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Congress of the United States

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Report of Proceedings

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Hearing held before

Joint Committee  
on the  
Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack  
S. Con. Res. 27

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November 20, 1945

Washington, D. C.

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## S. Con. Res. 27

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Tuesday, November 20, 1945

Congress of the United States,  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of Pearl Harbor Attack,  
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at  
10:00 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office  
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,  
Brewster and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,  
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;  
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,  
of counsel, for the joint committee.

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Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 The Chairman: The committee will be in order.

3 Mr. Mitchell, you were examining the witness when we  
4 adjourned. You may proceed.

5 Before you proceed, Mr. Mitchell -- this is not neces-  
6 sarily on the record.

7 (Discussion off the record)

8 The Chairman: All right, Mr. Mitchell.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Very well.

10 TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL JAMES OTTO RICHARDSON

11 (having been previously sworn) - Resumed.

12 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral Richardson, in the correspondence  
13 which you have there appears to be a memorandum from the  
14 Chief of Naval Operations dated October 9, 1940, made by  
15 you. That was the day following this visit with the  
16 President?

17 Admiral Richardson: It was.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman, I wonder if counsel will  
19 permit me to interpose.

20 Last week I requested from Admiral Inglis a chart which  
21 he said he would have ready for me yesterday showing the  
22 disposition of the ships in the Pacific from May 1941 to  
23 December 7 1941. I would like to have that at this moment,  
24 if I could.

25 Mr. Mitchell: I am informed that they have been working



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 on it; they ought to have it any time; they haven't sent  
3 it as yet.

4 Mr. Gearhart: I am most anxious to have it before I  
5 am permitted to examine the witness now on the stand. I  
6 want to ask him questions concerning those figures. So if  
7 a chart can be supplied me, I will appreciate it very, very  
8 much.

9 The Chairman: I am satisfied that Admiral Inglis and  
10 the Navy Department will make the chart available as soon  
11 as possible, and as soon as it is available it will be  
12 presented here.

13 Go ahead, Mr. Mitchell.

14 Mr. Mitchell: You made that memorandum of October 9,  
15 1940, following your visit the day before with the President?

16 Admiral Richardson: I did. In order that the Chief  
17 of Naval Operations might be informed as to the decisions  
18 of the President and as to his views as expressed to me.

19 Mr. Mitchell: The first item on that memorandum is:

20 "Go ahead with assembly of Train."

21 What does that mean?

22 Admiral Richardson: There has been some discussion as  
23 to assembling auxiliary vessels, transports, repair ships,  
24 supply ships. I had urged that it be done as one evidence  
25 of our intention to be prepared. The President stated that



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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we would go ahead with the assembly of a train.

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Mr. Mitchell: Item 2 is:

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"Have we fuel oil in Samoa adequate to fill four (4) old light cruisers?"

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Is that a question the President asked, or one you wanted to know about?

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Admiral Richardson: The President asked me. I knew we did not have it. So I wanted the Chief of Naval Operations informed that he might find it necessary or advisable to have a supply of fuel oil in Samoa.

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Mr. Mitchell: Item 3:

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"Give me a chart showing British and French bases or possible bases for surface ships, submarines, or airplanes in islands in the Pacific east of the International Date Line."

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Was that another request from the President?

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Admiral Richardson: No. That was a request by me, as I remember it.

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Mr. Mitchell: Then, in paragraph 4, you stated: "The British Ambassador stated that Ghormley" -- that is Admiral Ghormley, is it?

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Admiral Richardson: It is Admiral R. L. Ghormley.

Mr. Mitchell: "-- was busy transmitting to the Department information regarding technical materials, and the



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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British Admiralty felt that they should have offices prepared for staff conferences."

Were you reporting a thing that the President had said to you?

Admiral Richardson: I was.

Mr. Mitchell: No. 5:

"The British believe the Germans will attempt to occupy Dakar from Spain overland through Africa."

Under that, in brackets, "F.D.R."

What does that mean?

Admiral Richardson: "F.D.R." belongs to the next paragraph. The first is a bit of information. The next, the 6th paragraph is intended to read:

"I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, can be convinced of the desirability," because that is what the President stated to me.

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Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

Mr. Mitchell: (Reading)

"I can be convinced of the desirability of retaining the battleships on the West Coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American people, and the Japanese Government, that in bringing the battleships to the West Coast we are not stepping backward."

That was informing the Chief of Naval Operations what the President had said?

Admiral Richardson: That is true. I was at that time, just before going to Washington, on board a flagship on the West Coast with approximately one-third of the battleships. We had returned to the West Coast for replenishment and for recreation and for overhaul and, if my memory serves me correctly, I was at that time flying my flag on the New Mexico.

Mr. Mitchell: Item 7, the last on the memo, is this:  
(Reading)

"The President indicated that he might approve sending a Division of old Light Cruisers to visit Mindinao as a gesture. He did not appear favorably disposed toward sending a stronger force."

That was just passing on to the Chief of Naval Operations an item of information?



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

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Admiral Richardson: It was.

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Mr. Mitchell: Going back now, Admiral, to July 1940, prior to this visit in October 1940, you made a visit to Washington in July 1940, did you?

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Admiral Richardson: At my suggestion, before I left the West Coast for the Hawaiian area, I was ordered to proceed by air to Washington for a conference with the Chief of Naval Operations and the President.

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I actually started and France capitulated and my trip was delayed. I later came by air, arriving in Washington on 8 July and departing from Washington for Honolulu on 11 July.

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Mr. Mitchell: The appointment book at the White House states that on July 8th you had a luncheon engagement with the President at one P.M.; on July 11th another appointment with the President at twelve noon. What is your memory about that?

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Admiral Richardson: As to the appointment on 8 July, I had lunch with the President and talked with him for two or three hours and my mission at that time was primarily to find the thought back of our retention in Hawaii, to explore and endeavor to ascertain, if possible, the duration of our stay and, from my point of view, stress the necessity of increasing the number of men in the Navy because we were at that time building a very large Navy; we had on board ship



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Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 approximately eighty-five per cent of the number of men re-  
3 quired to man the ships.

4 In normal times, in normal peacetimes you can build a  
5 destroyer quicker than you can train the men to man them.  
6 Therefore, I was very strongly of the opinion that all the  
7 ships in active commission in the fleet should have on board  
8 them all the men that they could carry in order that the  
9 ships themselves might be prepared and that nucleus crews  
10 should be trained for the new ships, because they would be  
11 required whether we had peace or had war. I was also desir-  
12 ous of securing the retention of officers in the fleet with-  
13 out the normal change of duty.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Were those the subjects that you discussed  
15 with the President?

16 Admiral Richardson: They were.

17 Mr. Mitchell: Do you want to state in your own way, as  
18 near as you can recollect, what the general tenor of the con-  
19 versation was?

20 Admiral Richardson: Well, the President was rather  
21 loath to increase the number of men because he felt, as ex-  
22 pressed to me, that men of mechanical trades in civil life  
23 could be quickly inducted and make adequate sailormen if  
24 their services were suddenly required.

25 Mr. Mitchell: What about the second appointment at



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 twelve noon on July 11 with the President? Do you remember  
3 about that and what was said?

4 Admiral Richardson: I believe that that, - well, I  
5 know that that meeting lasted only a few minutes and I went  
6 by to tell the President good-bye and no subjects of any  
7 moment were discussed.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Did you have any appointment with Mr.  
9 Hull or Mr. Welles, or both of them, during July 1940? Their  
10 record shows an appointment on July 9th.

11 Admiral Richardson: During that visit I saw Secretary  
12 Hull and Under Secretary Welles and talked to both of them  
13 at the same time or, rather, I talked to Secretary Hull in  
14 the presence of Under Secretary Welles for an hour or so.

15 I saw Senator Byrnes on the 10th of July. I had lunch  
16 with General Marshall on the 10th of July. I saw Dr.  
17 Stanley Hornbeck on the 11th of July and outside of Naval  
18 personnel I think those were the only officials that I saw.  
19 I wanted to see the then Congressman Scrugham, who was  
20 Chairman of the Sub-committee of the Appropriations Commit-  
21 tee of the House that handled naval appropriations, but he  
22 was not in town.

23 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember the subject of your  
24 discussion with Mr. Hull on that meeting of the 9th of  
25 July, what the general tenor of it was?



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

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2           Admiral Richardson: I saw Mr. Hull to fully explore  
3 and learn all that I could as to why the fleet was retained  
4 in Hawaii, how long they would probably stay there and what  
5 the future intentions were, because I had been directed to  
6 retain the fleet in Hawaii and announced that it was retained  
7 there at my request and naturally, since I had made no such  
8 request, I wanted to know what was back of the whole thing.

9           I also felt so strongly the need for men that I  
10 wanted to impress on both the Secretary of State and the  
11 Under Secretary of State that I felt that they should assist  
12 in so far as possibly they could in seeing that the fleet  
13 was fully manned.

14           Mr. Mitchell: In this correspondence file is a letter  
15 from you to Admiral Stark dated June 22, 1940, dated at  
16 Lahina Roads, is it?

17           Admiral Richardson: Lahaina Roads.

18           Mr. Mitchell: Will you please look at that?

19           Admiral Richardson: I cannot find that.

20           Mr. Mitchell: Well, I will hand it to you, my copy.

21           Admiral Richardson: I have it. My letter?

22           Mr. Mitchell: Your letter.

23           Admiral Richardson: Yes, I have it.

24           Mr. Mitchell: Your letter refers to the fact that  
25 General Herron, then commanding the Hawaiian Department, had



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 received an alert from the War Department. Do you remember  
3 that incident?

4 Admiral Richardson: Vividly.

5 Mr. Mitchell: Was any alert ordered from Washington  
6 for the Navy at the same time? Just go on in your own way  
7 and tell us about it, Admiral.

8 Admiral Richardson: Lieutenant General Herron, com-  
9 manding the Hawaiian Department, received from the War De-  
10 partment a despatch on 17 June 1940 which read:

11 "Immediately alert complete defensive organization  
12 to deal with trans-Pacific trade to greatest extent pos-  
13 sible without creating public hysteria or projecting  
14 undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest  
15 manoeuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders.  
16 Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief  
17 of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge."

18 At that time I was at sea. Lieutenant General Charles  
19 D. Herron visited Admiral Claude C. Bloch on 17 June, in-  
20 formed him of the receipt of these orders and requested  
21 the Navy establish a distance reconnaissance. This is hear-  
22 say and gained from official correspondence.

23 Admiral Bloch, in company with General Herron, either  
24 had Vice Admiral Andrews come in or visited him and re-  
25 quested him to establish the long range reconnaissance be-



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 cause the patrol planes were under Vice Admiral Andrews.

3 Vice Admiral Andrews was the senior officer afloat in Pearl  
4 Harbor.

5 I was informed of what had been done by both Admiral  
6 Andrews and I believe Admiral Bloch, so I sent to the command-  
7 ant of the 14th Naval District, Admiral Bloch, the following  
8 message:

9 "Would like to know whether request of Commanding  
10 General Hawaiian Department for additional air patrol  
11 is a part of Army exercises or is it based upon inform-  
12 ation from the War Department?"

13 I received at 0945 local time on 19 June 1940 the fol-  
14 lowing reply:

15 "Request of Commanding General was based upon a  
16 directive from the War Department. He has no informa-  
17 tion as to whether or not it is an exercise."

18 I had received no information from the Navy Department.  
19 Therefore, despite what anybody else believed, I knew that  
20 it could not be other than a drill.

21 The Vice Chairman: Other than a what?

22 Admiral Richardson: Other than an exercise, because I  
23 firmly believed that no important information would be avail-  
24 able to General Marshall that was not available to Admiral  
25 Stark and if the information was of such a character as to



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

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necessitate alerting the Army, the Navy would be equally alerted; but in order to be certain I --

Mr. Mitchell: Are you looking for your letter of the 22nd?

Admiral Richardson: No. On 21 June I had a plane come out from Pearl Harbor, pick me up at 0745, take me into Pearl Harbor, where I had a conference with Admiral Bloch and General Herron. I read the order. I asked General Herron whether it was a real alert or a drill? He said he did not know. I assured him that it could not be anything but an exercise.

I sent a despatch to the Chief of Naval Operations requesting information. No reply was ever received.

In compliance with General Herron's request to establish a patrol Vice Admiral Andrews modified the patrol that was then in effect. I had established a plane patrol centered on Lahaina, which covered the arc from 220 to 335 degrees to a distance of 180 miles. Admiral Andrews changed this patrol to cover the arc from south, through west to north to a distance of three hundred miles. He also established a dawn and dusk patrol, reported his action to me in a letter dated 18 June and requested that I confirm his action. I sent to Vice Admiral Andrews the following despatch:

"Affirm patrol."  
Do you want me to go on?

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Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Mr. Mitchell: That report from Admiral Andrews is the  
3 document in the correspondence file dated June 18, 1940,  
4 "Memorandum from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet." You  
5 have it before you, have you?

6 Admiral Richardson: I forwarded that with a letter from  
7 Admiral Bloch to me, with the dispatch exchange between me  
8 and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District in my letter  
9 to the Chief of Naval Operations in order that he might be  
10 fully informed as to the whole incident.

11 Mr. Mitchell: The report of Admiral Andrews states  
12 that the sector you spoke of from South through West to  
13 North to a distance of 300 miles would be searched.

14 Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

15 Mr. Mitchell: With what types of planes was that re-  
16 connaissance conducted?

17 Admiral Richardson: Well, the patrol planes, a type  
18 then known as VP, which is a seaplane, unarmed, used later  
19 in this war, primarily as a rescue plane.

20 Mr. Mitchell: How long did you keep that plane in re-  
21 connaissance operation on that scale?

22 Admiral Richardson: In order that the committee may be  
23 fully informed with respect to long range reconnaissance  
24 which prevailed for a number of months, it will be necessary  
25 for me to cover some correspondence and make a comprehensive



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 statement. Shall I proceed?

3 Mr. Mitchell: If you are ready to.

4 Admiral Richardson: In connection with the annual  
5 Fleet exercises, it had always been the custom to simulate  
6 war conditions, and therefore, when the Fleet arrived in  
7 the Hawaiian area, about 10 April, and all of the heavy  
8 ships anchored off Lahaina Roads, I established, as a part  
9 of the exercises, a dawn and dusk inner patrol of planes,  
10 which extended to a distance of about 30 miles. I estab-  
11 lished an anti-submarine patrol of destroyers at all the  
12 entrances to Lahaina Roads, and I established a long range  
13 reconnaissance of approximately 180 miles.

14 This reconnaissance was established solely as an  
15 exercise. It was not adequate either as to the density of  
16 the planes or as to the distance searched to provide warning  
17 of any impending attack from a prospective enemy. Because  
18 of the frequent warnings which I had received from the Chief  
19 of Naval Operations in personal letters, because of my orders  
20 to remain in the Hawaiian area with the Fleet for reasons  
21 unknown to me, I continued this patrol and gradually the  
22 purpose for which it was maintained was somewhat modified.

23 It was continued for three purposes: first, for  
24 training; next, because of my knowledge of the Japanese,  
25 and the Panay incident. Although I felt there was absolute-



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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ly at that time of an attack by the Japanese fleet, I feared that there was, at any time, a possibility that some fanatical, ill-advised officer in command of a submarine or a ship might attack.

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Also I felt -- and this may have been wrong, but I felt that Admiral Stark might not have all the information that there was available, or he might not fully understand the implications of all the information that he had, and that partly as a personal defensive device, he was warning me to be on the alert against a possible attack, and being an officer of long experience, I wanted the same protection, and therefore I flew this patrol so it could not be said of me after the thing happened that I was warned and did nothing about it.

It was in effect from that point of view a token reconnaissance.

That was continued until, in November, the 28th, 1940, in a letter to Admiral Stark, I said, in part -- that is my letter of the 28th of November --

"Your last two letters, touching on the security of the Fleet while operating in the Hawaiian area and the prospective operations of the Second Brigade of the Fleet Marine Force with the Fleet during the third quarter have been received.

"With regard to the first of these matters, I will take



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii."

3 The third paragraph states:

4 "The security of the units while carrying out routine  
5 operations gives me greater concern" --

6 Mr. Mitchell (interposing): You might read that fully,  
7 that second paragraph.

8 Admiral Richardson: That relates to another item, but  
9 I will do that.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

11 Admiral Richardson: "With regard to the first of these  
12 matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my arrival back  
13 in Hawaii. This feature of the problem does not give me a  
14 great deal of concern, and, I think, can be easily provided  
15 for. I think torpedo nets within the harbor are neither  
16 necessary nor practicable. The area is too restricted and  
17 ships at present are not moored within torpedo range of the  
18 entrance.

19 "The security of the units while carrying out routine  
20 operations gives me greater concern, because to provide a  
21 reasonable degree of security calls for employment of a great  
22 number of fleet units for security alone, which will consume  
23 both time and effort that could, otherwise, be well directed  
24 toward training and indoctrination. I feel that the Fleet  
25 must operate on either of two assumptions, i.e., (a) that



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 we are at peace and no security measures are required; or  
3 (b) that wartime measures of security must be carried out.

4 "Heretofore, we have carried out limited security mea-  
5 sures largely as a basis for training, and on the assumption  
6 that no foreign power would choose to bring on a war by  
7 an attack on the Fleet, but that some misdirected or fanati-  
8 cal nationals might undertake individual and irresponsible  
9 attack on fleet units.

10 "Now, however, in the light of your concern over these  
11 matters, and in view of your better information and position  
12 to evaluate the possibilities, I have come to the conclusion  
13 that I must operate on the basis of (b) above. I enclose  
14 tentative draft of a directive which I plan to issue upon  
15 arrival at Pearl Harbor. It is bound to result in the cur-  
16 tailment of badly needed basic training of new personnel,  
17 particularly in destroyers and planes and some degree of  
18 extra discomfort, but under the assumption, this will have  
19 to be accepted."

20 Now, Admiral Stark replied to that letter in a letter  
21 dated 23 December, the third paragraph of which says --  
22 have you got it?

23 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral, I have, but I was wondering if  
24 you would not get the thread of this a little better if you  
25 went back to Admiral Stark's letter to you of November 22nd,



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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the reply to which you just read? You refer to that in the reply. That is November 22, 1940.

Admiral Richardson: Mr. Counsel, there are two points, there are two lines of thought. There are two chains of action, and I am pursuing one.

Mr. Mitchell: All right. Go ahead. You may go back to that, if necessary.

Admiral Richardson: Go back?

Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

Admiral Richardson: What I am now discussing is long range reconnaissance. In Admiral Stark's letter of 23 December, he stated, in paragraph 3:

"First, in regard to security, I endeavored to outline to Murphy" --

Murphy was at that time Commander Vincent R. Murphy, my war plans officer, whom I had left in Washington to discuss matters with the War Plans Division of Naval Operations.

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Witness Richardson

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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2 --"I endeavored to outline to Murphy my idea as to the extent  
3 security measures should be prosecuted, namely, that while  
4 the extent of security measures required his increasing, it  
5 has not yet reached the demands of full wartime security. As  
6 I discussed with Murphy, there will be an advantage in making  
7 occasional sweeps by aircraft and surface craft but it is not  
8 yet necessary to make these continuous. I agree with you that  
9 the wear and tear on equipment, and the detrimental effects  
10 on training, of full security measures should be given due  
11 weight."

12 Upon receipt of that letter of 30 December, 1940, in a  
13 letter addressed to the Fleet, the number of the letter being  
14 "U.S. Fleet Confidential Letter No. 8CL 1-40; Subject: Security  
15 of Fleet Units operating in the Hawaiian area", which is the  
16 finished product, the tentative draft of which I sent to  
17 Admiral Stark --

18 The Vice Chairman: What is the date of that, please?

19 Admiral Richardson: 30 December, 1940. I doubt whether  
20 the committee has a copy of this letter, because I myself  
21 received it just yesterday, and I secured this letter because  
22 the counsel indicated to me his intention to interrogate me  
23 with respect to long range reconnaissance. Undoubtedly the  
24 counsel will supply the members of the committee with a copy  
25 of this letter, if he has not already done so.



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Mr. Gesell: It has not been supplied as yet.

3 Mr. Mitchell: Admiral, you are not referring to the  
4 report of December 30, 1940, from the Commandant?

5 Admiral Richardson: No.

6 Mr. Mitchell: They are different documents?

7 Admiral Richardson: Mr. Counsel, there are two chains of  
8 circumstances and letters originating at about the same time.  
9 I am pursuing one of them.

10 Mr. Mitchell: This letter you refer to is from you to  
11 Admiral Stark, is it?

12 Admiral Richardson: When Admiral Stark informed me that  
13 he felt it was no longer necessary to do other than sweep operat-  
14 ing areas and do what his letter of 23 December said to do,  
15 then I had no concern over doing other than what I thought was  
16 necessary. I discontinued then long range reconnaissance of  
17 any kind except the sweeping of operating areas.

18 I present this letter primarily to show that I discontinued  
19 patrol plane reconnaissance. I also issued this directive:

20 "Ships, except submarines, shall not anchor in unprotected  
21 anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and  
22 Kahului may be considered as such if boat patrols are maintained  
23 at the entrance and ships are so moored as not to be subject  
24 to torpedo fire from outside the harbor."

25 Now if the counsel so desires, I will pursue the other



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 chain of circumstances.

3 Mr. Mitchell: What was the precise date that Admiral  
4 Kimmel assumed command there?

5 Admiral Richardson: After issuing this directive, 8CL-40  
6 of 30 December 1940, I felt that this letter was not sufficiently  
7 comprehensive to provide for the security of the Fleet, so I  
8 immediately started the preparation of a revision of that  
9 document. I was engaged -- at least my staff was -- in re-  
10 vising that when I received information of my prospective  
11 detachment. So I amplified that very much. But inasmuch as  
12 I was to be relieved in the near future, I asked that my staff  
13 confer with the prospective staff of the prospective Commander  
14 in Chiefs to ascertain their views. So the document that  
15 was later issued under the title of "Pacific Fleet Confidential  
16 Letter No. 2CL-41, date of 15 February 1941" was signed by  
17 Admiral H. E. Kimmel, who was the Commander in Chief of the  
18 Pacific Fleet having relieved me on 1 February 1941.

19 Had I remained in command of the U.S. Fleet this order  
20 would have borne my signature and it would have been substantially  
21 the same order.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Well, now, let us go back for a moment  
23 to Admiral Stark's letter to you of November 22, 1940, which  
24 I have before me. He says:

25 "While you were here in early October we sent a dispatch



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 to Comfourteen to ascertain from Admiral Bloch whether or  
3 not the protection being afforded to the vital element of  
4 the Naval establishment in Hawaii was satisfactory, this in  
5 order that, if required, we could make representations to the  
6 War Department to direct more thorough protection on the part  
7 of its Hawaiian Department.

8 "Admiral Bloch's answers to this dispatch and to a second  
9 dispatch on the same subject were not very definite, and did  
10 not provide bases for further action by the Department.

11 "Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety  
12 of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, already great, has become even  
13 greater. This concern has to do both with possible activities  
14 on the part of Japanese residents of Hawaii and with the  
15 possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the  
16 most profitable object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters  
17 would be the Fleet units based in that area. Without question  
18 the safety of these units is paramount and imposes on the  
19 Commander in Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in  
20 which he must receive the complete support of Commandant  
21 Fourteen, and of the Army. I realize most fully that you are  
22 giving this problem comprehensive thought. My object in  
23 writing you is to find out what steps the Navy Department and  
24 the War Department should be taking to provide additional  
25 equipment and additional protective measures.



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 "For instance, is it desirable to place torpedo nets  
3 within the harbor itself? I will appreciate your comment  
4 and those of Comfourteen on this question.

(5) 5 "Anti-aircraft protection can be provided first by units  
6 of the Fleet actually in Pearl Harbor with guns ready at all  
7 times; by stationing about the Navy Yard of Army A.A. defense  
8 measures including mobile batteries, and possibly by utilization  
9 of Marine Defense Battalion Anti-Aircraft Units now available  
10 in the Pearl Harbor area, or that could be made available.  
11 Also by keeping carrier fighters squadrons alerted and ready  
12 to go." And so on.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Now you responded to that letter on the 28  
14 of November and you said:

15 "With regard to the first of these matters, I will take  
16 this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii."

17 Now you did take it up with Admiral Block?

18 Admiral Richardson: Yes.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Just tell us what you did about that.

20 Admiral Richardson: The letter of Admiral Stark to me  
21 dated November 22, 1940 is one of a series of letters and  
22 incidents about which at least three witnesses in addition to  
23 me will testify, and in order that that matter may be initially  
24 understood I think it advisable to cover the whole series.

25 When I was in Washington the 7th, or the 11th of October,



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 I discussed with Admiral Stark the position of the Fleet  
3 when in Pearl Harbor, the inadequate provision that had been  
4 made both by the Army and Navy to protect the Fleet, and before  
5 I returned to Pearl Harbor Admiral Stark sent to Admiral Bloch,  
6 Commandant of the 14th Naval District, a dispatch requesting  
7 certain information, as indicated in his first paragraph of  
8 the letter of November 22.

9 I remained in the New Mexico on the West Coast and did  
10 not arrive in Pearl Harbor until the 6th of December. Admiral  
11 Bloch was the Commandant of the District, and he was exceedingly  
12 busy with work under construction. I felt that it was essential  
13 that I personally know what we had, and what the Army had,  
14 therefore I arranged with Lieutenant General Charles D. Herron  
15 to inspect everything that the Army had to defend the Army  
16 and Navy installations in Hawaii from all forms of overseas  
17 attack.

18 I asked General Herron to have the officers who were  
19 subordinate to him, who were directly responsible for any  
20 part of the defense, prepared to show me what they had, to  
21 give me a list of what they had, give me a list of what the  
22 plans called for them to have, and the best estimate they  
23 could make of when they would receive what they required.

24 The flagship was going to sea on individual exercises  
25 which did not require my presence. Therefore, on 19 December,



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Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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in company with General Herron, I reviewed the Army equipment and received the data requested. I delivered this data to Admiral Bloch and told him that inasmuch as he represented the Fleet in relations with the Army in Hawaii, because I might be away at any time, that I wanted him to use this data and prepare a letter to the Navy Department setting forth his views and forward the letter through me, which Admiral Bloch did in a letter dated 30 December, 1940. The subject: "Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks."

WARD & PAUL,  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Hook follows



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 That letter was forwarded by me to the Chief of  
3 Naval Operations with the first endorsement dated January  
4 4, 1941. I have been informed, and I believe that Rear  
5 Admiral, now Admiral Richmond Kelley Turner, then on duty  
6 in the War Plans Division of Naval Operations, prepared,  
7 for the signature of the Secretary of the Navy, a letter  
8 dated 24 January, 1941, addressed to the Secretary of War.

9 Reference to this letter appears on page 5, section  
10 7 of the report of the Roberts Commission.

11 Mr. Mitchell: This letter, Admiral of December 30,  
12 1940, signed by Admiral Bloch and addressed to the Chief  
13 of Naval Operations, is in evidence here. Have you it  
14 before you?

15 Admiral Richardson: I have.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Would you mind reading paragraphs 1  
17 and 2 of that letter, or shall I read it for you?

18 Admiral Richardson: I will read it.

19 "In view of the inquiries contained in references (a)"  
20 -- which is Stark's dispatch of October, 1940 -- "(b) and  
21 (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set  
22 forth the present ability of the 14th Naval District to  
23 meet surprise hostile attacks of an enemy with the equipment  
24 and forces at hand.

25 "Aircraft Raids:



Witness Richardson

1.  
2        "Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will  
3 undoubtedly be brought by carriers. Therefore, there are  
4 two ways of repelling attack.

5        "First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior  
6 to launching planes. Second, by driving off attacking  
7 bombers with anti-aircraft guns and fighters. The Navy  
8 component of the local defense forces has no planes for  
9 distant reconnaissance with which to locate any enemy  
10 carriers, and the only planes belonging to the local defense  
11 forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army  
12 bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area fifty-nine  
13 B-18 bombers. All of these are classified as being obsolete.  
14 The model is 6 years old and the planes themselves are  
15 5 years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither  
16 numbers nor types are satisfactory for the purposes in-  
17 tended. New bombing planes are expected sometime in the  
18 future. However, not before July, 1941. For distant re-  
19 reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the  
20 forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet.

21        "To drive off bombing planes after they have been  
22 launched, will require both fighting planes and anti-aircraft  
23 guns. The Army has in the Hawaiian area, thirty-six pursuit  
24 planes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of  
25 them are six years old, and some of them are four years old.

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2 In numbers and models there is a serious deficiency exist-  
3 ing. New fighters are expected when the P-40 is in produc-  
4 tion to the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can  
5 be delivered. This does not appear to be probable before  
6 the end of 1941; this number does not appear adequate.

7 "The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl  
8 Harbor Base by anti-aircraft guns. There are in Hawaii  
9 twenty-six fixed 3-inch guns and forty-four mobile 3-inch  
10 guns. There are projected twenty-four more to be delivered  
11 in 1941. There are no 37-millimeter and only 109 .50-calibre  
12 out of the projected 120 37-millimeter and 308 .50-calibre  
13 machine guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of  
14 the 3-inch guns around Pearl Harbor and only a few near other  
15 military objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary  
16 to increase the numbers of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly  
17 to have any semblance of anti-aircraft defense. Further-  
18 more, I express my doubt as to the efficacy of a 3-inch  
19 gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude  
20 bombers. The Army has made no plans for the anti-aircraft  
21 defense of Lualualei or Kaneohe; furthermore, it will be neces-  
22 sary to have a considerable concentration of anti-aircraft  
23 guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor of Honolulu  
24 in order that lines of communication may be kept open. With  
25 a limited knowledge of the density of anti-aircraft barrages



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abroad, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian area.

"This number is in addition to 37-millimeter and .50 calibre machine guns.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



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Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 "In addition to the above, the Army has planned an  
3 aircraft warning service which will consist of 8 radar stations.  
4 Three of these stations are fixed and 5 are mobile. When  
5 completed at an indefinite time in the future, this warning  
6 net should be adequate."

7 May I also read the last paragraph?

8 Mr. Mitchell: Any part of it that you think is material,  
9 Admiral.

10 Admiral Richardson: This is paragraph 11:

11 "It is considered highly undesirable from my point of  
12 view that the War Department should in any way come to believe  
13 that there is lack of agreement between the Army authorities  
14 and Navy authorities here, or that the officials of the 14th  
15 Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do something  
16 in regard to Army matters."

17 Mr. Mitchell: Well, then on January 7, 1941, you placed  
18 an endorsement on that communication of Bloch's?

19 Admiral Richardson: I think that is January 4, sir.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Is it?

21 Admiral Richardson: Yes.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Oh, yes. It is blotted up. January 4.

23 Admiral Richardson: That is Saturday, and I wanted this  
24 away as quickly as I could and I know I would not hold it.

25 Mr. Mitchell: That expressed directly your individual



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 views about the situation, did it?

3 Admiral Richardson: It did. I think that Admiral Bloch  
4 and I were in complete agreement, because we fully discussed  
5 the matter.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Would you care to read the portions of that  
7 that you think are especially useful? The first paragraph  
8 probably covers the ground really, and the second. I will read  
9 it if you like.

10 Admiral Richardson: I think, if I may be permitted to  
11 suggest it, that the first and third paragraphs ought to be  
12 read, because the third paragraph contains the matter that  
13 has been mentioned several times. Paragraph 1:

14 "Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with  
15 the Commandant 14th Naval District and the Commanding General  
16 of the Hawaiian Department. As a result of the conference  
17 with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and an in-  
18 spection in company with him, information was furnished the  
19 Commandant 14th Naval District who prepared the basic letter.  
20 The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Commandant 14th Naval  
21 District in the opinion that the present Army Pursuit Squadrons  
22 and anti-aircraft batteries are inadequate to protect the  
23 Fleet and Pearl Harbor against air attack. When established  
24 the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate. The proposed  
25 total of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area is not



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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considered adequate. With the almost continuous high ceiling prevailing in this area a materially greater number of larger and longer range anti-aircraft guns are necessary to counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Mr. Mitchell: I will read "2" for you, to receive  
3 your voice. Admiral.

4 Admiral Richardson: All right.

5 Mr. Mitchell: "2. As neither the increased anti-  
6 aircraft batteries, nor the augmented pursuitsquadrons  
7 will be available for an extended period, the defense of  
8 the Fleet units within Pearl Harbor will have to be augmented  
9 by that portion of the Fleet which may be in Pearl Harbor  
10 in the event of attack by hostile aircraft. Plans for co-  
11 operation with the local defense forces are being made. At  
12 present the continuous readiness of carrier fighter squad-  
13 rons or anti-aircraft batteries is not contemplated. The  
14 improbability of such an attack under present conditions  
15 does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant  
16 interrupting entirely the training required by Fleet Air  
17 Units which would have to be largely curtailed if constant  
18 readiness of a fighter squadron were required."

19 Admiral Richardson: Paragraph 3:

20 "There does not appear to be any practicable way of  
21 placing torpedo baffles or nets within the Harbor to protect  
22 the ships moored therein against torpedo plane attack without  
23 greatly limiting the activities within the Harbor, particu-  
24 larly the movement of large ships and the landing and take-  
25 off of patrol squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor is the

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 only operating base available to the Fleet in this area,  
3 any passive defense measures that will further restrict the  
4 use of the base as such should be avoided.

5 "Considering this and the improbability of such an  
6 attack under present conditions the unlikelihood of an  
7 enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in  
8 wartime in the face of active Fleet operations, it is not  
9 considered it is necessary to lay such nets."

10 That paragraph was, in part, based on information from  
11 the Navy Department; insofar as was known torpedos launched  
12 from aircraft would not operate in water of the depth of  
13 Pearl Harbor.

14 Mr. Mitchell: You spoke, Admiral, of the fact that  
15 following that report of Admiral Bloch of December 30,  
16 forwarded with the endorsement you have just read, there  
17 resulted the letter from the Secretary of the Navy, Mr.  
18 Knox, to the Secretary of War, which you stated was pre-  
19 pared for him by Admiral Turner.

20 Admiral Richardson: Admiral Turner so informed me.

21 Mr. Mitchell: I have that letter here and it hasn't  
22 been offered in evidence yet. Probably I had better read it  
23 if the committee is ready.

24 The Chairman: Go ahead.

25 Will you identify that?

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Mr. Mitchell: This is a letter which we will mark  
Exhibit 10.

(The documents referred to were marked  
as Exhibit No. 10.)

Mr. Mitchell: It follows right along logically after  
this Bloch report. It is a letter from Secretary Knox, dated  
January 24, 1941, addressed to the Secretary of War.

Mr. Keefe: What is the date of it?

Mr. Mitchell: January 24, 1941.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C



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"My dear Mr. Secretary:

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The security of the U.S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

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In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

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The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

(1) Air bombing attack.

(2) Air torpedo plane attack.

(3) Sabotage.

(4) Submarine attack.



1 (5) Mining.

2 (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

3 Defense against all but the first two of these dangers  
4 appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The follow-  
5 ing paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the  
6 problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which  
7 I consider to be of primary importance.

8 Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried  
9 out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any  
10 of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable  
11 enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the  
12 minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking  
13 force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

14 The counter measures to be considered are:

15 (a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and  
16 supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;

17 (2) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft  
18 before they reach their objectives;

19 (c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;

20 (d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial  
21 smoke;

22 (e) Protection of vital installations by balloon  
23 barrages.

24 The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of  
25 the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case

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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



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1 of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declara-  
2 tion of war.

3 Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning  
4 net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood  
5 that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present  
6 in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an  
7 Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control  
8 equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly  
9 on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective  
10 up to four miles.

11 Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate  
12 if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are  
13 now in Oahu 26 - 3" fixed anti-aircraft guns (of which some-  
14 thing over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile  
15 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft  
16 batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required  
17 to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on  
18 Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one of the  
19 other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the  
20 prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of  
21 the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude  
22 bombing attack.

23 By late summer the defenses will be considerably strength-  
24 ened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is  
25 understood, sixteen additional 3" Mobile, twenty-four 90 mm.,

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C



1 and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on hand; the pursuit  
2 aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new  
3 radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although  
4 the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action  
5 against high altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly  
6 improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect  
7 the critical period immediately before us.

8 The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be  
9 of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon  
10 barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke  
11 from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advan-  
12 tageous.

13 To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following  
14 proposals:

15 (1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the  
16 increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and  
17 the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.

18 (2) That the Army give consideration to the questions of  
19 balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special  
20 services for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.

21 (3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective co-  
22 ordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and  
23 shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

24 (4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on  
25 appropriate degrees of joing readiness for immediate action in  
defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.



WLC5 1 (5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and  
2 Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids,  
3 be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty  
4 continues to exist.

5 Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid imple-  
6 menting of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of  
7 the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, will be  
8 met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Depart-  
9 ment."

10 Then attached to that is the reply of Mr. Henry L.  
11 Stimson, Secretary of War, dated February 7, 1941:



## "WAR DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-P pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks



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1 and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March  
2 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

3 3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-  
4 two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one  
5 hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project  
6 calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty  
7 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine  
8 guns.

9 4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the  
10 equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in  
11 Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have  
12 been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry  
13 develops the information that delivery of the necessary equip-  
14 ment cannot be made at an earlier date.

15 5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being  
16 directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the  
17 employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protect-  
18 ing the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not  
19 available at the present time for installation and cannot be  
20 made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there  
21 are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured -- forty  
22 for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September.  
23 The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand  
24 nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screen-  
25 ing vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified



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1 opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu  
2 render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale  
3 screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look  
4 into this matter again.

5 6. With reference to your other proposals for joint  
6 defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply  
7 to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am direct-  
8 ing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making  
9 those measures effective."

10 Signed by Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War.



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2 Attached to that is a letter of transmittal from the  
3 Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S.  
4 Pacific Fleet.

5 "Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii," and  
6 copy of Secretary Knox's letter, and one of Secretary  
7 Stimson's letters; transmitted under date of February 11,  
8 1941.

9 And another, addressed to the Commanding General,  
10 Hawaiian Department, signed by General Dick, Adjutant  
11 General, dated February 7, 1941, inviting attention to  
12 the correspondence I have just read between the Secretary  
13 of the Navy and the Secretary of War.

14 And attached then is a document dated February 13, 1941,  
15 signed by Carl Grosse, Assistant Adjutant General, Head-  
16 quarters, Hawaiian Department, acknowledging receipt of the  
17 Adjutant General's letter of February 7, together with  
18 the two enclosures noted.

19 They are all part of the same exhibit.

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Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 Now, Admiral Richardson, had you left Hawaii before  
3 February 11 and 13 when this Knox-Stimson matter was up?

4 Admiral Richardson: I was relieved of command of the  
5 Fleet on the 1st of February, 1941. Thereafter I knew nothing  
6 about fleet matters, although I did not actually leave the  
7 Islands until the 14th of February.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Well, then, this correspondence between  
9 the Navy and the War Department that I have just read, that  
10 reached there February 11 and 13, would not have come to your  
11 hands?

12 Admiral Richardson: This is the first time it has come  
13 to my notice.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Now, going back to your visits with  
15 Secretary Hull and Secretary Knox, which was your first trip  
16 here in 1940, along in July, you said you went to Mr. Hull  
17 and others to find out what the situation was, why you were  
18 being kept at Pearl Harbor. I neglected to ask you what Mr.  
19 Hull said, if he gave the reason for it.

20 Admiral Richardson: Mr. Hull in a very complete and  
21 comprehensive manner presented to me his views of the relation-  
22 ships, relations between the United States and Japan. He  
23 felt that we should take a very strong position with respect  
24 to Japan and that the retention of the Fleet in Hawaii was a  
25 reflection of that strong attitude.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 I did not receive this impression from Secretary Hull,  
3 and I cannot state with certainty how I received it, but I  
4 left here with the distinct impression that there was an opinion  
5 in Washington that Japan could be bluffed.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Well, when you were here during that trip  
7 you visited with Admiral Stark, I suppose?

8 Admiral Richardson: I did. I stayed with Admiral Stark  
9 at the Admiral's house.

10 Mr. Mitchell: In your contact with him did you gather  
11 any different impression about his attitude towards basing  
12 the Fleet at Pearl Harbor instead of on our West Coast than  
13 he expressed in these letters?

14 Admiral Richardson: It is my belief that had Admiral  
15 Stark been uninfluenced by other considerations he would have  
16 wholeheartedly agreed with me.

17 Mr. Mitchell: Well, just what did he say about it in  
18 your meetings with him, if you remember.

19 Admiral Richardson: Well, his letters, I think, in many  
20 places show that he hoped that the Fleet would return to the  
21 West Coast, and after the Fleet had been in Hawaii for some  
22 time he authorized me to return approximately one-third of  
23 the Fleet to the Coast at a time for recreation and replenish-  
24 ment and the securing of additional men, and when he informed  
25 me that I might do that he said that he informed me with great



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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pleasure. And I believe that I came with either the first or the second one of those task forces that visited the Coast.

Mr. Mitchell: During 1940, when you were in command of the Fleet, did you have fleet war games out in the Hawaiian area?

Admiral Richardson: We had, while I was in command of the Fleet, only one big fleet exercise which involved two fleet proper. They took place between the first of April and the 9th of May.

Mr. Mitchell: Did any of those exercised involve a simulated air attack by an enemy carrier force?

Admiral Richardson: Those exercised did not. The exercises were planned by my predecessor. They did not include a carrier attack on Pearl Harbor. And joint exercises with the Army were discussed by Admiral Stark with me in letters, and it was too late to modify the plans, and in those exercises the only exercises in which the Army participated was, I believe, on the 8th or 9th of April I sent some heavy cruisers in to simulate an attempting raid in order to exercise the forces stationed in Hawaii, the Navy patrol planes in locating the force and the Army bombers in bombing it, and the submarine stations normally in Pearl Harbor in attacking the force, which was simulating an attack.

So that there was not a large scale joint exercise between



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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the Army and the Navy in which a carrier raid on installations in Hawaii occurred, although in previous years, when I was in a position other than Commander in Chief, I had been present in the Fleet when such attacks were made.

Shefner follows.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C



Chief file  
LaChapelle  
11:40

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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Richardson:

Questions by the Chairman

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: I think we are ready for the committee to  
3 inquire of the witness.

4 The Chairman: Admiral, who was your immediate predecessor  
5 as Commander-of the United States Fleet?

6 Admiral Richardson: I relieved Admiral Claude C. Bloch.

7 The Chairman: What is the technical relationship be-  
8 tween the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, such as that which  
9 you were commander of, and the commandant of the 14th Naval  
10 District?

11 Admiral Richardson: The commandant of the 14th Naval  
12 District is a subordinate of the Commander-in-Chief. He is  
13 also under the Chief of Naval Operations with respect to  
14 other than fleet matters.

15 The Chairman: When the fleet is at sea does the com-  
16 mandant of the 14th Naval District have complete authority  
17 within that district or is he still subject to orders of  
18 the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet?

19 Admiral Richardson: He is always subject to the orders  
20 of the Commander-in-Chief. Because the Commander-in-Chief  
21 may not be present in Pearl Harbor he is the representative  
22 of the Commander-in-Chief in dealings with the commanding  
23 General.

24 The Chairman: Yes. Now, up to the time when you were  
25 detached the force of which you were Commander-in-Chief was



Witness Richardson:

Questions by The Chairman

1 known as the United States Fleet, is that true?

2 Admiral Richardson: That is correct, because at that  
3 time the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet had  
4 command of all the ships in the Atlantic that were in com-  
5 mission and not operating directly under the Chief of Naval  
6 Operations as a ship would be were she undergoing shake-  
7 down preparatory to joining the fleet.  
8

9 The Chairman: So that during the time when you were  
10 Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet that meant that  
11 you were the Commander-in-Chief of the entire fleet?

12 Admiral Richardson: That is true.

13 The Chairman: No matter where it was located?

14 Admiral Richardson: That is true.

15 The Chairman: Now, there was a reorganization that was  
16 somewhat coincident with your detachment?

17 Admiral Richardson: Absolutely coincident.

18 The Chairman: And they divided the fleet into the  
19 Pacific Fleet and the Asiatic Fleet?

20 Admiral Richardson: No.

21 The Chairman: No?

22 Admiral Richardson: There had always been a small  
23 force known as the Asiatic Fleet that was not under the com-  
24 mand of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet but  
25 passed under his command in case the United States Fleet moved



1 Witness Richardson:

Questions by The Chairman

2 to the Western Pacific.

3 The Chairman: Well, on the 1st of February, then, 1941  
4 approximately, the Pacific Fleet as such came into existence ?

5 Admiral Richardson: It did. The title and the position  
6 of Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet disappeared and  
7 in lieu thereof there was established the Commander-in-Chief  
8 of the Pacific Fleet, which commanded all the ships in the  
9 Pacific Ocean that were not part of the Asiatic Fleet and  
10 were not operating directly under the Chief of Naval Opera-  
11 tions. There was a Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Fleet, who  
12 commanded all the combatant ships in commission in the At-  
13 lantic Fleet except those that were operating directly under  
14 the Chief of Naval Operations.

15 The Chairman: When did you become Commander-in-Chief  
16 of the United States Fleet?

17 Admiral Richardson: On 6 January 1940.

18 The Chairman: So that you were in command of the Fleet  
19 approximately thirteen months?

20 Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

21 The Chairman: Was Admiral Kimmel associated with the  
22 Fleet under your command in the Pacific?

23 Admiral Richardson: He was. He was in the Fleet under  
24 the command of, or the immediate senior under Admiral Stark  
25 before I became Commander-in-Chief and before Admiral Stark



25 4

Witness Richardson:

Questions by The Chairman

1  
2 became Chief of Naval Operations. In fact, he relieved  
3 Admiral Stark as commander of the cruisers and from that posi-  
4 tion he relieved me.

5 The Chairman: What relationship did he occupy in au-  
6 thority with respect to you as Commander-in-Chief of the  
7 Fleet? Was he senior officer under you or how far down the  
8 line did he go?

9 Admiral Richardson: Admiral Kimmel?

10 The Chairman: Yes.

11 Admiral Richardson: Well, he was very far down. He  
12 was a Rear Admiral and under me came first the Commander of  
13 the Battle Force, who was an Admiral. Then Commander of  
14 the Scouting Force and Commander of Battleships, who were  
15 both Vice Admirals. Then Admiral Kimmel commanded the cruis-  
16 ers and as such he was on the same level as the Commander of  
17 the Battleships, the Commander of the Destroyers and the Com-  
18 mander of the Aircraft.

19 The Chairman: And he was commander of all the cruisers  
20 then in the force?

21 Admiral Richardson: Yes, what we call a type commander.

22 The Chairman: Yes. Now, in this correspondence between  
23 Admiral Stark and you you continuously emphasized your belief  
24 that the Fleet should be based on the Pacific Coast rather  
25 than in the Hawaiian Islands or Oahu?



Witness Richardson;

Questions by The Chairman

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Admiral Richardson: I did that.

The Chairman: And there were, as I gather from the correspondence, many reasons for that opinion on your part, one among them being that you had larger areas for training of the aircraft force and the other activities of training the men and also that you believed that the morale of the men would be improved by being closer to their homes?

Admiral Richardson: That is true.

The Chairman: Yes.

Admiral Richardson: I presented solely the naval point of view.

The Chairman: Yes.

Admiral Richardson: There are other considerations that at times determined the disposition of the Fleet or the units thereof.

The Chairman: Yes. And in your correspondence with the Chief of Naval Operations and in your conversations with him in Washington and with the Secretary of State and with the President you were impressed with their belief that in addition to naval reasons that there was probably a diplomatic or other, maybe psychological, reason for keeping the fleet in that area as a deterrent against activities on the part of Japan?

Admiral Richardson: Absolutely.



Witness Richardson:

Questions by the Chairman

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The Chairman: Now, when you were in Washington you emphasized the fact that you needed more men and that the Navy was being vastly expanded and that men were not coming in as fast as ships were being built?

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

The Chairman: That you needed more men?

Admiral Richardson: I did it in and out of port, everywhere.

The Chairman: Yes. Then you referred to five thousand men that were allotted to you on one of your trips here, or while you were here on one of your trips and that you sent them out to the Hawaiian area on a carrier, did you say?

Admiral Richardson: Those that I was unable to accommodate in the ships that came with me to the West Coast I sent out to Pearl Harbor in a carrier.

The Chairman: Yes. Following your detachment from the Fleet you became a member of the General Board of the Navy here in Washington?

Admiral Richardson: That is true.

The Chairman: I think that is all I want to ask at this time. Senator George?

Senator George: I don't care to ask any questions at the present time.

The Chairman: Congressman Cooper?



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1  
2           The Vice Chairman: I don't think I have any questions  
3 now, Mr. Chairman.

4           The Chairman: Senator Lucas?

5           Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the  
6 Admiral two or three questions.

7           In your memorandum of September 12, 1940 to the Secre-  
8 tary of the Navy you submitted a number of pertinent points  
9 to be considered, among which were the operations of the  
10 Fleet and in that part of the memorandum you discussed the  
11 problems involved if the fleet was to be retained in Hawaiian  
12 waters.

13           As I understand it, those points of disadvantage that you  
14 stressed in that memorandum were purely problems from a  
15 naval standpoint and nothing else?

16           Admiral Richardson: Oh, absolutely.

17           Senator Lucas: All right. Now, you set forth seven  
18 points, seven disadvantages to basing the fleet in that area.  
19 Those points have been gone over by counsel and yourself and  
20 I was anxious to determine from you as to whether or not at  
21 that time you considered the question of the possibility of  
22 a hostile air attack from some aggressor nation, in connec-  
23 tion with not basing the fleet in the Hawaiian waters?

24           Admiral Richardson: I had not considered that it was  
25 likely that the Fleet would be attacked by a carrier raid



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1  
2 and I so stated repeatedly in security orders issued to the  
3 Fleet.

4 The Chairman: Will the Admiral desist for a moment?  
5 The chair announced at the beginning of these hearings that  
6 the photographers would not be permitted in this area way.  
7 It interferes with the witnesses, with the counsel and with  
8 the committee and I hope that my friend will observe that  
9 rule hereafter. You may proceed, Senator.

10 Senator Lucas: This memorandum was in June of 1940,  
11 and if I understand you correctly, Admiral, the possibility  
12 of a hostile air attack on the Fleet was not considered in  
13 making up the recommendations which the authorities here in  
14 Washington should study?

15 Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

16 Senator Lucas: And the question of a submarine attack  
17 was not considered either in connection with those plans?

18 Admiral Richardson: I have difficulty in hearing the  
19 Senator.

20 Senator Lucas: I say the question of a submarine attack  
21 by a hostile force, that was not considered in 1940 either?

22 Admiral Richardson: No. I think my view is clearly  
23 presented in a document before the committee which says:

24 "The security of the Fleet operating and based in  
25 the Hawaiian Area may reasonably be based on two assump-



Witness Richardson

Questions by Sen. Lucas

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tions:

"(A) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt;

"(1) sabotage from small craft on ships based in Pearl Harbor,

"(2) to block the Entrance Channel to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel,

"(3) lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor."

So that, actually, before I left the Fleet we were sweeping the channel against magnetic mines.

Senator Lucas: How long was it after you gave your seven points of disadvantage to keeping the fleet in Hawaii that the order of Admiral Andrews was issued to start the patrol which you discussed?

Admiral Richardson: Admiral Andrews' order did not start a patrol.

Senator Lucas: What was that order?

Admiral Richardson: It modified the patrol that I had in existence.

Senator Lucas: I see, all right. And when did that patrol go into existence that you had, Admiral?



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

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Admiral Richardson: It started the day that the Fleet arrived in the Hawaiian area on the 10th of April.

Senator Lucas: 1940?

Admiral Richardson: 1940, purely as a part of the Fleet exercise for training purposes.

Senator Lucas: For training purposes only?

Admiral Richardson: Yes.

Senator Lucas: And how long did that continue?

Admiral Richardson: It continued until I think the 30th of December 1940.

Senator Lucas: Well, how did the Admiral's order augment that? I had just forgotten your statement a moment ago.

Admiral Richardson: Initially the long range patrol, so-called, but it was not a long range patrol, it was to 180 miles centered on Lahaina between the arc of 220 and 235, as I remember, but I can verify that, - 220 to 335 to 180 miles.

Now, when the Army received an alert Admiral Andrews shifted the center from Lahaina to Pearl Harbor and increased the distance to three hundred miles and changed the arc from 180 through west to north. Later on I modified that patrol.

Senator Lucas: Yes. Now, before you leave the patrol, how long did that continue?

Admiral Richardson: The patrol established by Admiral Andrews?



1 Witness Richardson:

Question: by Sen. Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: That is right.

3 Admiral Richardson: I am not certain but I think it  
4 continued as long as the Army maintained their alert which  
5 was, as I remember, almost a month.

6 Senator Lucas: Now, how many planes were being used on  
7 that patrol?

8 Admiral Richardson: I haven't the faintest idea.

9 Senator Lucas: That is an Army question?

10 Admiral Richardson: I haven't any idea.

11 Senator Lucas: Did the Navy use any planes?

12 Admiral Richardson: Oh, the Army used no planes.

13 Senator Lucas: But you don't know how many planes the  
14 Navy used on that patrol?

15 Admiral Richardson: No.

16 Senator Lucas: Well, who would know that?

17 Admiral Richardson: I doubt if anybody would know.

18 Senator Lucas: Well, weren't you --

19 Admiral Richardson: Because you cannot remember, - at  
20 least, the Commander-in-Chief cannot remember details of  
21 activities after five years.

22 Senator Lucas: Well, did you make any record of the  
23 daily patrols that were made by these planes from the ships?

24 Admiral Richardson: No. You established it in an order  
25 and forgot it, assuming that it would be carried out.



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

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Senator Lucas: You do not recall? You wouldn't want to make a guess as to how many planes daily went out on this patrol to cover this arc that was established by the Admiral?

Admiral Richardson: No, I would not hazard a guess and the only possible source of information of any reliability would be in the files of the Commander-in-Chief and the files--

Senator Lucas: Of the 14th Naval District?

Admiral Richardson: (Continuing) -- become very voluminous and are normally retained active only about two or three years.

Senator Lucas: Do I understand that at that particular time the planes that were on the sea on the Enterprise, that were making daily flights in training, that there was no record of the number of planes that went out and when they came back?

Admiral Richardson: Well, every ship keeps in her log a record of everything that it does.

Senator Lucas: Well, that is what I thought.

Admiral Richardson: And in the patrol squadrons there would undoubtedly be maintained a record of when the planes left and when they returned.

Senator Lucas: Now, would have the record of the patrol, of the men who were making the determination of the number of planes that were going out on this patrol in line



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1  
2 with the order that was augmented by Admiral Andrews?

3 Admiral Richardson: Well, Admiral Andrews' order to the  
4 officer in command of the patrol wing would tell him how many  
5 planes to use, when to start out, how far they would go,  
6 when they would return.

7 Senator Lucas: Well, was that Admiral Andrews' re-  
8 sponsibility then?

9 Admiral Richardson: What?

10 Senator Lucas: Would that be Admiral Andrews' respon-  
11 sibility for issuing the order and for the keeping of the  
12 record of the planes?

13 Admiral Richardson: No, he would not keep a record. In  
14 consultation with the commander of the patrol wing, which I  
15 think was Patrol Wing 2, he would issue the order in general  
16 terms. The commander of Patrol Wing 2 would implement it  
17 and record his compliance.

18 Senator Lucas: All right. Later on, Admiral, you  
19 modified this order?

20 Admiral Richardson: I did.

21 Senator Lucas: Just how did you do it, now?

22 Admiral Richardson: Because of the number of planes  
23 that were available and because of the need for training men,  
24 I modified the patrol to cover periodically an arc between  
25 170 degrees, which is ten degrees to the east of south and



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

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350 degrees and I covered daily an arc, a sector of that arc and in order that it might not be evident to Japanese residents of Oahu that I was searching the same sector every day, I rotated that sector.

Senator Lucas: All right. Now, one further question and then I will be through.

With respect to the letter that you wrote to Admiral Stark after General Herron, as I understood you to say, had been notified that an alert was on in the Hawaiian Islands, you did not receive any information at that time from anyone in Washington, D.C., about that?

Admiral Richardson: Not at that time.

Senator Lucas: You later said that you wrote to Admiral Stark about the type of alert that was on and that you had never received any answer from him.

Admiral Richardson: Oh, I telegraphed him, I mean I sent him a radio and asked him what it was all about.

Senator Lucas: And you never received any reply to that?

Admiral Richardson: Never.

Senator Lucas: Did you ever talk to Admiral Stark after that as to why he did not reply to that important message of yours?

Admiral Richardson: I talked to both Admiral Stark and



1 Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

2 General Marshall.

3 Senator Lucas: What did Admiral Stark say as to the  
4 reason he did not reply after this type of alert went out  
5 to the Islands?

6 Admiral Richardson: He said it was an exercise, an Army  
7 exercise.

8 Senator Lucas: That is what Admiral Stark said?

9 Admiral Richardson: Yes.

10 Senator Lucas: And he did not think it was sufficiently  
11 important, even though he had received a message from you,  
12 he did not think it was important enough to make reply to  
13 you?

14 Admiral Richardson: Well, he knew that I had enough  
15 confidence in him to know that if it were the real thing he  
16 would have told me.

17 Senator Lucas: But you did send him a wire?

18 Admiral Richardson: I did.

19 Senator Lucas: And asked him about it?

20 Admiral Richardson: I did.

21 Senator Lucas: You wanted to find out for yourself?

22 Admiral Richardson: I wanted an answer, too.

23 Senator Lucas: That is right. One other question, if  
24 I may. Over in one of these letters in reading this cor-  
25 respondence I note this, Admiral. In your letter of May 13,



2516

Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

1  
2 1940 addressed to Admiral Stark, - at that time you were then  
3 still discussing the reasons pro and con as to why the fleet  
4 should or should not be based in Hawaiian waters. In this  
5 letter you state this:

6 "It seems that under present world conditions the  
7 paramount thing for us is the security of the Western  
8 Hemisphere. This, in my opinion, transcends everything,  
9 anything, certainly, in the Far East, our own or other  
10 interests. South America is the greatest prize yet re-  
11 maining to be grabbed."

12 Who did you expect to grab South America in that letter?

13 Admiral Richardson: Well, Senator, I haven't a copy  
14 of that letter.

15 Senator Lucas: It would be interesting to know be cause--

16 Admiral Richardson: May what?

17 Senator Lucas: This is May the 13th, 1940.

18 The Chairman: If the Admiral is in a position to answer  
19 that question he may do so. We have gone past our adjourning  
20 hour.

21 Admiral Richardson: Oh, I have that.

22 Senator Lucas: I am sure you and I agree on the same  
23 thing, probably, as to who we think might grab South America,  
24 but it was just interesting to get your further reactions.

25 Admiral Richardson: Well, I didn't want anybody to grab



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Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Lucas

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South America.

The Chairman: The committee will stand in recess until  
two o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 o'clock P.M., a recess was  
taken until 2:00 o'clock P.M. of the same day.)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C



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Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Lucas

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 P.M.

The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

When we recessed Senator Lucas was examining Admiral Richardson. You may resume.

Senator Lucas: Admiral Richardson, in one of your statements made before the committee this morning you stated that you were certain that the Navy could have been alerted as well as the Army had it been any other thing than a drill.

Admiral Richardson: Correct.

Senator Lucas: Later on you told the committee, and told me on examination, that you wired, you radioed, I think you said, Admiral Stark, asking him directly in this radiogram what the alert meant, and you received no reply.

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

Senator Lucas: Later on you had a talk with Admiral Stark here in Washington and in that conversation with the Admiral he advised you that it was merely a drill?

Admiral Richardson: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: You also said that while you were here you had a conversation with General Marshall on that same question.

Admiral Richardson: That is correct.

Senator Lucas: Will you give to the committee what General Marshall said about the alert?



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Lucas  
Congressman Murphy

1  
2 Admiral Richardson: I told General Marshall that the  
3 Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had received an  
4 alert, that he did not know whether it was an exercise or a  
5 genuine alert, that I was certain that it was a drill, but  
6 a situation had been created where there was some uncertainty  
7 and some uneasiness, and that I would like to know what was  
8 the purpose of the alert dispatch sent by him.

9 He said, "Oh, that was simply an exercise and I thought  
10 if I did not state that it was an exercise the exercise would  
11 be carried out more completely."

12 Senator Lucas: That is about the end of the conversation,  
13 I take it?

14 Admiral Richardson: Yes.

15 Senator Lucas: That is all, Mr. Chairman.

16 The Chairman: Congressman Murphy.

17 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, you stated previously --

18 The Chairman: The Chair will state that Congressman Clark  
19 would be the next in order but he is not here at the moment.

20 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, you stated in your examination that  
21 you and Admiral Stark were close personal friends?

22 Admiral Richardson: Had been. Admiral Stark entered the  
23 Naval Academy one year after I did.

24 Mr. Murphy: When in Washington you stayed at his home?

25 Admiral Richardson: I did. He served with me when we



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 were both Ensigns.

3 Mr. Murphy: What was the attitude of Admiral Stark in  
4 regard to the location of the Fleet at Hawaii?

5 Admiral Richardson: Well, from all that he said to me,  
6 and from all that he wrote to me, I gathered that he was fully  
7 in sympathy with me. Of course, he was more closely in touch  
8 with diplomatic considerations than I was.

9 Mr. Murphy: Did you receive a message from Admiral Stark  
10 dated March 15, 1940?

11 Admiral Richardson: A letter?

12 Mr. Murphy: I understand that on March 15, 1940 Admiral  
13 Stark sent you a message in which he declared, despite your  
14 many doubts, that the policy of keeping the Fleet units in  
15 Hawaiian waters was sound, and that the State Department was  
16 very strong for it. Did you receive such a communication?

17 Admiral Richardson: That communication did not refer  
18 to the retention of the Fleet in the Hawaiian waters, for the  
19 reason that the Fleet had not arrived in the Hawaiian waters  
20 at that date. That referred to the Hawaiian detachment which  
21 was sent to the Hawaiian area the fall preceding, I think,  
22 September or October 1939.

23 Mr. Murphy: Do you know of any written memorandum, by  
24 letter or otherwise, where at any time Admiral Stark stated  
25 his position as to whether or not the Fleet should be assigned



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1  
2 to Hawaii?

3 Admiral Richardson: He stated repeatedly that he hoped  
4 we would return and that our delay in Hawaiian waters would  
5 not be unduly prolonged.

6 Mr. Murphy: Will you state -- give me a reference to any  
7 communication that you know where Admiral Stark made his posi-  
8 tion clear in writing?

9 Senator Brewster: May I be permitted to speak?

10 Mr. Murphy: Do you want to help me?

11 Admiral Richardson: On the 7th of May in a letter to me  
12 he says:

13 "Just hung up the telephone after talking with the  
14 President and by the time this reaches you you will have re-  
15 ceived word to remain in Hawaiian waters for a couple of weeks.

16 "When the Fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the  
17 delay will not be over two weeks, but I cannot tell)\*\*\*"

18 He said:

19 "Of course, you know the thought behind the above \*\*\*"

20 Mr. Murphy: Are you following the letter?

21 Admiral Richardson: No, I am skipping.

22 Mr. Murphy: Well, you stopped at "but I cannot tell"  
23 in the second line of the second paragraph, did you?

24 Admiral Richardson: That is right.

25 Mr. Murphy: Then you go from there to where?



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Admiral Richardson: The fourth paragraph.

"Of course, you know the thoughts behind the above and that is that the Italian situation is extremely delicate, the two weeks ahead regarded as critical; then --- ????? nobody can answer the riddle just now."

Mr. Murphy: Where is Admiral Stark's position in that?

Admiral Richardson: That is all I know.

Shefner follows.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C



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Questions by Mr. Murphy

Witness Richardson:

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Mr. Murphy: All right.

Admiral Richardson: It is manifest that he trusted that the fleet would not remain there long.

Mr. Murphy: Well, where is his position, I mean as to whether it should or not? Can you refer to anything in writing at any time, anywhere, where Admiral Stark states his position to you that he is in agreement with you, or that he disagrees with the proposition of having the fleet there?

Admiral Richardson: Well, whatever he said I firmly believe that he whole-heartedly agreed with me.

Mr. Murphy: But can you give us a reference to anything in writing anywhere? If so, state it.

Senator Brewster: I refer you, Admiral, to the letter of May 22nd to you, the first paragraph of which is (Reading):

"Replying to your letter of May 13th", - in which I think Admiral Stark made his position very clear.

Admiral Richardson: Unfortunately, I have not a copy of that letter.

Mr. Murphy: May I suggest to the Chairman that inadvertently the chair has overlooked that this would be the turn of Senator Brewster, the Senator from Maine, to examine the witness.

The Chairman: Well, the chairman exercised his right

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Murphy

1  
2 at the beginning and I examined following the examination of  
3 counsel and did examine the Admiral but not upon this point.

4 Mr. Murphy: I beg your pardon, you misunderstood me.  
5 I meant that after Mr. Clark it would then have been the  
6 turn of Senator Brewster.

7 Senator Brewster: I have placed no objection to your  
8 examining the Admiral.

9 Mr. Murphy: And then I would follow.

10 Senator Brewster: That is quite all right, Congressman  
11 Murphy, and I hope you will accept my suggestion which is  
12 simply in the interest of saving time.

13 The Chairman: The chair is subject to correction. In  
14 the absence of Mr. Clark the next in order by the alternation  
15 would have been the Senator from Maine, Mr. Brewster.

16 Senator Brewster: I am quite willing to let Mr. Murphy  
17 proceed.

18 The Chairman: I apologize to the Senator from Maine  
19 for that omission.

20 Senator Brewster: I know that my rights are being  
21 saved; Mr. Chairman.

22 Mr. Murphy: Now, do you have the letter of May 22nd  
23 suggested by the gentleman, the Senator from Maine?

24 Admiral Richardson: I doubt if I can find anywhere a  
25 specific statement saying, "I am opposed to retaining the



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Murphy

1  
2 fleet in the Hawaiian area."

3 Mr. Murphy: Can you find a specific statement saying  
4 that he agrees with you categorically?

5 Admiral Richardson: This is what he says on the 22nd  
6 of May. (Reading):

7 "When we sent our dispatch it looked as if Italy"--  
8 that means the dispatch to return -- "it looked as if  
9 Italy were coming in almost immediately and that a  
10 serious situation might develop in the East Indies, and  
11 that there was a possibility of our being involved. How,  
12 ever, the recent "blitzkrieg" events in Europe have  
13 certainly altered the picture for the time being.  
14 Personally I think it has made more remote (for the mo-  
15 ment at least) the question of a westward movement of the  
16 fleet. I agree with the tenor of your letter and you  
17 will be glad to know I had already so expressed myself."

18 Mr. Murphy: That is the only written memorandum to  
19 which you can refer?

20 Admiral Richardson: Well, I --

21 Mr. Murphy: I mean is that the only one?

22 Admiral Richardson: Congressman Murphy, since the re-  
23 ceipt of this correspondence I have been almost constantly  
24 in attendance here. If I had time to search through all of  
25 the papers carefully I have no doubt that I would find suffi-



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Mr. Murphy

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oient evidence of his concurrence with me as to convince any-  
one.

Mr. Murphy: If you find it will you produce it, please?

Admiral Richardson: I will, or I shall.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, you had a meeting with the Presi-  
dent about which you prepared a memoranda in October of 1940.

Did you prepare any memoranda after the previous meetings?

Admiral Richardson: I did not.

Mr. Murphy: I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman: Senator Brewster?

Senator Brewster: Pursuing farther the question which  
the Congressman has been asking, I think it should be clear  
what was the representation in your letter to which Admiral  
Stark expressed his view on. It was, as I understand it,  
your letter of May 13th, in which you used the following  
language: (Reading)

"I feel that any move west means hostilities. I  
feel that at this time it would be a grave mistake to  
become involved in the West where our interests, al-  
though important, are not vital, and thereby reduce  
our ability to maintain the security of the Western  
Hemisphere which is vital.

"If the Fleet is to go west it can only start,  
properly prepared, from the West Coast where it can be



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

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2 dooked, manned, stocked and stripped, and a suitable  
3 train assembled.

4 "Rest assured that although I am entirely without  
5 information I realize your position, and I want you to  
6 know that if the situation becomes such that higher au-  
7 thority decides we should go West, all of us are ready  
8 to give all we have."

9 That is the end of the quotation from your letter, to  
10 which I understand Admiral Stark in his letter of May 22nd  
11 replied: (Reading)

12 "I agree with the tenor of your letter and you  
13 will be glad to know I had already so expressed myself."

14 Would that lead you to believe, or would that leave you  
15 in any doubt, Admiral Richardson, as to the position of Ad-  
16 miral Stark in this matter?

17 Admiral Richardson: I was never in any doubt about his  
18 position.

19 Senator Brewster: And what was the situation, Admiral,  
20 of the Fleet? With the Fleet which you had at Pearl Harbor  
21 was it what would be considered in naval parlance as a fleet?

22 Admiral Richardson: Well, it was a combatant fleet but  
23 it did not have in company with it the auxiliaries that would  
24 be essential to active operations.

25 Senator Brewster: So that if there were hostilities



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

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that should develop, what would have been the mission of the

3

Fleet under any plans that were in existence?

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Admiral Richardson: Under the existing plans it would have been necessary for the Fleet to return to the West Coast to mobilize, assemble a train, fill the ships with the regulation number of personnel, provisions, supplies, stores, fuel, strip the ships of needless articles which necessarily appear on a ship during a long period of peace and prepare them for offensive operation.

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Senator Brewster: State whether or not the Fleet on December 7th was in such a condition as would have required its return similarly?

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Admiral Richardson: It had been more completely prepared for war action because before I returned to Pearl Harbor with a portion of the fleet, arriving there on the 6th of December, we had placed in storage a lot of inflammable material that we carried in time of peace. The ships had been degoused.

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The Chairman: Had been what?

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Admiral Richardson: Degoused.

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The Chairman: I don't get that word.

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Admiral Richardson: Well, it is a French word which means running a coil of wire around them which energized will probably prevent the magnetic field of the ship from exploding a magnetic mine.

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Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

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2       Senator Brewster: Under the plans existing prior to De-  
3 cember 7th, so far as your own knowledge goes, what was it  
4 contemplated should be the mission of the Navy during the  
5 earlier period of any hostilities with a Western Pacific  
6 power?

7       Admiral Richardson: Well, the plans then in existence  
8 were called the "Orange" plan or the "O-1" plan and it was,  
9 in my opinion, a fairly sound plan theoretically, but the  
10 time element bore no relation to reality and some time in  
11 October I wrote a comprehensive letter to the Chief of Naval  
12 Operations presenting my conception of the then existing  
13 "Orange" plan, which is in the hands of the committee.

14       Senator Brewster: What was in 1940?

15       Admiral Richardson: 1940.

16       Senator Brewster: And did that contemplate some manner  
17 of offensive action by the Fleet?

18       Admiral Richardson: It did, early action to reconnoitre  
19 and attack some of the mandated islands and a progressive  
20 step by step movement westward with the taking, eventually,  
21 of Truk in a time stated that absolutely could not be real-  
22 ized.

23       Senator Brewster: I want to quote to you, because I  
24 think we all are going to be vitally concerned with this mat-  
25 ter of naval defense, - you were Assistant Chief of Naval



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

1  
2 Operations during 1937 and 1938 under Admiral Leahy?

3 Admiral Richardson: One year.

4 Senator Brewster: I am quoting from Admiral Leahy's  
5 statement before the Naval Affairs Committee on the function  
6 of the Navy, as I think it will contribute to this matter,  
7 and I want to know whether you would agree with this concept.  
8 I quote Admiral Leahy on the first page of his testimony at  
9 the 1938 hearings. (Reading):

10 "In defending our territory in war, we cannot as-  
11 sume an attitude of passive defense and simply beat off  
12 an attack at one place and later at another. In such a  
13 case we would see our coasts blockaded, our outlying  
14 possessions seized, our commerce, both coastwise and  
15 foreign, driven off the seas, and we would undergo the  
16 costly experience of finding the war lasting just as  
17 long as the enemy willed it; that is, until he had at-  
18 tained every objective and everything he wanted. The  
19 only way that war, once begun, can be brought to a  
20 successful conclusion is by making the enemy want to  
21 stop fighting-- by injuring him before he reaches our  
22 shores so badly that he will be anxious to make peace.  
23 Prompt and effective injury to an enemy, at a distance  
24 from our shores, is the only correct strategy to be  
25 employed.



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

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2 "We have outlying possessions in Alaska, the  
3 Hawaiian Islands, Guam, Samoa, Panama, Canal Zone,  
4 Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. The Philippine  
5 Islands are still United States territory and will re-  
6 main so until complete independence is attained. All  
7 of these outlying island possessions are more or less  
8 vulnerable, and their defense depends upon two factors.  
9 One is a local defense by mobile forces and fortifica-  
10 tions. The other, and the dominant factor, is sea pow-  
11 er. A superior Navy can prevent powerful attacks being  
12 made on all those island possessions that lie closer to  
13 our home territory than they do to those of an enemy or  
14 enemies. A sufficient Navy can keep open the lines of  
15 supply to the defenders of such possessions, and, if  
16 they are secure in their own local defenses against minor  
17 attacks, the Navy can use them as bases from which to  
18 operate against the enemy or enemies. Defense of  
19 those possessions--Guam, the Philippines and Alaska--  
20 which lie nearer to the home territory of another power  
21 or powers than they do to the continental United States,  
22 is dependent solely upon sea power and the ability of  
23 sea power to support forces in those areas."  
24  
25



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

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I presume you would be in full agreement with that?

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Admiral Richardson: Complete accord.

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Senator Brewster: Yes. Now, I have here an exhibit which has been furnished us, which is extracts from the Joint Army and Navy war plan, Rainbow No. 1. That is a part of the extracts from Joint Army and Navy war plan, Orange 1938.

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I assume that was in the process of development year by year, but this does not contain any of the tasks that were assigned under Section 6 and others. In Section 6, the presentation apparently confines itself to the defense plans of the Hawaiian area without including therein anything regarding the tasks which I assume were the function of the Navy to carry out, the task forces, or tasks.

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Admiral Richardson: That is true. What is the date of that?

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Senator Brewster: This one is dated 1938, the Orange plan. I think that was Orange No. 1. This was approved, it says, by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy 14 August 1939, verbally by the President 14 October 1939, by the Joint Board 10 April 1940. That is April 10, 1940 brought down current. That was finally Rainbow No. 1.

24

You have that before you, do you?

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Admiral Richardson: I have it.

Senator Brewster: Now, whether or not --



Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Admiral Richardson: But, Senator Brewster, these are copies of extracts from plans that were modified from time to time. They are not complete; some of them were made after I left the Fleet; some of them were in process of being made, so any questions that I answer with respect to this is certainly to be most confusing because here is one that is dated 28 March 1941. I know nothing about it.

Senator Brewster: I think my question won't involve, perhaps, any confusion. The point which I wish to inquire about is whether or not the appointment of the tasks as they are called, which I assume were the functions of the Navy, the affirmative tasks, would be essential to an appraisal of the responsibility of the commanders in that area?

Admiral Richardson: Well, I think it would be but it would not be anything other than confusing to consider any other plans than the plans that were in existence on the 7th of December 1941, about which I know nothing.

Senator Brewster: Well, I don't intend to enter into that field. My point is in attempting to appraise the responsibility of those who were in authority at Pearl Harbor, as to whether or not their responsibility in taking aggressive action with the fleet under their charge must not necessarily be known in order to determine as to the wisdom of their course at any given time?



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Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

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WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Admiral Richardson: Well, of course, no plans ever made by the Army or the Navy of the United States visualized their being put in effect without either a declaration of war or an attack upon us, so if you take the joint Army and Navy Basic Plan Orange 1938, that was the basic plan on which the Navy drew its war plan and on which the Army drew its war plan.

Senator Brewster: Well, reading these excerpts, these extracts I have given you, which are apparently exclusively of an defensive character, one might draw the impression that the Navy had no function than to be there at Pearl Harbor and assist in its defense. That, of course, would not be a warranted conclusion, would it, Admiral? The Navy had another job to do under all plans, did it not?

Admiral Richardson: Oh, absolutely, and the Navy's job was to be aggressive.

Senator Brewster: That is right.

Admiral Richardson: Now, the pages of this refer specifically to the joint responsibilities of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area and it does not refer, as I can find here, to anything about what the Fleet is going to do.

Senator Brewster: Well, over on page, - I should say it is No. 2. For instance, on that first page we have Section 1. We then have Section 2 on the first page. There is no



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Witness Richardson:

Questions by Sen. Brewster

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Section 3 apparently. It becomes Section 4, then Section 5, Section 6. Then we come to extracts of Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plans, Rainbow No. 1, Section 6. "Tasks" \* \* \* \* "Joint Tasks" \* \* \* \*

Now, I take it those refer to omissions as to the naval tasks which they were supposed to undertake.

Admiral Richardson: Yes.

Senator Brewster: It is a part of the function of both the Navy and the Army to keep in constant preparation for possible war plans under any eventualities, is it not?

Admiral Richardson: If you will turn to page 3, under paragraph 35, "Naval tasks"; "(F) Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island areas."

Now, all war plans that I am familiar with for the Navy contained a task along those lines.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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Senator Brewster: What you were reading answers my question, I guess. It is a function of the Army and Navy to keep in constant operation war plans in the event of any eventualities?

Admiral Richardson: That is true.

Senator Brewster: When this came up, orders were immediately issued, were they not, to execute war plan 46 against Japan?

Admiral Richardson: I have no idea.

Senator Brewster: On that date?

Admiral Richardson: I have no idea.

Senator Brewster: I heard you mention when the order came through. That was what impressed me. I do not know what it meant. I assumed it was the plan which had been prepared.

Admiral Richardson: In every war plan there is a provision for putting it into effect, and it is defined and known how the plan will be put into effect, and when that order is received it goes into effect and everybody knows it is in effect, but during the latter part of 1940 and the early part of 1941, due to changing world conditions, the Navy war plans were in a constant state of flux, in an effort to have a plan that was in accordance with the existing situation.

As a matter of fact there is in this correspondence a



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

1  
2 letter from me with respect to the plan that was being  
3 developed, in which it is stated that the plan and that  
4 letter was prepared with the knowledge and approval of my  
5 successor. We worked on it jointly during the week or ten  
6 days before I was relieved.

7 The numbers of the plans are so numerous and the provi-  
8 sion of every plan is so different, the assumptions are so  
9 different, that it would be impossible for me to recall now  
10 the assumptions in Rainbow 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5.

11 Senator Brewster: But you would be -- had you finished?

12 Admiral Richardson: No. In fact, there was a plan  
13 which was known, I think, as "plan dog" for a while. "Dog"  
14 being the Navy name of the "D".

15 The Chairman: "Dog"?

16 Admiral Richardson: Dog, d-o-g.

17 The Chairman: Common cur.

18 Senator Brewster: But all of these plans contemplated  
19 aggressive action by the Navy as contrary to merely defensive  
20 action in fixed positions?

21 Admiral Richardson: The Navy had always believed that  
22 the only way you could defend the country was by aggressive  
23 action.

24 Senator Brewster: The basing of the Fleet at Pearl  
25 Harbor then would, of necessity, mean a return to the West



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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Coast, in time of war, and did inevitably affect the time element very seriously, the time involved in the return?

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Admiral Richardson: Well, there is a difference of opinion on that point. I thought it did.

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Senator Brewster: What would be the approximate time for the return to the West Coast and making the preparations under the condition when you were there?

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Admiral Richardson: Well, it is about a little over 2,000 miles, and the Fleet would only make about 15 knots, and that is 360 knots a day, or about a week to get back.

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Senator Brewster: In the matter of the patrol reconnaissance, the difficulty, so far as the air reconnaissance was concerned, was with the shortage of planes, was it not?

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Admiral Richardson: That is right.

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Senator Brewster: Are you familiar with the Naval Expansion Bill of 1938, which provided for 3,000 Naval aircraft?

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Admiral Richardson: Well, I am familiar with it to a very limited extent.

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Senator Brewster: Was that during your period as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations?

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Admiral Richardson: Yes, but the Assistant Chief of Naval operations in those days concerned himself primarily with administrative matters. Relations with the committees

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Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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of Congress, with the other executive departments, and with the President were handled by the Chief of Naval Operations.

Senator Brewster: It was becoming evident, more evident each year, was it not, as to the part which airplanes would play in Naval as well as land war?

Admiral Richardson: No doubt about that.

Senator Brewster: That was a constantly expanding activity?

Admiral Richardson: Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster: You spoke about getting the impression while you were in Washington, but not from Cordell Hull, that Japan could be bluffed. Do you recall where you gained that impression? Could I recall to you, did you confer with Stanley Hornbeck while you were here?

Admiral Richardson: I did.

Senator Brewster: Whether or not you gained any impression of that through your conferences with him?

Admiral Richardson: Well, whether I was correct or not, I was distinctly of the impression that Dr. Hornbeck was exercising a greater influence over the disposition of the Fleet than I was.

Senator Brewster: Could you develop that at all?

Admiral Richardson: The only way in which I can develop that is this:

I saw Dr. Hornbeck on 11 July. I talked to him from



Witness Richardson

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10:30 to-noon.

According to my notebook I said he is the strong man on the Far East and the cause of our staying in Hawaii where he will hold us as long as he can. And that was an impression that I wrote in my notebook when it happened.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C



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Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Brewster

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2 On 9 October I saw Hornbeck, who was unwilling to accept  
3 the responsibility for retaining the Fleet in Hawaii. Now I  
4 may have been entirely wrong, but that was the impression I  
5 gained.

6 Senator Brewster: Did you express to him, Admiral, in  
7 your conversations, the same opinion that you had expressed  
8 to the President as to the psychology of the Japanese military  
9 authorities on the situation?

10 Admiral Richardson: Well, inasmuch as Dr. Hornbeck was  
11 the advisor of the State Department on Far Eastern affairs  
12 and had written many books on the subject, some of which I had  
13 read, I doubt whether I told him that he was completely wrong,  
14 but I expressed my view fully.

15 Senator Brewster: He was at that time the one in charge  
16 of what they called the Far Eastern Desk in the State Depart-  
17 ment?

18 Admiral Richardson: No. I had known Dr. Hornbeck for  
19 some time.

20 Senator Brewster: His first name is Stanley?

21 Admiral Richardson: Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, and I think  
22 he had been relieved as head of the Division of Far Eastern  
23 Affairs, and had been superseded by Mr. Max Hamilton, if I  
24 remember correctly, whom I had also known for many years.  
25 Dr. Hornbeck was the advisor of the State Department on Far

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Senator Brewster  
Mr. Gearhart

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Eastern Affairs.

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Senator Brewster: In connection, Admiral, with your service in Hawaii, was there a local influence in leaving Hawaii?

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Admiral Richardson: If there was it was unknown to me.

6

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Senator Brewster: You did not have any situation of that kind locally?

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Admiral Richardson: None at all.

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Senator Brewster: That is all.

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The Chairman: Congressman Clark, when your name was reached you were temporarily absent. Do you have any questions of the Admiral?

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Mr. Clark: I have no questions.

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The Chairman: Congressman Gearhart.

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Mr. Gearhart: Am I next in order, Mr. Chairman?

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The Chairman: I think in order to balance between the two sides, inasmuch as the Chairman has assumed to do the first interrogating on the Senate side, that you would come next.

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Mr. Gearhart: Admiral pursuing the questions that have been asked just a moment ago by the Senator from Maine, I think you testified that the Fleet, as you commanded it in 1940, was undermanned, undertrained, understaffed, under-provisioned and underammunitioned.

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Admiral Richardson: Well, no American force was ever



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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underprovisioned. We eat better than anybody in the world.

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Mr. Gearhart: But did you have a sufficient supply of edibles to keep you going for a long time, for instance, through a war engagement, a war responsibility?

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Admiral Richardson: Well, normally we carried dry provisions for about 60 days, if I remember correctly. Insofar as I remember, there was no question of provisions. The ships did not carry the full wartime allowance of ammunition because of the needless expenditure of fuel in pushing that much weight through the water. There was a deficiency in certain types of ammunition.

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For example, we had little, if any bombardment ammunition which would be necessary in effecting a landing.

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As to enough men, never within my knowledge, except in war, has the Navy had on board enough men to fight the ship. We have been lucky if we could secure sufficient appropriations to maintain 85 percent of complement. Men of experience were being removed from the ships in order to train new men.

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Mr. Gearhart: Now to place it on a percentage basis, what would be the percentage of fighting efficiency of the Navy as you commanded it?

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Admiral Richardson: Well, that would be a highly theoretical question. No answer would be of any value.

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Mr. Gearhart: You consider you were 85 percent manned?



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Admiral Richardson: Well, we have 85 percent enough men  
3 to man the battery and steam at full power for more than a  
4 very short time, and as an instrument of war their value was  
5 prospective. They could be fully realized in a short space  
6 of time by the addition of men, because men in war learn far  
7 more rapidly than they do in time of peace.

8 Mr. Gearhart: Well, then, the Navy under your command  
9 was not in a condition of readiness to commence the war with  
10 Japan?

11 Admiral Richardson: Absolutely not.

12 Mr. Gearhart: And if it were the policy of the United  
13 States to commence a war with Japan the ships would have to  
14 return first to the West Coast, spending a week in travel and  
15 a week in coming back -- and how many weeks being put in shape  
16 for striking?

17 Admiral Richardson: Well, in my letter, one of my letters,  
18 I stated that in the event active war operations were under-  
19 taken it would either be necessary to return to the Coast for  
20 mobilization or preparation or accept the handicaps of preparing  
21 in Pearl Harbor. I could not hazard a guess as to how soon  
22 they would be ready from Pearl Harbor, returning to the Coast  
23 and being ready to start again, because I do not know how  
24 quickly you could have assembled the ships, the tankers, and  
25 done the training. Actually it was a year or so, was it not?



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: You say a year or so?

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Admiral Richardson: Well, before we really got going well in this war it was not a matter of weeks.

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Mr. Gearhart: Then in order to prepare the Fleet to strike, say, Japan originally, it would have to travel from Hawaii to the United States, spending a week, and then uncertain weeks in the United States being equipped for war, and then travel back a week, and that would mean really by leaving it in Hawaii it was 4,500 miles further away from the enemy than it would be if it had been in the United States?

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Admiral Richardson: Yes, but I think when you consider the many, many other things that had to be done before active war operations could be undertaken, the question of whether it was in Hawaii or whether it was on the West Coast would have little effect on the over-all time, because you had to assemble, train, you might have to build some, you might have to have drydocks, you might have to have repair facilities, you had to have a terrific amount of stores and all kinds of equipment for building roads and airfields, and everything else, none of which was ready.

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Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

Admiral Richardson: So that the question of whether it was in Hawaii or whether it was on the West Coast, when actual war started it was a matter of no moment, in my opinion, because



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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other things controlled the time of getting ready.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, considering the other situation, the one which actually happened, by having our Fleet in Hawaiian waters we had our Fleet 2,500 miles closer to the enemy for their sneak attack?

Admiral Richardson: Do you want an opinion on that?

Mr. Gearhart: Yes, unless it is a question of geography, unless it is a matter of going over water, or something else.

Admiral Richardson: In my opinion, Congressman Gearhart, a Japanese fleet that could cross most of the Pacific Ocean and deliver an undiscovered attack on Pearl Harbor would quite likely have been able to deliver the same attack on Puget Sound.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, that is amazing.

Admiral Richardson: But the whole question is the amount of oil they have got in the ships.

Mr. Gearhart: Now you have outlined the deficiencies in our Navy's strength at that time. Were those deficiencies known to the Japanese? Have you any way of knowing whether they were or not?

Admiral Richardson: Well, I never had any doubt that the Japanese knew everything they wanted to know about our Fleet, and the Secretary of the Navy told me himself that they knew more about it than I did.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, then in the light of what you have



Witness Richardson

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just said, do you think that the President was correct when he said he thought the presence of the Fleet in Hawaiian waters had a restraining effect on the Japanese?

Admiral Richardson: I did not think so when I was talking to him, and I have not changed my mind.

Mr. Gearhart: Now while you were in command of the ship -- or of the Fleet in 1940, and during the months of 1941 when you were in charge of the Fleet, were any of your battleships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers or service vessels transferred to the Atlantic?

Admiral Richardson: Mr. Chairman, my memory is not active, and certainly with changes made during my incumbency as to the ships in the Atlantic and ships in the Pacific, because new ships were being built, and joining the Fleet, and some ships were being transferred from that part of the United States Fleet in the Pacific to that part of it in the Atlantic, so I have here something that has just been prepared for me, expecting that this question might be asked me, from the records of the Navy Department the transfers that were made.

Before I can answer that I would need about five minutes to look over the data which has been compiled at my request.

Mr. Gearhart: Will you take a minute or two and see if there were any considerable or important transfers made one



Witness Richardson

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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way or the other?

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Senator Brewster: Mr. Chairman, whether or not it might be well to have it incorporated in the record.

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Mr. Gesell: We were hoping to get the final answer on that, Senator.

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The Chairman: The committee will be in order.

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Admiral Richardson: Mr. Chairman, in lieu of presenting at this time a hurriedly prepared presentation of this kind may I request that the counsel secure that information from the Department and present it to the committee?

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The Chairman: The Chair understands that the counsel is in process of doing that and it is to go in, as it no doubt should. It ought to be accurate to the last item. Therefore the Chair, as far as he is concerned, and I am sure the committee, will be glad to accede to the Admiral's request.

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Mr. Gearhart: That will be entirely satisfactory.

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Senator Lucas: What does that include?

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Mr. Gearhart: With the understanding it will be incorporated in the record as soon as it can be made available.

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The Chairman: That compilation will include the date at the beginning of any transfer and the end, the final date covering the transfer period.

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Admiral Richardson: What I propose is that they give me a list of the transfer of vessels to and from the Atlantic,

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