance within the respective Departments with respect to the release of information of the foregoing nature.

PROCEDURE

5. The SWNCC Subcommitte on Foreign Policy Information shall:

a. Establish its own method of procedure.

b. Maintain close liaison with other agencies of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and with the appropriate policy offices of the three Departments.

c. Facilitate the coordination of clearance within the respective Departments concerning the release of information on matters of foreign policy which require other than State Department release.

6. Each member of the SWNCC Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information is authorized to request the presence at meetings of the Subcommitte of authoritative consultants from the policy and functional offices of his Department.

7. If unable to reach agreement promptly, the Subcommittee of Foreign Policy Information will submit to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee a report indicating wherein the members disagree in order that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee can take appropriate action.

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APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. The public should not only be informed of what is happening abroad but also be in a position to form a reasoned judgment about existing or projected United States policy, its execution, and the comparative merits of alternative means to national security. Only a public thus enlightened can be expected to make its influence felt in the formulation of policy. Only by an information policy based upon truth can the government in a democracy hope for the support from the public which is necessary for a successful furthering of their country's true interests.

2. An arrangement is needed whereby the State, War and Navy Departments may have regular and continuing exchange of views with respect to policies concerning the release of foreign politico-military information, and the release of information in this field. Arrangements should also be made to facilitate clearance of information within the three respective Departments based upon a policy of the widest possible dissemination of information.

3. A program for keeping the public continuously informed in the field of foreign politico-military affairs involves three areas of decision and action:

a. Determining the Governments's position,

b. Deciding what to make public, or inversely what cannot be released in full and why, and

c. Dissemination of information.

4. Determination of the Government's position with respect to foreign policy (a above) is the responsibility of the President, or normally of the State Department acting for him. Coordination between the three executive Departments primarily concerned with

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respect to foreign politico-military policy is now made possible through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). It is considered beyond the scope of the present ad hoc Committee's functions to recommend changes in the intra-governmental machinery for formulating the Government's position.

5. Determination of what particular information is and is not (and why) to be made public on foreign policy (4 b above) is a major policy question, and final decision can be made only by those who are in close contact with the formulation of the Government's policies. Officials in the executive branch of the Government are in a favorable position to know the implications of world events on this Nation's interests. Arrangements are set forth in this report of your ad hoc Committee which provide for the establishment of a SWNCC advisory Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information charged with the responsibility of regular and continuing consideration of information bearing on United States foreign politico-military policy. This Subcommittee would serve as an agency through which the Department of State could obtain the advice of the War and Navy Departments on questions of this nature, and act as an agency to facilitate decisions concerning the release of this information.

6. Actual dissemination of information (4 c above) should, in the opinion of your ad hoc Committee, be accomplished by further developing these informational activities which are primarily the responsibility of the State Department.

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

JAPANESE REACTIONS
TO
ALLIED LEAFLETS

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

A.P.O. 500
1 December 1945

Published for the information of all concerned.

By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Lieutenant General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

C. A. WILLOUGHBY,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2.

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ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

RESEARCH REPORT

SUBJECT: JAPANESE REACTIONS TO ALLIED LEAFLETS

I.G. No. 6311
B.I.D. No. 1228

DATE OF ISSUE 1 December 1945 **No. 93 (Part I)**

SUMMARY:

1. This report brings together evidence of Japanese reactions to Allied propaganda leaflets in the period November 1942 to September 1944.

2. Methods of counteracting the influence of Allied leaflets; the effects of these leaflets on the Japanese soldier, on the natives in the South West PACIFIC Area and on non-Japanese elements in the Japanese Armed Forces are presented.

3. Criticisms by Japanese soldiers of the form and content of Allied leaflets and suggestions for rendering them more effective are included.

4. Translations of leaflets written by Japanese prisoners of war and copies of Allied leaflets are appended for reference.

BKY/CHR/djw

Distribution H

SIDNEY F. MASHBIR
COLONEL. S.C
CO-ORDINATOR

SOURCES: Statements by Prisoners of War.
Captured Documents.

[INFORMATION SHOULD BE ASSESSED ACCORDINGLY]

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

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Section I. REGULATIONS CONCERNING LEAFLETS

1. JAPANESE SECURITY REGULATIONS (LEAFLETS)

Prior to the outbreak of the war in the PACIFIC, regulations assigned the responsibility for the suppression of propaganda to the military police.

a. A printed book entitled "Military Police Service Regulations Manual (Guide)", published 10 August 1941 by KOBAYASHI, Matashichi, TOKYO:

"The military police must guard against espionage and other acts affecting the security of military secrets. They must also maintain peace in the Army.

"The Military Police Section Commander will suppress propaganda, counterintelligence and sabotage against the Army by persons acting for an enemy country or third power.

"The Military Police Section Commander must give guidance, where necessary, and, assisted by organizations and individuals within and without the Army, prevent the leakage of military secrets, and the theft of material designed for military use.

"The military police must collect, at all times, information concerning the trend of thought of reservists, men who have not yet been inducted, the general trend of thought which might spread into the Army, also world movements, and the peace situation. They will protect all matters affecting the peace of the Army.

"The collection and suppression of this information will be carried out in close cooperation with the particular officials concerned or, if it becomes necessary, it will be managed positively from the standpoint of Army protection only."

(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 163, page 36)

b. In February 1943, Japanese troops in NEW BRITAIN were instructed to hand leaflets to their force headquarters or to the nearest military police unit. Two bound mimeographed pamphlets entitled "MANO Group (65 Brigade) Security Regulations," dated 1 February 1943, issued by MANO Group Headquarters:

"Article 23—Instructions should be given to the effect that any native or soldier who has discovered enemy propaganda leaflets, etc., will immediately report this to the nearest military police unit or to the force to which the soldier belongs.

"At such a time, officers will give such guidance to the finder that the latter will not be led astray by the enemy's propaganda, and that the contents of the above-mentioned propaganda will not give rise to rumors.

"Furthermore, all forces will make an effort to forestall the above by picking up, as far as possible, all propaganda leaflets which have been scattered. They will immediately submit these to group headquarters."

(ATIS Bulletin No. 1358, pages 8—9)

c. Official instructions generally follow the same pattern; leaflets are to be collected quickly and turned in to headquarters.

(1) Extract from Bulletin, 20 April 1943, 41 Division Medical Unit:

"Propaganda leaflets scattered by an enemy airplane were found by the HANASE Unit. All units finding any of these will submit them to headquarters immediately."

(ATIS Current Translation No. 104, page 17)

(2) Extract from 51 Division Force Counterespionage Regulations, May 1943:

"For the sake of defense against propaganda strategy from the enemy and neutral countries it is forbidden to listen on all-wave receiving sets except for special duties. Where propaganda leaflets are found, deliver them at once to the force to which you are attached, or to the nearest military police unit. It is forbidden to keep them in one's possession. At this time, arrangements will be made so that officers will carefully explain the contents of the above propaganda, as well as try to prevent doubts or alarming rumors among noncommissioned officers and enlisted men. They will use enemy propaganda against the enemy and will create an opposite effect by raising morale. The force in whose area leaflets are dropped will pick up the scattered leaflets and prevent any harm."

(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 44, page 2j)

(3) Extract from mimeographed file of orders, MADANG Line of Communication Sector Unit, 18 November 1943:

"If enemy propaganda leaflets are dis-

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covered, quickly note the date and hour of their coming into your hands, and by what channel, then immediately forward them to this headquarters."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 824, page 15)

(4) Extract from 51 Transport Regiment, 51 Division, Daily Order No. 23, dated 10 February 1944:

"Upon discovery of enemy propaganda pamphlets, report to the force's headquarters, and prohibit personal possession of them."
(ATIS Current Translations No. 120, page 6)

(5) Extract from 4 Air Army Intelligence Duty Regulation, based on 8 Area Army Intelligence Duty Regulations, dated 1 March 1944.

"Propaganda papers scattered by enemy airplanes will be immediately seized and handed to 4 Air Army Headquarters. The use of these by any force is forbidden."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 1157, page 14)

d. Special restrictions are issued to keep the leaflets from reaching the Japanese homeland.

(1) Prisoner of War YAMASAKI, 751 Air Group, captured 22 February 1944, KAVIENG, stated:

"He saw one of the leaflets dropped before the raid on 12 October 1943. Some of the men were heard to comment that Americans must be very childish if they believed that a Japanese would fall for a thing like that. Many wanted to keep the leaflet as a souvenir, but if caught taking it into JAPAN, they might be liable to court martial. Usual disposal was burning, though no specific orders had been issued beyond the fact they were not to be read."
(SOPAC Interrogation Report, Serial No. 0805, page 9)

(2) Prisoner of War NOMA, Shoichi (JA 145661), 76 Infantry Regiment, captured 6 February 1944, WAREO, stated:

"Practical use, as for handkerchiefs, was made of the leaflets after perusal. The military police in JAPAN forbade returning troops to bring Chinese leaflets with them. They were collected by the military police and placed on public exhibition."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 365, page 8)

2. KNOWLEDGE OF REGULATIONS BY TROOPS

In line with official orders, examples of which are quoted in paragraph 1, some Prisoners of War state that they were aware of such regulations, and more or less strictly obeyed them.

a. This Prisoner of War, however, was almost alone in declaring that he had not read the leaflet before turning it in. Prisoner of War ICHIHARA, Takashi (JA 147004), 53 Infantry Regiment, 17 Division, captured 22 February 1944, stated:

"While at TSURUBU, he had seen one leaflet, which was brought to him by a native who had taken it from the dead body of a Japanese noncommissioned officer. He did not read the leaflet as this was against regulations, but in accordance with instructions, took it immediately to his company commander."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 363, page 10)

b. The great preponderance of testimony indicates that leaflets are almost invariably read before orders to turn them in are complied with.

(1) Prisoner of War SAWATARI, Zengoro (JA 145212), Medical Second Lieutenant, 1 Transport Company, captured 20 January 1943, GIRUWA, stated:

"He saw Allied propaganda leaflets at PAPAKI and GIRUWA. Soldiers were told to burn these leaflets, and there was very little discussion concerning them. From the wording and characters it was presumed that the leaflets had been drawn up by a Chinese."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 143, page 9)

(2) Prisoner of War MAKINO, 53 Infantry Regiment, captured 23 November 1943, TOROKINA, stated:

"While at RABAUL he saw some Allied propaganda leaflets. These stated that JAPAN was losing the war at all points and that Allied forces had already landed and were moving on to RABAUL. He did not believe all the contents, but took some of it into consideration and wondered if it were true or not.

"He also stated that some of the men got together and discussed these leaflets. Officers instructed the men to dispose of these leaflets before they got around too far."
(SOPAC Interrogation Report No. 194, Serial No. 0410)

(3) Prisoner of War YOSHINO, Kichijiro (JA 147012), 53 Infantry Regiment, captured 4 January 1944, stated:

"He saw one dropped from an airplane near TSURUBU. He did not remember the contents. Although told not to believe Allied propaganda leaflets, and to turn them in without reading them, troops always read them first. He thought it was a good idea to

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print leaflets and pictures dealing with exceptionally good treatment Japanese prisoners of war received, with statements of their appreciation. Ordinary propaganda was laughed at."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 388, page 6)

(4) Prisoner of War MATSUI, Sanshiro (JA (USA) 147149), 1 Shipping Engineer Regiment, captured 17 March 1944, stated:

"He had seen two leaflets while at BUSHING. He and his comrades thought they were very well written, but did not pay any attention to them. After reading, he took them to an officer in compliance with orders."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 439, page 6)

(5) Prisoner of War SHIMOYAMA, Yoshio (JA (USA) 147193), 141 Infantry Regiment, captured 22 March 1944, NEW BRITAIN, stated:

"He had seen one Allied propaganda leaflet in the vicinity of TSURUBU, but, as it was written in Pidgin-English, he was unable to read it. Orders had been issued that all leaflets found were to be turned in to the company commander for disposal, and troops were instructed not to read or discuss leaflets found."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 462, Section 13)

(6) Prisoner of War TAKAHASHI, Kunio (JA (USA) 147491), 4 Air Intelligence Unit, captured 26 April 1944, HOLLANDIA, stated:

"He picked up several Allied propaganda leaflets in the vicinity of WEWAK. Leaflets told of JAPAN's hopeless position in the NEW GUINEA Area, which he thought was probably true, though many of the soldiers did not. Leaflets when found were to be turned over to commanding officers of the respective companies."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 472, Section 13)

c. More positive measures to prevent circulation of the leaflets are reported in a minority of cases:

(1) Prisoner of War WAJIMA, Jutaro (JA (USA) 100045), 115 Infantry Regiment, 51 Division, captured 9 March 1944, stated:

"He saw one at BIRARA in March 1943. It described in detail the sinking of a convoy. Also saw one at MARKHAM Point. He thought they were well written. He was surprised to realize that we got information so quickly, and presumed such information had been obtained from prisoners of war. Officers endeavored to prevent the men from seeing the leaflets."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 326, page 8)

(2) Prisoner of War NOMA, Tsunenori (JA 145371) 144 Infantry Regiment, captured 25 July 1943, GIRUWA, stated:

"He had several in his possession when captured. The military police, however, were on the lookout, and destroyed the leaflets whenever they could lay hands on them."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 107, page 7)

(3) Prisoner of War TAIRA, Soichi (JA (USA) 147785), Civilian Laborer, Okinawan, 8 Naval Construction Unit, captured 8 May 1944, HOLLANDIA, stated:

"While at WEWAK, he picked up one Allied leaflet which was immediately taken away from him by a soldier who told him that it was against regulations for troops to read such leaflets. All leaflets had to be turned over to the military police."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 537, page 5)

(4) Prisoner of War KINOSHITA, Kazutoshi (JA (USA) 147506) Superior Private 7 Shipping Engineer Regiment, captured NIGHTINGALE Bay, near WEWAK, 28 April 1944, stated:

"In February or March 1944 he picked up a propaganda leaflet near WEWAK which contained a warning that the Allies intended to bomb the area, and that the Japanese would be wise to withdraw. The leaflet appeared to have been written by a man of poor education. He and his companions disbelieved its contents, and after reading the leaflet, he tore it up.

"Military police and officers had instructed men not to pick up leaflets if seen, and the men were warned that they would receive punishment for violation."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 510, page 6)

3. IGNORANCE OF REGULATIONS BY TROOPS

Although higher headquarters appeared to have a standard policy with regard to leaflets, i.e., forbidding their perusal and requiring that they be turned in to unit headquarters or to the military police, not all unit commanders observed it, and a large number of troops in the field seemed to be unaware of or indifferent to it.

A study of prisoner of war interrogations bearing on this point and covering the period May 1943 to May 1944 reveals that

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the preponderant majority (about 75 percent) who had seen our leaflets said that they had received no instructions from their officers as to reading or disposing of them.

a. Typical comments by prisoners of war who stated they had heard of no restrictions follow:

(1) Prisoner of War HANAZAWA, Kazuo (JA 145627), 51 Division, captured 24 January 1943, GIRUWA, stated:

"Leaflets were thrown away and forgotten as there were no instructions regarding their disposal."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 341, page 7)

(2) Prisoner of War SEKIGUCHI, Kiyoji (JA 145587), 238 Infantry Regiment, captured September 1943, SALAMAUA, stated:

"There were no orders for disposal of leaflets and none forbidding the reading of them."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 377, page 12)

(3) Prisoner of War MAMIDA, Tadashi (JA 145634) 51 Division, captured 20 July 1944, LAE, stated:

"Contents of leaflets were not discussed with officers or military police, and no instructions were issued by them as to disposal."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 334, page 17)

(4) Prisoner of War HASHIMOTO, Tadao (JA(USA)147022), 78 Infantry Regiment, captured 5 February 1944, SAIDOR, stated:

"He read one dropped from a North American airplane.....men used it for cigarette paper. Officers made no comment, and no orders were issued regarding disposal."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 398, page 10)

(5) Prisoner of War HARADA, Nobuo (JA (USA) 147275), 141 Infantry Regiment, captured 27 March 1944, TALASEA, stated:

"There were many Allied propaganda leaflets dropped over Japanese lines at Cape MERKUS. He remembered something of the contents of two.

"The first leaflet had a map showing the place where the Americans intended to land, and urged the Japanese to surrender as they had no chance.

"The second contained an account of a famous battle of olden times and had to do with Oda NOBUNAGA, together with a famous proverb. This leaflet was admired, and he thought it was well done.

"However, leaflets in general had no effect on him. Though style and writing were well done, he had assumed the contents were lies and paid no attention to them.

"He had never discussed the pamphlets with his companions, but thought the reactions of his companions would be similar to his.

"There were no instructions as to disposal of leaflets. They were read, and each individual disposed of them as he thought fit. Many Japanese saved the paper, as it came in handy for wrapping tobacco or use as toilet paper."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 443, pages 5–6)

b. In some cases a leaflet obtains wider attention by circulating throughout a unit.

(1) Prisoner of War AOI, Shiroki (JA 145600), 51 Division Engineers, captured October 1943, LAE, stated:

"They (two leaflets) were passed around his section and met with nothing but laughter. His superior officers did not see them. He did not know what became of them, as they were passed on from hand to hand."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 345, page 8)

(2) Prisoner of War MOTOYAMA, 751 Air Group, Superior Seaman, captured 22 February 1944, KAVIENG, stated:

"In November or early December, he picked up a copy of the 'Shipping Problem' leaflet, read it and destroyed it. A number of men had picked it up, and one wag posted a copy of it in the barracks for a laugh. Everyone got a big laugh out of it until Junior Officer ODA came in, saw it, flew into a rage and ripped it down."
(SOPAC Interrogation Report, Serial No. 01156, page 13)

(3) Prisoner of War YUICHI, Kozo (JA (USA) 147003), 17 Division, captured 1 March 1944, TSURUBU, stated:

"Picked up a leaflet in Mount TALAWE Area. Did not discuss it with other troops and had not heard of any orders as to any action to be taken if leaflets were picked up. As far as he remembered, this particular leaflet was passed around among some of the troops."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 386, page 7)

c. In a number of cases, officers also read the leaflets without comment and without subsequent restrictive orders concerning their disposal.

(1) Prisoner of War OGAWA, Yoshiji (JA 145652), 41 Division, captured 31

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January 1944, stated:

"Many troops, including the company commander, read the leaflets. No discussion was held regarding them,"
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 344, page 8)

(2) Prisoner of War KINTAKA, Kaoru (JA (USA) 145681), Independent Land Duty Company, captured 7 February 1944, stated:

"Officers and noncommissioned officers also read these leaflets, but no instructions were issued concerning them."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 382, page 6)

(3) Prisoner of War GOTO, Hideo (JA 145635), 51 Division, captured 21 January 1944, stated:

"He saw a leaflet at SALAMAUA. He thought that about half of the contents was true and that troops believed about that much of them. Officers also read them, but did not issue any orders regarding their disposal."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 336, page 5)

(4) Prisoner of War KANETA, Shishizo (JA 145704), 238 Infantry Regiment, captured 7 February 1944, GALI, stated:

"At TONEKOCHI, November-December 1943, a large number of leaflets were dropped and picked up by officers as well as men. No orders were given regarding disposal. He threw his away."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 402, page 7)

(5) Prisoner of War KITAMURA, 89 Guard Unit, captured 21 February 1944, near GREEN Island, stated:

"He had seen leaflets that had been scattered over KOLOMBANGARA while he was there. Men who read the leaflet considered it a strange approach in war, and found the whole idea quite amusing. He stated that he knew of no rule requiring the surrender of these leaflets, but that they were usually taken to an officer, since the officers would know what to do about them."
(SOPAC Interrogation Report, Serial No. 01155, page 5)

(6) Prisoner of War SAWADA, Iwao (JA (USA)100101), a Navy Lieutenant (junior grade), captured 1 July 1944, BOKE Island, stated:

"He had picked up one of several leaflets found on MANUS and read it. He thought its contents may have shaken the certainty he had felt that he would be killed rather than captured even though he might present himself unarmed with hands in the air. There was little discussion about them. He had received no orders regarding their disposal, so when he had read it, he threw it away, not bothering to destroy it."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 530, page 5)

d. While laxity on the part of the censors is presumable, it is of some interest that a propaganda leaflet was sent through the mails. A torn letter from Private First Class KIKUOKA, dated 7 January, presumably 1944, written on the back of an Allied Propaganda leaflet announcing the ARAWE landing on 15 December 1943, is an example:

"The writer describes having come down from BYOBU Mountain, his malaria recurrences, state of his wound, and apologizes for taking so long in recovering. He adds, "This propaganda leaflet was dropped over PAIPA on the 15th. I send it on for your information."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 744, page 1)

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Section II. METHODS OF COUNTERACTING EFFECTS OF ALLIED LEAFLETS

In addition to requiring that leaflets be turned in to headquarters, evidence indicates four techniques commonly employed by Japanese military authorities to discredit Allied leaflets.

4. THREAT OF DISEASE FROM CONTAMINATED LEAFLETS

a. The threat of sickness and death from handling a leaflet is a potent countermeasure. Natives in occupied territories would appear to be especially susceptible to such warnings. It is probable that variations of this method will be increasingly used.

(1) Prisoner of War OONG, Wai (JA 145389), Chinese Laborer, 102 Infantry Regiment, captured 6 February 1943, WAU, stated:

"He had never seen any leaflets, but at LAE, the Japanese section boss had told the Chinese that if they picked up any, they would catch a loathsome disease."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 117, page 6)

(2) Prisoner of War MIYACHI, Takashi (JA (USA) 147221), 141 Infantry Regiment, captured 29 March 1944, NEW BRITAIN, stated:

"He saw Allied leaflets in BATAAN and in RABAUL. BATAAN leaflet was about 6"×5" and contained obscene drawings of Japanese girls. On one side of the drawings appeared Japanese girls. On the other side of the drawings appeared Japanese characters which said bad things about Japanese. Prisoner of War thought the leaflet was funny, and thought this was the general impression among the troops. After perusal, he put it in his pocket as a souvenir. Other troops did the same.

"At RABAUL an Allied airplane dropped leaflets, but he did not see the contents. A noncommissioned officer picked one up and burned it immediately.

"In BATAAN troops did not have any orders regarding the destruction of leaflets, but in RABAUL they told him not to touch them, as they contained bacterial germs."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 457, Section 13)

5. IMPROVEMENT OF MORALE AND DISCIPLINE

a. Some authorities attempt to offset the influence of Allied leaflets by improving morale and tightening discipline in their commands.

(1) Excerpt from MATSUDA Detachment (65 Brigade) Report, dated December 1943:

"Recently, the unscrupulous American-Australian ideological battle strategy aimed at the detachment front has become more severe, and demagogic propaganda leaflets have been increasingly distributed. Every unit commander will more and more instill in the minds of officers and men a consciousness of the Imperial Army, so that they will not be influenced in the slightest degree by this propaganda. It is important to keep in close touch with the detachment special service squad (unit which engages in espionage and counterespionage) and the military police unit. Propaganda for the natives will be extremely thorough, guiding them to have faith in and rely upon the Imperial Army."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 719, page 2)

(2) Excerpt from an order issued by a Japanese division in BURMA, dated 20 January 1944.

"Notes on training necessary to counteract enemy propaganda schemes:

"Propaganda directed against the Japanese Army in the 'Field Service Newspaper,' printed by the enemy and dropped by airplanes based in INDIA, is designed to belittle the fighting spirit and chivalry of our fighting men. It is calculated to diminish our fighting spirit and cause dissension among all ranks. Unit commanders should take every possible precaution against this. We are aware here that our troops are fighting with unequalled bravery so we have nothing to fear. We must therefore believe in certain victory and cultivate a powerful fighting spirit. By this means we shall make ourselves invulnerable to the enemy's schemes. All ranks should understand the meaning of 'Complete Preparedness in Wartime.' They will then have nothing to

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fear."
(ACSEA Headquarters Weekly Intelligence Summary, Serial No. 20, page 7)

(3) TSURUBU Sector Telegram No. 14 (Presumably 53 Infantry Regiment), undated:

"Routine Meeting, 17 December:

"Tactics of the American and Australian psychological warfare are showing signs of resuscitation of late, as distribution of propaganda leaflets is more and more active every day. All unit commanders will incessantly instill their subordinates with the true spirit of the Japanese Army so that none of their men are misled by enemy propaganda."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 618, page 5)

6. ASSERTION THAT LEAFLETS SHOW ALLIED WEAKNESS

a. Another tactic, shrewdly adapted to the Japanese mentality, professes that Allied military weakness motivates the spreading of leaflets.

(1) Prisoner of War HARA, Yataro (JA (USA) 147133), 1 Independent Mixed Regiment, captured 16 March 1944, PAK Island, stated:

"He had seen a leaflet on MANUS Island. While the general idea was very good, he thought that the actual Japanese wording was poor, and not as it would be written by a Japanese.

"One of the officers told the men that the fact that the UNITED STATES was resorting to leaflets indicated that country was in desperate shape. The officer burned the leaflet, but did not admonish the men for reading it."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 446, page 8)

b. That a degree of success was attained is suggested by diary entries.

(1) Extract from diary belonging to Second Lieutenant SUGIHARA, 51 Transport Regiment, dated 18 July 1943–28 February 1944:

"29–30 January—An enemy propaganda leaflet says, 'How long will this agony of bloodshed continue?' 'Aha!' thought I, 'The enemy is already on the defensive.' Though they are making a terrific counterattack, it is clear that they long for an early conclusion of the war. I felt that we were already victorious. I don't care at all about the 'agony of bloodshed!'"
(ATIS Bulletin No. 937, page 4)

(2) Diary dated 17 March to 30 April, presumably 1943. Owner unknown, presumably member of SASEBO 5 Special Naval Landing Party:

"20 March—Although pamphlets were dropped by the airplanes, they do not swerve us from our intentions."

"22 March—Our enemy, AMERICA, is loudly proclaiming its ability to win.

"It is taken for granted that it is advantageous to keep military affairs secret. Looking at it from the above angle, there is no doubt that there exists a weakness which makes it necessary for them to propagandize. Their greatest weakness must be the lack of confidence in certain victory among the people. Their strategy is to kill two birds with one stone by concealing their weakness, while at the same time weakening our desire to fight. It is very clear to us that to attain these purposes it is advantageous for them to propagandize on a large scale.

"It appears that shipbuilding figures have been announced in terms of tonnage, and training airplanes have been included within the figures for the thousands of airplanes said to be building.

"In summarizing, it is certain that actual figures are less than those announced."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 481, pages 3–4)

7. STRESSING PROPAGANDA MOTIVES OF LEAFLETS

a. An obvious method in discrediting Allied leaflets is the stressing of their propaganda purpose.

(1) Diary dated 1 January to 2 August, presumably 1943, presumably belonging to Probationary Officer HATTORI, Masaaki, 41 Division Medical Unit:

"During evening roll call enemy airplane(s) flew over and dropped cards. We were especially admonished not to be weakened by their propaganda."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 469, page 8)

(2) Prisoner of War HASHIMOTO, Kunio (JA (USA) 147066), 65 Infantry Brigade Headquarters, captured 24 February 1944, KARAI-AI, stated:

"He had never seen any leaflets, but had heard of them in NEW BRITAIN. These told about the hopeless position of the Japanese in NEW BRITAIN. Officers warned troops that the leaflets were purely Allied propaganda and the contents were to be ignored."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 419, page 5)

(3) In one case an officer in a 51 Division unit, in apparent disregard of the of-

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fear."
(ACSEA Headquarters Weekly Intelligence Summary, Serial No. 20, page 7)

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"Tactics of the American and Australian psychological warfare are showing signs of resuscitation of late, as distribution of propaganda leaflets is more and more active every day. All unit commanders will incessantly instill their subordinates with the true spirit of the Japanese Army so that none of their men are misled by enemy propaganda."
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"22 March—Our enemy, AMERICA, is loudly proclaiming its ability to win.

"It is taken for granted that it is advantageous to keep military affairs secret. Looking at it from the above angle, there is no doubt that there exists a weakness which makes it necessary for them to propagandize. Their greatest weakness must be the lack of confidence in certain victory among the people. Their strategy is to kill two birds with one stone by concealing their weakness, while at the same time weakening our desire to fight. It is very clear to us that to attain these purposes it is advantageous for them to propagandize on a large scale.

"It appears that shipbuilding figures have been announced in terms of tonnage, and training airplanes have been included within the figures for the thousands of airplanes said to be building.

"In summarizing, it is certain that actual figures are less than those announced."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 481, pages 3–4)

7. STRESSING PROPAGANDA MOTIVES OF LEAFLETS

a. An obvious method in discrediting Allied leaflets is the stressing of their propaganda purpose.

(1) Diary dated 1 January to 2 August, presumably 1943, presumably belonging to Probationary Officer HATTORI, Masaaki, 41 Division Medical Unit:

"During evening roll call enemy airplane(s) flew over and dropped cards. We were especially admonished not to be weakened by their propaganda."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 469, page 8)

(2) Prisoner of War HASHIMOTO, Kunio (JA (USA) 147066), 65 Infantry Brigade Headquarters, captured 24 February 1944, KARAI-AI, stated:

"He had never seen any leaflets, but had heard of them in NEW BRITAIN. These told about the hopeless position of the Japanese in NEW BRITAIN. Officers warned troops that the leaflets were purely Allied propaganda and the contents were to be ignored."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 419, page 5)

(3) In one case an officer in a 51 Division unit, in apparent disregard of the of-

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ficial instructions issued by division headquarters, took pains to call the leaflets to the attention of his men. Prisoner of War HORIUCHI, Shigeru (JA 145588), 51 Division Signal Unit, captured 9 March 1943, BISMARCK Sea, stated:

"While in KOKOPO his platoon leader, Second Lieutenant TANAKA, read out an Allied propaganda leaflet to the men while on parade. The men did not discuss the leaflet very much as they were not particularly interested. They were not forbidden to read leaflets and were not told that the contents of the leaflets were lies."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 115, page 10)

(4) Another soldier also declared that his attention was officially called to the leaflets. Prisoner of War ITO, Shoji (JA (USA) 147345), Superior Private, 141 Infantry Regiment, captured 10 April 1944, KO, stated:

"He had been shown these leaflets twice on a parade at RAKUNE, when warned by commanding officer to hand all similar leaflets to officers, as the information was incorrect. One leaflet said there was great hardship in JAPAN, and it was useless continuing the war."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 614, page 16)

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Section III. FAVORABLE EFFECTS OF LEAFLETS ON JAPANESE SOLDIERS

As might be expected, Japanese soldiers reacted to Allied leaflets in widely varying fashions. The interaction between the specific leaflet, the individual temperament, and the situation of his unit at the time cannot be accurately predicted. Certain reactions, however, are sufficiently common to permit their being grouped for useful reference.

Evidence that Allied leaflets produced effects desired by their sponsors is afforded not only by written or verbal statements, but through surrenders induced by leaflets. (See also Appendix A)

8. ACCEPTANCE OF RELIABILITY BY JAPANESE

a. Reliability of the leaflets was accepted by some Japanese soldiers, including officers.

(1) Prisoner of War KOBORI, Masuo (JA 145633), 115 Infantry Regiment, captured October 1943, SALAMAUA, stated:

"While he was stationed at BIRARA shortly after returning from the BISMARCK Sea Battle, Allied airplanes scattered leaflets. These were spotted as they floated to earth and eagerly picked up by soldiers. Copies were taken to officers who did not forbid the men to retain them. The general form was excellent, very different from that of the crude leaflets used in CHINA. Contents were discussed openly, and the general opinion was that the leaflets stated the truth, although some men expressed the opinion that the claim of total annihilation at BUNA and GONA was perhaps exaggerated. His company commander, however, stated that in his opinion the report was probably correct, as troops in that area were in a hopeless position."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 309, page 8)

(2) Prisoner of War KAWAZU, Goromasakado (JA (USA) 147330) Second Lieutenant, 30 Independent Field Machine Cannon Company, captured by American Marines near TALASEA, 4 April 1944, stated:

"Allied leaflets were dropped over NATAMO Area almost daily, and he had read several. He felt that the information given was correct. Never discussed them nor did he know of any orders about disposal. After reading he threw them away. There were thousands scattered about the camp area."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 587, page 6)

(3) Prisoner of War NOMA, Tsunenori (JA (USA) 145371), 144 Infantry Regiment, captured 25 July 1943, GIRUWA, stated:

"On two occasions, he saw leaflets being dropped from Allied airplanes in the vicinity of a hospital in NEW GUINEA. He had read some of the leaflets and had felt that they were generally truthful."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 107, page 7)

(4) Prisoner of War NISHI (University Graduate), unit unstated, captured on SAIPAN, stated:

"Later during the attack Prisoner of War came across an American propaganda leaflet which he recalls having read and approved in entirety. He did not recollect exactly what the leaflet said, but states that the general purport was to the effect that JAPAN had lost everything on SAIPAN and that it was useless to struggle further. He said that at the time it was perfectly apparent to him that the struggle was indeed hopeless on SAIPAN, but he did not conceive of himself becoming a prisoner. It was not until he was actually confronted with the situation described in the details of his capture that the choice offered itself to his mind."
(CINCPOA Interrogation Report No. 66, page 8)

(5) Prisoner of War SAKAKIBARA, Teruichi (JA 145682), 33 Independent Engineer Regiment, captured 12 January 1944, stated:

"He saw a number in NEW GUINEA and considered them truthful, though some of his friends did not. He could not recall where or when he picked them up."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 401, page 8)

(6) Prisoner of War HASHIMOTO, Yoshito (JA 147006), 17 Division, captured 2 February 1944, NEW BRITAIN, stated:

"Leaflets were read and taken to the company commander in accordance with

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instructions. Subsequent disposal unknown. He wondered whether the contents were true, as leaflets gave news unknown to troops."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 347, page 12)

(7) Prisoner of War HANAI, Kaoru (JA (USA) 147490), Mess Sergeant, Headquarters 4 Air Intelligence Unit, captured HOLLANDIA Area, April 1944, stated:

"He saw one at WEWAK in January 1944. One side showed pictures of Mt. FUJI and NIKKO, and the other, Japanese characters. A leaflet said the Australian forces were strong and well situated in the surrounding mountains ready to wipe out the Japanese force. His impression was that the contents might have been true. Others expressed the same opinion.

"No orders were given as to reading or destruction, but some were kept as souvenirs."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 568, page 5)

(8) Prisoner of War OSHITA, Misato (JA (USA) 147783), Leading Private (Medical), 52 Hospital Ship Medical Section, captured near DEPAPRE, 9 May 1944, stated:

"He picked up a leaflet which was dropped at RABAUL during an air raid in September 1943. Part of the contents as he remembered them were as follows:

"'Not only is JAPAN short of weapons, but the transportation of materials by sea presents great problems. Furthermore, Japanese ships in the PACIFIC are being sunk by sea and air attacks. JAPAN now has absolutely no prospects of victory!'

"He stated that he thought the above statement and other statements in the leaflet were true as he had knowledge of Japanese losses. Other Japanese soldiers who read the leaflet also thought it was true. He thought the leaflet he saw was well written.

"He stated that they did lower morale.

"Leaflet was taken from him by an officer who tore it up. Japanese soldiers had definite orders against reading any leaflet."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 628, pages 3–4)

(9) Gradual acceptance of the reliability of Allied leaflets, under the stress of experience, is admitted by this prisoner. Prisoner of War WATANABE, Hiro (JA (USA) 147462), Leading Private, 39 Independent Field Antiaircraft Regiment, captured 22 April 1944, KALINGI, NEW BRITAIN, stated:

"He saw three Allied leaflets at KOKOPO Airfield, NEW BRITAIN, April 1943. The first one was a quarter size of a foolscap sheet. It contained news of annihilation of Japanese units at BUNA, and stated that remaining units were without supplies. Prisoner of War thought this report was grossly exaggerated, but was saddened to learn of its truthfulness later.

"The second leaflet was the same size and contained reports of excessive prices of commodities in JAPAN. He did not believe it, but this information was substantiated by the next newspaper from JAPAN.

"The third leaflet was three-quarters the size of a foolscap sheet. It showed pictures of sinking Japanese ships.

"These leaflets were well prepared, except that the Japanese language in the first leaflet was odd. His friends thought the picture propaganda leaflet was good, but were reluctant to believe this news. Leaflets were to be turned in, but no one seemed to pay attention to the rule, and officers did not enforce it."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 518, page 6)

(10) A diarist, while not openly admitting to the truth of Allied statements, appears none the less receptive. Extracts from diary-notebook, belonging to MAKAI, Kasuyoshi, 51st Engineer Regiment:

"23 March 1943—Rested. Enemy airplanes flew over. They bombed KOKOPO Airfield. Out of eight airplanes, two were damaged beyond repair. They also dropped pictorial propaganda leaflets which said 'What is the Japanese Navy doing?'
(ATIS Bulletin No. 424, page 1)

9. INFLUENCE OF LOW MORALE

a. Low morale and a tendency to accept Allied leaflets go hand in hand.

(1) Extract from diary of Leading Private YAMAMOTO, 20 Division. BOGADJIM:

"1 September 1943. No news of home, and I am lonely. I could even believe enemy propaganda leaflets."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 801, page 8)

(2) Extract from diary taken from Prisoner of War FUKATSU, Sadamu, (JA (USA) 147583), dated 14 November 1943–29 April 1944:

"7 February. Will we eat this morning and flee? We might yet believe the enemy propaganda leaflets in the end."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 1083, page 3)

(3) Extract from diary of SAOTOME, E., unit unknown, dated 7 March 1943

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-14 December 1943. ARAWE:

"I picked up a propaganda leaflet entirely written in Japanese. It was probably written by a Chinese. It told of the unfavorable situation of our Army. Fear! Nothing but fear! We are expecting to evacuate early tomorrow morning. Probably the enemy is planning to land. We may suffer an honorable defeat."

(ATIS Current Translations No. 113, page 68)

(4) Prisoner of War TOJO, 6 Division, captured 24 March 1944, TOROKINA, stated:

"The morale was very low. Insufficient rations, sickness and resentment against officers' selfishness depressed the troops. Rumors prevalent of cripples' being conscripted and sent to the front line made men believe JAPAN's manhood was being sadly depleted. Men all carried pictures of home folk, and much nostalgia existed. One man in this company committed suicide while at BUIN by hanging. He had deserted three times before. He knew of two or three other cases of desertion and suicides. Men were bitter during the general attack in March, as they felt that the chance of success was slight. More did not surrender because they didn't believe Allied promises of food and protection.

"He saw a leaflet at NABOI, March 1944. It contained a map of the SOLOMONS Area and pointed out American progress and the futility of Japanese resistance. The men praised its contents and composition. Strongest appeal was the praise given 6 Division. The ineffective parts were portions dealing with American superiority and Japanese impotence in air and on the sea. Promises of food, tobacco, etc.," were impossible to believe. The platoon leader read the leaflet to the men to show the skill of American propaganda. However, the men thought the situation of the Japanese as described was true and felt depressed."

(SOPAC Interrogation Report, Serial No. 01659, Item No. 346, page 14)

(5) Prisoner of War MATSUSHITA, Wajuro (JA 148100), 49 Construction Duty Company, captured 27 May 1944, SENTANI, stated:

"When he was in WEWAK in January 1944, Allied planes on three occasions dropped leaflets. They were all picked up by the soldiers, who passed them from hand to hand. Reading of the leaflets was not forbidden by officers. The contents were as follows:

"'Headquarters of the Japanese Army have cut NEW GUINEA completely out of Japanese Southern Operations. Officers and men in NEW GUINEA should therefore consider their position. Officers and men were abiding by the orders, but TOJO had left them in the lurch—which conduct was to be expected from an unscrupulous statesman such as TOJO. Japanese in WEWAK will be bombed morning and night with increasing ferocity. Japanese soldiers, if they desired to avoid this, should desert.'

"His personal reaction to this was that the leaflet spoke the truth about bombing, and when he considered the fact that the bombings would get worse, his heart trembled. About 50 percent of those whom he heard talking about the leaflets were inclined to believe the contents. The effect on morale was to cause it to deteriorate. Because the bombings did in fact become more ferocious as forecast in the leaflets, he thought that the leaflets were very effective propaganda.

"The leaflets did not induce him eventually to surrender, especially as there was no mention of what treatment he would get if he were captured. He was convinced that he would be shot after being captured, and it was only after being reassured on this point by a forward interrogator that he completely lost the fear."

(ATIS Interrogation Report not yet published)

(6) The estimate of 50 percent effectiveness given above is repeated by another source. Prisoner of War IMAI, Ken (JA (USA) 147263), Superior Private, of 141 Infantry Regiment (studied 1 year at COLUMBIA University, NEW YORK), captured between TALASEA and KOMETTO, 29 March 1944, stated:

"He thought Allied propaganda leaflets affected 50 percent of those who read them to some degree. Troops were supposed to destroy them immediately, but invariably read them first."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 585, page 4)

10. SURRENDERS INDUCED BY LEAFLETS

a. Surrenders have been brought about by Allied leaflets. The instances cited here are those in which leaflets were explicitly given as a cause for surrender; their more indirect and long range effects cannot be evaluated adequately here. (See also Appendix A)

(1) Prisoner of War KATA, Shuichiro,

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First Lieutenant, 228 Infantry Regiment, captured 8 February 1943, GUADALCANAL. Details of capture:

"In the middle of January, American forces broke through and isolated his company. He received week-old orders to withdraw and attempted to make his way to the coast. He saw surrender pamphlets; these and the lack of leadership displayed by superior officers aided his decision to surrender."
(JICPOA Interrogation Report No. 1–44, page 2)

(2) Prisoner of War WATANABE, Takeo (JA (USA) 148924), First Class Private, 219 Infantry Regiment, captured 3 August 1944, NOEMFOOR, stated:

"On 22 July approximately 1,500 men collected about a mile to the west of INASI in the vicinity of hill marked 200 on provisional map NOEMFOOR Island, scale 1:63,360. Prior to collecting at this hill, troops had bivouacked at a farm between the hill and INASI. At this farm the only food available consisted of potatoes, and the officers were guilty in the eyes of the men of the most reprehensible conduct. The officers confiscated all the potatoes for their own use and permitted the men only to have the leaves of the potatoes. There was great dissatisfaction about this, and bitter criticism, especially as the potatoes were the only food available.

"At about midday on 22 July, when the soldiers arrived at the hill previously mentioned, they saw 300–400 Allied leaflets strewn over the ground. The soldiers read them and passed them from hand to hand. At least half of the 1,500 soldiers were able to read the contents before officers came around and issued an order that the leaflets were to be handed in and burnt. He stated that the general context of the leaflets was as follows:

"'Japanese Law. Lieutenant General TATEKAWA at the time of the RUSSO-Japanese War became a prisoner. When the war ended he was not killed, and now he has risen to the elevated position of Lieutenant General. Therefore, becoming a prisoner is not a disgraceful thing. Food is short, and dying of hunger is dying like a dog. If you become a prisoner of the American Army you will never be killed, nor will you be treated like slaves. The American Army will preserve your dignity and honor and treat you as gentlemen'.

"The prisoner stated that after the men had read these leaflets their dissatisfaction became more evident, and everyone was talking about deserting and wondering whether the passage in the pamphlet about not being killed was true. He said that probably 50 percent of those to whom he spoke were of the opinion that the pamphlet spoke the truth. Some of them were quite frank about the position, and stated that after the treatment they had had in the Japanese Army it would be a good thing to be taken prisoner.

"Colonel SHIMIZU issued an order that a general retreat was to be made towards the center of the island to a spot marked 310 in the center of the map mentioned above. The time set for departure was 1500 hours on 22 July. SHIMIZU, as was to be expected, led the retreat. Just after the retreat commenced, approximately 30 men of MORI Force broke away and made off in a southerly direction. They were followed quickly by another 30 men from TSUTSUMI Unit, an Airdrome Equipment Unit. On the heels of TSUTSUMI Unit three groups of approximately 30 men from FUKATA Unit deserted. The leader of one of these groups was Second Lieutenant KOIKE. He met KOIKE after he had deserted. The time was now approximately 1600, and morale was rapidly sinking lower and lower. At approximately 1600, 50 men from 219 Regimental Headquarters deserted. At 1700, 30 men from 12 Company, 3 Battalion, 219 Infantry Regiment, deserted. These were followed at 1730 by 60 men from 3 Machine Gun Company. These 60 men were led by Warrant Officer MASUMORI. The prisoner deserted at 1800 with 20 others from 3 Battalion Headquarters.

"If the propaganda leaflets had not been dropped, he was positive that such wholesale desertion would not have taken place."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, not yet published.)

(3) Prisoner of War FUSEI, Iwataro (JA 145118), 15 Pioneer Battalion, captured 3 January 1943, BUNA, stated:

"About 30 November 1942, he picked up a red pamphlet dropped by an airplane. The pamphlet told Japanese soldiers of the hopelessness of their cause and how they would be well treated if they surrendered. The pamphlets were the subject of jokes, one man proposing that they make an excursion and all surrender together. The joking was discouraged, and it was determined that they would fight to the last man. On 10 December 1942, he picked up another pamphlet identical with the first one, and

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determined that he was not going to be killed in a hopeless cause. He had not desired to walk through the defense lines to surrender, because he believed that the Japanese soldiers would have shot him."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 97, page 10)

(4) Prisoner of War UEDA, Hajime, Superior Private, captured 30 March 1944, TOROKINA, stated:

"He felt that Japanese forces had no chance of winning any battle on BOUGAINVILLE, and that sooner or later he would die or be captured. After reading Propaganda Leaflet No. 8, he decided to find out for himself if the promise made in the leaflet would be carried out. He gathered nine other men of 7 Battery and persuaded them to desert. After learning that his battery was withdrawing from the 45 Regimental Sector, the group scattered at the base of Hill 1111. He was captured by a patrol."
(SOPAC Interrogation Report, Serial No. 01659, Item No. 345, page 2)

(5) Prisoner of War KOBAYASHI, Superior Private, MAKI Engineer Unit, captured April 1943, ATTU, stated:

"They (prisoner of war and three other engineers.) had by this time thrown away their grenades, and decided to 'let the Americans take care of us.' Asked why he assumed the Americans would take care of him, Prisoner of War replied that before leaving CHICHAGOF Harbor for the last time, he had seen one of the American surrender leaflets."
(NORPAC Interrogation Report, Prisoner of War KOBAYASHI)

(6) Prisoner of War NISHIYAMA, Superior Private (Infantry). Captured April 1943, ATTU:

"He was rounded up in the area between CHICHAGOF Harbor and SARAWA Bay. Asked why he decided to surrender rather than fight, he replied: 'There was no use fighting, for we had not eaten for quite a while.'

"NISHIYAMA was one of two prisoners of war to have one of the American surrender pamphlets in his hands at the time of capture. He had found it the preceding day on the beach at CHICHAGOF Harbor. He stated that he had surrendered on the strength of this pamphlet."
(NORPAC Interrogation Report, Prisoner of War NISHIYAMA)

(7) Prisoner of War NISHIMURA (Naval Civilian Technician, First Class), captured April 1943, ATTU, stated:

"After the battle of ATTU had started, he was in the area where surrender leaflets were dropped. He picked up one as a souvenir, though most of them blew out to sea because of the high wind. Others who picked them up thought it an enemy propaganda trick and discounted the validity of the statement that we would give them good treatment. He thought that he too might have committed suicide had he been wounded, but he thought he would try his luck as a prisoner of war."
(NORPAC Interrogation Report, Prisoner of War NISHIMURA)

(8) Prisoner of War UEHARA, Shiyeji (JA (USA) 147831), Formosan, 31 Anchorage Unit, (a civilian laborer), stated:

"After the Naval bombardment of HOLLANDIA, 22 April 1944, he and others of the KIMURA HAN fled to the hills. They had no food and many were dying of starvation. He heard that 54 had died from this cause, and among the Formosans who comprised one half of the KIMURA HAN, the question of surrender was discussed. Someone had seen leaflets dropped from airplanes in which food and good treatment were promised if they surrendered. The leaflets gave instructions that they should hold a white cloth above their heads, and in this manner he and seven others came down and surrendered. He had never seen leaflets or heard propaganda broadcasts."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, not yet published)

(9) Prisoner of War KOGA, Masami (JA 145702), 80 Infantry Regiment, surrendered 12 February 1944, SATELBERG, stated:

"He finally became ill with malaria and was unable to go ahead but told the rest of his party to continue. He was shown an Allied propaganda leaflet by natives, which referred to the Japanese captives and stated that he could be with them and live comfortably. He therefore decided to give himself up and surrendered to native troops about 9 February 1944."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 432, page 3)

(10) Prisoner of War KO, So Yu (JA 147520), Civilian Laborer, 27 Field Freight Depot. Induced by propaganda leaflet to surrender. SENTANI, 4 May 1944.
(ATIS Interrogation Report, not yet published)

(11) In a report dated 12 May 1944, the Far Eastern Liaison Office, Allied Land Forces Headquarters, South West Pacific Area, states:

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"At HOLLANDIA on 2 May, a party of sixteen Japanese surrendered voluntarily to Allied troops driving a truck. At NARI (west of HOLLANDIA), eight Japanese were captured who were reported to have surrendered voluntarily. On the 4th May, the number captured had risen to 35, and the American Task Force in the area reported that it was believed surrender leaflets were prompting their action."

(12) Prisoner of War SATO, Hachiro (JA (USA) 149734), 222 Infantry Regiment captured 2 September 1944, BIAK, stated:

"He surrendered due to the influence of two friends from his unit who had planned to give up after reading the leaflets; and since without food it was useless to carry on as they were weak with hunger, the three men walked voluntarily into one of the tents where the American troops were and asked for water and tobacco.

"The leaflet was of white paper written in black, saying:

"You have been fighting very courageously and probably endured great hardships but your duty has been fulfilled, so now go to AUSTRALIA and start a new and complete life again. (Prisoner of war could not recall the remainder of the wording)."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, not yet published)

(13) Prisoner of War OSHIMA, Yutaka (JA (USA) 149569), KUMA Construction Unit, captured 28 August 1944, BIAK, stated:

"He surrendered with three others from his unit to the American troops after reading the propaganda leaflets. After not eating for so long they believed it was better to surrender and take the consequences rather than starve.

"He was very sick at the time, so he could not recall what was written, except that all men who were sick would be treated with care. The leaflet was of red paper written in white words."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, not yet published)

b. A prisoner of war who had considered surrender found the instructions in the leaflet inadequate:

(1) Prisoner of War NAKA, Masao (JA 145359), Second Lieutenant, 41 Infantry Regiment, captured 27 January 1943, GO-NA, stated:

"A comrade of his, who had two or three sheets of Allied propaganda leaflets, gave one to him in the hospital at GIRUWA. He lost it before he was captured. Owing to the constant bombing he had no opportunity to discuss its contents with his comrades. The leaflet said something about 'Why remain and get killed? Come over and we will feed you well.' Prisoner of War said that the invitation was very tempting when there had been no food for days and days, but the leaflets did not say where to come."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 84, page 8)

c. The experience of a prisoner of war underlines the necessity of keeping faith with the promises contained in propaganda leaflets if satisfactory results from the intelligence point of view are to be obtained:

"He not only gave false information at the forward area, but even the few questions that he answered correctly were wrongly reported. In explanation of this action he stated that at the time of his capture he was very roughly treated by his captors — he was beaten on the head, kicked, refused food and water and generally tormented. This behavior of the captors while he was on a boat made him decide that our promises in propaganda leaflets, about which he had been told, were mere promises and not intended to be carried out, He therefore decided not to give any true information."

(ATIS Interrogation Spot Report No. 10, page 1)

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Section IV. UNFAVORABLE EFFECTS OF LEAFLETS ON JAPANESE SOLDIERS

11. LAUGHTER

a. A majority of prisoners of war who expressed generally unfavorable reactions to Allied leaflets declared that they personally, or their unit as a whole, found them "laughable". This attitude appears to have been assumed most generally whether or not completely genuine; it is not surprising that it was most frequently reported.

(1) Prisoner of War MATSUOKA, Ryoju (JA (USA) 145116), 251 Infantry Regiment, captured 2 January 1943, between TARAKENA and SIWORI, stated:

"He had not actually seen any leaflets, but he had heard that many were dropped in the BUNA Area. They were said to promise good food and treatment and had obviously not been written by a Japanese. They only caused amusement and would have no effect on Japanese spirit, as there was no thought of becoming prisoners of war or losing the battle.

"He did not think that any instructions were issued as to disposal of these leaflets. Officers had full confidence in their men to disregard them."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 251, page 5)

(2) Prisoner of War SANUKI, Shigeyoshi (JA (USA) 147021), 33 Independent Regiment, captured 30 January 1944, MADANG, stated:

"He saw an Allied leaflet near SIO which stated that plenty of food would be given if Japanese troops surrendered. He also heard from men who had returned from the front that similar propaganda was broadcast through loudspeakers. They all thought it was a good joke and laughed about it."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 399, page 5)

(3) Prisoner of War MATSUMOTO, Hajime (JA (USA) 147113), 6 Navigation Aid Unit, captured 13 March 1944, TALASEA, stated:

"He saw a leaflet at TSURUBU which criticised Japanese leadership. He was sure it had no effect on the morale of the troops, who laughed at it."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 464, Section 13)

(4) Prisoner of War TAKAYAMA, Saburo (JA (USA) 147254), 1 Shipping Engineer Regiment, captured 29 March 1944, KOMETTO, stated:

"He saw an Allied leaflet in November 1943, in KARAI-AI. Soldiers thought it was funny so they carried it around. The characters were poorly written. No one believed the leaflets, and no special orders were issued concerning them."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 452, page 6)

12. ANGER

a. On the other hand, unfavorable references to Allied leaflets in captured documents more frequently reflect anger than amusement. Some also allege "increased fighting spirit" as a reaction:

(1) Diary: Owner and unit not stated. Dated 21 January—12 May 1943:

"During last night's raid enemy planes dropped propaganda leaflets which told in the Japanese language that the Japanese reinforcements for LAE were annihilated off LAE. I became very angry in reading it."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 521, page 8)

(2) Notebook belonging to First Lieutenant UCHIMURA of the 231 Infantry Regiment, containing a diary covering period 22 October 1943—20 November 1943, and miscellaneous notes:

"A crude propaganda leaflet of the vainglorious American and Australian Army. Just like the words of the self-important, selfish newly rich. To our Imperial Army, it is ridiculous. It does no more than stir up our feelings of hostility and increase our fighting spirit. I paste this one here for future reference."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 552, page 16)

(3) Diary belonging to TOMOCHIKA, Manichi, 141 Infantry Regiment, 65 Brigade. Dated 1 October 1943—24 January 1944:

"19 December 1943—The natives brought some leaflets dropped from airplanes. They were entitled 'Memories.' They are really ridiculous and childish."

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(ATIS Bulletin No. 983, page 7)

(4) Diary of Junior Adjutant of unknown unit:

"21 December 1943—As the intensity of enemy air-raids increases, and I read propaganda leaflets, my 'Japanese spirit' to fight to the end is aroused."

(ATIS Bulletin No. 798, page 7)

(5) 51 Division Intelligence Report No. 16. Dated 23 January 1943, at KABAKAUL:

"During the air attack on RABAUL on the evening of the 20th, the enemy scattered propaganda leaflets. Region where they were found: MINAMIZAKI Billeting Area. The pamphlets were printed with handwritten Japanese characters on white paper, seven SUN (about eight and one half inches) square. The contents emphasized the Allies' wealth of natural resources and their great industrial power, and said that a Japanese victory in the Greater East Asia War would be difficult. The rest was the customary nonsense."

(ATIS Enemy publications No. 44, page 169a)

(6) Prisoner of War ENDO, Masaru, Probationary Officer, captured 22 February 1944, near KAVIENG, stated:

"He had heard of one picked up somewhere on the subject of JAPAN being a pawn of GERMANY in ASIA. Perhaps wars were good if they killed off people who had such silly notions. If there was any truth in the statement, the situation was the reverse. Such assertions were an insult to Japanese and would only intensify fighting hatred."

(SOPAC Interrogation Report, Serial No. 01009, page 15)

(7) Prisoner of War TAKAHASHI, Jiro (JA (USA) 147485), Medical Captain, 41 Airfield Battalion, captured 27 April 1944, HOLLANDIA:

"He saw one Allied mimeographed propaganda leaflet near WEWAK. It said that American forces were fighting the Japanese Air Force and not the ground forces. It also said that Americans had chased the Japanese airplanes from this area.

"A second leaflet of similar size was seen, written in Pidgin-English and Japanese. It reported the fall of the SOLOMONS and Japanese failure in NEW GUINEA. He said that these leaflets made the troops angry as it told of their failures, and because it was the truth, which hurt.

"These leaflets were well written.

"There were no orders by the commanding officer as to the disposal of the leaflets, but they were destroyed by the troops."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 622, page 5)

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Section V. EFFECTS ON NON-JAPANESE

Allied leaflet propaganda has been directed to natives in territories occupied by the Japanese, with effective results. There is reason to believe also that non-Japanese racial groups incorporated in the Japanese Army were influenced more than the thoroughly indoctrinated Japanese soldiers were.

13. NATIVES IN SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

a. The Japanese have paid tribute to the efficacy of Allied leaflets in influencing natives in NEW GUINEA and NEW BRITAIN.

(1) Excerpt from booklet entitled, "Tactics of the UNITED STATES Army," issued 15 December 1943 by 2 Army Staff Section:

"The propaganda disseminated by the enemy is highly ingenious. In effect it influences the natives to believe that the UNITED STATES Army will be victorious. It is also effective in pacifying the natives."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 1248, page 5)

(2) Excerpt from military police intelligence reports, dated 5 December 1943 to 3 March 1944, issued by Military Police Section, 18 Army Headquarters:

"We obtained information that an enemy airplane appeared from the direction of MAIMAI and dropped many propaganda leaflets in the vicinity of MANIKAPPU Village during the month of January. We took action in the said area. However, when the villagers knew that the Japanese Army was coming, the chief part of the entire population hid themselves in the jungle. We searched the houses and found over two hundred propaganda leaflets entitled 'Notice to the Chief and all Boys.' These we confiscated. Furthermore, two secret agents were dispatched to the chief, who advised him to co-operate with the Japanese Army, but it was all in vain."
(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 161, page 13)

(3) Excerpt from operations order of YAMAGUCHI Mobile Small Boat Unit, dated 29 March—12 June 1943, FINSCHHAFEN:

"The majority of natives who were favorably disposed towards the Japanese have fled as a result of the enemy's intimidating propaganda."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 434, page 9)

(4) Excerpt from file of bulletins of 2 Company, 54 Infantry Regiment, dated 17 February 1944:

"Propaganda leaflets were dropped from enemy airplanes today, and the natives' attitude became worse. If they do not obey our orders, they will be severely threatened."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 982, page 8)

b. Counter measures are energetically advanced.

(1) Excerpt from BUSHING Garrison Intelligence file No. 13:

"3 October 1943—The enemy dropped propaganda leaflets on native villages in the BUSHING and AISEGA Areas. The force immediately dispatched the propaganda and conciliation squad who at once collected the leaflets and carried out propaganda and conciliation work."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 799, page 2)

(2) Excerpt from file of 54 Infantry Regiment Combat Plans, dated 1 December 1943:

"Spread propaganda with the native population as the chief object. Execute it in such a manner as to destroy any enemy propaganda spread among the natives and to further our own. Mass propaganda material to discourage the fighting spirit of the enemy soldiers at the front. Also engage in promoting the combat morale of our officers and men."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 925, page 17)

14. NATIVES IN NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES AND BURMA

a. The effectiveness of Allied leaflets on the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES native population is stressed by two informants:

(1) Informant No. 3 (Javanese):

"The population of BIMA had run away to the mountains. A carriage driver told him that pamphlets had been dropped and that afterwards the town had been demolished. This made a tremendous impression on the population."
(NEFIS Interrogation Report, No. 148787, page 7)

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(2) Informant No. 174 (Javanese):

"Allied leaflets made a great impression on the informant and the circles he moved in. The reasons were:

"(a) A sign of activity, proving that they were not left in the lurch.

"(b) They provided the only news they were able to obtain other than Japanese news."

(NEFIS Interrogation Report, No. 5150,. page 3)

b. Actions of the Japanese police also indicated that Allied leaflets were effective.

(1) Informant No. 1:

"When MACASSAR was raided on 23 June 1943, one of his shipmates saw the leaflets being dropped and also the bombs. After the raid the ship moored again and this shipmate saw that Japanese soldiers and Indonesian police collected the leaflets. Orders had been issued by the Japanese that anyone found reading, or in possession of the leaflets would be killed. However, the pamphlets were read and understood."

(NEFIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 5591, page 3)

c. Other stringent measures against Allied leaflets have been adopted in BURMA where, presumably, the danger from Allied propaganda is also seriously regarded:

(1) Informant B-363 (Burmese) stated:

"In October—November 1943, he picked up a leaflet printed in English and Indian languages. The text of the leaflet was an appeal to the Indians in BURMA to try to return to their homes in INDIA.

"He said that he destroyed the leaflet immediately after reading it as there were strict orders that persons found in possession of the leaflets would be very severely punished."

(CSDIC Information Section Report No. 40, page 3)

15. KOREANS AND FORMOSANS

a. While evidence available is scanty, there were indications of greater receptivity to leaflets on the part of Koreans, Chinese, Formosans and other alien groups more or less willingly serving the Japanese Army. In this connection, reference may be made to the Formosan laborers who surrendered at HOLLANDIA (See paragraph 10).

(1) Prisoner of War CHIN (Formosan of prominent family), Merchant Seaman, captured 19 June 1944, off SAIPAN, stated:

"Almost all Formosans share his feelings (hostility to JAPAN) having not merely a national, but in most cases a personal enmity towards the Japanese, mainly because of their coercive measures and the stranglehold that they have over the island's material goods.

"Relations between Japanese and Formosans are never good, he stated, and even on the ships on which he sailed, quarrels were always breaking out between the two. He doubts, however, whether his countrymen would attack the Japanese in a mass rising at the moment of a possible American landing operation, for repressive measures practiced by the Japanese against the island's inhabitants have been so severe that active resistance has been largely discouraged.

"However, he feels certain that if effective propaganda mediums, mainly in the form of airplane leaflets, were to reach the people of FORMOSA from American sources, the way would be very well paved for the passive support of all Formosans and the active support of an extremely large number should an American landing be attempted. Prisoner of War attaches great importance to the effect of propaganda leaflets used in this manner, and he believes that a simple statement of the imminence of American attack and instructions to the civil population as to what they should do when it came, would be of great value. A grave error, however, would be made if any of these leaflets were to be printed in Japanese instead of Chinese, and the psychological result would be quite bad, because of the resentment of Formosans at the forced intrusions of the Japanese tongue in the island as the prevailing medium of speech."

(JICPOA Interrogation Report No. 68, pages 5–6)

(2) Prisoner of War KIYO, Eiki (JA 145465), Seaman, Korean, captured 10 March 1943 off RABAUL, stated:

"He had seen two Allied leaflets. There were no restrictions or objections to reading them. Comments by his Japanese shipmates on them were jocular. Prisoner of War thought that Japanese education had effected its purpose only too well. Leaflets were useless and would not sway the Japanese soldier, who would fight to the end.

"However, he felt that some effect could be produced later, say about the end of the present year, if propaganda pamphlets were dropped around RABAUL, BURMA and even KOREA itself. By then a considerable number of his countrymen would be in the Japanese services, and he could vouch for

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it that they would not be there by their own choice."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 201, page 17)

(3) A Japanese corroborates this suggestion. Prisoner of War ARAI, Sadao (JA 145456). 115 Infantry Regiment, captured 11 March 1943, GOODENOUGH Island, stated:

"Heard from other prisoners of war that Allied leaflets were dropped in great numbers in BUNA-GIRUWA Area. They would have no effect except perhaps on Koreans or TAIWAN (FORMOSA) native volunteers. Japanese were educated enough to disregard them. There were no specific orders regarding their disposal."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 302, page 11)

(4) A Korean, one of a group who surrendered after refusing to commit suicide at the demand of Japanese soldiers present, stressed the energetic measures taken by the Japanese to prevent Allied leaflets from influencing the wavering. Prisoner of War KIM, Civilian Formosan, captured November 1943, TARAWA, stated:

"He did not believe that leaflets dropped on the Koreans at other island bases would have any real effect, inasmuch as the Japanese would always be present either to label the leaflets as lies, or to kill anyone who read them."
(JICPOA Interrogation Report No. 4, page 4)

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Section VI. JAPANESE CRITICISMS OF ALLIED LEAFLETS

In the criticisms of Allied leaflets given below, an effort has been made to select those which, having been mentioned by more than one source, appear to be most representative. Some typical leaflets available in this theatre have been reprinted as Appendix B for reference.

In analyzing statements from Japanese sources concerning our leaflets, reactions such as these appeared with sufficient frequency to merit attention.

16. LANGUAGE AND STYLE

a. Correctness of language and style is held to be important by the Japanese.

(1) Extract from a diary, owner an unnamed platoon leader of an unspecified unit, dated 23 December 1943:

"The leaflets, which are written in either pen or brush, are well expressed, although at times incorrect characters are used."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 762, page 8)

(2) Extract from diary of a Second Lieutenant, dated 10 January 1943:

"Enemy planes dropped propaganda leaflets. Well written in beautiful penmanship. Probably done by a Chinese."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 535, page 5)

(3) Prisoner of War KITAMOTO, Chuji (JA (USA) 147574), Civilian Weather Observation Technician, 8 Independent Meteorological Unit (Naval), captured MANUS Island, 3 May 1944, stated:

"He saw several Allied leaflets in RABAUL. The composition and literary style were good and appeared to have been written by a Japanese. They were written in different intellectual caliber. However, the calligraphy was poor and seemed to have been written by a young schoolboy."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 564, page 5)

(4) Prisoner of War (Naval Air Warrant Officer), captured November 1943, BOUGAINVILLE:

"In view of the Prisoner of War's co-operativeness, he was shown three of the most recent leaflets which have so far not been distributed, on which he commented as follows:

"Blue leaflet entitled 'Hearty Welcome, Of Course.'

"Considered best, but there are several words and characters wrong. Also, writer has mixed KATAKANA and HIRAGANA, which is something no Japanese would do. He thought reaction to this leaflet would be laughter, whereas actually the text has appeal.

"Sketch entitled 'Let's Talk It Over.'

"Text is quite good, but leaflet would have been greatly improved if calligraphy had been used instead of square type. The bad and objectionable feature of this leaflet is the 'Safe Conduct Pass' at the foot. No soldier would want to have one of these about him, and the probabilities are that he would tear the leaflet up without really digesting it."
(SOPAC Interrogation Report, Serial No. 02382, page 14)

(5) Prisoner of War NINOMIYA, Harume (JA 145698), 79 Infantry Regiment, captured February 1944, NAMBARIWA, stated:

"He had not seen any Allied leaflets before capture but expressed interest in them and was shown examples of various types. His comments were that in general the writing was grammatically correct, although it was usually apparent that it had not been done by a native Japanese.

"He thought that in general they would be taken seriously by Japanese. He felt sure that all troops would read any they saw as a matter of interest. Actually troops read anything they could get.

"The form of the leaflet was also correct, except that he thought it unnecessary to print the same thing on both sides.

"KANA used on leaflet J32 were opposite to what they should be. He thought that HIRAGANA should have been used in the sentences and KATAKANA at the sides for pronunciation. It would be easier to read that way. He noticed on leaflet J53 that 'GA' should have been used in place of 'NO' at the top of the fourth line from the end, because the sentence was complex and the latter word gave an entirely opposite meaning to the clause."

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(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 395, page 9)

(6) Prisoner of War IKEMA, Eizo (JA (USA) 147101), Second Lieutenant Medical Corps, captured 13 March 1944, TALASEA, stated:

"He had seen five. Three of these, J49, J59, and J74, he saw at AKANE Point, RABAUL. Saw J151 at NATAMO, and one unidentified South PACIFIC News Bulletin at AISEGA.

"Three seen at AKANE Point were picked up in RABAUL or on the airfield by a truck unit located near the Prisoner of War barracks, and were passed around for interest among troops of the regiment.

"J49. It was generally thought that a Japanese prisoner of war had written this as it was skilfully done. But the speeches in the top drawing contained expletive particle NO, very typical among old, educated military men or civilian officials. However, leaflets which contained cartoons and a comparatively small amount of reading matter made little impression, as troops looked at the pictures with some interest and then tossed the leaflet away.

"J59. General opinion was that this had been written by a Chinese, because the woman in the top picture referred to her son as 'ARE' instead of the usual words 'MUSUKO' or 'SEGARE'."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 545, page 13)

(7) Prisoner of War NOMA, Shuichi (JA 145661), 79 Infantry Regiment, captured December 1943, WAREO, stated:

"Troops had been forewarned about Allied propaganda. The characters did not appear normal, and the phraseology was non-Japanese.

"Practical use, such as for handkerchiefs was made of leaflets after perusal."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 365, page 8)

17. INTEREST IN FACTUAL NEWS

a. Newspapers and bulletins have been singled out more than once for favorable mention.

(1) Prisoner of War HASHIMOTO, Yoshito (JA (USA) 147006), 53 Infantry Regiment, captured 30 December 1943, TAUALI, stated:

"He had seen two leaflets. They were 'These Two Years' (J141) and the 'South West PACIFIC Weekly' (J60). Last named proved of greater interest as it contained news of the homeland."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 347, page 12)

(2) Prisoner of War SAKAKIBARA, Teruichi (JA 145682), 33 Independent Engineer Regiment, captured January 1944, NAMBARIWA, stated:

"J130: (South PACIFIC News Bulletin.)—Found this interesting, particularly the news concerning JAPAN. He thought that the South PACIFIC News Bulletin would be the most popular of the Allied leaflets, as it provided the only link troops had with the outside world."
(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 401, page 8)

(3) Prisoner of War NAKAMOTO, Chosai, Superior Private, captured 2 April 1944, TOROKINA Area, stated:

"He had seen many leaflets prior to capture. One, containing a map of the situation and the story of the 6 Division, was thought most effective. He thought leaflets would not induce the majority of men to desert, but said that it would confuse them no end. He thought that it would affect the more rational thinkers such as noncommissioned officers. No instruction as to disposal of leaflets was given. He said that Sergeant OBATA and Corporal KAI of 23 Infantry Regiment had deserted on 31 March 1944, after reading leaflets. Many doubted the invasion of the MARSHALLS, GILBERTS, ADMIRALTY and EMIRAU Islands. He knew of the invasion of Western NEW BRITAIN, but could not believe UNITED STATES forces had occupied half of the island as shown on the propaganda map."
(SOPAC Interrogation Report, Serial No. 01306, page 14)

(4) Prisoner of War IKEMA, Eizo (JA (USA) 147101), Second Lieutenant Medical Corps, captured 13 March 1944, TALASEA, stated:

"J74: Troops were very interested in this leaflet because they heard about the BISMARCK Convoy sinking and the pictures were apparently a true record.

"J151: Although impressed by the honesty of the South PACIFIC News Bulletin, J151 caused the greatest interest among the troops. Many of these were picked up at NATAMO, and everybody who could secure one carried it in his pocket. Troops all read and thought a great deal about this pamphlet, as they had been in action since the beginning of the war.

"Unidentified Leaflet.—This South PACI-