

EXHIBIT NO. 663

Document No. 2667

HEADQUARTERS SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER
SOUTHEAST ASIA.

COMMISSION No. 1 SAIGON

17th December 1945

My Dear Admiral

I enclose herewith a copy of the history of the Japanese
38th ARMY produced by HQ JAPANESE SOUTHERN ARMY HQ. It may be
of interest to you.

Yours sincerely,

S/ GRACEY

Admiral THIERRY D'ARGENLIEU
HAUT COMMISSAIRE DE FRANCE EN INDOCHINE.

Certified true copy
Chief of the Federal War Crimes Commission
Signed.

SEAL
FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

SUMMARY OF CHANGES OCCURRED TO THE JAPANESE
FORCES IN INDOCHINA (38th ARMY)

1) Following the transfer of the Japanese South Area Command from Saigon to Singapore in December 1942, the 38th Army was formed and installed its Headquarters in Saigon, for the defence of Indochina, according to the Japanese-French protocol signed in August 1941, and was put under the command of the South Area Command.

The main dispositions of troops at that time was as follows:-

- South Indochina Area..... 82nd Infantry Regiment of the 21st Division (Saigon)
- North Indochina Area..... Main forces of the 21st Division (Hanoi)

2) Later, with the developments of general situation in the Southern area, the 34th Independent Mixed Brigade (formed in Japan proper) was stationed in Tourane district in March, 1944, and, in December 1944 the 70th Independent Mixed Brigade (formed by surplus troops in Indochina) was quartered in Saigon district, thus enforcing the Japanese-French defence power in Indochina, and increasing the total reserve troops of the South Area Command.

3) In December 20th, 1944, the troops stationed in Indochina were reformed under the 38th Army Command, which gave the 38th Army the character of an operation army.

The main disposition of troops at that times was as follows:-

- North Area..... Main force of the 21st Division,
- Central Area..... The 34th Brigade
- South Area..... Part of the 21st Division and the 70th Brigade.

4) In February 1945, the navy units which were stationed in the operation zone of the 38th Army, were put under the command of the Army Command so far as ground defence was concerned. The main navy units thus put under the army command were, the 11th Navy Base Unit.

5) Since December 1943, the 38th Army under the above-mentioned formation, took the responsibility for the common defence of Indochina, based upon the Japanese-French Protocol, though once engaged in minor operations in the north frontier districts.

- 6) Judgement of the general war situation in January 1945.

As the U.S. Army main forces attacked Luzon in the beginning of January, the next points of disembarkation were judged to be either South China (including Hainan island, and Lei-Chou peninsula), Central China, or Okinawa. The 38th Army prepared the necessary counter plans, forecasting a landing in North Indochina, in case of an attack to South China.

- 8) According to the forecast and scheme as stated above, the troops were concentrated as follows:

a) The 37th Division was transferred in the middle of February from South China (11th Army) to North Indo-China.

b) The 22nd Division was transferred in the beginning of March from South China (23rd Army) to North Indo-China frontier Districts.

c) The 2nd Division was transferred gradually from March to June from Burma to Saigon District.

- 9) The incident of March 9th (details apart).

Troops used in March 9th incident were as follows:

- North Area.....21st - 22nd, 37th Divisions,
- Central Area.....70th Brigade and part of 4th Division (T),
- 1 Regiment of 20th Division.

- 10) Transfer of Army Headquarters to Hanoi.

The 38th Army advanced its commanding-post from Saigon to Hanoi in May 1945, to facilitate the command of troops concentrated in North Indochina.

- 11) Forecast of war situation in May 1945.

With the landing of the U.S. Army main forces on Okinawa, the possibility of an attack to South China or to Indo-China much diminished, the chief enemy of the South Area Command shifted from the U.S. Army to the British Army, and the strategic object was judged to be Singapore.

12) With the above judgement, the troops stationed in Indochina were transferred in the following way, according to the orders of the South Area Command:

- a) The 70th Brigade from Saigon districts to the central Malay, in the middle of May.
- b) The 37th Division to Bangkok district in the middle of May to be used either in Burma front or in Malayan zone.
- c) The 22nd Division, since the end of May, to North-Eastern Siam.

13) Main operations executed by the 38th Army.

Co-operation with the China Area Command in the operations joining Central and South China (under separate cover).

14) Situation at the time of surrender.

Following the rapid development of war situation in Burma, the South Area Command established plans to make French Indochina and Malay the defence centre of Southern Area. Accordingly, the 38th Army was planning to enforce the defence of Hanoi and Saigon districts in the following manner, when the war ended:

- a) Formation of defence units of Hanoi and Saigon
- b) Strengthening of the organization of the 34th Brigade,
- c) Strengthening of the organization and equipment of the 2nd Division.
- d) Reconstruction of the 55th Division.

THE DISPOSITION OF FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

1) The purpose of the disposition of French Indo-China.

The attitude of the French authorities towards the Japanese-French common defence of Indo-China were rapidly lacking sincerity in accordance with the general war situation, especially with the American progress in the Philippines. In spite of the repeated expostulations of the Japanese authorities, the French at last came to prevent the Japanese war preparations in Indochina in every sphere, and it became evident that, if the Japanese left the situation at that, they would find themselves in quite a difficult position; between the devil and the deep sea, in case of the landing of American Forces.

Thus, the disposition of French Indo-China was attempted to awake the sincerity of the French authorities and to make them contribute to the full extent to the Japanese war preparations.

2) The general policies of the disposition.

The Japanese Government, in order to apply to the changed situation decided, at the Supreme War Guiding Conference in February 1945, the following policies concerning French Indo-China:-

"Japanese authorities, taking into account the general situation, especially the American progress towards Indochina regions, and in order to accomplish the defence of Indochina, will demand that the Governor General of French Indo-China should consent to the following propositions, as a concrete token of the determination to defend the Indo-China territory against the eventual American operations towards it, in collaboration with the Japanese, according to the fundamental spirit of Japanese-French common defence of Indo-China (See the appendices No. 1 - Protocol concerning Japanese-French common Defence of Indo-China; No. 2 Local treaties based upon the preceding.)

a) As long as the present circumstances last, the French troops and armed police will be put under the Japanese command and will act solely according to its directives as for the organization, disposition and movement of the troops, arms, and munitions, and materials.

b) The organizations particularly necessary for the war conduct, such as railways, sea transportations, and communication, will be put under the Japanese controls.

c) The Governor General will immediately give instructions to all the organizations in French Indo-China to collaborate fully and faithfully with the Japanese upon their demands.

(The above thesitis were in fact presented officially in the demand which Ambassador MATSUJITO made to Governor General DECOUX on March 9).

In case the Governor General accepts fully the Japanese demands, the Japanese will not go beyond the reorganization of the French troops and armed police. If not, the Japanese will be obliged to appeal to arms and resort to military control. In that case, the following principles will be adopted:-

a) Even if the French rejects the Japanese demands, the relations between the two countries will not be considered as being at war.

However, Japan will not be bound by the existing treaties, concerning French Indo-China.

b) Japan will not admit the execution of functions to the Governor General and his leading staff of the Government, but their personal treatment will be as moderate as possible.

c) The lower organizations of the Government will not be touched and will be utilized as they are.

d) The French troops and armed police will be disarmed and reorganized. Those who resist at the disarmament, however, will be treated as prisoners.

e) The French civilians and their properties will not be treated as for enemy nation, but will be treated as moderately as possible. However, in the case of military necessity, the Japanese may proceed to the control of private properties and the restriction of habitation and movement.

3) The development of the disposition.

On March 9, 1945, at 1900 (Japanese time) Ambassador MATSUHITO visited Governor General DECOUX at his official residence in Saigon, according to the instructions of the metropolis. They talked about the general war situation, and after the various discussions, the Governor General admitted the possibility of American Forces' landing in Indo-China. Hence the Ambassador requested him in the authority of Governor General invested with full powers to manifest his sincerity towards Japan in strengthening Japanese-French common defence in the present circumstances. He explained the above-mentioned conditions which the Japanese Government had instructed him to propose to the Governor General, and asked to give reply by 2200. He took leave after having warned that the Japanese Army would be obliged to take necessary measure if the reply was not favourable.

About 2220 Captain ROBIN brought the reply of the Governor General to the Ambassador, which was found qualified and which the Japanese authorities could not help considering as rejection.

On this, the Commanding General of the 33th Army found himself under the necessity of taking decision to appeal to arms, according to the instructions which had been given him by the General Headquarters, and ordered all these forces immediately to disarm the French troops and armed police.

b) The Japanese forces succeeded in disarming the main forces in a few days, though they met some resistance in Hanoi, Saigon, Phnom-Penh and Mhatrang. However, the Japanese paid considerable sacrifice in disarming the French troops which resisted in the strong fortresses in the north frontier regions, such as Lanson, Dong Dang, and Moncay.

Then the Japanese army proceeded to suppress French detachments stationed in the remote countries and wipe out French contingents who had escaped into mountains, while endeavouring to re-establish the public order and to revive the administration. In about one month's time, public order was gradually re-established, except in the remote corners, public feelings were reassured, and various organizations generally recovered their former activities.

It took a considerable time to clear the mountain range of Annam, Chinese frontiers, mountainous regions of Laos of the remnants of French troops and it was May 15 that the Japanese army finished its armed operations.

Meanwhile, the activities of Viet-Nam Party in the Northern Indo-China became more and more vigorous, and especially its disturbances of public security, aiming to dispel Japanese forces in order to accomplish the full independence of their people, grew rife. The Japanese army was compelled to continue to employ a considerable strength in painstaking work of sweeping Viet Minh partisans, until the cessation of hostilities of August 15.

c) The French troops disarmed were divided into the Frenchmen group and the native group; the former was concentrated and interned chiefly in Saigon and Hanoi, and as for the latter, a part of it was adopted in the Japanese army as auxiliaries, and the rest was planned to be reorganized into the voluntaries and the national armies, but that plan was not achieved, though preparations were being made.

d) Armed police were indispensable for the maintenance of public order, the Japanese army rearmed the minimum native policemen, excluding French ones, and distributed them to each province. But the total numerical

strength of them was below the half of the former one.

e) As for French civilians, the Japanese army, both on military necessity and for safeguard's sake, restricted their residence in Hanoi, Haiphong, Hue, Hhatrang, Saigon, Phanom Penh and Kalat.

f) Administration organizations were left intact, and though a small number of Japanese officials took charge of some important positions, almost all officials, both French and Annamite, were permitted to remain at their posts. Thus the Japanese army arranged to re-establish public order as soon as possible, preventing social uneasiness and disorders and to make all Indo-China co-operate with the Japanese in war preparations.

h) As a logical result of Japan's disposition of French Indo-China, Annam and to other nations proclaimed their independence for themselves and were realizing their independence substantially. The Japanese Army took the attitude not to interfere in the internal affairs and left them free to do what they wanted. Meanwhile the Japanese army kept their actions always under eye lest they should be off the rails, ridden by a mistaken idea of independence and race-consciousness, and always paid minute attention not to make them repeat the same un-cooperative attitude as the French regime.

i) The progress of battle at the moment of the disposal of French Indo-China is shown in the appended plan No.1.

4. The conclusion.

Japan's disposition of French Indo-China was really inevitable step as the result of the fact that, facing eventual American invasion, the French authorities could not be hoped to correct their unfriendly attitude and to co-operate with the Japanese in rapid war preparations and to facilitate the operations. It was not that Japan regarded the French as enemies, or attempted to occupy the Indo-China territory, or tried to set the Annamite on the French.

Moreover, the disposition of French Indo-China was based upon the directives of TOKYO, and was not an arbitrary decision of local Japanese army. All the Japanese troops, militarists, officials, civilians however humble their posts might have been, always acted solely by orders of superior commanders, and fulfilled their responsibilities most faithfully according to each given duty.

P R O T O C O L

BETWEEN JAPAN AND FRANCE - CONCERNING
THE JOINT DEFENCE OF FRENCH INDO-CHINA.

The Government of Japan and
The Government of France.

Taking into consideration the actual international situation;

Recognizing that in consequence, in case that the security of French Indochina will be menaced, Japan will estimate that the general tranquility in East Asia and her proper security will be in danger;

Renewing at this occasion the engagements, of one party, by Japan to respect the rights and interests of France in East Asia and especially territorial integrity of French Indo-China and the sovereign rights of France on all the parties of the Union of Indo-China, and of the other, by France not to contract at the subject of Indo-China any agreement or understanding with a third Power anticipating political, economic or military co-operation in the nature to oppress directly or indirectly to Japan;

- (1). The two Governments engage to co-operate militarily for the joint defence of French Indo-China.
- (2). The measures to be taken with the view of this co-operation will be the object of special arrangements.
- (3). The above mentioned agreements shall be in force only as long as the circumstances motivating their adoption will exist.

In witness whereof, the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed the present Protocol which shall come into effect on this very day and have hereunto affixed their seal

Done in duplicate, in Japanese and French, at Vichy, this twenty ninth day of the seventh month in sixteenth year of Showa, corresponding to the twenty ninth day of July in the Nineteen hundred and forty first year.

Signed: SOTOMITSU K. ITO.
F. DARLAN.

(Proclaimed on the first day of the eighth month in sixteenth year of Showa).

CO-OPERATION OF THE TROOPS STATIONED
IN INDO-CHINA WITH THE JAPANESE CHINA
AREA COMMAND IN THE OPERATIONS CONNECTING
CENTRAL AND SOUTH CHINA.

1) The purpose of the co-operation.

To facilitate the captivation of Heng-Ning by the China Area Command, thus securing the land route between Indo-China and Heng-Ning, in order to enable the transport of important materials from the Southern Region to Japan, supplementing sea transportation which was getting gradually difficult at that time.

2) General Plans of Operation.

a) Since April 1944, the Japanese China Area Command started attacks from the Yangtse River and Canton district towards Changsha, Kweiling and Heng-Ning, in order to connect Central and South China.

b) The troops stationed in Indo-China will facilitate this operation, co-operating with the China Area Command in the siege of Heng-Ning, while repairing and securing the land route. The date of starting operations is fixed to be after November 1944.

(It was the beginning of September that the Japanese Command in Indo-China received orders to begin to prepare for the operations).

c) The Commanding General of the troops stationed in Indo-China gave orders in the beginning of September 1944 to the Commanding General of the 21st Division situated in North Indo-China to prepare for the operations, which were due to start towards the end of November 1944. Later, army orders were issued that a powerful unit should move secretly from Hanoi towards Lanson district at the beginning of November, in order to be able to enter into actions any time after the latter part of November.

d) The formation of the unit for this operation (ICHIKAWA Unit of the 21st Division) was as follows:-

Infantry	4 battalions
Artillery	1 battalion
Engineers	Main force of engineer regiment, 21st Division.
	And other necessary supply corps.

3) General Progress of the Operation (See annexed plan).

a) The ICHINOMIYA Unit (main forces of the 83rd Regiment of the 21st Division) started to move secretly from Kanci in the middle of November, and completed concentration at Lanson towards the 25th November.

b) The Army issued orders to the Commanding General of the 21st Division to start attack in the direction of Nang-Ning, crossing the frontier on the dawn of November 29th.

c) The ICHINOMIYA Unit commenced the attack on November 29th, from east and west side of Lanson, in keeping with the orders given that the unit should cross the frontier at 00.00 of November 29th, march first towards the line connecting Hingkiang and Longtchou then towards that of Ssulo and Chaoshan, and prepare for the siege of Nang-Ning while repairing and securing all the routes south of the above-mentioned line.

d) That same day, the ICHINOMIYA Unit was put under the command of the 6th Army Corps Command of the China Area Command.

e) In the beginning of December, the ICHINOMIYA Unit reached the line connecting Hingkiang and Longtchou. Then the unit pursued the reparation of roads, while sending a contingent towards the line joining Ssulo and Chaoshan. Besides, the unit advanced a penetrating corps along Ssulo-Nang-Ning-road, which succeeded in getting contact with the 6th Army corps that had captured Nang-Ning in the middle of December.

f) The ICHINOMIYA Unit continued to secure and repair roads around Hingkiang, Longtchou and Kiangnang until the middle of January 1945, when the advanced troops of the 6th Army Corps pushed southward of Nang-Ning. Accordingly the ICHINOMIYA Unit began to retreat gradually, and in the beginning of February came back to its original posts, thus completing the operations.

Certified true copy
Chief of the Federal War Crimes Commission.

SEAL

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2667

24 September 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Copy of Document Addressed by the Commanding General, Japanese Army, Southern Zone, to General Gracey and Communicated to the High Commissioner of France on "Activities of the Japanese Forces in Indo-China before the Surrender". (Bulletin of Information No. 2 Office of the High Commissioner of France for French Indo-China)

Date: 1 Feb 46 Original () Copy (x) Language: French

Has it been translated? Yes (x) No ()

Has it been photostated? Yes () No (x)

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Office of the Commissioner of France for French Indo-China.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Office of the High Commissioner of France for French Indo-China

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Relations with France: French Indo-China

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

Report covers disposition and activity of Japanese forces in Indo-China, particularly with reference to early 1945. In February of that year the Japanese forces, because of the change in the tides of the war, and based on a Supreme War Council decision, were to disarm French forces and take other necessary measures if the Governor-General did not accede to demands which would have placed the French and Indo-Chinese forces directly under the command of the Japanese military. The Governor-General's answer was qualified, and therefore considered negative. The Japanese then proceeded to disarm all said troops, and met heavy losses in the north, according to the report.

Analyst: W.H.Wagner

Doc. No. 2667

CHARGE OUT SLIP

DATE 1947 .

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 2667

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FILE NO. _____

PRESS TRANS _____

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DEFENSE DOC. NO. _____

Signature _____

Room # _____

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663

EXHIBIT NO. ^{Doc. # 2667 (cover page)}
663

佛國印度支那高等辦理處

特種參謀局 第二課

第三四號 日 P 12

西貢、一九四六（昭和二十一年）一月三十一日

秘密 情報 第二二號

件名 印度支那ニ於ケル降伏前ノ日本軍活動

出所 日本南方軍司令部ヨリ、クラツセー將軍

參謀部へ提出サレ佛國高等辦理處へ移牒

サレタル文書ノ寫

佛國參謀長海軍大佐ル・テユイトン

(署名)

第二課長海軍大尉

ツーシマローム (署名)

(送附先) 參謀部 D II (第二課)

印支委員會

最高司令部

海軍大將 F N S O

海軍軍令部第一 D O

印支海軍

印支空軍

外交顧問

政治顧問

(寫) 卷庫ニ

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2667-1

印度支那ニ於ケル日本軍（第三十八軍）活動概要

一 一九四一年（昭和十六年）八月調印サレタル日佛
議定書ニ基キ日本南方方面司令部ガ西貢ヨリ、新
嘉坡ヘ移動ノ結果日本第三十八軍ハ印度支那防衛
ノ爲メ一九四二年（昭和十七年）十二月創設サレ
司令部ヲ西貢ニ置キ、南方方面司令部ノ指揮下ニ
置カレタリ。

當時ノ軍隊ノ主要配備次ノ如シ

佛印南部地區一第二十一師團歩兵第八十二聯隊（西貢）

佛印北部地區一第二十一師團主力（河内）

ニ後日、南部地區ノ一般情勢ノ發展ニ伴ヒ第三十四
獨立混成旅團（日本本土ニ於テ編制サル）ガ一九
四四年（昭和十九年）三月ツラン地方ニ駐屯シ
一九四四年（昭和十九年）十二月第七十獨立混成
旅團（佛印駐屯軍ノ通稱軍隊ヲ以テ編制サル）ガ
西貢地方ニ駐屯シ、斯クシテ印度支那ニ於ケル日
佛防衛力ヲ増強シ、南方方面司令部ノ豫備軍ノ
總數ハ増大セリ。

三 一九四四年（昭和十九年）中二月二十日印度支那
駐屯ノ軍隊ハ第三十八軍下ニ編制替サレ、第三十
八年ニ作戦兵團ノ性格ヲ與ヘタリ。
（以下ノ記載ハ注記配備次ニ依リ）

2667-2

當時ノ軍隊ノ主要配備次ノ如シ

北部地區 第二十一師團主力

中部地區 第三十四旅團

南部地區 第二十一師團ノ一部及第七十旅團

四一九四五年（昭和二十年）二月第三十八軍ノ作戦地域内ニアリタル海軍部隊ハ地上防備ニ關スル限リ陸軍司令部ノ指揮下ニ置カレタリ。斯ク陸軍司令部下ニ置レタル主要海軍部隊ハ第十一海軍根拠地部隊デアリタリ。

五上記ノ如ク編制サレタル第三十八軍ハ既ニ北境地方ニ於テ小作戦ニ從事セシトハイヘ、一九四三年（昭和十八年）十二月以降日偽議定書ニ基キ印度支那共同防衛ノ責任ヲ取リタリ。

六一九四五年（昭和二十年）於ケル一般戦況ノ判断米軍ノ主力ガ一月初メ呂宋ヲ攻撃セル故、次ノ上陸地區ハ華南（海南島及雷州半島ヲ含ム）華中又ハ沖繩ノ何レカデアルト判断サレタリ。第三十八軍ハ華南攻撃ノ場合北部偏印ニ上陸アルヲ見越シ對抗法策ヲ用意セリ。

ハ上記ノ見越シ及方策ニヨリ軍隊ハ次ノ如ク配置サレタリ。

(イ) 二月中旬第三十七師團ハ華南第十一軍ヨリ北部

佛印へ移駐サル

(ロ) 三日初メ第二十二師團ハ華南(第二十三軍)ヨリ北部佛印國境へ移駐サル。

(ハ) 第二師團ハ三月ヨリ六月ノ間ニ緬甸ヨリ西貢地方漸次移駐サル

三月九日事件(説明ヲ省ク)

三月九日事件ニ用ヒラレタル軍隊次ノ如シ
北部地區一第二十一、第二十二及第三十七師團
中部地區第七十旅團及第四師團ノ一部(一)、第二
十師團ノ一部隊

十陸軍司令部ノ河内へ移駐

第三十八軍ハ北部佛印ニ集結セル軍隊ノ指揮ニ便
ナル爲メ一九四五年(昭和二十年)五月西貢ヨリ
河内へソノ指揮地點ヲ前進セリ。

一九四五年(昭和二十年)五月ノ戦況見越シ米軍
主力ノ沖繩上陸及ビ華南又ハ印度支那ニ對スル攻勢
勢ノ見込ヲ甚シク減少セルニ依リ、日本南方方面
司令部ノ主要ナル敵ハ米軍ヨリ英軍トナリ、戦時
目標ハ新嘉坡ト見做サレルニ至レリ。

十二新ク決定ノ上、印度支那陸屯ノ軍隊ハ南方方面司

司令部ノ命令ニヨリ次ノ如ク移動サレタリ。

(イ) 第七十旅團ハ五月中頃西貢地方ヨリ中部馬來へ、

2667-4

- (ロ) 第三十七師團ハ五月中旬頃緬甸戰線或ハ馬來地帯ニ使用サルルガ爲メ益谷地域へ、
- (ハ) 第二十二師團ハ五月下旬以來シヤム東北部へ、

十三、第三十八軍ニヨリ行ハレタ主要作戰

中國方面司令部ト協同シ華中及華南

ハ各別ノ指揮下ニ於テ一連絡作戰ヲスルニアリタ

リ

十四、陣伏時ノ情勢

緬甸ニ於ケル情勢ノ急激ナル發展ニ從ヒ南方方面司令部ハ佛印ト馬來ヲ南方地域ノ防衛中心地トナス案ヲ設ケタリ。

其ノ結果終戰時ニハ第三十八軍ハ次ノ如ク河内ト

西貢地方ノ防衛ヲ強化スベク計畫シツツアリタリ。

イ河内西貢防衛部隊ノ編制

ロ第四十四旅團編制ノ強化

ハ第二師團編制裝備ノ強化

ニ第五十五師團ノ再建

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

佛印ニ對スル處置

一 佛印處置ノ目的

印度支那ノ日佛共同防衛ニ對スル佛官憲ノ態度ハ一般の軍事情勢ニ伴ヒ殊ニ比律賓ニ於ケル米軍ノ進撃ニ伴ヒ迅速ニ誠意ヲ俟キツツアリタリ。日本官憲ノ反復セル申入レニ拘ハラズ佛人ハ遂ニ印度支那ニ於ケル日本ノ凡テノ戰備ヲ阻止スルニ至レリ、而シテ日本ニシテコノ狀態ノ儘ニ捨テ置カバ進退兩難ニ落入り米軍上陸ノ場合極メテ困難ナル立場ニ於カルルコト明瞭トナレリ。サレバ佛印ノ處置ハ佛官憲ノ誠意ヲ喚起シ日本軍ノ準備ニ充分彼等ヲ貢獻サセル爲試ミラレタルモノナリ。

ニ 處置ノ一般的政策

日本政府ハ新事態ニ順應スル爲一九四五年（昭和二十年）二月最高戰爭指導會議ニ於テ佛印ニ關スル次ノ政策ヲ決定セリ。

「日本官憲ハ一般情勢ニ米軍ノ印度支那地方ヘノ進撃ニ對シ又印度支那ノ防衛遂行人爲佛印總督ニ對シ印度支那ニ關スル日佛共同防衛（附屬第一）印度支那日佛共同防衛ニ關スル議定書ニ上記ニ基ク現地條約ノ基礎的精神

ニ依リ、佛印ニ對シ起リ待ベキ米軍ノ作戦ニ對シ日本軍ト協力シ印度支那領土ヲ防衛スル決意ノ確タル證據トシテ次ノ提議ヲ承認スルコトヲ求ムルコト

(イ) 現存ノ狀態ガ存続スル間佛軍隊及武装警察ハ日本ノ命令下ニ置カレ軍隊、武器、軍需品、資材ノ編制處置及行動ハソノ命令ニノミ從ヒ行動スルコト、

(ロ) 戦争ノ遂行ニ時ニ必要ナル組織、例ヘバ鐵道、海上輸送及交通ハ日本監理下ニ置カル、コト、

(ハ) 總督ハ直チニ全佛印ニ於ケル組織體ニ對シ日本軍ノ要求アラバ全面的且ツ忠實ニ協力ヲナスベク命令ヲ與ヘルコト、

〔上掲三條件ハ事實三月九日ドック總督へ松本大使ヨリナサレタル要求中ニ正式ニ提示サレタリ〕

總督ガ日本ノ要求ヲ充分承認スル場合ニハ日本ハ佛軍隊及武装警察ノ再組織以上ノコトハナサズ。之レニ反對ノ場合ニハ日本軍ハ武力ニ懸ヘ軍事的支配ヲ實施スルノ餘儀ナキニ至ルベシ。コノ場合次ノ原則ガ取ラレルデアラ

ウ。

(イ) 佛ガ日本ノ要求ヲ棄却スルトモ兩國ノ關係ハ戰爭狀態ニアルトハ見做サレザルベシ、サレド日本ハ佛印ニ關スル現存條約ニ束縛サルルコトナキコト。

(ロ) 日本ハ總督及ソノ政府主腦者兼ニソノ職務ノ遂行ヲ許サズ、シカシ彼等ノ個人的取扱ハ出來ルダケ寛大ナルベシ。

(ハ) 政府ノ下部組織ハ用レラルルコトナクソノ濫利用サルベシ。

(ニ) 佛軍隊及武裝警察ハ武裝解除サル組織替サレコト。併シ武裝解除ニ當リ抵抗スル者ハ停罰トシテ取扱ハル、コト。

佛人非敵國員及ソノ財産ハ敵國ノモノトシテ取扱ハル、コトナク可及的寛大ニ取扱ハルベシ。サレド軍事の必要アル場合ニハ日本軍ハ私有財産ノ監理及居住ト行動ノ自由ヲ制限スルコトアルベシ。

三 處置ノ發展

一九四五年（昭和二十年）三月九日午後七時（日本時間）松本大使ハ本國ヨリ受ケタル勅令ニヨリ西貢官邸ニドーク總督ヲ訪問シタ。彼等ハ戰爭ノ一現狀況ヲ論ジ、見解ヲ交換シタル後總

督ハ米軍ノ印度支那上陸ノ可能性ヲ容認シタ。
依テ大使ハ總督ニ對シ全權ヲ賦與セラレタル總
督ノ資格ニ於テ現状ニ必要ナル日佛共同防衛ヲ
強化シ日本ニ對シ誠意ヲ披瀝スベキコトヲ要求
シタ。

彼ハ日本政府ノ訓令ニ甚ク上掲ノ條件ヲ總督ニ
説明シ午後十時迄ニ回答スベキコトヲ求メタ。
彼ハ回答ニシテ受諾的ノモノニ非ルトキハ日本
軍ハ必要ナル手段ヲ取ルノ已ムナキコト、ナル
ベキヲ警告シテ辭去シタ。

午後十時頃ロバン大尉ハ總督ノ回答ヲ大使ニ持
参シタ。此ノ回答ハ正式ノ回答ト認ムルモ日本
官憲ニハ拒否ヲ表示セルモノト認ムルノ外ナキ
モノデアツタ。

依テ第三十八軍司令官ハ參謀本部ヨリ受ケ居リ
タル訓令ニ從ヒ武力行使ヲ決意セザルベカラザ
ルニ至リ全軍ニ對シ直チニ備軍及武装警察ノ武
裝解除ヲナスヨウ命令シタ。

日本軍ハ河内、西貢、ブノムベン及ニヤトラ
ニ於テ若干ノ抵抗ニ遭遇シタガ歐日中ニ佛國ノ
主力ノ武装解除ニ成功シタ。然シ日本軍ハ北部
國境地境例ヘバ諒山、同三、義關ノ如キ堅固ナ

ル障地ニ據リ抵抗シタ佛軍ノ武装解除ニハ少カ
ラザル損害ヲ蒙ツタ。

カクテ日本軍ハ進ンテ僻遠ノ地ニ駐屯セル佛軍
分遣隊ヲ制壓シ又山間ニ遷退セル佛軍ノ小部隊
ヲ掃蕩スルト共ニ他方治安ヲ回復シ行政ヲ復活
セシムルコトニ努メタ。約一ヶ月ニシテ僻遠ノ
地方ヲ除キ治安ハ漸次回復シ一般ノ感情モ安定
シ各種ノ機關ハ大体平常ノ活動ニ復歸シタ。

安南山脈、支那國境地方、及老撾ノ山岳地帯ヨ
リ佛軍ノ強兵ヲ掃蕩スルニハ相當ノ時日ヲ要シ
タ。ソシテ日本軍ガ第一次武力行動ヲ終了シタ
ノハ五月十五日デアツタ。

カ、ル中ニ越南黨ノ北部佛印ニ於ケル活動ハ漸
次擴大トナツタ。特ニ自國民ノ完全ナル獨立ヲ
遂行スルガ爲メニ日本軍ノ驅逐ヲ狙ツタ公安ノ
擾亂行爲ガ盛トナツタ。之ガ爲メニ日本軍ハ八
月十五日ノ終戦ニ至ル迄記明ノ群徒掃蕩ト云フ
骨折多キ仕事ニ相當ナル勢力ヲ割愛セ不バナラ
ナカツタ。

(c) 武装ヲ解除サレタ佛軍ハ「佛人」ト「土人」
ノ二團ニ分ケラレタ。第一團ハ主ニ西貢ト河
内ニ集結及收容サレタ。第二團ハ一部ハ「棉
蘭兵」トシテ日本軍ニ編入サレ他ハ義勇兵及

國民軍トシテ編成サルベキデアツタガ此ノ案
ハ用意ハ出來テ居タガ實施サレナカツタ。

(d) 武装警察ハ治安保持上不可缺少レバ日本軍ハ
佛人ヲ除キ土人警察官ノ最小數ニ再武装セシ
メ各州ニ配置シタ。然シ其ノ員數ハ以前ノ數
ノ半分ヨリモ少ナカツタ。

(e) 佛人非戰鬥員ニ對シテハ軍事上ノ必要ト本人
ノ安全トノ爲メニ河内、海防、順化、牙莊、
西貢、金邊及ダラツトニ居住地ガ限定サレタ。

(f) 行政組織ハ其儘トサレ少數ノ日本人官吏ガ重
要ナル官職ニ就イタ外ハ殆ド總テノ佛人又ハ
安南人官吏ハ原職ニ止マルコトヲ許サレタ。
斯クシテ日本軍ハ社會的不安及無秩序ヲ制御
シツツ可及的速カニ治安ヲ回復シ依テ以テ全
印度支那ヲシテ戰爭準備ニ日本ニ協力セシム
ル様努力シタ。

(h) 日本ノ佛印ニ對スル措置ノ必然的結果トシテ
安南ト他ノ二國ハ獨立ヲ宣シ其ノ獨立ヲ具體
的ニ實現シツツアツタ。日本軍ハ之等諸國ノ
内政ニ干渉スルコトヲ避ケ彼等ガ彼等ノ欲ス
ルコトヲ實行スルニ任セタ。只日本軍ハ彼等
ガ謀リタル獨立ノ觀念ト民族意識トノ爲メニ

軌道ヲ外レナイ様ニ絶エズ彼等ノ行動ニ對スル監視ヲ怠ラナカッタ、同時ニ佛政權下ニ於ケルガ如キ非協力的態度ヲ再ビ取ルコトナキ様常ニ細心ナル注意ヲ拂ツテ居タ。

(1) 佛印ニ對シ措置アリタル時ニ於ケル戦闘ノ進行状態ハ附表第一ニ示シテアル。

四 結 語

日本ガ佛印ニ對シ取りタル手段ハ米軍侵入ノ可能性ニ直面シ佛官憲ハ今更其ノ非友好的態度ヲ改メテ急速ナル戦争準備ノ爲メニ日本ニ協力シ日本軍ノ作戰ニ便宜ヲ供與スルガ如キコトハ望ミ得ベキコトデハナイカラ眞ニ已ムヲ得ナイモノデアツタ。シカシ日本ハ佛人ヲ蔑視シタノデハナイ又印度支那ノ領土占領ノ野心ガアツタノデモナク又安南人ヲ佛人ニ忍向ハサウトシタノデモナイ。且又佛印ニ對スル措置ハ東京カラノ命令ニ基イタモノデアリ外地軍隊ノ獨斷的決意ニ依ツタモノデハナイ。總テノ日本軍ハ將兵モ官吏モ非戰鬥員モ如何ニ下級ノ地位ニアルモノモ常ニ上官ノ命ニヨツテノミ彼等ノ與ヘラレタル各義務ニ從ヒ彼等ノ責務ヲ完遂セルモノデア

2667-12

印度支那ノ共同防衛ニ關スル
日本佛蘭西間議定書

日本政府及佛國政府ハ現下ノ國際情勢ヲ考察シ其ノ結果佛印ノ安全ガ脅威セラレ、場合ニ於テハ日本國ガ東亞ニ於ケル一般的靜謐及自國ノ安全ガ危険ニ曝サレタリト爲ス理由アルヲ認メ

此ノ機會ニ一方日本國ニ依リ爲サレタル東亞ニ於ケル佛國ノ權利及利益特ニ佛印ノ領土保全及印度支那聯邦ノ全部ニ對スル佛國ノ主權ヲ尊重スル旨ノ約束ヲ、他方佛國ニ依リ爲サレタル日本ヲ直接又ハ間接ニ壓迫スルガ如キ性質ノ政治上、經濟上又ハ軍事上ノ協力ヲ予想スル何等ノ協定又ハ了解ヲモ印度支那ニ關シ第三國ト締結セザル旨ノ約束ヲ夫々更新シ左ノ議協定ヲ爲ス

一 兩國政體ハ佛印ノ共同防衛ノ爲メ軍事上協力ヲ爲スコトヲ得ス

二 前記協力ノ爲メ執ルベキ措置ハ別ニ之ヲ定ム
三 前記諸協定ハ其ノ締結ノ動機ト爲リタル情勢ノ存續スル限りニ就テノミ効力ヲ有スベシ

右證據トシテ各本國政府ヨリ正當ノ權限ヲ附與セラレタル下名等ハ本日ヨリ實施セラレ、本議定書

2667-13

ニ署名詞印セリ

昭和十六年七月二十九日即チ千九百四十一年七月二十九日ヴィシーニ於テ日文及佛文ヲ以テ本書二通ヲ作製ス

(署名者) 加藤外松 I エフ・ダルラン

(昭和十六年八月一日公布)

印度支那駐屯軍ノ中文及南支ノ共同作戦ニ於ケル在支日本軍トノ協力

一協力目的ニヨルニ

在支日本軍ニヨル南寧ノ占領ヲ容易ナラシメ、且ツ日本向南方地域ノ重要物資ノ輸送ヲ可能ナラシムル爲印度支那ト南寧間ノ陸路ヲ確保シ當時次第ニ困難トナリツツアリシ海路輸送ノ補充ヲラシムルコト

ニ作戦計劃大綱

(イ) 一九四四年(昭和十九)年四月以來在支日本軍ハ中支ト南支トヲ連絡スル目的ニテ揚子江及廣東地方ヨリ長沙・桂林及南寧ヘ向フル攻撃ヲ開始セリ。

(ロ)

印度支那駐屯軍ハ南寧ノ包圍ニ付キ在支日本軍ト協力シ陸路ヲ確保修理シ以テ前記作戦ヲ容易ナラシムコトヲ作戦開始ハ一九四四(昭和十九)年十一月以降ト決定サル(九月初頃印度支那日本軍ハコノ作戦準備ノ命ヲ受ケタリ)

(ハ)

一九四四(昭和十九)年九月初頃印度支那駐屯司令官ハ北部印度支那ニアル第二十一師團長ニ一九四四(昭和十九)年十一月未頃開始スベキコノ作戦ノ爲ノ準備ヲナスベク發令シタ。

後日強力ナ一部隊ヲ秘密裡ニ河内ヨリ十一月初頃諒山地方へ移動シ十一月下旬以降何時ニテモ行動ニ入りウルヤウ措置スベキ旨軍ノ命令ガ與ヘラレタ。

(ニ)

コノ作戦ノ爲メノ部隊(第二十一師團一官部隊)ノ編成ハ次ノ如シ

歩 兵 一 四 箇 大 隊

砲 兵 一 一 箇 大 隊

工 兵 一 第 二 十 一 師 團 工 兵 隊 隊 ノ 主 力 及

必要ナル補充勦務隊

三 作戰ノ一般的发展 (添附ノ計劃紙参照)

(イ) 一官部隊 (第二十一師團第八十三聯隊ノ主力) ハ十一月中頃秘密裡ニ河内ヨリ行動ヲ起シ十一月二十五日頃諒山ニ結集ヲ了シタ
 (四) 第二十一師團長ハ十一月二十九日拂曉國境ヲ越ヘ南寧ヘ向ケ攻撃ヲ開始スベキ命令ヲ受ケタ。

(ハ) 十一月二十九日零時ニ國境ヲ越ヘ、明江、龍州ヲ進ネル線ニ向カヒ次ニ思樂昭峽ヲ進ネル線ヘ向カヒ以テ南寧ニ對スル包圍準備ヲ行フニ伴ツテ右線ノ南方ニアル凡テノ陸路ヲ修理確保スルトイフ命令ニ從ヒツツ十一月二十九日ニ於テ一官部隊ハ諒山東及西ヨリ攻撃ヲ開始セリ。

(ニ) コノ日一官部隊ハ在支日本軍ニ屬スル第六兵團ノ指揮下ニ置カレタリ

((ホ) 十二月初頃一官部隊ハ明江・龍州ヲ進ネル線ニ進シタ、次テ同部隊ハ一部ヲ思樂ト昭峽トヲ結ブ線上ニ派遣スルト共ニ陸路ノ修

2667-16

(一)

理ヲ續ケタ、ノミナラズ同隊ハ突撃隊ヲ
思樂南寧路ニ沿ヒ前進セシメ十二月中頃南
寧ヲ占領セル第六兵團ト連絡スルニ成功シ
タ

一官部隊ハ明江・龍州・江南附近ノ陸路ノ
確保及修理ヲ一九四五（昭和二十）年一月
中頃迄繼續シタガコノ時第六兵團ノ前衛隊
ハ南寧ノ南方へ進出シタ。
コノ結果、一官部隊ハ次第ニ後退ヲ開始シ
同部隊ニ課セラレタ職務ヲ完遂シ二月初ニ
出發基地へ歸還シタ

本論本ハ戦争犯罪調査部委員會長

ニ證明セラレタリ

「M・M」調 印

2667-17 (cert.)

證 明 書

東南「アジア」聯合軍最高司令部

委任狀第一號 「サイゴン」


一九四五年一月二日一七日

親愛ナル提督閣下

私ハ日本南方總軍司令部作成ノ日本第三八軍ノ戦歴ノ獨本一部ヲ同封致シマス。之ハ閣下ニ興味アルモノト思ヒマス。

敬 白

「エス・グレイシイ」



寫本ノ眞實ナル
戦犯ノ眞實ナル
戦務局長

在印度支那「フランス」高等辨務官

「テイエリ・ダルゴンリュ」提督

Dr. returned for return to
Tateki Shirai as per T W X
13 May 52 at request of Cin CFE
Japan

Security request 5-806
for D M D S recd 15 May
52

Request fulfilled —
Dut. fwd. — thru D M D S

J. Melton
15 May 52

G M D S, W C U

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