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INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT

Name: Alfred F. KRETSCHMER

Address: Kanko Hotel  
Atami, Japan

Concerning Military Commission mentioned in Document 955

I was German military attache in Tokyo from December 4, 1940 until May 3, 1945.

During this time the military commission, as such, was never talked about. The General, Military and Economic commissions were assembled twice as far as I remember; for the first time in 1943 before Mussolini's fall and for the second time in 1944. Both of these meetings, I am sorry to say, were only empty propagandistic performances. The intentions of these ineffective gestures were to camouflage that nothing was done here in Tokyo which could be called a cooperation between the German and Japanese High Commands. Whether these two meetings were sponsored by the Japanese Prime Minister or the Japanese Foreign Office I do not know. They were not proposed by the German side. All my urgings for a closer cooperation between the German and Japanese High Commands were in vain. Both Supreme Headquarters seemed to be intent on waging their

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own wars. The bases for this assertion are:

1. The outbreak of a German-Soviet hostility surprised me. Within the two months previous to the German attack on Russia, I had sent two telegraphic inquiries to the German General Staff asking whether a German-Soviet war was imminent and how I should answer corresponding hints made by the Japanese General Staff. Both times I had been answered in the negative and was emphatically ordered to oppose such silly rumors.

2. The start of the Japanese war against the U.S. and Great Britain, and especially the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines was not expected by me. Although I had been visiting the Japanese General Staff nearly daily at this time because of the precarious situation on the Russian front, I had not been informed about the Japanese intentions in the south, neither officially nor privately. By my various impressions, a Japanese invasion of Siam and sudden occupation of important oil sources in the Dutch East Indies had seemed most likely to me. But I was convinced that the Japanese would in any event do everything possible to keep U.S.A. out of their undertakings in the south. Germany then had to make the best of the situation that Japan had created on December 8, 1941. Just as before, Japan had to put up with the situation created by Germany on June 22, 1941.

3. When in the summer and autumn of 1941 Germany approached Japan asking her to intervene in the German-Russian war, there never was a clear-cut Japanese reply of "yes" or "no". I could guess that Germany could not reckon with Japan's help against Soviet Russia. It was not

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before autumn 1942, after the German Foreign Office had approached Japan for the third and last time, asking that Japan enter the war against Soviet Russia that the Japanese General Staff let me definitely understand that a Japanese interference into the German-Soviet war was out of the question. The almost daily explanations of the situation in the Far Asiatic theater of a war were confined to just what had happened. Future events were hardly ever mentioned. The Japanese information to us about Soviet Russia was always very sparse and often worthless. The same reluctance as in Tokyo was manifested, as far as I know, by German High Command concerning the war in the European theater. All of my endeavors to persuade both sides to be more frank were in vain.

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

... F. Kretschmer

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24 day of April, 1947,  
at Tokyo, Japan.

Bernard A. Hergaden  
Bernard A. Hergaden, 1st Lt  
Inf.  
Administrative Officer  
Defense Division, Legal Section