

NAME OF WITNESS: TANAKA, Ryukichi

REQUESTED BY : SHIGEMITSU

DATE : 2 April 1947

Completed at to Items 1 - 8.

CHARGE OUT SLIP
LEGAL SECTION
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL DIVISION

DATE 25 Feb 49

CASE FILE NO. Tanaka, Ryukichi
VOL. _____

Signature _____

Room No. _____

Capt Robinson's Defense witness file

Tanaka, Ryukichi

CHARGE OUT SLIP
LEGAL SECTION
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL DIVISION

DATE 25 Feb 49

CASE FILE NO. Tanaka, Ryukichi
VOL. _____

Signature Munaghan

Room No. 823

Defense witness -- certified

Tanaka, Ryukichi

Tanaka file

CROSS REFERENCE SHEET

SUBJECT:

Bureau Chief Meeting re: treatment
of POW's.

DATE

18 March 1946

SEE FILE:

POW atrocities

INTERROGATIONS

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION
FRENCH DIVISION

Excerpt from an interview with General TANAKA Ryukichi.

... An agreement had been reached in August 1940, respecting the French sovereignty over Indo-China; despite that agreement, General TOMINAGA, head of G1, wanted to send troops to the Indo-Chinese territory.

New demands were made, and negotiations were still in progress in September 1940. Thinking that they were dragging, and resenting the slowness of the proceedings on the part of the French authorities, General Tominaga wanted to order the troops into Indo-China before the conclusion of the negotiations.

On the other hand, the Chief of Staff and Tojo, Minister of War, were of the opinion that agreements should be respected, and that it was advisable to wait until completion of the ~~agreements~~ negotiations then under way.

Q.- Who gave the troops the order to penetrate into Indo-Chinese territory ?

A.- The order came from General SATO, then Chief of Staff of the Japanese army in China. At the same time, General Tominaga, coming to China, further incited the Fifth Division to take action. So, the initiative of hostilities came from General Sato, General Tominaga, and also General ANDO (who committed suicide at a later time).

.....

INTERROGATION OF

TANAKA, Ryukichi

Date and Time: 17 May 1946, 1630-1645 hours.

Place : Room 374, War Ministry Building
Tokyo, Japan.

Present : TANAKA, Ryukichi
Mr. Elton M. Hyder Interrogator
Mr. Cseiji TAMINAGA Interpreter
Miss Claire Stefanelli Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, administered by
Mr. Hyder:

Mr. Hyder : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God,
that you will truly and accurately interpret
and translate from English into Japanese and
from Japanese into English, as may be re-
quired of you, in this proceeding?

Mr. TAMINAGA : I do.

Questions by : Mr. Hyder.

Q. General, do you know who planned the Manchurian Incident?

A. General ITAGAKI and ISHIHARA, and in Japan HASHIMOTO,
OKAWA, and TATEKAWA.

Q. Could you tell me how you learned that, General?

A. I was head of the Investigation Section of General Staff.
I also heard it from TATEKAWA, my senior officer in Tokyo.

Q. General, did TATEKAWA go to Manchuria just before the
Incident happened, on September 18?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it after September 18?

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 17 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. The day before - the 17th.
- Q. He arrived there?
- A. He arrived on the 17th. I heard it from TATEKAWA himself.
- Q. Did TATEKAWA know beforehand of the plans in Manchuria?
- A. Yes, of course, he did. MINAMI sent TATEKAWA to Manchuria to try and stop that Incident which apparently General MINAMI knew about. That was told to me by TATEKAWA himself. Strange to say TATEKAWA had no intention of stopping the Incident although he was sent to stop it. That was told to me by TATEKAWA himself. He arrived in Mukden by railway.
- Q. What was HASHIMOTO's part in the plan?
- A. I don't know much about that. OKAWA was at that time head of the East Asia Economic Research Department and I spent most of the time in the Investigation Section of the General Staff so I had rather frequent contact with OKAWA. I was often told by OKAWA that Manchuria should be made independent. I, myself, didn't think that the independence of Manchuria wasn't so bad an idea but I never joined the plan.
- Q. Did MINAMI really want the Incident stopped? Did he really want TATEKAWA to stop the Incident?
- A. I think MINAMI had intentions to stop the Incident and TATEKAWA was the proper man to send over. In my opinion, MINAMI probably had intentions to stop the Incident but TATEKAWA, himself, did not. If TATEKAWA had any intention of stopping this plot he could do that because he could have immediately met the Commander of the Kwantung Army but he apparently didn't.
- Q. MINAMI could have stopped the Incident from spreading after it happened if he so desired, could he not?
- A. Yes, he could if he liked, by asking the Emperor and using his power.
- Q. General, who is General ONODARO - at that time Director of the Army Ordnance Department.
- A. He was a Lieutenant General. He was then Director of the Accounting Department.
- Q. Do you know whether General ONODARO knew of the Incident before it took place?
- A. Probably he did.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 17 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. Who else knew here in Tokyo, before the Incident, of the plan for the Manchurian Incident?
- A. There were many who knew of the Incident before it happened especially the members of the Cherry Blossom Association. I just believe that -- I think.
- Q. General, how did MINAMI learn that the Incident was about to take place? Was it from SHIDEHARA?
- A. General MINAMI apparently did not know about the actual plan but he was in suspicion that there must be something which would be done by the Kwantung Army. There was a Japanese Army Company stationed at Fushung Coal Mine. The Commander of that Company told some Japanese civilians in Fushung that something would happen very soon. That rumor came to the ears of the Japanese Consul in Mukden. The Consul in Mukden sent a telegram to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA and SHIDEHARA told MINAMI something about that. This news I simply heard through somebody whom I don't remember but if you ask Baron SHIDEHARA it will be much clearer.
- Q. General, after the Incident occurred in September 1931 the civil government of Manchuria was taken over by the Kwantung Army?
- A. Yes, Manchurian political leaders formed a civil government and General DOIHARA formed that plan.
- Q. For Mukden or Manchuria?
- A. DOIHARA became Mayor of Mukden and gradually the people's government was established.
- Q. The provincial governors in Manchuria submitted their plans to the Kwantung Army for approval?
- A. The Kwantung Army set up the provisional government and naturally they asked recognition of their government.
- Q. General, was there a secret treaty between the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army and the Emperor of Manchukuo signed after September 15, 1932, to the effect that the administration of Manchukuo was to be handled by Manchurian officials and Japanese officials who were recommended by the Commander of the Kwantung Army to the Emperor of Manchukuo?
- A. Yes, that is quite true. That is a fact.
- Q. Did you ever see a copy of that agreement?

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 17 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. I haven't seen it but it was published in the newspaper at that time - announced to the public.
- Q. Was it announced that the officials of the Manchukuo Government had to be recommended to the Emperor of Manchukuo by the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army?
- A. The Manchurian Government officials were actually appointed by the Manchurian Emperor but he could not appoint without approval of the Kwantung Commander. That is called internal leadership.
- Q. The Board of General Affairs in Manchukuo - are you familiar with that?
- A. Yes, that General Affairs Bureau is supposed to be like an assembly of Japanese officers. This Bureau had actual power and by that the Manchurian Government was operated.
- Q. Through it?
- A. Through that. That means the Manchurian Government was managed by the Commander of the Kwantung Army through this Bureau.
- Q. Do you know what the functions of the Bureau were? In other words, did it control the various Ministries - finance?
- A. I was not very much interested in political power but I am sure that this Bureau contained a Personnel Department and also a Financial Section.
- Q. General, could you tell me how you knew this Bureau ran the Government of Manchukuo?
- A. Well, because I was Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army from 1935 to 1937 and I had contact with officers of the General Affairs Bureau. Particularly, I was in charge of the Investigation Department of the Kwantung Army. My Investigation Section took charge of all investigation in Manchuria. I, myself, actually called different sections of the Manchurian Government trying to get various information so that is why I know.
- Q. Did the abolition of extra-territoriality in Manchukuo by the Japanese Government affect the domination of Manchukuo by Japan through the Kwantung Army?
- A. Before Japan abolished extra-territoriality she had begun to dominate Manchuria and also afterwards.

INTERROGATION OF

TANAKA, Ryukichi

Date and Time: 18 May 1946, 1015-1215 hours.

Place : Room 374, War Ministry Building,
Tokyo, Japan.

Present : TANAKA, Ryukichi
Mr. Elton M. Hyder Interrogator
Mr. W. I. McKenzie "
Mr. Rishichi ONUMA Interpreter
Miss Claire Stefanelli Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, administered by
Mr. Hyder.

Mr. Hyder : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that
you will truly and accurately interpret and
translate from English into Japanese and
from Japanese into English, as may be required
of you, in this proceeding?

Mr. ONUMA : I do.

Questions by : Mr. Hyder.

Q. General, was there a report made by the War Ministry or
General Staff of the planning of the Manchurian Incident?

A. At that time I was in Shanghai. I don't know about that,
but I heard TATEKAWA went to Manchuria and made an investi-
gation. When he came back he made a report to the War Min-
istry. The night TATEKAWA arrived in Mukden the so called
Manchurian Incident broke out suddenly. After TATEKAWA
investigated the Incident he came back and made a report
to General MINAMI.

Q. Did you see that report, General?

A. No, I don't know about the contents. I was told by another
person.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 18 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. General, do you know who murdered Chang Tso Lin?
A. KOMOTO, Deisuke.
- Q. How did you learn that, General?
A. KOMOTO told me about that.
- Q. When did he tell you?
A. When I was on the Staff of the Kwantung Army. I knew at the time he killed Chang Tso Lin and that is why he was dismissed from the army. He was not dismissed but rather suspended from his office and since that time I knew he killed the man. The Incident happened in 1928. I met him again in Manchuria in 1935. At the time he was suspended from the Army and was President of South Manchurian Coal Company. We were drinking with each other and he told me a lot of things. I asked him by what manner did he kill him and he told me all about that.
- Q. What was his purpose in killing Chang Tso Lin?
A. He wanted to bring to power Chang Hseuh-liang. He wanted him Head of Manchuria instead of his father.
- Q. Was there anyone else connected with KOMOTO in the killing of Chang Tso Lin?
A. There were one or two Army officers who had close connection with KOMOTO but I don't know their names. They were officers of the Engineering Corps.
- Q. Was anyone in Tokyo connected with the plot of Captain KOMOTO when he assassinated Chang Tso Lin?
A. I think General TADA knows about that because General TADA's wife is KOMOTO's sister. That is why I think he knows.
- Q. What is TADA's first name?
A. Hayao. TADA is a relative of KOMOTO and also a close friend.
- Q. Is there any connection between the murder of Chang Tso Lin and the Manchurian Incident?
A. It was KOMOTO who planned the Manchurian Incident.
- Q. Military plans?
A. He planned the Manchurian Incident on behalf of the Kwantung

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 18 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. Army. I wish you would remember that all Manchurian Incidents had been planned and executed alone by the Kwantung Army without public notice to the central government or ministry. When the Manchurian Incident broke out KOMOTO was in Manchuria....in Mukden. I think he played a most important part in the Incident of Manchuria. He had been working very hard for the independence of Manchuria, until the independence of Manchuria was complete.
- Q. KOMOTO is dead now?
A. He is still alive and in China.
- Q. Do you know where?
A. Taiywang. At the time Japan surrendered he was President of an Iron Company. He is now President of the Japanese Association in Taiywang. The Association is composed of Japanese. The population of Taiywang is about 100,000. There are about 10,000 Japanese there.
- Q. General, was there a SHIGETO and CHO in the conspiracy of the Manchurian Incident? Major CHO?
A. CHO had close connection with the Manchurian Incident but he died. SHIGETO also died.
- Q. Were they in on the planning of the Manchurian Incident?
A. I think they did. CHO died at Okinawa. SHIGETO died from illness about three years ago.
- Q. General, Jehol was occupied in January or February of 1933?
A. I don't remember whether it was January or February. It was cold weather - in winter anyway.
- Q. At any rate you knew that it was occupied? How did you know that it was occupied?
A. It is not necessary to ask me because I am a soldier at that time and I know very well. At the time I was Commander of a company at Osaka and I knew it through a newspaper.
- Q. Later you were in Manchuria. Did you go to Jehol Province?
A. I went there often.
- Q. And it was occupied by Japanese soldiers when you were there?
A. Yes, it was completely occupied by Japanese Army.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 18 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. General, do you remember the Tangku Truce?
A. I knew also about that when I was at Osaka.
- Q. Did you ever see a copy of the agreement or the truce?
A. At that time I didn't see that agreement but after I went to the Kwantung Army I saw it.
- Q. Did Japanese troops go into Hopei Province?
A. The Japanese Army went over there and had to withdraw from that place later.
- Q. Did Japanese troops go into Chahar Province?
A. No, the Japanese Army did not advance there.
- Q. Did it go in the middle of 1936?
A. No, the Japanese Army advanced to Chahar in 1937. Before that time the Japanese Army did not go over there but Japanese people went there.
- Q. Did they go in Chahar before the Chinese Incident in July 1937?
A. No, at that time I was a member of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army and I knew it very well but the Japanese Army did not go/at that time at all but I know that the Mongolian Army composed by Manchurian officers had been there.
- Q. General, in 1935 didn't Japanese troops go into Chahar in the southern region?
A. The Army went over there - the Mongolian Army lead by Li-Sho-Sin. He was the leader of the Army and I knew him very well because he is a friend of mine. There were three divisions under him - Mongolian cavalry.
- Q. Were there any Japanese troops with that Mongolian Army?
A. Yes, there were about 30 Japanese soldiers who were advisers to him.
- Q. Did this Mongolian Army go into Chahar at the instigation or request of the Japanese Army?
A. These 30 men had been sent by the order of the Japanese Imperial Order. Li-Sho-Sin went there in accordance with the order from the Kwantung Army.
- Q. When did you learn that, General?
A. At that time I was a member of the General Staff of the

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 18 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. Kwantung Army and I took care of them. That is why I know it very well. SHIMONAGA, Kenji embezzled Army money and I went over there to punish him. That is why I knew very well.
- Q. General, could you tell me the plans of the Kwantung Army? Were they to go south and west?
- A. The plan of the Kwantung Army was to go to the west. The plan of the Army was to prevent the advance of the Communistic Army. If our Army advanced to the west the Communistic Army would be stopped over there. That would be our purpose. Our purpose was to cut down the advance of the Red Army.
- Q. Why did the Japanese Army withdraw from the Hopei Province?
- A. When?
- Q. April 1933.
- A. The Japanese Army had to withdraw from that place because the Japanese Army did not think those provinces should be included to the territory of Manchuria -- because the Japanese Army did not think about including this province to Manchuria. That is why the Japanese Army had to withdraw from there.
- Q. Did they run into strong Chinese resistance?
- A. When the Japanese Army advanced to Hopei, the Chinese Army resisted very stubbornly and the Japanese Army had a fierce battle.
- Q. Are you familiar with the Ho-Umezumi Agreement?
- A. At that time I was in the General Staff of the Kwantung Army, so I knew the matter very well.
- Q. Could you tell me what you know of it, General?
- A. At that time there was a Chinese Army in Peiping and Tientsin in Hopei Province. The purpose of the troops was to push back the army of Chiang Kai-shek.
- Q. Push it south?
- A. To the south near the Hwang River (Yellow River). The purpose of the troops was to replace the Japanese Army instead of Chiang Kai-shek's Army at that province, namely, Hopei. After the Chinese Army withdrew, the Japanese Army occupied the territory. *
- Q. What was the area involved?
- A. Hopei, Chahar Provinces.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 18 May 1946 Cont'd)

Q. The full provinces?

A.

(Correction should be made for above where marked *).

A. Replacement should be made by a Chinese Army that the Japanese could recognize. That is the only thing I know about that. I have forgotten small matters because that was the most important thing in that truce. All others are not important so I have forgotten.

Q. Did General Ho Ying Ching actually agree with General UMEZU that this should be done?

A. In fact the Japanese Army oppressed him but he agreed. Probably inside he did not agree. He was compelled by the oppression of the Japanese Army. That is the way I understand.

Q. Do you recall the date, General, of that agreement?

A. I am not sure, but I think according to my memory, it was in June 1933 - June or July, I am not sure. It was before General UMEZU came back to Japan.

Q. Under whose orders, General, was UMEZU acting?

A. I can't tell you, but I think he executed it at his own will. Of course, the Kwantung Army and MINAMI supported him. I think the Japanese Government did not get any order. That is the way I understand.

Q. Did the War Minister approve it later?

A. Of course, the War Minister approved it later.

Q. General, are you familiar with the North China Autonomous Movement?

A. Yesterday I told Mr. Tavenner about it in detail.

Q. Were there any other provinces occupied by the Japanese Army in Mongolia other than Chahar, Hopei, and Jehol?

A. No, there were none occupied by the Japanese Army.

Q. In the China Incident of July 1937, did the Kwantung Army send troops to be used in the war in China?

A. Immediately after the Incident, the Japanese Kwantung Army sent troops.

Q. Do you know approximately how many?

A. About two brigades -- one regiment of airplanes.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 18 May 1946 Cont'd)

Q. Did they send anymore later?

A. The Kwantung Army later sent another two brigades - altogether four brigades.

Q. About how many men?

A. About 30,000. I don't know what happened later because I was sent to Korea.

Q. How did you know these four brigades were sent from Manchuria into China proper?

A. I knew very well because I was a member of the General Staff. After those four brigades had been sent to their places I was Lt. Colonel and I was promoted to Colonel and then I was transferred to Korea.

Q. Were the troops sent to China a month or two after the beginning of the China Incident in July 1937?

A. Before the Chinese Incident broke out, the Japanese Army sent two brigades. After it broke out another two brigades had been sent...altogether four brigades.

did

Q. Where/they send the first two brigades?

A. The first two brigades had been sent south of the Great Wall - two brigades to Peking.

Q. General, was the China Incident planned by the Japanese Army?

A. I think the Japanese Army did not plan that Incident but I think it broke out naturally because there was a collision between Japanese and Chinese over there.

Q. It was not planned like the Manchurian Incident?

A. It was quite different from the Manchurian Incident. There was no definite plan made by the Japanese Army. At that time there was a rumor. The Chinese Army was training -- practicing sham battle. At that time the Japanese Army was doing a sham battle. Near the bridge there were many Communistic Chinese students so I think the Chinese Communistic students fired at the Japanese Army and also to the Chinese Army and that is why the Incident started. It was a rumor but I am not sure. After I came back to Japan, I investigated it thoroughly but I could find nothing. That is why I think the rumor was true. My specialty was investigation. Every case I investigated, every time I was successful, but about this matter I was not successful. Only on that one I failed to succeed. At this moment I can't tell you exactly why the collision had happened.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 18 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. Were there any military plans drawn up just in case such an incident should happen?
- A. The Japanese Army always has preparations for any incident because it is a duty of the Army.
- Q. General, was Manchuria used as a post for training troops or sending troops and supplies to China?
- A. Not before the China-Japan Incident broke out but later a Japanese Army had been trained in Manchuria and sent to China. Not before the Incident.
- Q. Did they use troops that were trained in Manchuria for service during World War II?
- A. After the great Pacific War, the Japanese Army had been trained in Manchuria and this trained Army had been sent to China and many islands in the South Pacific and also the Philippines.
- Q. Please name the islands.
- A. As far as I know, this Army had been sent to many islands in the South Pacific and the Philippines. I don't know because it was after I left the Army. The Japanese Army trained in Manchuria had been dispatched to China, Philippines, Okinawa, Celebes, and New Guinea. Those troops were sent only to the west part of New Guinea. I knew it because my friends had been sent there. That is why I knew.
- Q. General, approximately how many troops had been trained in Manchuria and sent later to China and other Southern Islands in the Great War?
- A. About ten divisions or more. I think not so many troops have been sent to China but most of them had been sent to those islands.
- Q. Did the War Ministry and General Staff use Manchuria as a training ground for troops that might be used in the China War?
- A. Yes, the Japanese Army made Manchuria a training ground for the Japanese Army who had been sent to China and the South Pacific Islands. It was especially the Japanese Army. So a big army had been trained in Manchuria after America declared war against Japan.
- Q. They trained large numbers afterwards?
- A. After America declared war, a larger Army had been trained in Manchuria after the beginning of the Great War.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 18 May 1946 Cont'd)

Questions by: Mr. McKenzie.

Q. General, some time ago you said that HASHIMOTO and TATEKAWA and ISHIHARA had been active in the Manchurian Incident and had prepared the plans for it?

A. These three men were central figures of Manchuria.

Q. How do you know that?

A. I know because the Japanese Army had in their head that the province of Manchuria should be independent. The Japanese Army thought about that since after the China-Japan War for many many years. After Chang Tso Lin was killed the Japanese Army thought more about the independence of Manchuria. HASHIMOTO is a friend of mine.

Q. Did HASHIMOTO tell you about it?

A. TATEKAWA was my superior officer - my senior officer - and he told me about that.

Q. Did HASHIMOTO tell you about it?

A. When HASHIMOTO came back from Turkey to Japan, I was sent to China (Shanghai). That is why I had no chance to meet him.

Questions by: Mr. Hyder.

Q. General, how did you know that IMADA, Shintaro destroyed the railway tracks on September 18, 1931?

A. Mr. Helm knows about that.

Q. How did you know IMADA destroyed the tracks?

A. I never heard about that from IMADA. General OKAMURA, Neiji told me about that. He is in Nanking.

Q. When did he tell you, General?

A. It was about in March 1936.

Q. Did the General say how he had destroyed the railway tracks?

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 18 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. OKAMURA told me that he (OKAMURA) imagined that IMADA executed it. If you want to have better knowledge I think you had better ask Lt. General SHIBAYAMA, Kaneshiro.
- Q. Is he in Tokyo?
- A. He is a former Army Vice Minister. I think he is in Tokyo, although he is sick, I think. I wish to tell you, Mr. Hyder, why I know that man had plenty of knowledge about that incident in 1931. IMADA was a Captain. SHIBAYAMA at that time was a Commander. SHIBAYAMA at that time was Adviser to Chang Tso Lin. IMADA was Assistant to SHIBAYAMA. Though he was Assistant to the Commander they were not friendly at all.

Questions by: Mr. McKenzie.

- Q. Did KOMOTO tell you that he killed Chang Tso Lin?
- A. KOMOTO himself told me.
- Q. How did he do it.
- A. KOMOTO told me that he hung up some very high explosives bombs on the bridge. The Junction.
- Q. Was the whole train destroyed?
- A. About two cars were destroyed. When the Manchurian Incident had broken out SHIBAYAMA was in Peking. He went with Chang Tso Lin. At that time SHIBAYAMA was Assistant to General Chang Tso Lin and IMADA was Assistant to SHIBAYAMA. Correction...IMADA was Adviser to Chang Hseuh-liang.
- Q. Who were not friendly?
- A. IMADA and SHIBAYAMA. When the Manchurian Incident broke out SHIBAYAMA was very indignant about that because SHIBAYAMA was opposed to the Manchurian Incident. If you call SHIBAYAMA he will, or can give you more data than I can give you now.
- Q. SHIBAYAMA at that time was Commander of the Japanese forces?
- A. Yes, at Peking.
- Q. Japanese garrison there?
- A. Yes. He was very interested in Chang Hseuh-liang and he was adviser to Chang Hseuh-liang.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 18 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. He was Adviser to Chang Hseuh-liang after the death of Chang Tso Lin?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You were in China, were you, when Chang Tso Lin was killed?
- A. I was at Peking. I was attached to the Japanese Embassy.
- Q. Did the Army plan the death of Chang Tso Lin or was it just this one officer's idea?
- A. I tell you exactly. It was the plan of KOMOTO himself. His personal plan and not of the Japanese Army.
- Q. Did you ever see the report on the Chang Tso Lin Incident that was filed with Army Headquarters in Tokyo?
- A. I was at that time at the Embassy in Peking.
- Q. After you came back to Tokyo and were in General Staff did you ever see that report?
- A. I think they never recorded that. They might but it was a fact. On account of this matter KOMOTO was dismissed from the Army.
- Q. Were you in China (Shanghai) when the Mukden Incident occurred?
- A. Was it in 1931?
- Q. Yes.
- A. I was in the Embassy at Peking.

Questions by: Mr. Hyder.

- Q. General, did you ever talk with HASHIMOTO or Dr. OKAWA after the Manchurian Incident happened about the part they played in it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you talk to them about the part that they played in the Manchurian Incident?
- A. They talked to me about that.
- Q. Did they say what their part was?
- A. He instigated people in order to bring up the October

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 18 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. Incident because he was opposed to the political party. Major CHO told me that the purpose of the October Incident was to support the Manchurian Incident. CHO, HASHIMOTO, and OKAWA were central figures in the October Incident.
- Q. Was OKAWA's and HASHIMOTO's part to get public opinion in favor of the Incident when it happened?
- A. I think at that time politicians were opposed to the Manchurian Incident and diplomats were opposed too. Generally speaking, the people of this country were in favor of the Manchurian Incident and newspapers, not high class papers but low class papers, favored the Manchurian Incident. I think about half of the people were in favor of the Incident but the other half were not. The Manchurian Incident shocked all the people of this country. They were so excited they could not give correct opinions - there were so many opinions. The Japanese people favored that Incident because the Japanese people believed the explosion was made by the Chinese and not by Japanese -- that is why the Japanese people favored the Incident.
- Q. The part that HASHIMOTO played -- was he to get the newspapers in favor of the Incident?
- A. HASHIMOTO could not do anything because he was in the Army and Army people are forbidden to make public opinion but I heard that CHO published some pamphlet and spread it all over to the people.
- Q. What did HASHIMOTO do to help out the Incident?
- A. He helped in the October Incident.
- Q. Did he know of the Manchurian Incident before it happened? Did he know that it was going to occur?
- A. I think he knew it. He told me once that that kind of Incident would happen. I think OKAWA knew about it one year before. Because OKAWA knew about it HASHIMOTO must have known of it.
- Q. Are they good friends?
- A. They are very good friends. They are like brothers.
- Q. Did TATEKAWA tell you the actual plans of the Manchurian

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 18 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. Incident? Did he say that they were to blow up the railway track and then the Japanese Army planned to occupy Mukden and the rest of Manchuria?
- A. TATEKAWA always stated that Manchuria should be an independent country. It was his opinion, so I think he knew about that Incident. I think this explosion was known to very few men. The explosion of the bridge was the means to the end of the independence of Manchuria. That is why, I think, there are very few men, two or three men in the Kwantung Army, who knew this matter was going to happen. I think SHIBAYAMA was the only man to know about the matter because of his being on the opposing side. Last year he had an operation on his stomach but I think he is still sick but still alive. I think he is much better for this, so if you want to know about this matter, you had better call him.

INTERROGATION OF

TANAKA, Ryukichi

Date and Time: 21 May 1946, 1640-1700 hours.

Place : Room 374, War Ministry Building,
Tokyo, Japan.

Present : TANAKA, Ryukichi
Mr. Elton M. Hyder Interrogator
Mr. Rishichi Onuma Interpreter
Miss Claire Stefanelli Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, administered by
Mr. Hyder.

Mr. Hyder : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God,
that you will truly and accurately interpret
and translate from English into Japanese and
from Japanese into English, as may be re-
quired of you, in this proceeding?

Mr. Onuma : I do.

Questions by : Mr. Hyder.

Q. General, are you familiar with the provisions of the
Tangku Treaty?

A. I know about that to some extent. After I went to the
Kwantung Army, I, myself investigated the matter a
little..I don't know very much about that.

Q. Can you tell me the area which was demilitarized?

A. Near the Great Wall there remained two neutral spots.
The neutral spots were located on the right and left.
and

Q. To the right/left of what?

A. A line was drawn to east from west not including Peiping
and Tientsin which divided it into two parts -- on the
left side and on the right side. Both spots are being
neutralized because it concerns a matter of administra-

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 21 May 1946 Cont'd)

A. tion of that place, provided that, Chinese troops shall not enter that neutral spot. Another reason was to restore the transportation between Mukden, Tientsin and Peiping. Japan and China agreed to establish an airplane transportation company but the capital was invested by the people and not by the government -- a privately owned company. The purpose was to recover transportation and communication between Manchuria and China. That is all I know.

Q. No Chinese troops could enter this zone?

troops

A. It provided that Chinese troops should not enter the neutral spots but Japanese could enter. Japan recognized that the Chinese Government could establish four or five police groups -- five or six groups -- in the neutral spots.

Q. The Japanese Army maintained garrisons in towns located in this neutralized zone by virtue of the Boxer Protocol?

A. According to the agreement made with China regarding the Boxer Protocol, the Japanese Army could be stationed only along the railway. That is between Tientsin, Peiping, and Shan-hai-kuan.

Q. General, did they set any specific time limit for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from this zone?

A. There was an agreement that the Japanese Government should withdraw the troops to the north of the Great Wall.

Q. There was no agreement?

A. Yes.

Q. Did the agreement say when they were to withdraw?

A. The Japanese Government made an agreement that Japanese troops will be withdrawn within one month or at once. I am not sure about that.

Q. Was that in the Tangku Treaty itself or was that in a later agreement?

A. I think that matter was included in the Tangku Truce.

Q. General, in January 1935 did the Kwantung Army go into Chahar Province?

A. The Army dispatched over there was not the Japanese Army. It was the Manchurian Army trained by Japanese.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 21 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. They went on the orders of the Kwantung Army?
- A. The Manchurian Army had been dispatched over there by the order of General MINAMI of the Kwantung Army.
- Q. You know that by reason of your being in Manchuria at that time?
- A. I know because I was a member of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army.
- Q. How far did they go, General? How far into Chahar Province did they advance?
- A. The Manchurian Army reached the outside of the Great Wall -- or beyond the Great Wall. Immediately after that those troops were dispatched to Dawan of Mongolia.
- Q. Did they have a conference in February of 1935 in which they decided that part of Chahar was really part of Jehol Province?
- A. I don't know. I know the conference was held by the Japanese officers and Chinese officers in the month of February 1935 but I don't know what they talked about. I think they had decided the boundary of Chahar and Jehol but I don't know exactly.

INTERROGATION OF

TANAKA, Ryukichi

Date and Time: 24 May 1946, 1115-1200 -- 1315-1435 hours.

Place : Room 374, War Ministry Building,
Tokyo, Japan.

Present : TANAKA, Ryukichi
Mr. Elton M. Hyder Interrogator
Mrs. Yumi Goto Interpreter
Miss Claire Stefanelli Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, administered by Mr. Hyder:

Mr. Hyder : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

Mrs. Goto : I do.

Questions by : Mr. Hyder.

Q. General, are you familiar with the Cabinet Advisory Council?

A. I am.

Q. What were its functions?

A. They had no real power. It was first made when KONOYE was a Premier....it was under the first KONOYE Cabinet. At that time there were four military cliques, in the Army and Navy. Kodo-ha and Tosei-ha were the two main ones in the Army. In the Navy there were Kantai-ha and Gusei-ha. The Kantai-ha was radical, the head of it was Admiral SUETSUGU, Nobumasa. They were advocates of war with America. This corresponded with the Kodo-ha in the Army and the Kantai-ha was opposed to the London and Washington Conferences. The other clique, Gusei-ha had among the members, OKADA and TAKARABE. They were pacifists. These four cliques were always quarreling with

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

A. one another.

Q. ARAKI was the head of Kodo-ha?

A. Yes, ARAKI was the head of Kodo-ha. TOJO, NAGATA and MUTO belonged to the Tosei-ha. Among the political people there were the Seiyukai and Minseito. Those two political parties had their supporters among the bureaucracy. There was much confusion and restlessness in the country. They did not think about the nation but about themselves. They wanted to hold power in their own hand. The series of incidents like the October Incident, March Incident, May 15 Incident, Shimpei Tai Incident, February 26 Incident, represented the quarrels between these cliques and when KONOYE became the Premier for the first time he was much worried about this situation. He wanted to pick up the leaders of those cliques and wanted to make friends so that the balance of power would be kept. That was why the Cabinet Advisory Council was organized. Therefore, the members of that Council were the leaders of those parties and cliques. The KONOYE Administration was close to Kodo-ha and Kantai-ha. Therefore, the Tosei-ha and the Gusei-ha did not send their representatives to the Council because the Tosei-ha held the actual power of the Army and they saw no need to send their representatives to the Cabinet. The influence of Gusei-ha -- of OKADA and TAKARABE -- was very low since the Manchurian Incident. Admiral SUETSUGU joined the Council of the representatives of the Kantai-ha. From Kodo-ha, ARAKI joined the Council. Mr. MACHIDA from the Minseito and KUHARA from Seiyukai. IKEDA represented the Zaibatsu. There were some other members, I don't remember.

Q. General, did they give advice to KONOYE as to the China Incident?

A. If I remember correctly, this Council was made after the Incident. I think that those councillors advised KONOYE but their opinion was not very strong. I am sure that noone opposed the Incident very strongly.

Q. Did ARAKI favor the occupation of China?

A. Mr. ARAKI is an opportunist. I am not sure whether ARAKI was opposed to the occupation of China but I am sure that he was opposed to the Tripartite Alliance.

Q. Was ARAKI in favor of the war with America or Great Bri-

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

Q. tain?

A. He was against it...absolutely against it. I don't say that in order to defend ARAKI. I know that ARAKI was opposed to it. It was because ARAKI wanted to attack Russia.

Q. ARAKI as Education Minister revised textbooks?

A. He as Education Minister revised the textbooks and changed the name of Shonaha Grammer School or Primary School to National School.

Q. ARAKI was a nationalist?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. Did he want to spread Japanese influence to East Asia?

A. He did.

Q. ARAKI was definitely in favor of the occupation of Manchuria?

A. Yes, he was in favor of it. I heard this directly from General ITAGAKI. ITAGAKI came back to Japan in the summer of 1931 and stayed until January 1932.

Q. That is, that ARAKI was in favor of the invasion of Manchuria?

A. He was sent back home by the Kwantung Army to have consultation with the Army here. He came to get approval of the central government concerning the independence of Manchuria. At that time INUKAI was the Premier. INUKAI was against it. The government as a whole was against the idea. At the Cabinet Meeting that idea was rejected and as ARAKI was the War Minister of the INUKAI Cabinet, it was his duty to oppose it. But ARAKI secretly invited ITAGAKI and invited him to do it. I heard it from ITAGAKI himself.

Q. He encouraged what?

A. To go to make Manchuria independent. I will speak frankly. This I heard in 1935 at a dinner party in Manchuria.

Q. Did the Cabinet and Privy Council, do you know General, decide to completely occupy Manchuria?

A. 1931?

Q. December.

A. No, they were opposed to the idea.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. Of completely occupying Manchuria?
- A. They were opposed to the idea of completely occupying Manchuria but they supported the plan that Manchuria will be made into an autonomous government under the influence of the Chinese central government. They must have been supporting the idea expressed in the Lytton Report of Mr. Lytton which was set up by the League of Nations. I remember that Mr. Lytton's opinion was along that line. If my memory is wrong, please correct me.
- Q. General, could you tell me the purpose of the revision of the textbooks by ARAKI?
- A. General ARAKI considered the education of the Japanese primary school too liberalistic and made it along the totalitarian line, when the actual draft was made by ISHIGURO, Hidehiko, Vice Minister of Education. This man is in Tokyo. If you call him he will know more about it. ISHIGURO was one of the Directors of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. I was at that time the Chief of the Military Discipline Service of the War Ministry and had contact with the Education Ministry.
- Q. Do you know whether ARAKI as Education Minister voted for the annexation of the Spratley Islands?
- A. Yes, he supported it.
- Q. Do you know the purpose in annexing those Islands, General?
- A. The Navy wanted to take the Philippines in case war broke out and the Spratley Island would be the best stepping stone toward the Philippines.
- Q. Did ARAKI tell you he was in favor of this annexation?
- A. I did not hear it from General ARAKI but it was decided upon at the Cabinet Meeting so that naturally General ARAKI would have to approve it.
- Q. Approval would have to be by the full Cabinet?
- A. If anyone should disapprove, the decision could not be reached. In the Japanese Cabinet, all the members of the Cabinet have the same right as to the voting and if anyone should disapprove the decision cannot be reached. I should like for you to study into that matter deeply.
- Q. Did you know that the Cabinet did decide and approve the occupation?
- A. The Cabinet issued a statement concerning the annexation of the Islands.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. The Hainan Islands?
A. Yes.
- Q. That was occupied by Japanese troops?
A. Yes, the Japanese troops occupied it but they did not annex it.
- Q. Do you know the purpose of the occupation?
A. There is much iron and rubber in that island.
- Q. Iron and rubber?
A. Yes, besides the Hainan Islands would be another stepping stone for the development of the Japanese in the South Seas.....the political motive, economic motive, and strategic motive.
- Q. That is, for a base of operations for attacks in the South Seas?
A. One of the bases for operation toward the South Seas.
- Q. Do you recall the Japanese forces landing at Amoy in May of 1939?
A. Yes.
- Q. Could that have been effected by the Japanese forces without the approval of the Cabinet?
A. I remember that it was done by the Navy and I think that it was done first and asked about afterwards. At any rate it was not the Army but the Navy.
- Q. The Cabinet approved it after the landing?
A. It did.
- Q. And, of course, they would have to have ARAKI's consent as Education Minister?
A. Yes, if the Cabinet approved of it, naturally, the Education Minister, ARAKI, approved of it as a member of the Cabinet.
- Q. General, was ARAKI in favor of the so called New Order in East Asia?
A. I think he was in favor of it although he was against the American-Japan War. I think that the New Order in East Asia and the war with America are quite different things. The fact that he was in favor of the New

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. Order in East Asia does not mean that he was in favor of the war with America.
- Q. Did you ever hear ARAKI make speeches or did he tell you that he was in favor of the New Order in East Asia?
- A. After the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War, General ARAKI went on a tour making speeches.
- Q. Outbreak of the China War?
- A. After the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War.
- Q. And he made speeches in favor of the New Order in East Asia?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you recall the nature of the speeches, General?
- A. I heard one of the speeches. It was when General ARAKI organized a group of medics among the civilians. The name was Dai Nippon Iryo Dan (Greater Japan Medics Association). I am not quite sure about the name. Anyway, it was an association of doctors. General ARAKI gave me the address when the Association of Tokyo was established. I was then the Chief of the Military Service Discipline Bureau. General ARAKI made the address in order to get contributions for the Association.
- Q. Do you recall the nature of the address?
- A. I was invited to the meeting and I remember that the speech was to the following effect: "In order to establish a New Order in East Asia, Japan must win the war. Unless Japan wins the war, we cannot establish the New Order in Japan. In order to win the war the health of the Japanese nation must be kept very well. But the fact is that the health of the Japanese nation as a whole is going down and our Medical Association must do something to improve it." I didn't like General ARAKI. I attended the meeting only because I was officially invited. The speech was formal and commonplace.
- Q. Do you know where we can get copies of the speeches of ARAKI?
- A. Of his speeches during the war?
- Q. Yes, and before the war.
- A. His speeches before the war very often appeared in

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. magazines published by the Kondan Shi...publisher, Noma Seiji. Nine magazines were published by this company and General ARAKI's speeches very often appeared in those publications.
- Q. Would the University Library have those magazines?
A. I don't think so but if you refer to the company....
- Q. In Tokyo?
A. Yes, the best way to get the books is to order them from the publishing company.
- Q. Do you know the address of the publishing company?
A. I do not remember, I think it is....Otoba Cho, Koishikawa-Ku, Tokyo.
- Q. ARAKI wrote several books?
A. I do not think they were written by ARAKI. They were published under his name. Perhaps, ARAKI told others to write books and publish them with his name. I disliked General ARAKI so much that even looking at his books made me sick.
- Q. General, do you recall the General National Mobilization Committee of the Cabinet?
A. Yes.
- Q. ARAKI was a member of it?
A. I think so.
- Q. Do you know what the function was of that Committee?
A. The Committee was to make a draft for the negotiations of the National Mobilization Act...It was not a draft but the principles.
- Q. They worked out the Act?
A. Yes.
- Q. In other words, they prepared the draft of the Act?
A. The draft was drawn by the Planning Board.
- Q. What did the Cabinet Mobilization Committee do?
A. The National Mobilization Act was to control all economic systems in Japan so that it was really a great job. The Japanese Government after the China Incident was the spokesman of the Army and Navy. Therefore, the fact that

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. the National Mobilization Act was made by the Government means that the Military from that time on controlled the economics of Japan. That Act was made for national defense. The object of the military was the establishment of the country on national defense measures. Therefore, the National Mobilization Act was the fundamental ground-stone for establishing Japan as a military country, and control of economy in Japan was firmly established after this National Mobilization Act was formed. Therefore, this Committee was responsible for all the controlled economic policies in Japan, and the Army must take greater responsibility of it.
- Q. How many members were on the Committee?
A. There were a great many of them. There were about 30, as I recall.
- Q. ARAKI was just one of the members?
A. Yes, he was.
- Q. And this Committee had to do with the policy of economic control and deciding questions under the Mobilization Act?
A. What kind of National Mobilization Law would be more effective than controlling Japanese economy?
- Q. The Committee was formed before they passed the National Mobilization Act?
A. Yes.
- Q. And they worked out the Act?
A. The Committee was dissolved when the Act was passed.
- Q. Were most of the members, members of the Army or Navy?
A. More than half were civilians.
- Q. General, do you recall what they called "thought control"?
A. That matter was also discussed at the National Mobilization Committee Meetings because without "thought control" there is no control of economics.
- Q. "Thought control" had not been in effect prior to 1939?
A. When General ARAKI became the Education Minister in HIRANUMA's Cabinet there were two big jobs which General ARAKI did. One was the establishment of the Spiritual Mobilization Bureau. It was organized by the suggestion of General ARAKI, and, he set the Asia Service Day. It was the first day of every month. On that day all the people were supposed to visit shrines, refrain from drinking and contribute money to the government. I heard these

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. two things were the idea of General ARAKI.
- Q. What was the function of the Spiritual Bureau?
- A. "Thought Control".
- Q. That was under the Education Ministry?
- A. Directly attached to the Cabinet. I cannot testify that it was General ARAKI's idea but it was what I had heard. HIRANUMA and ARAKI know very well.
- Q. Did this Bureau have the power to make arrests and imprison?
- A. No, it had not. This right was only had by the Kempei Tai and the Home Minister. At any time, other offices had no right concerning arrest and imprisonment. Perhaps, they could order the Home Ministry or the Kempei Tai to arrest people but it was the right of those two offices.
- Q. The Spiritual Bureau simply sought to form public opinion in favor of the National Mobilization Act and its purpose?
- A. The object of the Bureau was to lead and inspect public opinion....lead, educate and inspect.
- Q. Was ARAKI a good friend of ITAGAKI?
- A. They are good friends. ARAKI was the Instructor of Military Cadets and ITAGAKI was a student there.
- Q. General, was ARAKI directly or indirectly connected with the February 26 Incident?
- A. The connection between ARAKI and the February 26 Incident is vague and complicated. All the young officers who participated in the Incident respected ARAKI very much. They belonged to Kodo-ha and the people who belonged to Tosei-ha suspected that ARAKI had strong connections with it. However, they could not discover definite proof. MAZAKI was a close friend of ARAKI and was actually connected. He was imprisoned but later set free.
- Q. ARAKI interceded in behalf of the defense of ITAGAKI?
- A. I do not think ARAKI defended MAZAKI. ARAKI was not in a position to defend MAZAKI because ARAKI himself was suspected. I have never heard that ARAKI ever defended MAZAKI.
- Q. ARAKI became the idol of the Army?

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

A. ARAKI was not the idol of the Army until General UGAKI diminished armaments.

Q. In 1930 or 1931?

A. It was before 1930. He made two attempts at diminishing armaments. ARAKI and MAZAKI were against the idea. Therefore, after 1930 ARAKI and MAZAKI came to be the idols of the young officers. If I remember correctly the young officers came to respect him very much after the Manchurian Incident.

Q. ARAKI was a member of the Kokuhonsho?

A. Yes.

Q. The founder of it?

A. Kokuhonso was founded by HIRANUMA. ARAKI was a member.

Q. ARAKI and HIRANUMA were close friends?

A. Yes, very close friends.

Q. General, can you define Kodo as ARAKI defined it?

A. This morning I saw a Japanese military official visiting Mr. Helm (YAMAMOTO). He belonged to that faction. They advocated direct rule by the Emperor. "Ko" of Kodo means Emperor, and "do" means rule. They considered Communism as their enemy. In their opinion, the people should have no rights. Their life and property should be returned to the Emperor. The Kodo-ha was against the war with America and England. They were thinking only of attacking Russia. I am sure that ARAKI and MAZAKI will deny that they have ever thought of fighting against America. I am positive that they will deny that they were ever in favor of the war with America.

Q. Have you ever heard ARAKI say that he wanted to attack Russia?

A. Many times.

Q. Did he have plans prepared when he was War Minister to attack Russia?

A. All the War Ministers after the Russo-Japanese War were thinking about attacking Russia without any exception. Until the Washington Conference the Army never considered America as their enemy.

Q. They did after the Washington Conference?

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

A. It was a demand of the Navy. In 1924 the General Staff Office for the first time made a plan for attacking the Philippines.

Q. 1924?

A. Yes. However, the war with Russia was planned ever since the Russo-Japanese War. General HATA knows everything about it. He served on the General Staff Office of the Army for a long time.

Q. Did the definition of Kodo include the meaning that it was the mission of Japan to conquer the world?

A. The young officers talked about the unification of the world.

Q. Under the Emperor?

A. Yes.

Q. Did ARAKI ever advocate that?

A. Of course.

Q. Did you hear him?

A. Indirectly. I hated ARAKI.

Q. You hated ARAKI?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he ever make speeches advocating it?

A. After the Manchurian Incident, General ARAKI advocated it very much. If you visit private homes in the country you will see many scrolls written by General ARAKI with the four words that mean, "The unification of the world under the Emperor" -- Hakko Ichi U.

Q. Were they printed and people purchased them?

A. General ARAKI gave them as presents. It is the Oriental custom. Other countries are not familiar with this custom.

Q. General ARAKI was a leader in the Ex-Service Man's Association?

A. Yes, he was one of the important staff.

Q. Did they have many members -- as many as 3,000,000?

A. The number of the members was about 5,000,000.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. It had great influence in governmental policy?
- A. No, it had not, especially after I became the Chief of the Military Discipline Service Section I oppressed those soldiers who wanted to participate in politics. HASHIMOTO, Kingoro was one of them. HASHIMOTO tried to hold the power himself concerning the Ex-Service Man's Organization. I prevented him from doing it.
- Q. Were ARAKI and TOJO good friends?
- A. Not good friends.
- Q. They were not enemies?
- A. Yes. TOJO was the leader of Tosei-ha and ARAKI was the leader of Kodo-ha.
- Q. General, how many Chinese troops were killed in Manchuria as a result of the Incident there?
- A. I don't know how many.
- Q. Do you have any idea, approximately?
- A. At least 10,000. Something just came to my mind. I have often been asked who made the plan of destroying the railroad. The explosion on the track was a trifling incident. This, I heard directly from General ITAGAKI. (See Exhibit 1). In the spring of 1931 the Japanese troops installed in these barracks two big guns -- 24 CM. It took a long time to install these two guns. They did it in secrecy telling others they were digging a well. It was September 10 when the installation was finished. As soon as the destruction was made on the railroad one of the guns attacked the Chinese barracks and one of them attacked the airfield. You had better question General ITAGAKI and when you do tell him you heard it from me. The explosion on the railroad was done in order to bring the chance to attack those two points. These Japanese troops were the first to install those big guns. The two guns were sent from the Army in Japan proper to the Kwantung Army. The sending of those two guns was suggested by NAGATO, Tetsuzan who was the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. The reason the Chinese troops did not resist was because they were quite surprised by the two guns. The explosion on the railroad was done immediately after the installation of the two guns. It took about three or four months before the two guns were installed.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

Q. Could these guns have fired over here (See Exhibit 1) and caused an explosion on the track?

A. Yes, the guns could reach 3 km.

Q. They could have caused the explosion on the railroad track.

A. Yes, these two places were quite close to each other. Immediately after the explosion they bombed the barracks very severely.

Q. Within a few hours?

A. Immediately after.

Q. How did you learn this, General?

A. ITAGAKI told me.

Q. Told you about bringing guns in and also about firing at on the barracks?

A. It was/the sound of this heavy bombing that General TATEKAWA held closely in his arms the Geisha girl who tried to run away. I recalled it only recently. This is all that I remember about the Incident.

Q. Did the Geisha girl tell you or did TATEKAWA?

A. The Geisha girl told me in Mukden. She said that she was surprised at the composure of General TATEKAWA. TATEKAWA was not in the least surprised at the sound. I think that now you understand that the explosion was a trifling incident. I have too often been asked about this Incident. I am getting tired of repeating it. SHIBAYAMA knows about this.

Q. Do you know SHIBAYAMA's first name?

A. Kaneshiro.

Q. What was the highest rank that SHIBAYAMA reached? General?

A. Lieutenant General. He was a Vice Minister of War when SUGIYAMA was Minister.

INTERROGATION OF

TANAKA, Ryukichi

Date and Time: 24 May 1946, 1345-1645 hours.

Place : Room 374, War Ministry Building,
Tokyo, Japan.

Present : TANAKA, Ryukichi
Mr. Elton M. Hyder Interrogator
Mr. P. Lopez "
Mrs. Yumi Goto Interpreter
Miss Claire Stefanelli Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, administered by Mr. Hyder:

Mr. Hyder : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

Mrs. Goto : I do.

Question by : Mr. Hyder.

Q. General, will you tell me again what you just told me in the hall so that we can get it in the record.

A. When you asked me whether in 1935 the Kwantung Army entered Chahar, I said no, but I later found out that my answer was wrong. I remembered that two battalions went into the place called Doronnoru - a small town. I remembered that two battalions were dispatched to this town but they stayed there and didn't advance any further. There were three divisions under Sun Cho Yuan. I made a mistake there were less than three divisions - I don't remember how many. The Chinese were fighting against the soldiers of the three divisions (Mongolian soldiers) under Li Sho Sin but the Japanese troops didn't move, they didn't partake in the fighting. The two Japanese battalions were a part of a brigade which was stationed at Jehol...the two battalions stationed at Doronnoru were a part of the brigade which was stationed at Jehol. The frontier lies

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

A. between Chahar and Jehol. Here is a small town.

Q. Where is it?

A. Right below the southwestern boundary of Jehol Province north of the Great Wall there is this small prefecture. In February 1936 the question arose whether this small district should be attached to Jehol or to Chahar and the Kwantung Army officials and Chinese officials conferred and decided that this district should belong to Jehol. I have come today to tell you.

Q. Was that in February 1935?

A. I am not sure. It might be 1936 but it might be 1935. Your record is accurate - I am sure that it is 1935. Before the negotiations this prefecture belonged to Chahar. After the negotiations it belonged to Jehol.

Q. Now that, General, had been known for a long time as part of Chahar for many year before?

A. It was uncertain.

Q. Yet maps show it was part of Chahar?

A. Yes, geographically it was known as part of Chahar.

Q. About how large an area was it?

A. Just as big as Tokyo.

Q. What was the purpose of the annexation?

A. There were many bandits there in the mountains. They gave came very often to Jehol and trouble to the people there. In order to exterminate them the district was annexed to Jehol. If my memory is correct this was the reason.

Q. General, under the Ho Umezu Agreement the only area involved was the province of Hopei, was it not?

A. North China and Jehol.

Q. Did it include any of Chahar?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it the southern part of Chahar?

A. Yes, it included the southern part of Chahar. It covered the whole of North China. I remember that it was a very

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. vague, ambiguous agreement. In the whole of North China it was only at Hopei where the Kuomintang Army was stationed. Therefore, the order for the central army to withdraw from Hopei meant that there would be no Kuomintang Army in North China. Hopei was the only place where the Kuomintang Army was and to withdraw from that place meant there would be no Kuomintang Army in North China. I am not quite sure that it mentioned North China.
- Q. General Ho Ying Ching did withdraw his army from Hopei Province as a result of that agreement?
- A. Yes, he did.
- Q. General, when did MINAMI and UMEZU decide to set up the North China Provinces as autonomous?
- A. It was about April 1935. I was dispatched to Duwan in Mongolia in April, therefore, I think that was the time when it was decided upon. Without making that decision they would never have dispatched me to Duwan.
- Q. MINAMI was Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army at that time?
- A. Yes, he was appointed the Commander of the Kwantung Army in December 1934.
- Q. What was UMEZU's position at the time?
- A. He was a Commander of the North China Army. He was at Tientsin.
- Q. And they sent Colonel DOIHARA to the Chinese war lords to help organize the provinces in North China?
- A. It was in October 1935. By that time UMEZU was replaced by TADA and DOIHARA was ordered to go there by MINAMI after consulting TADA.
- Q. DOIHARA was unsuccessful?
- A. Partly successful and partly unsuccessful. It was only Sun Cho Yuan that listened to DOIHARA. The other war lords did not listen to him.
- Q. His purpose was to set them up as independent provinces?
- A. Autonomous.
- Q. But friendly with the Kwantung Army?
- A. Not independent but autonomous and friendly with Manchuria.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. Then they sent DOIHARA to Sun Cho Yuan?
A. Yes.
- Q. What date was that approximately?
A. Approximately October 1935.
- Q. Later they formed the East Hopei Anti-Comintern Autonomous Concern?
A. Yes, In Ju Keng organized it. DOIHARA made two autonomous regimes. The one was under Sun Cho Yuan and the other was....yesterday I spoke about it....the neutral district under the Tangku Truce. One of the autonomous government's was made in the district which I spoke about yesterday.
- Q. That was between Peiping and the Great Wall?
A. The neutral district which was agreed upon by the Tangku Truce. The autonomous government under In Ju Keng was an independent one but the other under Sun Cho Yuan was not quite independent.
- Q. Did DOIHARA succeed in his mission there?
A. Partly.
- Q. The heads of these two areas were selected by DOIHARA?
A. Not by DOIHARA but by the Chinese. These two men were ambitious men.
- Q. They were friendly to Manchukuo?
A. Yes, and they wanted much money.
- Q. Did they receive money from the Kwantung Army?
A. No, they did not. They only borrowed money when they started banks.
- Q. The territory under Sun Cho Yuan was East Hopei Province?
A. It was a district between the outer Great Wall and inner Great Wall and the entire Hopei District was that under In Ju Keng.
- Q. Sun Cho Yuan had all the Hopei Province including Peiping, Tientsin, etc.
A. Yes.
- Q. And In Ju Keng had the northern part of the demilitarized zone under the terms of the Tangku Truce?

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. (See Exhibit 1.) In Ju Keng had East Hopei and Sun Cho Yuan had what was called the North China regime.
- Q. Now, on what date approximately were those two set up?
- A. It was November 1935.
- Q. Now, the plan had been to bring all of North China to Pei fu Wu?
- A. DOIHARA's plan was to make these five provinces independent and put them under the influence of Pei fu Wu. The five provinces are Sui yu Wang, Shanhsi, Shantung, Hopei, and Chahar. (See Exhibit 2.) If you ask DOIHARA he will be more sure of that.
- Q. Did DOIHARA have the approval of the Kwantung Army and the Minister of War?
- A. Yes, he was ordered by the Kwantung Army Commander and approved by the War Minister.
- Q. And the Kwantung Army Commander was MINAMI or TADA?
- A. MINAMI.
- Q. Minister of War?
- A. HAYASHI. He is dead now.
- Q. And ITAGAKI?
- A. Vice Chief of General Staff.
- Q. And, of course, this was with his approval?
- A. ITAGAKI was lower than DOIHARA.
- Q. Who was the Chief of the General Staff of the Kwantung Army?
- A. NISHIO.
- Q. DOIHARA stayed with Sun Cho Yuan at Peiping as his Advisor?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What were his duties, do you know?
- A. It was to help the complete development of the government. Of course, it was for the benefit of the Kwantung Army.
- Q. In other words, political and economic exploitation?
- A. Yes.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. Were there further autonomous movements in Inner Mongolia in January and February of 1936?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Could you tell me the provinces in which the movements took place?
- A. North part of Chahar and the north part of Seiwan.
- Q. Did they set up Prince Tei?
- A. Prince Du.
- Q. Could you tell me how that movement was started?
- A. I am excellent on this question. I was a close friend of Prince Du. Prince Du organized the Mongolian Independent Committee at Pirinyao. It is a temple in Sui yu Wang Province and it was permitted by Chiang Kai Shek but the head of the Province - Fu Tso Ii was against it. Fu Tso Ii tried to prevent it and it made Prince Du approach the Kwantung Army so that he would get assistance from the Army. Prince Du moved his Mongolian Independent Committee from Pirinyao to Duhua in Chahar. I think it was in May 1936. I remember it because I went to celebrate it by the order of the Kwantung Army.
- Q. You acted at the order of the Kwantung Army?
- A. I didn't go at my own accord.
- Q. And who was Commander at that time?
- A. UEDA.
- Q. Chief of General Staff of Kwantung Army?
- A. ITAGAKI.
- Q. What provinces were involved?
- A. North Chahar and north Sui yu Wang.
- Q. And in May they announced the founding of this State, is that correct, General?
- A. They didn't announce it. They kept it secret because it was not a real government. Prince Du called it the Mongolian Ministry Government. It was kept secret.
- Q. Did this Mongolian Ministry Government at that time or later actually control the provinces of North Chahar and North Sui yu Wang?
- A. In Chahar, Sun Cho Yuan didn't try to oppress it but in Sui yu Wang, Fu Tso Ii was against it and tried to op-

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. press it so that Prince Du tried to withdraw little by little.
- Q. General, what happened after that, did that Military Government actually control those provinces or did it fail?
- A. At that time it controlled them.
- Q. For how long?
- A. Until the China Incident broke out.
- Q. In July 1937?
- A. In 1937.
- Q. And what caused it to fail after that?
- A. After the China Incident broke out the Japanese troops went in and they held the power in their hands. I was opposed to the idea of Japanese troops holding power in their hands because it is invasion. In Greater Asia Japan made puppets of many invaded countries but it was only the Mongolians who wanted independence.
- Q. General, the ^{Military} Ministry Government in North Chahar Province was controlled by the Kwantung Army, was it not?
- A. They tried to but he prevented them from doing it.
- Q. Did they each have a pact with Manchukuo for mutual aid between the two countries?
- A. Yes, it was concluded in August 1936.
- Q. Did it provide for mutual self defense and for advisors from the Kwantung Army?
- A. There were many advisors from the Kwantung Army. It provided that if Mongolia was invaded by another country, Manchukuo would help it - not the Kwantung Army but Manchukuo.
- Q. Did it have any other provisions?
- A. It provided that Japanese advisors will be employed. The draft was made by Prince Du and Ohashi Chin Chi who was the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Manchukuo Government.
- Q. Did it give Manchukuo certain economic rights or did it have any provisions as to trade and commerce between Manchuria and the provinces of North Chahar and North Sui yu Wang?
- A. It provided that Manchukuo and Mongolia would/each other help

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. economically. This was a military and economic mutual aid agreement. Mr. Ohashi knows everything about it, naturally.
- Q. Was the Government, General, of Sun Cho Yuan under the domination of the Manchukuo Government or the Kwantung Army?
- A. It was not under the influence of Manchukuo and if it was under any influence it was under the influence of the Kwantung Army. Sun Cho Yuan was a very good politician and on one hand he pretended to reason with the Kwantung Army and on the other he was shaking hands with Chiang Kai Shek. His soldiers, the lower of the rural ranks, hated the Japanese Army especially the Kwantung Army.
- Q. Could any of these autonomous governments be set up without the aid of the Kwantung Army?
- A. Both of them were established but the Government of In Ju Keng was entirely under the influence of the Kwantung Army - East Hopei - the other Government was partly under the influence of the Kwantung Army.
- Q. The Government under Sun Cho Yuan?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Could he have been established as the Head of that Government without the help and aid of the Kwantung Army?
- A. No.
- Q. What about the Government under Prince Du?
- A. Prince Du held real power over the Mongolians. With or without the help of the Kwantung Army he would have been Head of the Mongolian Government. Prince Du was not always obedient to the order of the Kwantung Army so that the Kwantung Army tried to abdicate him, but the Mongolians would never let Prince Du go.

Questions by: Mr. Lopez.

- Q. General, do you know Akira MUTO?
- A. Yes, I know him very well.
- Q. Since when ~~did~~ you know him?
- A. Ever since we were young. Both of us were military cadets. Mr. MUTO was my senior by one year.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

Q. When was that?

A. 1910. In the Military Academy.

Q. What was the name of the Military Academy?

A. Rikugun Daigakuko.

Q. Were you in China in 1937 and 1938?

A. I was not in China at that time.

Q. Where were you?

A. Korea. From December 1938 until March 1940 I was serving in the War Office in Tokyo. I was the Chief of the Military Discipline Bureau.

Q. Are you familiar with the fact that General MUTO was third in command of the Japanese Expeditionary Army that entered Nanking in December 1937?

A. He was Vice Chief of the General Staff.

Q. Of General MATSUI?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you come to know about that?

A. I heard it from MATSUI and from MUTO also.

Q. Did you have a talk with General MUTO or General MATSUI regarding the Incident and the rape and massacre of Nanking?

A. They said they did not know. Although they had the responsibility they said they did not know anything about it.

Q. When did you talk with Muto about it?

A. When I was Chief of the Military Discipline Bureau. At first I did not know anything about that but when NAKAJIMA who was Commander of the 16th Division brought a few things from China which he got there it made me suspicious. When I investigated into the matter I found out that there was much violence committed in Nanking and I learned there was also massacre. I questioned MATSUI and he said he did not know.

Q. You mentioned the name of NAKAJIMA. Who was he?

A. Kesago NAKAJIMA. He was the Commander of the 16th Division.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. That was the Division under the orders of MATSUI?
A. Yes.
- Q. NAKAJIMA's Division was the Division that entered Nanking?
A. Yes.
- Q. What were the things that he brought from China which made you suspicious?
A. Scrolls, carpets, furniture, old curios, paintings, and pieces of art.
- Q. They were very expensive pieces of art?
A. I think so.
- Q. More or less, how much did they cost?
A. I don't know anything about that.
- Q. What did NAKAJIMA tell you? Please recollect, more or less, the words that he used in reporting the violence in Nanking.
A. I did not see NAKAJIMA himself. NAKAJIMA was still in Manchuria but his baggage was brought back to Kyoto by his men.
- Q. Whom did you investigate when you became suspicious because of this baggage and things NAKAJIMA sent over to Japan from China?
A. I ordered an M.P. to investigate into the matter. I ordered the Chief of the Kyoto Kempei Tai.
- Q. What was the result of the investigation?
A. There were 32 packages. An M. P. upon removing the cover found out that there were pieces of fine art, paintings, furniture, rugs, etc., and when I heard about it I ordered immediately to have them sent back to China.
- Q. When did you learn for the first time that there was violence, atrocities, and massacre in Nanking?
A. It was about March in 1938. I was in Korea.
- Q. From whom did you learn that information?
A. I heard it from Colonel Isamu CHO who was a Staff Officer to General MATSUI.
- Q. What did Isamu CHO tell you in Korea?

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. Colonel CHO gave^a/talk to a number of officers in Korea and he told how they occupied Nanking and how they killed a number of prisoners of war at Chenkyan which was east of Nanking.
- Q. Did he tell you directly about that?
- A. I was the Commander of the Regiment and I was attending the Lecture Meeting.
- Q. Did he mention about raping of women in Nanking?
- A. Colonel CHO told us that soldiers raped women so often that they started houses of ill fame in Nanking to prevent it.
- Q. Did he mention to you about the many thousands of civilians who were killed and whose bodies were floating on the river that passes by Nanking?
- A. He told us that thousands of people were killed but I don't remember whether he told us about dead bodies floating on the river.
- Q. These thousands of people killed included women and children?
- A. Colonel CHO didn't mention killing of the civilians. He just mentioned the killing of prisoners of war.
- Q. Did he mention the fact that the International Committee composed of nationals of foreign countries in Nanking lodged serious protests against Japanese atrocities upon the populace?
- A. He did not mention this.
- Q. What else did he know about the Incident in Nanking?
- A. He didn't mention anything else.
- Q. After the talk of Colonel CHO did you happen to have any talk with General MUTO or General MATSUI about the Nanking Incident?
- A. I did not talk to MUTO but I asked General MATSUI whether it was true. General MATSUI said that he had not known anything about it and was very much surprised when he heard about it. Because General MATSUI at that time already had retired he could not do anything about it.
- Q. When did you talk to General MATSUI about it?
- A. It was August 1943. It was long after the Incident.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

Q. Where?

A. At General MATSUI's villa beside Lake Yamanaka.

Q. How come that you talked with him about it after so long a time?

A. It was when I spoke about the corruption of the Japanese Army in China that I started the conversation.

Q. What had you heard about the corruption of the Japanese soldier in China which led to your talk about the subject of the rape of Nanking with General MATSUI in 1943?

A. When the Nanking Incident happened I was in Korea and I didn't know anything about it. Later I transferred to the post of Chief of the Military Discipline Bureau in the War Office and from various places many documents and reports concerning the acts of the Japanese soldiers in China were sent to me. I knew from those reports that the Japanese Army in China did very bad things. Then in 1943 when I met General MATSUI I was already retired from the post and it was the first time I met General MATSUI when I resigned. I wanted to make my questions clearer. I was a mere farmer when I met General MATSUI.

Q. According to those reports what were the nature of the misbehaviours of the Japanese soldier in China?

A. Raping of women and plundering were the chief cases of the Japanese soldiers who were court martialled. The reports concerning murder and massacre were very few. Perhaps, there were many cases but the Commander of the Army didn't send them because it would be his own responsibility.

Q. As Chief of the Disciplinary Section of the Japanese Army in Tokyo, did you receive any report from General MATSUI regarding any misbehaviour of his troops that entered Nanking between December 1937 to 1938?

A. No, I didn't. At that time I was not the Chief of the Bureau. I was only the Chief of the Section of the Military Discipline Bureau. Misbehaviour of the Japanese soldiers in China - at the front - is not the responsibility of the War Ministry but of the General Staff. The War Ministry took care of the soldiers in Japan proper Korea and Formosa but the General Staff took care of the soldiers in Manchuria and foreign lands.

Q. Including China?

A. Including China, and it was, as you know, beyond my limitation so that I could not make an investigation

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. concerning it. If the General Staff decided not to make an investigation we could do nothing about it.
- Q. Is it not true, General, that some time in 1938 a book was published in London and widely publicized in America, China, and Japan regarding atrocities committed by Japanese in Nanking?
- A. Who published the book?
- Q. Mr. Templeton.
- A. I heard about it. I remember just now....I also heard from General MATSUI that when the Japanese soldiers entered Nanking we wanted to make peace with Chiang Kai-shek but Chiang Kai-shek after hearing what the Japanese soldiers did in Nanking, wouldn't listen to us. He was very angry. I heard it at Yamanaka Villa in 1943.
- Q. Is it not true, General, that when all of the Japanese officers learned of the contents of the book written by Mr. Templeton they were ashamed of it, like yourself?
- A. It is true.
- Q. And is it not also true that there was a novel written by a Japanese who went to Nanking by the name of ISHIKAWA - a famous novelist in Japan - and that he was punished and sentenced to imprisonment in Japan for having published the novel?
- A. I heard about it. I think it is true.
- Q. When General MUTO was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau what position were you occupying?
- A. I was Chief of the Discipline Service Bureau.
- Q. Where was your office?
- A. My office is now occupied by Mr. Morgan.
- Q. Here in the War Ministry?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And where was the office of General MUTO?
- A. His office was on the second floor on the north western corner of the building.
- Q. Where was the office of the War Minister - General TOJO?
- A. TOJO's office was on the second floor. The room which is now marked "Private".

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. And where was the Office of the Vice Minister of War?
A. Next to TOJO's.
- Q. Who was the next ranking officer of the War Minister after the Vice Minister of War?
A. MUTO was. I was the lowest officer.
- Q. In October of 1941 you were here as Chief of the Discipline Service Bureau?
A. Yes, I was.
- Q. General MUTO was also here as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau?
A. Yes.
- Q. Did you have occasion to talk with each other?
A. Almost every day.
- Q. Did you talk about impending war between Japan and the United States?
A. I purposely avoided the subject because the Office of the Discipline Service Bureau was never to take part in politics. All that I remember is that on the 25th of November we received a memorandum from the USA regarding it. MUTO said that if Japan should accept it Japan would be ruined. I heard this opinion from MUTO....It was well known that we were enemies so that when we talked we discussed business only. Immediately after the outbreak of the war I heard from MUTO himself that he was the advocate of the war against the United States. As you well know this war was planned by a small group of people very secretly. To be frank, I did not know that we were going to declare war upon America until the day before the declaration. I heard about it at noon, December 7.
- Q. Did you say that MUTO advocated for a war with the United States? Did he tell you that?
A. Yes, MUTO told me himself.
- Q. Where?
A. In this War Office.
- Q. In this building?
A. In the old building.
- Q. When was that?
A. At noon of December 8.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

Q. What did he tell you?

A. At noon of December 8 the War Minister summoned all the officials in the War Ministry and gave us an address of instructions in the auditorium. Mr. MUTO and I sat together and MUTO said "At last we have made it.....This made TOJO a hero".

Q. Was that before the attack on Pearl Harbor or after the attack?

A. Immediately after the attack at Pearl Harbor.

Q. Did not MUTO tell you that he knew about the attack on Pearl Harbor before that attack was actually made, in his capacity as Chief of the General Affairs Bureau?

A. About two days later, Mr. MUTO told me that the Japanese Navy from a long time before set the 8th as the day when to make the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Q. We want to get this straight, General, do you mean to tell us that MUTO told you that long before the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 8, 1941, he had been informed by the Navy that the attack was going to be made secretly on Pearl Harbor on December 8, 1941?

A. I believe so.

Q. Where did he tell you that?

A. In the mess hall of the Old War Ministry Building.

Q. That was two days after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

A. I think it was either on the 10th or the 11th.

Q. Did General MUTO tell you how many days before December 8 going he was informed by the Navy that the attack on Pearl Harbor was/to take place on December 8?

A. He did not.

Q. Did he not tell you that the Navy took him into his confidence regarding the details of the attack on Pearl Harbor long before the attack took place?

A. He did not exactly mention it but he told me that the Navy had been talking about December 8 for a long time. Therefore, I believe he must have possibly heard it from the Navy.

Q. He must have gotten his information from the Navy people?

A. Yes. It was all what Mr. MUTO told me.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. What was the nature of the position of the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau at the time of TOJO's administration?
- A. Politics, military budget, propaganda, organization and armament of the Army, and finance.
- Q. Budget of the Army?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Because of his position as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau under TOJO do you think that the Navy would have consulted him about any plans on the attack on Pearl Harbor?
- A. I am sure about that.
- Q. Why are you sure about that? What was the relation between General MUTO and General TOJO?
- A. Mr. MUTO told me after the war broke out that Mr. MUTO, himself, set the date for Ambassador OMURA to hand over the Japanese ultimatum to the United States Government. It was planned that the ultimatum would be handed over just at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Mr. MUTO told me. I think it is a good clue that he was consulted by the Japanese Navy and he told me also that we used the most polite language in the ultimatum on purpose. He told it to me very proudly.
- Q. Who was the right hand man of General TOJO? Was it MUTO?
- A. Yes, MUTO was the right hand man....more than that.
- Q. What was he?
- A. TOJO is a fool and MUTO was the brain. TOJO was the gramophone record and MUTO was the gramophone itself.
- Q. Why do you say that? On what facts do you base that?
- A. MUTO made light of TOJO. He didn't think much of him... kind of despised him.
- Q. Did MUTO tell you that?
- A. Mr. MUTO imitated Mr. TOJO writing his notes down in his small notebook. When Mr. TOJO did it he used to raise his eyeglasses up on his forehead. MUTO used to imitate him. TOJO is a very simple minded man. MUTO is just the opposite....very complicated.
- Q. Very shrewd?
- A. Yes, too ambitious.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. Who was practically running the War Ministry during the TOJO regime?
- A. It was Mr. MUTO. The Military Service Bureau, whose Head I was, did not listen to MUTO.
- Q. Which was the higher category -- the Army Chief of Staff or MUTO under the TOJO regime?
- A. Under the TOJO regime, MUTO was more influential than the Chief of the General Staff. TOJO was all powerful.
- Q. Under the TOJO regime was it possible for any important decision of the General Staff to be taken without the knowledge or consent of MUTO or TOJO?
- A. No they could not. Not without the consent of TOJO or MUTO.
- Q. Do you mean to say that even operational plans of the General Staff would have to be submitted to MUTO as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau?
- A. Matters concerning international affairs the General Staff could decide by themselves but important decisions concerning the war in general, they could not.
- Q. How was MUTO able to influence the decision of the General Staff on matters of policy?
- A. They could not make decisions on any important matters regarding the war without TOJO or MUTO's consent.
- Q. On what fact do you base that assertion?
- A. Mr. MUTO was in charge of the Military Budget.
- Q. What has that got to do with the decision of the General Staff?
- A. The General Staff Office had no money and if they wanted to make war they had to ask the War Ministry to let them have money.
- Q. And they had to ask it through the Military Affairs Bureau headed by MUTO?
- A. Yes, if MUTO didn't sign his name they could not draw money for the War Ministry Budget. It was the procedure in the War Ministry. Without money you can't make a war. The General Staff had no money for the war expenditures. They only had plans but no money.
- Q. Do you mean to say that all the plans of the General Staff had to be submitted to the Chief of the Military Affairs

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. Bureau in order to pay the necessary budget to carry out those plans?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How specific were the plans submitted for which money was requested?
- A. Every detail had to be submitted to the Military Affairs Bureau.
- Q. Including the time and plans of the operation?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Let us take as a specific case the plan of the General Staff to invade French Indo-China. Was the General Staff required to under existing law submit all the details of the operation including the number of men that were required, the place of the landing, and when the landing was to be executed?
- A. Yes.
- Q. How long before, do you happen to know General, were the operation plans for China submitted to the Military Affairs Bureau?
- A. Do you mean North French Indo-China or South French Indo-China?
- Q. Both.
- A. As for the north, Japanese troops were to advance there according to the negotiations between the Japanese Government and the Vichy Government, so that we knew about it immediately after the negotiations started.
- Q. When was that?
- A. I do not remember exactly because I was not there that time in China. As to the South French Indo-China, it was decided at the conference before the Imperial Presence on the 2nd of July.
- Q. 1941
- A. Yes.
- Q. Who informed you about the decision? Did MUTO tell you about it?
- A. I heard it from OHASI, Chuichi the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs. OHASI was against it. Mr. OHASI was present at the conference because Foreign Minister MATSUOKA was ill.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 24 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. As Chief of the Discipline Service Bureau what connections did you have with operational plans submitted by the General Staff to the Military Affairs Bureau?
- A. As Chief of the Military Discipline Bureau I had no connection with that.

INTERROGATION OF

TANAKA, Ryukichi

Date and Time: 11 June 1946, 1445-1630 hours.

Place : Room 374, War Ministry Building,
Tokyo, Japan.

Present : TANAKA, Ryukichi
Mr. Eiton M. Hyder Interrogator
Mr. Toshio Tomishige Interpreter
Mrs. Yumi Goto "
Miss Claire Stefanelli Stenographer
Major Roger Depe
Mr. J. Gouelou

Oath of Interpreter, administered by Mr. Hyder:

Mr. Hyder : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that
you will truly and accurately interpret and
translate from English into Japanese and from
Japanese into English, as may be required of
you, in this proceeding?

Mr. Tomishige: I do.

Questions by : Mr. Hyder.

Q. General, in 1940 what position did General SATO, Kenryo
hold?

A. His position was Vice Chief of Staff of the Japanese
Expeditionary Forces at Canton, China.....Japanese Expedi-
tionary Forces in South China and he stayed in Canton.

Q. Was he ever promoted to Chief of Staff of that Army in 1940?

A. No, he was not promoted.

Q. He was Vice Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army in South
China?

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 11 June 1946 Cont'd)

A. Yes.

Q. Who ordered the invasion of French Indo-China?

A. The Army did not march into Indo-China by any order, but the Fifth Division entered there at their own discretion.

Q. How did you learn that, General?

A. I was appointed the Chief of the Discipline and Service Bureau in December, 1940, and I investigated the matter of French Indo-China. That is why I know very well about that.

Q. Did you learn it from records? How did you learn it in your investigation?

A. I made the investigation by records and documents and the report from the Army in French Indo-China.

Q. From the Japanese Army in French Indo-China?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you learn it from SATO?

A. No, I did not hear anything directly from SATO. Shall I tell you the reason why I had to investigate the case?

Q. Please.

A. According to my memory, the Japanese Army invaded French Indo-China on September 26. The Japanese Emperor was indignant at the news of this invasion of the Japanese Army into French Indo-China. The reason was that the Fifth Division crossed the border of French Indo-China from the Chinese side, one-half day earlier than the conclusion of the agreement between the French Indo-China authorities and Japanese authorities was made. Therefore, the Minister of War, TOJO, called back Lt. General ANDO, Rikichi, Lt. General KUNO, Seichi (Head of the 18th Army)...ANDO was the Commander of the Japanese Army in South China....and Lt. General NAKAMURA, Aketo (Head of the Fifth Division, and also dismissed Brigadier Generals and Commanders of Regiments; also Commanders of Battalions and other high officers at the places where they were for the purpose of trying them at court-martial

Q. Who was Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army in Southern China?

A. The Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army in South China was Major General TANAKA, Kyuichi.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 11 June 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. General, that is a different TANAKA than yourself?
- A. Yes, he is another TANAKA. He is now Lt. General and is in prison at Canton. There was strong opposition to the order of Minister TOJO. Those persons were youthful officers and they were unable to open court-martial until December 15. I was ordered by Minister TOJO to come back to Tokyo and decide how to settle the program as to whether they be tried at court-martial or not. Therefore, I know about this matter although I was not at the places concerned.
- Q. Who was responsible for the Fifth Division moving into Indo-China?
- A. The responsible men were in high command....ANDO and KUNO.
- Q. And their positions were what?
- A. As high officers. The responsible person who should take direct responsibility was Lt. General NAKAMURA. There were two persons who encouraged or instigated the Generals to continue their invasion. They were Lt. General SATO, Kenryo and Lt. General TOMINAGA.

Oath of Interpreter administered to Mrs. Yumi Goto by Mr. Hyder.

- Q. What position did TOMINAGA hold at that time?
- A. He was Head of the First Section of the General Staff. Orders from central headquarters were to the effect that the Japanese troops should not use armed force in French Indo-China because at that time in French Indo-China the negotiations between the Japanese people and Governor Decoux were being continued. However, when the Fifth Division suddenly attacked, this question was brought up.
- Q. Who was the Commander of the Fifth Division?
- A. Lt. General NAKAMURA, Aketo.
- Q. What part, General, did SATO play in the movement of the Fifth Division from South China into Indo-China?
- A. He was Vice Chief of General Staff. The negotiations were getting prolonged, SATO and TOMINAGA instigated the Army to start action.
- Q. TOMINAGA was in Tokyo at the time?

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 11 June 1946 Cont'd)

- A. Both TOMINAGA and SATO were in French Indo-China.
- Q. Although TOMINAGA's position was Head of the General Staff at that time?
- A. He went on purpose to French Indo-China. Major General Suchihashi YUITSEI who was the Head of the Second Section of General Staff strongly opposed the plan of TOMINAGA.
- Q. Who was the Head of the First Section of General Staff?
- A. TOMINAGA.
- Q. General, could the Fifth Division have moved across the border without the order or permission of Lt. General SATO?
- A. Unless SATO and TOMINAGA instigated them to do so they would not have done it.
- Q. How do you know that SATO and TOMINAGA instigated the Japanese to move?
- A. I learned it through my investigation. Investigations were made because they couldn't make up their minds whether these people should be court-martialled or not.
- Q. When he incited them, whom did he incite, the Commander of the Fifth Division?
- A. NAKAMURA.
- Q. He was Head of the Fifth Division?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You learned that through investigation?
- A. Yes. I have no records or documents to prove it, only my memory.
- Q. Did NAKAMURA tell you this?
- A. Yes, NAKAMURA told me that SATO had a strong opinion against the plan.
- Q. Against what plan?
- A. The plan to advance the Army across the border.
- Q. SATO didn't want to advance the Army?
- A. SATO had a very strong opinion for the plan. NAKAMURA told me that SATO and TOMINAGA had a very strong opinion for the plan.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 11 June 1946 Cont'd)

Q. And that is why NAKAMURA told you?

A. Yes.

Q. When did he tell you that?

A. About 20 December 1946.

Q. Where did SATO have his headquarters in South China?

A. Canton.

Q. Where was the Fifth Division stationed?

A. They were stationed northeast from French Indo-China.

Q. About how far from Canton?

A. About 300 Km. from Canton. SATO visited the Commander of the Fifth Division very often by aeroplane.

Q. Could the Army have started its movement without SATO as Deputy Chief of Staff learning of the movement within a very short time?

A. SATO was for it.

Q. Could it have invaded Indo-China without SATO learning of it either before or shortly after the movement started?

A. SATO was the man who instigated it. They could not have started this action without SATO knowing it.

Q. How many men were in the Fifth Division, General?

A. About 20,000.

Q. How far did they move when they went into Indo-China?

A. They entered Langson. It was on the initiative of the Commander of the Fifth Division. The order did not come from Canton. He knew that this would be approved by headquarters later.

Q. Did approval come subsequently?

A. Yes.

Q. Who issued that order?

A. ANDO.

Q. General, did you talk to SATO when you investigated the movement of these troops?

A. I talked only with NAKAMURA.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 11 June 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. Did NAKAMURA say he had been influenced by SATO?
- A. He did. He said he was influenced by SATO and TOMINAGA. Investigation was completed around the 31st of December, 1940. I made this investigation with the Chief of the Military Service and Discipline Bureau, KODAMA, who was a Colonel at that time.
- Q. Once the troops had crossed the border they were not withdrawn?
- A. No, they didn't withdraw.
- Q. How long after the crossing of the border was SATO Deputy Chief of Staff of the Japanese Army in South China?
- A. Until March, 1941.
- Q. After the Fifth Division crossed the border, did it stop or did it proceed further?
- A. It proceeded further south. It proceeded further south because the treaty was concluded between French Indo-China and Japan permitting the movement of troops further south. The treaty was concluded a few hours after the attack. That is why they issued an order to proceed.
- Q. When was the order of approval issued for the crossing into Indo-China?
- A. After the treaty was concluded.
- Q. General, do you know why General SATO was transferred from duty in Tokyo in 1938 to China?
- A. It was because General SATO had a quarrel with General ITAGAKI who was the War Minister at that time.
- Q. There was no purpose other than that in sending General SATO to the Southern Expeditionary Army in China?
- A. The immediate reason was the quarrel with ITAGAKI but the fact that General SATO was known as a strong supporter of Japanese expansion in China might have been another reason.
- Q. But you don't know definitely?
- A. No.
- Q. General, in your investigation did you learn whether SATO before the invasion of Indo-China, favored a total invasion and occupation of French Indo-China?

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 11 June 1946 Cont'd)

- A. He must have been thinking about that but I don't know for sure. Lt. General WAKAMATSU, Tadashichi, who was the Chief of the General Staff of the 18th Army can give you the right answer.
- Q. Is he here in Tokyo?
- A. Yes, he is. Both KUNO, whom I mentioned, and WAKAMATSU are in Tokyo now.
- Q. General, are you familiar with the activities of Lt. General SATO in 1945?
- A. Yes.
- Q. He was stationed in Indo-China as Commander of the 37th Division?
- A. At the end of the war, he was either in Indo-China or Siam, I am not sure. I think he was in Siam and after the war ended he went to Indo-China.
- Q. Do you know of any of the activities of General SATO while he was stationed in Indo-China in 1945?
- A. He supported the independence movement.
- Q. General, do you know whether General SATO when stationed in Indo-China as Commander of the 37th Division went into the southern part of Indo-China in 1945?
- A. It was in the southern part of Indo-China that the 37th Division was stationed.
- Q. Could you give us the dates approximately, General, when SATO was Commander of the 37th Division?
- A. He was appointed the Commander of the 37th Division about January, 1945...either in January or February.
- Q. How long was he stationed there?
- A. About four months.
- Q. Are you familiar, General, with the mistreatment of civilians in Indo-China while SATO was Commander of the 37th Division?
- A. No. I have heard of the mistreatment committed in ^{Indo-}China but I have never heard that it was done by the 37th Division.
- Q. Could you tell us, General, the places in Indo-China at which the 37th Division was stationed?
- A. Saigon.

(TANAKA, Ryukichi 11 June 1946 Cont'd)

Q. Were there any other Divisions in Indo-China at that time?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. That was the only Division in Indo-China?

A. Yes.

SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION OF GENERAL TANAKA

He was Lieutenant Colonel and Staff Officer of the Kwantung Army stationed at the capital of Manchukuo between April 1935 and August 1937. From March 1940 to November 1940, he was Major General serving in active operations in Shansi Province.

In 1935 Lieutenant General TADA was the Commander-in-Chief of the Teintsin Army and MINAMI was Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army. Under the Umezu-Ito Agreement, Sun Cho Yuang, a warlord from one of the North China provinces came down to Peiping with three divisions. At this time UMEZU was the Commander-in-Chief of the Teintsin Army and continued in command until August 1935.

MINAMI and UMEZU conceived a plan to organize the North Chinese provinces as a security zone and send Colonel DOIHARA to the Chinese warlords of the various provinces for the purpose of organizing them in this effort, but they were unsuccessful.

Finally MINAMI and TADA sent DOIHARA to SUN CHO YUANG at Peiping and succeeded in setting him up as head of the East Hopei Anti-Comintern Autonomous Council with his headquarters at Peiping. The area of this council was much larger than the area of the demilitarized zone which had been established years before. DOIHARA remained with SUN as his advisor.

TANAKA knows these things of his own knowledge by reason of the fact that he was head of the Information Bureau, that is, Second Section of the Kwantung Army, and saw all telegraphic orders and in addition talked to General MINAMI about the matter.

It was the plan to bring all North China under PEI-FU NU, but the Japanese had to be contented with the East Hopei area.

There were two reasons for the setting up of the Hopei Section. One was to establish a safety zone. The other rose out of an economic situation. Many people living in the North China Province of Hopei worked in Manchuria during the summer months and in the winter came back to Hopei with considerable money. SUN was the head of a bank in Peiping which was closely affiliated with the Bank of Manchuria.

Political and economic exploitation occurred during this period. Many spinning companies were established by the Japanese Government, and the South Manchurian Railroad Company obtained large interests in the Hopei territory. The Japanese Army was instrumental in securing these investments.

SUMMARY OF INTERROGATION OF GENERAL TANAKA (Cont'd.)

MINAMI sent TANAKA to DU WANG, King of Inner Mongolia, in April 1935 where he acted as interpreter for Colonel ISHIMOTO. The purpose of the trip was to induce DU WANG to come to Manchuria for conference with MINAMI regarding closer cooperation between Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. DU WANG came to Manchuria in August of that year where he was paid a half million yen by ITAGAKI in the presence of TANAKA for his cooperation.

The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Council had been formed about three years before this and is fully described in a book by Owen Lattimore entitled "Thirty Years in China."

The first step having failed of any appreciable results, MINAMI sent DOIHARA to CHIN DU SUNG, General Staff Officer of SUNG CHO YUANG for the purpose of having SUNG give DU WANG the north part of Chahar, which he agreed to. From this time on DU WANG cooperated with Manchuria and the Kwantung Army supplied him with arms and money. This north part of Chahar was not incorporated into Manchuria.

Personal History

Name: TANAKA, Ryukichi

Born: July 9, 1893.

SHIMANE-Prefecture.
Commoner

Date		
May 30, 1912	Graduated the regular course of the Central Military Preparatory School.	
May 31, 1912	Appointed cadet and assigned to the 23rd Field Artillery Regiment.	War Ministry
June 6, 1912	Entered the 23rd Field Artillery Regiment	
Same date	Given the grade of artillery superior private.	23rd Field Artillery Regiment
Aug. 1, 1912	Promoted to artillery corporal	"
Sept. 1, 1912	Promoted to artillery sergeant.	"
Dec. 1, 1912	Entered the Military Academy.	
May 28, 1914	Graduated the Military Academy.	
June 3, 1914	Returned the Mother Unit.	
Same date	Promoted to the grade of sergeant-major and appointed probationary officer.	23rd Field Art. Regiment.
Nov. 27, 1914	Passed by the Officer Selection Board in accordance with Article 12 of the Army, Personnel Replacement Regulation.	
Dec. 25, 1914	Appointed an Artillery 2nd Lieutenant	Cabinet
	Assigned to the 23rd Field Artillery Regiment.	War Ministry
Mar. 1, 1915	Raised to the Eighth Court Rank Senior Grade.	
July 29, 1918	Promoted to Artillery 1st Lieutenant.	Cabinet.

Personal History - TANAKA (Cont'd)

-2-

Sept. 30, 1918	Raised to the Seventh Court Rank, Junior Grade.	
Apr. 1, 1919	Relieved of the present position and assigned to the 26th Field Artillery Regiment.	War Ministry
Dec. 10, 1919	Ordered to enter the Army Staff College.	War Ministry
Mar. 17, 1923	Relieved of the present service and assigned as an acting captain attached to the 26th Field Artillery Regiment.	War Ministry
June 22, 1923	Relieved of duties as an acting captain attached to the 26th Field Artillery Regiment; assigned as an acting company commander in the 26th Field Artillery Regiment.	War Ministry
Aug. 6, 1923	Promoted to Artillery Captain. Assigned as a Company Commander of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment.	Cabinet
Nov. 30, 1923	Raised to the Seventh Court Rank, Senior Grade.	
Dec. 11, 1923	Ordered to service with the Army General Staff Headquarters.	War Ministry
Apr. 9, 1924	Relieved of the present post and assigned to the 26th Field Artillery Regiment.	War Ministry
Oct. 14, 1924	Relieved of the present position and assigned as a member of the Headquarters of General Staff.	War Ministry
Nov. 25, 1925	Concurrently assigned as an instructor in the Army Veterinary School.	War Ministry
May 10, 1927	Relieved from concurrent position.	
July 18, 1927	Decorated with 6th Class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
July 26, 1927	Relieved of the present position and assigned to the Headquarters of the Army General Staff.	War Ministry
Dec. 28, 1928	Raised to the Sixth Court Rank, Junior Grade.	

Personal History - TANAKA (Cont'd)

-3-

Aug. 1, 1929	Promoted to Artillery Major	Cabinet
	Assigned as a member of the Headquarters of the Army General Staff.	War Ministry
Sept. 30, 1929	Concurrently assigned as a military instructor of the Army Staff College.	
Oct. 25, 1930	Assigned to the Headquarters of the Army General Staff.	
Nov. 7, 1931	Decorated with the 5th Class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
Aug. 8, 1932	Assigned as a Battalion Commander of the 4th Field Artillery Regiment.	
Feb. 1, 1934	Raised to the Sixth Court Rank, Senior Grade.	
Mar. 5, 1934	Promoted to Artillery Lieutenant Colonel.	Cabinet
	Assigned to the 1st Heavy Field Artillery Regiment.	War Ministry
Mar. 15, 1935	Assigned as staff officer of the Kwantung Army.	"
Apr. 29, 1934	Decorated with the Small Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, Fourth Class; for meritorious service in the Incident of the years 1931-1934.	
Aug. 2, 1937	Promoted to Artillery Colonel.	Cabinet
Sept. 1, 1937	Raised to the Fifth Court Rank, Junior Grade.	
Aug. 2, 1937	Relieved as a staff officer of the Kwantung Army; assigned as Commanding Officer of the 25th Ministry Mountain Artillery Regiment.	War Ministry
July 10, 1936	Decorated with the Middle Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, Third Class; for meritorious service in the Incident of the years 1931-1934.	

Personal History - TANAKA (Cont'd)

-4-

Apr. 15, 1939	Appointed as a member of Army Munitions Investigation Commission.	Cabinet
Aug. 8, 1939	Ordered to be a judge of the Army General Court Martial.	War Ministry
Dec. 23, 1939	Appointed chairman of Military Arts Promotion Committee (T.N. BUDO SHINKO IINKAI)	Cabinet
Mar. 9, 1940	Promoted to Major-General.	"
Mar. 28, 1940	Relieved as Chairman of Military Arts Promotion Committee (T.N. BUDO SHINKO IINKAI).	"
Mar. 9, 1940	Appointed the Chief of Staff of the First Army.	War Ministry
Apr. 1, 1940	Raised to the Fifth Court Rank, Senior Grade.	
Jan. 16, 1939	Assigned as the Chief of Military Service Section of Military Service Bureau of War Ministry.	War Ministry
Aug. 5, 1940	Relieved as a member of Army Munitions Investigation Commission.	Cabinet
Dec. 24, 1940	Appointed as a government delegate concerned with matters under the charge of the War Ministry in the 76th Imperial Diet.	Cabinet
Jan. 13, 1941	Appointed a member of the Investigation Committee of the Horse Administration Section (T.N. Under the Military Service Bureau).	Cabinet
Jan. 17, 1941	Appointed a member of the Central Air Defense Commission.	
	Appointed a member of the National Language Investigation Committee.	
	Appointed a participant in the Horse Administration Bureau.	Cabinet
	Appointed a member of the National Physical Strength Investigation Committee (T.N. KOKUMIN TAIRYOKU SHINGIKAI).	Cabinet

Personal History - TANAKA (Cont'd)

-5-

Feb. 4, 1941	Appointed a participant in the Population Reserved Institute (Discontinued by Imperial Ordinance No. 762 of Nov. 1, 1942.)	Cabinet
May 20, 1941	Appointed a member of the Text-book Investigation Committee.	Cabinet
	Appointed a member of the Labor Control Committee (Discontinued by the Imperial Ordinance No. 95 of Mar. 10, 1945).	Cabinet
Dec. 12, 1941	Decorated with the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, Second Class.	
Jan. 22, 1942	Appointed a government delegate concerned with matters under the charge of the War Ministry in the 79th Imperial Diet.	Cabinet
Mar. 27, 1942 (T.N. The word "March" is not clear in the original text.)	Appointed a participant in the Air Defense Bureau of the Home Ministry.	Cabinet
Oct. 13, 1942	Relieved as a member of the Text-book Investigation Committee.	
	Relieved of a member of the National Language Investigation Committee.	
	Relieved as a participant in the Horse Administration Bureau.	
	Relieved as a member of the Horse Administration Investigation.	Cabinet
Oct. 19, 1942	Relieved as a participant in the Air Defense Bureau of the Home Ministry.	Cabinet
Apr. 29, 1940	Given the Imperial Order of the Golden Kite, Third Class; and the Imperial Order of the Double Rays of the Rising Sun, Second Class; for meritorious service in the China Incident.	
Oct. 30, 1943	Army reserve. (T.N. This text is in pencil on the original).	

TANAKA, Ryukichi

Request by: SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru

Witness is now in Tokyo, USHIGOME-KU, c/o IPS, Investigation
Div. War Ministry Building.

Document requested:

Location

Diary of M. M. Litvinov, former
commissar of Foreign Affairs of
the Soviet Union (from July 1, 1938
to Aug. 31, 1938) excerpts were
introduced as Exhibit No. 754.

I.P.S. War Ministry
Building, Tokyo, Japan

The relevance of the testimony of these witnesses, all of whom were associated with the accused SHIGEMITSU, in various capacities during the time charged in the indictment, or who have personal knowledge of such events is, in its tendency, to establish that the accused SHIGEMITSU took no part in any of the conspiracies charged to him; and was not in any way connected with the planning, initiating or waging of wars of aggression; and was, furthermore, in no way connected with the commission of any crimes against peace and is not guilty under the indictment or any of its counts.

Resume by: Cmdr. Cole

Date : 22 April 1947

TANAKA, Ryukichi

1. Called as a witness by: KIMURA

2. Subpoena request: states that the witness will testify as follows:

"...that he was the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau during the time the accused KIMURA was Vice War Minister and the Military Affairs Bureau was the controlling branch of the War Ministry and that matters of policy were decided by the War Minister and the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, and other pertinent facts.

"The testimony of this witness is relevant in that it tends to prove that the accused KIMURA took no part in the formulation of policies in the more important matters."

3. Summary of Major Posts Held:

9 Jul 1893 - Born, Shimane Prefecture.

Status: Commoner.

30 May 1912 - Graduated from Central Military Preparatory School.

28 May 1914 - Graduated from the Military Academy.

11 Dec 1923 - Ordered to service with Army General Staff Headquarters.

1 Aug 1929 - Assigned as member of Headquarters of Army General Staff.

15 Mar 1935 - 2 Aug 1937 - Assigned as staff officer of Kwantung Army.

16 Jan 1939 - Assigned as Chief of Military Service Section of Military Service Bureau of War Ministry.

15 Apr 1939 - Appointed a member of Army Munitions Investigation Commission.

9 Mar 1940 - Promoted to Major-General.

Appointed Chief of Staff of First Army.

17 Jan 1941 - Appointed a member of the Central Air Defense Commission.

27 Mar 1942 - Appointed a participant in the Air Defense Bureau of the Home Ministry.

30 Oct 1943 - Army reserve.

4. Decorations:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
18 Jul 1927	6th Class Imperial Order of Sacred Treasure		
29 Apr 1934	Small Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, Fourth Class	For meritorious service in Incident of 1931-1934	

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
10 Jul 1936	Middle Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun, Third Class	For meritorious service in Incident of 1931-1934	
29 Apr 1940	Order of the Compound Light Rising Sun	China Incident	War Ministry
29 Apr 1940	Military Order of the Golden Kite, 3rd Class	China Incident	War Ministry
12 Dec 1941	Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 2nd Class		
27 Nov 1942	Manchukuo Chingyuan-Chang, 2nd Class	Japanese-Manchurian Amity	Foreign Ministry

5. Summary of Interrogations:

General TANAKA was interrogated at great length concerning a great variety of subjects. This evidence has been partially summarized at length in IPS Case File No. 234, Serial 25, but is not repeated here since it concerns the Manchurian Incident, Japanese narcotic control in occupied China, Japanese ultra-nationalistic societies, and other subjects which are not involved in TANAKA's anticipated testimony concerning the accused KIMURA.

6. Summary of testimony already given by this witness concerning the accused KIMURA:

The witnesses previous testimony concerning KIMURA (found in the Transcript, pages 14,385 to 15,947) in general is favorable to KIMURA.

a. TANAKA testified (Transcript, p. 14,289) that at a meeting of bureau chiefs of the War Ministry at the end of April, 1942, TOJO gave his decision that all POWs would have to engage in forced labor. KIMURA was present at this conference as Vice War Minister but did not say anything and took no positive part. (Transcript, p. 14,385). KIMURA merely transmitted the note relating to treatment of prisoners of war as a routine matter and had no authority relating to the actual decision.

b. In TOJO's absence KIMURA was War Minister and upon TOJO's return he would report upon all matters and receive the approval of the Minister. (Transcript, p. 14,386). When TOJO was absent he turned over some very small matters relative to business routine but he turned over nothing with respect to state affairs, such as policy making, politics, economics and diplomacy. TOJO was War Minister as well as Premier and KIMURA, even while acting as War Minister in TOJO's absence, never made any important decisions. (Transcript, p. 14, 388).

c. As to the fliers who raided Japan on April 18, 1942, and were captured in China and sent to Japan, the matter was decided by the Chief of the Army General Staff. Both TOJO and KIMURA were strongly opposed to being too severe, but the decision was carried over their opposition. (Transcript, p. 14,387).

d. As Vice-Minister of War, KIMURA had no command authority over the chiefs of the various bureaus. He merely carried out the will and order of the War Minister without giving positive suggestion or opinion. The witness TANAKA suggested to KIMURA that something be done to control the bureau heads who were taking too much positive action, but KIMURA did not agree, saying that the War Minister was capable and should be left to decide such matters. KIMURA was, for this reason, called a robot Vice-Minister. (Transcript, p. 14,397).

e. The Vice-Minister had merely a supervisory capacity over the bureau heads. Consequently, the bureau heads frequently had direct contact with the Minister and decisions were made sometimes without consultation with the Vice-Minister. (Transcript, p. 14,397).

f. As to KIMURA's appointment as Vice-Minister of War, TANAKA testified that he was told by the Chief of Personnel that since KIMURA had been Chief of the Munitions Bureau and was well-acquainted with matters within the War Ministry, it was felt that a servile and honest man would be best for this position. It was considered best to appoint KIMURA to boost war production which was then waning as he was well acquainted with ordnance matters. (Transcript, p. 14,399).

g. When General SATO reported the Doolittle fliers were to be executed, the War Minister strongly objected, as did KIMURA on the ground that Japanese residents in British and American territories might be treated in such a way. As a result the decision could not be taken and the execution was delayed. (Transcript, p. 14,403).

h. Since the decision to use POWs in the construction of the Siam-Burmese Railway was made by the General Staff, the witness TANAKA thinks it highly improbable that KIMURA had any voice in the matter. However, it is highly probable that the technical procedures in assigning POWs, etc., might have been done on instructions from the Vice-Minister representing the War Minister. (Transcript p. 14,405).

i. KIMURA had no authority to hire or fire employees or to punish, such authority being only in the Minister. The bureau chiefs are directly responsible to the War Minister for management of business in each department. KIMURA let each Bureau Chief handle the affairs of his bureau without interference. External negotiations were handled by the War Minister and were not in the province of KIMURA. They were to be handled by the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau (Transcript p. 14,407).

j. Court Exhibit 1966 - Extract from the Diet Proceedings of 17 February, 1943 - is KIMURA's explanation of a draft of revision of part of the Military Service Law relating to the supervision and punishment of POWs in particular instances where ordinary criminal laws are incomplete as applied to POWs. (Transcript p. 14,477).

k. It was absolutely impossible for a Vice Minister who is not of the status of a state minister to act in place of the War Minister. KIMURA was never a state minister. When TOJO was absent the position of War Minister remained vacant and no acting war minister was appointed. Although TOJO was concurrently Premier he could not leave matters pertaining to state affairs in the hands of Vice Minister KIMURA. TOJO himself took the leadership in supervising the work of the War Minister. The Vice Minister had no executive authority except for matters delegated to him. He had no power to punish or force the Bureau Chiefs to obey his orders. (Transcript p. 15,947)

7. Cross-Examination:-

In view of the fact that the witness TANAKA has already testified as a Prosecution witness and since much of his testimony was very favorable to KIMURA it may be advisable not to cross-examine this witness. However, if cross-examination becomes necessary, it is suggested that the witness be questioned on the basis of certain statements made by him during interrogations by IPS concerning KIMURA.

a. In his interrogation of 16 March, 1946 (IPS Case File #234,-38A, pp. 7 and 8) TANAKA stated as follows: -

A. "At the Imperial Conference they decided to send main force to occupy South Indo China unless compromise with United States could be made by early or middle part of October.

Q. When did this main force go to South Indo China?

A. I think the main force started movement almost soon after September 6th Imperial Conference without consulting the Konoye Cabinet. (p. 7)

.....
A. ... The inside story of the September 6 Imperial Conference was only known to the Chief of the Military Affairs MUTO and his assistant KIMURA of the War Ministry." (p. 8)

b. In his interrogation of 1 April, 1946 (IPS Case File #234-57, pp.4,5) TANAKA stated that KIMURA was among those who attended the meeting of the Bureau Chiefs in early part of May, 1942 at which TOJO ordered all POWs to undergo forced labor.

c. In the same interrogation (IPS Case File #234-57, pp.8,9) TANAKA stated:-

Q. "KIMURA, Heitaro, as Vice Minister of War from 1941 to 1943 - what was his responsibility in regard to decisions on the B-T Railway construction?

A. His responsibility should be the same as that of General DOIHARA.

Q. Why?

- A. Because he was commander of the Japanese Army in Burma at that time. At the same time General KAWABE, who preceded KIMURA, should be held responsible.
- Q. One final question about SATO, Kenryo, what responsibility would he have in regard to decisions on prisoners of war?
- A. He should be held responsible for causing Imperial Decree to be issued on the treatment of war prisoners. He drafted the Decree as well as the order concerning the treatment of prisoners of war. In other words, he should be the responsible officer in the construction of shelters for war prisoners. The responsibility for anything relating to treatment of prisoners should rest on the shoulders of War Minister TOJO, Vice Minister KIMURA and Chief of Military Affairs Bureau SATO." (p. 9)

d. In his interrogation of 11 May, 1946 (IPS Case File #234-134, p. 1, 2 and 4) TANAKA stated: -

- Q. "General, what I am interested in finding out about this morning is the people responsible for the employment of prisoners of war in the construction of the Burma-Thailand Railroad. ... (p. 1)
- A. ... In Burma those responsible for gathering workers were KAWABE and KIMURA, both of whom are in Sugamo. KIMURA was Vice Minister of War. (p. 2)
- Q. Of course, what I am interested in, particularly, is people in the General Staff or the War Ministry who were responsible for permitting the employment of prisoners of war in such dangerous and hazardous work.
- A. Those responsible in the War Ministry are: TOJO, KIMURA and SATO. In the General Staff, SUGIYAMA, TANABE, TANAKA, Shinichi (not me) and KATO." (p. 4)