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U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
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INTERROGATION NO. 284
Jap. Intel. No. 10

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 7 November 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS

Subject: INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURE IN JAPANESE ARMY AIR
DIVISION (HIKOSHIDAN).

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Major TOGA, Hiroshi, Japanese Army Air Force; staff officer for maintenance and communications with 10th Air Division (Hikoshidan) in 1944-45. In 1928, commissioned a Second Lieutenant (infantry) and served with the 57th Infantry Regiment in Manchuria until 1941; in December 1941, entered War College for ground training in air; in November 1943, went to TOYOOKA, Japanese "Air West Point," as tactics instructor.

Where interviewed: Meiji Building

Interrogator: Maj. R. S. SPILMAN, Jr., AC, AUS.
Lt. S. P. AHLBUM, USNR.

Interpreter: Lt. Comdr. F. B. HUGGINS, USNR.

SUMMARY:

The 10th Air Division (Hikoshidan), which was responsible for the air defense of the TOKYO area, included an intelligence unit consisting of two officers and five or six enlisted men, plus an additional special intelligence unit charged with monitoring radio communications of U.S. aviation units.

Officers performed intelligence functions in the Air Regiments (Hikosentai) and Squadrons (Chutai) and, according to Major TOGA, were listed as such (Joho Shoko) in the manning table of organization. This is contrary to the statement of Col. MIYASHI (Jap Intell Interrogation #8 of 6 November 1945) that there was no table of organization provision for an intelligence officer below the level of Hikoshidan. Intelligence officers did no actual briefing or interrogation; this was accomplished by the squadron commander. Beyond the routine functions of keeping up situation maps, making out mission reports, and handling charts, the intelligence officer's scope seemed mainly to be technical and tactical.

Intelligence training at TOYOOKA included radar, recognition, own and enemy tactics, map reading, some photo interpretation, but virtually nothing on procedure. The tactics instructor was also the intelligence instructor for all phases except photo interpretation, which was a separate school, and what written instructions there were on intelligence were included in the tactical texts.



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TRANSCRIPT OF THE INTERROGATION

- Q. What training did you have as an intelligence officer?
- A. In the hikeshidan tactics room, where all staff officers had to do duty, a certain amount of intelligence work was required. I had no particular training. Furthermore, as communications and maintenance officer, I was not normally involved with intelligence.
- Q. Was any intelligence course, as such, given at TOYOOKA?
- A. Yes, there was.
- Q. You did not take that course?
- A. Yes, I did.
- Q. What subjects were included? Will you describe the course?
- A. It involved the study of radar, which was considered a form of intelligence, and things like that. Radar, recognition, and some tactics to be used against enemy planes were included.
- Q. Was there anything on analysis of Allied tactics?
- A. We got reports from pilots who actually fought Allied pilots in the South, also some reports from Germany. Air headquarters received the information from Germany and disseminated it to air units.
- Q. Did you have courses in map reading?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Were there any courses in photo interpretation?
- A. There was special instruction in that. That's a different outfit. All pilots received a certain amount of photo interpretation training at TOYOOKA, but not a complete course.
- Q. Were any instructions given for the interrogation and briefing of pilots?
- A. It was a very general sort of instruction on how to coach pilots to tell what they saw and did. At TOYOOKA, this teaching was very general, and only when we got into the operational units did we really learn from practice.
- Q. Were there any courses on U. S. and British plane performance and capabilities?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Where did the information on this come from?
- A. From Air Headquarters (Koku Hombu).
- Q. Were standard instructions issued as to what kind of photo material, charts, and so forth, were to be carried by pilots on missions?
- A. Yes. They were more or less security measures, orders against carrying material which would show the locations of our own forces, or code books.
- Q. Do you know what working material, in practice, a pilot would take with him on a mission?
- A. Usually a 1x200,000 map and pertinent aerial photographs which might be available. These were taken by the squadron leader and above only. The

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION OF: TOGA, Hiroshi, Major, Japanese AAF
(Contd).

others in the squadron followed his moves, dropping their bombs when he did, etc.

Q. What mechanical aids or type of training material were used for recognition study?

A. Mainly models, silhouettes and pictures. Models were hung from the ceiling, pictures were pasted on the walls so the pilots would study them as they walked by.

Q. Were any measures taken to set up a definite intelligence procedure and routine in the field?

A. Not at all in the air college. After we got into operational units, it was done because of actual necessity.

Q. Who was superintendent at the Air College at TOYOOKA?

A. Lieutenant General TOKUGAWA, Japan's first aviator.

Q. Was any one man in charge of intelligence training?

A. I was one of them. The tactics instructors also taught intelligence.

Q. Were any training manuals or written texts concerning intelligence used at TOYOOKA?

A. It was included in the tactics texts.

Q. Do you have any copies of these texts?

A. I will look around to see if I can find any.

Q. Was there any separate intelligence section in the 10th Air Division (Hikoshidan)?

A. We had an intelligence unit which was simply a radar warning unit. Then there was another squad which did deal with enemy intelligence. The intelligence officer of the division handled it, with one officer, a first lieutenant, and five men under him. We also had a nisei who could listen to the voice communications of U.S. pilots, and a special intelligence squad consisting of an officer and 10 men who monitored U.S. aircraft communications.

Q. From what type of radio broadcast did they get the most information?

A. Mainly from the B-29s.

Q. Was that from the B-29s in the air, on take-off, or what?

A. The B-29s sent out some kind of a signal, then we knew they were coming.

Q. Were you able to estimate the number that were coming?

A. From things like call signs of different squadrons, which we had picked out, we could estimate the number coming.

Q. What type of intelligence reports did your air division get from higher echelons?

A. We received spot reports coming in from China, for instance, that the B-29s had passed over a certain point. And then from Air Headquarters we got reports on tactics, mullied over from previous actions.

Q. What type of reports did your air division require from lower echelons?

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW OF: TOGA, Hiroshi, Major, Japanese AAF
(Contd).

- A. While in the air, reports were required from squadron commanders. They reported the type, number and direction of planes. After returning to base, they would report any special types of planes or tactics.
- Q. Did you require such things as mission reports?
- A. Yes. After every mission. Division headquarters tabulated the reports when they were received and sent this tabulation to Air Headquarters.
- Q. What kind of briefing did your pilots get before taking off on an interception?
- A. They had no briefing at all. Fighter control directed them after they took off, but there was no briefing. After the day's operations were over, the squadron commander would discuss tactics with them. They were in too much of a hurry for anything before take-off.
- Q. Was there any systematic questioning of pilots after they returned from a mission?
- A. That was up to the squadron commander. If he found anything of importance he would pass the information along to division headquarters. Every pilot was required to report to the squadron commander upon return and tell his story.
- Q. Were any intelligence units as such assigned to units lower than hikoshidan?
- A. There was one officer attached to each of the various squadrons as intelligence officer. He did not do the questioning of the pilots, but examined the reports obtained by the squadron commander and also gave the squadron commander information received in reports from higher echelons.
- Q. Did the manning table, or table of organization, call this officer an intelligence officer?
- A. Yes - Joho Shoko.
- Q. Were situation maps - war rooms - maintained at division headquarters?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Was that an intelligence or an operations function?
- A. It was an intelligence function.
- Q. Describe the procedure you used in estimation Allied losses, both after a mission and over a monthly period.
- A. We based our estimates on pilot reports, and reports from the radio unit which would listen in for distress calls from your planes on their way back to base.
- Q. Were the reports given by the pilots believed to be accurate?
- A. We would get the squadron commander to try to screen the pilot reports. There might be one plane shot down and many pilots trying to claim credit for it. By using the information as to where the plane was shot down, what time, and where it fell, it was possible to discount duplicate reports.
- Q. Was there any rescue organization for pilots from your division shot down during a mission?

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION OF: TOGA, Hiroshi, Major, Japanese AAF
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- A. None at all. If they fell near the Japanese shore, somebody might save them.
- Q. Were there any instructions for pilots on how to escape or on how to conduct themselves if shot down over Allied territory?
- A. Very little. Just security measures: burn codes, destroy the plane, try to get back to his own lines or shoot himself if capture was imminent.
- Q. Were any special intelligence files kept in the air division?
- A. Yes, there were some files kept of our documents.
- Q. What in general did they contain?
- A. There were a good many documents on American tactics, performance, and deployment of planes.
- Q. Was the keeping of maps and charts an intelligence or an operations function?
- A. That was an intelligence function.
- Q. The Japanese Air Force prepared an elaborate intelligence study of the capabilities, deployment, and intentions of the B-29s. Who would have prepared this?
- A. I think it was Air Headquarters. The document examiner - Lt. Col. ASHIHARA - probably had charge of this.
- Q. Did your division headquarters make plans for deployment of fighter strength in the defense of the TOKYO area or did that come from above?
- A. That came from above.
- Q. Did you know the reasons for deployment?
- A. If we asked, we would be given the reasons, but otherwise not. I think the higher command based its decision for deployment on the importance of various industrial areas.
- Q. Were your fighters ever sent out against U.S. carriers?
- A. Only once, on the 13th of August. We hadn't yet received the word the war had ended. The information on the carriers came from the First Air Army; one of their reconnaissance planes had spotted the carriers. We sent out three or four planes, but they couldn't find the target. One of them didn't come back.