

SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Operations, CIS, G-2  
Compilation Branch

APO 500  
2 Aug 1947

SUBJECT : OTA Saburo  
BIRTHPLACE : Tokyo.  
ACTIVITIES :  
1928 Graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, Law Department.  
1943 Third Secretary, Japanese Embassy, USSR.  
Chief, Fifth Section, Political Affairs Bureau, Foreign Ministry.  
9 Dec 1943 Chief, Third Section, Research and Investigation Bureau, Foreign Ministry.  
26 Aug 1945 Director, Third Department, Central Liaison Office.  
? Lecturer, Institute for Research into Total War.

REMARKS :

On 23 October 1943, subject made the following statement regarding the establishment of a Free India Government:

"It is most appropriate. It is the first government established by the hands of Indians themselves....."

"No compromise will be accepted until independence is achieved. Its objective is a march to Delhi. It will fight to the bitter end."

Incl 31

SECRET

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff

General Activities  
APO 500  
9 June 1947

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION

SUBJECT: OTA, Saburo.

Present Address: 334 Hayashi Machi, Oi, Shinagawa Ku, Tokyo.

Education:

1928: Graduated Law School, Tokyo Imperial University.

Career:

1940: 3rd Secretary, Japanese Embassy to USSR.

1941: President of the KORIYAMA Club of the TOHOKU District Chamber of Commerce (FUKUSHIMA Prefecture).

1943: Chief of the 5th Section of Political Bureau, Foreign Ministry.

9 Dec 1943: Appointed Chief, 3rd Section, Research and Investigation Bureau, Foreign Ministry until Feb 1945.

26 Aug 1945: Appointed Director of 3rd Department of CLO, dealing with industries, currency, reparations, accounting, supply, transport and communication.

Remarks:

On 23 Oct 1943 he made the following statement broadcast in Japanese to South America, concerning the establishment of the "Free Indian Government":  
"It is most appropriate. It is the first government established by the hands of the Indians themselves...No compromise will be accepted until independence is achieved. Its objective is a march to Delhi. It will fight to the bitter end."

OTA is at present a member of the Russia Society.

SECRET

OTA, Saburo

Def. Doc. 1581

Affidavit

Third Secretary to the Japanese Embassy in Moscow from  
May 1938 under Ambassador Togo.

Report by  
H. A. Dolan, Jr.

25 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

OTA, Saburo  
ISONO, Yuzo  
HAYASHI, Kaoru  
YAMAMURA, Haruo  
MIURA, Kazuichi

A search of the IPS files reveals no information on the  
above subject.

OTA, Saburo

Def. Doc. 1581

**Affidavit**

Third Secretary to the Japanese Embassy in Moscow from  
May 1938 under Ambassador Togo.

~~H. POYSON~~

Permanent residence and status: IBARAGI Prefecture - commoner.

Date of birth: 5 April 1905.

Name: OHTA, Saburo

Former status:

Former name:

- 31 March 1925: Graduated from the Fifth Higher School, Senior Division, literature course.
- 31 March 1928: Graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University, Law School, political course.
- September " : Passed the Diplomatic Service Examination, a Higher Civil Service examination.
- 10 November 1928: Appointed a Chancellor of the Foreign Ministry and given the 5th salary grade by the Foreign Ministry. Ordered to serve in England by the Foreign Ministry.
- 9 April 1929: Departed from Tokyo.
- 23 May " : Arrived at his post in London.
- 28 May 1930: Appointed a student diplomat and given the seventh rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet. Raised to the 4th salary grade and ordered to serve in England by the Foreign Ministry.
- 16 June 1930: Conferred with the 7th Court Rank, Junior Grade.
- 8 October 1930: Appointed attache to the Japanese representative to the Narcotics Producing Countries Conference held at London, England, by the Cabinet.
- 28 April 1931: Appointed attache to the Japanese representative to the Narcotics Control Conference held at Geneva, Switzerland, by the Cabinet.
- 30 September 1931: Appointed a student consul. Given the seventh rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet. Given the 4th salary grade. Ordered to serve in Sidney by the Foreign Ministry.
- 30 June 1932: Raised to the 3rd salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.
- 16 August 1933: Promoted to the sixth rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet.
- " " " : Raised to the 2nd salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.
- 1 September 1933: Conferred with the 7th Court Rank, Senior Grade.
- 10 April 1935: Appointed a Secretary in the Foreign Ministry. Given the sixth rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet. Given the seventh salary grade and assigned to serve with the Second Section of the European-African Bureau by the Foreign Ministry.
- 1 July 1936: Promoted to the fifth rank of the Higher Civil Service.
- 1 July 1936: Given the 6th salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.
- 1 July 1936: Appointed a secretary of the Information Committee by the Cabinet.
- 10 July 1936: Assigned to serve with the First Section of the Information Board by the Foreign Ministry.
- 15 July 1936: Conferred with the 6th Court Rank, Junior Grade.
- 30 November 1936: Ordered to proceed on business to OSAKA by the Cabinet.
- 5 April 1937: Appointed Secretary of the Foreign Ministry. Given the fifth rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet.
- 5 April 1937: Assigned to serve with the European-African Bureau by the Foreign Ministry.
- 5 April 1937: Ordered to proceed on business to FORMOSA by the Cabinet.
- 26 June 1937: Ordered to proceed on business to OSAKA and to AICHI Prefecture. Not published in the Official Gazette. (Business trip to AICHI Prefecture cancelled for his convenience). By the Cabinet.
- 1 July 1937: Given the 5th salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.

- 23 August 1937: Ordered to proceed on business to TOCHIGI Prefecture by the Cabinet.
- 25 September 1937: The post of secretary of the Information Committee was abolished in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 519 of 1937.
- 25 September 1937: Appointed Information Officer of the Cabinet Information Bureau by the Cabinet.
- 6 October 1937: Ordered to proceed on business to OSAKA by the Cabinet. Not published in the Official Gazette.
- 18 October " : Ordered to proceed on business to OSAKA, HYOGO Prefecture, SAGA Prefecture, and KYOTO by the Cabinet. Not published in the Official Gazette.
- 13 December 1937: Ordered to proceed on business to AICHI Prefecture and OSAKA by the Cabinet. Not published in the Official Gazette.
- 20 December 1937: Appointed Third Secretary of the Embassy. Given the fifth rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet. Given the 2nd salary grade and ordered to serve in the Soviet Union by the Foreign Ministry.
- 27 December 1938: Raised to the 1st salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.
- 13 November 1940: Appointed Secretary of the Foreign Ministry. Given the fifth rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet. Given the 4th salary grade and appointed Chief of the Third Section of the European-African Bureau by the Foreign Ministry.
- 28 December 1940: Given the 3rd salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.
- 28 December 1940: Promoted to the fourth rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet.
- 15 February 1941: Conferred with the 6th Court Rank, Senior Grade.
- 30 June 1942: Given the 2nd salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.
- 1 November 1942: Appointed Chief of the Fifth Section of the Political Affairs Bureau by the Foreign Ministry.
- 8 January 1943: Promoted to the third rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet.
- 1 February 1943: Conferred with the 5th Court Rank, Junior Grade.
- 30 June 1943: Raised to the 1st salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.
- 30 June 1943: Assigned to concurrent duty as Chief of the Fourth Section of the Investigation Bureau by the Foreign Ministry.
- 29 July 1943: Given non-regular appointment as Secretary of the Newsprint Control Committee.
- 8 September 1943: Concurrently appointed Information Officer of the Information Bureau. Given the third rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet. Assigned to serve with the Foreign Reports Section, the Third Division, Information Bureau, by the Cabinet.
- 1 November 1943: Assigned to concurrent duty as Chief of the Third Section of the Investigation Bureau by the Foreign Ministry.
- 8 December 1943: Appointed Chief of the Third Section of the Investigation Bureau by the Foreign Ministry.
- 29 April 1940: Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure for services in the China Incident.
- 21 May 1945: Assigned to serve with the First Section, Third Division, Information Bureau, by the Cabinet.
- 31 August 1945: Appointed an attache of the plenipotentiary dispatched to the Supreme Commander For the Allied Powers by the Cabinet. Not published in the Official Gazette.
- 26 August 1945: Promoted to the second rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet.
- 8 September 1945: Appointed an advisor to the Foreign Ministry. Given the second rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet.
- 15 September 1945: Conferred with the 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade.
- 30 October 1945: Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 4th Class.

OVER

1 April 1946: Appointed Secretary of the Foreign Ministry in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 193 of 1946.  
24 March 1947: Relieved from current post at his own request. By the Cabinet.



23 May 1947

OTA, Saburo

Witness- General


Nationality- Japanese

Address - Yokosuka, Kanagawa-Ken.

This witness will testify concerning the diplomatic negotiations between Japan and U S S R.

Def. Doc. 2916  
(Tōgō)

*was ~ mistreated  
of diplomatic service*



INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI Sadao, et al

*4 3639*

*Exchange ship -*

- Defendants -

*is this an issue*

A F F I D A V I T

ŌTA SABURŌ

*Inmaterial*

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, in accordance with the procedure prevailing in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

I entered the service of the Foreign Ministry in 1928. As Chief of the Third Section, Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs, Foreign Ministry, from November 1940 to October 1942, I was charged chiefly with business concerning relations with the British Empire; the Foreign Minister presiding over the Foreign Ministry from 18 October 1941 to 1 September of the following year, 1942, was Mr. Tōgō Shigenori.

Shortly after the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Governments of the United States and Britain respectively proposed to the Japanese Government the mutual exchange of diplomatic and consular officials and their families, as well as as many resident enemy nationals as possible. I was ordered to take charge of the exchange business under Foreign Minister Tōgō, and managed the business relating to the negotiations, with the United States, Britain and other Allied Powers, through the protecting Powers, and also the preliminary consultation among the competent Japanese offices, necessary for its realization.

As a result of the negotiations with the United States and Britain, it was decided that, owing to the shortage of bottoms, those persons to be repatriated should for the time being be limited, except for diplomatic and consular officials and their families, be limited to temporary residents, and that the Japanese Government should send back, not only the resident nationals of the enemy countries in Japan Proper, but also those in Manchoukuo, China, French Indo-China and Thailand, including the nationals of all the allied European and American countries, not to speak of those of the United States and Britain. In spite of the complexity and difficulties attending the exchange business and the carrying out of the agreement, Foreign Minister Tōgō exerted himself from the very first to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion and to carry out the agreement thus reached, constantly urging us to the speedy realization of the repatriation.

For this purpose, however, it was necessary to secure vessels to transport those persons to be repatriated, and great was the difficulty, among Army, Navy and other circles concerned, with the development of operations imposing large demands upon shipping. Moreover, the High Command attached various conditions to setting a date for the voyages of the

exchange ships through southern waters to and from Lorenzo Marques, Portuguese East Africa, the place of exchange of those to be thus repatriated, on the ground that the safety of navigation could not be guaranteed owing to the operations in progress in those waters. The Foreign Minister frequently had conversations with the Naval High Command and the other authorities concerned on this question, and at last succeeded in persuading them to the realization of the program. The Japanese Government thereupon chartered the Asama Maru (16,975 tons) and the Conte Verde (18,765 tons), and then, afterward, the Tatsuta Maru (16,975 tons) and the Kamakura Maru (17,526 tons), all first-class liners, which sailed for the place of exchange between 25 June and 10 August, 1942, taking aboard those to be repatriated at Yokohama, Kōbe, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Saigon and Singapore. The nationals of Britain, the United States and other Allies sent back to their respective home countries came to the approximate number of 3,500 in total, the majority of whom, nearly 2,500 men and women, were temporary residents. Among them, those Allied nationals who were taken aboard at various places beyond Japanese waters amounted to 2,000. The largest part of those resident in Japan who were repatriated included a considerable number of persons who had been interned by the Japanese authorities. Some of these had been charged under the criminal law and were on trial. We had great difficulty in releasing them. Foreign Minister Tōgō in person demanded of the judicial authorities to release several of them, with success.

Furthermore, one or two representatives of the Foreign Ministry were on board each of the exchange ships to see that the repatriates were treated well. Special attention was also paid to all facilities afforded to them (Exhibit No. 8,074). ?

After the resignation of Foreign Minister Tōgō, the Teia Maru (17,536 tons) made a voyage in September 1943 as an exchange ship to Malmagon, a Portuguese port in Goa, India. The above five were the exchange ships sent by the Japanese Government during the war.

*Def. Doc. 2916  
correct re*

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and addign nothing.

Ōta Saburō (seal)

On this 2nd day of December, 1947

At Yokosuka

Deponent: Ōta Saburō

I, Shichida Motoharu, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn to by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Yokosuka

Witness: Shichida Motoharu (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Nishi Haruhiko (seal)

Tokyo  
6 December 1947

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
 May 27, 1947  
 DEFENSE - Division IV - Russia  
 OTA - Direct

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23087

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF OTA, SABURO,  
 By Mr. Blakeney.

23092

The witness stated that he lived in Yokuraka, and is mayor of that city. He identified exhibit No. 2659 and verified it. \* The affidavit stated that the witness served as third secretary to the Japanese Embassy in Moscow from May 1938, serving under TOGO after October 1938. TOGO left Moscow for Japan in October, 1940, and the witness left in the same month. During that period the Nomonhan Incident occurred in May 1939, and diplomatic negotiations were conducted to solve it. From August, the witness was in charge of handling the negotiations under TOGO.

23093

The Incident occurred because the border between Manchukuo and Mongolia was not clearly defined \* but was merely a border line of administrative districts in the Ching Empire. The Incident began when some Outer Mongolian Forces crossed the Khalka River, which Manchukuo believed to be the boundary between Manchukuo and Mongolia, and entered into the territory of Manchukuo in May 1939. The Japanese and Manchukuoan forces were obliged to counter-attack to secure the border line, and pressed the Outer Mongolian forces south of the river. The Soviet and Mongolian forces were reinforced and tried to recover the area. Protests were mutually lodged by the governments of Japan and the Soviet. Japan and Manchukuo aimed at maintaining the Khalka River as the border, but the reinforcement of the Soviet forces continued and their military action was large-scale, and it was therefore difficult to get an opportunity to start negotiations despite Japan's desire to settle the matter promptly and restore normal relations.

23094

On August 22, when TOGO at an interview with the Deputy Foreign Commissar on the matter of the North Sakhalin concessions, stressed the \* need of solving pending questions, the Deputy stated that the Soviet also desired to normalize the relations. TOGO then took the opportunity to state that it was essential to solve the frontier questions between Manchukuo and the Soviet and between Manchukuo and Mongolia in order to improve relations.

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23095

The Deputy replied that the Soviet would study any concrete proposal of Japan, indicating that the Soviet also desired to settle the incident. TOGO then exchanged telegrams with Tokyo, and having received instructions which Japan sent after consulting with Manchukuo, met with Molotov on September 9. He expressed Japan's desire to solve the various issues with mutual good-will and conveyed to the Commissar that it was proposed to determine the \* border, that there was no objection to establishing a commission to solve the border disputes, and that a commercial treaty would be readily negotiated. In response to Molotov's query as to the disputes which the committee would consider, TOGO stated that the Nomonhan Incident should be solved as soon as possible because the adjustment would be difficult if further conflicts developed there. TOGO explained in detail Japan's proposal for demilitarizing the disputed area to avoid further conflict and to improve relations.

23096

At the meeting of September 10, Molotov stated to TOGO that the demarcation of the borders and the establishment of a commission to solve border disputes was deemed appropriate, but such commission should handle future disputes on land as well as invasion of territorial waters in Kamchatka and Sakhalin; that the conclusion \* of a treaty of commerce was desired, and with respect to the Nomonhan Incident, it was the Soviet intention to restore the status quo and solve the incident by withdrawing the forces of both parties to the line contended for by the Soviet Mongolians, and it is deemed that such a line should be established as the legitimate one since it had been fixed for years, and establishment of a demilitarized zone was not deemed reasonable.

TOGO replied to Molotov that he would answer the proposal to extend competence of the commission to Kamchatka and Sakhalin after consultation with his government. With respect to Nomonhan, the Outer Mongolian Forces had begun to invade the area where they were never stationed before March or April 1939, and the disputes spread after May. According to the Russian proposal of restoring the status quo, the Soviet forces were to retreat to the left bank of the Khalkha River and there was not much discrepancy between the two proposals.

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23097 The Japanese proposal offered to establish a demilitarized area \* despite the fact that their forces had been stationed in Nomonhan even before the incident. Molotov insisted that it must be clarified that it was not "demarcation" of the border but "redemarcation", and insisted that the border line existing prior to the incident should be restored, and on Japan's agreement the Soviet forces were to retreat to the line.

TOGO asserted Japan could not accept the proposal because Manchukuo believed the area to be her territory, but insisted on the necessity of solving the incident and calming the tense atmosphere.

23098 \* On September 14 TOGO offered a compromise in which he proposed that the status prior to May 1, 1939, be restored, and both forces cease hostilities. Although TOGO explained that the Japanese proposal was generally in agreement with the Soviet except it did not include the border line problem, Molotov insisted that Japan recognize the Soviet assertion that the line upheld by the Soviets had existed prior to May 1. Molotov insisted on his stand. TOGO stated that so long as the Soviet did not agree to restore the original status, the only solution would be to stop hostilities at a line held at a certain time. Molotov promised to consider the matter and reply.

23099 At the meeting of September 15 Molotov stated that the Soviet could accept the proposal of the day before to cease hostilities and agreed, and at the same time proposed a draft agreement to establish a joint commission for border demarcation \* consisting of two representatives of Japan and Manchukuo and two from the Soviet and Mongolia. They then consulted about the time of stopping hostilities as well as the joint commission for demarcation, and the agreement for cessation was concluded at about 2 a. m. on the 16th. It was agreed that the agreement be oral instead of in writing, and that its contents be made public at 3 a. m. of the 16th in a joint communique.

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23100 The negotiations for the establishment of the Manchukuo-Mongolian border joint commission were begun between TOGO and Molotov and an agreement was reached on November 19, 1939. Under the agreement the representatives of Japan, Manchukuo, the Soviet and Mongolia held eight conferences in Chita from December 7 to 25, and another eight in Harbin between January 5 to 30, 1940. The work of the commission \* in the Nomonhan area and the district south of the Arshan River came to a deadlock because of differences of opinion after studies in these 16 conferences based on highly authentic maps and documents.

Although the discussions foreshadowed the future of the negotiations, TOGO resumed negotiations around March 1940, and had frequent conferences with Molotov and others. An agreement was finally reached between TOGO and Molotov on June 9 relative to the border line.

23101 The agreement for demarcating the area signed by TOGO and Molotov on June 9 was exhibit no. 767. In the lower part of this map is the notation that the border line between Mongolia and Manchukuo in the Khalkin Gol area prior to the agreement of June 9, 1940, and the notation of border line between Mongolia and Manchukuo in the area according to the agreement of June 9, 1940. These markings \* did not exist on the map attached to the agreement then signed. Before the agreement there had not been in the disputed area any border line markings recognized by international agreement. Next to the markings is written "Scale 1:1,000,000. He recalled that at the time of the negotiations maps of scale of 1:1,000,000 by the Japanese Army were used, but at the time of signing the 1935 edition of scale 1:200,000 prepared by the Soviet General Staff, were used for convenience sake. The agreement actually mentions this. He also recalled that part of the disputed area which Mongolia ceded to Manchukuo in accordance with the agreement was the triangular area of the Havat Mountain and the narrow area south of the Arshan River, whereas Manchukuo agreed to cede to Mongolia the area between the Khalkha River and the new boundary.



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- 23102 To clarify on the ground the new boundary determined, TOGO and the Deputy Commissar made arrangements on July 19 with respect to the constitution and duties of the border demarcation commission on the spot. Under these \* arrangements the representatives of Manchukuo and Mongolia held six conferences in Chita between August 3 and 24 and agreed on technical matters. They began operations on the spot after the beginning of September. TOGO was ordered home on August 29, and left Moscow on October 20. The witness left for home on October 18.
- 23103 \* Since the settlement of the incident marked beginning of normal relations, TOGO deemed it proper to proceed to conclude a non-aggression pact between the two countries. At the end of 1939 or 1940 he recommended the plan to Tokyo, and sent his secretary home to persuade official quarters. As a result TOGO received instructions from ARITA to conclude a neutrality pact and began negotiations with Molotov, which made great progress. Agreement had been reached on the gist of the pact when TOGO was ordered home by MATSUOKA. When the witness returned home he was chief of the 3rd Section, Europe-Asiatic Bureau. Spot operations on border demarcating the Nomonhan area were practically at a standstill after December 1940, owing to disagreement between Manchukuoan and Mongolian representatives. Immediately after the conclusion of the \* Neutrality Pact in April 1941, an agreement was reached between TATEKAWA and Molotov, that spot operations be concluded within 1941. The representatives met again in Chita after May 18, and after agreeing on technical matters on June 14 began operations on June 27. The work was carried on despite the Soviet-German war, until completed on August 17, when border marks were established throughout the entire area. The matter was solved two years after hostilities ceased.
- 23104

The general protocol and documents drawn on the ground were signed in Harbin on October 15. Although the governments of Manchukuo and Mongolia agreed to recognize these documents by exchanging notes on December 5, this failed because of procedural delays on the part of Mongolia and for the convenience of the Soviet. Notification of recognition was completed on May 15, 1942.

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CROSS-EXAMINATION BY COLONEL SMIRNOV.

3105 \* TOGO did not entrust the witness with conducting negotiations instead of himself. The witness did not conduct independently any negotiations with the Soviet or Mongolia. He was never present at the negotiations between TOGO and the Soviet. Before the negotiations were actually commenced, as secretary of the Embassy \* he prepared for them. After they were concluded, on orders from TOGO, he drafted the text of telegrams, reports, and opinions to be sent to the Foreign Office.

3106 He was testifying to the negotiations on the basis of what he heard from TOGO, and from the interpreter of the Embassy who was present. He had seen a portion of them himself. The maps he himself saw. \* He again repeated that he was not present even once at the negotiations between TOGO and Molotov. What he did was to prepare for them before they were opened, and after they were over on instructions from TOGO he drafted reports and telegrams embodying TOGO's opinions. He did not have at his disposal \* at the present time a single one of these original documents.

3107 When the Nomonhan hostilities started, the witness was in Moscow. He had testified about the incident on the basis of his recollection of instructions received from the Foreign Office. He would say it was an order if the Japanese Foreign Office was a third party.

3108 \* The hostilities started in Nomonhan around May 11. TOGO raised the question of peaceful settlement on August 22, a little over three months later. When asked why it was necessary to wait three months before starting negotiations, the witness stated that in order to open negotiations they had to wait a favorable moment. In the Changkufeng \* Incident, SHIGEMITSU had received instructions almost immediately after the outbreak and tried to settle the incident. With respect to the Nomonhan Incident, they first heard of it by means of the protest from Molotov. Furthermore, Japanese forces in the Changkufeng Incident belonged to the Korean Army, while those involved in the Nomonhan Incident belonged to the Kwantung Army.

May 27, 1947

DEFENSE - Division IV - Russia

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23111 Ambassador TOGO decided that August 22 was the favorable moment to begin. \* At the time he did not know that on August 20 the Soviet and Mongolian troops had started decisive offensive operations.

23112 \* He believed that when TOGO visited the Deputy Commissar he did not go there with the intent of taking up the border question. He believed it was correct to state that peaceful settlement of the conflict was prevented by the fact that reinforcements to the Soviet troops were being continually sent.

23113 \* As a foreign service officer the witness knew nothing about military operations. All he knew were the instructions and reports received from Tokyo which stated that both forces were gradually reinforcing their armies and the situation was developing and a large-scale war was going to be waged.

23114 \* The border commission had no power to change the agreement between Molotov and TOGO, and in fact they did not.

## REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BLAKENEY.

23115 The witness was shown exhibit No. 2660, and stated that so far as he could recollect \* it was a copy of the original map of the boundary between Outer Mongolia and Manchuria in the Nomonhan area as agreed on in the TOGO-Molotov agreement, drawn up by the Soviet Foreign Office and sent to the Japanese Embassy. It is an exact copy of the map attached to the agreement, and it shows the boundary line agreed on. Since it was drawn by the Soviet, it also shows the boundary as asserted by the Soviet before the Nomonhan Incident. There is nothing on the map to indicate the meaning of the lines drawn across it.

23116 \* With the exception of the fact that the map does not include the initials of TOGO and Molotov, he was certain it was an exact copy of the original. In addition to the initialing by TOGO and Molotov, there was also the initials of CHIDA, Embassy Counsel, and Tsarapkin, Chief of the 2nd Far Eastern Division of the Soviet Foreign Office.

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- 23117 \* The witness stated that he could say with conviction that the superscriptions appearing on the map attached to exhibit No. 767 were not on the original map attached to the TOGO-Molotov agreement. Furthermore, the map attached to the agreement was one of 1:200,000, and this map was on a scale of 1:1,000,000. When conversations were begun between TOGO and Molotov to settle the incident,
- 23118 \* the embassy had received information that severe fighting was going on toward the end of August, but they did not receive any information more detailed than the embassy at Russia.

RECROSS EXAMINATION BY COLONEL SMIRNOV.

- 23119 The witness stated that comparing the two maps mentioned before, there are two lines, one unbroken and one dotted on both. \* The dotted line on the big map is printed, and the unbroken line is made with india ink. He believed that the dotted line was on the map earlier than the unbroken line, which was put on at the moment of
- 23120 signing of the treaty. \* Unfortunately, he did not think that both maps were identical. The larger one is an exact copy of the original map attached to the agreement. The smaller map is not an exact copy. It is not the large map reduced in scale, but is an altogether different one. There are a few differences in geographical names between the maps. In the larger map the upper reach of the river is marked the Khalkhin-Gol River, while in the smaller map is called the Arshan-Gol River.

- 23122 \* The witness marked each of these rivers with an "x" on each map.

- 23118 \* the embassy had received information that severe fighting was going on toward the end of August, but they did not receive any information more detailed than the embassy at Russia.

RECROSS EXAMINATION BY COLONEL SMIRNOV.

- 23119 The witness stated that comparing the two maps mentioned before, there are two lines, one unbroken and one dotted on both. \* The dotted line on the big map is printed, and the unbroken line is made with india ink. He believed that the dotted line was on the map earlier than the unbroken line, which was put on at the moment of signing of the treaty. \* Unfortunately, he did not think

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23,124

The witness stated that if he went into detail there would probably be more differences between the two maps, but at present he had only the smaller one and it was difficult to point them out. \* With respect to the new border line, he believed generally there was no difference. On the larger map produced the day before there were no inscriptions or initials showing that the map was attached to the agreement between Molotov and TOGO and there is no mark certifying the date or place of publication. \* He had stated that the map strictly corresponds to the map attached to the Molotov-TOGO agreement just from memory. He looked at it and remembered after seven years that it was the identical map attached at the time. The original map was signed by TOGO and Molotov on both copies. He did not know where the Japanese copy of the map with the initials was.

23,125

23,126

REDIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. Blakeney

23,131

The witness stated that some time after the signing of the TOGO-Molotov agreement the Soviet Foreign Office sent to the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, for transmission to Tokyo, copies of the map attached to the agreement. They sent two copies, which passed through the witness's hands. These documents, he believed, were sent to the Japanese Foreign Ministry. So far as he remembered, \* the initialled, original map was sent to the Japanese Foreign Office. The two maps furnished by the Soviet Foreign Office later were identical with the copies initialled at the time of signature and this was so stated to be by the Soviet Foreign Office. So far as he could remember, Exhibit 2660 was the very map sent by the Soviet Foreign Office.

23,132

23,133

\* The witness stated that he had marked a number of additional places where the two maps differ.

23,141

23,142

Exhibit 2661-A, report of activities for 1939, First Section, Bureau of European-Asiatic Affairs, joint communique on the Nomonhan truce agreement, stated \* that as a result of negotiations \* recently carried on between TOGO and Molotov, Japan and Manchukuo on one hand, and the Soviet and Mongolian Republic on the other, have come to an agreement that all military action on the part of both sides will cease on September 16th, 2:00 AM, Moscow time. The front of both forces will be restored to the status of September 15th, 1:00 PM, Moscow time. The representatives of both forces on the spot will immediately take steps to realize this agreement. Prisoners of war and war

26 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Maj. General Vasiliev; Mr. Sutton

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief, Investigative Division, IPS

SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

**Witness General**

10 May 1942

Appointed a Counsellor of the Foreign Service, 3rd grade, the 3th salary grade by the Foreign Ministry. Ordered to serve in England by the Foreign Ministry.

7 May 1947

Departed from Tokyo.

WITNESS

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

25 May 1930

Appointed a student attached and given the 1st rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet. Ordered to the 3th salary grade and ordered to serve in England by the Foreign Ministry. **Curriculum Vitae**

OTA, Saburo

15 Jun 1930

Conferred with the 7th Court Rank, Senior Grade.

3 Oct 31

Appointed attaché to the Japanese representation to the Executive Planning Conference held at London, England, by the Cabinet.

28 Apr 1931

Appointed attaché to the Japanese representation to the Executive Control Conference held at Geneva, Switzerland, by the Cabinet.

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

*E P M*

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Incl (Described above)

15 Aug 1933

Promoted to the 6th rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet.

Raised to the 2nd salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.

1 Sep 1935

Conferred with the 7th Court Rank, Senior Grade.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Permanent residence and status: IBARAGI Prefec. commoner.  
 Date of Birth: 5 Apr 1905  
 Name: OHTA, Saburo (OTA)

- 31 Mar 1925 Graduated from the Fifth Higher School, Senior Div., literature course.
- " 1928 Graduated from the Tokyo Imperial University, Law School, Political course.
- Sep " Passed the Diplomatic Service Examination, A Higher Civil Service examination.
- 10 Nov 1928 Appointed a Chancellor of the Foreign Ministry and given the 5th salary grade by the Foreign Ministry. Ordered to serve in England by the Foreign Ministry.
- 9 Apr 1929 Departed from Tokyo.
- 23 May " Arrived at his post in London.
- 28 " 1930 Appointed a student diplomat and given the 7th rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet. Raised to the 4th salary grade and ordered to serve in England by the Foreign Ministry.
- 16 Jun 1930 Conferred with the 7th Court Rank, Junior Grade.
- 8 Oct " Appointed attache to the Japanese representative to the Narcotics Producing Countries Conference held at London, Englan, by the Cabinet.
- 28 Apr 1931 Appointed attache to the Japanese representative to the Narcotics Control Conference held at Geneva, Switzerland, by the Cabinet.
- 30 Sep " Appointed a student consul. Given the 7th rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet. Given the 4th salary grade. Ordered to serve in Sidney by the Foreign Ministry.
- 30 Jun 1932 Raised to the 3rd salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.
- 16 Aug 1933 Promoted to the 6th rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet.
- " Raised to the 2nd salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.
- 1 Sep 1933 Conferred with the 7th Court Rank, Senior Grade.

- 10 Apr 1935 Appointed a Secretary in the Foreign Ministry. Given the sixth rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet. Given the 7th salary grade and assigned to serve with the Second Section of the European-African Bureau by the Foreign Ministry.
- 1 Jul 1936 Promoted to the 5th rank of the Higher Civil Service.
- " Given the 6th salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.
- " Appointed a secretary of the Information Committee by the Cabinet.
- 10 Jul " Assigned to serve with the First Section of the Information Board by the Foreign Ministry.
- 15 Jul " Conferred with the 6th Court Rank, Junior Grade.
- 30 Nov " Ordered to proceed on business to OSAKA by the Cabinet.
- 5 Apr 1937 Appointed Secretary of the Foreign Ministry. Given the 5th rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet.
- 5 " Assigned to serve with the European-African Bureau by the Foreign Ministry.
- " Ordered to proceed on business to FORMOSA by the Cabinet.
- 26 Jun " Ordered to proceed on business to OSAKA and to AICHI Prefec. Not published in the Official Gazette. (Business trip to AICHI Prefec. cancelled for his convenience). By the Cabinet
- 1 Jul " Given the 5th salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.
- 23 Aug 1937 Ordered to proceed on business to TOCHIGI Prefec. by the Cabinet.
- 25 Sep " The post of secretary of the Information Committee was abolished in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 519 of 1937.
- " Appointed Information Officer of the Cabinet Information Bureau by the Cabinet.
- 6 Oct " Ordered to proceed on business to OSAKA by the Cabinet. Not published in the Official Gazette.
- 18 Oct " Ordered to proceed on business to OSAKA, HYOGO Prefec., SAGA Prefec., and KYOTO by the Cabinet. Not published in the Official Gazette.



- 13 Dec 1937 Ordered to proceed on business to AICHI Prefec. and OSAKA by the Cabinet. Not published in the Official Gazette.
- 20 Dec. " Appointed Third Secretary of the Embassy. Given the 5th rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet. Given the 2nd salary grade and ordered to serve in the Soviet Union by the Foreign Ministry.
- 27 Dec 1938 Raised to the 1st salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.
- 13 Nov 1940 Appointed Secretary of the Foreign Ministry. Given the 5th rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet. Given the 4th salary grade and appointed Chief of the 3rd Section of the European-African Bureau by the Foreign Ministry.
- 28 Dec 1940 Given the 3rd salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.
- " Promoted to the fourth rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet.
- 15 Feb 1941 Conferred with the 6th Court Rank, Senior Grade.
- 30 Jun 1942 Given the 2nd salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.
- 1 Nov 1942 Appointed Chief of the 5th Section of the Political Affairs Bureau by the Foreign Ministry.
- 8 Jan 1943 Promoted to the 3rd rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet.
- 1 Feb " Conferred with the 5th Court Rank, Junior Grade.
- 30 Jun 1943 Raised to the 1st salary grade by the Foreign Ministry.
- " Assigned to concurrent duty as Chief of the 4th Section of the Investigation Bureau by the Foreign Ministry.
- 29 Jul " Given non-regular appointment as Secretary of the Newsprint Control Committee.
- 8 Sep " Concurrently appointed Information Officer of the Information Bureau. Given the 3rd rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet. Assigned to serve with the Foreign Reports Section, the 3rd Div., Information Bureau, by the Cabinet.
- 1 Nov. " Assigned to concurrent duty as Chief of the 3rd Section of the Investigation Bureau by the Foreign Ministry.
- 8 Dec " Appointed Chief of the 3rd Section of the Investigation Bureau by the Foreign Ministry.
- 29 Apr " Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure for services in the China Incident.

- 21 May 1945 Assigned to serve with the 1st Section, 3rd Division, Information Bureau, by the Cabinet.
- 31 Aug " Appointed an attache of the plenipotentiary dispatched to the Supreme Commander For the Allied Powers by the Cabinet. Not published in the Official Gazette.
- 26 Aug " Promoted to the second rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet.
- 8 Sep " Appointed an advisor to the Foreign Ministry. Given the second rank of the Higher Civil Service by the Cabinet.
- 15 " Conferred with the 5th Court Rank, Senior Grade.
- 30 Oct. " Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 4th class.
- 1 Apr 1946 Appointed Secretary of the Foreign Ministry in accordance with Imperial Ordinance No. 193 of 1946
- 24 Mar 1947 Relieved from current post at his own request. By the Cabinet.

27 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Maj. General Vasiliev; Mr. Sutton

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief, Investigative Division, IPS  
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEPENDANT

Witness General

WITNESS

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

~~OTA, Saburo~~  
ISONO, Yuzo  
HAYASHI, Kaoru  
YAMAMURA, Haruo  
Miura, Kazuichi

Report by Mr. Dolan

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl  
(Described above)

*E P M*

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Report by  
H. A. Dolan, Jr.

25 May 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

OTA, Saburo  
ISONO, Yuzo  
HAYASHI, Kaoru  
YAMAMURA, Haruo  
MIURA, Kazuichi

A search of the IPS files reveals no information on the above subject.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

**Maj. General Vasiliev; Mr. Sutton**

FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief, Investigative Division, IPS  
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

**Witness general**

WITNESS

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

**OTA, Saburo**

**Info from request for witness**

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl  
(Described above)

*E P M*  
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

23 May 1947

OTA, Saburo

Witness- General

Nationality- Japanese

Address - Yokosuka, Kanagawa-Ken.

This witness will testify concerning the diplomatic negotiations between Japan and U S S R.

Def. Doc. No. 1581

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI Sadao, et al

A F F I D A V I T

ŌTA Saburō

Having sworn an oath as in the attached sheet, and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

I served as Third Secretary to the Japanese Embassy in Moscow from May 1938, serving under Ambassador Tōgō after he assumed his office in Moscow in October 1938. Ambassador Tōgō left Moscow for home in October 1940, and I also left for home in the same month. During that period, the Nomonhan Incident occurred in May 1939 and diplomatic negotiations were conducted for its solution. From about August of the same year, I was in charge of handling the negotiations under Ambassador Tōgō.

The Nomonhan Incident occurred because of the fact that the border between Manchoukuo and the Mongolian People's Republic was not clearly defined by the two countries but was merely a border line of administrative districts in the Ching Empire. The incident began when some Outer-Mongolian forces crossed the Khalkha River, which Manchoukuo believed to be the boundary between Manchoukuo and Mongolia, and entered into the territory of Manchoukuo in May 1939. The Japanese forces as well as the forces of Manchoukuo were obliged to counter-attack in order to secure the border-line, and pressed the Outer-Mongolian forces to the south of the Khalkha River. The forces of the Soviet Union and Mongolia were reinforced and tried to recover the area. Protests were meanwhile lodged mutually by the Governments of Japan and the Soviet Union. Japan and Manchoukuo aimed at maintaining the Khalkha River as the border-line, but the reinforcement of the Soviet-Mongolian forces continued and their military action came to be large-scale, so that it was difficult to seize an opportunity to start negotiations for the solution of the incident, in spite of the desire of Japan to settle it promptly and to restore normal relations between Japan and the Soviet Union. However, on 22 August, when Ambassador Tōgō, at an interview with Deputy Foreign Commissar Lozovsky on the question of the Northern Sakhalin concessions, stressed the necessity of solving various pending questions, Mr. Lozovsky stated that the Soviet Union also desired the normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations. Thereupon Ambassador Tōgō took the opportunity to urge upon him that it was essential to solve, together with other questions, the frontier questions between Manchoukuo and the Soviet Union as well as those between Manchoukuo and Mongolia, in order to improve relations between the two countries. To this, Deputy Commissar Lozovsky replied that the Soviet Union would study any concrete proposal of Japan regarding the boundary problem, indicating that the Soviet Union also desired to solve the incident through diplomatic negotiations.

Accordingly, Ambassador Tōgō exchanged telegrams with Tokyo, and having received the concrete instructions which the Japanese Government sent after consultation with the Manchoukuo Government, met Commissar Molotov on 9 September. He expressed to the Commissar the desire of the Japanese Government to solve various

*we have a unit  
ota says  
(Hankow)  
says  
Kramenka*

pending issues between the two countries with mutual good-will in order to improve general relations, and conveyed to the Commissar that (1) it was proposed to determine the Manchoukuo-Soviet and Manchoukuo-Mongolian border; (2) there was no objection to the establishment of a commission for the solution of border disputes; and (3) a commercial treaty would readily be negotiated. In response to Mr. Molotov's query as to the disputes which the commission as proposed in (2) was to consider, Ambassador Tōgō told the Commissar that the Nomonhan Incident should be solved as soon as possible because the adjustment of relations would be difficult if further conflict were to develop in Nomonhan. Replying to the further query as to the Japanese proposal for the solution of the incident, Mr. Tōgō explained in detail the Japanese proposal for demilitarizing the disputed area with a view to avoiding further conflict and contributing to the improvement of relations between the two countries.

At the second meeting of 9 September, Commissar Molotov stated to Ambassador Tōgō (1) that the demarcation of the Manchoukuo-Soviet and Manchoukuo-Mongolian border and the establishment of a commission for the solution of border disputes were considered appropriate, but that such a commission should handle disputes on land which might occur in future as well as invasion of territorial waters in Kamchatka and Sakhalin; (2) that the conclusion of a treaty of commerce was desired; and (3) that as to the Nomonhan Incident, it was the intention of the Soviet Union to restore the status prevailing before the incident and to solve the incident by withdrawing forces of both parties to the line contended for by the Soviet Mongolians, and that it was considered that that line should be established as the legitimate line inasmuch as it had been fixed for years and that therefore the establishment of a demilitarized zone was not deemed reasonable.

Ambassador Tōgō replied to the Commissar that (1) he would reply to the Russian proposal for extending the competence of the above-mentioned commission to Kamchatka and Sakhalin after consultation with his government; that (2) as to the Nomonhan Incident, the Outer-Mongolian forces had started to invade the Nomonhan area, where they had never been stationed before March or April of this year, and the disputes spread after May; that according to the Russian proposal of the restoration of the original status, the Soviet-Mongolian forces were to retreat to the left bank of the Khalkha River and so there was not much discrepancy between the Russian and Japanese proposals; and that the Japanese proposal offered to establish a demilitarized area in spite of the fact that the Japanese-Manchoukuoan forces had been stationed in the Nomonhan area even before the incident.

Commissar Molotov insisted that it had to be clarified that it was not "demarcation" of the border but was "redemarcation" thereof, and repeated that the border-line that had existed prior to the incident should be restored and that upon securing Japan's agreement to it the Russian forces would retreat to the line. Ambassador Tōgō asserted that Japan could not accept the Soviet proposal because Manchoukuo believed the Nomonhan area to be her territory, insisting at the same time upon the necessity of solving the incident and calming down the tense atmosphere prevailing on the spot.

At the third meeting of 14 September, Ambassador Tōgō offered a compromise plan in which it was proposed that the status prevailing prior to 1 May 1939 should be restored and that both forces should cease hostilities for this purpose. Although Mr. Tōgō explained that the Japanese proposal was generally in agreement with the Soviet proposal except that it did not include the problem of the border line, Mr. Molotov insisted that Japan should recognize the Soviet assertion that the line upheld by the Soviet-



Mongolians had existed prior to 1 May. As Commissar Molotov insisted on his stand in a long discussion, Ambassador Tōgō stated that so long as the Soviet Union did not agree to the proposal of restoration of the original status, the only solution should be to cease hostilities at a line held at a certain time, and requested the Soviet Union for reply. The Commissar promised to consider the matter and make reply.

At the fourth meeting of 15 September, Commissar Molotov stated that the Soviet Union could accept the Japanese proposal of cessation of hostilities made the day before, and agreed thereto and at the same time proposed a draft agreement on the establishment of a joint commission for border demarcation composed of two representatives of Japan and Manchoukuo on the one side and two representatives of the Soviet Union and Mongolia on the other. Thereupon the Commissar and the Ambassador consulted about the time of cessation of hostilities and related matters, as well as the joint commission for demarcation, and the agreement for the cessation of hostilities was concluded at about 2 A.M. of the 16th. It was also agreed that the form of the agreement should be oral instead of in writing. It was decided that the contents of the agreement were to be made public at 3 A.M. of the 16th in a joint communiqué, which is Defense Document No. 1570.

As to the establishment of the joint commission for the Manchoukuo-Mongolian border demarcation based on the agreement of cessation of hostilities at Nomonhan, negotiations were subsequently conducted between Ambassador Tōgō and Foreign Commissar Molotov, and as a result, an agreement was reached between them on 19 November 1939. In accordance with the agreement, the representatives of Japan, Manchoukuo, the Soviet Union and Mongolia held eight conferences in Chita between 7 and 25 December, and another eight in Harbin between 5 and 30 January of the following year. The work of the commission for the demarcation of the border in the Nomonhan area and the district south of the Arshan River came to a deadlock because of differences of opinion after the studies in these sixteen conferences based on maps and documents of high authenticity.

Although the discussions in these conferences foreshadowed the future of the negotiations, Ambassador Tōgō resumed the negotiations concerning the matter around March of 1940, and had frequent conferences with Commissar Molotov and other officers. An agreement was finally reached between Mr. Tōgō and Mr. Molotov on 9 June relative to the border demarcation of the disputed area and determining the border-line on the map.

The agreement concerning the demarcation of the border in the Nomonhan area, signed by Ambassador Tōgō and Foreign Commissar Molotov on 9 June 1940, and the map attached thereto, have been submitted to the Tribunal by the prosecution as Exhibit No. 767. In the lower part of this map is the notation, "The border line between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchoukuo in the Khalkin Gol area prior to the agreement of 9 June 1940", and "The border line between the Mongolian People's Republic and Manchoukuo in the Khalkin Gol area according to the agreement of 9 June 1940". Such markings, however, did not exist on the map attached to the agreement then signed. Before the Tōgō-Molotov agreement there had never been in the disputed area any border line recognized by international agreement. Next to the above-mentioned markings is written "Scale 1:1,000,000". I recall that at the time of the Tōgō-Molotov negotiations and maps of scale 1:1,000,000, prepared by the Kwantung Army, were used, but that at the time of signing the agreement the 1935 edition of scale 1:200,000, prepared by the Soviet Army General Staff, were used for the sake of convenience. The Tōgō-Molotov

agreement actually mentions this. I recall, furthermore, that that part of the disputed area which the Mongolian People's Republic ceded to Manchoukuo in accordance with the Tōgō-Molotov agreement was the triangular area of the Harat Mountains and the narrow area south of the Arshan River, whereas Manchoukuo agreed to cede to the Mongolian People's Republic the area between the Khalkha River and the new boundary.

In order to clarify on the ground the new boundary determined on the map, Ambassador Tōgō and Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs Lozovsky made necessary arrangements on 18 July with regard to the constitution and duties of the border-demarkation commission on the spot. In accordance with the arrangement the representatives of Manchoukuo and Mongolia held six conferences in Chita between 3 and 24 August and agreed upon technical matters, and started operations on the spot after the beginning of September. Meanwhile, Ambassador Tōgō was ordered home on 29 August and left Moscow on 20 October for home. I left for home, also, on 18 October.

As the settlement of the Nomonhan Incident marked the beginning of normal relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, Ambassador Tōgō deemed it proper to proceed to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two countries, which had been his cherished desire. Toward the end of 1939 or the beginning of 1940 he strongly recommended the plan to the Tokyo Government. He sent Secretary Saitō home temporarily for the same purpose--to persuade influential quarters. As a result, Ambassador Tōgō obtained instructions from Foreign Minister Arita for the negotiation of a neutrality pact between the two countries, and commenced negotiations with Foreign Commissar Molotov, which made great progress. Agreement had been reached between them as to the gist of the draft pact when Ambassador Tōgō was ordered home by Foreign Minister Matsuoka, and he subsequently left Moscow.

After I returned home, I served as chief of the Third Section, European-Asiatic Bureau. The operations on the spot concerning the border demarcation in the Nomonhan area were practically at a standstill after December 1940, owing to disagreement of views between the Manchoukuoan and Mongolian representatives. However, immediately after the conclusion of the Neutrality Pact in April 1941 an agreement was reached between Ambassador Tatekawa and Commissar Molotov that the operations on the spot should be concluded within the year 1941. Accordingly the representatives of Manchoukuo and Mongolia met in Chita after 28 May, and after reaching agreement on technical matters on 11 June, started operations on the spot on 27 June. The work was carried on in spite of the Soviet-German War, until it was completed on 17 August, when border-markers were established throughout the entire disputed area. The matter had been completely solved two years after hostilities ceased.

The general protocol and documents attached, drawn by the border-demarkation commission on the ground, were signed in Harbin on 15 October. Although it had been agreed that the governments of Manchoukuo and Mongolia would recognize these documents by exchanging notes on 5 December, this failed to materialize because of procedural delays on the part of the Mongolian Government and for the convenience of the Government of the Soviet Union. The notification of the recognition of these documents was completed in Harbin on 15 May 1942.

Def. Doc. No. 1581

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

H. Nishi

Tokyo  
16 May 1947

On this 10th day of May 1947.

At Tokyo

DEPONENT OTA, Saburo (seal)

I, NISHI, Haruhiko hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) NISHI, haruhiko (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

OTA, Saburo (seal)