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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

movement intercepts or send him copies thereof?

Admiral Wilkinson: Whether we informed him of the fact that these detailed inquiries as to the locations in Pearl Harbor had come in in addition to the regular -- I mean aside from the regular esplonage that was going on, is that your question?

Mr. Gearhart: I want the question answered.

Adriral Wilkinson: He knew there was a regular espionage.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, as you have testified that the ship movement intercepts took on greater importance in your mind in the light of the dead line message I have read you, did you at that time give some consideration to the proposition that you should send Admiral Kimmel the substance of the ship movement intercepts, or copies thereof?

Admiral Wilkinson: May I ask you, sir, if you meant should I tell him that in addition to the regular espionage with which he and we were familiar, that there were special messages inquiring as to special information desired from the spies?

Mr. Gearhart: That is right.

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, I did not.

Mr. Gearhart: In other words, did you give any consideration to the question as to whether or not you should give to Admiral Kimmel the information that you had?

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Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

Adriral Wilkinson: No, sir, I did not.

Mr. Gearhart: All right. Then when you encountered this intercept, directing your attention to page 165 of exhibit No. 1 in this proceeding, from Tokyo to Washington, November 22, 1941; (Reading)

"To both you Ambassafors.

"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you -- twenty ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished, we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Arbassadors alone, "

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Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Now when you read this intercepted message that the Japanese had fixed a positively unalterable deadline of November 29 at which things are automatically going to happen, after you read that did it not occur to you, Admiral Wilkinson, that you should give to Admiral Kimmel the information that you had?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. If that was information of the character that would influence the operations of the Fleet, whether to move in or out of port, I am not sure that it was within the responsibility or the authority of my office to send that. If, however, it was within that authority and responsibility, I did not consider sending it to him.

Mr. Gearhart: You were charged with evaluating all inforwartion that came to you, domestic and foreign. You were charged with the responsibility of disseminating that information. You had the information. Did you go and talk to Admiral Stark about it, or to any other higher officer than yourself?

Admiral Wilkinson: I was charged with evaluating the information, but I had been ordered not to develop the enemy intentions. I was charged with the dissemination of this information "as desirable". I had been restricted as to the dissemination of information of this character. I should perhaps have talked to Admiral Stark, or to Admiral Turner,

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

about it. I did not. The information, however, was available to all hands, including myself.

Mr. Gearhart: So much for that. Now I want to ask you some more questions about a few intercepts which were not translated until after the 7th.

I notice, by making a rough count of Exhibit No. 1 and Exhibit No. 2, that on December 6, 36 or 37 Japanese intercepts were decoded. Without counting them carefully, I notice in these two exhibits that very, very few were decoded on the 5th and very few on the preceding day.

How do you account for the fact that on the 6th day of December our decoders were decoding like lightning and on previous days they decoded very, very few in comparison?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not account for it, sir. That was being done by the War Department Signal Intelligence Service and by the Navy Communications Service. It is possible that the completion of the transcripts were in part done on the 5th and finished on the 6th. It is possible that the key to the code was obtained on the 5th and applied on the 6th, but I haven't any information as to why.

Mr. Gearhart: Do you not consider it regrettable that e message containing this phrase remained undecoded until the 8th of December, a message which was received on December 6, 1941, from Honolulu to Tokyo, "I imagine that in all

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probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places", referring to Pearl Harbor? That appears on page 27 of Exhibit No. 2.

Admiral Wilkinson: You ask me if it was not unfortunate that it was not decoded before?

Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: It was tragic that that was not decoded before?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: How do you account for the fact that that was not decoded, when the decoders were decoding very rapidly and decoding messages in great number on that day, the 6th?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not account for it, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: How do you account for them picking out the 13-part message to decode on the 6th and ignore this surprise attack message that arrived on the same day?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not account for it. It is possible it came in another code which they could not so readily translate; it is possible that they were primed to get that 14-part message because the pilot message had come before it and they were on the lookout for it and wanted to

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## Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart
Senator Ferguson

tackle it first.

Mr. Gearhart: Was there any special organization of decoders on the 6th day of December, 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not know, sir. It was not under my knowledge of cognizance. That was in the Communications Office.

Mr. Gearhart: Have you heard anyone account for the tremendous output of decoding that occurred on that day?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Has it been subject to conversational discussion?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I think I heard Captain Kramer remark that there was a heavy demand for translators that day, but that was, of course, after the decoding work had been done.

Mr. Gearhart: That is all.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson from Michigan will inquire.

Senator Ferguson: Did you, Admiral, have any conversation with Admiral Kirk about why he had been replaced in a few months?

Admiral Wilkinson: I feel quite sure I did, sir. I know he was not replaced. He went to sea at his own request, in order to take advantage of an opportunity for command.

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Senator Ferguson: Whom would he have to make a request to?

Admiral Wilkinson: The Chief of Naval Operations, I presume,
would release him, and the Bureau of Personnel would give
him the orders as to his duty.

Senator Ferguson: Had you requested the assignment in there?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. It was a surprise to me.

I was in command of a battleship at the time.

Senator Ferguson: You were called from the Fleet then?
Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: To come into Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Were you briefed on any subject when you came in?

Admiral Wilkinson: I spent some little time going through the Office of Naval Intelligence, spending a few hours in each section and division in order to see what subject they handled and how they handled them. I had intermittent conversations with Admiral Kirk and finally a fairly complete turnover personally from him orally. I was not briefed by any officer outside of Admiral Kirk and his subordinate divisions.

Senator Ferguson: Were you briefed by Admiral Kirk?

Admiral Wilkinson: In the sense of the usual turnover,

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Questions by: Senator Ferguson

yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Were you briefed on the diplomatic messages up to that day?

Admiral Wilkinson: Not specifically. I was in the Far Eastern Division and discussed the general tenor of them, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now who in the Far Eastern Division did you discuss the general tenor with?

Admiral Wilkinson: Captain McCullom.

Senator Ferguson: Captain McCullom?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, the head of the division. He was a continuing source of knowledge in there, had been in there some little time, and would subsequently find me there as well, and he told me the status up to the moment.

Senator Ferguson: You think you came there the 15th of October?

Admiral Wilkinson: I took over the duties on the 15th of October. This period of briefing I spoke of, I had gone through the various offices, that took perhaps two weeks.

Senator Ferguson: Before that time?

Admiral Wilkinson: Before the 15th of October.

Senator Ferguson: So you really came into the Department about the 1st of October?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. I spent a time in the

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individual offices seeing what they did. I had a fairly complete and informative turnover.

Senator Ferguson: You mean when you say that the mechanical end of the office you were looking over for two weeks?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. Not the mechanical, I mean each one of the sections, I mean the domestic branch, the foreign branch, or the geographic section, or the methods of counter-espionage, suspection, and so on, in each one of the Geveral offices, of which there were perhaps 20, I spent a few hours.

Senator Ferguson: That would be the administrative end then, that part of it?

Admiral Wilkinson: The operating end entirely. Not purely administrative, the operating end of the office, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: At that time you knew, on the 16th, that there was a change of Cabinet in Japan?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you recall that?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did the Intelligence Branch figure in any way that that was a changing point in our negotiations? Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, and I think we so reported it

## Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

in our fortnightly situation, or fortnightly summaries, as our general understanding of the picture. The Far Eastern section had considerable information on the make-up of the new Cabinet, that is on the military and naval members of it. We were all cognizant of the fact that this made a more military tenor in the Japanese Government than had existed before.

## Hook 8

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: From a diplomatic viewpoint, when you went in, effective on the 15th of October, where did we stand in relation to the negotiations with Japan, as far as you are concerned; what was the diplomatic situation as of that time?

Admiral Wilkinson: My recollection is that the negotiations, which had been begun the preceding spring, interrupted in the summer, had been resumed, were now being carried on with Admiral Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador, as the senior Japanese representative, Mr. Kurusu had yet to arrive.

Senator Ferguson: At that time, were you familiar with what had taken place about the 17th of August, 1941, in relation to our diplomatic situation?

Admiral Wilkinson: With relation to the Argentia Conference, you mean, sir?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson: No, only by newspaper accounts.

Senator Ferguson: Now, will you tell me what the newspaper accounts were at that time, on that question? Tell me what you got from the newspapers.

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not think I got very much more than the Four Freedoms, and I think there was a communique there, I forget it now.

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Senator Ferguson: Pardon me?

Admiral Wilkinson: I think there was a communique issued, but I forget it now, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You say you learned about the Four Freedoms from the newspapers?

Admiral Wilkinson: To my recollection, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Is that all you knew about that
conference?

Admiral Wilkinson: I knew our naval and military staffs had attended, and I knew, in all probability, they had discussed measures of supply of England. The lease-lend, I am not sure whether it was in effect at that moment, but it soon was, and I knew they had probably discussed that and discussed the safety of the Atlantic lanes. I knew nothing of any discussions whatsoever regarding the Far East.

Senator Ferguson: When did you first learn about the discussions that had taken place there with relation to the Far East?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not know that I ever learned, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, you were going to make a summary or appraisal of the intelligence that was coming through, isn't that correct?

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Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Have you ever learned about the parallel action of the two countries?

Admiral Wilkinson: Only recently.

Senator Ferguson: Just recently?

Admiral Wilkinson: As I think I have explained, Senator, our interest, responsibilities, and authority were confined to the action of foreign countries, and particularly prospective enemies. Matters on arrangement within our own country and diplomatic military and naval plans or arrangements or understandings for cooperation were not given to us.

Senator Ferguson: Then the question, as I understand it, as far as intelligence was concerned, of what our diplomatic negotiations were, did not concern you; you did not use that in any way to evaluate what the enemy might be going to do?

Admiral Wilkinson: As I could learn and find out matters of that degree, yes, of course, they would be reflected in our interest. There was no machinery set up that I was definitely informed of. I learned a good deal through the translation of these intercepts as to what proposals our State Department had made to Japan which otherwise I would not have known through the machinery

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Witness Wilkinson

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Questions by: Senator Ferguson

Senator Ferguson: Do you recall getting the Winant message in relation to the movement of ships on the 6th of December, 1941?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall it specifically, sir, but if I did see it, and I presume I did because it came through the information channels, it was confirmatory of the evidences that we had already had of this advance through the south China Sea.

Senator Ferguson: Had you received Admiralty messages on the same point?

Admiral Wilkinson: I had been informed of them, yes, sir, and I think I had seen them.

Senator Ferguson: What did those two messages mean to you?

Admiral Wilkinson: They meant an attack was coming in the south China Sea area.

Senator Ferguson: It meant an attack was coming on the south? I did not get that?

Admiral Wilkinson: The south China Sea area, if we are speaking of the same message. You are speaking of the Winant message regarding the movement of ships?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. That is the attack which

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Questions by: Senator Ferguson

we had foreseen.

What did that mean to the United Senator Ferguson: States?

Admiral Wilkinson: I have my doubts, sir. It might mean we would come into the war in support of Siam, if that country were attack, or Singapore, if that were attacked; it might mean we would not come into the war.

Senator Ferguson: Why would we possibly come in if Singapore was attacked, in your opinion, as of that time?

Admiral Wilkinson: Only because of two things: First because of our possible relations with England, as had been evidenced by the arrangements for the transfer of food and ammunition to England, the lend-lease, ocean convoys; the second thing, because that was because that was an encroachment, a further advance of Japan, and the policy of our country apparently was directed toward preventing the aggressive moves of Japan extending beyond certain limits.

Senator Ferguson: All right.

Now, I want to get what information you had in relation to the United States policy as far as Japanwas concerned if they moved beyond certain limits, as you now say in your last answer.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: What was your information along that line?

Admiral Wilkinson: I had the information -- I cannot say whether I saw the document, or was told about it -that an advance of the Japanese forces to the westward of the 100th meridian or the southward of the 10th parallel of latitude would be a matter of grave concern to both England and America.

Whether that policy, as so indicated, of our State Department would be translated by the Congress and people into not only grave concern, but a resistance by war, I did not know.

Senator Ferguson: Now, you say someone showed it to you, or someone told you about it. Is that true?

Admiral Wilkinson: I am not sure which, sir, whether I had heard of it, or I had seen some message to that effect.

Senator Ferguson: Can you recall what kind of message you may have seen along that same line?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I think I have seen some exhibit to that effect now. It may be that that I have seen.

If the counsel will show me, I can perhaps speak of it.

Senator Ferguson: I want to try and take you back

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

as of the date, rather than what you saw here or heard at the hearing.

Admiral Wilkinson: What I am speaking of now, is what I have seen which embodied those same parallels, those same geographical limits.

As to the time I knew of the geographical limits, I cannot remember whether I knew of them by someone telling me, or whether I knew of them by seeing a paper. You ask me what paper I saw. I saw if I saw a paper it was probably this paper I speak of now. I think more probably I was told that by Captain Schuirmann, who was the Director of the Central Division, and Liaison Officer with the State Department.

The Vice Chairman: It is now four o'clock. You will require some further time, Senator?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: The committee will stand adjourned until ten o'clock tomorrow morning. You will return then please, Admiral.

(Whereupon, at 4:00 o'clock p. m., the committee recessed until 10:00 a. m., the following day, Wednesday, December 19, 1945.)