

Interr. T & JO (17 Jan. Hb)

DOC 4153

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

CONTINUED INTERROGATION OF

General Hideki Tojo

Date and Time: 17 January 1946, 1400 - 1635 hours.

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : General Hideki Tojo
Mr. John W. Fihelly, Interrogator
Commander Yale Maxon, USNR, Interpreter
Miss Myrtle B. Mills, Stenographer

- Q.: At the time of the formation of the policy of building a new order in East Asia, was it considered that Japan would become more wealthy or less wealthy as a result thereof?
- A.: The idea of greater wealth or greater poverty was not the basic idea in mind. The basic idea was that of co-prosperity and mutual dependence.
- Q.: Was it not considered that Japan would be able to obtain raw materials more easily, and also increased wealth and prosperity?
- A.: The basic intention was that the raw materials, which China possessed in abundance, would be contributed by China and the technique, capital and skilled personnel be contributed by Japan for the mutual benefit of both countries. Manchuria would come into the picture similarly.
- Q.: This is rather theoretical. As a practical matter, was it not expected that Japan would benefit in wealth and increased prosperity?
- A.: No. Not at all. The basic idea was that both parties would benefit.
- Q.: Was it thought by you or by other Japanese that Japan would lose money as a result of the creation of a new order in East Asia?
- A.:- The idea of profit or loss did not enter in. The idea of mutual benefit was the main one. It had a moral basis.
- Q.: By the new order would Japan not necessarily obtain first, raw materials and, secondly, trade and commercial rights which she otherwise would not have had?

- A.: Of course Japan would receive raw materials and trade would increase. The question of rights would depend on the spirit in the minds of both parties. If the proper spirit were there, there would be a spirit of mutual helpfulness.
- Q.: Prior to the recent war with the United States and Great Britain, did Japan ever seek to adjust with Great Britain or the United States the rights which were involved and which would have to be adjusted to put this new order into existence?
- A.: She tried. Of course Japan wished to settle these things by negotiation. Matters of extra-territorial rights and foreign settlements were negotiated. Under the second or third Konoye cabinet, a basic treaty was signed between Japan and China. There was also the Japan-Manchuria-China Joint Declaration of January 30, 1940. There were also Konoye's three principles. These three things (the treaty, the declaration and the three principles) represented the spirit in which Japan desired to negotiate and these things were also one part of the negotiations between Japan and the United States. This whole question was a matter which Japan was negotiating with America about.
- Q.: Did Japan enter into negotiations with England prior to the outbreak of the Great East Asia War in regard to British rights in such places as Hongkong and the Malay Peninsula?
- A.: I was not Premier at that time before the war, and I am not the responsible party, but I believe that specific negotiations in regard to Hongkong and the Malay Peninsula were not ever entered into. In the negotiations with America, which began in April 1941, Japan proposed a tentative plan in regard to the Far East. I am speaking now, not as the responsible officer but on the basis of what I believe to have been the case. This plan was unacceptable to America. In the normal course of negotiations, it was necessary to agree first on broad principles for the solution of a problem. Since the Japanese plan was applicable in a broad way to East Asia and, since this plan was unacceptable to the United States, the opportunity never arose to discuss specific problems. This is important. The most serious question that faced Japan in April 1941 at the start of the negotiations with the United States was the necessity of taking the diplomatic initiative to secure American consent to the disposition of the China Incident. This is what I think, since you asked me for my opinion. I was not Foreign Minister or Premier at that time. The second important problem was to actually put into effect the terms of the Japan-China basic treaty.

Q.: Was the new order in East Asia, as it affected China, taken up in the discussions with the United States?

A.: Specific problems, as I stated before, were not taken up but the broad basis was discussed.

Q.: Is the fact that the United States didn't accept the tentative plan, as set forth by Japan in connection with the new order in Asia, not one of the primary causes which led to the war between Japan and the United States?

A.: It was not a basic cause I believe, but I think it was an indirect cause.

Q.: If Japan had won the war, the problems of adjustment with America and Britain would not have arisen, would they?

A.: They would have arisen at the Peace Conference.

Q.: Could not Japan have made any adjustment that she saw fit to make in that connection?

A.: Japan would have had two principle aims if she had been victorious: (1) to help maintain world peace and, (2) to help maintain peace in East Asia. In the latter connection, it would have been necessary to consider both the point of view of the native peoples in East Asia and the views of America and England in order to prevent dissatisfaction which would lead to later wars. The most important thing I believe, whether Japan is victorious or defeated, is to have peace in the world.

Q.: If Japan had been victorious, the new order would have been put into effect?

A.: Yes. If Japan had been victorious, there would have to have been a settlement between East Asia on the one hand, and England and America on the other. However, it would then have been necessary by negotiations between both East Asia and England and America to have laid the foundations for world peace.

Q.: If Japan had won the war, the new order would have been put into effect after discussions and negotiations with America and Great Britain had been made, would it not?

A.: Yes.

- Q.: Was it not a basic cause of the war that the United States and Great Britain would not agree to the Japanese plan for setting up a new order in East Asia?
- A.: It was not a direct cause, I believe. It was an indirect cause.
- Q.: Was not the idea of "Asia for the Asiatics" the basic idea behind the plan for the creation of a new order for Asia?
- A.: The idea is narrow-minded, in my opinion.
- Q.: What was the date of the Greater East Asia Conference that you alluded to yesterday?
- A.: November 6, 1943.
- Q.: In that conference, were not five points set forth and declared?
- A.: Yes. There were.
- Q.: Was not one of those points the construction of a co-prosperity sphere between the countries involved?
- A.: (Reads from a booklet which he carries in his pocket.) Yes.
- Q.: Was another one of those points not this, "To accelerate the economic development of the various East Asia countries, thereby promoting the general prosperity of their region"?
- A.: (Reads from his booklet.) Yes.
- Q.: Was not another one of those points "To insure the fraternity of the various East Asia nations by respecting one another's sovereignty and independence and practicing mutual assistance and amity"?
- A.: (Reads from his booklet.) Yes.
- Q.: Did Japan ever discuss the question of the independence of the Philippines with the United States before the war?
- A.: No, because America had already of itself expressed the intention of giving independence to the Philippines.
- Q.: Under the new order in East Asia, what former British possessions were to acquire independence?

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A.: Japan, and I too, hoped that Burma would attain independence.

Q.: How about India?

A.: India was outside the sphere of Greater East Asia.

Q.: Was the question of the independence of Burma ever taken up with Great Britain?

A.: No, of course not. In accordance with the progress of the general war situation, these problems appeared. By the time this problem had appeared, it was, of course, out of the question to negotiate regarding it.

Q.: Was China represented at this convention of Greater East Asia in November 1943?

A.: Yes. Wang Ching-wei was the representative.

Q.: Who was he and who authorized him to represent China?

A.: He was President of the Executive Yuan of the Peoples' Government. This was the, I don't know the Chinese pronunciation for it, but it was the Chinese Government recognized by Japan.

Q.: So that this man and his associates Japan was not at war with at this time?

A.: No.

Q.: Was Chiang Kai Shek or any of his people represented at this convention?

A.: No.

Q.: Did the people of China as a whole at any time ever ask for or approve of the new order in Asia?

A.: I didn't ask individuals, but the Government of Wang Ching-wei was recognized by Japan and therefore it was considered to speak for the people of China.

Q.: How many of the 400 million people did he represent?

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A.: I have no way of knowing, but the Government of Wang Ching-Wei was recognized not only by Japan but by other countries in this area, such as Manchuria, and also by Germany, Italy, etc. as the legal government of China. I recognize that England and America had a different point of view about it.

Q.: Prior to the China Incident, did the people of China at any time as a whole, or the Chinese Government, ever approve of the new order in East Asia?

A.: A vague answer must suffice for this. As I explained before, the idea of the creation of a new order in East Asia did not become definite until after the outbreak of the China Incident. However, I believe that there were people both in Japan and in China who desired some such thing previous to the outbreak of the Incident itself.

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Certificate of Interpreter

I, Yale Maxon, Cmdr., USNR, 11-35-72
(Name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 6 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Yale Maxon
Yale Maxon, ~~Cmdr.~~, USNR

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12 day of August, 1946.

John W. Fihelly
John W. Fihelly

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Myrtle B. Mills, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Myrtle B. Mills
Myrtle B. Mills

Certificate of Interrogator

I, John W. Fihelly, certify that on 17th

day of January, 1946, personally appeared before me TOJO

Hideki, and according to Commander Yale Maxon, USNR,

Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

John W. Fihelly
John W. Fihelly

TOKYO
(Place)

12 August 46
(Date)

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- A It was not a basic cause, I believe, but I think it was an indirect cause.
- Q If Japan had won the war, the problems of adjustment with America and Britain would not have arisen, would they?
- A They would have arisen at the Peace Conference.

Q Prior to the China Incident, did the people of China at any time as a whole, or the Chinese Government, ever approve of the new order in East Asia?

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