

IIMURA, Minoru, (Jo)

Attached hereto are two copies of a resume of information contained in the IPS files (other than the transcript of the record) pertaining to the above-named individual.

SUMMARY OF PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE.

Exhibit 868-A (R. 8816) Imperial ordinance establishing Institute. It states that the Institute "shall be under the administration of the Prime Minister and shall control basic study and research in connection with national total war and shall control the education and training of officials and others in connection with national total war."

Exhibit 869 (R. 8821). Affidavit of HORIBA, Kazuwo.

Attached to the affidavit as Exhibit A is a document which consists of a list of the members of the Institute and indicates that the members thereof were high-ranking Army and Navy officials and high-ranking officials of the various ministries.

Attached to the affidavit as Exhibit B is a document which contains a list of research student members of the Institute for the first, second and third periods from April 1941 to March 1944.

Attached to the affidavit as Exhibit C is a document consisting of a list of the contents of lectures at the Research Institute as well as the name of the lecturer and his position. This document indicates that the lecturers were members of various ministries and high-ranking Army and Navy officials.

Exhibit 871 (R. 8941). This exhibit consists of the records of the progress of theoretical maneuvers for total war. These were marked "top secret."

Exhibit 686-A (R. 7416), portions of which were read into the record beginning on page 8888 and continuing at intervals to page 8928. These are excerpts from a document entitled "First Table-top Maneuvers, a Top Secret Symposium of the First Total War Military Gains of the Total War Research Institute, on 1941." It sets forth in detail the work of the Institute.

In the event it is deemed advisable to cross-examine Iimura with respect to his affidavit (Def. Doc. 164) the following suggestions might prove helpful:

In connection with paragraph 3, page 1 of his affidavit, Exhibit 868-A (R. 8816) is pertinent.

In connection with paragraph 4, page 1 of the affidavit, Exhibit 869 (R. 8821) might be used and emphasis placed upon the rank and number from the Army and Navy listed as members.

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In connection with paragraph 6 on page 2 of the affidavit, reference might be made to page 3 of the resume relating to "top secret" and national resources.

In connection with paragraph 7, appearing on page 2 of affidavit and continuing on page 3, reference might be made to the bottom of page 3 of the resume attached hereto and the point stressed that the Institute was in fact the Army and Navy. This can be substantiated by Exhibit 869 (R. 8821) which lists the members of the Institute and the lecturers thereof.

In connection with paragraph 5 on page 3 of the affidavit, reference might be made Iimura's interrogation of 20 May 1946, appearing on page 11 of Case No. 455, Serial 1.

This file is attached hereto and I would be glad to discuss it in advance with the person who will cross-examine Iimura.

In connection with paragraph 6 on page 3 of the affidavit, reference might be made to the bottom of page 2 of the resume where Iimura states that the Councillors were mainly bureau heads.

In connection with the last paragraph on page 3 of the affidavit, reference might be made to page 3 of the resume wherein Iimura states that "Hoshino collected public officers to foster the organization."

Def. Doc. 164

Translated by  
Defense Language  
Branch

General KIMURA

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPONENT: IIMURA, Minoru

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached  
sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed  
in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1742

I was Director of the Total Warfare Institute from January 1941 to October of the same year.

There were institutes in other countries similar or kindred to the Total Warfare Institute. Following their example, the Total Warfare Institute of our country was founded in the autumn of 1940 (the 15th year of SHOWA).

In the government organization regarding the Total Warfare Institute, it was prescribed that, under the Premier's control, it shall take charge of the fundamental investigation and research into total warfare, and the education and training of officials and others concerning the nation's total warfare. However, its actual operational management was as given in the following articles.

All the Ministries, the army and navy, not to speak of Premier KONOYE who was responsible for administering this Institute and was my direct superior, were scarcely interested in this Institute, therefore during my incumbency, I received no instruction, advice, or suggestion concerning the business of this institute from any of the above-mentioned quarters or persons. Consequently, its business, in accordance with the stipulations of the above-mentioned government organization, was carried out from an independent standpoint.

As the first step, education and training were undertaken. In instructing its students, the conventional memorizing cramming system was ignored; developmental and practical education was sought after.

The main subjects of education and training comprised lectures on fundamental knowledge concerning various fields such as politics, economics, thought and military science, physical education; theoretical (hypothetical) exercises, inspections and tours were utilized simultaneously.

*Exhib. 609 from stress Mats who says under Army & of interrogations*

*868 F  
R 8916  
Emp.  
Ordinance  
established  
Institute*

who were staff members see out 8/69

Even when I first joined the Institute, there existed the training program in theoretical exercises which was one of the annual functions of this Institute. In carrying out this plan, no person, except staff members of this Institute, gave instruction or guidance. The apportioned term was about one month.

The reason why current conditions were adopted in our hypotheses given at the beginning of the theoretical exercises was that if the circumstances of a period other than the current had been adopted, it would have been difficult for the students to imagine themselves operating under assigned circumstances and to imagine the hypothetic operations, particularly the intricate numerical basis.

The various conditions arising from the hypotheses were no more than suppositional situations adopted for the sake of exercises. The object of the exercises was, not the suppositional situations themselves, but training in co-ordinated actions based on those situations.

①

The hypotheses and the consequent suppositional situations have no connection with the actual policies of the authorities concerned. It was because actual matters of this sort were known to no one except the authorities concerned who would never have divulged them.

As these exercises were partly open to the public, it was impossible and not permissible to utilize the actual policies of the government.

See 299 of the President's

The reason why the accounts of the exercises were marked "strictly confidential" was because they contained some secret national statistics.

In accordance with the administrative procedure of the institute, the result of this research was probably reported to the Cabinet which was directly in charge of this Institute, but

Under control  
P.P.  
Ministry  
64868-17

never reported it to other quarters to say nothing of the other ministries or the military; we were never instructed by them.

As anybody will see from a glance at the documents, the utilization of the results of this study in actual policies was out of the question because of the lack of time necessary for scrutiny and because of the above stated aims.

Students of this Institute, who were first selected by all Ministers and certain civil organizations at the request of this Institute; then examined by the Institute and submitted to the Cabinet, were selected and formally appointed by the Cabinet as students of this Institute.

They were all young men whose average age was about 32, and none held a responsible position in any Ministry. There was one judge among them but he was also a young man like the others and was in a low grade.

The budget of this Institute was ¥160,000 a year and a half of it was for personnel expenses and the other half for office expenses. The budget was too small for making any activity possible.

In short, this Institute would seem to be considerably important so far as its name and stipulations in the organization were concerned, but it was, in fact, nothing but an institute for educating junior officials. And from various standpoints it was not possible to educate them successfully. Not a single result of their study was utilized in drawing up practical policies or war plans.

With a view to obtaining assistance from various quarters, a councillor system was adopted by this Institute in May or June, 1941; but these councillors were entirely nominal personnel registered only as members.

We received no direction or suggestion from the accused KIMURA, SUZUKI, or HOSHINO in connection with business of this Institute.

*bottom summary  
didn't say  
was in fact  
Army & Navy*

*Cite  
10 steps  
of course*

*see p 99c 3 summary re rank  
& #7 of memo from Army & Navy*

*Cite 10 steps  
Bottom p. 2  
of resume*

*P's resume  
re Army & Navy*

0

Def. Doc. 164

On this 1st day of December, 1946

At No. 501 2-Chome,  
Soshigaya, Setagaya-Ku,  
Tokyo

DEPONENT: IIMURA, Minoru (seal)

I, SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
At same place

Witness: (signed) SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

IIMURA, Minoru (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan  
Date: 4 March 1947



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
June 2, 1947  
DEFENSE - Division IV - Russia  
IIMURA - Direct

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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF IIMURA, Jo  
by Mr. Blakeney

23,395

23,396

The witness stated he lived in Tokyo, identified Exhibit 2679 as his affidavit and verified it. The affidavit \* stated that he became Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army, when UMEZU became commander on September 7, 1939 and held the post until October 1940. In October 1941 he became commander, 5th Army, with headquarters in Tongan and served under UMEZU's command until October 1943.

23,397

Their first duty under UMEZU in September 1939 was to settle the Nomonhan Incident according to Tokyo instruction. On appointment UMEZU gave certain instructions. They were to study withdrawal of the border guard line and other matters to prevent future trouble. \* All subordinates were to understand UMEZU's intentions and were not allowed to deviate from them. They were always to keep UMEZU well informed. When investigating or planning important matters, the main points were to be reported to the commander first and then investigation in detail be made. Even in progress plans were reported to the commander and were to be gradually completed according to his instructions.

23,398

During the full year he served as Chief of Staff, everyone was completely under UMEZU's command on these policies. This extended down to all troops under the command. He believed this complete command was based on UMEZU's firm determination not to have border trouble. \* The border guard regulations were made by UMEZU and his subordinates based on UMEZU's instructions and running parallel to settlement of the Nomonhan Incident. These regulations provided for complete prevention or border troubles.

23,399

A border guard line was to be established behind the border except where the border was clear, and troop activities were prohibited beyond the line. The area between the guard line and the border was to be a non-militarized zone and only small patrol parties could be sent to such zones if they were required. A patrol party and even troops stationed on or inside the guard line were prohibited the use of arms except \* when absolutely needed for self-defense. Transfer of troops in case of border trouble could not be done without operation orders from UMEZU. Even in case of illegal plane crossing by Soviet, counter-attack by plane was strictly prohibited, though ground fire could be used. If an incident

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
June 2, 1947  
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occurred, it was to be reported immediately to higher headquarters, including the Kwantung Army, and such reports were given absolute priority.

Based on these border guard regulations every field commander made detailed guard regulations. The field commander was not alone responsible for making these, but he was only permitted to do so after close investigation by UMEZU. UMEZU made strong representations to the Manchukuoans on preventing border trouble since Manchukuoan police guard places not guarded by the Japanese.

23,401 UMEZU's determination to avoid border troubles was further strengthened when the Emperor advised him concerning peace in the north when UMEZU went to Tokyo in December 1939. His determination was evidenced by the fact that there wasn't one border clash during his five years with the Kwantung Army. The Emperor's advice was conveyed to the subordinates at the commander's office and the Army Commanders conferences in December 1939. Such conferences were held by UMEZU once or twice a year. At each conference, including the first, he called attention to preventing trouble by saying that a fire must be stopped while it is small. If trouble unfortunately happens though it should have been prevented beforehand, \* the army commander on the spot should prevent expansion. UMEZU should go to the spot to settle it. This item was always included in the reports of army commanders at the conference. This was always true during the witness's term as Chief of Staff and his term as Commander of the 5th Army under UMEZU.

When the witness investigated the attitude of the men toward preventing border troubles when he became Commander of the 5th Army, he recognized that the guard regulations had been well brought home to each man, and the term "prevention of border troubles" was common among them. This was good evidence that UMEZU's wishes had been well drilled into all men.

23,402 In addition to instructions, UMEZU went himself and sent his staff officers to the front for inspection to see how his orders were carried out. The witness inspected the eastern front many times. \* Following the Pacific War, UMEZU, realizing the need to keep peace in the north, issued written instructions

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Page

to avoid border trouble and inspected the whole front line to prevent trouble. The witness received this order at Tonan.

23,403

UMEZU's subordinates were much worried about the defense of Manchukuo, since the troops had sustained losses and the real power of the Soviet was clear, and they were uneasy just after the ice melted on the frontier rivers. Although the subordinates wanted reinforcements, UMEZU would not permit it, stating that they were in the middle of the China incident and its settlement was most needed. They should not ask Tokyo for reinforcements. The shortage of man-power could be made up by preventing border troubles and strengthening fortifications. One division, the 25th, was reinforced after the Nomonhan Incident, but not by UMEZU's proposal. \* After the Pacific War began a considerable number of men were taken from the Kwantung Army, but UMEZU stated he was glad to sacrifice man-power because of general conditions. They were also uneasy because of the disproportionate strength.

The witness stated he arrived as Chief of Staff about three days prior to UMEZU's arrival. UMEZU arrived on September 8, 1939.

CROSS-EXAMINATION by Colonel Ivanov

23,404

23,405

With respect to the statement of UMEZU about stopping the fire, the witness stated he said this from memory, which was very fresh, because UMEZU repeated it frequently. \* The later statement that they were in the middle of the China incident was also quoted from memory. He remembered these very clearly after eight years.

23,406

During UMEZU's five years he repeated there were no important or serious border incidents. He could state positively with respect to the three years when he was with the Kwantung Army. With respect to other matters he was able to learn them through papers and documents, but he could not speak of them. However, \* he stated positively that there were no serious border incidents such as the Nomonhan and Changkufeng Incidents.

The witness stated he did not know that in 1940 the Japanese military violated the Soviet border 59 times, or that in 1941 there were 136 violations; in 1942, 229; and in 1943, 414. He stated he did not know that during violations of

Page

23,407 territorial waters in 1940 the Soviet held up 18 ships, \* and in 1942, 36 ships. He stated he did not know that in 1940 there were 56 violations of the borders by planes; in 1941, 61; in 1942, 82; and in 1943, 119. He did not remember the figures as given.

23,408 The witness stated that he had no recollection that special secret funds were used for strategic purposes against the Soviet. He stated he did not remember what questions were discussed in February 1940 in Harbin at the conference of chiefs of the Japanese Special Service Agency. \* When asked, after having heard an excerpt from Exhibit 736, whether special personnel trained to administer Soviet territory which it was planned to seize, were not trained and whether this personnel was trained under the supervision of UMEZU and the Chief \* of the Harbin Special Service organization, the witness stated that such personnel was not being trained. The Chief of the Harbin Special Service was directly under the command of UMEZU. The witness, however, was not engaged in their guidance. The witness said that he remembered nothing about a conference of chiefs of Special Service organs in 1940.

23,410

The witness stated he did not know that at the beginning of 1938 TOJO and UMEZU were concerned with constructing fortifications directed against the Soviet and UMEZU's arrival was in September 1939.

23,412

The witness stated that while there were no serious border incidents there were occasions when spies crossed the border or airplanes crashed in the vicinity of the border.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION by Mr. Blakeney

23,413

The witness stated that it was his recollection there were frequent crossings of the border by airplanes of the Soviet air forces, frequent incidents in which Soviet citizens, probably soldiers, came into Manchukuo, attacked Manchurians, and abducted them. The witness stated that he did not think that in 1939 387 Japanese violated Russian frontiers. \* 1939 was the year of the Nomonhan Incident. 1938 was the year of the Changku-Feng Incident.

23,414

Page

Direct Examination of IIMURA (JO) MINORU

23,472

23,473

23,474

The witness identified Exhibit 2684 as his affidavit \* and verified it after correction. The affidavit stated immediately after the Nomonhan Incident the witness became Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. \* Having suffered a great damage and loss of men in the Incident they felt very insecure as to the defense of Manchuria. The measure UMEZU adopted to meet the situation was to avert further border disputes, to construct defense installations especially new fortifications and strengthening the old ones. The strengthening and construction were entirely of a defensive nature and by no means offensive. The depths could not be said to be short but compared to the Russians it would seem less great. This was due to Japanese Army tactical ideas. Once a defense position was set up it was the Japanese Army's principle to defend them to the death yielding not an inch.

23,475

During the period Sept 1939 to Oct 1940 there were not many air bases and airfields constructed although plans to increase them were in existence. At that time the Japanese air forces in Manchuria were extremely meager and to mitigate the loss and damage it was felt that air bases should be scattered far and wide to avoid damage by one attack and to render futile enemy raids by freely moving planes. It was only a negative means of preserving fighting strength that the air bases and air fields were constructed.

Soviet river crafts, including large sized gun boats were far superior in number and it was absolutely impossible for Japan and Manchuria to challenge the Soviet forces to a river fight. Japan had to content itself with constructing fortifications in the north of Chimussu to defend in case the Soviet forces came up the river on an offensive expedition. It was out of the question for Japan to attempt to operate against the Soviet on the Amur River.

There was no cross examination but reference was made to Exhibits 713 and 714.

Page  
23,477

Exhibit 2685-a - excerpt from Report of Activities for 1940, compiled by the First Section, Bureau of European Asiatic Affairs, Foreign Ministry, stated \* that the total unlawful acts committed by the Soviet on the Manchurian frontier from January to December 1940, classified by kinds and districts. The total sum of unlawful firing, violation of border, kidnapping, detention, 94; violation territorial air: \* 12 ; interruption in river navigation etc. 8; detention of rafts 28, others 4, total 151.

23,478

23,479

23,480

Exhibit 2686 A, Report of Activities for 1941, stated that generally speaking the frontiers including those between Manchoujoo and Mongolia were calm in 1941 \*<sup>1</sup>here were no collisions between big forces as had occurred in previous years and the sum total of unlawful acts committed by the Soviet had shown a tendency to decrease gradually from 1939. If they inquired into the nature of unlawful acts they noticed a rapid increase of intentional acts of air violations and planned aggression of the border. They could not but recognize the outstanding tendency of aggravation in their malignant nature. In 1938 the total incidents were 166; 1939 -195; 1940 -151; 1941 -98.

Exhibit 2687 A. The report of activities for 1942 stated that the total unlawful acts committed by the Soviet from January to December 1942 totalled 58, including unlawful firing, violations of border, kidnapping, violence: 19; territorial air violations: 38; interruption in river navigation : 1.

(1)

In my opinion, the testimony of this man (Clemens) is important in this trial. It relates to the (Total War Research Institute) about which he was questioned by Mr. Sutton (Case file 455 Serial 1 May 20, 1946)

A summary of that interrogation is attached hereto, as well as references to an interrogation conducted on May 22, 1946 (Case file 23 - serial 141) mentioned on page 5 of my resume of 24 March, 1947. (attached hereto)

Considerable weight should <sup>in my judgment</sup> be placed upon Justice Weble's remarks (pertaining to Total War Research Institute) appearing at ~~page~~ R 8865 <sup>where</sup> ~~where~~ he said (quote)

(2)  
The 10 points mentioned in  
"Table Top Maneuvers" when compared  
with actual report, should be  
stressed as stated on page ~~13~~ 8 of my  
resume of 24 March 1947.

In Admura affidavit (Ex Dec 164)  
with reference to the 3<sup>rd</sup> paragraph  
on page 1 cite ex 868 A (introduced  
into evidence R 8916) Imperial  
Ordinance establishing Institute

In connection with paragraph  
4 on page 1 of affidavit see ex  
869 + stress the Army + Navy  
men who were members (p 7 & 8  
& interrogation)

In connection with paragraph  
page 2 of affidavit - who were  
members + refer to ex 869

In connection paragraph 4 (p 2  
of affidavit) cite pages 9 + 10 of



(3)

Interrogation appearing on p  
2 of resume of March 24, 1947  
paragraph 6, p 2 affidavit  
see resume p 3 relating to  
"Top Secret" + Prime Minister

paragraph 7 affidavit p 2 (continuing  
on page 3) cite of 868 A (Institute  
under control of p<sup>r</sup> Minister) +  
cite bottom page 3 of Resume  
that institute was in fact the Army  
& Navy.

Connection with complete  
paragraph 2, 3, 4 on page 3  
affidavit see page 4 Resume  
re rank + number of men from  
the Army + Navy.

Connection complete paragraph 5  
of affidavit cite 10 points (find  
Definite reference)

(4)

paragraph 6 affidavit (p 3  
re councillors being "nominal  
personnel" see batch p 2 of  
resume where says councillors  
were "mainly bureau heads")

Last paragraph p 3 of affidavit  
see resume p 3 re Hopkins collecting  
"public officers to foster organization"

IIMURA, Minoru, (Jo)

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Resume by: L. C. Dunigan

Date : 24 March 1947

IIMURA, Jo (Minoru)

Subpoena request states he will testify as to nature and operation of "Total War Research Institute."

Major posts held

- 1924 - 1927 - Major in Intelligence Service on Western Border of Manchuria.
- 1930 - 1932 - Military Attache in Turkey.
- 1933 - 1935 - Chief of European and American Sections in Army at General Staff Office.
- 1937 - Major General -- Research Department of Army War College.
- 1938 - President of Military Staff College.
- 1939 - Lt. General, Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army.
- January 1941 - October 1941 - Chief, Total War Research Institute.
- 1943 - Commander-in-Chief, 5th Army in Manchuria.
- November 1943 - 1944 - President, Staff College.
- 1945 - Commander-in-Chief, Tokyo Defense Army.
- 1945 - Commander, Tokyo Military Police.

Decorations:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
29 Apr. 34	Intermediate Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	Army Ministry
29 Apr. 40	Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	China Incident	Army Ministry
7 June 41	Grande Ufficiale Corona d'Italia	Japanese-Italian Amity	Foreign Ministry
9 Dec. 41	Manchukuo Decoration, Order of Chukuo-Chang, 1st Grade	Japanese-Manchurian	Foreign Ministry
9 Dec. 43	Manchurian Decoration, Order of Ching Yun-Chang, 1st Grade	Japanese-Manchurian Amity	Foreign Ministry

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IIMURA, Jo, (Minoru) - continued

Summary of Interrogation, May 20, 1946  
Re: Total War Research Institute

*Case file 455 Serial 1.*

Appointed Chief January 1941 and served until October 1941.

Institute was connected with Japanese Government under direct control of Prime Minister (page 1).

Purpose of institute was to conduct investigations and research in connection with national total war (page 1).

Institute was organized in fall of 1940 and from that time until his appointment as Chief he attended the Institute (page 2).

When first organized, the Institute had only five or six leaders -- no research or investigations had been made -- "the people were discussing how to obtain their object -- by what means they were to conduct investigations or research."

"I and other people were busily engaged in the matter of education." (page 3)

Instructors at the Institute were chosen from the offices of various ministries and also from the public." (page 3)

"In order to get rid of sectionalism, it was necessary for the instructors to know materials which were not their specialties, so both instructors and students had to know various subjects such as economics, diplomacy, foreign affairs, and also military affairs civilians and officers alike and from time to time lecturers were invited from experts in the departments!"

Before he became Chief of the Institute, it had already started research work (page 3)

Reference to document of the Institute in August 1941, known as "First Table-Top Maneuvers", IIMURA said the international situation was tense at the time so an imaginary maneuver was conducted on a table "appointing such and such persons as ministers, etc., and they studied in case of an emergency how they should act." (page 4)

He arranged work on first table-top maneuvers -- said he received no instructions -- he consulted with officials of War Ministry (did not name them) "but the institute had some counsellors who were composed of Bureau heads of the various ministries. The ministries included the War Ministry." (page 4)

"I reviewed the plan of the Navy in an assembly of the counsellors including those representatives of the War Ministry." (page 4)

The counsellors were mainly bureau heads -- Muto attended the meeting of counsellors -- was not sure of OKA (page 4). It was his custom to send notices of meetings to all counsellors.

(2)

*Bottom P 2  
of affidavit*

IIMURA, Jo (Minoru) - continued

T. HOSHINO attended meeting of counsellors -- knows that HOSHINO was acting director of the Institute (he apparently means from inception of Institute in 1940 to time he became director in January 1941). (page 5)

Does not think Admiral NAGANO was present -- that maybe NAGANO was represented by OKA. SUZUKU, Teiichi, may have been present.

Referring to how table-top maneuvers originated, IIMURA said, "By that time the lectures on diplomacy, military affairs, economics, etc., had roughly been finished, so they proposed to put the result of hearing those lectures into execution of some form or other and on that basis they managed to make out such a plan under the table planning."

"That was the finishing touch to the education of the Institute and from the outset the program was continued to hold table-top maneuvers."

IIMURA would not say who in the Government was responsible for organization of Institute but "HOSHINO collected public officers to foster organization." (page 6)

First table-top maneuvers resulted from lectures given by following persons who were staff members of the Institute: "OKAMATSU, Seitaro, from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; TERADA, from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; MAEDA, Katsumi, from the Finance Ministry, TSUDA, Tetsutoki, from the Ministry of Communications, HAGIWARA, from the Foreign Office; Lt. Gen. IBARA, Col. WATANABE, Wataru, Col. HORIBA, Kasu. Those three from the War Ministry. OKA, Shin, Rear Admiral, from the Navy Ministry. Capt. MATSUDE, Chiaki, also from the Navy Ministry. SATA, from the Military Affairs Bureau, made one lecture." (Re staff members, HORIBA testified that they were fixed by Government regulation -- that staff members were permanently engaged in the Institute -- that members occupied positions as instructors. R 8879) *See Exhibit 8689 (R 8916) Imperial Ordinance establishing Institute*

When asked if the first table-top maneuvers did not contain complete general plans for the opening of war against America, Britain, and China, IIMURA said "it was only a dreamy conception of the war entertained by the military authorities or the Government. It had nothing to do with the War Ministry or the Navy Ministry. Both the Army and Navy gave the Institute no program for work." (Compare answer above with number of staff lecturers from the Army and Navy ministries -- also use list of members from Army and Navy on list of members of Institute in EX. 869. (R 8921))

(In connection with IIMURA's statement that the Army and Navy gave the Institute no program for work, it may be stressed that it was not necessary that the Institute was to a large degree, in fact, the Army and Navy.)



IIMURA, Jo (Minoru) - continued

IIMURA in a series of answers on pages 7 and 8 bases his statement that the table-top maneuvers had nothing to do with the Army and Navy on the ground that he did not know Army and Navy plan, that he only saw Prince KONOYE, Prime Minister, three times during his tenure as director of Institute and that plans in first table-top maneuvers when compared with subsequent events were just coincidences.)

(NOTE: In connection with his answers the stress should be placed upon the rank and number of men from the Army and Navy listed as members.)

Reference to document "First Table-top Maneuvers" being marked "Top Secret" he explains it contained numerical data on <sup>national</sup> resources and that it was surrendered only to Prime Minister. (page 8)

(NOTE: Stress <sup>above</sup> the ~~of~~ statement <sup>if</sup> it was only a "dreamy" conception of war as he says.)

(Stress (1) that Institute was set up by Japanese Government, maintained by Government, meeting of counsellors from various Government ministries were held, lectures were given by Government personnel, which he admits; and (2) after lectures were given, a plan was drawn up for total war (First Table-top Maneuvers); and (3) events which actually took place coincided to great degree with plans set out in maneuvers; and (4) the document was marked "Top Secret.")

On pages 9 and 10 IIMURA in a series of answers says in substance that the Institute served no purpose so far as the Government was concerned, but does say on page 10 "in those days the government ministries and officers were not entirely smooth and unified -- that there was some confusion and disorder among them. In order to rectify such differences it was proposed for all government officials to have as wide a scope of knowledge--that is why they were to study not only his own specialties but also other subjects and in that respect the institution had some effect." (NOTE: Stress that institute was <sup>formed</sup> for that purpose, in other words to unify and train personnel for war.)

Reference to table-top maneuvers, IIMURA was questioned on pages 11-12 concerning ten coded periods covering separate items and stated that they were the result of work of the institute and "so far as the present table plan was concerned it appears that after they were collected, the opinions of different Ministers formed the coincidences here seen."

He stated (page 13) after the outbreak of the war the students and other people of the Institute "were rather surprised at the strange coincidences but they didn't know whether such incidents had already been in the minds of the people of the War Ministry or Army General Staff." (NOTE: This should be stressed as it seems to me the state of mind of those who brought the Institute into existence is <sup>important</sup>.)

IIMURA, Jo (Minoru) - continued

Justice Webb said, R 8865:

*brains* "They based it on ~~an~~ Imperial Ordinance and gave it the best  
*plans and* the highest placed persons in the land and war followed within  
a matter of months or years, one year."

IIMURA was interrogated again on 22 May 1946, File #23, Serial #141 and he said on page 12 that the purpose of the Institute was "to prepare and strengthen government officials toward the war, that it was placed under the control of the Prime Minister and that it was to conduct fundamental investigation and research regarding the total national war and to attend to the education and training of government officials and others concerning the total national war."

He stated on page 13 that the Superintendent of the Institute notified the several departments of Government to select candidates for admission to the Institute and that the Superintendent "received his instructions from the Prime Minister."

IIMURA, Minoru, (Jo)

Attached hereto are two copies of a resume of information contained in the IFS files (other than the transcript of the record) pertaining to the above-named individual.

**SUMMARY OF PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE.**

Exhibit 868-A (R. 8816) Imperial ordinance establishing Institute. It states that the Institute "shall be under the administration of the Prime Minister and shall control basic study and research in connection with national total war and shall control the education and training of officials and others in connection with national total war."

Exhibit 869 (R. 8821). Affidavit of HORIBA, Kazuo.

Attached to the affidavit as Exhibit A is a document which consists of a list of the members of the Institute and indicates that the members thereof were high-ranking Army and Navy officials and high-ranking officials of the various ministries.

Attached to the affidavit as Exhibit B is a document which contains a list of research student members of the Institute for the first, second and third periods from April 1941 to March 1944.

Attached to the affidavit as Exhibit C is a document consisting of a list of the contents of lectures at the Research Institute as well as the name of the lecturer and his position. This document indicates that the lecturers were members of various ministries and high-ranking Army and Navy officials.

Exhibit 871 (R. 8941). This exhibit consists of the records of the progress of theoretical maneuvers for total war. These were marked "top secret."

Exhibit 686-A (R. 7416), portions of which were read into the record beginning on page 8888 and continuing at intervals to page 8928. These are excerpts from a document entitled "First Table-top Maneuvers, a Top Secret Symposium of the First Total War Military Gains of the Total War Research Institute, on 1941." It sets forth in detail the work of the Institute.

In the event it is deemed advisable to cross-examine Iimura with respect to his affidavit (Def. Doc. 164) the following suggestions might prove helpful:

In connection with paragraph 3, page 1 of his affidavit, Exhibit 868-A (R. 8816) is pertinent.

Resume by: Lester C. Dunigan

Date: 3 June 1947

IIMURA, Jo (Minoru)

Attached hereto is a summary of an interrogation of the above-named person on 20 May 1946 (Case File #455, Serial #1). This interrogation related to the Total War Research Institute.

He was also interrogated on 27 May 1946 (Case File #455, Serial #2), and that likewise related to the Total War Research Institute. He was interrogated on 22 May 1946 (Case File #23, Serial #141), and that interrogation related to the Total War Research Institute. Subject matter of the interrogations of 22 May and 27 May, mentioned above, is contained in substance in the summary of his interrogation of 20 May 1946, which is attached hereto.

He has submitted an affidavit (Defense Document #1150) which relates primarily to the efforts of General UMEZU to avoid border troubles in Manchuria.

He has also submitted an affidavit (Defense Document #1445) which has to do with the establishment of fortifications in Manchuria. In connection with the latter affidavit, the only reference I have been able to find in the files is a report by Investigator R. H. Larsh, dated 1 July 1946, wherein he states that General IIMURA was interviewed, that no stenographer was present. The report goes on to state that "General IIMURA states that construction of the fortifications was not organized while he was in Manchuria. The KWATUNG GUN CHIKIYOEUBU (Construction Section) established in 1936 or 1947 was then in charge of all construction work headed by Lt. General KAWADA, Susaburo." This report is contained in File #239, Serial #85.

The only other reference to IIMURA that I have been able to locate is contained in Case File #206, Serial #36. This is a statement of ISHIDA, Otogora, and described as "Miscellaneous Items Concerning the Military Police." This reference to IIMURA states in substance that in the early part of September 1945 following the Japanese surrender, committees were formed in the army in order to investigate the treatment of enemy airmen -- that the policy of the chairman of the central committee was to reveal the truth to the utmost -- that when the MP headquarters received this instruction the Commander, Lt. General IIMURA, instructed the commanders of various MP units to investigate and report on the actual state of things in accordance with this policy.

None of the references with the exception of Investigator Larsh's report mentioned above relates to the subject matter of the two affidavits submitted by IIMURA. I have examined the affidavits, and because of the nature of their contents I have no particular suggestions

IIMURA, Jo (Minoru) - continued

for cross-examination. Undoubtedly, the Russian Division because of their peculiar knowledge of the subject matter of the affidavits may have some suggestions.

LCD/rs  
26 August 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. David N. Sutton  
FROM : Mr. Lester C. Dunigan  
SUBJECT : IIMURA, Minoru (Jo)

1. In connection with my memorandum concerning the above-named individual which was submitted to you on 25 August, I wish to make the following further observation.
2. HORIBA, Kazuo, was the only witness called by the Prosecution in connection with the Total War Research Institute. His direct testimony begins at p. 8820 of the Record and continues to 8827.
3. HORIBA identified Exh. 869 (R. 8821) as his affidavit. As you will note from my memorandum attached to the affidavit and becoming a part thereof were three documents.
4. HORIBA underwent an extensive cross-examination which begins at p. 8828 of the Record and continues to p. 8887. There was no re-direct examination as is indicated at p. 8887.
5. In his cross-examination, HORIBA in effect contradicted his direct testimony almost entirely. This is indicated by a remark of the President of the Tribunal at p. 8888 of the Record, wherein he states "Well you see what you have done by letting him go without re-examination. He has contradicted his affidavit and his contradiction stands." In connection with the reading of some of the documents attached to HORIBA's affidavit, the President remarked at p. 8888 that "All you are proving now is that he contradicted himself."
6. I regard the documents attached to HORIBA's affidavit, Exh. 869, as being important in connection with the Total War Research Institute. It seems to me that in view of the Tribunal's remarks that an effort should be made through IIMURA to re-establish Exh. 869. In my memorandum which was submitted to you on 25 August, I believe there is material for cross-examination which would re-establish Exh. 869. In this connection, particular attention should be paid to the interrogation of IIMURA of 20 May 1946, which is attached to the memorandum. IIMURA has peculiar knowledge of the Institute since he was the Director thereof from January to October 1941. To merely cite Exh. 869 as the Record now stands, in my opinion we would not be citing anything of value to the Prosecution.
7. This suggestion is submitted to you for your consideration.

cc: F.S. Tavenner

LESTER C. DUNIGAN

**IIMURA, Minoru, (Jo)**

Attached hereto are two copies of a resume of information contained in the IPS files (other than the transcript of the record) pertaining to the above-named individual.

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Attached to the affidavit as Exhibit A is a document which consists of a list of the members of the Institute and indicates that the members thereof were high-ranking Army and Navy officials and high-ranking officials of the various ministries.

Attached to the affidavit as Exhibit B is a document which contains a list of research student/members of the Institute for the first, second and third periods from April 1941 to March 1944.

Attached to the affidavit as Exhibit C is a document consisting of a list of the contents of lectures at the Research Institute as well as the name of the lecturer and his position. This document indicates that the lecturers were members of various ministries and high-ranking Army and Navy officials.

Exhibit 871 (R. 8941). This exhibit consists of the records of the progress of theoretical maneuvers for total war. These were marked "top secret."

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In the event it is deemed advisable to cross-examine Iimura with respect to his affidavit (Def. Doc. 164) the following suggestions might prove helpful:

In connection with paragraph 3, page 1 of his affidavit, Exhibit 868-A (R. 8816) is pertinent.

In connection with paragraph 4, page 1 of the affidavit, Exhibit 869 (R. 8821) might be used and emphasis placed upon the rank and number from the Army and Navy listed as members.

In connection with paragraph 1, page 2 of the affidavit, reference could again be made to Exhibit 869 (R. 8821).

In connection with paragraph 4, page 2 of the affidavit, reference might be made to pages 9 and 10 of his interrogation, appearing on page 4 of the resume attached hereto.

In connection with paragraph 6 on page 2 of the affidavit, reference might be made to page 4 of the resume relating to "top secret" and national resources.

In connection with paragraph 7, appearing on page 2 of affidavit and continuing on page 3, reference might be made to the bottom of page 3 of the resume attached hereto and the point stressed that the Institute was in fact the Army and Navy. This can be substantiated by Exhibit 869 (R. 8821) which lists the members of the Institute and the lecturers thereof.

In connection with paragraph 5 on page 3 of the affidavit, reference might be made Iimura's interrogation of 20 May 1946, appearing on page 11 of Case No. 455, Serial 1.

This file is attached hereto and I would be glad to discuss it in advance with the person who will cross-examine Iimura.

In connection with paragraph 6 on page 3 of the affidavit, reference might be made to the bottom of page 2 of the resume where Iimura states that the Councillors were mainly bureau heads.

In connection with the last paragraph on page 3 of the affidavit, reference might be made to page 3 of the resume wherein Iimura states that "Hoshino collected public officers to foster the organization."



Resume by: L. C. Dunigan

Date : 24 March 1947

IIMURA, Jo (Minoru)

Subpoena request states he will testify as to nature and operation of "Total War Research Institute."

Major posts held

- 1924 - 1927 - Major in Intelligence Service on Western Border of Manchuria.
- 1930 - 1932 - Military Attache in Turkey.
- 1933 - 1935 - Chief of European and American Sections in Army at General Staff Office.
- 1937 - Major General -- Research Department of Army War College.
- 1938 - President of Military Staff College.
- 1939 - Lt. General, Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army.
- January 1941 - October 1941 - Chief, Total War Research Institute.
- 1943 - Commander-in-Chief, 5th Army in Manchuria.
- November 1943 - 1944 - President, Staff College.
- 1945 - Commander-in-Chief, Tokyo Defense Army.
- 1945 - Commander, Tokyo Military Police.

Decorations:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
29 Apr. 34	Intermediate Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	Army Ministry
29 Apr. 40	Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	China Incident	Army Ministry
7 June 41	Grande Ufficiale Corona d'Italia	Japanese-Italian Amity	Foreign Ministry
9 Dec. 41	Manchukuo Decoration, Order of Chukuo-Chang, 1st Grade	Japanese-Manchurian	Foreign Ministry
9 Dec. 43	Manchurian Decoration, Order of Ching Yun-Chang, 1st Grade	Japanese-Manchurian Amity	Foreign Ministry

IIMURA, Jo, (Minoru) - continued

Summary of Interrogation, May 20, 1946  
Re: Total War Research Institute

Appointed Chief January 1941 and served until October 1941.

Institute was connected with Japanese Government under direct control of Prime Minister (page 1).

Purpose of institute was to conduct investigations and research in connection with national total war (page 1).

Institute was organized in fall of 1940 and from that time until his appointment as Chief he attended the Institute (page 2).

When first organized, the Institute had only five or six leaders -- no research or investigations had been made -- "the people were discussing how to obtain their object -- by what means they were to conduct investigations or research."

"I and other people were busily engaged in the matter of education." page 3)

Instructors at the Institute were chosen from the offices of various ministries and also from the public." (page 3)

"In order to get rid of sectionalism, it was necessary for the instructors to know materials which were not their specialties, so both instructors and students had to know various subjects such as economics, diplomacy, foreign affairs, and also military affairs civilians and officers alike and from time to time lecturers were invited from experts in the departments.

Before he became Chief of the Institute, it had already started research work (page 3)

Reference to document of the Institute in August 1941, known as "First Table-Top Maneuvers", IIMURA said the international situation was tense at the time so an imaginary maneuver was conducted on a table "appointing such and such persons as ministers, etc., and they studied in case of an emergency how they should act." (page 4)

He arranged work on first table-top maneuvers -- said he received no instructions -- he consulted with officials of War Ministry (did not name them) "but the institute had some counsellors who were composed of Bureau heads of the various ministries. The ministries included the War Ministry." (page 4)

"I reviewed the plan of the Navy in an assembly of the counsellors including those representatives of the War Ministry." (page 4)

The counsellors were mainly bureau heads -- Muto attended the meeting of counsellors -- was not sure of OKA (page 4). It was his custom to send notices of meetings to all counsellors.

IIMURA, Jo (Minoru) - continued

T. HOSHINO attended meeting of counsellors -- knows that HOSHINO was acting director of the Institute (he apparently means from inception of Institute in 1940 to time he became director in January 1941). (page 5)

Does not think Admiral NAGANO was present -- that maybe NAGANO was represented by OKA. SUZUKU, Teichi, may have been present.

Referring to how table-top maneuvers originated, IIMURA said, "By that time the lectures on diplomacy, military affairs, economics, etc., had roughly been finished, so they proposed to put the result of hearing those lectures into execution of some form or other and on that basis they managed to make out such a plan under the table planning."

"That was the finishing touch to the education of the Institute and from the outset the program was continued to hold table-top maneuvers."

IIMURA would not say who in the Government was responsible for organization of Institute but "HOSHINO collected public officers to foster organization." (page 6)

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When asked if the first table-top maneuvers did not contain complete general plans for the opening of war against America, Britain, and China, IIMURA said "it was only a dreamy conception of the war entertained by the military authorities or the Government. It had nothing to do with the War Ministry or the Navy Ministry. Both the Army and Navy gave the Institute no program for work. (Compare answer above with number of staff lecturers from the Army and Navy ministries -- also use list of members from Army and Navy on list of members of Institute in EX. 869.

In connection with IIMURA's statement that the Army and Navy gave the Institute no program for work, it may be stressed that it was not necessary that the Institute was to a large degree, in fact, the Army and Navy.)

IIMURA, Jo (Minoru) - continued

IIMURA in a series of answers on pages 7 and 8 bases his statement that the table-top maneuvers had nothing to do with the Army and Navy on the ground that he did not know Army and Navy plan, that he only saw Prince KONOYE, Prime Minister, three times during his tenure as director of Institute and that plans in first table-top maneuvers when compared with subsequent events were just coincidences.)

(NOTE: In connection with his answers the stress should be placed upon the rank and number of men from the Army and Navy listed as members.)

Reference to document "First Table-top Maneuvers", being marked "Top Secret" he explains it contained numerical data on American resources and that it was surrendered only to Prime Minister. (page 8)

(NOTE: Stress of the statement that it was only a "dreamy" conception of war as he says.)

(Stress (1) that Institute was set up by Japanese Government, maintained by Government, meeting of counsellors from various Government ministries were held, lectures were given by Government personnel, which he admits; and (2) after lectures were given, a plan was drawn up for total war (First Table-top Maneuvers); and (3) events which actually took place coincided to great degree with plans set out in maneuvers; and (4) the document was marked "Top Secret.")

On pages 9 and 10 IIMURA in a series of answers says in substance that the Institute served no purpose so far as the Government was concerned, but does say on page 10 "in those days the government ministries and officers were not entirely smooth and unified -- that there was some confusion and disorder among them. In order to rectify such differences it was proposed for all government officials to have as wide a scope of knowledge--that is why they were to study not only his own specialties but also other subjects and in that respect the institution had some effect. (NOTE: Stress that institute was economically for that purpose, in other words to unify and train personnel for war.

Reference to table-top maneuvers, IIMURA was questioned on pages 11-12 concerning ten coded periods covering separate items and stated that they were the result of work of the institute and "so far as the present table plan was concerned it appears that after they collected, the opinions of different Ministers formed the coincidences here seen."

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IIMURA, Jo (Minoru) - continued

Justice Webb said, R 8865:

"They based it on an Imperial Ordinance and gave it the best plans in the highest placed persons in the land and war followed within a matter of months or years, one year."

IIMURA was interrogated again on 23 May 1946, File #23, Serial #141 and he said on page 12 that the purpose of the Institute was "to prepare and strengthen government officials toward the war, that it was placed under the control of the Prime Minister and that it was to conduct fundamental investigation and research regarding the total national war and to attend to the education and training of government officials and others concerning the total national war."

He stated on page 13 that the Superintendent of the Institute notified the several departments of Government to select candidates for admission to the Institute and that the Superintendent "received his instructions from the Prime Minister."

Mr. DeWagon

4 March 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. SUTTON

SUBJECT : Total War Research Institute

1. It is believed that the Record reflects the following views re Subject:

a. That Subject was a pure and disinterested research body for determining the causes and cure of war.

b. That Subject was designed to train personnel for participation in contemplated total war.

2. It is believed that the following biographical facts on Lieutenant General Yuzuru (or Jo) IIMURA, the head of this Institute, indicate that the latter view is the correct one.

IIMURA, JO (Yuzuru)

1. Major General, Research Dept. of Army War College, 1937 (239 SER 85)
2. President of Military Staff College, 1938 (Biogs. 30)
3. Lt. Gen., Chief of Staff Kwantung Army, Oct. 1939 (239 SER 85)
4. (Interviewed in connection with use of cobble labor for construction of fortifications in Manchuria.) (239 SER 85)
5. Chief, Total War Research Institute, January 1941 (IPS 2403)  
Oct. 1941 (239 SER 85)
6. Comm.-in-Chief, 5th Army TOAN Oct. 1943 (239 SER 85)
7. President Staff College, Nov. 1943-1944 (239 SER 85 and)  
(Biogs. 30 )
8. Comm.-in-Chief Tokyo District Army, June 1945 (Biogs. 30)

YALE MAXON  
Comdr, USNR

1111

See file 23, serial 141 for  
interrogation of Sumuro which  
concerns mainly Total War  
Research Institute.

Attached to interrogation is

1. List of members of the institute  
and name in parenthesis.
2. List of students of the institute
3. List of the content of the lectures.

Object of institute was to  
prepare Japan for Total War.

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See Document 1795 which is  
Imperial Ordinance 648 establishing  
control of Total War Research  
Institute. Ordinance dated 30 September  
1940.

The ordinance clearly provides  
that the institute shall be  
directly under the control of the  
Prime Minister thus definitely  
establishing a governmental relationship  
& responsibility.

IIMURA, Minoru

Request by: TOJO, Hideki

Address: 50 Soshigaya 2 chome  
Setagaya-ku, Tokyo

President of "Total War Research Institute".

This witness will testify as to the nature and operation of this  
Institute.



IIMURA, Minoru ( )

Date	Class of Decoration	Achievement	Recommending Ministry
29 Apr. 1934	Intermediate Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun.	Manchurian Incident	Army Ministry
29 Apr. 1940	Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	China Incident	Army Ministry
7 June 1941	Grande Ufficiale Corona d'Italia	Japanese-Italian Amity	Foreign Ministry
9 Dec. 1941	Manchukuo Decoration, Order of Chukuo-Chang, 1st Grade	Japanese-Manchurian Amity	Foreign Ministry
9 Dec. 1943	Manchurian Decoration, Order of Ching Yun-Chang, 1st Grade	Japanese-Manchurian Amity	Foreign Ministry

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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT

IIMURA, Minoru

According to the usual custom of our country, having sworn an oath in the attached sheet depose as follows:

I was appointed Chief of Staff of the KWANTUNG Army at the same time that General Umezu was appointed Commander-in-Chief, on 7 September 1939, and held that post until October 1940. In October 1941, I was appointed Commander of the 5th Army, which had its headquarters in Tongan on the Manchoukuo-Soviet border, and there served under the command of General Umezu for two years, until October 1943.

- I. Our first duty as newly-appointed subordinates under General Umezu in September 1939 was to settle the Nomonhan Incident, according to Tokyo's instructions. Upon his appointment, General Umezu gave us instructions, the main points of which were as below:
- (1) Study withdrawal of the border guard line and other matters in order to prevent border troubles in future.
  - (2) All subordinates were to understand General Umezu's intentions well and were not allowed to deviate from his intentions.
  - (3) Subordinates were always to keep their commander-in-chief very

Def. Doc. # 1150

well informed. When important matters were being investigated or planned the main points were to be reported to the commander-in-chief first, and then investigation in detail should be made. Plans were, even while in progress, to be reported to the commander-in-chief, and were to be gradually completed according to his instructions.

During the full year when I served as chief of staff all subordinates were completely under General Umezu's command concerning his above-mentioned policies. This complete control over his men by Umezu was not only over the but also extended down to all troops under his command. I believe this complete command by Umezu over his men was based upon his firm determination not to cause border troubles like the Nomonhan Incident.

Further, he gave attention to the expenditure of the special funds, which was very likely to be the cause of undesirable incidents, and he established regulations that use of more than ¥10,000 of the secret funds required approval of the commander-in-chief.

## II. Umezu's Efforts in Preventing Border Troubles

### (1) The "Border Guard Regulations of the Kwantung Army"

The "Border Guard Regulations" were made by the commander-in-chief and his subordinates together, being based on Umezu's instructions given upon his appointment and running parallel to the settlement of the Nomonhan Incident, in order to avoid border troubles.

I shall explain below concerning the "Border Guard Regulations" according to what I recall from my memory,

Def. Doc. 1150

- a. Complete prevention of border troubles was to be the principle.
- b. A Border Guard Line was to be established behind the border, except in places where the border was very clear, and troop activities were prohibited beyond the Border Guard Line.
- c. The area between the Border Guard Line and the border was to be made a non-militarized zone. Only patrol parties made up of very small numbers of men might be dispatched to the non-militarized zone, if any were required.
- d. A patrol party of course, and even troops stationed on or inside the Border Guard Line, were prohibited the use of arms except in case of absolute necessity for selfdefense. (Transfer of troops in case of border trouble might not be done without operation orders from the commander-in-chief; this was particularly explained at the time the "Border Guard Regulations" were ordered.)
- e. Even in case of illegal crossing of the border by Soviet planes, counter-attack by plane was strictly prohibited, though ground fire might be used.
- f. If an incident occurred on the border it was to be reported immediately to higher headquarters (including Kwantung Army Headquarters). Such reports were to be given priority over everything else.

As was mentioned above, the "Border Guard Regulations" were made according to Umezumi's intention, based upon current general conditions and Tokyo policy, to avoid any border troubles and keep peace in

REF. Doc. # 1150

the north. Based on these "Border Guard Regulations", every field commander made his "border guard regulations" in detail. However, a field commander was not alone responsible for making these, but it was only permitted after close investigation by Umezu himself.

Umezu also made strong representations to the Manchoukuoan side concerning prevention of border troubles, since vacant places along the border--not guarded by the Japanese army-- were guarded by the Manchoukuoan police.

(2) Other Efforts of Umezu to Avoid Border Troubles

It was Umezu's firm determination from the time of his appointment to avoid border troubles in order to keep peace in the north. His determination was further strengthened, I believe, when the Emperor gave him advice concerning peace in the north at the time he went to Tokyo in December 1939.

The fact that there was not a border clash even once in his long term of five years in the Kwantung Army is clear evidence of this.

The Emperor's advice was conveyed to us at the office of the commander-in-chief and also at the Army Commanders conferences, in December 1939.

Umezu used to have army commanders conferences once or twice a year.

At every conference, including of course the first conference in October 1939, he called his men's attention to prevention of border troubles by saying: "A fire must be stopped while it is small. If border trouble unfortunately happens--though it should have been prevented beforehand-- it is desired that the army commander be on the spot to prevent expansion

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of the incident. I myself will go to the spot in order to settle it." The state of affairs concerning prevention of border trouble was always included in the reports of army commanders to the Army Commanders Conference. This situation was always true throughout my term as chief of staff, and also during my term as commander of the 5th Army under the command of Umezu after October 1941.

When I investigated the men's attitude toward prevention of border troubles immediately after reporting as commander of the 5th Army in October 1941, I recognized that the "Border Guard Regulations" had been very well brought home to every man; and a term "prevention of border trouble" was common among the men. All this was good evidence that Umezu's wishes had been well drilled into all men under his command. In addition to giving instructions, Umezu not only went himself, but also sent his staff-officers to the front whenever there were chances for inspection to see how his order was being carried out. I also inspected the eastern front many times.

Following the outbreak of the Pacific war, Umezu, realizing the necessity of keeping peace in the north, again issued written instructions to avoid border troubles, as well as inspecting the whole front line himself for the purpose of preventing trouble. I received this order at Tonan H.Q.

What I want to state further is Umezu's attitude toward reinforcement of the Kwantung Army while I was chief of staff. We subordinates were very much worried about the defence of Manchoukuo, as the troops had sustained losses and the real power of the Soviet had become clear, as it was right after the Nomonhan Incident, and we used to feel uneasiness just after the ice

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melted on the frontier rivers. Though we subordinates wanted reinforcement, Umezu would not permit our proposed reinforcement, saying, "We are in the middle of the China Incident and its settlement is most needed. At this time we should not ask Tokyo for reinforcement of the Kwantung Army; the shortage of man-power can be made up for by preventing border troubles and by strengthening border fortifications." One division (the 25th Division) was reinforced after the Nomonhan Incident, but this was not by Umezu's proposal.

After the outbreak of the Pacific war (I was then the commander of the 5th Army) a considerable number of men was taken away from the Kwantung Army, but Umezu told us that we should be glad to sacrifice man-power because of general conditions as a whole. At this time also we were uneasy because of the proportion between their strength and ours.

All I have stated above is, I believe, good evidence of Umezu's unchangeable, firm determination to keep peace in the north.

OATH

15 January 1947

Tokyo

I hereby swear that I shall state nothing but the truth according to my conscience, neither concealing nor adding anything.

(signed) IIMURA Minoru

I hereby certify that the above was duly sworn in my presence and signed at Tokyo, the same day.

(signed) MIYATA Mitsuo

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On this 15 day of Jan. 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT IIMURA, Minoru (seal)

I, MIYATA, Mitsuo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At same place.

Witness: (signed) MIYATA, Mitsuo (seal)



Def. Doc. # 1150

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowlege and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke, .

Tokyo, Japan

Date 12 May 1947

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI SADA0, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: IIMURA Minoru

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

On this 26 day of April, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT IIMURA Minoru (seal)

I, KIYOSE Ichiro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) KIYOSE Ichiro (seal)

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

1. I hereby undertake to give an account of the fortifications reported to have been built in Manchuria.

As is stated at the end of the deposition which I made on August 17, 1946, it was immediately after the Nomonhan Incident that I was appointed Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. Since we had suffered a great damage and loss of men during that incident, we felt considerable insecure in regard to the defense of Manchuria. The measure that Commander-in-Chief Umezū adopted to meet the situation was to avert further border disputes, to construct defense installations, especially new fortifications and to strengthen the old ones. Accordingly, both the construction and strengthening of fortifications were entirely of defensive nature, and by no means of offensive nature. The depth of the positions of our fortifications can not perhaps be said short, but compared with that of Russian works, it would probably seem less great. This, however, was due to the tactical idea of the Japanese Army. Once their defense positions were set up, it was the principle of the Japanese army to defend them to the death, yielding not an inch of ground to the enemy.

2. About the construction of air-bases and air-fields.

During the period September, 1939--October, 1940, while I

DEF. DOC. #1445 .

was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, there were not many air-bases and air-fields constructed, though plans to increase them were already in existence. In those days the Japanese air-forces in Manchuria were extremely meager, and so, in order to mitigate the loss and damage that we were likely to suffer at the hands of our enemy it was felt necessary that air-bases should be scattered far and wide to avoid receiving damages by one attack and that enemy raids should be rendered futile by freely moving our airplanes. Thus, it was only as a negative means to preserve our fighting strength that numbers of air-bases and air-fields were constructed.

3. About the river-crafts on the Sungari, Manchuria.

The Soviet river-crafts, including large-sized gun-boats were far superior to ours in number, so that it was absolutely impossible for Japan or Manchuria to challenge the Soviet forces to a fight on the river; we were to content ourselves with constructing fortifications in the north of Chiamussu to defend in case the Soviet forces should come up the river on their offensive expedition. Such being the circumstances, it, was quite out of the question for us to attempt on our own initiative to operate against the Soviets on the Amur river when we were provided with a meager number of river-boats.

DEF. DOC. #1445

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Signed IIMURA Minoru (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan

Date 12 April 1947

Iimura Minoru's Affidavit

## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al )	}	AFFIDAVIT OF IIMURA, Minoru
vs )		
ARAKI, Sadao, et al )		

Having first duly sworn on oath, as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I am IIMURA, Minoru, an ex-Lieutenant General.

2. From April, 1921, to March, 1922, I served in the Army General Staff as a member of a section of which General ARAKI was the chief. Again from August, 1928, to August, 1929, I served as instructor in the Army Staff College of which the General was the President. Thus I served twice as a subordinate officer of the General.

3. During his term of office as President of the Army Staff College, Gen. ARAKI, unlike his predecessors, used to lay special stress on the culture of the moral character as well as technical faculties of the students as officers of the Japanese Army. Whenever he gave an instruction or special lecture to the students, he did not fail to advise them to cultivate their moral character so that they might be qualified in the future to command large forces or assist superior officers. After outlining the course of the First World War, he would teach the students that it was our old tradition that no war be opened without sufficient reasons justifying it. He liked to trace the tragic end of those who were driven by his ambition to fight unjustifiable wars. In speaking of Napoleon he used to say that although with his brilliant genius, adamant will and manly and courageous character, he was a model of soldiers, the motives of his wars and above all his behavior after the enthronement, were quite contrary to the principles of our Imperial Army, and would add that the students should take advantage of the object lessons given by Napoleon. He often taught the students how to behave when in the future they might be in some vital positions of the state. He taught them not to worry about the small extent of the Japanese territory, but to keep to the O-Yashima (the original islands of the Japanese Empire), saying: "If we manifest the virtues of our Empire and clarify the light of our nation, our country will prosper of its own accord. Never suffer our country to be invaded by other nations, but never think of invading other countries. The true aim of our Army lies in manifesting the Imperial virtues." In regard to the behavior of soldiers in battle fields, the General always remarked that strict discipline be enforced so that there could be no room for criticism against the Army of the Japanese Empire which was one of the greatest Powers in the world. In this connection, he said, tracing his own personal experiences during the Russo-Japanese War, that the psychology at the front was a strange thing, that therefore it was very difficult even for highly cultured officers to control themselves in battles and that it was necessary, especially for the graduates of the Army Staff College, to cultivate their virtues as well as intellectual faculties. He emphasized that, besides complying with international treaties, it was necessary to refrain from resorting to any weapons or modes of operation which would involve injuries to civilians, and warned them never to listen to the abhorrent proposals in Europe that noxious gases and bacteria be used in war.

He said that victory should be perpetuated and that if any one of the graduates of the Army Staff College should do anything which would provoke resentment on the part of the enemy forces or enemy nation, it would be a shame to the College.

He taught his students that despite the general state of confusion prevailing at that time, none of them should commit any imprudent act which might be inconsistent with his duties, and that they should elevate their ideas and widen their range of view. Above all it is to be mentioned here that during his term of office as President of the College, the General gave to the students a precedent-breaking task entitled "Rules of Conduct for Japanese Officers," to be answered by each student. By commenting upon the answers of the students, the General showed them specifically all the above principles.

4. During his term of office at the Army Staff College, Gen. ARAKI annually took the second-year class students of the College on a trip to Manchuria in order to study the historic remains of the Russo-Japanese War. I also took part in this trip for about three weeks in my capacity as regular instructor on the history of war for the class. It was in the spring of 1929.

From the time of our departure from the harbor of Kobe, the General tried to be in constant contact with the students and utilized all the time he could spare to talk with them with a view to their moral education. I was always present at such talks as regular instructor. His talks mainly concerned his personal experiences in the Russo-Japanese War in which he took part as adjutant of the Umezawa Mixed Brigade. He narrated the circumstances of the battles at the actual spots.

What impressed the students as well as myself was the fact that there was not the slightest sign of bellicosity in his talk. On the contrary, he preferred to dwell upon the miseries and hardships of war, citing such sayings as: "War is the gravest matter of the state. Whoever goes to war cannot be sure about the possible place of his end." - a quotation from Sun-tse, a Chinese classical writer on strategy. His tone was always very grave and somber. The General consistently held that every soldier should conform himself to the Emperor's will, and in his instructions to the students he used to quote the Imperial rescripts of the peace-loving emperors of Japan. Especially he often quoted the Imperial Rescript which the Emperor Meiji gave to the members of his army and navy in 1882 in order to show that the duty of the Japanese Army and Navy exclusively consisted in the defence of the country, and by no means in aggression.

5. As regards war mementos, he taught: "Never think of taking back mementos from the battle field. Such an idea borders on taking spoils of war. The meritorious deeds of a soldier in battle are enough as his trophy. If he may return home alive, his flesh and blood will make the finest trophy for him. If you wish to take something, take a broken piece of cannon ball, and nothing more."

6. As stated above, neither in the General Staff nor in the Staff College could I hear the General utter anything which sounded aggressive or bellicose. On the contrary, I often heard him say that the true nature of "bu" - i.e., military arts in general - lay in the prevention of war, as was clearly shown by the etymology of the Chinese character "bu" which derived its origin from "giving up arms."

7. It happened one day during the above mentioned trip to Manchuria that we passed through a village of Manchurians, where we found the abandoned corpse of a Manchurian lying on the ground. On discovering the body, the General called the students together and said in a sad and impressive tone: "Poor fellow! This dead man may, like other people, have parents and brothers. Yet in this remote place there is none to take care of him in agonies of death, and none to bury him after death." We were all so deeply moved by his humane compassion that all of us took off our caps to express sorrows for the dead. We afterwards learned from a farmer in the neighborhood that the dead man had entered the village to steal hens and had been discovered and killed by the villagers with clubs. The farmer added that within a few days or so dogs wandering here and there would demolish the body. We were very much astonished by the disorder in Manchuria at that time.

8. The General always welcomed his visitors, whether they were civilians, his subordinate officers or young students, respected their personality and treated them with courtesy, kindness and sympathy. Whenever young officers were going to resort to imprudent actions, he used to dissuade them from such frivolities.

During the above mentioned trip to Manchuria, he sometimes held a table talk with the students. At such meetings he would show the right way for the Japanese and especially for the Japanese soldiers. "Be manly and upright", "be upright and broad-hearted", etc. These were his favorite mottoes which were the rules of conduct for all those who were enlightened by him.

On this 26th day of  
August, 1947, at Tokyo.

DEPONENT IIMURA, Minoru (seal)

I, HASUOKA, Takaaki, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
at Tokyo

Witness (signed) HASUOKA, Takaaki (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

IIMURA, Minoru (seal)



LCD/rs  
10 September 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. David N. Sutton  
FROM : Mr. Lester C. Dunigan  
SUBJECT : IIMURA, Minoru

1. The above-named person has testified on three prior occasions. His testimony is included in R. 23395-23414 -- R. 23472-23477 -- R. 27066-27071.
2. He has now submitted a new affidavit (Def. Doc. 2226). This affidavit has to do with the personal defense of General ARAKI.
3. All of the information pertaining to IIMURA which is contained in the IPS files has previously been furnished to you. I would suggest that the present affidavit be considered by the attorney assigned to General ARAKI.

LESTER C. DUNIGAN

m. Iinuma

-1-

Checked by Ogito.

Translated by  
HATATE, Kihel.

Permanent Domicile: AICHI  
~~Aichi~~ Prefecture

Social Status: Military Rank Class

Born: Nov 25, 1888

Name IINUMA, Mamoru

1905

July 10 Graduated from the NAGOYA Local Military Preparatory School.

1907

May 28 Graduated from the Central Military Preparatory School.

Appointed a ~~cadet~~ cadet.

May 31 Ordered to be officer on Probation.

Assigned  
Detailed to the 33rd Infantry Regiment.

Dec 1 Entered ~~into~~ the military Academy.

1909

May 27 Graduated from above school and returned to the Home Regiment.

Appointed a probationary officer.

May 30 Ordered to be Cadet

Dec 25 Appointed a 2nd Lieutenant, Infantry.

Cadet

Attached to the 51st  
55th Infantry Regiment.

m. Dinama

-2-

1910 Feb 21	Conferred <del>with</del> the Senior Grade of the 8th Court Rank	
1913 Feb 3	Appointed 1st Lieutenant, Infantry,	Cabinet
Apr 21	Conferred with the Junior Grade of the 7th Court Rank	
1916 Dec 9	Ordered to enter the <sup>Military</sup> Staff College.	
1918 May 20	Conferred with Senior Grade of 7th Court Rank	Cabinet
1919 Oct 6	Appointed Captain, Infantry	Cabinet
Dec 24	Relieved <del>from</del> <sup>of present post</sup> the Principal office and assigned <sup>a</sup> Company Commander of the 51st Infantry Regiment. and ordered to duty in	
1920 Jun 28	Attached to the Army Transport <sup>War Ministry</sup> Headquarters	
	Relieved <sup>of present post</sup> from the Principal office	

	And assigned a member of the Army	
	Transport <sup>Cation</sup> Headquarters.	war ministry
1920 Nov 1	Decorated with the 5th <sup>Class Imperial</sup> Order of <del>merit with</del> Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
	Awarded with 620 Yen. <del>for the</del> <del>in</del> meritorious services in the war between 1915 <sup>to</sup> and 1920	
1922 Apr 1	Relieved from the <sup>present post</sup> Principal office and assigned <sup>as a</sup> Staff officer of the 20th Division.	war ministry
1923 Jul 31	Conferred the Junior Grade of 6th Court Rank	
1924 May 28	Relieved from the <sup>of present post</sup> Principal office and assigned <sup>as a</sup> member of the General Staff I + P.	war ministry

M. Suenami

-4-

1924 Dec 17	Concurrently assigned <del>to Faculty</del> <sup>Military</sup> Instructor at the <sup>Military</sup> Staff College.	War ministry
1925 May 1	Appointed Major, Infantry	Cabinet
Mar. 15 1927 <del>Mar 15</del>	Relieved from the <sup>present post</sup> <del>Principal</del> and also from the <sup>post,</sup> additional offices; and assigned as <del>to</del> Battalion Commander of the 1st Infantry Regiment	War ministry
1928 Mar 24	Assigned <del>to</del> <sup>as</sup> Instructor at the Infantry school concurrently <del>to</del> <sup>made</sup> member of the Research Department of <sup>the</sup> same school.	War ministry
1928 Nov 2	Decorated with the <sup>Class</sup> 4th <del>Order of merit</del> with the Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
1928 Sep 1	Conferred with Senior Grade of the 6th Court Rank	

M. Jimena

1929 mar. 16	appointed Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry	Cabinet
1930 Aug 1	Assigned <del>to</del> <sup>a</sup> staff officer of the 3rd Division	War ministry
1932 Aug 8	Assigned <del>to</del> <sup>an</sup> Instructor of the Army Infantry school, concurrently made a <del>to</del> member of the Research Department of <sup>the</sup> same school	War ministry
1933 may 8	Assigned <del>to</del> <sup>an</sup> Instructor of the Military Staff College, <del>Army Infantry School</del>	War ministry
1933 Aug 1	Appointed Colonel, Infantry	
1933 Sept 1	Conferred with the Junior Grade of the 5th Court Rank	
1934 Aug 1	Assigned <del>to</del> <sup>a</sup> Commander of the 2nd KONOYE <del>Group</del> 2nd Infantry Regiment.	War ministry

1935 Nov 2	Decorated with the <sup>(Class Imperial)</sup> 3rd Order of Merit with <del>the order of</del> the Sacred Treasure	
1936 Aug 1	Assigned <del>to</del> <sup>as Commander of the</sup> <del>Chief of the</del> Regular Course Students' Corp. of the Military Academy	War ministry
1937 Aug 2	Appointed Major-General, <del>Infantry</del>	Cabinet
"	Assigned <del>to</del> <sup>as Executive Officer</sup> <del>Secretary</del> of the Preparatory <del>Junior</del> Course of the Military Academy	
	Not mentioned <sup>in</sup> <del>with</del> the	
	Official Gazette	War ministry
1937 Sept 1	Conferred with the Senior Grade of 5th Court Rank	
1938 Nov 9	Assigned <del>to</del> <sup>as</sup> Director of the Per- sonnel Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry	

1938

Nov 9

Appointed ~~as a~~ <sup>a suite-member</sup> ~~envoy's suite~~ of the War  
General  
Minister at the Imperial Headquarters

The original post remained as before.  
The ~~present~~ office remained as ever

Not mentioned ~~with~~ <sup>in</sup> the Official Gazette, War  
Ministry

1938

Nov 9

Appointed <sup>Chairman</sup> ~~President~~ of the <sup>Regular</sup> ~~Ordinary~~

Civil Service Examination Committee;

<sup>made a</sup> <sup>Regular</sup> member of the Civil Service ~~Penishment~~

~~Disciplinary~~ <sup>Ordinary</sup> Committee; a member of the

Civil Service Limitation Committee;

<sup>Director</sup> ~~President~~ of the <sup>Higher Examination Com-</sup> ~~mittee~~ <sup>mittee</sup> for the Priests of the National Shrines;

National Shrine Higher Examination

Director of the Primary Examination for  
Committee ~~President~~ of the Shinto

the Priests of the National shrines, ~~ordi-~~

~~nary Examination Committee~~

War  
Ministry



1938 Nov 24

Appointed a  
~~Assigned to~~ member of the Committee

for the <sup>of the Enterprises</sup> Protection ~~of the~~ business of the  
Businessmen  
~~Traders~~ called to the color.

Cabinet

1938 Nov 26

Appointed  
~~Assigned to~~ member of the Pension

Examination  
Examination Committee.

Cabinet

1938 Nov 30

Appointed a member of the Pension

Depository Council.

Cabinet

1938 Dec 3

Appointed a  
~~Assigned~~ Councillor of the

Wounded Soldiers' Protection

Board; Appointed a  
~~Assigned~~ member of the

Central Social <sup>Enterprise</sup> ~~Trade~~ Committee;

Appointed a  
~~Assigned~~ member of the Central

Employment Agency Committee. Cabinet

1939

Jan 14 Abolished on Oct 11, 1939 // <sup>TN</sup> stamped in red ink

(Imperial ordinance No. 697) // <sup>TN</sup> written in red ink

Appointed an extraordinary  
~~Assigned~~ temporary member of the

~~Council for Protection Measure for~~  
~~Council for~~

the Disabled Ex-Service ~~men~~ <sup>new</sup>

Cabinet

1939 Jul 15

~~Abolished~~ <sup>The</sup> office of Councillor of the Wounded

<sup>was abolished</sup>  
Soldiers' Protection Board, by the Imperial

Ordinance No. 479 of 1939 // <sup>TN</sup> written in

red ink

1939 Aug 12

Assigned Councillor of the Military

Protection Board

Cabinet

1939 Oct 2

Appointed Lieutenant General.

Cabinet

Relieved from the <sup>post of</sup> duty of

M. Dinunia

suite member

~~Enoy's suite~~ of the War Minister at

General  
the Imperial Headquarters

war  
ministry

1939 Oct. 2.

~~date~~

~~date~~

Appointed a member of the ~~Ordinary~~ Regular

Civil Service Limitation Committee

War Ministry  
~~the same~~

1939

Oct 9

Relieved <sup>of post</sup> from the office of member

of the Committee for Protection

of Enterprises of Businessmen <sup>to</sup> ~~the~~ called for

the Color.

Cabinet

1939 Oct 10

Relieved <sup>of post as</sup> from the office of member

of the Pension Examination Committee

Cabinet

~~1939 Oct 10~~

~~Relieved of post as member of the office of member of Pension~~

(post as

1939 Oct 15

Relieved of the office of member of

the Central Social <sup>Enterprise</sup> ~~work~~ Committee

at  
by his own request.

Cabinet

1939 Oct. 10.

Relieved as member of the Pension Depository Council,

Cabinet

1939 Nov 22

Relieved <sup>of post as</sup> from the office of Councillor.

M. Simma

-11-

		of the Military Protection Board	Cabinet
1939	Dec 1	Relieved <sup>of position with</sup> from the office attached to the Eastern East District Defense Headquarters.	was ministry
1939	Dec 1	Appointed Commander of the 110th Division. Not mentioned <sup>in</sup> with the official gazette / T.N. Stamped in red ink /	Cabinet
1940	Jan 15	Decorated with the <sup>Class Imperial</sup> 2nd Order of merit <del>with</del> Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
1939	Dec 28	Conferred with the Junior Grade of the 4th Court Rank.	
1942	Jan 15	Conferred with the Senior Grade of the 4th Court Rank	

Mr. Dinnia

-12-

1940

Apr 29

Decorated with the 1st <sup>Class</sup> Order of

merit ~~with~~ <sup>of</sup> the Grand Cordon

of the Imperial Order of the

Rising Sun

Decorated with the 2nd <sup>Class</sup> Imperial

military ~~and~~ Order of the

Golden Kite.

Both for meritorious services in  
By the merit of the ~~Chinese~~

the CHINA  
Incident,

1942

Aug

Placed on the First Reserve, ~~list~~

1942

Sep 30

Received one  
~~Elevated by one grade of the~~

<sup>promotion</sup>  
Court Rank by His Majesty's

special grace.

Conferred with the Junior Grade of

M. Dinunia

3rd Court Rank

1945

Feb 20 Appointed Commander of the 96th Division

Not mentioned <sup>in the</sup> Official Gazette

/T.N.  
/stamped in red ink/

Cabinet

Curriculum Vitae

Name: IMURA, Jo.

Date of Birth: 21 May 1888.

- 28 May 1907: Graduated from Preparatory Military School.
- 31 May 1907: Appointed Military Cadet.  
Attached to 3rd Guard Infantry Regiment.
- 1 Dec 1907: Entered Military Academy.
- 27 May 1909: Graduated from Military Academy and rejoined above  
Regiment.  
Appointed Probational Officer.
- 25 Dec 1909: Appointed Sublieutenant of Infantry.
- 3 Feb 1913: Promoted to Lieutenant of Infantry.
- 5 Sep 1917: Assigned to Secretariate, War Ministry.
- 18 Dec 1918: Relieved of assignment to above Ministry.
- 14 Jun 1919: Promoted to Captain of Infantry.
- 20 Aug 1924: Promoted to Major of Infantry.
- 10 Dec 1926: Appointed Instructor of Strategy at Military  
Staff College.
- 10 Aug 1928: Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel of Infantry.
- 30 Jan 1930: Relieved of Principal Office.  
Appointed Military Attaché of Embassy in Turkey.
- 28 May 1932: Appointed Instructor of Strategy at Military  
Staff College.
- 8 Aug 1932: Promoted to Colonel of Infantry.
- 18 Mar 1933: Appointed Chief of a Section, General Staff Office.
- 27 Sep 1933: Concurrently appointed Instructor of Strategy at  
Military Staff College.

- 22 Jun 1945: Appointed Commander of Tokyo Defence Forces.  
15 Mar 1935: Appointed Commander of 61st Infantry Regiment.  
Not reported in Official Gazette.  
1 Mar 1937: Promoted to Major-General.  
2 Jul 1945: Appointed Commander of District under jurisdiction of  
Appointed Chief Secretary of Post Graduate Course,  
Tokyo Division. Former Office held as before. Not  
Military Staff College; and concurrently appointed  
reported in Official Gazette.  
Instructor of Strategy at above College.  
2 Jul 1945: Granted Junior 3rd Class of Court Rank  
10 Dec 1938: Appointed President of Military Staff College.  
10 Mar 1940: Appointed Provisional Member of Committee for Investi-  
1 Aug 1939: Promoted to Lieutenant General.  
gation about War.  
7 Sep 1939: Appointed Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army.  
16 Sep 1939: Appointed Delegate to Japanese-Manchurian Joint  
Economic Committee.  
Appointed Delegate to Manchurian Exploitation Committee.  
7 Nov 1940: Relieved of Delegateship to Japanese-Manchurian Joint  
Economic Committee.  
Relieved of Delegateship to Manchurian Exploitation Commit-  
tee.  
11 Jan 1941: Appointed Director of Institute for Studies in Total  
Warfare.  
Appointed 1st Rank Official of Higher Civil Service.  
15 Oct 1941: Relieved of Principal Office.  
Appointed Commander of 5th Army. Not published in  
Official Gazette.  
29 Apr 1940: Decorated with 1st Class Order of Rising Sun in  
recognition of service rendered in Sino-Japanese Conflict.  
26 Dec 1944: Appointed Commander of 2nd Theatre Army. Not  
reported in Official Gazette.



IIMURA, Minoru

Request by: TOJO, Hideki

Address: 50 Soshigaya 2 chome  
Setagaya-ku, Tokyo

President of "Total War Research Institute".

This witness will testify as to the nature and operation of this  
Institute.

(700)

IIMURA, Minoru

Request by: Tojo, Hideki

address: 50 Sashigaya 2 chome,  
Setagaya-ku, Tokyo.

President of "Total War Research Institute"

This witness will testify as to the  
nature and operation of the Institute.

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF IIMURA, MINORU

27066  
27067

\* The witness identified exhibit No. 3030 and verified it.  
\* The affidavit stated that the witness was Director of the Total Warfare Institute from January through October 1941. Other countries had similar institutes. Following their example, the institute was founded in August 1940.

27068

It was provided that, under the Premier's control, the institute should take charge of fundamental investigation and research into total warfare, and the education and training of officials and others concerning the nation's total warfare. All Ministries, the Army and Navy, and Premier KONOYE, who was responsible for administering, were scarcely interested in the institute, and the witness received no instructions, advice, or suggestion from any quarter. Consequently, its business was carried out \* from an independent standpoint.

First, education and training were undertaken. Development and practical education was sought for. The main subjects comprised lectures on fundamental knowledge in politics, economics, thought and military science, physical education, theoretical exercises, inspections and tours. When the witness first joined, there already existed the training program in theoretical exercises, an annual function of the institute. No person except Staff of the Institute, gave instruction or guidance. The term was about a month.

27069

The reason for adopting current conditions in their hypotheses at the beginning of theoretical exercises was that if anything else had been adopted it would have been difficult for the students to imagine themselves in operations. \* The various conditions arising from the hypotheses were no more than suppositions adopted for the sake of exercises. The object of the exercises was not the supposed situation, but training in coordinated actions based on the situation.

The hypotheses and supposed situations had no connection with actual policies of the authorities concerned. This was because actual knowledge of these matters were only known to the authorities who would never have divulged them. Since the exercises were partly opened to the public, it was not possible or permissible to use actual government policy. The reason for marking them strictly confidential was that they contained some secret national statistics.

The result of the research was probably reported to the Cabinet, which was in direct charge of the Institute, but it was never reported to other quarters or of other ministries or to the military, and they were never instructed by them.

Page

27070 The use of the results of this study in actual policies was \* out of the question because of the lack of time needed for scrutiny and because of the aims. Students, who were first selected by Ministers and other organizations and examined by the Institute, were selected and formally appointed by the Cabinet as students. All were young men of an average age of 32, and no one held any responsible position. There was one judge of low grade.

The budget was ¥160,000 a year, of which half was for personnel expenses and the other half for office expenses. It was too small for making any activity possible. The Institute would seem to be of considerable importance from its name and stipulations as to its organization, but it was nothing but an Institute for educating junior officials, and they could not be educated successfully. Not a single result of their studies was used in drawing up practical policies or war plans.

27071 \* In order to obtain assistance from various quarters, a councillor system was adopted in May or June 1941, but they were registered only as members. They received no suggestion or direction from KIMURA, SUZUKI, or HOSHINO in connection with business of the Institute.

CROSS EXAMINATION BY BRIGADIER QUILLIAM.

27072 The witness stated that he was the first director of the Institute, but before his appointment HOSHINO acted as director. Before the witness' appointment, he had been Chief of Staff of the Quantung Army, and for a short time had been attached \* to the General Staff. He relinquished his appointment to take up the directorship, and at that time he was a Lieutenant-General. When he gave up his directorship he was appointed to command the Fifth Army in Manchuria. He held that appointment for two years, and was then appointed director of the Military War College.

27073 The Cabinet felt primarily responsible for establishing the Institute. The students were trained by the Institute, using as the background the international and domestic situation then facing Japan of which it expected to face. They discussed and examined the national \* problems which would arise if Japan moved into the Southwest Pacific.

page

27077 Attention of the Tribunal was called to the testimony of  
27078 FUGITA, page 17550, \* and to that of SAWAMOTO on page 26415.

27083 Exhibit 3032, excerpt of interrogation of TOJO, January  
30, 1946 \* stated that the military setup in Japan was very different from that in the United States. The Chief of Staff is independent of the War Dept in matters of command and organization. He is not subordinate to the War Minister but is equal to him. The atmosphere which permeated the Army was communicated to the War Minister by the Chief of Staff and by the War Minister to the Cabinet. This was not a clique or faction. \* All matters of command passed from the Emperor to the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief. All matters of military administration passed from the Emperor via the War Minister to the Commander in Chief.

27084

The Emperor could also issue Imperial ordinances. The China Incident was in progress and many decisions passed from the Emperor to the Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief, and the Chief of Staff was exceedingly important. The Chief of Staff was naturally cognizant of the pro-Axis feeling in the Army and informed the War Minister. The latter introduced this subject into the Cabinet discussions where they had some influence. The Chief of Staff does not attend cabinet meetings. However his view on matters relating to strategy are conveyed to the Cabinet by the War Minister. Generally speaking, he is of equal standing with the War Minister and not subordinate to him.

27086

\* Exhibit 3033, excerpt from Interrogation of TOJO stated that TOJO as War Minister was not a member of the Supreme Command but was a participant. He was concerned with military administration and not with operations or tactics. He was not a member of the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals. He was, along with the Chiefs of Staff, a member of the Supreme War Council.

27087

He did not wish to avoid responsibility and would take full responsibility. This was only a factual explanation of a real situation. When KONOYE was premier \* it was very difficult for him because his authority included only the civil sphere. When TOJO became premier, since he was also War Minister, he had a voice in military administration. When he became Chief of Staff Feb. 22 1944, he had additional authority on purely military affairs.

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August 28, 1947

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In fact only purely naval matters were outside his authority. As Premier he had full responsibility for civil affairs, as War Minister he had the additional military function of military administration and as Chief of Staff he had the High Command functions of operations and tactics. This must be understood to explain the China Incident and the matters in southern FIC. At first the government policy on the China Incident was localization. But due to the independence of the High Command, the fighting spread. KONOYE had a terrible time.

27088

\*In addition, the Emperor was assisted by the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, the Lord Chamberlain and the Imperial Household Minister and a Chief Aide-de-Camp. The Lord Keeper was the adviser on civil affairs. The Grand Chamberlain and the Imperial Household Minister had no direct connection with the civil government or the Supreme Command. The Chamberlain was adjutant to the Emperor. He was a civil official and not a military man. The Aide-de-Camp being a full general had unofficial access to the Supreme Command but had no authority for direct liaison.

27089

The Emperor conferred directly with the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals. This was not a very active body since most of the members were old. In practice, the Emperor was in a difficult position. He had no one to help him on High Command matters. \* When the Premier and various cabinet members reported to the Emperor on civil matters he could consult the Lord Keeper. When the Chiefs of Staff reported to him on command problems, he had nobody to consult except the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals.

The responsibility of the various ministers and the President of the Planning Board, and chiefs of staff for advice to the Emperor through Liaison Conferences and Imperial Conferences was of tremendous importance. For example in the China Incident the Government policy was not enlargement but because the civil government had no authority over the Supreme Command, the fighting was enlarged and the civil government was powerless.

With respect to Exhibit 3032, it was read that TOJO stated \* as an answer to the question whether a large number of army officers were pro-axis, he stated that a majority of officers' opinion was pro-Axis for a number of reasons; that one of the reasons

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was that the Japanese had followed the Prussian military system since the Franco-Prussian War instead of the French system. During the World War I, even though Germany was defeated, her military strategy and tactics were considered excellent. A second reason was the diplomatic isolation, and a third reason was that the military situation had developed in a manner comparatively favorable to the Axis.

27091 \*Then there was such a pro-Axis atmosphere in the army. There was no faction or clique.

27092 \*Exhibit 1501, affidavit of Alfred F. Kritschner, former German Military Attache in Japan, stated that he was Military Attache in Tokyo from Dec. 4 1940 until May 8, 1945; that the German Foreign office could grant his request through the German Ambassador for the bestowal of German decorations upon Japanese Army officers. The Foreign Office was very reserved in granting such orders. It wished to limit the number of decorations bestowed on foreigners to increase the value of the German Eagle, that being the only decoration granted to foreigners in diplomatic courtesy routine. The German Foreign Office aspired to full reciprocity from Japan. This request was refused by the Japanese Foreign Office which pointed out that different classes of the German Eagle were bestowed upon foreigners only, while the Japanese decorations of the Rising Sun and Sacred Treasure were worn by both Japanese and foreigners.

27093 \*Neither the German Ambassador nor the affiant regarded the maintenance of reciprocity in number between German and Japanese decorations, as essential. They were much more interested in maintaining a favorable atmosphere with the Japanese officers assigned to work with them. This was enhanced by the bestowal of occasional decorations. Sometimes the Japanese War Ministry or General Staff mentioned officers they wished distinguished by a German decoration. Most times such hints coincided with the affiant's intentions. Usually those mentioned did not know anything until they received the order.

The witness did not regard these mutual German and Japanese decorations as a reward or bribe but as an act of diplomatic courtesy without much significance.

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27094

To overcome resistance of the German Foreign Office, the witness deemed it necessary to word the arguments for German decorations upon Japanese officials in exaggerated terms. The class of the decoration \* to be recommended depended first and foremost on the rank of the officer to be honored and not on his merits. This created a paradox because it was impossible to decorate a Lt. Colonel because the German and Japanese Foreign Office had not been able to agree how to classify them, whether as colonels or as majors.

As to the German Embassy's telegram of May 17, 1942, the wording of the telegram was not made by the affiant. He had handed Amb. Ott his proposals for orders to be conferred upon Gen. SUGIYAMA, Lt. Gen. KIMURA, Lt. Gen. MUTO, Maj. Gen. SATO and others. He had proposed them because of their position in the Japanese army rather than because of special accomplishment in favor of the German Army. Gen. OKAMOTO and others were not recommended since they had already received the German decoration.

27095

He did not recall that he had asked \* for an order for Gen. KASIMARA. He did not remember the exact wording of his proposals but must have been close to the wording used in the telegram. In order to overcome the German Foreign Office's reluctance, he regarded the superlative to be necessary where the positive would have been more correct. The Ambassador added superlatives in his additional explanations.

27096

Exhibit 3035, agreement between Thailand and Japan \* stated that to cope with the urgent situation in the Far East Thailand would give Japan permission for passage of Japanese forces through the Thai territory and would give all necessary facilities for the passage and would execute measures to avoid every possible conflict which might arise between the Japanese and Thai forces.

The particulars were to be agreed on between the military authorities of the two countries. Japan would guarantee Thailand's independence, sovereignty and honor.



LCD/rs  
10 September 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. David N. Sutton  
FROM : Mr. Lester C. Dunigan  
SUBJECT : IIMURA, Minoru

1. The above-named person has testified on three prior occasions. His testimony is included in R. 23395-23414 -- R. 23472-23477 -- R. 27066-27071.
2. He has now submitted a new affidavit (Def. Doc. 2226). This affidavit has to do with the personal defense of General ARAKI.
3. All of the information pertaining to IIMURA which is contained in the IPS files has previously been furnished to you. I would suggest that the present affidavit be considered by the attorney assigned to General ARAKI.

LESTER C. DUNIGAN

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al )

vs )

ARAKI, Sadao, et al )

AFFIDAVIT OF IIMURA, Minoru

*araki taught student at staff academy  
noble principle*



Having first duly sworn on oath, as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I am IIMURA, Minoru, an ex-Lieutenant General.

2. From April, 1921, to March, 1922, I served in the Army General Staff as a member of a section of which General ARAKI was the chief. Again from August, 1928, to August, 1929, I served as instructor in the Army Staff College of which the General was the President. Thus I served twice as a subordinate officer of the General.

3. During his term of office as President of the Army Staff College, Gen. ARAKI, unlike his predecessors, used to lay special stress on the culture of the moral character as well as technical faculties of the students as officers of the Japanese Army. Whenever he gave an instruction or special lecture to the students, he did not fail to advise them to cultivate their moral character so that they might be qualified in the future to command large forces or assist superior officers. After outlining the course of the First World War, he would teach the students that it was our old tradition that no war be opened without sufficient reasons justifying it. He liked to trace the tragic end of those who were driven by his ambition to fight unjustifiable wars. In speaking of Napoleon he used to say that although with his brilliant genius, adamant will and manly and courageous character, he was a model of soldires, the motives of his wars and above all his behavior after the enthronement, were quite contrary to the principles of our Imperial Army, and would add that the students should take advantage of the object lessons given by Napoleon. He often taught the students how to behave when in the future they might be in some vital positions of the state. He taught them not to worry about the small extent of the Japanese territory, but to keep to the O-Yashima (the original islands of the Japanese Empire), saying: "If we manifest the virtues of our Empire and clarify the light of our nation, our country will prosper of its own accord. Never suffer our country to be invaded by other nations, but never think of invading other countries. The true aim of our Army lies in manifesting the Imperial virtues." In regard to the behavior of soldiers in battle fields, the General always remarked that strict discipline be enforced so that there could be no room for criticism against the Army of the Japanese Empire which was one of the greatest Powers in the world. In this connection, he said, tracing his own personal experiences during the Russo-Japanese War, that the psychology at the front was a strange thing, that therefore it was very difficult even for highly cultured officers to control themselves in battles and that it was necessary, especially for the graduates of the Army Staff College, to cultivate their virtues as well as intellectual faculties. He emphasized that, besides complying with international treaties, it was necessary to refrain from resorting to any weapons or modes of operation which would involve injuries to civilians, and warned them never to listen to the abhorrent proposals in Europe that noxious gases and bacteria be used in war.

He said that victory should be perpetuated and that if any one of the graduates of the Army Staff College should do anything which would provoke resentment on the part of the enemy forces or enemy nation, it would be a shame to the College.

He taught his students that despite the general state of confusion prevailing at that time, none of them should commit any imprudent act which might be inconsistent with his duties, and that they should elevate their ideas and widen their range of view. Above all it is to be mentioned here that during his term of office as President of the College, the General gave to the students a precedent-breaking task entitled "Rules of Conduct for Japanese Officers," to be answered by each student. By commenting upon the answers of the students, the General showed them specifically all the above principles.

4. During his term of office at the Army Staff College, Gen. ARAKI annually took the second-year class students of the College on a trip to Manchuria in order to study the historic remains of the Russo-Japanese War. I also took part in this trip for about three weeks in my capacity as regular instructor on the history of war for the class. It was in the spring of 1929.

From the time of our departure from the harbor of Kobe, the General tried to be in constant contact with the students and utilized all the time he could spare to talk with them with a view to their moral education. I was always present at such talks as regular instructor. His talks mainly concerned his personal experiences in the Russo-Japanese War in which he took part as adjutant of the Umezawa Mixed Brigade. He narrated the circumstances of the battles at the actual spots.

What impressed the students as well as myself was the fact that there was not the slightest sign of bellicosity in his talk. On the contrary, he preferred to dwell upon the miseries and hardships of war, citing such sayings as: "War is the gravest matter of the state. Whoever goes to war cannot be sure about the possible place of his end." - a quotation from Sun-tse, a Chinese classical writer on strategy. His tone was always very grave and somber. The General consistently held that every soldier should conform himself to the Emperor's will, and in his instructions to the students he used to quote the Imperial rescripts of the peace-loving emperors of Japan. Especially he often quoted the Imperial Rescript which the Emperor Meiji gave to the members of his army and navy in 1882 in order to show that the duty of the Japanese Army and Navy exclusively consisted in the defence of the country, and by no means in aggression.

5. As regards war mementos, he taught: "Never think of taking back mementos from the battle field. Such an idea borders on taking spoils of war. The meritorious deeds of a soldier in battles are enough as his trophy. If he may return home alive, his flesh and blood will make the finest trophy for him. If you wish to take something, take a broken piece of cannon ball, and nothing more."

6. As stated above, neither in the General Staff nor in the Staff College could I hear the General utter anything which sounded aggressive or bellicose. On the contrary, I often heard him say that the true nature of "bu" - i.e., military arts in general - lay in the prevention of war, as was clearly shown by the etymology of the Chinese character "bu" which derived its origin from "giving up arms."

7. It happened one day during the above mentioned trip to Manchuria that we passed through a village of Manchurians, where we found the abandoned corpse of a Manchurian lying on the ground. On discovering the body, the General called the students together and said in a sad and impressive tone: "Poor fellow! This dead man may, like other people, have parents and brothers. Yet in this remote place there is none to take care of him in agonies of death, and none to bury him after death." We were all so deeply moved by his humane compassion that all of us took off our caps to express sorrows for the dead. We afterwards learned from a farmer in the neighborhood that the dead man had entered the village to steal hens and had been discovered and killed by the villagers with clubs. The farmer added that within a few days or so dogs wandering here and there would demolish the body. We were very much astonished by the disorder in Manchuria at that time.

8. The General always welcomed his visitors, whether they were civilians, his subordinate officers or young students, respected their personality and treated them with courtesy, kindness and sympathy. Whenever young officers were going to resort to imprudent actions, he used to dissuade them from such frivolities.

During the above mentioned trip to Manchuria, he sometimes held a table talk with the students. At such meetings he would show the right way for the Japanese and especially for the Japanese soldiers. "Be manly and upright", "be upright and broad-hearted", etc. These were his favorite mottoes which were the rules of conduct for all those who were enlightened by him.

On this 26th day of  
August, 1947, at Tokyo.

DEPONENT IIMURA, Minoru (seal)

I, HASUOKA, Takaaki, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
at Tokyo

Witness (signed) HASUOKA, Takaaki (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

IIMURA, Minoru (seal)

*Copy to Brigadier  
8/26*

LCD/rs  
26 August 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. David N. Sutton  
FROM : Mr. Lester C. Dunigan *LC*  
SUBJECT : IIMURA, Minoru (Jo)

1. In connection with my memorandum concerning the above-named individual which was submitted to you on 25 August, I wish to make the following further observation.

2. HORIBA, Kazuwo, was the only witness called by the Prosecution in connection with the Total War Research Institute. His direct testimony begins at p. 8820 of the Record and continues to 8827.

3. HORIBA identified Exh. 869 (R. 8821) as his affidavit. As you will note from my memorandum attached to the affidavit and becoming a part thereof were three documents.

4. HORIBA underwent an extensive cross-examination which begins at p. 8828 of the Record and continues to p. 8887. There was no re-direct examination as is indicated at p. 8887.

5. In his cross-examination, HORIBA in effect contradicted his direct testimony almost entirely. This is indicated by a remark of the President of the Tribunal at p. 8888 of the Record, wherein he states "Well you see what you have done by letting him go without re-examination. He has contradicted his affidavit and his contradiction stands." In connection with the reading of some of the documents attached to HORIBA's affidavit, the President remarked at p. 8888 that "All you are proving now is that he contradicted himself."

6. I regard the documents attached to HORIBA's affidavit, Exh. 869, as being important in connection with the Total War Research Institute. It seems to me that in view of the Tribunal's remarks that an effort should be made through IIMURA to re-establish Exh. 869. In my memorandum which was submitted to you on 25 August, I believe there is material for cross-examination which would re-establish Exh. 869. In this connection, particular attention should be paid to the interrogation of IIMURA of 20 May 1946, which is attached to the memorandum. IIMURA has peculiar knowledge of the Institute since he was the Director thereof from January to October 1941. To merely cite Exh. 869 as the Record now stands, in my opinion we would not be citing anything of value to the Prosecution.

7. This suggestion is submitted to you for your consideration.

cc: F.S. Tavenner

LESTER C. DUNIGAN

re Jimmy

Exhibit 868A

Aruta

Exhibit 869

4

871

870A

re Imura Jr

Copy to  
Augustine Quilla

See Exhibits 868 A

8/25/47

869

871

870 A

IIMURA, Minoru, (Jo)

*His Interrogation  
is J.P.S. file 4-55*

Attached hereto are two copies of a resume of information contained in the IPS files (other than the transcript of the record) pertaining to the above-named individual.

**SUMMARY OF PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO TOTAL WAR RESEARCH INSTITUTE.**

Exhibit 868-A (R. 8816) Imperial ordinance establishing Institute. It states that the Institute "shall be under the administration of the Prime Minister and shall control basic study and research in connection with national total war and shall control the education and training of officials and others in connection with national total war."

Exhibit 869 (R. 8821). Affidavit of HORIBA, Kazuo.

Attached to the affidavit as Exhibit A is a document which consists of a list of the members of the Institute and indicates that the members thereof were high-ranking Army and Navy officials and high-ranking officials of the various ministries.

Attached to the affidavit as Exhibit B is a document which contains a list of research student members of the Institute for the first, second and third periods from April 1941 to March 1944.

Attached to the affidavit as Exhibit C is a document

Exhibit 870-A (R. 8929) consists of excerpts from Prosecution Document No. 1356 and contains a record of table-top maneuvers held by the Total War Research Institute during the first half of August 1941. This exhibit, if called to the attention of the Tribunal, would probably belong between Exhibit 869 and 871.

progress of theoretical maneuvers for total war. These were marked "top secret."

Exhibit 686-A (R. 7416), portions of which were read into the record beginning on page 8888 and continuing at intervals to page 8928. These are excerpts from a document entitled "First Table-top Maneuvers, a Top Secret Symposium of the First Total War Military Gains of the Total War Research Institute, on 1941." It sets forth in detail the work of the Institute.

In the event it is deemed advisable to cross-examine Iimura with respect to his affidavit (Def. Doc. 164) the following suggestions might prove helpful:

In connection with paragraph 3, page 1 of his affidavit, Exhibit 868-A (R. 8816) is pertinent.



In connection with paragraph 4, page 1 of the affidavit, Exhibit 869 (R. 8821) might be used and emphasis placed upon the rank and number from the Army and Navy listed as members.

In connection with paragraph 1, page 2 of the affidavit, reference could again be made to Exhibit 869 (R. 8821).

In connection with paragraph 4, page 2 of the affidavit, reference might be made to pages 9 and 10 of his interrogation, appearing on page 4 of the resume attached hereto.

In connection with paragraph 6 on page 2 of the affidavit, reference might be made to page 15 of the resume relating to "top secret" and national resources.

In connection with paragraph 7, appearing on page 2 of affidavit and continuing on page 3, reference might be made to the bottom of page 3 of the resume attached hereto and the point stressed that the Institute was in fact the Army and Navy. This can be substantiated by Exhibit 869 (R. 8821) which lists the members of the Institute and the lecturers thereof.

In connection with paragraph 5 on page 3 of the affidavit, reference might be made Iimura's interrogation of 20 May 1946, appearing on page 11 of Case No. 455, Serial 1.

This file is attached hereto and I would be glad to discuss it in advance with the person who will cross-examine Iimura.

In connection with paragraph 6 on page 3 of the affidavit, reference might be made to the bottom of page 2 of the resume where Iimura states that the Councillors were mainly bureau heads.

In connection with the last paragraph on page 3 of the affidavit, reference might be made to page 3 of the resume wherein Iimura states that "Hoshino collected public officers to foster the organization."

Resume by: L. C. Dunigan

Date : 24 March 1947

IIMURA, Jo (Minoru)

Subpoena request states he will testify as to nature and operation of "Total War Research Institute."

Major posts held

- 1924 - 1927 - Major in Intelligence Service on Western Border of Manchuria.
- 1930 - 1932 - Military Attache in Turkey.
- 1933 - 1935 - Chief of European and American Sections in Army at General Staff Office.
- 1937 - Major General -- Research Department of Army War College.
- 1938 - President of Military Staff College.
- 1939 - Lt. General, Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army.
- January 1941 - October 1941 - Chief, Total War Research Institute.
- 1943 - Commander-in-Chief, 5th Army in Manchuria.
- November 1943 - 1944 - President, Staff College.
- 1945 - Commander-in-Chief, Tokyo Defense Army.
- 1945 - Commander, Tokyo Military Police.

Decorations:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Class of Decoration</u>	<u>Achievement</u>	<u>Recommending Ministry</u>
29 Apr. 34	Intermediate Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	Manchurian Incident	Army Ministry
29 Apr. 40	Grand Cordon of the Order of the Rising Sun	China Incident	Army Ministry
7 June 41	Grande Ufficiale Corona d'Italia	Japanese-Italian Amity	Foreign Ministry
9 Dec. 41	Manchukuo Decoration, Order of Chukuo-Chang, 1st Grade	Japanese-Manchurian	Foreign Ministry
9 Dec. 43	Manchurian Decoration, Order of Ching Yun-Chang, 1st Grade	Japanese-Manchurian Amity	Foreign Ministry

IINURA, Jo, (Minoru) - continued

Summary of Interrogation, May 20, 1946  
Re: Total War Research Institute

Case file 455 Serial 1

Appointed Chief January 1941 and served until October 1941.

Institute was connected with Japanese Government under direct control of Prime Minister (page 1).

Purpose of institute was to conduct investigations and research in connection with national total war (page 1).

Institute was organized in fall of 1940 and from that time until his appointment as Chief he attended the Institute (page 2).

When first organized, the Institute had only five or six leaders -- no research or investigations had been made -- "the people were discussing how to obtain their object -- by what means they were to conduct investigations or research."

"I and other people were busily engaged in the matter of education." (page 3)

Instructors at the Institute were chosen from the offices of various ministries and also from the public." (page 3)

"In order to get rid of sectionalism, it was necessary for the instructors to know materials which were not their specialties, so both instructors and students had to know various subjects such as economics, diplomacy, foreign affairs, and also military affairs. Civilians and officers alike and from time to time lecturers were invited from experts in the departments.

Before he became Chief of the Institute, it had already started research work (page 3)

Reference to document of the Institute in August 1941, known as "First Table-Top Maneuvers", IINURA said the international situation was tense at the time so an imaginary maneuver was conducted on a table "appointing such and such persons as ministers, etc., and they studied in case of an emergency how they should act." (page 4)

He arranged work on first table-top maneuvers -- said he received no instructions -- he consulted with officials of War Ministry (did not name them) "but the institute had some counsellors who were composed of Bureau heads of the various ministries. The ministries included the War Ministry." (page 4)

"I reviewed the plan of the Navy in an assembly of the counsellors including those representatives of the War Ministry." (page 4)

The counsellors were mainly bureau heads -- Noto attended the meeting of counsellors -- was not sure of OKA (page 4). It was his custom to send notices of meetings to all counsellors.

IIMURA, Jo (Minoru) - continued

T. HOSHINO attended meeting of counsellors -- knows that HOSHINO was acting director of the Institute (he apparently means from inception of Institute in 1940 to time he became director in January 1941). (page 5)

Does not think Admiral NAGANO was present -- that maybe NAGANO was represented by OKA. SUZUKU, Teichi, may have been present.

Referring to how table-top maneuvers originated, IIMURA said, "By that time the lectures on diplomacy, military affairs, economics, etc., had roughly been finished, so they proposed to put the result of hearing those lectures into execution of some form or other and on that basis they managed to make out such a plan under the table planning."

"That was the finishing touch to the education of the Institute and from the outset the program was continued to hold table-top maneuvers."

IIMURA would not say who in the Government was responsible for organization of Institute but "HOSHINO collected public officers to foster organization." (page 6)

First table-top maneuvers resulted from lectures given by following persons who were staff members of the Institute: "OKAMATSU, Seitaro, from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry; TERADA, from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry; MAEDA, Katsumi, from the Finance Ministry, TSUDA, Tetsutoki, from the Ministry of Communications, HAGIWARA, from the Foreign Office; Lt. Gen. IBARA, Col. WATANABE, Wataru, Col. HORIBA, Kasu. Those three from the War Ministry. OKA, Shin, Rear Admiral, from the Navy Ministry. Capt. MATSUDE, Chiaki, also from the Navy Ministry. SATA, from the Military Affairs Bureau, made one lecture." (Re staff members, HORIBA testified that they were fixed by Government regulation -- that staff members were permanently engaged in the Institute -- that members occupied positions as instructors.

R 8879) *See exhibit 868-A (R8816) Imperial ordinance establishing Institute*  
When asked if the first table-top maneuvers did not contain complete general plans for the opening of war against America, Britain, and China, IIMURA said "it was only a dreamy conception of the war entertained by the military authorities or the Government. It had nothing to do with the War Ministry or the Navy Ministry. Both the Army and Navy gave the Institute no program for work. (Compare answer above with number of staff lecturers from the Army and Navy ministries -- also use list of members from Army and Navy on list of members of Institute in EX. 869. (R8821))

In connection with IIMURA's statement that the Army and Navy gave the Institute no program for work, it may be stressed that it was not necessary that the Institute was to a large degree, in fact, the Army and Navy.)

IIMURA, Jo (Minoru) - continued

IIMURA in a series of answers on pages 7 and 8 bases his statement that the table-top maneuvers had nothing to do with the Army and Navy on the ground that he did not know Army and Navy plan, that he only saw Prince KONOYE, Prime Minister, three times during his tenure as director of Institute and that plans in first table-top maneuvers when compared with subsequent events were just coincidences.)

(NOTE: In connection with his answers the stress should be placed upon the rank and number of men from the Army and Navy listed as members.)

Reference to document "First Table-top Maneuvers", being marked "Top Secret" he explains it contained numerical data on American resources and that it was surrendered only to Prime Minister. (page 8)

(NOTE: Stress <sup>this</sup> of the statement that it was only a "dreamy" conception of war as he says.)

(Stress (1) that Institute was set up by Japanese Government, maintained by Government, meeting of counsellors from various Government ministries were held, lectures were given by Government personnel, which he admits; and (2) after lectures were given, a plan was drawn up for total war (First Table-top Maneuvers); and (3) events which actually took place coincided to great degree with plans set out in maneuvers; and (4) the document was marked "Top Secret.")

On pages 9 and 10 IIMURA in a series of answers says in substance that the Institute served no purpose so far as the Government was concerned, but does say on page 10 "in those days the government ministries and officers were not entirely smooth and unified -- that there was some confusion and disorder among them. In order to rectify such differences it was proposed for all government officials to have as wide a scope of knowledge--that is why they were to study not only his own specialties but also other subjects and in that respect the institution had some effect. (NOTE: Stress that institute was economically for that purpose, in other words to unify and train personnel for war.

Reference to table-top maneuvers, IIMURA was questioned on pages 11-12 concerning ten coded periods covering separate items and stated that they were the result of work of the institute and "so far as the present table plan was concerned it appears that after they collected, the opinions of different Ministers formed the coincidences here seen."

He stated (page 13) after the outbreak of the war the students and other people of the Institute "were rather surprised at the strange coincidences but they didn't know whether such incidents had already been in the minds of the people of the War Ministry or Army General Staff." (NOTE: This should be stressed as it seems to me the state of mind of those who brought the Institute into existence is responsible.)

IIMURA, Jo (Minoru) - continued

Justice Webb said, R 8865:

~~"They based it on an Imperial Ordinance and gave it the best plans in the highest placed persons in the land and war followed within a matter of months or years, one year."~~

IIMURA was interrogated again on 22 May 1946, File #23, Serial #141 and he said on page 12 that the purpose of the Institute was "to prepare and strengthen government officials toward the war, that it was placed under the control of the Prime Minister and that it was to conduct fundamental investigation and research regarding the total national war and to attend to the education and training of government officials and others concerning the total national war."

He stated on page 13 that the Superintendent of the Institute notified the several departments of Government to select candidates for admission to the Institute and that the Superintendent "received his instructions from the Prime Minister."

Def. Doc. 164

Translated by  
Defense Language  
Branch

General KIMURA

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEPONENT: IIMURA, Minoru

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached  
sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed  
in my country, I hereby depose as follows:



I was Director of the Total Warfare Institute from January 1941 to October of the same year.

There were institutes in other countries similar or kindred to the Total Warfare Institute. Following their example, the Total Warfare Institute of our country was founded in the autumn of 1940 (the 15th year of SHOWA).

In the government organization regarding the Total Warfare Institute, it was prescribed that, under the Premier's control, it shall take charge of the fundamental investigation and research into total warfare, and the education and training of officials and others concerning the nation's total warfare. However, its actual operational management was as given in the following articles.

All the Ministries, the army and navy, not to speak of Premier KONOYE who was responsible for administering this Institute and was my direct superior, were scarcely interested in this Institute, therefore, during my incumbency, I received no instruction, advice, or suggestion concerning the business of this institute from any of the above-mentioned quarters or persons. Consequently, its business, in accordance with the stipulations of the above-mentioned government organization, was carried out from an independent standpoint.

As the first step, education and training were undertaken. In instructing its students, the conventional memorizing cramming system was ignored; developmental and practical education was sought after.

The main subjects of education and training comprised lectures on fundamental knowledge concerning various fields such as politics, economics, thought and military science, physical education; theoretical (hypothetical) exercises, inspections and tours were utilized simultaneously.



Even when I first joined the Institute, there existed the training program in theoretical exercises which was one of the annual functions of this Institute. In carrying out this plan, no person, except staff members of this Institute, gave instruction or guidance. The apportioned term was about one month.

The reason why current conditions were adopted in our hypotheses given at the beginning of the theoretical exercises was that if the circumstances of a period other than the current had been adopted, it would have been difficult for the students to imagine themselves operating under assigned circumstances and to imagine the hypothetic operations, particularly the intricate numerical basis.

The various conditions arising from the hypotheses were no more than suppositional situations adopted for the sake of exercises. The object of the exercises was, not the suppositional situations themselves, but training in co-ordinated actions based on those situations.

The hypotheses and the consequent suppositional situations have no connection with the actual policies of the authorities concerned. It was because actual matters of this sort were known to no one except the authorities concerned who would never have divulged them.

As these exercises were partly open to the public, it was impossible and not permissible to utilize the actual policies of the government.

The reason why the accounts of the exercises were marked "strictly confidential" was because they contained some secret national statistics.

In accordance with the administrative procedure of the institute, the result of this research was probably reported to the Cabinet which was directly in charge of this Institute, but

never reported it to other quarters to say nothing of the other ministries or the military; we were never instructed by them.

As anybody will see from a glance at the documents, the utilization of the results of this study in actual policies was out of the question because of the lack of time necessary for scrutiny and because of the above stated aims.

Students of this Institute, who were first selected by all Ministers and certain civil organizations at the request of this Institute, then examined by the Institute and submitted to the Cabinet, were selected and formally appointed by the Cabinet as students of this Institute.

They were all young men whose average age was about 32, and none held a responsible position in any Ministry. There was one judge among them but he was also a young man like the others and was in a low grade.

The budget of this Institute was ¥160,000 a year and a half of it was for personnel expenses and the other half for office expenses. The budget was too small for making any activity possible.

In short, this Institute would seem to be considerably important so far as its name and stipulations in the organization were concerned, but it was, in fact, nothing but an institute for educating junior officials. And from various standpoints it was not possible to educate them successfully. Not a single result of their study was utilized in drawing up practical policies or war plans.

With a view to obtaining assistance from various quarters, a councillor system was adopted by this Institute in May or June, 1941; but these councillors were entirely nominal personnel registered only as members.

We received no direction or suggestion from the accused KIMURA, SUZUKI, or HOSHINO in connection with business of this Institute.

On this 1st day of December, 1946

At No. 501 2-Chome,  
Noshigaya, Setagaya-Ku,  
Tokyo

DEPONENT: IIMURA, Minoru (seal)

I, SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
At same place

Witness: (signed) SHIOBARA, Tokisaburo (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

IIMURA, Minoru (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language  
Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation  
described in the attached certificate is, to the best  
of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation  
and is as near as possible to the meaning of the  
original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan  
Date: 4 March 1947