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From Despotism to Anarchy



PORFIRIO DIAZ *to* VICTORIANO HUERTA

**B
Y** RAMON PRIDA *FORMER JUDGE AT
VERA CRUZ, MEX.*

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EL PASO PRINTING COMPANY EL PASO, TEXAS
— PRINTERS AND BINDERS —

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By
JUDGE RAMON PRIDA



Facts and Commentaries about the Mexican Revolutions
at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century

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Note

This is an abridged translation of a complete Spanish edition, several chapters of which have been omitted because the author deems them of no interest to English speaking readers.

However, by carefully reading the introduction, where the gist of these chapters is clearly outlined, a fair conception of the matter will be formed. The chapters omitted refer exclusively to Mexican politics prior to the revolution of 1910. The facts relating to this revolution and to subsequent events, are given in full, exactly as in the Spanish edition.

The translation has been made under the immediate supervision of the author, thus assuring a correct version in English of his opinions and statements,—something not always realized in translations of works of this nature.

New York, March, 1914.

Introduction

"History is not a Flatterer but a Witness."—Charles XII.

General Porfirio Diaz remained in power for so many years, because his government gave to the country that which it craves—PEACE! The moment, therefore, that the government was unable to quell the incipient revolution incited by Madero, the people for the first time became aware of its weakness and its inability to supply their wants—peace, order, and the opportunity quietly to earn their daily bread—and at that moment they rose in a body and peremptorily demanded back the rights which they had sacrificed, and summarily overthrew the government which could no longer satisfy these natural cravings.

At first they turned to General Reyes, looking again for the energy and strength of the iron hand of a soldier to continue the work whereby General Diaz had formerly compelled the peace they craved. It did not take them long to realize their mistake. With his many ready but empty speeches General Reyes insured his own downfall. The nation was soon convinced that the soldier with whom she was coquetting was not the man who could guide her to her goal; and she scornfully cast him off.

Then, as in German legends, there appeared at this trying moment a man simple in bearing with the halo of an apostle and the vocation of a martyr; a man who had traveled over most of the country offering life and welfare and preaching democracy and an equality verging on socialism. He was the last hope, the only refuge, the one man to arise from the cringing multitude; so the country resolutely turned to him and delivered itself body and soul to Francisco I. Madero. He was the pampered child of fortune. His was the privilege of reaping the accumulated fruits of three generations; his the gathering of products maturing from labors since the French Intervention and almost ripe at the time he rose to power. Unfortunately, either

he did not fully appreciate the situation, or appreciating it, he did not know what remedies to apply to our ills.

What was Madero? An apostle, as his friends called him? A visionary, as some considered him? A madman, as his enemies declared him? Flattery clothed him in purple of various hues; his deriders made him a ludicrous figure; his own oratory, which was affluent and of great scope, presents in him contradictory characteristics. But for the cold, dispassionate thinker, he was not an apostle, nor a visionary, nor yet a madman,—he was a symbol.

When in 1867, after the War of Intervention, the country had secured its independence, it wished to close the door to all ambitions and devote itself to work. It wished to banish the specter of revolt which for half a century had repressed its desires for liberty, and stayed its material progress. The wish was disappointed, simply because the soldiers, both victors and vanquished, had to live. For those who for so many years had led a life of hardship and peril, it was necessary that the government should find employment in time of peace, if peace were to be maintained. This was beyond the power of the government; and strife was inevitable.

The war of '71 was a national crime, but a necessity to the military element. The rebellion of Tuxtepec in '76 headed like that of '71 by General Porfirio Diaz, was likewise justified because it completed the amalgamation of the soldiery uniting them all under the flag of the Republic. However, in full justice to the rebels of Tuxtepec it must be added that this revolt was also unavoidable because the government of Don Sebastian Lerdo had totally ignored all the essentials on which every government in countries like ours should be based, and the selfish arrogance of Mr. Lerdo himself entirely overshadowed his wonderful intellect.

After the war of '76, every attempted revolution was subdued by the iron hand of Diaz; and during his first term of office and the four years of his successor, General Manuel Gonzalez, the calm of peace pervaded our social organism. From the moment of General Diaz' reelection in 1884 when General Manuel Gonzalez peacefully yielded him the reins of government, we Mexicans seem to have resigned ourselves to live under the dictatorship of Don Porfirio, exacting from him only peace, tranquility, and the opportunity for work. This explains the

power of General Diaz and the submissiveness of the people. It explains why, when the revolution of 1910 first broke out, it found so slight an echo in the national conscience, which was not dead as many have believed but simply resigned. But the government, inwardly conscious that the nation had just cause for rebellion, became panic stricken at the very first murmurs of it. As a result, the revolution instead of dying out, flickered, suffering blows and defeats, but not entirely extinguished, until, by its very inability to cope with it, the government showed its own weakness and proved conclusively that instead of a real tower of strength and power it was merely a phantom. Then were awakened ambitions dormant through fear; then burst forth energies theretofore restrained by a desire for peace; and then, suddenly and inexplicably to all but the close observers of the phenomenon, the revolution, which had seemed a dying ember, extinguishable by a breath, leaped into flame, became an all-consuming conflagration.

The rebels themselves were dumbfounded at their success and the rebellion thus suddenly triumphant was entirely unprepared to receive the government turned over to it by General Diaz. Events followed each other closely; men had to be obtained quickly; there was not time to pick and choose; it was necessary to take what first came to hand. As a result, the new administration was not entirely revolutionary, nor was it by any means competent to carry out the work before it. When finally forced to resign, General Diaz, estimating the man at his worth, disdainfully and contemptuously accepted as his successor, Mr. Francisco L. de la Barra. Mr. de la Barra, no less surprised at the outcome than the rebels themselves, was equally unprepared to face it; in fact, he utterly failed to grasp the situation. Had he grasped it, the course of his administration would have led through a different channel. Two definite courses lay open before him, either of which would have insured his success: he could either personify and develop the revolutionary principles not held by him, but thrust into his hands by fate, or he could become an independent self-reliant organizer. To follow the first, it would have been necessary for him to surround himself exclusively by capable men closely identified with the revolution, in order to carry out immediately the great promised reforms. To follow the second, it would have been necessary for him to direct public sentiment into a common channel by impos-

ing himself equally on rebel and non-rebel, but bound by neither, being in truth the real head of the nation, controlling with an energetic hand the excesses of both and ignoring the demands and ambitions of all. In other words, he would oblige everyone to maintain order and to obey the law without listening to the honeyed words of flatterers who would attack his vanity, nor to the clamor of the ambitious who would endeavor to intimidate him with their outcries.

I insist that de la Barra failed utterly to grasp the situation; for, unconscious of these two courses, he chose rather a *via media* between the victorious party and the vanquished, attempting at one and the same time to represent a revolution, of whose principles he was ignorant, and to continue the work of the old government which was crumbling through senility. In other words, he tried to please both sides and succeeded in pleasing neither. There we have in a nutshell the whole reason for his failure. The rebellion, as we have said, found itself totally without organization when it came into actual power, so naturally, the old system continued to flourish and conditions continued in the same rut as formerly. Justice, that illusive ideal we always so covet, was ministered under the same system, the same curse, the same anathema, and the only thing worthy of note in this period of transition, is the wonderful vitality of the country, which resisted, as it continues to resist, the blows of those who had joined the revolution from purely mercenary and self-seeking motives, the inertia of the government, the appetites of those who were yet insatiable even though for many years they had been glutting themselves at the table of the old regime, and the lust of those who had joined the armed rebellion impelled by their eagerness to satisfy their feverish greed for honor and riches.

When Madero, who had been virtually the head of the nation, finally reached the presidential chair, he found nothing organized; for—let flatterers say what they will, and de la Barra had more than most men—the provisional government had utterly failed to accomplish the work of conciliation and preparation to which it was pledged, which was its primary duty, the salient feature of its program, and which, if accomplished, would have enabled the new administration to dedicate itself at once to the great reforms which, inscribed on its banner, promised life and prosperity to the nation.

Let us suppose that Madero was alive to the task before him. How could he begin? On what resources could he count? The men who were closely identified with the revolution and who had gone through the mill should in all justice have been given precedence in the work of reconstruction. Madero, fully realizing this, felt it his duty not to break entirely with them, but the fact is they had proved their incompetency;—the provisional government had fully tested them and found them wanting, not one of them all deserving the name of statesman. Don Manuel Bonilla, though much maligned by the press, was the best one, a good official, honorable, just, and painstaking, but inexperienced in politics. Don Ernesto Madero, the most promising of them all, was unequal to the task of checking the scandalous waste of public funds which characterized the provisional government as well as that of Madero, and, in the crucial moments of the downfall of the government, showed his entire lack of political foresight. Could Madero throw himself into the arms of men identified with the old regime? This would have been gross folly as the revolutionists would have considered themselves betrayed. Where then could he find the men to assist him in a task of such gigantic proportions? For besides the ordinary work of reconstruction resultant from a revolution there would be the control and direction of the strong current of immigration, which, attracted by the wonderful resources so widely advertised by the Centennial Celebration was sure to invade the country, if, at that very moment, it could present a serene and peaceful front and a determination to proceed in the paths of progress.

How could Madero find men of the necessary calibre when for the last thirty years all activities which came to life anywhere had been struck down and smothered and all legitimate ambitions had been considered rebellion? Could he by his blind faith and love of justice create these statesmen as the Almighty made man by the breath of his wish? Could he give life to the marble images of his illusions and by the strength of his imagination break the heavy clouds which hung over our country? Impossible! The task which confronted him demanded an exceptional man, and this Madero was not. To carry out the tremendous work before him, Madero needed not only qualities he did not possess, but a different education, and, above all, a thorough training in statesmanship. Like de la Barra, Madero was headed towards an absolute and complete failure. Though

a good man at heart and full of the best intentions his weakness of character, his childish caprices, his lack of mental capacity and stamina, were all insurmountable obstacles, but there was an even greater obstacle, which was the regime of the Madero family.

The Madero family may be properly compared to a Scottish clan whose chief had been Don Evaristo Madero, deceased on the very eve of his grandson's victory. This Don Evaristo was the undisputed head, lord and master of the whole family and as such his word was law. Don Francisco I. Madero as President tried to wield the same power over the nation that his grandfather had wielded over the clan; but at one and at the same time he desired to be a democrat ruler and finally he failed to impose himself even over his own family. For, though they had naturally and, one might say, as a matter of course, obeyed Don Evaristo, a man of experience, talent, and dominant personalty, they balked at submitting themselves to him whom they had been wont to consider the meanest of them all. Unable to dominate his own clan, Mr. Madero was doubly unable to control the nation. Besides, he had one other great fault which led to his downfall: namely that he was never known to reward services rendered him, a glaring illustration of which we have in his attitude towards General Pascual Orozco, Jr., who, though practically responsible for Madero's triumph, was by no means adequately rewarded.*

Such, then, was the man who led the Nation at the outbreak of the revolution of Vera Cruz instigated by Felix Diaz. This uprising in the "Thrice Heroic City" was the first step towards the tragedy which was later to be enacted in the very City of Mexico itself; and it was of so great a magnitude that it could leave no doubt of the subsequent downfall of Madero. Unfortunately, it also indicated the beginning of an era of anarchy which should at all costs be avoided. But Madero and his followers not only failed to realize the dangers which hung like a cloud over them, but failed utterly to grasp the meaning of the movement, the consequences of which we are now feeling. The men who overthrew Madero and have taken the power into their hands, have instituted a military despotism, their main weapon being to inspire terror, thinking that in this way they can perpetuate themselves and quell the rebellion headed by Don Venus-

*The same was done with Maximo Castillo who saved Madero's life at Casas Grandes.

tiano Carranza. They should arrive if it will be necessary to assure their ambitions, even to provoke a war against the United States.

My object in writing these incidents is to study the crisis through which the country is passing; to clearly establish facts; and to place the responsibility on the shoulders of those upon whom it should be placed, the real actors in the tragedy we are now enacting. I wish to call the attention of my fellow countrymen to the great catastrophe which threatens our nation; and I also wish to tell the world of that which has occurred and is occurring in Mexico. In order to accomplish this purpose, I shall relate facts, all of which have been secured from the best sources of information and I shall relate them not as pictured by the imagination or by political prejudice and passion, but as they really occurred. Throughout, I judge deeds and men with the merciless and impersonal severity of the historian, who, like myself, is under obligation to no man; and putting aside all feelings of friendship and rancor, I tell the truth so that it may be perpetuated in history. I have no intention of teaching anybody nor offering a remedy for anything, for no doubt the book will be issued too late to prevent any of the evils which I foresee. It is merely a cry from the very depths of my soul as a patriot, a cry that will probably go unheeded by all, but which I still feel it my duty to give. It will not improve our condition but it will, I hope, at least contribute to the study of this period of our history which we have all anxiously witnessed and bewailed; and may it especially serve to teach my children, to whom I dedicate these pages. In them may they learn what human nature really is, to what human ambition can lead, and above all how some people interpret patriotism. May they, my children, in whom I have always endeavored to inculcate the noble spirit of patriotism, they who have shared with me my hopes and fears, they who have closely assisted me in my labors, and have appreciated the fact that I have never been ambitious and have always been willing to sacrifice myself for my country, may they live anew when in future years they read these pages dealing with this sad period in the life of our Nation. To them I dedicate these lines. They, and perhaps they alone, will estimate the true idea that inspired them.

RAMON PRIDA

Mexico, November 1913.

CHAPTER I.

REELECTION WITHOUT RESTRICTIONS.

The life of Porfirio Diaz presents four striking phases. Up to the year 1867 he is a stainless patriot, a soldier of the republic, making all the necessary sacrifices to preserve the integrity of his country and dedicating all his energies to defend and protect its institutions. His enemies, and he has very bitter ones, will cite this or that military event as questionable, but without reason. The military life of General Diaz, is, I repeat, stainless, and his conduct during the war of the Reform, during the three years war, and during the war against the Intervention and empire, is absolutely above reproach. From 1867 to 1884 he is a revolutionist who has forgotten all affection and duty, who devotes himself solely to securing the power he covets, bribing his employees and perverting his former subalterns; indifferent to everything but the fixed purpose of climbing to the presidency. From 1884 until the centennial celebration in 1910 he is a statesman, empiric but able. Although personal ambition governs all his acts, and although he respects no duty, remembers no service, has no affection, and is hindered by no obstacle which could prevent him from carrying out his main purpose, which is to retain the power in his hands, nevertheless he devotes himself earnestly to the material progress of the republic undertaking the development of all the branches of the government, except the administration of justice and the action of the courts, in which he never had any faith and which, as a matter of fact, he never for one single moment left free. After the centennial celebration he is a sick man, without will or energy, swayed to and from by reckless and ignorant men, but still clinging to the power, and in his more lucid intervals willing to sacrifice everything and everybody rather than give up the presidency, which he feels is fast slipping from his grasp. Finally, he surrenders in an incomprehensible way leaving behind him his friends and

loyal servants seriously compromised and leaving ruin and desolation for his country. In these final supreme moments he reveals himself cold and selfish with no thought for the future, with no solicitude for his country which has been sprinkled with his own blood, and with no anxiety for his good name and his glory which he leaves to be dragged in the dirt and trampled upon by the mob in the streets of Mexico.

The period of most interest to us and which deserves a brief survey even in this short history is that of his statesmanship. When General Diaz was reelected president in 1884, he was an entirely different man from the one who had been elected in '76. He had acquired a distinguished bearing and an aristocratic air, in fact, his whole physical appearance had changed so radically as to make him look even like a different man. Politically, he was now almost a statesman, as the make up of his cabinet proved. As Secretary of State, he appointed Mr. Ignacio Mariscal, formerly Secretary in the Juarez Cabinet; as Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Manuel Romero Rubio; as Attorney General, he retained Mr. Joaquin Baranda, who had held that office under President Manuel Gonzalez; as Secretary of Development, he appointed General Carlos Pacheco, then Governor of Chihuahua; as Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Manuel Dublan; and as Secretary of War, General Pedro Hinojosa. His chief task ought to have been to conciliate the various factions, by drawing together the most capable men, irrespective of former enmities. The most able and capable men of the time were at his disposal to help him, in the great task which he had undertaken. His work was highly beneficial, and the material progress and development of the country, particularly in the first twelve years from 1884 to 1896, were stupendous. We see close to him three men who not long before had figured as his enemies: Mr. Manuel Romero Rubio, head of Mr. Lerdo's last Cabinet; Mr. Joaquin Baranda, a representative under Mr. Lerdo's administration, and implicated in the revolution so severely suppressed on June 25th, 1879; and Mr. Manuel Dublan, a man who had served the Empire and who had been sentenced to death as a traitor by General Diaz himself, at that time head of the Army of the East. It is worthy of note too that General Carlos Pacheco was the only member of the Cabinet chosen by Diaz, really representing the revolution of Tuxtepec. General Diaz having acquired by experience a considerable knowledge of statesmanship, knew that men truly

revolutionary were usually unsuited for government positions; therefore to the subordinates with whom he did not break entirely, he gave only second rate positions taking care, however, to enrich them, while the heads of the movement he remembered only to watch them. General Pacheco was there to play an important part in the development of affairs, for he, a pure Tuxtepecan, the sole representative of the revolution in the Cabinet, was destined to be the one to introduce the abolition of the anti-reelection reform that had been the banner of the revolutions of Noria and Tuxtepec. Had the measure been introduced by any other Cabinet officer, all of whom had been reelectionists, either under Juarez or under Lerdo, it would not have been so remarkable, but no, the important and almost unbelievable fact is that it was introduced by the very member of the Cabinet representing those who, by force of arms, had upheld the anti-reelection principle against Juarez and Lerdo. Thus General Diaz, secure in power, condemned those revolutions instigated by himself as well as all future revolutions, and he was determined to throttle them, no matter by what measures, even by sacrificing his own friends and followers as he did in Vera Cruz on June 25th, 1879. General Diaz figured that the best plan for him to follow in order to perpetuate himself in the government would be to make the prominent men around him bitterly jealous of each other. Thus, at every subsequent election, each man rather than see his dearest enemy rise to power, would conclude that the only way to prevent it would be for General Diaz himself to be re-elected. Those with whom he did not come into direct contact, he would either keep friendly by enriching them if necessary, or else would declare them under suspicion, persecute them, and if they revolted, annihilate them. Such was the unhappy fate of Division General Trinidad Garcia de la Cadena, who had incited the State of Zacatecas in favor of General Diaz in 1871 and in 1876; both he and his devoted companion, Colonel Lazalde, meeting their death on the estate of Gruñidora on October 31st, 1886. To the generals, who, by their renown and popularity in various sections of the country, might instigate new revolutions, he gave large grants of land, making the exploitation as easy as possible. Thus enriching them, he gave them interests which would be of value only in times of peace and which would naturally make them the defenders of the government and the advocates of the indefinite re-election

of the Rebel Chief of Tuxtepec. Immediately upon reaching the presidency in 1884, General Diaz began to put these plans into force; in fact, no sooner had his Cabinet entered upon its duties than a three cornered strife broke out between Mr. Romero Rubio, Mr. Manuel Dublan, and General Carlos Pacheco. General Diaz added fuel to the flame by insinuating to each man the possibility of his succeeding him to the presidency. This jealousy and strife resulted in the increasing of his own power, for each secretary, confidentially informed upon this point by the President himself, believed that by increasing the latter's power, he was gaining prestige with the President and making his own ultimate triumph certain.

Towards Don Manuel Gonzalez who had loyally given up his power, Diaz' actions were as follows: At a meeting of the House of Representatives, on the 28th of May 1885, he forced the friends of Mr. Romero Rubio, led by those who had opposed his own election, to question the accounts of the former administration; and against the expressed stipulation of law, on October 30th of the same year, at an ordinary public session, a public impeachment was instituted against Ex-president Don Manuel Gonzalez, by those very persons who had questioned the accounts. The object of this action was to discredit General Gonzalez in the estimation of the people, and at the same time to open a way to his destruction with public approval, should he, while under impeachment by the House, make any attempt at revolt or behave in a suspicious manner; for then, on the slightest provocation, he could easily be put out of the way by Diaz himself, who would be applauded by the people as a zealous defender of national justice.

CHAPTER II.

LOYALTY UNTO DEATH.

During the convalescence of General Diaz at Cuernavaca, though his family tried to prevent him from attending to public duties, still the Cabinet members consulted with him personally over the more important affairs of state, one of which was the nomination for governor of the Federal District. For this they had launched the candidacy of Don Ramon Corral, then in Europe consulting specialists about a throat trouble from which he was suffering. Upon receiving the cable stating that the government needed him, Mr. Corral at once sailed for Mexico, where just a few days after his arrival, he assumed control of the government of the Federal District. His troubles began very shortly, for he at once undertook to reform the various departments which he found entirely disorganized, but on all sides he was hampered by the administration which had for its motto the *statu quo*. However, by infinite patience, and by surmounting great obstacles, he finally succeeded in instituting several reforms, one of the most important was the suppression of the gambling houses in the Federal District.*

When General Mena left the Cabinet, obliged by his physician to go to Europe, General Diaz, with Limantour's approval decided to appoint Mr. Corral to fill the position of Secretary of the Interior, at the same time appointing Mr. Guillermo de Landa y Escandon as Governor of the Federal District.

The position of Secretary of the Interior presented a much broader field to Mr. Corral, who at once set to work in the Department of Public Charities, where he succeeded in completing the General Hospital and the Insane Asylum as well as radically reforming the Juarez Hospital; he also formulated laws for public and private charities. In addition, he organized

*The gamblers paid \$20,000 dollars monthly for the permission.

the Rurales, endeavoring to choose the personnel very carefully; he enlarged the penitentiary; and he drew up the plans for the new city jail, which was to do away with the present one, a center of unhealthiness and immorality due to its material conditions. On May 22nd, 1904, Lieutenant Colonel Felix Diaz, a nephew and favorite of the President, was appointed Police Commissioner. His work in this capacity was highly detrimental to the government, for he began by delivering himself body and soul to Mr. Celso Acosta, Secretary of Police, who with the cooperation of several subordinates, soon succeeded by means of flattery and adulation towards the Commissioner, in making Police Headquarters a center of political intrigue directed in general against the "cientificos" and in particular against the Secretary of the Interior.

Shortly after Mr. Corral had been appointed Secretary of the Interior, the constitutional amendment creating the office of Vice-President was passed. General Diaz, now completely undeceived concerning General Reyes, advocated that the position be filled by a civilian, and named two persons, the only ones who in his opinion could be entrusted with the office: Mr. Olegario Molina and Ramon Corral. These two, he thought, were the only men who could fulfil the duties of Vice-President without making trouble for the administration. Mr. Molina having been finally eliminated, Mr. Limantour was commissioned to solicit the consent of Mr. Corral; his candidacy being launched in 1904.

When the elections were held, the President's candidate as was fully expected, was elected by a large majority, and on December 1st, 1904, General Diaz and Mr. Corral took the oath of office as President and Vice-President respectively. No change was made in the Cabinet, so everything went on as before. On his part, Mr. Corral refrained entirely from participation in political affairs, but in spite of that, General Diaz would tell any one who would listen, that he had found an ideal vice president and that it was a pity that so valuable a man should be so unpopular. As a matter of fact Mr. Corral, entering upon his new duties with the determination of giving the office the prestige it ought to have, was an ideal vice president. But General Diaz neither understood the part the Vice President should play, nor did he take measures to give Mr. Corral the prestige needed so that in case of necessity, he might assume the position of head

of the nation. On the contrary, he, the President, listened willingly to any and every gossip, to the most slanderous tales aimed at the Vice President, and repeated them, always regretting that he should be so talked about.

After the lapse of several years, just following the interview given by General Diaz to Mr. Creelman, the American newspaperman*, the question of reelections again arose. As usual, General Diaz made himself out to his friends a victim of duty, a martyr to patriotism. Not a month elapsed after the famous interview was published, before General Diaz called together Mr. Limantour, Mr. Corral, and Mr. Olegario Molina, to tell them that every day he received letters urging him to accept reelection, and that before deciding anything he wished to consult with his friends. He added that he believed himself too old to begin another presidential term, but that as he was resolved to sacrifice himself for the good of his country, he would accept another term if his friends believed that the nation still needed his services, and that he was not mentally incapacitated to continue at the head of the country. From the way he presented the subject, there could be no doubt that what he wanted was not advice but approbation. Mr. Limantour, the first to answer, said that the friends of the administration believed that General Diaz could undertake another term; that it was known that his intellectual faculties were still intact; that his reelection would be accepted without protest provided, however, that he make a number of radical changes in his platform and, above all, in order to preserve peace, that the make up of the Cabinet be completely changed; and that he, Limantour, should be the first to leave, as he had been a member for fifteen years. General Diaz agreed to make as many changes as his friends deemed advisable except in the Vice Presidency, for Mr. Corral had met all the requirements, and had filled the position with loyalty and honor.

Mr. Molina agreed with Mr. Limantour and General Diaz, but added that it was his opinion that the Vice President be given a much more actively political life; especially that he become thoroughly acquainted with the military leaders of the country so that in case of necessity they should not be unknown to him, and should during the life of General Diaz become

*In Pearson's Magazine, May 1908 edition.

accustomed to obey him and look on him as the head of the Nation.

Then, for the first time, Mr. Corral spoke, saying that he believed that although it was possible and even advisable for General Diaz to accept reelection, still it would be an error to retain himself in the vice presidency. After having shown his good will by serving six years, he wished to retire to private life, and he therefore begged General Diaz to name another candidate. Either Mr. Limantour or Mr. Molina could replace him. General Diaz interrupted him to say that on his part he was resolved not to accept reelection unless Mr. Corral should accept it. At the same time Mr. Limantour and Mr. Molina said it would be impossible for them to accept the nomination, the former on account of ineligibility, since his nationality had been passed upon, and the latter, on account of advanced years and illness. Both urged Mr. Corral to accept, but he insisted that either of them or some other friend of the President should be nominated. They, however refused to accept, and the President refused even to consider another man, claiming that the only way the reelection could be justified was if both the officials accepted, since there was no good reason for eliminating Mr. Corral, who had filled the office with so much circumspection. Mr. Corral still refused, until at last General Diaz stated that he solemnly promised that from that day he would decide no matter of importance without consulting the three of them, "unless," he added, "Mr. Corral has some personal grudge against me that causes him to take this stand." With that, Mr. Corral was forced to acknowledge himself beaten and agreed to appear on the ticket for reelection. The President repeated that in accordance with Mr. Molina's suggestion, no military appointment would be made without consultation with the vice president, who would become acquainted with all the military leaders and that nothing of any importance would thereafter be resolved without the majority vote of those present at that meeting.

From that day on, Mr. Corral had not one moment of rest or peace. The whole pack of hounds at the President's beck and call hurled itself upon him and respected nothing. Newspapers, orators, gossips at large, friends, and enemies of the administration, all hurled themselves against the man whose only crime was his loyalty. This infamy reached the lowest depth

when Mr. Corral, advised by his physician that a change of climate was essential, complying with the Constitutional provision, asked Congress for a leave of absence. At once, a group of the personal friends and relatives of the President opposed the granting of the leave, insisting that it be refused so that he should be forced to resign or die. I will quote the following passage from one of the most striking speeches, that made by Mr. Muñoz, a nephew of General Diaz: "If Mr. Corral is ill, let him try to cure himself, but let him die here where duty calls him, for we shall then mourn a man who has died perserving in his duty as a good patriot, but let us not out of pity, as Mr. Prida says, allow the Nation to suffer irremediable disasters."*

The leave of absence was finally granted, whereupon Mr. Corral made his preparations for the journey, and on the morning of the 11th of April, 1911, left with his family for Vera Cruz. Up to the very last minute that he was on Mexican soil, he gave his whole energy and strength to the good of his country, which he was leaving in the midst of great disasters never to see again, for whose future he had fought and suffered, and to which he had sacrificed life itself. In our last interview, when we talked over the situation, his voice was the voice of a Prophet. With what clearness he foresaw events! With what firmness he suffered disillusionment! The President had been to see him on the eve of his departure, and had timidly broached the subject of his resignation. Mr. Corral had answered him with dignity: "Yes, sir," he said, "you may count upon it, but it will be submitted with yours. I will accompany you even in this supreme act."

*As chairman of the House Committee on Interior Affairs, in my speech I had said that Mr. Corral's enemies were merciless in prosecuting him, sick as he was.

CHAPTER III.

THE REVOLUTION OF 1910.

On account of the personal attacks aimed at him, General Diaz decided to order Mr. Madero's arrest, and in issuing the order, he took advantage of a speech delivered by the candidate of the anti-reelectionists at the railroad station in San Luis Potosi as he passed through that city on his way to the border. This particular speech was chosen not because it was more impassioned or fiery than others made by Madero, but for the significant reason that it had been heard by Congressman Mr. Juan R. Orci. As this gentleman was a particular friend and protege of Vice President Ramon Corral, and widely known to be closely identified with him, Diaz felt quite sure that should he be the principal witness against Madero, the whole blame would be placed upon Mr. Corral, who would then naturally bear the brunt of unpopularity resulting from such a measure. As soon as the step was decided upon, orders for the arrest of Madero were issued to General Jose M. Mier, Military Chief of the Zone of Nuevo Leon, who succeeded in making the arrest in the city of Monterey just as Madero was about to board a train for the Laguna region, where he was to deliver another speech. By reason of the fact that the judge of the Federal District Court of San Luis Potosi was the judge within whose jurisdiction the offense had been committed, the prisoner was taken to that city and confined in the penitentiary, where all his correspondence was opened and examined by the government which was then in a position to prove that he was planning an armed revolution. However, by the time the proofs were collected, he had escaped to the United States, having been released on bail by express orders from General Diaz to the judge of the Federal District Court, Mr. Tomas Ortiz. These orders were issued in compliance with a petition made by Don Ignacio Montes de Oca, Bishop of the diocese of San Luis Potosi, who in order to intercede for the

prisoner had made a special trip to Mexico City where he had succeeded in winning the favor of the President's wife on behalf of the accused, and where he also had the support of Mr. Limantour who was a personal friend of the Madero family and, as such, had received various telegrams from them begging him to use his influence with Diaz in favor of the petition which Madero had presented to the Judge of the Federal District Court. The Bishop experienced no difficulty in having his request granted, for in addition to these facts, President Diaz did not think that Francisco Madero could do him any harm, nor did he consider him of very great importance. Upon the receipt of orders from Diaz, the act being according to law, the District Judge placed the bail at \$10,000. This sum was at once deposited by Mr. Madero who though released, was expected to remain in the city of San Luis Potosi until the conclusion of the trial which had already begun.

By this time, which was the beginning of October, the elections had already taken place and the House had made its customary declaration concerning them, so with Madero free, everything was ripe for a rebellion against Diaz, which was nevertheless not started until the 20th of November. The delay was due to the fact that the anti-reelectionists, though resolved to revolt, as they were friends of Madero, thought it dangerous to start the revolution while he was still in reach of the government police, so in order to eliminate this difficulty, they planned that he should escape on the train to Laredo. This, Mr. Madero easily accomplished, for one night, disguised as a mechanic, he walked out of the city to the suburbs where an automobile awaited him. Along the road which the machine was to take, spies were posted by friends of the cause in order that at the slightest alarm, or at the first indication of discovery, the fugitive could be hidden in the mountains of Matehuala. However, as the escape went unnoticed by any one, Mr. Madero was able calmly to board the train at a flag station. Still disguised as a mechanic and clean shaven, he managed with the help of the Auditor who was also in the plot, to gain the frontier of the United States. The first news the government had of the flight was from a telegram addressed by Don Andres Garza Galan to the Director of the Reelectionist Club advising him of Madero's arrival at Laredo, Texas. Several days later, in November, the revolutionary plan signed by Madero in the city of San Luis

Potosi, was made public. The movement was at once seconded in Chihuahua by Pascual Orozco and Abraham Gonzalez who were soon joined by Caraveo, Emilio Campa and others. General Manuel M. Plata, Chief of the Zone, immediately notified the government of the movement, urgently requesting that 10,000 men be sent him so that he might suppress the rebellion.* This report was received with derision in government circles where it was deemed so erroneous that the chief was relieved of his command. General Juan Hernandez was appointed as his successor for he had previously engaged in the campaign against the Indians of Chihuahua and was considered capable of mastering the situation with the meagre resources at the command of the second military zone.

In the meantime, General Diaz sent an intimate friend of his, Don Inigo Noriega, to interview the rebels. He was willing to sacrifice everybody in order to give the rebellion its death blow, at the very beginning. General Diaz thought that this plan would have the same success it had at the time of the rebellion of General Neri, but Mr. Vasquez Gomez, who was appointed by the rebels to interview the President's envoy and hear the propositions he had to offer, demanded that Noriega present his credentials in due form; in other words, he demanded that the government should recognize the revolution in its belligerent character. As it happened, Mr. Noriega had nothing but the private telegraphic code by which he was to communicate the proposals of the revolutionists to the President. In view of this fact, Mr. Vasquez Gomez very wisely refused to enter into any agreements with him, and the negotiation was a complete failure. By this time, public opinion, greatly excited over the unfruitful results of military affairs, demanded a brief and energetic campaign that should immediately reestablish communications and restore to the country the peace which it had lost. Colonel Martin Guzman had been badly defeated at Mal Paso, where he lost many of his soldiers and where he received a wound from which he died a few days after his arrival at Chihuahua. The President's assistants and his son Lieutenant Colonel Porfirio Diaz, made all the arrangements and plans

*Enrique C. Creel, Secretary of State, questioned by President Diaz, on the subject, answered that with the cowboys of the Terrazas' estates only the rebellion would be drowned off in a few days.

for the campaign, as the President was personally incapacitated by illness.

Mr. Madero, when he escaped from San Luis Potosi, went to San Antonio, Texas, where he organized the revolutionary junta. According to an understanding with Don Catarino Benavides, he was to go into the interior of the State of Coahuila, but on the 18th of November, he lost his way and wandered about for two days. Finally, on the 20th he met his partisans in the ranch called "El Indio." Twenty days he waited for those who had promised to join him, but as they did not appear, it was decided that the forces on hand in Coahuila were not enough to head a rebellion and that it would be better for Madero to establish his headquarters in Chihuahua. Therefore, towards the middle of December, assuming a disguise, he again crossed the border. His adherents in San Antonio were anxious that he should go by way of Havana to Yucatan, where it was stated by Mr. Jose Maria Pino Suarez he could count on resources far superior to those on the frontier. They were still doubtful as to the best course of action to follow, when it was learned that through the efforts of the Mexican government an order was to be issued by the United States for the arrest of Don Francisco I. Madero and Abraham Gonzalez, both accused of violating the neutrality laws.

On February 14, Don Francisco I. Madero and his followers re-entered Mexican territory, where they were soon joined by the guerrilla bands marauding in that vicinity; on the 19th, in the Charco de Grado, there began the organization of the revolutionary forces. Don Eduardo Hay was given charge of destroying the railroad tracks in order to prevent the mobilization of Federal troops. On the 22nd, Mr. Madero and his forces entered Villa Ahumada, and on the 28th, they invaded San Lorenzo, encountering absolutely no resistance. On the 1st of March, they were joined in San Buenaventura by 200 men led by Colonel Jose Flores Alatorre, but on account of the numerous complaints against the man, he was relieved of his command and his soldiers were incorporated into the column commanded by Hay, Roque Gonzalez Garza, and the Italian Garibaldi. The column marched towards Casas Grandes, arrived there on March 5th, and immediately proceeded to attack the town. Colonel Garcia Cuellar, leader of the 6th Battalion since the defeat of Colonel Guzman at Mal Paso, who with a section of the artillery under Colonel

Eguia Liz had been for some time in the vicinity of the town, immediately came to its defense. The commanders, Jose de la Luz Soto, Garibaldi, Hay, and Gonzalez Garza, although none of them knew anything about military tactics, refused to take advice from the officers in the column who had technical knowledge. The federal attack was so fierce, and the surprise of the rebels so great, that Soto's forces were completely demoralized, and this demoralization spread disorder among the rest. Mr. Madero, who was watching the scene from a distance, was advised to take to flight. A carriage and mules were provided, but on hitching, it was found that one of the mules was a pack mule and could not draw the carriage; so Madero was forced to hide in a ditch to escape capture.

Colonel Garcia Cuellar was badly wounded in the hand but in spite of this, he refused to leave his post. In answering Colonel Eguia Liz' remonstrations and entreaties that he should attend to his wound and leave him in command, enough time was lost to give Madero the necessary opportunity to escape. Don Benito Goribar in his book entitled "El Maderismo en Cueros" says: "If Colonel Garcia Cuellar had been a soldier, he would at that very instant have ordered fifty cavalymen to charge, and there and then would have put an end to Madero and the Maderista revolution of 1910." Mr. Goribar fails to take into consideration the fact that Colonel Garcia Cuellar was wounded, and that therefore the only mistake for which he can be held responsible is for not having resigned his command and for his over anxiety to fulfil his duty.

In the meantime, the guerilla bands in Chihuahua had succeeded in cutting off Ciudad Juarez, for with the men Pascual Orozco, Caraveo, Salazar, and Campa in Guerrero, Batopilas, the Sierra Tarahumara, and the Sierra de las Mestefias, they had advanced on Ciudad Juarez and Ojinaga in their efforts to take possession of some border town. The government, apparently believing that it was merely a local uprising against the domination of the Terrazas, forced the resignation of the Governor, Mr. Alberto Terrazas, son of General Luis Terrazas, owner of most of the land in the State, and appointed as his successor, Colonel Miguel Ahumada who had just been relieved of the governorship of Jalisco in favor of Don Manuel Cuesta Gallardo. Ahumada had formerly been Governor of Chihuahua and had won the esteem of all the inhabitants. The government

at the same time had ordered General Lauro Villar, chief of the forces in Laredo, to lead the campaign in Chihuahua, but events were hastened when towards the beginning of May, Ciudad Juarez was besieged by a large number of rebels commanded by Pascual Orozco, Jr., as commander-in-chief, with Francisco Villa, Salazar, Caraveo, and Emilio Campa, next in command. Of these, Villa, besides being very well acquainted with that region, was also an excellent marksman; Salazar was a very intelligent and brave young man; Caraveo a daring fellow dearly beloved by his troops and of an unflinching courage; and Emilio Campa was also a young man of exceptional qualities; but none of them had had any military schooling whatsoever. These forces had, separately, various encounters with the Federals in Coyame, in Cuchillo, Párado, besides other places, and had never been routed, so now coming together into one group, they formed a nucleus of some importance.

The forces in Ciudad Juarez were under the command of General Navarro, now an old man, who had always fought with courage, but whose strategic knowledge was almost nil. This, it is true, was offset to some extent by the presence of Colonel Tamborrel who belonged to the corps of engineers and had made scientific preparations for the defense of the town. The Federal columns had up to that time been moved by direct orders from the War Department, although as a matter of fact, General Diaz himself directed the campaign from his house, assisted by his aides, particularly by his son, Lieutenant Colonel Porfirio Diaz. So long as General Diaz was able personally to issue orders and direct the movements, these movements suffered only because of the fact that the directing power was so far away from the scene of action and was unfamiliar with the country where the forces operated; but as soon as General Diaz was prevented from personally attending to the campaign, which was then carried on chiefly by his son, these movements suffered from the appalling incompetence of the directing power. It was never known at a given time where the columns were, for they were moved about without reason and needlessly exhausted. The Secretary of War, General Gonzalez Cosio, not wishing to displease the President, said nothing, and consequently the results of the campaign became worse every day. General Mondragon, an intimate friend of Lieutenant Colonel Porfirio Diaz, was also there, but with an eye to business. One proposition which he submitted was an

offer of a large quantity of ammunition at 70 marks per thousand, made to the government by a German factory through a Mr. Perez. The President ordered it to be bought, but the Sub-secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Nuñez, who had a personal aversion to Mondragon, suspecting that there was something crooked in the deal, cabled to Mr. Limantour at Paris. Mr. Limantour answered that the ammunition was in fact German, but that it had been refused by the Chilean government and that it could be bought at about 40 marks per thousand. In view of this reply and in spite of the decisive order from the President, Mr. Nuñez refused to approve the contract. General Diaz, who, as I have said* was a slave to formalities, canceled the contract that had already been drawn up by the Secretary of War. The army administration was also in frightful disorder. The Sanitary Department was continually complaining of not having the requisite materials because orders for them were not given in due time. The failure of the campaign in Chihuahua was due to the weakness of the Secretary of War who in deference to the President's son, did not himself take actual direction of the Campaign. It has been said that General Gonzalez Cosio was incompetent, but in my opinion such a charge should not be made for he did not actually direct the movements, but simply transmitted the orders he received. Another cause of disaster was the untimely death of Colonel Tamborrel in Ciudad Juarez at the very beginning of the assault, because General Navarro, though a good column commander, was not capable enough to carry out the defense as it had been planned. Thus the fall of Ciudad Juarez, though in itself really an insignificant event, was, as we shall see later, the death blow to General Diaz and his government; with this single battle, and with the capture of this single small town, the revolution begun in November 1910, had triumphed.

*In the complete Spanish edition.

CHAPTER IV.

THE FALL OF THE COLOSSUS.

As a rule, whenever elections were to be held, General Diaz would show Mr. Limantour the list of the Congressmen who were to be elected as soon as made out, and listen to his suggestions and comments, but in 1910, the first glimpse Mr. Limantour had of this list was when he read it in the newspapers. However, in spite of the express agreement made the previous year by General Diaz with him, Corral, and Molina, Mr. Limantour did not complain nor in fact did he in any way show that he was aware that elections would be held in July of that year; but when the names of the candidates for magistrates of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation were published by the newspapers of the different states, and he saw that among them figured a protege of Mr. Dehesa, he could not but remonstrate, though in a respectful and amiable way, stating that the course of action of General Diaz on this occasion was entirely different from his usual attitude towards him, and that, above all, it was absolutely contrary to the express agreement made when Corral had accepted the re-nomination. The President offered some explanations, and the conversation, less cordial than usual, ended by Mr. Limantour asking for a leave of absence to accompany his wife on a trip to Europe for her health. This was immediately granted, though the President requested him to postpone his departure until after the elections. No sooner were the primary elections over than Mr. Limantour left with his family for Europe promising to return in time to assist, on December 1st, in the inauguration of Don Porfirio Diaz and Mr. Ramon Corral, which was to be the beginning of the six year term of office for which they had been elected.

Mr. Limantour's friends considered it a mistake on his part to take the trip at this particular time. They showed him clearly that it would cause much unfavorable comment, and it would

be open to criticism for the Secretary of the Treasury to be absent from the country just at the time of the centennial celebration, a celebration which General Diaz intended should surpass all previous ones in brilliancy and luxury. They also argued that it would be particularly unfortunate for him to be away should the revolution really break out, as there was every indication to believe it would, judging from Madero's actions. But Mr. Limantour, deaf to all arguments, would listen to none of them, and firm in his resolution, left for Europe in July, apparently determined to break entirely with Diaz.

In Europe he was, therefore, when things began to happen in Mexico, and in Europe it was he met General Reyes with whom he became so intimate that hardly a day went by that they were not seen together in the streets of Paris. Both seem to have completely forgotten their former mutual grievances. When events grew worse, and the rebellion finally broke out, General Diaz cabled and wrote to Mr. Limantour urging his return, but Mr. Limantour, offering as an excuse now the illness of his wife, now the illness of his daughter, stayed where he was. The President was compelled to demand from his minister an explanation of such conduct, but it was not until February 1911, when events were reaching a crisis, that Mr. Limantour finally decided to come back to the side of Diaz. He returned by way of New York, where he conferred with Messrs. Madero, Vasquez Gomez, and Ambassador de la Barra. What they discussed and what they agreed upon, they have refused to divulge. Mr. Vasquez Gomez alone has thrown out hints about it, but not enough on which to base a statement; his reticence is even more eloquent, but not even from that can a logical deduction be made. Time alone can throw light on the discussion held in the American metropolis.

Mr. Limantour was met on the way by his best friends, headed by Mr. Macedo and by Mr. Nuñez. His first words of greeting were that in returning to his country he did not wish to identify himself with any particular political faction, that what he wished was to be entirely independent so as to be able to attract to himself the most able men the nation could supply, regardless of what their ideas or affiliations had heretofore been. Those who up to that time had been Mr. Limantour's political friends, but had been aware of Mr. Limantour's intimacy with General Reyes in Paris, immediately understood that what Mr. Limantour wished was to be entirely at liberty to join his old

enemies, believing it to be the best way of attaining the power which had slipped through his fingers when he had been faithful to his old friends. Therefore, from that very moment they tacitly agreed to separate, making no comment whatsoever on what had occurred.*

Limantour, ex-chief of the *Científicos*, entered the Capital on March 19th, 1911, after having broken completely with his old friends. On his entry he was accorded an ovation that might almost be called frantic, prepared for him by the *Científicos* who naturally had not been able to foretell his change of mind. There were speeches at the railroad station, and acclamations in the streets. It seemed as if the Savior of the country had arrived. The popularity so eagerly sought by Mr. Limantour for nearly twenty years was his at the most unexpected moment. And this, in spite of the fact that the people did not know that Mr. Limantour was no longer a *Científico*!

A conference was immediately held between General Diaz and Mr. Limantour at which it was decided to call a special meeting of the Cabinet. At this meeting, he urged the necessity that the Cabinet resign *en masse*. Mr. Corral, who although seriously ill attended to his official duties, approved the course suggested by the Secretary of the Treasury, but turning to General Diaz he openly reminded him of his words at the conference with Limantour, Molina, and himself; he brought before him his failure to keep his promises made at that time as to what he would do, and finally he declared that events had reached such a climax because of the government's weakness, because of the hesitancy of the President in making any changes in the personnel of the Cabinet, and because of the unwillingness of Mr. Limantour to provide the necessary funds when and where needed.

On March 24th, it was decided that all members of the Cabinet should resign. The President placed the formation of the new Cabinet in charge of Mr. Limantour who from the nature of things was its head. When this new Cabinet became known to the general public, it was christened by Mr. Bulnes in one of his brilliant articles "The Cabinet of High C," for this famous orator argued that it would only last as long as a high C sung by an opera tenor. On the 28th of March the Cabinet was defi-

*From the next day, 20th of March, 1911, the *Científico* party was no longer in Mexican politics.

nitely appointed as follows: Secretary of State, Francisco de la Barra, Ambassador of Mexico in Washington, to whom Mr. Limantour had offered the portfolio on his way through the United States; Secretary of the Interior, vacant, because the President had suggested as a candidate, Mr. Rafael Rebollar whom Mr. Limantour flatly rejected, because on his side, following his new policy of flattering his old enemies, he had proposed Mr. Teodoro A. Dehesa, but General Diaz, in spite of the persistence of his own nephew, Congressman Ignacio Muñoz, refused to countenance the appointment; Attorney General, Demetrio Sodi, Justice of the National Supreme Court, and son of an intimate friend of General Diaz; Secretary of Public Instruction, Jorge Vera y Estañol, law partner of Mr. Calero, and suggested by this gentleman to the President and Mr. Limantour. (It was Mr. Vera Estañol who was given charge of the portfolio of the Interior towards the end of the Diaz regime in order that he might intervene with Madero for the restoration of peace); Secretary of Development, Mr. Manuel Marroquin y Rivera, a man in whom Mr. Limantour had absolute confidence; Secretary of Communications, Mr. Norberto Dominguez; Post Master General, a man in whom General Diaz had full confidence, although the public accused him of having given assistance to violation of the mails that passed through the post office; the office of Secretary of War Mr. Limantour had promised to General Reyes, but the President flatly refused to appoint him; in the meantime Lieutenant Colonel Porfirio Diaz, Jr., a great friend of General Gonzalez Cosio, the incumbent, made the most of the opportunity for supporting the latter, and finally succeeded in convincing his father that it would be a mistake to remove him; General Diaz was well enough pleased with General Gonzalez Cosio, not to desire a change, nor did he under any circumstances want General Reyes appointed to the post. Secretary of the Treasury, filled again by Mr. Limantour.

As soon as the new Cabinet was organized, Mr. Limantour's first thought was to cable to General Reyes, who should be placed in charge of the campaign, and whose sword would then come to save the government; but the President strenuously opposed such a course and it took all the persuasive powers of Mr. Limantour finally to secure his consent. General Reyes then imposed conditions, one of which was the elimination from politics of Mr. Limantour's former friends. General Reyes stated that in the

agreement made in Paris, Mr. Limantour had pledged his word that Mr. Corral would resign; that all the Cientificos would be eliminated from public posts; that there would be no compromise with the revolution; that he, Reyes, would be appointed Secretary of War and would be given all the supplies he might ask for.

The Cabinet completed by the arrival of Mr. de la Barra, presented itself before Congress on the 1st of April. In his message, the President proposed the constitutional reform that there should be no reelection. This proposal was presented in due form on the following day and its speedy dispatch was recommended. After a three days discussion, in which individuals rather than political principles were discussed, the proposed reform was accepted on April 25th. In this way the new government thought to calm the storm that threatened its deposal; a gross error, for the revolution had already taken such a strong hold on public opinion all over the country that nothing could stop it. Besides, the government had made a change of persons but not of program. Mr. Limantour continued his old method of not spending the national funds; he defended them as though they were his own, and for what? In order that at his downfall he should have a large sum in the treasury for his successor. How much better would it have been had he spent some of the money in preventing the evils caused by the revolution! Above all, he continued negotiating with the rebels, against whom he defended not the personnel of the government nor its institutions, but the funds which the revolutionists demanded of him.

In defense of this course of action, Mr. Limantour would say that his main object was to prevent American Intervention, a phantom with which Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson was always threatening. It is rather peculiar and inexplicable though, that Mr. Limantour who had made his return trip from Europe via the United States, should not have learned there the real attitude of the American government towards the Mexican situation, and should not have come to the conclusion that the threats of invasion came only from Henry Lane Wilson himself and not direct from the Cabinet nor from the peaceful President. Mr. Taft, at that time the occupant of the White House.

Fearing intervention, or pretending to fear it, Mr. Limantour ordered Oscar Braniff, who had gone to the United States for the purpose of entering into some agreement with the rebels.

to move to El Paso that he might be nearer to the revolutionists. There, aided by Mr. Toribio Esquivel Obregon, who accompanied him, he began negotiations. In these negotiations, Dr. Vazquez Gomez, who was gifted with much more shrewdness and sagacity than the government envoys and even than the chief of the Cabinet himself, brought things to such a pass that the government, unconscious of the fact, was made to recognize the revolutionists as belligerents. The way Vazquez Gomez accomplished this was by demanding that the government send a special envoy with credentials so that in case there should be a break, they could extend as an argument to the American government the fact that the Mexican government itself had already recognized them as belligerents, and that therefore a foreign government could not do otherwise. Mr. Limantour, falling nicely into the trap, appointed as a special envoy, Supreme Court Justice Francisco Carvajal to whom were given written instructions and credentials that the rebels could not reject. The government was treating with the rebels as equals and therefore the government was lost! In the conferences which took place in Mexican territory near Ciudad Juarez, Vazquez Gomez, acting as spokesman for the revolutionists, was more exacting than ever. He demanded the resignation of General Diaz, although Madero had already relinquished this demand; that all Cientificos leave the House; that men proposed by the revolutionists be appointed governors for eight or ten states; and that furthermore, a heavy sum of money be paid by the government to defray the expenses of the revolutionists. The government was willing to sacrifice all of Mr. Limantour's friends, and to change a considerable number of the governors, but it was by no means willing to give the money demanded, nor to have General Diaz resign. The President imposed another condition which was accepted by the revolutionists, namely, not to recognize the military standing of any rebel, as he did not wish to hurt the army that had been faithful to him. This condition then was agreed upon by the revolutionists and as I have said before, Mr. Madero even consented to have Diaz remain in power; but the revolutionists, headed by Mr. Vazquez Gomez balked and the negotiations were interrupted. General Diaz then issued to the Nation a proclamation drawn up by Mr. Rosendo Pineda, one of the former friends of Mr. Limantour, for, it may be noted, Mr. Limantour is a man of such character, that though he was quite willing,

in order to please General Reyes, to have his old friends debarred from politics and quite willing to have them leave the House of Representatives, where they had loyally defended the government, still he was always ready to use them when occasion demanded and did not hesitate to call upon them and earnestly request work of this kind.*

As the negotiations were interrupted, the rebels in view of the moral support which the government's attitude had given them, broke the armistice and on May 9th took Ciudad Juarez by assault. Among their prisoners was General Juan J. Navarro, Commander in Chief, whom they intended to execute. Mr. Madero declared this assault an act of disobedience as he had not ordered such a step; the government's envoy entered a vigorous protest, in answer to which Mr. Madero complained of his own powerlessness to impose his will. Nevertheless, with great energy he opposed the execution of General Navarro, personally defending him and conducting him to the American side, thus compelling obedience to his desires. Two days later, there was a new disagreement when the military commander of the revolutionists, Pascual Orozco, carried matters so far as to arrest Madero in the City Hall. This building had been converted by the revolutionists into their Federal Building. Once more Mr. Madero succeeded in imposing himself, and he regained his liberty, thus asserting the authority with which the rebels had invested him.

Mr. Limantour did not recall either of the envoys from El Paso; on the contrary, he continued negotiating for peace until finally on the night of the 21st of May, a treaty was signed. On the following day, the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Vera Estañol, appeared before the House and read the following message from the President, concerning the matter:

"Gentlemen: You are duly informed by the Secretary of State that the President, always solicitous for the welfare of his country, declared his intention to listen to any peace proposals that might be made to him by the revolutionists then in arms. For this purpose he appointed as his envoy, Mr. Francisco Carvajal, whom he authorized to negotiate with the envoys that Mr. Francisco I. Madero, publicly considered chief of the revolution, might appoint. The President's desire was to ratify pub-

*The proclamation can be read in the Spanish edition.

lic opinion, but he would make only such concessions as would be compatible with the dignity of the government as well as practicable within constitutional limits.’’

Official negotiations took place at the beginning of this same month of May, Mr. Francisco I. Madero having appointed as his representatives Messrs. Francisco Madero, Sr., Francisco Vazquez Gomez, and Jose Maria Pino Suarez. Unfortunately, it had been necessary to break off negotiations because the revolutionists demanded as a necessary condition for declaring their propositions that General Porfirio Diaz should first announce his intention to resign from the Presidency within a specified time. However, it was unofficially known that in order to end the revolution the chiefs intended to propose among other terms, some that it would be impossible to accept without violating the Constitution.

The Cabinet believed that the sudden announcement of the resignation of the President, without first adjusting the terms under which the revolutionists should lay down their arms, and especially without knowing officially what these terms would be, would have loosened the ties of order and legality with which the greater part of the country was still bound together, thus bringing about a state of anarchy which was already threatening some parts under the name of a revolutionary agitation. Moreover, the government correctly judged that if peace was reestablished by means of unconstitutional arrangements, instead of being permanent it would merely be the beginning of deeper and more lasting national troubles.

When it was necessary to break negotiations, the President issued his proclamation of the 8th of May, calling upon the nation to support the government and stating that he would withdraw from power when, in his judgment, the country would not run the risk of falling into a state of anarchy at his withdrawal from office. The fall of Ciudad Juarez, in spite of the heroic defense made by our army, furnished resources and gave new strength to the revolution, increasing not only the number of its forces, but also the number of its sympathizers. These two important facts induced the government to facilitate the renewal of negotiations to which, in view of the President's proclamation, the leader of the revolution also consented. In the renewed negotiations, the revolutionary chiefs no longer insisted that the President resign, nor did they insist that he even fix a

date for his resignation. They did, however, propose conditions which could not constitutionally be made the terms of an agreement, but could only be decided upon if demanded by public opinion through legal and authorized channels. In view of these facts and of the general clamor throughout the country for the reestablishment of peace and security, the government thought it necessary to find a radical solution to the conflict. What was finally determined upon was that General Diaz should publicly announce his intention of withdrawing very shortly from office, at the same time stating that Don Ramon Corral's resignation was also on its way. On their side, the revolutionists should pledge themselves to support the provisional government which, as provided by the Constitution, would in that event take office and should aid it to reestablish peace and satisfy public opinion within constitutional bounds.

Such an act of patriotism by the President of the Republic produced good results, as the revolutionary leader at once consented to come to an agreement and in fact did agree with the government's envoy to a general armistice through all parts of the country, an armistice which is to end today.

Mr. Carvajal, the government's envoy, was immediately given instructions to enter into negotiations with Messrs. Vazquez Gomez, Madero, and Pino Suarez to arrange for a definite cessation of hostilities. The result of these new negotiations was that an agreement subject to ratification already asked for, was agreed upon. This was as follows:

“At a meeting held in the border Custom House in Ciudad Juarez on the 21st of May, 1911 by Mr. Carvajal representing the government of Porfirio Diaz and Messrs. Francisco V. Gomez, Francisco Madero, Sr., and Jose Maria Pino Suarez, representing the revolutionists, to try to readjust matters and put an end to hostilities throughout the country and whereas Porfirio Diaz declared his intention of resigning before the end of the present month; whereas it is gathered from reliable information that Mr. Ramon Corral will also resign within the stated time; whereas as provided by law, the Secretary of State, Francisco de la Barra will become president *ad interim* and will, according to the constitution, call a general election; whereas the new government will carefully study present conditions in order to grant within lawful limits to each state what it may require and will consider payment of indemnities for damages caused directly

by the revolution, the contracting parties represented at this conference have agreed upon the following terms: That hostilities between the government and the revolutionary forces shall from this day cease; that the revolutionary forces be disbanded as soon as each state takes steps towards the reestablishment and guarantee of peace and public order. TRANSITORY: that the reconstruction and repairing of telegraphic and railroad lines at present interrupted shall be taken up immediately. The present agreement shall be signed in duplicate."

The attitude of the government had naturally caused revolutionists to spring up all over the country. On the 20th, Colima fell into the hands of the rebels. On the 21st Cuernavaca fell, and on the following day Acapulco and Chilpancingo. On the 22nd it also became known that Tehuacan and Torreon had turned against the government and so on, all over the country, revolutionists whose very existence was unknown sprouted in every place. The ambitious and the hungry, all joined the revolution where it was succeeding, in order to share the booty.

General Diaz though ill and without energy, and though urged by the Secretary of the Treasury and his friends; still resisted. Though the agreement demanding his resignation was already signed, the President still refused to resign. The mobs shouted in the streets and the riots increased so that the troops had to be called out to quell the disturbances; blood flowed through the streets of Mexico City; the House had been waiting since the 24th for the resignation of the President and the Vice President, but still the President wavered. The scene in the President's house on the morning of the 25th of May was really pathetic. The House of Representatives was about to go into session and the *de facto* head of the Cabinet was at the President's side with the written resignation in his hand. His family begged the President to resign; Mr. Limantour, never before showing so much energy, demanded his resignation, but it was not until half past two o'clock when the representatives were already beginning to arrive at the House to approve that humiliation and sacrifice, that General Diaz, in the delirium of fever, almost unconsciously, submitted and signed his resignation. Mr. Corral's resignation had arrived several days before. Mr. Limantour, with a deep sigh of relief, left the President, taking with him both resignations in order that the House might consummate

the act. Both documents are worthy of passing into history. That of President Diaz is stated in the following terms :

Mexico, May 25, 1911.

Gentlemen :

The Mexican people, that people who have so generously overwhelmed me with honors, who proclaimed me their leader in the International War, who have patriotically supported me in all works undertaken for the industrial and commercial improvement of the country, to establish its credit, to give its name international prestige, and to gain for it a worthy place among friendly nations; that people, gentlemen, have revolted, and in armed bands of thousands, declare that my continuance as chief executive of the country is the cause of the insurrection. I do not know of what I am accused that would give rise to this social phenomenon but granting for the sake of argument that I am unconsciously guilty, this would make me the person least able to reason about and decide my own guilt. Under such circumstances, respecting as I have always respected the will of the people, and in accordance with Article 82 of the National Constitution, I appear before the highest representatives of the people to present my resignation as constitutional president with which the national vote has honored me; and I do this all the more because to retain my position, it would be necessary to continue to shed Mexican blood, to destroy the Nation's credit, to squander and drain the fountains of her wealth, and to expose the government to international conflict.

I hope, gentlemen, that when the passions, always brought out by a revolution, cool down, a deeper and more unbiased study shall form in the public conscience a fair judgment which will permit me to die having in the depth of my soul a reciprocation of that esteem which all my life I have held and shall continue to hold for my fellow countrymen.

Respectfully,

Porfirio Diaz.

Mr. Corral's resignation reads as follows :

To the Secretaries of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Union.

Gentlemen :

On the two occasions when the National Convention offer-

ed me the candidacy for the Vice Presidency of the Republic on the ticket headed by General Diaz, I informed them I was disposed to occupy any position in which my country deemed my services most useful, and that if the public vote placed me in a position so far above my deserts, my aim would be to support at all times the policies of General Diaz so as to co-operate with him in so far as it lay in my power for the aggrandizement of the nation, which had to such an extraordinary degree been developed under his administration.

Let those who take an interest in public affairs and have watched their development during the past years judge whether I have achieved my purpose. What I can declare is that I shall at all times endeavor even at the sacrifice of personal conviction to raise not the slightest obstacle to the policy of the President or to his work of development, not only because such was the basis of my program and demanded of me by my duty and my loyalty, but also because I seek to give prestige to the office of Vice President, so useful in the United States, and so entirely underrated in Latin countries.

The events which have shaken the country in the past few months have forced the President, out of pure patriotism, to withdraw from the high office given him by the practically unanimous vote of the Mexican people at the last elections, and at the same time, it seems necessary for the national welfare, that the Vice President act likewise so that with new men and new energies, a stimulus may be added to the national prosperity. Therefore, pursuant to my program of seconding the policy of General Diaz, I add my resignation to his, and do hereby surrender my office as Vice President, respectfully requesting the House to accept my resignation when it accepts that of the President.

I beg of you, Messrs. Secretaries, to present this request, which I submit with the assurances of my most distinguished consideration.

Liberty and Constitution.

Paris, May 1911.

Ramon Corral.

On the 22nd, Mr. Limantour had accepted the resignation of the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Roberto Nuñez, and had appointed as his successor Mr. Jaime Gurza. It was to Mr. Gurza that he left the Secretaryship when a few days later he unexpectedly fled from the city, accompanied to the

station by his successor, and accompanied to the frontier by Mr. Emilio Madero, homage which the triumphant revolution paid to the chief of the fallen government.

On the night of May 25th, democracy held a veritable orgy, the mobs marching and shouting all over the city. What were they celebrating? What was the cause of that exultation, of that rapture of joy? They themselves did not know!

General Diaz from his house in Cadena Street could hear the shouting of the frantic mobs as they passed the corner near his residence. Through the street itself they could not go for it was closely guarded by a heavy cordon of troops and was closed at both ends by a compact column of dragoons, behind which, as a reenforcement, stood a double line of infantry. The President's house was guarded by one hundred men from the Engineers' Battalion and by the whole squadron which composed the President's body guard. On the roofs there were rapid fire guns, and policemen held the points of exit. Faithful friends stood armed at the entrance on the main stairs, and even on the second floor of the ex-president's house. Vain precautions! The people did not hate Porfirio Diaz, they were merely celebrating their liberty to run through the streets shouting down anybody they pleased. The mob scenes were not the work of the anti-reelectionists, nor of the victorious Maderista party; they were prepared by old government partisans, men who had fattened their purses from the budget of the Diaz government and who owed Diaz many a good turn. Mr. Lalanne incited the mobs, and Mr. Joaquin Baranda McGregor, son of erstwhile cabinet member of the fallen government, paid the expenses of the demonstration. The leaders of that demonstration were well known; recalcitrant Reyistas, servants of Mr. Dehesa, and ex-employees of Mr. Felix Diaz. All were united on that occasion to give vent to their feelings by shouting. If at even the most riotous moment of the celebration some practical joker had passed the word that General Diaz was mounted and ready to personally disperse the crowds, there would not have been a single one of those thousands of rioters left in the streets. I myself saw that human wave as it was passing by the House of Representatives; with several gentlemen I was leaving the House on our way home from a meeting which had been called by Mr. Calero. Of our party, Mr. Calero himself, Mr. Sierra Mendez, and Mr. Ricardo Molina got into the latter's automobile which was waiting in

front of the House and were able quickly to leave by way of Canoa Street. I tried to get on a street car which was passing at full speed so as to cross before the mob, but I was prevented from so doing by Don Benito Juarez who jumped on while the car was moving. Others of my companions had gone through the Treasury of the Congress out to Factor Street, whereupon the servants had locked the doors of the House so that I was compelled to take refuge in another street car which was held up by the passing mobs. From there, I was able to see everything and to hear the insults that were hurled at all of us. Whether they did not see me, or seeing me did not recognize me, I do not know, but the fact is they did not interfere with me at all. Among that motley mass of humanity that passed so short a distance from me, I saw two women standing in a hired carriage and carrying a tri-color banner and a picture of Madero. One of these women was a teacher in a national school. I saw in other carriages, men who would often address the multitudes or would shout insults in incoherent phrases against the government, against the congressmen, and, above all, against the Cientificos.

Once in a while, a "Viva Madero!" was shouted, but the cry that was most frequently heard, was "Viva el General Reyes!" I knew quite a number of the leaders of these groups. Some of them had been bribed to take part in the celebration of the reelectionists; others were obstinate Reyistas, and still others in fact the greater part of them, were men who had served the government up to that very day and would serve the new one.

Fortunately, a heavy and timely shower put a stop to the orgy, which might otherwise have degenerated into a riot with very serious consequences, for some of the more violent had already begun to propose to set fire to the homes of the reelectionists. The police had remained stock still with arms crossed, probably watching the sight with great complacency.

The following day at daybreak, without telling anybody, not even his most intimate friends like Don Guillermo de Landa y Escandon, ex-governor of the Federal District, General Diaz left for Vera Cruz escorted by a force composed of Engineers of the 7th Infantry, and a detachment of the President's body-guard, commanded by General Victoriano Huerta. He was also accompanied by his aides-de-camp, by Mr. Gonzalo Garita. In-

spector General of Police, and two sons of the former President, Manuel Gonzalez. In these supreme moments, these two men in payment of the treachery and disloyalty shown to their father, offered a sublime act of loyalty and self sacrifice. On the arrival of the party at Tepeyahualco, on the border of the States of Puebla and Vera Cruz, a large band of revolutionists, who had been concentrating there with the full knowledge of the Governor of Vera Cruz, had the audacity to attack the train; somehow or other they knew the time of its departure and the route which it was to take, facts which seemed to be unknown to everybody. The chief of the escort immediately detached three columns under command of the Messrs. Gonzalez and of the Lieutenant Colonel of the Engineers, whereupon the revolutionists instantly fled. General Diaz also got off the train and once again he was the calm and brave chief of former times. His voice was clear and sonorous, his orders curt and precise. The rebels were commanded by a protege of the ex-president, the son of a man whom Diaz had always served as a friend.

After the flight of the assailants, the party resumed its journey arriving at Vera Cruz without further mishap.

Due to the events of 1879*, General Diaz had no sympathizers in the city of Vera Cruz, and knowing it, he had always stayed in the city as little as possible. Now in the hour of his misfortune, that magnanimous people treated him with every respect and consideration; and when on board the German steamer Ypiranga he was ready to sail for Europe, the send off they gave him was more than cordial, it was enthusiastic. The crowds acclaimed him. All rancor had vanished, and this was because the athletic figure of General Diaz, as it appeared on deck waving good bye to his country, did not remind the people of the overbearing ruler but rather of the magnificent soldier of the years from '57 to '67. His countenance did not remind them of the Lord of the Castle of Chapultepec, but rather of the brave soldier of Jalatlaco, Miahuatlan, and Carbonera; and the tears that were running down his cheeks blotted out in the eyes of the people all his past mistakes. People in general are simple and forgiving, but history is cruel and impersonal in such

*The bloody repression inflicted by Governor Teran on the Lerdo party on the 25th of June, 1879, as related in the complete Spanish edition.

moments as these, for it is obliged to ignore tears, to remain unmoved by misfortune, and to look at events and men in their true aspect.

* * *

As General Diaz had twice failed to carry out his promises to Mr. Limantour; as he had deceived him many times, and had humiliated him even more, Mr. Limantour must have had a feeling of relief as from a distance he watched the Ypiranga carry General Porfirio Diaz away, and with him all the ambitions of the old executive, and could have said to himself:

“I am avenged.”

CHAPTER V.

THE WHITE PRESIDENT AND THE BLACK PRESIDENT.

On the 25th of May General Diaz finally sent in his resignation with that of Vice President Corral to the House of Representatives and it was accepted that very afternoon, whereupon the Secretary of State, Francisco L. de la Barra, who was designed in the treaties of Ciudad Juarez as the man to take charge of the Government until general elections could be held, became President *ad interim* of the Republic. On the following day, he took the oath of office and at once removed his residence to the Castle of Chapultepec. He then proceeded to name his cabinet, or rather, decreed the appointment of the men imposed upon him by the revolution. In this instance, he was guided by history, for in 1876, Jose Maria Yglesias lost the presidency by refusing to subordinate his constitutional powers to the terms of a treaty made with the revolutionists. Mindful of this fact, Mr. de la Barra, rather than risk having the same thing happen to him, accepted all the ministers that were imposed upon him.

The Cabinet, as finally made up, was as follows: Secretary of State, vacant, the President to discharge the duties of this office assisted by the Assistant Secretary Bartolomé Carvajal y Rosas; Secretary of the Interior, Emilio Vazquez Gomez; Attorney General, Rafael L. Hernandez; Secretary of Education, Francisco Vazquez Gomez; Secretary of Development, Manuel Calero; Secretary of Public Works, Manuel Bonilla; Secretary of the Treasury, Ernesto Madero, suggested by Mr. José Ives Limantour; and Secretary of War, General Eugenio Rascon. This last appointment was the only one left entirely to the President's judgment, and it was left to him either because the revolutionary party had no one to suggest for the office

or because it did not wish to hold up before the soldiers any of its leaders as implicated in the successful revolution.

It may be noted that Mr. Limantour's work was now complete. He had seen to it that two of his friends, Ernesto Madero, and the Assistant Secretary, Jaime Gurza, were left at the head of the Treasury Department, thus preventing any attack that might hurt his good name. In the great disaster which was to bring so many ills to his fatherland, this thought alone filled his mind. He had not lost the hope of attaining the presidency, but though he did not realize it, he was dead politically.

Owing to the fact that some of the new ministers were in exile, the government was not finally installed until a few days had passed. Mr. Calero, the most intelligent of the new officials not excepting the President, was expected to be the life and soul of the government, and was in fact from the very start its spokesman in Congress. But neither the Secretary of the Interior, nor the Secretary of Education had been born to obey anybody, nor were they disposed to see another enjoy the benefits accruing from the success of the revolution. Consequently, from the beginning, they dispatched the affairs of their respective departments without taking the trouble of consulting the President nor much less of asking his consent. Emilio Vazquez Gomez at the head of the Department of the Interior, began to squander money in a most outrageous manner. In vain was the attention of the Cabinet called to this state of affairs. The only change that was eventually agreed upon was to the effect that all drafts on the Treasury be countersigned by the Secretary of War, a thoroughly honorable man who would not lend himself to any questionable transaction. But on the day following the agreement, Vazquez Gomez sent to his colleague in the War Department a stack of printed drafts to be signed in blank and returned. General Rascon consulted the President, but the latter, afraid of crossing the Messrs. Vazquez Gomez, the intellectual leaders of the revolt, ordered that all the requisitions from the Secretary of the Interior be honored. Thus did the new plan bring results directly contrary to its purpose, for not only did old abuses continue, but the responsibility for them was removed from the perpetrator. Then there followed an unheard of looting. Not only did the Department receive pay rolls of soldiers who had never existed, but it even received notes given in saloons and dives of the capital by the revolutionary leaders whom

the Cabinet officer was anxious to please. Money was given to everybody, even to those who had not even dreamed of joining the rebellion. In less than one month, over one million dollars passed out of the public coffers by order of Emilio Vazquez Gomez. But even this was not the worst. Arms and ammunition were distributed all over the country to people entirely unworthy of this confidence, under pretext of preparing against a counter revolution which was impossible at the time. In this way, the foundation was effectually laid for the revolution which broke out at the opening of Mr. Madero's constitutional term.

On all sides the friends of Madero sought to throw obstacles in the way of the government. In Tlaxcala, six hundred Maderists, who formed a body of Rurales paid by the state, revolted against Governor Sanchez and the legislature, with a view to imposing their wishes on their superiors, and it finally became necessary to bring some of the regular troops to quell them. In Toluca, the chief of the Rurales, Joaquin Miranda, acting in accord with Munguia Santoyo, whom Madero had sent as his political leader in the State, issued an order prohibiting in the name of free suffrage the nomination for governor of anybody connected with the fallen regime. In Xalapa, blood was shed through the imprudence of the Maderista leader. In Torreon, the so-called General, Adame Macias, after the massacre of the Chinese by his troops, plotted with the 6th Battalion at the time of the evacuation of the city by General Lojero, finally securing its desertion in a body; and in Chiapas, a conflict in which even the bishop was mixed up, occasioned an encounter in which several atrocities were committed.

In Puebla the insolence of the rebels knew no bounds. After the barbarous excesses at Atencingo and Covadonga, Abraham Martinez calling himself the chief of staff of Zapata, proceeded with the aid of the rurales, and, as he said, by order of the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Vazquez Gomez, to imprison in the bull ring in the City of Puebla itself, a large number of prominent persons with a view to executing them. Among these was the son of General Mucio Martinez, at that time Representative in Congress. The Governor of the State, Mr. Cañete, personally went to the rescue of the unfortunate prisoners, but soon found that Martinez refused point blank to obey him, on the ground that he had direct orders from the Secretary of the In-

terior. The result was that the Governor was forced to call federal troops under the leadership of Colonel Aureliano Blanquete, who after a bloody conflict, in which over three hundred were killed, finally reduced them to submission.

On the 7th of June, the leader of the revolution, Mr. Francisco I. Madero, made his triumphal entry into the capital where he was greeted with an indescribable enthusiasm and a formidable earthquake. The reception accorded to Madero that day can be compared only with the ovation given to Juarez on his entry to the city after his victory over the French intervention and the Empire. All streets through which he passed were in festal array, and not for a single moment did the throngs cease to acclaim him. An attempt was made to unhitch the horses from his coach, so that the people themselves might draw it along.

Madero standing up in his carriage and smiling to the right and to the left, was really an object of pity. When he arrived at the palace where he was to review the parade, he was exhausted; his fatigue was so evident that he looked more like a sick man than a triumphant chief. Mr. de la Barra accompanied him to the balcony, flattering him and waiting on him, without receiving any attention from Madero nor much less from his companions, for at that moment, to the revolutionists, the real head of the nation was Madero, and they wished to impress that fact upon the provisional president.

Madero opened offices in the Paseo de la Reforma, and, utterly ignoring the President of the Republic, began to handle the more important matters, while his brother, Gustavo, the most energetic member of the family, opened offices in the Avenida Juarez and began to arrange for the elections which were to give legal sanction to the power already held by the revolutionists, and which were, moreover, destined to be the apple of discord between the various factions, who fearing the weakness of their common leader, wished at all costs to get hold of the vice presidency.

These offices could not exist simultaneously. It was impossible that at one and the same time the Secretary of the Interior, and Mr. Francisco Madero, and his brother Gustavo, should govern the country while the President of the Republic was allowed only to entertain and draw the applause of the people as he drove through the streets bowing to everybody.

The Secretary of Education, on his side, paid no attention

to the provisional president, but occupied himself chiefly with his campaign for election to the vice presidency, which the candidacy of de la Barra threatened to deprive him of, for the latter had grouped around him last-minute revolutionists, and especially the catholics organized ostensibly as a political party.

In the contest with Vazquez Gomez on one side, incapable of obeying anybody, and on the other with Gustavo Madero, constitutionalist party leader, demanding that he be heard and even obeyed, an absolute break between these men was bound to come, and finally did come. An inevitable and obvious result of the conflict seemed to be the removal of the Messrs. Vazquez Gomez from the Cabinet, but the Secretary of Education, a cunning man and more highly versed in political intrigue than his brother, realized that his resignation would raze to the ground all the plans he had built up to attain power; in consequence, he so modified his course of action that both Francisco Madero and the provisional President exerted their influence in his behalf fearing that his removal from the government would alienate all those revolutionists who had been flattered and protected by Messrs. Vazquez Gomez. Thus the only one to leave the Cabinet was Emilio Vazquez Gomez, who up to that time had been the black president, in contradistinction to de la Barra, known as the white President.

CHAPTER VI.

ZAPATA.

When the government first assumed control, all the revolutionists bowed down to the new order of things, but as Secretary Vazquez Gomez squandered money, arms and ammunition promiscuously, many of the rebels soon found that it was by far more advantageous to continue in rebellion, surrendering occasionally. By this plan they could live like lords without any great risk and when their prodigal life began to pall on them, they could seek diversion and more riches. In Morelos, the revolution had been led by Emiliano Zapata, a former federal soldier. According to his own story, he had served in the army only because of an arbitrary act by the Prefect of his county who without right or reason had drafted him into the ranks. When his term of service was completed, he had returned to his home where he had earned his living as a plowman, or as a herder, or as the head of some small business, or engaging more or less honestly in other affairs. When the revolution broke out, thinking that the time was propitious for avenging ancient wrongs, he plunged into the struggle having as his primary motive the punishment of the Prefect who had forced him into the army. An absolutely fearless man, with a good knowledge of his section of the country, well known to the people, and with some knowledge of military discipline gained during his service in the army, Zapata soon had many followers. By the time the revolution triumphed, his company had increased to a force of eight hundred men which popular imagination further increased to several thousands. Among those who came to his side during the revolt was a certain high school teacher, Otilio Montaño by name. In the capacity of secretary, he followed the leader around from the very beginning and finally came to be the moving spirit of that revolt. Zapata himself had neither ideals nor program, his only

idea was to try his luck at fighting until the sowing season, always with the hope of getting in the meantime the revenge so dear to him. This man Montaña, however, did have both ideals and a program, besides cherishing a desire for vengeance, but a vengeance much broader than Zapata's since it was not against an individual but against the whole of society. For eight years he had studied zealously in the Normal School where he obtained a degree, but he soon found that as a professor the only reward for his labors was a position as teacher in his native village with a salary insufficient to meet the necessities of life, and with a future which promised, if he were successful after years of toil and privation, only the possibility of obtaining a slightly better position where his remuneration would be less than that received by men of much inferior education. Montaña felt that something was radically wrong and aimed to set it right. He could, however, not unfurl as a flag for a revolution the injustice of which he personally felt himself the victim, so he broadened his grievance so that it should attract supporters to his side. What others were there, victims like himself for social injustice? Obviously the "peones" of the ranches whose daily wage was hardly enough to enable them to eke out a bare existence. On these he fixed his attention, and chose to use them as the instrument of his vengeance on society—that society which had made him study, throw away his youth in class rooms, only to find at the end of his career that he was a nobody with barely enough to live on, like the day laborer on the ranch. Therefore, taking as his own the cause of the day laborer, he began at one and the same time to preach a brutal socialism and to carry on with the forces of his chief a war of extermination.

The Indian of today has only two interests for which he will go to extremes; his land and his wife. As part of a primitive race, he should have one other, his religion, but the uncivilized Indian still gropes between the memory of his aboriginal beliefs and the Catholic religion forcibly imposed on him by the conquerors. This causes the Indian's fanaticism to be localized so that although he would never think of fighting for his religion in the abstract, he is quite capable of suffering the worst torture and making all manner of sacrifice for the saint of his particular parish. Fundamentally, it is his idol—the white conquerors have changed its name and its appearance, but for him the St. Anthony or the St. Joseph, which is venerated in his village

church is the *teotl** which his forefathers worshiped. It is not, therefore, a rare occurrence for priests, especially in remote towns, to find hidden between the fold of the Virgin's mantle, or behind the carvings of the tabernacle, or beneath the pedestal of the monstrance, a little clay figure, which is really what the fanatical element adores when the people flock to church to recite the novena of the Immaculate Conception, or the vespers of St. Joseph.

In this connection it may be recalled that the original cause of the persecution and subsequent death in 1871 of General Felix Diaz, father of the present general of that name, at the hands of the Indians of the village of Juchitan, was that among the outrages and cruelties which as Governor of Oaxaca he had perpetrated he had scourged and then burned in effigy the patron saint of that village. When General Felix Diaz rose against the government of President Juarez, the Secretary of War, Ignacio Mejia, aware of this grievance and familiar with the traits of the Juchitan Indians, authorized the formation of a guerilla band of natives of that region to go out in search of the fugitive ex-governor. The band led by Apolonio Jimenez, and Mr. Cartas, caught up with Diaz near the city of Pochutla, and after torturing him horribly, put him to death and tore his body to pieces. Without a doubt, it was a horrible crime, but yet comparable with the many acts committed by Felix Diaz himself during his campaigns and his tenure of office in Oaxaca. General Forey, confusing General Porfirio Diaz with his brother Felix, delivered a speech before the French Senate, in which he related heartbreaking atrocities. His mistake lay not in the deeds narrated, for these were on the whole true, but in attributing them to Porfirio Diaz, who was always a humane leader and never committed such horrible acts as those related by the Commander in Chief of the army sent to Mexico by Napoleon.

To tell an Indian in any part of the country that he has some rights to the property of the neighboring landowner, or that he must fight the neighboring village to take its land for himself, or his village, is to sow a seed that instantly bears fruit. There is no village chief or village lawyer who does not know this, and who does not establish his authority or prestige on a lawsuit over the question of lands with the nearby ranch or town.

*Aztec for God.

It is not that the Indian needs that land for his sustenance, for our Indian can live on almost anything, few races being by nature so frugal, and so impervious to privations, nor does his love of land spring from any exact notions of private ownership; but he has in the very depth of his soul a profound conviction that that property has been snatched from him though he knows neither when nor how. The only concrete idea he has on the subject is a determination to recover it. He has in the fastnesses of the mountain disposable property, which he has obtained from nobody, but which he owns by right of first occupancy. Thither he betakes himself when his inborn melancholy impels him to flee from civilized man, and on a piece of ground in the wildest part of the mountain he establishes his temporary abode which he frequently changes according to the necessities of life.

This idiosyncrasy is perfectly well known to all exploiters of the aboriginal race, and Professor Montaña made use of it to incite the people of Morelos to rebellion. This was the first seed he sowed and he found fruitful soil, as I shall explain hereafter; other factors contributed powerfully to renew a struggle which originated long before the existence of government and which was exactly what caused its establishment.

CHAPTER VII.

THE REVOLT IN MORELOS.

Exceptional conditions exist in the state of Morelos, which must be examined in order to understand why the revolutions have been able to thrive there through so long a period. The one million seven hundred and twenty nine thousand acres comprising the state's arable lands, are under control of exactly thirty-two people, who alone reap the benefit of their cultivation. The result of these holdings has been the building up of immensely wealthy plantations equipped with the most costly machinery and with great hydraulic works, facilitating the production of sugar and spirits which bring to the proprietors fabulous profits. The climate of that region (I speak of the agricultural region) is very rigorous and can be withstood by few people besides the natives. Foreigners especially suffer a great deal from it, except Spaniards, who get used to it very quickly and resist it with ease. For this reason the majority of superintendents and managers of the haciendas are of that nationality.

The country in Morelos is extremely broken, encouraging the formation of small clans which live comfortably in the mountains surrounding the state. These mountains are of the most rugged type, having as their limit along the Puebla boundary the summit of Popocatepetl; along the side contiguous to the State of Mexico, the peak of Zempoala; along the Guerrero border the Ocotlan range; and along the boundary of the Federal District, the Ajusco range, whose spur on joining the Zempoala is called the Tepoxtlan range.

The Popocatepetl chain divides the districts of Cuautla and Jomacatepec, extending until it meets at right angles the spurs of the Ocotlan range. Those spurs in their turn divide the districts of Jonacatepec and Jojutla. Between Jojutla and Yautepec there extends another range, that of Tlaltizapan, along the foot hills

of which runs the Jojutla River, chief tributary of the Amacusac, which divides Morelos from Guerrero.

The great canyons formed by these ranges are natural fortifications which a small band of men can defend successfully; therefore pursuit of the rebels is difficult.

The climate, as I have said above, also materially helps the defense, since those who are not native take sick very easily. Besides, the abundance of vegetation due to the fertility of the region is so great that it can easily furnish sustenance to bands of men hidden even in the most remote parts of the mountains.

With cheap food, with rich plantations from which money can be obtained by threats of destroying the costly machinery, and with the facility to flee at a moment's notice to places where pursuit is practically impossible, the life of rebel or bandit is extremely pleasant.

At the close of the war against French intervention and the Empire, the State of Morelos, as at present, was the scene of bloody warfare. So also had it been before 1862, for as a matter of fact, it was the murder of some Spaniards at the San Vicente and Chiconcuac plantations that had served as pretext for the intervention. But at that time there was not even a revolutionary standard, it was merely a band of marauders who under the name of "The Silver Plated Band" were the terror of that region.

The government of Juarez in order to handle the situation efficiently, separated what is now the State of Morelos from the State of Mexico and under a purely military regime managed to give security to the people of that neighborhood. But the termination of the war against the "Silver Plated Band" and the complete extermination of these highwaymen was not finally accomplished until five years later, when during the administration of President Lerdo, General Francisco Leyva, as governor of Morelos succeeded in suppressing brigandage through extraordinary power conferred on him by the government and through his own personal ability.

The germ was not dead, however, but merely latent, and made its reappearance on several occasions during the administration of Diaz, only to be put down with pitiless rigor. General Preciado and Colonel Alarcon were governors who were obeyed because of the terror they inspired; thus, they were able, thanks to their energy, to preserve peace in the State.

At the death of Colonel Alarcón, in the last days of the Díaz administration, the desire to be elected governor seized Don Pablo Escandón, a very worthy and very rich man, proprietor of a magnificent plantation in the state and chief aide de camp of the President of the Republic.

Conditions throughout the country had changed radically. The preachings of Madero had had their effect and the opposition to General Díaz had gained many converts. Mr. Leyva, son of the military governor whom I have mentioned as successful in reducing to submission the outlaws of the state, also presented his candidacy for governor against Escandón, the man designated for the office by General Díaz. The latter, instead of imposing his will without allowing any discussion of the question, as had been his custom, authorized appeals to the people to counterbalance those made by Leyva. Accordingly, José María Lozano, afterwards Cabinet Minister in Huerta's administration; Diodoro Batalla, and Heriberto Barrón, leader of the Reyista party, went to Morelos to promote the candidacy of Escandón by making speeches which stirred up the latent spirit of disorder.

Naturally, it became necessary to speak of democracy and to promise all manner of freedom and privileges, but the supporters of Leyva promised still more. Therefore, in this battle of promises, there was preached a truly socialistic propaganda with the full knowledge and tolerance of the authorities. These authorities, though themselves products of a dictatorship, were utterly at a loss how to proceed in the dilemma when a propaganda made under the auspices of the government was notoriously opposed to all that the government had theretofore preached. When the period of oratory reached its zenith, stone throwing at public meetings marked the first move towards armed rebellion. The moment that stone throwing began, however, General Díaz, judging that law and order might be seriously upset, sent Brigadier General Juvencio Robles and the 23rd battalion which was under his command, to the city of Cuernavaca, capital of the State of Morelos.

The presence of the Federal troops in the state capital was the deciding argument in the electoral campaign, forcing the partisans of Leyva temporarily to see "the light of reason." Escandón was declared the elected Governor of the State and took office shortly afterwards.

Thereupon, the supporters of Leyva began to make a propaganda which was purely revolutionary and, as was to be expected, they allied themselves with the rebels in the north who were fighting in favor of Francisco I. Madero. The new governor of the state, a very worthy man, as I have said before, but wholly without political acumen, wished to flatter the people and for this reason abolished the poll tax. But at the same time, since he himself was a large landowner in the state he yielded to the entreaties of his partners and friends appointing to office men who would protect the interests of the landed class. Some of these appointees abused their powers and were promptly removed by Escandon, but at that, the demands of the revolutionists only became greater, since they believed that the government was entering on a period of vacillation and weakness which it behooved them to take advantage of. Some landowners on the other hand, considering that they could count on the absolute backing of the new governor, under titles more or less legitimate, began to take away from neighboring villages certain lands which they could develop better than the natives. With the leaven of revolt already at work, with landowners attempting unreasonable things, with those who had given their aid in the elections making demands, and finally, with the authorities, weak and at a loss as to which way to turn, the result was a condition of disorder which the triumph of the revolution converted into a veritable chaos very much like an agrarian revolution.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE AGRARIAN PROBLEM

Since the beginning of the present period of revolution everybody has been speaking of the agrarian problem. Hardly a day goes by that in some newspaper, large or small, there does not appear a sententious article proposing remedies for the nation's agrarian problem, all more or less adequate according to the intelligence of the writers themselves. All this, in my opinion, is building castles in the air.

Our agricultural population is divided into three great classes; the landowners, the tenants, and the peons. Concerning the first of these, the great majority as a rule would willingly rent half of what they own if they could be assured that the land thus disposed of would be worked, and but one-third of its product given to them in payment of rent. The tenants as a rule do not want land either.* They ask for it, certainly, just as the Indian asks for it, but whenever they succeed in acquiring a strip, their immediate concern is to mortgage and sell it. The tenant is satisfied if he has enough wherewith to live. When his crop is good, enabling him to pay all or part of his debts, he does not generally care about anything but the whereabouts of the next county fair where he may spend in cock fights and roulette his year's earnings buying some jewels for his wife, that he could put in pawn on the bad days. Following this, he will once again go to his landlord begging for seed on credit and for loans against his next crop. Concerning the peon, in the majority of cases, if he has enough to enable him to live and drink his gin, he cares little or nothing for anything else. The whole trouble lies in the fact that nearly all lack the spirit of thrift, and that the peon especially lacks necessities. He eats little, and requires as clothing merely unbleached cotton sheeting in winter as well as in summer. So much for the classes of people.

*I speak on the majority of cases, and especially, those not in the border states.

Our lands are not worked as they should be because there is no cheap money available to develop their productivity. Until a few years ago, there was hardly a mortgage on rural property at ten per cent, the majority being at twelve per cent and even higher rates of interest. What business of any kind is possible with money at that rate? Furthermore, for our lands to produce what they should, works of irrigation are indispensable, and these are so costly, that they can be undertaken only when cheap money is available and when a great, productive, easily developed plantation is used as the basis.

Taking into consideration the characteristics of the people in conjunction with the aforementioned facts, it becomes evident that a universal distribution of property, such as is demanded by the majority of writers, would be the ruination of the country.

And yet, it is an undeniable fact that the laborer is exploited. No other term can be used to describe a system in which the laborer receives only 28 to 40 cents a day* and then has that pittance further reduced by means of ranch stores, inventions admirably suited to deprive the laborer of the fruits, in themselves inadequate, of his toil.

The ranch store is a highly important factor in the widespread discontent of the rural population, for on account of, or rather by means of this institution, the laborers are really held to the plantation, and as a matter of fact, become its slaves. Although the peon's wages are so scant that he can hardly live on them, still, small as they are, they are seldom given to him in cash. For in spite of the fact that he requires little food and less clothing, as I have already said, they are given to him in the shape of credit to order what he needs at the store, which is kept opposite headquarters by the proprietor of the plantation. The account which the landowner opens with the peon will never be fully paid, as the former well knows, but that is all part of the exploiter's plan. Under these arrangements, the peon can do nothing but buy at the store what is necessary for himself and family, and in so doing run up a debt which his scant wages cannot begin to pay, and which on his death falls to his son as an inheritance. This effectively prevents him from seeking employment at another plantation where wages might be higher,

*Mexican money whose value is now 0.10 to 0.13 U. S. currency.

for his original employer would bring him back as a debtor. The law, it is true, does not protect this abuse, but powerless to prevent it, tolerates it. On the other hand, it is also true that the peon, whenever he pleases abandons the ranch, and laughs at his creditor if it happens that the owner or manager is not in league with the prefect. But if the owner or manager is a friend of the prefect, what happens then?*

The laborer is brought back to the plantation by force, or is drafted into the army as a suspicious character; and so great as well as so justifiable is the terror on the part of our country people of being forced into the ranks, that the mere threat of conscription is enough to prevent anybody from having sufficient courage to tempt the wrath of the superintendent, who in most plantations is the only master the peon knows.

Conditions are noticeably better in the plantations which are personally directed or at least frequently visited by the owner; and where no ranch store exists, there is no grievance, no discontent, no agrarian problem; everything goes along smoothly and the peon is the first man to defend his employer.

In the towns, there does truly exist the desire to own land, for most of our towns in some states owe their existence to grants of commons by the Spanish government for the use of the entire community. When a boom in the business affairs of the nation brought with it the thirst for land, which in certain business men amounted to a craze, the encroachments on the village commons began. Using as a pretext that the lands would be much more productive in the hands of large plantation owners, the expropriation of the lands of the towns began in earnest†, the principal victims being those who were the weakest, most defenseless, and least able to reach the ear of the men in power. What was done to some frightened all, and there grew up a hatred on the part of the villagers toward their neighboring plantation owner, not for what he did, but for what he might do in the future.

But the agrarian problem does not consist in reclaiming from the usurping planters the nine square miles of land which

*The Spanish farm managers are invariably in league with the prefect.

†This occurred especially in Morelos and Mexico.

is what was generally granted to villages as a commons. The problem is a different one and can be stated as follows:

Is it better to have large plantations or to divide the land up into a large number of small holdings? The latter appears to be preferred by the majority of those who consider the subject, but it seems to me that it would be the country's ruin under the present circumstances.

The topography of Mexico is such that there is a very uneven distribution of rain throughout the republic, though the rainfall is not as bad as is generally supposed, yet there is need of regulation so as to utilize it, to the best advantage, for much rain is no good if it does not come when it is needed, and in sufficient quantity for all the works of the field. In other words, what is necessary is the regulation of the distribution of water. This can be attained only by large works of irrigation, which the small landowner cannot afford, and which in view of the expenditures involved cannot bring adequate returns unless undertaken with a large plantation as a basis.

Small holdings are useful only when the desired end is intensive cultivation such as is needed in highly developed countries where land is scarce and labor plentiful, where, consequently the industry of man must make up for the niggardliness of nature. But even at that, the products of intensive cultivation cannot compete in price with the products of extensive cultivation carried on with appropriate machinery.

It requires cheap capital to install great works of irrigation, for with money at ten per cent as a minimum, it is impossible to obtain desired results, unless the plantation in question happens to be of extraordinary richness, and such plantations are the exception in all parts of the world.

During the last years of the Diaz administration, when there was a surplus in the Treasury and a credit which made possible loans at low interest, the government might have been able to undertake works of this kind, but Mr. Limantour was never interested in the agricultural problem.

Mr. Olegario Molina, when he was Secretary of Development, did do something in this regard, ordering surveys in the region of the Nazas River in order to ascertain the character as well as the cost of the works necessary there. This survey was completed but the outbreak of the Madero revolution prevented

the formulation of a plan of action based on the information thus gathered. Mr. Rafael L. Hernandez, later Secretary of Development, finding this undertaking already started by his predecessor, Mr. Molina, attempted to make a study of the question, but he had neither the required preparation nor the necessary experience to tackle the problem adequately. Besides, the revolution or rather the state of anarchy of the country, made difficult the consideration of any question not purely political. The study made of conditions at the Nazas is needed for other productive regions where the land can be apportioned for irrigation as is done in the Nazas district; but it should be borne in mind that only a comparatively small part of the country is of this character. Most of the great ranches and plantations include mountainous regions, where the only possible source of income is lumber and cattle, and here, obviously, division into small holdings would spell ruin.

Up to the present, the experiment stations which have been established in the country have yielded no results because they have been placed under the direction of men of theory who have devoted their time to theoretical experiments, whereas what the agriculture of our country needs is practical methods which will enable the rude farmer to utilize the teachings of modern science without having to take a formal course of study. For the same reasons our School of Agriculture has been a failure up to the present. Its students have been required to make extended studies in mathematics or military problems and have not been taught what every agriculturist should know—how to increase their products and lower the cost of production.

The agrarian problem, therefore, in my opinion, can be boiled down to the consideration of four measures. First, giving back to the villages the commons taken from them. By the removal of this traditional grievance, the dissatisfaction among the rural population in certain quarters could be entirely removed. Second, is the construction of great works of irrigation after a detailed survey of the various parts of the country. Third to enforce the law ordering that all wages must be paid in cash. Last, but not least, is to seek the means to obtain cheap capital without which development is impossible. The division of the land among many small landowners will follow as an inevitable result of the accomplishment of these measures.

CHAPTER IX.

THE BRAINS OF THE REVOLUTION

The result of the withdrawal as Secretary of the Interior of Vazquez Gomez on the 2nd of August, was a complete break between the Vazquez Gomez brothers and the Constitutional Progressive Party, or what amounts to the same thing, with Gustavo Madero, the party boss. Don Gustavo Madero, realizing how difficult it would be for his brother to govern if Don Francisco Vazquez Gomez were elected vice president of the Republic, worked zealously to have the convention nominate someone else. On their side, Vazquez Gomez and his friends also worked strenuously for victory at the convention. This convention was held in the Theatre Hidalgo in the City of Mexico. After a desperate contest, Gustavo Madero's candidate, Jose Maria Pino Suarez, was nominated. This nomination, the death blow to all Dr. Vazquez's ambitions, made him break completely with his former friends, because, claiming as he did to be the brains of the revolution, he believed that he and he alone deserved the power*. He probably thought that with the title of vice president he would as a matter of fact govern the country. When he lost the nomination, he correctly judged that his ambitions had received a fatal blow. From that moment he began to form plots against Mr. Madero and his government even going so far as to reach a temporary understanding with the partisans of Don Felix Diaz and Don Bernardo Reyes, who were also conspiring against Madero and who had been considered bitter enemies by Vazquez Gomez while he was in power.

Because of gifts he had made while Secretary, Don Emilio Vazquez Gomez had left a very good impression among the revolutionists and among people not fond of order. As a consequence, his brother found little difficulty in gathering around

*At the convention Mr. Luis Cabrera, speaking in behalf of Vazquez Gomez, called him the "brains of the revolution."

him a group of supporters who saw in him not only the brains of the revolution, but also, and principally, the man who could satisfy their craving for money. The provisional government did not cease squandering money with the withdrawal of Vazquez Gomez from the Cabinet, for as it had started, it was very difficult to retrocede. To stop the waste, it would have been necessary for the Secretary of the Interior who received the drafts signed by the Secretary of War, to be not only of strong character, but a man of great intelligence and political foresight, with a knowledge of men keen enough to discriminate between those really influential and worthy of consideration, and those adventurers who should be dismissed without ceremony. Mr. Garcia Granados was a man of character, but in every other respect he was unqualified for the position and soon proved his incompetence to such a degree that he was obliged to resign from the Cabinet in the same year, 1911, on October 27th. On that day the House of Representatives summoned the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Interior to render an account of conditions in the State of Morelos. In compliance, the President sent Mr. Granados and General Gonzalez Salas to give the desired information and they both met with a very cold reception. On the following day, Mr. Calero, Attorney General, went before the House to explain matters more fully, but public opinion was against the Cabinet and the ill feeling between the Constitutional Progressive Party and the Cabinet was so great that Messrs. Garcia Granados, Dr. Vazquez Gomez, and General Gonzalez Salas, were forced to resign. Another change had taken place in the Cabinet soon after it had begun operations. This was the exchange of offices on July 3rd, 1911, between the Secretary of Development and the Attorney General, Mr. Calero assuming the duties of Attorney General and Mr. Hernandez those of Secretary of Development. From the moment Mr. Hernandez had been assigned to the Department of Justice, there was not much doubt that he would not last long in that capacity because he did not possess the necessary qualifications to fulfill its duties. As a lawyer he had had scant experience in the courts. He knew neither the personnel nor the requirements of the profession. Having but a superficial professional knowledge, he could not even attempt legislative reform, so his work was confined to the appointing of employees and other functionaries. In making these appoint-

ments, he always met with great obstacles since the President ad interim as well as Mr. Madero and the Messrs. Vazquez Gomez always had somebody in mind for these positions and naturally it was impossible to please them all. In this respect, the Secretary of the Interior had the advantage over his colleagues since he was well acquainted with the personnel of the Department as well as with its procedures.

On his side, Mr. Calero, the most intelligent of all the Cabinet members, was not satisfied with his portfolio in the Department of Development as he could neither carry out the physically impossible reforms promised by the revolution, nor could he initiate the projects he had in mind because the Provisional President was fearful of any innovation. As both these men were dissatisfied with their respective positions and both were unwilling to withdraw from the Cabinet, it was easy for them to make arrangements for the exchange of offices.

At the same time, Mr. Calero, with high hopes for the future, was able to devote himself to the task of impressing the future President with the fact that he was the man best fitted to solve the great problems which the new government would necessarily have to face. Thus was he paving the way for his appointment as Secretary of State, which might eventually be the stepping stone to the presidency. For was not de la Barra president simply because he had been Secretary of State during the conflict resulting in the resignation of Don Porfirio Diaz? Furthermore, Mr. Calero had a superior intelligence as well as a deeper knowledge of public affairs than the provisional President. Therefore, what had been possible for Mr. de la Barra was not only possible, but even easy for Mr. Calero. At least so he thought.

General Rascon, an honorable man and a conscientious commander, as I have said, did not want the officers of the artillery regiment who had conspired against the Diaz government to go unpunished even though they were exempt from punishment by the law of amnesty. On moral grounds, he ordered their dismissal as unworthy members of the army. This measure, though worthy of the highest praise did not meet with the approval of Francisco I. Madero or with that of the rest of the revolutionists, who compelled the provisional President to revoke it. But General Rascon rather than withdraw the order sent in his resignation on July 19th. General Gonzalez Salas, the subsecretary, assumed charge of the department.

Mr. Robles Dominguez had been commissioned to disband a second time the revolutionary troops remaining in the State of Morelos, as the first disbanding when Mr. Vazquez Gomez was secretary had failed. The revolutionists once they had received their pay, instead of returning to their homes reorganized, taking back the arms which had been collected from them as a precautionary measure against a new revolt. Zapata, leader of the rebellion in Morelos, protested to Mr. Robles Dominguez, whereupon he was summoned to the Capital. There he was interviewed by Secretary Vazquez Gomez and the provisional President. After the interview, there were rumors that because he had been insolent to the head of the nation, the Chief of Rurales, Ambrosio Figueroa, had begged permission to execute him in the public square. This permission had been refused. Zapata and his companions had then returned to Morelos in the same automobile which had brought them to the Capital. On his arrival at Morelos, he denounced the government and re-started the revolution, forcing the government's representative, Mr. Dominguez, to return quickly to Mexico City. The government sent a division under General Victoriano Huerta to suppress the rebels; but before he was able to accomplish anything, General Huerta received orders to suspend action because that Mr. Francisco Madero urged by Vazquez Gomez and others had gone as mediator to Morelos. On his return, orders were again given to General Huerta to advance; but this time the "Big Stick Clique," already fully organized, prepared a popular demonstration and even went to the Castle of Chapultepec to request the recall of General Huerta, or rather, the immunity of Zapata.

Up to that time Mr. de la Barra had received only the applause of the multitude, but now for the first time, he saw the disagreeable aspects of a position of power; but impotent to assert his authority, he had to resign himself to listen to the discordant yells of the mob headed by Mr. Urueta. As a result of the demonstration, General Huerta was again ordered to halt, and a few days later he was withdrawn from the command of the division.

* * *

General Bernardo Reyes arrived at Vera Cruz from Havana on June 4th, and three days later held a conference with Francisco I. Madero at which it was agreed between them that Reyes

should not present his candidacy for president or vice president, but in exchange, he would be appointed Secretary of War.

Mr. Madero made this agreement because he dreaded a reaction against himself fearing that the Porfirista faction together with the partisans of General Reyes, which according to the latter were very numerous, would rob him of the triumph he had gained by the agreement signed at Ciudad Juarez. The anti-Reyista party soon persuaded him that the Reyes followers were not so numerous as claimed; that once appointed Secretary of War, Reyes would as a matter of fact, be the real master of the situation, and above all, that he, Madero, would lose prestige in the eyes of the people for having made such a pact. Madero's only thought after that was to find a decent way out of the agreement.

General Reyes on his side, after his interview with Madero, realized that this idol of the nation was losing prestige, and therefore with an impatience which was his leading characteristic, he rebelled at biding his time in the position of Secretary of War. Overestimating both his popularity and the influence of his name, he decided to tempt fortune by presenting himself as a candidate for the presidency, ignoring his pact with the leader of the revolution. At the first inkling of General Reyes' intention, Mr. Madero freed him from all obligations, and the agreement made early in June was by mutual consent declared void, towards the 1st of August to the great relief and satisfaction of all concerned.*

In view of the resignation of General Diaz and Ramon Corral, Congress had ordered the elections for president and vice president. The election of the electors was held on the 1st of October, while the vote of the electoral college took place on the 15th of the same month. The triumph of Mr. Madero was overwhelming; he was elected president of the republic almost unanimously.† Such was not the case with the vice presidential elections which were bitterly contested though they resulted in the absolute majority of votes for Jose Maria Pino Suarez, the candidate of the Progressive Constitutional Party.

*The meeting between Madero and Reyes was held at Tehuacan in the State of Puebla.

†He obtained 20,000 votes in the electoral college, each of which vote represents about 100 votes in the elections for presidential electors.

The candidacy of General Reyes had received little response in the country; it had merely caused him to be derided and abused by "The Big Stick Clique" in the streets of the city at a demonstration of his own partisans on the 4th of September. On appearing before the public, General Reyes was pelted with stones, and he had to take refuge in a photographic gallery in Juarez Avenue opposite the National Theatre.* General Reyes was as a matter of fact the victim of his own methods. What was done to him in Juarez Avenue that day was but a repetition of what he himself had ordered done in San Luis Potosi in 1902 and in Monterey on the 2nd of April 1903.†

Reyes hoping that in the course of time Madero's candidacy would lose prestige, had tried to induce the House of Representatives to postpone the elections.‡ Unable to have this granted by a majority of the representatives, he decided to begin at once an armed revolt and as a preliminary he tendered his resignation from the army leaving the Capital on the evening of September 27, disguised as an invalid. On the following day he sailed from Vera Cruz for the United States from where as it was planned he should cross the border to lead the revolt. On November 2, in accordance with its Constitutional rights, the House of Representatives ratified the election of Madero and Pino Suarez and ordered the inauguration for the 6th.

As his last official act, the provisional President asked permission to submit personally to the House of Representatives a report he had drawn up for the purpose of showing what his administration had accomplished. Though the Constitution did not provide for such a contingency, the House out of respect for Mr. de la Barra, granted the permission and appointed the 4th of November for its reading. In this report, Mr. de la Barra attempted to excuse his deficiencies in a great oratorical speech, but the fact of the matter is that the provisional President had been president in name only. His administration, as I have said in the Introduction, was disastrous to the nation because

*This same gallery was used as a refuge on February 9th, 1913, by Madero himself.

†See next chapter.

‡This information is first hand as he spoke to me about it wishing to count on the support of myself and friends in the House, which I refused.

he permitted the scandalous waste of public funds, because he allowed the Cabinet members to usurp rights granted by the Constitution to the President alone, and, above all, because he suffered the dignity of the Chief Magistrate of the Nation to be trampled upon, thereby completely eradicating the prestige gained for the office by General Diaz. Neither the Cabinet nor the State governors in any way attended to Mr. de la Barra's orders. Congress alone, faithful to its traditions, showed him the deference, which as Chief Executive of the Nation was his due. But when, following the precedent set by Diaz, he tried to impose his candidate as Speaker of the House, the members totally ignored his recommendation. They chose as their speaker a Reyista, not because the Reyistas were in the majority in Congress, but just to show the President that they had decided to assert their absolute independence.

When Porfirio Diaz tendered his resignation as President, all the State governors either resigned or asked for an indefinite leave of absence. These offices were then filled either by men closely identified with the revolution or by men who up to that time had taken no part in the political movement. The provisional governors were: Alberto Fuentes, governor of Aguascalientes; Urbano Espinosa, of Campeche; Venustiano Carranza, of Coahuila; Miguel Garcia Topete, of Colima; Reynaldo Gordillo Leon, of Chiapas; Abraham Gonzalez, of Chihuahua; Luis Alfonso Trejo, of Durango; Juan B. Castelazo, of Guanajuato; Francisco Figueroa, of Guerrero; Jesus Silva, of Hidalgo; David Gutierrez Allende, of Jalisco; Rafael M. Hidalgo, of Mexico; Dr. Miguel Silva, of Michoacan; Juan M. Carreon, of Morelos; Leobardo Chapa, of Nuevo Leon; Heliodoro Diaz Quintas, of Oaxaca; Rafael P. Cañete, of Puebla; Jose Antonio Septien, of Queretaro; Dr. Rafael Cepeda, of San Luis Potosi; Celso Gaxiola Rojo, of Sinaloa; Carlos E. Randall, of Sonora; Manuel Mestre Ghigliazza, of Tabasco; Lic. Espiridion Lara, of Tamaulipas; Augustin Sanchez, of Tlaxcala; Leon Aillaud, of Vera Cruz; Jose M. Pino Suarez, of Yucatan; and Guadalupe Gonzalez, of Zacatecas.

The majority of these men were unfit to perform the duties devolving upon them. However, with few exceptions, those really revolutionary began immediately to work to be constitutionally elected.

A government with the task of uniting and controlling all

the revolutionary movements which had so radically upset the political system of the nation, needed at the front a man of action, of strong personality, with a keen knowledge of human nature, with a thorough understanding of political conditions throughout the country, and one who could count on the co-operation of men possessed of similar characteristics. It would also require that the head of the Nation and his colleagues be men of great energy, able to prevent the wave of democracy from becoming a tide of anarchy.

Mr. de la Barra had been absent from the country for many years. He had never taken part in political affairs, in fact had only served a two year term as representative at the beginning of his career. He knew the men by hearsay only. Under the circumstances, his work must inevitably lack thoroughness. Of an easy good nature, weak in character, and well educated, he was totally unqualified to meet a situation which required men of energy like Juarez, Don Justo Benitez, or Don Protasio Tagle.

When General Diaz assumed control of the government after his triumph in the revolution of Tuxtepec, he gathered around him the most able men of his time, men thoroughly familiar with the political situation, and acquainted with conditions, and men; and yet, it took all his energy and force of character to check the avalanche which threatened to destroy the work of the revolution. Mr. de la Barra had no such assistants. Mr. Calero was the only one with sufficient intelligence to really help; but, unfortunately, branded as disloyal, he was looked down upon by everybody. General Diaz had stated that he had used him as a spy in the democratic party, so naturally neither the revolutionary nor the Porfiristas had any faith in him. The other members of the Cabinet were either men of only average qualifications, like Don Rafael Hernandez, Don Ernesto Madero, Don Manuel Bonilla, or even General Rascon himself, or they were unprincipled men whose chief object was to gratify their personal ambitions, utterly ignoring the President. None of them had even been prominent in politics, and their ignorance of human nature, of the necessary steps to be taken, and of the natural course of events, was really astounding. Besides, three elements of disturbance sprang up after the inauguration of the provisional government; the Reyismo, the Vazquismo, and the Big Stick Clique. The Reyismo consisted of the partisans of Reyes who were trying to win over to their side the old Diaz faction;

the Vazquismo consisted of the partisans of Vazquez Gomez and considering him the brains of the revolution, wished him to reap the greatest harvest from the triumph achieved; and the Big Stick Clique consisted of the partisans of Gustavo Madero who claimed the real power, since by the very nature of things Gustavo Madero would presumably be successor to Francisco I. Madero at the expiration of his term of office. These were the disturbing elements that did not allow the provisional President a minute's rest. He wished to submit to none of them, and was unwilling to have any of them predominate, and yet he submitted to all of them and allowed them all to dominate. Always vacillating, and uncertain, he completely lacked the necessary energy to impose his authority on anybody or at any time. The personal friends of de la Barra also added to the difficulty of the situation because they began to suggest that he should retain the office placed in his hands by chance*. As a result he lost the confidence of Francisco Madero, of Dr. Vazquez Gomez, and of the Big Stick Clique, and his troubles grew to such an extent that it would have been impossible for him to have continued as President had his period of office been extended two months longer.

The consent of Mr. de la Barra to run for vice president had an even more serious result than the mistrust of the revolutionary party, who believed his weakness to be merely a mask to cover his ambition to be president. It fostered an opposition to Madero's government even before Madero began to govern, because de la Barra's partisans on being defeated, began to accuse the Big Stick Clique of committing frauds at the polls and to complain that their chance of victory was snatched away from them by illicit methods in conducting the election. That is, they echoed the protests of Vazquez Gomez and his friends, shielding these protests under the prestige of the Chief of the nation. Thus was the revolution germinated even before Madero came into power.

Politically, Mr. de la Barra was a complete failure. He never had a definite idea of what course to follow. His firmest resolution came to nought at meeting the slightest obstacle or at hearing the faintest applause. He was an abject slave of the press, flattering and fawning to all newspaper men so that they in their turn might praise him before the public. Apparently

*In fact, Mr. de la Barra never listened to that suggestion.

this praise was all he craved. Unconscious of the role he was playing, and more desirous of attracting attention than of making friends, he placed the dignity of the head of the nation at the feet of the mob, and allowed himself to be dragged by his flatterers.

Don Francisco I. Madero was a weak ruler, but even he at times asserted his authority. It may have been whimsical and childish, but at least it was the will of the President of the Republic. The only energetic act of Mr. de la Barra was to appear before Congress to confess his own weakness.

* * *

On November 6, escorted by Pascual Orozco, Jr., and other revolutionary leaders, Madero went to the House of Representatives to take the oath of office as constitutional president of the Republic. On this solemn occasion Mr. Madero's nerves forsook him completely. He quite ignored the constitutional method for the solemnization of the act. Instead of allowing Mr. Levy, Speaker of the House, to administer the oath as prescribed by law, he took the words out of the Speaker's mouth and himself asked as well as answered the questions formulated by law. He then retired to the National Palace amid the shouts and acclamations of the populace. These shouts and acclamations, however, were not as enthusiastic nor as spontaneous as those on the 7th of June when Madero entered the capital.

On November 6, Pascual Orozco, Jr., eclipsed Madero in popularity.

Mr. de la Barra was awaiting Mr. Madero at the National Palace to turn the reins of government over to him. Cordial phrases were exchanged between them though at heart they were already separated by an abyss.

Vazquez Gomez, with an inscrutable smile which might mean either contempt or anger, was taking the measure of both presidents. His mind was already nourishing the idea of a triumphant revolution which would give him the office he thought he deserved, him who both presidents ignored without realizing that he had been the brains of the revolution which was that day consecrated by the inauguration of Francisco I. Madero as constitutional President of the Republic.

CHAPTER X.

THE BIRTH OF THE BIG STICK CLIQUE.

The place of Vazquez Gomez in the Cabinet was filled by Alberto Garcia Granados, Governor of the Federal District, a man who had been opposed to General Diaz since 1892 when he was put in prison as author of an anti-reelection newspaper known as the "Republic." He was held in esteem by the general public in spite of rumors that he had been forced to give up the managership of the mine "San Francisco" in Pachuca. Mr. Granados, of morose disposition and scant intelligence, was bound to fall out with the group led by Gustavo Madero who were impulsive and uncompromising men of action. The proclamation for the election of president and vice president had been made, and the Constitutionalist party girded itself for the fight. Even though there was no possible contest over the presidency in spite of the fact that General Bernardo Reyes had appeared as candidate against Madero, the same cannot be said about the vice presidency.

As I have stated in a previous chapter, General Reyes had been an avowed enemy of Limantour and his adherents, and in consequence of his suspicious conduct had been exiled by General Diaz to Europe. There, the startling events in Mexico took him by surprise, and when the Secretary of the Treasury in his trip to Europe in 1910 met him in Paris, forgetting old grudges, they made up their quarrels and promised each other effective co-operation. It was not surprising, therefore, that Limantour, when he took the reins of government in March 1911, should count on the support of Reyes and should cable him to return and give to the government the assistance of his sword. Reyes started immediately for Mexico, resolved as he said, to tear the revolution to shreds, but by the time he arrived at Havana, negotiations with the rebels had reached such a point that they were able to

stipulate among other conditions that the ex-governor of Nuevo Leon should not return to the country. In consequence, he was ordered by cable to disembark at Havana and there await further instructions.

With the triumph of the revolution, Rodolfo Reyes, son of the General, ingratiated himself with the rebels and offered them his father's aid in pacifying the country, making them believe that he could count on a large following. The result was that they consented to allow General Reyes to return to the country, and went so far as to offer him the position of Secretary of War in the cabinet Madero was to form on taking office. Thus Reyes, with astounding rapidity, had traveled the distance from an uncompromising Porfirista to a triumphant Maderista, and his sword, unsheathed to quell the revolution headed by Madero, had now become one of the supporters of that same Madero's administration. At that time, the favorite scheme of all who sought public approval was to revile the Cientificos, so General Reyes, always fond of granting interviews and having the papers make a fuss over him, let loose a tirade against the ancient friends of Limantour, in which he denied even having allied himself with the former Secretary of the Treasury. Furthermore, he declared Limantour to blame for the fall of the Diaz government.*

* * *

Once in Mexico, the old ambitions returned to Reyes. At first he attempted to gain from the friends of Madero the nomination for vice president, but as the revolutionists refused to accept him among their number, even forming a political party which called itself anti-reyista, he had to desist from his attempts at alliance, and gradually drifted away from the Maderista group until he finally became its greatest enemy.

Among the revolutionists there were two groups essentially opposed to Reyes. One was led by Fernando Yglesias Calderon who was bitterly opposed to any compact between Madero and Reyes on the ground that such an alliance would threaten the very principles which the rebellion had proclaimed. This group, composed of people of weight, including among others, Mr.

*The portion included in the asterisks will be found in detail in the chapter entitled "General Reyes," in the Spanish edition.

Jesus Flores Magon, had not participated actively in the revolution but had sympathized with the rebellion because of their conviction that the government of Diaz was not a constitutional government, as they understood it. They limited themselves to pointing out to the public by means of the press, and to Madero confidentially, that Reyes represented dictatorship, which could in no way be amalgamated with the basic principles of the platform of the revolt. The Messrs. Vazquez Gomez, seeing in Reyes a probable competitor for the office of vice president which Francisco Vazquez Gomez already deemed his, joined their efforts to those of Mr. Calderon's coterie. The other group consisted of the fiery younger element, who held a grudge against Reyes for his dissolution by force of their convention in San Luis Potosi, years before, when under the title of Liberal Party they had been in fact displaying symptoms of the revolution soon to break out. The leaders of this fiery group were Camilo Arriaga, Juan Sarabia, and Conrado Diaz Soto y Gama, who were also the founders of the aforementioned anti-reyista party, whose main purpose was to prevent the rise of General Reyes. The first group sought to accomplish its end through the future president, Francisco I. Madero, while the anti-reyista party soon made a quick alliance with Gustavo Madero's Progressive Constitutional Party. As the anti-reyistas had been dissolved by forcible measures at San Luis Potosi, they considered themselves justified now in using the same forcible methods in subduing their enemies. Accordingly, they decided to suppress by force all manifestations which the adherents of Reyes might make in honor of their candidate, just as Reyes with the aid of Heriberto Barron and Captain Cristo had prevented by force the rally they had organized in San Luis Potosi.

When the principle of violence proposed by the anti-reyista followers had been accepted by the Constitutional Progressive Party, there grew up within the party itself a clique to which the press gave the very appropriate name of "Big Stick" in remembrance of the similar organization formed by Felipe Ducazcal in Spain during the political upheaval of 1868-70. The Big Stick was not therefore the handiwork of Gustavo Madero nor of the Progressive Constitutional Party. When they entered politics, the Big Stick already existed. It had arisen under the auspices of General Reyes, Secretary of War, in 1902, in the city of San Luis Potosi.

The Maderista "Big Stick Clique," like the original Reyes clique, received the abuse of the press and of the public in street rallies. Confident as it was of absolute immunity and of the help or at least the tolerance of the police, the clique widened its scope until it became truly hated, and its actions became highly subversive to the general welfare.

CHAPTER XI.

MADERO'S ADMINISTRATION.

Immediately on assuming the presidency, Madero announced the following appointments to his Cabinet: Secretary of State, Manuel Calero; Abraham Gonzalez, Secretary of the Interior; Miguel Diaz Lombardo, Secretary of Public Instruction; Manuel Vasquez Tagle, Attorney General; Manuel Bonilla, Secretary of Public Works; Rafael L. Hernandez (his own cousin,) Secretary of Development; Ernesto Madero (his own uncle,) Secretary of the Treasury; Secretary of War, General Jose Gonzalez Salas, who had been obliged to resign the post of Assistant Secretary in the Cabinet of Mr. de la Barra on account of the opposition which the House of Representatives had shown him. Madero thus began his administration by making the grievous mistake of defying both the House and public opinion.

The only new Cabinet officers in this list were Abraham Gonzalez, Vasquez Tagle and Diaz Lombardo. All the rest had held positions in the provisional government. The first named of these three had been copartner with Orozco in organizing the revolution in the State of Chihuahua. The other two, although long dissatisfied with the government of Diaz had not been actively connected with the revolt. Both were men of high intelligence and of unquestioned professional standing. Much was expected of them, particularly of Vasquez Tagle who was known to possess special qualifications for the post to which he had been appointed and who was looked upon, because of the energy he was supposed to possess, as the one man above all others to correct the evils which had grown up in the Department of Justice. The appointment of both these men was received with universal approval; but not so that of Mr. Abraham Gonzalez. Totally devoid of culture, he might have been fitted to discharge the duties of an officer of Rurales, but as to managing a department of the government, that was totally beyond his

capabilities. Only his fellow revolutionists in Chihuahua were pleased with his appointment to so high an office.

Nevertheless, Madero's administration, as a whole, was very cordially welcomed and with extraordinary unanimity the people patriotically determined to support him. Few governments have begun their administration under such good auspices and with public opinion so much in their favor. Consequently, when a few days after the inauguration it became known that General Reyes had crossed the border in armed rebellion and had distributed a revolutionary proclamation addressed principally to the army, the whole movement met with universal condemnation, and the failure of the revolt was considered inevitable.

General Reyes had left Vera Cruz for Havana in the last days of September. From Havana he went to New Orleans and thence to San Antonio, Texas, where he organized a force with which he was to join an uprising his partisans had promised to organize in the States of Nuevo Leon and Tamaulipas. Despite the failure of his candidacy, the General continued to believe that in those states he still had a numerous following.

The Reyista party had tried to induce the whole country to rise in arms, but had succeeded only in a few widely separated localities—in Yucatan, in the Laguna Region, in Ramos Arizpe, and in Michoacan. As the instigators of trouble met with slight response, these movements were all of little importance and finally were disbanded.

On November 19, General Reyes had been arrested by the United States authorities for his revolutionary operations in the United States and having been set at liberty under bail, there was no other way open to him but to engage in the fight. On December 19 he crossed the border into Mexico accompanied by Quiroga, owner of the gambling houses in Monterey during General Reyes' administration, David Reyes Retana, a friend and blind partisan of the rebel General, and two servants, and began to look for the troops that were to join him in accordance with the promises of his partisans and especially in accordance with the picturings of his own imagination.

He crossed the Rio Grande at a ford called "La Vela," near the city of Camargo, in the State of Tamaulipas, and entering Nuevo Leon through the first spurs of the Pamorones Mountains, he proceeded in the general direction of the Galeana range.

In vain did he seek his supporters; there were none. Of five hundred men whom he expected to meet, waiting only for his arrival to start a triumphant campaign, he met not one. What he did meet was a detachment of federal troops of the 11th cavalry, which quickly scattered his faithful little band. General Reyes was left alone with his guide, and while in the grip of the terrible and bitter disillusionment which he had suffered, he ordered his companion to lead him at once to the nearest town. This happened to be the city of Linares, Nuevo Leon, where the General arrived on the evening of December 25th and gave himself up as a prisoner to Corporal of Rurales Plácido Rodriguez, who was then on guard. At first, the officer fearing that Reyes had come accompanied by a large force to which he could offer no adequate resistance, was at his wits end what to do, but finally he was convinced by the General himself that the man before him was his prisoner. Thereupon he telegraphed the news to General Trevino, Commander in Chief of the Zone, who ordered that the rebel leader be accorded every consideration and paroled within the city limits. He further ordered Lieutenant Colonel Garcia Lugo, in command of a body of Rurales near Linares, to take charge of the prisoner and conduct him to Mexico City with every arrangement for his comfort.

On arriving in Mexico on December 28, Reyes was placed in Santiago prison* where he remained until the uprising at the Ciudadela in which it was his lot to be one of the first victims.

Fortune continued to smile on Madero, but unfortunately he refused to heed her smile, and as Fortune is a capricious mistress, she sooner or later was sure to turn against him.

Madero and those surrounding him began from the very first to create trouble for their own administration. In Vera Cruz, Governor Dehesa had sent in his resignation, and an election was ordered by the legislature of the state.† The President at first favored the election of Gabriel Gavira, an honest artisan who knew well his trade of cabinet maker, but who was not in any way fitted to govern that important state. Madero finally decided to support Francisco Lagos Cházaro also an incompetent man and in this case mentally unbalanced as well; his

*As it is named the Military Prison.

†Mr. Leon Aillaud was named provisional governor, but a few days after was removed and Manuel Alegre took the place.

absolute lack of character could not but bring on grievous conflicts during the period of his administration. In Aguascalientes and Tlaxcala, Madero insisted on the retention of the ignorant governors whom the revolution had allowed to rise. One was a former coffin maker and the other, a doorkeeper in a cotton factory. Both were denounced by the intelligent people of the above mentioned states. In Jalisco, the provisional government had appointed as governor pro tem Alberto Robles Gil, a man who managed through his great popularity in the state to assert himself and maintain perfect order. Madero was determined to have the election take place immediately. The provisional governor protested on the grounds that so premature an election would lead to serious troubles. At this point the Legislature declared itself in favor of the plan proposed by the Federal government, or rather by Madero, and against Robles Gil. The latter finally was forced to submit, and in the ensuing election the victory was gained by the candidate nominated by the Catholics, Jose Lopez Portillo y Rojas, a man of the scantest ability and whose name had appeared in a notorious fraud case. In Michoacan also, Madero was undecided between two candidates for the governorship; Miguel Silva, an honorable, liberal, and generally liked man, and Primitivo Ortiz, an old lawyer who had always boasted of being an enthusiastic liberal. Ortiz appeared to be the candidate of the Catholic Party whose displeasure the President was particularly anxious to avoid. Only Gustavo Madero's vigorous protests prevented him from committing the grave error of deciding against the popular candidate. Serapio Rendon, a man in whom Madero had complete confidence, was sent to Morelia* to settle all controversy, and finally Silva was declared elected by a large majority. In Oaxaca notwithstanding the friendship between the Governor, Juarez Maza† and Madero, a conflict had taken place during the last days of the provisional government that reached its critical period just after Madero assumed the duties of President, and which had a tragic ending and a disastrous result both for the local and the federal governments.

On the 2nd of September, Juarez Maza had assumed the governorship of the state after defeating Felix Diaz decisively

*Capital of the State of Michoacan.

†Son of the great President, Benito Juarez.

for that office. Almost his first official act was to remove all the prefects under his jurisdiction, and quite naturally, to substitute in their places personal friends on whose assistance he relied in guaranteeing peace in the state. Among others, was the ill starred appointment for prefect of the District of Juchitan of a gentleman by the name of Enrique Leon. In Juchitan there had grown up, partly because of the Maderista revolution, but principally because of the introduction of true popular elections for the governorship, two distinct local parties, each of which aspired to control the government of that district. The importance attached to the contest lay in the fact that the district is so far from the state capital that it is considered almost independent of the state authorities. Juchitan is a city of some importance, head of the district that bears its name, and is situated on the isthmus near Tehuantepec. Both districts, Juchitan and Tehuantepec, abound in wealth and their contribution to the expenses of the state form a considerable part of its total revenue. But, as mentioned above, they are so far removed from the state government at Oaxaca that the local authorities of those districts do not concern themselves with it at all, except to send their quota of taxes at regular intervals. Even less attention is paid by the inhabitants themselves, since the state government refers all their controversies to the local authorities which in consequence are vested with greater power than the officers of similar rank in other districts.

Taking advantage of this situation, a certain native of Juchitan, Jose Gomez, popularly known as Che Gomez, had formed a party for which Vazquez Gomez procured money, arms, and ammunition, and with these elements at his disposal, he declared himself the cacique of the district, and under the title of Municipal President, claimed to be the governor of that region.

As Governor of the State, Juarez Maza could not tolerate such presumption on the part of a municipal president, and chiefly for this reason he named Mr. Leon Prefect of Juchitan. This appointment, of course, displeased Che Gomez, and he tried his best to induce the inhabitants of Juchitan to reject the new officer. Ever since the uprising that occurred at the beginning of the Diaz government, the custom had prevailed that when a prefect was to be appointed, the municipal government of Juchitan was consulted. The latter always gave its consent, or rather, reported favorably on the candidate proposed by the governor.

In this instance, the Governor failed to comply with the required formality. This oversight suited Che Gomez' purpose admirably. On account of the opposition of the inhabitants of Juchitan to the new prefect, Governor Maza asked for federal assistance in asserting his authority. Mr. de la Barra sent him federal troops and later a body of Rurales under the command of Gabriel Hernandez*, a ferocious man who in Pachuca had committed innumerable atrocities, and Cándido Aguilar, a man of a more quiet disposition and who, though a native of the State of Vera Cruz, knew well the character of the Juchitecos. On the arrival of Hernandez, an encounter took place in the streets of Juchitan, but when Aguilar arrived, negotiations were entered into and an agreement was drawn up in which it was stipulated that a new prefect should be appointed with due regard for the local custom of consulting the Board of Aldermen regarding the proposed candidate. Madero, who had suggested that Aguilar be sent, judged that the affair had received a satisfactory solution and telegraphed Juarez Maza recommending Aguilar for the post of prefect. The Governor, however, thought that it would greatly weaken his authority in the State if he should allow the Federal Government to take part in the affair and settle the conflict directly without consulting with the State Government, and in consequence insisted that the prefect that had been appointed should take charge, and in return he promised to substitute him later on and declared that he would then submit to the established custom of Juchitan in the matter of choosing a new prefect. Mr. Madero, angered at the attitude of the governor, gave orders that the federal troops should take no part in the affair and thus left the governor's appointee entirely without support, and as a result, the State Government, without federal backing, became a mere mockery. Che Gomez headed a force too powerful to be attacked by the local militia, which was the only force that Juarez Maza had at his command. Seeing that the stage was set for a conflict, Governor Juarez Maza immediately set out for the scene of action, judging that by his presence he could impose his authority. When the attitude assumed by the respective State and Federal governments became generally known, and it was seen that the Governor was defending the sovereignty of the State of Oaxaca, the entire

*Hernandez was murdered in his prison during Huerta's administration, by order of the governor of the City of Mexico.

state rose as one man and placed itself side by side with him. His arrival at the isthmus was a veritable triumphant march and the occasion for demonstrations against Madero. Seeing the stand taken by the populace, Che Gomez recognized that his was a lost cause and surrendered, but exacted from the federal government guarantees for himself and his followers. Madero who had also suffered a defeat in this conflict, immediately agreed and ordered that a passport and safe conduct be given Gomez. The Governor, however, ordered the arrest of the ringleader in order to submit the case to the State Courts. Che Gomez and Governor Juarez Maza had met in San Gerónimo, a railroad junction on the isthmus, and Gomez had sought an interview with the Governor who not only refused to listen to him but even ordered his arrest. The military authorities did not dare to disobey the Governor's orders, but satisfied themselves by telegraphing the fact of the arrest to Mr. Madero. Now, as a favor and not as a command, the President requested Juarez Maza to send Che Gomez to Mexico City. Unfortunately, this telegram was received by Juarez Maza too late for him to grant the request. During the night previous to its receipt, some of the residents of Juchitan, adherents of the party opposing Che Gomez had taken him forcibly from jail with his eight companions and had lynched them all near the outskirts of San Gerónimo. When the Governor received the President's telegram on the following day at Juchitan, he already had had a message from the authorities of San Gerónimo advising him of the occurrence.

The officials who took charge of the remains of Che Gomez reported that they had found on his person some papers which seriously implicated Don Emilio Vazquez Gomez. Even while Secretary of the Interior, he had been preparing and fomenting a revolt in Juchitan and after his withdrawal from the Department he had held conferences with the ringleader in which he showed him the possibility of segregating the districts of Juchitan and Tehuantepec from the State of Oaxaca, and together with the Cantons of Acayucan and Minatitlan in the State of Vera Cruz, forming a small state or territory on the isthmus which Che Gomez was to receive as feudal land. He, in his turn, was to bind himself to aid and abet the Vazquez Gomez brothers in that region.

The conflict in Oaxaca proved fatal to the Madero government, chiefly because it was one of the first official acts of his

administration and its failure had been complete. He had not even been able to save the life of his protege. Moreover the conduct of Mr. Juarez Maza without doubt deserved some applause. He had energetically asserted his rights as an executive and had at once proceeded to the scene of the conflict. This act presented even a heroic phase and aroused a general sentiment of independence in the other states which later caused serious and important troubles to the federal government.

Men guilty of highly reprehensible conduct had been elected governors in Guanajuato, Puebla, and San Luis Potosi; those of the two latter were not even natives of the states to which they had been elected; all three were incompetent and had been repudiated by the thinking class of these respective states. In Guerrero and in other points, differences were constantly arising between the various leaders, each of whom claimed to be lord and master of the whole state; these differences were becoming more serious because Madero, well intentioned but utterly impracticable in such matters, did not know his men sufficiently, and consequently delayed his decision regarding which of these aspirants he should support in the scramble for power.

All of these local strifes could have been easily suppressed if there had been at the head of the Department of the Interior a politician of even mediocre ability, but, thanks to the poor handling of the affair by Mr. Gonzalez, who was even worse than the President himself, they were assuming serious proportions and day by day were weakening the government which had at first had the united sympathy of the public. Now, after two months, it found itself practically isolated. The President, though upright and tender hearted, was practically nullifying his best intentions through lack of training in public life; he became excited at the least contradiction and although he attempted to hide his displeasure, his treacherous nerves exposed him and transformed him in most instances from a man affable even to familiarity to a man of the most peevish and insolent character.

CHAPTER XII.

THE NEW REVOLUTION.

The most serious conflicts were those in Chihuahua and in Morelos. The one in Chihuahua was headed by Pascual Orozco, Jr., who had been a leader in Madero's army. At the time, it was said in Chihuahua that his change of attitude had been caused by the work and influence of Don Gonzalo Enrile who had just arrived with instructions from General Diaz and Mr. Limantour for Mr. Terrazas. This may or may not be true, but one fact is certain, that the Orozquista revolution was supported by funds furnished by members of the Terrazas family. The one in Morelos was led by Zapata who still continued to revolt although Mr. Madero was already President and had offered to satisfy all his demands. The uprising of Orozco was due to the lack of tact with which he was treated. For the most part Madero's advisors are responsible for this, although, as a matter of fact, Madero should not have forgotten that Orozco had been the moving spirit of the uprising which had made him triumphant. Instead of showing Orozco his gratitude and honoring him as he deserved, he treated him harshly, put him aside for men worth much less, and more than that, he even refused to help him secure work to gain a livelihood.* What less could have been requested by him who had been the commander of Madero's whole army?

The flatterers supported by the American jingoism were also responsible that Orozco, Jr., and Madero had broken. From the beginning of the revolt they lifted up Orozco, praising his work as a wonderful one, and exhibiting him as the real head of the rebellion. Orozco during the campaign did not heed these flatteries but when Madero was President and did not reward him, as he expected, through the every day renewed flatteries he lost his

*The same Mr. Madero did with Máximo Castillo.

head and, believing that he was strong enough to be the leader of a new revolution, revolted.*

The uprising in Morelos was serious because of its duration and because of its proximity to the Capital of the Republic. General Juvencio Robles, a man well acquainted with the state besides being esteemed for his prudence and energy, was sent to take command of the federal troops and to put an end to the disturbance. General Robles immediately began an active campaign, guaranteeing security to every one. When Zapata realized that the fight was almost lost, he appealed to Madero asking that he be allowed to deal directly with him and asking that all fighting be suspended. This same thing had happened during the provisional government when General Huerta had been at the point of killing the leader of the rebels. Now as then, the soft heart of Madero interposed, causing incalculable damage to his administration and to the country at large. General Robles was relieved of the command and was superseded by General Felipe Angeles, a very sincere and good hearted man, but entirely theoretical at that moment and totally unadapted for a campaign like that of Morelos. Two days later, the hordes of Zapata attacked the passenger train in Ticuman and killed Mr. Herrerrias and Mr. Strauss, both newspaper men. In spite of so many missteps, fortune still smiled upon Madero. The campaign in Chihuahua like that in Morelos had been disastrous to the government. General Gonzalez Salas, the Minister of War had been forced to resign and in order that he might have an honorable pretext, he had been appointed to lead this campaign. General Pascual Orozco at the head of his army had taken possession of the State Capital on the 3rd of March, forcing Mr. Abraham Gonzalez, the constitutional governor, to flee. When the rebellion broke out in Chihuahua, Mr. Abraham Gonzalez had resigned from the Cabinet and had gone there reassuming the governorship on the 29th of February. He believed that through his friendship with Orozco he could reestablish peace. He was too late. His tactless efforts alienated even the few friendships he still could claim and caused the loss of the State to the Federal Government. Until then Orozco had wavered, but as soon as he saw Mr. Gonzalez summoned the rebel leader, Villa, to put him in command of the federal troops, he

*The same is doing now with General Villa.

broke openly with the government, placed himself at the head of the revolution, rapidly organized his forces, and took immediate possession of Chihuahua. Within two weeks he had under him a good army and was making his authority felt throughout the whole state.

Mr. Jesus Flores Magon who though hostile to the government of General Diaz had not been a revolutionary, succeeded Mr. Abraham Gonzalez as Secretary of the Interior. Under normal conditions, he would have made a good Secretary of the Interior, because though passionate and inexperienced in politics, he had good common sense. But under the abnormal conditions at the time of his appointment, a far superior man was needed. He had to cope not only with the very delicate affairs of the moment, but also with two other important factors: the President, almost childishly capricious at times, and Gustavo Madero and his followers. The first one with aspirations to the office of Secretary of the Interior. This gentleman was day by day becoming more politically influential, backed by the Constitutional Progressive Party and especially by the Big Stick Clique with which he dominated the House of Representatives.

Mr. Flores Magon because of his ignorance of conditions and not from any personal ill will, was largely responsible for the removal of General Robles from command of the campaign in Morelos. The unfortunate result of this step was that the government failed to put a decisive end to the campaign in Morelos although success was then almost assured.

* * *

When General Gonzalez Salas withdrew from the Cabinet, he was appointed to direct the campaign in the north against the forces of Pascual Orozo, Jr., who with a regularly organized army threatened to invade the neighboring states. The two forces met at Rellano, near Jimenez, on the 22nd of March. The results were disastrous to the federal troops, in spite of the fact that the rebels through lack of artillery were unable to press their advantage. General Gonzalez Salas, who was entirely unfitted for the work assigned to him, committed a series of blunders which it is unnecessary to enumerate in this book. After his retreat, judging that the defeat had been more ignoble than it really was, and believing that the artillery abandoned by him had been lost, he committed suicide on the train to Torreon.

Thus through its own misjudgment, the government suffered great losses and the President suffered the loss of a friend whom he highly respected and esteemed.

When the federals retreated, Pascual Orozco thought that General Gonzalez Salas would reorganize his forces and with renewed strength would reopen the attack. Therefore, as his ammunition had run short, he ordered a retreat. When General Tellez, commander of the federal artillery, saw himself abandoned by the Chief of Division, he failed to realize what had happened, but in obedience to the command he had received, broke camp and retreated to Torreon where he took command of the straggling bands that arrived there little by little. Brigadier General Trucy Aubert had by far the worst share in the battle. Pursued by Orozco's troops, he was compelled to make a long detour in order to rejoin the main army. In this retreat he lost all his ammunition and artillery and nearly all his men, arriving in Torreon with only sixty odd men. The government rewarded the conduct of General Aubert with an immediate promotion and with twenty thousand dollars in cash. This last they gave as if it were a tribute from a group of friends of the government.

General Angel Garcia Peña, an entirely mathematical man, had succeeded General Gonzalez Salas as Minister of War. He had devoted his whole life to mathematics and had no experience as a commander of troops. His sole command had been over the escorts which accompanied him on his scientific expeditions. Nevertheless, he was somewhat wise and competent in organizing the material at his disposal. Unfortunately, he was impulsive and violent to such an extent that one day he actually came to blows with the motorman of a street car. Naturally such a character was not the best suited for the position at that time. The Department needed at its head a man of sense and poise who would not foolishly waste the resources of the government and who would be respected for his dignity and his fairness.

* * *

Mr. Calero was not at ease in the Cabinet because he had been cut off from all interference with the House of Representatives, and because the President did not take his advice as much as he wished. Moreover, he could not agree with the fiery opinions

of the majority of the Cabinet members who were dragging the government to ruin. He, therefore, secured the appointment as ambassador at Washington. Don Gilberto Crespo, Mexican Minister to Austria Hungary, who occupied the position at that time, was again sent to Vienna. Mr. Pedro Lascurain was appointed on the 9th of April to fill the vacancy left by Mr. Calero. For the first time he took an active part in politics from which he had been excluded because of his religious beliefs, for he was an ardent Catholic, and because of his own character which is little given to seeking strife and trouble. Mr. Lascurain is a man of good intelligence but inexperienced in the affairs entrusted to him. He is calm, affable and upright, but lacking in decisiveness and in initiative. He, as well as Ernesto Madero, was to be swept away by the strong current of passions let loose by the other Cabinet members. When at the supreme moment, events placed him in a most precarious situation and gave him executive power, he was merely the plaything of the men who took an active part in this momentous drama. The responsibility he assumed in history when he presented the resignations of Mr. Madero and Mr. Pino Suarez, contrary to the agreement made with them, can only find an excuse in his absolute good faith or in his absolute lack of political acumen. When Madero first heard of the step taken by Mr. Lascurain, he believed himself betrayed, but Mr. Pino Suarez exclaimed: "It is not treason, it is stupidity, but it will cost us our lives." Mr. Pino Suarez was right. Mr. Lascurain had been deceived like a child; he had been impelled to catastrophe through force of circumstances, and had been unconsciously and against his will forced to contribute to the death of Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez.*

Mr. Diaz Lombardo had been obliged to resign as Secretary of Public Instruction in order that the Vice President, Mr. Pino Suarez, might have a position in the Cabinet.

Since taking the oath of office as Vice President, Mr. Pino Suarez had presided over the Senate and had even taken an active part in some matters. A fiery and impulsive young man by nature and a zealous revolutionist, he chafed under the passive duties of the Vice Presidency. He was the tool of Don Gustavo Madero who was constantly recommending him to the President for a more active part in the affairs in order that he might have a voice in all the business transacted by the Presi-

*See chapter XXIX.

dent. Mr. Madero esteemed Mr. Pino Suarez and made him attend the Cabinet meetings, but at these meetings there was no free play for his activity. When Congress adjourned, the Vice President's life became even more monotonous. For this reason both he and Gustavo Madero wished that he might be a Cabinet member so that their schemes might become actual facts.

When the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Abraham Gonzalez, resigned, Gustavo Madero concentrated his energies to obtain the portfolio either for himself or for Mr. Pino Suarez. Neither Mr. Ernesto Madero, Secretary of the Treasury, nor Mr. Rafael Hernandez, his companion in politics, wanted the President to be obsessed with the advice of his favorite brother. The family, divided upon this point, was continually quarreling.

Mr. Ernesto Madero strenuously opposed the appointment as Secretary of the Interior of either Gustavo Madero or Pino Suarez, because he believed that either appointment would raise a storm of criticism. The President wavered between his personal affection and his duty as president. His affection inclined him towards pleasing his brother, but he fully realized that such an action would create scandal. Weak, he wavered in his decision. Mr. Calero, still Secretary of State, solved the question by suggesting Mr. Pino Suarez for Secretary of Public Instruction and recommending Mr. Jesus Flores Magon for Secretary of the Interior. With no excuse to offer, Mr. Diaz Lombardo resigned from this post merely as an act of friendship towards Mr. Calero who had originally recommended him for the portfolio. He was then appointed Minister to France to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of Mr. Sebastian de Mier at the time of the fall of the Diaz government.

* * *

Mr. Rafael Hernandez, Secretary of Development, had attempted to secure for the government a majority in the House of Representatives. This was a comparatively easy matter as a large number of the representatives wished to help the new government and had already fulfilled their pledges to ex-President Diaz. In order to have greater assurance, Mr. Hernandez had personally offered reelection to the majority of congressmen. Most of these, however, realizing the weakness of the government, knew quite well that these were merely empty promises,

but still, they did their utmost to help the executive power which needed the backing of Congress in order to establish itself firmly.

* * *

Such were the existing conditions at the time for the election of representatives, senators, and justices of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation. These elections had to be carried out in accordance with the new law passed by Congress at its last session. The government and the Constitutional Progressive Party, or, we may say, Gustavo Madero, each made out its slate. The governors, who had no slate of their own, wavered between the two parties, uncertain from which they could gain the greater advantage. The candidates of these two parties were opposed by the nominees of the Catholic Party from nearly every district of the Republic, and by the candidates of those who under the name of "Independents," were trying to profit by the general confusion.

The number of excesses committed was astounding. With the exception of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War, each Secretary presented his candidates for congressmen or senators, and they were victorious, all more or less legally. The Constitutional Progressive Party adopted all sorts of measures to gain victory for its candidates. Though legally defeated for many offices, it found revenge at the time of examination of credentials, since it caused many credentials to be accepted when they were palpable frauds.

In the State of Vera Cruz, Mr. Tomas Braniff in league with Messrs. Gustavo Madero and Pino Suarez, nominated candidates against all law and order at the eleventh hour. These candidates were upheld by the governor. In Misantla, the prefect even had two men shot on the eve of the elections and had their bodies paraded through the streets shortly before the voting began. Such an argument was decidedly successful and the prefect was able to forge all papers with impunity in his own office, naming Jose R. Aspe congressman. In Zongolica the ballots arrived on the day following the elections, but they were not for that reason declared illegal. In the State of Mexico the scandal did not reach the point of murder, but there were prefects like the one in Ixtlahuaca who brutally enforced the candidacy of the nominees of the Secretary of the Interior. There was not one state where the law was not trampled upon in a most shameless way. Under cover of these abuses, there were

districts as for instance Juchitan in Oaxaca, where the prefects paid no attention to the recommendations of Gustavo Madero's party nor to the recommendations officially made, nor even to the protests made by the independent parties and candidates, but they elected their own personal friends or relatives.

Of the representatives who made up the Twenty-fifth Constitutional Congress only twenty-one were elected, among whom were Messrs. Calero and Hernandez. Of these twenty-one, eleven were proteges or nominees of the government or of the Constitutional Progressive Party. The rest obtained their election through personal relations. In other words, there were only eight who did not owe their victory to the backing of the government. These eight men were: From Vera Cruz, General Gregorio Ruiz, native of the district of Jalacingo where he had many relatives and friends; from the State of Mexico, Mr. Francisco M. de Olaguibel, a man well known and esteemed in his state; from Hidalgo, Mr. Javier Torres Rivas, a large landowner; from Jalisco, Mr. Jose Maria Lozano, a native of the district of San Miguel el Alto, where he is well connected; from Nuevo Leon, Mr. Nemesio Garcia Naranjo,* elected for the district of Lampazos, where he is well known and esteemed; from Oaxaca, Messrs. Jose Maria Garcia, Francisco Modesto Ramirez, and Prisciliano Maldonado, all well known citizens in their towns. There were others who secured backing in their respective districts but their nominations did not go through the discussions at the preliminary meetings. The scandals perpetrated at these meetings have no precedent in our constitutional history. There were credentials that the committee tried to reject although the members of the committee confessed that they had not even opened the documents relative to the business at hand. Even after this flagrant confession, they still attempted to reject credentials alleging that they had not been correctly filled out. Mr. Querido Moheno,† a congressman, one day admitted before the House that he had submitted two different opinions concerning the same credentials so that Mr. Gustavo Madero might choose the one he preferred. The credentials of Mr. Francisco Pascual Garcia of Michoacan were approved since the elections in his district were

*Both Mr. Lozano and Mr. Garcia Naranjo are Cabinet Ministers in Huerta's administration.

†Secretary of State in General Huerta's administration

declared legal; but when the votes were cast, he himself was rejected without any explanation for the action.

The debates were endless. In the majority of cases the Board of Elections did not know how the documents stood, nor did they bother to answer the arguments of those who opposed their actions. They merely imposed their decision by force of a majority vote. These debates lasted so long that the House had to convene even though all the credentials had not been duly examined. The debates did not come to an end until October, that is, until two weeks after the opening of the session of Congress.

The Catholic Party which had contended in nearly every district, played a most unworthy role in these debates. Fearing that the credentials of their party leaders would be rejected, it supported the Constitutional Progressive Party, voting with it even in the most flagrantly shameless cases. In fact, it did not even protest in favor of some of its coreligionists but rather sacrificed them disgracefully. As a result, it secured only about twenty seats in the Congress. The Constitutional Progressive Party obtained a majority though not an overwhelming one. The rest of the Congress was made up of representatives of all varieties, lacking discipline as well as definite affiliation. In each question, therefore, a majority had to be formed, a majority that at any moment might become a minority through lack of subordination of the elements that composed it. Yet there was always a tendency to group around Gustavo Madero who was the man of power. When the session was opened and the House began its work, it commenced a series of insults against every one, unprecedented in any constitutional body. The House did nothing useful for the country. It seemed as if the representatives had convened solely and exclusively to insult each other or to insult those who could not defend themselves since they were not representatives. The Speakers elected in the months of September, October, November and December, were powerless to bring to order these excited enthusiasts. To make matters worse, the administration in spite of the behavior of the representatives, had the brilliant idea of calling a special session, which began at the end of December and lasted until the fall of the Madero administration.

CHAPTER XIII.

OROZCO AND VAZQUEZ GOMEZ.

In the North the revolution began as a Vazquista movement; that is, it took as its leader Mr. Emilio Vazquez Gomez who after his disappearance from Mexico City had appeared in San Antonio, Texas. But it soon deteriorated into nothing but an anti-administration movement.*

Dr. Francisco Vazquez Gomez who had remained in Mexico City, was arrested one day as he was about to get into an automobile. He claimed that he was merely leaving the city to visit some property he owned just outside the Federal District. In spite of his remonstrances he was taken to prison, but he soon managed to gain his liberty although the government accused him of complicity with the rebels. It was even said that the telegraph operator of the Treasury Department had intercepted a telegram to the Doctor which left no doubt as to his complicity with the forces of Zapata.

To my mind there is absolutely no doubt that Dr. Vazquez Gomez was in close touch with the revolutionists. The rebel leaders, Limon, the Sámano brothers and others of the State of Mexico in league with Zapata, were constantly receiving instructions as well as pecuniary aid through Representative Pedro

*The first proclamation issued by Pascual Orozco, Jr., was as usual against the científicos or rather against the Terrazas coterie, known in Chihuahua as the científico party, claiming that Governor Abraham Gonzalez had been subdued by General Luis Terrazas. The meeting at Enramada with David de la Fuente and other chiefs openly showed that the revolution was a Vasquista one, but some days later Orozco, Jr., changed his mind and proclaiming that the only purpose of the revolution was the downfall of the Madero regime, ordered Mr. Emilio Vazquez Gomez to leave Mexican territory at once, notwithstanding that Colonel Orozco, the leader's father had welcomed Mr. Vazquez Gomez in Ciudad Juarez and honored him as Provisional President of the Republic.

Galicia Rodriguez from Dr. Vazquez Gomez or from some committee over which he presided. This I affirm because I myself handled a letter from Limon and other leaders addressed to Mr. Galicia Rodriguez. In this letter they complained that Dr. Vazquez Gomez had not sent money nor ammunition as he had promised to do; they, moreover, threatened to abandon the Vazquista cause unless the ammunition were sent on the very days promised. Scarcely two months after the receipt of this letter, Limon and the Sámamo brothers were marauding in the State of Mexico, not exactly stealing, for they usually paid for what they took, but always parading the fact that they had plenty of ammunition. In fact Limon was in arms up to the very time of the successful revolt of the Ciudadela after which he was executed by the Federals in the State of Mexico. According to the official statement this was done through an error but it is more likely that it was done to wipe out by his death the understanding which the rebel leader had had with those who at that moment were victors. The best proof of the understanding between Dr. Vazquez Gomez and Zapata is the letter which follows, in which Dr. Vazquez Gomez clearly states that the revolt led by Zapata was a revolution founded on principle, and that the Plan of Ayala is the clear and definite echo of an agrarian revolution which will save the country. This letter, published in "El Pais" on the 19th of June 1913, read as follows:

Washington, June 4th, 1913.

To the Editor of El Pais.

Dear Sir:

After much delay, I have at last received copies of newspapers in Spanish from your city and from the southern frontier of this country. I have read the articles as well as the news items concerning my journey to the northern part of Mexico. Some of these are groundless, others inexact. In order not to make this letter too long, I will just correct the news items, for since the articles are all written anonymously by my political enemies, they do not deserve any comment or notice; moreover, the very same charges were made from the very same sources in 1912, and their falsehood has already been passed upon by those in authority. As for the news items published by the press of that city, I shall correct the most important. It has been stated that the revolution of the North agreed to proclaim me Provis-

ional President as soon as the administration of this country should recognize the belligerency of the revolutionists. This is absolutely incorrect. In the conference I had in Piedras Negras with Mr. Venustiano Carranza, this was not even mentioned. Besides, the United States has declared, and rightly, that it will not recognize any government proceeding from violence. Perhaps my approbation will surprise many who only seek that by which they profit for the moment; I, however, seek as usual only that by which our country will really profit. For this reason, I believe that the precedent established by Mr. Wilson is a guarantee for the legal administration of the countries, which like ours, are frequently the scene of political revolutions. I may be wrong, but, be that as it may, I sincerely believe it.

It has been stated that I am working among the revolutionists in order to be made provisional president when the revolution triumphs. This is absolutely groundless and false. There is not a single rebel who can bear witness to such an endeavor. These rumors come from a source that every one knows but which I shall call to mind in a very few words.

Politically, I figured in a secondary capacity in the revolution of 1910. It was due to my efforts, though my enemies deny it even at present, that the revolution did not completely fail.

At the time of the negotiations at Ciudad Juarez, had it not been for intrigues, well known to all, I would have been elected vice president of the Republic. The complete failure of the revolution of 1910 followed my withdrawal from politics. I do not, however, pretend to believe that this downfall was due to my withdrawal.

Very well then; these facts as well as others that I do not mention, because I am not trying to write history, are the origin of the good will shown me by the revolutionists of 1910, the greater part of whom have again taken up arms; but between this good will and leadership there is a vast difference. One of the newspapers of your city has said that the work ascribed to me does not agree with my ideas of revolutionary unity; that lack of agreement would be true if the actions ascribed to me were true, but as they are false, I confirm my ideas, and I still believe that if there had been unity in the revolution the country would have been saved from anarchy and all its consequences. It is not hard to prove that what I say is right. After the armed

movement in the capital which changed the order of things and established a very serious precedent for the country, the revolution is still in full swing and no one can say how or when it will end.

But just as I am a friend of revolutionary unity when the revolution is real and not imaginary, I am a decided enemy of revolutions when they have no other aim but to change the personnel of the government. It has been clearly shown in our country that the result of such a change does not compensate for the blood shed.

Fortunately, the main object of the revolution of 1910 was not to change the personnel of the Government. It tried to institute a real reform, to solve the agrarian problem, to better the economic conditions of the country, and to assure the welfare and liberty of the people.

The agrarian revolution only roughly sketched in 1910, and not understood by many *has had a clear and well defined echo in the Plan of Ayala*;* it is a revolution of principles and not of personal ambition, it originated in support of ideas and not on behalf of men. This fact in itself is an advantage, because when men are the standards, the practically inevitable result is that the victorious leader or chief sets up a personal and tyrannical dictatorship which renders null and void the sacrifices of the people. Our contemporaneous history is filled with cases that bear out this statement.

Consequently convinced as I am of the true tendency of the present revolution, my efforts cannot be directed in behalf of one man, even though that man be myself, because principles come before men, and when these principles triumph, men—not one man—will appear to carry them out.

Begging you, Mr. Editor, to have this letter published in your distinguished paper, and thanking you in advance, I beg to remain,

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) Dr. Francisco Vazquez Gomez.

In the north the revolution had begun to take a truly vazuquista character and Mr. Emilio Vazquez Gomez had even gone

*Signed by Zapata and written by Doctor Vazquez Gomez himself.

to Ciudad Juarez. Pascual Orozco, father of the leader of the revolution in Chihuahua accorded him the honors due to the President of the Republic. But, when on the following day he received decisive orders to leave Mexican soil, the revolutionists themselves rescinded the title they had given him, and the revolution was thus left without an avowed leader.

Months later, in December, the principal leaders of the revolt issued a proclamation in which they all adhered to the plan of September 22, made public by General Gaudencio de la Llave in the State of Puebla.

In Sinaloa, the revolution also had at the beginning a vazquista tendency, but later, it recognized Pascual Orozco as its head. Then all those who had personal ambitions tried to lure Orozco to submission. Even the administration, under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Jesus Flores Magon, sent agents to the rebel leader to see whether his conditions were acceptable to the government. Representative Juan Sarabia was entrusted with this mission, but as he was unable to come to an agreement, negotiations were broken off. The league for Social Defence headed by Alberto Garcia Granados, ex-Secretary of the Interior, also opened negotiations with Orozco, but the only result was a friendly intercourse which in no way compromised the leader of the revolution.

CHAPTER XIV.

RELLANOS—CONEJOS—BACHIMBA.

After his victory at Rellanos, Pascual Orozco, Jr., had marched southward, taking possession of Escalon, Zavalza, Conejos, etcetera, and was approaching Torreon. The government realizing that he was the nucleus of the revolt, wished at any cost to prevent his advance. It therefore sent a strong force under the command of General Victoriano Huerta. General Huerta was a good soldier, well known throughout the army. He had studied his profession scientifically at the Military College from which he had been graduated with the rank of Staff Officer. Besides this theoretic training, he had had a vast practical experience for he had escorted General Diaz during his flight to Vera Cruz; he had commanded the column against Zapata during de la Barra's administration; he had been in command of the 3rd Battalion of Infantry during the campaign against the rebels of Guerrero, led by General Neri; he had later been sent to Yucatan as second in command of the forces fighting the Maya Indians in the Territory of Quintana Roo; and, lately, he had been Commander in Chief of the campaign in Morelos.* Therefore, well versed in military affairs, he calmly made preparations, leaving Mexico City on the 10th of April to assume command of his forces. He first went to Monterey where he conferred with General Geronimo Treviño, Chief of the 3rd Military Zone. General Treviño was able to put at his command forces organized by him comprising three thousand men accustomed to the climate as well as to the method of warfare in that region. From Monterey, General Huerta went to Torreon where he began his plan of attack, reorganizing the forces left by General Gonzalez Salas. Towards the end of April he

*In all of their commandings, General Huerta was drowned off, accused of misappropriation of funds.

began to attack the position held by Orozco. He sent a detachment under Colonel Mercado with a repair train to restore the railroad towards Bermejillo. These repairs extended from Bermejillo to Escalon, a distance of one hundred and twenty-one kilometers, but as the bridges were burned down and the railroad destroyed, the advance of the main army was made very slowly. In the meanwhile, Orozco was advancing towards the south, having established headquarters at Escalon. After several attempts to flank General Huerta's forces, among which were the skirmishes at Tlahualilo and Cuatro Cienegas, the main encounter took place on the 11th of May, eight kilometers from the station of Conejos. The result of the battle which ended on the 12th, was that Orozco retreated toward the north taking his position between Asunsolo and Corralitos.

The next battle was on the 22nd and 23rd of May on the Canyon of Rellano. Once again the artillery played an important part in the struggle. Orozco's forces had to retreat hurriedly toward Jimenez and there again met the federal in Bachimba. While Orozco was fighting at Conejos and Rellano, he had ordered his lieutenants to make flank movements in order to cut off the retreat of General Huerta. In spite of the disasters of Tlahualilo and Cuatro Cienegas, he ordered Campa and Argumedo to start for the South with the intention of taking Torreon just disoccupied by General Huerta. The rebel forces met and defeated Colonel Peña, the chief of the federal troops at Velardeña, forcing him to retreat to Pedriceña, to Nazas and to Picardías. There Colonel Peña met General Blanquete who had been hurriedly sent North because of General Huerta's reports concerning the movements of Orozco's lieutenants. Blanquete had met and had been defeated by the revolutionists at La Loma, a point near Aviles, about twenty-five kilometers from Torreon. He had therefore, been forced to fall back to Picardias, from where he sought assistance of the troops in Torreon. Upon receiving reinforcements from Torreon, General Blanquete reorganized his forces and joined Colonel Peña. He was then able to attack Argumedo, who was now alone. Campa had gone to the assistance of Orozco who had been defeated by General Huerta on the very day, May 22nd, that General Blanquete had been defeated by the revolutionists. Since Nazas, Pedriceña, and Velardeña were by that time restored to the Federals, Torreon was free from an attack and the rear of General Huer-

ta's army was protected. He was therefore able to march with entire freedom upon Orozco for the attack at Bachimba.

Before the beginning of the battle of Bachimba, General Huerta ordered the concentration of all forces in the vicinity. Among these was the division of Francisco Villa, former highwayman, afterwards revolutionist with Orozco, and at that moment Chief of the regiment of Rurales in the service of the government. Villa arrived at the camp of General Huerta from Parral where among other outrages committed by his troops he himself had seized a handsome horse, the property of one of the most prominent men of the place. The owner of the horse appealed to General Huerta as Commander in Chief for the return of his property. Huerta ordered Villa to return the animal, not to the owner but to headquarters, but Villa unaccustomed to such things, most decidedly refused. General Huerta was equally decided in his orders and an immediate clash ensued. The result was the imprisonment of Villa and a summary sentence of death on June 4th. Raoul and Emilio Madero who commanded bodies of Rurales in the division of General Huerta, interceded in his behalf, and telegraphed to their brother, the President, the details of the affair. General Huerta suspended the execution and upon the express command from the President sent Villa as prisoner to Mexico City.* Saved from death, Villa arrived in Mexico City where he was put in Santiago prison. He was soon allowed to escape and was even provided with the means to flee to the United States.

Before General Huerta left Santa Rosalia, he was joined by Mr. Abraham Gonzalez, Governor of Chihuahua. This gentleman had been obliged to hide when the capital of Chihuahua had declared itself in favor of the revolution. General Huerta also received a visit from a German merchant who as representative of the merchants of Chihuahua, came to seek guarantees for the residents who had contributed voluntarily or by force to the revolution. General Huerta was soon joined by General Sangines who had marched from Ojinaga to reinforce him, and by Colonel Ortega who had received orders in Cuchillo Parado to join him. Thus reinforced, General Huerta prepared for the attack. The battle began on July 3rd at nine o'clock

*Huerta ordered the chiefs in command along Villa's route to Mexico City to shoot him, but not one dared obey.

in the morning and lasted until five o'clock in the afternoon, when the rebels were completely routed. This was not confirmed until the following day when, upon the failure to receive an answering fire from the rebels a reconnaissance was ordered. It was then learned that the rebels had abandoned the field during the previous night.

Orozco's forces reorganized at Mapula. However, they did not interrupt their retreat, and instead of entering the City of Chihuahua, kept right on to Moctezuma. Since the nucleus of Orozco's powerful army was now broken up, guerrilla warfare began, a warfare that was to last until the revolt of the Ciudadela. Orozco fell sick not long after and had to hide in order to take care of himself. The real leadership of the rebellion then fell on Jose Inez Salazar. On the other side, General Huerta also gave up the command of the division as he was forced to go to Mexico City to be treated for a disease of the eyes that was threatening him with blindness. Upon his arrival in Mexico City, he went to the Sanatorium of Dr. Aureliano Urrutia* to be operated on by that skillful surgeon a few days later. In the meantime, he was raised to the rank of General of Division. But he did not again take the field, because the administration, for some unknown reason, sub-divided his command, placed General Antonio Rábago over one part and General Joaquin Tellez over another. General Sangines who had also had command of some of the troops was recalled to Mexico City as was Colonel Rubio Navarrete, chief of the artillery. General Huerta was greatly displeased at the course of action of the government which kept deceiving him for a long time telling him again and again that he would shortly receive orders to resume command of his division; but he says he was mostly displeased because the leaders who had assisted him in his campaign were not rewarded as he desired. Brigadier General Blaquete, who fought ceaselessly and untiringly ever since the fall of General Diaz' administration, who had been wounded at the battle of Rellano under General Gonzalez Salas, who had afterwards so bravely protected the rear of General Huerta's army, who, recalled to Mexico to fight against Zapata now invading the States surrounding Morelos, had not been accorded the promotion so well earned. General Huerta himself had not

*Afterwards Secretary of Interior in Huerta's administration.

been promoted until after the battle of Bachimba although Generals Lauro Villar, Jose Maria Mier, and Jose Maria Vega had all received promotions the previous December. It is true that some of the promotions, as for example, that of General Villar, were entirely justified, but none of the other generals had fought for the Madero government as had General Huerta.

The very same thing happened with General Juvencio Robles, who had fought for six months in Morelos and had not yet been rewarded. Had the administration made no promotions at all, none of the generals would have felt slighted, but Mr. Madero raised to Generals of Divisions leaders who had never been in a single battle, and ignored those who had served him efficiently and loyally.

In Oaxaca, immediately after the death of the Governor, Mr. Juarez Maza, deceased on the 20th of April, there had begun a revolt of the highlanders of the Ixtlan Mountains. In order to quell it, the administration sent Brigadier General Manuel Rivera who had been in charge of the 5th Military Zone, with headquarters in the City of San Luis Potosi. General Rivera, with tact and prudence, was successful in reestablishing peace after severely punishing the leaders of the insurrection. He received no recognition for his services from the administration which seemed to wish to slight the ablest leaders of the army who served it best.*

*Brigadier Rivera was promoted on the last days of Madero's administration, but the promotion did not reach him until after Madero's downfall.—See chapter XXV.

CHAPTER XV.

THE ELECTIONS IN VERA CRUZ.

The governors who had been elected to office at the triumph of the revolution were only completing the unexpired term of their predecessors; for this reason elections were due in Vera Cruz and in Puebla, while in Oaxaca they were necessary because of the death of the constitutional governor.

Again Mr. Madero entangled the electoral situation. Fortunately the elections in Puebla were carried on without great difficulty but those in Vera Cruz were the source of great scandals.

In Vera Cruz many candidates had come to the fore. Among the most important were: Representative Guillermo Pous, a large landowner on the coast of Sotavento, very well thought of in his state because he was intelligent, kindly, and well versed in the politics of his country; Adrian Carranza, a merchant of Vera Cruz, prominent in his city but little known throughout the rest of the state; Antonio Perez Rivera of Xalapa, a man of culture but violent and passionate, little known in the state outside of Xalapa and the district of Jalacingo where his estates were located; Mr. Manuel M. Alegre, a newspaper man who had sided with Madero in his propaganda against General Diaz, and who at the suggestion of Mr. Dehesa was the candidate of the members of the State Legislature; Mr. Hilario Rodriguez Malpica, a naval commander, chief aide to the President, known only in his native city of Vera Cruz; Mr. Tomas Braniff, son of a highly respected American citizen, and although an intelligent man, phlegmatic almost to indolence; but he was a capitalist of Mexico City and as such, able to spend a great deal of money on his campaign. Therefore, although completely unknown throughout the state, except in Cordova where his wife is a large landowner,

he was nevertheless one of the strongest candidates for the reason that he was able to make an expensive campaign as well as an extensive one. The other candidates, comparatively unknown citizens, were minor factors of no importance.

Of all the candidates, Mr. Madero at first favored his chief of staff. This candidate was not only, as we have said, comparatively unknown, but moreover, he had no means at his disposal to carry on his campaign. Convinced of these facts, Mr. Madero soon realized that it would be impossible to impose him except by brute force, which the government was in no position to consider, much less to adopt. He then began to vacillate between Mr. Alegre, an old friend and co-religionist; Mr. Tomas Braniff, who was backed by the vice president, Pino Suarez; and Mr. Antonio Perez Rivera, candidate of the Catholic party. Mr. Rivera was a close friend of Don Alfredo Alvarez, an intriguer whose official position—head of the President's household—gave him daily intercourse with the President. Vacillating between these three candidates, Madero, who was not born intrigant, soon succeeded as usual in entangling himself hopelessly. He broke completely with Mr. Braniff with the result that a controversy was started between the two in which Braniff seemed to be trying to force his candidacy by power of money, while Madero, forgetting the dignity of his position, became a demagogue, openly reproaching the methods of Braniff. The controversy soon degenerated into nothing less than mud slinging, Mr. Braniff going so far as even to give the lie to the President.

The whole fact of the matter is that from the very beginning, Mr. Madero's one fear was that Mr. Pous might be elected. He was particularly opposed to this man because he had been managing editor of the "El Debate," a newspaper which had hotly campaigned against him in 1910.*

According to the press, Mr. Francisco Lagos, the governor, was offered a large sum of money to back the candidacy of Mr. Braniff. The disclosure of this bribery caused such an uproar, that Madero judged it expedient to interfere; he called the principal candidates to a meeting at the Castle of Chapultepec at which he ordered the immediate removal from office of Mr. Lagos Chazaro. As his successor he appointed Congressman Manuel Levy to complete the unexpired term, pending the new

*Details in the complete Spanish edition.

elections. Such an act was a direct encroachment on the sovereignty of the State, but it was done openly by Madero without any attempt at disguise, and without taking its significance into account.

Mr. Lagos retired in favor of Mr. Levy as ordered. In preparation for the elections, Mr. Levy's first act was to remove many prefects who had had dealings with Mr. Braniff. A majority of the new officials appointed, recommended by the members of the Legislature, were friends of Mr. Alegre, for the Legislature was hand in glove with ex-Governor Dehesa. At the time, however, their only instructions were to accomplish the defeat of Mr. Pous, since Madero was still obsessed by his animosity towards the former editor of "El Debate." As a matter of fact, Mr. Pous had a state wide popularity and was really the best fitted for the office. Besides, owing to the fact that he had guaranteed to maintain peace in Vera Cruz, he was also the candidate most advantageous to the Central Government. Mr. Madero in league with a majority of the State Legislature, openly favored the candidacy of Mr. Alegre. In the meantime, partisans of Perez Rivera, consisting in the main of the Catholic Party which had first nominated him, were successful in winning Gabriel Gavira over to their support. Gavira was a former carpenter who had run against Lagos Cházaro. After his defeat at the elections for governor, he had publicly declared himself against the local government, for which he had been imprisoned in Uluá. With Gavira* on his side, Mr. Perez Rivera was soon able to gain the support of the working class. They had been wavering between all the candidates, though with leanings toward Mr. Pous. But now at the call of a comrade they flocked around Gavira's ally and began an active campaign for him. The greatest aid lent by Gavira to Perez Rivera was that, through his old friendship with Madero and through his old reputation as a revolutionist, he was able to win over the President who now declared himself in favor of the candidate of the Catholic party. This in turn caused Gustavo Madero and naturally Pino Suarez to desert Braniff and support the candidate favored by the President.

The elections held on the last Sunday in July showed Mr. Pous victorious with thirty-eight thousand votes against thirty-four thousand for Perez Rivera, fourteen thousand for Alegre, ele-

*See chapter XI.

ven thousand for Braniff, and the balance scattered among the remaining candidates. The votes cast for Mr. Alegre were generally fraudulent; those cast for Mr. Braniff were obtained only by the power of his money; thus there were only two real and legitimate contenders and the decision now lay with the Legislature. The members whose term was about to expire, refused to render a decision. Therefore, in order to induce them to act on that way, they were led to believe that all the intrigants would be reelected. In fact, Mr. Levy gave credentials to five, credentials which were revoked when the services of the representatives were no longer needed.

The prefects, realizing that the results of the elections would greatly displease the President of the Republic, began to withhold votes cast for the popular candidate. The new Legislature was composed entirely of partisans of Braniff and Perez Rivera because the credentials of the Dehesistas had been rejected and the votes of the partisans of Pous had been declared null and void by the Board of Elections under pressure of the prefects. Nearly twenty thousand votes for Mr. Pous were thrown out, with the result that Mr. Perez Rivera now showed a majority, and was duly declared Governor of the State.

In this election, frauds more flagrant than those during the elections for congressmen were perpetrated. But the government was fortunate in that the defeated candidates were serious minded men like Mr. Pous who accepted the decision of the Legislature, and putting politics aside, went about their business, or like the others, were men of little or no importance. Therefore, no revolution resulted directly from the election, but it left a bad taste and paved the way for a revolutionary movement in the future.

The question in Vera Cruz had not been quite settled when there was trouble in Tlaxcala. The Governor, Antonio Hidalgo, although his term had expired and it was so declared by the Legislature, refused to turn over the office to his successor. The governor-elect was practically under siege in the Capitol and it was necessary to send regulars to his aid. The situation was further complicated when the commander of the irregular troops, Rafael Tapia, a former revolutionist under Madero, sided with Mr. Hidalgo. It was then necessary for the government to send troops, and only upon their arrival did the retiring governor surrender his office.

In Chiapas, Madero, in order to please his friend, Flavio Guillen, appointed him governor.* First, though, he forced the incumbent, Mr. Reynaldo Gordillo Leon, to resign by appointing him Minister to Guatemala. The appointment of Mr. Guillen, who was very unpopular in the state, caused unrest and dissatisfaction. After a short time, Mr. Reynaldo Gordillo Leon resigned as Minister to Guatemala and returned to Mexico to resume his office as governor. Madero unwillingly gave his consent to this procedure, but not until the storm had broken and his overthrow was inevitable.

*It was thereupon stated in Mexico City that the appointment of Mr. Guillen was made at the urgent request of the President of Guatemala, who offered in exchange, to prevent any revolutions against the Mexican government from being fomented on the Guatemalan frontier. Mr. Guillen was charged to be a former Guatemala spy.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE FIRST MILITARY REVOLT.—VERA CRUZ.

The loss of prestige of the government was increasing in geometric progression; a revolution, though not in tangible form, was in the air and everybody felt that it was bound to break out at any moment. Moreover, it was suspected that Brigadier General Felix Diaz was at the head of it. He had asked to be retired from the army and had suddenly left the capital for Vera Cruz where he had taken up his residence.

The government, unable to shut its eyes to these facts, sent two detectives to shadow him constantly. In addition Secretary Hernandez commissioned Mr. Celso Acosta* to go to Vera Cruz to secure all possible information as to the actions and intentions of General Diaz. This was inconceivable stupidity for there was nobody who did not know that Acosta was closely allied with Diaz, and was in fact one of his most ardent supporters and as deep in the conspiracy as the ex-General himself. Their relative position then was that the government was deluding itself with the idea that it had Diaz under strict surveillance, while as a matter of fact Diaz was well posted as to every move of the government. Things kept on in this way until finally one day Diaz disappeared. He left the house of his brother in law, Notary Alcolea, with the avowed intention of going to the Regatta Club, but he failed to return. The fact was known in Mexico City that very afternoon as pre-arranged, and the government, learning of it through rumor, immediately telegraphed its agents. They reported that Felix Diaz was still in Vera Cruz closely watched by them. Within a few hours they admitted they were unable to see their charge because upon inquiry at his home they learned that he was ill and unable to receive callers. They still insisted that he had not left the city.

*Former secretary of Mr. Felix Diaz when he was Police Commissioner.

In the meantime, Felix Diaz had proceeded from Vera Cruz to Orizaba where Colonel Diaz Ordaz was stationed with most of the 21st Battalion. Diaz had persuaded this Colonel to begin the movement of the revolt against Madero's government, proclaiming Diaz himself head of the nation. Owing to the fact that the conspirators took absolutely no precautions, the government knew on the following day where Diaz was hiding; but still it hesitated to order his arrest, and still Secretary Hernandez continued to depend on Celso Acosta even going so far as to assign to him the task of confirming the news.* Needless to say, Acosta immediately notified Diaz that his hiding place was discovered and urged him to hurry matters. On the night of October 15th, Colonel Diaz Ordaz demanded special trains for the purpose of transferring his force from Orizaba to Vera Cruz where he arrived on the morning of the 16th.

At that time, General Hernandez, head of the Prison of Ulua, was provisional Military Commander of the city. The rebels of course attempted to win him over to their side by alluring inducements; but General Hernandez refused all overtures and remained a prisoner in Military Headquarters, under guard of the men of the 21st Battalion, commanded by Colonel Diaz Ordaz. Nevertheless, General Hernandez devised the following stratagem to obtain his freedom: He requested permission to go to Ulua for his family. Upon receiving it, he proceeded thence under escort, or rather in the custody of two officers belonging to the rebel force. When he arrived at Ulua, where he he was still the acknowledged head as well as commander of all the troops in that post, General Hernandez, as he entered the guard house, ordered the arrest of his two guards. Thus he not only regained his freedom but he also placed the prison beyond the power of the rebels. Commodore Azueta, chief of the Arsenal, had acted in more or less the same way. He also had been removed at daybreak from his home and invited to join the rebels. Upon learning what their intentions were, without giving a definite consent, he said he would go on board one of the warships to see that there was no disorder. No sooner had he boarded the Morelos, than he hoisted the ensign of Commander in Chief of the fleet. A number of the commanders of the

*I obtained this information on October 14th, 1912, from Antonio Villavicencio head of the detective force in charge of the political bureau.

vessels had gone ashore to receive orders from General Diaz: these he supplanted by the second in command. He thus put the fleet beyond the power of the revolutionists even though the commanders had agreed to assist the rebellion. In the early morning, Colonel Diaz Ordaz marshalled his troops, and at their head, paraded through the streets proclaiming the downfall of the Madero government, and acclaiming Felix Diaz as Provisional Head of the Nation, at the same time rendering him all honors due the President.

The news spread like wildfire throughout the country and the very audacity of the coup delivered at Vera Cruz gained for it sympathizers on all sides even though not a single military chief supported the uprising. As a whole, the army continued loyal to the constitutional government in spite of the great discontent evident throughout the country.

All communication with Vera Cruz was cut off and therefore the government could learn what was happening there only by cable. Thus it was that for several days the public did not learn the real attitude of the fleet, a very important fact, because had the rebels been able to count on its support, they could have taken possession of the remaining Gulf Ports. The government would then have been in sore straits. It had strong evidence that the fleet commanders were in league with Diaz but at the same time it had the conviction that Azueta had taken command of the squadron and was on board the Morelos. His unwillingness to land left no doubt as to his lack of sympathy with the revolutionary movement. The capture of Vera Cruz was of grave importance for several reasons, firstly, because there was a large quantity of munitions of war in the Warehouses of the Custom Houses, which gave the rebel leader means for arming eight thousand men, furnishing them with heavy artillery and machine guns which had just arrived from Europe; secondly, because there were large amounts of available funds, for there were not only those produced by the Customs as well as large amounts in the banks, but there was also the possibility of inducing the merchants and brokers of the city to pay their indebtedness to the Custom House within short terms by offering them discounts; and finally, because revolts once started by the soldiery would take root with the result that occurrences like that in Vera Cruz would soon be duplicated at other points. The government, therefore, took immediate steps to smother the move-

ment and ordered General Joaquin Beltran, recently appointed Military Commander of the city though not yet in command, to march with all his available forces to recapture the seceded city.

The advance was at once begun by the troops stationed on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec under Brigadier Zozaya, and those in Xalapa under Brigadier Celso Vega. From Mexico City there were sent the 2nd, 11th, and 18th Regiments under their respective heads, Lieutenant Colonel Ocaranza, Colonel Jimenez Castro, and Brigadier Agustin Valdez, as well as a body of volunteers from Xico, commanded by Captains Limon and Preciados, and a body of irregular troops under General Tapia, and two batteries commanded by Captains Oropeza and Prida. Later orders were sent to Colonel Blanquete instructing him to proceed with his regiment, the 29th Infantry, to reenforce the column under General Beltran, while bodies of Rurales stationed at Tehuacan, Perote and Tierra Blanca were mobilized and sent under Brigadiers Davila and Gustavo Maas to cooperate in the attack on the city.

Vera Cruz was defended by the 21st regiment brought by Colonel Diaz Ordaz from Orizaba, by a part of the 19th which had been stationed in the city, and by the stationary batteries of Vera Cruz consisting of six cannon mounted on one of the forts and a few cannon of little tactical value.

When he arrived before Vera Cruz, General Beltran began to entrench himself around the city. General Felix Diaz had believed that General Beltran would make common cause with him in view of their friendly relations and comradeship, but the steps taken by the commander of the column admitted no doubt as to his attitude in the matter even though the tone of his messages to General Diaz declining to join the revolt was quite affectionate. As each detachment of federals arrived before the city, Felix Diaz would send emissaries to the leaders to try to win them over to his cause; but none of them accepted his overtures. Some replied that if a general revolt embracing the whole army were intended, they would lend their co-operation, but that in no case would they initiate a revolt nor would they lend themselves to isolated movements. Others, like Colonel Jimenez Castro, replied that if any person should again come to him with such overtures or missives he would shoot him down on the spot. The inferior officers who were approached, invariably replied

that they would only act in conjunction with their superior officers. These mediations which were carried on by various persons, some passing themselves as members of the Red Cross, and others as newspaper correspondents, lasted up to the very moment of the fall of the city.

Felix Diaz judged that the underlying note of the replies sent him was really one of adherence, for he believed that the whole army would support him; in fact he was convinced that every division arriving before Vera Cruz would make common cause with him.

The arrangements he made for defense were without rhyme or reason; not even what had happened with Commodore Azueta and Brigadier Hernandez caused him to take precautions; everything was in disorder and confusion. From the Coast of Sotavento he received reports to the effect that there was great enthusiasm for his cause, that if arms and ammunition were sent, an army of nearly four thousand men could be raised to arrest the advance of General Zozaya and his forces. General Diaz replied by ordering these men to proceed immediately to Vera Cruz, an absurdity of which he soon became convinced since it was ridiculous to suppose that a column of such strength could undertake an advance unarmed as it was, without making it not only possible but easy for General Zozaya to intercept and annihilate it with only five hundred well armed men. Convinced of this fact, Diaz ordered that arms be sent by train under a guard commanded by Major Zarate and one of his aides. When the train arrived at its destination it was found that only the officers were on board as the arms had been left behind in Vera Cruz. This naturally served to greatly discourage the revolutionists of Sotavento, and was the cause of desertion of many, who, grasping the situation, realized that with leaders such as those in Vera Cruz, disaster was inevitable. Diaz, in order to obtain funds with which to pay the revolted troops and the people who had joined him, sent for the Collector of Customs, Mr. Azcárraga, and ordered him to turn over to the paymaster all the funds at hand in his office. Mr. Azcárraga pretended that since all his funds were deposited in the bank it would be necessary for him to go to the Custom House to make out the necessary cheque. As a matter of fact, he did go to his office to secure the cheque book, but thereupon, accompanied by his Accountant, he escaped on board the gunboat Morelos which flew the

ensign of the Commander in Chief, Commodore Azueta, and thus made a laughing stock of Diaz.

There remained a few funds in the Treasury of the General Treasurer's Office which General Diaz seized to pay his troops. He even continued to pay the men of the fleet and allowed them to obtain their supplies in the very city itself. In this way intercourse was maintained between the land and naval forces to such an extent that not even Vera Cruz, let alone the general public, could determine whether the naval forces favored the rebels or favored the government.

However, the government itself was fully informed of the true state of affairs because Commodore Azueta had communicated by cable with the Secretary of War. There was also intercourse between the opposing land forces for the messengers of General Diaz had free access to the Federal camp, while at the same time federal spies could enter the city unmolested. Since, as we have stated, overtures were made to superior and inferior officers of the federals up to the very moment of the attack, and since, in spite of the repeated refusals, Diaz never for one instant doubted that the whole army would join him, it is not out of place to ask, why these illusions? Were they merely deceits practised by the emissaries in order always to obtain money, or were they incomprehensible illusions of Diaz? This is a mystery impossible to fathom. But the fact remains that although not one single officer accepted the overtures, there was not one, with the exception of Colonel Jimenez Castro that gave a decisive refusal warranted to convince Diaz that the path he proposed to follow was impossible. These symptoms of wavering were fatal to the government, for they clearly showed that the officers of the federal forces were defending the government only half heartedly, merely from a sense of discipline; but this would easily disappear if a daring man in whom all officers had complete confidence should place himself at the head of the rebellion. The government did not notice this fact or if it did, failed to give it the importance it deserved. When the federal forces placed at his command had assembled, General Beltran notified the residents of the city to betake themselves to the neutral zone which had been designated at the request of the foreign consuls, and on the 22nd of October at six A. M. he began the attack. The attacking force was divided into several columns, one under Colonel Jimenez Castro entering the city

from the north; another under General Agustin Valdez, advancing from the east through the Parque Ciriaco Vazquez; a third under Brigadier Celso Vega entering from the southeast; and the fourth under Brigadier Zozaya, approaching the cemetery from the south. The artillery under Brigadier Gustavo Maas took up a position on the sand dunes commanding the whole city. A body of irregular troops commanded by Don Rafael Tapia, formerly a saddle maker, but promoted to general during the revolution, took up a position between the forces of General Valdez and those of General Vega.

The defenders of the city held positions on high places such as the railroad terminal, the roof of the City Hall, the tower of the Church of the Parroquia, the match factory, as well as on the roofs of the tallest buildings of the principal streets, but they failed to send out scouts and to erect breastworks. In fact, all their actions indicated clearly that they were commanded by a brainless soldier.

At the first exchange of shots, the federal artillery completely silenced that of the rebels and put it out of commission; at the second discharge, the roundhouse at the railroad terminal was abandoned by the rebels. It must be noted here that such a blunder was inexcusable. The roundhouse had been occupied by fifty men whose object no one has ever explained, especially if we take into consideration the fact that just across the way from this building there existed at the time an extensive trench about seven feet wide by four feet deep throughout its length. This trench could have been used as a protection by the sharpshooters had it been necessary to defend this point. Nevertheless, instead of taking advantage of this available defence, the soldiers were shut in the roundhouse which had no loopholes and served only to render the force useless. The assaulting party soon learned this fact and ordered their artillery fire to be aimed at the building which could not have withstood a bombardment. This the defending officers realized so well that at the second discharge they abandoned their position. When Colonel Jimenez Castro, who led the attack against that part of the city saw that the soldiers were abandoning the building, he charged them sharply. Thrown into disorder, they retreated headlong towards the center of the city. General Diaz had left his home on horseback at early dawn to inspect his lines of defense, reaching the railroad terminal just when the attack was

begun. He was still fully under the impression that this was merely a sham and that the attacking party would declare itself for him. In vain did his companions try to persuade him that this was no sham since the bullets were even now beginning to fall near them. Diaz remained firm in his idea that he would be joined by the opposing force and that the attack was nothing but a farce. As the firing grew hotter, his aides forced him to seek shelter in the city hall where they dismounted and proceeded to the roof.* Meanwhile Colonel Jimenez Castro had pursued the fleeing rebels through Main and 5 de Mayo Streets, passing through the Parque Ciriaco Vazquez where he met General Valdez who had advanced to this point without meeting with opposition. General Valdez informed Colonel Castro that in his opinion it was not yet time for an advance; he had not only not encountered the enemy, but had also lost touch with Headquarters and therefore was receiving no orders. Colonel Castro replied that the time was so ripe that he was even then in pursuit of General Diaz, apparently whom he had seen through his field glasses retreating from the Terminal making for the barracks of La Merced. Colonel Castro continued his advance. When he arrived at the corner of Benito Juarez and Main Streets, he divided his forces into two columns. One, under Lieutenant Colonel Ocaranza, he ordered to proceed along Benito Juarez Street to the Customs Warehouses, thence to the right towards the Municipal Building, which it should enter through the north wing of the Prefecture. The other with himself at the head, he led along Main Street towards the barracks of La Merced. As he passed the Portales de Diligencias, he was struck by the fact that he had not been fired on by the troops in the Parroquia nor yet by those on the roof of the Town Hall; but without stopping to investigate the reasons for this, he proceeded at quick step until he arrived at the Cafe Zamora where he encountered an armed detachment of citizens advancing from the opposite direction under command of Major Delgado. This force did not fire, but the two officers met and there ensued a violent altercation which ended by Major Delgado firing at Colonel Castro and at the same time ordering the troops on the roofs to fire. As Colonel Castro fell wounded

*I obtained this information from Mr. Enrique Tejedor Pedroza who was with General Felix Diaz that morning and was captured with him.

he fired pointblank at Major Delgado, killing him instantly. He then attempted to rise, but his horse, also wounded, had him pinned down by one leg making it impossible for him to move. His faithful cornet then ran to his assistance and by raising the dying horse enabled the Colonel to extricate himself. This deed cost him his life, for his body had served as a shield for his Colonel, against the bullets which were poured on him from the roofs. Colonel Castro dragged himself to the Cafe Zamora, miraculously escaping a certain death. His field glasses and his watch had deflected two bullets which had struck him in the skirmish. When the men of the 11th Regiment saw their Colonel fall, they resolutely charged upon the house from which the volleys had been fired and quickly dislodged the enemy. This was really the only encounter of the assault in which any blood was shed, hence the small number of fatalities. In the meantime, Lieutenant Colonel Ocaranza arrived at the Prefecture and ascended to the roof of the building, in which, as we have noted, General Diaz then was. Lieutenant Ocaranza met General Diaz on the staircase as the latter was descending from the roof with several citizens and two aides. "You are my prisoner," exclaimed the federal officer. "How is that?" asked Diaz, "Have you not joined me?" They were in the midst of this dialogue when General Valdez, who had advanced with his forces against the Municipal Hall, entered and commanded Diaz to surrender his arms.

Diaz handed General Valdez a Mauser which he carried slung from his shoulder and a revolver from the holster at his hip. Neither of these arms had been discharged even once. His companions then surrendered as prisoners of General Valdez. The city had fallen into the hands of the government with no effort at all. Why did Diaz persist in his error up to the last moment? The answer is simple. Negotiations were steadily carried on to win over to his cause not only the commanding officers but even their staffs. In fact they were carried on to such a degree that as a column was entering Miguel Lerdo Street on the point of beginning an assault, the leader, an officer in a battalion of irregular troops, was approached with overtures to join the rebels. While the officer hesitated, women of the town surrounded him and urged him earnestly to join the revolt. They tied towels and handkerchiefs around the rifles of the soldiers, all the time hurraing for Felix Diaz.

The poor officer, either utterly confused or else convinced that the same thing had happened with the other columns as no firing had been heard, continued his march accompanied by the shouts of the populace, who flocked to the balconies believing as they saw him march by, that the whole force had joined Felix Diaz. The latter from the roof of the Municipal Hall saw the column advancing with what appeared to be white flags and heard his name acclaimed; he therefore, naturally supposed that his victory was an accomplished fact and gave orders to cease firing. He then descended to receive the federals whom he believed to have come over to his side. The above column had just reached the Plaza de Armas, when, as before stated, Colonel Jimenez Castro with his forces marched past. This explains why he was not greeted with volleys from the tower of the Parroquia nor yet from the roofs of the Municipal Building, and why no one seemed to be aware of what was actually happening. However, when Lieutenant Colonel Ocaranza, with part of the 11th Regiment, reached the Prefecture and observing the actions of the irregulars, sharply called them to order. These soldiers in reality had no interest either way in the struggle, and merely followed their officers like sheep. Therefore, as soon as they saw themselves shut in by General Valdez, they began shouting for Colonel Ocaranza and returned to their allegiance to the government, which they had foresworn but a few moments before. This action, though, was due more to the stupidity of their commander than to their feelings of sympathy for the revolution. These circumstances led to the belief that General Beltran had made use of an unsoldiery stratagem to gain possession of the town. It cannot be denied that the irregular soldiers did actually arrive at the City Hall flying white flags, for this deed was witnessed by many residents of Vera Cruz, but it can be asserted that neither Colonel Jimenez Castro nor Lieutenant Colonel Ocaranza authorized such a deed nor did they avail themselves of it in the capture of General Diaz. This can be testified to by all the residents of Vera Cruz who saw the federal regulars participate in the assault and duly engaging in the fighting which took place. Diaz, as may be seen, had some reason for falling into the error. The replies to his overtures were not decisively negative on the part of the federal leaders, but on the contrary, were evasive and hinted at the possibility of an understanding with him. If General Beltran had listened to the overtures and

had consulted his officers, an agreement favorable to the revolt might have been made because the sympathy of the officers with the exception of Colonels Jimenez Castro and Ocaranza, lay with Diaz. As we have said, they were only deterred by their inherent habit of discipline and their honor as soldiers. As a matter of fact, their real feelings were such that if the call had been formally issued by a leader of prestige, or if they could have seen that the revolt was headed by a true soldier, that very day would have witnessed the fall of the government. Jimenez Castro and Ocaranza would have been powerless to stay the revolt. But General Beltran did not accede to the offers nor did he waver or if he did waver, he concealed it well, for he made no mention whatever of the affair to his staff. His character, quixotic and formalistic, gave his reply to the proposals of Diaz an under current which might indicate a possibility of concurrence with him although his actual words carried a direct refusal. I repeat, though, that in his own mind, there was no thought that the friendly tone of his reply could be open to double construction or could be interpreted as acceding to the proposals submitted; neither his words nor his deeds show even the faintest shadow of treason.

Immediately upon the surrender of General Diaz, all his troops stationed in the Parroquia, in the barracks, and in the match factory, began to disperse and their officers went into hiding to escape the death prescribed by the military code, which they felt sure would be their fate.

As soon as Brigadier Valdez had captured the city and arrested the rebel leader, he notified headquarters, but the Commander in Chief did not march into the city until five o'clock that afternoon. Immediately upon receipt of the news in Mexico City, Captain Gustavo Garmendia,* son-in-law of General Beltran and Military Aide to the President, was sent in a special train with full instructions to convene a drumhead courtmartial at once for the execution of the leaders of the revolt.

On the following day, October 23rd, the necessary orders were issued and on the 24th, the special court was convened, composed of Generals Maas and Vega, and Colonels Zaldo and Figueroa, and presided over by General Rafael Davila. The deliberations of the Court lasted until the 25th at which time sentence of

*Killed when assaulting Culiacan at the head of a constitutional force in October 1913.

death was pronounced against Felix Diaz, Colonel Migoni, Major Fernando Zárate, and Lieutenant Salustio Lima. A sentence of ten years imprisonment was imposed on Captains Manuel Mallen, Hermilo Martinez, and Lieutenant Oscar Camacho. Naval Lieutenant Vicente Solache and Tejedor Pedroza, a civilian, were acquitted.

The friends of Felix Diaz had at once actively sought the District Judge to obtain a writ of Habeas Corpus and a suspension of the proceeding of the Drumhead Courtmartial, which had convened in strict infraction of the Military Code; but it proved impossible to find the Judge of the District of Vera Cruz. As every minute was precious, they appealed to the First District Judge of the City of Mexico. This official, acting against the law, admitted the appeal and by telegraph requested full information from the drumhead courtmartial, but owing to the fact that the President of that Court had given strict orders that under no circumstances were its proceedings to be interrupted, General Dávila did not receive this telegram until sentence had been pronounced and the Court adjourned *sine die*.

Colonel Diaz Ordaz, one of the chief instigators of the revolt and in fact the most seriously implicated of them all, had succeeded in escaping. Protected by some Spanish merchants, he remained concealed in Vera Cruz for a few days. When the police slightly relaxed their vigilance, he left the city disguised as a milkman with a young Spaniard who was willing to undertake the hazardous task of guiding him to Tuxtepec. Unfortunately, they stopped for a drink at a wine shop in the outskirts of the city, where they were recognized by a policeman who immediately notified his superiors. A police officer and a detective were sent in pursuit. When Colonel Ordaz arrived at Boca del Rio, a town near Vera Cruz, he again stopped to quench his thirst and there he was found by his pursuers and arrested together with his companion without offering the least resistance. He was taken to Vera Cruz where he was remanded that very day to the custody of the military authorities for trial by courtmartial in its regular sessions.

Only Captain Ordorica really succeeded in escaping. With one hundred soldiers, he took refuge in the nearby mountains, that is, in the Sierra Negra running from Zongolica to Misantla and separating the central part of Vera Cruz from the coast of Barlovento. Here he continued in rebellion until the subse-

quent revolt in the Ciudadela. A few days after his escape, he was pursued from Vera Cruz by Lieutenant Ocaranza, now a Colonel, commanding the 11th Battalion. Jimenez Castro, former commander of this Battalion, had been sent seriously wounded to the Military Hospital of Mexico City from which he was transferred to the private Sanatorium of Dr. Aureliano Urrutia.

An incident worthy of mention occurred during the siege of Vera Cruz. The prison was in charge of a detachment of the 21st Infantry, and although the Superintendent of the prison placed no confidence in them, he was in no position to have them relieved. He did, however, take all the precautions in his power but even so, he was unable to prevent a revolt which was started by the reserves stationed daily on the northern break-water connecting the city to the islet. These reserves attempted to incite the whole prison. Captain Avalos, commanding the troops, was the instigator, and was ably seconded by Lieutenant Salustio Lima, commanding the reserves as well as the main guard on the islet itself. The shouts and the cries of the soldiers brought General Hernandez to the scene. He imposed himself so forcibly upon them that he prevented an abandonment of the prison, and kept the disturbance from extending to the prisoners inside. He was, however, unable to prevent the escape of Lieutenant Lima and the soldiers under his command. They were fired upon by Commander Azueta from the gunboat Morelos but without success. Lieutenant Lima ran along the break-water carrying his wife in his arms and answering the fire from the fleet and from the fort. He finally reached the city in safety where he received an ovation for the courage and coolness he had displayed. Captain Avalos disappeared nobody knew when nor how.

When sentence was pronounced on the prisoners of war, they were confined in the prison of Ulua where they were well treated and visited daily by their families, friends, and partisans. A launch was specially detailed by the Military Commander for the use of Mrs. Diaz who was permitted to visit her husband every day and at any hour.

CHAPTER XVII.

IN THE MIDST OF REVOLUTION.

From that time the government was confronted by the very serious problem of what to do with the prisoners. The members of the Cabinet held diverse opinions. Some were in favor of death without pity for the culprits, while others were of the opinion that they should wait for the reports from the Courts before coming to any decision. Even the Madero family disagreed within itself. Gustavo Madero favored quick and energetic action, other members held out for clemency. The President as usual, wavered, but decided in favor of reprieve. Don Ricardo del Rio, counsel for the defendants from the very beginning, had as his associates, Don Rodolfo Reyes, Fidencio Hernandez, and Esteban Maqueo Castellanos. Together they began to interpose objections so as to delay proceedings. They obtained the backing of the Supreme Court of the Nation which granted a stay of execution while the writ of Habeas Corpus was decided. The Military Court rendered even more efficient aid by admitting testimony during the review of the proceedings.

It can safely be said that from the moment the government agreed to abide by the law, the defendants were safe, because the time required for preparation of proofs and briefs was long enough to allow the cooling of hot blood and consequently to secure a pardon for the culprits. At the same time, the friends and partisans of Diaz began to make demonstrations in his favor. The most important of these was one made by the women at the urgent request of the leading women of Oaxaca, headed by the worthy Mrs. Castellanos de Maqueo. The ladies sought an interview with the President to ask for the pardon of Felix Diaz. During the interview Madero conducted himself very courteously, but made no promises and committed himself in no way. There was, however, a slight altercation between the President

and one of the young ladies of the committee, unpleasant in itself, but of no subsequent importance.

There was a further demonstration made by the students of the Military Academy when the ladies, on leaving Chapultepec, crossed the academy grounds.

The Big Stick Clique, which could not possibly remain inactive at such a time, organized a demonstration in favor of the immediate execution of the prisoners. The students of the Military Academy met this demonstration with a hostile demonstration for which they were severely reprimanded and commanded not to meddle again in politics. The demonstration of the Big Stick Clique could not have been more injudicious. In fact, it bordered on cruelty. The public indignantly protested against it, thus gaining for the culprits greater sympathy, although among the educated class the predominant feeling was that the government should be inexorable if it wished to maintain discipline in the army. But from the moment the abstract thought and feelings of all were put into concrete form by the deeds of an unpopular group, it gave the act the appearance of a political reprisal, killed all sentiments of justice, and gave rise to feelings of clemency which were being trampled upon by the Porra.

The leniency of the government, or rather, its desire to conduct itself in strict accordance with the law, lent wings to the conspirators. In fact it can safely be said that from about the middle of November there was not a resident of Mexico City who was not in the conspiracy, with the exception of office holders.

Secretary Hernandez was still reposefully trustful of Major Celso Acosta who was thus able to be the link between the conspirators and the rebels of Vera Cruz. Colonel Gaudencio Gonzalez de la Llave who early in September had rebelled against the government and had organized his forces in conjunction with General Higinio Aguilar, was now in possession of part of the State of Puebla. He was also in league with the rebels which Tello had raised in Zongolica, and across the mountains with those of Alvarado and Aguirre Perea had under their command at Tuxtepec. When the revolt at Vera Cruz broke out, Gonzalez de la Llave sent his son to confer with Diaz on the proposition that Diaz should leave the city with all the men he could gather, join forces with those now directly and indirectly commanded by de la Llave and thus form an important nucleus

which properly organized, could impose itself on the whole country. De la Llave's plan was to occupy the roads to Vera Cruz with the forces on which he could at present count, threaten Puebla where he had important partisans, take this city, and then immediately throw all his forces against the Capital which had few if any defenses. For this plan it was absolutely necessary to take advantage of the munitions and arms which had been captured by the rebels in Vera Cruz and which, in his opinion, would be wholly wasted if Diaz shut himself up in Vera Cruz.

Colonel de la Llave could also count with partisans on the coast of Sotavento because these people were indignant at the treatment which had been accorded the candidate of that section, Don Guillermo Pous, at the popular elections, and were anxious to enter a struggle for the overthrow of the government of Madero. There is no shadow of a doubt that had Diaz accepted the plan proposed by de la Llave, a few days would have seen an army of ten thousand men, against which the garrisons of Orizaba, Cordoba, Tehuacan and Puebla would have been totally powerless to offer adequate resistance, and within fifteen days these towns would have fallen into the hands of the rebels. But Diaz was obsessed by the inexplicable idea that under no circumstances should he leave Vera Cruz. He therefore, invariably replied that if he had had the intention to abandon Vera Cruz it would hardly have been worth his while to capture it. He failed to grasp the fact that the fall of Vera Cruz had been rich in results as it had given to the revolution very necessary resources and that there was no object in shutting himself up in the town and exposing it to bombardment or to recapture, as indeed happened, for such a capture only nullified all the sacrifices made and the advantages acquired. When the coup of Vera Cruz was frustrated through the obtuseness of Diaz, the enemies of the government sought a different flag around which to rally, but there was none. General Bernardo Reyes was also a prisoner and though his surrender at Linares did not tend to gain him partisans, there was still a group of his loyal followers who believed that in him lay the only salvation of the country. Headed by Dr. Samuel Espinosa de los Monteros, these men succeeded in forming an alliance with other enemies of Madero.

The partisans of Diaz who was a prisoner in Vera Cruz, formed the principal nucleus. It was judged dangerous to

make any move while the heads of both parties, Diaz and Reyes, were imprisoned in separate prisons, since a move in favor of one might prove fatal to the other; they therefore began to set wheels in motion to effect the transfer of Diaz to Mexico City. In this they were so successful that it appeared as if the government itself and not the partisans of Diaz, was the one who desired this transfer. However, as a precaution, he was lodged in the Penitentiary rather than with Reyes in the Military Prison of Santiago. The partisans of Diaz submitted themselves to the leadership of General Manuel Mondragon who had boasted of his friendship for Diaz and who, because he had been Chief of the Artillery in the War Department for many years, possessed a great many friends among the officers garrisoned in Mexico City.

The Reyistas had obtained aid from General Gregorio Ruiz, a distinguished cavalry officer, who had been at the head of this branch of the War Department. He was, besides, a member of Congress under protection of Constitutional guarantees, and therefore immune from arrest even if found guilty of conspiracy. Communication, or rather the contract between the two leaders, was arranged through Mrs. Sara Baeza de Miranda who pretending to be a niece of General Reyes had daily access to the prison. She in turn communicated daily with General Ruiz through the latter's two daughters who were daily callers at church and only in pressing cases saw her at her home.

Besides these two, there were several other conspiracies in Mexico City at that time, the most important of which was that headed by Alberto Garcia Granados and Carlos G. de Cosio. Both these leaders had an understanding with the rebels in the north and with those headed by Mr. Vazquez Gomez, in league with Zapata and the rebels in the State of Mexico. The Felicistas and the Reyistas were soon able to make an agreement with the group under Garcia Granados but they were unable to come to terms with Vazquez Gomez. Though in sympathy with any movement to overthrow the Madero government, he could not consider any one a better substitute than himself; he, therefore, deliberately prolonged the conferences in no way committing himself. He gave as an excuse for his delay, that it was necessary for him to communicate with his brother at San Antonio, Texas, in order that the latter might renounce the right he claimed to lead the revolt.

The army leaders as a whole were thoroughly dissatisfied. General Peña, a very brusque and harsh man, entirely devoid of military spirit and training, and quite unfit to be a leader, had been promoted to General of Division over the heads of many generals older in the service. As a consequence, he was very unpopular among the soldiers. The President, quite unaware of the real situation, still thought himself the object of a popularity which had been sapped on all sides by the greed and passions of all those around him. Gustavo Madero was gradually falling from the good graces of his brother, the President, and he was daily becoming more unpopular mainly because of the implacable war waged on him on one side by people supported or encouraged by the Secretary of Development, and on the other, by the press.

Gustavo Madero was an intelligent man, but ponderous and slow in thought. He needed time to grasp an argument or to understand a fact, and sometimes it was even necessary to put details before him in the simplest form possible before he could fully grasp the trend of an argument or circumstances, but once in his grasp, he looked very deeply into current events and into sociological phenomena and was able almost infallibly to estimate their importance. He was trustful, but not easily imposed upon; wilful and imperious, but with a wonderful control over his nerves which rarely failed him; he was affable in manner, but at heart perhaps he was somewhat of an egotist, possessed with a great ambition which he strove at all costs to hide. He was, besides, a hardworker, daring and energetic. From the moment of triumph, he was the target for attack, because, since he was surrounded on all sides by the impulsive, the irreconcilable, and the resolute men, he was thought the author, or rather, the instigator, of all deeds of violence promulgated by the Maderistas. As a matter of fact, however, he not only took no part in many of these affairs, but he even strongly disapproved the measures. Thus at the mercy of an anti-government press which afraid to attack the President direct, vented its spleen on his brother, he little by little gained the reputation of a merciless monster, a reputation which he was far from deserving. "El Pais" in its columns had fiercely attacked him even to the point of personal slander, and a foolish friend sought to avenge the offence by a personal assault on Director Sanchez Santos. This attempt gave rise to new slanders

and attacks not against the assailant but against Gustavo Madero, though as a matter of fact he had had no foreknowledge of the intended assault.

In view of the great wave of unpopularity which swept over Gustavo Madero, and in view of the public clamor, even his family became convinced that he was endangering the government and that it would be best for him to leave the country. To this end he was appointed Ambassador to Japan with the fixed purpose of keeping him out of the country for several years. Gustavo Madero fully resigned and submissive to the wishes of his family, began his preparations for the journey which at one and the same time killed all his political ambitions and sounded the death knell of constitutional government.

As soon as the intended journey of Gustavo Madero was made public, all fear of the government was lost. It was believed though the belief was perhaps unfounded, that Gustavo Madero was the only man in the government capable of firmly suppressing any attempt at revolt. As soon as it was perceived that there was a break in which the leader of the Constitutional Progressive Party was to be sacrificed, there was no doubt that he would cease to bring further hatred on himself for a government which was so badly repaying all his sacrifices. Besides, the Big Stick Clique, not bound by any ties, and having no one to suppress its excesses, gave full rein to the passions of those who composed this depraved group. "La Nueva Era," a newspaper founded by Gustavo Madero to defend the government, had frequently changed directors as none came up to the requirements demanded by Gustavo Madero. This also gave loose rein to the intemperate ideas which were the dominating note of those who composed the Constitutional Progressive Party. Up to that time the members themselves had considered Gustavo Madero a weakling because he restrained his friends and energetically forced them to keep certain limits in their attacks. On some occasions, with political acumen, he held his partisans in leash, on others, he incited them to make themselves feared by their adversaries; but he always succeeded in controlling the attacks and in restraining the impetuosity of his friends. When this restraint was removed, that paper became an insane instrument which contributed to a marked degree to the unpopularity of the government. And that even before Gustavo Madero had left the country!

Thus disgraced before the public, former animosity now became open hatred; there was no crime which was not attributed to him, no fraud but he had had a hand in it. Because of this hatred, his reputation for daring was now interpreted as an unscrupulousness in business deals, and his political ambitions as an insatiable desire for power and riches.

It is probable that in his heart he cherished the ambition of succeeding his brother; but that ambition which he strove at all cost to hide was a very clear one for the public and still more reflected the public opinion, which believed that the whole family was fully resolved not to abandon the power it had obtained by conquest. And since the supposedly dominant thought of the entire family could be easily crystallized in Gustavo Madero, the more resolute partisans grouped themselves around him. For this same reason, public opinion saw in him its greatest peril.

The hatred for Gustavo Madero was due not to his character nor to his deeds but to his alleged ambitions for the future; it was feared that he was to become the second of a series of rulers from his family.

Although the material progress of the country during the regime of Porfirio Diaz was undeniable, a struggle had been undertaken to oust him because he had enthroned himself in power, and it could not therefore be tolerated that such a perpetuity should be the patrimony of a family whose first attempt had resulted in national disaster. There we have the reason for the intense hatred which possessed the whole nation against this man who in reality had no power and had filled no position nor did anything which could cause this hatred. The enemies of Gustavo Madero took a new lease of life on learning of the decision to send him out of the country. Their attacks were now directed towards those who it was believed had been appointees of the leader of the Constitutional Progressive Party. Pino Suarez was viciously attacked, but as he was an impassioned man, he retaliated. His chief enemy was Mr. Flores Magon, Secretary of the Interior, with whom he was always at swords points. The fact that their controversy was made public through the newspapers, caused the removal of Magon as Secretary. The tone of Magon's resignation clearly shows the state of mind of those who composed the government.

Flores Magon was succeeded by Don Rafael L. Hernandez, Secretary of Development, whose portfolio was taken over by Bo-

nilla, Secretary of Communication. To this latter position Don Jaime Gurza, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, was appointed. These changes were natural, and it can be said that they were the first logical steps taken by Mr. Madero. As soon as it had been resolved to eliminate Gustavo Madero and his influence in politics, it was natural that the parties who had fought him until they dislodged him should now predominate.

Gustavo Madero began preparations for his journey and was in the midst of them when the events which brought about the fall of the government, his own death and that of Francisco Madero and Pino Suarez took place.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE SECOND MILITARY REVOLT.

Practically everybody surmised that the revolution would break out within a few days. It was generally known that there was a conspiracy, that the soldiers garrisoning the city had been undermined, and that the overthrow of the government was decreed. The meetings of the conspirators were held almost openly at their favorite rendezvous, the candy shop "La Opera." On Saturday, February 8, the artillery officers who had entered most deeply into the plot, had committed the imprudence of bidding their families farewell, at the same time advising them of what was to occur; therefore, it is not at all strange that by noon the Secretary of War, General Angel Garcia Peña, was in full possession of the exact details of the conspiracy engineered by the Ex-Generals, Gregorio Ruiz, and Manuel Mondragon. The Assistant Secretary of War, General Manuel M. Plata, was also advised of the plot, but after a conference between himself and the Secretary, the only precaution deemed necessary by them was to lay the facts in their possession before Lauro Villar, Military Commander of the City.

Just about the same time, Don Rafael Hernandez, Secretary of the Interior, was informed of the plot by the Commander of the Rurales as well as by Don Leopoldo Martinez,* a close friend, who told him what was more or less public knowledge, that on that very night the garrison of the city would revolt with the definite purpose of overthrowing the government and imposing as rulers Generals Bernardo Reyes and Felix Diaz. Mr. Hernandez claims that he immediately notified Mr. Madero, but the real fact was that Mr. Hernandez rebuked his friend for propagating such sensational stories. Indeed he gave not the slightest importance to a report so minutely detailed as to render it creditable. The truth of the matter is that rumors of plots

*That was told to me by Mr. Martinez himself.

had spread so many times that Madero and his advisers thought that this, just like all the rest, would be nothing but a cry of "Wolf." They therefore gave it no importance whatsoever not realizing that this time, and this time alone, the secret service had furnished tangible and trustworthy proofs. The President laughed as usual, and his Secretaries went to their homes as if they knew nothing at all. Only the Vice President, Jose Maria Pino Suarez, was precautious enough not to sleep at home, but spent the night at the house of the mother-in-law of a very intimate friend, Domingo Barrios Gomez. Gustavo Madero received news of the plot while attending a banquet given in honor of Engineer Reynoso, recently appointed Assistant Secretary of the Treasury. It was then about eleven o'clock and he withdrew from the banquet very shortly after to ascertain personally the truth of the rumors in circulation. He hurried away in an automobile to Tacubaya. When he reached the artillery barracks the guard came out to arrest him, but the men were too slow. There was another machine besides his, and in order to surround both, the men forming the guard were obliged to separate into two parties. With the time lost they succeeded only in capturing a plain clothes man whom Gustavo Madero had sent to speak with the officer of the guard. Gustavo Madero, quicker witted than usual, realized as soon as he saw the movements of the guard that they wanted to make him prisoner; he therefore speeded up his machine and escaped for the time being the terrible death which was to be his fate. The detective who had been captured by Lieutenant Vazquez,* was led into the guard house where, beset with questions, or rather cowed by the threats of death, he confessed his mission and the purpose of his journey to Tacubaya as well as the names of his companions.

Immediately upon escaping, Gustavo Madero hurried to Mexico City to tell the Secretary of the Interior and the Inspector General of Police, Don Emiliano Lopez de Figueroa, what was happening. Mr. Figueroa showed his utter incompetence to grapple with such a situation, for he was content merely to confer over the telephone with the Military Commander and with the Secretary of War at the same time sending new agents to investigate facts which Mr. Madero himself had

*Lieutenant Vazquez told me these details.

already laid before him with perfect clearness. The officer of the guard at Tacubaya* when called to the phone by the Second in Command of the City, not only made a reassuring report himself, but even forced the captive detective to call up the Inspector General of Police and completely reassure him. In the meantime, there were serious complications in the artillery barracks. Lieutenant Colonel Aguillon, commander of the 2nd Regiment of Artillery, who was seriously involved in the plot because his regiment, the Military school at Tlalpam, and the 1st Regiment of Cavalry, the life and soul of the revolt, began to waver. He refused to fulfill his promise, hoping to gain time or at least a postponement. This frame of mind was due to the fact that the Military Commander, Lauro Villar, had addressed the officers of several military divisions reminding them of their duties and had ordered them to place their barracks on a war basis. In order to convince him anew it was necessary to send to Dr. Osorio's house in Tacubaya for General Manuel Mondragon who had great influence over the Commander of the 2nd Regiment of Artillery. General Gregorio Ruiz, although warned that an order had been issued for the arrest of anyone involved in the plot, went in person to bring General Mondragon to talk with Aguillon. It was not long before Mondragon was persuaded to leave his hiding place, and with the greatest precaution to betake himself to the barracks of San Diego. Once there, he installed himself in the quarters of the 2nd Regiment of Artillery to await the arrival of Aguillon. In obedience to orders issued by the Military Commander of the City, Aguillon was sleeping in the barracks.

In the meantime, it was decided that Lieutenant Francisco Hajar should go to the commander of the detachment at Cuajimalpa, which was guarding the powder factory of Santa Fe, to order him to join his forces to those of the artillery regiment in Tacubaya.

After Gustavo Madero had told the Inspector General of Police what was happening he returned to Tacubaya because he wished to ascertain exactly what measures were being taken; but before reaching the barracks of San Diego, another detective informed him that an automobile filled with artillery officers was proceeding to Cuajimalpa. Instead of continuing on

*Captain Armiñó.

his way, he started in pursuit of this machine driven by Lieutenant Hajar, but failed to catch up to it owing to the inexperience of his chauffeur.

When the conspirators assembled at the barracks of the 2nd Regiment of Artillery in Tacubaya, the place chosen as a rendezvous, it was perceived that many were missing. Among the arrivals was Don Martin Gutierrez, son of the late General Alejandro Gutierrez, at one time the terror of the Las Cruces Hills, and later commander in chief of the auxiliary brigade which patrolled the roads to Ajusco. Gutierrez was accompanied by a number of trusty men who were entirely familiar with the roads that lead from Santa Fe to the Hills of Ajusco. It was there that the plotters were to escape if their attempt should fall through, a not unlikely event, because, as the plotters well knew, the government had complete details of the conspiracy. As I have stated above, Captain Armiño, commanding the guard in the barracks of Tacubaya, was asked over the telephone by General Villareal, 2nd in Command of the city, what he intended to do with the automobiles which the Inspector General of Police had advised were even then standing in front of the barracks. The officer replied that these machines, filled with fast men and stylish women, were no longer there, for he himself had ordered them to withdraw from the barracks. To make the deceit more complete, the captive detective was forced to call up the Inspector General of Police and give him the same account that Captain Armiño had given the 2nd in command of the city. Major Trias, 2nd in command of the artillery at San Lazaro, arrived half an hour later. He explained that when Messrs. Duhart and Ramon Diaz had appeared at the barracks with orders for him to join the movement, with his men, they had encountered his chief, Lieutenant Colonel Gamboa, who becoming suspicious, had demanded from him an explanation of his conduct. Trias saved himself by denying that he knew the said gentlemen. Besides he not only volunteered to arrest the suspects, but even offered to conduct them himself to Military Headquarters. While on their way to Headquarters, Duhart and Diaz agreed to remain there as prisoners in order to prevent a discovery of the plot; but on their arrival, they were informed that General Villar was ill at his home and had given orders that he should not be disturbed. On leaving Headquarters, Trias, Duhart and Diaz, instead of returning to

the San Lazaro Barracks proceeded to Tacubaya. Trias remained at San Diego while his companions were sent to watch the house of General Gregorio Ruiz to prevent any surprise. In the meantime, General Mondragon and Colonel Anaya, Commander of the 1st Regiment of Cavalry, were arranging the final details. Shortly afterwards, Colonel Anaya proceeded to his barracks. As soon as he arrived there, he gave orders to sound boots and saddles, to have everything in readiness to leave as soon as they were joined by the force due from Santa Fé. Just after Colonel Anaya had left, a message was received from the sentry of the 2nd Regiment of Artillery, advising that three police automobiles had just passed him on their way up. General Mondragon issued orders that they be detained on their return. For this purpose, officers and men were ambushed among the trees along the street. A few moments later, the first was seen returning. As it passed near the ambushed men, Lieutenant Colonel Aguillon shouted: "Get at them!" His officers, with revolvers cocked, forced the occupants to step down from the machines. One of these men was the Commander of the 2nd Regiment of Mounted Police. After the passengers had been disarmed by Lieutenants Peña, Vazquez, and Castillo, and others, they were imprisoned in the barracks of the 2nd Regiment of Artillery. The police surrendered without offering any resistance. About twenty were made prisoners and their arms were distributed among the followers of Don Martin Gutierrez who were unarmed. About 3 A. M. on the morning of Sunday, February 19th, Lieutenant Colonel Aguillon ordered the revolt of his regiment as well as of the 5th Artillery which occupied the same barracks. Although the assistance of the respective heads of these regiments was not relied upon, all the other officers, partisans of the rebellion, had given their promise. Lieutenant Colonel Catarino Cruz, commander of the 5th Artillery had flatly refused to second the movement as had also Major Baldomero Hinojosa in spite of the offers and persuasions of Lieutenant Colonel Aguillon and General Mondragon. They did however agree to retire early to their respective quarters and to lend a deaf ear to anything which might occur in the barracks. Colonel Aguillon personally went through the officers' quarters of both regiments, awakening the officers and inviting them to join him; all accepted with pleasure. Shortly afterwards, he ordered out a battery of service guns which he had previously put aside

for the purpose; distributed ammunition among the soldiers of the 2nd and 5th regiments, assembled them in the main yard of the barracks and in the presence of General Mondragon and all the officers and civilians, he harangued them, explaining the object of the uprising and the great benefits, which, according to him, would accrue to the country by the fall of the government of Madero, which was sowing ruin and desolation. The harangue of Lieutenant Colonel Aguillon aroused the soldiers who broke into cheers for the national army and their respective regiments. These ignorant men were going into danger charmed by the voice of their chief probably unaware of the transcendent importance of their act and the sacrifices they were about to consummate.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE DIE IS CAST.*

To one of the conspirators, Captain R6mero Lopez, was left the task of inciting to revolt his own Machine Gun Regiment. He was to be in readiness to unite it as soon as he received due notice, with the column proceeding from Tacubaya under Generals Ruiz and Mondragon, and together they were to liberate General Reyes from the Military Prison, and Felix Diaz from the Penitentiary. On the eve of the outbreak, however, Captain Lopez was in such a nervous state that he could not wait for the signal, but assembled his regiment in conjunction with his officers at four o'clock in the morning and proceeded to the Liberty Street Barracks where he found that the other officers had already assembled their men. The commandants of these regiments had, without exception, refused to enter into the plot but had agreed to retire to their quarters and turn a deaf ear to the acts of their subalterns. As soon as these two forces had united, they started for the prison of Santiago where General Reyes was confined, taking with them two cannon and fourteen machine guns from the Barracks of San Cosme; at the prison they were joined by Major Zozaya who was leading the horse of General Reyes.

It had been impossible to count on the support of the Commander of the Military Prison, Colonel Miguel Mayol, whose attitude had been such as to force the plotters to desist from further attempts to obtain his co-operation. The under officials of the prison did, however, lend themselves to the plot; these, together with the Captain of the Guard, were awaiting anxiously the arrival of the conspirators to give the coup d' 6tat. The first step taken on arriving was to train a cannon on the main gate

*I obtained the facts related in this chapter from several sources, but chiefly from Dr. Espinosa de los Monteros, Mr. Mallen and other officers.

and another on the quarters of Colonel Mayol. Captain Romero Lopez then entered the prison and reappeared shortly accompanied by General Reyes, already in uniform and enveloped in his military cape. With him were several officers, who had also been prisoners and about two hundred soldiers, besides a large part of the prison guard who from that moment joined the rebels. The forces from Tacubaya entered the square just as General Reyes was leaving the prison.* Before leaving, General Mondragon suggested the advisability of executing Colonel Mayol who had already been made prisoner in his quarters by the prison guard itself, but General Reyes opposed such an act, in consequence, the commander was merely detained under guard while the plot was carried to its conclusion.

The force was further augmented at this point by the timely arrival of a detachment of citizens, some on foot, some on horseback, and others in automobiles, and organized by Don Samuel Espinosa de los Monteros, by Rodolfo Reyes, Ramon Cosio Gonzalez, and several others. The whole force with General Reyes commanding, now set out for the Penitentiary to liberate General Diaz and not till day was breaking did they reach their destination. The precaution was again taken of training the guns on the gates, and a delegation was sent to release Diaz. The head of the prison Octaviano Liceaga, had in no way compromised himself in the plot, but not so his sons, who had promised to set the prisoner free as soon as the conspirators should reach the Penitentiary.

When the rebels appeared, one of the sons of Liceaga told Diaz that his friends awaited him outside and that he could now leave his cell. Although aware of the movement on foot, the General had not been told the exact date for his execution, and fearing at that moment a scheme to kill him under the pretense of an attempt to escape, he became suspicious and refused to budge unless advised by a mature man rather than a mere boy. The head of the prison saw in this hesitation a means of saving himself from all responsibility in case the plot should fail and immediately began to place difficulties in the way of the release of the prisoner. He was unceremoniously pushed aside by Generals Reyes and Mondragon who then entered the prison. The presence of these two leaders at once convinced both the head of the prison and General Diaz who then abandoned his cell and

*Some hours later the prison caught fire.

in civilian dress joined the column. As he came out, a young lady delegated by her friends presented him with a bunch of violets which he placed in his hat. The march was then begun towards the National Palace. Early that morning, the Battalion from the National Training School, together with all the other students, had left Tlalpam under the officers of instruction, Escoto, Garcia Armiño, and Zurita, and had joined the column at Santiago. The infantry of the school made the trip on a train bound for Xochimilco but which the cadets had seized and compelled to take them to Mexico City, arriving before the National Palace at about 4 a. m. as I shall detail in another chapter. With them were the boys from the Cavalry School. In a wagon seized for the purpose near Tlalpam, two machine guns used in the school for demonstration purposes, had been brought to the city.

After the two heads of the revolt had been liberated, and as the column was about to set out from the penitentiary, several of these Training School boys suddenly appeared on the scene to give warning of what had been done at the Palace by General Villar. On receipt of this news, the 1st Regiment of Cavalry, Colonel Anaya commanding, was sent ahead at the double quick with General Gregorio Ruiz, to prevent if possible the National Palace from remaining in the hands of the government forces. While General Ruiz and Colonel Anaya with the 1st Cavalry, hastened towards the Palace, General Reyes duly organized the remaining troops into column formation and sounded the march. As they reached the Calle de la Moneda,* they were joined by other students who had fled from the Palace when General Villar had taken possession and these confusedly related the occurrence. General Mondragon was of the opinion that the advance should be halted and a new plan of attack devised, but General Reyes, who was highly excited, would not listen to reason, but judged that with the troops at his command, no serious resistance would be offered him. His son, Rodolfo Reyes, attempted to dissuade him but he replied, "If I back down at this time, everybody will call me a coward as happened at Linares. The die is cast." So saying, he spurred his horse, threw aside his cape and resumed the advance, turning the corner of the Calle de la Moneda and making straight for the Palace. When he arrived at the corner, the cornet stationed there by General Villar began to sound the salute. General Reyes, firmly believing that

*At the north side of the National Palace.

the salute denoted his complete success advanced without suspicion, accompanied by Don Martin Gutierrez, Dr. Espinosa de los Monteros, Don Emilio Perez de Leon, who was on foot and carried a rifle, Captain Cervantes, and Don Enrique Fernandez Castello.

Generals Mondragon and Felix Diaz remained in "Licenciado Verdad" Street in command of the reserves.

General Velazquez who had also joined the revolt, was injured by being thrown from his horse which shied at the first discharge. He was assisted into one of the automobiles at hand by Lieutenant Colonel Ortiz Monasterio, and then, accompanied by Rodolfo Reyes, and Cosio Gonzalez, left the scene shortly after the firing had become general.

When the civilians who had received strict orders from General Reyes to remain at the corner of Moneda Street until he had taken possession of the Palace, saw him passing between the double files, they began to advance little by little but dispersed at the first volley. The advance guard of the column commanded by General Reyes, composed of cavalry of the Training School, reached the southern corner of the Palace without meeting opposition; to the rear of General Reyes came a detachment of artillery with four pieces commanded by Captain Jose Tapia, and to the rear of this came regiments of artillery on foot, but these did not reach the firing zone as they were obstructed by civilians. The latter had thrown the whole column into disorder by entering the double file* and finding themselves unthinkingly brought up against the forces of the 20th Infantry which was drawn up at the north of the Central Gate. The ex-prisoners who had been set free from the Military Prison and the prison guard who had abandoned their post, brought up the rear together with the artillerymen of the Machine Gun Regiment.

*At the west side, the 1st Regiment of Cavalry and the loyal troops at the east.

CHAPTER XX.

THE 9TH OF FEBRUARY.*

The Military Commander of the City, General Lauro Villar, had received a warning a few days previous to February 9th, concerning an attempt to incite the rebellion against the government by several officers, especially those of the Artillery Regiments and he had transmitted this news to the Secretary of War. At the same time, he had called together the Commandants of the several regiments and had cautioned them to keep a strict watch over their staffs, especially those officers who were suspected of complicity. On the afternoon of Saturday, February 8th, the Secretary of War, who as I have said previously, had received notice from General Villar of the proposed plan, sent for the Military Commander and told him that the War Department had just received the very warning which he had communicated to them eight days before, and advised him to take all precautions necessary to prevent possible surprise.

The Military Commander called the Secretary's attention to the fact that he had warned him of the danger some days previous and had reported at the time that there were insufficient forces in the city to control a military outbreak if any should occur. There were only two bodies in the garrison, the 20th Battalion, which he did not trust but which enjoyed the full confidence of the President, and the 1st Cavalry, Colonel Anaya commanding, which was fully trusted by Secretary Garcia Peña. Besides, there were a few detachments from various regiments, composed entirely of recruits tactically useless should a crisis arise.

On his return to Headquarters, General Villar called his regimental leaders, cautioned them to keep strict watch and ordered that all troops be called to quarters and held in readiness against any alarm. He further instructed the officers to remain in their respective barracks until further orders.

*The facts related in this chapter were obtained from the official and from private sources.

General Villar was suffering from an injury to his leg which prevented him from walking and therefore he did not sleep that night at Military Headquarters, but ordered his second in command, General Villareal, to remain there all night and to advise him by telephone of any new developments.

At 2 A. M. the Inspector General of Police telephoned General Villar to inform him that word had been received to the effect that two suspicious looking automobiles were near the Barracks of the 2nd Regiment of Artillery in Tacubaya. General Villar thereupon telephoned orders to his second in command to find out what was going on at Tacubaya and to report by telephone the results of his investigations. General Villareal spoke with the Captain of the Guard who informed him that, in fact, several automobiles had gone past the barracks, but that there was nothing new and that things were quiet.

At 4 A. M., the Inspector General of Police again telephoned, this time to notify the Commander that the 2nd and 5th Batteries and the 1st Cavalry had left their barracks under the leadership of ex-Generals Gregorio Ruiz and Manuel Mondragon. General Villar immediately dressed and literally dragging himself, as his left leg was completely paralyzed, sallied out for the Palace. At a short distance from his home he found a carriage and ordered the driver to make all speed for the National Palace, but upon reaching the corner of Flamencos Street, a party of cadets from the Training School, who were convoying two machine guns on a wagon, held up the driver, and taking no notice of his fare commanded him to keep going and not to stop in front of the Palace "because one of his horses might be killed." General Villar managed to remain unseen and clearly perceiving the condition of affairs, ordered his driver to make for the Portal de las Flores. As soon as the Cadets of the Training School were out of hearing, he countermanded these directions with new ones to proceed through the gardens of the Zócalo, and passing in front of the Palace, he perceived that the main entrance was open as was also the Entrance of Honor, and that the guard had been called out. He recognized the uniform as that of the students of the Training School and knowing of the movement on foot, at once understood that the Palace was already in the hands of the rebels. General Villar thereupon ordered his coachman to convey him to the Barracks of St. Peter and St. Paul, where the 20th Regiment was quartered.

Upon arriving near the corner of the barracks, he left the carriage, moving very slowly, and dragging himself along, assisted by a passing Indian whose aid he had requested, he approached the barracks and announced himself at the door. He ordered the assembly of the troops, that is, of the recruits who were the only men in barracks because the regiment was doing duty in the city. When they assembled he directed Colonel Morelos, commander of this battalion, to proceed with his force to the Palace, to enter through the barracks of the Engineers and at all costs to dislodge the rebels who had taken possession of the residence of the Federal authorities.

Assisted by two soldiers, he then made his way to the barracks of Teresitas, where the main body of the 24th was quartered, and he at once ordered it out. Here he found his second in command, General Villareal, who upon hearing what had occurred, had immediately left the Palace in search of the Military Commander, and not finding him at his home, was seeking him in the various barracks. General Villar ordered General Villareal to proceed at the double quick to take command at the Ciudadela in order to prevent any surprise by the rebels. He himself at the head of the rookies of the 24th,* set out for the barracks of the Engineers. The brave soldier forgot his physical pain, and did not stop to consider the meagreness of the force at his command nor the strength of the enemy he was attacking. His only thought was to do his duty and to retake the Palace before the city was awake. In those moments, General Villar embodied the spirit of the Mexican army, serene, tranquil, immutable, even to the point of heroism, and without fear or hesitation. In the barracks of the Engineers, he found a detachment of fifteen men who had arrived at the capital that very Saturday, and he ordered them to arm themselves and follow him. He forced his way into the Palace, battering down the door which led from the barracks. Here he divided his force into three detachments; thirty men of the 24th under their Major, were sent to the main entrance; twenty-two men also of the 24th, under a Captain, were sent to gain possession of the Entrance of Honor; the fifteen cavalrymen under the Aide-de-camp of the Military commander, Captain Malagamba, who had joined him on the way, brought up the rear as a reserve for

*General Villar had commanded the 24th for many years and was revered by officers and men.

both advances. General Villar himself led the three detachments. In order to avoid the alarm which would be given by rifle shots, all three forces, with fixed bayonets, fell simultaneously upon the two guards of the Palace, at the cry of the Military Commander "Surrender and silence!" The guard at the Entrance of Honor, the first to be attacked, as it was the nearest, surrendered at once, as did also the one stationed at the Main Entrance. This was accomplished without a single shot and with no casualties of any kind. Officers and men were disarmed, conducted to the stables of the Palace, and with the students of the training School, were held prisoners there under the immediate supervision of General Felipe Mier who had opportunely arrived at Military Headquarters to offer his services. The fifteen cavalrymen were placed as a guard over the prisoners, and the remaining fifty-two were so distributed as to prevent any possible surprise. At that moment Colonel Morelos made his appearance with the rookies of the 20th. As ordered by General Villar, Colonel Morelos had arrived at the Barracks of the Engineers, but aware of the number of the enemy in the Palace, he judged the enterprise foolhardy. He therefore decided to enter the National Palace from the roof of the adjoining building, the War Department Building; he met with no resistance on the roof of the Palace, entered the building with his force and joined General Villar. The latter immediately took the necessary precautions to resist the attack which undoubtedly would be made by the forces even then marching upon the Palace under Generals Reyes, Mondragon, and Felix Diaz. After he had taken the Palace, General Villar ran across Gustavo Madero who had been imprisoned in the guard house at the main entrance, and General Angel Garcia Peña, Secretary of War, who said he also had been made prisoner by the rebels and had even been wounded in the neck at the time of his capture. Gustavo Madero upon returning from Tacubaya, had gone to the Palace, not aware that it was then in the hands of the rebels. When he approached, no one opposed him, but as soon as he passed the sentries, he was surprised and made prisoner by the Training School Cadets, and on account of the suddenness of the attack, he was unable to offer any resistance. The Secretary of War had gone to the Palace when the Inspector General of Police had telephoned the news to him as well as to the Military Commander. On his arrival he met with no opposition but as he was ascending the

stairs on his way to the office of the Military Commander, he met a group of cadets who were searching for General Villar. He was immediately recognized and fired upon by one of the boys, but the bullet missed its mark and shattered a window. A piece of flying glass struck the Secretary, cutting his neck and spattering blood all over the front of his shirt. General Peña retreated quickly and favored by the darkness of the corridors of the Palace, (all lights had been put out) he was able to reach the offices of the War Department where he remained with the Assistant Secretary, General Manuel M. Plata while the events I have related were occurring. When Colonel Morelos entered through the roof of the War Department wing, the two secretaries became aware of what had occurred, whereupon General Peña commanded an automobile and went with all speed to Chapultepec to report to the President. The Assistant Secretary went to his offices, and Gustavo Madero departed in his automobile.

General Villar, as soon as he gained complete possession of the National Palace, divided his small force of only one hundred and fifty men into several detachments. General Felipe Mier with thirty men was placed as a guard over the prisoners who had been disarmed and the Training School men who had remained in the Palace after its capture by the rebels; in all, there were nearly three hundred prisoners. To this detachment was given the further duty of guarding the entrance to the Palace from the Barracks of Engineers. The detachment from the 20th Infantry, commanded by Colonel Morelos, was stationed at two meters distance from the sidewalks of the Palace and to the north of the center entrance in double file, the first stretched prone on the ground, and the rear rank crouched on one knee. The fifty-two recruits of the 24th Infantry, commanded by the major of that regiment, took up their station to the south of the center entrance but on the sidewalk in the same formation, the first rank prone, the rear kneeling. The Military Commander with his aide, Captain Malagamba, placed himself in the center, between the two detachments, with two machine guns. He ordered that not a shot be fired until he himself gave the word. As there were no artillerymen to handle the machine guns, the soldiers who seemed the most capable, were put in charge of them. By this formation, General Villar with the fifty-two men in whom he had entire confidence purposed to defend the position he had so gallantly won, and at the same time to keep an eye on and

control the detachment of the 20th Infantry. He feared that the latter would attempt to take sides with their rebel comrades especially if the fortunes of the fray should seem to be against the loyal troops. Shortly after the troops were in position, the advance of the rebels, two squadrons of the 1st Cavalry under the command of General Gregorio Ruiz and Colonel Anaya, appeared. The force advanced in columns, rifle in hand, as though executing a manoeuver. As they reached the Palace, General Ruiz halted at twenty paces distance from the loyal troops and gave the order to form into line of battle. The opposing forces were now face to face, but notwithstanding the fact that the advance guard outnumbered his handful by more than two to one, the Military Commander did not for one moment falter. In an imperious tone he commanded the advance to halt. When General Ruiz saw the stoicism with which General Villar was awaiting developments, he thought that he might be able to win him and the small force at his command to the rebel cause. With this object he advanced as far as the center entrance to confer with him. General Villar advanced a few paces to meet him but did not step beyond his own lines. In the colloquy that ensued, General Ruiz reminded his comrade of the friendship he had always had for him, showed him the absolute futility of the steps he was taking on account of the great strength of the column marching against the Palace, and pointed out to him the damage which the government of Madero had done to the country. He then proposed that he surrender this position and join the rebels, and made him enticing offers in the name of the leaders of the rebellion. General Villar listened attentively and slowly enticed his opponent until they were directly between the detachments of the 20th and 24th stationed in front of the Palace. When the General finished speaking, Villar with his left hand grasped the rein of the General's horse and his only reply was "You are my prisoner. A soldier since the French intervention, I have never yet been a traitor. I have always served faithfully and I will not stain my service record for any price nor for any man. It is not for me to count the enemy, my only duty is to defend the post entrusted to my honor, and this I will defend to the death. It is not for us as soldiers to criticize the acts of the government; our duty is to defend the constituted powers. Dis-mount immediately and do not force me to fire upon you." Still holding the reins, he ordered that the two machine guns be train-

ed on the rebel general. General Ruiz made an attempt to draw the revolver he carried in his saddle holster, but General Villar in a threatening tone said "Hands up and dismount. As your superior, I command you to get down." General Ruiz obeyed, and surrendered. General Villar was here informed that the main body of the troops of the rebels were now in sight. At that moment General Cauz, head of the Cavalry Division of the War Department, arrived at the Palace, and General Villar who had no one else to whom to deliver the prisoner, handed him over to General Cauz, saying "I hold you responsible for this man, General; I entrust him to your honor as a soldier." He then returned immediately to the front. General Reyes who was now advancing had as his vanguard a squadron of Training School cadets. Except for two civilians, and a few horsemen immediately behind him, he was, however, practically alone when he entered between the double file formed by Villar's men and the 1st Cavalry Regiment. As he advanced, he was joined by man after man and by the time he passed the door of the center entrance to the palace, he was surrounded by a number of armed men some on foot, some mounted. He was followed by the 20th Infantry, the 1st Cavalry, the 2nd and 5th Batteries, by a part of the regiment of police and by a squadron of mounted police. It was estimated that Reyes, Mondragon and Diaz at that time commanded nearly three thousand men; four hundred and fifty of the 1st Cavalry; two hundred Training School cadets; one hundred and eighty men of the 20th Infantry; and four hundred and fifty men of the Batteries; eleven hundred made up the machine gun battalion, the battalion of police, and the civilians raised by Dr. Espinosa de los Monteros, Mr. Martin Gutierrez, Mr. Fidenicio Diaz Lopez, Mr. Jose Bonales Sandoval, and a Mr. Ramirez, and several others. To oppose this force, well supplied with ammunition, for it had four batteries of guns belonging to the 1st, 2nd and 5th Batteries, and all the machine guns belonging to the regiment of that name, the Military Commander could count only on one hundred and twenty men, two machine guns, and sufficient ammunition for ten minutes fighting. General Villar measured the overwhelming magnitude of the undertaking but did not hesitate. Turning to the officers near him he said "Boys, if we are fated to die, let us die defending the honor of our Army." Shortly before the arrival of the main column at the Palace, a body of Training School cadets who, as scouts,

had advanced between the force of General Ruiz and the main body, notified Reyes of the position of the troops in front of the Palace and of what had happened to General Ruiz. This occurrence was witnessed by all the troops commanded by this hapless man and by Colonel Anaya. General Reyes gave the matter no importance whatever and to the comment of General Mondragon that he thought the enterprise dangerous owing to the attitude of the Military Commander, Reyes replied "General Villar can not with his limited force resist the column we ourselves command, and besides there is no doubt that when he sees us he will join us. If he does not, we will wipe him out." Notwithstanding the assurances of General Reyes, neither Mondragon nor Diaz held this view and the column was therefore split. These two leaders remained in Licenciado Primo Verdad Street with the police and a few civilians to await there the result of the venture of General Reyes. The latter proceeded with his forces down Moneda Street, turned to the left and immediately faced the Palace. Without halting, he advanced between the double file twenty-five paces apart, formed by the loyal troops on one side and on the other by the 1st Cavalry, lined up by General Ruiz. Upon arriving opposite the door that General Villar was guarding, the latter ordered them to halt, but General Reyes continued to advance for about fifteen paces to the south of this door. Here death overtook him while he was addressing the multitude that was following him and cheering him. Owing to the very limited quantity of ammunition, General Villar had given strict command that no one fire until he himself gave the word. His intention evidently was to allow the leaders of the revolt to enter and then if possible to arrest them as he had arrested General Ruiz. As a last resort, he planned to kill the leaders, rightly judging that their death would put an end to the revolt and suffocate it with the minimum bloodshed. When General Reyes passed through the Center Entrance and did not halt although commanded by General Villar to surrender, the men who followed him, seeing that no resistance was offered, fell upon the soldiers of the 20th stationed as I mentioned above, to the north of the Palace. As the latter were mere recruits under Colonel Morelos, they were easily driven back towards the Palace. Here General Villar, pistol in hand, checked their retreat, and though the command was not actually given, the loyal troops opened fire in sheer self-defense against the assault. The

firing immediately became general. The men of the 24th were forced to fall back to the entrance of the Palace where the Military Commander was personally directing the handling of the two machine guns at his command. At the first volley, General Reyes had fallen shot through the brain and in the legs. The loyal troops reformed at the command of their superior officer and presented such a stubborn resistance that the rebels were forced to retreat shielding themselves behind the columns of the Gates of Las Flores and La Diputacion, and finally were completely dispersed.

General Villar ordered his troops into the Palace and put General José Delgado who had just arrived, in charge of the two machine guns to guard the Center Entrance. With the remaining soldiers who had replenished their ammunition by appropriating that taken from the imprisoned guard and cadets, he at once proceeded to the roof of the Palace from where he could better defend his position. He believed that the defeated column would advance against the Palace at once as it was known that his supply of ammunition was practically exhausted. But by the time General Villar reached the roof, the rebels had vanished. He organized sentries to patrol this height and he himself descended to take account of the fatalities resulting from the fray.

The loyal troops had suffered heavily; twelve of the recruits of the 20th had been killed and sixteen wounded; Colonel Morelos, Lieutenant Anaya, and three other officers had been killed, and all the surviving officers of the battalion were wounded; five men of the 24th had been wounded and the Military Commander himself was suffering from a shattered collar bone. His aide, Captain Malagamba, had received four wounds. The rebels, on the other hand, had lost General Reyes; and nearly two hundred men, dead or wounded, lay on the sidewalks. Many of these were dressed as civilians and it was therefore impossible to determine whether they were innocent bystanders or members of the rebel host. The surgeons who had arrived on the scene, attempted to remove General Villar in order to dress his wound properly for he was completely spattered with blood, but the punctilious leader would not, and in fact did not, abandon his post until he was relieved of his charge by order of the President himself.

When President Madero arrived at the National Palace

two and one half hours after the battle, General Villar was still standing guard over the main entrance, ready to repel further attacks by the rebels. Here he received the President who greeted him with the words "What a great man you are, General." "I have only done my duty," replied Villar. "But you are wounded," exclaimed Madero. "I have retaken this place, which is more important," rejoined the Military Commander. "Turn over your command to General Delgado and come with me," said the President dismounting from his horse. He took General Villar by the arm, led him to the elevator and thence to the reception rooms of the Palace where he submitted to treatment for the first time.

While he was being prepared for treatment, the Secretary of War said to him "Lauro, by order of the President, I have appointed Victoriano Military Commander of the City while you are convalescing," and he pointed to General Huerta. General Villar made an effort to sit up, and turning to General Huerta, said, "Swear on your honor that you will defend the constituted government to the last cartridge." As General Huerta hesitated and did not give an immediate answer, General Villar twice again exhorted him to swear and he finally answered, "Yes, brother, calm yourself, I do so swear." General Villar, almost weeping in his excitement, feebly murmured, "to the last cartridge, to the last cartridge," and fell back in a dead faint.

The surgeons who examined him declared that the wound was dangerous and ordered him to go home immediately as he was unfit for further duty. Mr. Madero then formally ordered General Victoriano Huerta who had arrived at the Palace with him, to take over the post of Military Commander of the City. After being relieved of his command, General Villar requested to be taken to the Military Hospital. "You will be better off in your home," said Madero. "Yes," replied General Villar, "but I must go where my men go, I was wounded with them and with them I should be cared for." He was taken in an automobile to the Military Hospital. His condition on his arrival greatly worried his physicians because he was in a state of complete collapse. The stress he had been under had made him forget for the moment the pain in his leg, and the loss of blood he had suffered put him in grave peril of death.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE LAST OVATION.*

After General Villar regained the National Palace, General Garcia Peña, as I have said before, took an automobile and hastened to the Castle of Chapultepec to report to the President. Mr. Madero decided to go to the city at once, escorted by the Cadets of the Military Academy and other forces which had been ordered by telephone to proceed immediately to Chapultepec. The Cadets of the Military Academy had not as yet breakfasted and as it was Sunday, they were making arrangements to leave when they received orders to supply themselves with arms and ammunition and assemble by companies on the parade ground of the Academy. As soon as they had assembled, the President informed them that there had been a mutiny in Mexico City, which had been suppressed and as the Training School men had unfortunately participated in it, he wished to enter the city surrounded by the Cadets of the Military Academy. That as there was no enemy, their entry would be in fact a triumphal procession, and it was his desire that the Cadets being educated at Chapultepec should take part, for he had entire confidence in their loyalty to him. When the Commandant had added a few words of praise and encouragement to the students, the President mounted his horse and set out from the Castle for the City of Mexico without giving the students time to breakfast. When they reached the Forest of Chapultepec, a body of firemen waiting there under arms, fell in as an advance guard. The rear was brought up by a detachment of foot and mounted police who had arrived with the Inspector General of Police. Major Emiliano Lopez Figueroa. In the center of the line of march was Madero surrounded by the Cadet Battalion led by the Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Victor Her-

*The facts set forth in this chapter were related to me by several cadets who were my wards.

andez Covarrubias. The advance was slow, for the line march-
ed cautiously along the full length of the Calzada de la Reforma,
and as it passed the Cafe Colon, General Huerta joined it.
When the line reached the Statute of Charles IV, it turned into
the Avenida Juarez to the spot where the National Theatre is
in course of construction. Here they encountered the fugi-
tives routed at the Plaza de Armas who, led by Captain Jose
Tapia, in a semblance of order were proceeding to the Ciuda-
dela in an attempt to rejoin the main column. As the two for-
ces met, shots were exchanged and the forces under Tapia re-
treated through the Avenida del Teatro Nacional, thence through
the streets of Hombres Ilustres, and came up with the remainder
of the rebels in the gardens of San Fernando. In the confusion
that followed the encounter, the companions of President Ma-
dero, fearing that the affair might assume serious proportions,
forced Madero to seek shelter in the Daguerre Studios* where
he remained under the escort of ten Cadets of the Military Aca-
demy commanded by Sergeant Garcia Peña, and of fifteen
mounted police, the only ones remaining of the detachment
which had left Chapultepec as the President's guard. The
rest of the escort was divided into three columns which pro-
ceeded respectively through the Street of 5 de Mayo, San Fran-
cisco Avenue, and the Avenue 16 de Septiembre, and advanced
in battle line upon the Plaza de Armas under the command of
General Huerta.

As the firemen and police arrived at the corner of Profesa
Street, they were fired upon from the roofs of the building "La
Mexicana" and probably also from the spires of the Cathedral.
The Cadets, however, were not fired upon. When some of the
policemen and firemen fell wounded, the rest turned and fled
headlong down the Avenida Isabel la Catolica, leaving the Ca-
dets without a rear guard. The mounted police had already
deserted almost to a man, some at the corner of Rosales Street,
and others at every cross street on the line of march, so that only
fifteen remained when the advance halted at the Avenida del
Teatro Nacional. Most of the deserters entered the ranks of the
forces under Mondragon and Diaz, which shortly afterwards
arrived as above mentioned, at Rosales Street.

*The same place where General Reyes took refuge when
threatened by the Big Stick Clique, as related in Chapter X.

Generals Mondragon and Diaz were informed in Licenciado Primo Verdad Street of the death of General Reyes and instead of reinforcing the attackers and thus forming a party which the defenders could not have resisted through lack of ammunition, they proceeded at top speed through the streets of Relox and Mina towards the Ciudadela. They reached Rosales Street but a few seconds after the President and his escort, who were just at that moment arriving at the high ground where the National Theatre is in the course of construction.

When the vanguard of the column under Mondragon and Diaz appeared, some sympathizers of the revolt carried the news to Captain of Artillery Jose Tapia, who with his reorganized force of rebels was passing through the Avenida 5 de Mayo on his way to the Ciudadela. Thinking that he would be supported by the rebels in Rosales Street and thus catch the President and his party between two fires, Tapia made an attack on them in the Avenida del Teatro Nacional. But either because he perceived that he was receiving no support from the forces in Rosales Street, or possibly because he wished to avoid confronting the Cadets, he withdrew through the Avenida de Hombres Ilustres and rejoined the main column. The Cadets of Chapultepec continued their march through the three main streets of the capital until they reached the Plaza de Armas. Here again reigned confusion, which might have had very serious results since either the commandant of Cadets as well as the other officers leading the brigade failed to give correct orders, or the orders given were misunderstood. For whatever reason it may have been, the three columns entered the Plaza de Armas with trumpets sounding the attack. The troops at the National Palace, were momentarily expecting an attack from the rebels under Mondragon and Diaz as soon as the latter should learn from the defeated contingent of the scarcity of ammunition among the defenders, and consequently, when they saw the advance of the Cadet Battalion, of whose arrival they had not been notified, they prepared to resist. Fortunately, Sergeant Padilla, a Cadet officer, took the situation in at a glance and ordered the trumpeters to sound "cease firing" and to give the bugle call of the Military Academy. Those inside the Palace recognized the call and immediately ceased firing, but not before an officer of Cadets had been killed. There were no further fatalities among the cadets for they quickly

sought shelter behind the pillars of the Portal de Mercaderes and advanced pillar to pillar, until an officer and three men who issued from the Palace for the purpose of reconnoitering, found that the arriving forces were friends.

Upon arriving at the Palace, some of the Cadets formed into a cordon surrounding the dead still stretched on the pavement to await the arrival of the Hospital Corps; others were placed as sentries on the side streets leading into the Plaza de Armas, and others were sent to the roofs of the City Hall which could command the square in case of a new attack. After all these precautions had been taken, Mr. Madero was notified, and he immediately proceeded on horseback to the Palace, receiving an ovation all along the line of march. This ovation was to be his last. He entered the Palace on that fateful occasion amid the plaudits of a populace with whom he had always liked to rub elbows, whom he had always liked to flatter, and from whom he had always received proofs of esteem.

Shortly afterwards, the assembly was sounded. The Cadets of the Military Academy were concentrated in the street de la Acequia, and some detachments were stationed inside the Palace to act as sentries where most needed. These latter were shortly relieved by a body of Rurales who had arrived from the Villa de Guadalupe, and by the soldiers of the 20th who had been held as prisoners but who were now put under arms with new officers. Thus scattered at their posts, the Cadets of the Military Academy went without food until six o'clock in the afternoon, without a moment's rest, with no apparent interest in their welfare on the part of the Commander who had exposed them to a participation in a fratricidal strife, although his main duty it was to care for these youths, with whose education he had been entrusted. It is well to recall here that at the time of the revolt of the Ciudadela in the year 1870, General Sóstenes Rocha in his official report expressed himself in the following terms: "There was also a noteworthy enthusiasm shown by some of the students of the Military Academy who were on leave and who came to me to ask for arms. But I ordered them to present themselves to you at the Palace because I did not think it right that the blood of this precious youth should be shed so early." People in the neighborhood of Acequia Street, pitying the situation of the youthful Cadets, began to bring them food, until at ten p. m., the Military Commander of the City,

General Victoriano Huerta, ordered them to the Castle of Chapultepec, where they finally remained without further participation, as a body, in suppressing the rebellion.

As soon as Mr. Madero arrived at the Palace, he called a meeting of the Cabinet, and it was agreed that the President should leave that very day for Cuernavaca and join the army which, under the command of General Felipe Angeles, was making a campaign against the Zapatistas.

At four o'clock, the President accompanied by Messrs. Garmendia, Montes, and de los Rios, left in an automobile for the capital of the State of Morelos. Preceding him was another machine carrying ten soldiers armed with Mausers and a Rexer, under command of a 2nd Captain of Artillery.

That same morning, after Mr. Madero's appearance upon the scene, the Military Commander, General Huerta, had ordered the execution of General Gregorio Ruiz, officer of the 20th, and in command of the Palace guards, and of one of the Training School men accused of firing upon Garcia Peña when he had arrived at the Palace at daybreak. The executions took place in the inner courtyard at about twelve-thirty on February 9th. Shortly after one o'clock it was known at the National Palace that the Ciudadela was in the hands of the revolutionists and that the second in command of the city had lost his life in the defense of that point.

CHAPTER XXII.

AT THE CIUDADELA.*

As I have already recounted, General Reyes met exactly the death he foreboded. His nerves killed him. With a little prudence, with greater calmness, his triumph would have been assured—the city would have been spared the tragic ten days when so many innocent persons perished, and the country would have been saved from the shame of subsequent events.

When Messrs. Felix Diaz and Mondragon realized that Reyes had lost his life, they began to march from the streets of Licenciado Primo Verdad towards the Ciudadela. When they arrived at the ancient Boulevard of Bucareli, they began to organize their troops in order to make sure of the actual forces at their command, but not even on this occasion did they take any of the necessary military precautions. Shortly afterwards, Major Trias and Mr. Enrique Zepeda arrived and they were the ones who put the troops into a semblance of order and directed the attack upon the Ciudadela. A cannon was placed in the School of Commerce, and the forces were arranged to the best advantage, taking the street of Donde as a base of operations.

By order of the Military Commander of the City, issued in the early hours of the morning, General Villareal had assumed command of the Ciudadela, which had been under Brigadier Dávila.

When Generals Mondragon and Felix Diaz presented themselves on the Street of Bucareli, they demanded the surrender of the Ciudadela. Both felt certain of an immediate affirmative reply, because of an agreement made through Captain Izunza with the forces which were in the Ciudadela and probably because of an agreement with General Dávila himself. But the presence of General Villareal completely upset all former agree-

*This chapter is based on information received verbally from Mr. Zepeda, Mr. Rodriguez and several officers who were with the rebels.

ments and instead of an immediate surrender as had been agreed upon, the Second in Command of the City, General Villareal, gave orders to his men to prepare for a formal defense of the position.

A few scattered shots were fired when the defenders of the Ciudadela saw that the rebels were mounting a cannon, but a few moments later all firing ceased. General Villareal who was the sole obstacle to a complete surrender, had just been shot dead by an officer in the Ciudadela who was involved in the revolt. The white flag was raised at once and the surrender immediately took place, the former head of the Ciudadela, Brigadier General Rafael Dávila, giving himself up as a prisoner with all the men and supplies in the building.

The revolutionists soon had at their disposal all the reserve ammunition that there was in the City, with the cannon of the 1st, 2nd and 5th Batteries, except one that had been left in front of the Palace during the skirmish of the morning, and with sixty machine guns in perfect condition and most of them brand new.

The death of General Villareal had rendered void the act of heroism of the Military Commander, General Lauro Villar and the officers under him. With a little daring on the part of the rebels, the government could have been in their hands that day. But Messrs. Mondragon and Diaz did not stir, but rather preferred to lock themselves up in a trap and give the government time to assemble a strong force and to provide itself with the cannon and ammunition that it absolutely lacked at the moment. Only treachery could save them. Fate was propitious and instead of being annihilated, they emerged after ten days of fighting never to be forgotten by the inhabitants of Mexico City, apparently triumphant, and full of joy. The Madero administration had indeed fallen, but the Felicista revolt itself had also fallen through. Its own leaders had smothered it at its birth. They lacked the daring necessary for undertakings of such a character. The momentary popularity that surrounded the seeming victor could not fail to die away completely in a very short time. General Huerta who had been entrusted by the government with the task of putting an end to the revolt, was to fulfil his charge, but he was to destroy the revolt for his own personal gain and to the disgrace of the national army which at that moment he unfortunately represented.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE TRAGIC TEN DAYS.

The first sensation of the rebels when once in possession of the Ciudadela was one of joyful elation; but Mr. Trias and Captain Romero Lopez soon called them to order, and as a first precaution commanded them to seize the barracks of the President's Guard, since these men were not in the plot. The commander of this guard, Captain Blazquez, was in Vera Cruz owing to his wife's illness.* Aware of this fact, the rebel leaders attempted to win this regiment over to their cause but the officers refused. They did agree, however, to remain neutral. On the following day, General Mondragon annulled this compact and ordered them to incorporate themselves with the rebels; instead of so doing, the officers with the greater part of the guards decamped and went to Chapultepec to place themselves under the orders of the officer there in command. Only a 2nd Lieutenant and fifteen men obeyed Mondragon's orders. Major Trias after placing his sentinels, secured provisions by raiding all the stores in the neighborhood. Colonel Ignacio Muñoz who had just arrived, was placed in command of the line to Bucareli. He established headquarters in a house on Tolsa Street. Captain Tapia whose horse had been killed under him during the fight at the Palace, had managed to rejoin Felix Diaz in Rosales Street and was now ordered to take possession of the Young Men's Christian Association and assume command at that point. Captain Landero, a brave soldier, was chosen to command the outposts stationed in the Calzada de la Piedad. There he met his death, because mistaking daring for valor, he neglected to take the necessary precautions to protect himself.

Captain Escoto and Lieutenant Vazquez were placed in command of the assault on the prison of Belem which fell into the

*Capt. Blazquez himself related this to me.

hands of the rebels that same afternoon. On the following day however, Mr. Olivera, Superintendent of the Prison, again changed his mind and notified the Military Commander that he would support the government. The rebels gave him a few moments in which to decide definitely one way or the other; at the expiration of the allotted time, they opened fire on the prison, destroying parts of the walls. The escape of a large number of the prisoners was thus facilitated; two hundred of them were admitted into the Ciudadela where they were set to refill the magazines of the machine guns.

Mr. Fidencio Hernandez assumed the duties of secretary to General Felix Diaz, who was now installed in apartments on the southeast side of the Ciudadela together with General Mondragon and his two sons.

On the following morning General Diaz left the Ciudadela accompanied by Don Enrique Zepeda and Don Celso Acosta to keep an appointment with an emissary of General Victoriano Huerta, Military Commander of the City. The conference was to be held at a candy shop, "El Globo" on Providencia Street. The automobile in which Diaz rode was escorted by another in which were Don Ramon Rodriguez Peña and three men. The secret conference at "El Globo" with Colonel Guasque, Huerta's emissary, was very short; in fact, after a very few minutes General Diaz returned to the Ciudadela. Later in the day he was visited by Lieutenant Colonel Monter, commander of one of the artillery regiments which had that very day deserted his barracks and was presenting himself in the rebel camp.

Confusion reigned supreme in the Ciudadela. If the government had only made an attack, no matter with how small a force, the Ciudadela would have fallen immediately.

Lieutenant Colonel Monter, placed in command of the post, immediately began to bring order out of chaos. He, Mr. Trias, and Captain Romero Lopez, were from that moment the life and soul of the defense. Many false versions have been given of the events of those days—one in praise of the marksmanship of General Mondragon, when, as a matter of fact, General Mondragon not only did not fire a single shot, but did not even once appear outside the building. Lieutenant Colonel Monter mounted a cannon at each corner, and himself appointed the corresponding gun crews. Besides, he aimed the cannon stationed on the corner opposite the Prison of Belem and trained on the

National Palace; therefore his shots were those which reached the Mariana entrance. He accompanied the advance of Felix Diaz to the Calles Anchas and duly allotted their positions to the outposts. He attempted to take possession of the 6th Precinct Police Station, but after a fierce engagement it remained in the hands of the federals, under command of General Celso Vega. The Inspector General of Police, Major Emiliano Lopez Figueroa, presented himself that day at the Ciudadela pretending that he wished to come to some agreement whereby the police should remain neutral, and whereby he could get back those policemen now with the rebels so that he might give the usual protection as usual to the city.

Major Figueroa entered the building and went through it all even to the roof, unmolested. Finally, without having once been halted or challenged, he found General Diaz. When he learned the mission of the Inspector General of Police, Diaz peremptorily refused to sanction the withdrawal of the police, saying that since they had already participated in the fight, they could no longer be regarded as neutrals, and that it was up to the government to patrol the city as best it could. Major Figueroa had already been ordered to leave, when one of the bystanders suggested to Mondragon that it would be an act of sheer stupidity to allow him to leave for he had already had an opportunity to take full note of the dispositions made by the rebels. This knowledge would undoubtedly bring about an assault by the government forces with every probability of final success. Acting on this suggestion Felix Diaz immediately ordered the Inspector General to be placed under arrest. Mondragon wanted him shot at once, but the person who had first cautioned against his departure, now opposed the execution, saying that such a step would challenge retaliation from the government, which might even take revenge on the families of the men in the Ciudadela.* Once a prisoner, Major Figueroa was treated so leniently and his guards were so lax, that many people were quite sure that the whole affair was nothing but a farce.

*I obtained this information from Francisco Moreno, an eye witness.

That day the government ordered all the lights in the vicinity of the Ciudadela to be put out, but the telephones remained intact. Thus the rebels were able to keep themselves fully informed of the march of events throughout the city.*

On Tuesday, February 11th, the siege of the Ciudadela was begun, following a conference held at the home of Mr. Zepeda in Naples Street between General Victoriano Huerta and Felix Diaz, at which in general terms, the overthrow of the Madero government was agreed upon.

General Huerta placed General José Delgado, his second in command, over the forces on the Alameda; General Celso Vega over those in the Streets of the Ayuntamiento; and General Felipe Mier over those in the Calzada de la Piedad, where he was later superseded by Lieutenant Colonel Catarino Cruz. General Felipe Angeles, who had arrived with his forces from Cuernavaca, was stationed in the Paseo de la Reforma; and General Gustavo Maas in the streets of San Diego. Chapultepec was under command of Rear Admiral Angel Ortiz Monasterio, but two days later he was superseded by General Joaquin Beltran.† The attack from the Engineers Park was entrusted to Col. Ocaranza who gained possession of it shortly after taking over his command. Colonel Francisco Romero, Speaker of the House, who had brought a regiment mustered in the State of Hidalgo, was given command of the forces on Cinco de Mayo Street directly protecting the National Palace.

As I have stated before, the government lacked artillery officers for field service, since most of the capable officers were in the Ciudadela. This deficiency was made up by calling as volunteers cadets from the Military Academy for field service with the rank of Lieutenant of Artillery. This absence would in no way prevent them from continuing their studies when peace should be reestablished. These volunteers were immediately despatched to take charge of the batteries which were

*It is but justice to pay tribute here to the young ladies who acted as telephone operators throughout those days; their conduct merits warm commendation.

†After the fall of Vera Cruz, General Beltran had been relieved of his duties as Military Commander of that city. His place had been taken by General Refugio Velasco, the same who was later defeated by Villa at Torreon.

mounted on the plains encompassing the city on the side towards San Antonio Abad.

This disposition of the forces at hand, reenforced constantly by troops arriving at the city from outside points, since orders had been issued to all garrison Commanders to rush their forces with all speed to the aid of the city, established a siege, which according to all tacticians, should have been brought to a successful close within a few hours.

The new Military Commander of the city, in order to pretend that he would begin the assault on that Tuesday, gave orders that a body of Rurales, commanded by Colonel Castillo, distinguished for its loyalty to Mr. Madero, should advance at the double quick down Balderas Street until they should enter the Ciudadela.

Colonel Castillo on receiving these orders thought them so foolish that he sent his aide to interview the Military Commander so that the latter should repeat the order to him personally. When the aide returned with the same identical orders, Colonel Castillo formed his men, and placing himself at their head, advanced as he had been commanded, as punctiliously as if he were performing a mere dress parade manoeuver. When they reached the corner of Balderas and Morelos Streets, the machine guns on the roofs of the Ciudadela and in the windows of the Young Men's Christian Association building, under command of Captain Tapia, opened fire on the dragoons, mowing them down by the hundreds and totally annihilating them, the dead reaching even to the gates of the Ciudadela. The horses which were not instantly killed galloped riderless through the streets of the Ayuntamiento as far as San Felipe Neri Street.

This squadron so gallantly led by its colonel, was wiped out to a man. Colonel Castillo was a victim of military discipline, a victim of one of the most cowardly and dastardly deeds perpetrated in those tragic days. Colonel Castillo knew that he was being sent to his death and consummated the sacrifice without a word, without even a murmur of complaint. "Theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do or die." If the author of that deed had a like conscience, he would not have been able to sleep in peace, his remorse for those victims of his incompetence or of his infamy would have killed him ere this.

General Angeles had stationed his battery in the Colonia Station, and when he tried to move it to a more favorable posi-

tion, he was prevented by the protests of Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson who did not wish to be disturbed by the roar of the guns nor to expose his residence to the fire of the rebels who would no doubt answer that of General Angeles.

From the Station Colonia, Angeles opened fire on the Ciudadela, but as a capable artilleryman, he soon perceived that his guns were doing little if any damage. He therefore personally undertook the aiming of his cannon but with no better success. It was said that the officers under General Angeles, in league with the rebels, had purposely put the sights out of commission and that to this is due the bad marksmanship of General Angeles, a very plausible tale, in fact his inefficiency was a surprise to everybody because in France as well as in Mexico he had a reputation for wonderful accuracy as an artilleryman. Be that as it may, the truth is that few shots reached the rebel lines and those that did, caused little or no damage. It can be further stated that only the battery of General Angeles and that of General Maas in San Diego did any effective work. This explains the few casualties among the followers of Felix Diaz. On the other hand, the city itself suffered havoc from a conflict which in reality was but a farce though infamous in itself, for if there was little loss of life among the soldiers, there was a heavy loss among non-combatants, and the material damage done was not inconsiderable.

General Angeles showed great force of character. His were the only forces to really maintain strict siege against the rebels who were receiving outside aid from a large number of persons. Some young men of the best families who were caught spying for the rebels, were immediately executed by General Angeles. In this way he prevented the rebels from receiving exact details of what was going on in his camp.

These actions gave grounds for the court martial of General Angeles which ended in his imprisonment after the fall of the Madero Government. However, nothing further was done to him; he was liberated and immediately sent abroad on a military mission, but it seems that at the present writing, he has resigned this commission and has joined the rebel government, which has thus gained a valuable asset.

From Tuesday, February 11, when General Huerta simulated the attack, there was intermittent firing; but a serious assault on the Ciudadela was never undertaken nor even intend-

ed, because the opposing leaders, the one of the government and the other of the rebel forces, had come to a full understanding on that day, agreeing on the important question, the overthrow of Madero. But the government continued to place full confidence in General Huerta. He was allowed to continue his preparations so that he could usurp the power, and at one and the same time he was laughing up his sleeve at a government which trusted him fully and at the rebels who were also so innocently trustful.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE ACTION OF THE SENATE.*

The American Ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, took the same attitude he had taken towards the end of Don Porfirio Diaz' administration. At that time he had stated on every possible occasion that his government was tired of quietly witnessing what was happening in Mexico and had intimated the possibility of an armed intervention. In fact, this was the very weapon which Mr. Limantour had wielded over General Diaz to secure his resignation.

Mr. Lane Wilson now used these threats on Mr. Lascurain. The administration feared that the words of Mr. Lane Wilson really voiced the definite opinion of the American government, and therefore, by order of the President, the Secretary of State called a meeting of the Senators at the House of Representatives. At this meeting, held on February 13, there were thirty members of the Senate present.

In his address to them Mr. Lascurain, Secretary of State, said that relations between their country and the United States were at that moment very critical, judging from interviews with the American Ambassador; that at any moment the marines from the American men of war in Vera Cruz might land, and that it was therefore the President's wish that the Senate be informed of these facts. He then read a telegram and a memorandum from the American government, neither of which really said anything. The occasion was propitious to those senators who sympathized with the revolution and they made the most of it.

*The facts in this chapter were related to me by two Senators.

Senator Gumesindo Enriquez answered on behalf of those present that in view of the report of the Secretary of State, they thought it advisable to have an audience with the President in order to impress upon him the need not only of making any sacrifice to avoid foreign intervention but, above all, in order to put a stop to the existing impossible state of affairs. The Secretary was commissioned to beg for an interview with the President. The last action taken before adjourning was to call a meeting for the next day at the residence of Senator Sebastian Camacho. Only the nine following Senators kept the appointment: Sebastian Camacho, Gumesindo Enriquez, Guillermo Obregon, Ricardo Guzman, Emilio Rabaza, Enrique Goroztieta, Rafael Pimentel, Tomas Mancera, and Jose Castellot. At this meeting it was decided that since the interview requested had not been granted, they ask Mr. Madero to resign from the Presidency and at the same time beg Mr. Felix Diaz to withdraw as a candidate. A provisional president, acceptable to both sides, could then be appointed to call the elections.

Mr. de la Barra, although not present at the meeting, began on his own initiative, to work for the same end. He wrote a letter to the President offering to speak to Mr. Felix Diaz as agreed by the Senators.

On the following day, Saturday the 15th, the Senators again met at the house of Mr. Camacho. Messrs. Obregon and Pimentel who had been appointed to approach Felix Diaz, reported that they had done so, but that the rebel leader absolutely insisted upon two things as a working basis for any discussion or provision; first, the immediate resignation of Mr. Madero; second, that no member of his Cabinet should be a nominee for the Provisional Presidency.

As agreed upon with the Secretary of State, the Senators went to the Palace to give Diaz' answer to the President, but the latter refused to receive them. By order of the President, they were told by Mr. Ernesto Madero and Mr. Bonilla that on no account was Mr. Madero willing to resign. The Senators then decided to go to Military Headquarters to address themselves to General Huerta, head of the government forces.

When General Huerta was told the purpose of the visit, he begged the Senators that before beginning they allow him to call the Secretary of War as a witness to the conference that was

about to be held. Since the Senators raised no objection to General Huerta's proposition, the Secretary of War joined the meeting shortly after. Hardly was he inside the door than he faced them all and with an angry gesture addressed Mr. Obregon, saying that they were the prime corrupters of the army. He was not allowed to finish, for all the Senators sprang to their feet and angrily protested saying that no feeling hostile to the administration had led them there; that they desired to corrupt no one; that they were moved only by the desire of finding a solution to the strife that was causing countless misfortunes and whose end it was impossible to foresee, since they believed that the administration would gain nothing by fighting the rebels. They added that in view of the attitude assumed by the Secretary of War, they considered their mission at an end, and that the responsibility for the future events would rest with General Garcia Peña. He, in turn, somewhat subdued, apologized profusely, adding that since he too was seeking a solution to the matter, he would gladly hear the one proposed by them. The Senators then complained of the President's behavior and General Garcia Peña offered to speak to Mr. Madero in order to obtain an interview for the Senators who were there present. At the end of the meeting, Senator Obregon insinuated to General Garcia Peña that one solution might be the resignation of Mr. Madero and the subsequent appointment of General Garcia Peña as Provisional President. He said that he himself would obtain the consent of Felix Diaz. General Peña answered that not only was it probable that Mr. Diaz would not accept this proposition, but that he did not feel himself sufficiently authorized to propose it to Mr. Madero.

On Sunday the 16th, during the armistice, the Senators again met at Mr. Camacho's house, without reaching any agreement, for General Garcia Peña did not let them know at what decision Mr. Madero had arrived. On Monday morning, the 17th, while at Mr. Camacho's home, they received word from General Huerta to meet on the following morning at 10:30 at Military Headquarters. Believing that this appointment was the one with the President, promised them by General Garcia Peña, the Senators met at the stated hour at Military Headquarters on the mezzanine floor of the Palace. On their arrival, and as if in answer to previous conversations, General Huerta told them

that he was at their command and would carry out any orders they might see fit to give him.*

The senators surprised by such an unexpected stand, and unable to grasp the significance of the Military Commander's attitude, kept silence for a few minutes. Finally, Mr. Enriquez, who had been chosen spokesman for the interview with Mr. Madero, replied that they had nothing to command, but still insisted upon speaking with the President. When Mr. Enriquez finished speaking, General Huerta sent an aide to the Presidential apartments. The aide returned almost immediately with the answer that the President would receive the Senators in the Audience Chamber.

As soon as they joined Mr. Madero, Senator Enriquez began to expound their reasons for soliciting the interview; but he had no sooner begun to speak than he was interrupted by Senator Guillermo Obregon who began a lengthy and involved speech. In fact, he talked in such a round about way, and expressed himself in such terms that finally Madero, losing all patience, said somewhat rudely, "Speak out and say frankly what you want." He then proceeded to rebuke them all saying that he knew perfectly well what they were after; they wanted him to resign so as to allow Porfirio Diaz to come back to the Presidency and remain there until his death, but they could understand once for all that under no circumstances would he resign, that death only could remove him from the National Palace. He admitted that the day when his term expired and he could turn over the office to his successor, would be the happiest day of his life; but in the meantime, only death could remove him from power.

Senator Enriquez retorted emphatically that their mission was not one of intervention in favor of General Diaz, but they did believe it their duty to take the necessary steps to prevent greater conflicts; that was why they had come together. Their wishes which were also those of the country at large, were that the government should come to an agreement with the revolutionists so as to put an end to the struggle. That the greatest

*General Huerta knowing the insinuations made by Senator Obregon to the Secretary of War, hoped that because of the latter's refusal, these offers might be made to him. Thus in the acts that he had planned for that very day, he would appear to be carrying out the commands of the Senate and so could hope to be free from all blame.

fear of the Senators was that this continued strife would force intervention by foreign powers. Mr. Madero, quite calm now, answered that they could banish all such fears since he would read to them a telegram just received from President Taft, the contents of which were pacific and entirely different from the attitude assumed by Henry Lane Wilson.

Obregon then took the floor again, becoming so very much excited that Mr. Madero also became excited and the interview came to an end. Each of the Senators present had the firm conviction that they would all be put under arrest as they left the Palace; but Mr. Madero took personal leave of each in such a way that they soon lost all fear.

On their way to Military Headquarters to take leave of General Huerta, they were met by Lieutenant Colonel Riverol, an intimate friend of one of the Senators, who whispered "Three o'clock this afternoon will see the beginning of the end. You just see!"

Madero, as soon as left alone, summoned General Huerta and asked him when this state of affairs was going to end, in other words, when did he intend to gain possession of the Ciudadela. General Huerta told the President that everything would be settled that very afternoon, that at that very moment he was going to give orders for the final assault to begin. He then saluted and withdrew. It was true. General Huerta made the assault that very afternoon, but not against the Ciudadela, but against the very President himself; instead of giving a death blow to rebellion, he sounded the knell of constitutional law and order.

Senators Obregon and Pimentel since the very first interview with Felix Diaz, had obtained passes from both the Military Commander of Mexico City and the leader of the rebels in the Ciudadela. In this way they went back and forth daily and were able to learn that just as the President was fully decided not to resign, Felix Diaz was fully as decided not to cede an inch.

CHAPTER XXV.

AN EVENT IN THE MEROVINGIAN DYNASTY.

History relates how the Merovingian dynasty was borne down by the weight of the sword of Pepin, Steward of the Palace who usurped the power by abusing the confidence reposed in him by the last Merovingian emperor. General Huerta though not conversant with history, sought to imitate Pepin, and to scale the ladder to power by using the same means employed by the founder of the Carolinian Dynasty. General Huerta, unfortunately, used this means but he was absolutely incapable to be a ruler such as Pepin, and much less capable to organize a government like that of the ancestor of Charlemagne.

Resolved to usurp the power, his first effort was to force the Senate to take such steps as would give legality to his acts, but the senators were deaf to the insinuations whispered to them and would not do what the Military Commander wished. Therefore, General Huerta was compelled to resort to brute force, and arrest the President and the Vice President in the National Palace itself, and to shoot on the very spot any one offering resistance to the execution of this act.

For these arrests, General Huerta made use of the services of Brigadier General Blanquete, Commander of the 29th Infantry, in whom he had entire confidence. Blanquete in turn could count on Lieutenant Colonel Jimenez Riverol and Major Izquierdo, his immediate subordinates in the 29th Infantry.

General Huerta, some of his friends say, feared that he would be arrested and even executed by the government, which suspected that he was hand in glove with the revolutionists. Some of Huerta's intimates even state that General Peña invited the Military Commander to visit Chapultepec Military Academy with the idea of placing him under arrest, but on arriving at the Cas-

tle, he was so heartily cheered by the Cadets that the Secretary of War saw the impossibility of carrying out his plans. He therefore attempted to induce Huerta to go with him to the barracks of San Cosme so as to arrest him there. All this however is but imagination.

General Huerta ever since the battle of Bachimba had received whispered suggestions to depose Madero and usurp the power. The enemies of the government believed that a soldier like General Huerta would alone be able to establish peace, and some of them had looked to him, while others had their eyes on General Gerónimo Treviño. The latter had refused to listen to any proposals, but General Huerta not only had lent a willing ear to the suggestions, but even broached the subject to some of the most prominent officers, notably to General Blanquete who warmly seconded the idea as he believed it to be the sole solution of the problem which was bringing ruin to the whole country.*

When the revolt broke out and the first conferences were held between Felix Diaz and General Huerta, the latter hesitated at first, but finally accepted the main points. He did, however, impose as a condition that he should act as Provisional President and should reserve to himself the right to decide on the propitious moment for the execution of the plot. During the tragic ten days, the whispered insinuations were not hushed for a single moment. A very strong pressure was brought to bear especially on the wife of the Military Commander, to force him to repudiate Mr. Madero.

General Huerta could not count on the support of all the troops under his command. In fact, he was certain that some of them, in particular those under General Angeles, would not lend themselves to any action inimical to the government of Madero. He had the idea that perhaps the Senate would facilitate the realization of his object and with that in mind, he had held his interviews with the group of senators which had met at the house of Mr. Camacho.

In order to be able to act with safety, he insisted that the 29th Infantry, commanded by General Blanquete, be transferred to Mexico City, but General Blanquete who was not as yet in the plot, had delayed the transfer, offering first the excuse that he

*I myself mentioned all this on Feb. 14th, 1913, to Mr. Madero's relatives at Monterey.

was not fully confident of the loyalty of his troops, and later that the bridges across the Lerma had been destroyed. However, when called directly by General Huerta, he rebuilt the bridges which had been burned down by the 7th Regiment of Rurales under Major Cárdenas. He then organized his regiment for the march, arriving in Mexico City on Sunday, and pitched his camp in the Calzada de Tlaxpana. Soon after his arrival, it was agreed that the troops acting as guards in the Palace were to be supplanted by detachments of the 29th Regiment so that once in possession of the Palace, they could arrest Madero and Pino Suarez and force them to resign, that is if the Senate could not be induced to remove them and appoint General Huerta as President pro tem. This point was discussed by General Blanquete and Senator Obregon at the Tlaxpana camp.

When the plans had been ratified by all concerned, the necessary orders were issued. As soon as the 29th had been duly installed in the Palace it was agreed that on Tuesday, the 18th at three o'clock in the afternoon, while the high officials were lunching, they should all be placed under arrest by Lieutenant Colonel Jimenez Riverol and Major Izquierdo, supported by a detachment of the 29th.

It was decided that Gustavo Madero should be lured from the Palace because it was feared that his natural impulsiveness might cause the shedding of blood. In order to carry out this scheme, he was invited to a luncheon given by General Delgado at the Restaurant Gambrinus, in honor of Colonel Francisco Romero. The hour of the banquet was set for three o'clock, but in the morning it was learned that General Manuel Rivera, commander of the 4th Military Zone, was to arrive that very day from Oaxaca with his brigade. It was therefore thought necessary to hasten events before this soldier should enter the city.

When the brigade arrived at the San Lázaro station, an aid of General Rivera was sent ahead to Military Headquarters, arriving there shortly after noon, to request the necessary permission for the brigade to enter the city. He was instructed to await further orders. General Huerta then rushed out, called for Gustavo Madero, took him with the aid of General Delgado, to the Restaurant Gambrinus, and then pretending some pressing business left them and sped in an automobile to the San Lázaro station. On his arrival there he requested General Rivera to ac-

company him in his automobile to Military Headquarters. Once there, General Rivera was placed under arrest and remained in confinement until after the death of Madero. On his arrival at Military Headquarters, Huerta was informed by General Blanquete that all the plans had been executed and that Madero and Pino Suarez were under arrest.

CHAPTER XXVI.

THE THIRD MILITARY REVOLT.

In accordance with the orders issued, Lieutenant Colonel Riverol accompanied by Major Izquierdo, by a Captain of Artillery, and by Don Enrique Zepeda, took thirty men of the Palace Guard and proceeded by way of the main staircase to the Presidential apartments. He went through the waiting room and the aides' room to the Cabinet Chamber where he formed his men in line and left them under command of Mr. Zepeda. Then he and Major Izquierdo proceeded to the salon next to the Library where Madero and his Cabinet and a few friends were about to sit down to dinner. Lieutenant Colonel Riverol informed Mr. Madero that General Rivera with his troops, had revolted and was even then within the city, that since there was fear that the garrison might lend him its support, it was deemed of the greatest importance that the President should be taken to a safe place at once and that he had accordingly come to conduct him. Madero was greatly surprised by the news and asked for details; Riverol grasped the President's left arm and Major Izquierdo his right and in this way, they attempted to push him into the next room. Madero at once understood what was in the wind and said: "I will not go like this." As the two officers dragged him towards the room in which the guard was stationed, he asked Riverol who had given such orders. When he saw the guard drawn up in the other room, he understood that he was lost and stopped as he crossed the threshold. Captain Garmendia, aide to the President, drew his revolver, saying: "You shall not lay hands upon the President of the Republic," and fired point blank at Colonel Riverol. Don Marcos Hernandez at the same time fired at Major Izquierdo, both bullets taking deadly effect. Colonel Riverol fell dead across the door leading into the library from the Cabinet Chamber, and Major Izquierdo fell dead in the latter room. About twenty or thirty more shots were fired by the soldiers of the 29th Battalion,

the aides of the President, and Mr. Hernandez. Mr. Zepeda, who was in command of the detachment of the 29th, was hit in the hand. Zepeda answering the fire, killed Mr. Marcos Hernandez. Captain Montes a member of the Presidents's personal staff, ordered the troops to about face and leave the room. Since Major Izquierdo had been killed by Captain Garmendia in the library, the men found themselves without an officer in authority; they therefore obeyed the orders of Captain Montes, the only man in uniform. With him at their head, they left the Presidential suite, and the door was slammed behind them by Mr. Rodriguez Malpica, chief of the President's staff. The President, judging it dangerous to remain, intending to abandon the National Palace, entered the elevator accompanied by Captain Garmendia and others; but when he issued from the elevator to the corridor beneath the Hall of Honor, he found General Blanquete there already with reinforcements commanded by Captain Hernandez.

Hernandez made as if to stop the President, but Garmendia shouted, "Men, long live the President!" The soldiers at once presented arms in salute to the Head of the Nation. Captain Hernandez, perceiving that the attitude of his men obviously was favorable to the President, fell back hastily. Madero began to address the soldiers, but in the midst of his speech, was interrupted by General Blanquete, who, ghastly pale, advanced and placing his hand on Madero's shoulder said: "Come here" and pushing him into the guard house; when he was into the room he said: "You have just killed a man of great worth, so you are my prisoner," and grasping him by the arm, pushed him quickly into the rear of the guard house. Madero, highly unstrung, asked repeatedly by whose authority this was done.*

While this was going on, the Vice President and the Cabinet members, as well as those who had accompanied Madero, had escaped, each as best he could. Pino Suarez descended by the stairway leading to the offices of the Secretary of the Treasury, but instead of issuing immediately to the street, went towards the Treasury. On perceiving his error and attempting to leave the building, he was taken captive by an officer from Military Head-

*Some of the aids of the President tried to impede the arrest and went so far as to aim their revolvers at Gen. Blanquete but they were prevented of their purpose at the instance of one of the Cabinet Members who ordered "Don't fire! Don't fire!"

quarters who conducted him to where General Blanquete was holding Madero prisoner.

Mr. Bonilla, a less nervous man, had also descended the stairs to the office of the Secretary of the Treasury and had calmly and quickly quitted the National Palace, accompanied by Captain Blazquez, commander of the President's guard. Both of these officials went first to Mr. Bonilla's residence, but immediately after sought refuge in another house.

While events were running their course at the National Palace, similar deeds were being enacted at the Restaurant Gambrinus. Gustavo Madero had been invited to dine with Generals Huerta, Delgado, Yarza, Romero, and Sangines. Shortly after their arrival at the Restaurant Gambrinus, two officers, Luis Fuentes and Revilla, entered with twenty men from the forest guard of Chapultepec and ordered those present to put up their hands and surrender. The only one to make the least attempt at resistance was Gustavo Madero, but Officer Fuentes, placing his cocked revolver at Madero's head, showed him the futility of such an act. Madero who was also covered by Revilla's men, realized how useless resistance would be, and surrendered. Gustavo Madero and Generals Yarza and Delgado were conducted to the coat room of the restaurant and placed under heavy guard strictly "incomunicado." Messrs. Romero and Sangines disappeared during the confusion without any one knowing how or when they had escaped, for the attention of the party making the arrest had been concentrated on Gustavo Madero.

At eleven o'clock that night, the prisoners were transferred to the National Palace and at two, the same night, officer Revilla conducted Gustavo Madero in an automobile to the Ciudadela where he met his death as will be described later.

President Madero and Vice President Pino Suarez were conducted that afternoon to the apartments used by the Administrative officers of Chapultepec at the National Palace, situated to the south of the Court of Honor.

CHAPTER XXVII.

AN ORGY OF BLOOD.

The Secretary of War was arrested in his office from which, at his own request, he was transferred under escort to the guard house where Madero and the other Secretaries were confined. Upon his arrival, the guard turned out to show him the honors as directed by the Military Code. General Garcia Peña remarked that under the circumstances such honors were superfluous. He had only just greeted the President and his colleagues in the Cabinet, when new orders were received to conduct him to Military Headquarters. Shortly after, he was given his liberty.

That afternoon at about five o'clock, Huerta arrived at the apartment where Madero was confined. He addressed Madero as "Mr. President," but Madero interrupted, saying, "Oh, so I am still President." Huerta then began again: "Mr. ex-President, I have already notified the Senate and the American Ambassador regarding what I have done, and they both approve my actions. Since I won the battle of Bachimba"—"Even then you were already a traitor," interposed Madero. This interruption caused Huerta to forget the speech he had been about to make, and after a few words, he took his leave. He shook hands with Mr. Lascurain and Mr. Hernandez, but on reaching Madero, the latter refused to extend his hand. General Huerta then offered his hand to Mr. Vazquez Tagle, who said: "I also refuse to shake hands with you, General." Huerta hesitated, then turned away saying "God be with you."*

At seven he gave orders that the Cabinet members be set free and be accompanied to their respective homes by aides from Military Headquarters. Ernesto Madero and Rafael Hernandez, who left together, were escorted by Major of Rurales Francisco Cárdenas and a Captain, personal aide to General Huerta. On their way back to the Palace, the escort stopped at the home of

*These facts were related to me by one of the Cabinet Ministers who was at the side of Mr. Madero at the time.

Don Ignacio de la Torre to greet and give him an account of what had happened. Referring to Madero, Cárdenas said: "What I do not understand is why that contemptible dwarf is still alive." One of his hearers made some remark to which Cárdenas replied: "Just let them give me the order and I'll kill him. That——— has done enough damage already." That same night Huerta was advised of Cardenas' willingness to be made executioner in the government which was being formed.

No longer awaiting the appointment by the Senate, Huerta sent for Mr. Lascurain on the following day, in order to persuade him of the absolute necessity that Madero resign so as to legalize the new government; that this was of urgent importance before the felicistas should recover and desire to take charge of the prisoners, as they had done with Gustavo Madero that morning. He reminded Mr. Lascurain of the tragic end of the President's brother. Finally, he assured Mr. Lascurain that as soon as Madero and Pino Suarez resigned, they would be sent to Vera Cruz. Mr. Lascurain, who had been deeply moved by the tragic death of Gustavo Madero, went immediately to see Madero. General Juvencio Robles had, at the express command of General Huerta, already taken the matter up with Madero, whose first impulse had been one of violence, and he had decisively refused to resign; but calmed by the remarks of the aged General, he had agreed to talk the matter over with his Cabinet, exacting first and foremost that he should have absolute guarantees that the life of Pino Suarez would be spared as also that of General Felipe Angeles, in whom he was especially interested. General Robles offered to transmit these conditions to General Huerta.

When General Huerta had left the room, in which Madero and his Cabinet were confined, he had gone immediately to the American Embassy where there were awaiting him Felix Diaz and the other persons who participated in the now celebrated compact described in the following chapter. At this moment, the orgy was started at the Ciudadela.

Those who had shared the danger of the tragic ten days with Felix Diaz, believing themselves triumphant, were celebrating the event by carousing and singing. Some one proposed to finish the work by setting fire to the building of the champion of Maderismo, the newspaper "La Nueva Era," a building which had been shelled from the Ciudadela during the battle. Soon after this suggestion, a party of men left the Ciudadela,

and presently the glare of the flames indicated that it had been acted upon promptly. The same was done to the other Madero newspaper. When Felix Diaz returned from the American Embassy after he had signed the famous compact, the orgy was at its height. It was impossible to command respect. The fumes of alcohol, the inebriety of triumph, the excitement caused by the flames, had transformed all these men into veritable beasts. The friends and partisans of Felix Diaz besieged him and insistently demanded that he should force General Huerta to deliver into their hands both Madero and Pino Suarez, so that they might execute them immediately in the very Ciudadela itself. Without waiting for the decision of General Diaz, General Mondragon sent two aides in an automobile with a message to General Huerta, who refused absolutely to surrender his prisoners. They had not yet duly resigned. After the various exchanges of messages, the automobile returned to the Ciudadela with Gustavo Madero about 2 A. M.

Gustavo Madero arrived just as Felix Diaz had finished relating to his friends the happenings at the American Embassy and was about to retire. "General" said Revilla, an aide, who had brought Gustavo Madero, "General Huerta has ordered me to deliver this prisoner to you." "Turn him over to Mondragon," said Diaz, and retired. When General Mondragon took charge of the prisoner, he turned to Zurita, an officer of the Military Academy who, with Messrs. Remes and Izabal, had just arrived at his quarters, and said to them. "Take this man and do to him what he and his men did to General Ruiz."*

Zurita took Gustavo Madero by the arm, and ignoring his request to be allowed to speak with Felix Diaz or with General Mondragon, he pushed and pulled him out through the main gate to the small plaza where stands the statue of General Morelos. On reaching the threshold of the door, Madero who from the very first knew what to expect, offered a stubborn resistance. He talked entreatingly to the youngsters in an attempt to win them over. Grasping the frame of the door, he was able to withstand the pressure exerted against him, while in the meantime he talked about his hapless children, about his own insignificance, claiming that he had never had any real power. But

*All these facts were related to me by an eye witness, whose name it is not yet advisable to publish.

it was a mere waste of words and energy, for he was not allowed to continue, a cadet shot him inflicting a wound in the maxillary. An instinct of self preservation forced Madero to break and run, but he could only take a few steps and leaning against one of the wagons standing in the plaza, he let his head fall on his left shoulder. The pain caused by the wound must have been intense. Here he was caught by the men who had pursued him from the Ciudadela; they immediately fired on the hapless man, who, riddled by bullets, fell dead at the feet of his youthful murderers. When they saw him fall and ascertained that he was dead, they threw themselves on his inanimate body and stripped it of everything of value; sixty dollars, three letters from his wife, dated at Monterey, and a memorandum book whose last entry was "Everything is lost, the soldiers refuse to fight....."

Drunk with the taste of blood, these men returned to the Ciudadela, to demand that Huerta be forced to deliver in to their hands Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez. Felix Diaz had already retired and could not be seen, but an aide again jumped into an automobile and went to the Palace. Huerta again refused to surrender them and the automobile returned to the Ciudadela. Rodolfo Reyes then said, "He should at least let us have Basso, who killed my father." The automobile again speeded to the Palace returning shortly with Mr. Adolfo Basso, Head of the President's Household, who had been held prisoner in Military Headquarters since the arrest of Madero and his Cabinet. Mr. Basso, an old sailor and retired major of artillery, immediately grasping what was in the air, turned to General Mondragon and said "I do not ask for mercy. I would not have shown mercy to you."

General Mondragon, affected by the tragic death of Gustavo Madero, turned to Paulino Ortega, who had just arrived with fifty men from the cable office and said "Paulino, detail a firing squad for this man and see to it that the scene just enacted with Gustavo Madero is not repeated with him."

Paulino Ortega, with his squad conducted Mr. Basso to the spot where Madero had died. When Basso saw the corpse he took off his hat, saying: "Poor man!"—"He died like a coward,"* interrupted one of the men. Basso answered, "You

*This is false. Mr. Gustavo Madero was not a coward, but his enemies hated him even after death.

will not say that of me," and stepping in front of his guard, he added, "Allow me to find the North Star, it has been my guide in many journeys; I want to see it face to face now that I am making my last journey." When he found the star, he fixed his gaze on it, again took off his hat and cried, "Viva Mexico! Shoot now!" A volley was heard and the body of Mr. Basso fell heavily to the ground. Dr. Izabal* bent over him and ordered the coup de grace to be fired, adding "It is useless now, he is dead."

A few hours later, Mondragon's son arrived at the Ciudadela in an automobile with another prisoner, Mr. Oviedo, prefect of the neighboring village of Tacubaya. General Mondragon had given orders that he also should be executed. He fell shortly after, facing the statue of Morelos, on the very spot where Gustavo Madero and Adolfo Basso had met their tragic end. All three bodies were interred on the spot.

On the morning of the 19th, after reading the newspaper reports, Don Angel Caso, a personal friend of Gustavo Madero, presented himself at the Ciudadela to claim the body of his friend; but there was no one to whom he could speak; everybody was intoxicated.† He was finally able to obtain the desired order from Mr. Ocon but no one would obey it. Then he went to Military Headquarters and General Blanquete gave him another very decisive order. But even this was ineffective. As a last resort, he went direct to General Huerta, who sent one of his aides with orders for immediate compliance with the instructions of General Blanquete.

The disagreeable task of disinterring the dead from their sepulchre in the courtyard of the Ciudadela was then undertaken, to see if Madero's body could be found there. Thirty four were exhumed, but his body was not among them. The search was then abandoned. On the 25th, the Board of Health ordered that the bodies in the Ciudadela be exhumed and removed to the Dolores Cemetery. When Mr. Caso heard of these orders, he went to the Cemetery to receive the bodies. Among the unsepulchred dead was the corpse of Gustavo Madero. It had been found in the yard, buried in a hole less than three yards deep and so small that it had been necessary to double up

*Afterwards murdered by order of Huerta.

†I do not include Felix Diaz, who is no drinker.

the body so that it would fit in the grave. He, who in life had been the leader of the Progressive Constitutional Party, had been buried ignominiously at the foot of the statue of Morelos. Mr. Caso received the body, and escorted by two aides from Military Headquarters, he took it to the French Cemetery where it was laid to rest next to the body of the ex-President. The two brothers now sleep in a small roadway to the left as you enter the Cemetery. Here, loving hands frequently take floral gifts, a mute protest against the brutal deaths of which they were both victims.*

*When Gustavo Madero was arrested, knowing that he would be despoiled of everything, he hid a valuable stick pin in the lapel of his coat which he had carried with him during the tragic ten days in case he should suddenly need funds. When the corpse was found, Mr. Caso, aware of this fact, looked for the stick pin but it had disappeared; he was able, however, to obtain the pawn ticket from an employee of the cemetery, who had pawned it for two dollars and a half. This employee saw Mr. Caso looking for the pin and gave him the pawn ticket.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

THE COMPACT AT THE EMBASSY.

Under such existing conditions, the Diplomatic Corps could not remain idle. In those dark hours, those days of anguish for Mr. Madero, Mr. Pino Suarez, and their respective families, there was one man who played a conspicuous part, the Ambassador of the United States, Mr. Henry Lane Wilson.* From the 9th of February, Mr. Lane Wilson had declared that the government of Mr. Madero no longer existed, and had proposed to the accredited Diplomatic Corps in Mexico the repudiation of the legitimately constituted government, but he was unable to gain the sanction of the Latin American Republics. He had on his side the Belgian Minister openly and the Guatemalan Minister timidly. When he saw that his suggestion was not accepted, the American Ambassador then suggested that Mr. Madero be asked in the name of the Diplomatic Corps to resign. This, he claimed, was the only way by which to reestablish order which had been disturbed by the military outbreak of Tacubaya. However, owing to the attitude taken by the representatives of Chile and Cuba, he did not dare to make the proposal openly at a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps, but he chose rather to broach the subject privately to his colleagues. After he had obtained the consent of a number of them, he succeeded in convincing Mr. Cologan, the Minister of Spain, that it would be an act of Christian charity to persuade President Madero that the Diplomatic Corps was of the opinion that he should resign in order to prevent the bloodshed that was imminent. Mr. Colo-

*Mr. Manuel Marquez Sterling, Cuban Minister in Mexico at the time, has published in the "Heraldo de Cuba" nine articles beginning on March 14th, 1914, relating all the facts as referred to in this and succeeding chapters.

gan agreed to approach the President because with this plan, according to Mr. Lane Wilson, it was the desire of the Diplomatic Corps as a whole. He proposed it to Mr. Madero but was flatly refused, though Mr. Madero understood quite well that Mr. Cologan was moved by no unworthy interest. Aside from the humanitarian emotion that had been aroused in his soul by the expressed fears of the American Ambassador, Mr. Cologan had other reasons for believing himself justified in the step he had taken. Prominent members of the Spanish colony were involved in the movement headed by Mr. Felix Diaz, because they believed that the administration of Mr. Madero was leading the country to destruction and that his downfall was essential to save the numerous interests in their hands. Some had personal interests, the product of many years of labor; others had interests intrusted to them and dependent upon their wisdom and integrity.

Mr. Gonzalo Garita, who was entrusted with the collection of funds for the revolt of the Ciudadela, has made the statement that of all those who pledged themselves only the Spaniards had given the money they promised. This statement is not strictly true because I know that some Mexicans contributed for the support of the rebellion, but it does show the part played by the Spaniards in the downfall of the Madero administration. Personally, I do not blame them. They were only defending their interests, which were gravely threatened; besides, the Spaniard in Mexico does not feel himself in alien land, nor in the majority of cases, does he consider himself a foreigner. According to definite facts obtained by the Spanish legation, there were fourteen Spaniards among the combatants of the Ciudadela.

During the tragic ten days, Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson did not lose a single opportunity for putting obstacles before the government, nor for inciting his colleagues so that daily difficulties arose; sometimes he complained because bullets fell on the buildings occupied by the Legations, at other times, because troops camped near those buildings, and still at other times, because some of their own countrymen were wounded on the streets.

The Ambassador did not once leave the Embassy. His house was a nest of conspiracy, but not once did he expose him-

self to a bullet shot. On the other hand, the Spanish Minister was constantly within the danger zone; his automobile was hit by projectiles on several occasions and pierced in two places by bullets.

When the Cuban government sent the cruiser "Cuba" to the port of Vera Cruz, the American Ambassador tried in every way to force a landing of the Cuban soldiers on board. His idea was to cause an international conflict, because he would then be able to intervene with the force on board the American ships. President Taft had forbidden the landing of these forces unless the troops of some other nation should land, or unless development of circumstances should render it absolutely essential.

A paper to encourage the revolutionists was issued every day. It was printed on a press established for that purpose in the cellar of the very Embassy itself. Mr. Madero was never able to trace the origin or source of this paper.

After Madero's fall, the conduct of the Ambassador was even less that of a man of culture and education. On the afternoon of the 18th, a number of foreign ministers who wished to know the truth about what had happened, met at the Embassy. Mr. Henry Lane Wilson was not able to receive them immediately because he was busy with other callers. In one of his reception rooms and in his very presence, General Victoriano Huerta and General Felix Diaz were conversing. General Huerta was accompanied by Mr. Enrique Zepeda and Lieutenant Colonel Joaquin Maas. Brigadier General Diaz was accompanied by Messrs. Rodolfo Reyes and Fidencio Hernandez. There was also present at the conference, Senator Guillermo Obregon who had come with Mr. Diaz. The object of the meeting was to discuss and agree upon terms for the division of power between two conflicting ambitions. The inevitable result was, as the fable tells us and as always happens in such cases, that the Lion took the Lion's share. Merely as a matter of form, General Huerta discussed the merits of one or two of the Secretaries. For example, the portfolio of the Treasury was taken from Mr. Carlos G. de Cosio in order to give it to Mr. Toribio Esquivel Obregon. This gentleman was not consulted in the least. When the decision was reached, he was ordered to present himself on the following day at the Department of State to take office.

When the list of Cabinet officers was complete, Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson took it into the next room where the

foreign Ministers were awaiting him. "Gentlemen" the Ambassador said, to them, "the new rulers of Mexico submit to your approval the Cabinet that they are going to name. I would like to hear any objections that you may have in order that I may present them to General Huerta and General Diaz, who are waiting in the next room. By submitting this list to us for our consideration, they show their desire to act in harmony with our respective governments. I firmly believe that with such methods, peace in Mexico is assured." Each of the foreign diplomats hastened to copy the list for himself. When they came to the name of Mr. Garza Aldape for Secretary of the Department of Agriculture, which was to be created, one of them objected, saying: "That man is a thief." "Mr. Garza Aldape," replied the Ambassador, "is only a prospective secretary." The Cuban Minister then said: "It is my opinion that we should neither disapprove nor approve anything. We should simply take note of all communications sent us and transmit them to our governments." Since a majority of those present agreed with the opinion expressed by Mr. Marquez Sterling, the Ambassador returned to the room where Huerta and Diaz and their friends were awaiting him. He informed them that the Diplomatic Corps had no objection to the Cabinet as proposed. A few minutes later, the diplomats were invited into the presence of Huerta and Diaz. Then, before them all, Rodolfo Reyes read with great emphasis what the public has called "The compact at the Ciudadela" but which in reality should be known by the name I give it, "The Compact at the Embassy."

When the reading of this document was finished, Ambassador Wilson and the Mexicans present applauded. Then Huerta, stating that he had urgent business to attend to, took leave of those present. He intentionally left General Diaz for the last; on reaching him, he hesitated a moment. It seemed as if both hesitated, but at length Huerta opened his arms, and the two of opposing ambitions embraced, each probably wondering how he could destroy the other. Then applause broke out again, which as before, was led by his Excellency the American Ambassador, Mr. Henry Lane Wilson.

The Ambassador accompanied Huerta to the door. On his return he met in the vestibule Felix Diaz who with his companions had just taken leave of the diplomats. On seeing Diaz,

Wilson cried "Viva General Diaz, savior of Mexico!" The companions of Diaz answered with a cheer; then, accepting an invitation from the Ambassador, they entered the dining room to partake with him a glass of champagne. At the time this took place, Madero was still living and had not as yet signed his resignation!*

The foreign diplomats heard all that occurred; they heard the clink of glasses, the popping of the corks when the champagne was opened. One of them passed the remark that it was strange that they themselves had not been invited to participate in the celebration; but the Japanese Charge d'Affaires replied: "Mr. Wilson well knows whom to invite on such occasions."

When Mr. Wilson rejoined his colleagues, they simultaneously exclaimed: "Will not these men assassinate the President?" "Oh, no," rejoined Mr. Wilson, "Madero will be locked up in a lunatic asylum; as for the other, he is nothing but a scoundrel, so if they kill him it will be no great loss." "We must not allow it," said the Chilean Minister." "We must not meddle in the domestic affairs of Mexico," replied the Ambassador. "Let them arrange that themselves." Nobody spoke a word in reply. A few moments later the diplomats silently withdrew from the American Embassy. Once in the street, after crossing the threshold, one of them said: "This Ambassador is a queer man; he does not refuse to allow a rebel chief under the very roof of his government to plot the downfall of the legitimate government to which he is accredited; he is a willing witness to the compact; he even discusses the persons who will form the new government, without a thought as to whether or not the matter deals purely with the domestic affairs of the country; but when the question turns to the saving of the lives of two political officials, whom treason and infamy are even now seeking to murder, then he finds that his position as a representative of a foreign power does not allow him to intervene, but he does criticize bluntly and with extreme

*But Ambassador Wilson telegraphed to the American Consuls all over Mexico to use pressure to have General Huerta recognized as President by the local authorities. A fac simile of the telegram was published by the "N. Y. World" verified by Consul Hanna of Monterey.

indiscretion the executives of the government to which he is accredited." "You are right" replied another of the diplomats, "Maybe this is a secret chapter of the Monroe Doctrine of which we are as yet ignorant." "And talking about indiscretions," he added, "will there be no newspaper today?" "What for?" replied the other, "the printing plant has probably been transferred today to a more convenient place."

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE RESIGNATION OF MADERO.

On the afternoon of February 19th a meeting of the members of the Diplomatic Corps was called by the American Ambassador for the purpose of acquainting them with the communication received from General Huerta announcing the fall of Madero and his administration. The Ambassador read before the meeting not only Huerta's note, but also the answer he had drawn up recognizing the new government. The Diplomatic Corps rejected Mr. Wilson's plan. They decided to wait until the following day before making a formal reply because so many rumors were afloat that they did not really know who was to be the head of the new government.

After his plan was rejected by his colleagues, the Ambassador concentrated his efforts to force Madero to resign. The parents of the hapless President had addressed that same day in the morning, a note to Mr. Wilson requesting him, as ranking member of the Diplomatic Corps, to intercede on behalf of their sons. When they wrote, they were not aware as yet that Gustavo Madero had been assassinated at dawn. They begged the Cuban Minister and the Japanese Charge d'Affaires to personally convey their message to the Ambassador and to urge him to call a meeting of his colleagues. Messrs. Marquez Sterling and Hari-goutchi knew well what to expect for they had been present the evening before at the interview between the American Ambassador and the Chilean Minister. They therefore hastened to the Embassy where in the presence of several of the foreign representatives, notably Mr. Cologan, Minister from Spain, with due ceremony, they delivered their message. Mr. Wilson after taking note of the context, folded the paper and put it in his pocket, saying that the affair did not concern him at all. The Cuban Minister protested that the letter was not a private communica-

tion to the Ambassador, but an appeal to the Diplomatic Corps as a body, that therefore it was they and not the Ambassador who should decide the matter. The Japanese Charge d'Affaires seconded this opinion. Impelled by this opinion, Mr. Wilson handed the letter from Mr. and Mrs. Madero to the Spanish Minister.* On reading it, Mr. Cologan became highly incensed at Mr. Wilson's attitude and declared that they should make every possible effort to save the lives of the imprisoned officials. He further declared that if Mr. Wilson refused to issue a call for a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps, he himself as Dean would issue the necessary call and would lay before the Diplomats the attitude of the representative of the United States. After a very heated discussion, throughout which the Spanish Minister remained firm and unmoved, Ambassador Wilson consented to send a request to the new administration not to impose too severe a punishment on the ex-President. The gentlemen present openly opposed any such action for they rightly judged that such a step would be a tacit admission that Madero should be punished and they realized that by so expressing themselves, they would be overstepping their functions as foreign representatives in Mexico. They could only interpose in the name of humanity; above all, because they had been invoked by the parents of one of the victims to save the lives of the prisoners; but it was not for them to judge the actions of either those on one side or those on the other.

It then seemed as if the Ambassador gave in, for he suggested that the Diplomats go to General Huerta and request him to spare the life of Madero. He urged however, that care should be taken not to call upon the authority of their respective governments, since as a matter of fact, he himself had not received any instructions. His argument was that if the petition should be made in the name of the respective governments, the new officials would refuse their request so as not to give the world the idea that they had been coerced. When this proposal was accepted, Mr. Wilson offered to speak personally to Don Felix Diaz about the matter. The Spanish and the Cuban Ministers took charge of the affair and went immediately to the Palace. They were unable to see General Huerta there, but spoke instead to General Blanquete,

*According to diplomatic usage, the Ambassador presides over the Diplomatic Corps regardless of the date of his appointment; next to him in rank follows the Dean, who is that Minister whose official reception dates back the farthest.

who informed them that nobody had ever thought of killing Madero; that if he should resign, on that very same day he would be conducted under suitable guard to Vera Cruz where he would be allowed to board the first steamer sailing from that port. The Cuban Minister placed at their disposal the Cuban gunboat anchored at Vera Cruz for the deportation of Madero and his family. Then they discussed the details of the journey, even going so far as to consider who would be the best person to put in command of the escort of the ex-President. "It is necessary," said one of those present, "that the leader of this escort should be not an irresponsible subaltern but an officer of rank, who will appreciate the responsibility of his position." "There is no objection to that," said General Blanquete, "in fact, the escort will be commanded by a General designated by Mr. Madero himself." Everything seemed satisfactorily arranged but the Diplomats, still desiring to have General Huerta confirm the words of General Blanquete, went up stairs to the President's suite. Here they met Rodolfo Reyes, who immediately began to express to them his regrets at the tragic end of Gustavo Madero and Mr. Basso, head of the President's household. The Diplomats remembered Mr. Basso because at a reception given by the President on February 1st, they had had reason to praise the good taste and tact which Mr. Basso had displayed in his arrangements. Therefore, when they heard he had been killed, they naturally asked the reasons which had led to his assassination. Reyes replied that he did not know the reasons but that he regretted the occurrence; then covering his face with his hands, as if in deep sorrow, he said: "I suppose my friends killed Basso because it was he who killed my father." Greatly alarmed at this news, Messrs. Sterling and Cologan insistently demanded an interview with General Huerta in order to fulfil their mission, but without avail. Nobody seemed to know where General Huerta was. Unable to see General Huerta, the diplomats went to the apartments where Madero, Pino Suarez and General Felipe Angeles were confined. Mr. Madero, surrounded by a majority of his Cabinet, was gently chiding Mr. Vazquez Tagle for having refused to shake hands with Huerta. As soon as he learned the mission of the diplomats, he agreed to resign, but he stated that he would place the resignation in the hands of the Chilean Minister who would turn it over to the proper authorities only after the prisoners were safely aboard the Cuban cruiser.

The resignation was quickly drawn up and signed by Madero and Pino Suarez. Mr. Lascurain took it to show to General Huerta. Everything was now arranged. Madero with his short-sightedness, named General Angeles as commander of the guard which was to escort him to Vera Cruz. It was pointed out to him that this would be impossible since General Angeles himself was a prisoner and that such a choice would awaken the suspicions of his jailors. But argument was useless. The President would not yield the point. Still believing in his power, he thought that by such a course he could save himself as well as the prisoner for whom he had a great affection. He stubbornly clung to his idea and it was impossible to swerve him from his purpose. As usual, Madero through his obsessions was hastening events, rendering useless all efforts to save him. General Huerta would undoubtedly suspect that it was a trick. Madero with General Angeles in command of the escort, could frustrate his ambitions and nullify all his efforts, so naturally he would not sanction such a choice. Madero was personally signing his own death sentence.

It was then and there decided that the prisoners should proceed that very night to Vera Cruz accompanied in their journey by the Cuban Minister and the Japanese Charge d'Affaires. The hour of departure was set for ten o'clock that night, and Madero requested the Cuban Minister to be at the prison at least two hours earlier. When all these arrangements had been made, without the knowledge or consent of General Huerta, the diplomats again sought Huerta, but again without avail. They were unable to find him and were able to see only de la Barra and Vera Estañol, who assured them of the safety of the prisoners. They then returned to their respective homes hardly satisfied by the assurances they had received.

Mr. Lascurain, Don Ernesto Madero, and Don Jaime Gurza had gone with the resignation in their hands to see General Huerta. The interview was a lengthy one. General Huerta considered it out of place to allow the Foreign Diplomats to meddle in the political affairs of the country. He maintained that the resignation should immediately be placed in the hands of Congress, adding that if this were not done, he refused all responsibility in the matter. The army and the populace were both at a high pitch of excitement; the followers of Felix Diaz were clamoring for a brutal slaughter; he himself had that very morning been

seriously compromised by his repeated refusals to deliver the prisoners to the men at the Ciudadela, who, he held, were really the stronger party. He had heard rumors of an assault on the Palace with the object of murdering the entire Madero family. He claimed that he himself could exert no authority until the power was turned over to him; besides, he greatly feared that if this act were delayed much longer, deplorable events would take place; still, he refused to accept any responsibility whatever because he feared the soldiers would not obey his commands. If the resignation should be withheld, there might be uprisings, for the suppression of which he did not have at hand the necessary resources. If uprisings were to break out, a veritable slaughter would result, for the populace was infuriated. Moreover, all the followers of Felix Diaz were hourly adding fuel to the flames and not one of the family would be saved. The only salvation for all would be to make his power real and effective by turning over to him the presidency. He could then assume all responsibility and he would then have the right to impose his authority with the certainty that the army would obey him.

Mr. Lascurain agreed that the Diplomatic Corps should not be allowed to mix in the affairs, but he hesitated to hand over the resignation. Then, in order that the transference of power should be accomplished in strict accordance with the Constitution, it was agreed that the resignations of Madero and Pino Suarez be formerly accepted. Mr. Lascurain, as Secretary of State, would according to law, assume the presidency; he would at once appoint General Huerta, Secretary of the Interior, after which he himself would resign, thus leaving General Huerta Constitutional President. Huerta assured them that in this way everything could be satisfactorily arranged; that he would answer for the lives of all, but only if immediate steps were taken so as to forestall any move on the part of the men in the Ciudadela. The picture thus painted before the eyes of Mr. Lascurain and his colleagues in those moments was one to cause real anguish. Mr. Lascurain still wavering, conferred with his companions and with some of the members of the Madero family. They all were of the opinion that necessity forced them to accept the harsh terms imposed by General Huerta in whose hands lay the fate of them all; but they were also of the opinion that guarantees must be exacted from Huerta. Mr. Lascurain returned to General Huerta and requested adequate guarantees for the lives of

Madero and Pino Suarez. "All that you like," replied Huerta, "you must either repose full confidence in me or none at all. If you do not give me this confidence, it is useless to continue this interview." He abruptly stopped talking, put his hand inside his shirt and drew out a scapulary, a medal of Our Lady of Guadalupe, and another of the Sacred Heart, which hung around his neck on a gold chain. "These," he said, "were placed around my neck by my mother; by her memory, and by these sacred images I swear to you that I will not allow any one to make any attempt against the life of Mr. Madero." Saying this, he solemnly kissed the sacred medals. Mr. Lascurain, an honorable man and a devout Catholic, was fully convinced by this act and delivered into his hand the resignation.

All present at once proceeded to the House of Representatives, after having made the necessary preparations for the appointment of General Huerta as Secretary of the Interior, the swearing into office and subsequent resignation of Mr. Lascurain as Provisional President of the Republic. They found the Representatives already assembled. Roll call was omitted because the affair was pressing, and because it would not be necessary to prove that there had been a quorum at this session. Everybody was called and everyone at hand was urged to enter the room. All were excitedly discussing the affair when the House was abruptly called to order and the resignations of Madero and Pino Suarez were read. Only five Congressmen voted against the motion to accept these resignations. These five were: Leopoldo Hurtado y Espinosa, Antonio Alarcon, Manuel Mendez, Francisco Escudero, and Luis Manuel Rojas.*

Following the acceptance of this motion, the message of Mr. Lascurain, in which he appointed General Huerta as Secretary of the Interior, was read; then followed the resignation of Mr. Lascurain, which was at once accepted. General Huerta and his aides had not for one moment quitted the room in which the session was held. They closely followed each move and probably prepared to take measures, no matter how extreme, to force their plan through. But its accomplishment was assured. The House of Representatives of the 26th Constitutional Congress offered no opposition; it ignored the question of a quorum, and in no

*Copy of the minutes of the session will be found in the *Diario de los Debates*.

way did it try to ascertain whether or not the officials were acting with entire freedom in a matter of such great importance. A few of the members of the House privately verified the signatures on the resignations as authentic. The Secretary of the Treasury could swear to them, if the honesty of Mr. Lascurain was not sufficient guarantee. The argument of terror was used against Mr. Lascurain. Against the Congressmen General Huerta did not even take that trouble. The followers of Don Felix Diaz took all the necessary trouble. Huerta dominated with his mere presence.

The cowardice of the House made matters easy. That night, Huerta officially became Provisional President of Mexico. Immediately after taking the oath of office, he retired and no one was able to see him.

In the meantime, the Madero family had arrived at the apartments of the Palace where Madero was confined. The President embraced his mother saying: "I do not know what blindfold God put over my eyes that did not let me see what Gustavo was pointing out to me." "My son," answered his mother, "this is no time for reproaches, we must pray God to save the living and with his divine mercy to pardon the dead." Until that moment Mr. Madero had been unaware of the death of his brother, for he had not been permitted to read the newspapers containing the accounts of the occurrence nor had any of his visitors dared tell him about the affair. Shortly thereafter, the family left in order to make preparations of the journey.

Mr. Pino Suarez had written a long letter to his wife, which he delivered, together with all the money he had at hand, to the Cuban Minister, Mr. Marquez Sterling, who true to his word, had arrived not two but nearly three hours ahead of the appointed time, in order to accompany the prisoners on their contemplated journey. Ernesto Madero also came on a visit. The President questioned him closely, but he hesitated to answer and put him off in every possible way even to leaving the room with the excuse that he had to telephone. Finally, however, he was so pressed by the President's questions that he reluctantly confessed that Mr. Madero's resignation had, in spite of his express orders to the contrary, been presented to General Huerta as the only means of saving the lives of all of them. Madero then cried: "I have fallen a second time into the trap set by that man! Run, run," he said to Ernesto Madero, "and tell Lascurain not

to resign until we have all arrived at Vera Cruz." Don Ernesto left at once, but returned shortly, saying, "I arrived too late. Huerta is already President and is even now arriving at the Palace after taking the oath of office before Congress." In fact, the Palace guards had just rendered the honors to the new president.

"We are lost," said Madero, "no one can save me from two years in the Penitentiary at the very least." Poor Madero! Not for one moment did the possibility of his assassination enter his head. Pino Suarez on the other hand was not at all optimistic as to the end. He sat without saying a word, with his elbows on his knees and his head bowed down on his hands. He was thinking of his family, of his children, all of them very young, who were to be left orphans and even perhaps in dire need. At intervals Pino Suarez would toss his head as if trying to shake off the thoughts that obstinately occurred, but he would again fall into the silent and deep meditation in which he was wrapt. His wife arrived and they both exchanged a few words. Suarez took the letter and articles which he had turned over to the Cuban Minister and handed them to her. Both fully appreciating the gravity of the position made the interview short. He seemed especially desirous of making it very brief. It may be that he wished to prevent his wife from witnessing the tragedy which he was momentarily expecting, for just as soon as she left the apartments, the Vice President gave a sigh of relief.

Night fell, it was getting late, but still no preparations for the journey were visible. General Angeles observed that the sentries were being changed frequently and that the officer of the guard must have received new orders, because his attitude had undergone a change. As soon as this observation had been made, Madero sent messengers to inquire what the trouble was, but none of the messengers returned. They were "incomunicados." Gradually one after another of Madero's visitors left. The Cuban Minister was the only one to remain. He had been requested to do so by Mr. Ernesto Madero who feared lest something would happen to Madero and his fellow prisoners. The diplomat consented to remain, thinking that his presence might prevent the assassination of the prisoners that night.

After Don Ernesto Madero had withdrawn, Madero recovered his usual poise. Once convinced that the journey would not be undertaken, he had been unwilling to force the Cuban

Minister to pass an uncomfortable night, but he finally consented to allow him to remain, owing to the insistence of Mr. Marquez Sterling himself and to that of Don Ernesto Madero, who in order to convince him, suggested the possibility that the journey might perhaps have only been postponed until dawn. He made a couch for Mr. Sterling with three chairs and a blanket and then fixed one in the same way for himself. He persuaded the Minister to lie down, and covered him with another blanket; then rolling himself in another, he lay down, and very soon fell into a heavy sleep. Mr. Pino Suarez remained all night in the position I have described.

Mr. Lascurain, after he had relinquished the reins of government held by him for so short a time, left the House in search of the Cuban Minister. He went to the legation to accompany him to the station; not finding him there, he went directly to the station of Buena Vista, where he found the rest of the Madero family waiting; but no Madero arrived. They telephoned to the Palace but no one seemed to know what the trouble was. At least, after a delay of two hours, they were able to speak to Colonel Maas, nephew of General Huerta and Chief of Staff. The Colonel informed them that President Huerta had retired and had forgotten to sign the necessary orders. All understood by this that the journey would not be undertaken, and departed. Lascurain first accompanied the members of the Madero family to their temporary residence and then retired to his own home.

On the following morning, breakfast was served as usual at the Palace, but Pino Suarez with a dread that it might contain poison, did not wish to allow the Cuban Minister to taste it. But Mr. Sterling in order to encourage the prisoners, quickly picked up a glass containing milk and took a sip. This act calmed the fears of Pino Suarez and they at once ate a hearty breakfast.

That day Mr. Lascurain accompanied by Mr. Vazquez Tagle and Mr. Gurza, made many efforts to see General Huerta, but all were futile. The new President was very busy owing to the fact that he had to assist at the swearing in of his new Cabinet. He had to attend to a great many urgent and important matters and therefore requested Mr. Lascurain and his companions to excuse him, saying that he would see them later. On the following day it was also impossible to obtain an audience with the

Provisional President; he was again too busy. He had to receive the Diplomatic Corps and to attend to pressing affairs.

Then Mr. Lascurain and his companions attempted to speak with General Blanquete but were unable to do even that. They saw Mr. de la Barra and Mr. Vera Estañol.* These two gentlemen assured them that the lives of Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez were in no danger, that they would be transferred to the penitentiary. Permission was granted to Lascurain and Vazquez Tagle and Gurza to see Madero. In this interview, Lascurain explained to Madero why his orders in reference to the resignation had not been followed in strict compliance with the ex-President's instructions, whereupon Madero embraced Mr. Lascurain with warm expressions of his gratitude for what had been done.

After his Cabinet had left, Madero turned to Pino Suarez saying with a smile: "If I ever become head of the government again I will not have as my advisers men whose very courtesy and kindness makes them half men. I will surround myself exclusively with men who are really men."

Mr. Madero did not lose his illusions even in the most tragic moments of his life. At the very instant when he was alluding to the possibility of coming into power, his death had already been decided upon. At the very moment, in fact, his executioners were discussing the way in which he should be assassinated. He was day dreaming while his assassins, always alert, were preparing the scaffold on which he would be consecrated as a martyr!

*On his way with Mr. Gurza, they met Alberto Robles Gil, who told them that the new Cabinet were badly disposed against Madero and wished to execute him, that he opposed it and would continue opposing it, but feared he would be overruled. All this was related to me by Mr. Gurza himself.

CHAPTER XXX.

THE DEATH OF MADERO.*

On February 22nd, 1913, the Cabinet met, as usual, at eleven o'clock in the morning. Besides the Cabinet officers, there were present expressly invited for the occasion, General Felix Diaz and General Aureliano Blanquete, Military Commander of the city and a blind instrument of Huerta.

General Blanquete announced that as he himself did not wish to shoulder the legal responsibilities in a case of such impor-

*The facts related in this chapter were given to me by a close friend of General Huerta. Later on, after the chapter was written, it was read by ex-Governor Enrique Zepeda who, in the presence of Lic Vicente Sanchez Gutierrez said this description of the facts is a perfect picture of the events.

While I was in New York, at the suggestion of Mr. Calero, I called on Mr. Toribio Esquivel Obregon and also on Mr. Jorge Vera y Estañol, both Cabinet Ministers of General Huerta when Madero was murdered. These gentlemen claimed that the version was wrong, as they didn't have any thing to do with the death of Madero, and they even denied positively that they knew anything about the events at that time. They were unable to convince me that my version is wrong. They contradicted each other and carried no weight as evidence against the facts as related to me by an eye witness.

Mr. Calero acknowledged that General Huerta told him that when the facts are cleared up the public will be convinced that he had nothing to do with Madero's death. The same statement was clearly sustained by Mr. José Maria Lozano, Secretary of Public Works, in a speech delivered at Xochimilco and cabled to "Le Matin" a Paris newspaper which published it on the 30th of March, 1914.

Furthermore, this chapter was published in its full extension by Mr. M. Marquez Sterling, Cuban Minister in Mexico when Madero was murdered, and now chief editor of El Heraldo de Cuba, of Havana, on the 14th of April, 1914 issue of that daily paper.

tance and delicacy, it would be necessary for the Cabinet to decide the fate of Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez. Mr. Rodolfo Reyes, Attorney General, opened the discussion by stating that in his opinion it was essential that they be executed in order to remove any possibility of a counter revolution, which would nullify the sacrifices already made and the blood already shed. This opinion was very decidedly seconded by General Mondragon, Secretary of War, but Mr. Alberto Robles Gil, Secretary of Public Works, opposed it although he too believed essential the death of Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez. He claimed that the psychological moment had passed, and that in politics, such an act committed after the psychological moment becomes a crime which can scarcely be condoned.

However, the Cabinet as a whole emphatically supported the Attorney General, and the most prominent member argued that without the death of the ex-functionaries a counter revolution would be inevitable; and, as such a revolution could be initiated only in their name, it would be a greater crime for the Cabinet to force the Nation to further bloodshed. The debate was now becoming heated, when General Victoriano Huerta, President ad interim, who had hitherto maintained silence, interposed, saying he placed his honor as a soldier above all political expediency. He had pledged his word that the lives of Madero and Pino Suarez would be respected, and therefore could countenance no form of discussion other than the legal means for bringing them to trial, nor could he authorize their death unless legally sentenced. In answer to this statement, Mr. Reyes observed that such a course would lead to immunity for their crimes; because, he argued, granted that they were convicted by the Courts, it would be practically impossible to carry out the sentence of death which would surely be imposed, as the President ad interim would find it hard to refuse the pardon that would be undoubtedly urged by the rulers of the World Powers and thousands of other people. General Huerta thereupon promised to take no definite action without the consent of the Cabinet, and closed the discussion by placing the matter in the hands of the Attorney General for his legal decision regarding the Department which should have the custody of the prisoners. Without adjourning the session he immediately retired to another room accompanied by the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Toribio Esquivel Obregon, the only member who had not express-

ed a single opinion on the matter, and by his private secretary, Mr. Aurelio D. Canale, who had just arrived with a number of urgent telegrams.

Hardly had General Huerta left the room, than General Blanquete, Military Commander of the City, bluntly stated that if the Cabinet deemed important the death of Madero and Pino Suarez it would be necessary to execute them without the knowledge of the President as his statements left no doubt that he would never give his consent. The discussion was re-opened and at length it was agreed against the opinion of Secretary Robles Gil (*) that the welfare of the nation demanded the sacrifice of those two lives. This decision had no sooner been reached, than the Military Commander who had opened the discussion and had intimated that he himself would carry out the execution without the President's knowledge, now claimed that as a soldier he could not disobey the orders of the President and could therefore give no orders for the execution. He proceeded to explain, however, that he could, if so ordered by the Secretary of War, deliver the prisoners to the Secretary of the Interior. Under the latter's jurisdiction the execution could be placed in the hands of the rurales who are not so directly under the command of the President owing to the fact that the Military Code is not incumbent upon them. His plan, he continued, was to have a sham attempt at rescue in the course of which the prisoners should be killed. With this end in view, he already had in mind the officer of Rurales whom he could recommend as best fitted to carry out the execution and in whom the greatest confidence could be placed. The plan was finally accepted, but not before the Military Commander had twice requested Mr. Felix Diaz who up to that time had not uttered a single word, to express his opinion on the subject, insisting pointedly upon a reply, so as to force him to acknowledge his concurrence with the Cabinet. General Diaz finally admitted that he, like the Secretary of War, considered the death of Madero and Pino Suarez indispensable. No sooner had this acknowledgment been made, than General Blanquete proposed that immediate action should be taken. The receipt for the change of custody of the prisoners was then and there drawn up by the Attorney General, Rodolfo Reyes, signed by the Secretary

*See note on page 194.

of the Interior, Alberto Garcia Granados, and handed to the Military Commander.* At the urgent request of General Blanquete, the Secretary of War and General Felix Diaz promised to leave to Mr. Cecilio Ocon the task of assembling men to make the sham attack on the escort which was to convey the prisoners to the Penitentiary. Mr. Ocon had been paymaster of the forces in the Ciudadela and was therefore in touch with the kind of people demanded for such an occasion. General Blanquete further agreed to make arrangements at once with the officer of Rurales for the assassination of the doomed man. This officer was Francisco Cárdenas,† Major of the 7th Corps, who during the past few months had been stationed in the District of Lerma, State of Mexico, under the direct command of General Blanquete.

General Huerta's entry from an adjoining room in response to a summons from the Military Commander, broke up the Cabinet meeting shortly afterwards, and thereupon Generals Mondragon and Blanquete hastened to the office of the War Department to issue orders for the official delivery of the prisoners, explaining the plan of action agreed upon to Mr. Cecilio Ocon, who held some position in the War Department. General Blanquete suggested the advisability of having the assaulting party made up of men of the detective force so as to prevent the affair from coming to light and to this end Mr. Ocon was commissioned to confer with Mr. Celso Acosta, Inspector General of Police. Upon being approached, Mr. Acosta decided that it would be more advisable to have men from the police rather than from the detective force, and immediately issued orders that ten armed men of the mounted police in civilian dress place themselves under Mr. Ocon's orders.

In the meantime the Military Commander, returning to his office, ordered that the guard in charge of the prisoners be relieved by the 7th Corps of Rurales under command of Major Cárdenas. He also ordered Colonel Ballesteros, in the name of the President, to take charge of the Penitentiary immediately and come to an understanding with Major Cárdenas. But as Mr. Ocon already had had a personal interview with the major and

*Mr. Blanquete says he is not guilty of the murder, because both Mr. Madero and Mr. Pino Suarez were out of his control, as proved by a document in his possession signed by Secretary of Interior Garcia Granados.

†See Chapter XXVII "An Orgy of Blood."

had planned with him all the details, Cárdenas told Ballesteros that for the present there was nothing further to be done, so Ballesteros confined himself to the management of the Penitentiary, which he held for three days.*

That night the President and Cabinet Ministers attended the reception given by the American Ambassador to celebrate Washington's birthday. Whilst at the Embassy the great American's birthday was being celebrated, and toasts were being drunk to one people's freedom, another people's freedom was being violated at the National Palace, when, a few minutes before eleven p. m. General Chicarro accompanied by Major Cárdenas was entering the room in which Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez were sleeping and was informing them of his orders to transfer them immediately to the Penitentiary. In spite of objections by Mr. Pino Suarez, they were obliged to dress quickly and were hustled into two automobiles, Mr. Francisco I. Madero, Major Cárdenas and a Rural entering one, and Mr. José Maria Pino Suarez, Officer of Rurales Rafael Pimienta, and another Rural, the other.† They rode through Relox, Cocheras and Lecumberri Streets to the Penitentiary and upon arriving there, Cárdenas left the automobile and exchanged a few words with Colonel Ballesteros. He then reentered the automobile and headed towards the rear of the Penitentiary where the men sent by Mr. Ocon were waiting. Mr. Madero, rather surprised, asked "Where are we going?" "We are going in the back way," answered the Major. "But there is no entrance there," remonstrated Madero, but had time to say no more for at that moment the assaulting party fired a volley into the air and the machines were brought to a sudden halt. Major Cárdenas alighted and turning to Madero he said, "Get down, get down quickly or one of those fellows may kill you." Madero, always trustful, stepped down without a word, whereupon Major Cárdenas fired on him from behind, the bullet entering his head, killing him instantly. Mr. Pino Suarez, who from the moment they had been awakened had suspected what was in the air and had so told Madero, refused to move, but was forced to do so by blows and pushes from his escort. No sooner was he out of the machine than Pimienta

*Afterwards Mr. Ballesteros was promoted to Brigadier General and was put in charge of the Penitentiary in October last.

†I learned these details from Major Cárdenas himself.

fired on him, but either through nervousness or poor aim, the bullet did not inflict a mortal wound. He fell, however, but quickly picking himself up dashed away, shouting, "Help! Murder!" Hearing the cry, Cárdenas, from the other automobile darted after him and fired with deadly aim. Pino Suarez fell to the ground mortally wounded, and the police were ordered to finish the work by firing on the prostrate form. Cárdenas himself discharged a final shot, the coup de grace, into the dead man's head. He then turned to where the lifeless body of Mr. Madero lay stretched upon the ground, and fired again into the head of the hapless ex-President, although death had been instantaneous. The bodies were then taken into the Penitentiary where Mr. Madero's was wrapped in a red blanket and Mr. Suarez's in a gray one, and both interred in one of the yards of the building. No sooner was this done than the leaders informed the Military Commander and the Inspector General of Police by telephone that the escort of Messrs. Madero and Suarez had been attacked and the prisoners had been killed in the encounter. General Blanquete, who had slept all night at Military Headquarters at once personally communicated the news to General Huerta who was in the same building because he had moved his private residence to the National Palace. The President had just arrived from the American Embassy where he had spent most of the night in conversation with Mr. Henry Lane Wilson, and on hearing what had happened then and there ordered an immediate special meeting of the Cabinet. One of the official advisers of General Huerta carried the farce so far as to ask the Military Commander over the phone what the trouble was and whether the business in hand was really important, as he was very tired. On being informed by General Blanquete personally as to what had happened, he replied that he would leave at once for the Capitol. The President also gave orders that an aide be sent to request the immediate presence of the American Ambassador at the Palace. When the Cabinet officers had assembled they related to the President what had happened, making it clear that Mr. Felix Diaz, who was considered as sharing the power with him, had been in full accord with the occurrence, and that measures had been taken to prevent the disclosure of the plot at the inquest. Furthermore, they declared, a letter from Mrs. Madero, which could easily be interpreted as a plan of rescue, had been found in the room

where Madero had been imprisoned, and this could easily be used to place the blame for the entire occurrence on the Madero family. Besides, the autopsy would disclose that the bullets did not belong to any of the escort.* The President was further appraised of the fact that rather than run the risk of having the plans overturned by some unexpected change of judges in the civil courts, it had been deemed advisable to place the case in charge of the Military Courts, over whom more effective control could be exercised. Upon learning all that had occurred, the President expressed his chagrin but declared the necessity of submitting to the inevitable by accepting accomplished facts. The Military Commander, who had previously ordered the burial of the bodies of Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez, now telephoned that they be at once exhumed and washed and that the autopsy be held. For this he detailed an army surgeon in whom he had entire confidence.

Two courses of action were now open to the President, as he told to his close friends, in the situation officially created by his Cabinet Ministers: Either to break at once with the men of the Ciudadela, or to accept the fraudulent story of an assault in the course of which the two former officials met their death. General Huerta, on learning the situation from his advisers, lamented the course events had taken. He declared to his friends with the request that they make public his sentiments, that he would never forgive his Cabinet for what they had done, but that at that moment he lacked the necessary strength to oppose the triumphant partisans of Felix Diaz, and in consequence felt obliged to accept the version given him by those in charge of the execution. Thus did Huerta choose the second alternative. Thereupon, it was officially announced that a mob intent on rescuing Messrs. Madero and Pino Suarez had assaulted the autos and that in the ensuing fight the two prisoners had been killed by the mob. The autopsy was held and the bodies were placed in zinc-lined coffins which were tightly sealed and delivered for burial to the respective families of the dead officials. The body of Mr. Madero was placed in the French Cemetery where it rests in a grave near the entrance, and that of Mr. Pino Suarez was buried in the Spanish Cemetery. Both rest in foreign soil!

*The arms of the Rurales are Mauser 0.0075 and the Mounted Police were armed that night with Remington 0.44.

As soon as the Cabinet meeting adjourned, the President hastened to Military Headquarters where Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson awaited him.* It was there that the latter gentleman composed the telegram to his government stating what had occurred, and right from Military Headquarters telephoned for an employee of the Embassy to call for it. The version given to the United States contained the lie that the escort of Madero and Pino Suarez had been attacked and the prisoners killed in the skirmish.

But the public was not deceived, and to everybody the real instigator of the crime was General Huerta. The Cabinet had fallen into a skillful trap and had assumed the role of instigators of an assassination that the President and his close friends had planned with cunning.

On the following day Mr. Toribio Esquivel Obregon, Secretary of the Treasury, upon learning what had happened, tendered his resignation, but the President flatly refused to accept it, saying, "No, my friend, it would be very fine for you like Pontius Pilate, to wash your hands, but such things don't go with me. Together we all came into power, and together we'll all go to Hell if necessary, with equal responsibilities; but you cannot palm these two dead men on us." The gesture of General Huerta was so forceful that the Minister did not dare to insist upon his resignation. This resignation, however, the President was soon to demand, as his remark about hanging together was merely one of the jests characteristic of him; and in fact, he was eventually, half in jest and half in earnest, to demand the resignation of every single member of that Cabinet. He had appointed them because it had been so exacted of him by General Felix Diaz and his friends at the critical time when he was obliged to make it appear that he was coerced by the rebels of the Ciudadela to betray the government of Madero, and he had appointed them particularly because that was the surest way for him to obtain the Presidency which, after all, was really his ulti-

*When this chapter was published in the "New York Times," Mr. Henry Lane Wilson in an interview published six days later, claimed that this narrative was of my own malicious fabrication, but he produced no evidence to prove it; on the other hand the facts were related to me by an eye witness, who was at military headquarters that evening, and said that he had seen Mr. Henry Lane Wilson there, so I cannot change my opinion.

mate aim. For, the American Ambassador had given his consent and had accepted in the name of the Diplomatic Corps, the proposed Cabinet. In General Huerta's opinion at that particular moment, this assured the recognition by all the Powers of the government over which he was about to preside, and as such a recognition was essential to enable him to obtain the loan which it was imperative to negotiate, he consented to everything. But, finding himself secure in power after having gained the recognition of the Powers and obtained the loan, General Huerta had no further use for these Ministers who had been forced upon him by Felix Diaz at the American Embassy, and therefore would displace them in short order. Such was the intention of the new President when he appointed them, and this intention as we shall see, was carried out within six months.

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE MONEY ORGY.

The felicistas were delighted. Mr. Rodolfo Reyes and the friends of Felix Diaz believed that the so-called compact of the Ciudadela gave them power perhaps for all time. They believed that they had deceived General Huerta, when in fact they themselves were being deceived by him. As a whole, the Cabinet met with public approval, firstly, because the new incumbents were considered more competent than the men who had been ousted; secondly, because it promised the reestablishment of peace which was craved by all; and thirdly, because it assured the withdrawal of Madero from the government, which the public desired being convinced that it was worse than the administration of General Diaz. Besides, the general impression was that Huerta was an intelligent man. It was natural therefore that the people, tired of so many revolutions, should be ready and glad to countenance the new government. There were some skeptics among us who believed that the collapse of the government was a thing of the near future. We were called disaffected and accused of lack of patriotism, but the fact was that aside of its treacherous origin we knew the men identified with the government; we knew the history of each; we knew just what each was worth, and consequently we could well foresee what their real work would be. Unfortunately, we were not mistaken. The public itself soon began to lose all hope in them. The Cabinet, instead of dedicating itself to the task of finding a way to reconciliation and harmony for the purpose of obliterating the memory of recent events and of joining all Mexicans as one family, chose rather to seek revenge for old wrongs which had absolutely no connection whatever with the existing situation. Some of the Cabinet members took even a more practical view of affairs and began a veritable despoliation of the national coffers. The War Department principally was the scene of the

most scandalous outrages ever recorded in the history of our country in the frauds perpetrated against the Treasury. I will set forth some examples.

During Madero's administration the Inspector of the Commissary Department had refused from a factory "La Estrella," in which the Maderos had an interest, a lot of four thousand uniforms. These uniforms were now accepted at two and one-half dollars more per uniform than allowed by the official schedules. It is needless to state that General Mondragon, Secretary of War, and a son of the President both received very liberal commissions for this act. The same thing was done in the purchase of two thousand horses to replace the losses suffered by the cavalry. The contractor should have delivered the horses at \$65.00 per head, but the government paid for them at the rate of \$130.00. For sandals—a special kind in general use among the lower classes in Mexico—the government was charged one dollar and a half more per dozen than the value; the same thing happened with cartridge boxes, with saddles for the cavalry, and in fact with whatever supplies were needed for the army. All these purchases naturally meant a heavy commission for the Secretary of War, and some of them meant an additional rake off for one or another member of the President's family. General Mondragon made contracts for everything, uniforms, arms, belts, ships, aeroplanes, etc., etc., in such quantities as would obviate further purchases for years to come.

One of the higher employees made a compilation which showed that if all the contracts made by Mondragon during the four months he was in office had been carried out, his commissions would have reached the inconceivable sum of \$3,460,000.00. And this in only four months!

What was happening in the War Department was also happening in other departments. In the Department of the Interior, the needs of the Rurales and the police were filled for years to come; in the Department of Public Instruction, such supplies, for instance, as paper which was sold to the general public at one dollar ninety cents, was charged up to the government at two dollars and sixty-five cents. In all justice to Mr. Garcia Granados, I must state that all the grafting in his department was done entirely without his knowledge.

Everybody wanted to make big deals in order to accumulate a fortune in a few days. It seemed as if the government

was the only source of riches; and the men, judging that the new government could not exist very long, sought to embrace the opportunity at hand. When it was learned that the government desired to float a loan, hundreds of proposals poured in. All posed as representatives of foreign syndicates, each more powerful than the other, and all used every influence possible to be the chosen ones. Mondragon, who naturally could not be expected to let such an opportunity slip through his fingers, pretended to represent a group of French capitalists and made every effort to obtain the option. Mr. Moheno and several others also used the same plans. Among the most unique and worthy of note was Mr. José R. Aspe.

This gentleman had originally been a very vehement Porfirista. In fact he made a very heated speech in the House on the day the resignation of General Diaz was accepted.* After the fall of Porfirio Diaz, he had figured as a firm supporter of Mr. Madero whom he accompanied every day on his morning constitutional through the woods of Chapultepec. He had succeeded in obtaining an appointment as representative from the district of Misantla in the State of Vera Cruz, the bloody details of which I have set forth in another chapter.† Later he was appointed Minister from Mexico to Italy, but his credentials were never issued because Mr. Esteva, who occupied the post for many years, successfully fought against his removal. After the victorious uprising against Madero, Mr. Aspe suddenly remembered that he had been a classmate of Felix Diaz in the Military Academy and joined the ranks of the Felicista party in support of his old classmate, playing an important role before the House for the acceptance of Madero's resignation. He then attempted to obtain an option for the loan which was about to be floated in Europe. He made a bid, justifiable in itself, but it happened that the Secretary of the Treasury, at a loss what to do with the many proposals received, and by the many requests for options, finally telegraphed to Paris regarding the responsibility of the firm of which Mr. Aspe posed as agent. The answer he received was that the firm did not exist in Paris and was not even known in the Paris business world, or rather, cables from Paris were being sent with the signature of a man who had not authorized the

*See Chapter II.

†In the complete Spanish edition.

use of his name and did not even desire to have any connection whatever with the loan. The letters made public by the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Esquivel Obregon, show clearly the audacity of some persons and at the same time prove the authenticity of these statements. The letters were as follows:

A letter from Representative Aspe and a reply thereto from the Secretary of the Treasury.

Mexico, June 24th, 1913.

To the Editor of the *Imparcial*,
Addressed.

Dear Sir: I beg to request that if convenient, you will kindly publish in your paper the enclosed letter which is a copy of one I am today addressing to the Secretary of the Treasury and National Credit.

Thanking you in advance for the courtesy of your columns, I am

Yours very truly,

J. R. Aspe.

Mexico, June 24th, 1913.

The Honorable Secretary of the Treasury,
The Honorable Mr. Toribio Esquivel Obregon.

Sir: I have just read in today's paper the reply you make to an open letter addressed to you by Representative Querido Moheno, relative to the loan or contemplated loan, in which you make some statements referring to the proposals I had the honor to make you.

Not desiring to interrupt the progress of the affair, which I sincerely trust will be successfully consummated, I nevertheless reserve to myself the right of proving minutely and decisively the honesty and advantages of my proposals. At the same time, I wish to take advantage of the time limit you publicly set, the 26th inst., on which day the truth of the facts can be conclusively proved.

However, since the reply to which I refer, is not substantiated by your signature, since some of the statements contained therein may not perhaps be entirely authentic, and since any corrections I might now offer could only serve to complicate the situation, I limit myself to request that you be kind enough to answer the following points:

1. Do you confirm the statement that you are in receipt of a "cable from the Financial Agent of the Mexican Government in London advising you in the name of the Syndicate itself (Syndicat des Banquiers de Province) that this syndicate had no interest whatsoever in the affair"?

2. Do you confirm the statement "That the accredited representative in Mexico of this Syndicate (Syndicat des Banquiers de Province) has denied that his firm was interested in the loan"?

3. Do you confirm the statement that "to a cable sent by the Treasury Department to Mr. Petit, he cabled in reply denying any participation in the proposal"?

I remain,

Yours respectfully,

Mexico, June 25th, 1913.

To the Editor of the *Imparcial*,
Present.

Dear Sir: You will find herewith enclosed a copy of the letter I am this day sending to Mr. José R. Aspe in reply to his letter published today in several newspapers on the subject of the loan, and I request that you kindly have it published in your paper.

I am, Dear Sir,

Yours very truly,

TO. ESQUIVEL OBREGON.

Mexico, June 25th, 1913.

Mr. José R. Aspe,
Addressed.

Dear Sir: In reply to your communication of yesterday, I beg to state that I sincerely regret the necessity of referring again to the proposal you made me regarding the loan. I have, however, been forced to do so by Representative Moheno and I repeat, I do so with sincere regret. This feeling I have, not because I think I can injure the good name of one to whom I have always been bound by ties of friendship, one whom I

have never believed to have had any ulterior motives in making the proposals, but because the circumstances might hurt his pride, and self respect which I would have respected had public interest not forced me to allude once more to your participation in the affair.

With this explanation I shall now proceed to grant your request. In order to make certain facts concrete, and in order that they may appear not as my personal opinions because I still do not wish you to think I mean you any harm, but that they may appear as undeniable facts, I shall now set forth the telegrams which made me form my judgment.

I requested you to transmit to Paris the fact as the government could not consider proposals coming through Peindre, Denois & Roumagnac, the Syndicate of Bankers of Province, should address me direct. You agreed to do this, but in spite of that, on May 21, I received a cable in French which translated freely reads as follows:

“We repeat our offers made to Legation. We confirm acceptance of immediate loan conditions proposed by Roumagnac intermediary Aspe will sign here with Charge D’Affaires or await your representatives counting first on your support for the Syndicate Bankers Province Peindre.”

In this cable, the last sentence has the word “pour” which in French has two meanings. It could either mean “for” in the sense that it was intended to show that Peindre was signing for the syndicate, or it could mean “for” in the sense of only requesting our support for the firm since there was no period and no separate signature. But it is clear that if the cable had been sent in accordance with my demand that the Syndicate itself wire me direct, the apparent intention of this cable was to convey the impression that my demand was being complied with while at the same time leaving a loophole of escape should any question arise as to fraudulent use of the signature. The telegram as can be clearly seen was not one to inspire confidence, and I therefore insisted that Mr. Petit, Director of the Bank of Province, should himself communicate with the Department. By this time my suspicions were aroused and I did not wish to rely solely upon a reply which could be sent from Paris by any one whatsoever. For this reason on May 23rd, I cabled direct to Mr. Petit, Director of the Bank of Province, as follows:

“For my information kindly cable confirmation of proposals for loan to Mexican Government of fifteen to twenty million pounds sterling at 87 (eighty-seven) pounds; 5 (five) per cent interest; fifty years, made in your name by Aspe.”

That very day I received this reply:

“We confirm with full guarantees proposals Roumagnac intermediary Aspe. We authorize power of Peindre. Greetings.

“Petit, Director Syndicate Bankers, Conf. Financial Agent.”

Here though the name of Petit appeared, it was not with the full title of the Syndicate of Banks of Province, nor that of the Association of Banks of Province, according to the newest firm name of the institution. No, he merely signed himself Director of Syndicate of Bankers, and as there could exist thousands of Syndicates of Bankers, the personal identification had been eliminated with a singular lack of cleverness.

On the following day I received a reply direct from Mr. Petit, which reads:

“A long time ago we formulated proposals with view to granting loan amounting only to fifty million francs. In view of the greater importance of the contemplated transaction and owing to other obligations, we have not confirmed proposals.

“Petit Synprobank.”

“Synprobank” is the cable address of the Syndicate of Banks of Province, or rather, Central Association of Banks of Province.

This same cable was transmitted to the Department by the Financial Agent of the Mexican Government under date of the 26th. On the 24th I had received from Vera Cruz another cable herewith quoted:

“I advise I am in receipt just now message Achille Adam President Societe Central Banques de Province notifying me that said bank has made no bid on the loan of 500 million. Make use of this notice at your convenience and with no reservations whatever. Signed Maurice Armand Delille.”

Mr. Delille is authorized agent in Mexico for the Syndicate of Banks of Province.

Such are the facts of the matter.

I note, however, a peculiarity, and that is that among the various names given to the group in whose name you make the proposal, is that used in your above mentioned letter “Syndicat des Banquiers de Province,” and it is possible that the Treasury

Department committed a grave error in addressing itself to the Syndicat des Banques de Province.”

This deserves an explanation :

When you first filed your proposal and I informed you that I would not entertain it unless submitted by a banking house of high and recognized standing, you mentioned the Syndicate of Banks of Province which is in fact a first class institution. On that basis, which was a condition I exacted from all those who spoke to me about the loan, we were able to enter into negotiations. Had I known that we were dealing with a syndicate of bankers of a province in general terms, I would never have consented to continue negotiations in spite of the fact that Messrs. Peindre and Roumagnac were members of the syndicate, and that the latter gentleman is well known in Mexico, and Central America. Moreover, it is a very suspicious coincidence that the Director of the Syndicate of Banks of Province should be Petit, likewise that of the Syndicate of Bankers of Province, and that the latter should have accidentally signed the cable when I especially demanded his name to appear.

If you still have any doubts whatsoever as to the cables transcribed herewith, I will show them to you personally or give the necessary orders to the cable office to produce them at your request. I am,

Yours very truly,

As I have said, General Mondragon was also posing as the representative of a Mr. Mercurio, who called himself agent of another syndicate of French bankers. General Mondragon went so far as to cause an attack in the House of Representatives to be made against the Secretary of the Treasury for refusing to deal with the mysterious stranger recommended by the Secretary of War. This resulted in an unprecedented event in the history of the Mexican Congress and probably of any other parliament of the world; that the Secretary of the Treasury should question the Secretary of War in an open session of the House. Mr. Mondragon presented himself before the House and after cross examination by Mr. Esquivel Obregon, confessed that the Secretary of the Treasury had acted wisely in the affair and had demanded from those who posed as representatives of foreign

syndicates proofs as to who they were as well as to their financial responsibility. When Mr. Aspe and General Mondragon both found themselves in a false position, they placated the public and requested that it withhold final judgment for a few days when they could present proofs of their statements. These proofs naturally have never been submitted up to date although ten months have elapsed since these events took place.

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE REIGN OF TERROR.

The entrance of Don Aureliano Urrutia to the Cabinet was not exactly the beginning of the policy of terror, but just at that time measures became so bitter that the public naturally began to associate both facts. The first victim of the reign of terror was Mr. Edmundo Pastelin, alternate congressman for the district of Tuxtepec, State of Oaxaca, a trusted employee of the firm of Samuel Bros. of Mexico City. Mr. Pastelin who was accused of heading a plot against the government of Huerta, was arrested as he reached his home on the evening of June 11th and was executed without trial two days later in the Penitentiary.*

Shortly after, on July 7th, Mr. Pablo Castañon y Campoverde was arrested at his office and sent to Iguala where he was executed by Colonel Reynaldo Diaz by direct orders from the government.

On the 14th of the same month, Messrs. Jesus Velazquez and Domingo Juarez, Justices of the Peace in the village of San Pedro Martir, were denounced to the government by their personal enemies, the Oznaya brothers, and both were executed. The accusation against them was that in league with Zapata, they were the agents who supplied the rebels of Morelos with ammunition. They denied the charges and were supported in their protestations by the villagers, but the government remained inflexible; and although the charges were not proved, the men were executed in the vicinity of Ajusco.

*The government first stated that Pastelin had escaped, then it stated that he had died in an encounter. Both falsehoods, for an eye witness to the execution gave me a detailed account of it.

On the 20th of August it was rumored that Representative Enrique Bordes Mangel had been executed, but this rumor proved false.*

On the night of August 22nd, as Representative Serapio Rendon was leaving the house of Mrs. Clara Scherer, he was arrested by agents of the Department of the Interior,† bound and gagged, and taken in an automobile to the neighboring town of Tlalnepantla, where Commander of Rurales Fortuño Miramon shot and killed him. Several stories regarding the death of this congressman became current, but the facts here narrated were told me by the brother of Mr. Rendon, who in turn obtained them from the Major of the regiment commanded by Fortuño Miramon. This man was himself killed by Miramon on the arrival of the regiment at San Luis Potosi while on the way to join the forces attacking Torreon. On the road, Miramon and his second in command began a game of cards, which culminated in a quarrel in which the Major was killed and Miramon seriously wounded.

The facts of Rendon's murder, as related to me, are as follows: Congressman Rendon was taken at night to Tlalnepantla, where he arrived while Fortuño Miramon was at dinner. When the bonds and gags were removed, Miramon ordered his Major to stand Rendon up against a wall and shoot him. The Major, however, who knew Rendon and was aware that he was a congressman, demanded a written order to that effect, since he did not wish to be brought up next day on the charge of having executed a member of Congress without due authority. "This," he said, "is a man of importance and I refuse to be a scapegoat." Fortuño Miramon replied: "Order be d—; if you do not shoot him, I will." "Do as you like" said the Major, "I won't shoot him." Mr. Rendon, to whom nothing whatever had been said since his arrest, saw that the affair was becoming serious, that he was to be killed without a chance of escape. Desperately he tried to convince Miramon that this would be murder, but could gain no respite other than a few moments to write a farewell to his family. As he was writing to his wife, Fortuño Miramon

*On the 20th of August a well dressed individual was murdered in Tlalnepantla. This man was mistaken for Mr. Bordes Mangel.

†Mr. Rendon was arrested as he reached his home situated at No. 35 Industria street, three houses from mine.

placed his pistol at Rendon's head and fired, killing him instantly. A squad was then called into the room and ordered to fire a volley into the dead body of the unfortunate congressman.

"Your brother," said the Major relating the occurrence to Mr. Rendon's brother, "was the 104th person executed at Tlalnepantla by order of the Secretary of the Interior." Mr. Urrutia was determined to strengthen General Huerta's position by imbuing terror. In France, during the Reign of Terror, there was a certain Fouquier Thionville, as accuser. There was a committee of Public Safety which ordered the accusation, and there was a jury which generally convicted all those accused by Fouquier; but in Mexico, all these processes were brushed aside, an accusation sufficed, and the penalty was left to Mr. Urrutia's judgment. I have heard the following anecdote which shows how this terror was exerted:

Four individuals in the custody of several soldiers were marching through the street of Donato Guerra towards the 8th Precinct Police Station, when they met Mr. Rafael Reyes Spíndola. One of the prisoners shouted to the ex-Editor in Chief of the *Imparcial* and attracted his attention. "Save me, sir," he cried, "They are going to kill me and I am innocent." The commander of the guard would not let him speak further, but for Mr. Spíndola it was sufficient. He hastened immediately to the Department of the Interior and saw Mr. Urrutia. "I know that man," he told Urrutia, "he has been in my employ and would never think of fomenting a revolt." "You know him?" asked the Secretary, "Do you think him an honest man?" "Yes" replied Spíndola, "while in my employ, he always behaved well." "All right" said Urrutia; whereupon he gave orders by telephone that the man be set free. The man instead of going to his death, obtained his freedom not because he had been tried nor because he had been acquitted, but simply because he had accidentally met a man who had befriended him by using his friendship with the Secretary.

A similar story was related to me how Mr. Emilio Rabasa also saved an unfortunate who was in the same predicament. But Mariano Salgado, Nestor E. Monroy, Jesus A. Vazquez, and Trinidad Zapa Castillo, not meeting in their paths such propitious influences, were shot to death on July 16th. The charge against them was that they had conspired against the government and had attempted to hurl a bomb with intent to kill the Presi-

dent. Nor did Solon Argúello find any mercy when he was arrested in Mexico City because he was suspected of being an agent of the revolution and to have come to the capital with the sinister purpose of assassinating General Huerta. He and three other persons, one of whom was supposed to have been Congressman Bordes Mangel, and another congressman, Luis F. Navarro, were executed on August 29th near the station of Cima between Cuernavaca and Mexico City.

From the moment he entered upon his duties as Secretary of the Interior, Dr. Urrutia had proclaimed very peculiar theories. His one object was to set Huerta firmly in power, and any means for accomplishing this purpose seemed to him good and worthy. One of his pet theories, which caused universal amazement, was that men should not be judged by past actions; acting upon this principle, he emphatically declared that his candidate for the governorship of Morelos was Zapata, against whom the government was at that very moment waging actual warfare. This theory was upheld by Mr. Urrutia in an interview granted to a reporter of *El Pais*, which appeared in that paper on June 19th. The interview, as published, follows :

ZAPATISMO IN THE GOVERNMENT.

The Attila of the South is Secretary Urrutia's Candidate for Governor of Morelos.

Yesterday afternoon, Dr. Urrutia, Secretary of the Interior, made new and important declarations in an interview granted to representatives of the press.

The Secretary confirmed the statements made at the time he assumed the duties of Secretary of the Interior, relative to the freedom of the press encouraged by the government. "This is a stock in trade phrase of all Secretaries at the beginning of their terms," said Urrutia, "So long as the press sings their praise 'Long Live the Press!' But just as soon as it directs one or two attacks on them, then 'Down with the Press!' I assure you that the provisional government really desires freedom of the press, and furthermore, the Department of which I am in charge will gladly welcome any and every suggestion publicly where prudence and social welfare permit, and privately where

it might be directly harmful to society and indirectly harmful to the government." "Well then, Mr. Secretary," said the reporter of *El Pais*, "My paper has published rumors that Dr. Lara Pardo is coming to take over the duties of Assistant Secretary in your Department. What truth is there in this?"

"Dr. Lara Pardo is in my opinion, a very intelligent man, possessed of administrative ability and I think that if he returns to Mexico he will surely be offered an office in the administration. I will also say the same with regard to Mr. Luis Cabrera, another very capable man who in the near future must and will assuredly occupy an important position in shaping the destinies of Mexico in spite of the bad feeling created against him in the past by certain newspapers.

"As regards the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, the resignation of Martinez Carillo has not been accepted. Although I have been in office only a few days, I have formed a very favorable opinion of him, and consider him an upright man, learned in his profession, and of good sound judgment. All the reports I have received concerning him are corroborated. I believe that the charges made publicly against him about the 'Covadonga' matters are entirely groundless."

"Mr. Secretary," said another reporter, "The press has made further hints. It has been rumored that Orozco is candidate for Governor of Chihuahua."

"I know nothing about that" replied Dr. Urrutia, "but I would heartily endorse him just as I would have no objection to aid the gubernatorial candidacy of Zapata in Morelos. Zapata is my candidate. Men," he added, "should not be judged by hearsay."

"What are the developments regarding the surrender of this Attila?"

"I have already stated that there are no such negotiations in progress. The government does not treat with its enemies. The government is strong and is daily becoming stronger. A member of Zapata's family approached me to find out whether there would be any difficulty in granting guarantees of safety to Zapata if he should surrender, and I replied that there would be none. The government can make use of Zapata in Morelos but he must be unarmed. The government will not agree to allow the rebels to retain their arms. The army must be one and must be under one head. We cannot have an army of protection,

bodies of irregulars, etc. The army must be one and undivided. That is why the government so tenaciously insists on disarmament. Those who imported weapons into the country, and armed everybody, are the ones who brought ruin and desolation on the country. Moreover, there is the danger that if the rebels are allowed to remain in arms, they will never understand the meaning of force nor cultivate the ideas of discipline. Zapata, weaponless, can be Governor of Morelos. This should not seem strange to you. Governors are not appointed for life. If they are incompetent, they can be removed.”

But neither the theories nor the actions of Dr. Urrutia could halt the downward march of the government of General Huerta in the estimation of the general public.

The President feeling the storm that was gathering around the government wished to dispel the clouds by sacrificing his Secretary and friends; therefore, about the middle of September, he removed him and placed in his stead Mr. Manuel Garza Aldape who was at that moment a great favorite of General Huerta. But arbitrary measures did not cease with this change; on the contrary, it was then that Senator Belisario Dominguez was executed; and that the Congressmen were imprisoned, some of whom suffered brutal treatment, as for instance, Messrs. Palavicini and Rojas. Not even Rodolfo Reyes and Jorge Vera Estañol* were exempt from such treatment although both had been members of General Huerta's Cabinet and the first one an intimate friend of Mr. Garza Aldape, Secretary of the Interior. In fact, he owed his present position as adviser to General Huerta entirely to the personal influence of Rodolfo Reyes. Many other persons were imprisoned, such as Mr. Loaiza who was accused of having expressed opinions not flattering to the government. But finally even Garza Aldape fell. His conduct in all the departments in which he had served as Secretary had been disastrous. In the Department of Public Instruction, he misappropriated government funds and committed innumerable

*Owing to the fact that the House of Representatives refused permission to one of its members, Mr. Tamariz, to become Secretary of Public Instruction, General Huerta ordered the arrest of Representative Jorge Vera Estañol, who had been one of his Cabinet Ministers. Huerta had him taken by the police to his own residence at Popotla, and there, in the presence of his aides, insulted him and even threatened to thrash him.

injustices against the teaching staff; in the Department of Development, at whose head he served only a few days, he flagrantly disobeyed the law; and in the Department of the Interior, his term of office is marked by the attack on Congress, the imprisonment of many persons without just cause or reason, and the assassination of many Mexicans, like Senator Dominguez, whose only crime was that of telling the truth.

His work in the State Department was characterized by the remarkable stupidity of his official statement that Mr. John Lind, the Confidential Agent of the President of the United States, was "persona non grata," a fact that was absolutely immaterial to both President Wilson and his Agent.

When Garza Aldape was forced out of the Cabinet, the fear which he had instilled in others of the arm of the government, suddenly took possession of him. On the night of his dismissal he left Mexico City in a special train, and in the early morning boarded a French steamer. Living on the Nation's money, he serenely views from abroad the results of his work, but his conscience must trouble him at times and must wake him up often with a start.

He was a traitor to all parties, stupid in all his political deeds and entirely unscrupulous in the handling of public funds. In the orgy which General Huerta has been carrying on at the expense of the Nation, Garza Aldape has drunk deep and has been able to fully satisfy his greed. But he has been called before the bar of public opinion. Human justice, always weak, cannot punish him, but the Justice of History will be implacable.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE PARLIAMENTARY QUADRILATERAL.

Ever since the discussion regarding credentials of new congressmen war had been waged on the government of Madero by three members of the old Porfirista Congress, Messrs. Jose Maria Lozano, Nemesio Garcia Naranjo, and Francisco M. de Olaguibel. They themselves had had their credentials accepted, but not without difficulty, as they were bitterly opposed by the most important member of the Committee on Credentials, Mr. Querido Moheno. When accepted, they composed the nucleus of the opposition in the House and were called by the press "the Parliamentary Triangle."

Following the acceptance of the credentials, and the opening of the regular session of Congress, a difference arose between Mr. Moheno and Gustavo Madero. Mr. Moheno, who is not only daring, but totally devoid of scruples, suddenly declared in open session that he had broken with the government, after which he joined the triangle which now became known as the "Parliamentary Quadrilateral."

From the inauguration of his administration, General Huerta entrusted to this quadrilateral the defense of the program he intended to follow. All four were highly intelligent men and born orators, their election therefore had been a wise move for there was no one in the House capable of competing with their eloquence or their knowledge of Parliamentary procedure. At the time of Madero's downfall, Moheno had intrigued for the appointment of Tomás Braniff as President pro tem by the House;* but as I have remarked, he was intelligent and soon

*Mr. Braniff and Mr. Moheno had had serious differences on account of the elections for Governor in the State of Vera Cruz and the former had made serious charges against the latter on account of the handling of the campaign funds.

perceived the inadvisability of this move, whereupon he turned in favor of General Huerta, whose purposes he served from that moment wisely and actively.*

General Huerta, as I have stated before, had been forced by circumstances to accept as his Cabinet the men proposed by Felix Diaz, but he had done so fully determined to displace them as soon as events should permit. The day after he had signed the pact, he began to devise means to break it, for so far as he was concerned, it was not worth the paper it was written on. Shortly before the tragic ten days, Mr. de la Barra had been elected Governor of the State of Mexico. He took the oath of office on the 4th of March, appointed an acting governor, and returned immediately to Mexico City to continue his duties as Secretary of State. Mr. Garza Aldape, selected for Secretary of Agriculture, an office not existing in the present Cabinet, had arrived in Mexico and was attending Cabinet meetings as if he were really a member, although as a matter of fact, the law creating the new Department had not been passed nor has it been passed to date.

Huerta was fully resolved not to resign in favor of Felix Diaz or of any one else for that matter. He and his friends were looking for a loophole through which to escape from keeping the promises made to Diaz at the American Embassy; to this end they formulated numerous plans. Finally General Huerta entered into an understanding with the Quadrilateral. He held a meeting at his home at which it was agreed that on October 26th there be an election held for President and Vice President. Congress, agreeing with this plan, issued the necessary proclamation. The Felicistas who believed absolutely in the sincerity and honesty of General Huerta's words, began campaigning for their candidate. The Attorney General declared through the press that the call for an election quite carried out the compact made at the Ciudadela, which, as I have said, was really entered into and signed at the American Embassy. De la Barra was nominated for vice president. General Felix Diaz had succeeded in obtaining the appointment of Mr. Celso Acosta as Inspector General of Police. Mr. Acosta, one of his most enthusiastic partisans, was intimately associated with him, in fact had been his

*See note referring to the session of Congress on February 19, which will be found in the *Diario de los Debates*.

private secretary when Diaz was Inspector General of Police in Mexico City during the administration of Don Porfirio Diaz. Frankly, however, this appointment was a mistake on the part of the felicistas because no politician was safe as long as Celso Acosta held sway at Police Headquarters. This fact was indicated to the provisional President who, pretending to satisfy public opinion, at once decided on his removal. The truth of the matter is that the President himself was the one to feel most insecure because Acosta was a tool of Diaz. Huerta saw in public opinion an opportunity to deal a blow to the felicistas and to free himself from his bonds. Huerta had twice attempted to make this change, but each time had met with opposition from his Cabinet and from Don Felix Diaz who reproached and accused him of unfaithfulness. Huerta did not yet have the necessary energy to impose his authority. Finally, one day resolved to make the change, he instructed the Governor of the Federal District, General Samuel Garcia Cuellar, to advise the Secretary of the Interior that at a certain specified hour, the post should be turned over to the new Inspector, Mr. Joaquin Pita; after giving this command, he disappeared for the time being. At first, Mr. Alberto Garcia Granados, Secretary of the Interior, gave little importance to the orders, and made no objection to the appointment, but later, when Acosta was informed of the change, Granados complying with suggestions from Diaz, objected and issued orders that nothing definite be done until he could see the President personally. But it was impossible to find General Huerta. Therefore in compliance with the President's orders, General Garcia Cuellar, duly installed Mr. Pita as Inspector General of Police in spite of the strenuous objections of the Secretary of the Interior, backed by the Attorney General, Rodolfo Reyes, and Felix Diaz. Following this incident, Mr. Garcia Granados sent in his resignation. Thus was he the first of the Cabinet members chosen at the American Embassy to leave his post. The President insisted that the Parliamentary Quadrilateral had demanded the removal of Acosta, claiming that so long as the police were under the domination of Felix Diaz and his friends, it would be impossible to call an election since the members of Congress could not act with the liberty necessary for the proper performance of their duty. Huerta added that he himself was obliged to fulfil his promises, the first and foremost of which was to hold an election.

The choice of a successor to Mr. Garcia Granados gave rise to much intrigue. The President had offered this portfolio to Mr. Lozano, one of the members of the Quadrilateral, but Rodolfo Reyes, Attorney General, and Garza Aldape, the portfolioless Secretary, intimately associated with Reyes for many years, had bitterly opposed this choice. The President had considered Dr. Aureliano Urrutia, who was an eminent surgeon of Mexico City as well as a friend of his, in fact had attended him when he had been forced to give up the campaign in the North because of his eye trouble. Mr. Urrutia was finally appointed. This led to the resignation of Mr. Vera Estañol as Secretary of Public Instruction; the vacancy thus formed was filled by Garza Aldape whom Congress had left without a post by refusing to vote for the proposed reform to create a Department of Agriculture.

General Huerta had offered the portfolio of Secretary of War to General Blanquete for his yeoman service, but in the early days of the administration he was forced to yield to the demands of Felix Diaz, not because the latter had any real power, but because he wished it to appear that he thought so. For this reason, he acted as he did. Time was passing and General Blanquete was still waiting for the fulfillment of the promise. Fortunately for the President, the public set up such a clamor at the highhanded and flagrant graft of General Mondragon as Secretary of War and at the disastrous results of one campaign after another that he could truly say that public opinion demanded the removal of Mondragon. Rodolfo Reyes, the life and soul of the felicista party, was commissioned to convince Mondragon that his resignation was an absolute necessity. At a Cabinet meeting, he finally succeeded in extracting the desired resignation, whereupon he himself drew up the letter of resignation which was immediately accepted. That very day, June 13th, General Blanquete was sworn in as Secretary of War, Mr. Urrutia as Secretary of the Interior, and Garza Aldape as Secretary of Public Instruction.

The disorder and confusion in this last Cabinet were matters of public scandal. When Garza Aldape was transferred to the Department of Development and Mr. Jose María Lozano was appointed Secretary of Public Instruction in his stead, Mr. Lozano found that in the few days he had held office, the retiring Secretary of Public Instruction had almost equalled General Mondragon's record, not in the amount of business transacted, because

this Department did not lend itself so readily as the War Department to big deals, but in the quality of business which was equally detrimental to the Treasury. The new head of the administrative branch, Mr. Antonio Maza, mentioned to me a few outrageous cases, but it would be out of place to mention them here. I will limit myself to stating that here as in the War Department, contracts were freely handed out whereby the Secretary made enormous commissions.

On July 26th then, Mr. Esquivel resigned from the Cabinet after several quarrels with the other Cabinet members and with the President relative to the outrageous raids that were made or contemplated on the National Treasury. The main reason, however, for his forced resignation was that it had been hinted to President Huerta that his resignation would serve to put an end to certain difficulties which had arisen with the United States because of the methods he had employed to attain the Presidency, difficulties which seriously compromised the financial efforts of Mr. Esquivel Obregon.

After an all night banquet, General Huerta commissioned Mr. Garza Aldape to obtain the immediate resignations of Mr. Esquivel Obregon and Mr. Rodolfo Reyes. The latter was able to resist successfully, but Mr. Esquivel did not force the President to repeat his request, for as a matter of fact, ever since the events of February 22nd, he had wished to resign.

At first Mr. Garza Aldape was considered as a successor to Mr. Esquivel Obregon, and at the same time Mr. Jesus M. Rábago was chosen to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Mr. Robles Gil as Secretary of Development. In fact, this appointment had already been made and he had even presented himself to be sworn in, when owing to circumstances which have not as yet been made public, he was suddenly requested to withdraw from the Capital, and Mr. Garza Aldape was sworn in in his stead. The portfolio of the Department of the Treasury was offered to Mr. Gorostieta, a lawyer of the State of Nuevo Leon. He was a serious minded and calm man, highly esteemed in his native State, but advanced in years, worn out, and sickly.

Mr. Rábago was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Interior. The resignation of Mr. Robles Gil was on the program of President Huerta who only awaited a favorable opportunity for demanding it. This opportunity came when Jesus Flores Magon attacked the Secretary of Development through the press.

The charge made against him was that, as executor, he had notoriously mismanaged an estate, the heirs to which were minors.

Before Huerta had been in power five months, that is, by the end of July, Rodolfo Reyes and David de la Fuente were the only members left in the Cabinet appointed in accordance with the compact at the American Embassy. These two resigned shortly after, as demanded by the Parliamentary Quadrilateral; Reyes was named congressman and de la Fuente, who represented the Vazquizta faction in the government, was offered the command of a force which was to operate against the rebels in the state of Sinaloa. He was promoted to the rank of General of Brigade, but the campaign was never entrusted to him.

When de la Barra resigned as Secretary of State, the portfolio was offered to Federico Gamboa, a well known man of letters who was then Minister from Mexico at Brussels. Until his arrival from Belgium, Garza Aldape filled the office. It was Mr. Aldape who on the 7th of August made the famous statement that Mr. John Lind, the confidential agent of President Wilson, was "persona non grata" to the Mexican government.

The Cabinet was reorganized when Mr. Lozano accepted the portfolio of Secretary of Public Instruction and Mr. Garza Aldape that of Development. After many futile attempts, Huerta was at length able to force Rodolfo Reyes out of his Cabinet naming Mr. Adolfo de la Lama in his place.

On September 14th, it was again necessary to reorganize the Cabinet on account of the retirement of Dr. Urrutia. Mr. Aldape took over the Department of the Interior, and the vacancy he left was filled by Leopoldo Rebollar who had formerly been Assistant Secretary of State when Aldape was Secretary, and later had been Assistant Secretary of the Interior. Mr. Lozano succeeded Mr. de la Fuente as Secretary of Communications. Mr. Nemesio Garcia Naranjo, a member of the Quadrilateral, was made Secretary of Public Instruction. There was yet another change, which was that Mr. Gorostieta and Mr. de la Lama exchanged portfolios, Mr. Gorostieta becoming Attorney General and Mr. de la Lama Secretary of the Treasury.

When Mr. Gamboa accepted the nomination tendered him by the Catholic party to head the ticket as candidate for the Presidency, he resigned as Secretary of State, the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Antonio de la Peña y Reyes acting as Secretary;

a few days later, by order of the President, Mr. de la Lama, Attorney General, requested the resignation of Mr. de la Peña y Reyes. Mr. Querido Moheno, another member of the Quadrilateral, was appointed Assistant Secretary of State, and when the Cabinet was reorganized on September 14th, he was made Secretary of State. Mr. Francisco M. de Olaguíbel, the only member of the Quadrilateral who did not obtain a Cabinet position, was appointed Assistant Secretary of State.

As Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Garza Aldape found himself obliged to dissolve Congress on October 10th. This dissolution had been desired by both the President and his Cabinet ever since the House had refused to sanction the appointment of Mr. Tamariz as Secretary of Public Instruction, for which position he had been suggested when Mr. Lozano became Secretary of Communications. The dissolution of Congress was effected by violence, eighty-three members were arrested that day and warrants were issued for the arrest of ten or twelve others who managed to escape. The dissolution of Congress was due to the attitude assumed by the House a few days after the death of Senator Belisario Dominguez. This gentleman, Senator from the State of Chiapas, had arrived in Mexico City after the events of February, since he had only been appointed Senator to fill out the term of Leopoldo Gout, who had died in Mexico City. Immediately upon learning of past events, Mr. Dominguez, a man of action, drew an informal accusation against General Huerta which he could not read to the Senate. In it he demanded that the President be duly turned over to the proper branch of the Grand Jury. Although the Vice President of the Senate had very cleverly avoided the issue, the facts became public, and the speech of Mr. Dominguez was circulated widely *sub rosa*. On October 5th, Mr. Dominguez disappeared; he had been arrested by agents of the Department of the Interior as he was about to enter his home. A member of the family of Mr. Vera Estañol related a few days later at the gates of the Penitentiary, that Mr. Dominguez had been stabbed to death by police agents who had arrested him under orders of Isidoro Cortes and that his body had been removed to the Cemetery of Coyoacan where it had been cremated.

Mr. Dominguez had foreseen his tragic end; in fact his speech began by stating this fact to the Senate and saying that

he gladly offered himself as a sacrifice for the salvation of his country, a salvation which in his opinion, could only be obtained by the overthrow of General Huerta. Foreseeing his death, he had made his will and had formulated a request that the colony of Chiapanecans in Mexico City see that his little son who was with him in Mexico City be safely restored to his family.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE CONSTITUCIONALISTA REVOLUTION.

Mr. Venustiano Carranza had been proposed for Governor of the State of Coahuila in the elections of 1910. He had been proposed by his friend, General Reyes and accepted by General Diaz who had authorized him to work for the election. After the downfall of General Reyes when he was sent to Europe, the agreement with Mr. Carranza did not hold and General Diaz ordered the election of Mr. Jesus del Valle, an honorable lawyer of the State of Coahuila. The result was that Mr. Carranza went to the United States to join the Maderista revolution in which he had heretofore taken no part. When Madero triumphed, Mr. del Valle, like most of the governors, resigned, and the election went in favor of Mr. Venustiano Carranza. He was still in office when the events of February 1913 took place. According to the Governor's report to the State Legislature, the first news he received of events in Mexico was a telegram sent him by General Huerta on February 19th, reading as follows:

“Authorized by the Senate, I have assumed the Executive Power, the President and his Cabinet are under arrest.”

This telegram was sent before the resignation of Madero had been obtained and when General Huerta was pretending to obey orders from the Senate. On receipt of this telegram, Governor Carranza addressed the State Legislature of Coahuila, informing them of the fact and at the same time intimating that he intended to ignore the new government since he considered it illegal. The Legislature approved of the Governor's conduct, whereupon the Governor issued the following proclamation:

“The Government under my charge received yesterday from the Capital of the Republic a message from General Victoriano Huerta advising that the Senate had authorized him to take charge of the Executive Power and that the President and his Cabinet are under arrest. This news has been confirmed and I,

in my official capacity, cannot but deem strange the anomalous form of such appointments, because under no circumstances has the Senate the constitutional authority to make such designation; therefore it matters not what the result has been in the City of Mexico of the uprising of Brigadier Felix Diaz, General Mondragon, and General Reyes. Besides, whatever may have been the cause of the apprehension of the President and his Cabinet, it is the Federal Congress that should have held a meeting to call immediately an extraordinary election as provided by Article 81 of our Magna Charta. Therefore, in all events, the appointment of General Victoriano Huerta as President of the Republic by the Senate is an arbitrary and illegal act. It means nothing more or less than the most scandalous overthrow of our Constitution, and a retrogression to our shameful and backward period of mutinies. For it seems as if the Senate had connived and conspired with those unworthy soldiers, enemies of our country and of our liberty, making them turn against the Nation which armed them for the support and maintenance of order and legal rights. Therefore, the government under my charge, in due respect to the sovereign mandates of our Mexican Constitution, in obedience to our institutions, faithful to its duties, and animated by the purest patriotism, is obliged to disavow and to resist such a downright transgression against our fundamental law. Our government considers it its duty to declare this before the whole Nation, inviting all governors by this circular, as chiefs of the States to lead in the national sentiment, justly aroused to indignation, to support legal rights and to uphold the Constitutional Government recently elected in 1910 in accordance with our laws.

“Saltillo, February 19th, 1913.

Venustiano Carranza.”

At the same time that Carranza took this stand, General Refugio Velasco, Military Commander of Vera Cruz, acted in much the same way. For in reply to General Huerta announcing his rise to power, General Velasco replied that he still recognized Francisco I. Madero as President of the Republic and that from him and from him alone, would he obey orders.

If Madero had not so completely lost prestige in the eyes of the public, he would have been saved in spite of the revolt and of General Huerta's conduct; but public opinion did not respond promptly to the call from the Governor of Coahuila, or

to the worthy Military Commander of Vera Cruz. Huerta on his side realizing that the method he had adopted would not lead to good results, began to work hard for the resignation of Madero.

The first person that Huerta sent to persuade Madero to resign was, as I have said before, General Juvencio Robles. He was sent because General Huerta judged that since he had taken no active part in the mutiny, he was probably on good terms with the President and his associates.

When the resignation was secured, General Huerta immediately telegraphed again to the Governor of Coahuila that he was President. This time he did not say that he had been appointed by the Senate, but that he had attained to it by virtue of an agreement with Madero and Lascurain which seemed to legalize the act. The telegram was the beginning of negotiations with the Governor of Coahuila to induce him to recognize the Federal Government. General Blazquez, chief of arms in Coahuila and at that moment a resident of Monterey, was sent to confer personally with the Governor. At the same time, a commission was sent from the City of Mexico to treat with Pascual Orozco, Jr., who was in revolt in Chihuahua, and with the Messrs. Vazquez Gomez, who were in San Antonio, Texas. The commission was composed of Messrs. Ricardo Garcia Granados, brother of the Secretary of the Interior, José María Garza Ramos, ex-Senator and personal friend of both Mr. Carranza and the Messrs. Vazquez Gomez, and Mr. Herrejon Lopez, friend and correlative of the Vazquez Gomez. Besides these, in order that the felicistas might be represented, Mr. Esteban Maqueo Castellanos was appointed. He too was an ex-Senator and had always loyally supported Felix Diaz.

This commission first went to Laredo where it saw Orozco's father; thence it went to San Antonio and to El Paso where it held conferences with the Chief of the Chihuahua revolution. This the most important revolutionist at the time, agreed to recognize Huerta's government; but when Governor Carranza heard of Madero's death, he severed all relations he had thus far had with General Huerta; he armed as many troops as he possibly could, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Garfias. President Madero's former aide, and he himself left Saltillo, going to Monclova and Cuatro Ciénegas where he started the revolt. Some months later, Castillo Brito, Governor of Cam-

peche, also refused to recognize General Huerta and proclaimed himself in revolt against the Central Government. Dr. Cepeda, Governor of San Luis Potosi, and Miguel Silva of Michoacan, tried to do the same thing, but there, as in most of the states, the new government quickly appointed military governors to master the situation in every locality, suppressing by force if necessary any revolt that might be started. Governor Abraham Gonzalez, of Chihuahua, obtained Huerta's assurance through General Antonio Rábago, military commander of the federal troops that the State sovereignty should be respected and nobody would interfere with the local government; but some days later General Rábago claiming that Governor Gonzalez was planning a revolt against the Federal Government, took him prisoner and sent him back to Mexico City under the custody of Mayor Benjamin Camarena, aid and close friend of Huerta. On the way Governor Gonzalez was slain. The only civil governors left were those of Oaxaca, Jalisco, and Vera Cruz.* In Sonora, Governor Pesqueira, provisionally in charge on account of Governor Maytorena's leave of absence, also refused to recognize Huerta. In Nuevo Leon General Treviño, who had been appointed to substitute the Maderista governor, Mr. Villareal, resigned within fifteen days. Mr. Salomé Botello, old reyista and personal friend of General Huerta, was appointed to succeed him. In view of Governor Carranza's attitude, Huerta named Mr. Ignacio Alcocer provisional governor of Coahuila. He remained in power until last October when General Joaquin Maas, Jr., General Huerta's nephew, was assigned to the position.

The revolution at once assumed large proportions in Coahuila and Sonora. Realizing this, General Huerta started great preparations to fight it out, but the rebels succeeded in rousing the states of Tamaulipas, Chihuahua, Durango, and Zacatecas and even the mountains that border Hidalgo, Vera Cruz and San Luis Potosi and Queretaro. Congressman Pedro Antonio Santos, appointed to lead the revolution in San Luis Potosi, met his death as he went into the "huasteca Potosina." he was shot in Tancanhuitz City by forces under command of

*Three months later General Eduardo Cauz was sent as Governor of Vera Cruz and when Lopez Portillo was named Secretary of State General Jose Mier took the governorship of Jalisco, thus the only state where its constitutional governor remained is Oaxaca.

Colonel Vargas Huerta. Congressman Rodriguez Cabo and Mr. Larraga succeeded him in command in that region and afterwards Pedro Carrera Torres and Colonel Hernandez; on the north of the State Eulalio Gutierrez; Orestes Pereyra and Calixto Contreras in Durango and Pánfilo Natera in Zacatecas succeeded in taking possession of the respective capitals of both states.

In Tamaulipas Pablo Gonzalez, Lucio Blanco, and Luis Caballero, and in Coahuila Jesus Carranza and Eugenio Aguirre Benavides had raised the banner of the revolution, seconding the Plan of Guadalupe and had encountered many obstacles due to the lack of arms and ammunition but they carried on their military operations with a persistent tenacity of purpose.

At the same time in the State of Chihuahua Rosalio Hernandez had defeated the federals at Saucillo and Maclovio Herrera, a very brave and courageous fighter, defeated Colonel Pueblita at Santa Rosalia, and a few days later at the same place administered a riotous defeat to Pascual Orozco, Jr. Manuel Chao at Parral held his own and compelled the federals under General Mercado to retreat to Chihuahua and Chao continued and opened up the lines of Constitutionalist communications to Durango where Don Venustiano Carranza, named First Chief of the Revolution, had established his headquarters after the unsuccessful attack on Torreon by the forces of Contreras during the month of June.

At Santa Rosalia all the chiefs of the Chihuahua division, and some of the other states, with their respective armies named Francisco Villa as their chief and placed themselves under his leadership. Some of them like Toribio Ortega, Maclovio Herrera and Aguirre Benavides had been in many engagements and had acquired military training but they all accepted Villa as their chief because his many victories had shown them clearly that he was a strong military commander.

Villa had crossed the American border with only six men during the month of March and despite fierce persecution on the part of the federals and irregulars, known as the Colorados, he was able to organize a strong force with which he took Casas Grandes and achieved a great victory over the Federal General, Felix Terrazas, at San Andres where he captured nine military trains with equipment and war material. He drove out the federal garrison at Bustillos and arrived at Santa Rosalia. He then marched on Torreon and took personal command of the

Constitutionalist troops there which were attacking that federal stronghold and after having fought the battle of Avilés where he completely routed the federals and where General Alvérez met his death, he was advancing on Torreon when the Federal General Munguia evacuated the city and Villa entered and took possession of same. After establishing civil government there he began his advance on Chihuahua and after feinting an attack on that city by a clever strategic move surprised the Federal General Castro at Juarez capturing the same which was the most important port in Northern Mexico. Castro escaped in disguise to the American side of the Rio Grande where he was interned by the American army. Six days afterwards he fought the celebrated battle of Tierra Blanca where he gave them a crushing defeat. The news of this defeat at Chihuahua caused General Mercado and his entire division to evacuate Chihuahua and together with the combined forces of Orozco and Salazar they marched to Ojinaga where they were immediately attacked by Villa and fled across the Rio Grande River where to the number of four thousand men, General Mercado included, they were captured by the American army and interned. Salazar escaped but was later captured by the American army patrol at Sander-son, Texas. Orozco escaped in disguise and reached New Orleans where he boarded the Mexican gunboat Zaragoza which carried him to Vera Cruz.

Villa hastened to Chihuahua where after establishing a civil government he moved his entire command against Torreon which had been evacuated by the Arrietas and which was then garrisoned by the Federal General Refugio Velasco. The Torreon campaign began with an attack at Bermejillo where the federals were annihilated. Villa then with twenty thousand men attacked Gomez Palacio the federal outposts and after twelve days engagement captured Torreon once more. Villa then made a flying movement to San Pedro where he met the federals under General Maas, de Moure, Garcia Hidalgo and Argumedo which were coming to the relief of Torreon. This engagement was a very fierce one but General Villa succeeded in defeating the entire command. Velasco in the meantime having joined the others from Viesca, arrived only on time to cover the retreat to Saltillo. Villa at once began preparations for a campaign against Saltillo.

They destroyed any forces that opposed them, but in most cases the government forces deserted the towns at the approach of the rebels. General Huerta, as I have said, did his best to suppress the revolution. He appointed military governors, he waged merciless war, and ordered a relentless persecution of all those who had refused to recognize his government. By following such a course, he succeeded in recapturing Campeche and Morelos, the city of Zacatecas, Saltillo and Torreon and finally the mountains of Puebla; but thus far he has been unable to reestablish peace. In fact, he cannot reestablish it anywhere. The country has never had confidence in him and public opinion is against him. Only fear prevents public demonstrations, but the whole country is anxiously hoping for his downfall. His conduct both public and private does not inspire confidence.

He expects to remain in power by force, but impossible! The people will reclaim their rights and will as soon as possible work his downfall from a position which has been no less a disgrace to Mexico than an affront to civilization. He has succeeded in inspiring terror, but this will not enable him to consolidate his government. The dissolution of Congress should have caused his downfall, but the Congress which he dissolved had completely lost prestige with the public. In fact, the country was indifferent to what the President did with a Congress which had never been in its good graces. From the very beginning the 26th Congress was unworthy. By exasperating injustice, by frauds, and by violence, at the time of the inauguration, it forfeited the good will of the public; but its cowardly attitude in the course of subsequent events gained for it the absolute contempt of the people. Impassably it witnessed the death of General Ruiz, a congressman whom the Madero government executed; later it impassably witnessed the assassination of Mr. Gustavo Madero, a prominent member of the House of Representatives and one to whom many of its members owed their position. It also had a hand in the downfall of Madero's government since it accepted the resignation of two prisoners whose signature had been obtained by threats of death. Furthermore, it accepted Huerta as President of the Republic, it allowed him to take the oath, and authorized him to squander the national funds. All these acts were opposed only by an insignificant minority. It did not take the slightest action nor did it offer the slightest protest against the assassination of the President and

the Vice President. Besides countenancing all these things, at the beginning of the first period of the second year of its office, it watched unmoved the murder of Serapio Rendon, at that time a member of Congress. When the assassination of Senator Dominguez took place, Congress made a pathetic attempt to take a dignified attitude, but only succeeded in assuming a ridiculous and foolish one. To threaten a government like that of Huerta is the height of folly. The motions passed by the House of Representatives on October 9th, showed more than folly, they showed flagrant cowardice, because by them the House proved that it was conscious of its duties but at the same time afraid to accuse those who were in power and to whom it attributed all the crimes which it censured. In that frame of mind, it adopted a middle course which placed it in a very absurd position.

General Huerta soon tired of its impertinences and decided to dissolve a congress which had caused so much scandal and had done so little good to the country.* This is the only one of his crimes which is at all pardonable. It was a terrible dilemma to General Huerta since he either had to dissolve Congress or allow Congress to do away with him, and with the country also for that matter. It is a fact that the struggles between Huerta and Congress did not do him much harm, but they were sapping the very strength of the country and reducing it to a deplorable condition. For the most part, the House denied Huerta nothing; it pleased him in every thing, but when it finally rose against him, Huerta did what every slave driver does to a slave who mutinies—he punished it.

The dissolution of Congress caused General Huerta small worry, in fact the very night that the members were carried by the police to the Penitentiary, the President with his Secretaries of the Interior, of Development, of Communications, and of Public Instruction, was calmly dining at Bach's public restaurant. General Huerta was certainly daring. The Congressmen attempted to incite the people to revolt, but they had no followers. The same thing has happened on previous occasions, when the government followed a similar course, but heretofore such a measure has always in the long run proved fatal to those who have adopted it. On October 31st, 1822, Iturbide dissolved Con-

*Not a single resolution of the 26th Congress can be considered to the welfare of the Nation.

gress in the same way, and on March 19th of the following year he was forced to abdicate. On November 29th, 1844, Canalizo by order of Santana dissolved Congress, and Santana was forced to retire on December 6th of the same year. Mr. Juan Bautista Ceballos dissolved Congress on January 19th, 1853 and was overthrown on February 7th. History has repeated itself. The congressmen of those days also called on the people for support, but the people answered with the same scorn as now. The cause of this is that these Congresses have never appealed to the public ideals nor have they ever in reality represented the people.

Constitutional order in Mexico was upset completely from the very moment that the Military Commander of the City, without authority and without legal right, seized the President and Vice President, and usurped power. Unquestionably he had no legal right for such action since Congress had not previously passed judgment convicting Madero and Pino Suarez. According to the Mexican Constitution, the farce enacted later can in no way make Huerta legitimate President or give legality to his acts.

Governors Carranza and Pesqueira's attitude ought to have been imitated by the governors of all the states, but, in truth, many of them were unable to follow the same course because they were obliged by force to abandon their offices. There were those, however, who did prefer to keep their places, regardless of the situation in Mexico.

The revolt took great impetus in Coahuila, Tamaulipas, Sonora, Durango, and Zacatecas, but Mr. Carranza was unable to keep Coahuila because General Huerta reinforced his own forces strongly. The chief of the revolution was obliged to move through Durango to Sonora where the local chief Mr. Alvaro Obregon had succeeded in organizing his forces and kept out Huerta's troops. In this State Mr. Carranza established the capital of the Republic, proclaiming against General Huerta and his supporters the very decree issued on January 25th, 1862 by Juarez when he was forced to defend the Nation from foreign invasion. In view of the attitude assumed by the American government, General Huerta tried to arouse public sentiment by representing himself as the zealous defender of national autonomy. He thought in this way to strengthen his power. When he began to enact this new farce, Carranza sent him the following telegram, which, although supposed to be secret, circulated quite freely throughout Mexico.

“Piedras Negras, Coahuila, July 15th, 1913.

“Ex-General Victoriano Huerta, National Palace, Mexico, D. F.

“I am informed anti-American demonstrations your own idea as last resort to retain usurped power in the name of the Mexican people which in the majority are Constitutionalist, I protest against your infamous manipulations and those of your followers, that would throw us into an unlooked for conflict, reserving for a more opportune moment my rights to fix upon you the responsibility of this new treason.

“V. Carranza.”

In Sonora, Mr. Carranza has tried to organize a government with the best resources at hand. Revolutionists cannot pick and choose their people. They have to take all classes that are willing to help them; they cannot even do justice to their own war cry,* therefore, their hardest task after triumph, is to purge the triumphant elements so as to keep only the most able and honest men to aid in the reconstruction of the administrative system.

Will the Chief be able to control all the elements which are actually helping him to overthrow General Huerta? Will he be able if he is victorious, to form a government that will inspire confidence, that will permit those who are willing to lend their services towards its consolidation, at the same time that it encourages the laboring classes to resume their labors, so that together, all may undertake the work of National reconstruction?

Such are the tremendous questions which come to the mind of those who love their country. All we wish is to see it come back to that life formerly enjoyed.

*One of the strange features to be noted is that the Constitutionalist revolution shouts “Mueran los Científicos!” (Death to the Científicos) and yet among the men of the Ciudadela, who overthrew and killed Madero, there was not a single “Científico.” As a matter of fact, the revolution of February 1913 was the work of the “Reyistas” and “Felicistas,” both the sworn enemies of the “Científicos.” As regards the Government of General Huerta, it has not had the support of any of the prominent men of the “Científicos” many of whom have had to leave the country to save themselves from assassination. Those who remain in Mexico have stayed only through lack of means to leave the country. The most prominent ministers of Huerta, Mondragon, Reyes, Garza Aldape, Portillo y Rojas, Moheno, have always been the declared enemies of the “Científicos.”

General Huerta's government is condemned by moral sentiment, by law, and by patriotism. General Huerta is not qualified to be the ruler of a civilized people; to support him now would be a crime. We could have pardoned his treason and his crimes, if their perpetration had brought some benefit to the country; if he had by them concentrated all his energies to direct the country through channels of labor and morality. But his immoral life, his political ambitions, his actions of an ignorant soldier, his primitive and ferocious passions, do not inspire us with the hope that he will do any good to the country. We must, therefore, give our support to his overthrow; we must, disinterestedly, aid the government of the triumphant revolution, regardless of previous convictions and of our former opinions concerning revolutionary methods. To support the Huerta government would be a crime, but it would be no less a crime to desert the men who has taken up arms against his despotism. If the new head of the Nation lacks experience and knowledge, let us all join in lending him our experience, and our knowledge, slight as these may be, to aid the work of reconstruction in our country.

Thus when the time comes for separating the wheat from the chaff, it may be that we can form a government just and serene; a government free from rancour or radicalism, which may save the nation in the present terrible crisis.

If, contrary to expectations, the new government is urged forward by the revolutionary current towards an abyss, let us warn him, let us clearly make him see his danger, let us raise our voices and make ourselves heard. Then if we are ultimately vanquished in this awful national catastrophe, we shall at least have the consolation that we have performed our duty.

CHAPTER XXXV.

THE KING AMUSES HIMSELF.

General Huerta, as I have stated throughout this work, ever since the Battle of Bachimba had been seeking a means of ascending to power, and Madero's government gave him the opportunity by again putting him in command of the troops, a command that had been taken from him for the very reason that they had no trust in him. From the moment that General Huerta was named Military Commander of the City to fill General Villar's place, all of us who had followed closely the political events, judged that Huerta would take control of affairs. Only Felix Diaz and his friends could place any faith in the compact of the Embassy and believe that a man like Huerta was going to betray the President, carry the stain of traitor, and later that of murderer before the whole civilized world, so that Mr. Felix Diaz or any other person, other than himself, should obtain the Presidency. When the compact had been entered into at the American Embassy, and when public opinion, which condones everything but foolishness, had condemned the rebels of the Ciudadela, Mr. Felix Diaz and his friends urged Huerta to hasten the call for the presidential elections. Huerta with the cunning which is his characteristic trait, let affairs drag along, until finally, not wishing further to delay the definite solution of matters, he decided to issue a proclamation for an election.

Felix Diaz and his friends were meantime seeking a Vice President who by his prestige might help the work which they had begun. They decided on Mr. Francisco de la Barra, who was expected to carry the Catholic party by his personal prestige which they still believed as great as when he had become provisional president on the fall of General Porfirio Diaz. Mr. de la Barra accepted at first, but finding that his prestige was not the same, and that the Catholics did not accept him unconditionally, or perhaps guessing General Huerta's intentions, he

withdrew his name. Again the Felicistas had to seek a candidate who would help Felix Diaz with the burden he had taken upon himself. Various candidates arose in the Central Committee which was the only one that busied itself with the matter. Among the important ones were the noted lawyer, Senator Gumesindo Enriquez, a dignified man of common sense and an experienced politician, and Mr. Jose Luis Requena, a man of great intelligence, a lawyer who has never practised. He had never engaged in active politics, but he was a millionaire who could defray the urgent expenditures that had to be made. The Felicistas decided upon Mr. Requena, and the Diaz-Requena combination was the one favored by the rebels of the Ciudadela.

General Huerta, who was watching the electoral work in order to see how he could carry out his deliberate plan of not leaving his post, decided that he ought to urge the Catholic party to take an active participation in the campaign and nominate candidates other than those backed by the Felicistas. Thus, he reasoned, by dividing the votes, neither party would obtain a majority and the elections would be declared void. The Catholic party which, since its re-entry into the political arena of the country has played a part greatly lacking in dignity, lent itself to everything and nominated the Gamboa-Rascon combination.*

Mr. Gamboa is a good man and an excellent writer, but he has never taken any part in political affairs, has no renown in the country, does not know men nor is he himself known, except as a writer. His position as Secretary of State gave him the opportunity to write his message in answer to the one taken to Mexico by Mr. John Lind, and his decided stand against the demands of the American government gave him a popularity which nevertheless was not solid and could not carry him through a real election. Huerta realized this and it was he himself who told the Catholic party that they ought to nominate Mr. Gamboa. The same was the case with General Rascon, a worthy soldier, of very little civil ability, and well advanced in years. Neither

*At the time this book is going to press, I read that Huerta has treated the Catholic party as he did the Felicistas and the House of Representatives, just as bartenders do with lemons; squeeze them dry and then throw them aside. He has just had the President of the Catholic party imprisoned in the Fortress of Ulúa.

of the two candidates could win the election, but General Huerta, to be even more secure, made Mr. Manuel Calero come forward as the candidate of the Liberal Party, fearing then that the Catholic party was going to win the election. Mr. Calero, too, is not popular, in the country at large or among the intellectual element. However much his talent and political knowledge may be granted, no one has any trust in him and he frightens many on account of his boundless ambition. In order to complete the list of the Liberal Party, General Huerta himself insinuated the advantage of naming Mr. Jesus Flores Magon whom I have already described elsewhere. Thus the administration counted upon drawing from the resources of Mr. Felix Diaz and making the latter lose the election. In order to encourage the candidates, General Huerta used to send for them to congratulate them on account of the nomination, hinting that the administration would back them, indirectly, because it had to appear neutral in the struggle.

He also called for the anti-relectionists to take a part in the farce he was getting ready and had them nominate David de la Fuente and Dr. Vazquez Gomez as Liberal candidates in opposition to Messrs. Calero and Flores Magon, and to Felix Diaz. Thus through the month of October and part of September did General Huerta amuse himself. But at the moment of the elections, fearful that the game might go against his plans, he decided to be more energetic, and the Military Commanders received decided orders to have the election result in favor of General Huerta for President and General Aureliano Blanquete for Vice President, although neither of the two had presented himself as a candidate, nor had been nominated by any party. However, General Huerta continued to protest that he would fulfil his obligations like the good soldier that he was and would respect the popular vote. As an added measure of mockery to the candidates, he made them meet at the Palace shortly before the election to make them sign a paper to the effect that they would respect the outcome of the election whatever it might be. They were all present at this meeting except Mr. Felix Diaz who was away and who had been the one most flouted in the jest. In fact, shortly after the election had been called, Mr. Felix Diaz had been sent as special envoy to Japan and he had been forced to depart almost without taking leave of any one. Of course, in his appointment it was stated that the government hoped he

would fulfil his mission before the day of the elections so that he might return to the country in time to carry out his political engagements. Mr. Felix Diaz, who had re-entered the army and had been advanced to the rank of General of Brigade, had to start immediately for Japan with the members of the Embassy but no sooner had he embarked at Salina Cruz than it became known that the Mikado would be unable to see him until the middle of October for the latter was on his summer vacation. When Mr. Diaz arrived in California, he was the target of an inimical demonstration planned by the expatriated Mexicans who lived in that American State. The Mexican government ordered him to Canada and from Vancouver he was ordered to Europe via the Dominion of Canada. When in Europe, on the eve of the election, he was relieved of his mission and permitted to return to Mexico.* Mr. Diaz took the first steamer back to his country. In Havana, he was met by friends who had come as members of the felicista party, and by others sent by General Huerta to intimidate him and keep him from the country. It was considered best to land at Tampico rather than in Vera Cruz, but Mr. Diaz, giving a proof of energy and decision, heeded no one and continued his voyage on the German ship towards Vera Cruz. Upon their arrival there, the members of the Embassy who had accompanied Diaz, were taken into custody, conducted aboard the gunboat Zaragoza and sent to Havana to resume their journey. It was claimed that they had returned to the country without the permission of the government, for the telegram to Mr. Diaz authorized the return of the latter only and not that of his friends who accompanied him. When they arrived at Havana, they were all dismissed from office and nearly all returned to Vera Cruz. Upon their second arrival at this port, those who were army men were taken charge of by the military authorities, and some, like Mr. Fidenicio Hernandez, were taken into custody under charges of having tried to cause a mutiny among the sailors of the ship that had taken them to Havana.

*Huerta always distrusted, feared that Mr. Felix Diaz, in spite of the orders of the government, would return to Mexico, and with that audacious step could increase his opportunities; then he preferred to allow him to return at once and watch over him in Mexico.

General Felix Diaz remained in Vera Cruz, but the government sent Mr. Antonio Villa-vicencio* at the head of a number of detectives to watch him. As there was bitter enmity between General Diaz and Mr. Villa-vicencio, to the degree that when the former had triumphed at the Ciudadela orders had been given that the latter be shot at sight, General Diaz believed that the object of the police was to shoot him. He prudently moved his quarters to the German Hotel which borders in the rear to the house occupied by the United States Consulate. Villa-vicencio ordered his people to surround the block and the whole square was consequently guarded by detectives. In addition to this policing, a rumor was circulated around Vera Cruz to the effect that the Felicistas had prepared a riot in order to attack the crew of the German warship anchored in the bay and thus bring more trouble on the government. These facts served to increase General Diaz' suspicions of a possible attempt against his life.

On the night of Saturday, the 25th, and Sunday the 26th, squads of Rurales patrolled the streets of Vera Cruz, thus showing that the government believed there really was a plot afoot. Whether due to this or to other reasons, the fact is that on the night of Monday the 27th, Diaz passed by way of the roof from the German Hotel to the American Consulate. From there, accompanied by Messrs. Bonales Sandoval and Ocon, and by two American Naval officers, he went hurriedly to the wharf that is in front of the American Consulate and boarded a launch of Rear Admiral Fletcher's fleet that took him to the Whitley, which was anchored in the Bay. On the following day he was transferred to one of the cruisers that were outside the bay and one of these transferred him at sea to the American steamer Esperanza when the latter sailed from Progreso on the 2nd of December. On the eve of the election, General Diaz had again obtained his retirement from the Federal army. Meanwhile, the elections took place. In Vera Cruz, where I was at the time, very few went to the polls, but a Captain in the army took to one of the booths the ballots corresponding to all the garrison in the city, all of them in favor of General Huerta for President, and General Blanquete for Vice President. One of the Felicistas

*Chief of the detective force when Felix Diaz was Police Commissioner.

wished to protest against this as a flagrant violation of the law, and had the weird idea of making Mr. Alcolea, brother-in-law of Felix Diaz, the notary to give testimony to the fact. The police arrested the partisan who protested and the Notary before whom he was to swear to the statement, and sent them both to Mexico City charged with sedition.

In Havana, Mr. Felix Diaz met with another misfortune. One night, on the "Malecon," a dispute arose between the group in which he found himself, and another group of expatriated Mexicans, who claimed to be Maderistas or revolutionists. As a result of this dispute, Mr. Pedro Guerrero Mendez, a young man, native of Michoacan, an ardent partisan of Madero, was wounded by a firearm. When the police examined the parties concerned, no firearms were found upon any of them. Nevertheless, a lady who claimed to have seen the whole affair, accused Mr. Felix Diaz as the assailant of Guerrero Mendez, and Mr. Diaz was taken prisoner but released on bail upon the following day to await the trial.

General Huerta, in the meantime, had convened the new Congress, and this had declared the election null and void because it did not conform with the legal requisites, and because the majority of votes had been cast for Huerta who was not a candidate. This latter point was contrary to the express text of the Constitution, a fact that could not in any way be countenanced by so ardent a champion of the Constitution as General Huerta. At the same time the Huertista Congress declared that as the election was null and void, General Huerta should continue in office until such a time as a legal election could be held.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

AMERICAN POLICY.

In the whole of our conflict since the revolution began, that is, since the end of 1910, the policy of the United States Government has played an important part, but the policy of the government of the State of Texas has played even a greater part.

The State of Texas, particularly its cities of San Antonio and El Paso, has been the incubator of the last three Mexican revolutions. I wish to point out this fact and to lay stress on it because since peace in Mexico is of interest to Americans, they should begin by taking measures to prevent further conspiracies at home against the peace of their neighbor. There have been two chief incentives to foment revolutionary movements in Mexico. The fever for business, which has no limit with some merchants who seek profit wherever it can be secured, regardless of the means employed for obtaining it; and the protection which men of doubtful character find in all movements of disorder.

For instance, under cover of the revolutionary movements, cattle stealing on a large scale has been frequent. In the majority of cases, the authorities have been powerless to punish the guilty parties. Special legislation on the sale of cattle at the border would probably prevent the repetition of the evil.

Regarding the second question, the United States Government is already taking steps to revise the neutrality laws so as to authorize the federal authorities to punish violations more severely, and especially, to empower them to prevent the execution of acts of rebellion hatched north of the Rio Grande.

As I have related in different chapters of this book the spectre of intervention, which strikes terror to all Mexican politicians of whatever party, was conjured up by Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson ever since the time of General Diaz, whose downfall it powerfully aided. Later, it was used against Madero with greater force. Huerta is the only one against whom it has not

been employed, either because Ambassador Wilson was early recalled or because the new American administration soon understood that Huerta wished to be threatened, hoping by that means to consolidate his power.*

From the beginning of his administration, President Wilson outlined his policy against usurpation perfectly, and has constantly adhered to it. The just attitude of the President of the American Union is unassailable both morally and legally.

President Woodrow Wilson has refused to recognize the government of General Huerta so as not to establish the precedent that governments established by force and through treachery, are to be considered legitimate. Mr. Wilson justly denies the theory that he has no right to question the means by which an individual seizes the power. Such theories, as that of the legality of Huerta's government, are worthy of shysters but not of conscientious people. In refusing to recognize the government of General Huerta, the President of the United States has made use of an indisputable right of the American nation, for it is inherent to its sovereignty to decide with whom it should have friendly relations without having to declare whether that government is legitimate or not; in other words, whether an official has complied with his particular constitution so as to

*The propositions presented to the American Government by Mr. Henry Lane Wilson for the pacification of Mexico were published in the New York Herald of November 16th, 1913. It was proposed to authorize American intervention to the 26th parallel of latitude, beginning at Topolobampo, State of Sinaloa, and ending at Matamoros, State of Tamaulipas. This would result in the military occupation by the United States of the States of Sonora, Chihuahua, and a large part of Coahuila, Nuevo Leon and Lower California. Besides, Mexico was to relinquish all claims relating to the Chamizal, give up all share in the waters of the Colorado River, pay the claims that might be made against it, and express the wish and possibility of holding regular elections immediately. Did Mr. Wilson submit these propositions in accordance with a previous agreement with Huerta? This is quite probable, because Mr. Wilson has been continuously advocating Huerta's fitness to govern Mexico; besides the latter's telegram to Mr. Henry Lane Wilson thanking him for his work, gives peculiar weight to this assumption. The telegram is dated August 5th, that is, immediately after Mr. Wilson's dismissal on August 4th, when President Woodrow Wilson rejected the Ambassador's propositions.

represent the Nation legitimately. The American Government refuses to enter into friendly relations with the government of General Huerta for the same reasons that a merchant might refuse to do business with a given house without implying anything else than the exercise of an unquestionable right.

The American Government has been harassed by two parties clamoring for directly opposite courses of action in Mexico. On the one hand, it was asked to recognize the Huerta government, and on the other, to intervene in the affairs of Mexico, *manu militari*, and to impose peace by force of arms. Either would be a capital mistake. Armed intervention is condemned by the policy which the American Government has followed for a century.

John Adams, on November 18, 1782, maintained that the American people should not intervene in the affairs of others, and therefore, would not concede to anyone the right to intervene in the affairs of the United States.

Washington maintained the same principles in his proclamation of April 22, 1793, and particularly recommended them in his "Farewell Address" of September 1796. Jefferson also upheld them on March 12, 1793, and again recommended the same policy on June 30 of the same year.

Macon, member of the Senate Committee of Foreign Affairs, said on January 16, 1826: "The true interest of the United States was supposed to be promoted by avoiding all entangling connections with any other nations whatsoever."

Secretary of State Clay said on January 30, 1828: "The government of the United States scrupulously refrains from taking part in the internal dissensions in foreign states whether in the Old World or the New."

President Van Buren expressed the same views on June 9, 1829, and Secretary of State Forsyth on November 11, 1834 addressed a note to the American Minister in Mexico on the same subject. Webster, as Secretary of State, on January 29, 1842, also referred to this matter in the same terms. President Fillmore on December 2nd, 1851, said: "Let every people choose for itself and make and alter its political institutions to suit its own condition and convenience."

On December 28, 1855, referring to a controversy with Turkey about a man who had been condemned to death for changing his religion, Secretary of State Marcy declared that intervention

could not be justified in spite of the absurdity and inhumanity of such a sentence.

On account of the occurrences in Mexico, Secretary of State, General Cass, in a note dated March 7th, 1859, to Mr. McLane, the representative of the United States near the government of Juarez, maintained the policy of non-intervention in spite of the fact that President Buchanan himself desired to intervene having gone so far as to ask authority to do so, which was refused by Congress. Later the United States had their Department of State in charge of that great statesman whose name must always be mentioned with respect, Mr. Seward. I must cite his notes of November 5, 1861; June 23; November 22; and December 14, 1862, and his circular of November 30 of the same year, addressed to the Diplomatic Agents of the United States, in which he denies to the European powers any right of intervention; for at that time, in the name of humanity, they were pretending to meddle with the gigantic struggle of the American people.

The importunities of the European powers, chiefly France, who wished to re-establish peace in the United States, and to force the government to come to an understanding with the rebels, obliged the American Congress to pass a joint resolution, which Mr. Seward published on March 9, 1863 and contains the following paragraph: ".....In order to remove all chance of misunderstanding on the subject and to secure for the United States the full enjoyment of that freedom from foreign interference which is one of the highest rights of independence for Congress to declare its conviction on the subject."

Finally when things reached a critical point, Mr. Seward made a definite declaration which sums up the policy of the United States without leaving room for the slightest doubt. It is dated June 30, 1864 and in it, Mr. Seward says that "the principles of foreign mediation in our affairs can not be in any form or under any circumstances, admitted."

Mr. Fish, Secretary of State in the administration of General Grant, maintained the same thesis and ratified it on March 26, 1873.

On April 15, 1885, Mr. Bayard, as Secretary of State in President Cleveland's administration, referring to the protection due to Americans residing in foreign countries, denied the right of the United States to intervene in the affairs of a coun-

try for the purpose of guaranteeing the peaceful enjoyment of their property to Americans who found themselves endangered by civil war. Secretary Bayard declared that "generally speaking, persons who quit the shelter of their own flag to take up a voluntary residence in a foreign land do so at their own risk and subject to the vicissitudes of foreign invasion or domestic insurrection in the country where they cast their lot in common with the natives thereof."

Secretary of State Day on September 16, 1898, and President McKinley on December 5, 1899, were even more explicit.

Lastly, on December 6, 1904, the man who has been considered in these times the champion of a strong foreign policy by the United States, the famous originator of the "big stick policy," Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, said: "Ordinarily it is very much wiser and more useful for us to concern ourselves with striving for our moral and material betterment here at home than to concern ourselves with trying to better the condition of things in other nations."

The foregoing citations clearly show that the policy of the United States, inspired by a high sentiment of justice and love of country, has never tolerated the interference of any nation in the interior affairs of the country, and at the same time, applying the rule to other nations, has not interfered in their interior conflicts.

This has been the policy not only of its statesmen, who have held executive power, but also of the Congress of the United States, which has continuously refused to give authority for such interventions.

After the revolution of Ayutla, when we had the revolt of Tacubaya with the dictatorship of Miramon, President Buchanan very insistently asked for authority to intervene in Mexican affairs and expel Miramon from the Capital. President Buchanan desired to impress the American Senate with his message of December 19, 1859, but did not succeed. A year later, on account of the assassination of Crabb and his companions in Sonora, and of the murders by Marquez in Tacubaya on April 11, President Buchanan insisted with the American Congress for authority to intervene in Mexican affairs. Congress again refused; it went even further, it refused to ratify the treaty McLane-Ocampo, which authorized the American Government to protect traffic in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec with the forces

of the United States, and it refused because "the people of the United States ought not to meddle in the interior conflicts of any nation."

This policy was continually maintained by the United States during its own civil war in which some excesses were committed, excesses inevitable in fratricidal wars. Then, as now in Mexico, property suffered damages, because Sherman's famous march to the sea, begun November 16th, 1864, was a devastation lasting five weeks. The commander of the Union army, under the exigency of war, destroyed everything in his path, without stopping to inquire its value or who were the owners.

The government of General Huerta has entreatingly complained that it has been unable to restore peace, because the American Government has not recognized it. Did General Diaz in 1876 need this recognition when he entered the capital of the Republic after his victory at the battle of Tecuac? No. The need of it, which General Huerta proclaims, simply shows his own weakness. Strong governments, when supported by the nation they govern, need nobody's recognition. Foreign nations, on seeing them well established, recognize them in their own interests no matter what grievances they may have had previously. Spain, Catholic Spain, had seen Juarez expel from Mexican territory the Spanish Ambassador Pacheco, and Clementi, the Nuncio of his Holiness, but all that did not prevent Spain from recognizing Juarez when once she saw him solidly established. France, whose soldiers had fought against General Diaz, and Austria, which had seen the brother of its own Emperor shot in Mexico by the party for which Diaz fought, recognized his government and entered into diplomatic relations when they saw that the former republican soldier had constituted a real government. But as regards General Huerta, he does not possess the necessary qualifications to render him capable of establishing a real government, nor does he enjoy the support of the truly representative and thoughtful men who could guarantee the proper execution of the law and the sway of justice. He has at his side men of undoubted intelligence, but of no weight to the country or even to the mind of General Huerta himself, who listens to them only so long as they flatter his passions or do not oppose his wishes.

The representatives of European nations gave their respective governments favorable reports of General Huerta because

they only saw in him a bold soldier, and believed that in reestablishing order he would continue to show the same energy that he had used to grasp power. But they failed to apprehend the true character of General Huerta and to gauge correctly the medium where the events were taking place.

President Wilson, however, fully realized both, not because his Ambassador faithfully informed him of what occurred, but because the nearness to the theater of events, the large current of communications and the ease of transportation allowed him to receive quickly all the details needed to decide his line of conduct. This has tended to conserve peace between the two nations, which should always be friendly since their political ideals are the same and their mutual interests closely bound.

Some may complain that we have now been for three years in a state of civil war. This is quite true, but most nations have passed through similar crises before becoming permanently constituted. To enjoy the public liberties which so distinguish her, England had to go through the direful period from the end of the 13th century to the beginning of the 14th; through the civil war of the Roses, and lastly through the period from 1648 to 1658 which made Cromwell immortal. Besides, England had as a powerful auxiliary the One Hundred Years' War, which, like all foreign wars, served it admirably to consolidate its resources.

To reach the present Republic, and not considering the contests prior to Louis XI, France had to pass the revolutionary period at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th, one of the most imposing revolutions registered in history, and it was only after the commotions of 1830 and 1848 and particularly after the great catastrophe of 1870-71 that the country succeeded in reorganizing itself.

Spain has a revolutionary period which covers nearly all its history, but in its last stage, it took seven years to enable it to constitute a monarchy under the scepter of the present Bourbons.

The United States have been more fortunate because they came into being differently from other nations. When the British Empire was consolidated in America and the Colonies began to be formed in 1664, later to be the nucleus of this great nation, the great English crisis had passed and the head of Charles I had already fallen, carrying with it all future pretensions to

tyrannize the English people. With all these lessons in mind the Pilgrims of the Mayflower arrived in America.

All nations cannot be judged similarly. It is essential to study their history and the elements of which they are formed. Italy has been unified by its defeats. Turkey has been ruined by its victories. How long did that Holy Roman Empire last, which appeared so vigorous at the coronation of Charlemagne by the Pope on Christmas night of the year 800? Only the lifetime of its founder.

Why did Austria lose its predominance in Germany? On account of its civil wars, yet if we turn to Japan we find that it has risen to its present high position because of its civil wars.

It is true we have had three consecutive revolutions. We are now at the crisis. Our enemies say that there is not a single man visible with sufficient authority to control the situation. That is exactly what the allied nations said in 1861 at the discussions of the treaty of London, and yet Juarez demonstrated with facts that he did have the requisite authority to form a government in the country.

CONCLUSION.

The contemporaneous history of our country reminds us forcibly of another epoch, also disastrous to the life of our nation. Then, as to day, it was necessary to struggle with the natural reaction which, after a military revolt, took possession of power. Then the populace was victorious in the long run, and the military dictatorship of Santa Ana first, and that of Miramon second, both backed by a strong and invincible army, were overthrown, although in their death agony they nearly dragged with them the independence of the Nation.

The dictatorship of Santa Ana collapsed at the touch of the revolution of Ayutla, for this revolt had inscribed on its banners principles for making normal the political life of the Nation and thus implanting a real democracy. Among these principles, and in fact the main one, was the abolition of special privileges to the army and to the clergy, and the administering of justice equally to all.

After the triumph of the revolution of Ayutla, Don Juan Alvarez was made provisional President. His administration was characterized by the fact that everybody was president except the President himself. Alvarez was eventually succeeded by General Ignacio Comonfort, the first President elected under the system established by the Constitution of 1857.

Comonfort, without a doubt was a good man, but indecisive and lacking the necessary capabilities for accomplishing the task at hand. He was full of illusions which he had to put aside, and purposes which he could not carry out. Like all weak men, he hesitated, and like all men politically inexperienced, he put himself into the hands of the very men who would ruin him. These men betrayed him, and his downfall was horrible. The military revolt of Tacubaya carried to the Presidency an unknown soldier, Zuloaga by name, a man without education, and even weaker and more indecisive than Comonfort.

Soon after the revolt of Tacubaya, Miramon, who had been its heart and soul, declared the wish of the Nation to be that he

occupy the presidency; with this excuse, he seized the government and implanted a new dictatorship as bad if not worse than that which the revolution of Ayutla had overthrown.

Juarez, who had been elected Vice President at the time Comonfort was elected President, now took up the banner which had been dropped by the Constitutional President. He called on the Nation to assist him in a war against pretorian militarism, whose title to power was treason, and whose only arms were those entrusted to it by the Nation to guard its institutions.

The war lasted three years, but finally, at Calpulalpam, the supremacy of the populace over the pretorian militarists was decided, and right triumphed over the rebellious soldiery.

Comparing one epoch with the other, we see the similarity between them. The dictatorship of General Diaz, like that of Santa Ana, collapsed at the touch of a revolution on whose banners were inscribed principles which would make Mexico a true democracy. At the elections, the triumphant revolution placed Madero at the head of the government, a good man, but full of illusions, indecisive, and at the critical moment incompetent to carry out the promised reforms. Like Comonfort, Madero found the ground unfavorable since there had been no work of preparation and education along democratic lines. He, like Comonfort, placed his trust in the very persons who were to betray him.

Two revolts, entirely military in origin, planned at Tacubaya, brought to the Presidency soldiers like Miramon and Santa Ana, who thought to impose their authority by force of arms, believing that with bayonets they could establish peace.

Guillermo Prieto referring to Santa Ana on page 566 of his book entitled "Lessons on Our National History for the use of the Cadets of the Military Academy," says: "Needless to say that in the administration all members of the President's family were acting as brokers in all lines of business, thus converting into cash their submission and loyalty to their head. To strengthen such a situation, the army was necessarily increased. Outcasts of all parties flocked to the ranks, shoving aside and heaping humiliations upon the men of true merit. As was to be expected, the freedom of the press was withdrawn, spying and tale bearing, and shady intrigues became the politics of the time *

* * * * Santa Ana believed he could do anything and that he knew everything, for such is the invariable result where such

petty meannesses and adulations are combined. This is a symptom of the ruin of all brainless rulers.”

All who are familiar with the crisis through which Mexico is passing at this time, might think on reading the words of Guillermo Prieto about Santa Ana, that they were written about the dictatorship of General Huerta. The reason is that all dictatorships are fundamentally alike; they all carry to power men who as a rule are brutal; some more intelligent than others, and some more easily adaptable to their new surroundings. Of these, the intelligent men who harmonize their acts, if only in part, are able to make their government tolerable. Such was the case with General Diaz. In fact, when they are sufficiently clever to develop with the times and adapt themselves to the requirements of the people, they end by making themselves loved and are able to perpetuate themselves. Such was the case with Bernardotte in Sweden, and such would have been the case with General Diaz if he had developed politically as he did socially.

With the fall of the government of Madero, the country has been launched into a new revolution which must necessarily be the last, if we are to maintain our national independence. The present revolution is fully justified because of the unspeakable acts committed by those now in power. Entirely filled with the idea of gaining supremacy, they did not measure the consequences of their conduct, nor have they sought pardon for their deeds. On the contrary, they have all in all given ample cause for an armed rebellion. I repeat that, in my opinion, the present revolution will be the last; it therefore behooves us to make up our differences in such a way as to prevent the armed intervention of foreign nations, since it is not impossible that they may be forced to it by the insistent appeals of their citizens who raise before the eyes of the world the host of humanity. Intervention by a foreign power would be disastrous to Mexico, costly if not disastrous to the nation attempting it; facts well known to the governments of both continents as well as to ourselves. But public opinion carries such weight in some countries and imposes itself in such a manner that the governments at times, even against their better judgment, are obliged to submit to the mandates formulated in terms so imperious, that there is not even room for hesitation.

We should, therefore, not remain complacently tranquil, confiding in the personal judgment of this or that ruler, or in his

intentions and personal wishes. We must face the question as it stands, measure the conflict in all its phases, and seek a solution without undue haste or delay which may cause our eventual social death.

The government of General Huerta cannot stand, nor can it count on public opinion. It was born of treason, it lives nursed by the heat of a most frightful disorder, and will die execrated by the whole nation. Those who are not openly its enemies, hide their true feelings through fear, through personal expediency, or through misgivings for the future, seeming to believe that by merely closing their eyes, the yawning chasms will close. In fact, General Huerta can only count on the bayonet to maintain his position; and the bayonet as has been said by an expert, is useful for everything except to lean upon. But like Santa Ana, General Huerta will relinquish power only when he is ejected by main force. It may be that he intends, like Santa Ana, to put a figure-head in the chair; then leaving everybody satisfied, to flee to foreign lands to await an opportunity to seize power again, if there should be a new outbreak. But to give up of his own accord, definitely and completely, power gained by the blackest treason ever registered in the annals of our history, will never be done by General Huerta.

Does the salvation of the country then depend upon the triumph of the revolution headed by Venustiano Carranza? To all appearances; it is the only revolution now existing, and is. I insist, the last one we should have.

Like all revolutions, the Constitutionalista has not been able to choose its followers, but has been forced to accept all volunteers. For this reason, we cannot condemn it on account of having in its ranks men who may have been formerly evil-doers, nor because it may have resorted to acts unsanctioned by modern warfare. On the contrary, we must close our eyes to both these facts and concentrate our minds, as is meet and just, on the absolute necessity for the overthrow of a regime whose future points to the ruin of the nation; our eyes should seek to see and our minds to grasp the terrible anguish which possesses all patriots who think only of the welfare of Mexico. Will the government which succeeds that of General Huerta be able to establish itself on such a basis as to give promise of final consolidation, and prove itself strong, dignified, and worthy of respect?

If the men who are leading the present revolution should triumph and attain power, will they be able to establish the peace so eagerly desired by the whole nation? Or will they only give place to a new period of insurrection which the country itself cannot withstand and which foreign powers will not tolerate?

To try to prevent this, I have deemed it my duty to set forth a record of what has happened and call the attention of my countrymen to the danger we are in, pointing out at the same time the causes and motives which, in my estimation, have brought us to our present deplorable situation. Such has been the principal object of this book, since in its entirety it has been merely a narrative of deeds and a study of the men who have taken part in our national politics within the last few years. To attain my object fully, I must now name the responsible parties, attributing to each his responsibility in the deeds set forth in this book. Here, as throughout my whole work, I have endeavored to set aside all personal feelings so far as human nature will allow. Therefore, lest I be accused of attempting to shirk responsibility or of being moved by personal animosity, or of nursing some secret ambition, in writing these final pages I have put aside entirely all personal feelings. It has been my endeavor to write as though I had not personally known the men I am judging; in fact, as if I had never been connected with them. Only with this firm resolution is it possible to write contemporaneous history.

First of all then, before the tribunal of history, I impeach Don Porfirio Diaz, not of his acts as a revolutionist, which, as I have stated in Chapter II,* do carry with them a certain responsibility, but, first and foremost, I impeach him of his acts as President of the Nation. He enjoyed an authority throughout the country never possessed by any other man. Had not ambition killed every other sentiment in his soul, he would have been able to relinquish power at the proper time to younger, more robust, and more energetic hands. At the same time, he could have acted as adviser to his successor, protecting him with the respect and love his conduct would have of itself won for him in the hearts of the people. He would have been able, in the long years of his rule, to set the Nation on the road to a true democracy. He would have been able to educate a score of men

*Of the Spanish complete edition.

with a thorough knowledge of public affairs, so that they might properly control the reins of government and conduct the Nation through the paths of peace and order to true liberty. But far from that, he passed his official life distrusting the whole world, and playing those who surrounded him one against the other to their own destruction. He deceived everybody. He used everybody to his own ends and personal purposes. He antagonized all who could have served him or the country; some of them died, others were totally incapacitated for further work of benefit to the country. His political work was one of destruction, one of extinction. It is true that he developed and encouraged the material progress of the country, but it is also true that he neglected all the rest. He failed to remember that the material progress of a people, when not accompanied by their political education, can only presage ruin and desolation to the country; for, vast material works, unaccompanied by training in leadership, citizenship, and interest by all in public affairs, can only spell failure.

Sparta and Athens apparently so strong, so consolidated, one with its great military spirit, the other with its laurels of art and poetry, disappeared from among the nations of the world as soon as they concentrated their activities on material progress and delivered themselves body and soul to the spirit of commercialism, going so far even as to hire those satraps who were tyrannizing the towns bordering on Greece, those peasants crowned with glory at Platea and Marathon.

The same thing is true of the Persian Empire under the great Syrian, of the Empire of the Pharaohs, and of the Empire of Macedonia which reached the zenith of greatness with the genius of Alexander the Great.

The Roman Empire, that empire which gave birth to men who still live by the glory of their deeds and who are known to all students throughout the world, also disappeared on the day when its citizens, instead of going to the Forum to discuss the public welfare, went to inspect and admire the great material works which were to perpetuate the glory of the tyrants who were snatching from them one by one all their liberties.

Social development only is permanent. Greece still lives today because the poetry and art of the Athenians will live forever. Rome lives because its institutions and laws are an eternal fount of inspiration to the jurist and the lawmaker.

Material works fill a momentary need, but in history they only serve to recall the epoch of their construction, they are useful to posterity as sign posts to stimulate the interest in the men who ordered them and in those who constructed them. The monuments left by the Arab conquest of Spain remind us only that the forces of Tarik and Yousuf reached even across the Pyrenees before their progress was stopped by the son of Pepin; they tell us a story of seven hundred years of hideous crimes and treasons, and seven hundred years of constant blows against liberty. As a whole, those monuments are testimonials of pain more than of power. The great pyramids of Egypt, and the beautiful ruins of the civilization of the Indians in our own country, are altars which grief and shame, exile and slave, have raised to perpetuate throughout the centuries the wickedness of man and the pleasure of tyrants in the grief of a vanquished brother.

What profit has humanity received from such things as the magnificent baths of Caracullus, of Neztahualeoyotl, or the pyramids of Teotihuacan? They are only a reminder of the existence of great empires which, like the government of General Diaz, have collapsed. His material works will remind generations to come that Mexico once possessed a man of great power who had vast resources at his command; a man who for many years held a people in absolute subjection, but who lived to see his work perish because although he conquered his country, he was conquered by his own egotism and ambition. Therefore, eventually, instead of peace and prosperity, his work brought ruin and desolation. But the responsibility does not all belong to General Diaz. I now proceed to impeach General Bernardo Reyes. Had not the Reyista movement been a purely personal one to disturb our spirit, it is possible that we might not have witnessed the events which fill us with horror and shame, and make us shudder when we contemplate the end they may lead to in the very near future. Under the shadow and immediate supervision of General Reyes, that seed of rebellion and sedition was implanted which was the soul of the disgraceful mutiny of February 18th, 1913.

The Maderista revolution, as I have endeavored to show, in the course of this work, found the ground propitious because of the lengthy intrigues carried on for ten years by General Reyes and his subordinates. His was an undertaking essentially

disastrous because it aimed at discrediting resources of value, offering no substitute for them, and above all, because it stood for the supremacy of force as an element of life for the Nation.

General Reyes created nothing. His work, socially, only engendered a spirit of insubordination, of indecisiveness, of disloyalty, which is reflected throughout his entire political career. In fact, he did not even do anything worthy of note for himself though he concentrated his efforts to that end. If he had been upright and decisive, his energy would have served to consolidate a civil government as well as to restrain General Diaz from those acts which were dragging him down, and the whole nation with him. General Reyes could have taken advantage of the growing feeling against Porfirio Diaz to place himself at the head of a purely democratic movement. The country would have welcomed him with open arms, for as a matter of fact the people often turned to him and would have delivered themselves to him had he not hesitated. But he was not the man to face such situations. His work was destructive rather than constructive; it was the forerunner of events which have subsequently taken place. I put him down in history as one of those mainly responsible for the present conditions, and I impeach him as second only to Diaz himself.

Next, I impeach those officers who have made the army a stepping stone to their ambitions, who have forced the country back to the pretorian epoch of his Serene Highness, Santa Ana; an epoch so disastrous to the country. These men have corrupted the army whose mission it is to defend the fatherland and uphold its institutions; they have made of it an instrument to satiate their personal desires; and they have made the present time an epoch which will always be a blot on our national life. These officers are Victoriano Huerta, Felix Diaz, and Manuel Maria Mondragon.

Next to them, I impeach Mr. Madero. He is responsible in that he attempted a work far above his capability,—to bring into one channel the conflicting currents reyismo, the democratic party, and the anti-reelectionists, conflicting in everything but the desire to expel Diaz and the men identified with him. He should have understood that it was necessary to curb them so that they should not become anarchical. He should have analyzed himself carefully to see whether he really possessed the qualifications for such a work; but he did not do so. With no realiza-

tion of the greatness of the mission he was undertaking, and of the labor and work involved, he plunged straight to a destruction of incalculable consequences to the country. Notwithstanding, history undoubtedly will have mercy on him, perhaps forgive all his errors on account of his martyrdom.

I also impeach the advisers of General Diaz who were in touch with him for many years, who were with him at the crucial moment. Among them, in the first rank, I impeach Jose Ives Limantour. Mr. Limantour for many years enjoyed the friendship and affection of General Diaz and finally his entire confidence. His egotism and incompetence at the crucial moment, were revealed to such a degree that many consider him the conscious author of the fall of General Diaz. Events have not yet clearly established it; therefore, I myself would not dare to make such a weighty accusation. However, his incompetence in those moments is so plain, his insight into the political situation so slight, his acts so erroneous, that it is hard to believe that a man of his reputed high intelligence could have acted as he did only through error. Like General Diaz, he could have served the country, but either through malice, through ambition, or through incapacity, he hurled it into the abyss. I place him among the most guilty; in fact, to a degree equal to Bernardo Reyes.

I also impeach the American Ambassador, Mr. Henry Lane Wilson, whose work, entirely destructive in character, is inexplicable. He worked against the government of General Diaz, forcing the collapse of his administration; he was not less hostile to that of Mr. Madero, as he has openly admitted,* and in the tragedy of February 22nd, his sin of omission is absolutely despicable.

When recalled from office by the Democratic Administration, he upheld in this country the government of General Huerta, for the exploitation of his political party; but while in Mexico, his attitude was impertinent. He went so far as to demand in his official capacity as Ambassador of a liberty loving people, the suppression of the Mexican newspaper "El Pais" and the arrest of its editors.†

*Interview published in the New York Times, Jan. 11th, 1913.

†Letter from Henry Lane Wilson to President Huerta under date of June 11th, 1913.

I further impeach the Messrs. Vazquez Gomez and Mr. Francisco de la Barra, who also are, in my opinion, greatly to blame for present conditions in Mexico. The former for their plottings and ambitions; the latter for his weakness as a ruler. Mr. Lascunain is to blame, but only to a very slight degree. He was undoubtedly confronted by a situation which he could not possibly have foreseen. It is true he showed lack of energy and foresight, but we must judge him at the moment of action, and above all, we must remember that he was the only one not moved by a personal ambition. Though I do not absolve him entirely, I can only place his responsibility on a par with that of the rest of us, especially of those who have taken part in one way or another in the administration of affairs. I for my part do not shirk this responsibility, and I make my confession to extenuate my blame.

All of us, by our silence, contributed to the destructive work of General Diaz. All of us believed with a blind faith that we could change a man like Don Porfirio Diaz and induce him to institute a democracy. All of us, fearing a revolution with its appalling consequences, preferred to kill our desire for freedom and allow one man to rule us. We submitted silently without considering that our submission and our silence only served to postpone the conflict. Our conduct only retarded the struggle, but did not prevent it. With history for a teacher, we should have foreseen this. In Rome, after Tiberius came Caligula, then Nero, then the inevitable anarchy and insurrection of the soldiery, which brought into power uneducated, vicious, and incompetent soldiers like Galba, Otho, and Vitellius.

This is now the peril, and we must prevent it at all hazards. The people are not always fortunate enough to find a Flavius Vespasian, nor is a Domitius often succeeded by a Nervius or a Trojan; but the duty of a true patriot is to seek them, and to denounce impostors so that lies may not prosper or wickedness flourish. This is the principle purpose of this book. We were blindly obedient for thirty odd years and have fought untiringly for more than three years. The moment has now come for us to think, to reflect, and to work conscientiously. Putting aside all personal ambitions, we must think only of our fatherland, and duly consider its well being. For this, we must forget past strifes, and all purely personal incidents; these must give away to the question of greater interest, the welfare of the nation. Let us all unite, and reunited, gather around the govern-

ment which will rise when the present tyranny is overthrown, as I truly believe it will be. When the revolution should triumph, let us place at its command all our energies, all our activities, and all our love of country. Let us consecrate ourselves, not to quarrel over power, but to choose as our only possible course, the path of justice and truth which leads directly to Liberty.

For my part, I know that by relating events as they have truly happened, and by giving this book to the public, I will increase the number of my enemies; but for all that, I do not hesitate. I gladly place my life and my political honor in their hands. I care not if they revive my past and slander me as much as they please. In offering this book to the public, I have not forgotten the truth of that line of Terence "Veritas odium parit."



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