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ERRATA SHEET - Def. Doc. 2902, SUZUKI AFFIDAVIT.

- Page 1 - middle of page, the sentence starting "In April 1925, I was attached" should read, "In April 1926, etc."
- Page 5 - 3rd line from top, date should be "1919".
- Page 20 - first line of first quoted paragraph should read, "Please go to the War Minister and ask if he can hold down...."
- Page 21 - 10th line from top, delete comma after "and" and add the word "that" after "at home".
- Page 24 - 5th line from top, figure should be 5,000,000 instead of 8,000,000. last sentence on this page should read, "This might cause no small internal disquietude."
- Page 25 - 1st line should read "from the southern areas".
- Page 27 - 13th line from top, change "Government" to "High Command".
- Page 30 - date in last line on page should read, October 8, 1943.
- Page 38 - 9th line from bottom, delete after "feasible" to the end of that paragraph.
- Page 39 - 6th line from bottom, add after "Exhibit 2225" "Page 15,963 of Record".
- Page 43 - delete first word on page, e.g. "an".
- Page 44 - third line from top, capitalize "A" in "after".

RE SUZUKI OPENING STATEMENT.

First line should read, "Our opening statement for the accused...etc." instead of "The opening statement of the accused....etc."

**FILE COPY**  
RETURN TO ROOM 361

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al)

vs

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

TESTIMONY OF  
SUZUKI, Teiichi  
BY AFFIDAVIT

I, SUZUKI, Teiichi, having first been duly sworn on oath, in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, depose as follows:

PART I.

(1) I was born in Chiba Prefecture on December 16, 1888. I graduated from the Military Academy on May 28, 1909 and was attached to the 18th Infantry Regiment (Toyonashi). In December 1913, I was ordered to enter the Army Staff College from which I graduated on November 27, 1917. In 1918 I became attached to the General Staff Office. In 1919 I was despatched to the Ministry of Finance to study financial and economic practice for one year. In October 1920 I was ordered to be stationed at Shanghai where I stayed to the end of March 1922, to study Chinese affairs. From April 1922 to August 1923 I was a member of the General Staff. From September 1923 to March 1926 I was ordered to be stationed at Peking as Assistant Military Attache to the Japanese Legation. In April 1925, I was attached to the 48th Infantry Regiment (Kurume) and in August of the same year, I was appointed Battalion Chief of the same Regiment. In 1927 I was a member of the General Staff Office. In February 1929 I was sent, as a student to England, returning in October 1929. On December 10, 1929, I was again appointed as Assistant Military Attache to the Japanese Legation in Peking. In January 1931 I became attached to the Bureau of Military Affairs in the War Ministry. In August 1933 I was appointed Chief of the Intelligence Corps of the War Ministry. On March 5, 1934, I was appointed Chief Secretary of the Research Section of the Army Staff College and concurrently instructor in Military Science. In May

1935 I held the office of investigator at the Cabinet Bureau of Investigation. On August 1, 1936, I was appointed Regional Commander of the 14th Infantry Regiment stationed at Tongning, Manchuria. In November 1937, I was attached to the 16th Home Division, with Headquarters in Kyoto. In April 1938, I was appointed Chief of Staff of the Third Army Regiment stationed at Mutangian, Manchuria. On December 16, 1938, I was appointed Chief of the Political Section of the China Affairs Board. On April 4, 1941, I retired from military service having been placed on the reserve list and became Minister without Portfolio and concurrently President of the Planning Board in the Second Konoe Cabinet, continued as such in the Third Konoe Cabinet and the Tojo Cabinet until I resigned on October 8, 1943.

(2) As I look back upon my past life I feel that five things have deeply influenced my career, my outlook on life, and my political ideas.

First, my training as a professional military man has naturally made me mainly interested in the problems of national defence. It also caused me to entertain a high regard for the traditions of strict discipline of the Japanese Army, for the maintenance of which I used my best endeavors when signs of slackness were manifested within the Army during those turbulent years since 1931. It instilled into me a spirit of self-sacrifice. It taught me that in case my country was in danger I should sacrifice my all for the sake of my country.

Second, my studies in financial and economic affairs at the Finance Ministry in 1919 aroused in me a lively interest in the practical problems of national economy. This interest was further intensified, during my service as a Cabinet investigator in 1935-6, by coming into personal contact with officials of various Ministries and with a number of economic experts. The above experience, of a non-military character, enlarged my mental

vision and taught me, for instance, to look at problems of national defence, not in themselves alone, but in the texture of the entire national life. This broader view of national defence was especially helpful in doing my work as president of the Planning Board, the practical function of which, prior to December 1, 1941, lay not so much in making smooth the way for military preparations, as in moderating the demands of the armed services, so as to safeguard the national economic life, which was becoming more and more strained through the China Incident extending over four years.

Third, my sojourn in England as a student during the year 1929, though not a long one, exerted a deep influence on my modes of thought. It taught me to look at my country objectively and from an international standpoint. It made me deeply conscious of the shortcomings, spiritual and material of our people as well as of our backwardness in natural science, and saved me from that blind and narrow-minded patriotism which military education is apt to cultivate.

Fourth, my frequent contact with China and the Chinese was no small factor for moulding my life and thought. My father was a student of Chinese classics and my home education was such to arouse my interest in things Chinese. Then my stay in Shanghai during October 1920 to March 1922 and my sojourn in Peking during September 1923 to March 1926 and during January 1930 to January 1931 as Assistant Military Attache to the Japanese Legation, afforded me ample opportunity to become intimately acquainted with the Chinese people and to cultivate friendships with many leaders in China. It enabled me to study political affairs in China at close range which made me sympathetic with the Chinese nationalist movement. In January 1927 I was despatched as a liaison officer by war Minister UGAKI to meet General Chiang-Kai-Shek, then on his northern expedition.

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I had an interview with him at Kiukiang and learned from him his ideas and aspirations he cherished regarding the execution of the Chinese Revolution. Thereafter, my sympathy for the nationalist movement was all the more intensified. Most of my Chinese friends were thus of the Kuomintang Party, not military men of the old school. Again, during 1931-1933, I was assigned as part of my duties, the task of assisting the supervision and guidance of visiting Chinese military students. I taught the history of Chinese nationalism to the students of the Army Staff College, when I served as instructor in that institution.

All these experiences naturally deepened my understanding of and moulded my friendly attitude toward the Chinese people. They had cultivated my conviction that the aspirations of the Chinese people for the recovery of her national rights would be realized in due course of time and that Japan should assist and cooperate with the New China represented by the Nationalist Party. The course of events in the Sino-Japanese relations ran contrary to the direction I hoped for, but my views on China's destiny did not thereby suffer any change. I have read an affidavit by Mr. Hu Lin, Defence Document 197, obtained by my American counsel during his recent trip to China. I am glad to know that one of my Chinese friends understands me thoroughly, even after these deplorable years of military conflict between the two nations, though I feel ashamed to think and regard it as a tragedy that I was utterly helpless in checking the catastrophic course of Far Eastern politics.

Lastly, not only was my view of Japanese politics, national and international, deeply influenced, but the last phase of my official career as a civilian administrator and statesman was determined by my frequent contacts with Prince Konoe, Marquis Kido and Baron Harada. Since my name is often mentioned in Kido's Diary it might also be proper for me to elucidate here, my relations with them.

There were among my seniors in the Army, Marquis INOUE, Saburo. Marquis Inoue was never my immediate superior officer in the Army, but since as early as in 1918, when Marquis Inoue and I, then a lieutenant, were assigned at the Finance Ministry to study financial and economic affairs together, we became very friendly with each other. Marquis Inoue, therefore, often invited me to join him in golf tournaments or to assist at tea-ceremony held at his residence.

Marquis Inoue was a man of noble birth and of sound moderate views having been educated in England. He was rather of a quiet disposition and did not enjoy a wide circle of friends. He was however, on very intimate terms with Prince KONOE, Fumimaro, Marquis KIDO, Koichi whom he had known from his childhood and through them also with Baron HARADA, Kumao. Thus when I was invited by Marquis Inoue, naturally I had opportunities to meet Konoe, Kido and Harada, with whom I also became quite intimate. In the course of golf tournaments or dinner parties Kido and Harada often inquired of me regarding the internal conditions of the Army. Since about July 1931 especially, they seemed to be keenly interested to obtain information about the state of the Army circles. Various rumors had then been afloat concerning what is generally known as the March Affair, and Prince Saionji, the Elder Statesman, and Count Makino, the Keeper of the Privy Seal, for whom Harada and Kido were secretaries respectively, were seriously concerned over the rumored subversive activities of army officers and directed their secretaries to gather information and study measures for keeping them under control. As I looked upon Harada and Kido as my close friends, I used to tell them frankly about what I know.

After that I told them from time to time about the state of affairs within the Army. Through our informal frank and friendly chats about politics, I could also obtain much informa-

tion regarding the inside movements of the political world. Prince Konoe, Marquis Kido and Baron Harada were ardent admirers of Prince Saionji's liberalism in politics and their political views exerted no small influence upon me.

During 1936-1938, when my assignments were in Manchuria and at Kyoto, our intimate contacts were for a time suspended. However, since December 1938 when I was removed to Tokyo to assume my work at the China Affairs Board, our contacts were resumed. It was chiefly my friendship with Prince Konoe and the latter's confidence in me by reason of my long association with him, that made me give up my long military career in April 1941.

(3) My views on international political affairs affecting Japan, a statement of which will be helpful in elucidating the nature of my behavior on various occasions, may be outlined as follows:

As stated above, I felt much sympathy for the Chinese nationalist movement, and my Chinese friends were mainly personalities connected with it. Furthermore, my observations of and studies in Chinese political affairs came to convince me that with the gradual awakening of the Chinese people, the recovery of her national rights would be the natural course of development in China. So it was my basic conception of the Sino-Japanese relations that Japan should endeavor to bring about order and stability of East Asia by assisting and cooperating with the New China represented by the Nationalist Party, on terms of equality.

Regarding the Soviet Union, I thought that the Russian people were perfectly free to live under any government they chose, though the dictatorial and totalitarian form of government was not palatable to me. However, I felt no small disquietude, especially over those activities of the Third International, then generally believed to have been conducted under the guidance of the Soviet Union, which aided and abetted the subversive and revolutionary movements in East Asia, especially in Japan. Those

aspects of the Japanese Communist movement which advocated the abolition of the Emperor-system by revolutionary methods, and which discredited all religion through Marxian materialistic philosophy were especially abhorrent to me. On the other hand, for preventing the communistic revolution in Japan I considered it essential that Japanese statesmen adopt measures that the livelihood of the people be more adequately guaranteed.

I was well aware from my knowledge of history that war between major powers would bring great national disasters whatever the outcome of the war. I therefore, believed that a war between Japan and the Soviet Union should be avoided by all means. I thought that the sine qua non for the maintenance of peace between the two countries were (1) that the Soviet Union cease to support the Third International in the Far East, and (2) that competition in armaments between the two nations be terminated. It was also my favorite theory that in order to liquidate the mutual distrust and feelings of menace it was not enough to conclude non-aggression treaties which might easily be scrapped but it was necessary for both nations to express sincerity in pacific intentions by adopting such practical measures as: (1) the withdrawal by Japan of troops stationed in Manchuria and Korea; and, (2) the withdrawal of troops by the Soviet Union of troops east of Baikal. However, I had to recognize that my ideas could not in view of the prevailing circumstances, such as the activities of the Third International, readily be realized, and that so long as the Soviet Union increased her armament in the Far East, Japan must also make ample provision for any eventuality, although meticulous care must be employed by Japan to avoid conflict.

Vis-a-vis Great Britain and the United States which I regarded as militarily one and inseparable, I was convinced that Japan should keep on the most friendly terms with them and that she should never make them our enemy, unless indeed we are militarily attacked or placed under an immediate menace of attack.

This was, I thought, a matter of course even looked at solely from the standpoint of our national defence, in view of the fact that a serious potential danger lay in the North.

The Nazi conception of dictatorial and totalitarian government was not in harmony with my political views any more than that of the Soviet Union. I had a high regard for many excellent traits of the German people, but my political sympathy was not with the Hitlerite Germany. I was strongly opposed to the proposed conclusion of the Triple Alliance, and especially so as Germany was then at war with Great Britain, with which country we must keep on friendly terms. I was then only a Section Chief of the China Affairs Board and certainly not in a position officially to express any views on such matters. However, I told my private opinion about August, 1940 to my old friend Prince Konoe when he organized the 2nd Konoe Cabinet, but then the rough outlines of policy had almost been determined, and it was not possible for me to move him. After I became Minister without Portfolio in the Konoe Cabinet, I found that the Triple Alliance was one of the serious obstacles to the conclusion of the American-Japanese negotiations.

After the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, therefore, I presented my opinion to Prince Konoe that it would be better to terminate the Triple Alliance by reason of the gross German perfidy toward its Far Eastern Ally. The Premier told me that he would consult the Foreign, Army and Navy Ministers about it, but my suggestion made to Konoe was not realized through sturdy opposition shown by Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

(4) During the period covered by the Indictment, my status was that of a military officer until I became a civilian by being appointed to the Presidency of the Planning Board. However, the offices of the Cabinet Investigator and the Chief of the Political Section of the China Affairs Board were civilian in character,

though I did not forfeit my military status by assuming them.

During 1931 and the ensuing years when I served at the Bureau of Military Affairs in the War Ministry, I was much concerned over the subversive renovation movements of young officers. My endeavor outside of my regular duties during that period was therefore directed toward the maintenance of discipline within the Army. I tried to dissuade such young officers as came to see me, tendered my advice to my superiors to keep vigilant eyes on and to provide proper guidance for them. I explained the condition in the Army to Kido and Harada, secretaries to Count Makino and Prince Saionji respectively, with a desire that the situation be wisely dealt with under the guidance of these far-sighted and experienced statesmen.

(5) During my services in Manchuria, one in 1936-1937 as Regional Commander at Tongning, and another in 1938 as Chief of Staff of the Third Army at Mutangiang, incidents on the Manchuria-Siberian border were, so to speak, the order of the day. I fear that those minor incidents might develop into a major conflict between the two countries. So, during my service at Tongning, I devised a plan of my own to obviate them. I fixed an operational boundary-line, two to four kilometers inside the treaty boundary-line, and ordered my men never to resort to force unless the operational boundary-line was invaded. So on the boundary with the defence of which I was charged, there was not a single instance of conflict. In view of this success of my plan at that time, when I became Chief of Staff of the Third Army I persuaded the Commander of the Army, Yamada, Otozo to adopt the same plan. On the boundary with the defence of which the Third Army was held responsible, not a single case of border incident took place during my service.

(6) The China Incident commenced in North China during my stay in Tongning. I deeply deplored such developments, but as a Regional Commander in the remote corners of Eastern Manchuria, I could do nothing but watch the situation with great anxiety for the future.

When I was called back to Tokyo at the end of 1938 to occupy the post of Chief of the Political Section of the China Affairs Board, the broad outlines of our policy relative to the China Incident had already been decided upon by the High Command and the Government. Many features of the above policy were diametrically opposed to my fundamental ideas on China, and were of such nature as could not be approved by me in the light of my knowledge of Chinese affairs. As a Section Chief of the China Affairs Board, I had to execute the duties assigned to me within the framework of such a policy. However, I did my very best to deal with matters falling within my purview in a way which was most consonant with my convictions so that the broader national policy itself might in due course of time so transform itself in practice as would be in harmony with my basic ideas. So I set about my task with the following principles as my personal guide: (1) cooperation between the Chinese and Japanese nations on terms of equality; (2) the security of the Chinese inhabitants in the war-stricken areas; and, (3) respect for the rights and interests of the Powers in China.

Thus my efforts were so directed that the Chinese property under the control of the Enemy Property Custodian be returned to its respective owners, that interference of the Japanese in the political affairs of the Chinese regimes be minimized. I did my best also to have the freedom of navigation in the Yantze River by the Powers be restored. However, these policies even if decided upon by the central authorities along the lines toward which I endeavored was not speedily realized by reason of local conditions, especially of operational requirements. The establishment of new regimes in China was of course incompatible with my basic ideas regarding Chinese affairs, but it had been a fixed policy over which I had no control. I worked, however, on the hypotheses that such was but a temporary phenomenon in the course of military operations, which would cease to exist if the hostilities came to an end, and that the early termination of hostilities and the

restoration of peace between the two countries was the one thing needful for restoring Chinese politics to run their natural course.

(7) In April 1941 Prince Konoé asked me to accept the post of the Presidency of the Planning Board, saying that the Cabinet had decided to make both the Minister for Commerce and Industry and the President of the Planning Board to resign by reason of discords between them. Personally I was then reluctant to leave my military career by accepting such an offer. But since I was told by my old friend Prince Konoé that he as the Prime Minister would be placed in an awkward predicament in case I declined the offer, I finally gave my consent to the appointment.

Thus on April 4, 1941, when, after having been promoted to Lieutenant General, I retired from military service and was appointed Minister without Portfolio and concurrently President of the Planning Board. The precedent for conferring on the Planning Board President, the status of Minister, had been set from the time of my predecessor. Because of this status I was privileged to attend cabinet meetings, but I understood that my primary function lay in the execution of the business of the Planning Board under the control of the Prime Minister as provided in the Organization of the Planning Board.

(8) The first task that confronted me upon my assumption of the presidency of the Planning Board was the drawing up of a commodity mobilization plan, or plan for allocation of vital materials, for the fiscal year 1941. This plan had already been initiated some time earlier in the year before I assumed this office. This plan was to have been completed by the end of March, and put in operation, April 1st. But because of divergence of views among the various ministries concerned, no decision had been reached before I was appointed to the Planning Board. When I was appointed President of the Planning Board, Prime Minister Konoé said to me: "It may be quite natural that in view of the

current international situation, demands made by the armed forces should become all the more insistent. However, the national economic life is now much strained after four years of the China Incident. I wish that you would perform your work with that in mind." I understood that I was especially chosen, not blindly to comply with the exorbitant demands then made by the Army and the Navy, but to see that the allocation of vital commodities be made in such way as not to exhaust the very source of the nation's economic power through over-concentration on the production of munitions and to secure the nation's cultural life as much as possible. Accordingly I established an organ in the Planning Board concerned exclusively with the necessaries of life, and initiated a special plan for mobilizing such commodities, apart from the general Commodities Mobilization Plan. And, I endeavored to adjust the demands of the various Ministries from this broader viewpoint.

Then, from the end of June, I was confronted with two events of major importance. One of them was the German-Soviet War, rendering it impossible for Japan to obtain special steel, machine tools and other items which we had planned to import from Germany via Siberia. The other was the sending of Japanese troops to southern French Indo-China in July, which brought on its wake the economic blockade of Japan by America, Great Britain and other countries, cutting off our anticipated supply of scrap iron, petroleum, fertilizers, and other vital commodities. From this time on I was compelled as a matter of my official business, to feel a special concern over the Japanese-American negotiation.

(9) I cannot recollect having attended the Imperial Presence Conference of July 2, 1941. But I remember having heard from Prime Minister Konoe toward the end of June -- very likely June 30 -- that our troops might be despatched to southern French Indo-China. For fear lest such a move should lead to a situation

aggravating Japanese-American relations and adding another obstacle to the formulation of our commodity mobilization plan, which was already beset with many difficulties, I voiced my view that it would be a serious matter if we should ever be subjected to an economic embargo. The Prime Minister said that the step was imperative in order to ward off an immediate danger of a war with the Soviet Union. Inasmuch as the step was not directed against America or Britain, Americans would understand if we fully explained our purpose. Unfortunately, what I had feared became a fact. Japan found herself economically isolated from America, Britain, the Netherlands, and other Powers. We were obliged now to redraft our commodity mobilization plan in accordance with the new situation. Thus our commodity mobilization plan sanctioned by the Cabinet meeting on August 22, 1941, was formulated so as to ensure self supply and self sufficiency as much as possible in respect of vital commodities, with a view to guaranteeing the security of national livelihood as well as to preserve the people's sense of security with regard to national defence.

(10) However, while I thus tried to effect a compromise between the ministries and to draw up a commodity mobilization plan of a sort, I keenly realized that Japanese economy which had depended for so many years on foreign trade, would be ruined if kept isolated for any extended period. So I asked the Prime Minister for the readjustment of the Japanese-American relations and recommended that steps be taken in such a way as would bring about the lifting of the embargo. The Prime Minister told me that his mind was made up to confer personally with the President of the United States and to arrive at a speedy settlement through direct negotiation. I earnestly hoped that the Prime Minister's determination would bear fruit, restoring Japanese-American relations to normal as soon as possible. Unhappily, the views of the Prime Minister proved unacceptable to America, while within

Japan the opinion was brought to the fore that as long as the United States refused to sell us the needed commodities we were compelled to take by force of arms the areas containing such resources. This I conceived put the Prime Minister in an extremely difficult position.

(11) In August, 1941, I was ordered by Prime Minister Konoe to study three problems. The first problem was: Can Japan provide herself with needed materials without relying upon America and Britain? My answer was "No." I stated that there was no possibility of Japan's become self-sustaining. The second problem was: Supposing that the severance of economic relations was to continue, would Japan be able to stand it for its duration? I reported that the severance of economic relations would put Japanese economy in an extremely difficult condition, but as long as no further special development occurred in Japanese-American relations, we could rely on our stockpiles, excepting petroleum and a few other items, so that we might escape a collapse for a year and a half, or possibly two years. I added that in the case of such commodities as petroleum, for which the manufacture of substitutes was possible, we might be more or less self-sustaining after some years, provided that capital and materials were permitted to be thrown into those channels. The third problem was: Supposing war broke out and we succeeded in taking the oil producing areas of the Netherlands East Indies, would we then be able to obtain the needed petroleum? I reported that immediate acquisition of the petroleum would be impossible because military occupation would necessarily be attended with serious destruction.

(12) About the end of August 1941 when the effects of the economic severance became patent, Prime Minister Konoye ordered me to attend the Liaison Conference. He did so that I might acquaint myself with the atmosphere of the Liaison Conference which would be helpful in exacting my work connected with the

administration of national economic power, and also to make replies to questions if any, regarding economic problems. As I thought that the extent of my statement allowable at the Conference depended on my status, I asked the Prime Minister regarding the nature of the Liaison Conference and my status therein. In accordance with an agreement relative to the Liaison Conference between the General Headquarters and the Government (Exhibit 1103, p. 10,171 of Record) the Prime Minister explained to me in the following tenor:

(a) "Persons who always attend the meetings of the Liaison Conference are the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the two Chiefs of Staff, and the War and Navy Ministers. Regarding other Ministers, they will be asked by the Prime Minister to attend when deemed necessary by the latter. When your presence is required, you will receive orders from me or you will be notified thereof by the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet. You are to attend the Conference as president of the Planning Board, and I hope you will bear that in mind when you are asked to speak at the Conference."

I interpreted these words of the Premier to mean that I was to attend the Conference as the Premier's technical assistant and that I must refrain from speaking except by order or with the consent of the Prime Minister.

(b) "Even if an understanding has been reached between the General Headquarters and the Government, the execution must be postponed until after the approval of the Cabinet has been obtained. If, however, any matter is within the sole purview of a Minister present at the Conference, which can be executed under his own responsibility, I think he can forthwith carry it out without referring the matter to the Cabinet."

I interpreted these words of the Premier to mean that the Liaison Conference was not a policy-deciding body existing over and above the Cabinet, its so-called decisions thus not be binding on the Cabinet, but that it was a meeting convened with a view to reaching an understanding through an exchange of views as between the Government and the General Headquarters.

The Liaison Conference was sometimes convened in the presence of His Majesty. I understood that the Imperial Presence Conference was a kind of Liaison Conference, and not in any way different in character from the latter, although weighty matters alone were brought before it. I understood also that my status thereat was exactly the same as at the Liaison Conference.

(13) By order of the Prime Minister, I attended the Imperial Presence Conference of September 6, 1941. I presume that it was the intention of the Prime Minister to have me to speak before the meeting in case there arose any occasion requiring elucidation on economic matters. But at the conference on that day I was not called on to speak. Moreover, I was a little relieved to know that the topic of discussion for the day really centered on the continuation of the negotiation with America, war preparations having been considered only as a safeguard against a really remote danger.

(14) After the September 6 Conference I was requested directly by the Navy Vice-Minister for an additional allocation of 300,000 tons of steel. At about the same time the Director of the Equipment Bureau of the War Ministry also asked me for more steel. I refused these requests. Both ministries, especially the Navy, repeated their demands, setting forth, however, different figures each time for their requirements. The question was left pending until the war was actually decided upon.

(15) Meanwhile October set in and I could see how hard pressed the Prime Minister was, with time running out. One day early in October he told me that he would like to withdraw from politics and become a monk. I said that it was too irresponsible of him to entertain such a notion. Then I told him that it might be advisable to have heart-to-heart talks with the War, Navy and Foreign Ministers.

(16) On October 12 the Prime Minister invited the Ministers of War, Navy and Foreign Affairs to his private residence at Ogi-kubo for a frank exchange of views. I was also present at this conference, having been directed to make a record of its proceedings. On the question of withdrawal of the armed forces from China, there arose a sharp difference of views between the Premier and the War Minister, so that the meeting was adjourned without having reached any conclusion, all matters being reserved for further study.

It became quite clear as the result of this conference where the thorny question lay. The Navy really thought that the war with America was impossible but did not desire openly to say so.

The Army did not necessarily desire war, but vigorously objected to the withdrawal of troops from China. The Foreign Minister was firmly of the opinion that without consenting to the withdrawal of the armed forces from China, the negotiations with America offered no prospect of success. The only way for the Prime Minister to avoid war was, therefore, either to make the Navy formally declare its real intentions, or to make the Army understand the unexpressed intentions of the Navy and agree to the withdrawal of the armed forces. I saw that the Prime Minister was in a predicament, because personally he felt himself unequal to the task either of persuading the Navy or the Army.

I thought that the predicament in which the Prime Minister was placed was due to the decision of the Imperial Presence Conference of September 6. After the conference, therefore, I asked the Prime Minister if, it was not advisable in the light of the

discussions of the day, to request the Throne to wipe the September 6 decision off the slate and continue the negotiation with America. He replied that as that conference was in any case an informal one, such a proposition would be feasible, if he asked. He ordered me to talk over the matter thoroughly with the War Minister. So on the following day (October 13) I went to the War Minister and submitted the proposition. He said that to cancel the decision of the Imperial Presence Conference within the brief space of one month and to wipe it off the slate was a grave matter for which both the Government and the High Command had to assume responsibility, and he could not, therefore, agree to the proposition, which could be carried out only if and when the Government and the High Command leaders had been replaced. When I conveyed this view of the War Minister to the Premier, the latter said he would discuss the matter afresh with the former on the following day. On the evening of the same day I visited Marquis Kido and stressed the necessity of requesting the Emperor to nullify the September 6 Imperial Presence Conference to enable the diplomatic negotiations to be continued.

(17) Now at the cabinet meeting of October 14 the War Minister abruptly spoke declaring that he was opposed to the withdrawal of troops from China and that the negotiation with America should be broken off. This unexpected declaration of the War Minister so surprised the Prime Minister and all the members of the Cabinet that the meeting was adjourned without any one uttering a word. Late in the afternoon I was called up by the Prime Minister, who enjoined me as follows:

"From the attitude of the War Minister, as revealed today, the negotiation with America is impossible. If that is impossible, the Cabinet can do nothing but resign en bloc, and as this resignation is due to the War Minister's attitude, I want you to go and sound him about his views on the disposition of the political situation after the

resignation. I have to inform His Majesty concerning the post-resignation prospects."

Toward the evening I called on the War Minister at his official residence and conveyed him the Prime Minister's words, whereupon the War Minister spoke:

"I do not like to discuss in private a subject which is a matter of Imperial prerogative. But since you ask me, I will say this. I believe there is no one but His Imperial Highness Prince Higashikuni who can save the situation of today. I spoke about this to Marquis Kido when we met the other day."

The reply of the War Minister was to me rather unexpected. For I had often heard that Prince Higashikuni had expressed his ardent desire for the success of Japanese-American negotiations and granted words of encouragement to the Prime Minister to do his level best for attaining the worthy object. Late in the evening I conveyed to Prince Konoe the words of the War Minister. Greatly elated, the Prince said:

"That is splendid. His Highness is definitely opposed to war. He has time and again wished me success in our negotiations with America. I intend to speak to his Majesty to obtain Imperial approval. However, please communicate the views of Tojo and myself at once to Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal."

(18) On the following morning (October 15) at about 9 o'clock, I called on Marquis Kido at his private residence, and explained to him all that occurred on the previous day. The Marquis said:

"It is not customary to install a member of the Imperial Family as the head of a cabinet. Then there seems to be a group of men in the army who would make their way into war under premiership of His Highness. So I will think it over carefully."

I reported to Prince Konoe what Marquis Kido said. Then, a little later the Marquis telephoned and I called on him again. He said:

"Please go to the War Minister and ask if he can hold down the army's war faction if His Highness heads the Government and decides against war."

I visited the War Minister and put to him Marquis Kido's question. The Minister said:

"If His Highness heads the Government and decides on a no-war policy, and if it cannot check the Army, under whose premiership can it be checked? But I myself can't say just now whether it can be checked or it cannot be checked."

I transmitted to Marquis Kido these words of the War Minister just as he has said them.

(19) Early in the morning the next day, the 16th, I was called by Prince Konoe and given the following errand. He said:

"I had an audience with His Highness Prince Higashikuni last night. I pleaded with His Highness that, in the event the Imperial Command to form a cabinet should come to him, he would by all means accept it and use his endeavors toward the adjustment of our relations with America. The Prince said that it was a serious matter, on which he would like to consult with the War Minister and the Navy Minister, and he would like to have two or three days to think it over. It seems that His Highness was not necessarily disinclined to accept. Now I believe it advisable that he should be first informed of the nation's strength from the President of the Planning Board. So you will go now to His Highness and offer explanations as you see fit."

I immediately proceeded to the residence of the Prince, and explained to His Highness for about an hour about the actual state

of our national strength, using the 1941 Commodity Mobilization Plan as the central theme. And I spoke on the need of a satisfactory settlement of the American negotiation.

His Highness expressed his agreement to my remarks and said to me that war must be avoided by all means.

After leaving the Prince's residence, I called on Marquis Kido and made a detailed report to him as to what had transpired since the previous day. He expressed his fears that the assumption of premiership by a prince of the Imperial Family might create undesirable impressions both abroad and, at home, there was nobody among His Majesty's subjects who could shoulder the responsibility. However, he did not positively say to me that he was opposed to the formation of a cabinet by a prince of the Imperial blood. In the afternoon the Prime Minister said to me:

"As regards the premiership of the Prince, I have had word from the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal to the effect that it has been decided not to request the Prince to head the Government. So the matter is dropped. I suppose Marquis Kido has some idea. The Cabinet will resign en bloc at once."

Accordingly, I tendered also my letter of resignation.

(20) On the following day, the 17th, I visited Prince Konoe at his private residence to thank him for the kindness shown to me while I was in office and was engaged in a desultory chat, when the Prince said to me substantially as follows:

"Marquis Kido has telephoned me that Tojo is to form a cabinet. At the same time, he is to receive word from His Majesty to carry on the American negotiation, wiping the September 6 decision off the slate. Accordingly, Tojo will, I believe, check the war faction and proceed with the American negotiation. So, you will do well to remain in office and help him, in case he asks you to do so.

If the new cabinet comprises many members of my cabinet, it will show that the new cabinet desires to carry on the negotiations for peaceful settlement of the difficulties between Japan and the United States."

When I was asked by Prime Minister Tojo to continue in my office, I consented in conformity to the foregoing advice of Prince Konoe, seeing that many of my colleagues in the Konoe Cabinet also remained in office.

(21) My status in the Tojo Cabinet was the same as in the Konoe Cabinet, viz., Minister without Portfolio and concurrently President of the Planning Board. However, there was considerable difference in practice. For since Prince Konoe was my close friend of long standing, I volunteered my opinion to him on some political matters and the Prime Minister himself asked my opinion for his reference and indeed sometimes employed me to conduct certain political negotiations. Premier Tojo, however, gave me a warning at the very beginning of my entry in his Cabinet to the following effect. "It is my desire that you concentrate your energy on the work of economic mobilization and not to meddle in political affairs. You should especially keep in mind that the President of the Planning Board is to function under the control of the Prime Minister." Therefore, I endeavored to comply with his wishes and devoted myself to the work of the Planning Board.

(22) The attitude of General Tojo after he became Prime Minister was decidedly different from that assumed by him in the last days of the Konoe Cabinet. In order to continue the diplomatic negotiation by wiping the September 6 decision off the slate, he decided to investigate various questions. In this investigation I was assigned, at the end of October, 1941, the following two questions, on which I reported to the Prime Minister the conclusions of the Planning Board arrived at after

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consultation and joint study with the Ministries concerned, viz., the War, Navy, Commerce and Industry, Agriculture and Forestry, and Communications Ministries.

Question (A). If the American-Japanese negotiations should be broken off, and no prospect exists for the termination of the economic severance, to what extent may Japan maintain her supply of commodities?

The report of the Planning Board was that the answer would depend on the descriptions of commodities, to wit:

First, regarding commodities available in Japan proper, Manchuria and China, some increase would be feasible. In respect of steel, the 4,700,000 tons expected to be produced during the fiscal year 1941, might annually be increased by approximately 200,000 tons.

Second, regarding commodities to be imported from Indo-China and Thailand, a decrease due to American and British interference must be expected. This had to be taken into account in view of the fact that in 1941 when Japan sought to purchase rice from Thailand, she was forestalled by previous British purchases. However, since the extent of such interference was unforeseeable, the report did not contain the amount to be decreased.

Third, regarding commodities to be imported from America, Great Britain and the Netherlands, especially the petroleum, the prospect was anything but bright. The annual domestic production of petroleum did not exceed 400,000 tons, while civilian consumption amounted annually to about 1,800,000 tons. The amount then stored by the Army and Navy, as was divulged to the Planning Board for the first time, did not exceed 8,400,000 tons, and the amount of petroleum stored in the civilian circles had been nearly exhausted then. If the petroleum stored by the military was to be employed for civilian purposes as well,

it would be exhausted however economized within a space of three years. Moreover, a prospect for artificial petroleum production was by no means bright. The construction of artificial petroleum factories with a capacity for producing 8,000,000 tons annually, which had been the amount of peacetime imports, would involve a great quantity of materials and could not speedily be realized. It could not certainly meet the urgent needs.

Question (B). If Japan should succeed in the event of war, in occupying the natural resources zones in the southern region without serious damage, how far could self-supply be expected?

As in the question (A) the answer of the Planning Board depended on the kinds of commodities, to wit:

First, if war with America were to break out, requisitions would have to be effected of an enormous amount of bottom, and certain losses of ships must be taken into account. According to the estimates reported to the Planning Board by the War and Navy Ministries, continuous employment of 3,000,000 tons of ocean-going vessels was feasible for transport between the raw material zones and the processing and productive areas. If, however, these vessels were to be not only for transport to and from Manchuria and China, but also for that between the homeland and the Netherlands East Indies, it would necessitate strict economy in the carriage of goods, resulting in some diminution in commodities production. In regard to steel, the maintenance of an annual supply of 4,500,000 tons could hardly be expected. It might well diminish to the level of 4,300,000 tons.

Second, imports from French Indo-China and Thailand and especially rice would be reduced considerably by reason of military operations. The rice shortage thereby created would have to be made good by substitutes such as sweet-potatoes. This might

Third, with regard to imports from the northern areas, especially the petroleum, the estimate could not be made by the Planning Board.

Inasmuch as the petroleum was one of the strategic commodities, the petroleum questions apart from those relating to domestic production and civilian requirements were studied by the War and Navy Ministries not allowing any participation by the Planning Board nor by any other Ministry for that matter. This state of destruction or repairs of the oil fields installations again was closely related to the condition of military operations of which the Planning Board had no knowledge. Nor was the Planning Board aware of the state of tankers or other means of transport. In regard to the petroleum therefore, the Planning Board had to report, solely relying on the result of studies made by the Army and Navy, indicating that the report was exclusively based on the studies made by the Army and Navy. According to the above studies it was estimated that the petroleum obtainable in the first year would be about 300,000 tons and in the second year, approximately 2,000,000 tons, provided that the southern areas could be occupied after the outbreak of war.

The contents of the report of the Planning Board suggested the fact that in case the Japanese-American negotiation unfortunately failed, then war or no war, Japanese economy would be overwhelmed with difficulties. It suggested that our economic life would be impoverished to the extent that the minimum living standard itself might seriously be jeopardized. The Prime Minister after ascertaining the views of the Ministers responsible for the above report, namely, Ministers of Commerce and Industry, Agriculture and Forestry and Communications, and taking also other reports into account persuaded the High Command and decided to endeavor to bring about the successful conclusion of the American-Japanese negotiations.

And this policy was concretely manifested in the decision of the Imperial Presence Conference of November 5, which decided to withdraw the armed forces from China to make the negotiation successful.

(23) On the other hand, the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister seemed to be unable to totally disregard the vigorous demands made by the High Command. The opinion of the High Command was substantially as follows: When we reviewed the developments of the American-Japanese negotiation, the demands made upon us by the United States seemed to increase in proportion to the concessions made by Japan. No prospect was, therefore, in sight of the negotiation coming to any successful conclusion. This indicated that what the United States really had in view was not the amicable settlement of the China Affair, but the destruction of Japan as a leading power. If, therefore, Japan should recognize in principle the withdrawal of the armed forces and also evince her readiness to enter into negotiations concerning the details for such withdrawal, and America should assume nevertheless an attitude of evading the settlement, it might properly be concluded that the real intention of the United States was to gain time; and, that she intended, under the guise of continuing the negotiation to strengthen her<sup>Far</sup> Eastern forces and when fully armed, drop negotiations and turn to an offensive against Japan. If Japan were destined not to be able to avoid war with America, the earlier it came, the more advantageous it would be for Japan. Therefore, the diplomatic negotiations should be concluded by the end of November and if no prospect of success should be in sight at the beginning of December, the decision for war should then be made. As one reason for this contention, the High Command pointed to the concentration of the air forces in Malaya and the Philippines, and the growing divergence in

fighting power between the Allied forces and ours, and declared that after the lapse of several months the High Command could not be responsible for national defence.

The Government, especially the Foreign Minister was putting up a stiff fight against the contentions of the High Command. The Liaison Conference of November 1 immediately preceding the Imperial Presence Conference of November 5 continued in deliberations far into the night and indeed until 2 a.m. of November 2. The High Command had not relinquished its contentions until the very end. As the result, the Imperial Presence Conference of November 5, decided, on the one hand that diplomatic negotiations based on proposals A and B be continued; that if there should be no prospect of success the Government then proceed with operational preparations on the supposition that the opening of hostilities shall be decided upon; and that in case the negotiations should be concluded, the High Command was to suspend operational preparations whatever progress they might then have made. This was a weighty decision to be sure, but not a decision for a war. I thought the acceleration of diplomatic negotiations without a moment's delay was the very thing to be done, and then again at the beginning of December we could further continue diplomatic negotiation, if American attitude allowed it. For, the conditions for conducting the Japanese-American negotiations were more favorable for settlement than at the time of the Konoe Cabinet, by the recognition of the withdrawal of troops which had so far been vigorously opposed by the Army. Moreover, the troops which advanced into southern Indo-China, which was the cause of the economic blockade, were to be withdrawn. Further, a preliminary agreement to decide on war might, in view of the precedent of the decision of the September 6 Imperial Presence Conference, be rescinded. When I saw the above-mentioned agreement had been arrived at between

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the High Command and the Government, on November 5, I felt, therefore, not so much that war had become imminent, as that a new prospect of peace had arisen on our horizon.

(24) However, this determination to continue the Japanese-American negotiation, reached after all kinds of twists and turns, was nullified by the American reply of November 26. I was given the general purport of the note at the Liaison Conference of November 27 or 28. I heard also the Foreign Minister explain that the said note was tantamount to an ultimatum. At the previous Liaison Conferences I had frequently heard the representatives of the General Headquarters reporting on the strengthening of the British and American military preparations in the Pacific areas. Now being told that the American reply constituted virtually an ultimatum, I could not but sense that war with America might be unavoidable. The Liaison Conference of that day was adjourned. As for myself, I decided to abide by the final decision to be arrived at by consultation between the Prime Minister (who was also the War Minister) Ministers of the Navy and Foreign Affairs, and the Chiefs of the Army and Navy General Staffs.

(25) On November 29 an informal conference between the Government and senior statesmen was held at the Imperial Palace. I was directed by the Prime Minister together with the Navy, Foreign and Finance Ministers to attend the conference and to answer such questions as might be put to the Government regarding national economic strength. I did not, of course, volunteer any explanation. However, one of the elder statesmen -- I think it was Admiral Okada -- asked a question concerning the ship-building capacity and the capacity for the production of airplanes in the event of war. To the former question I answered that the annual output would be between 700,000 and 800,000 tons. Regarding the latter question, I replied that materials

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were not available at the Planning Board since the matter fell within the sole purview of the military. Another question was also put by another senior statesman regarding the supply of steel, to which I made the reply that it would be between 4,300,000 and 4,500,000 tons. The main theme of the conference, however, was the circumstances in which Japanese-American negotiations came to a deadlock. Most of the time was, therefore, occupied with that subject and little time was left for me to enlarge on economic problems, nor did any senior statesman demand such elucidation.

(26) The Prime Minister then seemed to have been finally determined to enter into war. At the Cabinet meeting on December 1, and before the Imperial Presence Conference on the same day, attended by all the Cabinet members, his conclusion to the following effect was announced:

"War with America, Great Britain and the Netherlands is unavoidable. The Army and Navy will respectively turn to war operations. However, when we see a definite chance for success in negotiation, the war operations will immediately be suspended, and the government will turn to negotiation."

I myself agreed to the above decision, believing that this was unavoidable as long as we had an American ultimatum.

(27) Following the above mentioned government decision, I was obliged to engage myself busily with the revision of the Commodity Mobilization Plan according to the requirements of the oncoming war. Although the preservation of the sense of security with regard to national defence was one of the objectives of the 1941 Material Mobilization Plan, it did not cover such a vast armament expansion as would be required for prosecuting a war with America and Britain. Economically Japan had not surely been prepared for any war with America and Britain prior to December 1, 1941. Quick readjustments

to meet the new situation demanded titanic efforts on my part. The plan had to be so revised that the allocation of military goods needed for war would be ensured curtailing civilian needs to the minimum.

For sometime thereafter, I concentrated all my energy on the performance of my duties, with hardly any time to spare to think of any other matter. Prior to December 1, 1941, I earnestly wished for and contributed towards the avoidance of the American-Japanese war. However, once the national decision was made for war, I considered it my moral duty as a Japanese subject to do my bit to collaborate in the prosecution of war.

(28) It was towards the evening of December 7, that I was notified that there would be a cabinet meeting the next day (the 8th) at 7 o'clock in the morning. At about 6:30 a.m. on December 8th when I went to the Prime Minister's official residence to attend the cabinet meeting, I was informed by the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet HOSHINO of the attack on Pearl Harbor and knew for the first time that the hostilities were commenced. At the cabinet meeting the Navy Minister gave a brief explanation that operation, after which the Cabinet decided on the text of the Imperial Rescript declaring war.

(29) After as before the outbreak of war, my main duties as the President of the Planning Board consisted in the preparation of an effective plan for commodity mobilization with the concurrence of the Ministries concerned, without any authority to compel them and without any power of the execution thereof. However, after the commencement of war the necessity for a unified administration of national economic power was gradually increased and various Ministries came to accede more easily to the opinion of the Planning Board, and especially after the end of 1943 the War and Navy Ministries themselves became less insistent in their respective demands. Thus the Planning Board which functioned as a sort of conciliation board in the pre-war days, gradually came to command prestige with the progress of war. It did not cease to be a conciliation board, although the conciliators came to command more influence over the parties concerned. At the request of Premier Tojo, however, I left the Cabinet as well as the post of the President of the Planning Board on October 1, 1938

PART II

In Part I of my Affidavit, I have made a general statement of facts concerning my case. During its rebuttal of my Motion to Dismiss, and on other occasions, the Prosecution referred to certain evidence allegedly tending to prove that I had participated in a criminal conspiracy as alleged in the Indictment. I beg, therefore, to make further elucidation of facts and circumstances relative to each item of the Prosecution's evidence.

(30) Exhibit 179 (F), Kido's Diary, August 7, 1931, page 1927, Exhibit 179 (O), Kido's Diary, October 7, 1931 page 1941 of record (Illegal plans of young officers).

Upon hearing about a plot, later called the March Affair, I reported the matter to Colonel NAGATA, Tetsuzan, my superior, with whom I collaborated to check the plot from being materialized.

The March Affair after all did not come to pass. However, after this rumor of a plot had become current, an agitation became palpable among young officers attached to the regiments. Some of them not only discussed politics before their seniors, but went as far as to advocate a national renovation by military force. I admonished them against such reckless behavior whenever they talked in such a tone in my presence. I also presented my views to my superiors to keep vigilant watch and to take care that junior officers might not be swayed by their youthful ardor to bring ruin on their own careers as well as cast reflections on the honor of the Army.

This restlessness among young officers was not, I thought, without its causes. One of the causes was that there was an apparent deterioration in politicians' morals, corruption cases involving them having often been rumored. This naturally irked young officers. Another cause was that economic depression having then been at its height, the number of the <sup>un</sup>employed was steadily increasing. Also, soldiers hailing from the country-side

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had been conscripted from families in great financial distress. It seemed to me in a sense quite natural that commanders of sections or companies should come to have a deep sympathy for the state of their subordinates' families and to look forward to a government capable of saving the nation from such economic distress. Their advocacy of national renovation was due to these causes, I thought. In view of such circumstances I concluded that the military authorities were certainly in duty bound to exercise the strictest control over those subversive young officers with the view of maintaining military discipline, but this alone might have the deleterious effect of intensifying their unexpressed resentment, unless the statesmen in power were pure and above corruption and unless more effective measures were adopted to deal with the agrarian problems and to solve the problem of unemployment.

Thus from the standpoint of maintaining army discipline I was much concerned over the state of domestic politics. I remember having said to Marquis Kido and Baron Harada to the effect that a young and able statesman, such as Prince Konoe, who was above all reproaches of corruption, should become Premier and form a coalition cabinet comprising party men of known moral rectitude, and that this would help in no small measure in maintaining and strengthening military discipline. And also a study of the agrarian problems brought me to the conclusion that greater protection of tenant-rights and lower farm-rents were even more necessary than the stabilization of the prices of rice. However, what I had primarily in mind and spoke to others at the time was the ways and means by which deterioration of military discipline might effectively be prevented, which was then my chief concern.

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(31) Exhibit 2252, Kido's Diary, May 17, 1932, page 16,215 of Record (Re the succeeding cabinet).

As I stated above, I presented my views to my superior officers that they should keep vigilant watch on young officers. On May 15, 1932, however, a deplorable incident occurred. A number of naval officers and several students of the Military Academy in collaboration with civilian extremists assassinated Premier Inukai. The War Ministry circles received a serious shock by this news. Among my colleagues a sentiment of self-reproach was expressed for the fact that several candidates for army officers should have been involved in such a plot. They said military discipline must be maintained so as to check the reoccurrence of a similar incident. A desire was also expressed in this connection that the succeeding cabinet be not organized by the Seiyukai Party then so generally condemned for its lack of moral integrity, and that instead a coalition cabinet be formed by upright men so as to facilitate the maintenance of military discipline.

When I met Marquis Kido after the May 15 incident, I gave him such information about the incident as was available at the War Ministry and the views and desires then expressed by my colleagues at the Ministry. The passage in the Diary is, I suppose, a summary statement regarding our conversations at that time.

(32) Exhibit 2253, Kido's Diary, April 13, 1933, page 16,216 of Record (Describing Russia an absolute enemy, etc.)

According to Kido's Diary I am reported to have said at a banquet at Marquis Inoue's residence that Russia was an absolute enemy and that I was opposed to the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty with her. I do not well remember the occasion but possibly I may have stated something to the effect that so long as the Soviet Union aided and abetted the activities of the Third International which plotted to effect a communistic revo-

lution in Japan comprising the abolition of the Emperor-system, the USSR was our absolute enemy and that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact against such background, would be illusory.

(33) Exhibit 3371, page 31,835 of Record, Exhibit 670, page 7,330 (Re: My alleged speech at the Toyama School in 1933)

I recollect that sometime in 1933 War Minister Araki invited the governors to a luncheon party at the Toyama School to express his thanks for their services rendered as advisors to the Soldiers Assistance Society, a charitable organization, having for its object, assistance to be given to the families of indigent soldiers. I think General Araki made a brief speech before the luncheon thanking guests for their endeavors in that cause. I have not the slightest recollection that I ever made any speech myself at that meeting. I remember, however, that in the ante-Chamber several maps of Manchuria were hung on the wall indicating, e.g., the state of bandit soldiers in Manchuria and I also remember having explained the maps in answer to questions put by Count Kiyoura Keigo, president of the Society, and that he expressed his satisfaction with my explanations. I absolutely deny that I ever made at that meeting or elsewhere, any speech connoting the necessity of military occupation of Siberia. This allegation seems to me preposterous for such a bellicose idea is contrary to my concepts of national defence.

(34) Exhibit 2266, Kido's Diary, December 29, 1938, page 16,232 of Record (Konoe Cabinet should carry on, etc.)

During the period extending from August, 1936 to December, 1938 my official assignments were at Manchuria and Kyoto. At the end of 1938 I was appointed Chief of the Political Affairs Section of the China Affairs Board. Prince Konoe was then Prime Minister, and I was to serve as one of his subordinates. Before hardly ten days had elapsed since my arrival in Tokyo, I was much disappointed to learn that the Konoe Cabinet had made up its mind to resign en masse. For I thought that since the China

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Incident took place during the incumbency of Prince Konoe, it was too irresponsible of him to leave his post as Premier without the slightest prospect regarding its solution. I, therefore, went to see my old friend Marquis Kido and told him that the Konoe Cabinet should carry on and do its level best to liquidate the China Incident.

(35) 1939, Talks with Goette, page 3,780 of Record.

I remember that about September, 1939 two American newspaper correspondents came to see me at my office in the China Affairs Board (not at the Planning Board). One of them asked my personal opinion about Wang Ching-Wei. Personally I did not favor the Government policy vis-a-vis the China Incident, and I told him frankly that the policy of our Government to deal with Wang was illusory, for Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-Shek was the only real ruler in China. So I frankly said to him that hostilities must be terminated early by dealing with the Generalissimo. The above was my personal conviction at the time. I do not remember whether or not the newspaperman was named Mr. Goette.

(36) Exhibit 1094, Kido's Diary, June 23, 1941, page 10,024 of Record (Re: Unification and re-inforcement of the General Headquarters).

I was appointed President of the Planning Board in April, 1941, and was charged with the preparation of a Commodity Mobilization Plan. What troubled me most in the performance of that duty was that the Army and Navy separately and without any consultation with each other demanded allotments of commodities, and that antagonism prevailing between them made the preparation of the Commodity Mobilization Plan impossible. Moreover, both the Army and Navy kept its own secrets not only vis-a-vis the outside world but in relation to each other. There was much reason to doubt that two factories, of one and the same category had been constructed separately while one factory would surely have

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been enough, and that the manufacture of munitions of war or studies and researches for their improvement had been carried on without any connection with each other, thus involving no small waste of materials and labor. I was of the opinion that in order to obviate this palpable waste and to make maximum use of the materials which had been scanty in any event, it was imperative that the General Headquarters which had been divided into the water-light compartments in the shape of the Army and Navy Divisions be unified and a system be worked out under which the two could then collaborate under a unified command. I told this to Marquis Kido who probably recorded the conversation in his Diary.

- (37) Exhibit 1107, page 10,140, page 10,216, page 10,333, page 10,518 of Record; Exhibit 1152, Kido's Diary, October 29, 1941, page 10,314 of Record. (Re: Attendance at Liaison Conferences).

The Prosecution alleges that I attended the Imperial Presence Conferences of July 2, September 6, November 5, and December 1, 1941. I attended the last three Conferences. With regard to the Imperial Presence Conference of July 2, 1941, however, I do not remember ever having attended it.

I attended also many of the Liaison Conferences. However, there were conferences at which I did not assist.

- (38) Exhibit 649, page 7,069 of Record; Exhibit 650, page 7,074; Exhibit 1241, page 10,690 of Record; Exhibit 1267, page 11,306 of Record; (Re: Attendance at Privy Council meeting).

I attended these meetings in the capacity of an explaining member. An explaining member has no right to vote (Exhibit 83, Organization of the Privy Council and Rules Art. 11, latter part). The functions of an explaining member are to make such necessary explanations as may be ordered by the Minister in charge. The Prime Minister directed me to attend these meetings probably expecting that elucidations might become

necessary on matters falling under the jurisdiction of the Planning Board.

- (39) Exhibit 840, page 8,403 and page 8,476 of Record; Exhibit 1132, page 10,205; Exhibit 1133, page 10,214 of Record; Exhibit 1140, page 10,228 of Record (Re: Functions of the President of the Planning Board).

The functions of the President of the Planning Board were provided for in the Organization of the Planning Board, (Exhibit 71). At the time of my assumption of office, there was little work to do in the way of drafting the outlines of laws and ordinances. My time was mostly devoted to the adjustment or conciliation of conflicting claims of the various Ministries. I have already referred to the 1941 Commodity Mobilization Plan in Part I of this affidavit and MAYAMA, Kanji formerly one of my subordinates, testified concerning the matter, (page 18,358 of Record). Inasmuch as the Prosecution makes certain allegations in reliance on a newspaper account which I deem entirely inadequate, I propose to offer further comments in addition to what has already been stated in Part I.

As stated above, the 1941 Commodity Mobilization Plan and the ancillary Mobilization Plans relative to transport and labor were prepared under the most exacting circumstances: the outbreak of the Russo-German war, involving a stoppage of imports from Germany and the economic severance effected by America, Britain, and the Netherlands. By reason of these events, Japan was confronted with the most brain-racking problems concerning the readjustment of her domestic economy which was placed in the most difficult circumstances. Through stoppage of the imports of petroleum not only from America but also from the Netherlands, the petroleum for civilian use was exhausted. The crude oil burners, buses, trucks and motor-ships (which latter had played an important role in domestic marine transport in Japan) could not be employed, and they had to be

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replaced by railways and sailing boats to meet the needs of domestic transport. The embargo on scrap iron had also far-reaching effects. The manufacture of steel had to be effected by the use of iron ores, which entailed the consumption of a large quantity of coal. Moreover, persons engaged in industries for the manufacture of export goods lost their jobs, which created serious problems for finding work for the unemployed. Problems after problems came to the fore, too numerous to be enumerated here. If the plain fact of the situation had bluntly been made public that the economic difficulties confronting Japan resulted from the economic blockade imposed by America, Britain and the Netherlands, and that Japanese economic life was on the eve of bankruptcy, it would have inflamed an anti American national sentiment so as to seriously impede our negotiation with the U.S.A. We, therefore, made use of such phrases as the "strengthening of national defence power," "war-time structure." etc., to direct the endeavors of the nation toward increased production and to make the people be resigned for the time being to the strained state of national economy.

It is true that the Commodity Mobilization Plan of 1941 somewhat increased allotments for munitions of war in view of the international tension then prevailing as well as of the China Incident, but they were by no means such as would make a war with America and Britain feasible, and therefore since December 1, 1941, when a war with America was decided on, I was obliged to expend my whole time and energy to negotiate with various Ministries with a view to increasing the allotments for munitions of war necessary for prosecuting the Pacific War.

It may be noticed that although various economic plans were styled "Mobilization" plans, a grandiose term apparently connoting military preparations, they were, in fact, plans made for the allocation of commodities, labor and transportation with an

eye to readjustments in domestic economy, out of the supplies allocated to civilian use after deducting what had been set aside for the Army and the Navy. The making of plans regarding the uses of the supplies allocated to the Army and the Navy, was, of course, outside the purview of the Planning Board, which was not informed of such uses. It may also be noted that economic mobilization plans were not prepared by the Planning Board in an autonomous way. Various Ministries presented their respective demands for allocations to the Planning Board, and in case the total of such demands exceeded the amount of supply for the current year, the Planning Board rendered its good offices by negotiating with various Ministries so that, through mutual concessions and compromises, the total amount demanded by the Ministries be curtailed to the amount capable of supply. The Planning Board functioned<sup>thus</sup> as a sort of conciliation board. It was not invested with any power to make an order binding on the Ministries. So long, therefore, as no compromise was arrived at between the Ministries, no economic plan could come into being. Nor was the Planning Board invested with any authority to execute the plans so prepared.

It is far from the truth to allege that as President of the Planning Board I had an all-important authority and influence on Japanese economy, (page 16,930 of Record). The allegation that the Key Industrial Bodies Ordinance was prepared during my tenure of office is not true. As a matter of fact this Ordinance had been deliberated upon and the outlines thereof had been formulated prior to my assumption of office (Exhibit 2225). At the time I assumed office, the Planning Board had nothing to do with its preparation, the draft outlines of the Ordinance having already been in the hands of the Legislative Bureau.

The testimony by Mr. Liebert that the President of the Planning Board controlled Japanese economy together with the presi-

dents of control associations (page 8403 of Record) is certainly an error. The Planning Board had no direct connection with any control association. The organization and operations of control associations were in charge of the Ministries concerned and not of the Planning Board.

It is an error and a misunderstanding for the Prosecution to imply in reliance on Mr. Liebert's testimony (page 8476 of Record) that I was responsible for the organization of the Imperial Petroleum Company (page 16,931 of Record). Not only were matters relative to that company outside the purview of the Planning Board but the law regarding the formation of the Imperial Petroleum Company had already been promulgated before I assumed office, viz., as early as in March 1941, in pursuance of which the said Company was organized in September as a matter of course over which I had no control. Mr. Liebert himself in another connection correctly states the date on which the law was promulgated, (page 8290 of Record).

(40) Exhibit 1142, page 10,231 of Record, Kido's Diary, September 29, 1941 (Re: My explanations made in the Imperial presence concerning rubber and tin resources in the U.S.A.).

On September 29, 1941 I received a telephone message from Chief Secretary Matsudaira by which I was requested by Marquis Kido to proceed to the Imperial Palace and explain to His Majesty concerning the rubber and tin resources in the U.S.A.

The tenor of my explanations was, that even if as a result of war the U.S.A. should be prevented from importing rubber and tin from the southern areas, it would not imply any vital blow to her, for they might be replaced by imports from South America. I also said that rubber could be artificially manufactured and that large scale production of artificial rubber would be feasible in the U.S.A.

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- (41) Exhibit 2280, page 16,253, Kido's Diary, October 1, 1941, (Informal Talks concerning Our Policy toward the U.S.A.).

By October, 1941, the far-reaching effects of the economic severance were beginning to manifest themselves. A section of the Army circles which had minimized them became conscious of the grave situation brought about by our economic isolation. The opinion came more and more to the fore that to wait for any successful negotiation with America would be to wait for the day of our economic starvation, and that we should find a way out of the predicament by taking an offensive prior to the consummation of American war preparations. On the other hand, Prime Minister Konoe seemed to have felt himself quite helpless. I called on Marquis Kido and conversed with him on the desirability of encouraging the Prime Minister to redouble his efforts to bring the American-Japanese negotiation to a success.

- (42) Exhibit 1148, page 10,250 of Record; Exhibit 1147, page 10,246 of Record; Exhibit 2250, page 16,199 of Record (circumstances in the closing days of the Konoe Cabinet).

At the time of the dissolution of the Konoe Cabinet, I played the part of a messenger between Konoe and Tojo, Konoe and Kido, and Kido and Tojo. In this liaison work I acted strictly as messenger and the words of these three men then conveyed to me are still fresh in my memory.

Therefore, it is submitted that of the evidence produced by the Prosecution those passages which are in conflict with what I stated minutely and with meticulous care in Part I of my Affidavit do not conform to actual facts.

- (43) Exhibit 1331, page 11,943 of Record; Exhibit 1332, page 11,947 of Record (The Sixth Committee and Outline of Economic Counter-plans for the Southern Areas).

In the last days of November 1941, the Government was inclined to the opinion that the opening of hostilities for

national self-defence against America, Britain and the Netherlands might be unavoidable in view of the surrounding circumstances, and they came to make studies to provide for such event. In order to supplement materials necessary for carrying on the said war, the Cabinet meeting of November 28 decided to organize a committee consisting of the officials of the Planning Board, and of the Foreign, Finance, War and Navy Ministries to work out plans for the development, acquisition, and control of resources in the southern areas which might possibly be occupied. On December 2, when the opening of hostilities had been decided upon, the Prime Minister ordered me to act as Chairman of the said Committee and to execute its functions in collaboration with the members representing the above-mentioned Ministries. The instructions then given by the Prime Minister regarding the work of the Committee were in outline as follows:

"The thing to be most feared after the outbreak of war with America, Britain and the Netherlands is that dubious and irresponsible enterprisers proceed to the southern areas in a disorderly manner, taking advantage of the military expedition. They are liable to come into conflict with the local population and to disturb the local economy. They are apt, moreover, to waste our funds and materials which are already deficient. Adequate measures should therefore, be devised for developing the southern regions so that such evils might not occur."

The Outline of Policy regarding the southern areas prepared by the Sixth Committee were in the nature of war-time measures so formulated as to realize the Prime Minister's instructions.

(44) Exhibit 1240, page 10,685 of Record (Signing the Imperial Rescript declaring war).

I signed the Imperial Rescript declaring war. War was certainly not what I desired, but I thought that the opening of hostilities was unavoidable for defensive purposes so long as an

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an ultimatum had already been delivered to us and we were placed in a situation liable to be militarily attacked at any moment.

(45) Exhibit 1271, page 11,342 (Re: Explanations at a Budget Committee of the House of Representatives).

I attended the meeting of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives and in reply to an interpellation of Representative SAKURAI, Hyogoro made explanations as mentioned by the Prosecution.

(46) Exhibit 1971A page 14,505, (Re: Treatment of prisoners of war).

The Prosecution seems to accuse me of having collaborated with the employment of prisoners of war for military purposes, in reliance on a document called the Foreign Affairs Monthly Report which had been prepared and circulated without any knowledge of the Planning Board. If so, it certainly would be a false accusation. For the Planning Board had not the slightest authority concerning the treatment of prisoners of war. It is unimaginable that the Planning Board should, even without my knowledge, have held a conference under its auspices or to have participated in any way in the formulation of policies thereon.

(47) Exhibit 687, page 12,070 of Record (Re: Deliberations on the Establishment of the Greater East Asia Ministry)

The Prosecution alleges that I played an important role at the conference of the Privy Council deliberating on the Organization of the Greater East Asia Ministry. As a matter of fact I attended the Conference as an explaining member to clarify the position of the Government regarding the Government measure.

(48) Exhibit 1272, page 11,353 of Record (Ott's telegram) (concerning German decoration).

About the end of September, 1942, I received an invitation from the German Embassy to attend a ceremony conferring decorations, I had no interest in any decoration to be conferred on me by the German Government, for I had entertained an antipathy to Nazi ideology. I notified the Embassy declining to accept

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the invitation, (Exhibit 2247, page 16,180 of Record). Indeed I must confess that I listened with a sardonic smile when at this Tribunal, Ott's telegram was read after the outbreak of the Russo-German war, I advised the

Premier that since Germany attacked the Soviet Union without giving any notice to Japan and that immediately after Japan's conclusion of a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, Japan should recede from the Triple Alliance. I do not know whether or not Ambassador Ott had heard of this from some one and concluded that "my attitude toward Germany was ambiguous" (as stated in the telegram). Ott's report concerning me in Exhibit 1272 contains a number of inaccuracies. I never knew that I was called Vice-Premier of the Tojo Cabinet. The order of rank in the Japanese Cabinet at official events was a sheer matter to be determined by court precedence, and not indicative of any political significance as seems to be implied in Ambassador Ott's statement. Apart from my official relationship there was no special personal intimacy between General Tojo and myself such as certainly existed between Prince Konoe and myself.

The aforesaid decoration was later sent to my residence, and as it would have been awkward to return it, I just kept it.

(49) Re: Total War Institute (Exhibit 3372, page 32,008 of Record).

I understood at the time that the Institute was a place where academic studies were made and persons who would be needed in time of war were educated. I was appointed counsellor to the Institute, but it was a nominal post ex officio accorded to me as Chief of the Political Section of the China Affairs Board. While I was counsellor I never visited the Institute and the Institute did not send me nor did I ever see any document embodying the results of the Institute studies.

I remember that I attended either the entrance or graduation ceremony with other Ministers of State at the invitation of the Principal of the Institute. However, in December 1943, I ceased to be a Minister having resigned from the Tojo Cabinet in

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October 1943, and moreover, was then travelling in Kyushu for about a month. Therefore, the statement by the witness MURAKAMI that I was present at a ceremony in December must surely be due to an error in his memory.

(50) Exhibit 126, (Re: Decorations).

I was conferred the Third-Class Order of the Middle Cordon of the Rising Sun in recognition of my services in the Manchurian Incident. And I was conferred the Second-Class Order of the Double Rays of the Rising Sun in recognition of my services in the China Incident.

However, the former was, so far as I know, conferred on all colonels in active service without any special merit. The latter was conferred on all major generals in active service also without any special merit. It may also be noted that at the time of the conferment of the two decorations, I had already been conferred decorations of the third and second class respectively of other descriptions.

At Tokyo, Japan, on this  
24th day of November, 1947.

/s/ SUZUKI, Teiichi (seal)  
Deponent

I, KAINO, Michitaka, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date  
at Tokyo, Japan.

/s/ KAINO, Michitaka (seal)

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SUZUKI, Teiichi (seal)