

Disc. 3169

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Folder 12

(78)

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 3169

Date: 25 September 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT:

Title and Nature: Bound file, Policy toward China, 1931-33

Date: 1931 to 1933 Original  Copy  Language: Japanese

Has it been translated? Yes  No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL:

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL:

Foreign Ministry

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

TANI, Masayuki; KOISO, Kuniaki; HASHIMOTO, Kingoro; SUZUKI, Teiichi; MURAI, Kuramatsu; SHIDEHARA, Kijuro; (as holding office during period stated above)

CRIMES OR PHASE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

Manchurian and China Affairs

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS:

Contains numerous communications and newspaper items relative to the China policy. Some of them are as follows:

Item 6. Communication No. 38

From: Consul-General MURAI, Kuramatsu  
To : Foreign Minister INUKAI  
Date: 7 January 1932

Reports that CHIANG TSO-PEN told the press that the Manchurian Incident was caused by the Japanese militarists and was not the true intention of the Japanese people.

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Item 9. Communication No. 1052

From: Consul-General MURAI, Kuramatsu  
To : Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA, Kijuro  
Date: 31 August 1931

Reports that the Evening Post wrote that the Japanese military authorities would have taken strong measures toward those Japanese officers who, in a body, advocated a strong policy toward China and Manchuria.

Item 10.

From: TANI, Masayuki; Chief of Asia Bureau  
To : KOISO, Kuniaki; Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, War Ministry, and HASHIMOTO, Kingoro, Chief of 2nd Sec., General Staff Headquarters.

Reports a press comment on the Japanese Army officers' criticism of the policy toward China. Enclosed is a newspaper item entitled "Soldiers and Politics" printed in English in SHANGHAI, dated 29 August 1931. Its summary is as follows:

"More than 7000 junior officers in the Japanese Army have organized with a view to bringing pressure to bear upon the government to adopt a 'stronger' China policy.....The military authorities in their own interests should have taken some steps to make it clear to the young military officers that it is not their business as soldiers to criticize the government's foreign policy."

Item 15. (A.N. Opinion expressed by the accused SUZUKI, Teiichi)

Letter (typewritten) dated 29 June 1932, sent by Lt. Col. SUZUKI, Teiichi, of the War Ministry to the Foreign Ministry as to the attitude of the Imperial Government concerning Chinese Minister CHIANG TSUO-PIN returning to his post in Tokyo.

"Conclusion: Despite friendly talks and other measures which the Chinese might take in order to enter direct negotiations with Japan, it is necessary for Japan to maintain her already fixed policy and must not take any conciliatory attitude toward China, especially regarding the questions of Manchukuo.

Furthermore, Japan must exercise caution not to fall under

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Page 2.

the suspicion of the Powers, as a consequence of the Sino-Japanese direct negotiation.

Reasons: It is reported that the Chinese Minister CHIANG TSUO-PIN is about to return to his post at Tokyo on the 4th of next month accompanied by military and naval attaches. His business after returning would be as follows:

1. After arrangement is made with Lt. Gen. SAKANISHI he would enter into negotiations on Sino-Japanese questions.

2. It is reported that he wanted to know Japan's minimum demands concerning the problem of ~~Manchukuo~~.

3. The last card the Chinese side wishes to play is not to let Japan recognize Manchukuo for the time being. It is further propagandized that CHIANG TSUO-PIN is returning to Tokyo just in order to execute CHIANG KAI-SHEK's amicable policy towards Japan, marking an epoch. However, the Chinese people are thoroughly opportunistic by nature and do not plan political operations. Accordingly, they will never negotiate with us frankly and seriously. All their decisions depend upon general situations (not true situations), that is, they depend on the surrounding atmosphere. When Great Britain and America look on us with disfavor, it is evident that China will instantly rise in arms against us, even during the negotiations.

11) What China is anxiously considering today is how to alienate Britain, America, and France from Japan. Therefore, it is proper for us to judge that a good bait offering should be based on such a policy. Today, there is not a single Chinese that can be trusted. This is the cause of their internal disturbances year after year.

If China really wishes to have an honest talk with Japan, she should first agree to the points given below:

a. China shall recognize that the various problems regarding Manchukuo and Mongolia shall be settled between Japan and Manchukuo. Accordingly, China shall withdraw her appeal (complaint) made to the League of Nations on the questions of Manchukuo.

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b. Having recognized the above, all other questions with regard to Japan and China proper shall be settled. Japan does not care about letting the powers participate in said questions of the settlement, for Japan has a definite intention about the same.

(2)  
see ✓ Japan must not change her former attitude, and must maintain her position of dignity. If Japan changes her attitude towards China by too hasty friendly action, the Powers will become suspicious of Japan. Consequently, there will be a great danger to our country, for China will take advantage of the occasion."

Analyst: 1st Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa

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Bridget Nolan:

Art: 15<sup>th</sup> is a complete rendering of  
the original.

2 notes have been added to  
clarify the meaning.

J. Hoyt

DOCUMENTAL NO.

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~~Mr. Joan~~

TOP Priority

Joan

How doc. no. 3169

(item 15 scanned)

[Bridget Nolan - Canadian  
division]

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No.

3169

Date 25 September 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

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1931 - 33*

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Has it been translated? Yes  No

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*Document Division*

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PERSONS IMPLICATED: *TANI, Masayuki; KOISO, Kuniaki; HASHIMOTO,  
Kiyomoto; SUZUKI Teiichi; MURAI, Kuramatsu; SHIDEHARA,  
Kijuro. (As ~~officials~~ <sup>holding office</sup> during period stated above)*

CRIMES OR PHASE TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

*Manchurian and China Affairs*

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

*Contains numerous communications and newspaper  
items relative to the China policy. Some of them are  
as follows:*

*(See attached sheets)*

Analyst:

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3169

note #1  
~~277~~

it is proper for us to judge that every good bait offered JAPAN comes from such a motive --

#2) JAPAN should maintain the attitude she has adopted hitherto until CHINA agrees to the above-mentioned two conditions, and <sup>never</sup> should take the attitude of choosing the easier way.



(SASAKI, Setsuo)

Item 1. Newspaper; "TOKYO NICHINICHI", Dec. 22, 1931.

YAMAMOTO, the president of the political affairs inquiry committee of the SEIYUKU party, explained the concrete plan for the 10 political platform of the party.

Item 2. Newspaper; "TOKYO ASAHI" Jan. 15, 1932.

Prime Minister. INUKAI disclosed the Cabinet views on "the SAKURADA-MON Case", the Manchurian problems, the state affairs problems, thought problems, etc.

Item 3. ~~Typewritten copies,~~

~~"Concerning the progress of the Anglo-Japanese Concord towards China." (Jan. 10, 1932).~~

~~This record said:~~

~~Differences of standpoints and interests between Japan and Britain were obstacles.~~

to ~~the~~ Anglo-Japanese co-operation on problems in China. Later Britain accepted Japan's proposal for co-operation but it was limited only to the exchange of views and no united front could be seen.

Item 4. Letter to Prime Minister INUKAI from a Chinese.

Transmitted through the Chief of Asia Bureau.

In this letter, a Chinese blamed Japan against her aggression on China and hoped for early restoration of peace between Japan and China.

Item 5. Report concerning TSOW LU's talk on Sino-Japanese relation.

From Acting Consul General SUMA

To Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA, Jan, 29, 1932.

TSOW LU stressed the necessity of Sino-Japanese coalition against invasion of the White.

As to the Manchurian issue, he wished Japan would not neglect the opinion of the Chinese people.

Item 6.

~~CHIANG TSO-PEN's interview with newspaper correspondents and pressmen.~~

From Consul-General MURAI  
To Foreign Minister INUKAI.  
Jan. 7, 1932.

~~(1) CHIANG expressed his views on the economic depression of Japan, Japanese people's attitude towards China and the Communism in Japan.~~

~~CHIANG TSO-PEN  
He said the Manchurian Incident was caused by the position of the Japanese Militarists and was not the true intention of the Japanese people in general.~~

Item 7.

~~Telegram from Minister SHIGEMITSU to Foreign Minister SAITO, May 30, 1932. SHIGEMITSU asked to send Mr. OMURA to SHANGHAI to confer with the Chinese.~~

Item 8. From Consul MIURA  
To Foreign Minister SAITO, June 6, 1932.

Telegram, in which SHIGEMITSU pointed out the indifference towards South China and the Formosan on the part of the Government-General of TAIWAN.

SHIGEMITSU said it was regrettable that the money actually spent in ~~the~~ South China by the Government-General was comparatively <sup>little.</sup> ~~few~~ and that the minimum facilities were being reduced:.....

Item 9. ~~Paper review concerning the Japanese Military Officers' criticism on the policy towards China.~~  
Report from Consul-General MURAI, Kuramatsu  
To Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA, Kijuro  
Aug. 31, 1931.

~~According to this report, The Evening Post~~  
claimed that Japanese Military Authorities that they should have taken strong measures towards those Japanese officers who advocated

5.

in a body ~~the~~<sup>a</sup> strong policy towards China  
and Manchuria.

Item 10.

~~Newspaper <sup>items</sup> cutting: TOKYO NICHINICHI, May 13, 1932.~~

~~Premier INUKAI's talk on the state of affairs.~~

~~INUKAI advocated parliamentarism.~~

~~He said Japan had no intention to  
wage war against Russia. etc.~~

Item 11.

Telegram

From Acting Consul General UEMURA  
to Foreign Minister SAITO, June 3, 1932.

Report on movements of CHIANG TSO-PEN.

1 January 1932: ~~Matsushita~~  
~~TAKAYANAGI~~, (~~director of Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Osaka~~) asked how to ~~open~~ <sup>the</sup> direct negotiations between Japan and China ~~shall be opened~~.  
 Prime and Foreign Minister INUKAI ~~answered~~ <sup>said</sup> that he would ~~take~~ <sup>use</sup> the principle of "SAIGO JUDO" in ~~But~~ <sup>his</sup> ~~there is difficult cause of the co-operation between Japan and China~~ <sup>Since Japan negotiations</sup>.

~~TOKYO NICHINICHI SHIMBUN~~ 5 Jan. 1932

"Being seated around Prime Minister INUKAI and heard him talk" (attended by Education Minister HATAYAMA)

5 January 1932: It is ~~of no use~~ <sup>useless</sup> to get Man, Chukino, but there is one ~~anxiety~~ <sup>concern</sup> that they ~~exclude~~ <sup>exclude</sup> foreigners.

~~TOKYO NICHINICHI SHIMBUN~~ 6 Jan. 1932

"Being seated around Prime Minister INUKAI and heard him talk" (attended by Education Minister HATAYAMA)

6 January 1932: ~~Vice-Chief Director KAWANO~~ asked ~~that~~ <sup>how can</sup> they ~~reconstruct~~ <sup>reconstruct</sup> the Japanese people <sup>can be</sup> ~~so as to become~~ <sup>reconstructed</sup> men of good character.

Prime Minister INUKAI answered that it is very difficult to make great men by ~~the diffusion~~ <sup>universal</sup> of education.

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~~The difference between at the end of the MIN era and that of the CHING era was caused by the change of way of <sup>the</sup> education system.~~

~~The Opinion of INUKAI, <sup>Tsuyoshi,</sup> ~~the~~ President of SEIYU KAI, regarding the China Problem~~

~~(From various newspapers)  
(Printed in TOKYO ASAHI SHIMBUN)~~

~~I. The conversation between INUKAI and Premier TANAKA on 19 July 1928 regarding problems toward China~~

MR. INUKAI, TSUYOSHI said as follows:

~~The East three Provinces will also hoist "the sun-in-the-blue-sky flag" and will take "Three Principles of the People."~~

~~The Nanking Government wants to revise "the unequal treaty" and to abolish "extraterritoriality" and for China. It will be reasonable demand.~~

~~It is necessary to let the Chinese understand that Japan is not aggressive.~~

~~The present situation of China is just like the Meiji Restoration.~~

II

~~The Chat on Japan and China~~  
(by INUKAI, TSUYOSHI)

(~~printed in~~ <sup>from</sup> the January ~~number~~ <sup>edition</sup> of the "NISSHI")

I agree with China that cries for the abolishment of extraterritorial rights but she must be raised to equal status ~~first~~ <sup>first</sup> all.

- - - - -

III. ~~The statement at the time of the memorial service for~~

SUN WEN.

孫文

(SHANGHAI U.P. 23 May 1929)

I, as a member of the Japanese people, have been sympathized with the idea and principle of KUOMINTANG since ten years and I ~~am~~ <sup>the fact</sup> delighted to see that many pending problems between the two countries were solved and became intimate with each other.

IV.

~~Returned from China~~

(~~printed in~~ the October Number of the "TŌA KEIZAI JYŪHŌ")

I understood ~~that how~~ <sup>that</sup> the officials of KUOMINTANG government were making an effort to establish the new China but I am wondering if one party can



⑨

rule over the country. ~~At present time, China is under the centralization of power but it is inconsistent with the historical practice.~~

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V. ~~From the speech at the Hibiyu Public Hall on 3 February 1930. (printed in CHUO SHIMBUN)~~

It is said that the MINSEITO is strong and right but it is not ~~in fact~~. China was opposed to the dispatch of ~~a~~ the Minister ~~rather~~ the charge d'affaires was dispatched instead.

- - - - -

VI ~~The Talk on the train for SENDAI on 11 February 1930. (printed in TOKYO ASAHI SHIMBUN)~~

MINSEITO ~~states~~ <sup>has</sup> three <sup>reasons</sup> ~~reasons~~ for reproaching the SEIYUKAI and one of them ~~means~~ <sup>is</sup> the <sup>lying</sup> ~~problem~~ toward China.

Telegram (Copy) No. 560

(2)

From: Ambassador DEBUCHI

To: Foreign Minister INUKAI

Dated: 16 December

According to the comment of the New York Herald Tribune, ~~the policy towards China by Premier INUKAI's~~ seems as before and expected but there is some fear ~~that the~~ <sup>policy of</sup> establishment of extraterritorial rights might disturb the rights and interests of European powers in China.

Kikui Sensei

by Onuma

Telegram No. 947.

From ambassador SHIGEMITSU.

To Foreign Minister SAITO.

~~Despatched from Shanghai (no date)~~

Reached 12 June, 1932.

Regarding influential Chinese <sup>who</sup> persons are trying to bring about better relations with Japan.

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~~a draft of foreign Minister's instructions to the prefectural Governors regarding Japan-China strained relations <sup>in this important</sup>~~

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~~News-paper article, Tokyo Asahi, July 7, 1932, the newly appointed Foreign Minister UCHIDA's View about relations between Japan and China, and his determination about settling the same.~~

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~~News-paper article, Tokyo NICHU-NICHU, 6<sup>th</sup> July, 1932. The newly appointed Foreign Minister Count UCHIDA's ambitions about settling the Chinese questions and his determination.~~

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Telegram No. 119

Sent by ~~the~~ Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA to  
Mr. SAWADA, Chief Secretary of the Business  
Affairs of the League of Nations at Paris.  
9<sup>th</sup> October, 1931.

Concerning indiscreet words and actions  
taken recently by Chinese prominent  
persons.

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A letter (typewritten) sent by Lt. Col. SUZUKI  
of the War ~~Department~~<sup>Ministry</sup> to the Foreign ~~Office~~<sup>Ministry</sup>  
29<sup>th</sup> June, 1932, regarding <sup>the</sup> Chinese  
Government's attitude <sup>on the</sup> as to settlement  
of the pressing <sup>Sino-Japanese</sup> relation, ~~between China~~  
~~and Japan~~ and also about <sup>the</sup> Manchurian  
question. He said that China ~~cannot~~  
~~not~~ be trusted.

Translate

in full

(3)

~~Decision at the mass-meeting of the  
SEIYU-KAI Political party.~~

~~11<sup>th</sup> November 1931, showing the party's firm  
the party encouraged the "get tough" policy of the government  
determination toward China regarding  
the settlement of the Manchurian Incident  
and encouraged the government.~~

Translate in  
full

~~News-paper - KOKUMIN SHINBUN.  
dated 22<sup>nd</sup> Dec 1931 regarding  
ten important political platforms of the  
SEIYU-KAI party, but said nothing  
about the Manchukuo or China  
questions.~~

(4)

Telegram No. 492.

From SUMA, acting Consul at Canton.

To The Foreign Minister UCHIDA.

Despatched - <sup>p.m.</sup> 12 July, 1932.

Reached - 10.m. 12 July, 1932.

Concerning conversations exchanged between Mr. SUMA and Chinese officials at a dinner party, to which SUMA was invited: the conversations were about peaceful settlement of the Chinese affairs.

Confidential letter No. 344.

Despatched ~~12 August~~ 1932.

~~Reached 17. Nov. 1932.~~

From Mr. AKIRA, ARIYOSHI, Special envoy

To Foreign Minister KOYA UCHIDA.

This is a report concerning the editorials of Chinese newspapers regarding advance of the Japanese troops to Jehol (Jehol) and asking change of Japan's policy.

(5)

Telegram No. 234.

From acting Consul YOSHIDA at Canton.

To Foreign Minister UCHIDA.

Despatched 22, April, 1933

~~Reached 22, April, 1933.~~

~~In this telegram YOSHIDA said that the report about the exchange of a note between the Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA and Mr. CHEN YU-JEN (EUGENE CHEN) was unfounded.~~

Telegram No. 233.

From Consul YOSHIDA at Canton.

To Foreign Minister UCHIDA.

Despatched p.m. 22, April, 1933.

~~Reached p.m. 23, April, 1933.~~

~~Concerning the speech made by KAN CHIEN-HOU, as to violent action taken by Japan's military clique, <sup>that</sup> in Manchuria in the months of May and June, 1931. (no detail on "excesses")~~

Telegram No. 403.

From Consul-general HIDAKA at NANKING.

To Foreign Minister UCHIDA.

Despatched A.M. 19, August, 1933.

~~Reached p.m. 19, August, 1933.~~

~~This telegram is a Report <sup>on</sup> about movements of prominent Chinese officials of prominence.~~

(6)

Telegram No. 127.

From Consul-General SUMA at Nanking.  
To Foreign Minister HIROTA.

Despatched ~~p.m.~~ 19, February, 1934.

~~Reached A.M. 20, Feb. 1934.~~

Concerning Chinese newspaper reports,  
of which conversations had been  
exchanged between Chinese and  
Japanese officials in China.

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Telegram No. 106.

From Minister ARIYOSHI at Shanghai.  
To Foreign Minister HIROTA.

Despatched ~~p.m.~~ 20, Feb. 1934.

~~Reached p.m. 20, Feb. 1934.~~

The Japanese officials advised the  
Chinese and foreign newspaper men  
that they should be more careful  
about their reports.

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Telegram No. 32.

From Consul-General HIDAKA at Nanking.  
To Foreign Minister Hirota.

Despatched ~~p.m.~~ 17, January, 1934.

~~Reached A.M. 18, January, 1934.~~

Concerning Mr. TANG YU-JEN's talk  
at a meeting.



Item 6. Communication No. 38

From: Consul-General MURAI, Kuramoto

To: Foreign Minister INUKAI

Date: 7 January 1932

<sup>Reports</sup>  
~~Reported~~ that CHIANG TSO-PEN told the press that the Manchurian Incident was caused by the Japanese militarists and was not the true intention of the Japanese people.

Item 9. Communication No. 1052

From: Consul-General MURAI, Kuramoto

To: Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA, Kijuro

Date: 31 August 1931

Reported that the Evening Post wrote that the Japanese military authorities should have taken strong measures toward those Japanese officers who ~~advocated~~, in a body, advocated a strong policy toward China and Manchuria.

Item 10: From: TANI, <sup>(Masayuki)</sup> Chief of Asia Bureau

To: KOISO, (Kuniaki), Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, <sup>War Ministry</sup>  
and HASHIMOTO, (Kingoro), Chief of 2nd Section,  
General Staff Headquarters

Date: 9 September 1931

Reported a press comment on the Japanese Army Officers' criticism of the policy toward China.

Enclosed is a newspaper item <sup>the "Soldiers and Politics"</sup> printed in English in SHANGHAI, dated 29 August 1931. Its summary.

is as follows:

"more than 7000 junior officers in the Japanese Army have organized with a view to bringing pressure to bear upon the government to adopt a 'stronger' China policy. . . . . The military authorities in their own interests should have taken some steps to make it clear to the young military officers that it is not their business as soldiers to criticize the government's foreign policy."

Item 15. (AN: Opinion expressed by the accused SUZUKI, Teichi)  
(See attached pages)

By R. Onuma

Telegram no. 39.  
From Minister ARIYOSHI at Shanghai.  
To Foreign Minister HIROTA.  
Despatched 17, January, 1934.  
~~Reached 17 January, 1934.~~

On the 16<sup>th</sup>, OKAMURA privately told the members of the Embassy staff that about 50 members of the Third Party had smuggled themselves into the army of SUN TIEN-YING. CHI FANG, ~~responsible person of the same~~ <sup>Third party chief</sup> in HOPEI province, who went to FUKIEN province in order to establish an independent regime there, visited me (OKAMURA) on the evening of January <sup>1st</sup> ~~first~~, and ~~he~~ told me privately that he expected to advance in the <sup>following</sup> ~~next~~ morning (Jan. 2) to the North. By this time, he is in ~~the~~ SUN's army and ~~was~~ <sup>he</sup> must ~~have been~~ directing ~~the~~ political propaganda work there.

(Chi Fang was graduated from PAO'ING Military Academy with TEN YEN-IA in the same class. Since the Third Party was organized he had been acting in concert with TEN YEN-IA. At present he is one of the leading veteran fighters of the party.)

Making the SUN's army its foothold and combining NINGSI, KANSU, SHENSI, TSING HAI, SINKIANG as a unit, the Third Army is planning to establish a North-West Independent Regime. <sup>There are trustingly Third Party members</sup> But under YANG HU-CHENG of SHENSI province, there is the Third Army truly trusted. <sup>does not love</sup> YANG has not a high regard for CHIANG KAI-SHEK. Therefore, it cannot be said that it is hopeless for them to accomplish the said plan.

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All the above said is known to us by  
hearsay (so don't make them public)

Regarding above we telegraphed to the  
Japanese authorities in Manchukuo,  
Beiping, Tientsin, Hankow and  
Nanking.

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~~T. N. a couple of lines of this telegram  
is quite ambiguous and  
cannot understand.~~

(7)

Telegram No. 39.

Tientsin

From Minister ARIYOSHI at Shanghai  
To Foreign Minister HIROTA.

Despatched ~~p.m.~~ 17, January, 1934

~~Reached p.m. 17, January, 1934~~

~~Report on  
Concerning movements of prominent  
Military personnel.~~

Telegram No. 37.

From Consul-General HIDAKA at Nanking.

To Foreign Minister HIROTA.

Despatched ~~p.m.~~ 18, January, 1934.

~~Reached a.m. 19, January, 1934.~~

~~Concerning <sup>newspaper</sup> reports and comments  
appeared in newspapers in Manchukuo  
as to <sup>about</sup> making Manchukuo an Empire  
and Pu Yi as ~~the~~ Emperor.~~

Telegram no. 11.

From Consul-General KURIHARA at  
To Foreign Minister HIROTA.

Tientsin

Despatched ~~a.m.~~ 17, January, 1934

~~Reached p.m. 17, January, 1934~~

~~A telegraphic report regarding  
moving general situations in China.~~

(17)

Telegram no. 93. (wireless)

From Naval officer NAKAHARA stationed at Canton  
To Vice Minister of Navy and Second Chief of  
the Naval Head Quarters General Staff.

Despatched ~~12:50 p.m.~~ 16, Jan. 1934

(from Destroyer "SAGA")

~~Reached 1:15 p.m. 16, Jan. 1934~~

~~Concerning political situations in China~~  
~~Report on the political moves of China~~

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Telegram No. 11. (Wireless)

From INOUE, Naval Officer stationed at  
DAI-HOKU, Formosa.  
To Vice-Minister of Navy  
and Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs.

Despatched ~~15:30~~ 16 Jan. 1934

~~Reached 15:38, 16 Jan. 1934~~

Concerning Military Situation of Revolution  
in China.

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Telegram No. 5. (Wireless)

From OKINO, Naval Officer at Peiping.  
To Vice Minister of Navy and second  
Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs.

Despatched 12:00, 16, Jan. 1934

Reached 08:00, 16, Jan. 1934

Regarding movements of the Chinese  
revolution.

(8)

Telegram No. 5. (Wireless)

From TANAKA, Naval officer stationed at  
Tsingtao  
To Vice Minister of Navy and  
Second Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs.

Despatched 13:00, 15. January 1934

Reached 18:37, 15. Jan. 1934

Concerning movements of the Chinese  
revolutionary army.

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Newspaper Articles from JIJI SHIMBUN on

~~JIJI SHIMBUN, 22 July 1931~~

→ "An Inquiry on the problems in Manchukuo and Mongolia  
(~~Legal and Political Nature~~) (NO. I)  
22 July 1931: This article lists all the special privileges and  
rights that Japan has in Manchukuo and Mongolia.

~~JIJI SHIMBUN, 23 July 1931~~

"An Inquiry on the problems in Manchukuo and Mongolia  
(~~Legal and Political Nature~~) (NO. II)  
23 July 1931: The tendency of the public opinions are as follows:  
those who are imperialistic want to appeal to arms  
when there is a good chance and those who seem  
quiet-looking <sup>want to</sup> hold the mastery of Manchukuo and  
Mongolia.

~~JIJI SHIMBUN, 24 July 1931~~

"An Inquiry on the problems in Manchukuo and Mongolia  
(~~Legal and Political Nature~~) (NO. III)

(2)

24 July 1931: Manchukuo and Mongolia are Chinese territory under ~~the~~ Chinese sovereignty and are not ~~the~~ Japanese colony, so they should be under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office.

~~JISI SHIMBUN, 25 July 1931~~

~~25 July "An Inquiry on the Problems in Manchukuo and Mongolia" (Legal and Political Nature) (NO. IV)~~

25 July 1931: all the special privileges that Japan has in Manchukuo and Mongolia should be liquidated.

~~JISI SHIMBUN, 26 July 1931~~

~~"An Inquiry on the Problems in Manchukuo and Mongolia" (Legal and Political Nature) (NO. V)~~

~~The theory of the special privilege should be harmonized with the practical question and, for the liquidation negotiation, we must take compromising attitude toward them.~~

26 July 1931: Such as "The Standing Organization for Administering International Disputes between Japan and China" should be established in future.

Jiji Shimbun, 27 July 1931

"An Inquiry on the Problems in Manchuria and Mongolia"  
(Legal and Political Nature) (No. 11)

~~27 July 1931: The above mentioned "Organization" is only  
for the purpose of resolving the disputes between  
Japan and China peacefully.~~

Official Letter NO. 469

~~From: Ambassador DEBUCHI, KATSUJI  
To: Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA, KIJURO  
Dated: 12 August 1931~~

~~The cutting of "The Washington Post" in which the  
account of "Japan in Manchuria" had been printed  
was sent to Tokyo from America.~~

(4)

Telegram ~~SHIDA~~ NO. 50

From : The Military Attaché to the Japanese Legation  
in Shanghai  
To : The Vice-Chief of the General Staff

Dated : ~~cabled at 4 p.m. on 8 August 1932~~  
~~reached at 8.20 p.m.~~

~~NANKING Report (cabled on 7 August)~~

The diplomatic policy of CHEN YU-JEN may be very much the same as <sup>that</sup> ~~he~~ <sup>is</sup> told to Mr. SHIGEMITSU <sup>is</sup> at Shanghai, and, ~~at~~ <sup>at</sup> this time, it will be better to assume the attitude of an onlooker, ~~not touch upon the new government.~~

Telegram (It was called off)

From : Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA

To : Minister to China SHIGEMITSU

~~dated~~  
Undated

~~SUNG TZE WEN~~ Travels in Manchukuo  
宋 子 文

It will be better to allievate general <sup>tension</sup> ~~atmosphere~~ between the both countries concerning the Manchurian problem, ~~by having~~ <sup>by having</sup> ~~of the opportunity~~ of ~~SUNG TZE WEN~~ <sup>SUNG TZE WEN</sup> travel in Manchukuo.

Telegram (Copy) NO. 618

From: Consuls General Agent SUMA, Yakichiro  
To: Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA  
dated: 18 November

~~It will be the best policy to say bare and~~ <sup>will be to propagandize</sup>  
~~propagate that CHIANG KAI-SHEK made a verbal~~  
agreement with Japan.

Newspaper Articles from

TOKYO NICHINICHI SHIMBUN <sup>on "Hearing</sup>  
~~January 1932~~

Prime Minister INUKAI Talk Beside me

"~~Being seated around Prime Minister INUKAI and~~  
~~heard him talk.~~" (~~attended by Education Minister~~)  
HATAYAMA

極秘

昭和七年六月二十九日陸軍省鈴木中佐ヨリ送付述セリ  
軍事課ヨリ陸軍上ヨリ提出セルモノナラシ

亞細亞局第一課

(對支政策)

駐日支那公使蔣作賓ノ歸任ニ對スル帝國ノ態度  
ニ就テ(七、六、二九)

判決

支那側カ如何ニ親日論ヲ述ヘ直接交渉ヲ求メ來ル事アル  
モ帝國ハ既定ノ方針ヲ堅持シ殊ニ滿洲國ニ關スル問題ハ一  
歩モ妥協的態度ニ出テサルヲ要ス

次官 尚日支ノ直接交渉ヨリ來ルコトアルヘキ列國ノ猜疑ニ就テハ充分  
ナル戒心ヲ必要トス

情報部長

理由

印

駐日支那公使蔣作賓ハ愈々末月四日頃陸海軍武官ヲ伴  
ヒ歸任ノ途ニ就クコトトナリトノ由テ其歸任後ノ行動ニ關シ  
一、坂西中將ト打合せタル後日支問題ヲ交渉ス

二、滿洲問題ニ對スル日本ノ最下限ノ要求ヲ知ラントス

三、支那側最後ノ腹ハ日本ヲシテ當分滿洲國ヲ承認セシメ  
サルコト

等ニ基クモノナルヤニ報セラレ更ニ蔣作賓ハ蔣介石ノ畫期的  
親日政策實行ノ爲再來スルモノナリ等宣傳セラレテ知ル  
ニ元來支那民族ハ徹底セル機會主義者ニシテ其政治ノ運  
營ニ一定ノ計畫等皆無ニシテ從テ右ノ如ク決シテ帝國ト  
真面目ニ事ヲ談セントスルモノニ非ルナリ彼等ノ事ヲ決スルハ凡  
テ謂所大勢(真ノ大勢ナラス)即チ四圍ノ空氣ニ其ニクモノトス

如何ニ日本ト誤合中ト雖モ英米等ノ空氣ニシテ我ニ不利ナ  
ラシカ忽チ鋒ヲ逆ニシテ東ルヘキハ明カナリ彼等カ今日苦心シテ  
ル所ハ如何ニシテ日本對英米佛等ノ間ヲ離間スヘキカニ  
存ス帝國ニ對スル好餌ノ如キ凡テ之レ地方寸ヨリ出登スルモノ  
ト判斷スルヲ至當トス今日支那人ニハ一人ノ信アルモノナキナリ  
之レ支那カ連年争亂スル根本ナリトス  
若シ夫レ支那ニシテ眞ニ帝國ト事ヲ欲セトセハ左ノ件ヲ承認ス  
ルコトニヨリ初メテ之ヲ確メ得ヘシ

一、滿洲ニ關スル諸問題ハ日滿兩國間ニ於テ之ヲ解決スルモ  
ノナルコトヲ承認スルコト後テ滿洲問題ニ關スル國際聯盟ヘ  
ノ訴ヲ取リ下クルコト

二、右ヲ承諾シタル上ニテ日本對支那本土ノ諸問題ヲ解決  
スルコト(帝國ハ之ニ列國ヲ参加セシムルモ敢テ之息トセザルノ  
決意アルコトヲ示ス)

即チ右ニ項ヲ支那カ是認スル迄ハ帝國<sup>依然</sup>ニ從來ノ態度ヲ持シ  
決シテ易キヲ求ムルノ態度ニ出ヅヘカラス萬一帝國ニシテ支  
那ニ親シメントスルノ餘リ從來ノ態度ニ變化ヲ來スカ如キ  
コトアラシカ茲ニ列國ノ猜疑ヲ蒙リ此間再ヒ支那ニ乘セラ  
ルルノ不利ヲ招來スルノ危險極メテ大ナリトス

By ~~Onuma~~

Item 15.

This is a letter (type written) dated 29 June, 1932, sent by Lt. Col. SUZUKI <sup>(Teiichi)</sup> of the War Ministry to the Foreign Ministry as to the attitude of the Imperial Government concerning Chinese Minister CHIANG <sup>TSOO-PIN</sup> Tsoo-ping to his post at Tokyo, returning.

### Conclusions

Despite ~~with~~ friendly talks <sup>and other</sup> ~~measures~~ <sup>which</sup> the Chinese ~~side~~ might take in order to enter ~~the~~ direct negotiations with Japan, it is necessary for Japan to maintain her already fixed policy and must not take any conciliatory attitude towards China, especially regarding the questions of Manchukuo.

Further more, Japan must exercise caution not to fall under <sup>the</sup> suspicion



of the Powers, <sup>as a consequence of</sup> ~~which might arise from~~  
the Sino-Japanese direct negotiation.

## REASONS

It is reported that the Chinese Minister

CHIANG TSUO-PIN is about to return  
to his post at Tokyo on the 4th of  
next month, accompanied by ~~the~~

Military and Naval attaches, ~~and this~~  
business after returning would be as  
follows:

1. — After arrangement <sup>is</sup> made with  
Lieutenant General SAKANISHI he  
would enter into negotiations <sup>on</sup> ~~regarding~~  
Sino-Japanese questions.

2 — It is reported that he wanted  
to know Japan's minimum

demands concerning the problems of  
Manchukuo.

3 — The last card the Chinese side wishes to play is not to let Japan recognize Manchukuo for the time being ~~at the least~~. It is further propagated that CHIANG TSUO-PIN is returning to Tokyo just in order to execute CHIANG KAI-SHEK's amicable policy towards Japan, marking an epoch. However, the Chinese people are thoroughly opportunistic by nature and <sup>do not</sup> have ~~any~~ <sup>no</sup> plan ~~about their~~ political operations. Accordingly, they will never negotiate with us frankly and seriously. All their decisions depend upon ~~the~~ general situations (not true situations) that is, they depend on the

15-

4.

surrounding atmosphere. In ~~case~~  
~~the~~ <sup>when the step</sup> ~~circumstances~~ <sup>when</sup> in Great Britain and  
America <sup>it look at us with disfavor</sup> are unfavourable to us, even  
during the period of her negotiation with us  
it is evident that they <sup>will</sup> constantly <sup>will rise</sup> arise  
in arms against us, even during the negotiation.

What China is <sup>anxious</sup> ~~anxious~~ <sup>considering</sup> ~~about~~  
today is ~~that~~ how to alienate Britain,  
America and France from Japan.  
Therefore, it is proper for us to <sup>be</sup> judge  
- this fact <sup>in mind</sup> and base our future <sup>action</sup> should be  
that a good bait offering ~~to~~ ~~it~~  
on it.  
~~based~~ on such a policy. To-day, there  
is no single Chinese <sup>that can be trusted.</sup> ~~credible~~. This is  
the cause ~~that~~ <sup>of their</sup> they have internal  
disturbances year after year.

If China really wishes to have an  
honest talk <sup>thing</sup> with Japan, <sup>(she should first agree to the points given below)</sup> it would  
be the first <sup>time</sup> for China to do so  
that ~~shall~~ she shall recognize

5.

The points given below:

1st — China shall recognize that the various problems regarding Manchukuo and Mongolia shall be settled between Japan and Manchukuo. Accordingly, China shall withdraw her appeal (Complaint) made to the League of Nations ~~in respect of~~ <sup>on</sup> the questions of Manchukuo.

2d — Having recognized the above, ~~the <sup>all other</sup> ~~hand~~~~ questions with regard to Japan and China proper shall be settled. Japan does not care about letting the Powers participate in said questions of the settlement, for Japan has a <sup>definite</sup> ~~determined~~ intention about the same.

6

Japan must not change her <sup>former</sup> attitude  
and must maintain her dignified  
position. <sup>of dignity.</sup> If Japan changes her  
attitude towards China by too <sup>fast</sup> hasty  
friendly actions, ~~then~~ the Powers  
will <sup>become</sup> suspicious of Japan.  
Consequently, the <sup>will be a great danger to</sup> danger for our country  
~~will be great, for~~ <sup>it for</sup> China ~~will~~ take  
advantage of the occasion.

---

Analyst: 1st Lt Paul F. England  
OK M. Nishida

*Processed but not used*

IPS No. 3169 (Item 15)

Exhibit No. \_\_\_\_\_

TOP SECRET

(CHINA POLICY) /TN: Marginal note  
in pencil/

Sent by Lt. Colonel SUZUKI of the  
War Ministry on 29 June 1932.  
Probably submitted to higher au-  
thorities by the Military Admini-  
stration Section.

/TN: Above is a marginal note in  
ink./

TADA /seal/

Vice Minister /TN: Written in red pencil/

Chief of Information Bureau /TN: Written in red pencil/

AMAGI /seal/

ASIATIC BUREAU, First Section/seal/

Concerning the Empire's Attitude Re-  
garding the Return to His Post of  
the Chinese Minister to JAPAN,  
CHIANG TSUO -PIN

(29 June 1932)

#### Conclusions

No matter how pro-Japanese the Chinese profess to be nor how much they seek to negotiate directly, the Empire must adhere strictly to its established policy and must not display in the least a conciliatory attitude, particularly as regards the MANCHUKUO question.

Furthermore, proper caution must be exercised with respect to the Powers' suspicious which would be aroused by direct negotiations between JAPAN and CHINA.

#### Reasons

It appears that the Chinese Minister to Japan, CHIANG TSUO-PIN, is at last to return to his post on about the 4th of next month accompanied by military and naval attaches. It is rumored that after his return to his post his movements will probably be governed by such considerations as:

1. He will negotiate Sino-Japanese problems after arrangements are made with Lt. General SAKANISHI.

2. He will ascertain JAPAN's minimum demands regarding Manchurian problems.
3. The underlying intention on the part of CHINA is not to let JAPAN recognize MANCHUKUO for the time being.

Moreover, the report has been spread that CHIANG TSUC-PIN is returning in order to carry out CHIANG KAI-SHEK's epochal policy of friendship with JAPAN. By nature, however, the Chinese are a race of thorough-going opportunists and have no set plan in the management of administration. Therefore, they will never discuss matters seriously with the Empire. All of their decisions are based on so-called trends (not trends in the true sense) i. e., the surrounding atmosphere. Even while conferring with us, if the atmosphere in BRITAIN, AMERICA, etc. is unfavorable to us, it is clear that they will immediately reverse their stand. They are now racking their brains on how to alienate JAPAN from BRITAIN, AMERICA, FRANCE, etc. It is proper to judge that every alluring bait offered the Empire proceeds from this motive. Today, there is not a single Chinese who may be trusted. This is the source of CHINA's /internal/ disturbances year after year.

If CHINA is really going to discuss matters with the Empire, it can be confirmed only by her acknowledgement of the following matters:

1. To recognize that every problem concerning MANCHUKUO and MONGOLIA shall be settled between JAPAN and MANCHUKUO; and, consequently, to withdraw the complaint to the League of Nations concerning the Manchurian question.
2. To settle every problem between Japan and China proper, after agreement to the above. (The Empire shall show her resolution to be indifferent to participation of the Powers in this settlement.)

In short, the Empire must continue to maintain her former attitude until China approves the above two clauses, and must not assume an attitude of seeking an easier way. Should the Empire change her former attitude by being too eager for friendship with CHINA, she will thereby incur the Powers' suspicions, and meanwhile, will run the extremely great risk of bringing about a handicap which CHINA will again turn to her advantage.