

ART. II. — *Moral Philosophy.*

1. *The Elements of Moral Science.* By FRANCIS WAYLAND, D. D., President of BROWN UNIVERSITY, and Professor of Moral Philosophy. Second edition. New York. 1835. 8vo. pp. 448.
2. *Christian Ethics ; or Moral Philosophy, on the Principles of Divine Revelation.* By RALPH WARDLAW, D. D. *From the second London edition, with an Introductory Essay.* By LEONARD WOODS, D. D. New York. D. Appleton & Co. Boston. W. Pierce. 12mo. pp. 380.

THE two works, whose titles stand at the head of this article, appear to have attracted not a little of the public attention ; the former having reached a second edition within six months from its first appearance, and the latter having been thought worthy of a reprint in this country, with the imprimatur of a Professor of Theology in one of our most popular institutions. At first sight, they seem to possess many points of close resemblance to each other, and one who had not actually read them, might expect to find some general similarity, to say the least, in the views which they present. The three clergymen, whose names are given on their title-pages, are all engaged in actual instruction, direct or indirect, on the subjects of which they treat. In their respective denominations, they are held to occupy a high rank, and from the supposed tenets of those denominations, might be presumed to agree, at all events very nearly, so far as theology is concerned, in their views of human nature, of its relation to the great principles of right and duty, and of the mode in which those principles are to be ascertained and proved. This, however, is very far from being the case. It is hardly indeed too much to say, that on these points the two books are absolutely contradictions to one another. Both written with evident care and ability, by men who could not previously have been supposed to differ widely from each other ; both adopted as standard works by classes of men in the same predicament ; they nevertheless proceed on altogether different principles, and of course arrive at very different results. If either one is right, the other must be radically wrong.

The object of the Scottish divine is to prove the insufficiency

and even danger of all moral speculations, based on any other ground than that of biblical interpretation. In his view, every Moral Philosopher who has preceded him, Butler himself included, has fallen into serious error, from this inherent vice of the whole system. The chair of Ethics is to be henceforth merged in that of Theology; and the seeker after truth, instead of reading, or attempting to read, as well that copy of the law of God which was "graven with his own finger on the table of the heart," as that other copy which was afterward "graven on a stone,"—instead of by this means adding at once to his understanding of its requirements, and to his confidence in its authority, is hereafter to regard the one of these two books as sealed; lest, after having read it, his views should not precisely square with those of his fellow-inquirer, whose attention has been wholly given to the other. To use his own language, "if the authority of the document be established, and the verity of its statements consequently ascertained, then it becomes, on all matters of which it treats, *the only philosophy*;" "the sole object of investigation comes to be, the meaning of the language in which the intimations of the Divine Oracles are conveyed." The wise man of this world is to become "a mere learner, a listener and asker of questions at the feet of Prophets and Apostles;" setting himself "with his grammar and his dictionary, to find out what it is that these men say; and in every point of which they treat, to bow without gainsaying to their authoritative decisions." The adoption of any other course, can lead only to a "science falsely so called." The "amalgamation of Philosophy and Theology, has, from the beginning, been a copious source of error." "We should be unfaithful to our God, and throw a disparaging insult on His name, were we thus to consent that the wisdom of 'the only wise,' should make its obeisance to the chair of human science; or were we to admit that he has left his word with less conclusive evidence in its behalf, than that by which the wise men of this world can vindicate the dictates of their own sagacity."

Dr. Wayland, on the other hand, has ventured, in spite of this threatened danger, to pursue the older course in regard to Moral Science, and has given us a text-book on the subject, in which other authorities, besides those allowed by Dr. Wardlaw's system, are acknowledged and referred to. Human nature, which the author of the "Christian Ethics"

declares to be so corrupted, from its original character, that the study of its actual manifestations can afford us no real clue to its true design, is made in even greater measure than has been common in previous works on Morals, the basis of Dr. Wayland's arguments. His whole system, indeed, is *mainly* founded on the view which he has taken of it. Here and there, as we shall have occasion presently to remark, he has not *altogether* followed out this plan; but in the ablest and most interesting portions of his work, it is to be clearly traced. Scripture is referred to throughout, in confirmation of the views which he presents, but the general line of argument is by no means drawn from it. On the contrary, the whole of Dr. Wayland's book proceeds on the supposition, which the "Christian Ethics" controvert, that a careful study of human nature, as now manifested in its various states of comparative vice and virtue, may, and indeed will lead us, so far as it will lead at all, to right results as to its true character; just as a careful study of any other portion of God's creation, will enable us to ascertain much that is true concerning it, and need not conduct us to anything that is erroneous.

The appearance of two works, thus seriously opposed in principle to one another, and each receiving so considerable a degree of attention to its views, seems to offer a fit occasion for some general remarks, bearing on the main point at issue between them. This course will enable us to give our judgment on the general merits and defects, as they appear to our mind, of the books themselves. In adopting it, it may be well to take a rather wider range, than the discussion of the actual difference in this case requires, and to consider somewhat in detail, a question which has not yet received its full share of attention from the public, viz. "What is the true foundation of Moral Science, as a branch of Philosophical Study?" Is the distinction between right and wrong to be referred, as some of our controversialists would seem to intimate, only to the prescriptions of human law, or of public opinion, or even of the written law of God; or is it not rather to be traced back to the very constitution of the human mind? Are we, in order to follow it out satisfactorily, in all its details of practical application, to confine our attention to any simply written institutions, to any *special* decisions, of what sort soever; or are we not rather, by a careful analysis of the mental faculties which God has given us, of their rela-

tions to each other and to the world around us, to ascertain the great principles of his government, — the leading outlines of his design in the creation of our species? Are we not, by the faithful pursuit of such an inquiry, to derive new confirmation of our faith in revelation; new sources of light and knowledge, to enable us to understand its meaning; new motives to induce us, with gratitude and hope, to aim at rendering obedience to its commands? If, in the discussion of this question, we should dissent altogether from Dr. Wardlaw's positions, we yet trust, that the general tenor of our views, will serve to acquit us of the charge of holding Scripture in any lower esteem than those do who take an opposite view.

We are aware that in proposing such a discussion, we ask attention to a subject which is very far from popular, in regard to which, indeed, there exists a strong and deeply rooted prejudice in the public mind. The question as to the foundation of moral science has not, as we have said, received the share of attention which its importance merits. We may indeed go further, and extend the remark to the whole circle of the mental and moral sciences, and their dependencies. Metaphysical studies, as they have been unfortunately styled, are not the fashion. The revival, that has wrought such wonders for those departments of science which relate to the world without us, has not yet reached them; and our system of intellectual education presents to the reflecting observer, a strange mixture of zeal for the diffusion of every other kind of knowledge, as of the utmost value to man, with comparative indifference to, and contempt for, that course of study, by which alone he can acquire a knowledge of himself. Ask the pupil of the modern system to give his attention to any one of what are called the physical sciences, and he will admit, to some extent at least, the propriety of your advice; but direct his notice to the laws of his own mental nature, ask him to observe and analyse his various emotions, and processes of thought, to compare his own ideas, feelings, and actions, so far as he may be able, with those of other men; in a word, ask him to study the human mind, and he will plead his want of time to spare from his other and practical pursuits. It is enough for him that he does actually think and feel. As to the *modus operandi* in the case, that is of very secondary con-

sequence. He will compass sea and land that he may know, and thereby render subservient to himself, the powers of external nature ; but self-knowledge, the power of understanding and acting on his fellow-man, the means of gaining that greatest of all victories, self-conquest, this is not what he aims at. The philosophy of the mind is, in his judgment, too abstruse and visionary, to be thought of beyond the limits of the college, where the folly of his ancestors unhappily in former times prescribed some little waste of time upon it. Speak to him of the laws of reasoning, of taste, of morals, of the rules by which he may distinguish truth from error, the principles which draw the line between beauty and deformity, between right and wrong. He will tell you that he makes these distinctions well enough for all his purposes, without reference to any such rules or principles. All men make them every day. What need is there of puzzling over a dry text-book of Logic, or dissertations on the sublime and beautiful, or treatises on Moral Science? Mathematical certainty and the practical spirit of the age are contrasted with metaphysical speculations, and the argument is ended.

That this is no exaggerated picture, we appeal to every man's experience of the way, in which, even by most of our intelligent men, every attempt to gain a serious hearing for such subjects, is treated. *Theorist* is just now a name of magical effect. Does any man appeal from the few crude and casually picked up notions, which form the sum of most men's knowledge of human nature, he is at once set down to be no practical man. He is a visionary and enthusiast. His views are no safe guide for those who would aim at really *doing anything* in the world. For this we want plain experienced men, not dealers in systems, or pretenders to philosophy. As if he were not in truth the more strictly an experienced and practical man, whose judgments are formed not on his own chance observations only, but who has drawn also on the recorded experience of others, who has reflected on and arranged carefully the results of this wide induction, and has followed them out in their applications to the concerns of life. What is a theory, using the term in its true sense, and without the implied reproach which is unfairly connected with it, but a systematized, straight-forward statement of the results of long continued observation? Why are a comparatively few facts on any subject, collected by a single observer, more valuable

than a far larger number, if brought forward as the result of many men's experience? Why is the knowledge of them to make a man a safe and valued counsellor, so long as they remain "without form and void," the burden of a treacherous memory, and to disqualify the same man for the same duties, so soon as, by the exercise of the higher powers of his understanding, he has reduced them to order, and it may be, written them in a book? When we are choosing an architect or engineer to construct our houses or rail-roads, or a gardener to experiment on our flowers and vegetables, or a farmer to improve the breed and training of our cattle, we never think to stipulate that he shall not have gathered any of his knowledge from others. The more he has read and learned of his profession, or, in other words, the wider has been his field of observation, and the more closely and thoroughly he has explored it, the better for our purposes. Why is our course different when we are choosing a school-master for our children, or a religious and moral teacher, or a legislator, for ourselves? The principle is the same in the two cases. If limited knowledge is better than none at all, is not extended knowledge better still? So says common sense in every other case; so says not popular opinion in this.

Unpromising, however, as may seem the attempt to divert this current of public sentiment to its right course, the attempt itself must not therefore be given up. The present state of things in this respect is not one, to whose continuance we can look forward with any satisfaction. We must call for the protest, and for the efforts of our directors of education, against it. Its results are to be seen in every direction, and the language in which they address us is sufficiently emphatic. Here the philanthropist, who seeks to improve the condition of his race, and who, in pursuit of this end, has to make war on any of the habits or institutions of society, is met with a triumphant appeal to existing laws and customs, to the opinions of distinguished men, or to that most absolute of all autocrats, the will of the public. To all his bright anticipations of the future, there is opposed a summary and unreflecting reference to the past. The saying of the wise man is wrested against him, and he is assured that "the thing that hath been, it is that which shall be, and that which is done is that which shall be done, and there is no new thing under the sun." To all his reasonings, drawn from the nature and prospects of man, to

all his appeals to our benevolence and moral feeling, the contemptuous sneer of his opponent gives for answer, that what he is condemning has the sanction of the law, the authority of precedent, the support of public opinion. And this reply passes current with the majority of those to whom it is addressed. Or to take another illustration, of which unhappily there are but too many instances, both in this and in other countries. There is another and very different class of reformers, agrarian agitators, who declaim loudly against priestcraft and monopoly, and resolve every thing they dislike into one or other of these hated evils, whose reforms, if carried out, would level all institutions in a common ruin. The past and present are with them the subjects of unqualified abuse. A futurity of endless change is their element. You warn them of the danger of sweeping and premature innovation; of the necessary inferiority, in all that ought to constitute the citizen and ruler, of that uneducated class, to whose worst passions they are appealing; of the immoral and destructive tendencies of many of their favorite and most popular doctrines; of the difficulty even now, the impossibility ere long, of arresting the career into which they are urging the community. What is all this to them, or to those on whom they act? The past abuses of aristocracy, the march of the human mind, the supreme and infallible decisions of the public will, — these are their watch words, irrelevant to be sure, but not therefore the less effectual for their objects. We are not stating here what has merely happened once, nor even what is now occasionally occurring. We speak of the prevailing feature of almost all our moral and political controversies; of the utter want of any commonly admitted principles of action, or tests of truth. Is this as it should be? Ought not they, to whom these questions are committed, and by whose voice the settlement of them is for the time determined, to be aware that the terms “legal” and “moral,” “popular” and “right,” do not always mean the same; that the enactments of human law, and the decisions of popular caprice, are often at variance with the dictates of that moral law, of which, so far as they go, they ought to be the exact transcript; and that in all such cases, it becomes the faithful citizen to labor, by all right means, for their correction? Let all such proposed changes, whether of law or of opinion, be canvassed as minutely as their enemies can desire, but let their ordeal be a fair one. Let not those who

contend on either side, be arguing on wholly different grounds from one another, and before umpires who cannot set either of them right. That this is so much the state of things at present, reflects no credit on the modes which have been adopted for the education of our people.

Nor is the effect of this system better on our religious controversies. The infidel raises a laugh at the priest-ridden follies of former days, and calls on men to reject forever the religious systems, which have been in all ages so fruitful of them. It is in vain that the use of revelation is contrasted with its abuse; the moral purity of Christianity itself, with the impure glosses and corruptions that have at times disfigured it. The scoffer is a sceptic about all this. He has not been brought up to draw such distinctions, and it is no wonder that his moral vision is too imperfect to perceive them clearly. The proof of the being and attributes of a God, offered by the noblest of his creations, the mind of man, and its adaptations to his other works, is too seldom and too slightly urged, for him to give it much attention. The whole subject, indeed, is an obscure one. Is not the mind, with all its powers, the result of accident? Have not even philosophers so considered it? Has it really any constitution, properly so called, and if it has, what are its elements? If there be indeed, as some think, a natural power of the understanding, whose office is to force on our minds the necessary connexion of effects with causes, and by enabling us to trace it in all things, to bear witness to that great *first* cause, to whose action all around and within us is to be ascribed, he has yet to learn its existence. If there be in the heart of man naturally implanted dispositions, leading him to do involuntary homage to whatever is above himself, to place unhesitating faith, nay, sometimes to take pleasure in truths which are yet incomprehensible to him, to "hope even against hope" for future happiness, these evidences of his inherent fitness for religious life, are still unregarded by him. If, again, in the natural instincts of humanity to "do justly and love mercy," there is to be found an evidence of the justice and goodness of Him who made man in his own image, these instincts are not acknowledged by him. The divine enlarges on the internal evidences of this revelation, its harmony with human nature, its adaptation to human wants;— to what purpose? The grounds of his reasoning are not recognised. Human nature and human wants are, with most minds, literally

unknown quantities, and cannot be made an available standard. Perhaps, indeed, by some of his shrewder opponents, he may be reminded of the position assumed in regard to this argument by certain even of his own class, and the *ex-cathedrâ* declaration of Dr. Wardlaw, that all systematic inquiries into human nature, have led more or less to anti-scriptural results, may be cited against him, as an evidence of the unreasonableness of his creed, or else of the utter emptiness of his argument in its favor.

And the people, in the meantime, whose judgment in this question is of so much moment, how stands the case with them? Are they better fitted than the disputants to follow out these trains of thought, and in so doing, to avoid those sources of error which have thus misled the disputants themselves? We know that most men never give a serious thought to such considerations at all. And yet to a mind that has ever reflected on them, they present by far the strongest and most unanswerable evidence of religious truth. The historical argument is a long one, and makes some demands on an unlearned man's *belief*, (and in the sense in which we here use the term, most men are unlearned,) in the *statements* of him who presents it. Every link of the chain has to be examined separately, and an impudent antagonist may easily, by a few well chosen assertions, make the uninstructed quite incredulous as to its whole fabric. This, on the other hand, is an argument that comes home to every man who has but the preliminary knowledge of his own nature. There is no gainsaying its conclusions. "He that runs may read it." And can we hope, knowing as we do, how much more powerful with the many a sneer is than *any* sober argument, that the defender of natural or revealed religion can succeed against the sneer of the sceptic, while he is himself unable to use with their full power, and his opponents and his hearers are alike unable to appreciate, his most convincing class of arguments? We do not wonder at the rapid growth, — we will not say, of avowed atheism, because that form of infidelity is not just now prescribed by fashion, but we do say, — of a practical and indefinite scepticism, a disposition neither to believe nor to deny any point in morals or in religion, — a disposition which, if unchecked, may lead to almost worse effects, than the noisiest and most open infidelity.

The limits of a review do not allow us to trace the results

of this all-pervading defect in our system of instruction, as they affect the controversies which are carrying on between the various sects into which the Christian world is divided, and to show how much their number, as well as their acrimony, is to be traced to this as a cause. We must pass on to a remark or two on the nature of the remedy for the evil.

On this head, our views are soon stated. The cause of the evil must be done away. Our course of education, so far as it tends to produce it, must be altered. Whatever be the defect in the early training of the young, or in the later operations of society and its institutions on the adult, it must be supplied. In seeking to ascertain this defect, we must look below the surface. It is not enough that we redouble our exertions to teach well and universally, what is already taught. Men may read and write, may even be profound in their acquaintance with the whole circle of the sciences, as fashionably taught, may be sound lawyers, dexterous as politicians, learned in theology; and yet when weighed in the balances, may be found wanting as men and citizens, in the highest and most essential features of the character. The root of the evil is not, that the public in general, nor that our various classes of innovators and anti-innovators, moral, political, or religious, know too much or too little, talk too loudly or too slightly of the law, or of public sentiment; nor yet that they are too well or too ill informed on general topics, or on the technicalities of religion. It lies deeper. It is that they know too little of themselves; that they are not enough versed in the great principles which are at the foundation of all these controversies; that they have not that which alone can serve them as their compass or pole-star, in the otherwise bewildering inquiry after truth. This knowledge we must give them, not indeed in the place of any other of the branches of what we rightly designate as "useful knowledge," but in addition to them all. They must learn the laws of the external world, so far as those laws can be ascertained, whether they relate to the abstract properties of space and number, which form the subject of demonstrative science, or to the simply observed phenomena of inorganic, vegetable or animal existence; but they must not be left in ignorance, — no, not even in *comparative* ignorance, — of the laws of nature, as they act upon the highest of those existences to which our powers of direct observation reach, as they are manifested in

the phenomena of the human mind. They must be made acquainted with this subject, not superficially, not as a matter of curious and interesting speculation merely, but as the great end and aim of all their previous studies, as the great business, we had almost said, of their life. Other knowledge they must be taught to regard as useful, highly useful ; but useful mainly, inasmuch as it may be made to minister to this. To construct rail-roads, to facilitate the intercourse of nations, to render the most fearful of the powers of nature ministers to our will and contributors to our power ; all this is well, is to be desired, and to be attained. But there is a higher object yet for our exertions, one which will yield us a far richer and more enduring reward, without which indeed all our other attainments will have rendered but half their blessings ; and this is the bringing of *ourselves* into that condition, individual and social, for which our nature is designed, the effecting, in the world within us, changes as striking, as miraculous, we might almost say, as those which our discoveries in physical science have enabled us to bring to pass in the world without. We do not call in question the indirect influence which the spread of general information exerts towards this result, nor yet the more direct agency which the government of law, the restraint of private by public will, and the existing institutions of religion, have in producing it. But we want something more than this. We are not contented with anything short of *direct* knowledge in regard to any other branch of science. The farmer does not trust to a mere geologist the management of his crops, nor yet does he expect simply by his own practical knowledge of soils and their vegetable productions, to make himself a successful rearer of cattle. Yet geology is found to contribute to the improvement of the soil, and therefore of the harvest ; a knowledge of husbandry in general, is a help to the improver of cattle. So too with man. Every kind of knowledge will do something for him ; but it is the *direct* knowledge of himself that will do most. It is on this, that he must base his laws, by this, that he must form and estimate public opinion, by this that he must in no slight degree test his interpretations of that revelation, whose provisions are all suited and addressed to himself. When he has done this, the great problem of human improvement will be solved.

But we shall be perhaps reminded that in our colleges this study has been long prescribed, and asked why these grand

results of which we speak have not already ensued from it, if indeed it possess the high rank we award it. To this we answer, not by a denial of what any man may quote our college catalogues to prove, but by a brief comparison of what they state to be done in this matter, with what a true estimate of its importance, and a practical man's calculation of what is needed to render it efficient, would require. What then is the testimony of these witnesses? Some months, no doubt, are given, more or less completely to mental and moral philosophy. But the time is much shorter than that devoted to the classical or mathematical departments, nay, often less than is allowed to the modern languages and the natural sciences. And it should be borne in mind, in making this comparison, that while both the ancient languages and the elements of mathematical and natural science are made the business of our preparatory schools; and while, with the exception of the classics, all the other branches we have named are regarded with favor, and very commonly pursued as studies after the college course is ended; there is no preparation made for the studies connected with the human mind before the student enters on them with his class, and scarcely ever the idea presented to him of continuing them for himself, when his daily recitations cease. Nor must we forget, that the atmosphere of college is not a little affected by that which prevails out of doors, and that our students mostly enter on this portion of their course with pretty unfavorable impressions as to its utility, impressions which the common regulations of the course itself are little likely to remove. In general, the undergraduate finds his text-books on the two subjects almost wholly unconnected with one another. A philosophy of the Mind is presented to him, which makes but very poor provision for any practical Moral applications, and a philosophy of Morals, which has as slender a foundation in any acknowledged theory of Mind. Logic and Rhetoric also are in the same predicament; neither the rules which profess to guide the mind in the search for truth, nor those which prescribe for the modes of its communication, being provided for by his mental science, or referring ever so remotely to it. Nor after he has left college, does the tenor either of professional and literary, or of more active life, tend to correct this idea. Law, medicine, divinity, criticism, are all pursued and carried on independently, or very nearly so, of the philosophy he has learnt. The du-

ties of the man of business, of the teacher, of the citizen, are commonly performed without a reference to it. If we take into view all these facts, and they all bear on the question whether the human mind is studied as it should be, even in the course of what we call "a liberal education," we think there can be no doubt of its being at once decided in the negative. That under all these disadvantages, this study should nevertheless for the time force itself on the attention of our students so considerably as it does, and should be so highly estimated as it is by the few who continue to it that attention, is no slight evidence of what it might and would effect, were the influences which now act unfavorably upon its usefulness, displaced by others of an opposite character. This change, however, it is not in the power of our colleges alone to make. It must be favored from without. The public mind must awake to its importance, and instead of forcing on our colleges the hard though honorable duty, of risking unpopularity, by continuing to mental science the sanction they still extend to it, must call upon them to add to the weight of that sanction, by raising the study of human nature to its proper place in the scheme of education.

And why, we may be allowed to ask, before passing from this topic, why is this branch of education to be confined to the collegiate course? Have not other classes, besides our literary and professional men, a deep interest in its being taught to their members? All men have to deal with the human mind, to act upon it, and with it. All men alike have powers of their own to cultivate, and propensities of their own to subdue; all have a circle round them of associates or dependents, on whose minds they ought to exert some influence for good; all help to form the mind and mould the character of the young, to give a bias to the laws and institutions of their country. Ought not *all* then to be made partakers of that knowledge, by whose light only these high duties can be rightly discharged. "The proper study of *mankind*, is man." Then only, when every member of the community has pursued this study, will our obligation to extend it cease.

In thus presenting to those who desire the success of the great efforts at popular improvement, which are now making, the claims of the Philosophy of Human Nature to be considered one of the most essential departments in the education of every class of men, we do not at all enter the lists as the es-

pecial champion of any one of the many more or less clashing theories, which have been broached in regard to it. We take a higher ground. A knowledge of the true analysis of the human mind *must be* of the utmost utility to every human being. All truth is valuable ; this, most of all. Are we told that this or that system of mental philosophy is not really found thus useful? Our reply is, not indeed that it is therefore wholly false, but that it is not "the whole truth." There may be in it, the chances are that there is in every such system which man has ever built on any number of observations, however small, something that is true, and therefore useful ; though, from defect in its foundation, that something may be but little. Our argument is not set aside, even by the assertion that no one of all the theories yet known can be turned to the uses we have assigned to the true theory of man. Such an assertion, could it be supported, would lead only to the conclusion that, as a whole, the true philosophy of man is yet in expectation. When discovered, we may be very sure that it will more than verify all the prophecies of the most sanguine of its eulogists. The way to bring about such a discovery, supposing it for the moment not yet made, is not to give ourselves no concern on the subject, and to direct our whole attention to other subjects about which we happen to be better informed, as if this were of no consequence. We must look upon it as therefore only of the greater moment, direct the public mind to it, point it out to the attention of the young, and set them also on the track towards discovering it. By this course we may reasonably hope to find it.

But, though this is not the place to enter on an examination of the various theories of the mind, or to state our preference of any one over the others, we cannot avoid expressing our belief that this process of discovery has not now for the first time to be undertaken. True, there are many theories, each supported by *some* facts and countenanced by some authorities, while truth, on whatever topic, is and must be single. A number of clashing systems cannot all be wholly true ; but each may contain some truth, and some may present a large preponderance of truth over error. The course of the philosopher will not be to reject them all, but to select from each, to widen in this way his induction of facts, and, as a result, to produce a system which may be wholly true, and which may therefore

bear him out in his applications of it to every one of those objects, which the true philosophy of man is to affect.

There is, on this point, not a little popular error. We are too apt to require originality, as we call it, in a work on the mind; as if the use of new and unheard of names, the statement of startling paradoxes, the display of fine writing, and of a train of thought too recondite for any of the uninitiated to follow it, were any thing more than an evidence of the still unsettled state of the whole subject. Our mental philosophers must not seek for any such originality, if they mean in earnest to be seekers after truth. The analysis of the mental operations does not require a formidable array of new and unintelligible names, nor will it lead us to any unintelligible or contradictory results. There is no reason why it should not be brought to the level of every man of ordinary capacity. Perhaps, when it is so presented, such men will wonder at the ease with which they recognise alike its meaning and its truth. The course of many of our philosophers will no doubt have to be materially changed before this effect takes place, but the result itself is not therefore the less certain. We have the analogy which the history of the natural sciences presents, in our favor. There is no reason why a theory of the mind should not be constructed, that shall be, to use the words of the Father of the Inductive Philosophy, "not vague and obscure, but luminous and well-defined, such as nature herself would not refuse to acknowledge." Let but our philosophers, while they analyse the operations of their own minds with all the minuteness, of which the case can be made to admit, correct their inferences, as drawn from this source alone, so far as may be necessary, by the observation of other minds. Let them reject from their consideration no theory that refers to facts in its support, however foreign it may appear at first sight from their own ideas; let them take into view all facts which they can collect directly or indirectly bearing on their subject, whether immediately relating to the brute creation or to man, to the bodily organization or to the mind, to men of this or that rank, age, or nation; let them discard that "science falsely so called," which seeks to solve questions to which the human mind is unequal, to explain the mysteries of Fatalism or Materialism; in a word, let them but deal with facts in their department, as other men already do in every other branch of science, and the work is done. The

materials are most of them ready to their hands, and very many of them indeed are already rightly sorted. Mental Philosophy will, of course, long admit of and require additions, just as is the case with the natural sciences. But that is no reason why we should not at once have it made a real and useful science, and admitted as such into our schemes of education.

So much then for the general importance and character which we assign to the study of the mind, and to those ethical and other studies which we consider dependent upon it. We proceed to what is more strictly the *object* of our present remarks, the nature of that dependence itself, especially as it relates to what is called by way of distinction, Moral Philosophy proper. The length to which this preliminary matter has been extended must be excused, as almost necessary, in the present disposition of the public mind, to the fair consideration of the question itself.

When an engineer, to borrow from an illustration now pretty often used, proposes to run a line of rail-road through a district, there are three distinct processes of inquiry through which in succession he has to pass, before he is prepared to enter on his actual operations. He has first to learn the physical properties of the country, its hills, valleys and rivers, the character of its geology, every fact, in short, connected with his undertaking, as well as the abstract results of his mathematical studies, as the accidental circumstances to which they are to be applied in the case before him. He must then, with this knowledge present to his mind, distinguish the favorable from the unfavorable circumstances, and determine the line which, all things considered, is the best; in other words, he must form and mature the plan, or model of his work. His third and last inquiry, relates to the means he is to use for its execution. If his plan be drawn before either his scientific knowledge or his surveys are complete, or if his contracts be made and his workmen employed, before both survey and plan are finished, his procedure will be so far wrong.

The case is much the same with the improver of his fellowmen. He seeks to effect a change for the better in the intellectual and moral character of man, as the engineer does in the physical features of a district; and for this purpose, he must resort to the same succession of measures. The various manifestations of the human mind as at present developed, every

fact which can be made to illustrate and explain them, must be his first object of inquiry. From this he must proceed to the selection of that class of manifestations, which are to be regarded as desirable, and then, and not till then, is he in a condition to make his third inquiry, and to seek for the means by which to render them predominant. This is the natural order of his studies. The material he is to work upon, the model by which he is to work, and the instruments he is to use, must be successively ascertained. His material must determine his model, his material and model together, his instruments.

This distinction seems to us to pave the way for a convenient three-fold division of the various sciences which have man directly or indirectly for their subject, and at the same time to suggest the relation which should subsist between them. If, in pursuing this division, we trace Mental Philosophy to one, and Moral Philosophy to another of these classes, we shall at once see how far either can be fairly said to depend on the other.

The division, then, which we propose to make, and which, though often not very distinctly kept before the mind by writers on these different sciences, is yet far from new, is simply this. Those branches of the philosophy of human nature, whose object is to give us a knowledge of its actual phenomena, to answer the question, "*What is it?*" in regard to it, we call, as they have been commonly called, "*physical sciences.*"* Those whose object is to lead us to the design of

* Some ambiguity has resulted from the common restriction of the term "*physical science*," in popular language, to a class of sciences not having man for their subject, geography, natural philosophy, chemistry, &c., for example. This restriction is however improper. That class of the sciences relating to man, to which we have here extended the term, treats as directly of existing nature, and is therefore as correctly called "*physical science*," as that class, to which the name is sometimes exclusively applied. All who have ever attempted to deal in definition on these subjects, have had occasion to echo the complaint of Sir J. Mackintosh, on the inadequacy of their language to furnish them with unexceptionable words for the purpose. "The philosopher alone," says that author, "is doomed to use the rudest tools for the most refined purposes. He must reason in words, of which the looseness and inadequacy are suitable, and even agreeable, in the usual intercourse of life, but which are almost as remote from the extreme exactness and precision required, not only in the conveyance, but in the search of truth, as the hammer and the axe would be unfit for the finest exertions of skilful handiwork; for it is not to be forgotten, that he must, himself, think in these gross words, as unavoidably as he uses them in speaking to others. — He might be more justly compared to an arithmetician,

human nature, to answer the question, "*What ought to be?*" in regard to it, have been commonly called "*the moral sciences,*" though from the necessary confusion between the word "moral" thus used in a wide sense, and the more limited sense of the same word when used to denote "Moral Philosophy" only, some other term would be desirable. We shall here call them "*the speculative sciences,*" for this reason, as well as from the impression that the term "speculative," though it may not be precisely what is wanted, yet conveys better than the older word "moral," their distinctive characteristic. The third class, those whose object is to ascertain the means of bringing into existence that state of things which the second class reveals, to resolve the question, "*how that which is, shall be made what it ought to be,*" may be styled, as they always have been, "*the practical sciences.*" The division thus proposed, appears to us, so far as its principle is concerned, an exhausting one. There is no kind of real knowledge on the subject of man, which is not referable to one or another of the classes which it recognises. To those ulterior inquiries as to the "*how*" or the "*why*" nature is created as it is, which have so often, to no purpose, perplexed our philosophers, we do not believe the powers of the human mind to be adapted. The attempt to explain, for example, the mode in which organization acts in producing the various forms of vegetable and animal life, or the compatibility of the laws of causation with human freedom and responsibility, has never led, and in the nature of things can never lead to any useful end, to any science, properly so called. Existing objects and phenomena, with their several qualities and relations, form the whole basis of true knowledge. When we have learned, on whatever subject, the existing results of the ordinations of nature, as actually apparent, when we have drawn the line between those that conduce directly to our well-being, and those which do not, and have ascertained the mode of reaping the advantages of the one set without incurring the disadvantages of the other, we have learned all that the Creator designed us, in our present state, to know.

To the first class then, as thus stated, all inquiries into the

compelled to employ numerals, not only cumbrous, but used so irregularly to denote different quantities, that they not only often deceive others, but himself." — *View of the Progress of Ethical Philosophy*, p. 1.

actual condition of mankind, bodily and mental, are to be assigned. Anatomy, which proposes to ascertain the several parts of the body, and their varying appearances in different individuals, and physiology, which investigates the phenomena of life as they are connected with them, are branches of the physical science which treats of the human body. Mental philosophy is the physical science of the mind. Its object is to collect all facts which bear on mental existence, to learn the modes of thought and feeling of which the mind is capable, the original faculties with which it is endowed, with their various manifestations for good or evil, the principles which determine their action on one another, on the body, and on the external world, and those which regulate the influences of bodily organization and external circumstances, in general, on them.

The sciences which constitute the second class, still keeping in view the division we have laid down, follow on these respectively. Of the phenomena, with which the observation of the human body makes us acquainted, some conduce to the happiness, some to the misery, of man. The bones, which serve in most cases as firm and solid supports, are not unfrequently soft and useless; commonly suited in their proportions to the movements which they are to assist, and destitute of sensation, they are frequently disproportioned, and sometimes the seat of excruciating pain. The digestive apparatus in many cases fails to supply nourishment to the rest of the system, and becomes a serious inconvenience to its owner. The nervous system has its derangements. In a word, every organ of the body is by turns a source of pain as well as of pleasure. Is this a necessary result of its constitution, or is there not to be drawn a distinction between healthy and diseased action, between the designed and desirable condition of the system, and that in which, from some cause or other, it is often found? If so, what is this normal state of all these organs, now so variously affected? The answers to these questions constitute that branch of the science of the human body, which is speculative in its character, and for which we have as yet no English name in common use, unless the term "Hygiene" be so appropriated.

Similar contradictions are to be observed in the manifestations of the mental powers, when studied as we have shown the mental philosopher ought to study them. Man has been truly

called an enigma. In one man we see the powers of the understanding equal to almost any amount of observation and reflection, discovering truth and detecting error as if by intuition, while in another we find them hardly capable of exertion at all. Here we are struck by the perfect taste displayed in the conceptions of the poet or artist, there by the perfect incapacity of the multitude to do them justice; here by the display of enlarged benevolence, strict integrity, and enlightened devotion, there by the indulgence of absorbing selfishness and revolting irreverence. The powers of the mind, like the organs of the body, produce mingled good and evil. Was this the object of their creation? Was it designed, that what is believed by one man, should be either not understood or not believed by another, that what is beautiful in this man's eyes should seem devoid of beauty or perhaps deformed to his neighbor, that what we look upon as our duty to God or man should not be so regarded by those around us? Or are we to suppose that these opposite results are traceable to any general rules of the Creator's government, one class of them springing from their being rightly observed, and the other from their being more or less infringed upon? If so, what are these laws, and what would be the results of perfect obedience to them? What are the proper sources of human belief, the rules by which we should distinguish truth from error? What are the true principles by which man should be guided in his admiration of the beautiful? And what, again, should be the general state of his dispositions towards his Maker, and towards his fellow-creatures? The pursuit of these investigations leads us to the speculative sciences which relate to the constitution of the human mind. When we are seeking to learn the proper field of operation designed for the Intellectual Faculties, individually and collectively, that is to say, when we are engaged in the inquiry for the principles which should direct us in the formation of belief, we have entered on one of them. We may here give it the name of Logic, premising, however, that the sense in which we use the word, is much wider than is really allowed to it in our text-books, which profess indeed generally to explain the principles of reasoning, but mostly confine their attention to what is in fact but a trifling fraction of the whole field belonging to their science, — the theory and practice of the Syllogism. The philosophy of Taste is another of these sciences, having for its object the dis-

covery of the laws, by which both the understanding and feelings should be guided in their estimate and admiration of the beautiful and poetic, whether in art or nature. Moral philosophy is that other science falling into the same class, which treats of the balance that should subsist between the several powers of our intellectual and affective nature, in order to the right discharge of our duties to those beings, whatever their relations to ourselves, to whom our states of mind or our outward actions, may have any reference. Setting out with the admission of the existence of conflicting tendencies to action in the human mind, and of the vast variety of views in regard to duty, existing among men, it aims at showing the relations which these several tendencies should bear to each other in the mental economy, at deciding which of these various views should be adopted as correct. These sciences which we have named, may not perhaps be all that could be referred to this class. We do not here attempt to give a full catalogue of them. Any such attempt would belong to a work on the subject, rather than to an incidental notice. Our object is to show the position we conceive Moral Philosophy to occupy; not to offer a classification in some respects new, of other sciences. Logic, or as we might with our definition term it, the philosophy of belief, and the philosophy of taste, we have here referred to, rather in illustration of our views in regard to the philosophy of morals, than with any other design.

The third or "practical" division of the sciences which relate to human nature, is, we need hardly say, synonymous with the science of Education, taken in its widest sense; the examination of all the means which can be employed, to render man, in every respect, both in his bodily and in his mental constitution, what, from our previous inquiries, we conceive he ought to be. These means, of course, are various; some acting solely on the organs of the body, others designed to affect the mind in one way or another. Education, in this view of it, is a vastly different affair from a mere theory of school-keeping. Every influence, the slightest as well as the most powerful, which, from the cradle to the grave, in the nursery, the school-room, the college, or in after-life, may be exerted, no matter by what agent, on the bodily or mental condition, falls under its investigation. It aims not merely, as some would seem to think, at devising the best methods of communicating

information, or of preserving discipline in a school, but at showing how we may produce the perfect and harmonious development of all the powers of the body and of the mind; how we may put an end alike to the diseases which shorten and embitter life, and to the errors of judgment and of heart which endanger the well-being of the individual and of the community.

If these remarks on the respective provinces of mental science, the theory of morals, and the philosophy of mental education, and on the relations consequently subsisting between them, be not wholly erroneous, the estimate we have made of the former sciences, as branches of useful study, is fully borne out by them. He only, as we all admit, can hope to succeed in the training of the body, who has become master of the sciences which teach the structure, functions, and design, of its several parts. He only can be considered perfectly, that is, properly qualified to discharge his duties as a practical educator of the minds of his fellow-men, (and *all* men *must* discharge them, well or ill, from the very fact of their being members of society) who has become acquainted with the powers of the mind and with the means by which they may all be made conducive to the general good. Is it not time that more should be done to give men generally this knowledge?

We are aware that by some this statement of the province of Moral Philosophy may seem to be unnecessarily refined upon. What is moral science, they may ask, but the science which teaches us what we ought, and what we ought not to do? If by the word "do," be here meant all that is really comprehended in the idea of a "*moral* action," we are ready to adopt the definition; but if the word be used, as it most commonly is used, in its popular sense of "doing" as distinct from "thinking," or "intending," we cannot assent to it. Christ's epitome of the moral law refers to motives wholly. *Love* to God and man, is its precept; not mere prayer, or alms-giving. Even the older and less comprehensive epitome, given in the decalogue, has the same reference to the disposition. "*Honor* thy father and thy mother," and "thou shalt *not* covet," are among its injunctions. Virtue is not, as Dr. Paley defined it, simply "*the doing* good to mankind." A man may be highly virtuous, and yet not succeed in really doing good in any proportion to his virtue; or again, he may

happen to be the greatest benefactor to his race, and yet not at all merit, from that fact, the character of a virtuous man. Expedient and inexpedient are the terms we should apply to actions, viewed separately from their motives; virtue and vice are qualities predicable only of the motives themselves. In common language, to be sure, we speak of virtuous "actions;" but in all such cases, our idea of the action so designated, if rightly formed, includes within it the intention of the act, as fully as the act itself. In this view of the case, Paley's definition is doubly in error. "Virtue," says he, "is the doing good to mankind, in obedience to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting happiness." On this principle, the benevolent designs of Howard, would be declared devoid of the quality of virtue, if either they had failed to *do good*, or had been prompted by sincere regard to the well-being of his fellow-men, rather than by a sense of any divine command to this effect, or if he had been even disinterestedly obedient to the divine will, and had acted without reference to the reward offered for obedience. Our limits do not allow us here to enter on the discussion of what we deem the true theory of virtue. In general, we look upon the views of Dr. Wayland on this head, as greatly in advance, both in regard to their correctness and to their comprehensiveness, of those expressed by his predecessor, to which we have adverted. They are so, in our view, from the fact, that he has based them so much more directly and completely on the leading principles of the true philosophy of the mind.

While on this topic, we may be allowed, without being disposed to censure what we regard as an extremely valuable accession to the library of the moral philosopher, to express our regret that, in one or two instances, Dr. Wayland should have omitted to perceive, how much a little further reference to the same source would have improved his arguments, and added to the clearness of his distinctions. For example, after stating his faith in "*a distinct and separate faculty* to make us acquainted with the existence of the distinct and separate quality" of moral rectitude, he goes on with the following remark:

"But after all, this question is, to the moral philosopher, of but comparatively little importance. All that is necessary to his investigations, is, that it be admitted, that there is such a quality,

and that men are so constituted as to perceive it, and to be susceptible of certain affections in consequence of that perception. Whether these facts are accounted for, on the supposition of the existence of a single faculty, or of a combination of faculties, will not affect the question of moral obligation. All that is necessary to the prosecution of the science is, that it be admitted that there is such a quality in actions, and that man is endowed with a constitution capable of bringing him into relation to it." — p. 34.

Now while, in regard to this subject, we admit with Dr. Wayland, that a knowledge of this ultimate fact in the natural history of man, his actual ability to take cognizance of the distinction between right and wrong, is all that is "*necessary to the prosecution of the science*" of morals, we cannot, with him, regard the question as to the existence of one or more faculties to enable him to arrive at this result, as one by any means of "*comparatively little importance.*" To the formation of any clear view of the proper balance of the different powers of the mind with reference to the idea of right and wrong, (and this, as we have said, we regard as the true aim of moral science,) it is of the utmost consequence that we have a clear conception of *what those powers really are* in their original constitution, which are concerned, directly or not, in the production of that idea. Nay, further, to the *satisfactory proof* of those fundamental doctrines of moral science, the real existence of any naturally implanted power of thought or sentiment having that special object, and the consequent authority of such power in the mind, it is almost, indeed we should be inclined to say, absolutely necessary, that by the researches pursued in the physical department of the science of mind, the power or powers themselves should be distinctly set forth and analysed, and their unity or plurality, their similarity or diversity of function, clearly shown. Thus, to explain our meaning, the doctrine of the "*moral sense,*" as it is called, is objected to on the score of the non-universality of the feeling which it supposes to be an essential attribute of humanity. It is for the mental philosopher to show, that universality is not requisite to the establishment of its existence among the natural instincts of the heart, any more than the universality of sight among men, is necessary to the proof that man was created with such a sense, or that of the faculties which discern the musical relations of sound, or lead us to abstract reasoning, to prove the natural power of

man in the abstract to judge of music, or trace the connexion of cause and effect. The very existence of the words "right" and "wrong," establishes the natural existence of some power or powers of mind which have relation to them, just as that of the words "light" and "darkness," "harmony" and "discord," "cause" and "effect," proves that man was naturally made to see, to discriminate between sounds, and to pursue abstract reasoning. But again, it is objected, that men's judgments in the premises differ, that duty with one man is not the same as duty with another. Here, too, the moralist must refer to the results to which the physical science of the mind will lead him. May not what he calls "the moral sense," be a result of the action of several powers, differing in their separate functions, — of a feeling which simply prompts men to desire justice and to admit the obligation of duty, and of intellectual powers which discern, or seek to discern, those qualities of actions in which their propriety or impropriety consists? Nay, more, may not this combined result of impulse and reflection, be further modified by other natural impulses of the mind, more or less in particular cases at war with the direct influence of the moral feeling? If so, he may admit, to the fullest extent of the objector's wishes, that the strength of men's moral feelings, and the clearness of their moral perceptions, and the violence and peculiar character of their antagonist dispositions, vary greatly; that some men have hardly any conscience in their dealings, that others are sadly mistaken in their views of right; and yet he may insist and prove, that nature no more necessitated or designed these aberrations, than she did the want of sight or understanding in the blind or idiotic.

For the sake of the greater clearness and conviction with which we conceive Dr. Wayland could have invested his arguments by such a course, we regret that he has not added to the value of his inquiry as to the existence of a moral sense, by entering more minutely into the analysis of its constituent elements. No degree of acquaintance with this analysis of any class of mental phenomena, can be too minute for the guidance of the constructor of a sound and comprehensive theory of Morals. Dr. Wayland has done very much that demands our thanks in this respect. He is himself the man who is capable of doing still more.

But we must not forget, that against the whole of this pro-

cedure Dr. Wardlaw's decided and labored protest is entered, and that our defence of it is not established, unless we can show the ground of that protest to be untenable. The position assumed by him, the truth and authority of Scripture, is one which we are as little disposed to question, as he can be himself. To the application which he makes of it in the case before us, we cannot by any means assent. We have already, at the outset of our remarks, given it in his own language. We shall now, as briefly as we can, consider its force, as an argument against the philosophical study of human nature, which we have recommended.

Before doing this, we may be allowed to repeat the expression of our belief in and reverence for Scripture, as a communication of truth, moral as well as religious. We are willing to echo all the forms of expression, (and they are many and varied) in which our author has in different portions of his work, repeated the declaration of his own faith on this head. We believe it to contain "*the only philosophy*," we believe it to communicate "the wisdom of 'the only wise,'" we desire not to see it "make its obeisance to the chair of human science." On the contrary, we will quote, and with full approval, when it is accompanied by such a course of investigation as our other author has fearlessly pursued, the sentiment expressed by Dr. Wayland in his preface.

"Entertaining those views of the sacred Scriptures, which I have expressed in the work itself, it is scarcely necessary to add here, that I consider them the great source of moral truth; and that a system of ethics will be true just in proportion as it develops their meaning."

Still, while making these concessions, and we make them not at all in that spirit of "verbal courtesy," which Dr. Wardlaw attributes to those who differ from his conclusions, we have something to urge against his mode of applying them to the case in question. Instead of resting satisfied, that truth as drawn from the careful study of the works of God, can only harmonize with that which is by a like process elicited from his word, and thereupon setting himself in good faith, as Dr. Wayland and others have done and as we would have all men do, to develop the analogies which must subsist between the results of these two processes, Dr. Wardlaw prefers to assume, that all who study the works of the Creator, and seek by that means to learn the laws of his natural government,

unless they are willing, in so many words, to bind themselves to depart in no iota from the ideas of other men, as deduced from the *mere* study of the expressions used in the written law, are seeking to exalt "the dictates of their own sagacity," above the authority of the written law itself. We are tempted to ask whether our author really regards the discoveries of Newton and his disciples, made by the observation of nature in her other departments, as simply dictates of *their* sagacity, or whether he is not willing to allow the now established principles of astronomy, to be the result originally of divine and not of human skill. And if Newton, by the study of the heavenly bodies was enabled to declare "the wisdom of God" in their construction and arrangement, why may not another meet with like success, by taking the same course in regard to another subject? The "science falsely so called," whose summary rejection by an apostle is insisted on by Dr. Wardlaw, and held up as an example for the christian world to follow, had, indeed, no higher authority than that of human sagacity. It was the "wisdom" in which the Greeks of his day delighted, for which they looked in vain in the simple and pure morality of the Gospel; and which is not to be found any more in the book of nature by the philosopher, than it is to be traced in the writings of the apostle by the critic. That the student of nature should also be a student of revelation, is true enough; and it is equally true, that the student of revelation ought to be likewise an inquirer into nature. When the cardinals of the Catholic church declared the doctrine of Galileo in regard to the solar system to be "absurd, philosophically false, and formally heretical, because it is expressly contrary to the holy scripture," they proved the insufficiency of the mere study of revelation to make men philosophically acquainted with the external universe. Perhaps some of Dr. Wardlaw's sweeping charges against all moral science, may go far to prove a like insufficiency of the same means to ensure any philosophical view of the world of mind.

Granted, that scripture treats far more directly of mind and its phenomena, than it does of the material world; granted, that whatever it states on these subjects is, and ever will be, absolutely authoritative:—does it therefore follow, either that it is designed to give us a full and complete account of all that man can profitably know in regard to them, or that, even as far as it goes, it presents to us the facts which it makes known,

in the most systematic form, and in the most philosophical language? The truth is, that scripture throughout uses the terms in common use at the periods when its several portions were composed, as well in its statement of facts bearing on the mind, as of those which relate to matter. It was no more its design to unfold the philosophy of man in all its parts, thoroughly, and in precise, defined, and unambiguous terms, than it was to perform the same task for any other branch of science. Its true object was to reveal to man, what he could not, but by revelation, have learnt with any certainty; and not at all to dispense with that necessity, which is laid upon him by the whole constitution of the world he lives in, to improve his state and prospects, bodily and mental, by the use of all his powers of mind in acquiring every kind of knowledge of which they are capable. Suppose that, instead of the simple assertions which we find scripture to make, in popular language, of such detached facts and principles respecting the mind and moral truth in general, as were essential to its great design of making known the will of the Creator, a future world, and other mysterious and undiscoverable truths, it had taken the other course, and had attempted to reveal *all* that man could require to know of himself, and of his duties and interests here, as well as hereafter;—what could it have been at its first appearance but a sealed book to those who were, (as almost all then were, as too many are even now) entirely unprepared by their previous knowledge for any such information? What could it have been, in all ages indeed, but a standing contradiction to the course of divine providence in regard to every other branch of humanly attainable knowledge? We have no sort of doubt that all the incidental statements which it does make, are in full accordance with what the true philosophy of man, as learnt by observation, has to disclose. And this belief is to our mind only a stronger motive to the faithful and independent study of that philosophy. The harmony of Scripture with itself, the truth and fitness of its representations of man, the force and meaning of its moral precepts, cannot be fully seen, until the nature of man and the laws of the universe as they bear upon it, are fully known.

We cannot here enter on any discussion in detail of the arguments by which Dr. Wardlaw has endeavored to defend his main position. Such a discussion would lead us too near

the limits of controversial divinity. As to the correctness or incorrectness of the theological views on which they profess to be founded, or the degree of precision with which Dr. Wardlaw has stated them, it is not our intention to say anything. So far as the arguments themselves are urged against the study of mental and moral science, on the same principles and in the same manner with every other science, it is hardly necessary to say that we consider them to fail entirely of their object.

Of Dr. Wayland's work, if we have not spoken so much at length in this article as its merits might seem to require, it is because its eminently systematic and condensed character, preclude all hope of doing justice to it by any analysis or direct criticism, either of the whole or of any detached portions. We have preferred to vindicate the propriety and importance of the study of which it treats, and to offer some remarks on the proper mode of pursuing it. If, by this course, we can induce our readers to study the work for themselves, we shall have done them a better service, than we could by any extracts or detached criticisms. As a whole, without making ourselves responsible for every one of its conclusions, we may say that we consider it a highly valuable work, and one likely to do not a little in producing the reform in our course of education, of which we have been endeavoring to urge the necessity. We could have wished to find in it a greater amount of illustration, not only for the sake of giving interest to the work, but also as an essential in some cases to its full comprehension by merely casual readers. The author of such a work, it is to be presumed, will be by far the best illustrator of his own views, and he should not therefore leave the task, in any considerable degree, to others. Future editions, of which we hope there may be many, might be advantageously enlarged in this respect.

Since the appearance of the second edition of the work which we have been noticing, Dr. Wayland has published an abridgement of it for the use of schools. Of this step we can hardly speak too highly. It is, as we have already stated, more than time that the study of Moral Philosophy should be introduced into all our institutions of education. We are happy to see the way so auspiciously opened for such an introduction. In its general style and illustrations the smaller work appears to us to have been the result of more labor on

the part of the author, than the larger work itself. Indeed, as he himself informs us, it has been "not merely *abridged*, but also *re-written*." We cannot but regard the labor as all well bestowed. The difficulty of so choosing our words and examples as to make them intelligible and interesting to the child, is very great. The success with which Dr. Wayland appears to have overcome it, is in the highest degree gratifying. We have no doubt that its circulation and utility will far more than repay its author for the pains he has taken with it.

In conclusion, we may be allowed to express the hope, that the science whose claims we have been considering, may not long continue to labor under the comparative neglect, of which it has been our present task to complain, and that, whenever we may again approach the subject, it may be to express ourselves less in the language of complaint, than our sense of what was required by truth, has compelled us in this instance to adopt.

ART. III. — *The Alcestis of Euripides, with Notes.*

1. *The Alcestis of Euripides, with Notes, for the use of Colleges in the United States.* By T. D. WOOLSEY, Professor of Greek in Yale College. Cambridge. J. Munroe & Co. 1834. 12mo. pp. 124.
2. *The Antigone of Sophocles, with Notes, for the use of Colleges in the United States.* By T. D. WOOLSEY, Professor of Greek in Yale College. Cambridge. J. Munroe & Co. 1835. 12mo. pp. 124.

A FEW years ago, the Greek classical studies of our schools and colleges were mostly confined to books of extracts. If we were to judge of the progress of taste, by a comparison of the works mentioned at the head of this article with those to which our courses of public instruction have heretofore been limited, we should be far from thinking that the love of ancient letters is on the decline. It may be true that the present age has but few scholars like the Scaligers, Casaubons, and Bentleys of days departed; but such mighty names are not of frequent occurrence in the literary history of any age. And yet the Hermanns, Boeckhs, Thirsches, to say nothing of living