

Doc. 2254 Evid

Folder 15

(22)

2254

INTERROGATION OF

ARAKI, SADAQ

Date and Time: 11 February, 1946. 1000-1215 hours

Place : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : ARAKI, Sadao
 Col. Thomas H. Morrow Interrogator
 Mr. Elton M. Hyder, Jr. Interrogator
 Mr. Denis Kildoyle Interpreter
 Miss Dinah Braun Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, administered by Col.

Morrow to Mr. Kildoyle:

COL. MORROW: Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

Mr. KILDOYLE : I do.

Questions by : COL. MORROW.

Statement by : ARAKI, Sadao:

I have written some notes in connection with the Privy Council which I would like to give you although I have not quite finished with them.

Mr. HYDER: I will take them.

Notes accepted and made part of this record.

Questions by : Col. MORROW:

Q. I would like to know whether the Planning Board was a board of any great importance starting with October 25th, 1937, and what it did.

A. This was a board organized during the Hirota Cabinet. Its duties were investigation of the national resources.

Q. Was it different from this board?
(indicating name of board)

58-25

(ARAKI Feb 11 cont'd)

A. It is not the same. I think the one you indicated was organized during the TOJO or KOISO Cabinet.

Q. This record shows that MATSUKI Masao was appointed on the 25th day of October, 1937, as the first president apparently.

A. That was during the first KONOYE Cabinet.

Q. And who appointed this Planning Board?

A. This was a board attached to the office of the Prime Minister. It was an outgrowth of what was called the Investigation Bureau and due to increased activities it was decided to call it a Planning Board.

Q. Who appointed it?

A. I do not know who directed the formation of this board, but I imagine it was the prime minister.

Q. It was not a constitutional office?

A. No, it was not a constitutional office but I think it required the permission of the Privy Council. It was an administrative Board and had no connection with the constitution.

Q. Some Japanese people have claimed that the Planning Board, particularly under SUZUKI was responsible for much of the aggressive attitude of Japan in the Chinese War and the events immediately preceding the war with America. What is your opinion about that?

A. I believe that in about 1940, during the second KONOYE Cabinet, many people became members of this Planning Board. Many of these members I thought were dangerous persons. These people joined this Planning Board in about 1940, just before the outbreak of the war. There were a great number of members with Fascist and Communistic tendencies opposed to free enterprise, and some hundred or so of these members were later arrested.

Q. What did they have to do with the Planning Board?

A. They were all members of the Planning Board.

Q. During the time you were Minister of Education in two cabinets starting May 1938 and ending August 1939 was the Planning Board an influential body in foreign affairs?

(ARAKI Feb 11 cont'd)

Q. Did the Foreign Minister ever bring up a question as to foreign
A. No, it was not an influential board.

Q. Was it influential in the prosecution of the war with China, particularly?

A. Absolutely not at the time when I was a cabinet member.

✓
Q. When I was here on the 7th of this month, I asked you this question: (Reading) "Then I understand that when you were Minister of War you attended these meetings but when you were Minister of Education later, you did not attend the meetings concerning foreign affairs", and you answered as follows: (Reading) "During my tenure of office as War Minister there were very few of these meetings to the best of my recollection, but during the time I held office as Minister of Education these matters were usually discussed at the usual cabinet meetings held once a week". Do you remember these answers?

A. Yes. When I was Minister of Education, I did not attend these meetings. If a question regarding foreign policy came up, this would be discussed at the usual cabinet meetings.

Q. And you were appointed Minister of Education in May, 1938, and held that position until August 29, 1939, and I understand then that important matters concerning foreign affairs were discussed at full cabinet meetings during that period?

A. At one time the Premier requested SUETSUGU, Nobunasa who was Home Minister, and myself to confer with him on the China question. It was decided to hold these meetings regularly but as my views and SUETSUGU's views differed so widely and we could not agree, it was decided after the second meeting to hold no more. I do not know whether SUETSUGU was requested to attend this meeting as Home Minister or as an Admiral.

Q. That is SUETSUGU who is dead now, who was Minister for Home Affairs?

A. Yes. Opposed to the advance towards London and Moscow. SUETSUGU took a very different view and advocated strong measures.

Q. I assume that the Prime Minister was the one who decided what foreign affairs were important enough to discuss in the full cabinet meetings, is that correct?

A. Yes, that is correct.

(ARAKI Feb 11 cont'd)

- Q. Did the Foreign Minister ever bring up a question as to foreign affairs for the full cabinet meeting to discuss?
- A. Yes the foreign minister would also have to bring up the question at full meetings.
- Q. And did the War Minister bring up such questions before the full cabinet meetings?
- A. As this was during the China incident, and the War and Navy Ministers were deeply concerned, they would also bring up such questions before the full cabinet. However, matters of great importance to the foreign office, the War and Navy and Finance Ministries, were usually not put before the full cabinet meetings as interference by other ministers was not relished and matters were usually discussed by the respective ministers direct with the Prime Minister.
- Q. That seems to contradict what you said up to now. Do I understand then that the full cabinet has nothing to do with decisions made?
- A. Yes, the full cabinet was concerned with decisions made, but, if the four principal ministers mentioned previously, and the Prime Minister decided on a line of policy, this would be pushed through the cabinet in spite of opposition.
- Q. If there was opposition in the cabinet to a decision made by these four would a vote be taken on the question submitted?
- A. No, a vote would not be necessary. The Prime Minister would request opinions from the other members, but when he had decided, the measure was put through. If that became impossible, the cabinet would fall, or the member opposing any measure up for discussion would resign.
- Q. What was it that you and SUETSUGU could not agree upon?
- A. SUETSUGU was a very aggressive man and I was just the opposite. I was opposed to the advance towards Canton and Hankow. SUETSUGU took a very different view and advocated strong measures.
- Q. And Canton fell October 21, 1938, and Hankow fell October 27, 1938, just six days later?
- A. Yes, that is true. And the meetings with SUETSUGU were held about June or July.
- If it was a statement by the government, it would have been discussed by the cabinet. But if it was Mr. SUETSUGU's own statement, it would not have been discussed.

(ARAKI Feb 11th cont'd)

- Q. Was the formation of the Chinese Affairs Board discussed by the cabinet?
- A. I remember the Manchurian Affairs Board but I do not remember the China Affairs Board. I think this was a board organized to facilitate the contact with civilians in connection with China Affairs. As I do not remember this, it must have been a very small unimportant board.
- Q. Do you remember that on September 19, 1938, the League of Nations invited Japan to sit with the League to settle the dispute with China? Was that invitation discussed in the cabinet?
- A. This is the first time I have heard of this invitation. Perhaps it was received by the foreign office and got no further.
- Q. Then you had nothing to do with Japan's refusal to the League's invitation to settle her dispute with China which took place on the 22nd of September, 1938?
- A. No, I had nothing to do with this.
- Q. And do you not remember that the refusal was discussed by the cabinet in your presence?
- A. If this invitation came when General UGAKI was foreign minister, it would not have been discussed in the cabinet, as he would have attended to it himself. If it came after General UGAKI's resignation, Premier KONOYE was attending to the duties of Foreign Minister, and he also would have decided by himself without referring it to anyone else.
- Q. Do I understand then that about a matter such as that, neither KONOYE nor UGAKI would take the matter up with the cabinet for discussion?
- A. Yes, they would have settled the matter themselves on the spot. Anyway, as I stated previously SUETSUGU and I did not agree on many points when we conferred with the Prime Minister, and such matters would not come to my notice.
- Q. On November 4, 1938, my records show that ARITA, Hashiro was Minister for Foreign Affairs, and my records also show that on that date the Japanese Foreign Office made a public statement that the Nine Power Treaty was obsolete. I want to know if that was taken up with the full cabinet.
- A. If it was a statement by the government, it would have been discussed by the cabinet. But if it was Mr. ARITA's own statement, it would not have been discussed.

(ARAKI Feb 11th cont'd)

- Q. Do I understand that the Japanese Foreign Office could tell the world, without the authority of the cabinet that was then in office, that they would not pay any attention to a treaty that Japan had entered into?
- A. Insofar as this concerned foreign affairs, the Foreign Minister possibly made this statement. The inadvisability of making independent statements often came up for discussion in the cabinet, and the foreign ministry was not the only office accused of acting independently.
- Q. My records show that on October 6, 1938, United States officially protested to Japan of her discriminatory practices in China and on November 18th of the same year, Japan rejected that protest. Do you recollect that this matter was discussed in a cabinet meeting and did you authorize, or did the full cabinet authorize this rejection of America's protest of October 6, 1938?
- A. I do not remember this well and I do not remember that it came up for discussion in the cabinet. My recollection of this is from newspaper accounts and other sources. In November and December the cabinet was tottering and due to fall and perhaps this rejection was the work of the foreign minister. If the matter had come up for discussion at a cabinet meeting I would have remembered it. To show you how little I was concerned with matters of foreign policy, I was not included in the list of awards in connection with the China incident. The Education Ministry was a very uninfluential ministry in matters concerning foreign affairs.
- Q. Do I understand that Mr. ARITA, the foreign minister, could make a statement of vital importance, vitally affecting Japan's foreign relations, behind the back of the full cabinet, and without the authority of the full cabinet?
- A. Actually, he has no power to make these statements without the approval of the cabinet.
- Q. My record also shows that on November 19 of that year, Mr. ARITA stated to the American Government, through its representatives, that Japan would not support the Open Door in China, notwithstanding the Nine Power Treaty. Did you as a member of the cabinet know about that?
- A. No, I do not remember this. I have read of this several times in the newspapers and other sources. If it had been discussed at a cabinet meeting, I would have remembered.

(ARAKI Feb 11th cont'd)

COL. MORROW: All right, go ahead Mr. Hyder.

Mr. ARAKI, interrupting, and continuing:

A. As an example in 1939, when Mr. WANG CHING WEN of the Provisional Government of China, visited Japan, I was not informed of his visit and did not know of his arrival until he was here and I heard about it from other sources. I think it was done purposely without our knowledge.

QUESTIONS BY: MR. HYDER.

Q. The four pages you have given me are in your handwriting, are they not?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you tell me briefly what they say?

(Hands pages back to MR. ARAKI).

A. This statement is in connection with matters relating to the China Incident when I was War Minister and the methods I advocated for settling this, the policy decided on at the Privy Council meeting, and other subjects. I have also touched briefly on the League of Nations.

Q. I will have it translated and may question you later as to the contents.

A. My sentences are usually involved and in difficult Japanese and if I can have a copy of the translation it would be of great help for future discussions. I think you will find it difficult to translate this.

Q. We will bring you a copy of the translation. The conference we have been discussing is what is known as an Imperial Conference, is it not?

A. Yes, it is called HON KAIGI. There usually is a preliminary meeting called SHINSA KAIGI, and if this preliminary meeting is satisfactory, an Imperial Conference is called.

Q. Would you give me the approximate date of the preliminary meeting?

A. I do not remember the exact date. It was between the 13th and 17th.

Q. Who was present at that meeting?

A. Certain members of the Privy Council are delegated to attend this

(ARAKI Feb 11th cont'd)

preliminary meeting, and the cabinet ministers concerned are consulted. It can be taken for granted that anything decided at an Imperial Conference was decided upon previously at the preliminary meeting. If the preliminary conference did not approve, it would never go before the Imperial Conference.

Q. You called the preliminary meeting did you not?

A. No, this was called by the Privy Council.

Q. What cabinet ministers were there?

A. I do not remember but I think the War Minister, the Finance Minister and the Foreign Minister and perhaps the Navy Minister. Sometimes they appear in force, and other times they appear singly and I cannot state for certain.

Q. Was it at your suggestion that the Privy Council called this meeting?

A. It is not within the province of the War Minister to suggest that meetings be held by the Privy Council.

Q. What was the purpose in the Privy Council calling this preliminary meeting?

A. This was a request for special expenditures for the China Incident. The Prime Minister takes the request to the Emperor who in turn requests the Privy Council to discuss and pass on the advisability of granting these requests.

Q. Does the Prime Minister do so at the request or unanimous consent of the cabinet?

A. If the Prime Minister decides, it is practically the same as the whole cabinet deciding.

Q. But at this time, there was a cabinet meeting in which it was agreed?

A. I do not remember that there was a cabinet meeting, but I do remember that I consulted the Prime Minister who was comparatively the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister, and the Secretary of the Cabinet.

Q. But the suggestion emanated from you?

A. Yes.

(ARAKI Feb 11th cont'd)

- Q. At the preliminary meeting it was the unanimous agreement of all present that the appropriation should be made and that the four provinces under General CHANG should be pacified and occupied by Japanese troops, was it not?
- A. The main object of the preliminary meeting was the appropriation for the army. The policy of occupying and pacifying the four provinces followed as a matter of course but this was not stated as a definite policy.
- Q. It was discussed, was it not?
- A. This would have been discussed because unless this was supported to the satisfaction of all, the appropriation would not be granted.
- Q. It was the unanimous agreement of all present?
- A. It was the unanimous agreement of the Privy Council members present at the preliminary conference. And when the question is taken up in the Imperial Conference, the members who did not attend the preliminary council would be present and the matter would be discussed. Members of the cabinet would also be present, and the decision would have to be unanimous.
- Q. What was your answer in the preliminary meeting to their questions on the violation of the Nine Power Treaty?
- A. I do not think this matter was discussed at the preliminary meeting.
- Q. It was discussed at the Imperial Conference, was it not?
- A. Not, it was not discussed. The only subjects discussed were the area of occupation and the object of the occupation. The violation of the Nine Power Treaty might have been discussed at other Privy Council meetings but at this meeting the important question was the settlement of the affair.
- Q. The area involved of which you speak being KIORIN, MUKDEN, HEILUNGKING and JEHOL, is that not true?
- A. Yes. At the time a discussion arose as to whether it was three provinces or four provinces.
- Q. They decided on four, did they not?
- A. Yes, they decided on four provinces to keep CHANG HSUEHLIANG from retreating to JEHOL and operating from there, it was also decided to include JEHOL.

(ARAKI Feb 11th cont'd)

- Q. At the time you made the suggestion to the Premier, and at the time of the preliminary meeting, and the Imperial Conference, you knew, did you not, of the contents of the Nine Power Treaty?
- A. I was not well acquainted with the contents of the Nine Power Treaty. I knew it was in existence, and of the League of Nations. Our aim was to settle the incident in Manchuria and the treaty was in the background.
- Q. You knew the contents of the Kellogg Briand Pact of Paris, 1928, did you not?
- A. No. I heard of this the other day at an interrogation but I do not know the details. I know of the Four Power Treaty, the Nine Power Treaty, the Anti-War Pact, and the League of Nations.
- Q. The Anti-War Pact? I assume you mean the Kellogg-Briand Pact - it is the same.
- A. I did not know that. I do know about the Anti-War Pact.
- Q. You knew enough of the contents of those treaties, did you not, to know that Japan would be violating these treaties if they pacified and occupied the four provinces under CHANG?
- A. My views as an army man were that it was important to put out the conflagration that had started and after this had been accomplished, to consider the treaties.
- Q. That being true, you still knew you were violating the treaties, did you not?
- A. Japan stated her position regarding this in several written statements. If the League of Nations had realized the actual state of affairs I am sure they would have seen that this war was unavoidable, although regrettable from my point of view with regard to the withdrawal of Japan from the League of Nations. I believe it would have been better to have stayed in, carried through our decision and then discussed matters later. I would like to write something on this matter, on the Manchurian matters, later.
- Q. You still knew, did you not, that you were violating the Nine Power Treaty, and the Anti-War Treaty?
- A. That is an open question in Japan. We did not think we were violating these treaties.

INTERROGATION ADJOURNED

(ARAKI Feb 11, 1946)

CERTIFICATE OF INTERPRETER

I, Denis Kildoyle, being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of ten (10) pages, are true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DENIS KILDOYLE

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 12th day of February, 1946.

THOMAS H. MORROW, Col.
Duly Detailed Investigating Officer
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

STENOGRAPHER'S CERTIFICATE

I, DINAH BRAUN, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

DINAH BRAUN

CERTIFICATE OF INTERROGATORS

We, THOMAS H. MORROW, COLONEL 5140284, and ELTON M. HYDER, JR. certify that on the 11th day of February, 1946, personally before us appeared ARAKI, Sadao, and according to DENIS KILDOYLE, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo
February 12, 1946

THOMAS H. MORROW, COL.

ELTON M. HYDER, JR.

The original transcript of this interrogation will be found in our EXHIBIT FILE as EXHIBIT # 290. The original shorthand notes of Miss D. Braun on this interrogation will be found in our EXHIBIT FILE as EXHIBIT # 291

FILE NO. 58
SERIAL NO. 25

CHARGE OUT SLIP

DATE JUL 1 - 1946

EXHIBITARY LOC. NO. 2254

TRIAL BRIEF _____

EXHIBIT NO. 184-G

BACKGROUND LOC. NO. _____

SIGNATURE Sackett

ROOM NO. 378

*Original presented
in Court*

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2248 to 2257 inclusive

26 June 1946

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Interrogation of ARAKI, Sadao

Date: See below Original Copy Language:
English

Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: ARAKI, Sadao

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date of Interrogation</u>	<u>Exhibit No.</u>
2248	12 March 1946	290
2249	8 February 1946	230
2250	7 February 1946	232
2251	15 February 1946	290
2252	13 February 1946	290
2253	19 February 1946	290
2254	11 February 1946	290
2255	8 March 1946	290
2256	21 February 1946	290
2257	7 March 1946	290

Analyst: C.W.J. Phelps

Doc. Nos. 2248 to 2257
inclusive

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. No. 2254

Date 26 June 46

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: *Transcript, Interrogation of*
ARAKI, Sadao

Date: *11 Feb 46* Original Copy Language: *Eng*

Has it been translated? Yes No
Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

Doc. Div.

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: *I. P. S. (see our Case File #58)*

PERSONS IMPLICATED: *ARAKI, Sadao*

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

*Interrogation of ARAKI by Mr. Hyder
and Col. Morrow.*

Analyst: *CW Phelps*

Doc. No.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

26 June 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. JOHN DARSEY
FROM : Calhoun W. J. Phelps, Asst. Chief,
Document Division
SUBJECT : Re-numbering of Interrogations of ARAKI,
Sadao.

1. Due to the necessity of presenting to the Tribunal single copies of each interrogation, in the original, the following system of numbering of such interrogations has been set up and cross-reference should be made to your document numbers (10,001 to 10,008):

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Date of Interrogation</u>
2249	8 Feb 46
2250	7 Feb 46
2251	15 Feb 46
2252	13 Feb 46
2253	19 Feb 46
2254	11 Feb 46
2255	8 Mar 46
2256	21 Feb 46
2257	7 Mar 46

2. It is suggested that subsequent to the initial presentation of these interrogations, you refer to them by the Tribunal exhibit number.

Calhoun W. J. Phelps
CALHOUN W. J. PHELPS

6 CC: 1-Mr. Eugene Williams
1-Capt. Salmons
1-Lt. Alexander
1-Miss Brunner
1-S/Sgt. Overfelt
1-Mr. Buckho
(9)-1 cy. ea. file.

Excerpts from ARAKI, Sadao Interrogation, 11 February 1945.

I was here on the 7th of this month, I asked you this question: (Reading) "Then I understand that when you were Minister of War you attended these meetings but when you were Minister of Education later, you did not attend the meetings concerning foreign affairs", and you answered as follows: (Reading) "During my tenure of office as War Minister there were very few of these meetings to the best of my recollection, but during the time I held office as Minister of Education these matters were usually discussed at the usual cabinet meetings held once a week". Do you remember those answers?

- A. Yes. When I was Minister of Education, I did not attend these meetings. If a question regarding foreign policy came up, this would be discussed at the usual cabinet meetings.
- Q. And you were appointed Minister of Education in May, 1938, and held that position until August 29, 1939, and I understand then that important matters concerning foreign affairs were discussed at full cabinet meetings during that period?
- A. At one time the Premier requested SUETSUGU, Nobumasa who was Home Minister, and myself to confer with him on the China question. It was decided to hold these meetings regularly but as my views and SUETSUGU's views differed so widely and we could not agree, it was decided after the second meeting to hold no more. I do not know whether SUETSUGU was requested to attend this meeting as Home Minister or as an Admiral.
- Q. That is SUETSUGU who is dead now, who was Minister for Home Affairs?
- A. Yes.
- Q. I assume that the Prime Minister was the one who decided what foreign affairs were important enough to discuss in the full cabinet meetings, is that correct?
- A. Yes, that is correct.
- Q. Did the Foreign Minister ever bring up a question as to foreign affairs for the full cabinet meeting to discuss?
- A. Yes the foreign minister would also have to bring up the question at full meetings.

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Q. And did the War Minister bring up such questions before the full cabinet meetings?

A. As this was during the China incident, and the War and Navy Ministers were deeply concerned, they would also bring up such questions before the full cabinet. However, matters of great importance to the foreign office, the War and Navy and Finance Ministries, were usually not put before the full cabinet meetings as interference by other ministers was not relished and matters were usually discussed by the respective ministers direct with the Prime Minister.

Q. That seems to contradict what you said up to now. Do I understand then that the full cabinet has nothing to do with decisions made?

A. Yes, the full cabinet was concerned with decisions made, but, if the four principal ministers mentioned previously, and the Prime Minister decided on a line of policy, this would be pushed through the cabinet in spite of opposition.

Q. If there was opposition in the cabinet to a decision made by these four would a vote be taken on the question submitted?

A. No, a vote would not be necessary. The Prime Minister would request opinions from the other members, but when he had decided, the measure was put through. If that became impossible, the cabinet would fall, or the member opposing any measure up for discussion would resign.

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Apr 22 18

問、私ハ今月七日ニ此處ニキタ時貴下ニ此ノ質問
 間ツシタ。(朗讀)「ソレデハ、貴下ガ陸軍
 大臣ノ時ニハ此等ノ會合ニ出席シタガ貴下ガ
 後ニ文部大臣ノ時ニハ外交關係ノ會合ニハ出
 席シナカツタト私ハ了解スル」。ソシテ貴下
 ハ次ノ如ク答ヘタ。(朗讀)「私ガ陸軍大臣
 トシテ在職中ニハ、私ガ記憶スル限りテハ此
 等ノ會合ハ非常ニ稀デアツタ、併シ私ガ文部
 大臣トシテ在職中ニハ此等ノ事項ハ毎週一回
 開カレタ通例閣議デ通常討論サレタ。」
 貴下ハソノ答申ヲ記憶シテ居ルカ。

答、然リ。私ガ文部大臣ノ時ハ、私ハ此等ノ會
 合ハ出席シナカツタ。外交政策ニ關スル問題
 ガ在座スルト之ハ通例閣議デ討論サレルコト
 ニナツテキタノデアル。

問、ソシテ貴下ハ一九三八年五月ニ文部大臣ニ
 任ゼラレソノ地位ニ一九三九年八月二十九日

1.
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迄キタ。而シテ外交ニ關スル重要事項ハソノ
間全關係國議ヲ討論サレタモノト私ハ了解ス
ルガ。

答、 一度總理大臣ガ内務大臣ノ末次信正ト私ニ
中國問題ニ就イテ總理大臣ト相談スルヤウ要
請シタ。此ノ會合ハ定期的ニ開クヤウ決定サ
レタガ私ノ見解ト末次ノ見解ガ大ニ相違シ
テ我々ノ意見ガ一致シナカツタノデ第二次ノ
會合以降ハ開催シナイコトニ決定シタ。私ニ
ハ末次ガ此ノ會合ニ内務大臣トシテ招請サレ
タノカソレトモ海軍大將トシテ招請サレタノ
カ分ラナイ。

問、 今レハ内務大臣ヲヤツタ、故人ニナツタ末
次ノコトカ。

答、 然リ。

問、 私ハ總理大臣ガ何レノ外交問題ガ全關係國
議ヲ討論スルニ足ル重要位ヲ持ツカ決定スル
人ダト思フガ、ソレニ相違ナイカ。

Doc 2254B

答、然リ。ソレニ相違ナイ。

問、外務大臣が外交ニ關スル問題ヲ附議ノ爲ニ
全關係附議ニ附議シタコトガアツタカ。

答、然リ、外務大臣モ亦ソノ問題ヲ全關係附議
ニ附議スルコトニナツテキタ。

問、ソシテ陸軍大臣ハソノヤウナ問題ヲ全關係
附議ニ附議シタカ。

答、此ノ時ハ支那事變ノ最中デアリ、陸海軍ノ
大臣ハ深い關心ヲ持ツテキタカラ陸海軍大臣
モ亦ソノヤウナ問題ヲ全關係附議ニ附議シタ
答デアル、然シ外務、陸軍、海軍、大藏等ノ
各省ニトツテ、非常ニ重要ナ事項ハ他ノ大臣
ニヨル干渉ガ毛嫌ヒサレタノデ全關係附議ニ
通常附議サレズ各大臣ニヨリ總理大臣ト直接
ニ附議サレタ。

問、ソレハ貴下ガ今迄ニ言ツタコトト矛盾スル
ヤウダガ。ソレデハ全關係附議ハ決定サレタ
事項ニ關シテハ無關係ダト言フ様ニ私ハ了解
スルガ。

3.

Doc 2254B

4.

答、否。全關係閣議ハ決定シタ事項ニ對シテハ

關係ガアル。併シ若シ前述ノ四名ノ主要關係ト總理大臣ガ施政ノ方針ヲ決定シタ場合ニハ之ハ反對ガアツテモ閣議ヲ通過シタノデアアル。

問、此ノ匹關係ガ決定シタ事項ニ對シテ閣内ニ

反對ガアツタ場合ニハ附議サレタ問題ニ關シテ採決ニ附シタノカ。

答、否、採決ハ必要デナイコトニナツテキタ。

總理大臣ハ他ノ關係ノ意見ヲ察メルガ、總理大臣ガ決定シタ時ニハ施策ハ推進セラレタ。若シソレガ不可能ニナツタ場合ニハ内閣ハ瓦解スルカ、鬭争ヲ許ラズ施策ニ反對スル關係ガ辭職スルコトニナル。

X X X X X