

HEADQUARTERS  
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY  
(PACIFIC)  
APO #234  
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. 259

PLACE: Tokyo.  
DATE: 5 November 1945

Division of Origin: Military Analysis.

Subject: JAPANESE ARMY MILITARY SUPPLY SERVICE; EVACUATION OF  
CASUALTIES; HOSPITALIZATION.

Personnel Interrogated and Background of Each:

a. Lt. General K. WATANABE - Medical Affairs Bureau,  
War Ministry.

b. Major G. AKIZUKI - " -

c. Major Y. MATZUNAGA - " -

Where interviewed: Room 238, Meiji Bldg., Tokyo.

Interrogator: Captain Walter M. DROZD.

Interpreter: Mr. N. YOKUKAWA

Allied Officers Present: None.

Note: This was the second interrogation of the above listed personnel. At the first meeting a list of prepared questions had been given to Lt. General WATANABE with instructions to prepare written answers. These answers were delivered to Captain Walter M. Drozd on 5th November 1945 and include the following data.

- a. Chart and discussion of the Japanese Army system for evacuating casualties from the front lines to hospitals in Japan proper.
- b. Statistics of the number wounded and sick in overseas areas - number evacuated to Japan proper - major diseases encountered in different areas of operation - a number and percentage breakdown of the causes for combat (wounded) casualties.
- c. Difficulties encountered in executing the evacuation of casualties.
- d. System of determining medical supply requirements. Depot supply system. System of medical supply distribution.
- e. Comments on the efficiency in the operation of the overall medical supply and evacuation services.

In addition the following summary covers the several aspects of the medical services discussed at the interrogation.

1. Factories producing medical supplies and equipment were said to have been bombed for the first time in May 1945. The following is a list of the factories bombed and the percentage destroyed.

- a. Sankyo factory - located in Shinagawa, Tokyo area - produces Vitamins and Diastase - 40% destroyed.

- b. Chioda factory - located in Honjo, Tokyo area - produced medical instruments - 100% destroyed.
- c. Shionogi factory and raw material depot - located at Amagasaki - Hiojo-ken in the Osaka Area - raw materials depot - 100% destroyed.
- d. Tanabe factories - (2) both produced medicines and drugs - located in the Osaka area - one factory 100% destroyed - other factory 66% destroyed.
- e. Fujisawa factory - located in the Osaka area - produced medicines and drugs - factory intact, however, its raw materials depot adjacent to factory 100% destroyed.
- f. Dai Nippon Drug Co. - located in the Osaka area, produced medicines and drugs - 50% destroyed.
- g. Takashimaya Independent Co., Ltd. - located in the Tokyo area produced bags and boxes for medical supplies - 50% destroyed.
- h. Szimazu Mfg. Co. - located at Kyoto - produced X-ray equipment - no report as to destruction.
- i. Shibaura Electric Co. - located at Shinagawa - Tokyo, produced X-ray machines - 100% destroyed.
- j. Two factories producing glassware for medical use - both located in Tokyo area - 100% destroyed.

2. Distribution of produced medical supplies for the period 1943-45 was as follows:

Of the total Army, Navy, and Civilian requirements for 1943, a joint consultation of the Army Department, the Welfare Ministry, and the material mobilization section of the Munitions Department approved production of only 80%. The factories, however, were capable of producing only 60% of the total requirements. Inability to produce the approved requirements was attributed to shortages of raw materials and fuel which developed after requirements were approved.

Of the 60% produced -

Army received	30%
Navy "	10%
Civ. "	60%

In 1944 planned requirements were cut to 60%, and only 40% was produced. Of this production -

Army received	35%
Navy "	15%
Civ. "	50%

In 1945 planned requirements were cut to 40%, and only 10% was produced. Of this production -

Army received	40%
Navy "	10%
Civ. "	50%

3. Destruction of medical supplies in Japan proper through aerial bombardment was estimated at approximately 2% of total stockpiles. In the Tokyo area depot 5000 boxes of medical supplies were destroyed. In the Osaka area depots 15,000 boxes of medical supplies were destroyed. (A standard medical supply box weighs approximately 30 kilograms).

4. Casualty statistics resulting from aerial bombardment of Japan proper were given as follows:

Military personnel - (since March 1945)

Killed	-	2,100	
Wounded	-	3,400	Total 5,500

This total does not include the bombing of Hiroshima where approximately 20,000 army casualties were estimated. Of these 20,000, 10,000 were said to have been killed; the other 10,000 were wounded. No military casualty figures were available on the bombing of Nagasaki.

Civilian casualties (from Dec. 1941 - Aug. 1945)

Killed	-	260,000
Wounded	-	420,000

This total of 680,000 casualties includes the casualties sustained in the bombing of Hiroshima. (Nagasaki casualties are not included).

5. Hospitalization in Japan proper encountered difficulties. It was indicated that numerous hospitals were bombed in urban areas. The limited hospital facilities were supplemented by utilizing available schools, temples, etc., however, the facilities were very inadequate.

6. Military authorities planned in 1945 to remove certain of their hospitals into rural areas. This plan was 80% completed. Civilian hospitals on the other hand were not removed even though such a plan was prepared. This was due to the difficulties of transport and shortages of equipment.

7. Casualties caused by bombings were directed to either civilian or army institutions. There was, however no direct cooperation between civilian and army hospitals. In June, 1945, Lt. General Kamibayashi, Chief, Medical Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry and Chief of the Medical Department of the Inspectorate General of the Lines of Communication, inaugurated a plan for the mutual support of both army and civilian medical services. This plan made army hospitals primarily responsible for service to casualties whether military or civilian when injury was incurred in front line areas. The remainder of the people were the responsibility of the civilian hospitals. This plan was never put into operation.

8. It was indicated that plan for the defense of Japan proper required stockpiles of medical supplies adequate for three to four months of combat operations. This reserve was to be stored in the District Army Depots. An additional reserve of 3 to 4 months was to be stored in the depots of the Imperial Japanese General Headquarters.