

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

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2 Mr. Mitchell: I think there were one or two messages  
3 such as the Admiral speaks of in exhibit 1.

4 Mr. Murphy: And there is also a reference in Matsuoka's  
5 message to Hitler that might lead to such an inference.

6 Mr. Gesell: I thought the Senator was referring to  
7 ones other than in the exhibit.

8 Senator Ferguson: I am. The letter maybe might refresh  
9 you.

10 Senator Brewster: Well, I have a letter from Mr. Mitchell  
11 saying that there was no evidence that the Japanese had any  
12 knowledge that we were breaking their codes or suspected it,  
13 and that the evidence was all to the contrary. Do you re-  
14 call that letter, Mr. Mitchell?

15 Mr. Mitchell: Yes. That is based on a report from the  
16 Department that we made inquiry of.

17 Senator Brewster: Yes.

18 Mr. Mitchell: I did not know it personally. I for-  
19 warded to you their report.

20 Senator Brewster: Yes.

21 Mr. Mitchell: But I think there are one or two messages  
22 in exhibit 1 that makes the same report, that the Japs were  
23 at one time fearful of certain ones of their codes being  
24 broken.

25 Senator Brewster: Well, I have one here, and it is



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

2 dated the 23rd day of June, 1941, from Tokyo to Mexico, it  
3 appears on page 122 of the intercepts, concerning military  
4 installations, ship movements, and so forth and it says:

5 "Furthermore, since the Panama Legation, in their  
6 #62\* from Panama to me, mentioned the question of a  
7 trip, get in touch with them regarding date and time of  
8 arrival. (American surveillance will unquestionably be  
9 vigilant. There are also some suspicions that they read  
10 some of our codes. Therefore, we wish to exercise the  
11 utmost caution in accomplishing this mission. Also, any  
12 telegrams exchanged between you and Panama should be very  
13 simple.)"

14 Now, that, of course, is squarely in conflict with the  
15 report which apparently the Navy Department gave you, is it  
16 not, indicating that at least the Japanese suspected that we  
17 were breaking their code.

18 Mr. Mitchell: I assume the Navy kept right on cracking  
19 them, so we can assume the Japs did not know that. I suppose  
20 that is why they made that statement. Obviously that one  
21 message contains a suspicion that we might be.

22 Senator Brewster: Yes.

23 Mr. Mitchell: But we kept right on breaking them and  
24 I assume that if the Japs had known we had broken them they  
25 would have fixed them up.



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

2 Senator Brewster: I am asking for information.

3 Mr. Mitchell: Well, you asked me if they were not in  
4 conflict?

5 Senator Brewster: Yes, and you agreed that it is. Now,  
6 the intercepts run from July 1st to December 7th and I asked  
7 some time ago for the earlier intercepts, after I was refused  
8 permission to examine the files, as I was reliably informed  
9 that there were five cablegrams which made very specific re-  
10 ference to this matter of which the Admiral now speaks, that  
11 the Germans had apparently discovered something of this kind  
12 and communicated it to the Japanese in this interchange of  
13 messages between Berlin and Tokyo regarding this and in this  
14 matter, - I am simply citing reports which the Admiral con-  
15 firms now, or at least intimates in his reference to the Ger-  
16 mans, I say I am at least surprised that the Navy would give  
17 you the information that there was nothing to indicate this  
18 if there are four or five messages of this character in their  
19 files.

20 Mr. Mitchell: To be specific, do I understand you would  
21 like to have any intercepts back to January 1st, 1941 of  
22 this type that indicate the suspicion, is that what you are  
23 interested in?

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Senator Brewster: Well, I certainly am, but I also call attention to my letter of November 15, in which I acknowledge the receipt of these intercepts from July 1, to December 8, and added I would greatly appreciate if you would send me another copy of this material, as well as a copy of all such intercepted messages between January 1st and July 1st, 1941.

To that, I, as far as I know, have received no reply. That was a month ago.

I think you will remember, Mr. Mitchell, ten days ago, in executive session, I spoke of this matter as a matter that I thought was of considerable interest, in view of the very great emphasis which had been placed on the complete ignorance of the Japanese of the fact that we were breaking their code.

Mr. Mitchell: I understand what you are especially interested in is the messages that have to do with the question of whether the Japs suspected our cracking the code. It is so much easier to get results if we know what we are after. I am just asking you the question, to get an indication as to what you are really interested in.

Senator Brewster: I think my interest has been made manifest also in a letter to you in which I asked specifically whether there was anything to indicate the Japs had



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either knowledge or suspicion that we were breaking their codes, and your reply, based on the Navy Department's information, was that there was nothing to indicate either, and your reply was that all the evidence was to the contrary.

Mr. Mitchell: That is exactly the report as it was given to us. I never asked them what their evidence was, but I assumed it was a fact because we kept on breaking the code, indicating that the Japs were not aware of it. I will get from the Navy just what the basis of that report is. I do not know.

Senator Brewster: You just heard Admiral Wilkinson testify that he understood there were indications that Berlin had given the Japanese a tip on this. I think it is unfortunate that the Navy should have given you a report of this character, if what Admiral Wilkinson says now is correct.

Mr. Murphy: That is two or three times that the statement is in the record.

Senator Brewster: I can quite understand the concern of the gentleman over anything which seems in any way to be in conflict here, but I think it is a rather important point, on which great emphasis has been laid, and I would like to know whether or not these messages exist. It is



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1  
2 very significant to me that the intercepts were given us  
3 back to July 1st when these messages apparently occurred,  
4 in May and June. I have been trying for more than a month  
5 to get them. I spoke to counsel about this in the execu-  
6 tive session ten days ago, and now I am advised that they  
7 would like to know just what it is I am after.

8 Mr. Murphy: You are using that microphone rather  
9 loudly. This is three times that that statement is in the  
10 record now.

11 The Vice Chairman: I think counsel understand, Senator.  
12 I am sure they will continue to cooperate in every way  
13 possible.

14 Are there any other questions of Admiral Wilkinson?

15 Senator Brewster: Yes, Mr. Chairman, I have further  
16 questions of Admiral Wilkinson.

17 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I have a memo that  
18 I would like to refer to the counsel, and might refresh  
19 their memory. It is dated the 17th of November, and signed  
20 by Mr. Mitchell. It was received by me November 17 at  
21 3 p. m.

22 (The document referred to was handed to Mr. Mitchell.)

23 Mr. Mitchell: That is the same thing, I think, to  
24 which Senator Brewster just referred.

25 Senator Brewster: You gave me the same answer?

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2 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

3 Senator Ferguson: Has this been put in the record?

4 Mr. Mitchell: No.

5 Senator Ferguson: I will put this in the record. It  
6 is dated November 17, 1945.

7 "Memorandum to Senator Ferguson:

8 "With reference to your letter of November 16th, re-  
9 questing 'all information that any of the Services or  
10 the Government had that Japan knew that we had broken their  
11 code', there is no information or indication that Japan  
12 ever knew it. All information would indicate the contrary."

13 Now, Mr. Chairman, that indicates that Mr. Mitchell  
14 signed it, and the initials in the lower lefthand corner  
15 are "WDM/CBN."

16 That would indicate, Mr. Chairman, it was answered the  
17 day following the request for that information. I requested  
18 it on the 16th, and the letter came on the 17th.

19 Mr. Mitchell: I have been sitting here wondering just  
20 what the special significance and the importance in this  
21 inquiry is the question of whether prior to June, 1941,  
22 or at any time, the Japs suspected that we were cracking  
23 their code. I confess it would help me a bit to work this  
24 thing out, if I knew just what bearing it has on the case.

25 I am probably dumb about it, but I do not quite grasp it.



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2 I have an idea that maybe that attitude may have had  
3 something to do with the fact that maybe I did not follow  
4 up your request as diligently as I otherwise would.

5 Senator Brewster: I should be very happy to give  
6 you what is in my apparently simple mentality. The  
7 first thing which has interested me a great deal on this  
8 particular episode, Mr. Mitchell, is if what Admiral  
9 Wilkinson now says is correct, then the Navy has not been  
10 giving you complete or accurate information when they  
11 tell you there was nothing to indicate that the Japs knew  
12 or suspected that we were breaking their codes.

13 That has been, as you know, a matter in which I had  
14 some concern about your previous willingness to submit  
15 the data.

16 As I said to you and others, that was the first point  
17 of my interest in this episode.

18 Mr. Mitchell: You made that request before the  
19 Admiral made that statement. I am trying to get back to  
20 your point of view as to the materiality of that in this  
21 hearing.

22 Senator Brewster: I am coming to that.

23 Mr. Mitchell: All right.

24 . Senator Brewster: The second point, I had thought  
25 that one of the very outstanding matters that had been



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emphasized here, and in fact you yourself examined General Marshall at great length regarding this very matter in connection with the Dewey episode, that a great state secret existing here was magic, and that the Japs had no knowledge or suspicion that we were breaking their codes, and apparently very great importance has been attached to that throughout this hearing.

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If there is anything to indicate that is not so, we must all, to some extent, revise our estimate of the situation in the light of that possibility or probability. At least that is my observation in all this evidence. I cannot otherwise reconcile the whole Dewey episode.

Now, if, back in May or June, 1941, there were messages indicating that the Japs suspected that this was happening, if it was of great importance, I cannot understand why this has not been developed. I cannot understand why the Navy will tell you there was nothing to indicate it. If it is not of any importance, why do not they just simply give us the facts and the messages, and if it is of importance, and there is any suggestion of concealment, that is something we must take into account.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I might say, the gentleman from Maine has been absent for some days. Yesterday we spent 20 minutes on tirades in connection with the Republican



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2 National Committee, and now we have spent 20 minutes in  
3 trying counsel, talking about the Dewey episode. I  
4 suggest that we talk about Pearl Harbor; I suggest that  
5 we proceed to inquire as to what happened at Pearl Harbor.

6  
7 The Vice Chairman: I am sure the counsel understand  
8 the gentleman's request now, and I hope we can move along.

9  
10 Senator Brewster: I certainly will be most pleased to.  
11 I am not at all surprised that the gentleman from Pennsyl-  
12 vania is considerably concerned over the necessity of  
13 my replying to the question of counsel. I have been rather  
14 patient myself, and perhaps it is just as well, and this  
15 will clarify it.

16  
17 The Vice Chairman: I think it does, Senator. I have  
18 heard every witness who has testified, and my clear impres-  
19 sion is that the remark just made by Admiral Wilkinson  
20 is the first intimation that has come out in the course of  
21 this hearing that the Japanese had ever suspected that their  
22 code might have been broken. I know other witnesses have  
23 been asked the question whether there was anything to indi-  
24 cate that Japan had ever suspected that the code had been  
25 broken, and their testimony was that there was nothing to  
indicate it, until just at this moment when Admiral Wilkinson  
had made the remark in response to the question, and I think  
that is the first intimation that has come to the committee



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that anybody thought Japan might have had any knowledge that the code had been broken.

Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much for that observation, and I hope you agree with me that this does have a distinct relevance in establishing it.

The Vice Chairman: Of course, if the Senator wants information, I am sure counsel will cooperate in every possible way to secure it, and to give it to the Senator when it is secured.

Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, might I just say I do not think we have wasted time this morning on this question as to whether or not counsel is able to obtain for us immediately upon our request information material to the matter that we have before us. I think as to whether or not the services are obtaining the information for us is very vital to this hearing. Now if we have a request in on the 16th day of November for certain material and that is material that is in the files, and then the fact that we get a reply immediately on the 17th of November, and we wait until the 18th day of December and do not have that information, that question is very vital to the thing that we are trying. Are we getting the cooperation of the services or are we merely here taking what the services desire to give us?



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That is the question.

I raised it on the floor and I raise it again here.

That is very vital to this case. Are we getting what they want to give us, when they want to give it to us, or are they going to give it to us because it is material to this issue as we request it?

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Witness Wilkinson

1 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, may I interpose for a moment?

2 The Vice Chairman: Does the Senator yield?

3 Senator Brewster: Yes, I will yield.

4 The Vice Chairman: Senator Brewster yields.

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6 Mr. Keefe: About the request for information and the  
7 speed with which it has returned, I have asked time and again  
8 for information and some of those requests were propounded  
9 in the first two or three days of this hearing.

10 In one instance it was promised to me in two days in  
11 respect to one request, and to date I have only received  
12 one or two responses of any kind to any request I have made.

13 You will recall that on the second or third day of these  
14 hearings I asked Admiral Inglis in respect to the condition  
15 of the Fleet, in respect to her fighting ability, on the  
16 7th day of December when it was in the harbor. He told me  
17 that the CALIFORNIA was practically hors de combat because  
18 of an inspection and because of boxed ammunition. The noon  
19 hour intervened, and when he came back he said they were  
20 investigating it and he would report to me immediately, and  
21 to date I have received no report on the ships, except what  
22 has come to me from letters from men on the ships, and who  
23 know, who were in a position to know whether their fighting  
24 condition was reduced because of open voids and the boxing  
25 of ammunition, and the type of inspection that was carried

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Witness Wilkinson

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2 on. That is one thing.

3 While we were quizzing the Admiral, Admiral Inglis in  
4 this room, I made a request on Friday and the material was  
5 promised me for Monday, and that request has not been complied  
6 with.

7 I can go on and read the list from my notes -- I haven't  
8 got my notes here -- but I have made at least 25 requests  
9 and I am sure only two or three of which have been complied  
10 with. I wanted the information for the purpose of interroga-  
11 tion of witnesses at the proper time.

12 I have been told that they have liaison committees in  
13 the State Department, in the War Department and Navy Depart-  
14 ment who are standing by all the time to get the information  
15 just as rapidly as it is humanly possible to get it. Now  
16 one month goes by and although you have made an important  
17 request there is no intimation from counsel at all as to  
18 whether or not that request had been looked into.

19 We cannot help but wonder as to what is the cause of  
20 this great delay. That has caused me great exasperation and  
21 I can only say we have been receiving spoon-fed evidence.  
22 If we have the information certainly we will be in a better  
23 position to conduct an intelligent cross-examination.

24 That is all I want to say at this time.

25 Mr. Mitchell: May I be permitted to say something?



Witness Wilkinson

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8 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Mitchell.

9 Mr. Mitchell: In regard to your request for the condi-  
10 tion of the ships on Pearl Harbor Day, when they were inspected  
11 and open and all that sort of thing, I think we have already  
12 brought in some data on that. I think it was during your  
13 absence within the last few days.

14 The Vice Chairman: Last Saturday.

15 Mr. Gearhart: I was sick in bed one day. The report  
16 came to the committee when I was absent one day. I wonder  
17 why that was done.

18 The Vice Chairman: That was done on Saturday when,  
19 unfortunately, the gentleman from California was unavoidably  
20 absent, and we regret that. The counsel made a report to  
21 the committee, which sat for about an hour longer than we  
22 had expected, for counsel to make a report to the committee  
23 on various requests that had been made during the hearing  
24 by the different members of the committee.

25 During the course of that report to the committee I  
recall that quite a number of the things requested by the  
gentleman from California were presented and included in the  
record. If the gentleman will examine the record of last  
Saturday, the day on which he was unable to be here, I think  
he will find at least responses to many of his requests,  
and the counsel made the statement that the information that



Witness Wilkinson

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2 was not being submitted at that time and that had been re-  
3 requested would be submitted as quickly as it could be secured.

4 The counsel gave us a rather exhaustive report along  
5 that line last Saturday. I am sure that many of the requests  
6 made by the gentleman from California were complied with in  
7 the course of that report.

8 Mr. Gearhart: May I inquire as to whether or not the  
9 chart I requested showing the numerical readiness of the  
10 Fleet in the Pacific, that I asked of Admiral Inglis, was  
11 mentioned?

12 Mr. Mitchell: There are so many of these that I cannot  
13 pick from memory the generality. We have been engaged in the  
14 last week checking up from the transcript to be sure that  
15 everything that was asked for orally here in the past will  
16 be submitted.

17 Mr. Gearhart: I requested a chart showing the number  
18 of ships that were in the Pacific on May 1st and the transfers  
19 from that Fleet to the Atlantic, and the augmentations from  
20 ship construction, and then I also asked for that information  
21 for the Atlantic Ocean as well, in chart form, and Admiral  
22 Inglis said he would have it two days later.

23 I have been told -- information has come to me from  
24 reliable sources -- that that report has already been sub-  
25 mitted to counsel. Can counsel verify it?



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster  
The Vice Chairman

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2 Mr. Mitchell: I have no recollection of seeing it. I  
3 will find out during the noon hour if it is in our files.

4 The Vice Chairman: I do recall, Mr. Gearhart, you made  
5 the request about the BOISE. That was included in the record  
6 last Saturday, and I am sure counsel will have the gentleman's  
7 request checked and every effort will be made to comply with  
8 his request.

9 Senator Brewster: May I just ask that Admiral Wilkinson  
10 will check on those cablegrams, the intercepts during the  
11 noon hour so we can get this thing clarified?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: My only recollection was a dispatch  
13 from Berlin, I think, to Tokyo, indicating that the Germans  
14 thought we might be reading the Japanese codes and warning  
15 them about it.

16 Senator Brewster: I understood there were five messages  
17 on this subject between Tokyo and Washington. I would like  
18 to have a complete file.

19 The Vice Chairman: Admiral, you understand the Senator's  
20 request?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

22 The Vice Chairman: You will make every effort to comply  
23 with it?

24 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record



Witness Wilkinson

note that not one question was asked the witness in the last half-hour.

The Vice Chairman: The committee will stand in recess until 2:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 P.M.

## TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL THEODORE STARK WILKINSON

(resumed)

The Vice Chairman: The committee will be in order.

Senator Brewster will resume his inquiry.

Senator Brewster: Admiral, were you able to secure those wires during the recess? I think they were radiograms.

Admiral Wilkinson: I have not been able to locate it to date. The liaison officer for the Navy Department has made the specific inquiry for that dispatch. I have talked to my predecessor, Admiral Kirk, who says he recalls it as a message from the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin to the home office in Tokyo that the German Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop had advised him that there were indications that the Americans were breaking Japanese codes.

I may state, of course, that there were a number of codes, some of which are relatively simple and can be readily broken, others are more complex, and the very reading of one code would not be any assurance that others or the entire bulk of them were being broken. The only indication would be with respect to such a message that we were at least attacking their codes.

I do know that in the late fall, - in the early fall and the late fall we had some worries about the Japanese finding



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster.

2 that out and the Japanese suspicions, although we did not be-  
3 lieve from the tenor of their dispatches that they were con-  
4 vinced at all that we were breaking them and those worries  
5 occasioned our tightening up of security concerning inter-  
6 cepts and occasioned our being particularly careful about  
7 broadening in any degree the text or even knowledge obtained  
8 from the text of such messages.

9 Senator Brewster: When you say there are different  
10 codes, how frequently are they changed ordinarily?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: Again it is a matter for a communica-  
12 tor to give expert knowledge, but there is in general, I under-  
13 stand, two types of concealed message. One is a code and the  
14 other is a cipher applicable to that code. The code is con-  
15 tained in a book and to change it you have to issue another  
16 book. The cipher may be changed from day to day and often is.

17 You must first break the cipher on any message before  
18 you can tell what the concealed message is and then you must  
19 have the code to know what the words which have now been de-  
20 rived, or the groups which have now been derived mean under  
21 that code.

22 Answering your question directly then, the ciphers were  
23 very frequently changed, sometimes from day to day, and the  
24 codes would not be changed so often, perhaps once a month or  
25 even a year or more.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

Senator Brewster: How many are they likely to have in use at any one time? How many would they be likely to have in use at any one time of codes as distinct from the ciphers?

Admiral Wilkinson: Oh, perhaps ten or twelve: A diplomatic code, a naval attache's code, a military, a consular, some very secret codes for each of those and some day to day codes.

Senator Brewster: And the interpretation of any one was dependent either upon breaking it as you did or upon having the code book to enable you to easily translate it?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. And the knowledge that we were attacking a code would not be particularly significant as it is more or less of an international practice. The knowledge that we had succeeded in breaking some of the simpler codes would not be particularly significant. If they knew definitely we had broken their most secret codes it would be a matter of great concern.

Senator Brewster: It is not considered that there is anything particularly reprehensible in this practice, is it? Isn't it a rather well recognized practice in the international code of morality that that is done by all governments in the interest of their national security?

Admiral Wilkinson: I think so. I do not think that governments are particularly desirous to admit it but I think it has been done in the past, sir.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

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Senator Brewster: Yes.

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Admiral Wilkinson: Whether it is being continued today in all countries I do not know.

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Senator Brewster: Wasn't there a rather conspicuous case in our own history during and after the last war about certain translations that were made in time of peace?

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Admiral Wilkinson: My recollection is not authentic at all but I know that in the last war we did have a so-called Black Chamber.

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Senator Brewster: Yes.

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Admiral Wilkinson: And that some time after the last war I believe the then Secretary of State decided that he would abolish it completely and all such activities on our part were then discontinued for a time.

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The Vice Chairman: If you will permit me, Senator, you and the Senator were both referring to the last war. You are talking about World War I?

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Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, World War I. This one is too recent to be known as the last war.

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The Vice Chairman: Well, both of them are last wars now.

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Senator Brewster: Was that discontinued at that time when Henry L. Stimson was Secretary of State?

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Admiral Wilkinson: I do not know.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

Senator Brewster: I think it was.

Now, have counsel been able to secure any further information about these messages? Have they made any inquiries from the Navy Department about it?

Mr. Mitchell: They are hard at work and so is the Army.

Admiral Wilkinson: Mr. Chairman, may I suggest a change in the stenographic record of yesterday at this point?

The Vice Chairman: Yes, go ahead. That won't disturb you, will it, Senator?

Senator Brewster: No.

The Vice Chairman: Go ahead, Admiral.

Admiral Wilkinson: On page 4575, referring to the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence regarding probable intentions of the enemy, in the middle of the page the record shows that my answer to a question was:

"I did not so understand, and I have the information, as I said, from my predecessor, my discussion with Admiral Ingersoll, the Assistant Chief of Operations, and just this morning from Admiral Kirk, also my predecessor."

That last phrase should read, "and just this morning I have received a dispatch from Admiral James who was a predecessor in turn of my predecessor, Admiral Kirk, to that effect."



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

2 The Vice Chairman: Does that complete your correction?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

4 The Vice Chairman: Senator Brewster.

5 Senator Brewster: In connection with the discussion of  
6 the answering of the questions, I believe, of Judge Clark,  
7 about the threat of the American Navy on the flank of the  
8 Japanese operations, in replying to that you pointed out on  
9 page 4712 of your testimony:

10 "Our navy was much smaller then than it was ulti-  
11 mately and in fact at that time it was smaller than the  
12 Japanese fleet in the Pacific."

13 How long had that condition prevailed so far as you  
14 know and on what were the comparisons made?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: Sir, our navy was smaller than the  
16 Japanese fleet in the Pacific. I meant, of course, our  
17 force in the Pacific itself.

18 Senator Brewster: Yes, I understand that.

19 Admiral Wilkinson: I think that had in general pre-  
20 vailed throughout the year of 1941 and the disparity had been  
21 somewhat increased by the necessity of sending ships to the  
22 Atlantic, one of which, in fact, was my ship, the battleship  
23 Mississippi, in May of 1941.

24 Senator Brewster: You brought that from Pearl Harbor  
25 to New York or thereabouts?



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

Admiral Wilkinson: From Pearl Harbor to the Atlantic, and then I was operating on the Atlantic patrol until I came ashore to the Office of Naval Intelligence.

Senator Brewster: Were there other battleships moved at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Senator Brewster: What were they?

Admiral Wilkinson: The Idaho and New Mexico, as I remember it, one carrier and three or four cruisers and some eight destroyers.

Senator Brewster: And what was the relative rank of the two navies before that transfer, approximately?

Admiral Wilkinson: Of the navies as a whole or of the forces in the Pacific?

Senator Brewster: No, the Pacific fleet and the Japanese fleet.

Admiral Wilkinson: I would prefer to refer to Admiral Inglis' testimony on that subject. My impression is that there was a slight disparity against the United States force.

Senator Brewster: Even before that time?

Admiral Wilkinson: Even before that time.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2 Mr. Gesell: May I interpose, Senator?

3 Senator Brewster: Yes.

4 Mr. Gesell: Congressman Gearhart raised before the  
5 recess the question of whether we had received a response to  
6 his request for a statement showing the relative strength of  
7 naval combatant units of various kinds in the Atlantic and  
8 Pacific on May 1, 1941 and December 7, 1941, including a  
9 comparison between the strength of our Navy and I believe the  
10 Navies of Allied and potential enemy powers.

11 We have gotten that material. I handed a copy to  
12 Congressman Gearhart, and we have one copy for every member  
13 of the committee.

14 I interpose with it now because it relates directly to  
15 your question.

16 Senator Brewster: Would you want to put that in the  
17 record now so it may be available?

18 Mr. Gearhart: I would like to have it included in the  
19 record, Mr. Chairman.

20 Senator Brewster: Will you offer it as an exhibit then?

21 Mr. Gesell: We will then offer this material as Exhibit  
22 86, and perhaps we better have it spread upon the transcript  
23 so it will be available to every member of the committee.

24 The Vice Chairman: Yes. So ordered.

25 Senator Brewster: That will appear in the transcript

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Wilkinson

tomorrow morning.

Mr. Gesell: Yes.

(The document referred to was  
marked Exhibit 86.)

(Exhibit 86 is as follows:)

NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, ATLANTIC OCEAN, May 1, 1941.

	<u>AXIS</u>			<u>OTHER AUG- MENTATIONS</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
	<u>GERMANY</u>	<u>ITALY</u>	<u>VICHY FRANCE</u>		
Battleships	6 (a)	6 (b)	5 (g)	-	17
Aircraft Carriers	-	-	1 (h)	-	1
Heavy Cruisers	4	4 (c)	4	-	12
Light Cruisers	4	11 (d)	9 (i)	2 (k)	26
Destroyers	15 (est.)	84 (e)	52 (j)	9 (l)	160
Submarines	150 (est.)	77 (f)	58	9 (m)	294

(a) Includes 2 overage battleships, SCHLESSEN and SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.

(b) Includes damaged DUILIO and CAVOUR, heavily damaged, resting on bottom.

(c) Includes damaged BOLZANO.

(d) Includes 5 ineffective light cruisers.

(e) Includes 2 ineffective destroyers.

(f) Includes 8 ineffective submarines

(g) Includes 4 damaged or incomplete battleships

(h) Interned in Martinique.

(i) Includes 2 interned in Martinique.

(j) Includes 4 damaged or incomplete destroyers.

(k) Includes Yugoslavian DALMACIA and Dutch GELDERLAND.

(l) Includes 3 Yugoslavian, 1 Greek, and 5 Norwegian destroyers.

(m) Includes 3 Yugoslavian, 6 Dutch submarines.



NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, ATLANTIC OCEAN, May 1, 1941.

ALLIED

	<u>UNITED STATES</u>	<u>GREAT BRITAIN</u>	<u>FREE FRANCE</u>	<u>OTHER AUGMENTATIONS</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Battleships	6	16 (a)(b)	3 (g)	-	25
Aircraft Carriers	3	7 (c)(d)	-	-	10
Heavy Cruisers	5	13 (e)	3 (h)	1 (k)	22
Light Cruisers	8	30 (f)	1 (h)	2 (l)	41
Destroyers	85	191 (f)	12 (i)	11 (m)	299
Submarines	53	65 (f)	8 (j)	15 (n)	141

(a) Includes 3 battle cruisers.

(b) Includes 6 battleships damaged and under repair.

(c) Includes 1 escort carrier.

(d) Includes 1 large carrier damaged and under repair.

(e) Includes 5 heavy cruisers damaged and under repair.

(f) Estimated, no accurate figures available at this time.

(g) Includes 2 base ships and 1 interned at Alexandria.

(h) Interned at Alexandria.

(i) Includes 4 incomplete and 3 interned at Alexandria.

(j) Includes 1 incomplete and 1 interned at Alexandria.

(k) Includes Greek GEORGIOS AVEROV.

(l) Includes Dutch HEEMSKERCK and SUMATRA.

(m) Includes 6 Greek, 1 Dutch, 2 Norwegian, and 2 Polish destroyers.

(n) Includes 5 Greek, 7 Dutch, 1 Norwegian, 1 Polish and 1 Yugoslavian submarine.



NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, PACIFIC OCEAN, as of May 1, 1941.

AXIS

	<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>VICHY FRANCE</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Battleships	10	-	10
Aircraft Carriers	7	-	7
Heavy Cruisers	18	-	18
Light Cruisers	17	1	18
Destroyers	100	-	100
Submarines	68	2	70

ALLIES

	<u>UNITED STATES</u> <u>Pacific - Asiatic</u>		<u>GREAT</u> <u>BRITAIN</u>	<u>DUTCH</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Battleships	9	-	1	-	10
Aircraft Carriers	3	-	1	-	4
Heavy Cruisers	12	1	4(a)	-	17
Light Cruisers	9	2	13(b)	3	27
Destroyers	67	13	6(b)	7	93
Submarines	27	28	-(c)	15	70

(a) Includes 1 unit damaged and under repair.

(b) Estimated, no accurate figures available

(c) Number unknown. Not enough data for estimate.



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NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, ATLANTIC OCEAN, December 7, 1941AXIS

	GE		VICHY FRANCE	OTHER AUGMEN- TATIONS	TOTALS
	<u>GERMANY</u>	<u>ITALY</u>			
Battleships	5(a)	6(b)	5(g)	-	16
Aircraft Carriers	-	-	1(h)	-	1
Heavy Cruisers	4	4(c)	4	-	12
Light Cruisers	4	12(d)	9(i)	2(k)	27
Destroyers	20(est.)	77(e)	53(j)	9(l)	159
Submarines	155(est.)	67(f)	60	9(m)	291

- (a) Includes 2 overage battleships SCHLESEIN and SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.
- (b) Includes CAVOUR heavily damaged but afloat.
- (c) Includes damaged BOLZANO and GORIZIA.
- (d) Includes damaged D'AOSTA, BANDE NERE, and MONTECUCCOLI.
- (e) Includes 34 damaged destroyers.
- (f) Includes 26 damaged submarines.
- (g) Includes 3 damaged or incomplete battleships.
- (h) Interned at Martinique.
- (i) Includes 2 interned at Martinique.
- (j) Includes 7 damaged or incomplete.
- (k) Includes Yugoslavian DALMACIA and Dutch GELDERLAND.
- (l) Includes 1 Greek, 5 Norwegian, and 3 Yugoslavian destroyers.
- (m) Includes 6 Dutch, and 3 Yugoslavian submarines.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



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NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, ATLANTIC OCEAN, December 7, 1941.

	<u>ALLIED</u>				<u>TOTALS</u>
	<u>UNITED STATES</u>	<u>GREAT BRITAIN</u>	<u>FREE FRANCE</u>	<u>OTHER AUGMENTATIONS</u>	
Battleships	6(a)	12(e)(f)	3(k)	-	21
Aircraft Carriers	4(b)(c)	8(g)(h)	-	-	12
Heavy Cruisers	5	12(i)	3(l)	1(o)	21
Light Cruisers	8(d)	28(j)	1(l)	2(p)	39
Destroyers	92	225(j)	11(m)	11(q)	339
Submarines	58	80(j)	8(n)	15(r)	161

- (a) Does not include NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON both on trials.
- (b) Does not include HORNET on trials.
- (c) Includes LONG ISLAND (Escort Carrier).
- (d) JUNEAU, ATLANTA, SAN DIEGO and SAN JUAN carried on Atlantic Fleet lists but were not completed or commissioned and are not included.
- (e) Includes 1 battle cruiser.
- (f) Includes one damaged battleship under repair.
- (g) Includes 2 Escort Carriers.
- (h) Includes 2 damaged aircraft carriers under repair.
- (i) Includes 5 damaged heavy cruisers under repair.
- (j) Estimated. No accurate figures available.
- (k) Includes 2 base ships and 1 interned at Alexandria.
- (l) Interned at Alexandria.
- (m) Includes 4 incomplete, 2 interned and 1 repairing.
- (n) Includes 1 incomplete and 1 interned at Alexandria.
- (o) Includes Greek GEORGIOS AVEROV.
- (p) Includes Dutch HEEMSKERCK and SUMATRA.
- (q) Includes 6 Greek, 1 Dutch, 2 Norwegian, and 2 Polish destroyers.
- (r) Includes 5 Greek, 7 Dutch, 1 Norwegian, 1 Polish, and 1 Yugoslavian submarine.



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NAVAL COMBATANT STRENGTH, PACIFIC OCEAN, as of December 7, 1941.AXIS

	<u>JAPAN</u>	<u>VICHY FRANCE</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Battleships	10	-	10
Aircraft Carriers	9	-	9
Heavy Cruisers	18	-	18
Light Cruisers	17	1	18
Destroyers	103	-	103
Submarines	74	1	75

ALLIES

	<u>UNITED STATES</u> <u>Pacific-Asiatic</u>	<u>GREAT</u> <u>BRITAIN</u>	<u>FREE</u> <u>FRANCE</u>	<u>DUTCH</u>	<u>TOTALS</u>
Battleships	9	-	4(e)(f)	-	13
Aircraft carriers	3	-	1(g)	-	4
Heavy Cruisers	12	1	4	-	17
Light Cruisers	10(a)	1	17(h)	3	31
Destroyers	54(b)(c)	13	13(h)	7	88
Submarines	25(d)	28	-(i)	15	68

- (a) Includes BOISE which at that time was escorting in Asiatic waters.
- (b) Includes 4 destroyers assigned 14th Naval District.
- (c) Does not include destroyers assigned other West Coast Naval Districts.
- (d) Status of two submarines not clear.
- (e) Includes 1 battle cruiser.
- (f) Includes 1 damaged battleship under repair
- (g) This aircraft carrier damaged and under repair
- (h) Estimated, no accurate figures available.
- (i) Number unknown. Not enough data for estimate.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2 Senator Brewster: I notice the date is May 1, 1941.  
3 Was that before or after you were detached?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: Immediately before. I left about  
5 two weeks later.

6 Senator Brewster: About the middle of May?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

8 Senator Brewster: So that as of May 1st it would show  
9 the three battleships and the other units you mentioned in  
10 the Pacific Fleet?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: It should so show.

12 Senator Brewster: There has been a good deal of dis-  
13 cussion about the information which was available to Admiral  
14 Kimmel. I think it has appeared rather clearly that under  
15 the limitations under which you were operating there was a  
16 substantial amount of material bearing on the diplomatic  
17 communications which you did not communicate to Admiral Kimmel.

18 Is that the way I understood your testimony?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: There was a substantial amount of  
20 diplomatic interchange of messages that was not sent verbatim,  
21 or even in gist of themselves outside of Washington either to  
22 Admiral Hart, Admiral Kimmel, or to the Atlantic Fleet, for  
23 instance. The summary of those with respect to the status  
24 of the diplomatic negotiations was, however, contained in the  
25 fortnightly situation wherein it was stated what the general



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2 progress of the negotiations was.

3 Senator Brewster: I think in Mr. Gesell's question  
4 yesterday, which was gone into rather clearly, whether it was  
5 not proper to convey that information, and there was a sub-  
6 stantial amount of information bearing on the situation which  
7 was not communicated to Admiral Kimmel. I think perhaps you  
8 answered that "yes", and you agreed it was a substantial  
9 amount but you kind of qualified it somewhat.

10 Admiral Wilkinson: There was certainly a substantial  
11 amount that was not forwarded in detail.

12 Senator Brewster: Yes.

13 Admiral Wilkinson: With respect to the summary, for  
14 instance, of the fortnightly summary of November 15, on the  
15 first page we find the diplomatic situation, paragraph 1:

16 "(1) Japan.

17 "The approaching crisis in United States-Japanese rela-  
18 tions overshadowed all developments in the Far East during  
19 the period.

20 "Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese Ambassador to Berlin,  
21 is flying to Washington with compromise Japanese proposals.  
22 No one apparently expects his mission to succeed, the Envoy  
23 himself reportedly expressing extreme pessimism. American  
24 spokesmen, including Secretary Knox, have indicated that  
25 the United States will not budge from her position. Prime



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2 Minister Churchill warned that if war breaks out between  
3 Japan and America, Britain will declare war on Japan 'within  
4 the hour'. The United States is preparing to withdraw the  
5 Marine detachments from China. The Japanese press continued  
6 to rail at Britain and the United States."

7 Now on December 1st, a similar first paragraph:

8 "Unless the Japanese request continuance of the con-  
9 versations, the Japanese-American negotiations have virtually  
10 broken down. The Japanese Government and press are proclaim-  
11 ing loudly that the nation must carry on resolutely the work  
12 of building the Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere. The  
13 press also is criticising Thailand severely. Strong indi-  
14 cations point to an early Japanese advance against Thailand.

15 "Relations between Japan and Russia remained strained.  
16 Japan signed a 5-year extension of the anti-comintern pact  
17 with Germany and other Axis nations on November 25."

18 Those were the diplomatic advices that were furnished  
19 to Admiral Kimmel, which are a brief summary of the status  
20 of negotiations.

21 Senator Brewster: You would recognize, would you not,  
22 Admiral, that there are very substantial gaps in those  
23 summaries, necessarily perhaps, as compared to the information  
24 available here in Washington?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Certainly. I mean the fact of the



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2 Dispatch of the 10-point note from us and the receipt of  
3 the Japanese reply was not in it.

4 Senator Ferguson: There was the conspicuous incident  
5 of the charting of the waters of Pearl Harbor, which was the  
6 dispatch of September 24, translated on October 9, and  
7 which I believe they indicated was not communicated to Admiral  
8 Kimmel at Pearl Harbor.

9 Is that your recollection?

10 Admiral Wilkinson: That is my recollection.

11 Senator Brewster: With those things in mind, Admiral,  
12 I am somewhat puzzled by this statement in your report of  
13 December 19, 1941, - which was, of course, very near to the  
14 event, - and I quote from that report -- I do not know whether  
15 this has been put in evidence as an exhibit or not. It is  
16 a memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations from Admiral  
17 Wilkinson on December 19, 1941.

18 Do you know whether that is in evidence?

19 Mr. Gesell: It is not, Senator. I think, if that is  
20 the memorandum given to us, it summarizes a report or reports  
21 on his testimony before the Roberts Board.

22 Senator Brewster: That is right.

23 Mr. Gesell: That is not in evidence.

24 Mr. Brewster: The subject is the proceedings of the  
25 President's Investigating Committee, December 19, 1941. .



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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

(3) This was a report from Admiral Wilkinson, reporting his testimony before the so-called Roberts Commission, to whom he stated on page 3, "The Commander in Chief Pacific had as much information as we had, but I myself could not expect that he and his staff would infer positively a raid on Hawaii any more than we had been able to do from the same information."

That would not be a correct statement of the situation, would it, Admiral?

Admiral Wilkinson: I think if you will read the preceding two sentences, sir, it will make it clearer.

"On the evidence available we had concluded on December 1st that the Japanese were contemplating an early attack, primarily directed at Thailand, Burma and the Malay Peninsula, and subsequent developments had proved this to be true. We had not been able to obtain intelligence or to develop by inference any indication of a raid on Hawaii. The Commander in Chief Pacific had as much information as we had, but I myself could not expect that he and his staff would infer positively a raid on Hawaii any more than we had been able to do from the same information."

Perhaps that is not correct in that the earlier dispatches had not been relayed to him specifically.

Senator Brewster: Would not it be a matter of concern, and a matter of considerable interest or significance to the



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2 entire Fleet at Pearl Harbor to know that the enemy were  
3 mapping the location of the Fleet day by day, by five sectors  
4 in Pearl Harbor? Would not it mean more to the Commander in  
5 Pearl Harbor than to anyone here in Washington who was less  
6 immediately concerned?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: Certainly it would be of more immediate  
8 application to him.

9 Senator Brewster: Yes.

10 Admiral Wilkinson: He was well aware that the Fleet  
11 was under constant observation from the surrounding hills.

12 Senator Brewster: Yes.

13 Admiral Wilkinson: And that the reports were being made  
14 as to them. Whether the geographical designation of the areas  
15 by sectors would mean more to him or not I cannot say. Probably  
16 it would, yes.

17 Senator Brewster: If you had been in command of that  
18 Fleet you would probably lie awake at night trying to figure  
19 out just what the significance of that was, would you not?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: Might well have.

21 Senator Brewster: Now here in Washington you had reports  
22 from all over, you had the whole world view, you had Manila,  
23 you had all the other departments coming in here, and while  
24 you were naturally concerned, you were not immediately re-  
25 sponsible for the safety of that Fleet, so it might well take



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

up less of your thought and attention and consideration,  
I can well understand, than it would in the hands of Admiral  
Kimmel. That is probably a fair statement, is it not?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster: So that in the light of what we now  
know it certainly proved unfortunate that it did not prove  
practical to send in some more information regarding the  
developments that were going on?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. That again was a question  
of the security of the code, of which we were becoming in-  
creasingly concerned.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: senator Brewster

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Senator Brewster: In future situations of this character the lessons which we have learned from this will undoubtedly have a substantial bearing on the conduct of our Armed Services, our Intelligence, and our entire arrangements, I assume.

Admiral Wilkinson: I hope so, sir. I hope we profit by all the lessons of the war.

Senator Brewster: I think that is the only justification of this investigation, as a matter of fact.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster: One other thing which I did not follow quite through is the matter of the Fleet.

Speaking to you now as a Naval officer of long experience, when you spoke of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, the American Fleet as being inferior to the Japanese, you meant in the relative strength of battleships, destroyers, carriers, the entire component of the fleet?

Admiral Wilkinson: Including the Naval Air Force, yes, sir. That is discounting any superiority of training and materiel, in which we hoped we were a little better off.

Senator Brewster: Yes. Is it not also true that the power of the fleet increased proportionately to its moving from its base?



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Senator Brewster: As I remember Admiral Leahy, his testimony before us in 1938, when we were considering expanding the Navy, he estimated we would need a superiority of approximately two to one in order to move into the Western Pacific, and take up the Japanese on equal terms.

That involved communication lines and everything else.

Admiral Wilkinson: I think that is more than a fair statement, and when we did finally move into the Western Pacific in this war, we were more than two to one.

Senator Brewster: So when you speak of the Fleet as being inferior, our Fleet being inferior, you compared the values side by side, rather than the fact that there was four or five thousand miles of water that we had to cover.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, a direct comparison.

Senator Brewster: It is probably useless to contemplate, except as it assists us in this lesson, but the price at Pearl Harbor was not only the price we paid at Pearl Harbor that day but all the way on from Guadalcanal to Leyte, and even Okinawa, was it not, in the matter of the depletion of our naval strength?

Perhaps I should confine it now to Guadalcanal, where we went to fight on a shoestring, to stop the Japs because we had to stop them right then.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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Admiral Wilkinson: I was thinking, Senator, that of course we could not say what the course of the war might have been. We might have gone out of Pearl Harbor with what we had in an attempt to relieve the Philippines, which might well have been disastrous in view of the Japanese islands and air fields, and the challenge we would have met from the Japanese fleet.

The temporary losses at Pearl Harbor, and of course the actually complete losses of two battleships, undoubtedly reduced for a time the ratio and we had to wait until that ratio was restored and increased before we could successfully conduct the campaign in the Western Pacific. It is possible if our losses had not been incurred in Pearl Harbor, other losses might have resulted subsequently, and that those losses might have been more permanent, not readily restored.

I cannot say what it may have been in the course of the war.

Senator Brewster: Well, after this initial upset, we did demonstrate a capacity to beat the Japanese on almost any terms from then on. We had no serious surprises, no serious upsets in our procedure from then on.

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. The first campaign in the South Pacific, in the vicinity of Guadalcanal, was



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

h4 2 pretty tough fighting. Our losses were heavy, and so were  
3 the Japs' losses, we hope, but thereafter we began to  
4 have disproportionate losses, comparing the Jap losses  
5 with ours.

6  
7 Senator Brewster: I think it is proper to speak of  
8 it now. It is my understanding that in the Naval Affairs  
9 Committee I think Admiral Stark, or Admiral King -- Admiral  
10 King I think testified that we had to go into Guadalcanal  
11 to stop it; we could not let the Japs go any further, so  
12 it was a calculated risk that we felt obliged to take.

13 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

14 Senator Brewster: Not because we felt it was necessar-  
15 ily easy or feasible, but it just had to be done with  
16 insufficient forces because of the losses at Pearl Harbor.

17 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Brewster: Is that right?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: In part. The ships that were dis-  
20 abled at Pearl Harbor, the older battleships, would have  
21 been strong units in the South Pacific, but they would not  
22 have been particularly well adapted to some of the fighting  
23 there which required faster vessels.

24 Senator Brewster: Yes.

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Our greatest difficulty, as I  
recall, in the earlier days of the war, was the lack of



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 carriers, and of course there were no carriers affected  
3 at Pearl Harbor.

4 Senator Brewster: The estimated losses -- I recall  
5 getting this at that time from Admiral Stark -- the losses  
6 incident at Pearl Harbor, it was estimated at that time  
7 had set us back a year. Did you hear such estimates at  
8 that time?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: I defer to his judgment. I made  
10 no such estimate.

11 Senator Brewster: It would be true that if the Fleet  
12 had remained in being, with the augmentations in the ensuing  
13 12 months, our progress both in the South Pacific and in  
14 West Pacific could have been that much more rapid, because  
15 of the strength which we would have had if we did not en-  
16 counter these losses, don't you think so?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: I should say so, unless we had under-  
18 taken an expedition for the relief of the Philippines in  
19 the crisis that was developing there before we were pre-  
20 pared for it, in which case, of course, we might have had  
21 heavy losses there, and then been worse off than we were  
22 to begin with.

23 Senator Brewster: I quite appreciate that. That is,  
24 if the Japs had not sunk these ships at Pearl Harbor, public  
25 opinion might have been for a relief expedition, although



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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1  
2 when I was at Pearl Harbor in 1940, the standing joke  
3 between the Army and Navy at that time was that the fellows  
4 in the Philippines were just out of luck, that we were  
5 not going to relieve them. There seemed to be a rather  
6 jovial aspect to it. The poor fellows were supposed to  
7 hold out for six months when they knew the Fleet, very well,  
8 was not coming, because it did not have the strength to  
9 go into the Western Pacific until it had the two to one  
10 superiority to the Japs, which it did not have. Did you  
11 ever hear such discussions?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. Not authoritatively, not in  
13 the sense that they were definitely doomed, but that it was  
14 difficult to relieve them.

15 Senator Brewster: I refer to the Captains, not the  
16 top command. I refer to the boys down the line who felt  
17 they were up against it.

18 I think that is all that I have.

19 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Gearhart of California will  
20 inquire.

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: Admiral Wilkinson, during the course of your examination by the gentleman from Pennsylvania you pointed out certain advantages that the Fleet had in the harbor at the time of the surprise attack. One of them was that it was practically protected from submarine attack. And I think you also pointed out that when the ships were sunk they were sunk in shallow water and you were able to later raise them.

You did not mean to imply that that was a good place to have the Fleet if we had been under any impression that an attack was to occur, did you?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I think I was asked in fact whether, as to the contrast between Pearl Harbor and Lahaina Roads, whether the fact that the water was shallow in Pearl Harbor and ships were recovered would not have made Lahaina a worse place to be if a similar attack with similar effects had taken place, and I think my answer was yes.

I did not of myself, I believe, say I would prefer the ships stay in Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact as they were lashed together in pairs and in line, that very arrangement of things reduced their fighting capacity, didn't it?

Admiral Wilkinson: It reduced their ability to get out and reduced the arc of fire of the guns of the inner



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1  
2 ship.

3 Mr. Gearhart: Prevented all maneuverability?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: The single ship would be unmaneuverable  
5 as long as it was tied up. The effect of tying them together  
6 was to delay the exit from the harbor in case of necessity  
7 of the inner ship and also it massed the guns, the inboard  
8 guns, the guns toward each other of the two ships lying side  
9 by side.

10 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

11 In the event that Admiral Kimmel and General Short had  
12 received information that an attack was imminent, within the  
13 range of possibility, those ships wouldn't have been in the  
14 harbor at all, would they?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: Depending on the time of advance  
16 notice he got.

17 Mr. Gearhart: If he had gotten advance notice he would  
18 have gotten them out of the harbor as fast as he could?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: My impression is that he would. I  
20 can't speak for his mind.

21 Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact they presented a very,  
22 very enticing target to the Japanese in the position in which  
23 they were moored, did they not?

24 Admiral Wilkinson: Very much so. That, of course, was  
25 a characteristic of the limited mooring in the harbor for



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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deep draft vessels. There were not many places we could put them.

Mr. Gearhart: Admiral, you were a witness before the Hewitt inquiry?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: That occurred in Washington sometime subsequent to the 2nd of May of 1945 and the month of August of 1945, did it not?

Admiral Wilkinson: It occurred, I think, in June, early June, 1945.

Mr. Gearhart: I will ask you if in that hearing, during the course of that hearing, the following questions were not asked you and to which you gave the following answers -- question by Mr. Sonnett:

"As to the dissemination of information, Admiral, outside of the Navy Department and to the Pacific Fleet, do I take it then that it was the responsibility of the ONI to disseminate information on the Japanese situation to the Pacific Fleet?"

Answer by Vice Admiral Wilkinson:

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"That point was never fully determined. We issued the reports and the bi-weekly summary of the situation but I was told that the deductions of future movements were the function of the War Plans rather than of Intelligence, and this understanding was confirmed by the Assistant Chief of



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Operations, Admiral Ingersoll, when at one time I said that I thought it was our responsibility. He told me at that time that the Army system was for Intelligence to prepare the analyses of the enemy's prospective movements, but in the Navy system the War Plans did that.

"I told him then that I would prepare that analysis myself in my office in order that War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations might use it as they saw fit, and in consequence such analyses as I made weren't transmitted to the Fleet but were given to the Chief of Operations and to the War Plans.

"The same with respect to spot news of the enemy movements. My understanding at the time was, and still is, that I would report to the War Plans and the Chief of Naval Operations the latest operational information deduced from all sources and that they would forward to the Fleet such items as they felt should be forwarded.

"Mr. Sonnet: Would it be an accurate summary then, Admiral, to state that information in the possession of the Office of Naval Intelligence concerning the Japanese movements, for example, would be disseminated by ONI but the evaluation of the Japanese plans or deductions to be drawn from these movements would be the function of War Plans or the Chief of Naval Operations?"

Answer by Vice Admiral Wilkinson:



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 "The latter part of your question, yes. The first  
3 part, the day by day information of Japanese movements would  
4 not, according to my then and present understanding, be sent  
5 out by Intelligence, but rather by Operations after their  
6 evaluation."  
7

8 I will ask you if those questions were asked and if  
9 those answers constituted the answers you gave to those  
10 questions at that time?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: To my recollection, yes.

12 Mr. Gearhart: At the time you gave those answers in  
13 1945, in June 1945, did you recall or did you have in mind  
14 the provisions of Schedule of Organizations, a schedule which  
15 bears the date of 23 October 1940, a schedule which I under-  
16 stand was in effect in 1941?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: I had those in mind as modified by  
18 the instructions that had been turned over to me by my  
19 predecessor and that had been confirmed by my conversation  
20 with Admiral Ingersoll to which I testified, I believe,  
21 yesterday.

22 Mr. Gearhart: The document Schedule of Organizations,  
23 is in the nature of a regulational order, is it not?

24 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Gearhart: Well, your understanding is quite  
contrary to what the Schedule of Organizations required and



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 recited; is that not correct?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: The Schedule of Organizations was  
4 prepared and issued by the Chief of Naval Operations. It was  
5 subject to change by him orally or otherwise. It had been  
6 changed orally by him to Admiral Kirk. It had been changed orally  
7 by Admiral Ingersoll, his assistant, and speaking for him, to  
8 me.

9 I considered that the change had been made orally and  
10 did not require the textual change in writing.

11 Mr. Gearhart: Now, are you giving hearsay evidence in  
12 reference to verbal changes by Admiral Stark, or are you  
13 reciting your own information received from the lips of  
14 Admiral Stark?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: I am giving the hearsay information  
16 received officially from my predecessor, and I am giving you  
17 information received from Admiral Stark's first assistant,  
18 Admiral Ingersoll, who spoke for him.

19 Mr. Gearhart: Now, regardless of that, the schedule  
20 of organizations provides that, in respect to both foreign  
21 and domestic intelligence, that the ONI should "evaluate the  
22 information collected and disseminate as advisable"?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

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25 follows



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

Mr. Gearhart: All right.

I find in the correspondence a letter dated 18 February, 1941 from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark, to which there is appended a postscript, which I will read:

"I have recently been told by an officer fresh from Washington that ONI considers it the function of Operations to furnish the Commander in Chief with the information of a secret nature. I have heard also that Operations considers it responsible for furnishing the same type of information to that of ONI. I do not know that we have missed anything but if there is any doubt as to whose responsibility it is to keep the Commander in Chief fully informed with pertinent reports on subjects that should be of interest to the Fleet, will you kindly fix that responsibility so that there will be no misunderstanding?"

I also find Admiral Stark's answer to Admiral Kimmel, dated 22 March, 1941, in which he says:

"With reference to your postscript on the subject of Japanese trade routes and responsibility for the furnishing of secret information to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific, Kirk informs me that ONI is fully aware of its responsibility in keeping you adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States. He further says that

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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information concerning the location of all Japanese merchant ships is forwarded by airmail weekly to you, and that if you wish this information can be issued more directly or sent by dispatch."

I also find a memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, dated March 11, 1941, signed A. G. Kirk; from the Office of Naval Intelligence, which is apparently the basis for Admiral Stark's answer to the postscript of Admiral Kimmel's letter in which it is stated:

"4. The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility of this division to keep the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States."

Now, with those letters in mind, I will ask you, first, the A. G. Kirk that signed the memorandum of March 11, 1941, to the Chief of Naval Operations, was then Director of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: That is the position you later held?

Admiral Wilkinson: I relieved him directly.

Mr. Gearhart: When you became Chief of Naval Operations, did Admiral Kirk inform you of that correspondence between Admiral Hart and Admiral Kimmel and of his memorandum



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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 which was sent around?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: Not specifically.

4 Mr. Gearhart: When you talked with Admiral Ingersoll,  
5 the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, as you testified  
6 in the Hewitt inquiry, and told Admiral Ingersoll in effect  
7 that you thought it was your function to evaluate and dis-  
8 seminate the intelligence, did you find and give him these  
9 precedents to support your position?

10 Admiral Wilkinson: No.

11 Mr. Gearhart: Did you ever discuss the subject with  
12 your senior subordinates in the office?

13 Admiral Wilkinson: Frequently.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Some of them had been on duty much  
15 longer than you had, had they not?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Did any of them recall to you the memoran-  
18 dum of Admiral Kirk?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall that they did, and  
20 do not believe they did, sir. I think it was generally  
21 understood that we had the responsibility and I accepted  
22 it, of keeping the forces afloat, including the Commander  
23 in Chief, Pacific, of all information, informed of all in-  
24 formation except that which through our instructions, was  
25 specifically excepted, and if I may I will read my answer

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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of yesterday:

"I said that the text of the regulations which you introduced read 'evaluate the information collected and disseminate as advisable.'

"I understood our duties to be, and still understand, to disseminate and spread abroad all types of basic information, what General Miles had termed static information, such as the defenses of the country, its economics, the diplomatic relations, the characters and activities and previous careers of its military and naval men, the location of its fleets, the actual movements of its fleets and everything other than the enemy's probable intentions, and such specific information as in itself might give rise or might require action by our fleet or by our naval forces.

"In the latter case, before dissemination, I would consult higher authority, either the Assistant Chief, the Chief of Naval Operations, or my colleague, Chief of War Plans, in order that this information that I sent out would not be in conflict with his understanding of the naval situation, and the operations for which he was responsible."

That is the end of my answer, sir.

I will explain further that it would obviously be



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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undesirable for me to send out information which on its receipt would cause the Commander in Chief to take such action as would be in conflict with the action which was desired by the responsible officer in the Department for War Plans.

Mr. Gearhart: And still Admiral Kirk issues a memorandum in which he says that it is his responsibility and we have also in the record that Admiral Stark says it was the responsibility of ONI.

Admiral Wilkinson: I think that last sentence of Admiral Kirk's is not as all-embracing as you would have it be, if you would mind reading it again, sir, the last part of Admiral Kirk's letter.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, Admiral Kirk says:

"The Division of Naval Intelligence is fully aware that it is the responsibility of this Division to keep the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United States."

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: That is pretty definite, isn't it?

Let's pursue it a little further. It is an interesting subject.

Admiral Wilkinson: All right.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: I find among the correspondence a letter from Admiral Kimmel, Chief of Naval Operations, dated 26 May, 1941, entitled "Survey of Conditions in the Pacific Fleet."

In this letter there appears under Title VII, "Information:"

"Information.

"(a) The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is as a rule not informed as to the policy or change of policy reflected in current events and naval movements, and as a result is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in some course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

"It is realized that on occasion the rapid development in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and perhaps even the lack of knowledge of the Military authorities themselves, may militate against the



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to modify, adapt, or even reorient his possible course of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation where the necessity for intensive training of a partially trained fleet must be carefully balanced against the debility of this training by strategic dispositions or otherwise to meet impending eventualities.

"Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island developments, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

"It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principal that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur, and by the quickest secure means available."

Did you see this letter after you arrived and assumed



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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the duties as Director of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I am not sure that

Admiral Kirk saw it.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: I find that Admiral Stark testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry, and I quote his testimony:

"You considered the letter Exhibit 33 so good, did you not, Admiral Stark, that you caused it to be reproduced and distributed in a restricted area upon its receipt among important offices in the Navy Department?"

Answer:

"Yes. It was our general custom to do that and I mimeographed this, sent it to all hands who were concerned, followed it up and, as I recall, assembled all concerned for Admiral Kimmel to talk to himself in my office."

Did you see the mimeographed copy that Admiral Stark, according to his testimony, had prepared and distributed to the Navy Department?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Did Admiral Stark mention this letter to you after you assumed your duties?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: I find that Admiral Stark testified further before the Naval Court of Inquiry in respect to this letter, and I quote:

"Have you any comment on the last sentence in the last paragraph of 7?"

Answer:



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2 "About being guided by broad policy and objectives  
3 rather than by categorical instructions? I have just covered  
4 that. You mean the next paragraph?"

5 "Yes."

6 Answer:

7 "(Reading). 'It is suggested that it be made a cardinal  
8 principle that the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet be immed-  
9 ately informed of all important developments as they occur  
10 and by the quickest secure means available.' I was in complete  
11 concurrence with him on that and that was one of my objectives,  
12 yes."

13 "You agreed with Admiral Kimmel then that the Commander  
14 in Chief of the Pacific Fleet should be, insofar as you were  
15 able, immediately informed of all important developments as  
16 they occurred, and by the quickest secure means available?"

17 "Yes."

18 Did Admiral Stark tell you after you became Director of  
19 Naval Intelligence that one of his objectives was that the  
20 Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of  
21 all important developments as they occurred by the quickest  
22 secure means?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: Not to my recollection.

24 Mr. Gearhart: I find in the correspondence a letter  
25 from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark dated 26 July 1941 --



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 by the way, when did you become Director?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: 15 October 1941.

4 Mr. Gearhart: This is a quotation of Admiral Stark --  
5 pardon me, it is a quotation from Admiral Kimmel's letter to  
6 Admiral Stark of July 26, 1941:

7 "1. The importance of keeping the Commander in Chief  
8 advised of department policies and decisions and the changes  
9 in policy and decisions to meet the changes in the international  
10 situation."

11 Sub-paragraph a:

12 "We have as yet received no official information as to  
13 the United States attitude toward Russia's participation in  
14 the war, particularly as to the degree of operation, if any,  
15 in the Pacific between the United States and Russia, if and  
16 when we become active participants. Present plans do not  
17 include Russia and do not provide for coordinated action,  
18 joint use of bases, joint communications systems, and the like.  
19 The new situation opens up possibilities for us which may be  
20 fully explored\*\*\*" and so on.

21 Then Admiral Kimmel asked a number of questions:

22 "Will England declare war on Japan."

23 The answer to 1 is in the affirmative -- and so on.

24 He asked all the questions possible about the situation  
25 which might develop in the Pacific.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Did you know anything about that long letter that he  
3 wrote to Admiral Stark?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not know, sir. I think normally  
5 that would be prepared in the division of War Plans which has  
6 cognizance of the plans you speak of, whether there was  
7 coordination between Russia and America, and so on. Anything  
8 with regard to our own participation or the participation of  
9 other nations in conjunction with us.

(6) 10 Mr. Gearhart: Your answer is interesting in view of  
11 Admiral Stark's answer to Admiral Kimmel, from which I will  
12 quote. His letter was dated August 19, 1941. That is getting  
13 pretty close up to your tenure, is it not? I will quote  
14 a portion:

15 "I can readily understand your wish to be kept informed  
16 as to the department policies and decisions and the changes  
17 thereto which must necessarily be made to meet the changes  
18 in the international situation. This we are trying to do, and  
19 if you do not get as much information as you think you should  
20 get the answer probably is that the situation which is upper-  
21 most in your mind has just not jelled sufficiently for us to  
22 give you anything authoritative."

23 Evidently Admiral Stark thought that that responsibility  
24 was ONI's, didn't he?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I should say that a



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 situation which has not jelled is a matter for the State  
3 Department, a matter of international relations. As I heard  
4 you, and I may not have understood it, that was a question  
5 of a fluid situation, an international situation.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Then I understand that you still believe  
7 that the organizational order of ONI didn't mean what it said  
8 during your tenure as Director of the Office of Naval In-  
9 telligence?

10 Admiral Wilkinson: It meant, as I interpreted it, and  
11 as it had been amended to me verbally, and as I mentioned  
12 yesterday, there was one whole paragraph with regard to the  
13 Division of Public Relations which viewed as it stood would  
14 give us authority and instructions as to what to do with  
15 Public Relations, they had been completely lifted out of my  
16 office, but the order of over a year's standing had not been  
17 amended, but there was no order, and I don't know that one  
18 was required to show textual changes in each order every  
19 time a directive of any sort was issued in modification of it,  
20 whether that directive was in text or orally.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Did Admiral Stark ever call you in and  
22 tell you that you should disregard the Schedule of Organizations  
23 in respect to the evaluation of information collected and of  
24 disseminating it as was deemed advisable?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: I never asked Admiral Stark that.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 I had the word from my predecessor and I confirmed it by  
3 instructions from Admiral Stark's responsible assistant.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Did Admiral Kirk tell you to disregard  
5 his memorandum which he had issued just a short time before  
6 to the contrary effect?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: I don't consider the memorandum is  
8 to the contrary effect, sir, if you speak of that letter which  
9 you read to me, because that is a broad and all-embracing  
10 program, and what he told me was specific orders he had re-  
11 ceived from Admiral Stark which he stated had been received  
12 in the presence of Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Turner.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Well now, to quote his memorandum again --  
14 there is no use disregarding its import --

15 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, except it is very broad.

16 Mr. Gearhart: (Reading)

17 "Naval Intelligence is fully aware it is the responsi-  
18 bility of this Division to keep the Commander in Chief Pacific  
19 Fleet adequately informed concerning foreign nations, activities  
20 of these nations, and disloyal elements within the United  
21 States."

22 Did Admiral Kirk ever tell you to disregard that memorandum?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: That is a very broad statement.  
24 There were limitations and modifications to it such as I  
25 mentioned. Admiral Kirk never told me of the memorandum itself



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

and, as I mentioned, I never saw the memorandum, but I do recognize that in the broad sense that is the responsibility of the office, as it may have been amended by instructions received from higher authority, which I mentioned, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Then I will ask you, Admiral Wilkinson, why didn't you transmit the information that was contained in the intercepts to Admiral Kimmel, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, when the information pointed directly to Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson: The information contained in those intercepts pointed to many sources.

Mr. Gearhart: I am not talking about the ones that pointed to Panama or the ones that pointed to any other place, but the ones that pointed directly to Hawaii. Was not it your duty to transmit the information contained in intercepts that reached your desk which did point directly to Hawaii and did evidence an inordinate interest by the Japanese in conditions which existed on Oahu Island?

Admiral Wilkinson: We did not, perhaps erroneously, recognize that that was an inordinate interest in Hawaii. We had found inquiries and reports of similar investigations in many ports. We considered that those were part, as I have said, of the degree of nicety of the Japanese Intelligence. We did not send this to the Commander in Chief, partly in



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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error, perhaps we didn't recognize it pointed specifically to an attack on Hawaii, and partly also because we were very jealous at that time of the security of the code and the fact that we were breaking the code, as Senator Brewster has mentioned they were already suspicious that we were attacking the code, and we continued to discourage that suspicion.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: There were some intercepts which reached your desk which indicated on the part of the Japanese an inordinate interest in conditions existing in Panama?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Did you inform the Commanding General and the Commanding Admiral at Panama?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Of those messages?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, they were of a special concern to the commanders at Panama?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Why did you not give them that specific information which pointed their way?

Admiral Wilkinson: It was well known that a great deal of espionage activity was going on throughout all of our coastal areas, and our island possessions. That information as to those espionage activities was known and sent by the Office of Naval Intelligence to the District Intelligence officers located in those various ports. That information which they received, plus that which we collected on the spot, was conveyed to the local commander in every instance. The Commander in Chief of Hawaii, the Naval Commander in Panama, the Commander in Chief of Manila,



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 were all aware that their forces were under constant  
3 espionage. They were so aware because of the activities  
4 of the Intelligence agencies, and our own representatives  
5 there.

6 These messages that you speak of, which pointed to  
7 the desire for information in those various ports, were  
8 of themselves but confirmatory of the espionage activities  
9 which were already known and which were constantly being  
10 kept before the commanders.

11 Mr. Gearhart: Well, the situation still remains  
12 that you had information, very much definite information  
13 which you did not transmit to the commanders in the field  
14 that were in command in the areas, that the information you  
15 had related to.

16 Admiral Wilkinson: That information was little more  
17 than what they had through their own intelligence agencies,  
18 Mr. Congressman. They were aware that they were the  
19 subject of constant espionage, that the result of that  
20 espionage was being transmitted back to Japan. We knew  
21 that photographs were being taken of the Fleet in Hawaii.  
22 In fact, we endeavored to secure a law to prevent the taking  
23 of photographs and were unsuccessful, and the commanders of  
24 the Fleet were aware of that, all of that.

25 The specific inquiry as to the division of Pearl Harbor

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WARD &amp; PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 into several areas and the location of ships in those  
3 areas was another refinement on that intelligence, a refine-  
4 ment which we perhaps should have recognized as indicating  
5 a possible attack.

6 It would also be indicated similarly elsewhere, but  
7 the fact that a comprehensive espionage was being carried  
8 on was, I think, known through the district intelligence  
9 officers to the Naval Commanders in all of these ports,  
10 and I know that the time I was in Hawaii, that we were  
11 cognizant of that fact, and we were helpless to stop it.

12 We could not censor the mails. We could not censor  
13 the dispatches. We could not prevent the taking of photo-  
14 graphs. We could not arrest Japanese suspects. There was  
15 nothing we could do to stop it, and all hands knew that  
16 espionage was going on all along, and reports were going  
17 back to Japan.

18 Mr. Gearhart: My dear sir, don't you think that you  
19 were assuming a tremendous responsibility in deciding in  
20 your mind what Admiral Kimmel knew and what the Admiral  
21 in command at Panama knew?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I think that from the  
23 reports that we had sent to our district intelligence officers  
24 and those returned by them, we knew they were acquainted  
25 with the espionage. But these particular messages, indicating



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 as it has been said, a bombing plan, were not sent out in  
3 view of the attempts at security of the code breaking  
4 apparatus, code breaking process that we were then main-  
5 taining.

6 Mr. Gearhart: In view of the fact that Admiral Kimmel  
7 was writing to Admiral Stark for information, begging for  
8 information almost monthly or weekly, don't you think he  
9 was entitled to know that a Japanese intercept had disclosed  
10 that the Japanese had divided Oahu into five areas, and  
11 that the Japanese were demanding and their confederates on  
12 that island were reporting day by day on the movements of  
13 ships into and out of Pearl Harbor, -- don't you think that  
14 that was information Admiral Kimmel was entitled to have?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: With the exception of a division  
16 of Pearl Harbor into these areas, I think Admiral Kimmel  
17 was aware that some such process of survey, espionage and  
18 reports was under way; I think he was aware of that by  
19 virtue of his contacts with the district intelligence  
20 officer.

21 Mr. Gearhart: But the point remains you had definite  
22 information to the effect that I have just described, and  
23 you thought you were fulfilling your full responsibility  
24 when you left Admiral Kimmel to guess that they were exercis-  
25 ing espionage over his command?



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Admiral Wilkinson: I did not leave him to guess. Our district intelligence officer and his fleet intelligence officer was aware of the espionage. The only thing he was not aware of was the message dividing the harbor into five parts, which might have been for convenience in locating it on a map, and which probably was, as we now appreciate, information convenient in establishing an attack.

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Mr. Gearhart: Yes, and that would indicate to any man that they were dividing that harbor into parts for the purpose of making more convenient a possible attack?

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Admiral Wilkinson: Very possible.

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Mr. Gearhart: Wouldn't that have been mighty important information for Admiral Kimmel to have?

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Admiral Wilkinson: It would have been useful. He had been writing himself of the dangers of an air attack. He had been drawing up plans for protection against an air attack. He was convinced that there was a possibility and a threat of an air attack. It would have been a confirmation of his suspicions.

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Mr. Gearhart: And being a confirmation of his suspicions, he probably would have acted, would he not, in the light of that confirmation?

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Admiral Wilkinson: I am not sure. The message that arrived was translated on October 9. If he had had the



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 message on October 10th, what action he would have taken,  
3 I don't know. He couldn't keep the Fleet at sea for two  
4 or three months.

5 Mr. Gearhart: He didn't have to bring them all in  
6 at one time, did he?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, he didn't. Ordinarily  
8 he had them operating in three sections, as I recall, of  
9 which two were at sea at one time.

10 Mr. Gearhart: Two less three battleships.

11 Admiral Wilkinson: Well, that was a particular inci-  
12 dent, as you recall, in that period, but the normal schedule  
13 called for their operating in three sections, of dividing  
14 the battleships, I believe, among two, if not three, and  
15 having them at sea, only one in port at any time.

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: Now, that information of the division of Hawaii into five areas, supported by six other intercepts, each one reporting in respect to those areas and with respect to the set-up in the harbor, taken all together probably would have a very decided effect upon the mind of the commander in Hawaii, the commander charged with the defense of the fleet and of our military and naval establishments there, would it not?

Admiral Wilkinson: I should think so. What effect it would have I do not know, sir, in view of the relatively protracted length of time that was affected, nearly two months, whether he would have kept the fleet at sea continually or would have pursued a rotational plan he had in effect.

Mr. Gearhart: If Admiral Kimmel had been informed by furnishing him either copies of the intercepts or the substance thereof, that the Japanese were constantly calling for further information with respect to ship movements, that would probably have had an effect upon the commander of the island, would it not?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, further information with respect to the ship movements might well have been desirable for him to know, but I do not think it would have affected the status of the fleet if he had known of these things.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, you are giving us an expression of



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 your thoughts now, aren't you?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. That is what you asked me.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Have you a right to assume that Admiral  
5 Kimmel would have thought the same way you do now or then?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: Not at all, except as a naval offi-  
7 cer, sir.

8 Mr. Gearhart: As commanding officer he had a right to  
9 make those decisions and make whatever conclusions he pleased  
10 from the information that you should have supplied him with,  
11 is that not correct?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: He had a right to make any conclusion  
13 which he pleased. I am not quite as yet in agreement with the  
14 fact I should have supplied it to him.

15 Mr. Gearhart: And by withholding from him that informa-  
16 tion you withheld from him the right to decide what importance  
17 should be attached to those messages, you denied to him the  
18 right to evaluate those messages in that way, didn't you,  
19 and you denied him the right to act in the light of what  
20 information those messages conveyed, didn't you?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: I denied -- in the first place, I  
22 am not convinced that it was I who was withholding them. In  
23 the second place, whoever withheld them was not denying him  
24 these facilities but not furnishing him the opportunity to  
25 work upon them.



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. Now, I have been referring specifi-  
3 cally to the messages which appear --

4 Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman  
5 yield at this point because I wanted to complete what I had  
6 which bears on this particular point you are discussing, which  
7 you just concluded. Are you through with that phase of it?

8 Mr. Gearhart: I was just going to conclude that phase  
9 of it by calling attention to him that I am referring to the  
10 messages that appear on page 12, 13, 14, and 15 of exhibit 2  
11 in this proceeding. Now do you want me to yield?

12 Senator Brewster: If you will, at that point.

13 I did not perhaps make it clear, Admiral, as to the pur-  
14 port of my questioning on your testimony before the Roberts  
15 Commission which bears I think very directly on this point  
16 that Mr. Gearhart has been stressing and I think that in  
17 justice to you it ought to be clear.

18 As I understand now, I did not realize that your testi-  
19 mony was not taken down before the Roberts Commission; that  
20 you appeared before them and testified off the record.

21 Admiral Wilkinson: My testimony was not intentionally  
22 off the record, but it was not recorded and reduced except as  
23 a summary of the statement, I believe.

24 Senator Brewster: Yes. So that this record which you  
25 made immediately thereafter for Admiral Stark was the only



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

2 record, apparently, of your testimony?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: Apparently and which, of course, was  
4 my recollection after the fact.

5 Senator Brewster: Now, the Roberts Commission, after  
6 the preliminaries on the first page, apparently thought it  
7 was important, - they apparently did attach great importance  
8 to this question of information that Admiral Kimmel had re-  
9 ceived, because at the bottom of the first page you state  
10 (Reading):

11 " They then asked me what information and communi-  
12 cations had been sent during the months preceding the  
13 attack."

14 And you turned in a full page there of information you  
15 furnished and then you say at the bottom of page 2:

16 "Without mentioning particular dispatches, we had  
17 assured ourselves that all of this information had either  
18 passed through the CINCS Asiatic and Pacific Fleets or,  
19 if not, had been furnished them from the Department."

20 Then came the next paragraph which I have quoted. "The  
21 Commander-in-Chief Pacific had as much information as we had."

22 I think you have now agreed in both the colloquies with  
23 Congressman Gearhart and myself that that was not strictly  
24 accurate, that they did not have all of the information which  
25 you had here, either in connection with this particular inter-



Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

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cept and some of those that followed it and also as to the broader diplomatic phases of it, which might be more arguable, but at any rate was information which you had which he did not have.

Now, the point which I was bringing out was this, that the Roberts Committee, which made the reports bearing on the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel, apparently did that on the basis of your statement that Kimmel had all of the "information which we had", that is the Department here had. If that is not so it would be possible that their conclusions might have been very different as to the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel and any others concerned, if they had had a more accurate picture of what had been furnished to Kimmel, would that not be so?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, and thank you for the suggestion. I had not appreciated that when I was answering Mr. Gearhart, and in the middle of page 2 you will find just above that this statement: (Reading)

"We had, on the first of December, drafted a summary of information available to us at that time, reciting the details of the concentration of Japanese land forces in Indo-China, Hainan and Formosa, and the several naval preparations, including:

"(a) Reorganization of Japanese Fleets;



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

2           "(b) Ready for war of Japanese ships by looking,  
3 etc.;

4           "(c) Additional naval aircraft to the Mandated  
5 Island area;

6           "(d) Establishment of patrol between Marshalls and  
7 Gilberts;

8           "(e) The activity of the combined Air Force  
9 (patrol planes and tenders) in South China and the  
10 Mandates;

11           "(f) The taking over of many merchant vessels by  
12 the Japanese Navy and the equipment of several anti-  
13 aircraft ships;

14           "(g) The radio intelligence with respect to the two  
15 task groups under the Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet -  
16 Group One operating in the South China area, and Group  
17 Two in the Mandated Islands area. (I stated, however,  
18 that nothing in this item made us forecast a movement as  
19 far east of the Mandated area as Hawaii -- whereupon  
20 Mr. Roberts asked the distance from Hawaii to the Man-  
21 dates, and I told him the easternmost - Jaluit -- was  
22 about 2300 miles, and the remainder extended to the west-  
23 ward about 2700 miles. Actually the figures are 2100  
24 and 2400.)

25           "Without mentioning particular dispatches, we had



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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

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assured ourselves that allop this information" --this information I just mentioned -- "had either passed through the CINCS Asiatic and Pacific Fleets or, if not, had been furnished them from the Department. In addition, on December 3rd we had ascertained that Japanese diplomatic and consular agencies had been ordered to burn all their confidential codes and papers immediately, and we had relayed this information to CINCS Asiatic and Pacific and to the Commandants of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts, and had also directed our representatives in the Far East (attaches and observers) to burn their codes and papers.

"On the evidence available we had concluded on December 1st that the Japanese were contemplating an early attack, primarily directed at Thailand, Burma and the Malay Peninsula, and subsequent developments had proved this to be true. We had not been able to obtain intelligence or to develop by inference any indication of a raid on Hawaii. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific had as much information as we had."

I think in speaking of that and bringing it back I might well have been -- I think I was in fact referring to the fact that he had as much information as we had on all of that subject I have just read.



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Sen. Brewster

2 Senator Brewster: Certainly the statement is somewhat  
3 broader than that. I think it is. We can now see here that  
4 it is perhaps unfortunate that you did not have a complete  
5 transcript of your evidence because it might do you more  
6 justice than this somewhat sweeping summary by yourself would  
7 when you perhaps might not have been thinking of all that was  
8 involved.

9 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. Obviously this was pre-  
10 pared by me for the private and personal information for  
11 Admiral Stark, which I had made, telling him what I and other  
12 officers had told the Roberts Commission.

13 Senator Brewster: Yes.

14 Admiral Wilkinson: That was entirely dependent on my  
15 recollection, it had nothing to do with the transcript. I  
16 thought notes had been taken. In fact, I thought there was a  
17 recorder or stenographer present and I was later to have a  
18 record of that but I understand none were taken, I understand  
19 none appeared in the record except a two paragraph statement.

20 Senator Brewster: This does have the value of having  
21 been made contemporaneously.

22 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Brewster: This was made --

24 Admiral Wilkinson: It is my recollection immediately  
25 after the event.



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by Sen. Brewster

2 Senator Brewster: Yes.

3 Admiral Wilkinson: But I know, for instance, I did not  
4 tell them about magic, I did not let them know, - I did not  
5 tell them about all the diplomatic messages.

6 Senator Brewster: So that magic, you say, was freely  
7 discussed, as you say later on in the memorandum. You men-  
8 tion that on the next page.

9 Admiral Wilkinson: My hearing was very brief. They were  
10 interested in the actual movements of forces and I did not go  
11 at any length into the discussion of the diplomatic magic.

12 Senator Brewster: On page 4 at the bottom you say:

13 "The meeting was discussing the Magic freely but  
14 stated they would be most careful that no mention of it  
15 would be made."

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Brewster: So that was apparently one of the  
18 topics that was gone into to a material extent.

19 Admiral Wilkinson: I think the discussion I had with them  
20 as to the magic was simply as to the fourteen part message.

21 Mr. Gesell: Senator, would it be helpful to put the en-  
22 tire text of the memorandum in the record? We have read dif-  
23 ferent portions, at different times, and to show the relation-  
24 ship of the excerpts wouldn't it be a good idea to put it all  
25 in?



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by Sen. Brewster

2 Senator Brewster: I think it would be helpful to put it  
3 all in.

4 The Vice Chairman: You want it included at this point  
5 in the record?

6 Mr. Gesell: Yes. I think it would be a good idea.

7 The Vice Chairman: It is so ordered..

8 Mr. Gesell: If it is so ordered I think it would be  
9 helpful.

10 The Vice Chairman: All right.

11 (The memorandum above referred to is in words and  
12 figures as follows, to-wit:)

13 "Op-16

Copy No. 5 of 5.

14 SECRET

15 December 19, 1941

16 S-E-C-R-E-T

17 MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

18 Subject: Proceedings of President's Investigating  
19 Committee, 1000 to 1200, December 19, 1941.

20 On notification from Admiral Reeves, received at 0915,  
21 I reported to Justice Roberts' Commission at ten o'clock in  
22 the Munitions Building. General Miles was also there, accom-  
23 panied by the chief of his Far Eastern Division, Colonel R.  
24 S. Bratton; Commander McCollum accompanied me. The Commis-  
25 sion stated they wished the Army and Navy Intelligence to



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1 Witness Wilkinson

2 cooperate in their answers; that they would hear General Miles  
3 first but might ask me any questions that might arise during  
4 his discussion.

5 General Miles was then questioned, and in the main his  
6 testimony was not interrupted by any side questions to me; so  
7 that despite the statement of joint questioning the actual  
8 effect was complete testimony by General Miles, followed by  
9 mine. In fact, General Miles was excused, because of prepara-  
10 tions for departure from the city this afternoon on an inspec-  
11 tion trip, immediately after his testimony, although Colonel  
12 Bratton remained.

13 They asked General Miles mainly what reports and instruc-  
14 tions his office and the command in Hawaii had exchanged for  
15 a period of approximately one month prior to the actual at-  
16 tack. He mentioned communications regarding possibilities of  
17 sabotage and described at some length the events in General  
18 Marshall's office, including the sending of the subsequently  
19 delayed dispatch to General Short on the morning of Sunday,  
20 December 7th. He mentioned his experience in service in the  
21 Islands and said that in the past the concern of G-2 of the  
22 Army had been rather in sabotage than in a military raid. He  
23 said his studies as war plans officer there had, however, en-  
24 visaged the possibility of a raid and that he had reached the  
25 conclusion that a successful raid was possible against a garri-



1 Witness Wilkinson

2 son which had not been warned, but was not possible against a  
3 garrison which had been warned.

4 They then asked me what information and communications had  
5 been sent during the months preceding the attack. I said that,  
6 for an understanding of the picture, I would like to describe  
7 our avenues of intelligence, and then mentioned the Naval  
8 Attaches we had maintained in the Far East, and the seventeen  
9 additional observers and consular shipping advisers we had  
10 established in the past year. These informants reported mat-  
11 ters which they ascertained either by their own observation or  
12 by contacts which they might make. We had in the past had  
13 secret agents in Japan but we had none recently since those  
14 we had had had not survived. Also a source of information  
15 was the radio net and the intercepted dispatches, utilizing  
16 the facilities of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts. Infor-  
17 mation dispatches were received by us and the forces in the  
18 field kept informed, and the Chief of Naval Operations had  
19 testified as to actual warning dispatches which he had sent  
20 in the period immediately prior to the attack. As to the  
21 actual interchange of messages with reference to intelligence,  
22 in general the sources reported their information to us via  
23 the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic and in forwarding it  
24 the Commander-in-Chief Pacific was usually advised. We had,  
25 on the first of December, drafted a summary of information



1 Witness Wilkinson

2 available to us at that time, reciting the details of the con-  
3 centration of Japanese land forces in Indo-China, Hainan and  
4 Formosa, and the several naval preparations, including:

5 (a) Reorganization of Japanese Fleets;

6 (b) Readyng for war of Japanese ships by docking,  
7 etc.;

8 (c) Additional naval aircraft to the Mandated Island  
9 area;

10 (d) Establishment of patrol between Marshalls and  
11 Gilberts;

12 (e) The activity of the combined Air Force (patrol  
13 planes and tenders) in South China and the Mandates;

14 (f) The taking over of many merchant vessels by the  
15 Japanese Navy and the equipment of several anti-aircraft  
16 ships;

17 (g) The radio intelligence with respect to the two  
18 task groups under the Commander-in-Chief Second Fleet -  
19 Group One operating in the South China area, and Group  
20 Two in the Mandated Islands area. (I stated, however,  
21 that nothing in this item made us forecast a movement as  
22 far east of the Mandated area as Hawaii -- whereupon  
23 Mr. Roberts asked the distance from Hawaii to the  
24 Mandates, and I told him the easternmost - Jaluit -- was  
25 about 2300 miles, and the remainder extended to the west-



1 Witness Wilkinson

2 war about 2700 miles. Actually the figures are 2100 and  
3 2400.)

4 Without mentioning particular dispatches, we had assured  
5 ourselves that all of this information had either passed  
6 through the CINCS Asiatic and Pacific Fleets or, if not, had  
7 been furnished them from the Department. In addition, on  
8 December 3rd we had ascertained that Japanese diplomatic and  
9 consular agencies had been ordered to burn all their confiden-  
10 tial codes and papers immediately, and we had relayed this in-  
11 formation to CINCS Asiatic and Pacific and to the Commandants  
12 of the 14th and 16th Naval Districts, and had also directed  
13 our representatives in the Far East (attaches and observers)  
14 to burn their codes and papers.

15 On the evidence available we had concluded on December 1st  
16 that the Japanese were contemplating an early attack, primarily  
17 directed at Thailand, Burma and the Malay Peninsula, and sub-  
18 sequent developments had proved this to be true. We had not  
19 been able to obtain intelligence or to develop by inference  
20 any indication of a raid on Hawaii. The Commander-in-Chief  
21 Pacific had as much information as we had, but I myself could  
22 not expect that he and his staff would infer positively a  
23 raid on Hawaii any more than we had been able to do from the  
24 same information. I believed the raid had been aside from  
25 the main effort, and to my belief the Japanese striking force



1 Witness Wilkinson

2 had retired to the westward immediately afterwards. We had no  
3 conclusive evidence of any Japanese surface vessels operating  
4 thereafter to the eastward of Hawaii, although it was probable  
5 that some submarines had come into the eastern Pacific and  
6 possibly were still there.

7 The Commission asked as to the control of fishing boats  
8 in the vicinity of Hawaii. I said that I knew that even be-  
9 fore I left there in May there had been measures to effectuate  
10 control of these boats - first, by denying non-citizens the  
11 right to own and use them; and second, by either removing or,  
12 in some way I thought, controlling their radio. These efforts  
13 were made principally by the Coast Guard as their proper  
14 province, although guided by the advice of the Commandant's  
15 office. Such measures as have been taken since the Coast  
16 Guard was incorporated into the Navy would, of course, be  
17 more directly under his command.

18 Under the Delimitation Agreement, regarding the special  
19 investigatory services, the actual investigations of all  
20 civilian population in Hawaii were in charge of the Federal  
21 Bureau of Investigation, but I knew the military and naval  
22 counter-intelligence services were closely allied with the  
23 FBI, and that I felt sure that with the fishing boats Captain  
24 Mayfield and Naval Intelligence gave actual assistance where  
25 possible. Mr. Roberts said that they would find out more of



1 Witness Wilkinson

2 that exact situation when they got out there.

3 They asked what arrangements we had in the Intelligence  
4 branch of the Navy Department as to information during Satur-  
5 day night (December 6). I said that responsible officers were  
6 on telephone call, but that in addition there was an officer  
7 watch in our Foreign Branch, in our Administrative Branch, in  
8 our Domestic Intelligence Branch, and that, beginning on  
9 Friday night I had set a watch over the week-end in the Far  
10 Eastern section itself. I said that Commander McCollum had  
11 relieved Lt. Comdr. Watts at 0800 Sunday, that I had arrived  
12 at the office at about 0900, and that only then had the last  
13 part of the Magic (the meeting was discussing the Magic  
14 freely but stated they would be most careful that no mention  
15 of it would be made) arrived containing the final instructions  
16 to the Japanese Ambassadors in Washington to break off nego-  
17 tiations, whereas the previous parts which had been available  
18 to us the preceding night had been more argumentative in sense  
19 and rather of the type of a 'White Paper' designed subse-  
20 quently for publication.

21 Sometime after 0900 Sunday the information came that the  
22 presentation of the complete message, which was to be with-  
23 held until a later dispatch announcing the hour, was not di-  
24 rected to be made at 1300, Washington time. I said I under-  
25 stood by hearsay that the actual call requesting the appoint-



1 Witness Wilkinson

2 ment was not made until 1300 and that the appointment was  
3 granted for 1345 - but that the State Department was, of course,  
4 aware of these times.

5 I said that we had reported this information to you, and  
6 that while we were discussing it you had talked over the phone  
7 with General Marshall, and that I understood you and General  
8 Marshall had mentioned (to the Commission) your conversation  
9 and the dispatch he sent.

10 The Commission asked about the RADAR installations on the  
11 ships and in Hawaii. I understood that the Army had RADAR on  
12 shore, and I knew we had it installed on a few ships. However,  
13 it only works on a direct line such as the eye does, and in  
14 consequence, the RADAR on the ships so fitted which were in  
15 Pearl Harbor could not be effective because of the interposi-  
16 tion of the mountains and the hills and the land in general.  
17 Some of the ships which were out of port were equipped with  
18 RADAR but, as far as I knew, they had not picked up anything  
19 on them - again because of the limitations of the device - the  
20 curvature of the earth limiting its range.

21 With regard to the general question of the readiness of  
22 the Intelligence Service, I said that on the recommendation of  
23 my predecessor, Captain Kirk, as early as last April the Chief  
24 of Naval Operations had sent out a dispatch that, because of  
25 past experience with reference to the Axis beginning activities



1 Witness Wilkinson

2 on Saturdays or Sundays or on national holidays, the per-  
3 sonnel of the naval intelligence service should be particular-  
4 ly careful on those days. Again in March the Chief of Naval  
5 Operations had directed an advanced state of readiness of the  
6 District Intelligence organization, had directed the placing  
7 of coastal information sections in active status in May, the  
8 further expansion of District Intelligence organizations in  
9 May; and a complete state of readiness had been directed in  
10 July.

11 After my testimony Lieutenant-General C. D. Herron, who  
12 relinquished command in early February in Hawaii, testified  
13 mainly about his preparations and his general practice as to  
14 alert stations. He said that last winter he had had them in  
15 the field for six weeks on the alert, but had subsequently  
16 modified that in some degree although he had maintained guns  
17 at their field stations. He said his primary plan was to  
18 use anti-aircraft for the defense of Pearl Harbor, to use  
19 fighting planes to control the air, and to have infantry sup-  
20 port covering landing beaches. He said that he considered the  
21 most dangerous time to be dawn, particularly because of the  
22 possibility of approach during the night of enemy vessels,  
23 whether aircraft carriers or an actual raiding expedition.

24 The Commission asked if he considered Sunday morning the  
25 most lax time in the defenses, and consequently the most ad-



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 vantageous time for an attack. He said that with regard to  
3 the reserves, Yes, because they were more likely to be on  
4 leave or other privileges, but with regard to the actual sta-  
5 tions in the field he considered that they should be as ef-  
6 ficient and as fully manned on Sundays as on any other morn-  
7 ing. He personally made many dawn inspections on Sundays to  
8 check on and insure their readiness.

9 T. S. WILKINSON

10 Copies

11 No. 1 - CNO

12 No. 2 - ACNO

13 No. 3 - Op-12

14 No. 4 - Op-~~16~~-F-2

15 No. 5 - Op-16."

16 - - -

17 Mr. Gearhart: Admiral, did you ever give any attention  
18 or consideration to the possibility of transmitting the sub-  
19 stance or the copies of those intercepts that I have directed  
20 your attention to?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. As I have stated, my re-  
22 sponsibility was limited to sending out, or included what was  
23 a limitation, the sending out of all information except that  
24 respecting enemy communications and that which might require  
25 or involve operational plans and movements. This message was



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 of that character. I am not convinced that I would have been  
3 authorized or permitted to send that out, or whether I should  
4 have given it or suggested to another agency that it should  
5 send it out, but in any respect, answering your question, I  
6 did not consider sending it out because I did not evaluate it,  
7 as I had not, as an indication of the detailed intelligence  
8 they desired.

9 Mr. Gearhart: Well, did you consider Hawaii to be  
10 beyond possibility of attack?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Did you think it was beyond probability  
13 of attack?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

15 Mr. Gearhart: Is that the reason why you did not ade-  
16 quately evaluate those messages concerning ship movements --

17 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

18 Mr. Gearhart: (Continuing) -- in and around Hawaii?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, it had nothing to do with  
20 the possibility versus the probability of them.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Did you refrain from transcribing copies  
22 of intercepts for any particular reason?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: If I considered sending them, which  
24 I doubt, I would have refrained from sending copies of them  
25 because of danger to the code, the code breaking activities.



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: What was the practice of your division?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: Not to send copies outside the Navy  
4 Department and to limit those very carefully.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Did you ever send any copies of inter-  
6 cepts?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: Not to my knowledge and only at the  
8 last moment did I send the gist of such an intercept, when we  
9 said that the diplomatic agencies have been told to burn their  
10 codes.

11 Mr. Gearhart: Now, by transmitting that information any  
12 Japanese who cracked our code would know that we had cracked  
13 theirs, wouldn't they?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: Not only that, but if any widespread  
15 conversation or discussion had come to the ears of any Japan-  
16 ese agents, they would have known we had cracked it. I think  
17 our code was fairly secure. What we were attempting to avoid  
18 was the spread of knowledge that we were engaged in code break-  
19 ing and had succeeded in breaking their code.

20 I think I recall that General Marshall testified that he  
21 had heard rumors that that knowledge was beginning to leak out.

22 Mr. Gearhart: You were present when General Marshall  
23 wrote out the message on the 7th of December, the one that  
24 arrived in Hawaii too late?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: You were not among those in that group?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Well, in that message he tells them that  
5 "Tomorrow the Japanese are going to deliver an ultimatum to  
6 the State Department" and also that they were going to deliver  
7 it at one o'clock. He did not hesitate to tell what he had  
8 learned through reading the intercepts, did he?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, not did we in sending out  
10 the message about breaking the codes.

11 Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, your office had been  
12 sending out the substance of intercepts all during the year  
13 of 1941?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: I believe not, sir. I think those  
15 messages you spoke of were sent out by the Communications of-  
16 fice.

17 Mr. Gearhart: What does "OPNAV" stand for?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: OPNAV? That is Chief of Naval  
19 Operations office as a whole. Is there any number, small  
20 number on it afterwards, Op-13, Op-20, something like that?

21 Mr. Gearhart: "OPNAV" is the way this reads.

22 Admiral Wilkinson: That is general operations of the  
23 Navy, yes.

24 Mr. Gearhart: That means the Chief of Naval Operations?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Or someone in his office. The actual



1 Witness Wilkinson Questions by: Mr. Gearhart  
 2 office number if it is prepared in a subordinate office would  
 3 be indicated by a number such as Op-200 which would be Com-  
 4 munications, or Op-16, which would be Intelligence.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Well, you have looked through these mes-  
 6 sages that have been sent them by OPNAV, have you not, during  
 7 the year of 1941?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: I have seen this book. I am not sure  
 9 that I recall which were sent out by OPNAV and which were  
 10 otherwise indicated.

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11 Mr. Gearhart: Well, here is one that was sent out on  
 12 the 7th day of July 1941 to the Commander-in-Chief of the  
 13 Asiatic Fleet and for the information of the Commander-in-  
 14 Chief of the Pacific Fleet. This reads:

15 "TOKYO TO WASHINGTON 1 JULY 329:

16 "Japan DIRECTS EIGHT MARUS ON EAST COAST UNITED  
 17 STATES RUSH CARGO HANDLING AND PROCEED COLON PASS THROUGH  
 18 CANAL TO PACIFIC BETWEEN 16 AND 22 JULY ON FOLLOWING  
 19 SCHEDULE: 16TH TOKAI; 17TH", and so forth, naming a  
 20 lot of dates.

21 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

22 Mr. Gearhart: You have that before you, do you?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

24 Mr. Gearhart: Page 6 of exhibit 37.

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: That is transmittal of information that  
3 was received from intercepts, is it not?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Turn over to page 7, and you will find an-  
6 other message.

7 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Gearhart: That is a transmittal by OPNAV or whatever  
9 you call it of information received from intercepts, isn't it?

10 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Gearhart: Likewise the next, on page 8?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Gearhart: And page 9?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Gearhart: Page 10?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. Those were all sent out  
17 by the Communications office and all sent out in July. I am  
18 informed that that practice was discontinued after July. In  
19 any event, it was not under the Office of Naval Intelligence.

20 Mr. Gearhart: That was sent out because someone who then  
21 had the sayso believed that it was necessary to advise Ameri-  
22 can commanders in the field of information that was received  
23 in intercepts?

24 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. There was a balance be-  
25 tween the information going out and the security of the code



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 breaking processes.

3 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

4 Admiral Wilkinson: As we have heard a few moments ago,  
5 sir, there were rumors of the suspicions as to code breaking  
6 and during the summer and fall every attempt was made to  
7 tighten up the security. This practice was apparently in-  
8 continued and we were constantly being warned by all hands to  
9 be careful about how the code breaking was threatened, the  
10 knowledge of code breaking was possible of suspicion.

11 Mr. Gearhart: All right. Now, in a lot of those mes-  
12 sages that I called your attention to, the ones relating to  
13 ship movements and inquiries concerning ship movements, did  
14 they take on any greater importance in your mind when the  
15 Navy translated this message from Tokyo to Washington, 5 Novem-  
16 ber 1941, translated on November 5, 1941:

17 "Because of various circumstances, it is absolutely  
18 necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this  
19 agreement be completed by the 25th of this month. I  
20 realize that this is a difficult order, but under the  
21 circumstances it is an unavoidable one. Please under-  
22 stand this thoroughly and tackle the problem of saving  
23 the Japanese-U. S. relations from falling into a chaotic  
24 condition. Do so with great determination and with un-  
25 stinted effort, I beg of you.



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 "This information is to be kept strictly to yourself  
3 only."

4 Now, when you read that message of a lead line being  
5 fixed by Japan for the doing of something, didn't the previous  
6 Japanese ship movement intercepts take on a new and a more  
7 important aspect in your estimation?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: I would not say that it did, sir.  
9 That was in the character of prospective diplomatic negotia-  
10 tions that they were anxious to reach a conclusion on. Our  
11 war plans people were fully cognizant of it. They were aware  
12 of the diplomatic negotiations and, in fact, on October 16th  
13 they had sent out a warning message, on November 24th they  
14 sent another and on November 27th still another. These mes-  
15 sages were in a class of affecting the operations of the Fleet,  
16 which I did not feel was in my province to relay.

17 Mr. Gearhart: When you read the intercept from Tokyo  
18 to Hong Kong dated November 14, 1941, translated November 26,  
19 1941, in which the following is said:

20 "Should the negotiations collapse, the international  
21 situation in which the Empire will find herself will be  
22 one of tremendous crisis. Accompanying this, the Empire's  
23 foreign policy as it has been decided by the cabinet,  
24 insofar as it pertains to China, is:

25 "a. We will completely destroy British and American



1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 power in China.

3 "b. We will take over all enemy concessions and enemy  
4 important rights and interests (customs and minerals,  
5 etc.) in China.

6 "c. We will take over all rights and interests owned  
7 by enemy powers, even though they might have connections  
8 with the new Chinese government should it become necessary."

9 When you read that warlike intercept didn't the inter-  
10 est in our ship movements in Hawaii take on an added import-  
11 ance in your estimation?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: I would say the interest in our ship  
13 movements everywhere did. The interest of the enemy espionage  
14 in the movement of our ships and the information they dis-  
15 patched in conjunction with the messages hitherto were all  
16 matters considered by the question of how the fleet would  
17 operate and what it would do and were measures under the  
18 jurisdiction of the War Plans section.

19 Mr. Gearhart: Now, in the light of these last two inter-  
20 cepts that I have called your attention to, intercepts having  
21 to do with a dead line and Japan's martial intentions, after  
22 you read them and you say the shipping movement intercepts  
23 took on a more important aspect and a greater importance, did  
24 you at that time give any considerations to whether or not  
25 you should transmit to Admiral Kimmel the substance of the ship