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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

INTERROGATION OF

(Marquis) KIDO, KOICHI

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 8 March 1946, 1400 - 1615 hours

PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Petar, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Sackett

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- Q We were talking about August 28 when we finished the other day. Your diary indicates that the War Minister, TOJO, talked with the Emperor on that day and later talked to you. Do you have any recollection of your conversation with TOJO on that occasion?
- A I have no recollection.
- Q On August 29, Prince KONOYE called you about having received some reply from the United States Government. Do you remember what that reply was and what KONOYE said?
- A I believe it was this time that I heard from KONOYE that Ambassador NOMURA said that President Roosevelt is very agreeable to meeting somewhere in Alaskan waters or in a boat near Alaska.
- Q On August 30, Prince KONOYE, according to your diary, stated he was much concerned about the Army. What was it he said?

- A I believe at this time the Army started giving all sorts of argument and making the problem more difficult by saying all sorts of things against the provisions that were made for negotiations.
- Q Did he mention anyone in particular in the Army - any names?
- A No mention was made of any names.
- Q On September 4, do you remember what your conversation was with Foreign Minister TOYODA?
- A I believe that the Foreign Minister at this time told me about the meeting Ambassador NOMURA had. I believe that his talk concerned mostly of the negotiations had with America.
- Q Did he have anything to say about Japan's expansion to the South on that occasion?
- A No, no such talk was done. The greatest concern of TOYODA was to do something about negotiations with America or to have it materialize and settled, so the talk consisted mainly in that respect.
- Q When was it, would you say, you first learned there was going to be an Imperial Conference on September 6?
- A It was on the 5th and because it was so sudden, I was surprised.
- Q How did you learn it was going to be called on the 6th?
- A KONOYE came to the Palace and told me about it.
- Q You talked to the Emperor, you indicate in your diary, on the morning of September 5. Do you remember the nature of that conversation - the day before the Imperial Conference on the 6th?
- A At that time when I had an audience, nothing was known of the Imperial Conference and the Emperor was not informed.
- Q You mean the Emperor, himself, learned about the Imperial Conference later on that day, when KONOYE went to see him that afternoon?

- A The Emperor learned of it on the 5th, too, and for that reason, he also was greatly surprised.
- Q In other words, when you talked with the Emperor on the morning of the 5th, neither you nor the Emperor knew about the Imperial Conference on the 6th?
- A No.
- Q Who was it that decided there would be an Imperial Conference on the 6th.
- A That is requested by the Cabinet after obtaining the agreement of both the Navy Chief of Staff and the Army Chief of Staff.
- Q When had those individuals gotten together and agreed they should have an Imperial Conference? It certainly was before the 5th, wasn't it?
- A I do not know exactly when they got together but I believe they got together on the 5th.
- Q There had been liaison conferences all along in those days, had there not?
- A I believe so.
- Q Who was it, according to your information or according to what the Emperor or Prince KONOYE told you, that suggested an Imperial Conference be called on such short notice? Whose idea was it to have an Imperial Conference the following day?
- A I believe it is after a discussion has been held by the Premier and the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff.
- Q Do you know what individual or individuals desired to have this particular conference on September 6 and urged the holding of the conference?
- A I did not hear about any one person or any special person making a request for it.

- Q Why was the Imperial Conference called for September 6? What was the purpose for calling the conference?
- A Because the matter was so important that the Premier and the Navy and Army Chiefs of Staff decided the matter for themselves and decided to submit the request to the Emperor.
- Q You refer to "matter". What was the "matter" these people decided should be submitted to the Emperor on such short notice? What do you mean by "matter"?
- A It is the problems that were decided upon at the liaison conference which happened to be important. The contents will be mentioned later.
- Q When you talked with Prince KONOYE on the 5th and he advised you there was going to be an Imperial Conference on the 6th, what was it he told you was going to be taken up at the Imperial Conference?
- A The contents are made clear in the notes which I have made and the contents are (1) preparation for war against America and Britain will be started; (2) that the negotiations with America will be vigorously continued; and (3) if the negotiations were not successful by the 10th of October, war will be decided against Britain and America.
- Q And when you talked with Prince KONOYE on the 5th, did he mention to you that is what was determined at the liaison conference and that was what was going to be placed before the Emperor for official decision? In other words, the day before the conference, you knew for all practical purposes what was going to be decided at the conference?
- A So I criticized and reproved KONOYE, saying that such important matters like these had been brought without long notice; that it has been brought so abruptly; and that the Emperor will not have time to think upon it and that a decision of this sort would mean war and because of that I reproached the Premier strongly.
- Q What did he say?

- A But Prince KONOYE answered that it cannot be helped because it was decided at the liaison conference but he said he will try vigorously on the second item; that is, for continuation of the negotiations with America and he said he would try his utmost in that respect.
- Q You mean these three points you have written in your diary or your memoirs?
- A Memoirs. It is a memoir which I have written pertaining to the collapse of the KONOYE Cabinet.
- Q Your memoirs had reference particularly to what happened in the middle of October but which also referred back to this conference in September?
- A Yes.
- Q Did KONOYE discuss with you what had been said by the various leading participants in these liaison conferences; such as TOJO and OIKAWA and TOYODA, and people of that kind?
- A There weren't any special talks by any special individuals at the conference.
- Q Well, I meant in the Imperial Conference of the 6th but did Prince KONOYE tell you the positions that these various ministers had taken in the liaison conferences, leading up to the Imperial Conference as to what they favored with reference to Japanese foreign policy?
- A I did not hear any one stand or opinion but I have heard that the military and the Navy circles were very strong in their demands and that people were complaining that they can't do anything about it.
- Q Prince KONOYE told/^{you}that the Army and Navy groups were insistent upon a decision being made to go to war. Is that correct?

- A They were strongly inclined toward war, and therefore, Prince KONOYE said he would do his utmost to continue negotiations and to bring about a successful conclusion.
- Q On this particular occasion, the 5th of September, did KONOYE make a complaint to you about TOJO's attitude that you recall?
- A I have no special recollection in that respect.
- Q He complained of the Army or military group in general without mentioning individuals. Is that right? A. Yes
- Q Still on the 5th of September, you indicate in your diary that the Premier had a lengthy conference with the Emperor late in the afternoon. What was it that the Emperor said to the Premier and the Premier said to the Emperor, as related to you by Prince KONOYE?
- A The things which I have mentioned were those occurring before the audience had with the Emperor - the audience had by Prince KONOYE - and according to Prince KONOYE after he had an audience with the Emperor, Prince KONOYE said that the Emperor was greatly surprised at the decision. The Emperor inquired of Prince KONOYE on the matter of operations and things like that, and the Premier was not able to give adequate answers. So, Prince KONOYE requested that both the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff be called.
- Q What questions with relation to operations did the Emperor ask KONOYE, according to Prince KONOYE? What did he say?
- A I do not know the details but the Emperor asked him if the operation can be conducted smoothly or successfully and the Premier decided it would be a good thing for both the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff to come and for that reason, they were called.
- Q He was inquiring with reference to the possibility of successful operations against Pearl Harbor, was he not?
- A I did not hear any such story.

- Q The Emperor and Prince KONOYE certainly discussed some of the details of operations rather than using the abstract word "operation", didn't they?
- A I do not believe such a detail was given in the talk with the Premier and I did not hear anything about it.
- Q Where were the operations supposed to take place, according to Prince KONOYE - what part of the Eastern theatre?
- A In a story or talk with us, it was an incursion into Malay, Philippines, and those southern regions. We did not even think or dream of Pearl Harbor being the objective.
- Q When you say "he" talked with you, do you mean KONOYE?
- A Yes.
- Q In other words, in your general talks with KONOYE, he indicated that the Emperor wanted to know some operational details with reference to Malay, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. Is that correct?
- A At this time, there weren't any detailed plans of operations made and it was decided to draft plans for operations at this time. Therefore, our talks were quite abstract.
- Q The Emperor really wanted to know in view of this sudden calling of the meeting whether or not the Army and Navy General Staffs were prepared to fight such a war. Is that correct?
- A At this time, there wasn't any detailed plan made and what the Emperor said at that time will be mentioned later. When the Emperor inquired of the three men, the Navy General Staffs, the Army General Staff, and the Premier, if Japan can be victorious in a war, SUGIYAMA replied that Japan wouldn't take long in conquering the situation. Thereupon, the Emperor told SUGIYAMA, "You said that you can complete the China Incident in a short time, but you were not able to do so", and the Emperor reproached him on that. Because of that reproach, SUGIYAMA had nothing to say. NAGANO thereupon said that by letting things ride as it is,

A (Cont.) Japan would ^{essentially} greatly go down into oblivion and gradually become weaker and weaker. Therefore, drastic surgery is required and he said that drastic surgery means war and because the nature of this talk was in that respect, there wasn't any detailed plans or operations given or submitted at this time. The Emperor also said and inquired of them that the order of the three decisions are kind of nonsensical - it doesn't make sense - the order of it. He said the proper order is that diplomacy should come first and then war last. But the Prime Minister said that the gist or the purport was the same. Prince Konoye said this was decided upon at the liaison conference and he requested the Emperor's consent and because of that, I believe that the matter taken up dealt with large outlines and generalities and there were no details. At this time, Prince KONOYE seriously said that he would like to do his utmost in the way of negotiations.

Q This was on the 5th of September when they came in to see the Emperor before the meeting on the 6th, when this was discussed with the Emperor. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q You were present at that particular conference?

A No.

Q Just the three of them and the Emperor were present? Is that right?

A This story which I have given was that given to me by Prince KONOYE and I believe this story is written in the memoirs of Prince KONOYE.

Q Did he tell you this story in the presence of SUGIYAMA AND NAGANO?

A No.

Q Did you ever hear the explanation of what took place from either SUGIYAMA or NAGANO?

A No.

- Q How long after this conference on the afternoon of the 5th was it that KONOYE explained to you what had happened at the conference?
- A Because the audience started at six o'clock and they went back at 7 o'clock, I didn't have much time to talk.
- Q By that, do you mean you talked to Prince KONOYE and he told you this story somewhere about 7 o'clock that same evening that they met with the Emperor on September 5?
- A It was for a very short time.
- Q In other words, immediately after the Conference, he saw you and told you what took place?
- A Yes.
- Q Where did you see him, at the Palace?
- A I was in my room and they had an audience with the Emperor in the regular place and because my room is located right where they come by after they had an audience with the Emperor, because of that reason he stopped in.
- Q By "room", you mean your office?
- A Yes.
- Q In other words, they talked with the Emperor in the Imperial Household Ministry Building?
- A In the Palace.
- Q And you had an office in the Palace Building?
- A Right near the Palace.
- Q A different building, however.
- A It is connected.
- Q In other words, the audience was held in the Emperor's Palace or home and it is connected with the office building where your office is?
- A Yes.

- Q After the meeting, they all came out together, did they, NAGANO, SUGIYAMA and KONOYE, and they came by your office?
- A NAGANO and SUGIYAMA went to their place of retirement while KONOYE came to me directly.
- Q Then did you go and talk to the Emperor that evening?
- A No, at this time, I did not have an audience.
- Q The next day?
- A Yes.
- Q When you saw the Emperor just prior to this meeting at six o'clock, between four and six o'clock, what did you have to say to the Emperor and what did he have to say to you?
- A I had an audience with the Emperor at five o'clock and the Emperor was greatly surprised at the abruptness of the decision and so I said that the course and the procedure of the Government is inexcusable and I am very sorry they have conducted themselves like that and I suggested that the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff be called in and that the Emperor inquire of them sufficiently.
- Q At five o'clock when you saw the Emperor, he had already learned from Prince KONOYE there was going to be an Imperial Conference, had he not?
- A Yes.
- Q And he also learned from Prince KONOYE what had been decided at the liaison conference and what was going to be asked to be determined in the presence of the Emperor? What comment did he have to you before the Chiefs of Staff arrived? What did he say about those things to you?
- A Because he hastily took on the procedure of calling those Chiefs of Staff, he did not go into details.

- Q This story that you have just related as to what Prince KONOYE told you happened in the conference between the Chiefs of Staff and the Emperor. Is that written in your diary? I don't have it in my translation. That is what you recall?
- A No, because I read the memoirs of Prince KONOYE, I was able to remember it.
- Q I have read it elsewhere, too. I was wondering how you were able to recall it. By way of summary then, on September 5, 1941, in the morning, you went to see the Emperor for a routine visit and nothing was said about the Imperial Conference between you and the Emperor because neither of you knew about the impending conference. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q As I understand it, late in the afternoon, the Premier went to the Palace and explained to the Emperor an Imperial Conference was going to be called for the following day. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q Did Prince KONOYE tell you about the coming Imperial Conference before he told the Emperor?
- A Before.
- Q On the way to the Emperor, he told you? Before he told the Emperor, did he tell you about the decision reached at the liaison conference - what was going to be asked to be affirmed at the Imperial Conference?
- A And so, as said before, I wanted to stop his going there and I said such a thing would mean war. But KONOYE replied back, this was decided upon by the liaison conference, and for that reason he could not do anything about it and he said he will do his utmost, however, in the way of negotiating with America.
- Q So he proceeded on to tell the Emperor the points decided at the liaison conference and that there was going to be an Imperial Conference?
- A Yes.

- Q Was this decision of the liaison conference involving these three points in writing or was it explained to you orally?
- A I believe it was written.
- Q Did he hand you a copy of it so you could read it that afternoon?
- A I did not see the written copy and I just remember the story given to me.
- Q But he had it in written form, did he?
- A I believe he had a written form in order to inform the Emperor about it.
- Q It was presented to the Emperor in written form as to what was decided at the liaison conference?
- A Yes.
- Q Do you have any idea where the original or a copy of that decision of the liaison conference would be?
- A I believe that it is held by the Cabinet and by the Navy Staff Headquarters and the Army Staff Headquarters. At the time that the U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey was being made, Prince KONOYE put it in his memoirs. He had numerous appendices attached.
- Q That was his recollection of what was in the decision or is that in original form?
- A I believe the copies of it were given completely out.
- Q Would copies of such a decision be in the offices of the Grand Chamberlain or Aide-de-Camp?
- A If it wasn't burned, I believe they have it in the office of the Aide-de-Camp.
- Q Do you think Mr. MATSUDAIRA might be able to help us locate a copy of that decision? I might say he indicated he was willing to help us.
- A I don't know if they have it or not. If they have it, I believe they would be willing to present it to you.

Q In other words, you think that your former Chief Secretary might be a person who would be able to locate such a copy if he could look for it?

A Yes.

Q To the best of your recollection, not having an original or a copy in writing of what was decided, by way of summary, it contained three decisions: First, that Japan would immediately prepare detailed plans for war against the United States and Great Britain, and, second, Japan would continue to negotiate and endeavor to settle her differences with the United States, and, third, if negotiations should be unsuccessful by the 10th of October, Japan should then immediately proceed to war with the United States and Great Britain?

A Say Japan will decide upon it.

Q The third point agreed upon was that if negotiations were not successful by October 10, Japan would then decide whether or not to declare war on the United States?

A Yes.

Q In other words, the 10th of October was set as the deadline at which time a decision would have to be made?

A Yes.

Q Then, further, by way of summary, on September 5 Prince KONOYE presented those written decisions to the Emperor and according to Prince KONOYE, when he told you about his conference with the Emperor, in addition to discussing the fact that very short notice was given for the Imperial Conference, he proceeded to ask Prince KONOYE many operational questions about how Japan was going to be able to fight a war in Malay, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And KONOYE indicated he would like to have the Chiefs of Staff present in order to answer those questions?

A Yes.

Q And the first meeting between Prince KONOYE and the Emperor took place about four o'clock?

A Yes, 4:30 P. M.

Q And when he retired from the presence of the Emperor, he talked to you about his conversation with the Emperor and asked you to discuss with the Emperor the calling in of the Chiefs of Staff? Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And you did go in to see the Emperor and suggested to the Emperor that the Chiefs of Staff be called? Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And did the Emperor ask you to call the Chiefs of Staff?

A And for that reason, through the Aide-de-Camp, Colonel YOKOYAMA, the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff were called.

Q Did Prince KONOYE remain there at your office waiting for them to arrive?

A Yes.

Q Then, at approximately six o'clock in the evening, Admiral NAGANO and General SUZUKI arrived and the two of them, together with Prince KONOYE went in to see the Emperor and they were in conference for some half hour. Is that right?

A About a half hour.

Q Then, they all left except Prince KONOYE, who stopped by your office and explained to you what had taken place at this conference with the Emperor. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q As I understand what he told you had taken place was that the Emperor had asked General SUZUKI whether the Army was capable of fighting a successful campaign in the South Pacific and the General answered it was and

- Q (Cont.) and the Emperor answered him in effect that General SUZUKI had said the same thing with reference to the China campaign but that it had not been completed very rapidly and General SUZUKI didn't press the matter any further.
- A And at this time, SUZUKI said China is a large continent while in the South, it is not a continent and for that reason something can be done. But the Emperor did not agree to it
- Q But General SUZUKI, at that conference, recommended that Japan should fight a war in the South Pacific if negotiations failed. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q And Admiral NAGANO stated to the Emperor, in effect, that he thought Japan was losing its strength little by little and the time had come for Japan to open hostilities in the South Pacific. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q Did Admiral NAGANO advocate further negotiations with America or immediately opening hostilities?
- A Admiral NAGANO was saying vigorously that if the negotiations can be conducted, that would be the best thing to do, but he said the dragging on of negotiations would weaken Japan and that a decision must be reached by a certain time.
- Q War Minister TOJO was not present - I mean at this meeting on the 5th?
- A No.
- Q Then, the gentlemen present, according to Prince KONOYE, discussed certain operational questions with the Emperor, did they not?
- A That isn't clear. But I have heard from Prince KONOYE about general outlines and generalities.
- Q Didn't these men on that occasion discuss the proposition that it would be necessary for such an operation to come by way of a surprise attack?
- A I didn't hear any such thing.

- Q And was there any discussion on that occasion, according to Prince KONOYE, as to the declaration of war or notice of attack?
- A KONOYE was totally opposed to such a thing and he was so totally for the conduct of negotiations and bringing it to a successful conclusion that he didn't touch upon such matters. When it became October, because war became imminent, Prince KONOYE quit it because he was opposed to war and KONOYE was very much indignant that a decision for war has been made while he was Premier.
- Q Although you indicate you personally didn't know anything about the plan to attack Pearl Harbor as incidental to the southern expansion in those days, there isn't any question in your mind, is there, but what the Navy as early as September 5, 1941 had that plan in mind, did they not?
- A Perhaps the Navy had such a plan, although we were not aware of it.
- Q Isn't it true that the Navy disclosed such plans to the Emperor - such possible methods of operation so that the Emperor knew about the possibility of a Pearl Harbor attack in connection with the southern campaign as of the 5th of September 1941?
- A I do not know when the Emperor knew of the plan and because I am not a bit connected with operational matters, the Emperor did not tell me of it, even though he may have known.
- A I understand that you did not know anything about it in those days and the Emperor didn't tell you when he first knew about the operation to attack Pearl Harbor but now the war is over and you have seen the Emperor since and discussed the beginning of the war, etc. Didn't the Emperor discuss with you that he would like to have told you about the start of the war? Hasn't he disclosed when he first knew of the Pearl Harbor attack?
- A I didn't hear anything about it at present.
- Q You haven't talked with the Emperor since the close of the war with reference as to how the war started?
- A No.

Q After the successful attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, no doubt there was a certain amount of jubilation in Japan over the success of the operation. In connection with the discussions or celebration of the success, didn't the Emperor tell you when he knew about it or what he had to do with the working out of that plan?

A I didn't hear anything about the time that the Emperor learned of such a plan but I did hear that the Navy had been preparing for such an operation long prior to the execution.

Q Certainly, an event of such great importance such as that and one, no doubt, discussed as much as that, would arouse some curiosity on your part as to how it came about. Who have you talked to who told you about the details of the plans to attack Pearl Harbor, even though you didn't know they were going on?

A I did not hear anything about the preparations made, even afterwards.

Q You learned that Admiral YAMAMOTO had originated the plan after the attack on Pearl Harbor?

A Yes, I heard stories to that effect.

Q Where did you learn that - from whom?

A I have no recollection as to who I heard it from, although the Navy Aide-de-Camp had been telling such stories.

Q You, no doubt, saw Admiral NAGANO after the attack and congratulated him upon the operation? It would be a natural thing to do. You did, did you not?

A I merely congratulated NAGANO but I did not engage in any long talk with him.

Q What did he have to say when you talked with him after the attack?

A I said, "I congratulate the Navy for its brilliant success."

- Q I was asking what he had to say, not what you had to say. What did the Admiral have to say?
- A He only said "thank you".
- Q You are sure that is all he said? Why after he had accomplished such a feat as that, I am sure he would have difficulty in restraining himself and have more to say?
- A Because NAGANO speaks in such a terse manner, so short, and makes things so concrete, this may not have been true. He may not even have said "thank you".
- Q You don't recall having received any explanation from him as to how the Navy, through long planning and hard work had accomplished such a result?
- A And because generally much of the story has been printed in the newspapers after the event, and perhaps for that reason, I had gotten the knowledge of it.
- Q Certainly there were some of the leading Navy men or military men who took credit for such a successful operation to a greater degree than merely saying "thank you" when you congratulated them. They were more verbose than that and had some explanation to make as to how it all came about, didn't they?
- A Because this meeting with NAGANO was while having an audience with the Emperor and it was conversation had while everyone was standing, it was conducted very tersely.
- Q Did you have any other conversations on a more friendly basis - less formal?
- A Because I didn't know him much, I didn't converse with him. He only came to me just before the war in order to explain about it. I have never been his friend.
- Q You say to explain about what - the attack on Pearl Harbor?
- A It was the explanation concerning war - that war is drastic surgery.

Q Oh yes. After the successful attack on Pearl Harbor, who was it that took credit in Japan for the attack being a success, whether they talked to you directly, in the press, or in public utterances? Who claimed credit for such an outstanding victory?

A The Japanese military or naval man does not engage in boastful talk; therefore, the press showered praises upon YAMAMOTO because he happened to be the Admiral of the Combined Japanese Fleet.

Q TOJO publicly took a little credit for it, did he not?

A TOJO wasn't praised because it was entirely a naval operation and the Government was not praised for the operation because the operation was decided upon by the Supreme Command, which is composed by the Navy General Staff and Staff Headquarters.

Q Let us go back to September 6. You saw the Emperor on the morning of September 6. I wish you would tell me about that conversation.

A I met him before the Imperial Conference opened at ten o'clock that morning, and the Emperor said that he would like to know lots of things concerning the decision, and I told the Emperor, HARA, President of the Privy Council, will make all sorts of inquiries and I said that the Emperor should have the final word in regard to it, and I said that the Emperor should say there is a fear that this decision would place the fate of the Nation as a stake through war, and it is that sort of an important decision. So, the Supreme Command should do their utmost for bringing forth a successful conclusion of his diplomatic machinery and I told the Emperor he should say that sort of a thing before the Imperial Conference.

Q All along, in those days, the Emperor was expressing to you the feeling that he wasn't permitted to give his opinions and advice at these imperial conferences and he thought he should be allowed to enter more in the discussions rather than permit others to decide things in his presences. Isn't that true?

A Yes.

- Q And here on the morning of September 6, prior to the Imperial Conference, he told you that he wanted to express his opinions at this Imperial Conference. Why did you oppose the Emperor expressing his opinions at this conference?
- A I did not oppose it. I only said that because HARA has already come to me, saying that he would like to ask questions regarding it, I suggested to the Emperor he should reserve himself to the last and that he should have final word. Therefore, I did not object to the questioning by the Emperor. I did not in any way mean to stop the Emperor from asking questions other than that asked by HARA.
- Q What you mean is that since HARA had prepared himself to ask important questions, you suggested that the Emperor permit him to ask those questions and not interfere with Mr. HARA's questioning at the conference?
- A And I didn't in any way mean to stop the Emperor from inquiring of any point or any matter not covered by HARA. I said that the final part is the most important so I suggested to the Emperor that he should save himself to the last.
- Q But it wasn't customary for the Emperor to ask many questions at these imperial conferences, was it?
- A Ordinarily, the Emperor does not ask much questions but because the Emperor made a previous request for it and because the matter is so grave and important.
- Q He wanted to ask questions, you mean?
- A Yes.
- Q You were the one who suggested that the real effect of this Imperial Conference was the decision as to whether or not Japan would go to ward with the United States within a certain length of time?
- A Yes.

- Q And because of that fact, you expressed to the Emperor that it was an extremely important conference, did you not?
- A Yes.
- Q Did the Emperor agree with you on that point?
- A It was needless for me to say and therefore, the Emperor was very much concerned and worried.
- Q What did he have to say to you, if anything, with reference to the importance of this particular conference on the 6th?
- A The Emperor was saying that a placing of a deadline as October 10 is a very dangerous thing to do.
- Q He told you that?
- A Yes. The previous day - I did not mention this previously - but I also told of that matter of placing a deadline as a dangerous thing to Prince KONOYE. I told Prince KONOYE to do something about the deadline; to remove it or something like that but Prince KONOYE said that was decided at the liaison conference and for that reason, he did not agree with me.
- Q Did Prince KONOYE mean that because the liaison conference had decided on the deadline, the Emperor had nothing to say about it and he should not be meddling with what the liaison conference had decided?
- A And for that reason, he came asking for the consent of the Emperor.
- Q As I understand it, the Emperor thought fixing a deadline was dangerous and you thought it was a dangerous procedure. I take it that Prince KONOYE thought it was a dangerous procedure? Was anything done about it to eliminate the dangerous procedure?
- A I believe that was the sore point in the discussion had at the liaison conference and there were great arguments pro and con for it among the Supreme Command.

- Q Then, the Imperial Conference took place starting at ten o'clock that morning. Did the Emperor say anything at the Imperial Conference with reference to this deadline?
- A I do not know whether he said anything or not.
- Q What did the Emperor tell you when you saw him during the recess of the conference along about one o'clock?
- A Upon HARA's inquiry as to whether diplomatic procedure will be given the greatest emphasis, the Supreme Command did not answer while the Navy Minister did, and for that reason, the Emperor reproached the Supreme Command and he cited the quotation from a poem of Emperor Meiji. He also stressed that they should give the utmost effort in diplomatic negotiations.
- Q As I understand it, when you saw the Emperor around one o'clock during the recess, he expressed disappointment over the fact that when President HARA asked whether negotiations were going to be continued with the United States, the Chiefs of Staff made no reply. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q What did the Emperor say he did or told them by way of admonishment for not answering that question?
- A The Emperor remonstrated the silence on the part of the Supreme Command and said that their attitude is very undesirable.
- Q At this Imperial Conference, the three points we mentioned that were decided at the liaison conference were decided upon in the presence of the Emperor, were they not?
- A Yes.
- Q When the question was discussed whether anything was going to be done with reference to further negotiations with the United States, the Supreme Command expressed no enthusiasm about it whatever.
- A That is right.

Q As a matter of fact, he told you in his own words that he did not think the Army and Navy were in good faith in wanting to negotiate? Is that correct?

A Because silence on their part means that they are not enthusiastic at all for diplomacy.

Q But apparently, the Navy Minister, OIKAWA, did answer. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q What did the Emperor tell you that Minister OIKAWA had to say?

A OIKAWA said that greatest emphasis will be placed upon diplomatic negotiations.

Q So, insofar as the first point is concerned, it was officially decided at the Imperial Conference that Japan would make plans for conducting war against the United States and Great Britain. That was merely a reaffirmation of what had been decided upon back on July 2 at that particular Imperial Conference on that one point?

A Yes.

Q On July 2 at the Imperial Conference, it had been decided to make plans to fight the United States, if necessary. Again on September 6, at that Imperial Conference the plan for fighting the war against the United States and Britain was reaffirmed by the Government?

A Yes.

Q In addition to that, it was decided to complete negotiations and a deadline was set?

A Yes.

Q Do you recall your conversation with President SUZUKI on the 8th and what he had to say?

A I believe that SUZUKI said that it appears that the Prime Minister seems to be dragged along by the Supreme Command and that he is in a quandary and indecisive in his actions and something must be done about it.

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A I believe that SUZUKI said that it appears that the Prime Minister seems to be dragged along by the Supreme Command and that he is in a quandary and indecisive in his actions and something must be done about it.

- Q As a matter of fact, wasn't General SUZUKI in favor of the policy of the Supreme Command?
- A I don't believe so.
- Q You think he favored a more bona fide effort of negotiating with the United States than the Supreme Command did?
- A At this time, it was so.
- Q I want to ask this question about the Imperial Conference, generally. From what you have told me, it would appear that generally what is decided at the liaison conference is adopted and ratified at the imperial conference. But at the imperial conference, certain important questions are asked by such people as the President of the Privy Council. Are there several occasions where the decision as a result of such questioning at the imperial conference varies from the liaison conference?
- A I believe that there never has been any case practically where through inquiries and questioning, the decisions has been changed. I believe there were suggestions made due to stern warning of the impending actions.
- Q Is there a vote taken at an imperial conference at the conclusion of the conference?
- A No vote by ballot is taken but I believe everyone stands up and agree to any measures. Maybe this isn't accurate because I never attended it and I do not really know.
- Q Is there any procedure at the imperial conference whereby one present can register his dissent if he was not in favor of a decision and could voice a protest? Is there any procedure by which that could be done?
- A I do not know if there is any regulation about it.
- Q At least, sofar as you know, there was no dissenting opinion expressed at this particular conference on September 6? Everyone agreed to the decisions that were made?

- A Only that a stern warning has been made by HARA and a reproach has been given by the Emperor to make diplomacy the main instrument.
- Q Both the Emperor and President HARA emphasized the necessity of negotiation?
- A Yes
- Q Can you tell us who was present at this Conference on September 6 - those you know were present. you might miss some - the minor officials but who do you know was at that conference?
- A The persons present at this Conference were HARA, KONOYE, TOJO, OIKAWA, TOYODA, SUGIYAMA, and NAGANO. I am not sure whether the Finance Minister or SUZUKI President of the Planning Board were present.
- Q How about MUTO, was he present?
- A The Bureau of Military Affairs, perhaps, attended as a general helper or assistant.
- Q Would you say that General MUTO was there?
- A MUTO and OKA, perhaps as helpers or assistants. MUTO and OKA, and the Secretary of the Cabinet, TOMITA attended.
- Q But the entire Cabinet was not present?
- A I don't believe so.
- Q Do you recall your conversation with the Emperor on September 10, a few days after the Imperial Conference? What, if anything, was said?
- A I do not remember at all.
- Q What was your conversation about the highest council with President HARA and Prince KONOYE on that day?
- A And because the problems were becoming so serious and so grave, it was suggested that a Supreme Command organ be created. A Supreme Command organ consisting of the Privy Council and the Senior Statesmen. KONOYE and HARA were proposing it and they asked me to participate in the discussion and I attended this conference.

- Q Was the proposal that this new body or council be formed in order to advise the Government officers as to whether or not war should be declared?
- A Because war became imminent, they devised such an organ because the organization and the functions were becoming difficult details; a conclusion for the proposal was not reached.
- Q I wish you would tell me in detail what War Minister TOJO told you on September 11 with reference to his report to the Emperor.
- A I heard about the investigation by War Minister TOJO on the military preparation against America which has been conducted and I heard that the preparation wasn't thorough as yet.
- Q What did he tell you about the preparation - the details of it?
- A I do not remember the details.
- Q You must remember some of them on an important matter like that. I want to know what TOJO's attitude was on that occasion and what he said about it.
- A TOJO was saying that since it was the decision at the Imperial Conference and since the deadline is October 10, he said that the preparation must be hastened and be completed as early as possible, but the information as to the preparation given indicated that preparation must be hastened and be completed as early as possible but the information as to the preparation given indicated that preparation was still insufficient.
- Q But he did tell you that the military forces were preparing as rapidly as possible to get ready to fight the United States and Great Britain. Is that right?
- A He was saying in the event of war, preparation must be made sufficient. On this occasion, I remonstrated TOJO, saying that the decision that the greatest emphasis should be placed on diplomacy and the Emperor has said that the Supreme Command should aid diplomatic negotiations.

- A In other words, TOJO, on that occasion gave you the impression that he was putting the greatest emphasis on getting ready for war and little emphasis on negotiation, and you remonstrated and said that was just the opposite of what the Emperor requested? Is that right?
- Q I remember TOJO saying, "I agree that the Emperor said that but as far as my responsibility is concerned, I have to be prepared for war in the event war is declared".
- Q What did he have to say about negotiations, anything at all or did he just brush that aside?
- A He did say, however, it would be a very good thing if diplomatic negotiations can be conducted and from this time, the Army was bringing forth strong criticism concerning the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China.
- Q It is true, as of this time, that War Minister TOJO was very much an advocate of Japan holding her ground and making no concessions and fighting the United States, if necessary to maintain the foreign policy that Japan had been following up to that time?
- A I never heard any mention made to the extent of keeping or holding on to the territories but the military from this time began to make stronger and stronger stand against the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China.
- Q TOJO, in his conversations with you in those days, was strongly anti-American, was he not?
- A Yes.
- Q And was opposed to making any concessions to the United States in the negotiations that were being conducted?
- A According to the surface of things, he did not come up to his opposing negotiations.

- Q You mean that underneath he felt differently from what he openly expressed?
- A Looking back at it now, perhaps due to the fact that the Army was strong at that time, he may have had that sort of a sentiment.
- Q At least, you will agree with me, he was anti-American in those days and had a philosophy of being willing and desiring to fight the United States, if necessary.
- A Yes, he had the determination and the sentiment of doing so whenever it became necessary.
- Q He indicated to you that he didn't have much confidence in the success of the negotiations, didn't he/
- A Yes.
- Q Do you remember what your conversation was with TOYODA on that day?
- A I heard of the progress in the negotiations being conducted with America. He gave a report on the situation that were pending.
- Q Do you remember any of the details?
- A No. I believe that the details of these portions are given quite completely in KONOYE's memoirs.
- Q Do you remember anything about your conversation with the Emperor on September 16?
- A I have no recollection.
- Q You make some notations in your diary about Prince TAKAMATSU and also Prince CHICHIBU. What were you referring to when you wrote about them?
- A Prince TAKAMATSU called me over on the matter of harmonious Japanese-American negotiations and he expressed his opinion concerning it and I exchanged my opinions. His brother, Prince CHICHIBU, happened to be ill and for that reason TAKAMATSU thought it would be a very good thing for me to inform CHICHIBU OF THE DECISION MADE AT the Imperial Conference.

- Q Did these two Princes have any influence on Government affairs in those days?
- A No, they did not have any great influence. Because TAKAMATSU was a Navy man, he had some influence with the Navy.
- Q Who was it that plotted against the life of Prince KONOYE about which you write on September 19? Who was responsible for that plot?
- A These persons were unimportant and rather insignificant. They were three members of the Rightists organization and they attempted to kill Prince KONOYE as he was departing for his office from his home and they thought to jump on his car and assassinate him.
- Q Is there any evidence that the military people were back of the plot?
- A I didn't hear anything about that.
- Q On September 25, you talked with the Aide-de-Camp concerning the Chief of the General Staff's report to the throne. What was that conversation? What did he have to say about that report?
- A I have no recollection.
- Q Do you know what the nature of the report was?
- A I can't remember.
- Q You talked to the Aide-de-Camp on the 26th with reference to the Army's opinion concerning the home problems. What did he have to say about that?
- A I believe that it was a talk concerning the Army sentiment, saying that national unity at the present time was still insufficient and that the Army was greatly arguing about it.
- Q What was it that Prince KONOYE told you on that day, according to your diary?

- A Because the deadline was October 10, according to the Imperial Conference, Prince KONOYE thought that things would start popping from the 15th and he did not have any confidence whatsoever if war should start and he told me he would like to resign. To that, I replied that he has been responsible for the decision reached at the Imperial Conference and this is no time for him to shift his responsibility.
- Q In other words, as of September 26, 1941, Prince KONOYE told you that he felt that the Army was committed to start a war against the United States and they were going through with it. He said they had no confidence in it.
- Q You mean confidence in the success of the war?
- A Yes.
- Q On the 29th, when you talked to the Emperor, he requested that you make some investigation as to the amount of rubber and tin the United States had and sources of supply in South America. What did the Emperor say to you when he asked you for that information and why did he want to know that?
- A I do not have any accurate idea about it, but I believe an item pertaining to that came out in the newspapers and because of that, I was told to investigate on those matters.
- Q Why did the Emperor want to know about the sources of rubber and tin of the United States?
- A I believe that the Emperor was interested in it because it came out in the newspapers.
- Q Why was he interested? Wasn't it from the standpoint of whether or not Japan was capable of fighting war with the United States successfully?
- A I don't believe he had such a deep interest as that. Because the Emperor is quite a scientist, he has made such requests on a great number of occasions previously.

Q The Emperor was getting reports from the Chiefs of Staff as to whether they thought they could fight the war with the United States and the Emperor was trying to get this information in order to make up his mind as to whether Japan could fight the war with the United States, was he not?

A Perhaps his thought may have relation to that respect, correlated to the situation. The military frequently write all sorts of propaganda like this in the papers and the Emperor on this occasion was probably trying to check the veracity of their propaganda. At this time, I believe there was numerous propagandists minimizing the strength of America.

Q The truth of the matter is that the Emperor knew that the United States was somewhat dependent on the Southern Pacific for tin and rubber and what the Emperor wanted to know was how seriously those sources of supplies would affect the United States war effort in case there was a war.

A And because those weaknesses of America has been propagandized and her strength has been minimized the Emperor has been greatly concerned.

Q In other words, he wanted to check up on the truth of the situation in order to further check on what he has been told by the Chiefs of Staff as to the ability of Japan to fight the United States.

A And the Emperor also was concerned about the acts of misinforming the people and of making various reports of America.

Q In other words, in the Japanese press in those days, there was a certain amount of publicity, was there, minimizing the ability on the part of the United States to fight Japan in case war broke out?

A There has been propaganda to that effect frequently.

Q And that propaganda has its source in the military people?

A Frequently, yes.

- Q Who was it in the military group that was responsible for putting out that propaganda?
- A I have no accurate conception of it but I believe that the persons in the Information Bureau were responsible mainly.
- Q The Government Information Bureau or the Military Information Bureau?
- A Military and Naval Bureaus.
- Q Due to the activity in China, Japan was on a war basis in those days and such articles that were printed in the press were subject to Government censorship and supervision, were they not?
- A Yes, there was censorship by the Government.
- Q Who was it that would pass upon and permit such types of articles to be printed in the Japanese press - what branch of the Government?
- A I believe that the censorship is done by the Police Bureau in the Home Ministry, because it was concerned more or less for the maintenance of peace and order in the Nation that it did not go too deeply in the contents of news items.
- Q You would say that the Bureau of Information of the Army and Navy were actively engaged in a propaganda campaign in order to convince the Japanese people that Japan was sufficiently strong to win a war with the United States?
- A I believe so.
- Q Certainly there were people in the Government in those days that sponsored such propaganda and permitted and encouraged it.
- A Who were they - I mean, individually, by name?
- A I do not know. That isn't known by me.

- Q Didn't War Minister TOJO have something to do with that type of propaganda with reference to military affairs?
- A The military and the Navy consented or agreed to those propaganda because they were of the same mind. But I do not know if they consented to the printing of wrong information and things like that. However, they were agreeable to the use of propaganda.
- Q Did the military people, through their Bureau of Information have an organization set up for the express purpose of selling to the Japanese people the idea of going to war with the United States and Great Britain?
- A At this time in the newspapers, there appeared many demands or many strong stands against America and Britain so I believe it may have been instrumental in that respect.
- Q Those articles could never have been printed if the Army and Navy had been opposed to their contents, could they?
- A Naturally, if the Army and Navy opposed it, it would not be printed.
- Q Had the Army or Navy been opposed, how would they have prevented such articles from being printed? What would have been the mechanics of preventing the printing of such articles?
- A Because the propagandizing is done by an organization affiliated or allied with the Army and Navy so that there is no public means or official means of stopping the propaganda. If any disagreeable propaganda is done, then the military will threaten the propagandist that if he ever wrote anything like that, something terrible will happen to him and things like that. That is the way they control propaganda.
- Q You mean that in the office of the Chiefs of Staff, if someone was writing articles in opposition to the military program, they would officially take notice of it and cause such an individual to be warned.

- A If any secrets were being divulged, then the persons can be punished by law but if he was expressing his own personal opinion, there are no laws which would subject him to punishment.
- Q Assuming that no law would be violated, would the Chief of Staff cause such person giving voice to such opinions opposed by the Army be intimidated or warned not to speak of such things opposed by the Army.
- A So from behind the scenes, they usually intimidate or threaten persons.
- Q You will agree with me that the Japanese press in those days was not a free press.
- A Not a free press.
- Q It was dominated by the military people, was it?
- A Yes, it was mostly allied with the military people.
- Q And it really voiced and only expressed opinions that the military people wanted to get into the press. Is that right?
- A Generally so.
- Q I agree with you that I believe that is true but what I want to know is how they brought it about and how they controlled the press?
- A In the Army and Navy, there is an Information Bureau and numerous newspaper correspondents go up there and these correspondents are usually influenced by the Bureau of Information. There is a newspaper correspondence club formed there and the Army and Navy control that Club and influence the correspondents. If any correspondents oppose the policy of the military, he can be immediately expelled from the club.
- Q But all correspondents in Japan did not belong to that club, did they?
- A Generally most large newspapers dispatched correspondents to the Information Bureau of the Army and Navy because it is such an important organ.

- Q How did the Army and Navy control those correspondents who were not members of this club and were on the outside?
- A Actually, they cannot do that. Because all the information concerning the Army and Navy are obtained through the Army and Navy Information Board, there is no source from which information can be obtained.
- Q I can understand how the Army had an active Bureau that transmitted such information as it wanted in the press but how did the Army go about preventing correspondents outside of this club from printing anti-military matters if they wanted to do so?
- A That can be done.
- Q How was it done?
- A By writing it as one's own personal opinion.
- Q In those days, were there people writing in the press in opposition to the military program and speaking against war with the United States and complaining that the military was forcing Japan into war with the United States?
- A There probably were some that were opposing it but most of them were controlled by the military and for that reason, I have no recollection concerning that.
- Q You would say that the military people in the Fall of 1941 for all intents and purposes had controlled the press?
- A Yes
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Certificate of Interpreter

I, Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt., 02030605
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 34 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt AUS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S. M. Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, ~~(xxx)~~ Henry R. Sackett, _____, _____

~~xxx~~ _____, _____, _____

certify that on the 8th day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~xxx~~) KIDO, Koichi and according to Lt. Fred Suzukawa Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
Place

8 March 1946
Date