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
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~~TOP SECRET~~  
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The Anderson Era Begins

For most employees of the Federal government, work continues unchanged when a new man moves into the White House. Employees of the Bureau of Reclamation, the Labor-Management Services Administration, or the Commodity Exchange Authority

all go about their jobs in their accustomed ways, ~~even~~ though changes of administration policy can ultimately have an effect. <sup>Even</sup> The pattern of most intelligence work--collection and the production of finished intelligence <sup>undisturbed.</sup> for a considerable number of officials--remains ~~unaffected~~ But for

those who are turning out intelligence specifically for the President, ~~everything is apt to change as soon as a~~ <sup>himself,</sup> ~~the appearance of a new Chief Executive signals the onset of~~ <sup>takes over, immediate</sup>

~~a whole new ballgame.~~ How wide-ranging will ~~be~~ the new President's foreign countries and in international relations? <sup>be</sup> interest in ~~foreign affairs~~ How much intelligence? <sup>will large</sup> ~~will he want great~~ <sup>be in order</sup> and frequent servings, <sup>appetite will be have for</sup> or modest portions only as absolutely <sup>requires</sup> ~~needed?~~

Will he want <sup>merely</sup> ~~only~~ facts, or facts plus interpretation and analysis?

FS

Separated or homogenized? Is he willing to read a regular intelligence document, or does he prefer to be briefed?

In each of the previous administrations, OCI had established a satisfactory channel directly to the President. However, the system ~~in~~ had never carried over from one incumbent to the next. Eisenhower did not want the personal weekly briefing from the Director that Truman had received; ~~he~~ preferred to be briefed in the setting of weekly meetings of the National Security Council. Kennedy did/<sup>not</sup>like to use the NSC with any regularity. Instead he found just what he wanted in the personal, daily intelligence Checklist ~~document~~ devised for him five months after he entered office.

The Checklist system worked so well with Kennedy that OCI and the Director naturally hoped to continue it with Lyndon Johnson, especially as it became apparent that Johnson, like his predecessor, was not going to have regular NSC meetings. Eventually OCI succeeded, but <sup>This was</sup> ~~only~~ after many months of frustration. It was only when ~~conduct~~

he had a firm hold of his administration and when certain foreign situations forced themselves upon his attention that President Johnson discovered the usefulness of a daily current intelligence document.

President

For a few days after the assassination of ~~John~~ Kennedy, ~~personally~~ R. J. Smith took the Checklist to ~~Mc~~ McCone at East Building at 8:30x a.m. The Director then held a staff meeting, after which R.J. personally Smith/took the Checklist to Bromley Smith and Gen. Clifton in the White

The briefing of President Johnson from the Checklist, however, House. ~~From about three weeks after the abrupt change of administrations,~~ was done by McCone, who saw the President daily for about three weeks ~~McCone met daily with President Johnson, partly with the purpose of briefing~~ after the assassination. 1/  
~~him from the Checklist.~~

Although OCI had provided more detail and background information ~~ix~~ than usual in its first intelligence books for President Johnson, McCone <sup>on 24 November</sup> ~~within two days~~ passed the word through DDI Cline <sup>there should be</sup> ~~that he would like to~~ see more but shorter items. ~~(Two weeks later Bromley Smith was still and return to a normal Checklist.)~~ ~~arguing that OCI leave out the background data.~~ McCone said the President expected that topics appearing in the Checklist would be followed up in later issues; therefore, OCI should make even negative reports.

Cline, presumably reflecting the Director's wishes, said that the checklist that day should cover military activity in South Vietnam, the fighting in Laos, ~~the~~ Soviet ICBM developments, and problems in the Berlin air corridors and ~~in~~ Venezuela.

Around the middle of December, ~~some members of the White~~  
~~House staff~~ <sup>take over the</sup> using the checklist, ~~tried to penetrate the~~ intelligence when McCone stopped seeing the President daily, the White House staff ~~including~~ <sup>the President</sup> tried to get ~~him~~ <sup>him</sup> to read the checklist, ~~but~~ <sup>they</sup> were largely unsuccessful, ~~tried to get the checklist~~  
 although McGeorge Bundy was able to do ~~a~~ some oral briefing, checklist in hand. On 16 December, Gen. Clifton told ~~checklist~~ <sup>OC's</sup> John Heidemann, ~~that~~  
 "If we can't penetrate this sort of wall today or tomorrow, we'll just have to try something else." In this cloudy atmosphere, the sun came out occasionally. On the 18th, Clifton said that the staff had finally managed to get the President to read ~~the~~ "the books"--probably two or three issues.

At Christmastime, the President went to his Texas ~~ranch~~  
 ranch and shortly after Christmas had Chancellor Erhard as a visitor for several days. The PICL was cabled to the ranch each day. The report

was limited to notes covering important developments and any information that might be useful in the talks with Erhard. The President returned to Washington on 5 January, and the next day Gen. Clifton, who had been at the ranch, ~~xxx~~ told Heidemann that he had been able to get the Checklist to the President with some regularity once Erhard had gone.

On 8 January, however, Clifton was having difficulties not again--the President had/read the intelligence document since leaving Texas. Clifton thought there would be a <sup>little</sup> let-up in the press of business after ~~what was evidently happening was that the President found time for~~ that day's State of the Union speech. He ~~the Checklist only when there wasn't a press of other business. Clifton~~ asked Philip Kennedy for a special report, briefly treating important and still-current ~~problems~~ problems that were covered in their books the President ~~didn't~~ <sup>hadn't</sup> read. ~~xxx~~ <sup>Clifton</sup> ~~also talked at length on the problem of the President~~ ~~not getting his reading done.~~ <sup>in fact, that</sup> Clifton thought, it would be good to try the system of giving the President a summary of significant intelligence twice a week.

OCI quickly put together an experimental President's  
 covering the period 4-9 January. This was taken by  
Intelligence Review, ~~which~~ Richard Lehman, ~~the~~ Assistant for Special  
 Projects, ~~talked~~ to Gen. Clifton on 9 January. Clifton thought the  
Review was the best solution to the problem of the President's intelligence  
 reading. He and Bundy <sup>were</sup> agreed that the President would not accept a  
 daily intelligence briefing. The President had instructed Clifton that  
 the DCI was to see him whenever he wished but that otherwise the President  
 relied on Bundy and Clifton to stay on top of the intelligence. Because  
 the President was likely to ask them <sup>with no warning</sup> for the latest <sup>word,</sup> intelligence, the daily  
Checklist had to continue. Clifton ~~seemed receptive to OCI's proposal to~~  
~~send the Checklist to <sup>six or eight</sup> ~~provide~~ additional ~~parag~~ ~~rams~~.~~ He also suggested that  
 the Checklist periodically include a special blue-~~ink~~ or green-bordered page  
 containing an operational report. 2/

The next morning Gen. Clifton called Lehman to report that  
 the White House was very pleased with the Review, <sup>and</sup> ~~which he~~ <sup>it</sup> wanted continued. ~~It~~ had been ~~the~~ tried on  
 the President at breakfast and it had "worked like a charm." 3/



~~INFORMATION~~

Because the President was not reading the Checklist every day, <sup>it sent</sup> ~~its contents known to~~ <sup>a few more</sup> ~~than~~ DCI McCone wanted ~~to know about~~ <sup>high-level officials</sup> ~~often sensitive~~ ~~contents beyond~~ the small circle of readers in Kennedy's time--the

Secretaries of State and Defense, McGeorge Bundy at the White House, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Therefore he obtained permission in

February to extend the dissemination to four <sup>additional</sup> ~~more~~ top officials in the

State Department, two more in Defense, one on the Joint Chiefs staff, <sup>plus</sup> ~~and~~ the

Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney-General. <sup>h/</sup>

~~for the basis of the~~ <sup>Besides doing the semi-weekly Review and the PICL, OCI was</sup> ~~OCI's production of the new~~ <sup>Things went along on</sup> ~~writing memoranda in response to requests from the~~ <sup>white House staff, and</sup> ~~semi-weekly Review and, the President's occasional reading of the daily~~

~~Checklist~~ <sup>(DCI McCone was</sup> ~~and briefings~~ <sup>of</sup> the President from time to

time ~~by McCone~~. The Checklist writers still took the publication to Bromley Smith and Gen. Clifton each morning and received their comments, plus occasional playback from the President. When ~~such~~ unusually

<sup>in the PICL</sup> interesting items/caught his eye, Clifton would make a point of bringing them to the President's attention. On 21 January, for example, he

reacted immediately to the "quotable Khrushchev" item and said he would get right to the President with this. A few days later he instructed OCI to keep the White House "up to the minute" on Cyprus developments. "Hours will make the difference," he said.

Gen. Clifton told James Hanrahan on 28 January that he had talked with the President about the President's Intelligence Review and Mr. Johnson had said it <sup>was</sup> just fine. He <sup>found</sup> finds it a very valuable supplement to his occasional briefings from the DCI and he want<sup>ed</sup> it continued without change.

*Insert \* from next page*

Early in 1964, the President drew his aides Bill Moyers and Jack Valenti into the intelligence picture. He wanted one of them present when he read the Review at breakfast and he was reported occasionally as discussing Checklist items with them. Although the ~~OCI~~ PICL writers continued to meet and talk with Bromley Smith and Gen. Clifton, it began to

look as though Moyers and Valenti were ~~actually~~ taking the documents to the President.

On 25 March the President's ~~associations of~~ plans to spend a weekend

in Texas ~~at the ranch~~ prompted Gen. Clifton to ~~say~~ comment that Mr. Johnson read his

intelligence while ~~he~~ at the ranch; he ~~is~~ <sup>was</sup> often ~~up and about~~ <sup>up and</sup> by ~~8~~

8:15 a.m. ~~was~~ asking for it. But it, ~~is~~ <sup>was</sup> hard to catch him in Washington.

The next day Clifton said that it was not necessary for the OCI representa- tives to meet him at 9:30 a.m.; The book did not move upstairs that fast.

He ~~is~~ asked that the meetings take place at 10 in the future.

James C. Graham, Acting AD/<sup>DDI</sup>OCI, took up with/Ray Cline

the possibility of ~~his~~ <sup>Clint</sup> inviting Moyers to CIA headquarters for lunch

and a briefing. Cline wanted ~~to~~ <sup>first</sup> discuss the White House problem

with McCone, but ~~first~~ <sup>asked Graham for</sup> wanted a little memorandum on how things were going. 5

OCI ~~then~~ drew up a statement for Cline making the principal points that

~~we~~ <sup>it</sup> had no way of knowing whether ~~we were~~ <sup>it was</sup> meeting the President's

needs because ~~we~~ <sup>it</sup> had no feedback from him, in contrast to the situation

under Kennedy. The reason for this was that ~~our~~ <sup>OCI's</sup> contacts at the White House

Insert on p. 8

did  
~~do~~ not deal directly with the President on intelligence matters.

OCI wondered how it could establish close links to the President's  
immediate staff. 6/

*What was  
McLean's  
position?  
Did Myers come  
out?*

*look for  
red borders*

Things remained in <sup>a confused</sup> ~~an unpredictable~~ state for the  
 only  
 next few months, with/occasional indications that OCI's presidential  
 publications had hit the mark. Clifton <sup>commented</sup> ~~remarked~~ in May that the Review  
 was the best means of reaching the President, although <sup>he said</sup> the PICL registered  
 at times when Valenti was interested in an item. One day when the

PICL was heavy on the side of bad news, Clifton said, "It's no wonder the  
 President doesn't want to read this stuff--it annoys you." There were  
 days when the President read and initialed both the Review and the PICL.

From mid-year on, ~~Mr.~~ <sup>Campaign</sup> Mr. Johnson made frequent ~~political~~ trips around  
 the country. Clifton, who was usually with him, said he had more luck  
 getting the President to read his intelligence on the return flights than  
 on the way out, when Mr. Johnson was reviewing his speeches.

As the election neared, Secretary of State Rusk  
 expressed some concern to McCona about the security of the Checklist  
 and seemed to prefer that dissemination be limited to the President,  
 Secretary of Defense McNamara and himself. <sup>McCona passed the word down</sup> ~~The DDI was asked to follow up~~

and also conveyed his  
~~He~~

~~on this matter, and was informed ~~blackbox~~ at the same time that McCone's~~

feeling

felt that the President should read the Checklist daily, ~~or~~ have it read to him, and should not depend on the semi-weekly Review. 7/

AD/CI R. J. Smith responded in a memorandum of 5 November 1964, ~~to~~

~~the DGE through the DDI~~ <sup>believed</sup> Smith He ~~felt~~ that the Agency would have a graceful

way of dropping some of ~~the~~ <sup>readers</sup> Checklist ~~subscriptions~~ if the publication

were to undergo a transformation in which it would acquire a new name, a

new cover, and a new format. It would become President Johnson's publication,

specifically designed to meet his needs. To increase the ~~possib~~ chances

of its being read by the Chief Executive, it would be ~~subscribed~~ produced

to conform to the President's working habits <sup>and would be</sup> by being delivered in ~~for late afternoon delivery so that it could be part of his evening reading~~

Smith noted that the Review, which Mr. Johnson "usually reads," was

<sup>timed</sup> ~~produced ~~blackbox~~~~ for his evening perusal. Smith also noted

the importance of finding a way to establish direct contact with the

President so that OGI could get feedback <sup>and thus avoid</sup> ~~so that it could not write in~~ ing

a vacuum. 8/

The PDB Appears

Smith's proposal for a new publication was accepted and was rapidly put into effect. The last Checklist was dated 30 November <sup>1964</sup> and the next day the first issue of the President's Daily Brief (PDB) was delivered to the White House. In substance it resembled the PICL, but it had a fresh appearance, and it ~~was~~ came out late in the afternoon instead of ~~the~~ <sup>in the</sup> early morning. Jack Valenti sent this first issue back to McGeorge Bundy saying that the President read it, liked it, and wanted it continued. Dissemination was cut back, so that the only persons receiving the PDB outside the White House were <sup>the</sup> Secretary ~~R~~ and Under Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary, and one Assistant Secretary, the Treasury Secretary, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Gen. Carroll.

~~In place of the semi-weekly Review, the Highlights of the~~

~~Week was begun,~~ The semi-weekly Review was dropped, but by 16 December

<sup>a</sup> the DCI ordered that ~~the~~ summary ~~sections~~ <sup>OCI's</sup> of the Current Intelligence

<sup>with</sup> Weekly Review be included ~~in~~ each Friday's PDB. The summary, titled

Highlights of the Week, lasted only until 26 February 1965, <sup>having</sup> ~~been~~ ~~with~~

failed to arouse presidential interest.

In the ensuing weeks and months, OCI was naturally watching for indications of the success or failure of the restyled <sup>PDB writer</sup> daily for the President. On 13 January, ~~Thomas Patton, PDB Executive~~ <sup>corner</sup> noted that Bromley Smith wrote "The President" in the upper right <sup>corner</sup> of Copy No. 1. Patton asked whether Smith would like OCI to type this on. ~~xxxxxxx Smith~~ No, said Smith, putting it on in long-hand gave it a human touch.

On 19 January, the format of the Brief was changed as a result of discussions between McGeorge Bundy and Ray Cline. Bromley Smith said he ~~was~~ liked the new format and he thought the South Vietnam item was "exactly right." The President was not interested in the names of generals and ministers and didn't follow such details.

Further experiments in <sup>page size</sup> ~~format~~ followed a talk McCone had with the President, <sup>but nothing came of them.</sup> There was even a sample Brief that the President could put in his pocket, though the thought of having sensitive material handled this way made Bromley Smith groan.



In mid-February, Bromley Smith said that the Vietnam Situation Report, which OCI had begun sending to the White House daily at 8 a.m., was proving to be very useful; it was going up to the President every morning. *It should not be imagined that the PDB writers did not always transacted their business with Bromley Smith in tranquility. Occasionally there was a certain amount of commotion in ~~when the PDBers were there~~ around Bromley Smith's office because of people coming and going to different meetings in the White House. One day Smith closed his door, explaining that ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~*

Bundy might be able to work this way with all the Indians charging in all the time, but I can't, especially since I was here till after 11 last night waiting for the President to leave.

*2nd Dan's*  
*marked*

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ one day ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Smith unburdened himself/about about problems for himself and the Agency. One of them was the occasional flow of raw clandestine information directly to the President, who "eats up information" and has a "very short reaction fuse." *Smith recognized the need to get important intelligence to the President as soon as possible, but thought the flow should be controlled by a* ~~And yet time was of the essence.~~ *Smith felt there should be a* timely "city editor" somewhere who could make a package of all the many types of information, including the operational. *to PDBer Joseph O. Matthews* At another time, he reiterated how short the reaction times had become at the White House. He also

The Impact of Santo Domingo

On 24 April 1965 events took place that resulted in

an improvement in the standing of OCI publications in the White House.

On that day an uprising ~~was~~ began against the provisional government of the

Dominican Republic. The US fear that Communists might seize control of the  
country led to the prompt dispatch of Marines to Santo Domingo. ~~President~~  
~~Johnson wanted a steady flow of intelligence~~

--28 April--

By coincidence, ~~that~~ the day they landed/was also the day  
~~Johnson wanted a steady flow of intelligence~~

that Admiral William Raborn was sworn in as DCI, succeeding John McCone.

Dominican  
President Johnson ~~was~~ could hardly get enough intelligence on the ~~Republic~~

situation, and Admiral Raborn was determined to provide the best service

the establishment of ~~a~~  
possible. The day after he took office, the Admiral ordered/a CIA task force  
on the Dominican Republic under E. Drexel Godfrey, chief of OCI's Western Area.

As directed, it provided "complete and around-the-clock CIA intelligence support  
Its first task each day was to brief Raborn to

him  
to the White House." / ~~It~~ put ~~himself~~ in readiness to deal with ~~the~~ calls from the

White House. ~~Periodically~~ Periodically throughout the day and night it issued  
round-up  
/situation reports, and when necessary, spot reports of particular developments.

All these reports were teletyped to the White House, ~~and~~ they were read by the

Mr. Johnson, who was described by Bromley Smith as a ~~President~~ President "who eats

up information." OOI, ~~wordx~~ of course, continued to put out its regular

Dominican publications. It was during the ~~DOMINICAN~~ crisis that wordx was received that

the President's Daily Brief had taken firm root in the White House. ~~It was~~

on 21 May that Bill Moyers said/the President read it "avidly." 9/

The increased tempo of intelligence service to the ~~White~~ Chief

~~House~~ Executive prompted further consideration of the proper ~~route~~ route to him.

~~Mr. Johnson,~~ and DDI Ray Cline the No. 1 recipient, ~~DDI Ray Cline~~ and DDCI Richard Helms) agreed that

a "greased channel" through ~~Mr. George~~ Bundy should be established for the PDB

and any other reports the DCI wants to be sure the President sees. 10/

on 20 May AD/CI Jack Smith commented/that a "greased channel" already appeared to exist

For the PDB. 11/

~~the NSC Staff (McGeorge Bundy, Bromley Smith, and the McGeorge Bundy, as the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, White House Situation Room)~~

should be the place of entry for intelligence for ~~Mr. Johnson~~ the President, although informa-

copies could be sent to Moyers and Valenti. Helms and Cline said ~~that~~ char

hectic

The ~~hazy~~ atmosphere in the spring of 1965, with the

Dominican situation coming on top of growing difficulties in Vietnam,

caused the men in the White House to ask more of intelligence and to ~~tended to produce sharper reactions in the White House to intelligence and to~~

react to it more sharply. Bromley Smith said the President has a "very short

reaction fuse." He wants <sup>ed</sup> to hear/about major developments, ~~and~~ so rapid

dissemination <sup>was</sup> is essential. <sup>Smith</sup> He also warned that OCI would soon be asked to report

on every coup and to cover all present and potential trouble spots with high

precision. He said that in the ~~near~~ future, OCI's reports would not say that

the Valencia regime is shaky, but that "Valencia is going to be overthrown

by a coup on the umpteenth July by X in Toonerville." Since this would be asking

the impossible in most cases, Richard Lehman, OCI's Assistant for Special

Projects, went to see Bill Moyers. He explained that ~~it was possible for~~ OCI

<sup>could</sup> ~~to~~ write 50 pages of intelligence warnings a day, thereby taking out insurance

against any possible contingency, but that the office did not believe ~~that~~ this

would really serve the President. Lehman said OCI tried to be highly selective

in warning of ~~big~~ coups and the like. Moyers expressed understanding of ~~the~~

OCI's difficulties, and the fire died down. 12/ This episode had an amusing sequel about eight months later when Bromley Smith pondered the series of army coups in the republics of West Africa. He said he didn't think the President wanted or needed to be informed in advance of every threatened coup. "Otherwise," he said, "you could fill the book with that sort of thing."

*INSERT from page below*

the system now seemed to be working satisfactorily. OCI was fairly confident that the PDB was being read regularly by the President, writers on the the/PDB team ~~wrote~~ and reactions, and ~~it~~ received useful suggestions, ~~and~~ criticisms, usually from Bromley Smith, they when ~~it~~ delivered the publication each day. *9* One day in June 1965 ~~the~~ ~~the~~

first paragraph of the lead item in the PDB said "Accumulating information suggests that Hanoi is bringing North Vietnam to a state of semi-mobilization." The second paragraph *explained* ~~said~~ that Hanoi's action was far short of classic mobilization for offensive operations; ~~therefore~~ OCI ~~was~~ considered the move defensive and was therefore inclined to ~~discount~~ *British expert* the view of one ~~British~~ who thought a large-scale attack would soon be made across the 17th parallel. President Johnson/at the time and Gen. Clifton

Inset on p. 19

The system for supplying current intelligence to ~~the~~

Johnson

President/was now working better than ~~at~~ previously, ~~under Johnson Johnson~~

~~OCI was fairly confident that the President was reading the PDB regularly,~~

To be sure,

~~the~~ OCI did not benefit from the steady playback <sup>from the Presidential</sup> it

under

had enjoyed ~~from~~ John Kennedy, <sup>usually,</sup> ~~it did not, in fact, receive the direct~~

~~reactions of the men - Moyers and Valenti - who were closest to Mr. Johnson.~~

On the other hand, ~~the~~ OCI was fairly confident that the President

was reading the PDB regularly, and the writers on the PDB team received

useful suggestions, criticisms, and reactions--usually from Bromley Smith--

when they delivered the publication each day.

were at the LBJ ranch. Late in the afternoon, the PDB received a phone call from Bromley Smith, who said that Gen. Clifton had called from the ranch.

*He had been shaken by the*  
~~The first sentence of the Vietnamese item had shaken Clifton, who was also~~

*and*  
was concerned about the whole piece. The President was out on the lake ~~at~~ and was not expected back for several hours. Clifton at first felt he should summon the President to shore. <sup>m</sup> Smith discussed the matter with the PDB writer, Thomas Patton, and there was further conversation with Clifton, who decided ~~that~~ simply to add the word "but" after the first sentence and continue with the ~~second~~ somewhat reassuring second sentence. The case <sup>was a vivid</sup> illustrated <sup>ion</sup> again of the potentiality of the PDB for causing excitement in the White House ~~family~~ entourage.

Foreign developments often ~~provoked~~ <sup>provoked</sup> ~~abominable~~

spirited reactions from ~~the~~ Bromley Smith, but it was not often that he expressed surprise ~~at the~~ <sup>nature of the</sup> kind of intelligence he was reading, substance apart. One such occasion, however, came when the PDB ran an item about dissension between Rumania and the Soviet Union.

*Comment  
Comment?*



that Ceausescu and Maurer had complained to Shelepin that the USSR acts on  
 the international scene without consulting its allies, just as in Stalin's time.  
 The Rumanians cited the 1962 missile adventure in Cuba and Soviet positions  
 on disarmament. Shelepin agreed that more coordination was needed. Smith was  
 particularly interested in this item and remarked ~~that it was "fantastic"~~  
 to PDB writer Archer G. Bush that it was "fantastic" that we could get this  
 kind of information.

Bromley Smith now and then modified or rewrote items when  
 he felt that they might confuse or unduly alarm the President. In December  
 1965, for example, President Johnson ordered a halt in the bombing of ~~Northern~~  
 Vietnam ~~in~~ in the hope of getting negotiations started. A PDB item reported  
 that Hanoi had broadcast a tough restatement of its position, making no reference  
 to the pause in air strikes. Smith, ~~was~~ <sup>this would be</sup> afraid that ~~the President~~  
 taken  
~~interpretation~~ as a rebuff to the President's efforts, reworked the text to  
 avoid this interpretation since the <sup>a fully</sup>  
~~emphasis on the~~ broadcast did not constitute ~~an~~ official government statement.



~~It was clear at various times that there was a~~

~~xx~~ Quite clearly, the White House staff cringed at bad news from Vietnam. When the PDB reported in April 1966 that "the political situation appears to be rapidly worsening" in South Vietnam~~xy~~ and ~~xxxxxx~~ <sup>averred</sup> that Ky might soon have to take drastic measures to restore authority or make major concessions to the Buddhists, Smith remarked that the article was pessimistic, and that ~~xxxxxx~~ he had later information. It was, of course, one of the perils of the PDB operation that the White House sometimes had ~~later~~ fresher reports from the field. Smith handed John Heidemann cables reporting that Ky was going to formulate a new constitution and that the State Department looked upon this <sup>as</sup> ~~as~~ hopeful. Heidemann agreed that OCI had written in ignorance of this information, but added that offhand he would not be optimistic.

A few days later Smith read that "There was no real improvement in the situation today..." and said "You're going to break the President's heart; he thinks things are much better today." When he finished the/dis<sup>whole</sup> - heartening ~~xxxxxxxx~~ report, he <sup>S</sup> tossed the book in the air, whistled, and said, "We'll

have fun tonight. But that's no reason for not writing it as you see it."

Smith had cause for unhappiness again when the PDB had to report that <sup>a</sup> Pakistan official~~s~~ felt that his country was ~~seriously, if~~ temporarily drifting apart from the US and would probably establish closer relationships with the Soviet Union. Smith told/Allen Valpey that this article was a "shocker" and that Walt Rostow would be disturbed by it. (Rostow had replaced McGeorge Bundy ~~xx~~ in April 1966.)

PDB writer

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White House  
~~White House~~

Although ~~the~~ John McCone had not taken up a suggestion

~~in Kennedy's time~~ that the President's daily give occasional coverage to CIA activities, ~~RFT~~

Admiral Raborn as DCI did adopt this practice. Bromley Smith reacted negatively to these reports, however, apparently believing that President Johnson did not like them. He particularly objected in 1966 to a PDB Annex explaining how CIA used a portable ultra-violet light device in Vietnam to detect guerrillas who ~~xxxx~~ had recently handled weapons before mingling ~~innocently~~

with innocent villagers. Smith did not want the Agency to "advertise" in the PDB. <sup>He believed that if</sup> The President should be informed of some CIA activities, the DCI should send him a memorandum.

<sup>2</sup><sub>11</sub> this time R.J. Smith was DDI, E. Drexel Godfrey was D/OCI and Richard Lehman was DD/OCI. Bromley Smith met with them and the PDB writers

Late in July 1966 Bromley Smith said that he had some ideas about the PDB and would like to get together with all the writers. ~~He met with them and the OCI/~~ ~~the OCI/~~ in the Langley building on 3 August. He prefaced his ~~remarks by saying that he had no criticisms~~ <sup>thought</sup> expressing his satisfaction with the way the President was being served; ~~He had no criticisms.~~ He explained, however, ~~that while the President "tolerates" anonymous documents, he is much more responsive to a personalized document.~~ <sup>anon</sup> He wondered whether the Brief could be signed by Mr. Helms, <sup>now DCI.</sup> Then ~~it~~ it would become a personal link between the President and the Director. In regard to content, Smith said the PDB did not have to alert the President to impending crises over which he would have no control. Rather, Smith thought ~~it~~ the PDB could be most useful by ~~carrying items that give~~ <sup>rendering</sup> pithy judgments on situations with which the President is or will be faced. ~~He~~ Smith said these judgments would be accepted; OCI did not have to support them with argumentation or evidence. Smith emphasized that the Brief writers had to be fully up on US policies and should <sup>adequately</sup> read presidential speeches. He felt the President is kept/informed of

Vietnamese military developments by other means; the PDB should carry more

Vietnamese political and economic items. ~~Smith~~ Smith urged that the Brief

have more coverage of ~~the~~ Europe and said that Panama was another subject

high on the priority list. 13/

OCI promptly set about adopting Smith's suggestions as to

content, and Smith, <sup>soon</sup> commented that he ~~had~~ noticed the change. 14/

(What about Helms signature?)

Back to Morning Delivery

A major <sup>alteration</sup> change in the PDB system occurred at the end

of February 1967. Seemingly all that was involved was that President Johnson

decided that he would rather get the Brief in the morning than in the evening.

However, this change in delivery/forced other changes. The President wanted

the Brief at 6:30 a.m., just before he began reading the newspapers. This meant

that OCI's closing time on the book was 5 a.m. Nonetheless, the PDB had to

be written in full knowledge of ~~the~~ what was in the morning press.

~~Proof~~  
As/E. Drexel Godfrey commented, the schedule ~~put~~ "the highest premium" on making the publication up to the minute." 15/

Because the ~~PDB~~ <sup>Brief</sup> now had to be delivered to the White House Situation Room by 6 a.m., the PDB writers ~~were~~ no longer had a member of the President's staff up and available to receive the book and comment on it. This meant that there was no point <sup>having</sup> in/the writers <sup>make</sup> ~~making~~ the trip to the White House. From this time on, the PDB was delivered by couriers. To make up for the loss of the morning conversations with Bromley Smith, an OCI staff member would visit him occasionally to check on how things were going, and there was also communication by phone.

Shortly after the changeover to the new ~~schedule~~ <sup>PDB</sup> ~~schedule~~, <sup>for the PDB</sup> commenting on the President's reaction, Bromley Smith, ~~and Bromley Smith~~ said emphatically that "we are much more certain now that he's reading it." He also made a point he was to make several times subsequently, which was that he disapproved of annexes to the Brief. He was afraid that if the Brief were burdened with an Annex, the President would put it aside for later reading--and then not

Smith thought it was an excellent idea for the Brief to summarize the conclusions of "important" national estimates. 16f

get back to it. In ~~Bromley's~~ Smith's view, the PDB should be of a length which the President could whip through quickly. ~~It would be~~ It would be better if annex-type reports were sent down separately. ~~16g~~

Smith continued to admonish OCI writers now and then ~~xxx~~ ~~language~~ about the words and phrases they employed in the PDB. He admitted that ~~xxx~~ it was hard to know where to draw the line, but he ~~cautioned that~~ ~~OCI~~ ~~the staff should be careful about~~ did not like "hopping mad," nor, As a rule of thumb, he said the writers should avoid seeming frivolous or light-hearted.

on another occasion, did he care for a description of India as an "unwilling bride."

At the President's request, OCI on 7 September 1967 began to attach to the Brief a Special Report on North Vietnam that ~~was~~ dealt with the effects of the war. ~~its title was~~ The only copy to go outside of the Agency was addressed: "For Bromley Smith - Eyes Only for the President." Beginning with the issue of 6 October, this Special Report carried a new section on North Vietnamese treatment of political attitudes toward the war, expressed in statements and demonstrations.

In November DCI Helms talked with Drexel Godfrey and Richard Lehman about the PDB. ~~Helms~~ The Director expressed great satisfaction with both the Brief and Special Report. He said the latter ~~ix~~ was "really hitting the mark." He urged that OCI try harder to ~~XXXXXXXX~~ come up with items on the personalities of men familiar to the President, who <sup>Helms said,</sup> thinks in terms of personalities. Helms also asked that the PDB give more attention to coming visits of worldx VIPs to Washington and to each other.

No major changes in the PDB were made during President Johnson's time after the introduction of the Special North Vietnamese <sup>Report</sup> ~~Report~~. To allx appearances, the Brief had evolved into a document satisfactory to the President, and it kept serving its purpose throughout the rest of the administration.

All OCI analysts who have worked on the PDB are familiar in the White House ~~ix~~ holding with a photograph of President Johnson sitting/with Lady Bird and his first grandson. In his handx is an issue of the President's Daily Brief, ~~which he~~ ~~appears to be reading.~~ This homey picture epitomized <sup>the</sup> the position <sup>occupied</sup> that OCI hoped the Brief had in the White House. And perhaps it did.

*Subhead*

The importance to a President of a steady flow of first-class intelligence is self-evident. Whatever scope and depth of information he can obtain from the public media, he still needs the intelligence that comes from the utilization of sensitive technological means and clandestine operations. He is entitled to objective appraisals based on all sources, public and governmental. In planning American positions and actions, he ~~needs~~ <sup>should have</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>seeks</sup> the most soundly based estimates of ~~how~~ <sup>the possible and probable development of</sup> foreign situations, ~~are likely~~ <sup>to develop.</sup>

CIA and its predecessor, the CIG, have met these Presidential intelligence needs. What they have furnished the Presidents has been determined by the interplay between the intelligence organization and the White House.

The Agency has been ~~prepared and~~ <sup>learn what each</sup> eager to ~~provide the~~ <sup>President wanted</sup>

and ~~it has tried~~ <sup>and it has tried</sup> in terms of subject matter, timing, format, /style, ~~For the most part, it~~

~~to meet these requirements.~~ <sup>has</sup> ~~has tried to give each President just what he wanted, and not bother him with~~ <sup>ed</sup>

~~anything else.~~ <sup>the Agency has fulfilled its obligation</sup> At the same time, ~~CIA, having the intelligence in its possession~~

~~before the President, has been obligated to see that he receives the reports~~ <sup>(the President)</sup>



to bring to the President's attention things he didn't know he wanted but which CIA recognized the President must have.

~~it has not been foreseen and requested, he must have, even if it does not fall within any category of requested~~

~~information.~~ There has probably never been complete agreement between

CIA and the White House on what the President really needs to know, but

a degree

~~of mutual toleration usually prevails~~ so that a President will

<sup>accept</sup> read some things he isn't particularly interested in and CIA will ~~carry~~

carry on certain lines of reporting simply out of regard for a President's ~~supply a President with certain reporting~~

idiosyncracies.

In serving Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and

<sup>was able to get</sup> ~~was able to get~~

Johnson, CIA's Office of Current Intelligence found ~~a direct line to the~~

~~Chief Executive~~ its message <sup>directly</sup> to the Chief Executive,

~~although the method was somewhat different for each President's preferences.~~

although the method was adjusted to accord with each President's preferences.