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SAB 7

**CLASSIFICATION,
DECLASSIFICATION AND
DOWNGRADING PROCEDURES**

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- Executive Secretary
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- State Adm. Assistant
- Army Adm. Assistant
- Navy Adm. Assistant
- File

SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

**CLASSIFICATION,
DECLASSIFICATION AND
DOWNGRADING PROCEDURES**



Issued by

SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

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INTRODUCTION

The Security Advisory Board has been engaged in a careful study of the overall problem of downgrading and declassification of classified official material. After consideration of the problem as it presented in numerous agencies, the Board has reached the conclusion that eventual downgrading and declassification can be accomplished only by continued hard work and attention to detail, if compromise of classified information is to be prevented. Although SAB 7 does not set forth any new and startling procedure for downgrading and declassification, it does bring together under one cover all appropriate downgrading and declassification guides and offers a ready reference for Security Officers of federal departments and agencies.

In carrying out the provisions of this Regulation, two important tasks become the responsibility of the Security Officer:

- (1) All personnel should be familiar with the current classification guides contained in Section II of this booklet. In addition, all personnel who will be working on declassification and downgrading should be familiar with the requirements in Section III. The proper indoctrination of such personnel should be accomplished by, or under the guidance of, the Security Officer;
- (2) If the problem of downgrading and declassification is a simple one, authority to downgrade or declassify all material originated in a department or agency which no longer deserves its original classification could be vested in the Security Officer or other responsible official in that agency. If there is any bulk of material, a Downgrading and Declassification Committee might be given full authority to downgrade and declassify all material originated by the agency or department, when it has been determined that the material no longer deserves its original classification. The Security Officer should supervise the establishment of such a Committee and where possible, serve on the Committee.

The Board will appreciate being advised as soon as your agency has placed this procedure in effect. The services of the Secre-

tariat of the Security Advisory Board are available to any government agency in establishing this procedure, and the advice of the Board may be solicited, whenever desired, on declassification and downgrading problems.

Changes and amendments to SAB 7 will be issued from time to time as they are considered to be necessary.

Ruth Catlett Barton
Secretary

February 10, 1947

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SAB 7. CLASSIFICATION DOWNGRADING

(Issued)

SECTION

1. DOCUMENTS.

Any form of record includes printed, mimeographed material of all kinds; transcripts, reports, minutes or photostatic copies; and all other similar material.

2. REGISTERED DOCUMENTS.

A Top Secret, Secret, cryptographic document, short title, and instructions.

3. DEVICE.

Any item of equipment and construction, part, design, mock-up, components or accessories.

4. CLASSIFY.

To grade a document, confidential, or Restricted in necessary for its handling.

5. DECLASSIFY.

To cancel the classification proper authority when classification no longer exists.

6. DOWNGRADE.

To lower the classification.

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SAB 7. CLASSIFICATION, DECLASSIFICATION, AND DOWNGRADING PROCEDURES.

(Issued February 10, 1947)

SECTION I. DEFINITIONS.

1. DOCUMENTS.

Any form of recorded information. The term "document" includes printed, mimeographed, typed, photostated, and written material of all kinds; dispatches, instructions, telegrams, memoranda, reports, minutes, airgrams, charts, maps, drawings, notes, or photostatic copies; photographs and photographic negatives; and all other similar material.

2. REGISTERED DOCUMENTS.

A Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential document, or a Restricted cryptographic document or device, carrying a register number, a short title, and instructions to account for it periodically.

3. DEVICE.

Any item of equipment, both complete and in process of development and construction, models that show features in whole or in part, design, mock-ups, jigs, fixtures, and dies, and all other components or accessories thereof.

4. CLASSIFY.

To grade a document or device as Top Secret, Secret, Confidential, or Restricted in order to indicate the degree of precaution necessary for its handling, distribution and safeguarding.

5. DECLASSIFY.

To cancel the classification of any document or device by proper authority when the necessity for maintaining the classification no longer exists.

6. DOWNGRADE.

To lower the classification of classified documents or devices.

7. UPGRADE.

To raise the classification of classified documents or devices from one classification to a higher classification, when it has been determined by proper authority that the assigned classification is not sufficiently protective.

8. OVERCLASSIFY.

To grade documents or devices with a higher classification than is consistent with the proper safeguarding of the information contained therein.

9. PRIMARY INTEREST.

a. An office which has "primary interest" in information is the office best qualified to determine its value, both when considering its original security classification and in downgrading it as conditions change.

b. "Primary interest" in any classified document or device will be considered to be held in that office which:

- (1) Originally classified the information;
- (2) Currently is charged with the information, or has primary control or jurisdiction over information in the same field;
- (3) Has succeeded or absorbed an office formerly charged with primary control or jurisdiction over the information.

10. CUSTODIAN.

An individual to whom a document or device is consigned or who inherits official possession of a document or device by succession to or absorption of the position of an individual formerly charged with the custody of such documents or devices.

SECTION II.**1. A WORD ON**

During wartime to protect classified enemy often led to "it is better to grade to grade it too low the criterion which stamp. Too often the iarity with classifica regulations.

Today many harass classifications from available to the public tories, feel the effects ly took place during government official documents and devic of classified informa sad experiences of cation problems ma trative concern.

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AN ADMINIST**

2. AUTHORITY TO***a.* TOP SECRET**

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***b.* CONFIDENTIAL**

Material may be the Chief or Head by officials whose

SECTION II. CURRENT CLASSIFICATION GUIDES.

1. A WORD ON CURRENT CLASSIFICATION.

During wartime the anxiety of many government officials to protect classified information from an actual or potential enemy often led to careless classification. The belief that "it is better to grade a document too high and be safe than to grade it too low and risk not having it high enough" was the criterion which guided many a hand on the classification stamp. Too often this axiom was made an excuse for unfamiliarity with classification definitions or failure to read security regulations.

Today many harassed government officials, struggling to wrench classifications from documents which should rightfully be made available to the public or go from bulging files to proper depositories, feel the effects of the careless classification which frequently took place during wartime. It should be the concern of every government official responsible for classification to make sure that documents and devices are properly classified. The protection of classified information is still the primary concern, but the sad experiences of many government agencies with declassification problems makes correct classification of vital administrative concern.

**REMEMBER: A CARELESS CLASSIFICATION TODAY MEANS
AN ADMINISTRATIVE HEADACHE TOMORROW!**

2. AUTHORITY TO CLASSIFY.

a. TOP SECRET OR SECRET.

Material may be classified as Top Secret or Secret only by the head of a federal agency or department, by his officially designated representatives, or by such individuals as may be designated in the departmental security regulations.

b. CONFIDENTIAL OR RESTRICTED.

Material may be classified as Confidential or Restricted by the Chief or Head of a Bureau, Division, or comparable unit, by officials whose positions may be considered to be on an

equal level, by their officially designated representatives, or by such individuals as may be designated in the departmental security regulations.

c. **PROCEDURE WITHIN DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES.**

If designation of officials who may classify material in any of the four categories above has not been made in government agencies and departments, such designation should be immediately undertaken and an announcement of this authority made within the department or agency. Where such a list is already in use, it shall be the responsibility of the Security Officer to insure that this list and any future lists are current and workable within his department.

3. THE MENTAL APPROACH TO CLASSIFICATION.

The importance of the use of mature judgment on the part of classifying officials cannot be stressed too highly. When an official classifies a document, he will, in most cases, have only his own judgment and the definitions set forth in security regulations on which he can depend as guides.

Before any classification is stamped or marked on a document the classifying official should ask himself:

DOES THIS DOCUMENT CONTAIN INFORMATION WHICH WILL ENDANGER THE NATION IF REVEALED TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS? IF SO, TO WHAT EXTENT?

The attitude of the classifying official should *not* be: Classify it high and safe.

Similarly, classifications should not be placed on documents for the purpose of overemphasizing their importance or for any personal reason whatsoever. Documents so classified depreciate the importance of classified information in the minds of handling personnel.

It should be the responsibility of all officials charged with classification to familiarize themselves with the following definitions of *Top Secret*, *Secret*, *Confidential*, and *Restricted* information and to apply such definitions correctly:

TOP SECRET information is information, the security aspects of which is paramount, and the unauthorized disclosure of which would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation.

SECRET information disclosure of which would cause serious injury to the governmental activities.

CONFIDENTIAL information disclosure of which, in the interest of national security, would be prejudicial to the national defense, any governmental activity, or the national economy would cause administrative inconvenience.

RESTRICTED information disclosure of which would be published or cause administrative inconvenience for official purposes.

In reviewing the damage caused by documents whose disclosure would be prejudicial to the national defense, any governmental activity, or the national economy, the following categories are defined: "Personal," "Personal and Confidential," "Confidential," "Restricted," "Secret," and "Top Secret." The classification of individual documents is determined as to which of these groups they belong. The procedures provided in the Declassification Manual apply to all documents.

4. CURBS ON CLASSIFICATION.

a. **GENERAL.**

Material shall be classified only when necessary and consistent with the interest of national security.

Material of a classified government agency or department shall be safeguarded in the receiving agency within the receiving agency.

b. **PREPARATION.**

Whenever practical, the classification on the document shall be removed at the event or the passage of time.

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in the departmental

CLASSIFICATION AND AGENCIES.

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CLASSIFICATION.

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INFORMATION WHICH SHOULD BE REVEALED TO UN- CLASSIFIED PERSONS AT WHAT EXTENT?

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and Restricted infor-
mation:

the security aspects of
disclosure of which
the nation.

SECRET information is information, the unauthorized disclosure of which would endanger national security, or cause serious injury to the interests or prestige of the nation or any governmental activity thereof.

CONFIDENTIAL information is information the unauthorized disclosure of which, although not endangering the national security, would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the nation, any governmental activity thereof, an individual, or would cause administrative embarrassment or difficulty.

RESTRICTED information is information which should not be published or communicated to anyone except for official purposes.

In reviewing the files of an agency, some confusion may be caused by documents which carry misleading classifications or by documents whose contents seemingly do not fit within the above definitions. In the first category fall some documents marked "Personal," "Personal and Confidential," etc.; in the second category belong certain documents which reveal, through fact or inference, business, industrial, or trade secrets, detailed handling of individual case histories, personnel policies, etc. The determination as to whether a document should rightfully remain in these groups or may appropriately be declassified under the procedures provided by this regulation should be made by the Declassification Authority within the agency.

4. CURBS ON CLASSIFIERS.

a. GENERAL.

Material shall be assigned the lowest security classification consistent with the proper safeguarding of the information concerned.

Material of a classified character originated by another government agency or department or by foreign governments will be safeguarded in the same manner as if it had been so classified within the receiving agency.

b. PREPARATION.

Whenever practicable, the classifying official will place a notation on the document that upon the happening of a specified event or the passage of a named date, the classification of the

document will be reduced or cancelled without reference to the originator. An exception to this rule is made in the case of telegrams.

Documents, except telegrams, referring to classified material but not in themselves revealing any classified information should not be classified.

Documents, including extracts from classified documents, except telegrams referring to previously classified telegrams, shall be graded according to their own content and not necessarily according to their relationship to other documents. The classification of a file or group of physically connected documents shall be that of the highest graded document therein. Documents separated from the file or group revert to their individual classifications.

Whenever classified information and unclassified information is issued together, the information should be so prepared that the classified can be separated from the unclassified and each part handled appropriately. Classified documents, such as reports, tabulations, magazines, or other bound material being prepared for distribution will have the individual items, columns, pages appropriately classified, or marked as being unclassified, whenever possible, in order that extracts may be made from documents without the necessity of assigning to them the same security classification as the document. **REGARDLESS OF THE FACT THAT PAGES, PARAGRAPHS, SECTIONS, OR COMPONENTS OF THE DOCUMENT MAY BEAR DIFFERENT CLASSIFICATIONS, THE DOCUMENT ITSELF WILL BEAR ONLY ONE OVERALL CLASSIFICATION, WHICH SHOULD BE EQUAL TO OR HIGHER THAN THE CLASSIFICATION OF ANY PART THEREOF.**

c. TRANSMITTAL.

A letter of transmittal shall be given the highest classification carried by any of its enclosures, unless the letter of transmittal contains information warranting a higher classification.

A CLASSIFIED LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL WHICH DOES NOT IN ITSELF REVEAL ANY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION MAY BE DECLASSIFIED WHEN THE ENCLOSURES ARE REMOVED. Such letters of transmittal should always bear a notation that they may be declassified when the enclosures are removed. Such notation may be a part of the body of the transmittal letter or it may

be typed or stamped for this purpose would

THIS DOCUMENT IS REMOVED.

d. OVERCLASSIFICATION.

Overclassification in the transmission of classified information

Cases of flagrant overclassification shall be referred to the Security Office of the originator. If the document is classified by the Security Office of the originator, cases of overclassification shall be referred to the Advisory Board of the originator.

e. UPGRADING.

If the recipient of classified information deems appropriate, he may upgrade the classification of unclassified material to be deserving of the same treatment.

When material is upgraded, the original custodians and the recipient shall be notified.

f. REVIEW OF CLASSIFICATION.

The Security Office of the originator shall be responsible for the continued review of the classification of this agency or department.

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al letter or it may

be typed or stamped on the letter itself. A suitable stamp for this purpose would read:

THIS DOCUMENT IS DECLASSIFIED WHEN ATTACHMENT IS REMOVED.

d. OVERCLASSIFICATION.

Overclassification will be avoided. It causes unnecessary delay in the transmission of documents and depreciates the importance of classified information in the minds of handling personnel.

Cases of flagrant overclassification will be reported by any official to the Security Officer of the department or agency. If the document originated in his own department or agency, the Security Officer will discuss the matter directly with the office of the originator. If the document was received from other sources, cases of overclassification will be reported to the Security Advisory Board for appropriate reference.

e. UPGRADING.

If the recipient or custodian of classified material believes the assigned classification is not sufficiently protective, he shall safeguard the matter in accordance with the classification he deems appropriate and shall refer the question to the originator. Unclassified material received from any source which is judged to be deserving of classification by the recipient shall be similarly treated.

When material is upgraded, the originator shall notify all custodians and addressees.

f. REVIEW OF SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONS.

The Security Officer of the department or agency will be responsible for the continuing review of all classified material throughout his agency or department.

SECTION III. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION GUIDES.

1. A WORD ON DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION.

Whether downgrading or declassification is undertaken by an individual, a group of interested workers, or a Board or Committee to which classified documents could be funnelled, there are a few inescapable facts to be faced.

a. Downgrading and declassification will require a great deal of work and continued diligence before it can be effective.

b. Downgrading and declassification cannot be undertaken unless personnel doing the work are thoroughly familiar with the downgrading and declassification procedures.

c. Downgrading and declassification cannot at any time be considered more important than the maintenance of security. The first consideration for any official authorizing the downgrading or declassification of a document should be, "Does the information in this document still deserve the classification which it holds?"

The initial establishment of a declassification and downgrading procedure is the most difficult, of course. When the procedures have been established, considerable experience in declassification will be necessary before personnel engaged in the work can formulate a satisfactory operating procedure. Declassification must necessarily be accomplished in a piecemeal fashion until sufficient types of documents have been submitted to security authorities to establish precedents for the declassification of other documents in that category. Such precedents will considerably expedite declassification. It is urged that Security Officers in federal departments and agencies make every effort to establish a declassification and downgrading procedure as soon as possible.

2. AUTHORITY TO DOWNGRADE AND DECLASSIFY.

a. GENERAL.

It is the responsibility and obligation of all government officials to keep classified material of current interest or continuing

value constantly under review and to downgrade or declassify it as soon as conditions permit.

b. AUTHORITY.

The official making the original classification, or higher authority in the same agency or department, may cancel or change the classification of a document. In any case when the originator of the document cannot be determined or is unavailable, the office having primary interest in the document, as defined in Section I, paragraph 9, may downgrade or declassify it when appropriate.

Authority to downgrade or declassify documents originating in an agency may be delegated to the Security Officer or to other responsible government officials by the head of that agency, or, if the agency has a considerable amount of classified material in its files, such authority might more practically be vested in a Downgrading and Declassification Board or Committee.

3. COORDINATION AND RESPONSIBILITY.

a. DOCUMENTS AFFECTING ONLY OFFICE OF ORIGIN.

Documents which affect only the office of origin or documents which contain information of primary interest to one office only will be downgraded or declassified by that office or higher authority within the agency without further reference.

b. DOCUMENTS AFFECTING INTERESTS OF TWO OR MORE OFFICES OR AGENCIES.

If a classified document contains information substantially affecting the interests of two or more offices or agencies, the one desiring to downgrade or declassify the document will consult the others and attempt to reach an agreement. Normally, the office which has the primary interest in the document as a whole will assume the responsibility for coordination with all other agencies whose interests are affected by portions thereof and will downgrade the document to the classification agreed upon.

c. DOCUMENTS AFFECTING INTERESTS OF FOREIGN NATIONS.

If a classified document was classified solely to accord with conditions imposed by a foreign nation, it may be downgraded or

declassified with approval of the D

If a document in conjunction with classified only wh

d. DOCUMENTS AFFECTING INTERESTS OF THE ARMY OR NAVY DEPARTMENT.

If a classified document of interests of the Army or Navy Department are downgraded or

In many instances will authorize declassification of a certain type of documents in that

e. STATE-WAR DOCUMENTS.

Classified War Documents phrase "Paraphrase" in response of Signal telegrams carrying classified or declassified basis as other clas

Department of State may be downgraded or declassified after ten years, War, or Navy Department or declassified until numbers and date Top Secret may be

f. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS.

A policy regarding in the possession of issued by the Security

g. DOCUMENTS AFFECTING FOREIGN DATA.

Executive Orders 8 June 1945 and 2

scientific and technical information, prepared by or for the U.S. Government, financed with Government funds, or obtained from the enemy, which is of any possible value or aid to business, industry or science shall be reviewed and declassified if there is no objection on the grounds of military security, and a copy of the declassified document forwarded to the Publication Board of the Department of Commerce. In the event of certain doubtful cases in which the government agency concerned may not be able to determine the extent of military interest in a document of this category, the item in question may be forwarded to the Publication Board, Department of Commerce, which will take it up with the appropriate military services and obtain their concurrence before declassification and release.

For full information regarding procedures on classified documents containing scientific and technical data, see SAB No. 2, dated 28 May 1946.

h. NON-CONCURRENCES.

In the event no agreement can be reached by two offices within the same agency regarding the proper classification of a document, the problem will be referred for decision to the lowest superior common to the disagreeing offices.

In the event no agreement can be reached as to the proper classification of a document, the document must maintain the disputed classification until eventual agreement can be worked out. The Security Advisory Board may be consulted for advice in any such instances of disagreement.

4. MARKING PROCEDURES.

a. GENERAL.

In every case after a downgrading or declassification authority has agreed that the classification of a document or device can be cancelled or changed, he should write or stamp over the mark at the top of the first page, "Classification cancelled or changed to, by authority of (Official authorized to change), date, by (name and position of person making the change)."

EXAMPLES:

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED	CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED
TO	BY AUTHORITY OF
BY AUTHORITY	DATE
OF	DATE
DATE	BY
BY	

b. LETTERS AND

Downgraded or recently and securely with the new classification and the old mark cancelled, the mark

c. BOOKS AND

Books or pamphlets and securely fastened the new appropriate first page, back page cancelled, the mark

d. BULK FILES

When a document files or supplies the until copies are of lation of security drawer or other sta

Declassified documents Congress, the National have been marked been made between declassification mark by the Library of Congress referred before declassification provided one record the files of the agencies the shipment visio that no further until declassification Library of Congress

The National Archives classified records, has not been able to complete these classifications. These classifications National Archives is made to the Archives accomplished.

pared by or for the U.S. funds, or obtained from or aid to business, in- declassified if there is security, and a copy of the Publication Board of the Board of certain doubtful concerned may not be interest in a document may be forwarded to the merce, which will take es and obtain their conse.

ures on classified docu- al data, see SAB No. 2,

ed by two offices within classification of a docu- decision to the lowest es.

ched as to the proper ent must maintain the eement can be worked be consulted for advice

classification authority document or device can or stamp over the mark n cancelled or changed uthorized to change), making the change)."

ICATION CANCELLED THORITY OF

b. LETTERS AND REPORTS.

Downgraded or declassified letters and reports, not permanently and securely fastened together, will be marked or stamped with the new classification at the top and bottom of each page and the old marking lined through. If the classification is cancelled, the markings on each page will be lined through.

c. BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS.

Books or pamphlets being downgraded which are permanently and securely fastened together will be marked or stamped with the new appropriate classification on the cover, title page, first page, back page and back cover. If the classification is cancelled, the markings on these pages will be lined through.

d. BULK FILES OR SUPPLIES.

When a document has been downgraded or declassified, bulk files or supplies thereof need not be marked as provided herein until copies are charged out for use. The change or cancellation of security classification will be indicated inside the file drawer or other storage container.

Declassified documents will not be forwarded to the Library of Congress, the National Archives or other depositories until they have been marked as declassified. Where an arrangement has been made between an agency and the Library of Congress that declassification markings on bulk shipments will be accomplished by the Library of Congress, declassified documents may be transferred before declassification markings have been accomplished, provided one record copy is properly marked and maintained in the files of the agency and one copy, properly marked, accompanies the shipment to the Library, together with a written proviso that no further distribution of the document will be made until declassification markings have been accomplished by the Library of Congress.

The National Archives will, of course, continue to accept classified records, when the agency or department concerned has not been able to accomplish declassification of such documents. These classified records will be maintained in the National Archives in their classified status until notification is made to the Archives that declassification has been accomplished.

e. INDEXING.

A current record of all material reviewed for the purpose of downgrading or declassification should be maintained by means of a card index or other suitable reference system.

5. DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION NOTIFICATIONS.

a. GENERAL.

The office which originally downgrades or declassifies a document will when practicable, notify all recipients or holders of copies thereof. All holders will, upon such notification, mark a downgraded or declassified document in their possession as prescribed in Section III, Paragraph 4.

b. RESPONSIBILITY FOR NOTIFICATION.

If the document is not widely held, it shall be the responsibility of the Downgrading or Declassification Authority to notify all recipients or holders of the copies.

If the document is widely held in government agencies, a request may be forwarded to the Security Advisory Board for announcement of the action taken to all Security Officers of agencies concerned. Such a request will be accompanied by a list of known agencies holding the document.

It should be emphasized that notification of downgrading or declassification to all holders of the document is one of the most important single steps in the downgrading and declassification procedure. Failure to notify holders of a document that it has been declassified or downgraded will nullify the effect of an overall downgrading and declassification program in federal government.

c. TYPE OF NOTIFICATION.

All notices of downgrading or declassification will specifically identify and describe the document or information, its office of origin, former classification, new classification, if any, authority for downgrading or declassification and date thereof.

6. DISPOSITION.

a. RECORD COPIES.

Section I of the Disposal Act of 1943 (57 Stat. 380) defines what constitutes records of the Federal Government. Care must be

exercised at all times. Documents are maintained. When such records are current business records, they are deposited in the National Archives by law.

Whenever practicable, records should be declassified prior to their disposal.

b. EXCESS COPIES.

The law (44 USC 2101) requires that all publications including blank forms, and other documents of Congress when they are not constitute records, be identified and excess copies be made to transfer to the Library of Congress Gift Division, Library of Congress, in cooperation with the originating agency for their proper disposal.

The Library of Congress maintains a collection of books or pamphlets for current use and for future reference. It is maintained in the Library of Congress under proper supervision. The Library of Congress will accept for deposit all classified documents. No transfer of classified documents to the Library of Congress shall be made without the approval of the Library of Congress.

c. DESTRUCTION.

Declassified documents should be destroyed when it is determined that they are no longer needed.

- (1) The document is no longer needed.
- (2) The document is no longer needed by the Library of Congress.
- (3) A copy of the document is maintained in the Department of State.

exercised at all times to insure that record copies of declassified documents are maintained in the files of the agency concerned. When such records are no longer needed for the conduct of the current business of the agency, they should be transferred to the National Archives or proposed for other disposition as provided by law.

Whenever practicable, classified records or documents should be declassified prior to their transfer to the National Archives.

b. EXCESS COPIES OF DECLASSIFIED BOOKS OR PAMPHLETS.

The law (44 USC 139) provides that 150 copies of all government publications including maps (but excepting classified matter, blank forms, and circular letters) shall be furnished to the Library of Congress when such copies are excess to agency needs and do not constitute record copies. When a document has been declassified and excess copies are available, arrangements should be made to transfer 150 copies of the stock to the Exchange and Gift Division, Library of Congress. The Library of Congress, in cooperation with the Superintendent of Documents, will arrange for their proper distribution.

The Library of Congress will also accept copies of classified books or pamphlets if they are excess to the needs of the agency for current use and if they are not record copies. They will be maintained in their classified status within the Library of Congress under proper security protection until notification is made to the Library of Congress that the publications have been declassified. No transmittal of classified material will be made to the Library of Congress except by accepted means of transmittal of classified documents.

c. DESTRUCTION.

Declassified documents may be destroyed by the custodian thereof when it has been determined that:

- (1) The documents are not record copies;
- (2) The documents are excess to the number required for the Library of Congress or for current agency needs;
- (3) A copy has been submitted to the Publication Board, Department of Commerce, whenever appropriate.

Classified documents, exclusive of those that fall into 6 c (1) and (2) above, may be destroyed by the custodian thereof without reference to the declassification authority.

Classified or declassified records or record copies of documents may be destroyed only when proper authorization for their destruction has been obtained.

Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential documents and registered documents, which are to be destroyed, will be burned by the custodian thereof or by his authorized representative in the presence of a disinterested official. In such cases a certificate of destruction will be signed by both the custodian and the witnessing official and submitted to the authority directing the destruction, when appropriate.

Restricted documents may be destroyed in any manner which will render them useless.

Declassified documents shall be disposed of in accordance with the established agency procedure for the disposal of nonclassified data.

33 x
SAB

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FOR THE PRESS

OCTOBER 22, 1947
NO. 846

The Acting Secretary of State authorized the publication of the following Memorandum which had been prepared in the Department for his information:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

The Security Advisory Board was originally established in early 1943 under the Office of War Information to advise and assist federal non-military agencies in developing adequate, uniform procedures to protect classified information. On April 3, 1946, upon recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee established a Subcommittee for Security Control, to be successor to the OWI Board and also to be known as the Security Advisory Board.

During the period April 1946 to March 1947, the Board devoted its major energies to simplifying and expediting downgrading and declassification of documents and to advising agencies on converting their procedures to a peace-time basis by the issuance of a revised set of security suggestions for non-military federal agencies.

In March of 1947, as a result of the recommendations made by the President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty, Executive Order 9835, as a part of the employee loyalty program, directed the Security Advisory Board to draft minimum standards for the handling and transmission of classified information which, when approved by the President, would be applicable to all departments and agencies of the executive branch.

The Board has drafted the standards as directed and has submitted its draft through channels for appropriate action. These standards represent merely a codification of existing practices and that the basic principles which guided the Board in the preparation of its draft were (1) to draft the least restrictive standards possible, (2) to set up a uniform pattern for the handling of classified information in all agencies, (3) to permit freer interchange of classified information between agencies by assuring the "sensitive" agencies that classified information originating with them would have adequate security protection in the receiving agency, (4) to stress the need for avoiding overclassification and (5) to require downgrading and declassification action at the earliest possible date.

* * *

116/R

ACCESS RESTRICTED

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation 334 - Subcommittee, Swedish Relief Shipments

Date 10/1/47

From Memo for Information # 10/4

To _____

In the review of this file this item was removed because access to it is restricted. Restrictions on records in the National Archives are stated in general and specific record group restriction statements which are available for examination. The item identified above has been withdrawn because it contains:

Security-Classified Information

Otherwise Restricted Information

CIA/CIG
Authority

JAN 5 1976

Date JTH

WITHDRAWAL NOTICE

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

File
331
12 September 1947 *JOB*
Crow

MEMORANDUM FOR

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Subject:

Draft of "Minimum Standards for the Handling and Transmission of Classified Information" as required by Executive Order 9835.

Pursuant to Executive Order 9835, the Security Advisory Board has drafted "Minimum Standards for the Handling and Transmission of Classified Information", a preliminary draft of which was submitted to SWNCC on July 7.

Secretariat
Since that time, comments have been solicited from the heads of agencies in the executive branch of the government and the Board has made revisions in the draft to give effect to such of these comments as seemed appropriate. The revision in final form as approved by the Board is attached as Exhibit "A" to Enclosure "A". [A summary of the suggestions received from the agencies to which the draft was submitted is attached hereto as Appendix "A" to Enclosure "C".] *James*


It is the Board's opinion that, in order to give continuing effectiveness to these Minimum Standards if and when issued by the President, it is essential that provision be made for their interpretation and revision, as well as for the continuing advice and assistance of the Board to the agencies concerned in their implementation. It is the Board's interpretation of the intent of Executive Order 9835, that any revision of the Minimum Standards should be submitted to the President for approval, but that official interpretations might properly be made by the Board without such submission, upon its own initiative or upon the request of a participating agency. If this view is adopted, the Board believes that it should issue interpretations only upon questions of general applicability, but that it should render advice or assistance where feasible with respect to problems or questions peculiar to an individual agency. It is also the Board's opinion that the effective date of the application of the standards should be sometime subsequent to their issuance in order to allow agencies sufficient time to prepare implementation procedures.


In order to implement the appropriate provision of Executive Order 9835 and to give effect to the foregoing the Board has drafted and attaches hereto as Enclosure "A" a draft of a proposed Executive Order approving the Minimum Standards, making them effective on January 1, 1948, and providing that the Security Advisory Board shall (1) interpret the Minimum Standards, (2) recommend to the President revisions thereto and (3) render advice and assistance to individual agencies where feasible.


Proposed letters of transmittal ~~from the Board~~ to the President and to the Bureau of the Budget are attached hereto as Enclosures "B" and "C".

It is requested that SWNCC approve the "Minimum Standards" attached as Exhibit "A" to Enclosure "A"; approve Enclosures "A", "B" and "C"; and authorize the Board to sign Enclosures "B" and "C" and forward them with their attachments to the Bureau of the Budget.

Substitute attached


Hamilton Robinson
Director, Office of Controls
State Member
Security Advisory Board


C. C. Blakeney
Colonel, WDGS
War Member
Security Advisory Board


Lawrence W. Gunther
Commander, USN
Navy Member
Security Advisory Board

DRAFT
7/1/47

EXECUTIVE ORDER

PRESCRIBING PROCEDURES FOR THE HANDLING AND
TRANSMISSION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN ALL DEPARTMENTS
AND AGENCIES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

WHEREAS, pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Part VI of Executive Order 9835, dated March 21, 1947, the Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee has drafted "Minimum Standards for the Handling and Transmission of Classified Information", and

WHEREAS, these minimum standards were designed as minimum rules applicable in all departments and agencies of the executive branch to the handling and transmission of confidential documents and other documents and information which should not be publicly disclosed;

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States..... and as President and Chief Executive of the United States, it is hereby, in the interest of internal management of the Government, ordered as follows:

1. The "Minimum Standards for the Handling and Transmission of Classified Information" in the form attached hereto as Exhibit "A" are hereby approved and made a part hereof.

2. These Minimum Standards shall be effective in all departments and agencies of the executive branch on or before _____ 1947.

3. Effective immediately, the Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee shall:

a. Be the final authority for interpreting any and all of the provisions of these minimum standards on its own initiative or upon request;

-2-

b. Issue such supplements to these minimum standards as circumstances may warrant;

c. Recommend to the President such revisions of these minimum standards as future developments may warrant;

d. Render such advice and assistance as may be requested by non-executive federal agencies desiring to prepare regulations governing the handling and transmission of classified information within their own agencies.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

2430 E STREET NW.
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

3345a8

31 July 1947


MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE, WAR, NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
(Attention: Mr. Gardner)

Subject: CIG TOP SECRET Courier

1. It is requested that the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee place the name of Mr. Andrew Polaschik on the list of persons authorized to pick up and sign for material classified TOP SECRET and below for the Central Intelligence Group. His name has been submitted to Joint Security Control for inclusion on the list of CIG Alternate TOP SECRET Control Officers.

2. Mr. Polaschik is an especially designated TOP SECRET courier for the Central Intelligence Group who will deliver and pick up material in the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee frequently.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:


LYLE T. SHANNON
Colonel, AGD
Executive for
Administration and Management



THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

330

~~311.2~~
~~Security Service~~

April 25, 1947

Handwritten initials and signature

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary
Advisory Committee on Occupied
Area Matters

Subject: Top Secret Control Officers in
Government Agencies

There is enclosed herewith for your information a copy of a memorandum from the Security Advisory Board regarding the delivery of top secret material to the Department of Commerce.

H. W. Moseley

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

HWM/hmh

- State Member
- Army Member
- Navy Member
- Ass't State Member
- Ass't Army Member
- Ass't Navy Member
- Executive Secretary
- Ass't Exec. Secretary
- State Adm. Assistant
- Army Adm. Assistant
- Navy Adm. Assistant
- File

C
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P
Y

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~RESTRICTED~~
Serial No. 467

April 23, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Subject: Top Secret Control Officers in Government
Agencies

1. The Under Secretary of Commerce has notified the Security Advisory Board that all Top Secret material coming into the Department of Commerce should be delivered to one of the following Top Secret Control Officers:

Mr. John C. Green
Room 1313, Commerce Building
DI 2220, Extension 2113

Mr. Jerome E. Burke
Room 2146, Tempo "T" Building
DI 2220, Extension 2793

2. It would be appreciated if you would direct all Top Secret papers which might be going to Commerce from SWNCC to one of the above listed individuals.

For the Security Advisory Board:

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

Ruth P. Barton	State Member	_____
Secretary	Army Member	_____
	Navy Member	_____
	Ass't State Member	_____
	Ass't Army Member	_____
	Ass't Navy Member	_____
	Executive Secretary	_____
	Ass't Exec. Secretary	_____
	State Adm. Assistant	_____
	Army Adm. Assistant	_____
	Navy Adm. Assistant	_____
	File	_____

DECLASSIFIED
NND 740132
E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)
By CO/LE NARS, DaMAR 29 1976

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~RESTRICTED~~
Serial No. 467

April 23, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Subject:

Top Secret Control Officers in
Government Agencies

1. The Under Secretary of Commerce has notified the Security Advisory Board that all Top Secret material coming into the Department of Commerce should be delivered to one of the following Top Secret Control Officers:

Mr. John C. Green
Room 1313, Commerce Building
DI 2220, Extension 2143

Mr. Jerome E. Burke
Room 2146, Tempo "T" Building
DI 2220, Extension 2793

2. It would be appreciated if you would direct all Top Secret papers which might be going to Commerce from SWNCC to one of the above listed individuals.

For the Security Advisory Board:

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

Ruth C. Barton
Ruth C. Barton
Secretary

- Member
- Army Member
- Navy Member
- Ass't State Member
- Ass't Army Member
- Ass't Navy Member
- Executive Secretary
- Ass't Exec. Secretary
- State Adm. Assistant
- Army Adm. Assistant
- Navy Adm. Assistant
- File

*Secretary (Mr. McLean)
Advisory Com. on Occupied
Areas Matters) notified
4/25/47
SWNCC*



STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

~~RESTRICTED~~

UNCLASSIFIED
Serial No. 379

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

State Member	-----
Army Member	-----
Navy Member	-----
Ass't State Member	-----
Ass't Army Member	-----
Ass't Navy Member	-----
Executive Secretary	-----
Ass't Exec. Secretary	-----
Adm. Assistant	-----
Army Adm. Assistant	-----
Navy Adm. Assistant	-----
File	-----

13 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR

Executive Secretary
State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee

334
SAB
Cross

Subject:

The Security Advisory Board and
its Relation to Records Security
Control

Reference:

a. Minutes SAB 15th Meeting

Enclosure:

a. Report and Chart on Subject

1. Recently Mr. Victor Gondos, Jr., Records Retirement Supervisor, National Archives, was asked by the Director of the War Records Office to submit a report on the relation of the Security Advisory Board to the program of Records Security Control. In compliance with this request, Mr. Gondos prepared the enclosed chart and informational report regarding the Board.

2. At my request, Mr. Gondos supplied me with copies of this material for each of the Board members and the SWNCC Secretariat. Although the material is for the internal use of the National Archives, I believe it will prove of interest to your office. Should there be any comments on the accuracy of the data presented in this material, would you please let me know?

For the Security Advisory Board:

MAR 14 1947



Ruth C. Barton
Ruth C. Barton
Secretary

3658

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

THE SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD
AND ITS RELATION TO RECORDS SECURITY CONTROL

BRIEF REPORT ON THE SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD OF THE
STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE AND ITS RELATION TO RECORDS
SECURITY CONTROL

Victor Gondes, Jr.
National Archives
January 20, 1947

NOTE

The text and chart included herein are part of a study made for the purpose of clarifying certain major points with respect to the SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD for the use of the Director and staff of the War Records Office, National Archives. The information and analysis relate to the following points:

- (1) What is the Security Advisory Board?
- (2) What is its jurisdictional area and authority? Are the issuances of SAB clothed with mandatory powers?
- (3) What is the relation of the SAB to the field of records security control within the entire Federal Government?

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

The SWNCC was created through an exchange of letters between the Secretaries of the three Departments in December 1944. For nearly a year the existence of such a unit was kept confidential and it was not officially formalized until the issuance of a memorandum signed by the three Departmental Secretaries on 16 October 1945.

The jurisdiction of the Committee extends, by agreement of the Secretaries, over such policies and activities of the three Departments as may require coordinated action. Whatever decisions the Committee reaches are to be implemented in each of the three Departments by their respective Secretaries, subject to the approval of the President. The Committee is thus a means, a tool, for achieving coordination (on the highest policy level) of the policies of the three Departments.

The functions of the Committee are stated in the State Department's Bulletin, p. 745 (11 Nov. 1945) as follows, "To reconcile and coordinate action to be taken...on matters of common interest...and establish policies on politico-military questions referred to it." And in the State Department Directory of Committees (15 June 1946) it is stated and reaffirmed that "To consider matter of a nature which would command high-level consideration by the three Departments and/or matters which should be referred by the State Department to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To improve existing methods of obtaining, for the State Department, advice on politico-military matters and of coordinating the views of the three Departments on matters in which all have a common interest."

The Committee is organized into sub-committees each of which considers matters relating to a particular geographic area or matters relating to a particular subject. Each sub-committee has one representative from each component Department. There is also a secretariat consisting of three officers from each of the three Departments and a supporting complement of Waves, Wacs, and civilian personnel.

At the time of allocation of this agency to the War Records Office, National Archives, 17 July 1946, the Executive Secretary of SWNCC was Lt. Colonel Virgil F. Field.

SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD

The Security Advisory Board is one of the sub-committees of the SWNCC, designed for the purpose of integrating the security policies and practices of the civilian agencies of the Government with those of the military agencies and the State Department.

The SAB was established by administrative action of the SWCC on 3 April 1946. To the Board were named two officials of the State Department, and one officer each from the War and the Navy Departments. Mrs. Ruth Catlett Barton (formerly a WAC Captain associated in the same capacity with the predecessor Board) was appointed Secretary of the Board.

The name of the SAB is identical with that of a similar Board established within the Office of War Information through the initiative of the Director, Elmer Davis. In order to assist the civilian agencies in establishing and operating proper security measures with respect to both personnel and records Director Davis, on 13 April 1943, requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to detail certain Army and Navy officers to a proposed Security Advisory Board. The Director was informed by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 April 1943, that the officers requested were authorized to serve with the SAB of the OWI. The first meeting of this Board was held 5 May 1943, with Rear Admiral R. P. McCullough, USN (Ret.), Chairman. The question of the Board's authority was immediately brought into discussion and a request was made for the issuance of an Executive Order to clarify the Board's status and powers. This request was denied by the Bureau of the Budget on the grounds that Executive Order 9182 which established the OWI and OWI's subsequent Regulation No. 4 were sufficient for the performance of the Board's functions. (See Federal Register, 16 June 1942, pp. 4468-4469). Section 5 of Executive Order 9182 states:

"The Director is authorized to issue such directives concerning war information as he may deem necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Order, and such directives shall be binding upon the several Federal departments and agencies."

As a result of the termination of OWI by Executive Order 9608, 31 August 1945, the SAB of that agency liquidated its affairs and ceased to function 1 November 1945.


It thus appears that between November 1945 and April 1946 there was no unit functioning within the Federal Government with the title of Security Advisory Board. When such a Board was re-created under the auspices of the three Departments of State, War, and Navy it was given the same name as that of a predecessor which had functioned in a similar capacity in a defunct wartime agency. But the mere borrowing of the name did not clothe the new Board with a single jot or tittle of whatever authority was possessed by the old Board within the jurisdictional areas of the defunct OWI.

While there are certain Acts and Executive Orders which bear upon the subject of the unlawful dissemination of secret and

3

confidential information with respect to the national defense, there do not appear to be any Acts or Executive Orders directly bearing upon the subject of classified records security within the civilian establishment of the Government. Directives issued by predecessor units as well as the present Board were and are being complied with voluntarily as in the interest of the public welfare. Apparently, too, no incidents have occurred to challenge the custom of voluntary compliance, and in each agency a member of the staff is designated as security officer with the function of facilitating voluntary compliance. The success of the voluntary system to date is due to the forbearance of all in the name of patriotic necessity, and, secondly, to the general lack of realization that whatever authority OWI possessed in the premises lapsed with the extinction of that agency. There is, however, ample authority to handle juridically, rather than administratively, such instances of palpable individual misconduct that may occur with respect to public records, and particularly records having a significance for the national defense.

Victor Gondos, Jr.
Records Retirement Supervisor
War Records Office




EMERGENCY
AFFAIRS
AGENCIES

JOINT
CHIEFS
OF STAFF

SECURITY
CONTROL UNIT

COMBINED
CHIEFS
OF STAFF

BRITISH
IMPERIAL
SECURITY
SERVICE



ILLUSTRATIVE CHART OF RECORDS SECURITY CONTROL IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT #

1/ The squares shown for subcommittees of SWNCC and for civilian government agencies are merely a device of relationships and do not show the exact number of units. 2/ The Joint Security Control acts as a liaison between War & Navy Depts. in controversies on security matters. It coordinates American security with those of the Combined Chiefs of Staff; and it maintains liaison with the British Imperial Security Service. ~ situation 15 JANUARY 1947 ~ PREPARED BY J. GONDOO, JR.

334 SAB

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED
MI-8
5 March 1947

COPY NO. 5

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD

Memorandum for Information No. 8

TOP SECRET CONTROL PROCEDURE

1. The Joint Security Control has requested that the Security Advisory Board distribute to interested civilian agencies the enclosed policy on Top Secret Control Procedure which will be followed in the War and Navy Departments.
2. This policy is forwarded to you as a matter of information only.
3. Should the enclosures to this memorandum be removed, MI-8 may be declassified.

MAR 7 1947

Ruth C. Barton
Secretary

3630



STATE WAR & NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

- State Member
- Army Member
- Navy Member
- Ass't State Member
- Ass't Army Member
- Ass't Navy Member
- Executive Secretary
- Ass't Exec. Secretary
- State Adm. Assistant
- Army Adm. Assistant
- Navy Adm. Assistant
- File

RESTRICTED

334
SAB

NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

Op-32-D2
A8-6
RESTRICTED
Serial No. 698P32

- State Member
- Army Member
- Navy Member
- Ass't State Member 1947
- Ass't Army Member
- Ass't Navy Member
- Executive Secretary
- Asst. Exec. Secretary
- State Adm. Assistant
- Army Adm. Assistant
- Navy Adm. Assistant
- File

From: The Secretary of the Navy
To: All Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department
Subject: Security Matters Pertaining to Federal Departments and Agencies - Handling of

- Reference:
- (a) SecNav restricted ltr., FFI, relative to subject matter, dtd. 28 April 1944.
 - (b) CNO restricted ltr., Op-3571-gw, Serial No. 1P35, dtd. 20 January 1947.

1. Reference (a) and (b) are hereby canceled and the following is substituted in lieu of them.

2. There is established within the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee a Subcommittee, known as the "Security Advisory Board", consisting of representatives from the State Department, War Department and Navy Department.

3. In general, the function of the Security Advisory Board is to assist Federal Departments and Agencies, except War and Navy, in maintaining uniform policies and practices to properly safeguard classified information.

4. It is desired that documentary and related security matters, pertaining to any non-military Federal Department or Agency, in which the Navy Department is concerned, be referred to the attention of the Security Advisory Board. The address of the Security Advisory Board is:

Room 711
515 22nd Street, N.W.
Telephone: Republic 5600
Extension: 3669, 2306

5. For information, and for an interpretation as to the meaning of the wording of paragraph 4 above, the Security Advisory Board should only be consulted, regarding security matters pertaining to a non-military agency of the Federal Government, when:

- (a) there is a question as to the security standards of the agency involved.

334
SAB

NAVY DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

Op-32-D2
A8-6
RESTRICTED
Serial No. 698P32

- State Member
- Army Member
- Navy Member
- Ass't State Member 1947
- Ass't Army Member
- Ass't Navy Member
- Executive Secretary
- Ass't Exec. Secretary
- State Adm. Assistant
- Army Adm. Assistant
- Navy Adm. Assistant

From: The Secretary of the Navy
 To: All Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department
 Subject: Security Matters Pertaining to Federal Departments and Agencies - Handling of

- Reference:
- (a) SecNav restricted ltr., FF1, relative to subject matter, dtd. 28 April 1944.
 - (b) CNO restricted ltr., Op-3571-gw, Serial No. 1P35, dtd. 20 January 1947.

1. Reference (a) and (b) are hereby canceled and the following is substituted in lieu of them.

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- (a) there is a question as to the security standards of the agency involved.

FEB 7 1947



32xJAB

January 30, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

STATE WAR & NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

Subject: Personal Use of Official Data

Mr. Kenneth Heckler of the Bureau of the Budget called this date to request a copy of SAB 7-1944, "Personal Use of Official Data", in order that he might take it to the White House. Upon his visit to the office, the Board was still present and a conversation with Mr. Heckler followed. The undersigned explained to Mr. Heckler that SAB 7-1944 belonged to the regulations which were issued under the jurisdiction of the Board under OWI's Executive Order and that the regulation had not been reissued under the present Board. Mr. Heckler wished to know whether the Board contemplated the issuance of another regulation along this line and was told that there was no plan at present to issue such a regulation. Col. Blakeney pointed out that a regulation of this type should be backed up by authority and the Board did not have such authority.

Mr. Heckler indicated that the Morgenthau controversy had stirred his interest in regulations which had been promulgated on this subject. At a question from Comdr. Gunther, he replied that his interest at present was not of an official nature.

Mr. Anderson asked informally what the attitude of the Bureau of the Budget would be toward the Board's being set up under an Executive Order. Mr. Heckler replied that he had not talked with Mr. Schwarzwald on this subject for a long time and he had no way of knowing what the Budget's attitude would be. He indicated that the Board might well make Mr. Schwarzwald more conversant with its activities, stating that he (Mr. Schwarzwald) was a very powerful man in Budget. Mr. Anderson pointed out that his inquiry was very informal and Mr. Heckler said that he understood that. He added that the Board might be in a better position at the moment than they would be if they broached the subject.


The undersigned gave to Mr. Heckler the copy of the regulations which the Civil Service Commission had issued following the publication of SAB 7 and a copy of the War Production Board regulations which had been issued before SAB 7. Mr. Heckler promised

- 2 -

to return the regulations to the undersigned and thanked Mr. Anderson for the copy of the State Department regulations which was given to him.

Ruth C. Barton

Ruth C. Barton
Secretary

cc Lt. Col. V. F. Field 
War Member, SAB
Navy Member, SAB

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

State Member	_____
Army Member	_____
Navy Member	_____
Ass't State Member	_____
Ass't Army Member	_____
Ass't Navy Member	_____
Executive Secretary	_____
Ass't Exec. Secretary	_____
State Adm. Assistant	_____
Army Adm. Assistant	_____
Navy Adm. Assistant	_____
File	_____

WJ

RCB:ar

In reply refer
to Initials
and No.
Op-35 1-gw
Ser. No.
1P35

RESTRICTED

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington 25, D. C.

20 January 1947

MEMORANDUM

From: Chief of Naval Operations.
To: All Bureau and Offices of the Navy Department.
Commandant, Potomac River Naval Command.
Commandant, Marine Corps.

Subject: Procedure for Handling of Security Matters Per-
taining to Non-Military Federal Departments and
Agencies.

Ref: (a) State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Memorandum
4879 of 15 November 1946.

1. There is established within the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee a subcommittee for Security Control, known as the Security Advisory Board, consisting of representatives from the State Department, War Department and Navy Department.
2. In general, the function of the Security Advisory Board is to assist Federal Departments and Agencies, except War and Navy, in maintaining uniform policies and practices to properly safeguard classified information.
3. Some offices of the Navy Department are continuing to deal directly with non-military Federal Departments and Agencies in regard to documentary and related security matters. It is desired that before release of classified documents or other classified information to non-military Federal Departments or Agencies, the matter be referred to the attention of the Security Advisory Board, which will advise whether or not the security standards of the Department or Agency permit release. The address of the Security Advisory Board is:

Room 711, 515 - 22nd St., N.W., Washington, D.C.

Telephone: Republic 5600, Extensions 3669, 2306.

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SAB

return to JCS

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20 January 1947

Subj: Procedure for Handling of Security Matters Pertaining
to Non-Military Federal Departments and Agencies.

4. All documentary and related security matters of a joint Army and Navy nature which pertain to any non-military Federal Department or Agency will be channelled through Joint Security Control before being referred to the attention of the Security Advisory Board. Joint Security Control is located in Room 2B656, the Pentagon, War Department Extension 74878.

J. L. McCREL

J. L. McCREL
Vice Admiral, U.S.N.
DCIO/Administration

CC: Adm. Aide, CNO
Sec'y, JCS
Security Advisory Board
Sec'y, SWNCC

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

State Member	_____
Army Member	_____
Navy Member	_____
Ass't State Member	_____
Ass't Army Member	_____
Ass't Navy Member	_____
Executive Secretary	_____
Ass't Exec. Secretary	_____
State Adm. Assistant	_____
Army Adm. Assistant	_____
Navy Adm. Assistant	_____
File	_____

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

RESTRICTED

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SWNCC - Mr. Moseley

DATE: January 17, 1947

FROM : CON - Mr. Anderson

SUBJECT: SAB Charter

234
SAB

Referring to your memo of January 15, 1947 (SWN-5066) I approve the proposed draft of the SAB charter with the following changes:

In paragraph 1, the fourth line should be changed to read "the efficient coordination of policies and the supervision of regulations and". In the sixth and seventh lines the phrase "with the exception of cryptographic security" should be in parenthesis. In the seventh line the first "and" should be omitted.

In paragraph 5, sub-paragraph b. should be changed to read "Have assigned thru SWNCC one or more officers or officials who will act as its Secretariat."

ETA
CON:ETA:ar

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Serial No. 249

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SWNCC SECRETARIAT

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State Member _____
 Army Member _____
 Navy Member _____
 Ass't State Member _____
 Ass't Army Member _____
 Ass't Navy Member _____
 Sec'y _____
 January 17, 1947 Secretary _____
 Ass't Exec. Secretary _____
 State Adm. Assistant _____
 Army Adm. Assistant _____
 Navy Adm. Assistant _____
 File _____

Colonel T. J. Sands
Chief, Security Branch
Central Intelligence Group
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Colonel Sands:

Reference is made to your letter of January 9, 1947, in which you state that the Director of the Central Intelligence Group desires that the Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee take steps to inform the War and Navy Departments and other interested agencies that the provisions of SWNCC 335 should not apply to the Central Intelligence Group.

On the basis of available information, the Security Advisory Board at its meeting on January 16, 1947, concluded that there appears to be no seeming justification for the concern of the Central Intelligence Group regarding the application of SWNCC 335. The Board as an operating unit understands fully the position of the Central Intelligence Group with respect to the military departments and to other government agencies, and will continue to conduct its activities with that understanding. The special relationship of the Central Intelligence Group to these departments is likewise believed to be clearly understood by the State, War, and Navy Departments. The Security Advisory Board considers therefore that no action is presently necessary to clarify the application of SWNCC 335.

If more specific reasons are submitted or if later experience proves that such clarification is necessary, the Board will be glad to reconsider its decision at that time, with a view to possible amendment of SWNCC 335.

Sincerely yours,

3482

E. T. Anderson
Acting Chairman
Security Advisory Board

cc War Member, SAB
Navy Member, SAB
Secretary, SWNCC

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 750065
OCT 20 1979
E: CD/KMS NARS, Date

~~Restricted~~
Serial No. 249

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SWNCC SECRETARIAT

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State Member _____
 Army Member _____
 Navy Member _____
 Ass't State Member _____
 Ass't Army Member _____
 Ass't Navy Member _____
 Secy 1947 Secretary _____
 Ass't Exec. Secretary _____
 State Adm. Assistant _____
 Army Adm. Assistant _____
 Navy Adm. Assistant _____
 File _____

Colonel T. J. Sands
Chief, Security Branch
Central Intelligence Group
Washington 25, D.C.

January 17, 1947

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3482

E. T. Anderson
Acting Chairman
Security Advisory Board

cc War Member, SAB
Navy Member, SAB
Secretary, SWNCC

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 750065
OCT 20 1979
By: CD/KMS NARS, Date: _____

In reply refer to
NAVY DEPARTMENT
DEC 9 - 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



Op-32-D2
 Serial No. 20946P32

4 - DEC 1946

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MEMORANDUM FOR State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Subject: Assignment of Personnel to SAB.

Reference: (a) SWNCC Memo., SWN-4919, relative to subject matter, dtd., 26 November 1946.

1. In reply to reference (a) it is recommended that the Security Advisory Board be retained for the present as a Subcommittee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

2. At such time, on or before 1 February 1947, as the Committee appointed by the President of the U. S. on 25 November submits its decision among other things, as to:

"Whether existing security procedures are adequate to protect the government from the employment of disloyal persons, and what agency should be charged with prescribing and supervising security standards",

the functions of the Security Advisory Board it is considered, should be placed under the Agency so designated.

Respectfully,

L. W. Gunther
 L. W. Gunther,
 Commander, U.S.N.
 Navy Member,
 Security Advisory Board

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~~RESTRICTED~~WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.334
JAB

29 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

SUBJECT: Security Advisory Board

1. In response to SWN-4919 dated 26 November 1946, the following expressions are submitted:

a. The activities of the Security Advisory Board are entirely foreign to the activities of any of the other subcommittees of SWNCC. The Security Advisory Board's approach to other government agencies not under the control of the State, War or Navy Departments has had to be completely advisory in scope. It is therefore thought necessary that more definitive control should be afforded the Security Advisory Board than would be afforded to it were it to remain a subcommittee of SWNCC.

b. The Director of Intelligence is charged with the safeguarding of classified military information. The National Intelligence Authority and the Director of Central Intelligence are charged with fully protecting intelligence sources and methods in the conduct of their activities. I can see or read into the letter of the President to the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy, dated 22 January 1946, which established the National Intelligence Authority, nothing which specifically charges that Authority with any of the functions contained in the present charter of the Security Advisory Board. The Director of Intelligence, in discharging his function of safeguarding military information made available to other government agencies for a governmental function, should exercise direct and positive control through direct representation on the Security Advisory Board. If the Security Advisory Board is placed under the control of the Director of Central Intelligence he will not be so represented. The only direct approach would be through the Intelligence Advisory Board, which advises only or through the indirect medium of the NIA which is too high a level for the kind of control needed. Any military person belonging to CIG is responsible for allegiance to his Director and not to the Director of Intelligence, WDGS.

c. In order that the Security Advisory Board may have personnel with sufficient authority and in sufficient number to perform adequately the functions which are assigned to it and also in order that the Director of Intelligence may have direct representation in the control or safeguarding of classified military information, it is believed that the Board should be established as a separate agency by Executive Order.

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Authority

NND 750065

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Date~~RESTRICTED~~

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2. The proposals outlined in paragraph 1b and c above were presented to the Director of Intelligence and approved by him on 21 November 1946.

Charles C. Blakeney

CHARLES C. BLAKENEY
Colonel, GSC
War Member
Security Advisory Board

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SWN-4919
26 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE MEMBER, SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD
WAR MEMBER, SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD
NAVY MEMBER, SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD

Subject: Assignment of Personnel to SAB.

1. Based upon a request from the Secretary, SAB for assignment of personnel to the Secretariat of that Committee, the SWNCC Secretariat is conducting a survey with a view to making recommendations to the Committee.

2. Due to varied opinions as to what agency the SAB should properly come under, it is requested that your comments be submitted to the SWNCC Secretariat as to the advisability of

a. Retaining the Board as a Subcommittee of SWNCC.

b. Transferring the activities of the Board to NIA jurisdiction.

c. Establishing the Board as a separate agency by Executive Order.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

H. W. MOSELEY,
Secretary

COPY FOR SWNCC FILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Serial No. 150~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.334
JAB

November 25, 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR H. W. Moseley, Secretary, SWNCC
Subject: State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee
for Security Control

1. Any Committee, Board, Subcommittee or similar organization which is delegated certain functions under a charter must first of all take stock of the existing work load in the field of operations allotted to the organization and then begin to evaluate the work which must be done if its terms of reference are to be satisfactorily carried out. Where no precedent exists for the operations of an organization, planning is very important. In connection with the establishment of the Security Advisory Board, a precedent did exist for its operations, since the old Security Advisory Board under OWI was in existence for over three years. The Board had never been geared for peacetime operations, however, and its reestablishment as a Subcommittee of SWNCC was in many ways similar to the setting up of an unprecedented group.

2. Immediately after the Board was reestablished under SWNCC, there should have been some comprehensive planning for its future, re-surveys of security throughout federal government, and an evaluation of the future administrative needs of the Subcommittee. It cannot be taken as a condemnation of the Security Advisory Board that none of this was done. From the time the Board was established under SWNCC on 3 April 1946 until 30 June 1946, it operated with no personnel actually assigned to it for full-time duty. The Assistant Secretary of the Far Eastern Subcommittee acted additionally as the Secretary of the Security Advisory Board with the permission of the SWNCC Secretariat. Because of the fact that the Secretary of the Board left the military services 1 July 1946 and a State Department position for her was not established until 26 September 1946, the Board had a further lapse of activity.

3. At the present time the Secretary of the Board is the only person actually assigned to the Board for full-time duty. The members of the Board have primary duties in their respective departments and their membership on the Board is an additional duty. The fact that the Board ceased to operate when the services of a Secretary were not available is sufficient evidence that the members themselves do not have the time to prepare the work for the Board.

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4. I am convinced that the Security Advisory Board not only is not carrying out its functions as enumerated in SWNCC Memorandum for Information No. 63, approved by SWNCC 4 November 1946, but also is not doing the long-range planning which is necessary for effective operations in a Board of this nature. There are several obvious reasons for this failure, among which the primary one is the lack of adequate personnel. ✓

5. The Security Advisory Board, when operating under OWI, was composed of members from the Bureau of the Budget, Office of Censorship (now abolished), War Department, Navy Department, and the OWI, who, like the present Board members, had primary duties in their respective departments. There were two distinct differences, however, which made a noticeable difference in the operations of the Board under OWI and the Board under SWNCC.

A. The members of the Board from the OWI [the Chairman of the Board and the Executive Officer of the Board] were assigned to the Board. They were physically located in the Board offices and hence were able to concentrate their full attention on the Board activities. ✓

B. The JCS were instrumental in securing the assignment of a staff of six officers to the Security Advisory Board to prepare staff studies on security for the approval of the Board and to do the necessary liaison work in federal agencies. ✓

6. As a comparison, as stated in paragraph 3 above, the Security Advisory Board presently operates with a staff of one person and no clerical help. There is supposedly a CAF-5 assigned to the Board from the Department of State but since her duties include being secretary to the Board Chairman in his other capacity in the Department of State, her services for the Board have thus far been negligible. The Board members have no time to handle operational work for the Board since their own staffs have been greatly reduced. ✓

7. It, of course, goes without saying that the volume of work to be done in security has diminished since the end of the War. In fact, if the Board could continue to accept actual incoming problems as a criterion of the work it should do, there would be no need to assign other personnel to the Board. The work which currently comes into the Board is sufficient to keep one person reasonably busy. There are not too many people in civilian government -- and, I believe, in the military services also, who voluntarily seek out security controls. Security is necessarily a religion and there are few religions which do not lapse into oblivion if they are not preached enough to become a habit.

8. If the Board continues, however, to work on actual incoming problems -- which is all that can be physically accomplished at the moment -- eventually there will be no current incoming work. The Security Officers of federal agencies expect, and have a right to expect,

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concrete policies and some measure of guidance from the Security Advisory Board on security problems. When they do not receive it, their interest in the long program of security will be dulled or turned elsewhere for the guidance which they need. The loss of interest in the Board activities by its liaison officers seems an imminent happening to me at the present time. The loss of prestige for the Security Advisory Board coincidentally endangers SWNCC prestige. If the Board again loses its place in federal government, I believe it will be a difficult thing to regain. The federal agencies have been extremely patient thus far with the helter-skelter existence of the Board, but their patience cannot be expected to endure forever.

9. The only conclusion which can be drawn from the preceding paragraphs is that the Board must make an earnest effort to ascertain the work which must be done in security throughout the federal government and be given the staff with which to accomplish its work if it is to justify its existence in the eyes of civilian departments and agencies.

10. In order to set forth a detailed picture of the work and problems of the Security Advisory Board, an effort has been made below to enumerate actual functions of the Board, the problems involved in carrying out each function, the amount of work which the Board has thus far done in carrying out each function, and my own personal opinions as to the work which should be done in properly carrying out these functions:

a. Functions

(1) "a. Formulating policies and procedures relating to the declassification of documents originating in non-military agencies and departments".

(2) The Problems Involved in Fulfilling this Function

In order to formulate a workable declassification procedure which is general enough for all agencies concerned to follow, specific enough to answer declassification problems and rigid enough to meet the requirements of the military services, any regulation must be thoroughly coordinated before being issued. The Board cannot sit in an ivory tower and draft such a declassification procedure. There must be first-hand knowledge of declassification problems in every government agency as an initial requirement. When the knowledge of declassification problems throughout federal government has been obtained and the procedure drafted, thorough coordination must then take place on all interested levels.

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(3) Work Which the Board Has Accomplished

Aside from the general declassification regulation contained in SAB Memorandum No. 1, no "policy" or "procedure" has been established on declassification. The Secretary is drafting such a policy at this time and a survey by the Security Officers of declassification problems in federal agencies has been requested. The Board has been, however, servicing civilian agencies on specific declassification problems. Numerous declassification problems have been handled by the Board and even though decisions from the Board have been slow, the problems have been solved satisfactorily.

(4) Work Necessary to Perform this Function Effectively

If the declassification procedure were to be completely effective, it should not be drafted until a personal first-hand knowledge of declassification problems in each agency has been secured, preferably by visit and survey in the agency concerned. Necessarily there must be extensive research on all available declassification material issued by the military services or by any other department which may have succeeded in establishing an effective procedure. Following the drafting of the declassification procedure with its intended recommendations for the formulation of declassification boards throughout government, the services of the Board should be available for use in implementation of this regulation. This would necessarily require on-the-spot action by the Board.

b. (1) Functions

"b. Establishing security requirements and procedures for clearance of civilian officials to receive classified material."

(2) The Problems Involved in Fulfilling this Function

Had the FBI been able to make checks of their subversive files directly for the Security Officers of all federal agencies and departments, there would have been no particular problem connected with the carrying out of this function. It has been the position of the Board that it could not act as the guarantor of the security of any individual. It has consistently maintained the stand that the Security Officer of the department or agency must accept final responsibility for the security of an individual in his department. Formerly, the Board acted as a channel for transmitting the opinion of the Security Officer from the agency to the office requesting the check. With the refusal of the FBI to make direct name checks for certain federal departments and agencies, the Board was forced to make the checks for the agencies as a temporary resort.

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The existing situation is far from satisfactory. Whenever derogatory information on any individual is discovered, the Board can do nothing but show a paraphrased version of this information to the Security Officer. The Board is bound by its agreement with the investigative agencies to prevent the information, even in paraphrased form, from leaving the Board offices and to prevent disclosure of the source of information at all costs. It is prohibited by its "advisory" status from making any recommendation to the Security Officer whatsoever. The Security Officer is thus placed in a most intangible position. From such nebulous information, he cannot succeed in obtaining permission from the head of his agency or department to close the sources of classified information to the individual.

I believe there is in this function of the Board a danger to SWNCC. Investigations are at best full of ticklish situations and even though the Board is making every effort to keep away from any delicate angles, it is possible that it may not always be successful.

(3) Work Which the Board has thus Far Accomplished

This is covered in part by the preceding paragraphs. The Board has issued a memorandum on security clearances to all non-military federal departments and agencies which establishes certain minimum standards for security clearance of individuals having access to Secret and Top Secret information and does not preclude the department's establishing higher standards when felt to be necessary. This memorandum was coordinated with the Security Officers of all interested departments and agencies before being issued and is workable in civilian agencies.

The Board has been the medium for obtaining security clearances on over one hundred government officials and some two hundred are presently pending.

The Board has recently addressed a letter to the Director, FBI, asking that the FBI make name checks directly for federal departments and agencies on personnel having access to Secret and Top Secret information. Should the FBI agree to this arrangement, much of the present work load in this function could be eliminated. In addition, of course, many delicate situations could be avoided.

(4) Work Necessary to Perform this Function Effectively

I feel that the Board is fully performing its function in this matter at the present time. It will likewise be performing its duty in this respect even if the FBI agrees to make the checks directly for civilian agencies. The minimum

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standards have been set. The Board must necessarily continue to act as a medium for transmitting these checks from civilian agencies to military offices but that can be done with minimum difficulty since the channels are well established. Aside from advising agencies on the means by which SAB No. 3 can be carried out and acting as the channel for the checks, I do not anticipate that the Board will have any further duties in this respect.

c. (1) Functions

"c. Establishing standards for the conversion of security regulations for civilian agencies from a war-time to a peace-time basis, including Top Secret Procedure."

(2) The Problems Involved in Fulfilling this Function

It will be necessary first of all to determine whether all civilian agencies and departments are still operating under war-time regulations. The Board must ascertain what has been done in this field before knowing what must be done. This further involves a complete revision of the Board's own general security regulations. ✓

The main difficulty envisaged will be the setting up of an effective Top Secret control procedure. There is presently no such procedure and the Board has no central list of control officers. Thus far it has been waiting for the new regulation on Top Secret procedure now in preparation by Joint Security Control.

(3) Work Which the Board has thus Far Accomplished

To date the Board has not made a final revision of its own general security regulations. In SAB No. 1 the Board made some slight revisions of these regulations and gathered together all pertinent OWI regulations under one head.

It is believed that the majority of government agencies still operate on the basis of war-time regulations. A request for information on this phase of security regulations has been submitted to all Security Officers but all answers have not yet been returned.

The Board has reviewed certain security policies which civilian agencies were contemplating issuing, but to date no new regulations have been submitted to the Board for review.

(4) Work Necessary to Perform this Function Effectively

Following the revision of the Board's regulations, the Security Officers of civilian agencies must be requested to undertake revision of their own regulations. From past experience,

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it is safe to assume that these revisions will not be undertaken without considerable guidance and "needling" from the SAB.

The revision of the Top Secret Procedure should not wait too much longer, even for the War and Navy Departments regulations. It is to be expected that the procedure must undergo a great deal of coordination in government agencies and departments before being acceptable to them. The Top Secret control procedure formerly used was very unpopular and impracticable in civilian agencies.

Following the issuance of a procedure, the central list of control officers must be established. This will require establishment of control offices and administrative procedures under the guidance of the SAB.

d. (1) Function

"d. Conducting surveys of security measures affecting administrative efficiency and physical security or affecting adversely the security of classified information."

(2) The Problems Involved in Fulfilling this Function

The imminent necessity for making these security surveys creates another danger to the prestige of the Board. Obviously, the Board does not have adequate personnel to make security surveys of civilian agencies and departments. Logically, the Board should have a team of at least two officers to make such a survey and to make recommendations on the basis of these reports. The lack of personnel is the biggest problem connected with this function.

(3) Work which the Board has thus Far Accomplished

To date the Board has done nothing toward carrying out these provisions. It has been fortunate that no specific requests have been received by the Board for security surveys until this time. The Board has just received a request from the Manhattan District Project in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for a survey of the Government Printing Office.

The Board has on file certain security surveys which were made during war-time but security surveys are useless unless they are up to date.

(4) Work Necessary to Perform this Function Effectively

To be an effectively operating Board, there should be on file in this office copies of reports on security measures employed in every federal agency and department which handles classified material.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~e. (1) Function

"e. Preparing studies and recommendations on matters referred to it by SWNCC."

(2) Problems Involved in Fulfilling This Function

SWNCC as a policy-making body concerned mainly with U.S. policy with foreign governments would logically not have many questions to refer to SAB. The only study which SWNCC would possibly want the SAB to undertake would be a study of the Board's place in the sun. That, unfortunately, the Board has not seen fit to do.

f. (1) Function

"f. Coordinating with other federal agencies in developing security training programs and other procedures which are designed to promote security of classified information throughout federal agencies."

(2) The Problems Involved in Fulfilling this Function

Here again there are no controversial issues concerned but the function cannot be properly fulfilled until more personnel are available to the Board. The question of an adequate budget would arise here in some part, because no training program can be effective until sufficient materials for training are available.

(3) Work which the Board has thus Far Accomplished

Aside from the fact that the Secretary has addressed groups of government historians and records officers, there has been no security training done since the Board became a Subcommittee of SWNCC.

(4) Work Necessary to Perform this Function Effectively

The Board should be equipped to do an extensive program of security training. The Board under OWI had an officer assigned to it whose duty was to train government personnel in security. It, of course, was more necessary then than now that such training be done, but it is still of vital importance that a comprehensive program of security training be carried forward. The ideal situation would be the use of an officer for this purpose alone who would have the use of visual aids as needed.

In view of the fact that the Board members do not desire to initiate a study of the proper solution to the problem of where the Board should be placed, it is my belief that there

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is sufficient administrative reason for SWNCC to make an administrative survey of the situation with a view to reaching one of three possible decisions:

(a) Leaving the Board under SWNCC and securing for it an adequate staff of at least two more persons assigned to the Secretariat, adequate clerical personnel and a possible full-time Chairman;

(b) Placing some of the SAB functions under NIA(CIG) and possibly eliminating those functions which do not properly belong to CIG or placing them under other authority;

(c) Recommending that the Board be set up under presidential authority.

12. As I see it, each of these decisions has certain merits and certain definite objections which are enumerated below:

(a) Leaving the Board under SWNCC.

(i) Pro

(a) The freedom of action of the Board is not unduly hampered. Unnecessary channels and red tape will definitely hurt the work of an organization of this nature;

(b) The Charter of SWNCC allows its acceptance of the Board functions;

(c) The Board as a SWNCC Subcommittee has the prestige it needs.

(ii) Con

(a) SAB is an operational body as well as a policy-making group and the operational end of its activities outweigh any domestic security policy it might advance; (The counter-argument has been proffered here that MIC is likewise an operational subcommittee.)

(b) As a subcommittee of SWNCC, SAB does not possess the authority to do other than recommend or advise, and in order to avoid any danger to SWNCC, it is further necessary that even its recommendations be extremely tactful;

(c) SWNCC prestige stands a change of being harmed through certain operations of the Board in spite of the efforts of the Board to prevent this.

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(b) Placing the Board under NIA (CIG)

(i) Pro

(a) The Charter of the CIG will allow it to absorb some of the functions of the Board;

(b) The presidential letter under which the CIG was formed will enable it to give authority to its recommendations;

(c) The budget of the CIG is seemingly quite elastic and will allow a properly staffed and equipped staff;

(d) The CIG, in order to carry out its functions of protecting sources and methods of intelligence, must necessarily have a group which will work with civilian agencies. In order to avoid duplication of effort, coordination with or absorption into the CIG will be necessary for the Board's effective operations.

(ii) Con

(a) Although there is no factual basis for my belief, I am of the opinion that the SAB would lose its identity completely if placed under the CIG. I feel that the operations of the Board have been cordial and pleasant with the majority of government agencies to date because of its liaison officers throughout government and membership from the departments most concerned with security. The intelligence offices of the War and Navy Departments should be able to keep in touch with the security of all federal agencies but will lose this contact if the Board goes under CIG.

(b) The permanency of the CIG is unknown and I think it would be unfortunate if the Board were placed for the third time under an agency from which it would sooner or later have to be salvaged;

(c) The CIG is definitely limited to "intelligence" sources and certain domestic functions of the SAB would thus have to be eliminated or transferred elsewhere.

(c) ~~Creating the Board under Presidential Order.~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(i) Pro

(a) The authority of the Board on certain matters of security would be unquestioned;

(b) An Executive Order would allow sufficient funds for adequate personnel and equipment, either on a budget or loan basis;

(c) Specific recommendations have been made by congressional committees toward setting up a body similar to the SAB.

(ii) Con

(a) The possibility that a Board thus set up would be duplicating the work of several other groups would make it difficult to get a presidential order approved, in view of strict curtailment throughout government.

13. If I have any recommendations to make on the decision to be made concerning the Board, it is simply that a thorough study be made of all the possibilities enumerated above before any definite recommendations are made. In other words, it is my sincere and earnest plea that the Board be placed this time where it has the necessary personnel, freedom of action, authority, funds, and prestige to accomplish the work it should be doing or else its functions be eliminated entirely. Work of the nature, if worth doing at all, must be done effectively.

Ruth C. Barton
Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Serial No. 149
RCB/gh

339
JCB.

20 November 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Subject: Security Checks

References: a. Minutes 9th SAB Meeting
b. Minutes 10th SAB Meeting

Enclosure: cc SAB Serial No. 144

Pursuant to direction from the Security Advisory Board at its 10th meeting, 18 November 1946, enclosed is a copy of SAB Serial No. 144 for the information of the SWNCC Secretariat

For the Security Advisory Board:

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

- State Member _____
- Army Member _____
- Navy Member _____
- Ass't State Member _____
- Ass't Army Member _____
- Ass't Navy Member _____
- Executive Secretary _____
- Ass't Exec. Secretary _____
- State Adm. Assistant _____
- Army Adm. Assistant _____
- Navy Adm. Assistant _____
- File _____

[Handwritten initials]

NOV 21 1946



Ruth C. Barton
Ruth C. Barton
Secretary

TO BE DECLASSIFIED WHEN ATTACHMENT IS REMOVED

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 740132

By *[Signature]* Date JAN 12 1978

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Serial No. 1/4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 20, 1946

The Honorable
J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

On June 26, 1946, the Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee issued a memorandum to civilian agencies and departments of the federal government which set forth minimum standards for security clearances of personnel having access to Secret or Top Secret information. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for your information.

Certain federal departments and agencies, in an attempt to follow the advice of the Board, were confronted with a refusal by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct checks of FBI subversive files, enumerated in SAB Memorandum No. 3 as a basic essential for clearance of personnel. It is understood that the Federal Bureau of Investigation's refusal in this instance was occasioned by a lack of funds and personnel to conduct such checks.

The Security Advisory Board, in an attempt to obtain security checks for agencies which did not have previous liaison arrangements with the FBI for this service, made an arrangement with the FBI by which a limited number of such checks would be made on behalf of these agencies through the medium of the Security Advisory Board.

The Security Advisory Board feels that it would be a more satisfactory arrangement if the FBI could service these agencies directly on name checks for personnel having access to Secret or Top Secret information. Because of the fact that the Security Advisory Board is an advisory board only and because it is not created by an executive order or similar authority, it is not possible to enforce any recommendation which it might make to a civilian agency. Furthermore, a recent interpretation of the terms of reference of the Security Advisory Board prohibits it from making recommendations to an agency on any employee of that agency. The service of the Board in this connection is therefore limited to channeling the results of name checks from investigative sources to the civilian agency or department requesting such checks. The

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Authority NND 740132
By CD/KMS NARS, Date JAN 12 1977

-2-

determination of the eligibility of an individual to receive classified information is still the responsibility of the Security Officer of the agency or department, which determination he makes on the basis of paraphrased information shown to him by the Board.

In view of the difficulties inherent in the present arrangement, the Security Advisory Board respectfully recommends that the FBI perform the service which it is presently rendering for the Board directly for agencies and departments which will be handling Top Secret and Secret information, reserving the right to refuse requests from agencies not working with classified information and to request from the Security Officer in each instance a certification that the persons whose names are submitted will have access to Top Secret or Secret information. In any instance when the Federal Bureau of Investigation considers the requests from any agency unreasonable, the Security Advisory Board will be glad to survey the situation to determine if the requests are justified.

It will be appreciated by the Security Advisory Board if a decision on this matter can be given as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours,

E. T. Anderson
State Member, SAB

Charles C. Blakeney
Colonel, GSC
War Member, SAB

L. W. Gunther
Comdr. USN
Navy Member, SAB

Enclosure
Copy No. 91 of SAB 3

RESTRICTED
P & O, WDG

334 Lab

P&O 334 SWNCC (7 Nov 46) **Revised Terms of Reference for the State-War-Navy**
 Director of Intelligence **Coordinating Subcommittee for Security Control (Security**
Advisory Board)
 P&P Gp, P&O, WDGS 7 Nov 46
Major Liggett/2273

1. On 4 November 1946, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC Memorandum for Information No. 63.

2. The inclosure is forwarded as a matter of primary interest.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF PLANS AND OPERATIONS:

JAMES L. CANTRELL, Lt Col, GSC
Executive Officer, P&P Group

1 Incl
SWNCC MFI No. 63, Cy No. 41

Copies furnished:

- D/P&A, w/incl SWNCC MFI No. 63, Cy No. 42
- D/O&T, w/incl SWNCC MFI No. 63, Cy No. 43
- D/SS&P, w/incl SWNCC MFI No. 63, Cy No. 44
- D/R&D, w/incl SWNCC MFI No. 63, Cy No. 45
- Chief, Public Info, w/incl SWNCC MFI No. 63, Cy No. 46
- CG, AAF, w/incl SWNCC MFI No. 63, Cy No. 47
- TAG, w/incl SWNCC MFI No. 63, Cy No. 48
- PRD, w/incl SWNCC MFI No. 63, Cy No. 49
- Sec, JCS, w/o incl
- Sec, SWNCC, w/o incl

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

- State Member *was*
- Army Member
- Navy Member
- Ass't State Member
- Ass't Army Member
- Ass't Navy Member
- Executive Secretary
- Ass't Exec. Secretary
- State Adm. Assistant
- Army Adm. Assistant
- Navy Adm. Assistant
- File

NOV 12 1946



RESTRICTED

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

Serial No. 117

State Member _____
 Army Member _____
 Navy Member _____
 Ass't State Member _____
 Ass't Army Member _____
 Ass't Navy Member _____
 Executive Secretary _____
 Ass't Exec. Secretary _____
 State Adm. Assistant _____
 Army Adm. Assistant _____
 Navy Adm. Assistant _____
 File _____

was

State SAB

October 30, 1946

The Honorable
 Solon J. Buck
 Archivist of the United States
 The National Archives
 Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Buck:

Reference is made to your letter of October 14, 1946, in which you requested that Mr. William Ross of the National Archives staff be allowed to examine the wartime history of the Security Advisory Board, in connection with his preparation of a short summary of security policies and procedures in Federal agencies for the Handbook of Federal World War II Agencies and Their Records, which the National Archives is presently preparing, at the direction of the President.

You are informed that the Security Advisory Board has reviewed the History of the Security Office and the Security Advisory Board, Office of War Information, and perceives no objection from the standpoint of security to the examination of this record by Mr. Ross. The Board has further determined that the security classification of this document can be reduced to Restricted and steps have been taken to effect this change in classification. The substantiating information required by Mr. Ross in this project will be furnished to him wherever possible.

The present Secretary of the Board, Mrs. Ruth C. Barton, worked with the Security Advisory Board during wartime and will be prepared to give Mr. Ross any supplementary information regarding the Board's activities which may not be contained in the files.

The Security Advisory Board reserves the right to review any material developed by Mr. Ross in this connection before its removal from the offices of the Board in the New War Department Building and its eventual publication.

Sincerely yours,

cc War Member, SAB
 Navy Member, SAB
 Lt. Col. V. F. Field, SWNCC

Anderson
 Acting Chairman

RCB/reb

Serial No. 105

file
SAB
October 22, 1946

Mr. George Schwarzwald
Bureau of the Budget
Washington 25, D.C.

Dear Mr. Schwarzwald:

Reference is made to our telephone conversation of October 10, 1946, in which you expressed your desire to attend regular meetings of the Security Advisory Board.

Following discussion of your request with the Board members, you are advised that the Security Advisory Board has confirmed its original policy that attendance at its regular meetings shall be confined to the membership of the Board, presently composed of designated representatives from the State, War, and Navy Departments. Exceptions to this policy are made in the following instances:

- a. When the regulation, security policy, or other subject under discussion will affect all or part of the various government agencies and departments, a general meeting is called at which the liaison officers concerned meet with the Board members;
- b. When the Board is concerned with a security matter in any single government agency or department, the liaison officer of that agency or department is invited to attend that portion of the Board meeting for discussion of the matter;
- c. When any liaison officer or government official solicits the advice or assistance of the Board, he is invited to attend a meeting of the Board at which this problem will be discussed.

This policy is believed to be consistent with the standard operating procedure of boards and committees, generally.

The designation of liaison officers in each government agency and department has been an invaluable aid to the Board in carrying out its function of advising civilian departments and agencies on documentary and other related security matters. The Board wishes to be of service to its liaison officers

Serial No. 105. Ctd.


- 2 -

whenever possible, and at your request, will be glad to meet with you to discuss the question of its functions, its establishment under the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, or any other related administrative matters about which you may be concerned. In addition, you will of course be invited to attend any general meetings of the Board with its liaison officers which may be held in the future.

Your interest in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Ruth C. Barton
Secretary

cc Lt. Col. Field 
State Member, SAB
War Member, SAB
Navy Member, SAB

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Col. Field
FROM : Mrs. Barton *ReB*
SUBJECT: Attached Letter

DATE: 10-22-46

WV

I thought you might be interested in seeing the attached letter to the Bureau of the Budget liaison officer. This reply, as approved by the Board, does succeed in placing Mr. Schwarzwald's request into the proper channels and may be the thing which is needed to force the issue of the Board's parentage into the open.

Declassified 10/2/46
Authority--para 5 this letter.

RcB

*New file
Subcommittee
334*

~~Serial No. 74~~
RCH/gh

2 October 1946

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. William C. Kirober
Chief, Document Security Section
Civilian Production Administration

Subject: Classification Review of Documents

References: a. Your Memorandum (21 May 1946) to
Security Officer, SWNCC
b. SAB Memorandum (6 June 1946)
Serial No. 32

Enclosures: Second and Third Protocol Documents

State Member	-----
Army Member	-----
Navy Member	-----
Ass't State Member	-----
Ass't Army Member	-----
Ass't Navy Member	-----
Executive Secretary	-----
Ass't Exec. Secretary	-----
State Adm. Assistant	-----
Army Adm. Assistant	-----
Navy Adm. Assistant	-----
File	-----

1. Reference is made to our letter of 6 June 1946, (Serial No. 32), regarding the declassification and possible publication of the Second and Third Soviet Protocols.

2. You are advised that the appropriate authorities in the Department of State hope to publish these Protocols in the next Presidential Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations. In view of present circumstances, however, it is not known when this Report will be presented to Congress or whether it will be advisable at that time to include the Protocols in the Report.

3. Upon publication of these Protocols in the Lend-Lease Report, you are of course authorized to take the necessary mechanical steps to declassify these documents. Until that time, downgrading the classification of the Second and Third Soviet Protocols to Confidential is authorized. The Security Advisory Board will advise you of further pertinent developments in this matter pending the publication of the Lend-Lease Report.

4. Documents numbered 8 and 14 on your itemized list of May 21, 1946, are hereby returned to you.

5. This memorandum, Serial No. 74, has been classified Secret in accordance with paragraph 4 g of Security Advisory Board Regulation No. 1,

~~SECRET~~
Serial No. 74

Mr. William C. Kircher


-2-

2 October 1946

dated 28 May 1946, and should be declassified when the classified enclosures are removed.

For the Security Advisory Boards

Ruth Catlett Barton
Secretary

cc: State Member, SAB
War Member, SAB
Navy Member, SAB
Col. V. F. Field 
Mr. George Truesdell

SWNCC SECRETARIAT

*334
Comm Sec Adv Board*

RESTRICTED
Serial No. 55
ETA/ris

July 9, 1948

State Member	-----
Army Member	-----
Navy Member	-----
Ass't State Member	-----
Ass't Army Member	-----
Ass't Navy Member	-----
Executive Secretary	-----
Ass't Exec. Secretary	-----
State Adm. Assistant	-----
Army Adm. Assistant	-----
Navy Adm. Assistant	-----
File	-----

MEMORANDUM FOR

War Member, SAB
Navy Member, SAB

Subject:

Proposed SAB bulletin to Security Officers regarding restricted mail service between U.S. and Germany, etc.

The following incident is of interest to the Security Advisory Board.

Professor Dr. Theodor Stocks of Stammen, Germany, recently wrote to the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey, Washington, for several nautical charts. A reply was prepared by the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey attaching several charts, some of which are classified, and sent to John H. Hildring, Assistant Secretary of State, with a covering memorandum asking if the forwarding of such information to a resident of an occupied country would be contrary to established policy. In reply the State Department advised the Coast and Geodetic Survey that in its opinion it would be contrary to the established policy of our Government to transmit a reply in a sense of the letter under reference. It is the State Department's understanding that since the Trading with the Enemy Act is still applicable to Germany, existing regulations governing the restricted mail service between Germany and the United States do not permit the sending of communications relating to other than personal or family matters. Consequently, it appears that both the letter from Dr. Stocks and the proposed reply thereto relate to matters other than those permitted under existing postal regulations. It is therefore assumed that it was only through inadvertence that Dr. Stocks' letter was permitted by Censorship authorities to go forward from Germany. In addition to these considerations it is the State Department's view that the sending to

persons

RESTRICTED
Serial No. 55

- 2 -

July 9, 1946

Subject: Proposed SAB bulletin to Security Officers
regarding restricted mail service between U.S.
and Germany, etc.

persons in Germany of material of the nature requested by
Dr. Stocks would, from a security standpoint, be contrary
to the national interest of the United States.

My attention was called to a memorandum from the
Special Projects Division in the State Department stating
that "this file leads us to inquire whether some government
agency should not undertake to warn all government agencies
that mail to Germany is limited to personal or family
matters. Apparently numerous responsible officials do not
read the newspapers."

This appears to be an instance where the Board could
be used as an implementing agency and if you concur
I will request the Secretary, upon her return, to issue
a bulletin to all Security Officers embodying the above
pertinent information, which would of course apply to all
occupied areas.

E. T. Anderson
Acting Chairman

cc ✓ SWNCC Secretariat
SWNCC Subcommittee for MIC

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD
Washington 25, D.C.

334
Security Advisory Board
Miss
SWNCC SECRETARIAT

~~Serial No. 32~~
Mr/glh

~~SECRET~~

(New file)

- 6 June 1946 State Member
- Army Member
- Navy Member
- Ass't State Member
- Ass't Army Member
- Ass't Navy Member
- Executive Secretary
- Ass't Exec. Secretary
- State Adm. Assistant
- Army Adm. Assistant
- Navy Adm. Assistant
- File

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. William C. Kircher, Chief
Document Security Section
Civilian Production Administration

Subject:

Classification Review of Documents

Reference:

a. Your memorandum dtd 21 May 1946 to
Security Officer, SWNCC

Enclosures:

a. Fourteen (14) Russian Protocol Documents

1. Your memorandum, dated 21 May 1946, addressed to Lt. Col. V. F. Field, Security Officer, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, requesting classification review of sixteen (16) Russian Protocol documents, was referred to the Security Advisory Board of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee for a determination of the action to be taken in this matter.

2. Mr. John H. Hazard, formerly Secretary of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee, was consulted regarding the advisability of declassifying or downgrading the documents forwarded by your agency to the SWNCC. It was the feeling of Mr. Hazard that the documents in this group which indicate the reasons for decisions by the President's Soviet Protocol Committee or which provide interim reports on the performance of the Protocols should not be published. He has accordingly recommended that the fourteen (14) documents which are herewith returned to you be retained in a classification no lower than "Confidential".

3. It was considered by Mr. Hazard that the Protocols themselves, Nos. 8 and 14 on the itemized list contained in your May 21 memorandum, might be part of a general publication program if the consent of the participating countries was obtained. He is consequently endeavoring to obtain the opinion of the appropriate authorities in the Department of State regarding the declassification of these two documents. You will be advised further when the Security Advisory Board has been notified of the decision reached by the Department of State in this regard.

4. This memorandum, Serial No. 32, has been classified "Secret" in accordance with para. 4 g. of SAB No. 1, dated 28 May 1946, and should be declassified when the classified enclosures are removed.

For the Security Advisory Board:

- cc: State Member, SAB
- War Member, SAB
- Navy Member, SAB
- Lt. Col. V.F. Field, SWNCC

M. RUTH CATLETT
Capt., WAG
Secretary

EWN-4320
21 May 1946

VFF:aj

33f
Legislative
Sec.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, STATE-WAR-NAVY
COORDINATING SUBCOMMITTEE FOR SECURITY
CONTROL (SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD):

Attached is a memorandum from the Chief,
Document Security Section, Civilian Production
Administration, forwarding sixteen documents
which that office is desirous of downgrading.

As per our telephone conversation this
date, it is requested that this memorandum and
documents be presented to the Security Advisory
Board at their next meeting for a determination
of the action to be taken in this matter.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

V. F. FIELD,
Executive Secretary

Enclosure

COPY FOR SWNCC FILE

Room 1041, Social Security Building

May 21, 1946

Memorandum

To: Lt. Col. V. F. Field
Security Officer
State, War & Navy Coordinating Committee
Room 178 - State Department Building

From: William C. Kircher, Chief
Document Security Section
Civilian Production Administration
3rd & Independence Avenue, S. W.
Republic 7500 - Ext. 74996

Subject: Request for Classification Review

Pursuant to our telephone conversation of yesterday, the documents appearing on the attached list, which form part of the permanent records of this agency, are respectfully submitted to you for review with regard to the possibility of removing or downgrading their security classifications of "Secret" and "Confidential". Wherever security or diplomatic considerations permit we would like to remove the classification entirely.

In that connection we should like to make the following observations.

1. It is and has been common knowledge that this country and Great Britain furnished the Russians with billions of dollars of supplies and equipment to aid in the prosecution of the war on the eastern front. The declassification of the Protocol Agreements and related documents therefore, could hardly be revealing, particularly since they dwell on the subject of aid only.
2. From the standpoint of military security, we venture the opinion that any secret military equipment with which the Russians might have been furnished, could hardly be considered classified any longer.

We submit that the Russians, for reasons of their own, may wish that these documents retain some sort of security classification, although we fail to see why in the light of the common knowledge character of the documents' contents. However, we shall

(Continued on next page)

(Request for Classification Review-Continued)

Page 2

be guided by the judgment of your office regarding the classification of these documents.

For purposes of ready identification we have attached numbered slips to the documents ranging from 1 to 16.

We shall be glad to have our Mr. Snow call for these documents when you are ready to return them to this office.

We wish to assure you of our sincere appreciation for your cooperation.

Attachment
WCK:lhs

CIVILIAN PRODUCTION ADMINISTRATION

1. SUPPLIES FOR THE U.S.S.R.
July 1 through December 31, 1945
Classification - "Secret"
2. MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF THE
PRESIDENT'S SOVIET PROTOCOL COMMITTEE
Dated - 5/15/45
Classification - "Secret"
3. PROGRAM OF REQUIREMENTS FOR ARMAMENTS,
EQUIPMENT & MATERIALS FOR SUPPLY TO THE U.S.S.R.
BY THE GOV'T. OF THE U.S. DURING THE PERIOD
7/1/44 to 6/30/45
Classification - "Secret"
4. THIRD RUSSIAN PROTOCOL MATERIALS PROGRAM
Dated - 4/22/43
Classification - "Confidential"
5. PROPOSED THIRD PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R.
AND THE U.S., U.K. & CANADA
COVERING PERIOD 7/1/43 to 6/30/44
Classification - "Secret"
6. PROPOSED THIRD PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R.
AND THE U.S., U.K. & CANADA
COVERING PERIOD 7/1/43 to 6/30/44
PREAMBLES & U.S. SCHEDULES
Classification - "Secret"
7. STATUS OF THE SOVIET AID PROGRAM
AS OF 8/31/43
" " 9/30/43
" "10/31/43
" "11/30/43
Classification - "Secret"
8. PROPOSED SECOND PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R.
AND THE U.S. & GREAT BRITAIN COVERING THE PERIOD
7/1/42 to 6/30/43 - Classification - "Secret"
9. PROPOSED FOURTH PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R.
AND THE U.S., U.K., AND CANADA FOR THE PERIOD
7/1/44 to 6/30/45
PREAMBLES & U.S. SCHEDULES
Classification - "Secret"

(Continued on next page)

(CIVILIAN PRODUCTION ADMINISTRATION-Continued)

Page 2

10. U.S. SCHEDULE OF SUPPLIES AND SHIPMENTS FOR THE THIRD SOVIET PROTOCOL
Classification - "Secret"
11. PROGRAM OF REQUIREMENTS FOR ARMAMENTS, EQUIPMENT & MATERIALS FOR SUPPLY TO THE U.S.S.R. BY THE GOV'T. OF THE U.S. DURING THE PERIOD 7/1/43 to 6/30/44
Classification - "Confidential"
12. PROGRAM OF REQUIREMENTS FOR ARMAMENTS, EQUIPMENT & MATERIALS FOR SUPPLY TO THE U.S.S.R. BY THE GOV'T. OF THE U.K. DURING THE PERIOD 7/1/43 to 6/30/44
Classification - "Secret"
13. SUPPLEMENTARY REQUEST FOR SUPPLY TO THE U.S.S.R. BY THE GOV'T. OF THE U.S. DURING THE PERIOD 7/1/43 to 6/30/44
Classification - "Confidential"
14. THIRD SOVIET PROTOCOL
7/1/43 to 6/30/44
Classification - "Secret"
15. REVIEW OF PRODUCTION OF MATERIALS AND INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT OF U.S.S.R. ACCOUNT UNDER THE SECOND RUSSIAN PROTOCOL
Classification - "Secret"
16. STATUS OF SOVIET AID PROGRAM
AS OF 12/1/42
" " 1/1/43
" " 2/1/43
" " 3/1/43
" " 4/1/43
" " 5/1/43
" " 6/1/43
" " 6/30/43
Classification - "Secret"

RESTRICTED

D R A F T338
[Signature]

4 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. F. B. Lyon, State Department,
CHAIRMAN ~~Steering Member~~ (S-2005)

Mr. Einar T. Anderson, State Department,
(Alternate) (S-2306)

Colonel C. C. Blakeney, Army Member,
(W-2468)

Capt. John S. Phillips, Navy Member
(N-2990)

Subject: Appointment of the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Subcommittee for Security Control.

1. By informal action on 3 April 1946, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 252/2 and agreed to appoint a Subcommittee for Security Control to be known as the "Security Advisory Board".

2. The above named individuals have been designated by their respective Departments to serve as members of this Subcommittee.

It is provided in SWNCC 252/2 that
3. [^]the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Security Control will be responsible for:

a. Declassification of documents originating in non-military departments and agencies.

b. Top Secret control procedures for non-military federal departments and agencies.

c. Security clearances of civilian officials to receive certain classified material from the War and the Navy Departments and Joint Chiefs of Staff committees.

d. Conversion of security regulations for civilian agencies from a war-time to a peace-time basis.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

e. Clearance of statistical information under Executive Order 9103 and performance of functions previously transferred to the Security Advisory Board by the Bureau of the Budget.

f. Survey of security measures affecting administrative efficiency.

g. Preparing studies and recommendations on matters referred to it by SWNCC.

4. Initially the Subcommittee for Security Control will defer action on Paragraph 11, SWNCC 252/2 and will consult with the SWNCC Secretariat for the purpose of submitting to SWNCC joint detailed recommendations as to its Secretariat requirements. In this connection the possibility of utilizing the SWNCC Secretariat, or at least integrating the two secretariats in order to save personnel should be thoroughly considered.

5. Copies of the approved and preceding papers of the 252 series are attached herewith.*

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

HAROLD W. MOSELEY

Secretariat

* Furnished Subcommittee members only.

RESTRICTED

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING
COMMITTEE

STATE

- Mr. Cox
- ② Mr. Moseley
- Mr. Gardiner

*See attached
proposed
change by
Capt. Austin*

WAR

- Colonel Reid
- Colonel Schulgen
- ③ Lt. Col. Field
- Major Karbel
- Lt. Weiner

NAVY

- ① Captain Austin
- Commander Richardsen
- Ensign Whiteside

*OK
either
way
HWM*

- Note
- Circulate
- File

REMARKS:

①+② For comment
or concurrence,

please. add.
mission
③ Shoot this with
par. 3 as shown in
pencil. add.

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

3. It is provided in SWNCC
252/2 that the State-War-Navy
Coordinating Subcommittee for
Security Control will be
responsible for:

4128

RESTRICTED5 April 1946COPY NO. 64STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. F. B. Lyon, State Department,
Chairman (S-2005)

Mr. Einar T. Anderson, State Department,
(Alternate) (S-2306)

Colonel C. C. Blakeney, Army Member
(W-2468)

Captain John S. Phillips, Navy Member
(N-2990)

Subject: 331 Appointment of the State-War-Navy Coordinating
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3. It is provided in SWNCC 252/2 that the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for Security Control will be responsible for:

a. Declassification of documents originating in non-military departments and agencies.

b. Top Secret control procedures for non-military federal departments and agencies.

c. Security clearances of civilian officials to receive certain classified material from the War and the Navy Departments and Joint Chiefs of Staff committees.

d. Conversion of security regulations for civilian agencies from a war-time to a peace-time basis.

e. Clearance of statistical information under Executive Order 9103 and performance of functions previously transferred to the Security Advisory Board by the Bureau of the Budget.

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f. Survey of security measures affecting administrative efficiency.

g. Preparing studies and recommendations on matters referred to it by SWNCC.

4. Initially the Subcommittee for Security Control will defer action on Paragraph 11, SWNCC 252/2, and will consult with the SWNCC Secretariat for the purpose of submitting to SWNCC joint detailed recommendations as to its Secretariat requirements. In this connection the possibility of utilizing the SWNCC Secretariat, or at least integrating the two Secretariats in order to save personnel should be thoroughly considered.

5. Copies of the approved and preceding papers of the 252 series are attached herewith.*

A. D. REID,
Secretary.

* Furnished Subcommittee members only.