government has enumerated powers under Article 2. For the execution of any one of these functions, both the mayor and the assembly may desire a committee, commission or board created in connection with it. Any of these can be quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial or quasi-administrative; they can, of course, be advisory also.

The city government has this authority and power to establish the agency either with or without the assembly's ratification. The initiative for establishment of the agency would normally be taken by the mayor, but the assembly need not be too content to wait on the mayor should the occasion in its judgment demand solution by a committee.

A number of cities in Japan have established these committees for varied purposes. A few examples are illustrative:

In Fukuoka there is the City Owned Evaluation Committee and the Police Personnel Committee; in Kurume there is the Committee for Handling Complaints of City Employees. In both cities the committees are appointed by the mayor and are advisory to him.

Summary: Three Conclusions

The power and authority of all the local governments in Japan to establish independent agencies to perform a particular function should and must be used with intelligence and real moderation. Good causes and good reasons ought to be in evidence before committees, commissions or boards are established. These agencies need not be established simply to make room for some person's forty-fifth cousin, especially when the other forty-four cousins are already having lunch off the municipality's unknowing

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taxpayers! Indeed, these agencies need not be established as the Family Monopoly or the Friends' Institution! A municipal government or any government can easily be hampered or its authority dissipated wildly by a multiplicity of offices and agencies. Friction develops, discontent matures and inter-departmental jealousies become rife; good government is vitiated quickly and easily by overdoing the agencies. Moderation in number or function of agencies will produce no public censure or bad political repercussions.

When committees, commissions or boards are created, their function most assuredly is to perform the given task, to do the work; in short, they are duty bound to produce! Who is to see that the agencies do produce? How is it done? Does the checker or inspector close his eyes, squint with one or open both? Some agencies report to the public, some to the mayor, some to the assembly and some to administrative offices. Each of these parties to whom the agency is responsible has the duty to check and to evaluate results. If an agency does not or cannot produce, even after change of personnel, the mayor must abolish it or the assembly legislate it off the books. The keeping of useless agencies is just grounds for wholesale criticism of the city's government.

What should the mayor, the particular office, the assembly or the city government as a whole do with the committee's, the commission's or board's technical advice or professional recommendation? Throw it away?

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What should the mayor, the particular office, the assembly or the city government as a whole do with the committee's, the commission's or board's technical advice or professional recommendation? Throw it away? Use it to start an argument? Or file it safely in some little dark corner where none need see it? When an agency of technically experienced or professionally trained personnel presents its findings and recommendations, the public, the assembly, the mayor or the administrative office - each is duty obligated to receive, to analyze and to give the most careful attention. To go counter to a qualified agency's report, the burden is on the party doing so to produce the strongest evidence. Why have the agency otherwise? Why use the taxpayers' money? Indeed, Koneori zon no katabire nōke: To labor hard but to gain nothing but fatigue.

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY
Military Government Section

REPORT OF SURVEILLANCE

General and By-Elections
1 January to 1 May 1949

Prepared by
Legal and Government Division

28 May 1949

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY
Military Government Section
Legal and Government Division
APO 343

28 May 1949

REPORT OF SURVEILLANCE

Reported Local General and By-Elections

1 January to 1 May 1949

1. Definition of Local Elections

Elections in Japan are of two types: the general elections whether national or local and the by-elections whether national or local. The general elections are those which are held in accordance with the laws for (1) the regular election on the expiration of the incumbent's regular four-year term of office, (2) vote of non-confidence against the premier, governor or mayor, (3) action from recall petitions, which results in either the vacancy of the offices of governor and mayor or in the dissolution of the assembly, (4) death of the governor or mayor, and (5) resignation of the governor or mayor. In Japan the term by-election has a particular definition. The by-elections in Japan are held for members of the National Diet, members of local assemblies and members of the Agricultural Land Commission and Agricultural Adjustment Committee. They are held only to fill unexpired terms of office. By-elections are provided for (1) members of the House of Representatives in Article 79 and 80 of the Law for the Election of the Members of the House of Representatives, (2) members of the House of Councillors in Article 71 and 72 of the Law for the Members of the House of Councillors, (3) members of the Agricultural Land Commission in the Agricultural Land Adjustment Law in Article 15, and (4) members of the Agricultural Adjustment Committee in Article 13, Cabinet Order No. 247 of 1948. By-elections for all local public bodies are provided for in Section VII in the Law Concerning Local Autonomy.

Both the general and the by-election can be a no poll election. When the number of candidates running equals the number of vacancies to be filled, there is no contest and no vote is required.

II. Election Laws and Cabinet Orders

There are four laws which provide for and govern the conduct of these local general and by-elections. Laws numbered 1, 2 and 3, listed below, provide a reason for having these elections and laws numbered 3 and 4 provide the method and means for conducting them. The Cabinet Order for each law issued in terms of each law gives implementing details to aid in its administration.

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1. The Law for Election of Members of the House of Representatives in Article 67 states, "public officials of the State and local public entities who, in accordance with the provisions of law, are prohibited from holding concurrently the office of member of the House of Representative, shall not (file notice of candidacy for the House of Representatives) until after the persons concerned have resigned the office of public officials."

2. The National Public Service Law in Article 102 states, "no person in the service shall be a candidate for elective public office."

3. The Law Concerning Local Autonomy provides not only a reason for having elections but also the processes by which they can be conducted. The Law Concerning Local Autonomy in Articles 57, 92, 127, 141 and 143 provides the legal restraints against chiefs or assemblymen of local public bodies from becoming Diet members concurrently. The time limit within which all of the elections must be held is provided for in Article 24 as follows, "..... the elections of the assemblymen of an ordinary public body and the chief thereof shall be held forthwith within 60 days of the date on which reasons have occurred for holding such elections....." Moreover, in Chapter IV the legal procedure is established for holding all local general and by-elections.

The no poll election for local governments is provided for in Article 58 of the Law Concerning Local Autonomy. This Article is based upon similar provisions in the former three famous organic acts: The Law Concerning the Organization of Prefectures, the Law Concerning the Organization of Cities, and the Law Concerning the Organization of Towns and Villages.

4. The Law Concerning the Regulation of Political Contributions and Expenditures, Law No. 194 as of 29 July 1948, is the corrupt practices act of Japan which limits political contributions and expenditures and establishes penalties for infractions.

III. Election Surveillance Program

On 11 February 1949, a command letter was dispatched by Headquarters Eighth United States Army to subordinate headquarters concerned indicating the general and by-elections which would probably occur in their zones of responsibility and requesting two reports for each election. The first report was to be submitted immediately upon announcement of the local or general by-election, giving the name and location of the vacancy and the date of the election. The second report to be submitted within fourteen days following the date of the election required more detailed information, including an evaluation of the results. A negative report was requested for each prefecture not holding any elections.

The extensive surveillance of polling places and ballot counting stations was not required as on 2[illegible] January 1949 for the national general elections. On that occasion all the military government teams, together with

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the many other surveillance teams composed of troops from the tactical units under their supervision, were required to be in the field an extended period of time and to cover a wide area carefully. The sparsity and degree of campaign activity in these local elections demanded little attention in comparison.

The Information Officer and the Legal and Government Officer of the teams had crowded schedules on many of these local elections as surveillance was exercised. Work of a preparatory nature for the holding of the election was performed throughout the areas of election. Typical of this type of program developed by all the military government teams is that from Shiga as reported by that Team:

"In order to insure a well informed vote in the past elections, the following have been done:

"a. Election circulars were produced and distributed locally.

"b. Mobile public address systems toured the prefecture.

"c. Spot announcements were made at railway stations.

"d. Commercial theaters ran slides urging the people to vote.

"e. Conferences held with leaders of PTA, Women's and Welfare organizations.

"f. Newspapers and printed articles encouraged the people to vote.

"g. Leaflets were scattered by airplane over the three cities of the prefecture on one occasion.

"h. Circulars covering the Election Laws were distributed.

"i. Letters were sent to all election officials by the prefectural information section.

"j. Large posters were made and distributed.

"k. 21 sign-boards have been erected through the prefecture."

The election report from the Osaka Military Government Team, (Tab A.) after showing specific facts for an assemblyman's election, has included (1) a statement of the activities of the Team's legal and government officer, and (2) a summary of some of the candidates' campaign "platforms."

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IV. Summary of Results

The 628 reported local general and by-elections held in Japan from 1 January to 1 May 1949 included 362 for executive positions and 266 for assembly positions. There were 210 by-elections, 57 for prefectural assemblies, 7 for municipal, 27 for town and 119 for village. There were 2,947 candidates contesting for the 2,055 offices. Thus, there was an average of approximately 1-1/3 candidates per office.

The position of political parties in Japanese local elections particularly so in towns and villages to a marked degree resembles that of the parties in the United States or in Great Britain. Political parties have meant little. The voter casts his or her ballot for the person rather than an adherent to political parties. The following figures show the degree to which the number of political party candidates was overwhelmingly dwarfed by the number of independent candidates:

Affiliation	Number of Candidates	Winners for Number of Position
Democratic-Liberal	167	91
Democrat	51	23
Social Democrat	80	23
Communist	142	34
Minor Party	30	9
Independent	2477	1875
TOTAL	2947	2055

Other tabulations to show details of the elections are compiled in Tab B.

As has been traditional for the past half century in Japan, the majority of the elections in the towns and villages averaging 5,000 to 10,000 population with but 1,000 to 2,000 qualified voters, have been uncontested; the number of candidates always equals the number of vacant positions to be filled. During this four months period covered in this report, 47% of the total number of elections, or 293, were of this nature. In a few cases even in which completely new village assemblies were to be elected, no formal public vote was held because only the minimum number of candidates filed. Thus, there were no poll elections for the 22 seats in the town assembly of Miwa Machi in Hyogo Prefecture nor for the 16 seats in the village assembly of Uchimaki, Nara Prefecture, of Doshi, Yamanashi Prefecture, of Kamiasakuna, Ehime Prefecture and of Okawa, Kyoto Prefecture.

Prefectural and municipal elections have demonstrated usually much more political activity because more importance is attached to campaigning for public office at those levels. Here, political party activity becomes more noticeable, and most of the major parties are represented. The candidates

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during the four months of this year were far greater than the number of positions to be filled.

In contrast with those facts the election interest among the voters was manifested more sharply in the town and village elections in which an average of approximately 75% of the registered voters went to the polls on election day as compared to the turn-outs of 50% to 60% of the voters in the prefectural and city elections. In seven by-elections for the Tokyo metropolitan assembly the abstention rate averaged 70% and in a Kyoto prefectural assembly by-election it averaged a little more than 60%. Much of the present discrepancy between the lighter vote in the cities as contrasted with the heavier vote in towns and villages can be explained by the fact that elections occurred during the slack season in agricultural areas; distance between the polling stations and places of work in the country are shorter, and working hour schedules in the country are not as rigid as in cities.

In virtually all the elections, independent candidates predominated both in total number of candidates and number of winning candidates. Political parties usually enjoyed a better position in prefectural and municipal elections as contrasted with that in towns and villages. In this year's reported local elections nearly 90% of the successful candidates were independents.

The National Election Management Commission's recent survey of the results of local elections indicates that political parties polled 57.3% of the popular vote. Most of this total is derived from city and prefectural elections and represents the voting for relatively few candidates. The popular vote for the elections reported by the National Election Management Commission is shown below:

Political Party	Popular Vote	% of Total
Democratic-Liberal	1,018,711	33.8%
Democrat	189,932	6.3%
Socialist	158,048	5.2%
Communist	265,860	8.8%
Minor Parties	96,519	3.2%
Independent	1,290,242	42.7%
TOTAL	3,019,312	100.0%

As to the strength of showing of particular political parties, the Democratic-Liberal Party fared best as it did in the national elections. It elected approximately two-thirds of the candidates. The number of elected independents who, for many reasons, might be considered Democratic-Liberal Party sympathizers would, if tabulated, swell the party's ranks tremendously. Hundreds, if forced to choose a party label, would identify themselves as Democratic-Liberals. The Party's success at the polls reflects more its continued popularity with the Japanese people than any particular adeptness at political

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strategy. In fact, the lack of the Party's discipline, shown at times, so diluted its strength that were it not for its overwhelming popularity, it would have fallen far short at the polls of effectively capitalizing on the results.

In the seven Tokyo Ward assembly by-elections the political parties overwhelmed the independents in number of candidates and winners. Greater activity occurred in Koto Ward with four Democratic-Liberals, one Socialist-Democrat, one Democrat and one Communist; in Shinagawa Ward with four Democratic-Liberals, two Democrats, one Socialist, one Minor Party and one Communist; and in Shinjuku Ward with three Democratic-Liberals, one Democrat, one Socialist, one Independent and one Communist. Although a Democratic-Liberal won in each of the three cases just given, a similar split among three Democratic-Liberal candidates, cost the party a victory to an Independent in Arakawa Ward.

As long as the Democratic-Liberal Party retains its overwhelming popularity it will not be too greatly handicapped from lack of discipline and poor political strategy. If its fortunes begin to wane, the Party will suffer election reverses to a proportionally far greater degree. Evidence that the Party's leaders are aware of this weakness can be seen in the purge of dissident members which is taking place in a number of local chapters.

The Democratic Party's local branches demonstrated negligible activity, winning between 1% and 2% of the total number of offices. The Party, which was in bad odor with the people because of the unsavory incidents that occurred during the Ashida Cabinet, has suffered a radical decline in its political policy and activity has been further hamstrung by the bitter wrangling going on in Tokyo between the Inukai faction, which favors a merger with the Democratic-Liberal Party and the Ashida faction, which opposes cooperation with the present conservative government. The Inukai faction is presently represented in the Yoshida Cabinet.

As a result, many Democrats joined the Democratic-Liberal Party or formed a common front by running as Independents. Currently the Democratic Party's label is of no apparent asset, and many local politicians affiliated formerly with the Democrats probably find it more profitable to run as independents, at least until such time as their opposition role in the Diet gains approval. Outside of Tokyo the Party's disunity also cost it what could have been a victory in the prefectural assembly election held in Ukyo Ward, Kyoto in February, when a total of 4,800 votes cast for the Democratic Party and split among 3 of the Party's candidates, enabled the single Communist candidate to win with 3,400 votes.

The Socialist Party has been muddling along in some confusion resulting from its disastrous defeat in the 1949 general election. Communist raids on the Party in addition to complete paralysis in its own activity because of

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the ideological split between left and right wing groups, caused a considerable exodus from the Party into the camps of both the "liberals" and other conservatives. The vacuous attitude of the Socialist Party during the local elections in the months of January, February and March resulted in its candidates winning but 23 offices. In this it matched precisely the result obtained by the Democrats. Most of the Party's candidates trailed others badly.

The Communist Party has continued to demonstrate its strength. With telling effects the Party has continued its sound policy of "grass roots financing"; Communist candidates receive aid to "operate" locally, which practice the other parties have looked upon with some disdain. It also allows its candidates substantial leeway for meeting local conditions. Analysis of the Communist position shows that although its candidates won less than 1% of the total number of offices, party-wise it did much better by obtaining nearly 20% of the total offices won by all political party candidates. The Party's tactics were concentrated on winning at least one seat in prefectural and city assemblies and piling up an impressive vote in elections for prefectural and municipal chief executives as well. Town and village elections were generally "ignored." The Party continued its strategy of running but one candidate in each election, except for local assembly elections when a large number of vacancies existed and few candidates entered the race. The strategy was successful in Kyoto and nearly so in Tokyo, in which the abstention rate was exceedingly high.

Although the Communist position as a whole has not changed appreciably since the General election, the Party demonstrated further gains in Tokyo, Kyoto and Osaka, as well as in the Kanto region. Scattered elections in Nagano, Kanagawa, Yamanashi, Shizuoka and especially Saitama resulted in the Communist Party polling anywhere from 20% to 30% of the valid vote and as high as 36.8% in the election for mayor of Ichikawadaimon Machi, Yamanashi Prefecture. Even though unsuccessful, many of the Communist candidates in these areas made good showings, in direct contrast to those made by the Socialists. Proximity to the Party's central headquarters in Tokyo accounts in a measure for a good deal of the strength shown in the Kanto region because representatives from Tokyo readily swarm into any nearby target area to help direct the Party's campaign. On the other hand, Communist strength in Chugoku and Tohoku Regions decreased. Elsewhere the Party's position remained substantially unchanged. Results of some of the more significant elections listed in Tab D are indicative of Party strength in the given areas.

In elections for village headman in Torii-mura, Ano-gun, Shimane Prefecture, village assemblyman in Okutsu-mura, Sosaku-gun, Kyoto Prefecture, and village assemblyman in Yonotsu-mura, Nishikanbara-gun, Niigata Prefecture, four Communists won because elections went in uncontested fashion.

Minor parties like the New Farmers and the Social Renovation, played

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an insignificant role in both local general and by-elections by putting only 30 candidates in the field out of the total of 2,947 and by winning only 9 of the offices. A number of these winners were Labor-Farmer Party candidates, and their performance was anything but spectacular. The People's Cooperative Party, a poor fifth in the national general election of 1949 by securing but 14 members in the House of Representatives did not sponsor any candidate officially in any of these local elections. This action is to be taken as a definite withdrawal by the party from the political arena. In the general elections of 1947 for local government, this Party placed in 23 prefectures 113 candidates in offices. This 1947 showing is in sharp contrast with this first four months period of 1949. If anything, the by-elections seem to reveal a trend away from minor parties, which are really little more than local political cliques resembling masks which present a respectable front for more personal ambitions.

V. Analysis

Local general and by-elections occurring as they have during this past quarterly period serve as a useful barometer in calculating a trend of the public's opinions between the intervals of the national general elections or the larger number of local general elections taking place at one time as will probably be the case in 1951. These local elections are the principal means whereby the Japanese people manifest their reactions to current social and economic conditions. They are also indicators of results of the many Occupational and Japanese governmentally sponsored policies or programs designed to improve Japanese political development.

Considered individually, either the local general or by-election can and often does indicate changes in the relative strength of political parties or factions in a particular locality.

Uncontested Elections

The traditional occurrence of uncontested elections in the towns and villages and occasionally in some of the smaller cities in Japan is based upon a number of reasons and the growth of practices and customs now "entrenched in the soil."

In these small localities in which the families for many decades have sold goods from nearby shops, worked and harvested neighboring paddy fields or fished the same coastal areas, personalities with Japanese qualities of leadership have loomed large, been elected and remained the officials years in and out.

Political group action, not political party action, has resulted. Moreover, in more carefully worked out detail in Japan perhaps than in most other countries, definitely planned political meetings prior to elec-

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tions are held by the leaders of the citizenry in which political action regarding particular persons is determined. The sole candidate or candidates are selected for the particular office in advance. Selection is frequently made for representation by buraku or a paddy field area and a formerly important administrative subdivision of the towns and villages. Localism is strong at the buraku level. This fact yields a uniformity of vote for all candidates as the householders of each buraku usually vote for their own citizens. When variations do occur, they generally reflect differences in population among the buraku with due allowances made for individual popularity. The "election" is a result of well determined agreements; selections and eliminations are simply but firmly made.

Other explanatory reasons for this Japanese custom today are present. After all there have been few political plums to be had in the towns and villages and this is the fact in present day Japan. What plums there are must at times be passed around; some rotation of offices take place. Salaries are too low to be a strong incentive for men of outstanding ability. The weak financial position of most local entities has never permitted large scale patronage; less so today. The increasingly heavy burden of taxes in the late years has caused larger numbers of the town and village citizens to fasten a more critical eye on their public officials making the conduct of local affairs more difficult and making conditions decidedly more risky to line one's pockets as in the past. Finding the money today to build new schools or nagging the people for contributions to pay some police costs is not an easy task, to say nothing of constantly begging prefectural and national government officials for subsidies to make ends meet. Local officials have many onerous duties. In any case, interest in running for public office in smaller communities is not to be thought of in the same light as for city, prefectural or national elections. Particularly is this true in the office of town and village assemblyman as the position is a part-time one, and the scope for exercise of individual initiative is sharply limited by inadequate finance not to say tradition. The Law Concerning Local Autonomy provides the legal authority for a wide latitude of action and rendering of needed services. Accomplishment requires proper financing.

Individual Candidates

It is axiomatic from the discussion given above that men and women in these rural localities come forward to the voting citizenry as personalities rather than as members of a political party. Moreover, allegiance to a political party even on the national stage has been whimsical in Japan. Hence, the voters demonstrated their customary penchant in the town and village elections; their party affiliations developed in the city and prefectural elections. Moreover, in the towns and villages, both the voters as well as the candidates themselves seemed more preoccupied with the practical down-to-earth problems of town and village administration--building a new

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school, constructing a new drainage ditch, or paying the police--than with political philosophy, which to a great many, is incapable of a particular realization because of the present systems of financial and political controls which are difficult to circumvent.

Accurate evaluation of by-election results depends largely on knowledge of the "story behind the news," particularly in Japan in which the changing fortunes of political parties at the local level is often in direct ratio to the personal popularity and ever-shifting allegiance of a handful of prominent politicians. The predominance of independent candidates at the local level makes it practically impossible to determine the significance of elections without knowing also the political leanings of the candidates and the groups which support them.

Communist Party's Report

The Communist Party in its own election report published on 17 April in Akahata, the official party organ, boasted that "The rate of Communist votes in prefectural, county and city elections increased by 1.3% as compared with the general election in January." The figure is a distortion of the truth, having been arrived at by comparing different sets of figures in the National Election Management Commission's General Election Report and By-Election Report. Based on the Commission's figures, the Communist popular vote was 9.5% while the number of Diet sets gained was 7.5% of the total in the 1949 House of Representatives election. By comparing the latter figure on percentage of seats gained in the general election with the percentage of the popular vote in the three months period, 1 January--31 March, local elections of 8.3%, the Communist Party is able to point to a 1.3% increase. These percentages are compared improperly. Actually a comparison of the popular vote in both the Diet election and those in this four months period 1 January to 1 May, reveals a 1.2% in decrease. However for the local elections all such percentage evaluations are unsatisfying and not too informative. Any positive statement as to the trend of the Communist Party's, or any other party's strength in local elections in Japan must be tempered by two imponderable factors: (1) the political character of the independent vote and (2) the knowledge that strong personalities count for more than parties or party platforms at the local level.

Socialist-Communist Relationship in Local Elections

During the past three and one half years there has been a concerted drive by the Communists to maneuver the Socialist Party into mutual collaboration; if not that, then to take as many members from the Socialist Party as possible. The Communist Party's manouvers of hacking away at the Socialist front has been both at the policy makers and at individual members. These adroit concerts and mass harangues have been effective.

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Divisions have been made with the Socialist Party. A number of Socialist executive officers have advocated collaboration or at least compromise with the Communists. Many Socialist members have bolted and left the Party. However, the central leaders of the Party during these many months of pressure have maintained the independence of the Party. They have gone straight ahead with their own programs. Most all members of the left wing of the Party, although "radical" and divergent as to views and methods from the members of the right wing, regarding the achievement of the Party's programs, are anti any united front with the Communists.

Since the three day Tokyo conference of the Socialist Party in mid April in which Ex-Premier Katayama was elected President, there has been marked activity throughout the Party's organization. The branch offices of the Party have been rejuvenated; a membership program is being made effective already by a person to person contact, the Party's own goals are being explained carefully and refutations on the spot are being made to the Communist propaganda. Despite this favorable momentum, any resurgence and maintenance by the Socialists of former strength or a better position in future elections, will be dependent upon an ideological policy agreement within the Party's whole organization or a separation of the two factions. At any rate a continuous vigorous leadership is needed to overcome the lethargy into which the Party's local organizations seemingly have sunk.

Elections held in Gifu City on 25 February 1949 for prefectural and municipal assemblymen cast an interesting sidelight on the present Socialist-Communist relationship. The Gifu edition of the Osaka Asahi carried the following news article on 20 February:

"The Labor Front Unification Council, which brings together various labor groups such as the NCIU and JFTU, and the Socialist and Communist Parties, has demanded that either the Socialist or the Communist candidate for the prefectural assembly by-election drop out so that the council can support one joint candidate.

"The Gifu Prefectural Committee of the Communist Party, on 18 February, decided to withdraw Communist candidate FUKUTA Tatsuro, 30, a new-comer, and throw the entire labor support behind Socialist candidate OGATA Hajime, 46, a new-comer. As a result, favored candidates SHIBATA and MASUDA will be hard hit.

"On the other hand, indications are strong in the Gifu City Council by-election that Socialist candidate SUGIMOTO Takeo, 30, a new-comer, will be withdrawn in favor of Communist candidate TAKAHASHI Kazuyoshi, 40, new-comer, and give him the total organized votes.

"The Communist Prefectural Committee has already announced as its official candidates Socialist OGATA for the prefectural assembly election

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and Communist TAKAHASHI for the city council election, but the Socialist Prefectural Federation has not yet shown any signs of withdrawing the candidacy of Socialist SUGIMOTO from the city council election."

The results of the election for prefectural assemblyman, in which the Democratic-Liberal candidates won, show that the Communist candidate did in fact withdraw in favor of Socialist OGAWA. The combined support of both parties gave the Socialist candidate enough votes to become the runner-up.

However, the Socialists refused to reciprocate in the election for municipal assemblyman. Both candidates SUGIMOTO and TAKAHASHI ran, which removed a major source of opposition to the winner.

Pronouncements by local chapters of the Socialist Party disclaiming "joint struggle" and taking a definite anti-Communist stand by explaining the incompatibility of Communist with Socialist principles would do much to weaken the Communists. At present, some of the local Socialist organizations have been inclined to ignore the injunction of the Party's central headquarters against collaboration with the Communists. For instance, the SHINANO MAINICHI newspaper reports on 4 April that the Socialists have agreed to cooperate with the Communists in future local by-elections in Nagano. There have been similar newspaper reports in February with reference to Hokkaido.

Political Party Local Election Strategy

A more realistic appraisal of each party's chances in local elections by party executives and heads plus tighter party discipline to prevent an excessive number of candidates from running would ensure against dilution of strength. This condition has allowed the Communist Party and other small organized minorities to steal the election. A divided opposition within both the Democratic-Liberal Party and the Democratic Party and low election interest enabled the lone Communist candidate to win the contest for one seat in the Kyoto Prefectural Assembly held in Ukyo-Ward, Kyoto, on 28 February, despite the fact that he received only 19% of the valid vote cast and less than 7% of the registered vote.

An interesting insight into the workings of local politics is afforded in the 8 April edition of the MAINICHI SHIMBUN which discusses "the behind-the scenes maneuvering" in preparation for the forthcoming Saitama gubernatorial election.

"The Saitama Prefectural Association of Town and Village Mayors held a council of country chapter heads of the association at the Urawa Chamber of Commerce and Industry on 6 April to discuss the coming gubernatorial election.

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"It was decided that instead of over stressing the political party, they should endorse a man who is not affiliated with any party but who can be supported by representatives of political parties, public organizations, industrial circles, municipal mayors, and all other groups.

"The same afternoon, council representatives called on Prefectural Assembly Chairman NAKAMURA at the Prefectural Assembly Secretariat and conveyed that although there are indications of some prefectural assemblymen trying to run a candidate under their control to monopolize the governorship by one party; the 314 town and village mayors of the prefecture are opposed to this.

"At the same time the mayors decided to launch an active drive among the various groups to select an ideal independent candidate."

A by-election for Sunakawa Town, Sorachi-gun, Hokkaido, also gives an interesting insight into various party election strategies. There were 29 candidates for 14 seats, including 21 Independents, 4 Socialists, 2 Democratic-Liberals, and 2 Communists. Ten of the winners were Independents. Of the party candidates, although the Socialists polled 12% of the vote compared to 11% and 7% for the Democratic-Liberals and Communists, respectively, they had so diluted their strength that they elected but one candidate. The Democratic-Liberals, on the other hand, elected both of their candidates and the Communists one of theirs. The second Communist candidate ran well ahead of the 3 Socialists who failed.

VI. Comments from the Military Government Teams

Many teams have commented on what they consider needless expense caused by resignations which were required by law to qualify for candidacy in the 23 January Diet elections. The expenditures which are completely borne by the prefectures run anywhere from ¥1,500 for a village election to ¥6,269,067 for a prefectural election as that in Miyagi for the gubernatorial race.

In addition, comments on by-election surveillance, platforms, and analysis of results, were submitted by teams to this headquarters.

1. Gunma Military Government Team (Election for Prefectural Assemblyman from Yamada-gun). "Statement of change in political trend between previous election for position to be filled and the Diet election and from the Diet election to the by-election, and your evaluation:

"1. The Democratic party candidates still remain strong and unchanged.

"2. The Democratic-Liberals gained support from the Independents in the recent Diet election so they in turn supported the Independents in this election.

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"3. Socialist Party strength remains unchanged. The Communist Party support shows small gains in each election.

"4. The trend in this area remains conservative.

"Statement of principal issues expounded by candidates and political parties.

"Eiichiro Kondo, Democrat

1. Rehabilitation
2. Promotion of social education
3. Increase foodstuff
4. Reduction of taxes
5. Democratization of education

"Noboru Sunaga, Independent

1. Repair of flood damages
2. Nationalization of agricultural enterprises

"Yukio Ishihara, Communist

1. Rehabilitation
2. Expose of tax evaders
3. Elimination of transaction taxes

"Ototaka Shimazaki, Socialist

1. Promotion of education
2. Revision of local tax system
3. Settlement of mine pollution problem."

2. Tokyo Military Government Team (Seven By-Elections for Members of Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly). "Tokyo Military Government Team had ten surveillance teams in the field on 2 and 3 March. All teams reported the polling places were orderly, the voting and counting were conducted in a very efficient manner. No major violation of election laws occurred."

3. Kanagawa Military Government Team (Election for Mayor of Odawara City). "The Odawara City area is a traditionally conservative area. This is due to the large fishing companies located in the city and an unusually large concentration of well to do and wealthy people who maintain homes. During the election, prior to the one which is reported on for the mayor of the city, the Democratic-Liberal Party polled 18,608 votes and the People's Cooperative Party polled 7,012 votes. It is interesting to note that the

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latter party seems to have lost its influence entirely in this area since that time. This is indicative of the situation of that party throughout the entire prefecture. It is assumed that supporters of the party have been absorbed within the body of the Communist and Socialist Parties.

"Prior to the last election of the members of the lower house of the Diet, Mr. Sato, the former mayor of Odawara, resigned to become a candidate of the Democratic-Liberal Party in the Diet race. Upon his defeat, he refused to again become a candidate for the mayor's office. Mr. Suzuki, the successful candidate, ran for election as an Independent. However, he was strongly supported by all conservative parties of the area and the Socialist Party. This is believed to have been caused by popular desire to prevent the election of a Communist mayor to the post. During the Diet race, Nakanishi, the Communist candidate received 2,469 votes in this area. While this comparatively poor showing could not have endangered the candidates of the conservative parties in the mayoralty election, it was felt that a united front was necessary against the Communists in view of the determined efforts being made by the Communists to carry the election. This was the first important election in this area since the surprising large Communist turnout on a national scale in the Diet elections. Therefore, the Communist Party concentrated heavily on a show of strength in this area. They conducted a strenuous campaign prior to the election. This included speeches made by national Communist leaders Tokuda and other famous Communists. It is reported that this speech alone was worth 2,000 votes. Indicative of the interest incited by famous Communist speakers is the report that many voters from other prefectures were present to see Tokuda. The Communist Party was unable to win the election because of the coalition of the other parties. However, they were successful in polling 6,500 votes, an increase of 4,031 votes within less than a thirty day period between this election and the Diet elections. This Communist vote represents about 16% of the total electorate.

"Although the Communist Party was able to stampede local politicians into a coalition against that Party, comparatively little notice or action was taken by other national parties at an important local election. This is an important defect in the operations of all of the national parties except the Communist Party. It is a defect which if not remedied will have serious consequences in the politics of Japan during the coming years.

"The platform of the candidate, Suzuki, was vague and negative. His was a "gentlemanly" campaign involving nothing of any political portent. He is not a strong political figure. He was elected on the basis of his personal reputation, powerful friends, and strong political support.

"The Communist candidate, Uchino, followed the usual party line. An interesting innovation was the inclusion of the taxes paid by prominent

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citizens of the area in the party platform. This is part of the protest program against taxes. This same technique has been used several times prior to this by the Communist Party in its publicity."

In the Odawara campaign the Party's platform was greatly detailed. Attention can well be paid to the types of issues pushed forward. Most of them can be whipped into highly emotional and controversial arguments. The 42 "planks" of the general and detailed policies are given in Tab D. This series of items is similar to others developed in other areas throughout Japan.

4. The Miyagi Military Government Team In the local general election for the office of governor which SASAKI Kasuji won, expenses totaled ¥6,263,067 and 494,820 out of 792,839 registered voters cast their ballots. The Team's commentaries were:

"The change in the political trend between previous governor's election in April 1947 and Diet election of 23 January 1949 showed parties to be weak, with Independents polling most of the votes. At the Diet election, however, the Democratic-Liberal Party had come to the front and took the majority of the Diet seats.

"For the political trend from the Diet election to the by-election very little change was noted as the Democratic-Liberal Party elected its candidate. One independent candidate made an excellent showing, however, indicating all the political power is not vested in the Democratic-Liberal Party.

"The present prefectural assembly was elected at the time when no party was particularly strong, and is therefore controlled to a large extent by Independents. Since the recently elected Governor is of the Democratic-Liberal Party, it is forseen that cooperation between the Governor and the Assembly will not be at its best. It is possible that a vote of non-confidence would obtain if such a vote were called for. In such a case, it is believed the final result would be resignation by the governor.

"Principal issues expounded by candidates:

Kiyoshi TAKAHASHI - Restoration of damages caused by war and floods, improvement of financial conditions, improvement of culture, increase in production, counter measures for unemployment and labor problems.

Kanroku SAIJO - Revision of illegal taxation and cleaning up of the Prefectural Government.

Kazuji SASAKI - Restoration of damages caused by natural disasters, maintenance of local financial policy, restoration of industry, utilitarianism.

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Takayuki MIYATO - Revision of taxation and the establishment of a wholesome financial structure.

Chiyoji YOSHIKI - Strengthening of industry in rural communities and counter measures for floods.

5. Hokkaido Military Government District The report covered six separate elections; costs for each locality, political trend by parties and a recommendation are given.

"The cost of by-elections to local entity were as follows:

a.	Hokkaido Prefectural Government	¥1,393,150
b.	Sapporo City	756,400
c.	Asahigawa City	410,180
d.	Muroran City	392,720
e.	Shiriboshi sub-Prefecture	2,011,444
f.	Iburi sub-Prefecture	1,112,681
	TOTAL	¥6,076,575

"The political trend by parties showed that (a) for the Communist Party there was no deviation from the Party's Diet campaign issue. Stress was laid on the seeming laxity of collection by officials of all taxes on blackmarketeers and big business. This is a typical Communistic tactic. The Party made a gain of 3.3% in Sapparo; the Party's number of votes obtained and its percentage of the total vote cast in the Diet and by-elections were respectively 5,115 or 6.3% and 5,186 or 9.6%. The percentage gain indicates a trend which is tempered by the individual candidate's local popularity.

"b. The Democratic-Liberal Party's candidates stressed the perfection of better governmental administration and an expansion of industry. This trend does not deviate from the Diet campaign issues. The Party retained its popularity as three out of seven candidates were elected.

"c. The Democrat Party's candidates stressed improvement of business, schools and governmental administration. Three out of three candidates were successful.

"d. The Social Democrat Party's candidates stressed perfection of the local reclamation and repatriation programs, but all opposed the government workers lay-off and taxes imposed on the masses. The popularity of the Social Democrats has fallen considerably. In 1947 this Party was the majority party in the Assembly; now it ranks third. It is believed that the majority of Hokkaido's people want a stabilized government and do not want radicals in their Assembly. None of the Socialists were voted into office.

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"c. The New Farmers Party's candidates stressed farming, fishing and small business cooperatives. As their campaign speeches were along socialist lines none of their candidates were elected. This Party is the majority party in the Hokkaido Assembly by having twenty one seats.

"There were no criminal incidents or serious violations of election laws reported.

"It is recommended that paragraphs 5, 6, and 8, Article 67, Laws Relating to House of Representatives General Election, January 1949, be deleted. These paragraphs make it mandatory that public officials of State and local public bodies resign their positions prior to filing for candidacy. The monetary loss computed in man hours lost by voters and election expenses is an additional burden on Japan's economy. If candidates were allowed to run for Diet seats without resigning their positions and were made to resign upon being elected, the prohibition of holding two offices concurrently would be fulfilled. If the paragraphs mentioned above had been deleted from the current law, one by-election would have been necessary in Hokkaido instead of six, thus saving the Nation some millions of yen."

6. Aomori Military Government Team In an election for the mayor of a town, 82.5% of the ,745 registered voters cast ballots. Moreover only 71 or 1.29% of the ballots cast were declared invalid.

"Inasmuch as this was an election for headman the campaign was restricted to the area of Goshogawara-machi. Notices of the election, personal history statements and platforms of the two candidates were posted on bulletin boards throughout the town by the Election Committee. Speech meetings under the auspicies of the Election Committee were held throughout the town. Newspaper announcements concerning the election were made along with information concerning the candidates.

"The statements of principal issues expounded by the two candidates are summarized as follows:

YAMAUCHI - Perfect accomplishment of the present projects now under construction and planning in the town. Improvement of the education and culture facilities of the town to make it the center of these activities for Kita and Nishi guns.

TAKAHASHI - Stabilization of the financial condition of the town. Improvement of instruction of general public concerning self-governing ideas. Greater cooperation on part of all organizations and institutions in the town for the general welfare of Goshogawara-machi.

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"At the election for headman held on April 5, 1947 YAMAUCHI Kyuzaburo ran last in a field of three candidates for the same post. This was his second try for the post."

VII. Conclusion

Local general and by-elections in addition to reflecting the political temper of the people often indicates: (1) the existence and nature of political, social, economic, and ideological problems affecting the objectives of the Occupation, (2) the magnitude of the issues as revealed by the trend of successive election, (3) the grounds for a proper course of action which military government teams can pursue locally, and (4) the specific areas in which greatest attention should be focused.

Through careful analysis military government units can determine the extent to which Occupation policies and their own activities are directly or indirectly made issues in the campaigns. By watching the fortunes of parties and organizations which on the one hand endorse them, and by observing the fate of those which are highly critical of them on the other hand, military government should be able to determine which areas or which programs should receive increased attention. Campaign criticism of unpopular policies and programs should be studied with a view through increased dissemination of information, to clear up popular misconceptions and overcome outmoded traditions or prejudices; or else it may be considered altogether appropriate to urge revision or abandonment in whole or in part. For it should be readily apparent that only those programs and policies which stand a chance of gaining popular acceptance will take root permanently; all others, besides awaking antipathy towards their would-be benefactors, will be scuttled unceremoniously at the first opportunity. Military government's comments and evaluations form the backbone of all election reports, without which bare statistics are often devoid of real meaning.

Aside from drawing pertinent conclusions as to the significance of local elections in their area of responsibility, which is perhaps the most important reason for their surveillance, military government can also do much to educate the Japanese in the essentials of intelligent politics. By encouraging the Japanese voters to form political parties to take a more active stand in adhering to concrete issues as well as to compete actively in every election, and by educating the people in the methods of successful election techniques, military government teams are aiding the citizenry to secure the desired maximum effective expression of the people's will and the assurance of the defeat of highly organized pressure groups. This task becomes a progressively more important part of the mission of military government in the Occupation.

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VIII. Recommendations

1. It is recommended that the system of plural voting be adopted in place of the highly restrictive (single voting) system now used. In Japan today, the political situation far outmodes the one in which the system was established. The system was adopted to ensure minority representation which one-half century ago in Japan was to come from particular rural areas. The conditions of those years, not to say the intervening ones, are far removed from those of today. The conduct of the pressure groups today with their socially insidious tactics completely negates the effects desired by the early law makers.

2. Further, it is recommended that provisions of the election laws be changed in which incumbents of elective positions are required to resign prior to running for another office. Needless expenditures now saddled upon the local public body concerned would be eliminated.

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HEADQUARTERS
OSAKA MILITARY GOVERNMENT TEAM
APO 25

JSG/sk
3 May 1949

SUBJECT: Summary of Election (Reports Control Symbol MG-22)

TO : Commanding General
Eighth Army
APO 343

1. Type of election - Election for Prefectural Assemblyman

2. Date of election - 23 April 1949

3. Location of election - Kitakawachi-gun, Osaka Prefecture

4. These data pertain to the area covered by this election for the following elections: (a) the last previous election held for the position to be filled by this election. (b) the National Election held 23 January 1949, (c) the present election

a. Number of elegible voters:

	Last Previous Election (23 Feb. 49)	23 Jan. 49	Present Election
(1) Male	30,865	31,070	30,381
(2) Female	34,895	35,150	34,154
(3) Total	65,760	66,220	64,555

b. Number of actual voters and percentage to eligible voters:

	Last Previous Election (23 Feb. 49)		23 Jan. 49		Present Election	
(1) Male	22,339	72.5%	25,433	81.9%	21,087	69.4%
(2) Female	24,291	69.6%	24,341	69.2%	23,323	68.3%
(3) Total	46,630	70.9%	49,774	75.1%	44,410	68.8%

c. Number of invalid ballots and percentage to total votes cast:

TAB A

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	Last Previous Election (23 Feb. 49)	23 Jan. 49	Present Election
Total	594 1.2%	972 1.9%	707 1.9%

d. Total number of votes obtained by each political party and all independents:

Party	Last Previous Election (23 Feb. 49)	23 Jan. 49	Present Election
(1) Democratic-Liberal	21,215	26,013	
(2) Democratic	10,224	3,011	
(3) Social Democrat		8,808	13,602
(4) People's Cooperative			
(5) Communists	11,515	7,578	11,159
(6) Social Renovation			
(7) Labour Farmer	2,548	989	
(8) New Liberal			
(9) Japan Farmer			
(10) Other Parties:			
Proletarian Union ("Musan Domei")		307	
(11) Independent	534	2,095	18,942
Total	46,036	48,801	43,703

5. Number of surveillance teams and other personnel other than military government personnel.

29 in total

6. Were the candidates' purge questionnaires available at the Election Administration Committee's Offices and at the Screening Committee's Offices?

Yes

7. Candidates. If any change from or additional information to Filing of Candidacies (Reports Control Symbol MG-20), place under remarks. Place asterisk before elected candidate.

Name	Political Party	Total Votes Obtained	Period of Time for which Elected	Remarks
• YAMADA Riichi	Independent	18,255	2 year term	
NISHII, Yoshitaro	Socialist-Democrat	13,602		

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Name	Political Party	Total Votes Obtained	Period of Time for which Elected	Remarks
INOUE, Yaichiro	Communist	11,159		
HATANAKA, Kosuke	Independent	687		

8. Number of violations reported or observed:
No violations reported or observed to date.

9. Extent of local publicity given to the election and campaign:

a. Seven thousand (7,000) posters were put up at various places in towns and villages.

b. Seventeen banners showing the date of the election were displayed in front of town, village and District Offices.

c. Thirty-five thousand (35,000) public reports on career of all candidates were distributed to each household. Careers of candidates were also broadcasted.

d. In order to decrease the abstention rate 5,000 posters were posted in towns and villages, and for 3 days prior to the election, chief of the district office and 6 other officials engaged themselves in a public information program on the street, through the use of a broadcasting car.

e. Sixty-thousand (60,000) handbills were distributed to newspaper readers on 15 and 22 April 1949.

f. Sixty-seven thousand (67,000) entrance tickets were sent to oligible voters.

g. Notices stating candidates' names and careers were posted in each voting district and polling-booth.

h. House to house visits were conducted by Primary and Junior High School boys to encourage voting.

10. Remarks:

a. Full details of any criticism expressed in regard to the Occupation Forces or policies of the United States.

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No criticism expressed

b. Any significant political strategy or trend

Tetsu Katayama, leader of the Socialist-Democrat party and Wataru Narahashi and Tetsuo Iwaki, influential members of the Democratic party came down to the electoral district from Tokyo and gave campaign speeches on 22 March 49.

c. Statement of principal issues expounded by candidates and political parties.

YASUDA, Independent
Principle issues presented by Yasuda were protection of the rights of farmers and small business; promotion of education with emphasis on rehabilitation of school buildings, strong measure against unemployment; stepping up of production through cooperation of labor and management; resistance against unfair taxation.

NISHII, Socialist-Democrat
Nishii did not present any main principle issues other than what the Socialist party advocates.

INOUE, Communist
Main principle issue of Inoue was for the cooperation of farmers to protect their rights to insure the fulfillment of their demands and resistance against unfair taxation.

HATANAKA, Independent.
The only principle issue that Hatanaka expounded was the electrofication of electric train line between Shijonawate and Kizu. A local problem in Kitakawachi-gun.

d. Details of serious violation of election laws or SCAPIN, including all violations directly effecting elected candidates or elective public officials:

No violations reported to date.

e. Any unusual incidents or other matters:
Number of votes cast for communist candidate decreased by 356 votes, or 3.2%, as compared with that of last previous election.

FRANK KOWALSKI JR.
Colonel, Infantry
Commanding

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LOCAL ELECTION AND BY-ELECTION SUMMARY

(Reported By-Elections Held During the Period
1 January to 1 May 1949)

1. ELECTIONS FOR GOVERNORS, MAYORS, CHIEFS OF SPECIAL WARDS

a. Elections for Prefectural Governor: 1

Candidates	Winning Candidate
1 Democratic-Liberal	1 Democratic-Liberal
1 Communist	
3 Independents	

b. Elections for Mayors of Cities: 11

Candidates	Winning Candidates
6 Democratic-Liberals	5 Democratic-Liberals
2 Socialists	6 Independents
6 Communists	
19 Independents	
1 Minor Party	

c. Elections for Mayors of Towns: 77

Candidates	Winning Candidates
12 Democratic-Liberals	4 Democratic-Liberals
1 Socialist	41 Independents
13 Communists	2 Democrats
86 Independents	
2 Democrats	

No Election Contests (30)

1 Socialist
29 Independents

d. Elections for Village Headman: 273

Candidates	Winning Candidates
22 Democratic-Liberals	10 Democratic-Liberals
3 Democrats	2 Democrats
8 Socialists	2 Minor Party
8 Communists	89 Independents
3 Minor Party	
196 Independents	

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No Election Contests (170)

1 Socialist
1 Minor Party
1 Communist
167 Independents

c. Election for Chiefs of Special Wards (Tokyo-to): 1
(Special break-down--figures not to be noted separately, having been included in par c, above).

Candidates	Winning Candidates
1 Democratic-Liberal	1 Democratic-Liberal
1 Communist	
3 Independents	

2. LOCAL GENERAL AND BY-ELECTIONS

a. Elections and By-Elections for Prefectural Assemblies: 57
No. of Seats: 59

Candidates	Winning Candidates
71 Democratic-Liberals	28 Democratic-Liberals
24 Democrats	8 Democrats
31 Socialists	1 Communist
48 Communists	2 Minor Party
83 Independents	19 Independents
14 Minor Party	

No Election Contest

1 Independent

b. Elections and By-Elections for City Assemblies: 9
No. of Seats: 85

Candidates	Winning Candidates
16 Democratic-Liberals	11 Democratic-Liberals
6 Democrats	1 Democrat
3 Socialists	1 Socialist
11 Communists	2 Communists
2 Minor Party	70 Independents
153 Independents	

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c. Elections and By-Elections for Town Assemblies: 42
No. of Seats: 463

Candidates	Winning Candidates
20 Democratic-Liberals	15 Democratic-Liberals
5 Democrats	2 Democrats
17 Socialists	10 Socialists
27 Communists	13 Communists
4 Minor Party	366 Independents
494 Independents	

No Election Contests (7)

3 Democratic-Liberals
3 Democrats
2 Socialists
2 Communists
47 Independents

d. Elections and By-Elections for Village Assemblies: 158
No. of Seats: 1,086

Candidates	Winning Candidates
9 Democratic-Liberals	7 Democratic-Liberals
5 Democrats	3 Democrats
13 Socialists	7 Socialists
20 Communists	10 Communists
3 Minor Party	2 Minor Party
760 Independents	601 Independents

No Election Contests (85)

4 Democratic-Liberals
2 Democrats
1 Socialist
2 Minor Party
5 Communists
442 Independents

e. Elections for Special Ward Assemblies (Tokyo-to): 7
(Special break-down--figures not to be noted separately, having been included in par a, above) No. of Seats: 7

Candidates	Winning Candidates
17 Democratic-Liberals	6 Democratic-Liberals
4 Democrats	1 Independent
7 Socialists	
7 Communists	
1 Minor Party	
4 Independents	

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Translation of the planks announced in the ODAWARA Sunday News
Dated Jan. 30, 1949.

SUBJECT: Communists' planks on Odawara Municipal Administration.

On Feb. 1, the Odawara local committee of the Communist Party announced its planks on municipal administration along with the recommendation of Takechiyo UCHINO as a candidate of mayor.

Planks on Odawara Municipal Administration.

Odawara Local Committee,
the Japan Communist Party.

General policy

1. From the municipal administration for the ruined life to that for the stabilized one.
2. Reduction of the commodity price through the proper taxation.
3. Democratic reconstruction of the municipal finance corrupted by the bureaucracy and bosses.
4. Cleaning the collapse of the municipal affairs.
5. From the tourist city to the productive one.
6. Absolute exposure of the tax evasions of the bosses and villa-dwellers.
7. Opposition to the fascistic rule of the Government.
8. Democratic mayor for the people or boss-like mayor for the riches.

Detailed policy

1. Instant cessation of the appropriation of a considerable amount of expenditures for entertainment.
2. Stop appropriating for tourist's facilities, but reconstruct the medium and small commerce and industry.
3. Save the useless expenses exploiting people.
4. Absolute investigation of the illegalities about bicycle race course.
5. Abolishment of all the compulsory donation.
6. Reduce the expenses of the municipal police to half that of today and establishment of the popular police.
7. Personnel cut of the reactional directors with pay in excessive number.
8. Publication of the city-owned assets and their profit.
9. Establishment of the Municipal Administration Supervision Committee by the people.
10. Construction of the great Odawara including Kohzu.
11. Construction of tram way between Odawara and Kohzu.
12. Public management of the municipal bus.
13. Public management of the fish market.
14. Public management of the vegetable market.

TAB C

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15. Building the city-operated residence.
16. Establishment of the municipal hospital.
17. Building the cit.zen club.
18. Setting heavy progressive taxation on the Residential Tax, 90% of which shall be imposed by estimation. Establishment by selection of the whole Tax-payers Tax Assessment Committee and the same committees in each quarter.
19. Income Tax and Business Tax shall be decided based upon the Residential Tax.
20. Absolute emancipation of land and purging the Farm-land Committee.
21. Opposition to the full delivery.
22. Establishment of the Agricultural Bank to loan out cheap money.
23. Strengthening the Agricultural Cooperative Association.
24. Agrarian administration of the forest co-owned by eight villages.
25. Vesting the fishery ground right to the city and fishery right to the fisher-men.
26. Full distribution of the linked goods.
27. Proper price of rice to cover the productive cost. - Proper price of fish.
28. Establishment of the Fishery Bank to loan out cheap money.
29. Establishment of the Democratic Commerce-Industry Association instead of the corrupted Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
30. Establishment of the special bank for the medium and small enterpriser to borrow the cheap money.
31. Reduce the power tariff for the medium and small enterprisers to that of the large scaled industry through the wholesale registration.
32. Bright window through high efficiency attained by high pay for the city employees.
33. Cheap loan of the livelihood expenditures.
34. Expansion and strengthening of the Life Cooperative Association related to the traders.
35. Immediate rehabilitation of the flood-stricken areas.
36. Releasing of big residences.
37. Securing the livelihood of the people requiring protection.
38. Full equipment of the school facilities.
39. Proper practice of the 6-3-3 school year system.
40. Educational expenses shall be fully borne by the National Treasury.
41. Full arrangement of the hygienic facilities.
42. Reconstruction and adjustment of the road and drain-covers.

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Elections For	Prefecture	Election District	% of Total Valid Vote Rec'd by Communist Candidate	% of Total Valid Vote Rec'd by Communist Party in 1949 H.R. Election (Prefecture as a Whole)
Prefectural Governor:	Miyagi		6%	5%
Prefectural and Ward Assemblies:	Hokkaido	Shiribeshi-shicho	5.0%	5.1%
	"	Ebury-shicho	4.4%	5.1%
	"	Muroran-shi	5.5%	5.1%
	"	Asahigawa-shi	9.5%	5.1%
	Aomori	Kita Tsugaru-gun	4%	9%
	Yamagata	Akumi-gun	5%	6%
	Iwate	Shiwa-gun	6%	6%
	Nagano	Hanishima-gun	11%	14%
	Ibaraki	Niihari-gun	20%	8%
	Saitama	Kita Katsushika-gun	25%	13%
	"	Oseto-gun	20%	13%
	"	Urawa City	15%	13%
	Tokyo	Minato Ward	23%	18%
	"	Arakawa Ward	15%	18%
	"	Katsusniko Ward	24%	18%
	"	Kita Ward	20%	18%
	"	Koto Ward	15%	18%
	"	Neriwa Ward	25%	18%
	"	Shinagawa Ward	17%	18%
	"	Shinjuku Ward	20%	18%
	Shizuoka	Haribara-gun	22%	8%
	"	Shida-gun	9%	8%
	Kanagawa	Chigasaki	22%	15%
	Gumma	Ora-gun	6%	8%
	"	Yamada-gun	6%	6%
	Ishikawa	Suzu-gun	2%	11%
	Kyoto	Ukyo Ward	10%	13%
	Osaka	Kita Kawachi-gun	25%	20%
	Okayama	Kurashiki City	11%	13%
	Hiroshima	Numakuma-gun	4%	10%
	Shimane	Ouchi-gun	5%	11%
Mayor of City:	Saitama	Kawaguchi	29%	13%
	Kanagawa	Odawara	25%	15%
	Yamanashi	Kofu	14%	10%
City Assembly:	Saitama	Yoshiwara	3%	13%
	Aichi	Nagoya	8%	10%

TAB D

SECRET

C-791 Mr. EC

BRIEF

PSD FILES

ESTIMATE ON TEN CHANGES IN CONDITIONS IN KOREA
(1 October 1949)

The operation to unite all of Korea under KIM-IL-SUNG of North Korea has begun along traditional communist lines, that is, inciting the people of South Korea to overthrow their government. The North Koreans are tying up a number of South Korean regulars with guerrillas.

Continuous border incidents and rumors of invasion from the North keep the Korean Regular Army glued to the 38th degree parallel.

The South Korean People and Officials have considerable martial spirit, but due to the character of the people it is not expected to stand up under the test of fire.

Continuous oppression by the Japanese warped the Korean's attitude toward legally constituted government and the communists are taking advantage of this.

Little change in the status quo between North and South Korea is expected before next spring.

It is highly desirable that the U.S. direct some of its strategy in the "Cold War" toward bleaching out some of the red tint in Southern Korea.

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 775009

SECRET

C-791 Mr. KO

ESTIMATE ON THE CHANGES IN CONDITIONS IN KOREA
(1 October 1949)

Concerning conditions in Korea, I haven't too much material upon which to base an estimate.

Without doubt, the intelligence agencies of the U.S. Army have far richer sources than my own and opinions such as mine will probably carry little weight but since, as an inhabitant of YAMAGUCHI Prefecture which is very close to Korea and having a definite awareness of Korea because of the proximity, I would like to give a summary based on material gleaned from reports of spies and the broadcasts originating from SEOUL, PYONG YANG, AND KHABAROVSK.

1. Now, North Korea is beginning to direct offensive operations against South Korea to unify the country.

The "Meeting for the Formation of a Democratic Front to Unite the Fatherland" which was held in PYONG YANG in July of this year/clearly showed the opening of the offensive to unite Korea by North Korea, and the declaration of the Premier of the Korean National Democratic Republic, KIM-IL-SONG, "Formation of the Democratic Front to Unite Korea" is, in other words a "declaration of war" against South Korea.

2. The operation to unite Korea by North Korea avoids open military aggression, but rather depends upon the traditional methods of the communists or a revolutionary uprising of the Korean people.

North Korea calls this the "Peaceful unification" of North and South Korea. This is nothing other than a non military unification of both sides of the 38th parallel which depends upon the instigation of a spontaneous uprising of the South Koreans against President SYNGMAN RHEE which will lead to a natural overthrowal of the government from within and bring South Korea under the domination of North Korea. Thus after developing the "red" agitation operation in South Korea, North Korea can do nothing but wait for South Korea to collaps.

3. The North Korean operation for unification is being advanced by tying down Korean Army regulars, by using guerillas and special agents and by converting importan South Korean officials to communism.

The continuous border incidents in July and August, the spreading of the rumor that South Korea will be attached in September, and so forth are methods of keeping the Korean Regular Army glued to the 38th parallel and the policy of attacking unguarded positions in the rear by guerillas plus the

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 775009

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The continuous border incidents in July and August, the spreading of the rumor that South Korea will be attached in September, and so forth are methods of keeping the Korean Regular Army glued to the 38th parallel and the policy of attaching unguarded positions in the rear by guerillas plus the expansion of the "liberated area" centering GOTAI-SAN, SHOHAKU-SAN and CHII-SAN mountains are the substance of the aggressive unification operation directed against South Korea by North Korea.

When we observe the way in which the PYONG YANG and KHABAROVSK broadcasts enlarge on the results of the guerilla warfare, as did the Japanese Imperial Information Section during the Pacific War, we can grasp their intentions readily.

4. Among the officials and people, there is considerable martial spirit, and the fighting spirit against North Korea seems to be aroused, but this excitement seems to be only so much hot air, and one cannot sense any real fighting ability.

At the outbreak of the Pacific War, I, who was on duty in Manchuria saw a supricing state of excitement among the Korean people. However, it soon became evident that that excitement was backed up by no real power. This was based upon the characteristic disposition of the Korean people.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 775009

SECRET

5. When we look at the character of the Korean people which is easily sucked into underground resistance movements which have been going on against the government since the Japanese Occupation, the present undercover activities of the Communist Party (the South Korean Labor Party) which are being carried on over the length and breadth of the nation, have a good chance of succeeding.

There is a tendency among the Koreans, whose character has been given a twist by the long years spend under oppression, and they are prone to look upon the functioning of the government with a warped viewpoint, instead of accepting it meekly. This is an opportunity of which the communist element avails itself.

6. Possibly, there will be no change in the situation in South Korea for some time, but there is a strong possibility that the situation in South Korea may be real agitated in the way that North Korea is hoping for in the long run and one can consider that, by the time for the spring planting at the latest, a state of tension will come about.

The fact that this will immediately affect the state of public peace in areas such as YAMAGUCHI, Prefecture, which are bridgeheads for the communization of Japan by Korean communists, must be prepared against.

From the standpoint of formation and preparation for the "cold war," which the American government will make for Eastern Asia, I earnestly hope that it will strive to bleach out the redness in South Korea.

EE

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDC NO. 775009

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 775009

Zda

COPY

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CHECK SHEET

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No: Subject: Reorganization of Civil Affairs Activities

Note No. 1. From: D C/S, SCAP To: All SCAP Sections Date: 29 Jul 1949

1. References:

a. Ltr, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, File AG 320 (25 Jul 49), SGS to Commanding General Eighth Army, subj: "Reorganization of Civil Affairs Activities". (Incl 1).

b. Staff Memorandum No. 28, GHQ SCAP and FEC, 16 July 1949.

c. Changes 7 to Occupation Instructions 5, GHQ, SCAP, 1 January 1948.

2. Arrangements have been made for representatives of the Civil Affairs Section, Headquarters, Eighth Army, to confer at an early date with SCAP Sections to ascertain their minimum requirements, present and programmed, for field work by Civil Affairs teams and reports thereon. In view of the scheduled discontinuance of prefectural teams, these requirements must be progressively reduced to correspond to the capabilities of field units.

3. In the hearings before the committee on relaxation of controls, the probable reduction in field units was discussed and tentative commitments to reduce the work load were made by some sections. In all cases these should be made firm during negotiations with Eighth Army conferees. The requirements agreed to in the forth-coming conferences, together with disagreements which call for arbitration, will be reported to the office of Deputy Chief of Staff, SCAP.

1 Incl.
Ltr. AG 320 (25 Jul 49) /s/ A. P. F.
- A. P. F. - - - - - - - - - -

cc: Hq. Eighth Army
Attn: Civil Affairs Section

2

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 775009

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Intelligence Section, G-2
Public Safety Division

18 October 1949

At a conference between Colonel Pulliam, Lt Colonel Battey, Mr. Tilton and Mr. Porter, it was agreed that:

1. Public Safety Division, G-2, GHQ, SCAP concurs in the recission of OD 3 Hq 8th Army, dated 6 Jan 47, Subject: Inspection of Japanese Penal Institutions. Retention of Ltr AG 814.2, dated 3 Feb 49, Subject: Relations with the Japanese Police, is desired.

2. Generally observe place of confinement and report cases of persons being confined for excessive periods without trial, mistreated, denied consul or otherwise deprived of civil rights which come to their attention. General observation of law enforcement agencies.

H. E. PULLIAM
Colonel, GSC
Chief, Public Safety Division

CECIL G. TILTON
Chief, Legal and Government Div.
Civil Affairs Section
Hq. Eighth Army

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 775009

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY
Civil Affairs Section
Legal and Government Division
APO 343

EXCERPTS FROM: Provisional Manual for Military Government in Japan

4. SURVEILLANCE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

a. Legal and government officers should visit summary and district courts and local procurators offices frequently. The purpose of these visits is to show that the occupation forces are interested in and are observing the operations and activities of the courts. During these visits encourage and assist Japanese officials in administering justice in accordance with the new constitution, the new criminal code, and other new legislation. Discuss problems of law and procedure with the Japanese judges, procurators, and lawyers. Encourage the Japanese to suggest possible remedies for existing problems and to make their own interpretations of new legislation. It must be remembered that military government exercises surveillance; it does not give orders or interpret the Japanese laws for the Japanese courts. Emphasis should be placed on the civil liberties provisions of the constitution, development of the dignity of the judicial system, elimination of special treatment or favoritism toward influential persons, and reduction of the backlog of untried cases.

b. In the surveillance of the administration of justice, it must be remembered that Japanese court procedure and the almost complete lack of rules of evidence are shocking to an individual trained in Anglo-Saxon law. It is the duty of the Supreme Court to establish the rules of procedure and evidence in accordance with existing laws. All Japanese judges and procurators should feel free to make suggestions concerning such matters. New laws concerning court practice and legal procedure are now under consideration in the Diet. A definite program to familiarize Japanese judges, procurators and lawyers will be initiated by GHQ, SCAP, and this headquarters, after the laws have been passed by the Diet. The legal and government officer should be familiar with the following limitations and obligations placed upon the Japanese courts by SCAP directives:

(1) Criminal jurisdiction over United Nations nationals. The Japanese courts have been divested of criminal jurisdiction over United Nations nationals. United Nations nationals residing in Japan, not connected with the occupation, who violate Japanese laws or occupation force directives, are subject to trial by a military occupation court. Such a court consists of three members, one of whom must be a representative of the nation of the individual to be tried. References are SCAPINS 756, 1218 and 1740, and GO 33 for 1948. SCAPIN 1912 defines united, neutral, enemy, special status, and undetermined status nations.

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(2) Civil jurisdiction over United Nations nationals. The Japanese courts retain jurisdiction over civil cases involving United Nations nationals not connected with the Occupation. However, if the United Nations national thinks that he has not received a fair decision of the issue, he may request the Eighth Army to review the case. Specific requests from such individuals should be forwarded through channels to this headquarters. References are SCAPIN 777 and GO 31 for 1946.

(3) Review of sentences imposed upon Koreans and certain other nationals. Koreans, foreign nationals, or stateless persons who think that they have not received fair treatment from the Japanese courts may request the Eighth Army to review their cases. References are SCAPIN 759 and GO 27 for 1946.

(4) Obligation to prosecute acts prejudicial to the occupation. Japanese courts have been given concurrent jurisdiction with military occupation courts over "acts prejudicial to the objectives of the occupation". They are required to submit a monthly report to the appropriate military government team, with a brief resume of the cases tried under Imperial Ordinance 311, which covers such cases. The legal and government officer must be thoroughly familiar with GO 33 for 1948, as amended, which defines certain types of cases which may be tried only in military occupation provost courts and those which may be tried in either Japanese or provost courts. If the team commander or the legal and government officer has been designated as the local occupation force authority, as defined in GO 33, he must decide whether certain cases will be tried in a Japanese court and recommend to Eighth Army that they be tried in a provost court, or whether certain minor cases are to be tried at all.

6. CIVIL LIBERTIES, INSPECTIONS OF JAILS AND POLICE METHODS. - Jails, police stations, and other places of confinement should be visited. By personal observation and questioning of inmates, determine whether individuals have been confined for excessive periods without trial, have been mistreated, denied counsel, or otherwise deprived of civil rights. When these conditions are found to exist, call the violation to the attention of the responsible Japanese authority and report the violation to higher headquarters. Legal and government officers should have copies of the Japanese constitution and the criminal code. The new Code of Criminal Procedure will be made available to military government teams after it has been passed by the Diet. At present, prisons come under the administration of the Attorney General's Office, but some consideration is being given to placing them under the Ministry of Welfare.

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Coordinate inspections of places of confinement with the team welfare officer. Where Japanese individuals have been deprived of civil rights by the occupation forces, take corrective action by liaison with the unit concerned. The pertinent directives on this subject are: GHQ, FEC Circular 90, 27 August 1947; Eighth Army Circular 6, 26 January 1948; and CD's 43 for 1947 and 33 for 1948. (Circular 59, 1948)

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SECRET

PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION
ROUTING SLIP

	FROM: DB	DATE: 5 July 46
3	Chief of Division	NFP
2	Executive Officer	
	Executive Assistants	
4	Captain Nealon	
1	Administrative Officer	DH
5	Chief Clerk	
	Fire Branch	
	Legal Branch	
	Liaison Branch	
	Maritime Branch	
	Police Branch	
	Prison Branch	
	Stat & Anal Branch	

FOR:

Information 1-4 Comment ___
Action 2
Approval ___ File ___

REMARKS:

Bailey = I do not see any application of this conjuncts to PSD. Ross Mathewson expect us to work up something on it.
NFP.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 775009

1103
19925

DO NOT DETACH

SECRET

G-2, GHQ, FEC

2 JUL 1949

DATE _____ 1949

FROM:

TO: ADMIN

AC of S, G-2	( )	Information	(X)
Executive	( )	Necessary Action	( )
Asst Executive SCAP	( )	Note & Return	( )
Asst Executive FEC	( )	Approval	( )
E/A Admin	( )	Signature	( )
E/A Radio Reports	( )	Initials	( )
E/A Fiscal	( )	Comment or Concurrence	( )
E/A CI Div	( )	Dispatch	( )
E/A Sp Intell	( )	Draft Reply	( )
E/A C & P	( )	Info on which to Base Reply	( )
E/A PSD	( )	Distribution Desired	( )
E/A CCD	( )	File	( )
E/A MIS Div	( )		
E/A Hist	( )		
Administrative Officer	( )	ROUTED BY: [signature]	
G-2 Message Center	( )		
G-2 Supply	( )		
G-2 File Section	( )		
Foreign Liaison	( )	REMARKS:	
Japanese Liaison	( )	Copy of JOINT E 30-600 attached	
Theater Intell Div	( )	JAB	
Operations	( )		
PDM	( )		
Plans & Estimates	( )		
MIS Div	( )		
ATIS	( )		
TID	( )		
Targets Branch	( )		
Historical Div	( )		
Library	( )		
CI Div	( )		
Executive	( )		
Plans & Policy Br	( )		
Opns Control	( )		
Central Files	( )		
441st CIC GP	( )		
Sp Intell	( )		
Coll & Pub	( )		
Public Safety Div	(X)		
Civil Censorship Det	( )		
G-2 Document Research	( )		
_____	( )		
_____	( )		

SECRET

DO NOT DETACH

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 775009

SECRET

1103
19525

G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

File No: **Subject:** T/O & E 30-600 **Date:** NSM/md/jcc 2 July 1949

FROM: G-2 **TO:** All Section Chiefs **PHONE:** 26-8838 **NAME:** Lt Col Mathewson

Comment Number 1

1. For some time since appearance of this T/O (T/O & E 30-600) I have preached that a personnel expert within each sub-division examine this table with a view to:

a. Possible adaptation to existing Theater approved T/Ds,

b. Argument against manpower boards; to requisition military spaces,

c. A check against your present T/Ds, as operative.

We admit that this table does not efficiently fit our own war-tested organization (Theater approved T/Ds). There has been acrimonious correspondence on that subject with MID, who did not consult this experienced theater at all; a point for future argumentation. However, a clever "tactician" can utilize the material contained in this T/O (30-600) for rebuttal to manpower cuts.

2. The procedure is relatively simple: we now demand reasonable military spaces under approved existing Theater T/D as now working. This can always be rightly defined as "war-tested" and "war-born". For example: Theater Intelligence is going to be cut under present manpower proposals, by 15%; we understand, of course, that the cuts aim at the expense of the DACs; as a corrollory we are quite willing to release DACs if we can get military spaces. Argument based on T/O & E 30-600:

a. See Order of Battle Teams CA, CB, CC and CD (Page 14). The team strength is pretty skimpy (as is the entire table, by the way), but they can be multiplied, i.e.: Team CB is at the rate of 1 per 20 thousand troops within a Field Army. Obviously, I can multiply this outfit seven or eight times on the current strength of the occupation forces or specifically the Eighth Army. However, this headquarters is combined; it provides for Ground, Air and Navy. Under this combined character you have interesting possibilities of expansion, vis: Aerial-Photo Inter Teams etc.

b. Under this perfectly legitimate approach, we have the following strengths applicable to Theater Intelligence immediately:

7	Team	CB (Troop Basis Occup)	7 Off 14 EM
4	"	CA (Augmentation)	- 12 EM
2	"	CC (One per 4 CB)	2 Off 4 EM
1	"	CD (One per CC)	1 Off 2 EM
		Aggregate	10 Off 32 EM

This is completely defensible on the basis of existing occupation strength. There is no need for an Ad Hoc committee to determine our strengths in

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Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 775009

SECRET

1103

G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only) NSM/md/lgd

File No: **Subject:** T/O & E 30-600 **Date:** 2 July 1949

FROM: G-2 **TO:** All Section Chiefs **PHONE:** 26-8838 **NAME:** Lt Col Mathewson

Comment Number

military spaces. They would not pass ordinarily on the internal structure in the Battery of Field Artillery. I think we shall throw this argument in their teeth. 1 (Cont'd)

c. New Theater Intelligence has other arrows for their bow, in utilizing this T/O & E. There is a little number entitled "Technical Intelligence Coordinator" (Page 14, columns 11 thru 14), teams CI, CJ, CK and CL. (Look it up; get familiar with your tools). The same argument applies as in the case of Order of Battle, only more so, viz:

3	Team CI (Augmentation)	- Off	9 EM
6	" CJ (Troop Basis Occup)	6 Off	12 EM
2	" CK (One per 4 CJ)	2 Off	4 EM
1	" CL (One per 3 CK)	1 Off	2 EM
	Aggregate	9 Off	27 EM

3. It must be obvious by now that you can continue this game almost indefinitely. The advantage is not the small basic teams (1 officer and 2 EM) but the "Augmentation Process", the relative troop strength multiplications are 20 to 25 thousand troops in this theater; rate the occupation strength as is and multiply the number of teams on that proportional basis.

Theater Intelligence is entitled to a few more spaces (although typist strengths are skimpy) especially for production and editorial:

a. This is one of the weakest items in the whole lot. It does not provide for reproduction draftsmen so in that case we utilize the augmentation team theory, by looking up a drafting and reproduction unit in some other T/O (Army Headquarters etc) and use it. What and where can we find mimeograph reproduction units? In AG and Engineers.

b. On editorial teams (Page 17):

6	Team CM (Troop basis Occup)	- Off	16 EM
4	" CN (One per 50 Indivs in MI Unit)	4 Off	8 EM
1	" CO (One per 4 CN)	1 Off	2 EM
1	" CP (One per 3 CO)	1 Off	2 EM
	Aggregate	6 Off	30 EM

Permanent Record—Do not Detach

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 775009

1103

SECRET

G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

NSM/md/lgd

File No: **Subject:** T/O&E 30-600 **Date:** 2 July 1949

FROM: G-2 **TO:** All Section Chiefs **PHONE:** 26-8838 **NAME:** Lt Col Mathewson

Comment Number 1 (Cont'd)

4. We have so far accumulated for Theater Intelligence the following:

Order of Battle Teams		10 Off	32 EM
Tech Intell Coord	"	9 Off	27 EM
Editorial	"	6 Off	30 EM
	Aggregate	25 Off	89 EM

To this can be added Headquarters Teams (Platoon, Company and Battalion) on a proportional basis as well as any number of additional augmentation teams with composite technicians based on Theater T/D or local situation requirements, i.e.: (if you analyze this T/O) a Company Headquarters type AC, column 5, page 4, is provided if the teams exceed 100 individuals. You have already exceeded it in Theater Intelligence alone.

Aggregate	25 Off	89 EM
Total	114	

This small Company Headquarters has three officers and five EM. In addition, you will find proportional auto maintenance and food service units which can always be had to keep the outfit mobile and account for their transportation, though admittedly skimpy.

5. Here again, no provisions are made for drafting, reproduction and printing. The solution is simple; look up some other T/O and find them and use them proportionately.

6. It is, along these lines, that every unit utilizes these teams. It is especially applicable to TID and ATIS; not so much for CCD except Headquarters, Food Service and Motor Maintenance. By careful analysis all subdivisions might pull out something serviceable. In the absence of any useful application, of course, our theater approved T/D will govern in any case. This whole approach requires:

a. Expert knowledge of various T/Os and T/Ds by G-2 affiliates.
b. Intensive study for application to obtain military spaces.
c. Argumentative check notes to manpower boards and Ad Hoc committees.

NSM

L.A.W.

From: G-2 To: All Section Chiefs NSM/md 2 July 49

1. All addressees will study the above comment and T/O & E 30-600 and be prepared for a discussion of the subject matter as generally applicable, at the conference Tuesday, 5 July, 1100 hours. 2

2. For your information, DA Rad 84301, dated 25 June 49, authorized Army strength for FEC: 118552 aggregate military. G-1 statistics show 11510 aggregate DACs are authorized.

NSM

Permanent Record—Do not Detach C.S.M.

SECRET

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 775009

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PSD FILES

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
APO 500

AG 320 (25 Jul 49) SGS

25 July 1949

SUBJECT: Reorganization of Civil Affairs Activities

TO : Commanding General
Eighth Army
APO 343

1. In keeping with the changing aspects of the Occupation, there will be a gradual reduction in strength of the Prefectural Civil Affairs Teams, culminating in complete discontinuance by 30 November 1949, thus leaving in the field only the Regional and the Hokkaido District Civil Affairs Teams. To this end it is desired that the Commanding General, Eighth Army:

a. Effective at once, commence the reduction in strength of the prefectural teams.

b. Maintain the regional and district teams at approximately their present authorized strengths and utilize DACs to the maximum extent possible. In the usual case, military personnel assigned to a regional or district team will be limited to the Chief of the team, his deputy, and a minimum number of enlisted men for administrative purposes (see Paragraph 3, below). The authorized strength of these teams may be varied, at your discretion, to conform to their respective tasks.

c. By 31 December 1949, discontinue the Civil Affairs Section of Headquarters, Eighth Army and I and IX Corps.

d. Select from the Civil Affairs Section, Eighth Army, the military and civilian personnel to staff the Civil Affairs Section, General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, which is to be organized prior to 31 December 1949. The specific personnel requirements for this section will be transmitted later.

2. Effective 31 December 1949, the Commanding General, Eighth Army, will be relieved of responsibility for Civil Affairs operations, at which time the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers will assume command of the Regional Civil Affairs Teams. The regional teams will be attached to the Eighth Army for logistic support, administration, discipline, and court-martial jurisdiction.

3. In the past, the Civil Affairs Teams have provided local transportation for, and have generally facilitated the movement of, SCAP staff personnel on official business in their respective prefectures. With the

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 775009

discontinuance of the prefectural teams, the only remaining U.S. Army agencies in certain prefectures will be the CIC detachments, which normally are not in a position to assume this task. A survey is now being made to determine specific requirements in the various prefectures. It is contemplated that a minimum number of enlisted men (not to exceed four in any prefecture) will be made available for this duty. These men will be assigned to the regional teams but will be attached to the CIC teams at their respective stations for administration and discipline. Further details respecting their selection, assignments and functions will be issued later.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

A. J. REHE
Major, AGD
Asst Adj Gen

Copies to:

COMNAVFE
CG FEAF
C/S
DC/S SCAP
AG
G-1
G-2
G-3
G-4
DS

Declassified E.O. 12065 Section 3-402/NNDG NO. 775009

AG 320 (25 Jul 49) SGS, 25 Jul 49
Subj: Reorganization of Civil Affairs Activities

discontinuance of the prefectural teams, the only remaining U.S. Army agencies in certain prefectures will be the CIC detachments, which normally are not in a position to assume this task. A survey is now being made to determine specific requirements in the various prefectures. It is contemplated that a minimum number of enlisted men (not to exceed four in any prefecture) will be made available for this duty. These men will be assigned to the regional teams but will be attached to the CIC teams at their respective stations for administration and discipline. Further details respecting their selection, assignments and functions will be issued later.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL MacARTHUR:

A. J. REHE
Major, AGD
Asst Adj Gen

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