

THE
WESTMINSTER
REVIEW.

“Truth can never be confirm'd enough,
Though doubts did ever sleep.”

SHAKSPERE.

Wahrheitsliebe zeigt sich darin, daß man überall das Gute zu finden und zu schätzen weiß.

GÖTTE.

NEW SERIES.

VOL. LXXXIV.

LONDON:
TRÜBNER & CO., LUDGATE HILL.
MCCCCLXV.

Quarterly Westminster Review
7776

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vol. 84 (N.S. 2)

THE
WESTMINSTER

AND
FOREIGN QUARTERLY
REVIEW.

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JULY 1, 1865.  
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ART. I.—LATER SPECULATIONS OF AUGUSTE COMTE.

1. *Système de Politique Positive, ou Traité de Sociologie, instituant la Religion de l'Humanité.* Par AUGUSTE COMTE, Auteur du Système de Philosophie Positive. 4 vols. 8vo. Paris: 1851-1854.
2. *Catéchisme Positiviste, ou Sommaire Exposition de la Religion Universelle, en onze Entretiens Systématiques entre une Femme et un Prêtre de l'Humanité.* Par AUGUSTE COMTE, Auteur du Système de Philosophie Positive et du Système de Politique Positive. 1 vol. 12mo. Paris: 1852.
3. *Appel aux Conservateurs.* Par AUGUSTE COMTE, Auteur du Système de Philosophie Positive et du Système de Politique Positive. Paris: 1855 (brochure).
4. *Synthèse Subjective, ou Système Universel des Conceptions propres à l'Etat Normal de l'Humanité.* Par AUGUSTE COMTE, Auteur du Système de Philosophie Positive et du Système de Politique Positive. Tome Premier, contenant le Système de Logique Positive, ou Traité de Philosophie Mathématique. 8vo. Paris: 1856.
5. *Auguste Comte et la Philosophie Positive.* Par E. LITTRÉ. 1 vol. 8vo. Paris: 1863.
6. *Exposition Abrégée et Populaire de la Philosophie et de la Religion Positives.* Par CÉLESTIN DE BLIGNIERES, ancien élève de l'Ecole Polytechnique. 1 vol. 12mo. Paris: 1857.

[Vol. LXXXIV. No. CLXV.]—NEW SERIES, Vol. XXVIII. No. I. B

7. *Notice sur l'Œuvre et sur la Vie d'Auguste Comte.* Par le DOCTEUR ROBINET, son Médecin, et d'un de ses treize Exécuteurs Testamentaires. 1 vol. 8vo. Paris: 1860.

THE above list of publications contains the materials for knowing and estimating what M. Comte termed his second career, in which the *savant*, historian, and philosopher of his fundamental treatise, came forth transfigured as the High Priest of the Religion of Humanity. They include all his writings except the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*: for his early productions, and the occasional publications of his later life, are reprinted as Preludes or Appendices to the treatises here enumerated, or in Dr. Robinet's volume, which, as well as that of M. Littré, also contains copious extracts from his correspondence.

In the concluding pages of his great systematic work, M. Comte had announced four other treatises as in contemplation: on Politics; on the Philosophy of Mathematics; on Education, a project subsequently enlarged to include the systematization of Morals; and on Industry, or the action of man upon external nature. Our list comprises the only two of these which he lived to execute. It further contains a brief exposition of his final doctrines, in the form of a Dialogue, or, as he terms it, a Catechism, of which a translation has been published by his principal English adherent, Mr. Congreve. There has also appeared very recently, under the title of "A General View of Positivism," a translation by Dr. Bridges, of the Preliminary Discourse in six chapters, prefixed to the *Système de Politique Positive*. The remaining three books on our list are the productions of disciples in different degrees. M. Littré, the only thinker of established reputation who accepts that character, is a disciple only of the *Cours de Philosophie Positive*, and can see the weak points even in that. Some of them he has discriminated and discussed with great judgment: and the merits of his volume, both as a sketch of M. Comte's life and an appreciation of his doctrines, would well deserve a fuller notice than we are able to give it here. M. de Blignières is a far more thorough adherent; so much so, that the reader of his singularly well and attractively written condensation and popularization of his master's doctrines, does not easily discover in what it falls short of that unqualified acceptance which alone, it would seem, could find favour with M. Comte. For he ended by casting off M. de Blignières, as he had previously cast off M. Littré, and every other person who, having gone with him a certain length, refused to follow him to the end. The author of the last work in our enumeration, Dr. Robinet, is a disciple after M. Comte's own heart; one whom no difficulty stops, and no absurdity startles. But it is far from our disposition to speak other-

wise than respectfully of Dr. Robinet and the other earnest men, who maintain around the tomb of their master an organized co-operation for the diffusion of doctrines which they believe destined to regenerate the human race. Their enthusiastic veneration for him, and devotion to the ends he pursued, do honour alike to them and to their teacher, and are an evidence of the personal ascendancy he exercised over those who approached him; an ascendancy which for a time carried away even M. Littré, as he confesses, to a length which his calmer judgment does not now approve.

These various writings raise many points of interest regarding M. Comte's personal history, and some, not without philosophic bearings, respecting his mental habits: from all which matters we shall abstain, with the exception of two, which he himself proclaimed with great emphasis, and a knowledge of which is almost indispensable to an apprehension of the characteristic difference between his second career and his first. It should be known, that during his later life, and even before completing his first great treatise, M. Comte adopted a rule, to which he very rarely made any exception: to abstain systematically, not only from newspapers or periodical publications, even scientific, but from all reading whatever, except a few favourite poets, in the ancient and modern European languages. This abstinence he practised for the sake of mental health; by way, as he said, of "*hygiène cérébrale*." We are far from thinking that the practice has nothing whatever to recommend it. For most thinkers, doubtless, it would be a very unwise one; but we will not affirm that it may not sometimes be advantageous to a mind of the peculiar quality of M. Comte's—one that can usefully devote itself to following out to the remotest developments a particular line of meditations, of so arduous a kind that the complete concentration of the intellect upon its own thoughts is almost a necessary condition of success. When a mind of this character has laboriously and conscientiously laid in beforehand, as M. Comte had done, an ample stock of materials, he may be justified in thinking that he will contribute most to the mental wealth of mankind by occupying himself solely in working upon these, without distracting his attention by continually taking in more matter, or keeping a communication open with other independent intellects. The practice, therefore, may be legitimate; but no one should adopt it without being aware of what he loses by it. He must resign the pretension of arriving at the whole truth, on the subject, whatever it be, of his meditations. That he should effect this, even on a narrow subject, by the mere force of his own mind, building on the foundations of his predecessors, without aid or correction from his cotemporaries, is simply impossible.

He may do eminent service by elaborating certain sides of the truth, but he must expect to find that there are other sides which have wholly escaped his attention. However great his powers, everything that he can do without the aid of incessant reminders from other thinkers, is merely provisional, and will require a thorough revision. He ought to be aware of this, and accept it with his eyes open, regarding himself as a pioneer, not a constructor. If he thinks that he can contribute most towards the elements of the final synthesis by following out his own original thoughts as far as they will go, leaving to other thinkers, or to himself at a subsequent time, the business of adjusting them to the thoughts by which they ought to be accompanied, he is right in doing so. But he deludes himself if he imagines that any conclusions he can arrive at, while he practises M. Comte's rule of *hygiène cérébrale*, can possibly be definitive.

Neither is such a practice, in a hygienic point of view, free from the gravest dangers to the philosopher's own mind. When once he has persuaded himself that he can work out the final truth on any subject, exclusively from his own sources, he is apt to lose all measure or standard by which to be apprised when he is departing from common sense. Living only with his own thoughts, he gradually forgets the aspect they present to minds of a different mould from his own; he looks at his conclusions only from the point of view which suggested them, and from which they naturally appear perfect; and every consideration which from other points of view might present itself, either as an objection or as a necessary modification, is to him as if it did not exist. When his merits come to be recognised and appreciated, and especially if he obtains disciples, the intellectual infirmity soon becomes complicated with a moral one. The natural result of the position is a gigantic self-confidence, not to say self-conceit. That of M. Comte is colossal. Except here and there in an entirely self-taught thinker, who has no high standard with which to compare himself, we have met with nothing approaching to it. As his thoughts grew more extravagant, his self-confidence grew more outrageous. The height it ultimately attained must be seen, in his writings, to be believed.

The other circumstance of a personal nature which it is impossible not to notice, because M. Comte is perpetually referring to it as the origin of the great superiority which he ascribes to his later as compared with his earlier speculations, is the "moral regeneration" which he underwent from "une angélique influence" and "une incomparable passion privée." He formed a passionate attachment to a lady whom he describes as uniting everything which is morally with much that is intellectually admirable, and his relation to, whom, besides the direct influence of her character

upon his own, gave him an insight into the true sources of human happiness, which changed his whole conception of life. This attachment, which always remained pure, gave him but one year of passionate enjoyment, the lady having been cut off by death at the end of that short period; but the adoration of her memory survived, and became, as we shall see, the type of his conception of the sympathetic culture proper for all human beings. The change thus effected in his personal character and sentiments, manifested itself at once in his speculations; which, from having been only a philosophy, now aspired to become a religion; and from having been as purely, and almost rudely, scientific and intellectual, as was compatible with his character always enthusiastic in its admirations and in its ardour for improvement, became from this time what, for want of a better name, may be called sentimental; but sentimental in a way of its own, very curious to contemplate. In considering the system of religion, politics, and morals, which in his later writings M. Comte constructed, it is not unimportant to bear in mind the nature of the personal experience and inspiration to which he himself constantly attributed this phasis of his philosophy. But as we shall have much more to say against, than in favour of, the conclusions to which he was in this manner conducted, it is right to declare that, from the evidence of his writings, we really believe the moral influence of Madame Clotilde de Vaux upon his character to have been of the ennobling as well as softening character which he ascribes to it. Making allowance for the effects of his exuberant growth in self-conceit, we perceive almost as much improvement in his feelings, as deterioration in his speculations, compared with those of the *Philosophie Positive*. Even the speculations are, in some secondary aspects, improved through the beneficial effect of the improved feelings; and might have been more so, if, by a rare good fortune, the object of his attachment had been qualified to exercise as improving an influence over him intellectually as morally, and if he could have been contented with something less ambitious than being the supreme moral legislator and religious pontiff of the human race.

When we say that M. Comte has erected his philosophy into a religion, the word religion must not be understood in its ordinary sense. He made no change in the purely negative attitude which he maintained towards theology: his religion is without a God. In saying this, we have done enough to induce nine-tenths of all readers, at least in our own country, to avert their faces and close their ears. To have no religion, though scandalous enough, is an idea they are partly used to: but to have no God, and to talk of religion, is to their feelings at once an absurdity and an impiety. Of the remaining tenth, a great proportion, per-

haps, will turn away from anything which calls itself by the name of religion at all. Between the two, it is difficult to find an audience who can be induced to listen to M. Comte without an insurmountable prejudice. But, to be just to any opinion, it ought to be considered, not exclusively from an opponent's point of view, but from that of the mind which propounds it. Though conscious of being in an extremely small minority, we venture to think that a religion may exist without belief in a God, and that a religion without a God may be, even to Christians, an instructive and profitable object of contemplation.

What, in truth, are the conditions necessary to constitute a religion? There must be a creed, or conviction, claiming authority over the whole of human life; a belief, or set of beliefs, deliberately adopted, respecting human destiny and duty, to which the believer inwardly acknowledges that all his actions ought to be subordinate. Moreover, there must be a sentiment connected with this creed, or capable of being invoked by it, sufficiently powerful to give it in fact, the authority over human conduct to which it lays claim in theory. It is a great advantage (though not absolutely indispensable) that this sentiment should crystallize, as it were, round a concrete object; if possible a really existing one, though, in all the more important cases, only ideally present. Such an object Theism and Christianity offer to the believer: but the condition may be fulfilled, if not in a manner strictly equivalent, by another object. It has been said that whoever believes in "the Infinite nature of Duty," even if he believe in nothing else, is religious. M. Comte believes in what is meant by the infinite nature of duty, but he refers the obligations of duty, as well as all sentiments of devotion, to a concrete object, at once ideal and real; the Human Race, conceived as a continuous whole, including the past, the present, and the future. This great collective existence, this "Grand Etre," as he terms it, though the feelings it can excite are necessarily very different from those which direct themselves towards an ideally perfect Being, has, as he forcibly urges, this advantage in respect to us, that it really needs our services, which Omnipotence cannot, in any genuine sense of the term, be supposed to do: and M. Comte says, that assuming the existence of a Supreme Providence (which he is as far from denying as from affirming) the best, and even the only, way in which we can rightly worship or serve Him, is by doing our utmost to love and serve that other Great Being, whose inferior Providence has bestowed on us all the benefits that we owe to the labours and virtues of former generations. It may not be consonant to usage to call this a religion; but the term, so applied, has a meaning, and one which is not adequately expressed by any other word. Candid persons of all creeds may

be willing to admit, that if a person has an ideal object, his attachment and sense of duty towards which, are able to control and discipline all his other sentiments and propensities, and prescribe to him a rule of life, that person has a religion: and though every one naturally prefers his own religion to any other, all must admit that if the object of this attachment, and of this feeling of duty, is the aggregate of our fellow creatures, this Religion of the Infidel cannot, in honesty and conscience, be called an intrinsically bad one. Many, indeed, may be unable to believe that this object is capable of gathering round it feelings sufficiently strong: but this is exactly the point on which a doubt can hardly remain in an intelligent reader of M. Comte: and we join with him in condemning, as equally irrational and mean, the conception of human nature as incapable of giving its love and devoting its existence to any object which cannot afford in exchange an eternity of personal enjoyment.

The power which may be acquired over the mind by the idea of the general interest of the human race, both as a source of emotion and as a motive to conduct, many have perceived; but we know not if any one, before M. Comte, realized so fully as he has done, all the majesty of which that idea is susceptible. It ascends into the unknown recesses of the past, embraces the manifold present, and descends into the indefinite and unforeseeable future. Forming a collective Existence without assignable beginning or end, it appeals to that feeling of the Infinite, which is deeply rooted in human nature, and which seems necessary to the imposingness of all our highest conceptions. Of the vast unrolling web of human life, the part best known to us is irrevocably past; this we can no longer serve, but can still love: it comprises for most of us the far greater number of those who have loved us, or from whom we have received benefits, as well as the long series of those who, by their labours and sacrifices for mankind, have deserved to be held in everlasting and grateful remembrance. As M. Comte truly says, the highest minds, even now, live in thought with the great dead, far more than with the living; and, next to the dead, with those ideal human beings yet to come, whom they are never destined to see. If we honour as we ought those who have served mankind in the past, we shall feel that we are also working for those benefactors by serving that to which their lives were devoted. And when reflection, guided by history, has taught us the intimacy of the connexion of every age of humanity with every other, making us see in the earthly destiny of mankind the playing out of a great drama, or the action of a prolonged epic, all the generations of mankind become indissolubly united into a single image, combining all the power over the mind of the idea of Posterity, with our best feelings towards the living world which sur-

rounds us, and towards the predecessors who have made us what we are. That the ennobling power of this grand conception may have its full efficacy, we should, with M. Comte, regard the Grand Etre, Humanity, or Mankind, as composed, in the past, solely of those who, in every age and variety of position, have played their part worthily in life. It is only as thus restricted that the aggregate of our species becomes an object deserving our veneration. The unworthy members of it are best dismissed from our habitual thoughts; and the imperfections which adhered through life, even to those of the dead who deserve honourable remembrance, should be no further borne in mind than is necessary not to falsify our conception of facts. On the other hand, the Grand Etre in its completeness ought to include not only all whom we venerate, but all sentient beings to which we owe duties, and which have a claim on our attachment. M. Comte, therefore, incorporates into the ideal object whose service is to be the law of our life, not our own species exclusively, but, in a subordinate degree, our humble auxiliaries, those animal races which enter into real society with man, which attach themselves to him, and voluntarily co-operate with him, like the noble dog who gives his life for his human friend and benefactor. For this M. Comte has been subjected to unworthy ridicule, but there is nothing truer or more honourable to him in the whole body of his doctrines. The strong sense he always shows of the worth of the inferior animals, and of the duties of mankind towards them, is one of the very finest traits of his character.

We, therefore, not only hold that M. Comte was justified in the attempt to develop his philosophy into a religion, and had realized the essential conditions of one, but that all other religions are made better in proportion as, in their practical result, they are brought to coincide with that which he aimed at constructing. But, unhappily, the next thing we are obliged to do, is to charge him with making a complete mistake at the very outset of his operations—with fundamentally misconceiving the proper office of a rule of life. He committed the error which is often, but falsely, charged against the whole class of utilitarian moralists; he required that the test of conduct should also be the exclusive motive to it. Because the good of the human race is the ultimate standard of right and wrong, and because moral discipline consists in cultivating the utmost possible repugnance to all conduct injurious to the general good, M. Comte infers that the good of others is the only inducement on which we should allow ourselves to act; and that we should endeavour to starve the whole of the desires which point to our personal satisfaction, by denying them all gratification not strictly required by physical necessities. The golden rule of morality, in M. Comte's religion, is to live for others,

“vivre pour autrui.” To do as we would be done by, and to love our neighbour as ourself, are not sufficient for him: they partake, he thinks, of the nature of personal calculations. We should endeavour not to love ourselves at all. We shall not succeed in it, but we should make the nearest approach to it possible. Nothing less will satisfy him, as towards humanity, than the sentiment which one of his favourite writers, Thomas à Kempis, addresses to God: *Amen te plus quam me, nec me nisi propter te.* All education and all moral discipline should have but one object, to make altruism (a word of his own coining) predominate over egoism. If by this were only meant that egoism is bound, and should be taught, always to give way to the well-understood interests of enlarged altruism, no one who acknowledges any morality at all would object to the proposition. But M. Comte, taking his stand on the biological fact that organs are strengthened by exercise and atrophied by disuse, and firmly convinced that each of our elementary inclinations has its distinct cerebral organ, thinks it the grand duty of life not only to strengthen the social affections by constant habit and by referring all our actions to them, but, as far as possible, to deaden the personal passions and propensities by desuetude. Even the exercise of the intellect is required to obey as an authoritative rule the dominion of the social feelings over the intelligence (*du cœur sur l'esprit*). The physical and other personal instincts are to be mortified far beyond the demands of bodily health, which indeed the morality of the future is not to insist much upon, for fear of encouraging “*les calculs personnels.*” M. Comte condemns only such austerities as, by diminishing the vigour of the constitution, make us less capable of being useful to others. Any indulgence, even in food, not necessary to health and strength, he condemns as immoral. All gratifications except those of the affections, are to be tolerated only as “inevitable infirmities.” Novalis said of Spinoza that he was a God-intoxicated man: M. Comte is a morality-intoxicated man. Every question with him is one of morality, and no motive but that of morality is permitted.

The explanation of this we find in an original mental twist, very common in French thinkers, and by which M. Comte was distinguished beyond them all. He could not dispense with what he called “unity.” It was for the sake of Unity that a religion was, in his eyes, desirable. Not in the mere sense of Unanimity, but in a far wider one. A religion must be something by which to “systematize” human life. His definition of it, in the “*Catéchisme,*” is “the state of complete unity which distinguishes our existence, at once personal and social, when all its parts, both moral and physical, converge habitually to a common destination . . . Such a harmony, individual and collective, being in-

“capable of complete realization in an existence so complicated as ours, this definition of religion characterizes the immovable type towards which tends more and more the aggregate of human efforts. Our happiness and our merit consist especially in approaching as near as possible to this unity, of which the gradual increase constitutes the best measure of real improvement, personal or social.” To this theme he continually returns, and argues that this unity or harmony among all the elements of our life is not consistent with the predominance of the personal propensities, since these drag us in different directions; it can only result from the subordination of them all to the social feelings, which may be made to act in a uniform direction by a common system of convictions, and which differ from the personal inclinations in this, that we all naturally encourage them in one another, while, on the contrary, social life is a perpetual restraint upon the selfish propensities.

The *fons errorum* in M. Comte's later speculations is this inordinate demand for “unity” and “systematization.” This is the reason why it does not suffice to him that all should be ready, in case of need, to postpone their personal interests and inclinations to the requirements of the general good: he demands that each should regard as vicious any care at all for his personal interests, except as a means to the good of others—should be ashamed of it, should strive to cure himself of it, because his existence is not “systematized,” is not in “complete unity,” as long as he cares for more than one thing. The strangest part of the matter is, that this doctrine seems to M. Comte to be axiomatic. That all perfection consists in unity, he apparently considers to be a maxim which no sane man thinks of questioning. It never seems to enter into his conceptions that any one could object *ab initio*, and ask, why this universal systematizing, systematizing, systematizing? Why is it necessary that all human life should point but to one object, and be cultivated into a system of means to a single end? May it not be the fact that mankind, who after all are made up of single human beings, obtain a greater sum of happiness when each pursues his own, under the rules and conditions required by the good of the rest, than when each makes the good of the rest his only object, and allows himself no personal pleasures not indispensable to the preservation of his faculties? The regimen of a blockaded town should be cheerfully submitted to when high purposes require it, but is it the ideal perfection of human existence? M. Comte sees none of these difficulties. The only true happiness, he affirms, is in the exercise of the affections. He had found it so for a whole year, which was enough to enable him to get to the bottom of the question, and to judge whether he could do without everything.

else. Of course the supposition was not to be heard of that any other person could require, or be the better for, what M. Comte did not value. "Unity" and "systematization" absolutely demanded that all other people should model themselves after M. Comte. It would never do to suppose that there could be more than one road to human happiness, or more than one ingredient in it.

The most prejudiced must admit that this religion without theology is not chargeable with any relaxation of moral restraints. On the contrary, it prodigiously exaggerates them. It makes the same ethical mistake as the theory of Calvinism, that every act in life should be done for the glory of God, and that whatever is not a duty is a sin. It does not perceive that between the region of duty and that of sin there is an intermediate space, the region of positive worthiness. It is not good that persons should be bound, by other people's opinion, to do everything that they would deserve praise for doing. There is a standard of altruism to which all should be required to come up, and a degree beyond it which is not obligatory, but meritorious. It is incumbent on every one to restrain the pursuit of his personal objects within the limits consistent with the essential interests of others. What those limits are, it is the province of ethical science to determine; and to keep all individuals and aggregations of individuals within them, is the proper office of punishment and of moral blame. If in addition to fulfilling this obligation, persons make the good of others a direct object of disinterested exertions, postponing or sacrificing to it even innocent personal indulgences, they deserve gratitude and honour, and are fit objects of moral praise. So long as they are in no way compelled to this conduct by any external pressure, there cannot be too much of it; but a necessary condition is its spontaneity; since the notion of a happiness for all, procured by the self-sacrifice of each, if the abnegation is really felt to be a sacrifice, is a contradiction. Such spontaneity by no means excludes sympathetic encouragement; but the encouragement should take the form of making self-devotion pleasant, not that of making everything else painful. The object should be to stimulate services to humanity by their natural rewards; not to render the pursuit of our own good in any other manner impossible, by visiting it with the reproaches of others and of our own conscience. The proper office of those sanctions is to enforce upon every one, the conduct necessary to give all other persons their fair chance: conduct which chiefly consists in not doing them harm, and not impeding them in anything which without harming others does good to themselves. To this must of course be added, that when we either expressly or tacitly undertake to do more, we are bound to keep our promise. And inasmuch

as every one, who avails himself of the advantages of society, leads others to expect from him all such positive good offices and disinterested services as the moral improvement attained by mankind has rendered customary, he deserves moral blame if, without just cause, he disappoints that expectation. Through this principle the domain of moral duty is always widening. When what once was uncommon virtue becomes common virtue, it comes to be numbered among obligations, while a degree exceeding what has grown common, remains simply meritorious.

M. Comte is accustomed to draw most of his ideas of moral cultivation from the discipline of the Catholic Church. Had he followed that guidance in the present case, he would have been less wide of the mark. For the distinction which we have drawn was fully recognised by the sagacious and far-sighted men who created the Catholic ethics. It is even one of the stock reproaches against Catholicism, that it has two standards of morality, and does not make obligatory on all Christians the highest rule of Christian perfection. It has one standard which, faithfully acted up to, suffices for salvation, another and a higher which when realized constitutes a saint. M. Comte, perhaps unconsciously, for there is nothing that he would have been more unlikely to do if he had been aware of it, has taken a leaf out of the book of the despised Protestantism. Like the extreme Calvinists, he requires that all believers shall be saints, and damns them (after his own fashion) if they are not.

Our conception of human life is different. We do not conceive life to be so rich in enjoyments, that it can afford to forego the cultivation of all those which address themselves to what M. Comte terms the egoistic propensities. On the contrary, we believe that a sufficient gratification of these, short of excess, but up to the measure which renders the enjoyment greatest, is almost always favourable to the benevolent affections. The moralization of the personal enjoyments we deem to consist, not in reducing them to the smallest possible amount, but in cultivating the habitual wish to share them with others, and with all others, and scorning to desire anything for oneself which is incapable of being so shared. There is only one passion or inclination which is permanently incompatible with this condition—the love of domination, or superiority, for its own sake; which implies, and is grounded on, the equivalent depression of other people. As a rule of conduct, to be enforced by moral sanctions, we think no more should be attempted than to prevent people from doing harm to others, or omitting to do such good as they have undertaken. Demanding no more than this, society, in any tolerable circumstances, obtains much more; for the natural activity of human nature, shut out from all noxious directions, will expand itself in useful ones. This is our conception

of the moral rule prescribed by the religion of Humanity. But above this standard there is an unlimited range of moral worth, up to the most exalted heroism, which should be fostered by every positive encouragement, though not converted into an obligation. It is as much a part of our scheme as of M. Comte's, that the direct cultivation of altruism, and the subordination of egoism to it, far beyond the point of absolute moral duty, should be one of the chief aims of education, both individual and collective. We even recognise the value, for this end, of ascetic discipline, in the original Greek sense of the word. We think with Dr. Johnson, that he who has never denied himself anything which is not wrong, cannot be fully trusted for denying himself everything which is so. We do not doubt that children and young persons will one day be again systematically disciplined in self-mortification; that they will be taught, as in antiquity, to control their appetites, to brave dangers, and submit voluntarily to pain, as simple exercises in education. Something has been lost as well as gained by no longer giving to every citizen the training necessary for a soldier. Nor can any pains taken be too great, to form the habit, and develop the desire, of being useful to others and to the world, by the practice, independently of reward and of every personal consideration, of positive virtue beyond the bounds of prescribed duty. No efforts should be spared to associate the pupil's self-respect, and his desire of the respect of others, with service rendered to Humanity; when possible, collectively, but at all events, what is always possible, in the persons of its individual members. There are many remarks and precepts in M. Comte's volumes which, as no less pertinent to our conception of morality than to his, we fully accept. For example; without admitting that to make "calculs personnels" is contrary to morality, we agree with him in the opinion, that the principal hygienic precepts should be inculcated, not solely or principally as maxims of prudence, but as a matter of duty to others, since by squandering our health we disable ourselves from rendering to our fellow creatures the services to which they are entitled. As M. Comte truly says, the prudential motive is by no means fully sufficient for the purpose, even physicians often disregarding their own precepts. The personal penalties of neglect of health are commonly distant, as well as more or less uncertain, and require the additional and more immediate sanction of moral responsibility. M. Comte, therefore, in this instance, is, we conceive, right in principle; though we have not the smallest doubt that he would have gone into extreme exaggeration in practice, and would have wholly ignored the legitimate liberty of the individual to judge for himself respecting his own bodily conditions, with due relation to the sufficiency

of his means of knowledge, and taking the responsibility of the result.

Connected with the same considerations is another idea of M. Comte, which has great beauty and grandeur in it, and the realization of which, within the bounds of possibility, would be a cultivation of the social feelings on a most essential point. It is, that every person who lives by any useful work, should be habituated to regard himself not as an individual working for his private benefit, but as a public functionary; and his wages, of whatever sort, as not the remuneration or purchase money of his labour, which should be given freely, but as the provision made by society to enable him to carry it on, and to replace the materials and products which have been consumed in the process. M. Comte observes, that in modern industry every one in fact works much more for others than for himself, since his productions are to be consumed by others, and it is only necessary that his thoughts and imagination should adapt themselves to the real state of the fact. The practical problem, however, is not quite so simple, for a strong sense that he is working for others may lead to nothing better than feeling himself necessary to them, and instead of freely giving his commodity, may only encourage him to put a high price upon it. What M. Comte really means is that we should regard working for the benefit of others as a good in itself; that we should desire it for its own sake, and not for the sake of remuneration, which cannot justly be claimed for doing what we like: that the proper return for a service to society is the gratitude of society: and that the moral claim of any one in regard to the provision for his personal wants, is not a question of *quid pro quo* in respect to his co-operation, but of how much the circumstances of society permit to be assigned to him, consistently with the just claims of others. To this opinion we entirely subscribe. The rough method of settling the labourer's share of the produce, by the competition of the market, may represent a practical necessity, but certainly not a moral ideal. Its defence is, that civilization has not hitherto been equal to organizing anything better than this first rude approach to an equitable distribution. Rude as it is, we for the present go less wrong by leaving the thing to settle itself, than by settling it artificially in any mode which has yet been tried. But in whatever manner that question may ultimately be decided, the true moral and social idea of Labour is in no way affected by it. Until labourers and employers perform the work of industry in the spirit in which soldiers perform that of an army, industry will never be moralized, and military life will remain, what, in spite of the anti-social character of its direct object, it has hitherto been—the chief school of moral co-operation.

Thus far of the general idea of M. Comte's ethics and religion.

We must now say something of the details. Here we approach the ludicrous side of the subject: but we shall unfortunately have to relate other things far more really ridiculous.

There cannot be a religion without a *cultus*. We use this term far want of any other, for its nearest equivalent, worship, suggests a different order of ideas. We mean by it, a set of systematic observances, intended to cultivate and maintain the religious sentiment. Though M. Comte justly appreciates the superior efficacy of acts, in keeping up and strengthening the feeling which prompts them, over any mode whatever of mere expression, he takes pains to organize the latter also with great minuteness. He provides an equivalent both for the private devotions, and for the public ceremonies, of other faiths. The reader will be surprised to learn, that the former consists of prayer. But prayer, as understood by M. Comte, does not mean asking; it is a mere outpouring of feeling; and for this view of it he claims the authority of the Christian mystics. It is not to be addressed to the Grand Etre, to collective Humanity; though he occasionally carries metaphor so far as to style this a goddess. The honours to collective Humanity are reserved for the public celebrations. Private adoration is to be addressed to it in the persons of worthy individual representatives, who may be either living or dead, but must in all cases be women; for women, being the *sexe aimant*, represent the best attribute of humanity, that which ought to regulate all human life, nor can Humanity possibly be symbolized in any form but that of a woman. The objects of private adoration are the mother, the wife, and the daughter, representing severally the past, the present, and the future, and calling into active exercise the three social sentiments, veneration, attachment, and kindness. We are to regard them, whether dead or alive, as our guardian angels, "les vrais anges gardiens." If the last two have never existed, or if, in the particular case, any of the three types is too faulty for the office assigned to it, their place may be supplied by some other type of womanly excellence, even by one merely historical. Be the object living or dead, the adoration (as we understand it) is to be addressed only to the idea. The prayer consists of two parts; a commemoration, followed by an effusion. By a commemoration M. Comte means an effort of memory and imagination, summoning up with the utmost possible vividness the image of the object: and every artifice is exhausted to render the image as life-like, as close to the reality, as near an approach to actual hallucination, as is consistent with sanity. This degree of intensity having been, as far as practicable, attained, the effusion follows. Every person should compose his own form of prayer, which should be repeated not mentally only, but orally, and may be added to or varied for suffi-

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cient cause, but never arbitrarily. It may be interspersed with passages from the best poets, when they present themselves spontaneously, as giving a felicitous expression to the adorer's own feeling. These observances M. Comte practised to the memory of his Clotilde, and he enjoins them on all true believers. They are to occupy two hours of every day, divided into three parts ; at rising, in the middle of the working hours, and in bed at night. The first, which should be in a kneeling attitude, will commonly be the longest, and the second the shortest. The third is to be extended as nearly as possible to the moment of falling asleep, that its effect may be felt in disciplining even the dreams.

The public *cultus* consists of a series of celebrations or festivals, eighty-four in the year, so arranged that at least one occurs in every week. They are devoted to the successive glorification of Humanity itself ; of the various ties, political and domestic, among mankind ; of the successive stages in the past evolution of our species ; and of the several classes into which M. Comte's polity divides mankind. M. Comte's religion has, moreover, nine Sacraments ; consisting in the solemn consecration, by the priests of Humanity, with appropriate exhortations, of all the great transitions in life ; the entry into life itself, and into each of its successive stages : education, marriage, the choice of a profession, and so forth. Among these is death, which receives the name of transformation, and is considered as a passage from objective existence to subjective—to living in the memory of our fellow creatures. Having no eternity of objective existence to offer, M. Comte's religion gives all it can, by holding out the hope of subjective immortality—of existing in the remembrance and in the posthumous adoration of mankind at large, if we have done anything to deserve remembrance from them ; at all events, of those whom we loved during life ; and when they too are gone, of being included in the collective adoration paid to the Grand Etre. People are to be taught to look forward to this as a sufficient recompense for the devotion of a whole life to the service of Humanity. Seven years after death, comes the last Sacrament : a public judgment, by the priesthood, on the memory of the defunct. This is not designed for purposes of reprobation, but of honour, and any one may, by declaration during life, exempt himself from it. If judged, and found worthy, he is solemnly incorporated with the Grand Etre, and his remains are transferred from the civil to the religious place of sepulture : “le bois sacré qui doit entourer chaque temple de l'Humanité.”

This brief abstract gives no idea of the minuteness of M. Comte's prescriptions, and the extraordinary height to which he carries the mania for regulation by which Frenchmen are distinguished among Europeans, and M. Comte among Frenchmen. It is this which throws an irresistible air of ridicule over the whole subject. There is

nothing really ridiculous in the devotional practices which M. Comte recommends towards a cherished memory or an ennobling ideal, when they come unprompted from the depths of the individual feeling; but there is something ineffably ludicrous in enjoining that everybody shall practise them three times daily for a period of two hours, not because his feelings require them, but for the premeditated purpose of getting his feelings up. The ludicrous, however, in any of its shapes, is a phenomenon with which M. Comte seems to have been totally unacquainted. There is nothing in his writings from which it could be inferred that he knew of the existence of such things as wit and humour. The only writer possessed of either, for whom he shows any admiration, is Molière, and him he admires not for his wit but for his wisdom. We notice this without intending any reflection on M. Comte; for a profound conviction raises a person above the feeling of ridicule. But there are passages in his writings which, it really seems to us, could have been written by no man who had ever laughed. We will give one of these instances. Besides the regular prayers, M. Comte's religion, like the Catholic, has need of forms which can be applied to casual and unforeseen occasions. These, he says, must in general be left to the believer's own choice; but he suggests as a very suitable one the repetition of "the fundamental formula of Positivism," viz., "l'amour pour principe, l'ordre pour base, et le progrès pour but." Not content, however, with an equivalent for the Paters and Aves of Catholicism, he must have one for the sign of the cross also; and he thus delivers himself:* "Cette expansion peut être perfectionnée par des signes universels. . . . Afin de mieux développer l'aptitude nécessaire de la formule positiviste à représenter toujours la condition humaine, il convient ordinairement de l'énoncer en touchant successivement les principaux organes que la théorie cérébrale assigne à ses trois éléments." This may be a very appropriate mode of expressing one's devotion to the Grand Être: but any one who had appreciated its effect on the profane reader, would have thought it judicious to keep it back till a considerably more advanced stage in the propagation of the Positive Religion.

As M. Comte's religion has a *cultus*, so also it has a clergy, who are the pivot of his entire social and political system. Their nature and office will be best shown by describing his ideal of political society in its normal state, with the various classes of which it is composed.

The necessity of a Spiritual Power, distinct and separate from the temporal government, is the essential principle of M. Comte's political scheme; as it may well be, since the Spiritual Power is the only counterpoise he provides or tolerates, to the absolute

* *Système de Politique Positive*, iv. 100.

dominion of the civil rulers. Nothing can exceed his combined detestation and contempt for government by assemblies, and for parliamentary or representative institutions in any form. They are an expedient, in his opinion, only suited to a state of transition, and even that nowhere but in England. The attempt to naturalize them in France, or any Continental nation, he regards as mischievous quackery. Louis Napoleon's usurpation is absolved, is made laudable to him, because it overthrew a representative government. Election of superiors by inferiors, except as a revolutionary expedient, is an abomination in his sight. Public functionaries of all kinds should name their successors, subject to the approbation of their own superiors, and giving public notice of the nomination so long beforehand as to admit of discussion, and the timely revocation of a wrong choice. But, by the side of the temporal rulers, he places another authority, with no power to command, but only to advise and remonstrate. The family being, in his mind as in that of Frenchmen generally, the foundation and essential type of all society, the separation of the two powers commences there. The spiritual, or moral and religious power, in the family, is the women of it. The positivist family is composed of the "fundamental couple," their children, and the parents of the man, if alive. The whole government of the household, except as regards the education of the children, resides in the man; and even over that he has complete power, but should forbear to exert it. The part assigned to the women is to improve the man through his affections, and to bring up the children, who, until the age of fourteen, at which scientific instruction begins, are to be educated wholly by their mother. That women may be better fitted for these functions, they are peremptorily excluded from all others. No woman is to work for her living. Every woman is to be supported by her husband or her male relations, and if she has none of these, by the State. She is to have no powers of government, even domestic, and no property. Her legal rights of inheritance are preserved to her, that her feelings of duty may make her voluntarily forego them. There are to be no marriage portions, that women may no longer be sought in marriage from interested motives. Marriages are to be rigidly indissoluble, except for a single cause. It is remarkable that the bitterest enemy of divorce among all philosophers, nevertheless allows it, in a case which the laws of England, and of other countries reproached by him with tolerating divorce, do not admit: namely, when one of the parties has been sentenced to an infamizing punishment, involving loss of civil rights. It is monstrous that condemnation, even for life, to a felon's punishment, should leave an unhappy victim bound to, and in the wife's case under the legal authority of, the culprit. M. Comte could

feel for the injustice in this special case, because it chanced to be the unfortunate situation of his Clotilde. Minor degrees of unworthiness may entitle the innocent party to a legal separation, but without the power of remarriage. Second marriages, indeed, are not permitted by the Positive Religion. There is to be no impediment to them by law, but morality is to condemn them, and every couple who are married religiously as well as civilly are to make a vow of eternal widowhood, "le veuvage éternel." This absolute monogamy is, in M. Comte's opinion, essential to the complete fusion between two beings, which is the essence of marriage; and moreover, eternal constancy is required by the posthumous adoration, which is to be continuously paid by the survivor to one who, though objectively dead, still lives "subjectively." The domestic spiritual power, which resides in the women of the family, is chiefly concentrated in the most venerable of them, the husband's mother, while alive. It has an auxiliary in the influence of age, represented by the husband's father, who is supposed to have passed the period of retirement from active life, fixed by M. Comte (for he fixes everything) at sixty-three; at which age the head of the family gives up the reins of authority to his son, retaining only a consultative voice.

This domestic Spiritual Power, being principally moral, and confined to private life, requires the support and guidance of an intellectual power exterior to it, the sphere of which will naturally be wider, extending also to public life. This consists of the clergy, or priesthood, for M. Comte is fond of borrowing the consecrated expressions of Catholicism to denote the nearest equivalents which his own system affords. The clergy are the theoretic or philosophical class, and are supported by an endowment from the State, voted periodically, but administered by themselves. Like women, they are to be excluded from all riches, and from all participation in power (except the absolute power of each over his own household). They are neither to inherit, nor to receive emolument from any of their functions, or from their writings or teachings of any description, but are to live solely on their small salaries. This M. Comte deems necessary to the complete disinterestedness of their counsels. To have the confidence of the masses, they must, like the masses, be poor. Their exclusion from political and from all other practical occupations is indispensable for the same reason, and for others equally peremptory. Those occupations are, he contends, incompatible with the habits of mind necessary to philosophers. A practical position, either private or public, chains the mind to specialities and details, while a philosopher's business is with general truths and connected views (*vues d'ensemble*). These, again, require an habitual abstraction from details, which unfits

the mind for judging well and rapidly of individual cases. The same person cannot be both a good theorist, and a good practitioner or ruler, though practitioners and rulers ought to have a solid theoretic education. The two kinds of function must be absolutely exclusive of one another: to attempt them both, is inconsistent with fitness for either. But as men may mistake their vocation, up to the age of thirty-five they are allowed to change their career.

To the clergy is entrusted the theoretic or scientific instruction of youth. The medical art also is to be in their hands, since no one is fit to be a physician who does not study and understand the whole man, moral as well as physical. M. Comte has a contemptuous opinion of the existing race of physicians, who, he says, deserve no higher name than that of *veterinaires*, since they concern themselves with man only in his animal, and not in his human character. In his last years, M. Comte (as we learn from Dr. Robinet's volume) indulged in the wildest speculations on medical science, declaring all maladies to be one and the same disease, the disturbance or destruction of "*l'unité cérébrale*." The other functions of the clergy are moral, much more than intellectual. They are the spiritual directors, and venerated advisers, of the active or practical classes, including the political. They are the mediators in all social differences; between the labourers, for instance, and their employers. They are to advise and admonish on all important violations of the moral law. Especially, it devolves on them to keep the rich and powerful to the performance of their moral duties towards their inferiors. If private remonstrance fails, public denunciation is to follow: in extreme cases they may proceed to the length of excommunication, which, though it only operates through opinion, yet if it carries opinion with it, may, as M. Comte complacently observes, be of such powerful efficacy, that the richest man may be driven to produce his subsistence by his own manual labour, through the impossibility of inducing any other person to work for him. In this as in all other cases, the priesthood depends for its authority on carrying with it the mass of the people—those who, possessing no accumulations, live on the wages of daily labour; popularly but incorrectly termed the working classes, and by French writers, in their Roman law phraseology, *proletaires*. These, therefore, who are not allowed the smallest political rights, are incorporated into the Spiritual Power, of which they form, after women and the clergy, the third element.

It remains to give an account of the Temporal Power, composed of the rich and the employers of labour, two classes who in M. Comte's system are reduced to one, for he allows of no idle rich. A life made up of mere amusement and self-indulgence, though not interdicted by law, is to be deemed so disgraceful,

that nobody with the smallest sense of shame would choose to be guilty of it. Here, we think, M. Comte has lighted on a true principle, towards which the tone of opinion in modern Europe is more and more tending, and which is destined to be one of the constitutive principles of regenerated society. We believe, for example, with him, that in the future there will be no class of landlords living at ease on their rents, but every landlord will be a capitalist trained to agriculture, himself superintending and directing the cultivation of his estate. No one but he who guides the work, should have the control of the tools. In M. Comte's system, the rich, as a rule, consist of the "captains of industry:" but the rule is not entirely without exception, for M. Comte recognises other useful modes of employing riches. In particular, one of his favourite ideas is that of an order of Chivalry, composed of the most generous and self-devoted of the rich, voluntarily dedicating themselves, like knights-errant of old, to the redressing of wrongs, and the protection of the weak and oppressed. He remarks, that oppression, in modern life, can seldom reach, or even venture to attack, the life or liberty of its victims (he forgets the case of domestic tyranny) but only their pecuniary means, and it is therefore by the purse chiefly that individuals can usefully interpose, as they formerly did by the sword. The occupation, however, of nearly all the rich, will be the direction of labour, and for this work they will be educated. Reciprocally, it is in M. Comte's opinion essential, that all directors of labour should be rich. Capital (in which he includes land) should be concentrated in a few holders, so that every capitalist may conduct the most extensive operations which one mind is capable of superintending. This is not only demanded by good economy, in order to take the utmost advantage of a rare kind of practical ability, but it necessarily follows from the principle of M. Comte's scheme, which regards a capitalist as a public functionary. M. Comte's conception of the relation of capital to society is essentially that of Socialists, but he would bring about by education and opinion, what they aim at effecting by positive institution. The owner of capital is by no means to consider himself its absolute proprietor. Legally he is not to be controlled in his dealings with it, for power should be in proportion to responsibility: but it does not belong to him for his own use; he is merely entrusted by society with a portion of the accumulations made by the past providence of mankind, to be administered for the benefit of the present generation and of posterity, under the obligation of preserving them unimpaired, and handing them down, more or less augmented, to our successors. He is not entitled to dissipate them, or divert them from the service of Humanity to his own pleasures. Nor has he a moral right to consume on him-

self the whole even of his profits. He is bound in conscience, if they exceed his reasonable wants, to employ the surplus in improving either the efficiency of his operations, or the physical and mental condition of his labourers. The portion of his gains which he may appropriate to his own use, must be decided by himself, under accountability to opinion; and opinion ought not to look very narrowly into the matter, nor hold him to a rigid reckoning for any moderate indulgence of luxury or ostentation; since under the great responsibilities that will be imposed on him, the position of an employer of labour will be so much less desirable, to any one in whom the instincts of pride and vanity are not strong, than the "heureuse insouciance" of a labourer, that those instincts must be to a certain degree indulged, or no one would undertake the office. With this limitation, every employer is a mere administrator of his possessions, for his workpeople and for society at large. If he indulges himself lavishly, without reserving an ample remuneration for all who are employed under him, he is morally culpable, and will incur sacerdotal admonition. This state of things necessarily implies that capital should be in few hands, because, as M. Comte observes, without great riches, the obligations which society ought to impose, could not be fulfilled without an amount of personal abnegation that it would be hopeless to expect. If a person is conspicuously qualified for the conduct of an industrial enterprise, but destitute of the fortune necessary for undertaking it, M. Comte recommends that he should be enriched by subscription, or, in cases of sufficient importance, by the State. Small landed proprietors and capitalists, and the middle classes altogether, he regards as a parasitic growth, destined to disappear, the best of the body becoming large capitalists, and the remainder proletaires. Society will consist only of rich and poor, and it will be the business of the rich to make the best possible lot for the poor. The remuneration of the labourers will continue, as at present, to be a matter of voluntary arrangement between them and their employers, the last resort on either side being refusal of co-operation, "refus de concours," in other words, a strike or a lock-out; with the sacerdotal order for mediators in case of need. But though wages are to be an affair of free contract, their standard is not to be the competition of the market, but the application of the products in equitable proportion between the wants of the labourers and the wants and dignity of the employer. As it is one of M. Comte's principles that a question cannot be usefully proposed without an attempt at a solution, he gives his ideas from the beginning as to what the normal income of a labouring family should be. They are on such a scale, that until some great extension shall have taken place in the scientific resources of

mankind, it is no wonder he thinks it necessary to limit as much as possible the number of those who are to be supported by what is left of the produce. In the first place the labourer's dwelling, which is to consist of seven rooms, is, with all that it contains, to be his own property: it is the only landed property he is allowed to possess, but every family should be the absolute owner of all things which are destined for its exclusive use. Lodging being thus independently provided for, and education and medical attendance being secured gratuitously by the general arrangements of society, the pay of the labourer is to consist of two portions, the one monthly, and of fixed amount, the other weekly, and proportioned to the produce of his labour. The former M. Comte fixes at 100 francs (£4) for a month of 28 days; being £52 a year: and the rate of piece-work should be such as to make the other part amount to an average of seven francs (5s. 6d.) per working day.

Agreeably to M. Comte's rule, that every public functionary should appoint his successor, the capitalist has unlimited power of transmitting his capital by gift or bequest, after his own death or retirement. In general it will be best bestowed entire upon one person, unless the business will advantageously admit of subdivision. He will naturally leave it to one or more of his sons, if sufficiently qualified; and rightly so, hereditary being, in M. Comte's opinion, preferable to acquired wealth, as being usually more generously administered. But, merely as his sons, they have no moral right to it. M. Comte here recognises another of the principles, on which we believe that the constitution of regenerated society will rest. He maintains (as others in the present generation have done) that the father owes nothing to his son, except a good education, and pecuniary aid sufficient for an advantageous start in life: that he is entitled, and may be morally bound, to leave the bulk of his fortune to some other properly selected person or persons, whom he judges likely to make a more beneficial use of it. This is the first of three important points, in which M. Comte's theory of the family, wrong as we deem it in its foundations, is in advance of prevailing theories and existing institutions. The second, is the reintroduction of adoption, not only in default of children, but to fulfil the purposes, and satisfy the sympathetic wants, to which such children as there are may happen to be inadequate. The third is a most important point—the incorporation of domestics as substantive members of the family. There is hardly any part of the present constitution of society more essentially vicious, and morally injurious to both parties, than the relation between masters and servants. To make this a really human, and a moral relation, is one of the principal desiderata in social improvement. The feeling of the vulgar of all classes, that domestic service has anything in it

peculiarly mean, is a feeling than which there is none meaner. In the feudal ages, youthful nobles of the highest rank thought themselves honoured by officiating in what is now called a menial capacity, about the persons of superiors of both sexes, for whom they felt respect: and, as M. Comte observes, there are many families who can in no other way so usefully serve Humanity, as by ministering to the bodily wants of other families, called to functions which require the devotion of all their thoughts. We will add, by way of supplement to M. Comte's doctrine, that much of the daily physical work of a household, even in opulent families, if silly notions of degradation, common to all ranks, did not interfere, might very advantageously be performed by the family itself, at least by its younger members; to whom it would give healthful exercise of the bodily powers, which has now to be sought in modes far less useful, and also a familiar acquaintance with the real work of the world, and a moral willingness to take their share of its burthens, which, in the great majority of the better-off classes, do not now get cultivated at all.

We have still to speak of the directly political functions of the rich, or, as M. Comte terms them, the patriciate. The entire political government is to be in their hands. First, however, the existing nations are to be broken up into small republics, the largest not exceeding the size of Belgium, Portugal, or Tuscany; any larger nationalities being incompatible with the unity of wants and feelings, which is required, not only to give due strength to the sentiment of patriotism (always strongest in small states), but to prevent undue compression; for no territory, M. Comte thinks, can without oppression be governed from a distant centre. Algeria, therefore, is to be given up to the Arabs, Corsica to its inhabitants, and France proper is to be, before the end of the century, divided into seventeen republics, corresponding to the number of considerable towns: Paris, however, (need it be said?) succeeding to Rome as the religious metropolis of the world. Ireland, Scotland, and Wales, are to be separated from England, which is of course to detach itself from all its transmarine dependencies. In each state thus constituted, the powers of government are to be vested in a triumvirate of the three principal bankers, who are to take the foreign, home, and financial departments respectively. How they are to conduct the government and remain bankers, does not clearly appear; but it must be intended that they should combine both offices, for they are to receive no pecuniary remuneration for the political one. Their power is to amount to a dictatorship (M. Comte's own word): and he is hardly justified in saying that he gives political power to the rich, since he gives it over the rich and every one else, to three individuals of the number, not even chosen by the

rest, but named by their predecessors. As a check on the dictators, there is to be complete freedom of speech, writing, printing, and voluntary association; and all important acts of the government, except in cases of emergency, are to be announced sufficiently long beforehand to ensure ample discussion. This, and the influence of the Spiritual Power, are the only guarantees provided against misgovernment. When we consider that the complete dominion of every nation of mankind is thus handed over to only four men—for the Spiritual Power is to be under the absolute and undivided control of a single Pontiff for the whole human race—one is appalled at the picture of entire subjugation and slavery, which is recommended to us as the last and highest result of the evolution of Humanity. But the conception rises to the terrific, when we are told the mode in which the single High Priest of Humanity is intended to use his authority.* It is the most warning example we know, into what frightful aberrations a powerful and comprehensive mind may be led by the exclusive following out of a single idea.

The single idea of M. Comte, on this subject, is that the intellect should be wholly subordinated to the feelings; or, to translate the meaning out of sentimental into logical language, that the exercise of the intellect, as of all our other faculties, should have for its sole object the general good. Every other employment of it should be accounted not only idle and frivolous, but morally culpable. Being indebted wholly to Humanity for the cultivation to which we owe our mental powers, we are bound in return to consecrate them wholly to her service. Having made up his mind that this ought to be, there is with M. Comte but one step to concluding that the Grand Pontiff of Humanity must take care that it *shall* be; and on this foundation he organizes an elaborate system for the total suppression of all independent thought. He does not, indeed, invoke the arm of the law, or call for any prohibitions. The clergy are to have no monopoly. Any one else may cultivate science if he can, may write and publish, if he can find readers, may give private instruction if anybody consents to receive it. But since the sacerdotal body will absorb into itself all but those whom it deems either intellectually or morally unequal to the vocation, all rival teachers will, as he calculates, be so discredited beforehand, that their competition will not be formidable. Within the body itself, the High Priest has it in his power to make sure that there shall be no opinions, and no exercise of mind, but such as he approves; for he alone decides the duties and local residence of all its members, and can even eject them from the body. Before electing to be under this rule, we feel a natural curiosity to know in what manner it is to be exercised. Humanity has only yet had one Pontiff, whose mental

qualifications for the post are not likely to be often surpassed, M. Comte himself. It is of some importance to know what are the ideas of this High Priest, concerning the moral and religious government of the human intellect.

One of the doctrines which M. Comte most strenuously enforces in his later writings, is, that during the preliminary evolution of humanity, terminated by the foundation of Positivism, the free development of our forces of all kinds was the important matter, but that from this time forward the principal need is to regulate them. Formerly the danger was of their being insufficient, but henceforth, of their being abused. Let us express, in passing, our entire dissent from this doctrine. Whoever thinks that the wretched education which mankind as yet receive, calls forth their mental powers (except those of a select few) in a sufficient or even tolerable degree, must be very easily satisfied: and the abuse of them, far from becoming proportionally greater as knowledge and mental capacity increase, becomes rapidly less, provided always that the diffusion of those qualities keeps pace with their growth. The abuse of intellectual power is only to be dreaded, when society is divided between a few highly cultivated intellects and an ignorant and stupid multitude. But mental power is a thing which M. Comte does not want—or wants infinitely less than he wants submission and obedience. Of all the ingredients of human nature, he continually says, the intellect most needs to be disciplined and reined-in. It is the most turbulent, “le plus perturbateur,” of all the mental elements; more so than even the selfish instincts. Throughout the whole modern transition, beginning with ancient Greece, (for M. Comte tells us that we have always been in a state of revolutionary transition since then,) the intellect has been in a state of systematic insurrection against “le cœur.” The metaphysicians and literati (lettrés), after helping to pull down the old religion and social order, are rootedly hostile to the construction of the new, and desire only to prolong the existing scepticism and intellectual anarchy, which secure to them a cheap social ascendancy, without the labour of earning it by solid scientific preparation. The scientific class, from whom better might have been expected, are, if possible, worse. Void of enlarged views, despising all that is too large for their comprehension, devoted exclusively each to his special science, contemptuously indifferent to moral and political interests, their sole aim is to acquire an easy reputation, and in France (through paid Academies and professorships) personal lûcre, by pushing their sciences into idle and useless inquiries (speculations oiseuses), of no value to the real interests of mankind, and tending to divert the thoughts from them. One of the duties most incumbent on opinion and on the Spiritual Power, is to stigmatize as immoral, and effectually

suppress, these useless employments of the speculative faculties. All exercise of thought should be abstained from, which has not some beneficial tendency, some actual utility to mankind. M. Comte, of course, is not the man to say that it must be a merely material utility. If a speculation, though it has no doctrinal, has a logical value—if it throws any light on universal Method—it is still more deserving of cultivation than if its usefulness was merely practical: but, either as method or as doctrine, it must bring forth fruits to Humanity, otherwise it is not only contemptible, but criminal.

That there is a portion of truth at the bottom of all this, we should be the last to deny. No respect is due to any employment of the intellect which does not tend to the good of mankind. It is precisely on a level with any idle amusement, and should be condemned as waste of time, if carried beyond the limit within which amusement is permissible. And whoever devotes powers of thought which could render to Humanity services it urgently needs, to speculations and studies which it could dispense with, is liable to the discredit attaching to a well-grounded suspicion of caring little for Humanity. But who can affirm positively of any speculations, guided by right scientific methods, on subjects really accessible to the human faculties, that they are incapable of being of any use? Nobody knows what knowledge will prove to be of use, and what is destined to be useless. The most that can be said is that some kinds are of more certain, and above all, of more present utility than others. How often the most important practical results have been the remote consequence of studies which no one would have expected to lead to them! Could the mathematicians, who, in the schools of Alexandria, investigated the properties of the ellipse, have foreseen that nearly two thousand years afterwards their speculations would explain the solar system, and a little later would enable ships safely to circumnavigate the earth? Even in M. Comte's opinion, it is well for mankind that, in those early days, knowledge was thought worth pursuing for its own sake. Nor has the "foundation of Positivism," we imagine, so far changed the conditions of human existence, that it should now be criminal to acquire, by observation and reasoning, a knowledge of the facts of the universe, leaving to posterity to find a use for it. Even in the last two or three years, has not the discovery of new metals, which may prove important even in the practical arts, arisen from one of the investigations which M. Comte most unequivocally condemns as idle, the research into the internal constitution of the sun? How few, moreover, of the discoveries which have changed the face of the world, either were or could have been arrived at by investigations aiming directly at the object! Would the mariner's

compass ever have been found by direct efforts for the improvement of navigation? Should we have reached the electric telegraph by any amount of striving for a means of instantaneous communication, if Franklin had not identified electricity with lightning, and Ampère with magnetism? The most apparently insignificant archæological or geological fact, is often found to throw a light on human history, which M. Comte, the basis of whose social philosophy is history, should be the last person to disparage. The direction of the entrance to the great Pyramid of Ghizeh, by showing the position of the circumpolar stars at the time when it was built, is the best evidence we even now have of the immense antiquity of Egyptian civilization. The one point on which M. Comte's doctrine has some colour of reason, is the case of sidereal astronomy: so little knowledge of it being really accessible to us, and the connexion of that little with any terrestrial interests being, according to all our means of judgment, infinitesimal. It is certainly difficult to conceive how any considerable benefit to humanity can be derived from a knowledge of the motions of the double stars: should these ever become important to us it will be in so prodigiously remote an age, that we can afford to remain ignorant of them until, at least, all our moral, political, and social difficulties have been settled. Yet the discovery that gravitation extends even to those remote regions, gives some additional strength to the conviction of the universality of natural laws; and the habitual meditation on such vast objects and distances is not without an æsthetic usefulness, by kindling and exalting the imagination, the worth of which in itself, and even its reaction on the intellect, M. Comte is quite capable of appreciating. He would reply, however, that there are better means of accomplishing these purposes. In the same spirit he condemns the study even of the solar system, when extended to any planets but those which are visible to the naked eye, and which alone exert an appreciable gravitative influence on the earth. Even the perturbations he thinks it idle to study, beyond a mere general conception of them, and thinks that astronomy may well limit its domain to the motions and mutual action of the earth, sun, and moon. He looks for a similar expurgation of all the other sciences. In one passage he expressly says that the greater part of the researches which are really accessible to us are idle and useless. He would pare down the dimensions of all the sciences as narrowly as possible. He is continually repeating that no science, as an abstract study, should be carried further than is necessary to lay the foundation for the science next above it, and so ultimately for moral science, the principal purpose of them all. Any further extension of the mathematical and physical sciences should be merely "episodic;" limited to what may from time to time be

demanded by the requirements of industry and the arts; and should be left to the industrial classes, except when they find it necessary to apply to the sacerdotal order for some additional development of scientific theory. This, he evidently thinks, would be a rare contingency, most physical truths sufficiently concrete and real for practice being empirical. Accordingly in estimating the number of clergy necessary for France, Europe, and our entire planet (for his forethought extends thus far), he proportions it solely to their moral and religious attributions (overlooking, by the way, even their medical); and leaves nobody with any time to cultivate the sciences, except abortive candidates for the priestly office, who having been refused admittance into it for insufficiency in moral excellence or in strength of character, may be thought worth retaining as "pensioners" of the sacerdotal order, on account of their theoretic abilities.

It is no exaggeration to say, that M. Comte gradually acquired a real hatred for scientific and all purely intellectual pursuits, and was bent on retaining no more of them than was strictly indispensable. The greatest of his anxieties is lest people should reason, and seek to know, more than enough. He regards all abstraction and all reasoning as morally dangerous, by developing an inordinate pride (*orgueil*), and still more, by producing dryness (*sécheresse*). Abstract thought, he says, is not a wholesome occupation for more than a small number of human beings, nor of them for more than a small part of their time. Art, which calls the emotions into play along with and more than the reason, is the only intellectual exercise really adapted to human nature. It is nevertheless indispensable that the chief theories of the various abstract sciences, together with the modes in which those theories were historically and logically arrived at, should form a part of universal education: for, first, it is only thus that the methods can be learnt, by which to attain the results sought by the moral and social sciences: though we cannot perceive that M. Comte got at his own moral and social results by those processes. Secondly, the principal truths of the subordinate sciences are necessary to the systematization (still systematization!) of our conceptions, by binding together our notions of the world in a set of propositions, which are coherent, and a sufficiently correct representation of fact for our practical wants. Thirdly, a familiar knowledge of the invariable laws of natural phenomena is a great elementary lesson of submission, which, he is never weary of saying, is the first condition both of morality and of happiness. For these reasons, he would cause to be taught, from the age of fourteen to that of twenty-one, to all persons, rich and poor, girls or youths, a knowledge of the whole series of abstract sciences, such as none but the most highly instructed persons

now possess, and of a far more systematic and philosophical character than is usually possessed even by them. (N.B.—They are to learn, during the same years, Greek and Latin, having previously, between the ages of seven and fourteen, learnt the five principal modern languages, to the degree necessary for reading, with due appreciation, the chief poetical compositions in each.) But they are to be taught all this, not only without encouraging, but stifling as much as possible, the examining and questioning spirit. The disposition which should be encouraged is that of receiving all on the authority of the teacher. The Positivist faith, even in its scientific part, is *la foi démontrable*, but ought by no means to be *la foi toujours démontrée*. The pupils have no business to be oversolicitous about proof. The teacher should not even present the proofs to them in a complete form, or as proofs. The object of instruction is to make them understand the doctrines themselves, perceive their mutual connexion, and form by means of them a consistent and *systematized* conception of nature. As for the demonstrations, it is rather desirable than otherwise that even theorists should forget them, retaining only the results. Among all the aberrations of scientific men, M. Comte thinks none greater than the pedantic anxiety they show for complete proof, and perfect rationalization of scientific processes. It ought to be enough that the doctrines afford an explanation of phenomena, consistent with itself and with known facts, and that the processes are justified by their fruits. This over-anxiety for proof, he complains, is breaking down, by vain scruples, the knowledge which seemed to have been attained; witness the present state of chemistry. The demand of proof for what has been accepted by Humanity, is itself a mark of “distrust, if not hostility, to the sacerdotal order” (the naïveté of this would be charming, if it were not deplorable), and is a revolt against the traditions of the human race. So early had the new High Priest adopted the feelings and taken up the inheritance of the old. One of his favourite aphorisms is the strange one, that the living are more and more governed by the dead. As is not uncommon with him, he introduces the dictum in one sense, and uses it in another. What he at first means by it, is that as civilization advances, the sum of our possessions, physical and intellectual, is due in a decreasing proportion to ourselves, and in an increasing one to our progenitors. The use he makes of it is, that we should submit ourselves more and more implicitly to the authority of previous generations, and suffer ourselves less and less to doubt their judgment, or test by our own reason the grounds of their opinions. The unwillingness of the human intellect and conscience, in their present state of “anarchy,” to sign their own abdication, he calls

“the insurrection of the living against the dead.” To this complexion has Positive Philosophy come at last!

Worse, however, remains to be told. M. Comte selects a hundred volumes of science, philosophy, poetry, history, and general knowledge, which he deems a sufficient library for every positivist, even of the theoretic order, and actually proposes a systematic holocaust of books in general—it would almost seem of all books except these. Even that to which he shows most indulgence, poetry, except the very best, is to undergo a similar fate, with the reservation of select passages, on the ground that, poetry being intended to cultivate our instinct of ideal perfection, any kind of it that is less than the best is worse than none. This imitation of the error, we will call it the crime, of the early Christians—and in an exaggerated form, for even they destroyed only those writings of pagans or heretics which were directed against themselves—is the one thing in M. Comte’s projects which merits real indignation. When once M. Comte has decided, all evidence on the other side, nay the very historical evidence on which he grounded his decision, had better perish. When mankind have enlisted under his banner, they must burn their ships. There is, though in a less offensive form, the same overweening presumption in a suggestion he makes, that all species of animals and plants which are useless to man should be systematically rooted out. As if any one could presume to assert that the smallest weed may not, as knowledge advances, be found to have some property serviceable to man. When we consider that the united power of the whole human race cannot reproduce a species once eradicated—that what is once done, in the extirpation of races, can never be repaired; one can only be thankful that amidst all which the past rulers of mankind have to answer for, they have never come up to the measure of the great regenerator of Humanity; mankind have not yet been under the rule of one who assumes that he knows all there is to be known, and that when he has put himself at the head of humanity, the book of human knowledge may be closed.

Of course M. Comte does not make this assumption consistently. He does not imagine that he actually possesses all knowledge, but only that he is an infallible judge what knowledge is worth possessing. He does not believe that mankind have reached in all directions the extreme limits of useful and laudable scientific enquiry. He thinks there is a large scope for it still, in adding to our power over the external world, but chiefly in perfecting our own physical, intellectual, and moral nature. He holds that all our mental strength should be economized, for the pursuit of this object in the mode leading most directly to the end. With this view, some one problem should always be

selected, the solution of which would be more important than any other to the interests of humanity, and upon this the entire intellectual resources of the theoretic mind should be concentrated, until it is either resolved, or has to be given up as insoluble: after which mankind should go on to another, to be pursued with similar exclusiveness. The selection of this problem of course rests with the sacerdotal order, or in other words, with the High Priest. We should then see the whole speculative intellect of the human race simultaneously at work on one question, by orders from above, as a French minister of public instruction once boasted that a million of boys were saying the same lesson during the same half-hour in every town and village of France. The reader will be anxious to know, how much better and more wisely the human intellect will be applied under this absolute monarchy, and to what degree this system of government will be preferable to the present anarchy, in which every theorist does what is intellectually right in his own eyes. M. Comte has not left us in ignorance on this point. He gives us ample means of judging. The Pontiff of Positivism informs us what problem, in his opinion, should be selected before all others for this united pursuit.

What this problem is, we must leave those who are curious on the subject to learn from the treatise itself. When they have done so, they will be qualified to form their own opinion of the amount of advantage which the general good of mankind would be likely to derive, from exchanging the present "dispersive speciality" and "intellectual anarchy" for the subordination of the intellect to the *cœur*, personified in a High Priest, prescribing a single problem for the undivided study of the theoretic mind.

We have given a sufficient general idea of M. Comte's plan for the regeneration of human society, by putting an end to anarchy, and "systematizing" human thought and conduct under the direction of feeling. But an adequate conception will not have been formed of the height of his self-confidence, until something more has been told. Be it known, then, that M. Comte by no means proposes this new constitution of society for realization in the remote future. A complete plan of measures of transition is ready prepared, and he determines the year, before the end of the present century, in which the new spiritual and temporal powers will be installed, and the régime of our maturity will begin. He did not indeed calculate on converting to Positivism, within that time, more than a thousandth part of all the heads of families in Western Europe and its offshoots beyond the Atlantic. But he fixes the time necessary for the complete political establishment of Positivism at thirty-three years, divided into three periods, of seven, five, and twenty-one years respectively. At the expiration of seven, the direction of public education in France

would be placed in M. Comte's hands. In five years more, the Emperor Napoleon, or his successor, will resign his power to a provisional triumvirate, composed of three eminent proletaires of the positivist faith; for proletaires, though not fit for permanent rule, are the best agents of the transition, being the most free from the prejudices which are the chief obstacle to it. These rulers will employ the remaining twenty-one years in preparing society for its final constitution; and after duly installing the Spiritual Power, and effecting the decomposition of France into the seventeen republics before mentioned, will give over the temporal government of each to the normal dictatorship of the three bankers. A man may be deemed happy, but scarcely modest, who had such boundless confidence in his own powers of foresight, and expected so complete a triumph of his own ideas on the reconstitution of society within the possible limits of his lifetime. If he could live (he said) to the age of Fontenelle, or of Hobbes, or even of Voltaire, he should see all this realized, or as good as realized. He died, however, at sixty, without leaving any disciple sufficiently advanced to be appointed his successor. There is now a College, and a Director, of Positivism; but Humanity no longer possesses a High Priest.

What more remains to be said may be despatched more summarily. Its interest is philosophic rather than practical. In his four volumes of "Politique Positive," M. Comte revises and re-elaborates the scientific and historical expositions of his first treatise. His object is to systematize (again to systematize) knowledge from the human, or subjective point of view, the only one, he contends, from which a real synthesis is possible. For (he says) the knowledge attainable by us of the laws of the universe is at best fragmentary, and incapable of reduction to a real unity. An objective synthesis, the dream of Descartes and the best thinkers of old, is impossible. The laws of the real world are too numerous, and the manner of their working into one another too intricate, to be, as a general rule, correctly traced and represented by our reason. The only connecting principle in our knowledge is its relation to our wants, and it is upon that we must found our systematization. The answer to this is, first, that there is no necessity for an universal synthesis; and secondly, that the same arguments may be used against the possibility of a complete subjective, as of a complete objective systematization. A subjective synthesis must consist in the arrangement and co-ordination of all useful knowledge, on the basis of its relation to human wants and interests. But those wants and interests are, like the laws of the universe, extremely multifarious, and the order of preference among them in all their different gradations (for it varies according to the degree of each)

cannot be cast into precise general propositions. M. Comte's subjective synthesis consists only in eliminating from the sciences everything that he deems useless, and presenting as far as possible every theoretical investigation as the solution of a practical problem. To this, however, he cannot consistently adhere; for, in every science, the theoretic truths are much more closely connected with one another, than with the human purposes which they eventually serve, and can only be made to cohere in the intellect by being, to a great degree, presented as if they were truths of pure reason, irrespective of any practical application.

There are many things eminently characteristic of M. Comte's second career, in this revision of the results of his first. Under the head of Biology, and for the better combination of that science with Sociology and Ethics, he found that he required a new system of Phrenology, being justly dissatisfied with that of Gall and his successors. Accordingly he set about constructing one *à priori*, grounded on the best enumeration and classification he could make of the elementary faculties of our intellectual, moral, and animal nature; to each of which he assigned an hypothetical place in the skull, the most conformable that he could to the few positive facts on the subject which he considered as established, and to the general presumption that functions which react strongly on one another must have their organs adjacent: leaving the localities avowedly to be hereafter verified, by anatomical and inductive investigation. There is considerable merit in this attempt, though it is liable to obvious criticisms, of the same nature as his own upon Gall. But the characteristic thing is, that while presenting all this as hypothesis waiting for verification, he could not have taken its truth more completely for granted if the verification had been made. In all that he afterwards wrote, every detail of his theory of the brain is as unhesitatingly asserted, and as confidently built upon, as any other doctrine of science. This is his first great attempt in the "Subjective Method," which, originally meaning only the subordination of the pursuit of truth to human uses, had already come to mean drawing truth itself from the fountain of his own mind. He had become, on the one hand, almost indifferent to proof, provided he attained theoretic coherency, and on the other, serenely confident that even the guesses which originated with himself could not but come out true.

There is one point in his later view of the sciences, which appears to us a decided improvement on his earlier. He adds to the six fundamental sciences of his original scale, a seventh under the name of Morals, forming the highest step of the ladder, immediately after Sociology: remarking that it might, with still

greater propriety, be termed Anthropology, being the science of individual human nature, a study, when rightly understood, more special and complicated than even that of Society. For it is obliged to take into consideration the diversities of constitution and temperament (*la réaction cérébrale des viscères végétatifs*) the effects of which, still very imperfectly understood, are highly important in the individual, but in the theory of society may be neglected, because, differing in different persons, they neutralize one another on the large scale. This is a remark worthy of M. Comte in his best days; and the science thus conceived is, as he says, the true scientific foundation of the art of Morals (and indeed of the art of human life) which, therefore, may, both philosophically and didactically, be properly combined with it.

His philosophy of general history is recast, and in many respects changed; we cannot but say, greatly for the worse. He gives much greater development than before to the Fetishistic, and to what he terms the Theocratic, periods. To the Fetishistic view of nature he evinces a partiality, which appears strange in a Positive philosopher. But the reason is that Fetish-worship is a religion of the feelings, and not at all of the intelligence. He regards it as cultivating universal love: as a practical fact it cultivates much rather universal fear. He looks upon Fetishism as much more akin to Positivism than any of the forms of Theology, inasmuch as these consider matter as inert, and moved only by forces, natural and supernatural, exterior to itself: while Fetishism resembles Positivism in conceiving matter as spontaneously active, and errs only by not distinguishing activity from life. As if the superstition of the Fetishist consisted only in believing that the objects which produce the phenomena of nature involuntarily, produce them voluntarily. The Fetishist thinks not merely that his Fetish is alive, but that it can help him in war, can cure him of diseases, can grant him prosperity, or afflict him with all the contrary evils. Therein consists the lamentable effect of fetishism—its degrading and prostrating influence on the feelings and conduct, its conflict with all genuine experience, and antagonism to all real knowledge of nature.

M. Comte had also no small sympathy with the Oriental theocracies, as he calls the sacerdotal castes, who indeed often deserved it by their early services to intellect and civilization; by the aid they gave to the establishment of regular government, the valuable though empirical knowledge they accumulated, and the height to which they helped to carry some of the useful arts. M. Comte admits that they became oppressive, and that the prolongation of their ascendancy came to be incompatible with further improvement. But he ascribes this to their having arrogated to themselves

the temporal government, which, so far as we have any authentic information, they never did. The reason why the sacerdotal corporations became oppressive, was because they were organized: because they attempted the "unity" and "systematization" so dear to M. Comte, and allowed no science and no speculation, except with their leave and under their direction. M. Comte's sacerdotal order, which, in his system, has all the power that ever they had, would be oppressive in the same manner: with no variation but that which arises from the altered state of society and of the human mind.

M. Comte's partiality to the theocracies is strikingly contrasted with his dislike of the Greeks, whom as a people he thoroughly detests, for their undue addiction to intellectual speculation, and considers to have been, by an inevitable fatality, morally sacrificed to the formation of a few great scientific intellects,—principally Aristotle, Archimedes, Apollonius, and Hipparchus. Any one who knows Grecian history as it can now be known, will be amazed at M. Comte's travestie of it, in which the vulgarest historical prejudices are accepted and exaggerated, to illustrate the mischiefs of intellectual culture left to its own guidance.

There is no need to analyze further M. Comte's second view of universal history. The best chapter is that on the Romans, to whom, because they were greater in practice than in theory, and for centuries worked together in obedience to a social sentiment (though only that of their country's aggrandizement), M. Comte is as favourably affected, as he is inimical to all but a small selection of eminent thinkers among the Greeks. The greatest blemish in this chapter is the idolatry of Julius Cæsar, whom M. Comte regards as one of the most illustrious characters in history, and of the greatest practical benefactors of mankind. Cæsar had many eminent qualities, but what he did to deserve such praise we are at a loss to discover, except subverting a free government: that merit, however, with M. Comte, goes a great way. It did not, in his former days, suffice to rehabilitate Napoleon, whose name and memory he regarded with a bitterness highly honourable to himself, and whose career he deemed one of the greatest calamities in modern history. But in his later writings these sentiments are considerably mitigated: he regards Napoleon as a more estimable "dictator" than Louis Philippe, and thinks that his greatest error was re-establishing the Academy of Sciences! That this should be said by M. Comte, and said of Napoleon, measures the depth to which his moral standard had fallen.

The last volume which he published, that on the Philosophy of Mathematics, is in some respects a still sadder picture of intellectual degeneracy than those which preceded it. After the admirable résumé of the subject in the first volume of his first

great work, we expected something of the very highest order when he returned to the subject for a more thorough treatment of it. But, being the commencement of a Synthèse Subjective, it contains, as might be expected, a great deal that is much more subjective than mathematical. Nor of this do we complain; but we little imagined of what nature this subjective matter was to be. M. Comte here joins together the two ideas, which, of all that he has put forth, are the most repugnant to the fundamental principles of Positive Philosophy. One of them is that on which we have just commented, the assimilation between Positivism and Fetishism. The other, of which we took notice in a former article, was the "liberté facultative" of shaping our scientific conceptions to gratify the demands not solely of objective truth, but of intellectual and æsthetic suitability. It would be an excellent thing, M. Comte thinks, if science could be deprived of its *sécheresse*, and directly associated with sentiment. Now it is impossible to prove that the external world, and the bodies composing it, are not endowed with feeling, and voluntary agency. It is therefore highly desirable that we should educate ourselves into imagining that they are. Intelligence it will not do to invest them with, for some distinction must be maintained between simple activity and life. But we may suppose that they feel what is done to them, and desire and will what they themselves do. Even intelligence, which we must deny to them in the present, may be attributed to them in the past. Before man existed, the earth, at that time an intelligent being, may have exerted "its physico-chemical activity so as to improve the astronomical order by changing its principal coefficients. Our planet may be supposed to have rendered its orbit less excentric, and thereby more habitable, by planning a long series of explosions, analogous to those from which, according to the best hypotheses, comets proceed. Judiciously reproduced, similar shocks may have rendered the inclination of the earth's axis better adapted to the future wants of the Grand Etre. A *fortiori* the Earth may have modified its own figure, which is only beyond our intervention because our spiritual ascendancy has not at its disposal a sufficient material force." The like may be conceived as having been done by each of the other planets, in concert, possibly, with the Earth and with one another. "In proportion as each planet improved its own condition, its life exhausted itself by excess of innervation; but with the consolation of rendering its self-devotion more efficacious, when the extinction of its special functions, first animal, and finally vegetative, reduced it to the universal attributes of feeling and activity."* This stuff, though he calls it fiction, he soon after speaks of as belief

* Synthèse Subjective, pp. 10, 11.

(croyance), to be greatly recommended, as at once satisfying our natural curiosity, and "perfecting our unity" (again unity!) by 'supplying the gaps in our scientific notions with poetic fictions, 'and developing sympathetic emotions and æsthetic inspirations: 'the world being conceived as aspiring to second mankind in 'ameliorating the universal order under the impulse of the Grand 'Etre." And he obviously intends that we should be trained to make these fantastical inventions permeate all our associations, until we are incapable of conceiving the world and Nature apart from them, and they become equivalent to, and are in fact transformed into, real beliefs.

Wretched as this is, it is singularly characteristic of M. Comte's later mode of thought. A writer might be excused for introducing into an avowed work of fancy this dance of the planets, and conception of an animated Earth. If finely executed, he might even be admired for it. No one blames a poet for ascribing feelings, purposes, and human propensities to flowers. Because a conception might be interesting, and perhaps edifying, in a poem, M. Comte would have it imprinted on the inmost texture of every human mind in ordinary prose. If the imagination were not taught its prescribed lesson equally with the reason, where would be Unity? "It is important that the domain of fiction should "become as *systematic* as that of demonstration, in order that their "mutual harmony may be conformable to their respective destinations, both equally directed towards the continual increase of "*unity*, personal and social."*

Nor is it enough to have created the Grand Fétiche (so he actually proposes to call the Earth) and to be able to include it and all concrete existence in our adoration along with the Grand Etre. It is necessary also to extend Positivist Fetishism to purely abstract existence; to "animate" the laws as well as the facts of nature. It is not sufficient to have made physics sentimental, mathematics must be made so too. This does not at first seem easy; but M. Comte finds the means of accomplishing it. His plan is, to make Space also an object of adoration, under the name of the Grand Milieu, and consider it as the representative of Fatality in general. "The final *unity* disposes us to cultivate "sympathy by developing our gratitude to whatever serves the "Grand Etre. It must dispose us to venerate the Fatality on "which reposes the whole aggregate of our existence." We should conceive this Fatality as having a fixed seat, and that seat must be considered to be Space; which should be conceived as possessing feeling, but not activity or intelligence. And in our abstract speculations we should imagine all our conceptions as located in

* Synthèse Subjective, pp. 11, 12.

free Space. Our images of all sorts, down to our geometrical diagrams, and even our cyphers and algebraic symbols, should always be figured to ourselves as written in space, and not on paper or any other material substance. M. Comte adds that they should be conceived as green on a white ground.

We cannot go on any longer with this trash. In spite of it all, the volume on mathematics is full of profound thoughts, and will be very suggestive to those who take up the subject after M. Comte. What deep meaning there is, for example, in the idea that the infinitesimal calculus is a conception analogous to the corpuscular hypothesis in physics; which last M. Comte has always considered as a logical artifice, not an opinion respecting matters of fact. The assimilation, as it seems to us, throws a flood of light on both conceptions; on the physical one still more than the mathematical. We might extract many ideas of similar, though none perhaps of equal, suggestiveness. But mixed with these, what pitiable *niaiseries!* One of his great points is the importance of the "moral and intellectual properties of numbers." He cultivates a superstitious reverence for some of them. The first three are sacred, *les nombres sacrés*: One being the type of all Synthesis, Two of all Combination, which he now says is always binary (in his first treatise he only said that we may usefully represent it to ourselves as being so) and Three of all Progression, which not only requires three terms, but as he now maintains, never ought to have any more. To these sacred numbers all our mental operations must be made, as far as possible, to adjust themselves. Next to them, he has a great partiality for the number seven; for these whimsical reasons: "Composed of two progressions followed by a synthesis, or "of one progression between two couples, the number seven, "coming next after the sum of the three sacred numbers, "determines the largest group which we can distinctly imagine. Reciprocally, it marks the limit of the divisions which "we can directly conceive in a magnitude of any kind." The number seven, therefore, must be foisted in wherever possible, and among other things, is to be made the basis of numeration, which is hereafter to be septimal instead of decimal: producing all the inconvenience of a change of system, not only without getting rid of, but greatly aggravating, the disadvantages of the existing one. But then, he says, it is absolutely necessary that the basis of numeration should be a prime number. All other people think it absolutely necessary that it should not, and regard the present basis as only objectionable in not being divisible enough. But M. Comte's puerile predilection for prime numbers almost passes belief. His reason is that they are the type of irreductibility: each of them is a kind of ultimate

arithmetical fact. This, to any one who knows M. Comte in his later aspects, is amply sufficient. Nothing can exceed his delight in anything which says to the human mind, Thus far shalt thou go and no farther. If prime numbers are precious, doubly prime numbers are doubly so; meaning those which are not only themselves prime numbers, but the number which marks their place in the series of prime numbers is a prime number. Still greater is the dignity of trebly prime numbers; when the number marking the place of this second number is also prime. The number thirteen fulfils these conditions: it is a prime number, it is the seventh prime number, and seven is the fifth prime number. Accordingly he has an outrageous partiality to the number thirteen. Though one of the most inconvenient of all small numbers, he insists on introducing it everywhere.

These strange conceits are connected with a highly characteristic example of M. Comte's frenzy for regulation. He cannot bear that anything should be left unregulated: there ought to be no such thing as hesitation; nothing should remain arbitrary, for *l'arbitraire* is always favourable to egoism. Submission to artificial prescriptions is as indispensable as to natural laws, and he boasts that under the reign of sentiment, human life may be made equally, and even more, regular than the courses of the stars. But the great instrument of exact regulation for the details of life is number: fixed numbers, therefore, should be introduced into all our conduct. M. Comte's first application of this system was to the correction of his own literary style. Complaint had been made, not undeservedly, that in his first great work, especially in the latter part of it, the sentences and paragraphs were long, clumsy, and involved. To correct this fault, of which he was aware, he imposed on himself the following rules. No sentence was to exceed two lines of his manuscript, equivalent to five of print. No paragraph was to consist of more than seven sentences. He further applied to his prose writing the rule of French versification which forbids a *hiatus* (the concurrence of two vowels), not allowing it to himself even at the break between two sentences or two paragraphs; nor did he permit himself ever to use the same word twice, either in the same sentence or in two consecutive sentences, though belonging to different paragraphs: with the exception of the monosyllabic auxiliaries.* All this is well enough, especially the first two precepts, and a good way of breaking through a bad habit. But M. Comte persuaded himself that any arbitrary restriction, though in no way emanating from, and therefore necessarily disturbing, the natural order and proportion of the thoughts, is a benefit in

* Preface to the fourth volume of the "Système de Politique Positive."

itself, and tends to improve style. If it renders composition vastly more difficult, he rejoices at it, as tending to confine writing to superior minds. Accordingly, in the *Synthèse Subjective*, he institutes the following "plan for all compositions of importance." "Every volume really capable of forming a distinct treatise" should consist of "seven chapters, besides the introduction and the conclusion; and each of these should be composed of three parts." Each third part of a chapter should be divided into "seven sections, each composed of seven groups of sentences, separated by the usual break of line. Normally formed, the section offers a central group of seven sentences, preceded and followed by three groups of five: the first section of each part reduces to three sentences three of its groups, symmetrically placed; the last section gives seven sentences to each of its extreme groups. These rules of composition make prose approach to the regularity of poetry, when combined with my previous reduction of the maximum length of a sentence to two manuscript or five printed lines, that is, 250 letters." "Normally constructed, great poems consist of thirteen cantos, decomposed into parts, sections, and groups like my chapters, saving the complete equality of the groups and of the sections." "This difference of structure between volumes of poetry and of philosophy is more apparent than real, for the introduction and the conclusion of a poem should comprehend six of its thirteen cantos," leaving, therefore, the cabalistic number seven for the body of the poem. And all this regulation not being sufficiently meaningless, fantastic, and oppressive, he invents an elaborate system for compelling each of his sections and groups to begin with a letter of the alphabet, determined beforehand, the letters being selected so as to compose words having "a synthetic or sympathetic signification," and as close a relation as possible to the section or part to which they are appropriated.

Others may laugh, but we could far rather weep at this melancholy decadence of a great intellect. M. Comte used to reproach his early English admirers with maintaining the "conspiracy of silence" concerning his later performances. The reader can now judge whether such reticence is not more than sufficiently explained by tenderness for his fame, and a conscientious fear of bringing undeserved discredit on the noble speculations of his earlier career.

M. Comte was accustomed to consider Descartes and Leibnitz as his principal precursors, and the only great philosophers (among many thinkers of high philosophic capacity) in modern times. It was to their minds that he considered his own to bear the nearest resemblance. Though we have not so lofty an opinion of any of the three as M. Comte had, we think the assimilation

just: these were, of all recorded thinkers, the two who bore most resemblance to M. Comte. They were like him in earnestness, like him, though scarcely equal to him, in confidence in themselves; they had the same extraordinary power of concatenation and co-ordination; they enriched human knowledge with great truths and great conceptions of method; they were, of all great scientific thinkers, the most consistent, and for that reason often the most absurd, because they shrunk from no consequences, however contrary to common sense, to which their premises appeared to lead. Accordingly their names have come down to us associated with grand thoughts, with most important discoveries, and also with some of the most extravagantly wild and ludicrously absurd conceptions and theories which ever were solemnly propounded by thoughtful men. We think M. Comte as great as either of these philosophers, and hardly more extravagant. Were we to speak our whole mind, we should call him superior to them: not intrinsically, but by the exertion of equal intellectual power in a more advanced state of human preparation, but also in an age less tolerant of palpable absurdities, and to which those he has committed, if not in themselves greater, at least appear more ridiculous.

J. S. M.

ART. II.—THE ANTI-SLAVERY REVOLUTION IN AMERICA.

1. *The American Conflict: A History of the Great Civil War in the United States of America, &c., &c.* By HORACE GREELEY. Illustrated by Portraits on Steel, Views, Maps, Diagrams of Battle Fields, &c. Vol. I. London: Bacon & Co. 1865.
2. *The Political History of the United States of America, during the Great Rebellion, &c., &c.* By EDWARD MCPHERSON, Clerk of the House of Representatives of the U. S. Washington: Philp & Solomons, (Trübner & Co.)
3. *History of the American War.* By Lieutenant-Colonel FLETCHER, Scots Fusilier Guards. Vol. I. (Bentley & Co.)
4. *Testimonies concerning Slavery.* By M. D. CONWAY, a Native of Virginia. Second edition. Chapman & Hall, 1865.
5. *The Confederate Secession.* By the MARQUESS of LOTHIAN. William Blackwood & Sons. 1864.

IF anything had been needed to confirm the instinct of those, who from the first have held the American war to be a final struggle between slavery and freedom, it would have been supplied in the character of the influence which that war has had upon the politics of other nations. The invisible rays of the war-spectrum have been potent enough on this side of the Atlantic, to affect profoundly the conditions of all popular struggles for political rights. At an early date, the American war became an English question; a question whose character is indicated in the less distinct class-division which occurred upon it, and whose depth may be gauged by the profound agitations by which its discussion has been attended. This discussion has been traceable here in disturbed meetings, in collisions, and some law-suits. Candidates have been broken upon or beneath it. It is not supposable, that a war turning upon any local or sectional question, involving no universal principle, or a tariff-war, should have stirred so deeply a foreign people, and a people somewhat noted for common-sense. It was felt by all, that the war was to be the crucial test of the principle of self-government amongst an Anglo-Saxon people; that if the United States could not maintain itself, it would be plausibly claimed as the bursting of "the

republican bubble ;" that if it should still fulfil its career as a Republic, the tide of reform in England, certainly, would steadily follow all the phases of its waxing strength.

The classes in England which espoused the cause of the South, entered upon as hopeless a task as their allies across the water. Even had the American Republic failed, it would have been seen to be the result of so much *anti*-republicanism as it had retained among its institutions ; and, instead of bolstering up aristocratic interests or theories, it would have been a terribly impressive lesson in favour of the inviolability of the rights of the lowest, and a powerful testimony to human equality. But if they could gain nothing in any event of the American war, they may yet find that they could lose much at home by assuming an attitude of rebellion against the established principles and most sacred feelings of the English people. We know that it is the habit in some quarters to deny indignantly that those who sympathised with the South sympathised with slavery. It is perhaps true that our privileged classes would reprove such a vicious excess of their principle as slavery ; but it is plainly not true, that the general triumph of slavery would not seem to them as dreadful as the general triumph of democracy. The willingness of the *Times* newspaper, at one time during this struggle, to defend slavery on scriptural grounds ; the proclamation of a leading weekly journal, that the negro was now "found out," and proved unfit to be free ; and the absence of any protest against Southern slavery by the friends of secession here,—are facts which have fewer off-sets than we could desire. It is true that these gentlemen have, with a degree of unfairness which only the proverbially wide allowance of war can excuse, brought forward everything, except slavery, as the cause and question of the American war ; the traditions and convictions of our people made necessary so much stratagem ; but there have not been wanting important avowals, which, whilst showing how far reactionism has penetrated in certain directions, reveal also how universally the cause of the Americans of the North is recognised as being identified with humanity.

The Marquess of Lothian, starting out to prove that the civil war in America originated in difficulties arising from temperament, the manner of electing presidents, and above all, the tariff, is yet, at every step, forced to make admissions, which show that he knows the true nature of the conflict. He tells us, (p. 8) in defending the Southerners from the charge of having provoked the war, that "all the provocation" came "from the Northern abolitionists." Again, (p. 23) "The Southerners made sacrifices for the sake of the Union, at their own expense : the Northerners made theirs at the expense of the negro ;" the inevitable

deduction from which is that the South was continually making demands favourable to slavery, which the North conceded; the Marquess forgetting, in the eagerness of the thrust, that his sword is two-edged. And to complete the matter, the South is acknowledged (p. 83) to have become entirely identified with the institution: "what had been regarded as an unavoidable evil came to be regarded as a national palladium." But there is no shrinking on that score in the mind of the Marquess. He does not even affect to conceal his contempt for abolitionism. Speaking of New England, he describes it scornfully, as full of "Isms," as welcoming notions which the most visionary dreamers of Europe would reject, and then adds (p. 81)—"It could hardly have been expected, that in such a country the doctrine of abolitionism should have had no place." The tone of all this is unmistakable. We quote these sentences, not to reply to them, but as indicating that those who trust in oppression throughout the world, are no more deceived by all the outcries of the South about "independence," than are those working men of the North, who think that any true theory of independence would at once have shown its genuineness by striking off the chains of its own forging. The magnitude and depth of the American struggle is thus clearly disclosed; and if the Pope, the Emperor of the French, and the class in England represented by the Marquess of Lothian, instinctively recognised their friends in the slaveholder and planter, the people of Europe have only additional reasons to feel in the striking down of that working man, who—having fulfilled the conditions of superiority, was supported by the people of the United States as their president, in the name of liberty and equality—a blow aimed at their own hearts, and at every hope that is leading them onward and upward.

The Confederates have appealed to the world for sympathy as revolutionists for their independence, and have been never weary of comparing the attitude of the North to that of George III., toward the American colonies in former times. Undoubtedly the civil war was one stage of a revolution, nor is it wonderful that, for the moment, the secession movement gained the applause which the world is not slow in yielding to those who strike for liberty, especially if they strike pluckily, as the Southerners certainly did. But this claim could not stand the test of the sober second thought which has followed that almost critical familiarity with the antecedents and conditions of the struggle, which mankind soon reached as one of the results of the war itself. It became sufficiently plain, that George III. in this case was the evil institution of the South, which that king did so much to foster, and which came at last to be a more formidable despot to America than any king could have been; and the real revolu-

tionists, those who inaugurated and resolutely sustained that anti-slavery revolution, which was meant to be peaceful, but which the Southerners forced to become violent. The Southern movement was thus only a rebellion against a revolution—and that a revolution for liberty and justice. To illustrate this fact, and to trace this new American revolution from its faint beginnings to its present condition and prospect, is our purpose in this article.

In the first volume of Mr. Greeley's History, we have traced, with wonderful clearness and force, by one who has been intimately associated with the political struggles which preceded the war for at least a quarter of a century, the chain of causes which are consummated in the present state of affairs. The essence of every important document from the formation of the Government, and the practical bearing of every event, are succinctly stated; and if we may admire the industry which has enabled the Editor of the leading daily newspaper in America to do this at such a time, we may still more admire the spirit of fairness and directness, which are the chief characteristics of his very valuable work. None who read it can wonder at the almost unexampled favour with which it has been received. This volume ends at a point immediately preceding the Peninsular Campaign of General M'Clellan, in Virginia. Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, looking at the whole matter with the eye of a soldier, passes impatiently and blunderingly over the causes of the war, which he deals with in a preliminary chapter, and carries his review of the course of military events down to the time of the advance of M'Clellan to the Chickahominy, and immediately preceding the disastrous battles before Richmond, which led to the inglorious retirement and ultimate downfall of that commander. Next to Mr. Greeley's work, the *Political History*, by the Clerk of the House of Representatives, must be regarded as the most valuable repository for the future historian. It includes in one volume a classified summary of all important public documents, and of legislation, in both the Washington and Richmond Capitals, from November, 1860, to July, 1864. These works, therefore, enable us to comprehend the parallel military and political events and forces which between them have already formed a characteristic portion of the American epoch, which they promise to consummate.

The construction of a government for the colonies, which had declared and maintained their independence of England, began under a natural reaction. Washington, in a letter to Henry Laurens (July 10, 1782) wrote: "That spirit of freedom, which, at the commencement of this contest, would have gladly sacrificed everything to the attainment of its object, has long since

subsided, and every selfish passion has taken its place. It is not the public but private interest which influences the generality of mankind, nor can the Americans any longer boast of an exception." This was, as we have said, natural; the ravages of war, and the debt created by it, must make trade paramount, and under that and the vices which follow in the train of war, the fiery lava of revolution must cool down and harden into the provisions of self-interest and the enactments of economy. A late Conservative orator of New England sneered at the Declaration of Independence as "the passionate manifesto of a revolutionary war," and appealed from its "glittering generalities" to the wary "compromises of the Constitution;" it has only been amid the fires of another revolution that those glittering generalities have been revealed as, to use Mr. Emerson's phrase, "blazing ubiquitousities." The great motives which prevailed to bring about the Convention of 1787, whose object was to supersede the loose articles of confederation and establish "a more perfect Union," were apparently the greater security of all economic interests, and a more complete combination against any attempt at a recovery of the States on the part of England. At this time, Massachusetts was the only State that held no slaves. By the census of 1790, there was a population in America of a little over 3,000,000, of which nearly 700,000 were slaves, whose relative distribution is shown in the following summary, taken from the same census :—

North.		South.	
New Hampshire	158	Delaware	8,887
Vermont	17	Maryland	103,036
Rhode Island	952	Virginia	293,427
Connecticut	2,759	North Carolina	100,572
Massachusetts	None	South Carolina	107,094
New York	21,324	Georgia	29,264
New Jersey	11,423	Kentucky	11,830
Pennsylvania	3,737	Tennessee	3,417
Total	40,870	Total	657,527

There is ample proof that slavery was never a source of wealth in the Northern States, and that the possession of slaves was rather coveted as an aristocratic distinction. Bancroft has also shown that the Northern slaves were carefully protected under the same roof with the master and his family. There were, indeed, many points in which their condition might be compared to that of the *clients* of ancient Rome. In the South, their treatment was already characterised by those cruelties and degradations which elicited the strong denunciations of the system which are to be found in the works of Jefferson, Washington,

and other eminent men who lived in the South. There seems, however, to have been a concurrent testimony as to the evil of the institution, and an implied agreement that each State should, more or less gradually, abolish it. The Northern States were busily engaged in this work of Emancipation at the time of the formation of the Constitution. Vermont framed a State Constitution in 1777, and embodied it in a Bill of Rights, whereof the first article precluded slavery. Massachusetts framed her Constitution in 1780, containing a Declaration of Rights, almost a paraphrase of the Declaration of Independence, which was held by the Supreme Court of that State, on the first case that arose, to have abolished slavery entirely. In like manner, New Hampshire was held to have abolished slavery by her Constitution, framed in 1783. Pennsylvania passed an Act, March 1, 1780, by which all persons born in that State after that day were to be free at the age of 28. Rhode Island provided that all persons born after March, 1784, should be free. Connecticut, in 1784, passed an Act of Gradual Emancipation. New York provided for Gradual Emancipation in 1799. In 1817 another Act was passed, providing that there should be no slavery in that State after July 4, 1827, an act by which 10,000 slaves were at once liberated. New Jersey passed an Act in 1804, designed to put an end to slavery, which was so slow, however, in its action that even so late as 1840 the census reported 674 slaves as still in that State. Nearly all of these Acts of Emancipation are accompanied by the prohibition, under severe penalties, of the exportation of slaves. This is a sufficient reply to that slander of the Northern States which declares that they "sold their slaves South and *then* abolished slavery." This statement—for which not a shadow of authority has been ever adduced—is made by the Marquess of Lothian concerning Massachusetts:—

"At the time of the Convention (i. e. of 1787) slavery was not the distinguishing mark between North and South, for the Northern states had slaves just as much as their Southern neighbours had.* There was one exception, and only one. Massachusetts had no slaves. That canny state had come to the perfectly correct conclusion that in her climate slave labour was unprofitable, and that her negroes were an inconvenience. So she had got rid of the 'peculiar institution' by converting them from slaves into . . . freemen? No; into cash."—p. 26.

He elsewhere says: "The first American ship that ever took part in this [slave] traffic sailed from the port of Boston." Though the fame of Massachusetts does not require a vindication from these charges, the recklessness of such a statement, made by a

* Compare the statistics of slavery in 1790, quoted above with this statement of the Marquess.

member of the English nobility, merits the severe reproof which a statement of the simple facts will best administer. At a time (1645) when the conscience of the world was as yet asleep so far as the slave-trade was concerned, though one or two Popes had denounced it, a ship of one Thomas Keyser and one James Smith, sailed "for Guinea to trade for negroes." At once throughout Massachusetts a cry was raised against the two men as malefactors and murderers; Richard Saltonstall, a magistrate, denounced the act as "expressly contrary to the law of God and the law of the country;" the guilty men were committed for the offence; and after advice with the elders, the representatives of the people, bearing "witness against the heinous crime of man-stealing," ordered the negroes to be restored at the public charge "to their native country, with a letter expressing the indignation of the General Court" at their wrongs.* So much for the justice of the fling at Massachusetts as leading in the colonial slave-trade. As to the other charge, although the Puritans had for a time consented to the authority of British law, which held that *pagans* might be enslaved, we find that so early as 1701 the agitation for emancipation was begun by the instruction given by the town of Boston to its representatives "to put a period to negroes being slaves." In 1780 the slaves were all declared by the Superior Court to be free, without any delay or warning, which would have enabled the few remaining slaveholders to sell their slaves. It is this state—with its proud eminence of having been the first to deal justly, upon moral and religious grounds, with slavery—that is singled out by a British nobleman for denunciation!

The Acts of Emancipation passed by the Legislatures of Northern States, before and after the adoption of the constitution in 1787, did but express what was understood to be the general sentiment of both North and South, though the South seemed reluctant to convert this sentiment into practical measures. When the convention met to frame the constitution, slavery inevitably came under its consideration, and it was found that the Southern States had become very deeply involved in the institution, and were determined to demand the utmost indulgence for that which no one was ready to justify. The delegates from South Carolina and Georgia came fully prepared to use the menace of disunion, as a lash over the convention, to secure advantages for slavery; and when the matter came up first, upon the proposition to prohibit the slave-trade, they placed before the convention the alternatives: "No slave-trade—no union." They thus secured the compromise, that the trade

* See Bancroft's "History of the United States," vol. i. p. 132.

should not be prohibited until the year 1808. By similar means, and with less discussion, they secured the compromise that the basis of representation in Congress should be the entire free population of each state, and "three-fifths of all other persons,"—*persons* being held to mean *slaves*—a measure which secured a preponderance of southern representation. To this they succeeded in adding a clause providing that "persons bound to service or labour in any of the United States, escaping into other states, should not thereby be considered discharged from such service or labour, but should be delivered up to the person claiming the same," which was proposed by Mr. Butler, of South Carolina. It will be observed that, whilst these advantages were given to slavery, the terms *slave* and *slavery* were decorously excluded from the constitution: this was, according to Mr. Madison, "because they did not choose to admit the right of property in man." It was plain that the framers of the constitution believed that the institution of slavery was dying out of the land, and that, though they might consent to humour it by certain indulgences, these must all terminate in 1808, when slavery, deprived of the traffic which fed it, would perish, and not a dead letter remain in the constitution to be its epitaph. Nevertheless, it is not to be supposed that these compromises were agreed to without much opposition. Nothing could have reconciled the people of the North to them, but the great and substantial advantage of which they had been the high price. *That advantage had been the establishment of a firm national union with supreme powers.* They consented to enter this narrow gate and straitened way only because they saw, or thought they saw, the spacious halls of liberty and justice in the distance. They knew that, in consenting to that constitution, the Southern States had created a new and sovereign power, which would gradually abolish their own evil institution—for there was a power of self-amendment, by a majority of three-fourths of the states, which would enable it to grow with the growing world. It is a sufficient proof of the absurdity of any theory of secession, that, when this constitution was returned to the several states for ratification, it was met furiously by the entire state-sovereignty party, on the one ground that it demanded the surrender of its sovereignty by each state. No one, at that time, urged that it was an agreement from which any state might withdraw at will. Said Patrick Henry, in the ratifying convention of Virginia, "That this is a consolidated government is demonstrably clear; and the danger of such a government is, to my mind, very striking." He is met by no denial; but, on the contrary, the president of the convention which framed the constitution—George Washington—declares that the purpose of

that instrument was "the consolidation of our union." In fine, the bitter and long struggles which occurred in various states where the constitution met with opposition, are inexplicable on any supposition that those states were only called upon to sign a bond from which they might break away at pleasure. Even Mr. Calhoun, in a "Declaration of Principles for South Carolina," drawn up by him in 1828, is forced to admit that his state had, by ratifying the federal constitution, "modified its original right of sovereignty, whereby its individual consent was necessary to any change in its political condition, and, by becoming a member of the Union, had placed that power in the hands of three-fourths of the States, in whom the highest power known to the constitution actually resides."

This, then, was the force of the compact into which the States had entered. Slavery clutched the strength of the hour. Freedom relied on the justice of the age. The South obtained advantages for slavery as long as it should exist, but no security for the continuation of that existence: the North accepted the grub actual, with the golden wings implied. This compromise was not quite noble on the part of the North, although it was natural that it should not fear an institution which all the physicians of State pronounced to be on its death-bed. Bitterly must they atone for it. Two events were to give slavery a new and most unexpected lease of life. The first of these was the invention of the cotton-gin, by Eli Whitney. Whitney was a native of Massachusetts, and a graduate of Yale College, Connecticut, who, in his 27th year, was employed as a tutor in a private family in Georgia. Hearing some gentlemen complain of the depressed state of agriculture in the South, and the impossibility of profitably extending the culture of the green-seed cotton, because of the trouble and expense of separating the seed from the fibre, young Whitney was led to make those efforts at remedying this difficulty, which resulted in the cotton-gin. Hargreaves had invented the spinning-jenny in 1764; Arkwright, the machine for making fine cotton-thread, in 1768; Watt had patented his improvement for obtaining a rotatory motion by his steam-engine in 1782; and all of these stood ready to reinforce the cotton-gin when it was invented, in 1795. In 1784 eight bags of cotton shipped to England were seized at the Custom House as fraudulently entered—"cotton not being a production of the United States." Even in 1790 the export was returned as eighty-one bags. But under the influences mentioned the supply at once doubled, then quadrupled itself, until it rose to the million bales of 1830, and the five millions of 1860. "Under this dispensation," says Mr. Greeley, "the prices of slaves necessarily and rapidly advanced, until it was roughly computed that each average field-hand was worth so many hundred dollars, as cotton

commanded cents per pound. That is, when cotton was worth ten cents per pound, field-hands were worth a thousand dollars each; with cotton at twelve cents they were worth twelve hundred; and when it rose, as it sometimes did even in later days, to fifteen cents per pound for a fair article of middling Orleans, a stout negro, from 17 to 30 years old, with no particular skill but that necessarily acquired in the rude experience of farm labour anywhere, would often bring fifteen hundred dollars on a New Orleans auction-block." But another event exercised a vast influence in the rehabilitation of slavery, namely, the purchase of Louisiana from France, by President Jefferson, in 1803. By \$12,000,000 paid France, and \$4,000,000 paid its own citizens, in satisfaction of claims against France, the United States became unquestionable owner of the entire Valley of the Mississippi. Mr. Jefferson freely acknowledged that he had overridden the constitution in making this purchase, but relied for justification before the country upon the greatness of the interests secured. The great influence which would be exerted by this purchase toward increasing the power and perpetuating the existence of slavery seems to have been suspected by no one. The antecedents of Louisiana, under both Spanish and French rule, had been slaveholding; and when it became a portion of the United States, the great south-western emigration carried slavery deep into the heart of the continent. The Treaty of Cession would, indeed, on a fair construction, have secured the liberty of all in Louisiana, but Napoleon, fresh from the murder of Toussaint, and just baffled in his attempt to re-enslave the negroes of Hayti, was not the one to care about the destiny of the negro in the ceded territory. The reception of this state, occurring only a little before the legal discontinuance of the slave-trade (1808), opened a vast market for slaves in the more northern slave states. The Coast of Guinea was simply transferred to Virginia, Maryland, and Kentucky. The negro infant was worth \$100 at birth. In fact, not to go further into this most loathsome and distinctive aspect of American slavery, slave-breeding for purposes of traffic, became a systematic thing in those border states. Under a seemingly humane opposition to the African slave-trade, they sheltered the infernal traffic, and in the war which seems to have singled out the regions where human beings were bred for merchandize for especial devastations, we find only reason to recognise the track of implacable Justice which still, with wheel and rudder, pursues wrong by land and sea.

This resuscitation of slavery was followed by a general corruption of the mercantile classes throughout the United States. The Northern manufacturer, and the warehouse-man, were partners with the planter in one firm. Slavery had "managed to clutch

one of the most important of the world's purse-strings, and thenceforth there arose a party rich enough to buy for it a science, a literature, and a gospel. Then slavery leapt from its death-bed, provided its feast, and was received into good society; it sat in its judicial seats, with the ermine on its brow; it sat in the President's chair; it entered the pulpit, and for it the Bible was clasped with handcuffs, and the very Cross of Christ festooned with chains.* The North had its long list of political leaders, who, one by one, deserted the principles of freedom at the demand of slavery. Alluding to the bold declaration of a Georgian congressman, that he would one day call the roll of his slaves on Bunker Hill, Mr. Wendell Phillips said, with bitter truth:—"Robert Toombs has already fulfilled his promise, to call the roll of his slaves on Bunker Hill. He calls them to-day:—'Daniel Webster—*Here!* Rufus Choate—*Here!* Edward Everett—*Here!* Robert Winthrop—*Here!*'"

"Against this frightful usurpation," says the work just quoted, "the anti-slavery men, though few and often faint, inaugurated a revolution. Spared at first, because of their insignificance, they at length, through much suffering, raised their cause to a sufficient equality with slavery to bring on those tempests which, as Lord Bacon says, may, in the calendars of states, be looked for when things come to an equality, as in the natural world they attend the equinoctia." It is now our purpose to give some account of this moral revolution, whose aim was justice, and whose method was peaceful argument, up to the time when it was forced, by the mad resistance of the South, to record its triumph in blood.

The pioneer of the anti-slavery agitation in America was a devout Quaker, named Benjamin Lundy. Leaving his father's humble home at the age of nineteen, he wandered, about the year 1808, to Wheeling, Virginia, where, during the next four years, he learned the trade of a saddler, and observed the cruelties of slavery. He settled in St. Clairville, Ohio, afterwards, and in 1815 organized the first anti-slavery society of America, which was called "The Union Humane Society;" and, beginning with five or six members, who met at his own house, within a few months numbered four or five hundred. Some two years after this, the first anti-slavery journal of the States was published at Mount Pleasant, Ohio, by Charles Osborne, Lundy being the chief writer in it: it was called *The Philanthropist*. We next find Osborne editing *The Emancipator*, in Tennessee, and Lundy *The Genius of Universal Emancipation*, in Ohio. This latter paper was printed at Steubenville, twenty miles distant from Mount Pleasant, where it was published, and Lundy each week walked that distance to

* "Testimonies concerning Slavery," p. 137.

bring back the edition on his back. Afterwards the two papers were united and edited, in Tennessee, by Lundy. In 1823-4 the first American Convention for the abolition of slavery was held in Philadelphia, and Lundy, who was a weak man physically, and very poor, walked all the way (600 miles) and back to attend it. He then resolved to print his paper at Baltimore; and (1824) started out from Tennessee on foot, knapsack on back, for that city. On his way he paused at a Friends' Meeting House, in a pleasant grove, at Deep Creek, North Carolina, and was there moved to give his first public address against slavery. The Friends received his address kindly, and formed then and there an anti-slavery society. Encouraged by this, he went about in that state, speaking to the people, now at a house-raising, then at a militia muster, and was instrumental in forming fourteen anti-slavery societies. He then passed into Virginia, where he met with less success. From this time forward Lundy devoted his life to enlisting writers and speakers throughout the country in the cause he had espoused. Of course, he met with the usual number of mobs, assaults, etc., which, however, in the anti-slavery movement, are too normal and numerous to be specifically referred to. He died in 1839, when was closed, as Mr. Greeley well says, "the record of one of the most heroic, devoted, unselfish, courageous lives that was ever lived on this continent."

Amongst those whom Lundy had met in his travels throughout the country was a journeyman printer, who had become an editor, and whom he persuaded to go with him (1829) to help edit the *Genius of Universal Emancipation*, at Baltimore. This was William Lloyd Garrison, who was then about twenty-four years of age. Having, in the paper at Baltimore, denounced the coast-wise slave-trade between that city and New Orleans, and stigmatized certain persons connected with it, he was indicted for "a gross and malicious libel," and, unable to pay the \$50 fine imposed, was cast into prison, where he passed forty-nine days, being released at last, by the payment of the fine and costs, by Arthur Tappan, a wealthy merchant of New York. After this, having met with violence in Baltimore, Garrison repaired to Boston, where the first number of the *Liberator* appeared, January 1, 1830. The paper was very radical. Its motto was, "Our country is the world—our countrymen all mankind." Somewhat later it adopted the motto, "No Union with Slaveholders." It also declared, "The (Federal) Constitution is a covenant with death, and an agreement with hell." The "Garrisonians," as they were distinctively called, refused to vote or hold office, and honestly believed that it was a plain duty to dissolve, by the constitutional method of a convention of states, the compact which permitted slavery. Of course, there were few who could go these

lengths. Mr. Greeley enumerates the anti-slavery classes as follows:—

“A very few years, dating from 1832-3, when the New England and American Anti-Slavery Society were formed respectively, sufficed to segregate the American opponents of slavery into four general divisions, as follows: 1.—The Garrisonians aforesaid. 2.—The members of the ‘Liberty party,’ who, regarding the Federal Constitution as essentially anti-slavery, swore with good conscience to uphold it, and supported candidates who were distinctively, determinedly, pre-eminently champions of ‘Liberty for all.’ 3.—Various small sects and parties, which occupied a middle ground between the above positions; some of the sects agreeing with the latter in interpreting and revering the Bible as consistently anti-slavery, while refusing with the former to vote. 4.—A large and steadily increasing class who, though decidedly anti-slavery, refused either to withhold their votes or to throw them away on candidates whose election was impossible, but persisted in voting, at nearly every election, so as to effect good and prevent evil to the extent of their power.”

This division of the anti-slavery movement into, as it were, various fingers, gave it greater power; every ingenuity of the defence of slavery was met. The anti-slavery men had little idea beforehand of the general corruption which slavery had superinduced, or of the obstinacy with which every link of the negro's chain was to be defended. The battle assumed a threefold character—ecclesiastical, popular, and political—of each of which we may give a brief account.

The only religious connexion which seems to have preserved a satisfactory record under this touchstone of practical morality is that of the Quakers. In 1696 the Yearly Meeting of Philadelphia had admonished Friends against “bringing in any more negroes.” In 1754 a minute against the slave-trade was entered, and those of the society who owned slaves were urged to take care for their morals and treat them humanely. In 1774 the Friends directed that all engaging in the slave-trade should be “dis-owned;” and in 1776 this sentence was extended to the owners of slaves. In 1783 it was shown that there was no case of slave-holding in the Quaker body in America. The Presbyterians, old and new school, the Baptists, Methodists, and minor sects, were much divided on the subject; for a time they seemed to be able to pass resolutions against slavery in the abstract, but gradually were more or less completely conquered by their Southern memberships,—only the Methodists having had vitality enough to be divided into Northern and Southern divisions upon the question of permitting a Bishop to hold slaves. The Roman Catholic and Protestant Episcopal Churches boldly maintained and do to this day, that slave-holding is no sin at all. These churches,

by a vast majority, and with great bitterness, denounced the abolitionists as agitators, schismatics, and infidels. The biblical justification of slavery was much dwelt upon. Accordingly the abolitionists denounced the churches very cordially, and it is certain that the growth of abolitionism has been attended by a gradual weakening of the influences of all churches. The Unitarians, next to the Quakers, seem to have acted with more zeal in behalf of the negroes; and Dr. Channing, who did such brave service, was followed by many faithful and earnest anti-slavery preachers. This body was so associated, indeed, with the movement against slavery, that only three or four Unitarian societies ever existed in the South, and of these the majority were closed for some years before the Rebellion, because ministers could not be found willing to pledge themselves to silence concerning slavery. When Garrison, who seems to have been in some official standing in the Baptist Church, began his exhortations against slavery in Boston, every church was closed against him, and he began speaking in the open air, on Boston Common. Finally, the infidels opened to him the hall in which they held their meetings. Although, of course, there has been a gradual improvement in the tone of the churches, they nevertheless have generally been dragged after leaders who were laymen, and we find, in association with the earlier reformers, no ministers more orthodox than Dr. Channing and Theodore Parker.

The social and popular resistance which the abolitionists had to encounter was terrible, and has left its traces in many deeds of mob violence. In the North, the movements, speeches, and writings of Garrison and his few friends seem to have excited at first little if any attention; but slavery, with the keen sense of the savage, seems to have laid its ear close to the ground, and to have heard behind these insignificant "fanatics" the tramp of the hosts of a mighty revolution. Before the *Liberator* had been issued a year, and while its subscribers were yet only a few hundreds, the Legislature of Georgia passed an Act offering \$5,000 to whomsoever should bring to trial either of its editors. A requisition was sent to the Mayor of Boston, by a Southern magistrate, for the suppression of the *Liberator*; but the Mayor—evidently not half so far-sighted as his Southern friends—returned answer that the paper in question, of which he had plainly never heard before, was not of a character to disturb Southern gentlemen,—that his officers had "ferreted out the paper and its editor, whose office was an obscure hole, his only visible auxiliary a negro boy, his supporters a few insignificant persons of all colours." The Southerners, however, could not share this contempt of the anti-slavery agitators and their movement. The threat of disunion, which had been held over the Consti-

tutional Convention with some success, was again resorted to. "We firmly believe," said the leading newspaper of Georgia (1833), "that if the Southern States do not quickly unite, and declare to the North, if the question of slavery be longer *discussed* in any shape, they will instantly secede from the Union, that the question must be settled, and very soon, by the SWORD, as the only possible means of self-preservation;" and the *Richmond Whig* said, "The people of the North must go to hanging these fanatics, *if they would not lose the benefit of the Southern trade, and they will do it* Depend upon it, the Northern people *will never sacrifice their present lucrative trade with the South, so long as the hanging of a few thousands will prevent it.*" In both Houses of the Legislature of Virginia (1836) it was "*Resolved*—That the non-slaveholding States of the Union are respectfully but *earnestly* requested promptly to adopt *penal enactments*, or such other measures as will *effectually suppress all associations* within their respective limits purporting to be, or having the character of, Abolition Societies." Our space will not allow us to trace the numerous and cruel mobs which assailed nearly every anti-slavery meeting, in consequence of these Southern threats, from 1833 to 1837. When the triumph of emancipation in the West Indies was secured, GEORGE THOMPSON went to America, to assist in the kindred struggle there. The interference of a "Briton" in what was held to be a domestic difference, roused the people to fury, and his presence was the invariable occasion of riot, until he was induced to return to England, introducing a needless cause of exasperation. President Jackson, in his annual message (Dec. 2, 1835), did not hesitate to approve these violent manifestations. "It is fortunate for the country," said that message, "that the good sense, the generous feeling, and the deep-rooted attachment of the people of the non-slaveholding States to the Union, and to their fellow-citizens of the same blood in the South, have given so strong and impressive a tone to the sentiments entertained against the proceedings of the misguided persons who have engaged in these unconstitutional and wicked attempts, and especially against the emissaries from foreign parts, who have dared to interfere in this matter, as to authorise the hope that those attempts will no longer be persisted in." Vigorous efforts were made by Governors Edward Everett (of Massachusetts) and Marcy (of New York) to suppress freedom of speech concerning slavery in their states; but with no further results than some vague denunciations of "fanatics" by legislative committees. It was thus felt that Legislature could do nothing so subversive of the traditions of the North as would alone satisfy the South, and the opponents of the abolitionists betook themselves to the

further instigation of mob-violence. But history attests nothing more completely than that the interest which wields the weapon of violence seizes a sword by the blade, and, though it may bruise its adversary with the hilt, much more gashes its own hands. Men of fine powers and great wealth—as Hon. Gerritt Smith and Arthur Tappan—had their honourable feelings aroused by these persecutions, and took their places among the abolitionists; and it was at a meeting called in Boston, to consider the murder of Rev. E. P. Lovejoy, at Alton, Illinois, by slaveholders from Missouri, that Wendell Phillips made his first speech for freedom, and began that career which, more than that of any other individual, has been the means of promoting the favourable reaction which has culminated in the abolition of slavery. To the inspiration which a great and just cause brought to its champions, opposition added the most needed condition of co-operation; the abolitionists became a compact minority, and wearied out the mobs. The disturbances became less bloody and less frequent, whilst the anti-slavery meetings commanded increasing attention by the accession of eloquent men, notably of the incomparable orator, Wendell Phillips. “Eloquence is cheap at the abolition meetings,” said Emerson; and the crowds who attended them in later years confirmed the assertion of the philosopher. Nevertheless, the popular fury did not subside until many devoted men had sealed the cause of emancipation with their blood, and, alas, not until many Northern statesmen had made the unworthy sacrifice of their principles to the insolent demands of slavery.

It has often been asserted that the North was not strictly faithful to the original compact by which the Union was framed; but the truth is notoriously the reverse of this. It was, in fact, the patient determination of the North to fulfil that compact in the letter and spirit which made the leading abolitionists adopt their theory that the Union must be dissolved, an object, however, which they sought to reach through the peaceful formula of a convention of the people of all the states. But in the South the compact was repeatedly violated in the interest of slavery. It has been already stated that President Jefferson purchased the great south-western territory of Orleans from Bonaparte, which was cut up into slave states, and that he openly acknowledged the unconstitutionality of that purchase. At Charleston, South Carolina, July 29th, 1835, the United States’ mails were rifled, and a large quantity of matter, supposed to be anti-slavery, burnt; President Jackson’s Post-Master General accepting such action in the following words:—

“By no act or direction of mine, official or private, could I be induced to aid, knowingly, in giving circulation to papers of this

description, directly or indirectly. We owe an obligation to the laws, but a higher one to the communities in which we live; and, if the former be permitted to destroy the latter, it is patriotism to disregard them."

In the same year South Carolina passed an act by which every coloured person found on board any vessel entering her ports was to be seized and lodged in jail; there to remain until the vessel was cleared for departure, when said coloured person or persons should be restored to said vessel, on payment of the cost and charges of arrest, detention, and subsistence. This act bore so heavily upon the vessels of Massachusetts, that this state resolved to institute legal proceedings in the United States' District Court of South Carolina, to test the constitutionality of the act; and the Hon. Samuel Hoar was commissioned by the Governor of Massachusetts to go to South Carolina for that purpose; whereupon the Legislature of the latter state formally "resolved, that the emissary sent by the state of Massachusetts" should be compelled immediately to leave the state of South Carolina, and the authorities resolved themselves into a kind of mob, to drive out this eminent gentleman, who was accompanied by his daughter. How such an event was related to the constitution may be judged by reference to Art. iv. § 2 of that instrument, which provides that "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states." The anti-slavery men of the North bore this patiently, and only raised another degree their determination to achieve that sublime revenge which the poet Whittier invoked on that occasion:

"Have they chained our free-born men?
Let us unchain theirs."

The abolitionists were a class which any monarchy on the continent of Europe would have exiled. They had that perilous *πρωστω* outside of the Government which few Governments can permit. The short arm of the lever, with which they moved the country, was the Republican party. Mr. Sumner was related to Mr. Garrison, as Jules Favre to Ledru Rollin. The union of the states was, from the first, threatened only by the insatiable hunger of slavery for fresh territory. It had already learned what an increase of the pecuniary value of slaves, and of political power, ensued upon the opening of new territory to it; by its extension into Louisiana; and when Arkansas had been devoured, the hunger grew to lust. The first serious resistance it encountered was in the agitation which led to the adoption of the Missouri compromise in 1820—the stormiest chapter in the political history of the United States. At that time, John

Adams, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson (December 18th, 1819), said :—

“The Missouri question, I hope, will follow the other waves under the ship, and do no harm. I know it is high treason to express a doubt of the perpetual duration of our vast American empire, and our free institutions; and I say as devoutly as Father Paul *esto perpetua* : and [yet] I am sometimes Cassandra enough to dream that another Hamilton, another Burr, may rend this mighty fabric in twain, or perhaps into a leash; and a few more choice spirits of the same stamp might produce as many nations in North America as there are in Europe.”

The threatened disaster was temporarily avoided by the adoption of the *Missouri Compromise*, so called, by which slavery was permitted in the great new state of Missouri, but prohibited in all that portion of the territory out of which it was carved, north of 36° 30'. It was hoped by the conservatives that the passage of this measure would for ever take the slavery-discussion out of the Houses of Congress, and, notwithstanding an infraction of it by the South,* it did manage to prevent any formidable conflict for full twenty years. The great pro-slavery reaction had prevailed over all the land, and the abolitionists could scarcely produce a sensation in Congress by sending in petitions for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, etc., which were at first received with derision, and at length forbidden even to be read. This long political truce on the slavery issue was destined to be broken by another exasperation of slavery's accursed lust for empire. We need not repeat here that disgraceful history of the entrance of filibusters into Texas—originally through the generosity of Mexico in bestowing grants of land upon them—the revolution of that territory by slaveholders, and its annexation in the interest of slavery. Against that measure Daniel Webster lifted his voice, in warning. The recklessness of slavery—its willingness to lie, rob, and murder, in order to reach its ends—were laid bare in that transaction more than in anything else. There was as yet, however, no Republican party, and, consequently, no adequate opposition to the annexation of Texas under the vigorous advocacy of “His Accidency”† John Tyler. That virgin country, which the measure

* In 1836 a considerable section of the territory beyond the original western boundary of Missouri was added to the state of Missouri, so quietly as not to attract attention. By this palpable violation of the Missouri compromise, slave-holding Missouri acquired 3,026 square miles of rich land, cut up now into six counties, which contained, in 1860, 70,505 inhabitants, of whom 6,699 were slaves.

† John Tyler, of Virginia, who became President by the death of Harrison, in 1841, one month after his inauguration. Slavery secured the immediate

of universal emancipation, passed by Mexico some twenty years before, had protected, was helplessly bound, and soon became a prey to the Southern dragon. Nevertheless, out of this outrage came the compensation of a party which revealed the important fact that the abolition movement was now represented within the pale of the constitution. The champions of slavery had some misgivings, when, in 1848, a Free Soil Convention met at Buffalo, New York, and, resolving "That Congress had no more power to make a slave than to make a king; no more power to institute or establish slavery, than to institute or establish monarchy," presented the names of Van Buren and Adams as candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency: they had still greater misgivings when those candidates polled, out of the 2,872,056 votes cast, 291,342. When, soon after this Presidential campaign—in which Taylor and Fillmore were elected—the question of a Government for the territory of Oregon came up, Freedom was conciliated by a defeat of the bill which would have given the best portion of it to Slavery. Then came on the fierce conflict about California, which, having fulfilled the conditions of population, etc., requisite for the formation of a state, asked to be admitted with a free constitution into the Union. President Taylor, a moderate Whig, having died as suddenly and mysteriously as his predecessor Harrison, slavery found in Millard Fillmore a compliant tool; and though California had to be admitted as a free state, it was not without the addition of offsets for slavery, in the admission of slavery into Utah and New Mexico, and the passage of the odious Fugitive Slave Bill, drafted by Mason, of Virginia, late Confederate Minister to England. The era of slave-hunting and kidnaping which followed this "Compromise of 1850," as it was called, was a terrible one for the negroes of the North. In the first year of its operation, more slaves were dragged from Northern refuges into bondage than in the sixty years preceding; but there was nothing that the warmest foe of slavery could have more ingeniously devised to produce a general disgust toward slavery in the Northern States. Hitherto slavery had been a distant evil, and its cruelties were declared to be mythic; but now its hideous form was seen dragging innocent men and women through the streets of Northern cities to enslave them, and there was a deep and wide revulsion of feeling. A most important anti-slavery reaction began. It did not make itself fully felt in the Presidential canvass of 1852, chiefly because it nominated, as candidates, two very radical men (Hale and Julian), and because the Whigs nominated men (Scott and Graham) who were, to a

annexation of Texas by the change; and though Mr. Tyler was popularly entitled "His Accidency," there has always been, among intelligent Americans, a suspicion that his accession to power was *not* "accidental."

moderate degree, satisfactory to the opponents of slavery, and were more generally voted for, as being more likely to be successful. In this election Franklin Pierce was elected—a man of absolute servility to the slave-power. Under him slavery conceived the fatal design, to itself, of nationalizing its power. To this end it attacked that line which had been established by the Missouri Compromise, and which, for over thirty years, had been a bulwark against its North-western encroachments. A bill to sweep away this limitation was, to use an American phrase, “engineered” through Congress, by S. A. Douglass. Immediately emigrants from the North and the South poured into Kansas, where the Bill decreed that the existence of slavery should depend upon the vote of settlers, and that territory soon became the theatre of a brutal civil war—slavery having determined to carry by force, and with assistance of military aid from President Pierce, the polls which it was vain to try and carry by numbers. Free state settlers were put to the sword; voters who would not vote for slavery were murdered; the villages of immigrants from the free states were burnt after their houses and churches had been plundered. Under this the tide of Freedom advanced, and in 1856 the democratic (pro-slavery) candidate, James Buchanan, was confronted with an ominous array of 1,341,264 votes for the radical Republican, J. C. Fremont, against his 1,838,169—many of which were notoriously fraudulent. Through the persistence and bravery of the Free State men, Kansas was brought in as a free state. Slavery did not forego, however, its dream of nationalizing itself. With the favour of its new Presidential tool, it betook itself to the Supreme Court, the judges of which were, with one exception, notoriously pro-slavery in their opinions, and a majority of them slaveholders. A fictitious case was made up, concerning an old negro of St. Louis, Missouri, named Dred Scott—who was made to bring suit for his freedom, on the ground that he had been taken by his master into territory made free by the Missouri Compromise—and the Supreme Court, through Chief Justice Taney, declared him still a slave. The Chief Justice went out of his way to declare that negroes “are not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution, and can, therefore, claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of the United States;” also, that “they had, for more than a century before, been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that *they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect*; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.” It was thus decided flatly that the Constitution carried slavery with it

wherever it went ; President Buchanan congratulated the country that the long agitation was settled ; and slavery prepared to celebrate its victory by raising a new star to its flag, to be called Slavery.

In the midst of slavery's festivities, however, about this time, there darted forth a hand of flame, which wrote on its walls some old sentiments from the Declaration of Independence, and warned it that there were some who, despite the decisions of the Supreme Court, still believed that "All men are born equal." Captain John Brown, having stood and fought bravely in Kansas until he saw it a free state, appeared in the town of Harper's Ferry, Virginia, with seventeen white and five black comrades, occupying the United States Arsenal, holding the town two days, all for the liberation of the slaves ! So intense was the suspicion of greater armies behind, so fearful the excitement, that troops enough of the United States and of Virginia were poured into Harper's Ferry, not only to capture these twenty-three, but to have encountered a fair-sized foreign invasion. When these rescuers were conquered, and the three or four who were not killed at once were in Virginian dungeons, the Governor of the invaded state still preserved a large garrison for the gaol. The weakness of slavery had been made manifest. It is said that the Hon. Thaddeus Stevens, of Pennsylvania, a radical Republican representative, was sneeringly asked at the time, by a member from Virginia, "Well, Mr. Stevens, what do you think of John Brown?" "He is a fool, sir!" "Why, I thought you would call him a hero!" "A fool, sir! Think of a man going to capture the State of Virginia with *twenty-two* men. Why didn't he take *thirty*? then he'd have *done* it!" The long trial ; the hanging of Brown and his few surviving companions all wounded ; the extended Congressional investigations ; the drilling of militia throughout Virginia, and some other states,—all told that a terrible fear had seized upon slavery. "Virginians," said Wendell Phillips, "did not tremble at an old grey-headed man at Harper's Ferry ; they trembled at a John Brown in every man's conscience." The heroism with which John Brown hurled himself against slavery, to free the slave, deeply affected the nation ; and the "Southern chivalry" lost any remnant of *prestige* it might have had when he was hung.

Among the papers of the late Theodore Parker, was found a letter, written from Canada, where his expedition was planned by John Brown, in which he said : "I expect to achieve a great victory, even though it be like the last victory of Samson." The death of this brave man did indeed produce a remarkable effect. For the months that he lay in prison, previous to his execution, his conversations, appeals, etc., on the subject of slavery, were reported in all the newspapers of the nation, and

were repeated in pulpits and from platforms. For some months he preached from every pulpit and edited every paper. His fortitude and heroism won applause from his enemies, and the Governor of Virginia, under whom he was executed, said, "He is firm, truthful, intelligent—the gamest man I ever saw." That slavery had only a scaffold for qualities like these, was not without its lesson for the North. When his body was borne home for burial, it was followed by the friends of freedom, who mourned for him as a martyr. On the South the effect of his "raid," as they called it, was no less noteworthy. For the first time, the intensity and determination of the enemies of slavery was revealed to them, and they scented the battle from afar. John B. Floyd, of Virginia, was at that time Secretary of War, and, as is now known, he began at once to send arms from Arsenals of the United States to the South.* It is certain that the Southern leaders had fully determined upon secession, and only awaited the appearance of some occasion which would enable them to "fire the Southern heart" and unite their states in the movement.

How often does the field of compromise prove the field of battle! When, thirty years before, the North and the South agreed upon a line in the Missouri territory, on either side of which slavery and freedom should rest and be thankful, they ignored the fact that their line pierced through the heart of humanity. Slavery, with its insatiable lust of territory, with its ambition for nationalisation, with its new Dred Scott decision in its hand, did, with a madness which an old Hebrew prophet would have attributed to a divinely-ordered temptation of the devil, sweep away that line. The result was, that the whole subject of slavery extension was brought up again for decision

* Mr. E. A. Pollard, sometime editor of the *Richmond Examiner*, who was in public employment at Washington throughout the administration of Buchanan, says, in his "Southern History of the War": "It had been supposed that the Southern people, poor in manufactures as they were, and in the haste for the mighty contest that was to ensue, would find themselves but ill-provided with arms to contend with an enemy rich in the means and munitions of war. This disadvantage had been provided against by the timely act of one man. Mr. Floyd, of Virginia, when Secretary of war, under Mr. Buchanan's administration, had, by a single order, effected the transfer of 115,000 improved muskets and rifles from the Springfield (Massachusetts) Armoury, and Watervliet Arsenal to different arsenals at the South." The same officer had, by a similar "timely" act, placed at the head of the United States forces, sent ostensibly to protect the Texan frontier from Indians, one whom he knew would throw them all into the hands of the South in case of collision; nor did General Twiggs betray his confidence. When Texas seceded he turned over to General Ben McCulloch his entire army, and all the fortifications, horses, &c., which he held; an act by which the United States lost one half of its army, and over two million dollars' worth of military property.

before the people. The anti-extensionists put forward Abraham Lincoln as their candidate. He was selected because, whilst a man of Southern birth, and therefore not liable to the charge of sectional unfriendliness to the South, he was a thoroughly-convinced champion of non-extension, who had surrendered political prospects for his principles, and was an honest man. No man had ever uttered before the American people the issue before them more simply and thoroughly. He showed that the admission of slavery into new territories was virtually the enslavement of men. "It means," he said, "that if A wishes to make B a slave, C has no right to interfere." But he also represented something more important—namely, the resolution of the Northern people that there should be no more delusive compromises on this subject, but that it should be at once and for ever settled. He acknowledged also, boldly, that this would be a blow at the life of slavery itself.

"We are now," said Mr. Lincoln (1858), "far into the fifth year since a policy was initiated with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. 'A house divided against itself cannot stand.' I believe this Government cannot permanently endure half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved—I do not expect the house to fall—but I *do* expect that it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction, or its advocates will push it forward until it shall become alike lawful in all the states, old as well as new, north as well as south."

In the spring of 1860 the various parties held conventions to organize their forces, declare their principles, and nominate candidates for the approaching presidential campaign. The Republicans met at Chicago, Illinois, and, with a declaration of broad anti-slavery and anti-extension principles, nominated Mr. Lincoln. In April the pro-slavery party, which in America calls itself the Democracy, met at Charleston, South Carolina, and was at once thrown into contention by the determination of the extreme Southerners to contend for the principle of the Dred Scott decision, that slavery already existed in the territories, because the Constitution carried slavery with it wherever it went, and that the territorial legislatures had no more right to prohibit slavery in them than Congress. The Northern wing declared that such a principle would be suicidal in the North; that they could not go before the people on such an issue, and warned the Southerners

that if they did not concede the principle of the bill which abolished the Missouri Compromise, that the people of the territories must decide for themselves the existence or non-existence of slavery among them, the election of a Republican President was almost certain. Neither party did or could yield, and the result was a split, the Southern wing nominating Mr. Breckenridge, of Kentucky, and the other Mr. Douglass, of Illinois. It was sufficiently evident that the Southern leaders intended the inevitable result of this decision—the election of a Republican President—on the ground stated at the time by its Washington organ, that “if Lincoln triumphs the result cannot fail to be a South united in her own defence—the only key to a full and, we sincerely believe, a peaceful and happy solution of the political problem of the slavery question.”

Confident that the alarm of the planters at the triumph of the policy of restriction, which would girdle slavery, and the humiliation of the proud Virginians and Carolinians at the election of an anti-slavery President, would secure a united movement throughout the South for secession; knowing that there was a strong conviction in the minds of many earnest Northern men that their complicity with slavery should end, though it cost the Union; aware that, during its long possession of the general government, slavery had been able, secretly, to disarm the North and arm the South, so that resistance would be at once seen to be futile, the Southern leaders looked forward with a delight which, in South Carolina, expressed itself in toasts to the success of the Republican candidate in the coming election as the signal for the formation of a grand Southern empire, with slavery for its corner-stone, a solution fondly believed to prove “peaceful and happy.”

To the long head and the stout heart of Abraham Lincoln, humanity owes that the earth is not at this moment cursed with such an empire. Nothing was easier than for a weak president to have demoralised the North at that moment. The majority were already calling for a compromise, and the anti-slavery men, fearing another compromise above all else, were showing what great advantages there would be in parting with the South. The leading men, and pulpits, and presses, were against the coercion of the South. But Abraham Lincoln understood the heart and power of the American people better. To all these voices he said—No; this Union is to be preserved, and that not by any compromise! With surprise and pain the country heard this; but when the South fired upon the flag of Fort Sumter, the nation rose up “with the war-cry of the first revolution on its lips.”

The Anti-Slavery Revolution had encountered, with what success

we have seen, the social, the religious, and the political forces which had opposed it; by a long and weary path it had now reached its final ordeal—War.

When it became evident that there was to be a civil war, the advantages seemed so clearly to be on the side of the North that the movement of the South excited surprise and contempt throughout the world. According to the census of 1860, the population of the free states and territories was 19,128,143; and that of the slave states, including the district of Columbia, 12,315,372. All the free states adhered to the Union, whilst of the slave states four, having an aggregate population of 3,137,282, did not unite with the movement for Secession. The population of the states which declared themselves actually in revolt was 9,103,014; but of these, 3,520,902* were slaves, who, it was generally predicted, would certainly take the occasion of war to gain their freedom by insurrection. In manufactures, commerce, shipping, and general wealth, the preponderance on the side of the Union was vast. The columns of the *Times* newspaper of that date show sufficiently the popular incredulity in this country of the ability of the South to maintain itself; whilst in the Northern States of America the same confidence uttered itself in “ninety-day” prophecies, and in some sad mistakes.

The fact was, that in the beginning of the war there was a substantial balance of advantages in favour of the South. In the first place, the Government of the United States had long been in the hands of the South. For four years the rebel chief had been Secretary of War, and had resigned that office only to be followed by Mr. Floyd, of Virginia. Not only did both of these carry on, through several years, the process of disarming the North and arming the South—another official, at the same time, scattering the navy to the ends of the earth,—but these men were personally acquainted with the officers of the army and navy, knew whom they might trust, and how others might be purchased. The secession movement was at once followed by a sweeping surrender of garrisons, forts, forces, and munitions—only one or two generals—as at Sumter—making a feeble resistance, and others—as at Norfolk—showing utter imbecility. In the second place the Washington Government had so long been administered in the interest of slavery, that the departments were full of disloyal persons, who, maintaining their positions by loud professions of devotion to the Union, conveyed every kind of military intelligence to the enemy. General Robert Lee had been for many years on the staff of the Lieutenant General-in-Chief of the United States, and remained long enough, before resigning, to

* The number of slaves in the United States, by census 1860, was 3,953,524.

possess himself of whatever plans or ideas his superior in rank had. It was fully ascertained by Federal prisoners, after the battle of Bull Run, and boasted of by the Confederates, that nothing belonging to the plans of Lieutenant-General Scott was unknown to the camp of the secessionists. In the third place, slavery was in itself a military training to the South. It implied constant patrols, familiarity with violence, a paucity of railroads, and other internal improvements, which made every Southerner a horseman, and vast primæval woods, with abundance of game, making each a good marksman. The conditions of Northern society were precisely opposite to these. Military ambition, cultivated in the South, was despised in the North, and for many years the leading military positions and officers of the country were filled by Southerners, who, on the breaking out of the war, generally went South. General Scott himself was a Virginian, who was originally in favour of letting the "wayward sisters depart," and always half-hearted in the war. The North was at first not only without arms, but was forced to fall back upon civilian generals. In the fourth place, there was a large and powerful party of pro-Southern and pro-slavery men in the North, who were in full sympathy with the South, and who continually prevented the Government from taking any step which would have made slavery a weakness to the South, as encouraging the slaves to escape. The four slave states which still held to the Union had only a loyalty conditioned on the careful preservation of slavery, so that they impeded its movements more than helped them. They were for a long time influential in securing such a policy of rendition and repression toward the slaves as to prevent any accession of them to the Northern lines, and sealed up what might have been the most important source of information to the North. Consequently, in the fifth place, the negroes, remaining as usual at work upon the farms and plantations, proved the chief military strength of the South. Whilst every Northern soldier who enlisted was missed as a labourer at home, the negro at the South, working upon the farm, enabled the South to make the widest draft upon its white population. The negro-women worked in the fields as well as the men, and these labourers were supported upon one-third as much as a white labourer or citizen at the North would require; thus making, in addition to the advantages above indicated, the mere numbers of the South far more nearly equal than would appear from the figures of the census.

Whilst Jefferson Davis showed from the first his long familiarity with the conditions under which the war was to be fought, Mr. Lincoln gave unmistakable evidence that, in his long seclusion at Springfield, he had gained no means of gauging the forces which were about to work in the impending conflict.

His first call, for 75,000 men to serve three months, was the result of a fearful mismeasurement of the Southern movement and resources, and was responded to by his enemy with derision. The terrible disaster which resulted from all this, opened the eyes of the Government, in a great measure, to the difficulty and extent of the task before it. As the Americans have raised the highest monument of the first Revolution on the spot—Bunker Hill—where they were defeated, so they may well build one at Bull Run, as the spot where a fearful defeat and humiliation taught their Government the necessity of putting forth its greatest energies. It was followed by a call for 500,000 volunteers to serve for three years. Arrests of the openly disloyal at the North were made. Large sums were voted by the Congress for the prosecution of the war. Nevertheless, the Government was not ready to take the step which alone could have prevented this force from being wasted. The battle of Bull Run had been lost, through the failure of General Patterson to engage the Confederate, General Johnston; and no explanation of this suspicious conduct having been given, the abolitionists very naturally reminded the Government that General Patterson was so earnestly pro-slavery that, when Fort Sumter was fired upon, he (General Patterson) had only exhibited the United States' flag when forced to do so, by a mob in Philadelphia. But the President had determined that the relation of states or individuals to slavery should not be made a test of loyalty—declaring that he held the man to be loyal who was willing to shoot and be shot for his country—and although Patterson was superseded, a hundred Pattersons remained to cripple the North in the field. Amongst the generals of this character was, notably, General McClellan. This general began his career in West Virginia, by a proclamation levelled, not at the rebels, but at the negroes, to whom he announced his determination to “crush them with an iron hand,” if they should attempt to rise and claim their freedom. The Democracy of the Northern States was at that time making a great noise over the alleged military failures of the Republican Government, and partly as a conciliation of them, partly because the North had so few other generals by education, this half-hearted man was given the command of the great army of the Potomac, when General Scott, through age and infirmity, resigned the command. He assumed command, July 25th, 1861, and for one year was a dead-weight upon the heart and power of the country. The “iron hand” with which he had promised to crush the negroes was covered with the softest of gloves when a rebel was to be dealt with. His idea of duty, with the fine army of 150,000 men entrusted to him, with which to take Richmond, seemed to be confined to the guarding of mansions deserted by

their former heads, for the Confederate service, and the rendition of fugitive negroes to disloyal masters. From month to month he sat motionless before Richmond, whilst to the impatient country every kind of excuse for the paralysis was exhausted. He was "waiting for the roads to get better;" they got better; "for the leaves to fall;" they fell; "for fair weather;" it came; and yet there was no onward movement. Meantime, his army became fearfully decimated by the diseases incidental to tide-water Virginia. It is difficult to believe that the waste of this noble army and the most precious year were due to M'Clellan's incapacity or cowardice. It seems but too plain, that political motives and insidious advices were at work; that it had slowly become evident to him that the military conquest of the South would imply the death of slavery, and that he was already acting—or rather sitting still—with reference to the candidature of the pro-slavery reactionists at the North, which was subsequently awarded him, and which he certainly had fairly earned. To his camp there came a favourite band of minstrels—the Hutchinsons—who sang to the measure and music of Luther's hymn, a song by Whittier, which the soldiers liked to hear, the first verse of which is as follows:—

" We wait beneath the furnace-blast
 The pangs of transformation :
 Not painlessly doth God recast
 And mould anew the nation.
 Hot burns the fire
 Where wrongs expire ;
 Nor spares the hand
 That from the land
 Uproots the ancient evil."

The Hutchinsons had gone by consent of the Secretary of War; they had been welcomed also by M'Clellan; but when he heard of this song, he at once issued an order, banishing them from the limits of his command. This little incident really explains the sad year. At length M'Clellan was compelled to make a movement towards Richmond; but it was evidently not done with any idea of entering that capital. While his soldiers were fighting and suffering frightfully, he was on a gun-boat in the James river, enjoying his wine and cigar, out of harm's way; and, in short, the ingenuity of his failure was only equalled by that with which he and his friends tried to make it appear that the failure was attributable to interference with his plans by the authorities at Washington, who were, indeed, seriously amenable to the charge of not having interfered with those plans to the extent of removing the General who had conceived them. The heavy tidings of the seven disasters before Richmond, came to the

North on the eve of Independence Day (July 4), and the festival became a day of deepest mourning.

Disheartening as was this dreary year, with its fearful climax of a ruined army, it could not fail to bring some compensation to those who had an unconquerable purpose. Those who desired that the rebellion should be put down without harm to slavery, could not deny that their method had been tried by commanders of their own opinions, and that it had failed. The President could not be accused of conducting the war for party ends, if he now tried a more energetic and radical policy. Moreover, the delusion that there was as yet a large party at the South favourable to the Union, which needed to be strengthened by conciliation, was dispelled, and the loyalty of the negroes to the Northern cause, and their willingness and ability to assist it, had been shown in many ways. It became evident to the Government, after the failure of McClellan, that it must destroy slavery and avail itself of the co-operation of the slaves to ensure success; but, owing to the necessity of carrying with it the four slave states which yet adhered to the Union, it proceeded very slowly and cautiously in this direction. That the Government and the Congress were anti-slavery, and disposed to exercise their constitutional power against slavery, apart from mere military expediency, is proved by the promptness with which they emancipated the slaves of the District of Columbia, of all United States' territories, and abolished the fugitive slave law. Nothing but military necessity could justify the setting aside of the codes which protected slavery in the States, and it is not to be wondered that the loyal slaveholders, and their Northern party, were slow to perceive this military necessity. The President (July, 1862) called together the representatives of the non-seceding slave states, and urged them solemnly to use their influence with their respective states to secure the acceptance of the proposition for gradual and compensated emancipation, which Congress, in accordance with a message sent by him, had passed. To this appeal twenty of those representatives responded angrily, in the negative; seven declared that they would appeal to their states for a fair deliberation on the subject; and two met the proposition with favour. The steps which had already been taken concerning slavery were, first, that no soldier should be allowed to return a fugitive slave; next, some time after, that any slave which had been used against the Northern army should be held to be free; and, later, that the slave of any disloyal person should be so held. On September 22, 1862, the world was startled by the President's proclamation, deciding that he would, on the following January 1, issue an edict liberating all slaves in any state or district where there should remain armed resistance to the

United States' laws. On the day named, the proclamation was issued.

The utterance of this proclamation was the signal for a political conflict of unsurpassed vehemence, which, beginning with the year 1863, continued without intermission until the 7th of November, 1864, when it was concluded by the victory of the Republicans, who re-elected Mr. Lincoln. The President knew that the decided adoption of an anti-slavery policy would cause the formation, into a compact opposition, of all the pro-slavery elements of the country. He proceeded cautiously. He did not remove the feeble generals of Democratic sympathies—not even General M'Clellan, who was retained some months after his failures in Virginia, in a restricted command. The resuscitation which the armies required made an interval in which this could be done without serious harm. It became the duty of M'Clellan to publish to the army the President's proclamation of emancipation, which he did in language which indicated his want of sympathy with the measure, and at once marked him as the standard-bearer of the political opposition. He at length disobeyed orders so flagrantly that the President was forced to remove him, when he was at once taken up by the "Copperheads" as they were generally called, and "lionized." The "Copperheads" took the ground, that the South could yet be brought back by conciliation, negotiation, and compromise; that the President, by over-riding the Constitution and making war upon the domestic institutions of the Southern states—inciting servile insurrection, &c.—had united them as one man, and that they would all return, if a president were elected who promised their former security. On the other hand there arose a dissatisfaction among the radical republicans and abolitionists, based upon Mr. Lincoln's slowness and hesitation in dealing with slavery, a dissatisfaction which had already come to its head in a strong party which gathered chiefly around Major-General Fremont. The "Copperheads" had considerable strength in the Congress, and used it in impeding, so far they could, the voting of supplies to the armies, and in urging measures for the institution of negotiations for peace with the South—their real object being to gain delays until they could obtain a president who would reverse the anti-slavery policy of Mr. Lincoln's government. But events could not be delayed. Negroes crowded by thousands to the Federal lines. The occurrence of fresh disasters made it necessary that these negroes should be enlisted; and both justice and common sense required that Congress should pass a measure emancipating the families of negroes so enlisted. The negroes fought magnificently, and won favour everywhere. Slavery was fast dying, by inevitable causes. Some military vic-

ories in the south-west—notably, the capture of Vicksburg—decided the republicans to nominate Mr. Lincoln for another term; and the nomination of General M'Clellan, by the "Copperheads," induced the radicals to forego their preference for Mr. Fremont.

Re-elected by an overwhelming vote of his countrymen; freed from any possible political "fire in the rear," the President had no longer any reason to halt in the work of emancipation. The cry for "peace" was hushed, and there was no path open but that of vigorous war. The South was giving signs of exhaustion, and the future was radiant with the auspices of victory. The President shared the enthusiasm of the people; half-hearted generals were removed, whole-hearted ones sent to the front; city after city—Atlanta, Savannah, Charleston, Columbia—fell, and state after state was conquered; and at length the Union banner floated over the Confederate capital itself, with the chief armies of the vanquished Slavery-Rebellion held as prisoners-of-war beneath it.

Self-conquest in the North had gone hand in hand with conquest in the South. Maryland, Missouri, West Virginia, and Tennessee had abolished slavery; Kentucky, by her leading journals and her governor, had begun a movement for the same end; Illinois and Ohio had abolished civil restrictions upon negroes; the street-cars of New York had resolved to admit negroes with whites; and the Government at Washington had purged itself, so far as it could at that time, by proposing to the States an amendment to the Constitution, prohibiting for ever the existence of slavery in the United States. The signs of this great conversion were appearing everywhere. The flag of the Union—its one stain almost faded out—floated over Sumter again. The nation was filled with unutterable joy as, on the Dial of Growth, the rank weed of slavery and the blood-red flower of war closed together, and the new hour was marked by the unfolding of a pure Peace. But there was, in the ecstasy of this proud moment, a lurking danger. The anti-slavery revolution was not yet consummated. The anti-slavery amendment yet lacked for adoption the votes of four or five states. There were yet thrice as many slaves actually held as in 1776. But, more formidable than any of these facts, there was a great spirit of clemency and conciliation sweeping through the North; and those, North and South, who wished to preserve as much of the old slave power as they could, were already manœuvring to preserve the caste of the slave-owners, and to reconstruct the State governments of the South out of the fragments of those that had already crumbled through inherent rottenness. General Banks had already shown that disposition to

restore states on the basis most desired by planters, which would have been prolific of evils. The negroes were to be, indeed, not slaves, but they were to be in the political power of their former masters—converted from treason to loyalty by the hope of saving their estates—a power under which they could have been oppressed to almost any extent so soon as the military occupation had been replaced by civil law, without any infraction of the laws abolishing slavery in its old form. There was every reason to apprehend that when the Federal power was withdrawn, and the late masters had exclusively the military and political power, the old wrong might survive in some form of serfdom, or enforced contracts with negroes, to be called by some decorous name, to harden gradually into a cruel and dangerous oppression, as slavery had done before. The chief danger was that this conciliatory spirit of the American people had already taken the shape, in the mind of the President, whom all were ready to follow, of a plan of reconstruction which must inevitably have preserved the *caste* which had grown out of slavery. He had already decided to issue a new proclamation of amnesty in this sense, which the people were ready to receive and applaud; and if, as has been stated, the order of General Weitzel, and the plan of reconstruction proposed by General Sherman, were based upon views and wishes expressed by President Lincoln, there is good reason to fear that this sultry clemency threatened the whole harvest of the war with blight. Was that noble Revolution which had conquered, in succession, indifference, social and ecclesiastical hostility, mobs, majorities, armies, to be lost now by a false and merciless mercy? Was the sword which had cloven iron bars to fail now in piercing the soft veil of sentiment? If there was any point where a great movement for humanity was vulnerable it would be just here. But out of the darkness emerged the hand of destiny, to rescue the American nation from this last peril. It was decreed that slavery itself should blot out the unpublished proclamation of amnesty, and write in the blood of the heart which was too kind to utter it, that death-warrant which it and its caste deserved, and which alone could fitly crown the sacrifices of so many weary years. At the very moment when the joyful nation was wreathing the laurel and evergreen of the victor and the patriot around the brow of their noble and gentle President, slavery slew him in cold blood. In a moment, the twenty million hearts that just now meditated indulgence demand implacable justice. The body of the murdered President passes from city to city, and from state to state, and the grief-stricken people swear over it that not one vestige of the infernal wrong shall remain in the land. The wild and guilty passions which the long outrages upon human nature have engendered gather

themselves into a last fearful stroke, the fit climax of their horrible history, and the policy of Southern reconstruction is remitted to one who, more than any loyalist in America, knows the nature of the monster with whose last writhings of desperation America has to deal. Andrew Johnson, who has had the rope of a rebel mob around his neck, who has had a son laid in the grave, and a daughter shot down at his door, is now the President of Slavery's own election, and the last cloud clears away from that future of America which too much clemency alone had imperilled.*

We are not of those who have feared, at any time, that the heroes of humanity in America are in danger of being provoked, even by the fiendish assassination of a beloved leader, to lend themselves to a savage or vindictive policy. President Lincoln is not the first anti-slavery martyr over whose grave they have journeyed to their noble goal. The blood of Lovejoy and of John Brown cried from the ground, only to inspire them to a new devotion to justice, and that of the martyr-President will plead for nothing lower. That their labours and sacrifices have culminated in so purifying the banner of the United States that slaveholders loathed it, and slaves prayed for a sight of it; that the Presidents who were known only as slavehounds were at last superseded by one worthy to die for Freedom,—these will be held by them as the costly certificates of their well-earned triumph, and be set as a bow on the receding cloud. The subsiding waters of rebellion will leave the stratum of a new society over the South, the slaves will be transformed to free and equal citizens, and the chain, the lash, the shamble, and the bowie-

* Since this article was written the hope expressed in this sentence has been cruelly disappointed. The new President has, in his first effort at reconstruction, surrendered the United States Law—under which blacks and whites are equally citizens—by which alone he has any authority in a Southern state, to the behests of the slave-code which North Carolina had anterior to her secession. If the laws of that state are in force, by what right can the President appoint its Governor, or convoke its Conventions? Or is every law invalid except that, the working of which excludes from political rights the only class in the South that can be absolutely trusted? With such an example, of how the most loyal whites of the South are resolved to oppress the negroes to the utmost of their power, as the Legislature of Tennessee has just given, it may be regarded as certain that the Congress will set aside any pretended state which tries to enter without adopting the principle of negro-suffrage. To take from the crumbled slave-state the rottenest fragment to be corner stone of the new, were of course to surrender all the moral result of the war. The deplorable position which Mr. Johnson has taken is doubtless to be attributed, not to any love of slavery, but to the lack of legal training. A much stronger and more popular President put forth great efforts to carry through the last Congress the Louisiana organization, and failed, and it is a much more anti-slavery Congress with which Mr. Johnson has to deal in December next.

knife will be preserved only as the fossil implements of an extinct race of half-human creatures.

We have, in the preceding pages, reviewed and condensed this great chapter of contemporaneous history from that point of view which regards it as the peaceful revolution of a principle which, beginning with no strength but its own inherent rectitude, has gone on, step by step, against vast interests and over all imaginable obstacles to the noblest of successes. It was the noblest revolution of history, because in it only the legitimate weapons of truth were used. The strongholds yielded to the voices, the persuasions, the reasons, of just and earnest men; they were besieged with arrows of light, shelled with bombs of free thought and free schools. "Love is the hell-spark that burneth up the mountain of iniquity," said Mohammed. In the strength of a broad and irrepressible humanity, the anti-slavery revolution had gone on until the steps of Liberty were upon the threshold of a liberated and redeemed new world. The flag which had for many years represented the scars and stripes on the slave's back, had once again floated up, and promised to symbolise, as at first, the stars and streaks of humanity's dawn. The late war we have seen as a rebellion against this revolution. It was a league against the peaceful and legitimate evolution of Liberty on that continent—an insurrection against a resurrection.

Whilst we admire this fresh publication to our age of the law, that Justice, without wealth or weapons, is still irresistible, there is to be no less studied that reverse side of the lesson, which shows that evil, in the presence of its serene antagonist, for ever digs its own grave. We might, indeed, well have headed this record "The Suicide of American Slavery." We have seen, at each step, that every defiant movement of Slavery was a stab at its own heart. Its greed for extension created the opposition; its war against Mexico resulted in new free states; its mobs begot sympathy for its opponents among decent people; its slave-hunting in the North revealed its cruel nature to people before incredulous; its assassinations silenced its Northern defenders; its hanging of John Brown gave its foes a watch-word and a battle-hymn; its treacherous disarming of the North led to its first victories, which made emancipation necessary; its animal ferocity evoked the energy which crushed it. It built about the nation a wall of fire, which cut off every way but that of universal and immediate emancipation. And when, at last, it had, in the merciful heart of the Republican President, one single remaining hope of lingering life, it planted its fang in that last spot of vitality, and must perish miserably and for ever. *Sic semper tyrannis.*

ART III.—MR. HERBERT SPENCER'S PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY.

The Principles of Biology. Vol. I. By HERBERT SPENCER.
London : Williams and Norgate. 1864.

UNQUESTIONABLY life is the touchstone of any system of philosophy. Not only is it in itself the most eminent fact in nature, the one which, above all others, challenges attention and puts curiosity upon the stretch; it is, to a thoughtful apprehension, much more than this. Though to a superficial view unlike, nay, in many aspects most opposed to the phenomena which lie outside the pale of organization, life is in reality, and is, more or less consciously, universally felt to be, the most perfect exhibition of the universe to us. We might call it Nature's revelation of herself; the mode in which she delights to make known her secret meaning. Yet, if it be a revelation it is still a hiding. If the ends are manifest the methods are obscure. Nature seems here to put herself into our hands, and yet eludes us when we seek to hold her. Life seems close to us, and yet is far off; it seems well known, and yet impenetrable; it seems distinct from all other things, yet its roots twine about the centre. We grasp it as Thor grasped the cup that drained the ocean. It furnishes our first draughts of knowledge, but the whole depth of nature must be pierced before its mystery is exhausted.

Yet that life should stand to us as the interpreter of the universe is necessary. The organic body constitutes the point at which man touches the world. It is here our consciousness and the external meet; here, if anywhere, we have direct apprehension of nature, and obtain a standard by which our other apprehensions may be judged. Nor can we, on reflection, fail to see that the distinction which exists so broadly between the organic and inorganic worlds, may be founded less on a true external difference than on a difference of relation to ourselves; and that, if ever our knowledge is to penetrate below the surface, the living organism furnishes the clue by which we must be guided. Accordingly, we do not wonder that Mr. Spencer, in fulfilment of the great task which he has set himself of summing up the main item of human knowledge, and ordinating them under the broadest and simplest principles attainable, has sought at once to test the value of his conceptions by their application to Biology; feeling doubtless not only, as he says, that it is of more

immediate importance to interpret organic than inorganic nature, but also, that to interpret life is to interpret all.

Nor is the tendency of science in this respect doubtful. While on the one hand extended observation has been constantly eliciting new points of apparent contrast between the organic and the inorganic, on the other a more minute examination has been almost as constantly resolving them on principles of universal application. The identification of the two regions can hardly, indeed, yet be said to be accomplished, but so far as their general aspects are concerned, it seems to be approaching. And the doctrine—to which Mr. Spencer's volume furnishes a powerful contribution—that organic and inorganic nature are one, is manifestly gaining an increased ascendancy. It is probable, however, that the march of thought on this subject, though on the whole decisive, has been much impeded by a certain one-sidedness. Almost all the effort bestowed on it hitherto has been exerted in one direction; namely, towards bringing vital phenomena into conformity with those of the inorganic world. To us it appears that this process should be at least in part reversed, and the endeavour made to read inorganic phenomena by the light of vital. We may illustrate our meaning thus. The motions of the heavenly bodies are in various respects unlike the motions which take place upon the earth; especially, perhaps, in this, that the latter never continue for more than a limited time; the former are unceasing. So palpable is the difference that by the natural sense of men these motions were absolutely contrasted; opposed, much as the organic and inorganic have been opposed among us. By the Greeks they were called respectively corruptible and incorruptible. But they are now wholly identified; the same laws are seen to prevail in each case, under different conditions. This identification was effected by a mutual interpretation. The apparently superior celestial motions were not reduced into terrestrial; the true nature of the latter was revealed by the former. The corruptible were raised up in thought and identified with the incorruptible. It was discovered that the apparent ceasing was an illusion of the sense. The seemingly simpler were the least truly seen—the least intelligible.

So, it appears to us, it must and will be in respect to the phenomena of the organic and inorganic world. The seeming higher will not be brought down to the lower; but the seeming lower will be raised up to the higher. The celestial regions, where dwells vitality, will explain to us the humbler terrestrial sphere of lifeless matter. We shall first learn to understand inorganic nature when we discern in it, though hidden, the same characters as those which seem the sole prerogative of life.

To complete our illustration, we might ask whether each class of motions—the celestial and terrestrial—did not contribute its own elements to the laws of motion: for example, the character of continuance by the celestial, that of taking a straight line until deflected, by the terrestrial? So, perhaps, the organic and inorganic spheres have each some special elements to contribute to our comprehension of the laws of force.

In the sequel we may better see the bearing of this view. We will now no longer detain our readers from Mr. Spencer—who having, perchance by a wise instinct, pretermitted the inorganic region, may come to his subject with hands less bound—but shall proceed to lay before them a brief recapitulation of his views of life.

In order to understand the present volume it is necessary to recal the main positions laid down in the former, and some of the fundamental conceptions there given. Premising that the absolute verity of things is unknowable by us, and their actual cause wholly inscrutable (wherein lies a reconciliation between science and religion), Mr. Spencer proceeds to show, that from the fundamental ideas of matter and force—the indestructibility of which is demonstrated—the general characters of natural phenomena may be deduced. Starting from matter as a homogeneous mass, subject to the operation of force in some quite simple form (say as attraction and repulsion, or as a mere undefined motion), there must ensue a process of “evolution:” that is, this homogeneous mass must become characterized by more and more differences; the unlike portions being separated from each other, and the like portions aggregated. Thus there will arise a progressively more and more complex structure of the universe, each portion undergoing its own particular changes, connected by a widely ramifying chain of mutual dependence. In short, from the embryo universe, as above presented, must be evolved the universe which so conveniently surrounds us, but which we so imperfectly know.

This great series of changes, which constitutes evolution, arises in conformity with certain necessary laws, all of them based upon the one great axiom of the persistence, or indestructibility, of force. The first is the *instability of the homogeneous*. Since different parts of a mass, which is throughout perfectly alike, must be differently acted upon by the same force, this force will produce upon these parts different effects, and will thus modify them differently; in a word, will “differentiate” them. So the homogeneous mass will become “heterogeneous.” Another law also comes into immediate bearing—the *law of the multiplication of effects*. For a force operating upon *differing* portions of matter, itself becomes modified and assumes different forms, again pro-

ducing new differences of arrangement, which in their turn still farther differentiate the forces. So, from the simple indeterminate force there arise definite movements, heat, electricity, light, chemical phenomena, &c.

Besides this ever increasing diversity, there ensues an answering process: the like elements are grouped together, and more and more distinguished from unlike groups. This is *integration*, of which we see an instance in the successive strata of the earth's crust; and finally the whole process tends towards equilibrium, a perfect balance of force in every direction.

Thus we find, from a mere unvaried aggregate, played upon by an unbalanced force, is evolved a mutually connected variety; or, in other words, "evolution is a change from an indefinite incoherent homogeneity, to a definite coherent heterogeneity, through continuous differentiations and integrations." And this is exactly what takes place in chief perfection in the organic world. The history of life is the history of a typical process of evolution, as this second volume is designed to show. Herein the general principles laid down in the first are applied to the special field of biology, or at least to that part of the science which concerns the wider phenomena of life. In one aspect it is a cumulative argument for the doctrine of the development of life through natural forces as opposed to that of special creations. Mr. Spencer begins with a discussion of the *data* of biology—the mutual actions between the organism and surrounding forces,—and attempts a definition of life: then, in the absence of sufficient knowledge to allow of complete treatment of the subject, he reviews the main inductions at which biology has arrived; and finally applies the gathered materials to demonstrate the process of evolution. We will attempt briefly to follow him.

It is not hard to understand that organic matter should be peculiarly unstable. Three of its four chief constituents are gaseous, the fourth a solid; all are very unlike each other, and nitrogen is especially prone to quit its compounds. Several exist in a variety of forms, among them oxygen, carbon, sulphur, phosphorus. The organic molecules consist of numerous atoms, and probably possess a spherical form, which tends to keep their polarities unbalanced. They belong largely to the group termed colloid, by Graham, and thus possess tenacity sufficient for plastic purposes, and yet permit an easy diffusion through them of substances belonging to the crystalline group, which freely traverse the body; some entering as excitors of its actions, others passing out as the results of decomposition. Some of the organic substances possess a greater molecular, others a greater chemical mobility. Upon the substance thus constituted the forces of nature are continually operating. It is changed by pressure,

rapidly imbibes and gives off fluids, is modified by heat and light, and is especially susceptible to chemical influences; rapidly falls from its unstable to a stable composition under the influence of oxygen, or of changes communicated in a manner akin to fermentation. Influenced thus from without, the organic body reacts; develops heat, light, electricity, nervous force, motion, all dependent on molecular change.

For a definition of life, Mr. Spencer, admitting that any definition must be imperfect, prefers this: "The definite combination of heterogeneous changes both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences;" or more briefly, "The continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations." The characters of life as thus defined are emphatically those of evolution. The highest animals present the widest, most rapid, and relatively the most prolonged series of changes; the higher the life the greater the variety of structure and of function, and the more definite the combinations or integrations. The correspondence, in life, between the internal and external is the establishing of a balance or equilibrium, "which ever leads an evolution to become more complete."

"On the one hand, for the maintenance of that correspondence between inner and outer actions which constitutes life, an organism must be susceptible to small changes from small external forces (as in sensation), and must be able to initiate large changes in opposition to large external forces (as in muscular action). On the other hand, organic matter is at once extremely sensitive to disturbing agencies of all kinds, and is capable of suddenly evolving motion in great amounts; that is to say, the constitution of organic matter specially adapts it to receive and to produce the internal changes required to balance external changes."

The natural scope of biology would be a detailed interpretation of all structural and functional phenomena in their relations to the phenomena of the environment and in their mutual reactions; but this being in the present state of knowledge impossible, Mr. Spencer takes up, one by one, the chief biological inductions, analysing them, and referring them to the laws of evolution, as already laid down. The inductions are: growth, development, function, waste and repair, adaptation, individuality, genesis, heredity, variation, classification, and distribution.

Growth is essentially the same in the organic and inorganic world, the growth of a crystal, for example, and of a plant; except in this, that inorganic substances, in growing, integrate with themselves such particles only as are already essentially the same as themselves; organic bodies first cause such particles to be formed from their elements, present in the surrounding medium, and then unite them with themselves. Growth is due

to the surplus of food over expenditure, and therefore in all animals it necessarily reaches a limit more or less definite, because with increase of bulk the expenditure of force must relatively increase; the masses of similarly-shaped bodies varying as the cubes of the dimensions, the strength varying as the squares. An animal that has doubled in bulk needs twice the intensity of muscular contraction to move its body through a given space. Thus, however great, at first, the excess of nutrition may have been, there must come a time at which the expenditure overtakes it. Plants, in which there is nothing to call expenditure of force, go on growing till they die; the crocodile and the pike, which from their habits expend very little, do almost the same. The possible limits of growth depend first on complexity of organization as subserving supply and distribution of nourishment; and, secondly, on initial size, as the profits obtainable in a business are proportionate to the capital.

Development, meaning by the term not increase of bulk, but growing complexity of structure, corresponds precisely with the idea of evolution: it is a change from indefinite homogeneity to definite heterogeneity. The embryo of every higher animal, as Von Baer pointed out, passes from the general to the special; by degrees assuming characters less common to all embryos and more peculiar to its own group. It is at the same time, with certain exceptions, progressively differentiated from the medium which surrounds it, alike in structure, form, chemical composition, specific gravity, temperature, and self-mobility. Of types of development there appear to be essentially two: the first round one or many *centres*, the second around one or many *axes*. Cellular plants and animals illustrate the former; trees and all animals above the lowest exhibit the latter.

The functions which life embraces may be arranged in three groups. They subserve either the accumulation of force, the expenditure of force, or the transfer of force: that is, either the incorporation of the food, the supply of the various organs by the blood and possibly by the nerves, or the actions of the various organs. Like the structure, the functions are made more complex and distinct by evolution, and at the same time more strictly inter-independent. In the lowest animals—mere lumps of jelly-like substance—every part serves every office; absorbs, breathes, secretes, acts. Gradually different parts are appropriated to different offices. In the hydra and sea-anemone there are an internal surface to digest, an external to respond to the outer world, and arms to seize the food. So the differentiation proceeds, while, as they become more complex, all the organs depend for their maintenance on each other. Stomach and brain cannot live without the heart, nor the heart without these.

From an indefinite simplicity there has arisen a definite variety. Remnants, however, of the primary convertibility continue to exist within narrow limits. (In disease, especially, one organ may often be seen to take on partially the functions of another.) This is the doctrine of the Physiological Division of Labour, first worked out by M. Milne-Edwards: the body becomes a complex and mutually dependent whole, just as society does. Function precedes structure. In the simplest animals—the rhizopods—which are structureless, yet move and feed, it evidently does: and deductively it must; for it is by the operation of external forces on the action of a part that structure is determined.

Of waste and repair, the former is immediately deducible from the persistence of force, since no expenditure of force can take place but through the fall of the organic matter from an unstable towards a more stable equilibrium. Repair is not so readily to be understood, yet with a power in the molecules of the body to combine into their own form separate elements around them, it becomes a simple case of integration. The assumption of this power seems to be justified by some phenomena of disease. In small-pox, *e. g.*, the blood appears to be altered by the poison, and the altered particles mould into their own model all those by which they are replaced. Hence the comparative immunity from the disease after the first attack. The restoration of a lost member, or reproduction of the whole body from a part, which occurs in many of the lower organisms, is like the power of a crystal to reconstruct its lost apex when placed in a like solution. The aggregate forces of the body control the formative processes in each part. Here Mr. Spencer proposes a hypothesis: “that the form of each species of organism is determined by a peculiarity in the constitution of its units; that these have a special structure in which they tend to arrange themselves, just as have the units of inorganic matter.”

“A fragment of begonia leaf, imbedded in fit soil and kept at an appropriate temperature, will develop a young begonia; and so small is the fragment which is thus capable of originating a complete plant, that something like 100 plants might be produced from a single leaf. Various succulent plants have like powers of multiplication. . . . As many as fifty polypes may result from the section of one. . . . What now is the implication? We cannot say that in each portion of the begonia leaf, and in every fragment of the hydra's body, there exists a ready-formed model of the entire organism. . . . We have, therefore, no alternative but to say that the living particles, composing one of these fragments have an innate tendency to arrange themselves into the shape of the organism to which they belong. We must infer that a plant or animal of any species is made up of special units, in all of

which there dwells the intrinsic aptitude to aggregate into the form of that species, just as in the atoms of a salt there dwells the intrinsic aptitude to crystallize in a particular way. It seems difficult to conceive that this can be so, but we see that it *is* so. Groups of units taken from an organism (providing they are of a certain bulk, and not much differentiated into special structures) *have* this power of re-arranging themselves; and we are thus compelled to recognise the tendency to assume the specific form as inherent in all parts of the organism. . . . For this property there is no fit term. If we accept the word polarity, as the name for the force by which inorganic units are aggregated into a form peculiar to them, we may apply this word to the analogous force displayed by organic units. But polarity, as ascribed to atoms, is but a name for something of which we are ignorant—a name for a hypothetical property, which as much needs explanation as that which it is used to explain. Nevertheless, in default of another word, we must employ this. . . —organic polarity, or polarity of the organic units—to signify the proximate cause of the ability which organisms display of reproducing lost parts.”—p. 180.

For the particles thus endowed, Mr. Spencer proposes the name “physiological units.” They are not the chemical units, albumen, fibrin, &c., because from these all forms alike are built, nor can they be the morphological units or cells, for these are not universal, and their existence implies the operation of the formative power. The “physiological units” are therefore something between these. The chemical units he infers must combine into units immensely more complex than themselves, complex as they are, these units differing in each organism.

Adaptation consists in the changes produced in the organs of animals or plants by the circumstances to which they are exposed, and the actions thereby called forth. The increase of an actively exercised limb, the thickening of an exposed surface, the acuteness of a cultivated sense, the false joint which may form after a fracture, are instances. But such adaptations have an early limit. They reach a certain point, but cannot be carried beyond, and without a continuance of their causes soon disappear. This is referable to the secondary changes which an altered, especially an increased, function of any organ involves. From increased action arises increased circulation, increase therefore of arterial and nervous supply. But these secondary changes imply others still in successive ratios, and these can only ensue slowly, and to a small extent. This point is illustrated in Mr. Spencer's favourite way.

“From the laws of adaptive modification in societies, we may hope to get a clue to the laws of adaptive modification in organisms. Let us suppose that a society has arrived at a state of equilibrium like that of a mature animal—a state not like our own, in which growth and structural development are rapidly going on, but a state of settled

balance among the functional powers of the various classes and industrial bodies, and a consequent fixity in the relative sizes of such classes and bodies. In a society thus balanced, there occurs something which throws an unusual demand on some one industry—say an unusual demand for ships (which we will assume to be built of iron)—in consequence of a competing mercantile nation having been prostrated by famine or pestilence. The immediate result is the employment of more workmen and the purchase of more iron by the ship-builders; and when presently, the demand continuing, the builders find their premises and machinery insufficient, they enlarge them. . . . Let us go a step further. Suppose that this iron ship-building industry, having enlarged as much as the available capital and labour permit, is still unequal to the demand, what limits its immediate further growth? The lack of iron. The iron-producing industry yields only as much iron as is habitually required for all the purposes to which iron is applied, ship-building being only one. If, then, extra iron is required for ships, the first effect is to withdraw part of the iron habitually consumed for other purposes, and to raise the price. Presently the iron-makers feel this change, and their stocks dwindle. [The iron-trade, however, expands under this demand much less rapidly than the ship-trade, because only a part of the demand for iron depends on ship-building, and meanwhile the growth of the ship-building industry must be limited by the deficiency of iron. A remoter restraint of the same nature meets us if we go a step further, in the requisite expansion of the coal-producing industry; and this restraint can be overcome only in a still longer time, because the additional demand on the coal-owners and coal-miners will be comparatively small, and will not for a long time overcome the inertia encountered in drawing capital and labour from other spheres.] Thus in a community which has reached a state of moving equilibrium, though any one industry directly affected by an additional demand may rapidly undergo a small extra growth; yet a growth beyond this, requiring, as it does, the building up of subservient industries less directly and strongly affected, as well as the partial *un*building of other industries, can take place only with comparative slowness; and a still further growth, requiring structural modifications of industries still more distantly affected, must take place still more slowly.”—p. 194.

Thus also in the animal organism adaptive modifications will be both slow and limited, and will readily revert to the original type. The fixity of species, therefore, as it exists in nature, does not contradict the evolution of life.

Genesis, heredity, and variation, Mr. Spencer groups together. The union of slightly unlike units renders equilibrium more easily disturbed, as is seen in the lower melting point of amalgams than of their constituent metals. Thus when the organic forces are approaching equilibrium mobility is restored. The likeness of offspring to parents results from the similarity of the “physiological units.” Acquired properties are thus per-

petuated. Dr. B. Séquard having produced epilepsy in certain guinea-pigs, found that their descendants were epileptic; Mr. Lewes records that the pup of a mother that had been taught to beg, spontaneously adopted the practice.

Variation has for its causes the unlikeness of parents, changes wrought in them by functional adaptations, and the varying quantity or quality of the units, which in no two cases can be alike. Variations are greatest where the species differ most, and fundamentally they owe their origin to changes of function which are necessarily adaptations. The doctrine of "physiological units" accounts for all classes of phenomena under these heads.

In the classification of the organic world, no linear arrangement will stand. The groups touch one another on all sides. The most extensive groups are distinguished from each other by profound physiological differences. There is first no distinction of functions; then the accumulation of force is differentiated from its expenditure; next a provision is made for its transfer, and action is distributed between the two factors, muscle and nerve. The smaller groups are distinguished by modifications in these parts, or by the presence or absence of subsidiary ones.

In the local distribution of organisms there exists a perpetual tendency to intrude on each other's spheres and habits, and the expansion of each is limited only by suitability of circumstance or by local obstacles. Resemblance of types is found even in distant and unlike places if there be no obstacle to migration, and the most closely related localities present different types if migration is difficult. There is no exact adaptation of organisms to localities, as is proved by the frequent extermination of indigenous plants or animals by new arrivals. Of the distribution in time, our knowledge is very fragmentary; but we see that change has been continuous and gradual where we have continuous evidence: where there are gaps in the record there are sudden changes in the forms. There is no proof of universal *progress*: where higher animals in succession make their appearance in the strata, it is probably owing to migration from previously existing continents to the present. With few exceptions, each species lives its life and ceases; and types that have once disappeared do not appear again.

Recurring now to the proofs of the evolution of life, Mr. Spencer urges that the distribution of organisms cannot be said to imply that they have been designed for and placed in particular habitats, because they are by no means always found where they are most suited; nor is there evidence of any design to multiply types, because similar types are found wherever migration is facile. On the other hand, changes corresponding to change of habitat or circumstance are everywhere visible,

and the changes are more extensive in proportion to the variety of circumstance to which any group is exposed. Even the change from water to air has its intermediate links in molluscs and crustacea, which live only partially in water, in fish which migrate or bury themselves during drought, and in the amphibia. In respect to the distribution in time, we cannot but ask, if animals were specially created, why was there no *valuable* life so long? or if circumstances were not fitting—of which there is no proof—why were they not? And why—if creative wisdom be shown in multiform adaptation of one type to many ends—did types instead of being modified become extinct? Strongly suggestive of evolution, on the other hand, are the kinship between recent existing forms, and the special relationship that exists between the present and the former inhabitants of each region. The classification of organisms, again, affords confirmation of the evolution of life. It corresponds precisely with that of languages, which are acknowledged to have arisen by evolution. Both present the same fundamental character of subordination of groups, the largest being radically unlike; the groups are of indefinite value, they are united by their lowest members, and they present unity and multiformity.

Further evidence is derived from embryology, in the gradual divergence of the groups as they proceed in their development, and the circuitous course through which many of them pass. The numerous modifications undergone in some cases before the final form is assumed, point to ancestral modifications produced by external conditions. Again, the suppression of organs once formed and their substitution by others—the teeth in foetal whales and in some embryonic birds—point to the same source: modifications gone through by their progenitors. Indirect and direct development are illustrated by the social organism. Society at first arises by a long series of changes, individuals gradually specializing or altering their operations as demand increases or arises; but when society is fully developed, offshoots from it are complete in all their elements at once. The units, being influenced by the whole, at once reproduce its form. So even among mammalia there is seen the commencement of a direct development; for example, in the heart, which arises by direct transformation of the germ-cells. This is an organ which must have been early developed, and has undergone throughout little change in its conditions; so that the action of the whole upon the particles, in respect to it, has been fully exerted. Direct thus tends to take the place of indirect development: the traces of ancestral modifications to be obliterated.

And yet again morphology—the ultimate forms of living things—may be summoned in evidence. These forms present characters

which cannot otherwise be explained but by evolution. All vertebrata, from the whale to the giraffe, have seven vertebræ in the neck—except a few. If so many, why not all? Insects and crustacea have all of them twenty segments in their body, though applied to the most various purposes, from feet to jaws; spiders and mites, though closely akin, have not. Are not the twenty segments derived from some common ancestor? See again the unity of plan, or homology, in organs differently used. Snakes need a spinal column, which is moveable in all its parts; mammals, on the other hand, require portions of them to be rigid—the sacrum, for example, which supports the lower limbs. Yet in them the sacrum is still composed of several portions. In its development it is first one, then is divided into several, then grows into one again. There are many useless rudimentary organs: snakes have abortive hind feet; the seal has nails on its toes; the manatee has rudiments of them hidden beneath the skin.

How then has evolution been brought about? Neither an inherent tendency to progress (the elder Darwin), nor efforts made to satisfy new desires (Lamarck), has any valid basis. Adaptive modifications of function are the true cause; but this formula requires to be reduced again to the ultimate laws of evolution. The factors in vital evolution are external and internal. Among the external come first the larger astronomical rhythms. In 21,000 years the earth presents a larger part first of one and then of the other hemisphere to the sun at the time of its nearest approach to him, giving rise to seasons sometimes temperate, sometimes of extreme heat and cold. This cycle is included in another of some millions of years, during which the orbit of the planet becomes more and less eccentric, increasing and diminishing the above described effects. The direct influence thus exerted on the fauna and flora, great as it is, is less than that arising from the alternate extensions and limitations of their habitats, occasioned by the changing temperature, which carry each species into the presence of new physical conditions. Next there are the perpetually recurring geological changes which give an increasing complexity to the earth's surface in most various ways; and with these the accompanying revolutions in atmosphere and climate. There are also the influences exerted by organisms on each other, especially by intrusions on each other's habitats; the conditions becoming more varied with every new accession of locomotive or other faculty in the subjects of them. Among the internal factors of evolution are the increasing heterogeneity involved in the very nature of force, which applies alike to the individual and the species: the additional changes brought about by every previous change—the modified development, for example, of neck, forelimbs, and therefore of every part, involved

in increased weight of head. An increasing definiteness of structure also is implied; and this in spite of varying conditions, because the variations must be trivial in comparison with the constant elements, or life would be overthrown. Some organisms, however, may escape the effect of these multiplied causes of change, neutralizing them by migration. Hence the perpetuity of a few species from the earliest times to the present. Finally, these accumulating changes must be such as to subserve the life of the individual, because they necessarily constitute a process of equilibration, or balancing of external by internal forces. This equilibration is direct or indirect. Direct is adaptation—modified function answering to external conditions; indirect equilibration is brought about by natural selection, or as Mr. Spencer terms it, "Survival of the fittest." By this means are rendered permanent those structural conditions which subserve the life of the individual, but which cannot have their source in adaptation; such as protective thorns on plants, a firm shell around an egg, the long leg of a wading bird. If from severity of season, or from stronger enemies, the weaker portion of a species are destroyed, the next generation being derived only from the stronger remnant of the race, is itself of a stronger order. Thus the external and internal force is balanced; and *vice versa*. But as the faculties of a species multiply, and the want of one can be compensated by the possession of others, natural selection becomes of less influence. It is of least influence among civilized mankind, with whom indeed, in advancing evolution, changes in the brain or mental organization tend to take the place of modification of external structure.

Thus, even apart from the physiology of individual organisms, many evidences converge to demonstrate evolution of life by natural forces against the doctrine of special creations. Various *a priori* considerations may be added. The latter view is probably false, as being an early belief arising in ignorance, as being one of a class of similar views which have been found to be erroneous, as being countenanced by no known facts, and incapable of being formed into a coherent thought. If we suppose a being capable of witnessing only a small part of the life of man, he would have as good a reason for supposing each individual specially created. There are also theological difficulties arising from the evils incident to organic life, which reach their climax in the existence of entozoa. For, if special creation be true, these must have been created specially to torment the higher lives, without even the poor excuse in many cases of a capacity for pleasure in themselves: created and endowed with special powers of existence and multiplication to cut off the chances of escape. The doctrine of evolution is contrasted in all these respects. It comes with

knowledge and arises among those who are best informed ; it is one of an increasing class of opinions ; it can be conceived, and so forms a legitimate hypothesis ; we see like things, *e. g.*, straight lines, passing through every stage into circles, which are utterly opposed to them in properties ; we see, too, that formless germs do evolve into the highest organisms ; there is some direct evidence, in the shape of known modifications of structure, and though it is not much, it is proportionately equal in amount to that on which the evolution of the structure of the earth is inferred from present geologic change. Evolution is morally more satisfactory, for though it does not tell us why evils could not have been avoided, it puts aside the question, why were they deliberately inflicted ? These evils no longer suggest deliberate malice ; nay, slowly but surely evolution brings about an increasing amount of happiness ; all evils being but incidental and diminishing.

Scanty as is the summary thus given, and little as it represents the wealth of Mr. Spencer's volume, by far too many points present themselves for remark for us to attempt to touch upon more than a few. But we have thought it well to present with a certain completeness the outline of the argument, both because we felt that in no other way could anything like justice be done to it, and because we think many readers will thank us for laying before them the leading points of what is certainly a very powerful and valuable, as well as novel strain of reasoning. Never before, that we are aware of, has the attempt been made with any degree of scientific precision, to subject the phenomena of life to a deductive process. Yet if we are ever to gain a real and commanding knowledge of physiology, this attempt must sooner or later be made—and succeed. And whatever may be Mr. Spencer's success in detail, there can be no doubt that the path he treads, and to which he has at least given an unprecedented scope and completeness, is one that promises great results, while many of his own conclusions bear the stamp of truth. In respect to the main position he aims to establish, that organisms have been "evolved," and not specially created, it is enough to say, here, that we entirely agree with him. The hypothesis of special creations has, to our mind, nothing in its favour except human ignorance and the good intentions of its authors. Yet we confess that we were somewhat struck with the novel view in ethics, presented by the doctrine that there is so great a moral difference between instituting a chain which involves certain results and directly bringing them about. Suppose the idea applied to social life : a man does not directly fire the gun which destroys an innocent life ; he only so arranges, or consents that so should be arranged, the gunpowder and the fire, that in the course of inevitable "differentiations" it will be destroyed.

Mr. Spencer, however, is reserving ethics for another volume, and perhaps we do wrong, though we do but follow his example, prematurely to start questions of morality. Our parallel also implies that the inscrutable first cause, even on the theory of evolution, is still a being with whom power dwells and who accepts its responsibilities. But on any view it is surely an undesirable thing (and Mr. Spencer, who places all religion in the sense of mystery, would not dissent from this) to endeavour *illegitimately* to lessen the feeling of mystery with which the phenomena of nature, moral as well as material, affect the student. That entozoa should devour men, should subject to loathsome and torturing disease or madness the sensitive nerves and brain of the world's chief denizen, is a dark mystery. Face it fairly, see it a thing as much meant and designed, as much embodied in the whole scope and make of life, as cool water, or the breath of flowers, or the answering glance of eyes, and it becomes dark enough to be full of infinite suggestions. It has a meaning, fearfully attractive—perhaps yet destined to be read; perhaps capable of bearing its part in raising our whole thought to a new level of moral elevation. Who knows what a felt mystery may not do for us in the sphere of morals as in that of knowledge? or how should it be less fatal to banish it, unsolved, in the one case than in the other? Evolution or no evolution, the moral problems of this great phenomenon, the world, form a book, the reading of which has yet to be re-attempted by mankind. Let us spare ourselves the task of whitewashing its solemn characters.

Perhaps in the ardour of his controversial zeal, Mr. Spencer is betrayed into speaking a little too contemptuously of the views men frame in ignorance. To us it has long appeared that the beauty of organic connexion and correlated evolution is nowhere more strikingly visible than in the development of thought from its earlier to its later forms, and that scarcely less beauty and adaptation are traceable in the first than in the last. Often it might surprise us, if a law were not recognisable in it, to see how an early thought anticipates the latest, or lays hold of the essential conditions of a problem, which subsequent ideas, framed with a greater amount of knowledge but less insight, fail to maintain. We may remind Mr. Spencer how early, on this very subject of evolution, his own doctrine was affirmed, and amid how much of ignorance it was nursed. So far from having arisen only in recent and scientific times, and driven out the opposite as light advanced, the process seems rather to have been the other way. In a dark and mistaken form, doubtless, the evolution of living organisms by natural force is as old as the most ardent lover of antiquity could desire. Nay, what could be more naturally suggested to an ignorant eye, by the teeming life

of the warmer countries of the world? It was growing knowledge, accurate observation, that banished the conception, which now, in more reputable associations, again solicits our suffrages. This is a point worth remembering, especially perhaps with reference to the probable future of opinion, or even—which is more important—the correct estimate of our own. Did not *observation* of the heavens banish utterly, and put to rout, the heliocentric doctrine of Pythagoras?—restored too, not by observation, but by private meditation in a cell. Those primitive ideas of life based upon the primordial impressions which it makes on us, and which led men to endow it with even superstitious self-directive and sustaining powers, are not without their justification, and will perhaps, hereafter, be invested with fresh meaning. We are the more confirmed in this opinion by noting, as we have done, not without some surprise, that not even so trained and guarded a mind as Mr. Spencer's is fully emancipated from their power. Surely in the doctrine of "Physiological Units," endowed with "inherent tendencies" to assume the form of each particular organism, we cannot be mistaken in recognising the identical lineaments, however shorn of their fair proportions, of our old friends the Archæus, vital principle, *nisus formativus*, and so on. Though yielding thus to a fascination too strong, and doubtless too firmly based on some deep necessity, to be entirely overcome, Mr. Spencer has himself, in treating of another subject, most emphatically pronounced their condemnation. "In whatever way it is formulated, or by whatever language it is obscured, this ascription of organic evolution to some aptitude naturally possessed by organisms or miraculously imposed on them is unphilosophical. It is one of those explanations which explain nothing, a shaping of ignorance into the semblance of knowledge." In what way does "the tendency to assume the specific form, inherent in all parts of the organism" affirmed by Mr. Spencer, differ from the "aptitude for organic evolution naturally possessed by organisms," thus condemned by him? Unless it be in this, that the organism or the germ, to which the aptitude to evolve is ascribed, is a known phenomenon, while the physiological units are postulated for the occasion? The analogy of the crystal, to which reference is made, is not available, for two reasons: first, that it is equally unscientific to infer an inherent tendency to assume certain forms in the one case as in the other; and secondly, because the circumstances are radically different. The atoms of the crystal are simply deposited in a certain form, which, having once assumed, they passively retain, so that we might almost conceive that certain peculiarities of shape alone might account for the phenomena; but the living body in its development presents a long suc-

cession of *differing* forms; a continued series of changes for the whole length of which, according to Mr. Spencer's hypothesis, the physiological units must have an "inherent tendency." Could we more truly say of anything, "it is unrepresentable in thought?" When Mr. Spencer says (p. 181), "It seems difficult to conceive that a plant or animal of any species is made up of special units, in all of which there dwells the intrinsic aptitude to aggregate into the form of that species; but we see that it *is* so;" it is difficult to think where his extraordinary philosophical acumen could for the moment have been laid aside. Surely we see nothing but that it *appears* as if it were so. The truth is, simply, that in nature there is no "inherent tendency" whatever, nor can be. The idea is essentially one and the same, wherever it appears, or under whatever guise; and is the one enemy with which science contends. It is simply the denial of causation. All tendencies whatsoever are manifestations of effects, are the results of operant forces, either present or past. The "inherent tendency" of a cannon ball under certain circumstances to crush an ironside is a type of all.

We have the more freely expressed our dissent on this point, because on the one hand it is a position quite in antagonism to the rest of Mr. Spencer's book, and seems to us by its indirect influence materially to detract from its perfection, as leading to the omission of certain physical elements involved in vital phenomena, which, if he had not held this phantasm before his eyes, he would necessarily have more fully recognised. And on the other hand, the inconsistency itself, when traced to its roots, is amply justified and most significant. It is not given to Mr. Spencer, who has shown so many evidences of a truly religious nature—not yet, perhaps (if we may use his own formula), perfectly equilibrated with his scientific apprehensions—to discuss the phenomena of life on the basis of matter and force alone, without reference, express or latent, voluntary or involuntary, to that which is beyond. By his own statement, life is not truly reducible to these abstract and empty terms; it only seems to be so. These are not the actual verity, but conceptions unrealizable even in thought, and far enough from fulfilling the true conditions of the source of life. We feel reverently towards the "intrinsic tendencies of physiological units," recognising in them a peering forth of the actual from beneath the phenomenal; obscuring its outlines indeed, yet witnessing to that for which alone it is of worth, by which alone it is. But we are treading here on forbidden ground, and must forbear. We cannot, however, but note the essential dependence of the scientific on the philosophical portion of Mr. Spencer's book. It is on condition that the terms in which he works are first expressly abandoned as

known, and affirmed only as unknown quantities, that he can work with them. Life may be represented in terms of matter and force—because they are merely terms. It is expressible so, not thence derived. The mechanical elements in which the problem is resolved are *products*, not genuine *educts*, of the analysis. They are resultants of our mental processes, and rejected even by the faculties to which they owe their origin—a progeny devoured by its parent.

Probably it would have been well if this position, clearly enunciated at the outset of the work, had been more distinctly kept in the reader's view (as doubtless it has been in the author's) during its course. The language necessarily employed is so apt to seem to affirm more than it truly does affirm, that an occasional recurrence to principles might be more than pardoned. It need never be forgotten that, however vital phenomena may be formulated in these *x*'s and *z*'s of molecules and forces, what life is still remains open to all the emotions of the soul; it is uncrystallized and fluent as ever to the heart; and this above all is certain, that the greater can never be derived from the less. If personal elements of consciousness and will have been falsely introduced, their expurgation can leave no vacuum. There is an atmosphere which forbids a void—that from which conscience and reason are derived can never be expunged.

For this digression we make no apology. The twofold aspect of physiology cannot be ignored. Nor could more be done to facilitate and advance its scientific study than by pushing wholly aside the obstacles which result from the substitution of mechanical for vital terms. There are necessarily many minds to whom nothing but a clear apprehension of this point can make the physical treatment of physiology tolerable, far less induce their active co-operation; whereas, in truth, its interest and significance from the emotional and poetic side are infinitely increased by this rigid formulation. That life, be it truly what it may, is susceptible of this ordination under the forms of the intellect; that besides what it presents to our perceptive and moral sensibility, it possesses also this boundless and almost incredible simplicity, is capable of being summed up in a few self-evident or rigidly deducible axioms, multiplies its wonder a hundredfold. Embodied in it, with all its variety of beauty and of use, are an absolute simplicity, an absolute necessity. It is, as it were, the bare and rigid pole that is clothed thus with flowers. There is no beauty of adaptation here, no grandeur of harmony, that is not necessary, rooted deep as the foundations of the earth, implied when we have said "existence." Nor any defect or failure, no loss or seeming ruin, no sacrifice of myriad lives or slow

wasting of a solitary frame, that does not root itself equally upon the centre and lay its hand upon the universal heart.

Before we turn to Mr. Spencer's definition of life, on which we have a few remarks to offer, we may present, in a summary form, a view of the phenomena of the organic world, which seems to us to exhibit, in a clear light, some of its most important characters. We do not say it is better than other representations, especially than that, given by Mr. Spencer, of a "Moving Equilibrium between Internal and External Forces." Probably for its due exhibition life needs to be represented in many ways.

Evidently involved in the doctrine that force neither increases nor diminishes, is this consequence, that every change which takes place in nature must have two aspects: it must be, on the one hand, a new exhibition of force, and, on the other, it must involve the withdrawal of force from a previous mode of operation. The importance of observing this twofold bearing of all natural changes lies in this—that the withdrawal of force from a previous mode of operation is also practically an action, and involves a change. Every action in nature, therefore, is truly two opposite and equal changes, and, to be adequately apprehended, requires to be seen in both its aspects. If one of the two constituents alone be recognised it is half unseen.

But, since we necessarily regard natural changes in their particular bearings, and with reference to special results, rather than from a point of philosophical abstraction, this result of the persistence of force presents itself to us under another form. Natural changes constitute two groups oppositely related in respect to force. Some of these changes exhibit the new operation of force, as when a weight is raised; others show the ceasing of the operation of some force, as when a weight begins to fall. It is true that in every case such action has somewhere its equal opposite; but this is often unseen by us, or is practically of no moment. The two classes of changes present themselves to us as opposites, and as such they need to be distinguished, and deserve to be marked by distinct names. We do indeed so distinguish them in special cases: we speak of "rise" and "fall," apart from mere direction, to represent the opposite dynamic relations of two processes. But we do not seem as yet to have thoroughly generalized the distinction. For these two kinds of change accordingly we propose here to use the terms "force-absorbing" and "force-liberating." The elevation of a heavy body absorbs force; the fall of it liberates force. All natural changes are of one kind or the other.

But again: there is an evident link between these two classes of changes—a logical order of succession. The force-liberating must precede the force-absorbing; the fall must produce the rise.

This is practically so familiar that it needs no proof. In a balance, it is the fall of one scale which causes the opposite to rise; the sinking of the fluid in one leg of a syphon elevates it in the other. In every force-liberating change we have given to us the necessity for an equal change of the opposite character; for every force-absorbing change we must seek the cause in some equivalent force-liberating change. The simplest corollary of the persistence of force is, that every fall produces some rise; every rise depends upon some fall. This law of course is universal; it applies to all forces, to all forms of change; and whenever, therefore, there are found in mutual relation two changes, or tendencies, thus opposed—one force-absorbing, the other force-liberating—there is *primâ facie* evidence that they stand to each other as effect and cause.

It is further evident that force-liberating changes imply the presence of some force shut up or rendered latent in the form of tension. Gravity is the great, or at least the most obvious, form of tension in the universe; but there can hardly be any force that may not exist in that form, since force necessarily becomes tension in so far as it is balanced by resistance. In organic matter the tension is based upon chemical affinity. It presents two sets of changes, or tendencies, mutually related: one force-liberating—the ordinary chemical action or decomposition; the other force-absorbing—the vital action, or nutrition. These are true opposites in respect to force; they are bound up together in the living body, and they are bound up as cause and effect. That in life chemical force should be the cause of an opposition to chemical force is as simple as that the gravity of one weight should support another; the requisite adjustments being in each case supposed. Not that chemical force is to be assumed as the only source of the resistance in organic matter to chemical affinity; other forces doubtless share in the action: in plants light works visibly to this end. But to recognise chemical action as also working thus, seems to give an insight into many of the processes which characterize organic life, in the animal world especially, and may possibly aid us in judging how it should be defined.

For the fact which, almost more than any other, strikes the mind when vital phenomena are traced but a short distance below the surface, is this: that the total activity of the body, its total existence almost, consists in the perpetual interweaving of these two opposite processes—nutrition and decay, the raising up, the fall, succeeding each other, or going on coincidentally in every part. Recognising the mutual dependence of these opposites, and that the chain which unites them is knit doubly close, we see that, though ultimately dependent on the external world, the

body has within itself, to a limited extent, the source of its own life. Besides its power of external action, wrought through the fall of the raised molecules, it has in that same fall also a spring of renovated vitality; the chemical, the anti-vital, processes continually going on within it, do thus support and maintain its life. Wheresoever is decay, the force of which is not expended as external function, or as heat, there is a focus at which the torch of life may be fresh kindled—a new turn of tension given to the relaxing textures. That the various activities of life have this connexion, is palpable. Take respiration, for example. The force-liberating process involved in the union of oxygen with the elements of blood (whether in the lungs or capillaries),* institutes and supports a force-absorbing process. It not only purifies (this is but a half view), it vitalizes the blood. Very significant in this respect is the fact that heat cannot be distinctly shown to be generated in the lungs.

A similar office may unquestionably be discerned in some, at least, of the secreting glands. A decomposition of the blood in more ways than one takes place in the liver, producing bile and other substances. Here is a force-liberating change. Is not the correlative force-absorbing change to be recognised in a higher vital tension of the fluid which has furnished them? The fact at any rate is to be accounted for, that from the less highly-vital food, as the liver and the lungs successively fulfil their offices upon it, the more vital, that is, the more force-containing, blood is formed. To these may be added the fact, discovered by Bernard, that during active secretion (of saliva, for example), the blood that has traversed the gland passes out of a bright scarlet hue, while in the intervals of inactivity it presents the ordinary venous tint. Another familiar instance is the vitalization of the vegetable germ through the oxidation of the starch laid up in the seed. Even the process of nutrition itself presents characters which suggest the same interpretation. Amid the various tissues flows the blood, bearing elements for all. But all do not stand in a like relation to it. Some have (probably, for we are here on somewhat conjectural ground) a higher vital status, an intenser concentration of force. Among these we may place brain and muscle. Others are lower than itself—bone, tendon, cartilage. Does not the blood, by sinking into the one, partly gain the power whereby it rises into the other class?

Is not the contemporaneous development of the various systems component of the body, each of which without the other were of

* The recent experiments of Professor Stokes on cruorine, and its varying relations to oxygen, render it most probable that the blood undergoes a true oxidation in the lungs.—See *Trans. of Royal Society*, June, 1864. p. 355.

no avail, in part determined thus? The frequent *wasting* of the internal portion of an embryonic tissue, while the circumference develops, might lend the idea countenance. It is true the use and renewal of brain and muscle vastly exceed that of the merely passive lower tissues; but the latter do waste, and are repaired. Their formation and maintenance claim place as one factor, though but a subordinate one, in the vitalization of the blood. And, finally, though our instances are but begun, may not the apparent renovating effect of some severe diseases find its explanation here? The excessive waste and fall of matter in the fierce pangs of fever, if, happily, they leave all vital parts undamaged, may they not transmit a remnant of the force thus violently freed to that portion of the blood and tissues which have preserved their balance? May not a fever sometimes be an act of respiration on a larger scale?

Let us now take up the definition of life proposed by Mr. Spencer. It is scarcely necessary to remark that he disclaims the pretence of giving anything more than an approximate definition; and we agree with him in the value he attaches to the attempt. Nothing can better serve to test our knowledge, and to give precision and completeness to our ideas. Previous formulas need not detain us now. Mr. Spencer's is, as we have seen, "the definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences." In framing this definition, Mr. Spencer proceeds upon the plan (which he counsels for general adoption) of taking two extreme instances, and finding the characters possessed in common. He chooses the lowest form of physical life as one element, and *reasoning*, as an example of the highest mental life, as the other, and frames a definition on that which they possess in common. It is, at least, interesting and valuable to see the result; but for our own part, we should prefer for physical life to take the narrower basis of physical phenomena alone; nor does it appear to us that in this relation Mr. Spencer's definition, ingeniously and scrupulously as it is constructed, will bear a rigid scrutiny.

It is obvious to remark, first, that it only includes dynamic and not statical phenomena. Not only does it exclude from the domain of life a seed, but even a tree in winter. These, we presume, are held as not possessing life, but only a capacity for life. Yet surely this is not satisfactory. It appears to us, rather, that not only seeds and dormant trees ought to be fully included in the definition, but also organic matter in its most indefinite form—a portion of white of egg, for example. The distinctive character of this substance is that it is living. Secondly, the definition affirms of living things that which is not universally true,

even of those which it is meant to include. By the "correspondence between internal and external relations," Mr. Spencer expressly states, that he means not a mere succession of internal changes directly answering to external, but that one change produced by external conditions in the organism institutes another change within it, which is in correspondence with another change about to ensue externally. He says (p. 78): "Let some change A impress on an organism a change C; then while in the environment A is occasioning *a*, in the organism C will be occasioning *c*; of which *a* and *c* will show a certain concord in time, place, and intensity." We cannot see that such consecutive correspondences are present in all living bodies—hardly, even in the majority. The amoeba surely responds simply to direct external impressions, in so far as it responds to them at all. What secondary process, answering to a future change about to occur around it, is set up in it by stimuli? or even in the hydra? Where are such secondary changes exhibited by plants?

Mr. Spencer does not furnish illustrations here, and we confess we cannot supply them. To us it seems that this description answers rather to the presence of a nervous system than to life. One of the chief functions of the nervous system is to institute such secondary adaptations, to enable one part to be modified by modifications of another. Thus such correspondent series of external and internal changes come to be characteristic of the higher grades of life, but they do not penetrate to the lowest strata. Mr. Spencer's own words imply as much. He says, "*If we take a living body of the requisite organization*" we shall find this nexus; but this gives up the definition. On the other hand, if this complexity of correspondence be given up, the definition ceases to be distinctive; for the motions of the earth furnish surely as complete a fulfilment of it as could be desired. These motions are definite, they are combined, they are in certain respects heterogeneous, they are both simultaneous and successive, and they take place in the strictest correspondence with external co-existences and sequences.

But further, even if it were granted that this succession of internal changes in correspondence to external, to which Mr. Spencer refers, were universally present in living organisms, the definition would still not be satisfactory; for if we could not construct anything else in nature answering to it, we could construct something. Let us suppose a water-mill, with a float placed upon the stream above, and so attached as to raise or lower a sluice as the amount of water varied. Would not Mr. Spencer's definition of life be perfectly fulfilled in this? Using electric wires for nerves, surely innumerable such pseudo-living creatures could be manufactured. Nay, look at the chronometer.

Does not here an internal change—expansion—produced by an external cause, lead to a second internal change, an adjustment of tension in strict correspondence with the external sequence?

Other objections of a different order might perhaps be urged: such as that the definition refers only to the external phenomena of life, and takes no note of its *becoming*, the process by which it is; that though recognising the *correspondence* of the internal with the external, it ignores its identity and absolute dependence; that in it the individualization involved in life, which, as truly affirmed by Schelling and Coleridge, is its chief characteristic, sinks into the background; and finally, that it is not expansive, that it does not suggest, but gives rather a feeling of finality. These, however, are matters on which it is not worth while to dwell. The point of interest that arises from the discussion is in our view this: that what may be called a *qualitative* definition of life is not to be obtained, because the differences on which it could be founded do not exist. Sincerely we believe that if life could in its distinctive characters be defined by man, Mr. Spencer would have done it. As every definition in the past has broken down, so, we believe, must every definition in the future, which seeks to draw any other than a merely relative distinction between the organic and the inorganic. The difference is but relative; it is one of form and mode alone, and no definition can stand which does not recognise this fact.

It is hardly fair, perhaps, to criticize another man's definition without presenting an opportunity for return. We will venture, therefore, undeterred by the *dissecta membra* which lie around, though with no vague forebodings of the fate before us, to try another; keeping, however, within the humbler field of material or organic life. Our definition would be this: Organic life is the limiting, within certain forms determined by external conditions, of molecular changes, both force-absorbing and force-liberating; with the effects of such limitation. Or more briefly: Life is a local limiting of molecular change.

If there is nothing more in organic life than in the rest of nature—and we have seen that if there be anything it is impossible to discover it—may there not be, in spite of appearances, something less? may not the organic be derived from the inorganic, not by a *plus* but by a *minus*?

We intend here simply to suggest whether the idea of a limit might not be found useful in physiology, and cannot pursue the subject into detail; yet having exhibited our wares, we may perhaps, like other showmen, be permitted modestly to praise them. This mode of regarding life answers precisely to that series of united force-liberating and force-absorbing changes, repeated within the same compass, which we have seen that organic

bodies present. *Through* all inorganic bodies force passes; it enters them, affecting them more or less intimately, continuing in them for a longer or a shorter time, and then leaves them, being transmitted onwards to another recipient; but within organic bodies it *circulates*. Part of it is passed on in external function, but part of it is retained. The forces of the living body, besides being transmitted externally, are bent inwards on itself. They are limited in their circuit; and thereby establish those permanent yet ever-shifting centres of force which we call living. Nor could such centres be otherwise established save by a limit to the circulating force, unless we imagined it endowed with the power to direct itself. An illustration will aid our conception here. Life was likened by Cuvier to a whirlpool, as being a constant form with ever-varying substance; but the idea will bear a deeper probing. Let us think not of a whirlpool simply, but of an *eddy* in a stream. All around it runs a large continuous current, from which it is marked off—individualized, we might almost say—by a certain difference of form and mode. Yet it consists of the very same elements, material and dynamic, as the stream around, upon which it is entirely dependent. That stream represents the great stream of force; that eddy the living organism. The eddy exhibits to us the current locally limited and turned upon itself. Save by such limit (be it from inequality of ground or whatever other cause) it could not be so turned; but a limit inevitably by the persistence of force must turn it so. The motion of the stream, being limited in its onward course, takes the reverse direction, becomes the opposite to itself, flows to a certain extent, measured by its momentum, upwards against gravity. The eddy presents to us opposite motions, down and up, united and mutually dependent. The force-liberating downward motion produces the force-absorbing upward, and they dwell together in one definite shape—definite yet transient; for the force in it, however long the circulation may continue, is given off into the outer stream at last, and the temporarily isolated fragment is resolved into the surrounding elements. But not until it may, serving as a new limit, have imparted its existence to another. Surely it is life in all but name.

Does our definition fail, then, by including too much? No. *Dynamically* an eddy answers to the simplest form of life, but not in respect to the nature of the changes involved. Life is a limiting of molecular changes—it might be simpler to say *chemical* changes, but that the term is open to objection—the eddy exhibits a limiting of mechanical ones. By laying stress upon the molecular character of the changes primarily concerned in life, the definition excludes those mechanisms which form in some respects the closest analogues of living organisms, and so

greatly embarrasses any definitions which dwell most upon their mechanical phenomena. It places those mechanical phenomena in their right place, as secondary. Some other advantages also the definition proposed seems to possess. It lays hold not of the mere phenomena of life, but of the process which constitutes it; and so to a certain extent gives an account of its becoming. It embraces the statical as well as the dynamical phenomena involved; the things in which life is latent as well as those which exhibit vital activity. It puts the individualizing tendency in the foreground, and expresses in its terms the essential identity of the organic with, and its intimate dependence upon, the inorganic. It is true the correspondence between the organism and its environment is left out, but this is necessarily involved in its dependence, and is therefore implicitly included among the "effects of the limitation." It is probable, also, that its remarkable correspondence, or adaptation to conditions, is only an apparent distinction of organic structure. Indefinite and more or less incoherent, from our point of view, as are inorganic phenomena, it would be a narrow conception that should refuse to allow them, under other aspects than those directly cognizable by us, at least as perfect a connexion and as definite and unitary a subordination, as are visible to us in the more contracted organic sphere. An entozoon—with whatever powers of reason endowed—would probably make little beyond accidental stratifications and aggregates out of the body of a man. Its sphere of definitely combined and correspondent changes would probably be pretty much confined to its own body and those of its compeers. Here again it should not be forgotten that evolution from homogeneous formlessness, though true according to some of the laws of our apprehension, is phenomenal only. According to other elements of our intellectual being, it would seem not less demonstrable that the adaptations which are seen in organic nature, must involve fully equal adaptedness in that from whence it flows. "Nor probably are the two views, each maintained with due relations, at all contradictory. The multiform correspondence, with its results of use, characteristic of the organic world, is not introduced by the limiting on which the organic condition depends, but only the direction of that correspondence to certain limited and particular results. Another advantage, indeed, which the suggested definition of life possesses, is that it brings nothing out of nothing: does not derive the more from the less.*"

* It seems worth considering whether the philosophical method used by Mr. Spencer might not be fruitfully extended. Matter and force, he says, can neither be destroyed nor introduced. When we seem to do either, we do but change the form. Nor does it invalidate this deduction, that to all appearance,

But it is in the expansiveness and the many ulterior bearings of the conception of a limit, as applied to life, that perhaps its chief attraction lies. It seems to cast a light alike on the fundamental postulates of the theory of evolution, and on the most widely ramified vital phenomena. For example, Mr. Spencer's first great deductive law from the persistence of force, is, as we have seen, that of the instability of the homogeneous; or, that change must necessarily commence wherever all parts are perfectly alike. But as he himself allows there is an exception to this statement, "one stable homogeneity only is hypothetically possible. If centres of force, absolutely uniform in their powers, were diffused with absolute uniformity through *unlimited* space, they would remain in equilibrium."*

Thus the idea of a limit is one around which evolution centres, in its widest as well as in its narrowest sphere.

And again in the same relation, the idea of a limit is equally suggested by the phenomena of force. Entirely unreconcilable with any complete dynamic theory is the idea of permanently fixed centres of force—any inherent powers. Gravity, for instance, refuses to be correlated with other forces; it remains as a permanent stumbling-block. What we rationally demand is an ever-current force always equal in amount, but

and to all practical purposes, we create what was not, or annihilate what was. May not the same class of propositions be applied farther; for example, to such things as *order*. Can order come into existence, or cease from existing? Granted that, apparently, and to all practical purposes, it is created or destroyed, there is not in this the least presumption that such creation or destruction truly takes place. Is not the form merely of the order changed; from an apparent to an inapparent one, and *vice versa*? It is true that order is not an existence, is perhaps only a conception of our minds, a purely relative term. But this would not affect the argument, for force and matter are the same. It may be said that order is a mode or condition only; but the same is true of motion. Can we any more think *being* and *not-being* together in the one case than in the other?

* "First Principles," p. 386. Mr. Spencer goes on to say that "this, though a verbally intelligible supposition, is one that cannot be represented in thought; since unlimited space is inconceivable. All finite forms of the homogeneous—all forms of which we can know or conceive—must inevitably lapse into heterogeneity." But is it not remarkable that Mr. Spencer should make representability in thought a condition of his postulate, when he has himself taken so much pains to show that matter and force and motion are themselves not representable in thought. He says, for instance, p. 61: "It is impossible to form any idea of force in itself, (and) it is equally impossible to comprehend either its mode of exercise or its law of variation." It would appear surely that the starting point at which Mr. Spencer legitimately found himself, was not a limited, but an unlimited homogeneity, in which, therefore, no evolution would occur, and that the one condition required to establish the whole process was precisely that of a limit—the very conception which we have found to constitute the starting point of that new evolution upon the old, the organic world. The coincidence here seems striking.

never traceable to a final home :—a force which we might trace back and back under shifting forms indefinitely. Nay, this doubtless is the true theory of force; the mind can never be at rest under the incubus of supposed fixed centres, howsoever imagined, beyond or before which force is not. These fixed centres, these apparent primary foci of force, how then do they arise? Clearly by a limit. Limit force in time, and the phenomenon of "centres" of force is given.*

But to descend to regions less remote. The influence of this relation to a limit is visible in other phenomena belonging to the organic body, besides those before referred to. Its effect may be traced in the progressive increase in the amount and complexity of life. Upon the evolution theory the organic world has grown up out of the inorganic; that is, more and more force has assumed the vital form, and become expended in producing that unstable union of certain molecules which constitutes matter organic. At the same time, the forms into which this matter is built up assume more and more complexity of structure, and exhibit an increasing intensity of force. A limit is the general idea to which these phenomena point. That occurs in respect to the organic world which occurs when a fluid is pressed into a space from which there is no proportionate egress. There arises a continually heightening tension. The force being retained, and, as it were, turned inward on itself, becomes more intense. Possibly we may witness the results of this process in the highly complex structure of the organic molecules and the successive stages in which their decomposition takes place. None but the simplest organic substances are resolved directly into the ultimate chemical compounds. Almost all of them, in their fall from their unstable equilibrium, sink by successive slips, each containing less force than the preceding. In this complex structure and manifold process of decomposition, do we not see evidence of a complex process of upbuilding—successive impulses of force applied to the same molecules?

If we turn from development of force to that of form, the same view recurs. Without reference to the constant tendency to increase of organic matter, and a resistance to its mere expansion, the extremely involved and, as it were, convoluted structure of the higher animals, can hardly be explained. Mere modifications by external circumstances have no adaptation to make life more, though they may tend to alter its distribution; and simple differentiations and integrations do not account for the immense concentration of structure as well as force, the com-

* And since "matter" is resolved into "centres of force," do we not, though somewhat vaguely, seem to trace *matter* to a limit?

pressed and implicated variety of parts, which is characteristic of the more developed organisms. The general conception, which, as it seems to us, should be applied to the evolution of life, is one which recognises a *pressure* of the natural forces tending to give rise to the organic state of matter, and a constant resistance under which this process is carried on, leading to a higher tension of the force, and a more involved structure in the forms in which it is exhibited. This view furnishes also a partial justification of the otherwise untenable doctrine of an inherent tendency in life to progress. There is not an inherent tendency; but there is, apart from changing circumstances, an external constraint.

This pressure from without, arising from increase of the vital form of force, Mr. Spencer does not expressly note as bearing on evolution; nor does it appear to us that he assigns it even by implication a due place. Without it, the causes he assigns for evolution appear insufficient to bear the weight which rests on them. Adaptations do not alter totals. It is possible that he may design to make more reference to phenomena of this class in the succeeding volume, to which the discussion of individual structure is deferred; but it seems to us that they should find a place in the treatment of the general doctrine of evolution. Nature becoming organic—that being so far the direction of least resistance for her force—we believe is the great element which lies at the root of the whole process; nature becoming organic under limit.

And this balance of vital action and limit or control, again, has the most striking illustration in the life of the individual organism; in which the whole nutrition and every function seem to be thus held in check, a special nervous organization existing for this very end:—which organization itself, may we not say in accordance with Mr. Spencer's own views, is but the specialization of an universal function in the organic world? But into this point and many others equally full of interest which press upon us, we have not space to enter now. It is with regret we leave so great a topic so scantily treated, and see our task cut off at its commencement; but we hope to resume it at no very distant day.

ART. IV.—POLITICAL ECONOMY.

Principles of Political Economy, with some of the Applications to Social Philosophy. By JOHN STUART MILL. People's Edition.

IT is with genuine satisfaction that we hail the appearance of a new edition of Mr. Mill's well-known volumes on "Political Economy." None of his writings, except, perhaps, his book on Liberty, have acquired so general a popularity, or exercised so wide an influence as this. Still, as the subject is even now but very imperfectly understood by the majority of our countrymen, we rejoice that Mr. Mill has made his work more universally accessible by publishing also a cheap edition at the very moderate price of five shillings. Very nearly ninety years have now elapsed since the publication of the "Wealth of Nations." During that period, the science that forms the subject of that treatise, has made no inconsiderable progress, and has exercised a conspicuous influence upon both the intellectual and political condition of civilized nations. It appears to us that a fitting opportunity has arrived for taking a general survey of the history and character of the new power that has thus arisen, and has acquired so marked a sway over the minds of educated men.

The name of political economy is far more frequently employed, by friends or foes, than its principles are understood, and we think it a matter of legitimate regret that a science which investigates and explains the laws of wealth, does not rank in more prominent place in the education of our countrymen. In the varied field of human learning, political economy occupies a peculiar position. Alone among all the sciences it assumes, as the acknowledged basis of its doctrines, a principle in human nature. It does not, like mental philosophy, make human nature itself the direct object of its investigations. It does not, like the physical sciences, confine itself to observing the phenomena of the external world, and thus discovering the laws which those phenomena obey. Political economy takes what we may call a middle course between these extremes. Considering human nature as an established fact, it builds upon that foundation the whole of its elaborate superstructure. It is this feature to which it owes, so to speak, its strong individuality and its special attractiveness. A "Science of History" is the darling dream of modern thinkers. Whether or not such a science be possible, we do not venture to say; but we may say that a presumption of its

possibility is afforded by the example of political economy. To Adam Smith and his successors belongs the honour of having indicated the road by which the scientific historian, should he ever exist, will have to travel. They have done on the small scale what the scientific historian must do on the large scale. Moreover, if the scientific historian will be compelled to deal with problems of far greater magnitude and complexity, political economists can at least claim to have succeeded in solving the comparatively simple problems with which it has been their duty to grapple.

But the science of which we speak possesses a still stronger claim to general attention in its pre-eminently practical character. In the words of a living statesman, written in 1819—"Political economy is an awful thing. It is appalling to think that the Legislature is often called upon to decide questions which involve the immediate happiness, perhaps the very existence, of millions of the people, by the rules of a science which changes from day to day. It is not a matter of very urgent or pressing necessity to know whether oxygen gets the better of phlogiston, or chlorine is a better founded name than oxymuriatic acid; but it is of another kind of importance to know whether a silver currency, of a certain standard, will prove a considerable benefit or certain ruin; whether an overflowing abundance of cheap foreign corn is a blessing or a curse to the nation which imports it." Deducting the hostile bias, this passage very fairly states the nature of the benefits which a knowledge of economical laws may be expected to confer. It is true that the advance of the science since 1819, and the universal acceptance among thinking men of that principle of free-trade which its disciples have so long inculcated, has rendered the questions it discusses somewhat less absorbing in their interest to the general reader. But the subject with which it deals continues, and must continue, to be one of universal importance.

That subject, to sum it up in a single word, is Wealth—Wealth, not in the narrow sense of superfluous riches, but in the large sense of every object useful or agreeable to mankind, from the first necessities of life to the rarest and most costly luxuries. Now the wealth of a nation is a matter of national concern. No sooner does a community emerge from the lowest barbarism than its members become occupied in acquiring wealth. Nor has the highest civilization hitherto attained exempted any but an insignificant fraction from this occupation. To acquire wealth—by which expression we do not mean to get rich, but to earn the means of subsistence—is still the main business of the vast majority of men; of all, in short, who are not either raised too

high or sunk too low to feel the necessity of working for their bread. It is true that many of those who are engaged in modes of labour which have for their direct result the enjoyment of an income, are mentally engrossed in objects of a more ennobling character. Many of them are adding to the knowledge and comfort of mankind, either by scientific researches, or new inventions, or judicious improvements upon those already in existence. But what we here insist upon is simply the fact that the mainspring of the whole machinery of civilized life is the desire of wealth. Look around upon the busy mass of toiling people. What is it but this intense, all-pervading desire that fills the several professions, drives men to employ themselves in trade, and even compels them to undertake the severest kinds of manual labour? Political economy, in answering this question and others of kindred nature, brings scientific processes to bear on the commonest phenomena of our daily life. Not only do the conclusions thus arrived at involve rules of the utmost consequence to human happiness, but it is impossible, so long as we are ignorant of these conclusions, to form any adequate conception of the world we live in. We can no more understand the social body without political economy than we can understand the natural body without physiology. And perhaps physiology is the only science which can be compared to political economy in practical importance.

Considering these things, we think it an improvement much to be desired that no young man in the upper classes should be allowed to regard his education as complete without an elementary acquaintance with the two above-named sciences; while even among the lower classes it would, we believe, be productive of good to recognise their existence. The claims of physiology, doubtless of more immediate urgency, have been ably enforced by writers conversant with the subject. Those of political economy have hitherto received less attention. We propose, in the present paper, to explain, so far as our limits may permit, the nature and objects of the science, and, if possible, to remove any feelings of aversion or indifference to it which may still unhappily linger in the minds of our readers.

Our investigation may properly begin by a brief allusion to the historical progress of our subject, and the principal steps by which it has risen to its present station. The origin of a science can rarely be fixed with absolute precision. There are generally some remarkable instances of acute, far-seeing intellects that have discovered truths the full significance of which it has been left to a later age more clearly to perceive. This is pre-eminently the case in the history of political economy. Various

writers had distinctly or indistinctly apprehended many of its fundamental principles, but it was the special merit of the "Wealth of Nations" to give form and body to their floating and partial speculations. Thus, near the end of the 17th century, Sir Dudley North had maintained the very enlightened propositions, that in trade "the whole world is but as one nation or people;" that no trade ought to be an object of favour, that no trade can be unprofitable to the public; and "that money is a merchandize whereof there may be a glut as well as a scarcity." About the same period Locke had arrived at the conclusion that labour is almost the sole cause of the value of commodities. In 1752 had appeared one of the brightest of those scattered rays of light that broke the almost universal darkness prevailing before the time of Adam Smith: we allude to the political section of Hume's *Essays*. In those *Essays*, Hume anticipated with the utmost clearness many of the leading principles that afterwards became the corner-stones of the most celebrated passages in the "Wealth of Nations." Adam Smith, for example, has declared that "Labour was the first price, the original purchase-money that was paid for all things." More than twenty years before these words were published, Hume had given utterance to the same great truth in the "Essay on Commerce." "Everything in the world," he had there written, "is purchased by labour, and our passions are the only causes of labour." It is the glory of Adam Smith to have utterly overthrown the mercantile system, which aimed at increasing the wealth of the country by increasing the amount of gold and silver imported into it. This fallacy was finally exploded in the "Wealth of Nations;" but Hume had already said, in the "Essay on Money," that "Money is not, properly speaking, one of the subjects of commerce, but only the instrument which men have agreed upon to facilitate the exchange of one commodity for another. It is none of the wheels of trade: it is the oil which renders the motion of the wheels more smooth and easy." It would be difficult to illustrate more aptly the functions of a circulating medium. There are several other points in which this philosopher evinces an acuteness of reasoning which renders the political section of his *essays* still worthy of an attentive perusal. Thus, in writing of "Interest," he explains with extreme accuracy the causes in consequence of which it is high or low. In another essay on the "Balance of Trade," he expresses sound views on the propensity of money to keep its level, and rightly conceives the principle by which it does so. Lastly, he exposes the folly of that narrow "jealousy of trade" which led his countrymen to dread the prosperity of other

nations. "It is our interest," he argues, "that they should be rich;" our domestic industry "receives an increase from it."

Remarkable as are the views of Hume, it did not enter into his plan to compose a systematic work in illustration of these opinions. The honour of having been the first to bestow upon political economy the character of a science is assigned both by Mr. M'Culloch and M. Say to a French physician, M. Quesnay. This distinguished man was the son of an agriculturist in Normandy, and having become Madame de Pompadour's physician, was raised by her influence to the post of surgeon to the king. He wrote in the middle of the eighteenth century, and was a strenuous advocate of commercial freedom, for which he deserves the higher credit, as he himself believed that agricultural labour alone was capable of increasing the national wealth. But, however great the merits of M. Quesnay's writings may be, it is not from them that we can date the origin of economical science, as at present understood. The well-known sect of French economists who followed in the footsteps of Quesnay were no doubt considerable in their day, but the opinions they represented, and therewith the principal value of their writings, have passed away. They were destined to yield to the more philosophic principles proclaimed in 1776 by Dr. Adam Smith.

The character of the "Wealth of Nations" is so generally known, and its place in English literature so irrevocably fixed, that no eulogy of ours could be other than superfluous, if not tedious. Cultivated readers do not require to be told that the author of the book collected the scattered fragments of economical wisdom to be found in previous writers, that he added many important principles of his own discovery, and fused the whole mass into one comprehensive system, destined, by the mere force of its superior truth, to bring discredit and ultimate destruction upon the systems which then obtained general acceptance. In his speculations there is much which the progress of knowledge has shown to be erroneous or imperfect; but the great practical conclusion upon which he insists has been only ratified and strengthened by subsequent experience. This conclusion, which follows as an irresistible corollary from his reasoning, is, that freedom of trade is in nearly all cases to be preferred to restriction; for that the interference of Government will only force some portion of the capital of the country from a more profitable into a less profitable,—from a more productive into a less productive channel.

The seed thus sown has borne abundant fruit. In 1787, Bentham wrote his well-known "Defence of Usury," which we commend to those who have not read it as a model of clear and unanswerable logic. In this little book Bentham pushed the

principle of non-interference somewhat further than Adam Smith had done, applying it in a case where the latter had failed to do so. He showed that nothing could be more injudicious than the attempt to protect borrowers by fixing a rate of interest which could not legally be exceeded. We forbear, however, to enter into the arguments by which this proposition was proved, for we must hasten to notice the other distinguished masters of economical science. In 1798, Mr. Malthus published the first edition of his "Essay on Population," which was republished in an improved and altered form in 1803. This book, which has been much discussed but little understood, deserves to be ranked as second only to the "Wealth of Nations" in the annals of the science. The theory of Rent, first propounded by Dr. Anderson, a Scotch farmer, in 1777, but nevertheless unrecognised by Smith, sprang into renewed existence under happier auspices in 1815. In that year it was re-discovered independently both by Mr. Malthus and Sir Edward West. Two years later, another great economist—David Ricardo—added to the literature of the science one of its most striking and valuable possessions, his "Principles of Political Economy." In 1820, a volume bearing the same title was given to the world by Mr. Malthus. Meanwhile, M. Say and M. Sismondi were pursuing kindred labours on the continent; M. Say having first published his "Cours d'Economie Politique" in 1802, and M. Sismondi his "Nouveaux Principes" in 1819. At this brilliant epoch in its history, the subject began to assume more and more distinctly its proper place as a special and peculiar branch of learning. The latest and hitherto most perfect development it has reached, is to be found in the work before us.

It is one of the distinguishing merits of Mr. Mill that he is never misled by a narrow partiality to his own subject. He treats political economy not only in the spirit of an economist, but in that of a philosopher. Hence he is saved from the error of attributing universal truth to doctrines which in reality are only true under given circumstances; while he is always able to write of economical questions from a larger, and therefore a more unbiassed point of view, than has always been attained by those who have been the exclusive devotees of such researches. It is, however, an error to suppose that an adequate knowledge of political economy can be acquired by the perusal of a single treatise, even though it be as comprehensive and complete as that of Mr. Mill. To appreciate the manner in which Mr. Mill closes some former controversies by a few decisive words—those, for instance, on productive and unproductive labour, and on a measure of value—it is necessary to refer to those writers who engaged in the thick of the conflict; for neither in this

respect nor in others will it be possible to enter fully into his reasonings, except for those who have acquired the mastery of previous writings, especially the writings of Adam Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, and M'Culloch.

Such have been the literary results of the researches concerning the laws of wealth. The legislative results are well known to every educated man. The commercial history of the present century bears witness to the beneficial influence which political economy has exercised upon the minds of the public. Monopoly after monopoly, restriction after restriction, has disappeared under its teaching, till at length a state of things has been reached in this country such as Adam Smith in his wildest dreams of unfettered trade could scarcely have conceived. The present is a signal instance of the manner in which philosophical truth, first discerned by a few reflecting minds, is next admitted by far-sighted statesmen who endeavour to apply it in practice, and is then gradually adopted by the more liberal politicians, till at length even the rank and file of the Conservative party are compelled to admit it. In 1792 we find Pitt referring in terms of cordial admiration to the "Wealth of Nations," and lamenting the loss of its author; but the times were not then ripe for the adoption of just commercial principles. More than 50 years had still to pass before Sir Robert Peel, when proposing to the House of Commons the repeal of the corn-laws, could introduce his measure in the following language:—

"I am about, in pursuance of the recommendation contained in Her Majesty's speech from the throne, advised by her responsible servants—I am about to review the duties which apply to many articles, the produce and manufacture of other countries. I am about to proceed on the assumption adopted in that speech from the throne, that the repeal of prohibitory and the relaxation of protective duties is in itself a wise principle. I am about to proceed on the assumption that protective duties, abstractedly and on principle, are open to objection—that the policy of maintaining them may be defended—but that there must be shown to be special considerations, either of public policy or of justice, to vindicate the maintenance of them."*

These words were spoken on the 27th of January, 1846. The proposal was not adopted without a hot discussion, nor was it till the twelfth night of the debate that the House divided. Yet the principle thus proclaimed by Sir Robert Peel—the principle thus angrily resisted by the "agricultural interest"—had been clearly and logically proved to be right by the Scottish philosopher in 1776; men of liberal opinions had for many years been ardent in their devotion to it; and it had received especially the ener-

* "Hansard's Parliamentary Debates," vol. lxxiii. p. 239.

getic and eloquent advocacy of the statesman whose recent death has been the just occasion of universal lamentation.

Apart, therefore, from its other claims, political economy is invested with a deep historical interest as a power which, having arisen within the last century, has acquired so absolute a sway over the minds of men as to expel the strongest prejudices, snapping them asunder one by one in spite of the feeling of self-interest which upheld them, and substituting in the minds of educated people an entirely new class of convictions and ideas, such as our forefathers would have laughed to scorn as the startling paradoxes of ignorant theorists. It is not, however, in its practical aspect that we propose at present to consider the subject. We are rather anxious to speak of political economy as a science than as an art, for we believe that in this respect its nature and objects have been, and still are, much misunderstood. Of the manner in which the absence of a distinct terminology has contributed to this misunderstanding, we shall have occasion to speak in a later part of the present article. Another potent incentive of opposition is to be found in the fact that political economists have not always been sufficiently careful to separate the strictly scientific portion of their writings from the practical rules which are in some cases deducible therefrom; a confusion which adverse critics have always made a point of rendering worse confounded. Thus, a dislike to the individual opinions of Mr. Malthus upon the subject of matrimony has led many to deny the Malthusian theory of population, one of the simplest and most incontrovertible among the doctrines of the science. In order to avoid these errors, it is essential to understand the principle upon which political economists have conducted their researches, as well as the scope and purposes of their undertaking. Upon this point the prevailing misapprehensions are so inveterate that we must be excused for dwelling a little upon what may seem to some of our readers very trite and familiar facts.

Induction and deduction have of late years become household words among us, and the two different modes of arriving at knowledge which they represent do not require to be explained at length. It is open to the political economist—or at any rate it was open to him at first—to choose either of these roads in order to reach his conclusions. He might travel by the inductive road, in which case it would be his business to make a vast collection of economical facts; to trace, for example, the variations in the price of goods, or the wages of labour through a given period of history; to explain the various customs that prevail throughout the world with regard to the tenure of land and the distribution of its produce. Upon this wide survey—for upon such a subject it must be very wide—he must build, if he can,

his scientific theory. Or he may choose the deductive road, and starting with some broad undisputed principle, deduce his particular conclusions from it by a chain of reasoning. Mr. Jones' "Essay on Rent" is the purest specimen of the first of these methods; Mr. Ricardo's "Principles of Political Economy" is the purest specimen of the second.

Necessity, if not a deliberate preference, has long decided between the inductive and the deductive schools of political economy. Induction, however proper in those sciences which depend on a nice observation of minute particulars, as all the physical sciences do, is of inferior value in one which is entirely concerned with the proceedings of human beings. Human nature is so complex a thing, and the phenomena by which it is manifested are so various, that there would be little hope of discovering the general laws that preside over the actions of men unless we can isolate one or more of the motives of which those actions are the result. This, however, is beyond our power, except by the process of abstracting a particular class of actions the motive, or motives, of which we already know. Having this knowledge, we are able to demonstrate the course which human beings, placed in a given position, will adopt, and thus to bring a particular class of actions under the dominion of regular and intelligible laws.

It is precisely such an abstraction which the political economist is compelled to make. The class of actions he selects for his investigations are those relating to wealth. The motive of those actions he knows, for it is nothing but the desire of wealth that can lead to its production and exchange. This, then, being the motive, it becomes a matter of correct reasoning only to demonstrate the course which human beings, engaged in the production and exchange of wealth, will adopt in given cases. Wealth being their object, they will be anxious to sell as dear, and to buy as cheap, as they possibly can. This, then, is the principle of human nature upon which we have said that political economy is based. It is, in fact, the foundation of the whole system, for if this assumption be unwarranted, the very conception of a science of wealth falls to the ground. The facts regarding the production, distribution, and exchange of wealth may remain; but a scientific explanation of them is no longer possible. For a collection of facts upon this subject, however interesting, or however extensive, would not of itself be entitled to the name of a science. Political economy, as now understood, is fairly entitled to that name; for it reveals a system of laws as distinct and as unchanging, though not so easily ascertained, as those which natural science has discovered in the material world.

We are aware that objections are entertained in certain quar-

ters to the application of the term "laws" to the movements of human beings. Those who make these objections appear to us to be misled by a very grave confusion with regard to the meaning of the word when thus applied. They suppose that the discovery of regularity rather than chance, of order rather than anarchy in human affairs, will take away the freedom of mankind to act as they please. When it is said that we act according to law, they immediately conclude that this is equivalent to saying that we could not have acted otherwise. They dislike the notion of being able to predict events, for they imagine that an event, if predicted, would be obliged to happen.

Such views, if they rested upon anything more solid than a sentimental horror of applying mathematical and logical processes to men, would cut at the root of a science of wealth. The political economist, as we have already explained, considers human beings in the mass as desirous of selling dear and buying cheap. All his reasonings are based upon that axiom. Are we to say that he is not justified in taking so much for granted? Now, if there be no regular sequence in human actions, if it be illegitimate to assume a single principle implying that there is, if the actions of men and women be as capricious, as uncertain, as exempt from any kind of law as it is sometimes pretended, there would be no such thing as knowledge of character at all, and our sense of dependence upon each other would be utterly destroyed.

Let us consider a little the nature of the cases to which economical logic is applied, in order to see whether it be really unreasonable to suppose that even human actions may be brought within the bounds of so-called laws. Is it too much to assume that a sensible man will prefer investing his capital at six per cent. to investing it at three per cent., if the security in each case be equally good? Or that if he have his choice between two butchers, in the quality of whose meat there is no difference, he will prefer the one who offers to supply him at the cheapest rate? Yet it is simply upon such cases, simply upon our knowledge of the fact, that sensible men will in general—it need not be always—choose the greater gain and the smaller expenditure, that we base our calculations concerning their mode of proceeding in the matters of wealth. It is a strange mistake to argue, that when we predict the conduct of our fellow-creatures we deprive them of the exercise of their reason, and treat them as machines bound by an iron necessity. We predict their conduct in reality, not because they have no reason, but because they have it; and because, assuming that they have it, we are able to foresee the course which the exercise of reason will lead them to adopt. Human nature need not be thought of as subjected to laws; for the laws themselves are the product of human nature.

In the present instance, it is a property of human nature to desire wealth. People will therefore take some trouble, and make some sacrifice in order to acquire it. Hence the phenomenon of labour, and consequently of production. There being, as explained by Mill, three requisites of production—land, capital, and labour—it follows that the produce must be divided between the owners of these three things. Hence the phenomenon of distribution. In all civilized countries, moreover, the various branches of industry are carried on by different members of the community, each man depending upon his neighbour for the supply of all his wants except the special want with which he is able to supply himself. But in order to gratify his desires, he must give some of his own labour or of the commodities which his labour produces. Wealth being, by the supposition, an object of universal desire, no one will part with it without receiving what he considers a fair equivalent. Hence the phenomenon of exchange.

The preceding sketch will perhaps convey some slight notion to the general reader of the manner in which the laws of wealth are deduced from the simple principle upon which we have dwelt above. Strictly understood, the function of the political economist is confined to the task of tracing the relation of cause to effect, throughout the numerous operations attendant upon these three phenomena—the production, distribution, and exchange of wealth. This, however, would be a dry and barren office, and we are not aware that any writers, except, perhaps, Mr. Senior, have entirely restricted themselves to so limited a range. There are two considerations which appear to us to justify, while at the same time they partially explain, the usual mixture of scientific investigation with original speculation.

In the first place, it must never be forgotten, that the fundamental axiom so often mentioned—the wish to buy as cheap and sell as dear as possible—though an undoubted truth, is not a truth without exceptions, or rather without limitations. Were the desire of wealth the sole desire of humanity, it would be absolutely true. But, although this is not the fact, we are obliged for the purposes of the science to conduct our reasonings as if it were. There could be no political economy in a scientific sense except by this process of abstraction. It would be impossible to take into account all the numerous motives by which men are swayed; hence the necessity of fixing upon a single one, and treating of society as influenced by that alone. Now the desire of wealth is, as we have shown, an almost universal, if not an universal feeling. Individual exceptions there may be, but these are of little consequence to conclusions which are only intended to apply to the community as a whole. To

recur to the preceding illustration, it is quite conceivable that a person might be found who would choose the three per cent. investment rather than the six per cent.—the dearest butcher rather than the cheapest. Such eccentricities, however, are so rare, that they would not at all affect the assertions a political economist would make, namely, that if the usual rate of interest were six per cent., it would be impossible to obtain loans at three; and that if the two butchers sold in the same market, competition would compel the dearest of the two to lower his prices. Nevertheless it must be borne in mind, that in these expectations we take no account of the force of habit, the love of ease, or the carelessness which so often attends the expenditure of the rich. Yet so powerful are these motives in counteracting the levelling tendency of competition, that we often find a wide difference in the prices at which goods are offered in different shops. These are exceptions which cannot be overlooked; for they prove, that although the conclusions of political economy are perfectly accurate deductions from the premisses, they require to be tested by an appeal to facts. For where the major premiss is only a partial truth, it is obvious that the conclusion can be no more. Hence the unwisdom of treating political economy as an entirely abstract thing, without regard for the notorious facts which limit, while they do not overthrow, its theoretical doctrines:

The received theory of Rent—the *pons asinorum* of political economy—furnishes an admirable illustration of what we mean. Rent, in the strict scientific sense, is that portion of a farmer's profits which is over and above the rate of profits usually obtained at the time and place in which the farmer lives. It is, in fact, a surplus profit. Now, it is obvious that if the average rate of profits be ten per cent., and a farmer receives fifty per cent., his landlord may claim forty per cent.* as rent. Whether he will do so, however, is another question. Custom, or good nature, or indifference, may induce him to be content with thirty or twenty. Probably there are few landlords who exact the full rent which they might be able to obtain. This should prevent us from talking as if rents were really fixed exactly as the theory supposes. But it no more invalidates the definition of rent which the theory gives, than the fact that we cannot draw a circle with all its radii precisely equal, invalidates Euclid's definition of that figure.

Another circumstance which gives an especially practical character to these inquiries, is the impossibility of separating in our minds the laws which regulate the distribution of wealth from their influence on human happiness. It would be at any rate extremely difficult, even if it were desirable, that political

economists should abstain from discussing the various degrees in which the social arrangements of a country contribute to the comfort and prosperity of its inhabitants. Whether the system of large landed estates or peasant properties be the most commendable, whether it be right to allow land to be entailed, and if so, for how long, whether primogeniture or equal division be the better custom, what is the best mode of providing for the able-bodied poor—these and many other questions of the highest importance have been always justly considered within the province of political economy. They are, of course, liable to be treated from very opposite points of view, according to the mental tendencies of individual writers ; but no difference of opinion, however great, on such points, can render the abstract principles of the science uncertain. Experience rather than theory must decide in the cases to which we have referred.

Meanwhile, we cannot at all agree with those who would desire to separate principle from practice. The “Applications to Social Philosophy” in Mr. Mill’s celebrated work are fully as important, and far more interesting to general readers, than the “Principles of Political Economy.” And we rejoice to find both in the title he has chosen, and in the preface, an explicit acknowledgment of his intention of treating the two branches of the subject together. His reasons for this course are worthy of attention :—

“The most characteristic quality of that work [the ‘Wealth of Nations’], and the one in which it most differs from some others which have equalled or even surpassed it as mere expositions of the general principles of the subject, is that it invariably associates the principles with their applications. This of itself implies a much wider range of ideas and of topics than are included in political economy, considered as a branch of abstract speculation. For practical purposes, political economy is inseparably intertwined with many other branches of social philosophy. Except on matters of mere detail, there are perhaps no practical questions, even among those which approach nearest to the character of purely economical questions, which admit of being decided on economical premisses alone. And it is because Adam Smith never loses sight of this truth ; because, in his applications of political economy, he perpetually appeals to other and often far larger considerations than pure political economy affords, that he gives that well-grounded feeling of command over the principles of the subject for purposes of practice, owing to which the ‘Wealth of Nations’ alone among treatises on political economy, has not only been popular with general readers, but has impressed itself strongly on the minds of men of the world and of legislators.”

However little the abstract doctrines of political economy may have been understood, its practical teaching has been still more liable to misrepresentation and unfounded censure.

Theoretical views, harshly and unsparingly reduced to rules of conduct, are especially distasteful to the English mind. This tendency to rebel against theory, so fatal in its extremest aspects, to the influence of the political economist, should make him peculiarly careful not to overlook those "larger considerations" alluded to by Mr. Mill—not to insist too exclusively upon his own favourite plans for the improvement of mankind—not to shock too rudely that rather blind aversion to logical consistency which is so often dignified by the name of "common sense." People will care very little whether his principles be true or false, if they do not like the precepts he deduces from them. A disagreeable truth is an object of far more rancorous hostility than a disagreeable falsehood. The latter dies in due season; the former continues to exist, and to excite the attacks of those whose interests it disregards or whose tranquillity it disturbs.

If political economists have occasionally forgotten these things, if they have sometimes been too purely and severely economical, it must be confessed that they have paid much more than a befitting penalty in the monstrous opinions for which they have been made responsible. Popular prejudice has not hesitated to fix upon them the most revolting narrowness of thought, and the most odious qualities of mind. Selfishness, hardness of heart, a preference of material good to moral goodness, and a desire that man should be absorbed in getting rich as the one great object of his existence—these have been supposed to be the characteristic marks of the votaries of social science, especially of that branch of it which relates to wealth.

Imputations of this description are the less excusable, because there are none who have shown themselves more truly and earnestly desirous of promoting the welfare of the poor than those who have thoroughly mastered the principles of political economy. Their philanthropy may indeed take a different form from vulgar charity; but it is a difference not between hardness and benevolence, but between scientific and unscientific ways of being benevolent. It is not a moral, but an intellectual distinction. It is not political economy on the one side, and the Christian religion on the other; but it is knowledge on the one side, and ignorance on the other.

How comes it, then, that the principles of those who possess this knowledge, and who have laboured so earnestly to extend its benefits to others, have been so grossly distorted that they have been made to appear inimical rather than friendly to the truest interests of mankind? The infection of this strange delusion has extended even to distinguished writers, seizing especially upon those minds in whom strong sympathies and generous feelings, rather than a clear understanding or a logical head, are

the predominant features. The causes of their error lie, to a great extent, in individual mental peculiarities, and are in this case beyond the reach of explanation. If, however, there be any semblance of foundation for their attacks, we are inclined to think it may be found in the doctrine, so sedulously preached by political economists from Adam Smith downwards, which has received the appellation of "Laissez-faire." The expression, "Laissez-faire et laissez-passer" (originally due to Gournay), a disciple of Quesnay, has been seized upon as the one piece of morality clearly enjoined by economists, and has conveyed altogether mistaken notions to those who have made it the pretext of so much righteous indignation.

According to the common misconception of the sense in which "Laissez faire" is inculcated by political economists, this principle is assumed to mean that the proper business of an enlightened Government is to do nothing—nothing, that is, for the intellectual or moral welfare of the people in whose interest they govern. It is assumed to mean that the richer classes have no duties to perform towards the poorer, unless it be the duty of leaving them alone; it is assumed to mean that the social evils under which we suffer may be, and should be left to remove themselves, without the co-operation of human effort, human forethought, and human charity.*

This, or something approaching to this, is the portentous form under which we have some difficulty in recognising the features of a very simple and familiar economical truth. "Laissez-faire" may be regarded as the practical deduction from a principle known by the name of supply and demand. This principle does indeed assert that since, throughout the whole field of industry, demand is the natural stimulus to supply, and since it is the interest of every one to discover the most profitable employment of his capital or his labour, it is advisable not to create a factitious demand or a factitious supply. Men, it is contended, will pursue their own interest if they are left to do so without legislative interference. But the wealth of a nation being simply the aggregate of the wealth of the individuals who compose it, it is obvious that whatever they find to be the best means of increasing their own fortunes, will also be the best means of promoting the national prosperity.

It was on such grounds as these that Adam Smith established what we prefer to call, not "Laissez-faire," but the principle of industrial freedom. "Every individual," he observes, "is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous

* Thus, the translator of Sismondi's "Essays on Political Economy," who might have known better, goes so far as to pretend that "all legislative interference with the modes of letting and tenures of land, is contrary to the maxim *laissez faire et laissez passer*."

employment for whatever capital he can command. It is his own advantage, indeed, and not that of the society, which he has in view. But the study of his own advantage naturally, or rather, necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the society.* What is here said of capital may, of course, be said equally of labour. It obviously follows that both capitalists and labourers should be left to their own direction with regard to the kind of employment they select, and that all attempts to protect individuals against the effects of competition can only be regarded as bad economy.

Undoubtedly it may sometimes happen that competition falls with excessive severity upon a particular class. Where labour is plentiful, and capital comparatively scarce, it is a necessary result that wages should be low. Whether it is the duty of Government to mitigate the distress arising in such cases, whether it should be our object to relieve the sufferers by temporary expedients, or rather to leave the evil to correct itself in time, are open questions, requiring the grave consideration of those who are interested in them. But the most unflinching enemy of artificial means for the relief of poverty can only maintain that the poor should be taught to help themselves, instead of trusting to the help of others. This theory, which is a natural corollary from the principles of political economy, certainly limits the province of Government in one direction, but leaves to it untouched the important functions of taxation, the punishment of crime, and the education of the people. Nay, the last of these three great duties becomes of more especial urgency if we desire to cherish among the labouring classes the spirit of independence and self-help. Such a spirit can only be advantageous or even safe when combined with education. And we believe it will be found that those who are the most strenuous in denouncing injudicious charity, are also the foremost in demanding that the means of receiving sound elementary instruction should be placed within the reach of every child throughout the kingdom.

This, however, is not the place for a general discussion upon the duties of Government. Our only object in alluding to them for a moment was to set in a clearer light the very restricted character of the principle of industrial freedom. That principle, in fact, only demands that the operations of trade should be exempted from interference, alleging for this modest claim the simple reason that interference, where it does anything, can only do harm. Nature has so provided, that the evils or inconveniences under which men suffer in regard to wealth have an inherent tendency to correct themselves. If only the

* "Wealth of Nations," book iv. chap. 2.

natural laws be left to act as they inevitably do when human folly does not step in to thwart them, their results will be more beneficial by far than those of any artificial laws devised by Parliament. Or to speak more plainly, human nature is so constructed that in the pursuit of wealth, it acts as an unfailing check upon its own excesses.

We have always thought it one of the chief merits of political economy that it teems with illustrations of this great truth. Were we inclined to insist upon the argument from design, we should certainly select as our proof the beautiful manner in which demand and supply balance and restrain each other. Every reader who possesses the most elementary acquaintance with the subject, is familiar with the *modus operandi* of this universal law. The best and simplest instances may be found in the process by which the supply of every article adjusts itself to the demand—an adjustment constantly being made throughout the civilized world. Let us suppose, for example, the supply of cloth to be in excess of the demand. In order to get rid of this excessive supply, the producers will be compelled to offer their wares at too low a price to yield them the ordinary rate of profit. Finding this, they will withdraw some portion of their capital, and thus diminish the supply, in consequence of which the price will again rise till it reaches a height sufficient to yield them average profits. Suppose, however, that the supply is now reduced so much as to fall short of the demand. The price will now be raised so much that the manufacture of cloth will become an especially lucrative business. Fresh capital will, therefore, be attracted towards it; the supply will again be increased, prices will again fall, and profits be again reduced to the common level.

There is thus a constant tendency to establish an equation between demand and supply, and though the equation may seldom, if ever, be fully established for more than a moment, it is plain that there can be no very wide departure from it, unless in consequence of some casual miscalculation on the part of producers. Mr. Mill, in his chapter on the "Equation of International Demand," has shown that the same principle extends to foreign trade. Exports and imports must of necessity balance each other; that is, the aggregate value of what we sell must equal the aggregate value of what we buy. The object to be aimed at, therefore, is that what we produce for exportation should be exactly enough, and no more than enough, to purchase what we ourselves require from foreign nations. If it is too little or too much, the balance must be made good by means of money.

If, however, nations may be compelled to make money payments to each other, it would appear that they, like individuals, might be drained of their gold and silver. Such, happily, is not the case. Money, like goods, provides for its own

distribution amongst those who need it. A large transfer of gold from England to France would raise the value of gold in England, and lower it in France. Nothing but this is needed to make it speedily return from France to England.

One more example of the law of supply and demand we are tempted to add; it is taken from an able pamphlet on the Lancashire distress, the precise title of which we are at present unable to recall. The author stated that large masses of raw cotton were lying at Liverpool, but that they were worked up very slowly on account of the prevailing opinion that the supply would be exhausted if consumed quickly. On the other hand, it was not advisable to leave them altogether unused, lest the supply might again be renewed, and the market be glutted. The requisite speed in the manufacture was obtained by the operation of a beautiful and simple law. The prices of the raw material and the manufactured article varied inversely as each other. If the price of the raw material rose, that of the finished article fell. This was a sign that, in the opinion of the best judges, too much of the former had been consumed, and too much of the latter had been produced. The manufacture was proceeding too fast. If, on the contrary, the price of the raw material fell, that of the finished article rose. This was a sign that too little of the former had been consumed, and too little of the latter had been produced. The manufacture was not proceeding fast enough. In the first case, it received a check; in the second, a stimulus.

In order to find the clue by which we may explain why it is that the law of supply and demand always produces the effect required by the state of the market, we must have recourse to a still more comprehensive principle, and one that should always be present to the mind in the discussion of these questions. We allude to the fact that every individual (having no monopoly) engaged in the competition for wealth, while ostensibly pursuing his own interest alone, does in reality promote the interest of the public. This great principle is the foundation of the practical teaching of political economy, as the principle that human beings desire to sell as dear, and buy as cheap as they can, is the foundation of its speculative doctrines. Political economy has always said to the rulers of mankind, "Do not interfere with the natural course of trade to protect this or that class of traders—to prevent this or that misfortune—to encourage the production of this or that article of consumption. Leave producers open to the free competition of the whole world. It is their business, not yours, to discover what they can produce with the greatest advantage. Their anxiety to produce their wares at the lowest cost will be a national economy; their efforts to exchange them at the highest price will be a national gain."

Apparent exceptions to the truth of this principle there doubt-

less are, but we believe a cursory examination will show them to be apparent only. Wherever free competition exists, we believe it will be found that the opposition of interest between buyers and sellers is only of a temporary character, and disappears the moment we transfer our gaze from the particular transactions in which we are engaged, to the mass of transactions throughout the country. As an *experimentum crucis* we may refer to the obsolete law against forestalling and regrating. One offence which the statute was designed to punish was that of buying corn and selling it again in the same market on the same day at a higher price. Now, when there is a scarcity of corn, it is natural that unreasoning people should lay the blame upon the corn-factors, who are seen to be making larger profits in consequence of the public distress. It is so easy to denounce the selfishness of those who take advantage of this calamity to raise the prices against a hungry population, that we find it difficult at first to regard these men as taking the very best and surest course to mitigate the evil. Nevertheless, it has been clearly shown that even in this instance the dealers in corn, while consciously pursuing their own objects only, are unconsciously furthering those of the public. For the object to be aimed at in a scarcity is to render the suffering that ensues as light as possible. If the whole of the year's supply were to be sold off in the first nine months, the remaining three would be months of absolute famine. It would obviously be better to submit to greater privations during the first nine, in order to avoid so terrible a consummation. If we can spread the supply in equal proportions over the whole year, submitting to the want of plenty as unavoidable, we should not incur the risk of starvation at the end. But this equal distribution of the distress is the very thing the corn-factors make it their business to effect. It is their interest to sell the whole of the supply within the year, lest its value should fall with the next harvest. It is their interest also to sell it for the highest prices consistent with that object. These two interests will check each other. The first will prevent them from asking too much, for the consumption would not proceed rapidly enough; the second will prevent them from asking too little, for then the consumption would proceed too rapidly. Either of these mistakes would increase the evil; but the course self-interest induces them to take, is exactly the one which is calculated to reduce it to the lowest point.

From the preceding argument it would therefore appear that self-interest, being the principle upon which men naturally act in the pursuit of wealth, is also that which is most conducive to the general welfare. The happiness of others, it may perhaps be objected, would, if this be the case, be best advanced by attending to our own. If only we set our hearts upon getting

rich, if only we take the proper means of becoming rich, we shall be doing at the same time what is most advantageous, not only to our immediate friends, but to our country, and even to mankind. To struggle for wealth would be, upon such a theory, not merely an excusable selfishness, but rather a sacred duty. The richest man would also be the most deserving of respect.

The bare statement of this *reductio ad absurdum* leads us, by a natural transition, to the consideration of a very interesting ethical question, which it is difficult entirely to overlook in treating of the practical part of political economy. That science, although it considers wealth as an object of desire, and inquires what circumstances are most favourable to its increase, lays down no doctrine whatever with regard to the moral propriety of devoting our energies to "making money." One of the most serious of the many confusions of mind existing upon this subject is the notion that the *science* of political economy is identical with the *art* of getting rich. It is not the business of the political economist to teach individuals how to augment their private fortunes; neither is it his business to tell them whether they are right or wrong in endeavouring to do so, though of course he is at liberty to transgress the boundaries of his province, and consider this question as well as others. But it should be upon the distinct understanding that political economy, strictly so called, merely takes human nature as it finds it—namely, as desiring wealth—and proceeds to reason upon that assumption. Since, however, it is apparent from the writings of political economists, that they regard it as an object of some importance that the material comforts and luxuries of life should be abundantly supplied, since they always teach that people should not be interfered with in seeking their own material good, it is natural that we should be led to ask whether the tone of contempt for money and money-making, which we sometimes hear, is founded upon reason. True it is, that the theory which teaches men to despise and disregard the solid practicalities of the world, though often preached, is seldom practised. But the milder form of this opinion is still extant in considerable vigour. It is still held that the occupation of adding to one's wealth is one of an entirely selfish, even sordid nature; to be tolerated, perhaps, but deserving no sympathy and no encouragement.

Now, there is an important distinction between self-interest and selfishness, which those who argue thus omit to think of. The feeling which prompts a man to labour for the sake of money comes properly under the former head. It has regard to his own interest, but it is not selfish. It may undoubtedly assume a selfish character, but this danger it has in common with the passion of love. To call any sentiment or any desire a selfish one is

equivalent to saying that in that sentiment or desire the love of self is so strong as to induce a positive callousness to the good of others. But the desire of wealth does not contain in its natural and unexaggerated form any such unamiable elements. It is one of those innumerable feelings which have reference to our own personal welfare, but do not in the least diminish our regard for the welfare of those around us.

It is a little overlooked by those who hastily condemn the money-making spirit, that money is not always the ultimate object of those who are striving for it. They are seeking to obtain a larger share of the enjoyments and luxuries of life, and this desire, however remote it may appear from the sublimer aspirations of humanity, yet enters into and forms a part of some of the best and most honourable feelings of virtuous men. To wish to maintain a wife in happiness and comfort, to be able to afford a good education for one's children, to have the means of showing kindness and hospitality to friends, or at least to avoid the disgrace of sinking to an inferior station and coarser modes of life—this is not low or sordid, but praiseworthy and right. Yet all these wishes include the element of money as the supreme necessity; they all involve what amounts to a positive obligation to make the acquisition of money (we use that word in its popular sense as representing wealth) one at least among the objects of life.*

That this object may easily obtain too exclusive a predominance, that men may easily become more entirely engrossed in it than is desirable either for the good of their own characters or for that of the state, we readily allow. Absolute devotion to making money, even for purposes in themselves unexceptionable, is no less to be condemned than absolute devotion to any other of the pursuits that engross mankind. But when we concede that it is equally deserving of censure, we have conceded enough. We cannot think it more selfish or more ignoble than absolute devotion to hunting, or racing; we cannot think the time that is spent in honest labour, even though money be its object, more completely wasted than that which is given to a course of frivolous amusements; we cannot think the pursuit of wealth, which adds to the security and comfort of the human race, more pernicious than the pursuit of glory in war, which destroys them both. And to say that our own interest is the

* A slight obliviousness of these considerations pervades Mr. Harrison's able article on "The Limits of Political Economy" ("Fortnightly Review," No. III). "Political Economy," according to him, "has, as its postulate, not the predominance merely, but the exclusive supremacy, of one of the selfish instincts." This is a grave exaggeration. A man may be very generous, or even careless, in money matters, and yet prefer to buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market. If so, his generosity or his carelessness do not suffice to render him an exception to the application of economical laws.

motive of what we are doing is by no means to imply that we are acting wrongly. It only amounts to saying that we are not impelled by the very noblest feelings of which our nature is capable. And there must be occasions without end, in the life even of the most unselfish and excellent of men, when this is the case. Our own interest—either life, or health, or convenience, or comfort—must inevitably be the motive of by far the larger part of our daily actions. Moreover, there are very few who have the power of pursuing a continuous course of exertion throughout any considerable period without the stimulus of personal advantage. Some there undoubtedly are to whom religious enthusiasm, or a devotion to truth which has all the power of religion, or a disinterested love of the human race which annihilates self, are incentives not only to a life of activity, but even, it may be, to unintermitted labour and heroic deeds, such as any less exalted objects would be altogether incompetent to produce. Ordinary people, however, are not endowed with natures so superior to the all but universal longing for personal enjoyment. It is open to a reasonable doubt whether it would be better if they were. For if the feeling of self-interest too often induces a lamentable disregard to the condition of the labouring poor, it must be admitted, on the other hand, that it gives rise to a class of virtues with which no well-governed society could afford to dispense. What is it but the love of property and of that respectability which property, honestly acquired, naturally confers, which makes the mass of civilized men work more than is sufficient to earn a bare subsistence? The vast material improvements of our age, its daily increasing luxuries, its more rapid means of locomotion, its more extended commerce, are due to this potent cause. The sense of a common interest in the established condition of society, the abhorrence of crime, and much of that decided preference of peace to war which is now so visible in England, could not exist, or could exist only in much feebler measure, among nations indifferent to commercial prosperity. Nor could the philosopher, engaged in abstract meditations on the hateful meanness of the "Gospel of Mammonism," pursue his studies for a single day without the aid of that very love of Mammon which evokes his scorn. Men may devote their lives to the pursuit of truth from a pure regard for truth itself, but it is by no means probable that they will manufacture shirts or trousers from a pure regard for shirts and trousers. Benevolence alone may inspire the labours of the philosopher himself, but benevolence alone will not induce his butcher to kill the meat, or his baker to bake the bread required for the support of the philosopher's existence. He would find his studies brought to a speedy termination if he were compelled to provide for his own material necessities. The love of wealth must come first, and when a sufficient store of wealth has

been accumulated, some will be left at liberty for other occupations. These latter will be the brain of the state; but the brain is not at liberty to despise the stomach.

Still, it may perhaps be urged, the foregoing argument, though it certainly proves the love of wealth to be a very useful thing does not prove it to be a morally good thing. It would be better, if the same advantages could be obtained by other means. Wealth may be a good stimulus to labour; but it is so only because men are selfish creatures. It would be quite possible, and far more desirable, to have all the benefits of civilization without this absorbing competition for the possession of money. To this objection we can only answer, Be it so: we gladly leave it to those who attack the existing constitution of human nature to prove that men might have been made on a better principle. We only urge, that considering how closely the desire of material wealth is interwoven with many excellent and honourable feelings—so closely that we can scarcely imagine these feelings to exist without it—material wealth is not a mean or a degrading, but an entirely proper and legitimate object of ambition.

Moral qualities, in short, are not evinced in the process of gaining money, but in that of spending it. The inborn fondness of acquiring property, which is almost as natural to men as hunger or thirst, forms no proper subject for praise or blame. The use that is made of property when acquired decidedly does. Selfishness and unselfishness are seldom more markedly shown than by the way in which a person disposes of his wealth. If he consumes it all upon his own pleasures, if he reserves none of it for the purposes of kindness or benevolence, if he lives in luxurious indolence, we may fairly pronounce him to be, in this respect, a selfish character. But it would be altogether a mistake to fancy that those who are earnest in the pursuit of wealth may not evince the greatest generosity in its employment. And if we are obliged to regret that the relation between capitalists and labourers is too often of a purely mercenary kind, this is to be attributed, not to the peculiar inhumanity of the former, but to the fact that they, like those above them in rank, do not adequately feel the responsibility of riches.

The natural preference of generosity to meanness is apt, however, to carry us too far. Although it may be true that careless extravagance is much more amiable than rigid economy, we must not assume that the extravagant man necessarily does more good to the poor than the stingy one. It is in reality of much less consequence that a man should expend large sums in charity or upon luxuries than that he should be regular in paying his bills; for it is less desirable that he should encourage unlimited expectations than that he should contribute to increase the sense of security among the industrial classes. There is, indeed, no

object whatever in mere expenditure, and the only reason we are able to perceive why it is commonly considered a better thing to spend than to save, is because the effects of money spent are immediate and palpable, while those of money saved are hidden behind the curtain that veils the operations of banks from the vulgar gaze. For money saved does not lie in coffers, but is left in the hands of bankers, and bankers make it their business to invest the capital in their hands productively; that is, so as to be returned to them with profits. The difference, then, that would arise if fewer luxuries were required would probably be that, while unproductive consumption would be diminished, productive consumption would be increased.

Those who fall into the common error of regarding direct expenditure as peculiarly advantageous to the poor, do not consider this important distinction between a productive and an unproductive employment of money. A very simple illustration will be sufficient to explain it. If a manufacturer distributes 10,000*l.* among his workmen in the shape of wages, he puts it in their power to consume wealth to the value of 10,000*l.* Assuming his profit to be 10 per cent., he himself receives his 10,000*l.* again, together with 1,000*l.* for his own share. And he may continue to employ the same number of workmen for any length of time, provided the manufacture continues to yield him a sufficient profit. But if a landed proprietor employs 10,000*l.* in adding to his house or embellishing his pleasure-ground, he may, no doubt, maintain as many labourers as the manufacturer until his money is exhausted, but when that happens the fund is not replaced; it has become fixed in the improvements made, and thenceforth ceases to exist in any form available for the support of labour. The manufacturer, on the other hand, preserves his capital, and makes it the means not only of supporting labour, but of contributing a yearly value of 1,000*l.* to the wealth of the country.

We have adverted to these current fallacies, because in matters of this nature they can by no means be suffered to pass as innocuous, and also because they justify the regret expressed at the beginning of this paper, that political economy does not form an essential element in the higher kinds of education. As an instrument of general culture, we believe there are few subjects of equal value that would not require a considerably longer time for their advantageous study. It is capable of exercising a double influence upon the mind of the student; for it teaches both theoretical truth and practical wisdom. By means of its theories we are led to recognise the existence of law and regularity where without their help we should have seen nothing but caprice or accident. By means of its practical deductions we are enabled to

avoid the errors that are still constantly committed in the well-meant efforts of charitable persons to benefit the poor. Dr. Chalmers urgently recommended the study of political economy to the clerical profession, rightly deeming that it is they who could best carry the most important of its lessons into practical effect. And there is abundant reason to lament that this injunction has been so generally neglected by a body who are certainly both able and willing to use the influence of their position in order to mitigate the evils of poverty, but who too often become the most active promoters of institutions by which those evils are much more likely to be aggravated and increased. We will not pause to dwell upon another advantage that might be secured by requiring that every clergyman should be familiar with the leading principles at least of political economy, namely, the greater probability that he would attempt to communicate the ideas thus gained to his poorer parishioners. It is, in fact, scarcely possible to say whether it would be productive of any considerable benefit to working men to teach them the elementary truths of economical science. We are, however, inclined to think that the more intelligent among them would decidedly profit by such lessons; while it is scarcely just that they should be left in absolute ignorance of the relation between capital and labour, and thus induced to attribute the lowness of their wages, as in the absence of knowledge they inevitably must, to no other cause than the selfishness of masters.

There is one circumstance which would greatly facilitate the introduction of these matters as subjects of general education; we allude to the exclusively popular terminology which economical writers are in the habit of employing. Other sciences guard their innermost sanctuaries by portals of technicalities sufficient in themselves to deter the careless portion of the reading public. Botany, for example, meets us at the outset with monocotyledones and dicotyledones, with stamens and pistils, calyx and corolla, and requires as the first step in our progress, that we should learn to discover by the structure of flowers the class to which they belong. Of geology and physiology we do not speak, for everyone who has even looked into a book treating of those subjects knows the mass of scientific terms that must be mastered in order to understand them. The phraseology of chemistry, beautifully adapted to convey the most comprehensive ideas in the most compact form, and to indicate the composition of bodies by the inflexion of words, is almost a study in itself. Even astronomy, though so many of its terms are in common use, makes no approach to political economy in simplicity of language. We do not mention these difficulties for the purpose of drawing any comparison unfavourable to the physical

sciences, to which a special vocabulary is an indispensable and useful adjunct. But, undoubted as the advantages of such a vocabulary are, it would be useless to deny, that it cannot fail to form a rather harsh barrier between the initiated few and the uninitiated many.

Political economy offers none of these preliminary obstacles to the mind of the beginner. Treating of the common phenomena of ordinary life, it makes use of the common language of ordinary people. No preparation is required for it except a limited amount of general cultivation. Having this, the student may plunge at once into the most intricate problems of the science, with no further apparatus than good books and an attentive mind. He is not required to associate exact ideas with a long list of hitherto unknown expressions, which at first convey to him no idea whatever. He is asked, at the utmost, to accept more distinct definitions of terms with which he is already familiar. He must attach a less indefinite meaning than he has hitherto been accustomed to do, to such words as wealth and value, production and consumption. But this is a very easy process, and is soon accomplished. It would, we conceive, be difficult to find a science which conveys so great a stimulus to the intellectual faculties in so simple and so unpretending a manner.

It is true, no doubt, that what the political economist gains in facility of expression he loses in scientific precision. When we invent a new word, we are able to make it convey to others the very same conception which it conveys to ourselves. But when we apply old words in common currency to the purposes of science, we run the risk of failing in our efforts to rescue them from their natural vagueness. Hence it is that many of the controversies between political economists have turned, consciously or unconsciously, on the meaning of words. The word *wealth*, for instance, was understood by some as indicating only *material* objects useful or agreeable to mankind; while others claimed the right of extending it to everything, material or immaterial, that possessed a value in exchange. The former party would not admit the skill or talents of a person, however valuable to himself, to be wealth; the latter contended that they were. Again, it was nothing but the want of a distinct conception of *value* that could lead such thinkers as Smith and Malthus to entertain the chimerical belief in a measure of value. For had they perceived that value is a purely relative term, they could not have expected to discover an object of which the value should never change. And in fact, we find Dr. Smith confounding in a single argument, the value of labour as an article of exchange with its cost to the labourer himself. "Equal quantities of la-

bour," he maintains, "are always of equal value to the labourer," because "he must always lay down the same portion of his ease, his liberty, and his happiness." The employer may purchase his labour with a greater or a smaller quantity of goods, but it is the value of the goods which varies, not that of the labour. Here the word *value* is obviously used in two very different senses. The value of labour is measured by the labourer's feelings; the value of goods is measured by their power of purchasing. This is a confusion of ideas which does not occur in more recent books, and which by a little attention may easily be avoided.

Besides the difficulty of fixing the signification of words like these with the needful accuracy, political economists have to contend with another disadvantage resulting from the popular character of a portion of their subject, and from the fact that they cannot avoid mixing up their theoretical deductions with practical corollaries. Owing to these circumstances, many persons, who in reality know nothing of political economy, conceive themselves justified in giving currency to a variety of crude and undigested notions concerning it, which infallibly produce an entirely misleading impression of its nature among those who are, if possible, one degree more ignorant than themselves. Nothing is more common among such superficial talkers than to detach the ethical superstructure from the logical basis, and to speak of political economy as if it were a mere set of rules for promoting happiness.* These rules are quoted in their naked harshness, entirely detached from the reasonings on which they are grounded, and without which their true purport cannot be understood. Thus, the maxim, that it is best to buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market, is brought in evidence of the selfish greed recommended by economical writers, while the arguments by which they believe it to be proved that such a policy is best, not for one nation or individual, but for all, are quietly suppressed. Mr. Ruskin—a conspicuous type of illogical readers—takes up the work of Mr. Mill, fancies he understands it, and forthwith launches his invectives against the "disgraceful" science which openly enjoins the worship of Mammon.

It would, however, be too much to expect that those who attack political economy should make a serious effort to know anything about it. There are two subjects upon which men still consider it becoming and right to judge without evi-

*. Say long ago corrected this error. "M. de Sismondi nomme l'économie politique, la science qui se charge de veiller au bonheur de l'espèce humaine. Il a sans doute voulu dire, la science qui devraient posséder ceux qui se chargent de veiller au bonheur de l'espèce humaine."—Cours d'Economie Politique, Neuvième partie.

dence, and to condemn without examination. Those subjects are social science and theology. Even physical science is not exempted from this summary process, where its speculations are supposed to trench upon the domain of some cherished theological belief. Such questions as the origin of species and the antiquity of man are selected as fitting topics for a display of mingled ignorance, the presumption and absurdity of which is barely hidden by its religious garb. In social, as in theological controversies, there are many who do not hesitate to pronounce their hasty and superficial judgments without reason and without reserve. Since both these subjects deal in some aspects with matters of universal interest, everyone conceives himself entitled to have an opinion upon them; while in sociology, as in theology, it is generally those who are most completely destitute of knowledge who are at the same time the most positive, the most dogmatic, and the most intolerant.

ART. V.—IMPERIAL HISTORY.

1. *Histoire de Jules César*. Tome premier. Paris: Henri Plon. 1865.
2. *History of Julius Caesar*. Vol. I. London: Cassell, Petter, and Galpin. 1865.

SINCE the Revolution the French people have held to the belief that the mantle of the Romans has fallen on themselves. This conviction is expressed in small matters no less than in great ones. They have adopted Latin names in their institutions and official acts. They have reproduced in Paris many of the public buildings of Rome. They have incorporated into their jurisprudence the entire body of the civil law. If a French author wishes to criticise his Government, he writes an essay on the decline of liberty under the Cæsars; if a French artist desires to lash the vices of Parisian society, he paints the Romans in the time of their decadence. It is on the great Roman arts of administration and war that the French people especially prides itself; nor are those wanting among them who dream of a confederation more durable than the Roman Empire, whose centre and leader will be France.

The book which the Emperor Napoleon has lately published is intended to express in another form the same subtle connexion between the destinies of the two nations. He is determined that

the liberal party shall not have a monopoly of this subject. There are two sides to an historical parallel as to everything else. If the triumphs of the Commonwealth furnish a pretext for Republican institutions, its collapse may be pleaded in aid of despotism. If the vices of the empire may be used as a cover for attack, the glory of its founder is equally good as a weapon of defence. Such is the belief of the Imperial historian.

But another and a stronger motive led him to this task. The family to which he belongs is distinguished from other families by having a mission to accomplish. They are a family of ideas. This at least is their language. By Providence, or by destiny—the two conceptions are not very clearly distinguished in the Napoleonic philosophy—they have been called, elected, and sent. The founder of their house was not merely a distinguished general and a successful gambler in European politics. So to regard him is profoundly to misconceive his spirit and genius. He is a member of a much higher brotherhood—one of the few who have sacrificed themselves for the sake of a great doctrine. When he advanced upon the stage of the world he saw that it was his part to carry out the principles of '89, to be the testamentary executor of the French Revolution. He accordingly struggled with consistent self-denial to embody its principal results, to reunite his country, to break down the feudal powers which were leagued against him, to heal the wounds inflicted on society by a too precipitate attempt at reconstruction; in a word, to do for Europe what the Revolution had done for France. The consciousness of this lofty purpose supported him throughout the disappointment of his non-success, and he saw with patriotic regret his projects misinterpreted, his family exiled, and the sacred cause of the French people abandoned to the grovelling ambition of Louis XVIII. Far from being a military man with rather confused notions of right and wrong, he was the first to unveil a profound scheme of political philosophy, and he adopted warfare solely as a means of making known the faith that was in him, and because of the hardness of men's hearts. As great a moralist as Socrates, as profound a thinker as Aristotle, it was only the force of circumstances which compelled him to be a greater general than Alexander.

Such, traced by the loving hand of his nephew, is the historical picture of the first Napoleon. The prophetic soul of the French Emperor recognises in his uncle the regenerator of Europe, the sublimest genius of modern times, the descendant and the complement of Moses, Mahomet, Cæsar, and Charlemagne, and above all and including all, the discoverer of an extremely curious and valuable system, which under the name of "the Napoleonic idea," was made known to the world by a special revelation in

the year 1840. Such being the mission of Napoleon the First, the mission of Napoleon the Third is, and has been, to explain it. He plays Boswell to his uncle's Johnson. "To enlighten public opinion by developing the thought which presided over his high conceptions, to recal the memory of his vast projects, this is a task which gladdens my heart and consoles me in exile. The fear of encountering adverse opinions will not deter me; ideas which are under the ægis of the greatest genius of modern times may be proclaimed without circumlocution; they cannot be subject to the variations of the political atmosphere. Enemy of all mere abstract theory, and of all moral dependence, I am bound to no party, to no sect, to no Government; my voice is as free as my thought, and the love of my heart is liberty."* The life of Cæsar is therefore no mere biographical study. It is this indeed, but it is also something more. It teaches us the doctrine of political progress as conceived by the greatest genius of modern times. A fertile and regenerating idea underlies it—an idea which Europe has been slow to recognise and appreciate, and which even now can be made fully known through one channel only. We were very lately told that to be able to apply to the present time this idea it is necessary to have passed through the severe trials and responsibility of power.† No one but the Emperor can expound an Emperor's policy. As it cannot but be good for us to know what this policy is, we may think ourselves fortunate that the Emperor has thought fit to write a book.

Most readers are by this time aware that the "Life of Julius Cæsar" is at present in an incomplete state. The volume before us only carries his history down to the year of his first consulship, A.U.C. 695. Our means of judging in what way his character and career will be estimated are therefore at present somewhat imperfect. But the life of Cæsar forms the least important part of the present instalment of his biography. Two-thirds of the book are occupied by a summary review of Roman history from the earliest period to the death of Sulla. And there is a preface which states in a few pregnant sentences the principles which have guided the writer in his interpretation of the past, and, we may fairly assume, which influence him in the view which he takes of the present. This introduction—the preface and the review—is the part which alone possesses much interest for the inquiring mind, for in it the Napoleonic idea is most visible, and the historical generalizations which support it are most complete.

The Emperor approaches his task in the most elevated spirit;

* From the Preface to "L'Idée Napoléonienne," by Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. July, 1839.

† Letter of the Emperor to Prince Napoleon. 27th May, 1865.

with a mind penetrated by religion and refined by philanthropy. He has a very grave opinion of the responsibility incurred by an historian. To tamper with facts, or to draw from them an inference which they do not really justify, is not merely immoral, it is irreligious. "Historic truth should be no less sacred than religion. If the precepts of faith raise our soul above the interests of this world, the lessons of history, in their turn, inspire us with the love of the beautiful and the just, and with the hatred of whatever presents an obstacle to the progress of humanity."*

The writer of these lines must be allowed to be an exceedingly good judge of what is due to religion, for he has protected it for many years. Next to our own Chancellor, whose spiritual graces won the admiration of the Christian young men of Wolverhampton, some short time back, we take Napoleon the Third to be the man in all Europe most likely to rise superior to temporal interests in whatever he undertakes. Truth, which has been the passion of his life, is also the object of his book. Unfortunately, the events of the world have not always found a chronicler equally earnest and sincere. There are who collect facts without due care, and without arranging them in the order of their philosophic importance; who do not sufficiently remember the providence which shapes our ends; who represent the events of history as spontaneously produced; and who fail to recognise the pre-eminence of the great heroes and able men. Against such, the Emperor lifts up his voice and cries with an exceeding great cry. "The lessons of history," he tells us, "to be profitable, require certain conditions. It is necessary that the facts be produced with a rigorous exactness, that the political or social changes be analysed philosophically, that the exciting interest of the details of the lives of public men should not divert attention from the political part they played, or cause us to forget their providential mission."† Having warned us what to avoid, the Emperor next proceeds to describe, in a few sentences, the true historical method. "In writing history, by what means are we to arrive at truth? By following the rules of logic. Let us first take it for granted, that a great effect is always due to a great cause, never to a small one; in other words, an accident, insignificant in appearance, never leads to important results without a pre-existing cause, which has permitted this slight accident to produce a great effect. The spark only lights up a vast conflagration when it falls upon combustible matters previously collected."‡

Preface, p. i.

† Ibid. p. ix. (E. T.)

‡ Ibid. p. x.

The French Emperor certainly has a way of putting things which is not the way of other men. We recognise thus early the fine Roman hand which penned the proclamation of the 2nd of December. To say as little as possible, and make as much fuss as may be in saying it, is an admirable rule in writing a state paper. But history, and especially the philosophy of history, requires altogether another style. Neat little sentences constructed on the model of "L'empire c'est la paix;" "Soyons logiques, et nous serons justes;" "Cæsar seul represente un principe," mean too much or too little, generally too little, and in the passage quoted above, absolutely nothing at all. "Mais, en écrivant l'histoire, quel est le moyen d'arriver à la vérité? C'est de suivre les règles de la logique." We scarcely require an Emperor to tell us that we must follow the rules of logic if we would arrive at truth in history; for it is only by following these rules that we arrive at any truth whatever. But the sentence reads as if the author wished to say, that whereas in the different sciences, there are various means of arriving at truth, logic is the special organon of history. This comes of adopting the diplomatic style, and putting in limitations which separate nothing. A certain Mayor of Exeter, who seems to have formed himself on imperial models, once produced a sentence nearly as good as the Emperor's own. "Nothing," said the mayor in passing judgment one day, "is more wicked and disgraceful in a free country, than playing pitch and toss on Sunday." *Secus*, of course, where the country is not free.

From this summary account of the method to be pursued, we are led to some general reflections on the lesson which history teaches. The view which the Emperor adopts is, certainly assuring. From the Tuileries, as from the centre of our system, he takes a comprehensive view of the past and present condition of things and pronounces it to be very good. The progress of humanity, so this simple-hearted enthusiast conceives, is the final cause of all existing governments and laws. Were it otherwise, the governments would be overthrown, and the laws would cease to exist. "Just as logic proves to us, in important events, the necessity of the fact of their existence, in like manner we must recognise in the long duration of an institution, the proof of its goodness.*" Were it otherwise, the governments would be overthrown, and the laws would cease

* Preface, p. iii. "De même que la logique nous démontre dans les événements importants leur raison d'être impérieuse, de même il faut reconnaître dans la longue durée d'une institution la preuve de sa bonté." The English translator thus renders it:—"Just as logic demonstrates that the reason of important events is impetuous, in like manner we must recognise in the long duration of an institution the proof of its goodness."—p. xi.

to exist. For there is in the moral order, a paramount law which assigns to institutions a necessary limit determined by their usefulness.* Until this term has been arrived at, in other words, until a given institution has produced the utmost good of which it is capable, all opposition is powerless; it is preserved by the irresistible force of destiny against which all human efforts are directed in vain. But so soon as it ceases to further the welfare of the human race, then it becomes as impossible to preserve it as it was before to destroy it. Neither the power of tradition, nor courage, nor the memory of a glorious past, can delay for a single day its predetermined fall.† Thus all things work together for our good. With destiny at the helm of affairs, the duty of mankind is only to watch and wait. What is more idle than to contend against a supreme law, and what more foolish than to take this superfluous trouble when the fates are arranging everything for us in the best possible manner. Let us therefore eat and drink, and go to the play, and leave politics to the direction of those powers whose province it is to superintend them.

It would be worth while to know how the French Emperor became acquainted with this singular law of human progress. Did he generalize it from the facts of history, or was it revealed to him by Mr. Home? It has many of the marks of a Napoleonic idea, and may possibly be a prophecy of the captive of St. Helena—one of those which have been in course of fulfilment since 1815.‡ Wherever it comes from, it is not fated to be of much use to the readers of *Cæsar's Life*, for it is shown for a moment, and then withdrawn. No sooner have we resigned ourself to the force of destiny, than we find that there is a second and perfectly independent power at work more active than destiny itself. It appears that certain men have "an incontestable influence on their age." We learn too soon that the amelioration of society which we had been led to hope was inevitable, depends after all on the action of a human will.

"Since the creation of the world, progress has always been going on. To be satisfied of this we have only to measure the route followed by civilization; its track is marked out by the great men who are, as it were, its military outposts—each higher

* "Il existe, on le dirait, dans l'ordre moral ainsi que dans l'ordre physique, une loi suprême qui assigne aux institutions, comme à certains êtres, une limite fatale marquée par le terme de leur utilité."—Jules César, p. 23.

† "Si, un état de choses, inébranlable en apparence, cesse d'être utile aux progrès de l'humanité, alors ni l'empire des traditions, ni le courage, ni le souvenir d'un passé glorieux, ne peuvent retarder d'un jour la chute décidée par le destin."—Ibid.

‡ See Preface, *ad fin.*

in degree than the other, as he brings us nearer the goal; we advance from Alexander to Cæsar, from Cæsar to Constantine, from Constantine to Charlemagne, from Charlemagne to Napoleon.* “For centuries the nations on the shores of the Jordan obeyed the laws of Moses. The institutions of Mahomet founded that empire of the East, which still resists all our attempts at civilization. In spite of Cæsar’s assassination, his policy and his measures maintained the unity of the Roman empire for 600 years, repelled the barbarians, and extended the limits of the empire. For eight centuries, the feudal and religious system established by Charlemagne has governed Europe, and served as a transition between Roman manners and the social condition which sprung up in ‘89.” “When in the history of past ages, we find a great man appearing upon the stage of the world, who united in himself the double character of founder and warrior, we always see his successors resuming the institutions he had sanctioned, and following the measures he had indicated.” These remarks, which we have borrowed from a work by M. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte,† illustrate the Emperor’s aim in writing this biography. That aim, as he states in the preface, is to prove that when Providence raises up men like Cæsar, Charlemagne, and Napoleon, it is that nations may know the path they ought to follow; such men are brought into the world that they may stamp with the seal of their genius a new era, and accomplish in a few years the labours of centuries. “Happy,” exclaims the imperial writer, “the people who comprehend and follow them! Woe to those who misunderstand and combat them! They do as did the Jews, they crucify their Messiah; they are blind and culpable; blind, for they do not see the impotence of their efforts to suspend the definitive triumph of good; culpable, for they only retard progress by impeding its prompt and fruitful application.”‡

The theory of the divine right of monarchs thus enters upon another phase of its existence. It no longer rests on the fact that the Jews asked for a king, and were punished by being allowed to have one, or that St. Paul bids the Roman church subject itself to the higher powers. Not all the powers that be are ordained of God. The monarchy of Louis XVI., the reformed constitution of the 4th Brumaire, the rule of the Orleans dynasty, and the Republic of 1848, were mere worldly experiments at self-government. They might be resisted, as they were resisted, without drawing down upon their enemies the prophetic curses of the imperial Sibyl. But there are kings who have a real mission. When Providence raises men like Cæsar, Charle-

* Louis Napoleon’s Works, vol. i. p. 257.

† “L’Idée Napoléonienne.”

‡ Preface, p. xv.

magne, Napoleon, and we hope we may add the present ruler of France, their legitimacy is apparent from the superiority of their powers. They place the impress of their genius on a new era, their existence proves their title, and resistance becomes not only a blunder and a crime, but a sin.

There are no two men who, in essentials, have less in common with one another than Napoleon the Third and Mr. Carlyle. But theory makes strange bedfellows; and it is curious to compare the language of the biographer of Frederick with that of the biographer of Cæsar.

"As I take it," writes Mr. Carlyle, "universal history—the history of what man has accomplished in this world—is, at bottom, the history of the great men who have worked here. They were the leaders of men, those great ones—the modellers, patterns, and, in a wide sense, the creators of whatever the general mass of men contrived to do or to attain. All things that we see standing accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical realization and embodiment of thoughts that dwelt in the great men sent into the world: the soul of the whole world's history, it may justly be considered, were the history of these."* "Hero worship means much more than an elected parliament or stated aristocracy of the wisest; it is the summary ultimate essence and supreme practical perfection of all manner of worships and noblenesses whatsoever. Hero worship, done differently in every different epoch of the world, is the soul of all social business among men; and the doing of it well, or the doing of it ill, measures accurately what degree of well-being or of ill-being there is in the world's affairs."†

Both writers agree that it is wrong to dwell on any irregularities in the character of the man adopted as a hero. "On the whole," says Mr. Carlyle, "we make too much of faults; the details of the business hide the real centre of it." "But of a great man, especially of him, I will venture to assert that it is incredible he should have been other than true. No Mirabeau, Napoleon, Burns, Cromwell, no man adequate to do anything, but is first of all in right earnest about it; what I call a sincere man." The Emperor is equally outspoken on this point. "When extraordinary facts attest an eminent genius, what is more irrational than to ascribe to him the passions and sentiments of common men? What more false than not to recognise the pre-eminence of those privileged beings who appear from time to time like luminous beacons dispelling the darkness of their epoch, and throwing light into the future?"‡ And again: "Grand causes require an historical figure to personify their interests and tendencies. The man once adopted, we forget his

* "Lectures on Heroes," i. p. 186.

† "Past and Present," p. 15.

‡ Preface, p. iv.

faults, and even his crimes, in order that we may only remember his great actions."* We are inclined to pay some attention to the Emperor Napoleon's views of great men; for we think that, on Mr. Carlyle's showing, as well as on his own, he is entitled to rank among the number. He is, in the first place, one who has had, during the whole of his public life, a singularly definite aim. This aim has been associated with a strong belief. Strange as it may seem that anyone should seriously have adopted the so-called "Napoleonic idea" for his creed, we think that Louis Napoleon has, in fact, adopted it. All his writings and all his acts converge to that one point. In exile, in prison, on the throne, he has clung to the idea that the policy inaugurated by the First Consul is the one means of saving France, and that his mission is to carry it out. He announced this view, with every appearance of conviction, thirty-five years ago, at a time when it seemed little short of impossible that he should ever realize it. He repeated it amidst universal ridicule four years later. For its sake, he undertook the most Quixotic expedition that sane man ever engaged in. In a letter from Strasbourg, addressed to his mother, on the eve of his attempt, he repeats his confidence in the nobleness of his cause, and in its ultimate success. From the moment of his election as President he bent himself resolutely to the task of establishing a military despotism which was to be the counterpart of the first empire. By means which no one can justify he raised himself to the place which his idol had occupied, and from that time to this his policy has been steadily guided by the "idea" which he announced from England in 1840. "Find me," says Mr. Carlyle, "the true *könning*, king, or able man, and he *has* a divine right over me." If this be so, the right of Napoleon the Third over the French rests on a secure foundation. He is essentially a man adequate to do something: he has realized an idea, lived for it, been true to it at a time when it had no single adherent but himself. He has been what Mr. Carlyle would call in right earnest about this notion of his. We may almost say that he has been sincere. The idea itself may not be worth much; but neither were the ideas of Dr. Johnson valuable, which does not prevent the doctor from being one of the hierarchy of great men. Louis Napoleon Bonaparte must have put some pressure on himself, as he has undoubtedly not forbore to sacrifice others for the sake of working out his conviction. Probably the details of his life will not bear looking into. But Mahomet was not what we call a scrupulous man,—nor Cromwell, nor Napoleon the First; who are all typical examples of the species *könning*. On the whole, the

* "César," p. 232.

French Emperor has as good a right to the title as any of the three. The theory of heroes and of the heroic in history is thus confirmed by the highest possible authority—that of the Able Man himself. In the language of the French Emperor, as well as in the dialect of Mr. Carlyle, hero-worship is the summary, ultimate essence, and practical perfection of all things. They both agree that universal history is at bottom the history of the great men who have worked here. They both think that when one of these privileged beings has been once revealed to us public duties and public interest are from that moment suspended. Nations have no longer anything to do but to sing hosannahs to their ablest man. "Find in any country," cries Mr. Carlyle, "the ablest man that exists there; raise *him* to the supreme place, and loyally reverence him: you have a perfect government for that country; no ballot-box, parliamentary eloquence, voting, constitution-building, or other machinery whatsoever, can improve it a whit. It is in the perfect state; an ideal country."* We may fairly congratulate our neighbours. The French have undoubtedly solved the difficult problem of political perfection. No Utopia or Platonic republic can be in a more ideally perfect state than France at this moment, according to the heroic doctrine. They have placed their most *cunning* man at the head of affairs, and invested him with large powers. He tells them exactly what to do; and which is more, sees that they do it. *Soyons logiques et nous serons justes*. Let us all betake ourselves to France, with Mr. Carlyle at our head, and read contemporary history in the columns of the *Moniteur*.

It is no longer necessary seriously to criticise the opinion that the history of the world is the history of its great men, for its most thorough-going supporters have not ventured to rely on it as a self-sufficient explanation of the facts of history. It is at best a sentimental way of expressing what every one admits, namely, that men of extraordinary powers and will obtain an ascendancy over common minds which enables them to act with the accumulated force of many human beings. Such men are every day becoming more and more rare. They are the product of an early and rude civilization. For the tendency of all the changes which constitute civilization, is to extend to the many the opportunities and advantages which were formerly the privilege of the few. So that where a highly endowed man springs up, although he may not be inferior to any of his great predecessors, he has much less plastic materials to work on, and therefore effects less. There is, of course, a pre-eminence still to be gained by becoming the representative and mouthpiece of current ideas. But this, which

* "Lectures on Heroes," vi. p. 332.

is frequently mistaken for power, is not power in the sense in which the adherents of the heroic theory understand it. It would be absurd to say that people are to be blessed or cursed as they do or do not follow out a course indicated by themselves. When we are referred to Odin, Mahomet, and Napoleon, we are bid to look up to them as teachers, and not as representatives. The chief objection, however, to which the views of the Emperor and Mr. Carlyle are liable, is that their explanation fails to account for the phenomena. It does not require much reflection to perceive that while the history of the world is continuous, the appearance of great men is intermittent. The ideas of even so great a man as Charlemagne are scarcely sufficient to account for the progress of European civilization from the ninth century to the eighteenth. There are even some phases of thought in the nineteenth century which cannot be referred to the ideas of the Emperor Napoleon. Some half-consciousness of this hitch must have led to the interpolation of destiny. It cannot be regarded as a happy way of settling the question. When a man talks of fate, it is at best an admission that there are facts which he cannot explain, but which, nevertheless, are deserving of explanation. It is not a philosophical manner of stating the difficulties, presented by individual and social life, but it is at least an intelligible one. History is a chaos, and somewhere or other resides a power whose mode of operating no one can understand, which disposes of events after a fashion which it is impossible to follow; to which the obvious reply is—why, then, write history? But to speak in the same breath of fate, and of laws of fate, is, if we may take leave to say so, simple nonsense. "It is well worthy of our attention," says the last of the Cæsars, "that when destiny is driving a state of things towards an aim, there is by a law of fate a concurrence of all forces in the same direction. Thither tend alike the attacks and the hopes of those who seek change; of those who would put a stop to every movement." If such were the fact, it would indeed deserve remark. The picture which is here presented to us is perfect for its repose and harmony. It is quite a happy family of forces and of historical theories. We have in the first place the grand central figure of destiny compelling, or, as the Emperor prefers to think of it, driving events to a certain end. In the foreground are several other forces, running all together in the direction in which destiny is driving; and in an intermediate place, partly directing fate, and partly directed by it, is the mysterious law which provides that things shall happen in the way in which they necessarily must happen. In the admitted difficulty of accounting for national progress, every author has a right to his own speculation. The more consistent he is with himself, the more likely is he to carry his

readers with him. When we hear of destiny, we think of some dark, all-powerful, and unknown agency; a law implies uniform operation, and leaves room for explanation and for prevision. If there are powers other than destiny with an independent action regulated by law, we are obliged to assume two co-existent forces, each of them sufficient to account for the phenomena, and each obeying a different impulse; one arbitrary, the other uniform; one the subject of knowledge, the other beyond knowledge as it is beyond all things else. But Napoleon the Third does not stop here. With that wealth of ideas which is hereditary in his family, he throws out a third explanation, alone perfectly sufficient and satisfactory. Things are as we see them owing to the fertile and decisive influence which a few gifted beings have exercised. Do we seek to account for the philosophical and political development of Europe in the nineteenth century? The germ of this growth is to be found in the ideas of the Emperor. For the history of the Middle Ages, we have only to understand Charlemagne. The first seven centuries of Rome's history are due to institutions founded by her kings; the last five are the work of Cæsar. We shall be happy to allow to the majesty of France the utmost possible latitude of speculation: it is the only return we can make for his permission to speak freely of his book. We do not require him to be original, accurate, or even particularly intelligible—

“Quum tot sustineat et tanta negotia solus,
Res Italas armis tutetur, moribus ornet—”

that would be too much to ask. But some degree of consistency is requisite. If “there exist general reasons which by fatality” cause events to turn out in a particular manner, what is the use of great men? If Cæsar, Charlemagne, and Napoleon are the efficient causes of civilization, what room is there for destiny? The Emperor's theory is carefully worked out, but it destroys itself.

Next to the difficulty of understanding the philosophical principles of this book, comes the difficulty of comprehending why Roman history should have been selected as an example of them. The annals of the city furnish, in good truth, about the worst text that can be conceived from which either to read the lesson of fatalism, or to enforce the duty of submitting ourselves to the rule of geniuses. They exhibit, on the contrary, an almost typical illustration of what may be called the natural laws of national development. We see a city expanding into a nation, and that nation finally including under its sway the greater part of the known world. The constitutional crises incident to these stages of growth are forced upon our attention by the extreme difficulty with which Rome survived them. The struggles of the

non-free population to share the rights of citizenship very early imperilled the existence of the state. Centuries later, when Rome had learned to look on the peninsula as her own, came the demand of the Italian allies for comprehension in the civic franchise—a demand long resisted, which was put to the issue of the sword, and conceded in the moment of victory by the triumphant party. But it brought with it consequences which led to more than one civil war, and ended by breaking up the republic. The institutions which had been framed for the city were unable to contain the larger community. The theory of the constitution was that every burgess was a citizen; the fact was that the citizen could at any time be swamped by the alien burgesses. On principle, those who by their residence within the city walls were most interested in the welfare of the state, had the right of electing to its magistracies and the duty of defending its territory. In practice, a mob of needy adventurers, the refuse of the allies, rushed to Rome to sell their votes to the highest bidder, or their sword to the general from whom they had most to expect. From the time when Rome owned provinces and a standing army, such men always found a market. Place meant wealth, and wealth meant an almost absolute power of doing as you liked. For the wealthy Roman there was scarcely any law. The constitution of the tribunals was such that however guilty he might be, if only he had money enough, he had a very fair chance of acquittal. We believe the condition of Rome in the earlier half of the first century B.C., hopeless as it was, to have been the necessary result of attempting to reconcile the forms of a town community and the requirements of a great empire. Yet, notwithstanding the difficulties which were experienced, the principle of comprehension—the idea of the indefinite expansibility of the state—retained a firm hold over the minds of Roman politicians. “I maintain,” says Cicero, “an universal proposition that there is no nation in the whole world—none so far removed from us by hostile feeling—none so near to us in its confidence and good wishes—from which we may not take a citizen, or to whom we may not make a present of the freedom of our own city.”* The principle is not to be questioned, but the way in which it was worked out led to the dissolution of the empire. We must decline to accept these changes as the handiwork of fate, partly because they can be accounted for on a much more intelligible hypothesis, and partly because their analogies are perceived wherever there is a substantial agreement in the conditions—in Athens in the fourth century, in Venice during the Middle Ages, and in our Australasian colonies to-day. Still less can

* “Pro L. Cornelio Balbo,” xiii.

the career of Rome be traced to the fertile and decisive influence of heroic men, for nothing is more remarkable in her annals than the rareness of those who saw beyond their times, and the slightness of the impression they left behind. Some great generals there were, and some men who, like Marius and Sulla, united the genius of war to shrewdness in understanding the necessities of the situation, not forgetting their own interests; but Sulla destroyed the arrangements of Marius, and the Sullan ideas were set aside by Cæsar. The Gracchi, perhaps the most lofty and disinterested of the Roman statesmen, were too limited in their views, and their reform, if effected, would have been quite inadequate to their avowed purpose. Even the French Emperor, who is keen to recognise genius, is fain to go back into the pre-historic time for examples that will serve his turn.

So much on the general question. We shall now advert to one or two peculiarities in carrying out the theory of which we have attempted to give a sketch. The narrative of the growth of the Roman power is in its main features accurate. We think it probable that pains have been taken to grasp the essential facts, and lay them clearly before the reader. Nor do we deny to the hand which has drawn this outline sketch some freedom and boldness of touch. When the Emperor forgets that he is addressing the world, he can write intelligibly enough. But his style has been spoilt by diplomacy, and he has got a most unfortunate habit of generalizing when he has nothing to say. Of the principles of historical criticism we must confess he seems perfectly innocent.

In the first book we get an account of Roman history before the time of Cæsar, written in six chapters, the first of which deals with Rome under the kings. Scarcely any period of history has undergone a more searching criticism than the annals of the city during the first three centuries. That the events of the earliest part of this period, as related by Livy and Dionysius, are "poeticis magis decora fabulis quam incorruptis rerum gestarum monumentis;" that the chronicles of Nævius and Pictor, which form the basis of the narrative, are in matters of detail utterly valueless; that Numa Pompilius and Ancus Martius are historical persons only in the sense in which King Arthur and Brute the Trojan are so—no one, since the time of Niebuhr, who is capable of weighing evidence, has attempted to deny. Were other evidence wanting, the chronology of the royal era would enable us to infer that it had been shaped in later times.

From the foundation of the city to its destruction by the Gauls is 360 years. This period has been divided by assigning 240 years to the kings, and 120 years to the republic. The reign of the fourth king, Ancus Martius, the creator of the ple-

beian order, according to the legend, falls exactly in the middle of the 240, years during which the monarchy is said to have lasted. We have thus three equal divisions of 120 years, each marked by an important constitutional change; the first by the commencement of the royal power; the second by the enfranchisement of the commons; and the third by the foundation of the republic. Add to this, that while experience gives an average of about six reigns to a century, the story stretches seven reigns over nearly two centuries and a half, and it becomes pretty evident that whatever truth there may be in the early Roman history, the account of the kings is in its main outlines fiction. The story is, in short, a poem of great dramatic beauty, one of those which, as Livy well remarks, may be excused for its want of truth by the halo of grandeur which it throws over the beginnings of the Roman people.* Accordingly, modern scholars have contented themselves with pointing out the obscurity which hangs over the earliest annals of the city, and with furnishing, chiefly by inference from language, and from later institutions, some general outlines of the constitution as it probably existed at that remote time.

The history of this period, which by the way is not very immediately connected with the life and times of Julius Cæsar, is written by the Emperor Napoleon exactly as it has been written by Goldsmith. No suspicion seems to have crossed his mind that the events he relates are absolutely without any historical foundation. We are told that the kingly power lasted 244 years. It stands recorded how under Romulus each clan was obliged to furnish 1000 soldiers; how colonies were sent to Cæcina and Antennæ; how Numa Pompilius regulated religion, and how generously he distributed to the poorer plebeians the lands which Romulus had conquered; how Tarquinius Superbus assembled the Hernici, the Latini, and the Volschi; how Servius Tullius ordered a general report of the population to be made, in which everyone was obliged to declare his age and the number of his children; how the kings introduced the plebeians into the senate, and how happy, and above all, how good the Roman people were under the fostering care of their monarchs. It is a pity that the writer did not go on to relate the exact year of Romulus' apotheosis, the day and year on which Servius Tullius triumphed over the Etruscans, and the precise numbers given by the Servian census. In a chapter written, as this appears to be, for children, such details are strictly in place, and would have been just as instructive as the legend stripped of its imagery and

* "Datur hæc venia antiquitati ut miscendo divina humanis primordia urbium augustiorafacit."—Livi præfat.

rewritten for a political purpose in particularly flat imperial prose. Although this part of the book might easily have been made accurate and scholarlike, it could scarcely have been made instructive consistently with its avowed purpose. The Emperor warns his readers that they are not to expect too much information from him. He writes only for the sake of reminding them that the kings laid the foundations of the institutions to which Rome owed her greatness. "L'homme a créé les institutions;" this is the vital fact of the first two centuries and a half, shaped into the form of a Napoleonic idea for the benefit of all the normal schools of France. The institutions formed, and the mission of the kings thus accomplished, they disappear by the order of fate, and we are asked to observe next how "les institutions vont former les hommes." The worst of this principle is that it ignores the only facts which are at once important to remember in the early history of Rome, and tolerably certain. In very remote times there was an incorporation of two distinct communities occupying adjacent territory. In the state thus formed a series of changes were introduced, by virtue of which a large class, intermediate between the burgesses and the slave population, gradually acquired political rights. Then, by a reform in the constitution, which is associated with the name of Servius Tullius, certain state burdens which formerly had been thrown on the burgesses alone, were made charges on property instead of being personal obligations. A land-register, or Domesday Book, was formed at the same time, in order that the assessment might be fairly carried out, as was done in England by William the Conqueror. Now, that these changes depend on purely general causes, that something analogous to them takes place sooner or later in every country with the gradual acquirement of property, is as certain as any proposition in political philosophy can be. They have nothing to do with the existence or the character of kings; they result from the growth and distribution of wealth, and from the principle, soon recognised in the rudest state of things, that the owners of property are the persons who ought to protect it. A change, similar in its general features to that brought about by the Servian constitution, took place nearly at the same time in Athens and in the Greek states of Lower Italy. Some eighteen centuries later, the feudal communities of Europe, in passing through a like constitutional crisis, exhibited analogous phenomena. The Emperor sees in all this only another proof of the far-seeing policy of kings. It was not the struggle of property against the exclusiveness of birth which enfranchised the Roman plebs; it was that "la politique des rois consista à fondre ensemble les différentes races, and à abaisser les barrières qui séparaient les diverses classes;" nor was it the counter claim

of the burgesses that those who shared with them the privileges should also divide the burdens of the state, which produced the reformed organization. The paternal wisdom of their rulers effected this critical alteration for the Romans before they were aware that they wanted it. "Servius Tullius voulut faire peser sur les plus riches le fardeau de la guerre, ce qui était juste. Patriciens et plébéiens furent mis sur le même rang si leur revenu était égal."

The nature of the changes by which the monarchy was converted into a republic, and which is described in the second chapter, is related with an equal want of appreciation of the real conditions of the problem. We may with certainty infer that this important modification of the constitution was brought about by the union of two great political parties for a common purpose against a common danger. The metæc population, composed of the originally unprivileged classes, had by this time become numerous and wealthy. The Servian reform, by giving to it a quasi-political status, had also given it an interest, which formerly there was little room for, in the limitation of the kingly power. Duties involve rights, and rights imply obligations. The metæcs had been compelled to serve in the armies of the state. As the price of this service they had obtained a share, subordinate indeed, but not wholly insignificant, in what we may call the popular representation. They naturally desired to strengthen their position, and took advantage of the abuses which the exercise of a royal prerogative is pretty sure to afford in order to do so. The old burgess body, with much more extended privileges, was more nearly affected by the encroachments of the kingly power. But they would, in all probability, never have been able to accomplish their object of abolishing the monarchy without the co-operation of the class below them. The combination of these two bodies—the metæcs and the burgesses—effected the revolution by which two yearly kings were substituted for one life king. In the redistribution of power which then took place we might expect each of the confederates to secure something. The burgesses obtained the higher magistracies created by the separation of the royal functions; the metæcs obtained the admission of their own body to direct electoral privileges in the curies. Thus much was gained by the people as the result of their co-operation with the aristocracy. At the same time it was felt by the richer members of the class of metæcs as well as by the burgesses themselves, that the result of this extension of the franchise might be to give too much power to mere numbers. We accordingly find that by another alteration in the constitution, the real weight of political power was thrown into the hands of the owners of property, or, in the language of the Roman constitu-

tion, vested in the *comitia centuriata*. The old privileged classes still remained strong enough to protect themselves in the enjoyment of several important and lucrative rights, in the monopoly of certain offices, and in the exclusive enjoyment of the state lands. Still, with whatever restrictions and compromises it was impeded, the important step in the direction of constitutional liberty was taken, and the commonalty, who formerly had only served in the levy, was now admitted to vote in the assembly and the council, and was placed, equally with the freeborn, under the protection of the law. This it is which gives to the reform movement of that time its historical importance. It was avowedly aimed at the kingly power, which both parties had reason to distrust, and in so far as it substituted two supreme magistrates holding office for a year, for one who reigned for his life, it was a step in the direction of popular liberty.* But the details of the arrangement show that no great abridgment of the chief governing power was thought necessary, although its duties were somewhat differently distributed. The alteration which was really significant was that by which the non-free members of the state were admitted into the wards as burgesses, and that by which the monied interest sought to protect itself against the loss of power which this reform implied, by immediately transferring all the really important business to another assembly—that of the hundreds—in which the richest citizens held the commanding or prerogative vote.

Of all this the author of the "Life of Cæsar" sees nothing. He shows his usual aptitude in fixing his attention at once on the most unimportant fact. A practical statesman, not unacquainted with the movements of popular force, might have been expected to discern, even through the pages of Livy and Dionysius, some of the bearings of this momentous crisis. And had he been describing the reform movement in England, or the course of that revolution in which he himself played a part, it is not likely that he would have been so utterly blind. But of Roman history he knows nothing. *Comitia curiata*, *comitia centuriata*, *populus*, *plebs*, mean no more to him than they do to a schoolboy. They are Latin terms which have to be translated into a modern language, but which he cannot translate into their meaning. Armed with his theory of the divine mission of kings, and with a neat little aphorism from Montesquieu about men creating institutions, and institutions forming men, he dis-

* The limitation of time is noticed by Livy as the only important part of the change. "Libertatis autem originem inde magis, quia annum imperium consulare factum est, quam quod deminutum quicquam sit ex regia potestate numeres."—Livy. ii. 1.

poses of the matter in one vigorous sentence : " Un homme abuse d'une femme, le trône s'éroule, et, en tombant, il se partage en deux : les consuls succèdent à toutes les prérogatives des rois." Here we have the whole of it : *le voilà, le chameau.*

The explanation which the Emperor adds from his own store of reflections to this luminous account is not a little remarkable, and it has the merit of being perfectly original. In substance it is this. The Roman state, in passing through the series of changes which were ultimately to lead up to Cæsar, had extracted from the kings the utmost good of which it was capable. Fate required that the political education of the aristocracy should be next provided for. " L'important était de créer une race d'hommes d'élite, qui se succédant avec les mêmes principes et les mêmes vertus, perpétuassent, de génération en génération, le système le plus capable d'assurer la grandeur de la patrie." Therefore, in the nature of things, the kingly functions were handed over by destiny to the nobles, in order that their faculties might be developed, and a race of men created, who by taking their turn at the sovereign power, should be rendered typical examples of aristocratic virtue. This was at once the cause and the object of the revolution in question—a revolution which was accomplished by Providence independently of human agency, in which the people took no part which the writer thinks it worth while to mention, and whose upshot was the production of certain *hommes d'élite*. The grandeur of Rome is traced directly to this fortunate modification of the constitution. " Power was destined to remain with the patricians so long as they showed themselves worthy of it ; and it cannot but be acknowledged that without their perseverance in the same policy, without that elevation of views, without that severe and inflexible virtue, which is the distinguishing character of the aristocracy, the work of Roman civilization would not have been accomplished."—p. 65. " During three centuries we see at Rome, notwithstanding the annual renewal of the magistracies,* such a perseverance in the same policy, such a practice of the same virtues, that it might have been supposed that the government had but a single head, a single thought, and one might have believed all its generals to have been great warriors, all its senators experienced statesmen, and all its citizens valiant soldiers."—p. 72. There are, then, in the history of a nation, times and occasions when an oligarchy is necessary to its fortune, and the proposition that we are to submit ourselves to a superior genius has to be taken with yet another limitation. Indeed, in a subsequent passage, the writer goes so far as to draw

* " Malgré le renouvellement annuel des pouvoirs"—" in spite of the annual renewal of powers."—E. T. p. 72.

a comparison between the work of a single man, or, as he expresses it, "the rapid creation of a man of genius," and the action of an aristocracy, positively unfavourable to the former. "Alexander the Great, he observes, having conquered Asia, died at Babylon. His fertile and decisive influence, which had introduced Grecian civilization into the East (which, by the way, it entirely failed to do) survived him; but at his death the empire he had founded was broken up. The Roman aristocracy, on the contrary, continuing itself from age to age, pursued more slowly but continuously the system which, by connecting the various nations with a common centre, was destined by slow degrees to assure its dominion firstly over Italy, and then over the world." This explanation does not appear to be particularly fortunate. The Macedonian empire in Asia was merely the military occupation of a foreign land. The Roman conquest of Italy was the gradual absorption of neighbouring and outlying states into a central power. The instances differ in so many respects, that the difference in the form of government becomes of no moment. The inference which is drawn might with equal probability be turned the other way. It is not likely that an oligarchy could have continued for a moment the kingdom of Alexander. On the other hand, had a Cæsar arisen at the conclusion of the Social War, Rome would probably have been spared the most bitter and disgraceful events of her history. Historical parallels are not this writer's strongest point. There is a passage at the end of the second chapter which contains the oddest comparison we have ever seen. It is between Rome in the fifth century B.C. and England in the earlier part of the present century. On this occasion we will allow the translator to use his own language:—

"The condition of Rome then bore a great resemblance to that of England before its electoral reform. For several centuries, the English constitution was vaunted as the palladium of liberty, although then, as at Rome, birth and fortune were the unique source of honours and power. In both countries the aristocracy, master of the elections by solicitation, money, or *rotten boroughs*, caused, as the patricians at Rome, the members of the nobility to be elected to Parliament, and no one was citizen in either of the two countries without the possession of wealth. Nevertheless, if the people in England had no part in the direction of affairs, they boasted justly, before 1789, a liberty which shone brightly in the middle of the silent atmosphere of the continental states. The disinterested observer does not examine if the scene where grave political questions are discussed is more or less vast, or if the actors are more or less numerous; he is only struck by the grandeur of the spectacle. Thus, far be from us the intention of blaming the nobility, any more in Rome than in England, for having preserved its preponderance by all the means which laws or habits placed at its disposal."—p. 64.

We pass over the boldness of comparing two countries in such entirely different stages of their career—one a mere town community, with a body of burgesses and a fauxbourg population; the other the mistress of a considerable empire: one in that embryo state when it is fighting for more territory—when its commerce has not sprung into existence, and there is, in truth, no middle-class to carry it on; the other, the parent of innumerable colonies, having long stretched itself to its utmost geographical limits, having long abandoned all schemes of foreign conquest, the chief trader of the world, and possessing a highly complicated social structure. We turn to the political situation. The question at Rome was, Who shall be citizens? the question in England was, among the citizens, Who shall be entitled to elect a member of Parliament? In Rome every citizen was a representative; he appointed the state officers, he enjoyed a monopoly of many social and political rights. In England there was absolute equality so far as the law or the theory of the constitution went, and the contest was, who should have the privilege of appointing those under whose guidance the Government was to be carried on? No two cases can be more unlike.

We have no space for the chapters which treat of the conquest of Italy and the Macedonian and Carthaginian wars. That which describes the reform of the Gracchi, and the successful attempts of Marius and Sulla, will be read with more interest by those who take up Cæsar's life in the hope of finding a clue to the policy of the Napoleons. As a study in Roman history this part of the book is disappointing. No one whose knowledge of the time was founded upon it could correctly understand the character and projects of the chief actors, or how they came to play the part they did. We will illustrate our opinion by a single example only. Perhaps the most considerable change which took place in Rome during the seventh century, was the alteration of its military organization from a burgess levy to a general enlistment of the lower classes in the ranks of the army. From a very early period in the history of the city up to the time of Marius, every soldier was a citizen. Such, at least, was the principle, and it had this effect: that the interests of those who fought for the republic, and of those who constituted it, were identical, and that no attempt at forcing a revolution at the point of the sword could possibly have succeeded. The change from this system to that of a standing army, composed of men not necessarily members of the state, but who took up arms as a profession, was one almost certain to occur at some time or other, but the occurrence of which at any time deserves to be dwelt on even in the most superficial survey. For from the moment when it takes place it becomes possible for a successful general to use the army as a

weapon of political warfare, and in fact, the revolutions of Marius and of Sulla were accomplished in great measure by this very means. The condition of the soldier is totally changed. He no longer looks forward to the end of a campaign with the hope of returning to his customary avocations and comforts; his only home is the camp, his only means of livelihood his pay, the dispenser of all he can expect or fear is his general. No one can suppose that Louis Napoleon Bonaparte is unacquainted with the political meaning of such a change; from his language, however, he might be as innocent as a child of what can be effected by gaining the army. This is all that he says:—

“After this oration, in which is revealed the legitimate ardour of those who, in aristocratic countries, demand equality, Marius, contrary to the ancient system, enrolled more proletaries than citizens.”
—p. 263.

The ancient system, be it observed, having been that proletaries were not enrolled at all, but that they accompanied the army as unarmed substitutes and workmen.

The period of Roman history which the last part of this volume embraces, and on which it professes to throw new light, is the twenty years which separated the death of Sulla from the first consulship of C. Cæsar. It is in all respects a memorable and instructive epoch. It contains the record of various attempts to reconstitute the republic in accordance with the necessities of the times. The old constitution had broken down under the weight of its additions. Planned originally as a mere town community, the forms which were suited to a self-governing body within narrow limits, were unable to comprehend the wider circle of imperial interests. By revolution, by a series of wars, and by treaty, the Italian allies had been added to the commonwealth, and a large body of Greek cities and of states outside the peninsula were being gradually merged into the political body. Neither the representative nor the administrative system, as originally settled, was large enough to include these foreign elements. The burgesses were swamped by a class of citizens whose interests were no longer identified with the city, and who used their power for the narrowest purposes of self-interest. The Government of the provinces offered such enormous temptations that men were always found who would make any sacrifice to popularity for the sake of obtaining it. The massacres of Marius, and the proscriptions of Sulla, had left a breach between the popular and the aristocratic parties which nothing but the necessity of combining for some common, urgent purpose—a Gallic invasion, or a Carthaginian war—could have healed. The middle class was completely broken down, and between the

nobles and the monied men on one side, and the pure mob on the other, there was nothing. By one of these three classes the Government, it was evident, must be carried on henceforth, for there was little chance of their reunion. Power might fall into the hands of an aristocratical oligarchy, or into the hands of a body of capitalists, or into the hands of some one man who could bend to his purpose the passions or interest of the rabble.

It may be admitted that it is not easy to write the history of this eventful period with perfect impartiality. As much political feeling has been imported into it, as if it were a matter directly affecting the interests of the present time. Take the case of Cicero. To the friends of popular liberty he appears a time-server; to the partizans of absolutism a fool. Between the estimate of Drumann and that of Middleton there is room for almost every shade of opinion. In a lower degree the same may be said of Julius Cæsar. He was a very much greater man than Cicero; and as to his ability, and the wide range of his accomplishments, there are not two opinions. But we scarcely know where to turn for a critical and just account of his career. And, so far as can be judged from his first volume, the French Emperor is not destined to supply the want.

There are two explanations of Cæsar's conduct: one is to represent his policy as a mere motion in the direction of the least resistance—a necessary compromise brought about by the pressure and position of the other parties in the state. Those who take this view of it, of whom the most distinguished is Niebuhr, describe Cæsar himself as an open-hearted, careless being, knowing nothing of intrigues, placing implicit confidence in others, lively and cheerful, and led by his frank and cordial disposition to do and to sanction many things of which he would otherwise have disapproved. The other explanation, which is partially sanctioned by the authority of Mr. Merivale, represents Cæsar as conscious from the first of the real nature of the revolution on which he was embarked. Those who have adopted it picture to us an astute far-seeing man; affable from policy, an intriguer who affected the exquisite to ingratiate himself with the nobles, and the profligate that he might conciliate the mob. On either of these hypotheses an intelligible account of Cæsar's political life can be written; nor is it very easy to say which would come nearest to the truth. But the two cannot stand together. We may deny him fixed principles and a definite aim in life; but if we admit his political action to have proceeded on a settled plan, such a plan could only have had the object which was ultimately realized. If, on the other hand, he never looked forward to the throne, we cannot suppose that he knew what he was doing in taking the steps which led him to it. Not

the least among the numerous inconsistencies of this book is, that its writer deliberately seeks to reconcile these antithetical views, Cæsar "was at once the arbiter of elegance, the hope of the democratic party, and the only public man whose opinions and conduct never varied." (p. 344.) He "laboriously pursues the course of his destiny." "Political influence does not depend solely on military successes, or on the possession of immense riches; it is acquired especially by a conduct always in accord with fixed principles. Cæsar alone represents a principle." (p. 483.) At the same time the French Emperor will by no means allow that the fixed principles which regulated Cæsar's conduct, or the destiny which he laboriously pursued, had anything to do with the subversion of the constitution. "Such an interpretation results from the too common fault of not being able to appreciate facts in themselves, but according to the interpretation which subsequent events have given them." (p. 486.) Both in the beginning and at the end of the book he protests in solemn and impressive language against this paltry view.

"Too many historians find it easier to lower men of genius, than, with a generous inspiration, to raise them to their due height, by penetrating their vast designs. Thus, as regards Cæsar, instead of showing us Rome, torn to pieces by civil wars and corrupted by riches, trampling under foot her ancient institutions, threatened by powerful peoples, such as Gauls, Germans, and Parthians, incapable of sustaining herself without a central power stronger, more stable, and more just; instead, I say, of tracing this faithful picture, Cæsar is represented, from an early age, as already aspiring to the supreme power. If he opposes Sylla, if he disagrees with Cicero, if he allies himself with Pompey, it is the result of that far-sighted astuteness which divined everything with a view to bring everything under subjection. If he throws himself into Gaul, it is to acquire riches by pillage or soldiers devoted to his projects; if he crosses the sea, to carry the Roman eagles into an unknown country, but the conquest of which will strengthen that of Gaul, it is to seek there pearls which were believed to exist in the seas of Great Britain. If, after having vanquished the formidable enemies of Italy on the other side of the Alps, he meditates an expedition against the Parthians, to avenge the defeat of Crassus, it is, as certain historians say, because activity was a part of his nature, and that his health was better when he was campaigning. If he accepts from the senate, with thankfulness, a crown of laurel, and wears it with pride, it is to conceal his bald head. If, lastly, he is assassinated by those whom he had loaded with benefits, it is because he sought to make himself king; as though he were not to his contemporaries, as well as for posterity, the greatest of all kings. Since Suetonius and Plutarch, such are the paltry interpretations which it has pleased people to give to the noblest actions. But by what sign are we to recognise a man's greatness? By the empire

of his ideas, when his principles and his system triumph in spite of his death or defeat."—Preface, pp. xii—xiv.

And at the end of the volume :—

"We have shown Cæsar obeying only his political convictions, whether as the ardent promoter of all popular measures, or as the declared partisan of Pompey; we have shown him aspiring with a noble ambition to power and honours; but we are not ignorant that historians in general give other motives for his conduct. They represent him in 684 as having already his plans defined, his schemes arranged, his instruments all prepared. They attribute to him an absolute prescience of the future, the faculty of directing men and things at his will, and of rendering each one, unknowingly, the accomplice of his profound designs. All his actions have a hidden motive, which the historian boasts of having discovered. If Cæsar raises up again the standard of Marius, makes himself the defender of the oppressed, and the persecutor of the hired assassins of past tyranny, it is to acquire a concurrence necessary to his ambition; if he contends with Cicero in favour of legality in the trial of the accomplices of Cataline, or to maintain an agrarian law of which he approves the political aim, or if, to repair a great injustice of Sylla, he supports the restoration of the children of the proscribed to their rights, it is for the purpose of compromising the great orator with the popular party. If, on the contrary, he places his influence at the service of Pompey; if, on the occasion of the war against the pirates, he contributes to obtain for him an authority considered exorbitant; if he seconds the plebiscitum which further confers upon him the command of the army against Mithridates; if, subsequently, he causes extraordinary honours to be awarded him, though absent, it is still with the Machiavellian aim of making the greatness of Pompey redound to his own profit."—pp. 485-6. (E.T.)

This criticism is, on the whole, just; but if we accept it we must abandon the notion that Cæsar foresaw, more clearly than other public men, the course and issue of events. We must read in a different sense the grandiloquent phrases in which he is described as pursuing the course of his destiny, obeying a profound conviction, and alone representing a principle. He may have been a disinterested patriot or an ambitious schemer; but he can scarcely have been both. There is, however, a very good reason why the Emperor Napoleon should have adopted this not very promising thesis. He has himself suffered from the want of appreciation against which he protests. Certain historians have not been slow to impute to him the meanest of motives. They recal his election as president, and the oath which he took to be faithful to the constitution; then they trace the history of the next three years; they describe the events of the 2nd of December, not less famous than the *idus illæ Decembres* of which Cicero speaks so often, and they conclude that the author of the *coup*

d'état, having become president, aspired to the sovereign power. Since Hugo and Lamartine, such are the paltry interpretations which it has pleased people to give to the noblest actions. Others acquit him of any policy. He is, say they, a man who has had the sense to keep his own counsel, and the cunning to seem profound. *Cunctando restituit rem.* Precisely because he has always followed in the wake of events, he has seemed to the world to lead them. ●It is not our business to offer any opinion on these theories of the imperial conduct. They exist; and we think that they are indirectly replied to in the "Life of Cæsar." The Emperor, of course, cannot admit that he has not been guided by a profound prescience. He is a Napoleon, and therefore a man of ideas. Still less can he have been capable of the motives which M. Hugo's theory would imply. That would impute to a pre-eminent genius all the passions of mediocrity. Accordingly in his life of Cæsar he offers an explanation which reconciles his history with his pretensions, and leaves us to conclude that to the wisdom of the serpent may well be united the harmlessness of the dove.

On the whole it cannot be said that the Emperor discloses in this book any capacity for historical generalization or any power of picturesque narrative. Even his flatterers can scarcely suppose that he has added anything to the researches of Niebuhr and Mommsen. His sketch of the six centuries from the foundation of the city to the death of Sulla, besides being little relevant to the subject, is flat and uninteresting in an extraordinary degree. It contains an array of names, dates, and statistics, in which history and romance are indistinguishable and indistinguishable. There is not the slightest attempt to discriminate between the various authorities, or to measure the credit which should be given to each. Facts borrowed from the ballad poetry of Rome, and facts related by an eye-witness—what Livy says of the kings, and what Cicero says of the Cataline conspiracy—are appealed to with equal confidence. Dionysius, Appian, Polybius, Florus, Eutropius, Suetonius are scattered about the notes in admirable confusion. The Emperor does not forget to mention, on the authority of the last writer, that Cæsar owned an extraordinary horse whose hoofs resembled a human hand. "César seul avait pu dompter cet étrange animal, dont la docilité, disait-on, lui présageait l'empire du monde."—p. 386. The greatest part of the book is made up of matters which have no relation whatever to Cæsar or to his times. Horace's laugh against the cyclic writer who began his history of the Trojan war with the birth of Castor and Pollux may be turned against the imperial historian with perfect justice. Here and there are scattered some of those pompous generalities which second-rate French writers especially

delight in—thoughts of the “*L’empire c’est la paix*” school—the moral of Roman history condensed into a few sententious apophthegms, and like nothing so much as the remarks which Richard makes at the end of a chapter in Mrs. Markham’s history. Judging the work merely by the appearance which it presents to the eye, it might be a very carefully written and learned memoir. The notes are tolerably full, and they contain plenty of references, quotations, and so forth. Their quality, however, is scarcely equal to their quantity. The translations are especially unfortunate. Readers of Cicero do not like to see the well-known “letters to his friends” (*epistolæ ad familiares*) invariably quoted as “familiar letters,” and everybody would feel it to be harsh to translate “mille” by “million,” and to make twenty-two million sesterces out of twenty-two thousand.* The more the book is read the more convinced the reader becomes that the air of research and critical accuracy which is thrown over it, is merely assumed. Sometimes the references do not support the text—and frequently they have little to do with it. Many of the notes have either been added at hazard or have got misplaced. We read that Cæsar passed several valuable laws, and especially some which subjected to the most rigorous restrictions the contributions in kind which were to be furnished by the provinces to the proconsuls.† Any information respecting the Julian laws being of interest, we proceed to examine the passages referred to; not one of them says anything about restraining the contributions in kind; the first shows that contributions of corn were not restrained, but forbidden; the others show that certain contributions were permitted by the law in question. During Cæsar’s first consulate we are told that he caused a number of laws to be passed, the greater part of which have not been handed down to us, although we possess precious fragments of the most important of them. The only one which is cited in the text as an example is the Julian law regulating the priesthood, a precious fragment of which is quoted and mistranslated in a note.‡ The authority given for the existence of the law in question is a

* “*Simul illud cogitare debes, me omnem pecuniam quæ ad me salvis legibus pervenisset, Ephesi apud publicanos deposuisse: id fuisse H—S xxii millia.*”—Cic. ad Diver. xx. 9. “Faites attention, s’il vous plaît, que j’ai déposé à Ephèse, entre les mains des publicains, une somme qui m’appartient très-légitimement, 22 millions de sesterces.”—César, p. 389, n. 134.

† César, p. 389; quoting Cic. in Pison. 37, and Cic. Epist. ad Attic. v. 10. 16.

‡ p. 387. “Car dans la loi Julia, la dernière sur les sacerdotés, il est dit: Celui qui demande, ou celui dont les titres ont examinés.” “Est enim in lege Julia, quæ lex est de sacerdotiis proxima, his verbis, Qui petit cujusve ratio habebitur.”—Cic. Epist. ad Brut. i. v.

passage from one of Cicero's letters to Brutus. That is, in truth, the only authority which could have been given, for the law is nowhere else mentioned. But every one who makes it his business to know anything at all of such matters knows perfectly well that the authenticity of these letters of Cicero's is a matter of dispute among scholars, and that one of the grounds on which the letter in question is thought to be spurious is precisely the very reference made in it to this unknown and unheard of *lex Julia de sacerdotiis*. It makes little difference in our estimate of Cæsar's character whether he did or did not carry the law referred to, but it is certainly bold for a writer to infer the existence of a fact on the sole authority of a document which is supposed to be spurious because it contains a reference to that fact.

What the Germans, Italians, Russians, Swedes, and Hungarians—all the nations and languages to which the imperial proclamation has gone forth—will think of this book remains to be seen. We hope they will have a better opportunity of judging it than Messrs. Cassell, Petter and Galpin have afforded to us. For the form in which it is presented to the British public is not attractive. We will not venture to criticise the Emperor's French. It is formed on the model of Reuter's telegraphic despatches, and is, no doubt, everything that can be wished. But of the English version we can pronounce with some confidence that it is the very worst we have seen and about the worst we can think of. To begin with, there is no attempt at idiomatic expression. We read of "the vanquisher of Sertorius dominating the situation" (p. 332); of everything being "struck with decadence;" of "the silent atmosphere" (p. 64); of "adopting a tactic" of the "law Icilia" and the "law Julia;" of "peoples" doing so and so, and of the object being "to create a race of men of choice" (p. 29). Throughout the whole book the form and construction of the French sentences has been retained, the translator evidently thinking that his duty was to give word for word and clause for clause, and thus to remind his readers as much as possible of the language of the original. For example: "the tribuneship, abolished during three years, was re-established" (p. 40); "Just as we have seen under the kingly rule, the principles begin to show themselves which were one day to make the greatness of Rome, so now we see the first appearance of dangers which will be renewed unceasingly" (p. 45). The following sentence is barely intelligible: "With no intention of clearing up whatever degree of fiction these earliest ages of history may contain, we purpose only to remind our readers that the kings laid the foundations of those institutions to which Rome owed her greatness, and so many extraordinary men who astonished the world by their virtues

and exploits" (p. 1). So conscientious an imitator can hardly be expected to correct any of the mistakes of his original. We find the "familiar letters" of Cicero and the "millions of sesterces" religiously reproduced. Sometimes, however, he does venture on a blunder on his own account, as in p. 463, where a passage from Cicero's letters, to which the correct reference is given in the French, is quoted as from the speech against Piso; and in p. 2, where we read that the kingly power lasted 144 years—the Emperor having in this case held more nearly to the received chronology. The writer of the original having occasion to translate the following line:—

"Eamdem virtutem istam, veniet tempus, quum graviter gemes——"

does so in this manner:—

"Un temps viendra où tu gemiras profondement sur ta malheureuse puissance."—p. 396.

This is not so good that it can afford to be made worse. The translator, however, being seized with a little fit of poetical enthusiasm, does contrive to make it worse by rendering it in this way:—

"A time shall come, when thou thyself shalt weep
That power of thine so deadly——"

If the gentleman who did this had been rash enough in early youth to have confided his charming rhythmical version to the master of a public school, he would very soon have been made to weep his deadly power of blundering over so exceedingly simple a sentence.

In reality it matters little how the book is translated. The worse the better, for it is not one of those which it will do anyone good to read. There are many reasons why the Emperor Napoleon should have produced a very indifferent work. We have already observed that he does not possess the preliminary requisites for his task. He is no scholar; he is unacquainted with the mode of life and habit of thought of the ancient world, and his literary antecedents are not calculated to give dignity to history. But even had he possessed the qualifications in which he is conspicuously deficient—intellectual ability, familiarity with the Latin writers, and critical and narrative powers—he would have failed, as Polybius has failed, in giving a satisfactory narrative of the times he has undertaken to describe. There are moral problems in history which it is not given to every Emperor to understand. A man who is either unable to perceive or unwilling to accept the truth which underlies events has a disqualification which no mere learning can remove. He may see, as a Napoleon sees, the outside of things; he may write ingenious

essays and throw light on isolated facts, but he can never become an historian. The defect of intention and scope is seen in every page of Cæsar's life. It is written with the vulgarest of all possible motives, that of serving a private and political purpose. Seven centuries of the world's history are read backwards, in order to prove how necessary the Napoleons are to France. The whole history of that great revolution which wrested political power from the hands of the Roman aristocracy and founded a line of emperors on the ruins of the republic, is carefully misconceived, that it may appear to the world that there is an historical parallel between Julius Cæsar and the writer's uncle. Government by geniuses—a theory narrower, if possible, than government by heroes—is presented to us as the consummation of all things—not without a hint of where we are to look for the greatest living genius. We hope the French people will lay to heart the counsels of their imperial guide, philosopher, and friend. Let them be kind to his faults, remembering how contrary to good sense it is to ascribe to him the passions of mediocrity. Let them reconcile themselves to his government by the reflection that it is an insult to humanity to believe that it will submit to a domination which is not truly great and unquestionably useful. Poets will hereafter arise to glorify the Augustus of the French Julii. At present Augustus is compelled to blow his trumpet for himself. He has done so in this book after sounding a long note of preparation, and calling upon all Europe to hear him.

This attempt to make out a case in favour of the divine right of despots has few chances of success. It would probably have miscarried had its purpose been concealed, had it been illustrated by more learning, supported by a far wider generalization, and entrusted to a less partial advocate. The present writer is too much interested in his conclusion not to be suspected in his argument. The theory which makes it so necessary to comprehend pre-eminent geniuses is perfectly satisfactory only to the geniuses themselves. Accept for a moment the imperial position. By a bold stroke, or in his own more forcible language, by taking a courageous initiative, he has proved to us that he is the creature of Destiny, and that his fate is to arrange our future in accordance with the Napoleonic ideas. It is a poor look out. Take the most favourable view. Assume the ideas to be reasonable, wise, and easily understood of the people. How do we know that we shall in fact be governed after these excellent principles. Cæsar's Life is not as yet complete. The testamentary executor of the revolution may happen to find a codicil which revokes all the beneficial clauses of the will. Such things have been. *We* are to give up our liberty of thought and action. *He* is to

live in a palace, receive our homage, and regulate our affairs. It is all very well for him, but where is the security for the future of Europe ?

“O ihm ist wohl ! Wer aber weiss was uns
Die nächste Stunde schwartz verschleiert bringt !”

ART. VI.—AMERICAN NOVELISTS : THEODORE WINTHROP.

The Works of Theodore Winthrop. 5 vols. Boston : Ticknor and Fields. London : Triibner and Co.

A VERY spirited sketch, entitled “Our March to Washington,” appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly* for June, 1861. Another paper, in the next number, on “Washington as a Camp,” was even more masterly. The writer handled his subjects with the dexterity and neatness which are only acquired after considerable practice in the art of literary composition. When it was discovered that their author was a private in the famous 7th New York regiment, and that he was wholly unknown to the world of letters and of readers, the surprise was great and undisguised. Theodore Winthrop, the private who had proved himself so well able to use his pen, did not return home with his regiment when it was thought improbable that Washington would be attacked. He entered the army as a volunteer, and received the appointment of military secretary to General Butler, who was then in command at Fortress Monroe. He took part in the expedition against Great Bethel, an expedition which was among the most disastrous and ill-planned of the war. During the combat, Theodore Winthrop displayed great gallantry, and strove by his example to inspire the soldiers when they wavered. At the moment when he was calling on them to advance, he was mortally wounded. One of the first who fell in the bloody civil war, he was chief among those whose loss his countrymen have had good reason most sincerely to lament. They have since ascertained that he was something still more admirable than a brave soldier ; that, had he lived, he might have added to the roll of American authors a name not less memorable than many of those which adorn it.

His friends became aware, after his death, that he had been an assiduous writer. Among his papers were several works in manuscript evidently prepared for the press. It was decided that these should be published. A similar decision is often come to,

but seldom on grounds more rational than those of personal admiration and friendly confidence. The usual result is, that the public takes an opposite view, and blames the folly of those who conclude that what pleases them, on account of their fondness for its author, must necessarily be intrinsically valuable. The case is still stronger against the well-meaning friends of the deceased, when the works which they think worthy of publication have been offered to publishers and declined by them during the author's lifetime. Publishers are generally the best judges of what will sell ; consequently, when they have given an adverse decision, it is hazardous in the extreme for an author's executors to appeal from their verdict to the judgment of the public. Disregarding such considerations, the surviving friends of Theodore Winthrop gave to the world nearly every paper he had left behind him. As the result proved, they acted with a boldness which is the truest wisdom. His writings filled five volumes. Of these, three were novels, and two sketches of travel and adventure. The novels are entitled, "Cecil Dreeme," "John Brent," and "Edwin Brothertoft." Within the short space of three years, seventeen editions of the first have been called for, fourteen of the second, and seven of the third. The number of editions through which a book passes, proves nothing in its favour. Not unfrequently the worst books sell most rapidly. But a book of which a new edition is issued nearly every month, deserves at least careful examination. To our readers, the present inquiry will be the more interesting, seeing that the name and works of Theodore Winthrop must be alike strange to them. It is very questionable if ten Englishmen are familiar with the fact that he has written a line. We think it certain, that even those who possess this knowledge are wholly ignorant of the contents of the volumes which have excited so much interest in America.

Theodore Winthrop ventured to attempt what none of his countrymen have yet done with success ; to embody, in a work of fiction, true pictures of his country at the present day. Americans consider that to European readers these pictures would be unintelligible, and consequently unattractive. The favour and the praise of English critics, American authors naturally aspire to gain. In the preface to his exquisite "Romance of Monte Beni," Mr. Hawthorne candidly confessed that "Italy, as the site of his romance, was chiefly valuable to him as affording a sort of poetic or fairy precinct, where actualities would not be so terribly insisted upon as they are, and must needs be, in America." He proceeds to state the difficulties which he had encountered in making the attempt. Moreover, he expresses a too confident hope that America will never become the favoured country of romance. In the following passage he showed himself unneces-

sarily timorous and distrustful; we cite the passage, because it evidently expresses not only his own opinion, but also that of his fellow-countrymen, on the subject:—"No author, without a trial, can conceive the difficulty of writing a romance about a country where there is no shadow, no antiquity, no mystery, no picturesque and gloomy wrong, nor anything but a commonplace prosperity, in broad and simple daylight, as is happily the case with my dear native land. It will be very long, I trust, before romance-writers may find congenial and easily handled themes either in the annals of our own stalwart republic, or in any characteristic and probable events of our individual lives. Romance and poetry, ivy, lichens, and wall-flowers, need ruin to make them grow."

If proof were needed that in America, even before the war, the materials for romances, as thrilling as any ever written, existed in unexampled profusion, it would be furnished by one of Theodore Winthrop's novels. In "John Brent" are depicted, with a vigour which convinces us of their truthfulness to nature, the pioneers of western civilization, the Californian diggers whose lives are like those of the adventurers of the Middle Ages, and the Mormons who, on the shores of the Great Salt Lake, are building up what may become, politically as well as socially, a second Constantinople. No man can write a novel worth a rush who is not himself the hero of a romance. Here are some of the qualifications of Theodore Winthrop.

Born at New Haven in 1828, he entered Yale College at the age of sixteen. Mental philosophy and Greek were his favourite studies. The information he acquired was extensive, and his assiduity extreme. Prize after prize fell into his hands. But his was the usual lot of those students who strive for, and attain to intellectual distinction. His health was irreparably impaired at the very time when it was necessary for him to exert himself in order to reap the fruit of his studies and his triumphs.

At twenty he took his degree, and repaired to Europe, there to seek, in change of scene and occupation, the strength of body which had departed from him. England, France, Germany, and Italy he visited in succession. After a time he returned to New York, and entered the counting-house of Mr. Aspinwall. But it was not long before he set out on travels again, residing for two years in Panama, then journeying through California and Oregon, visiting Vancouver's Island, Puget Sound, and the Hudson Bay Company's station there. Then he revisited New York, and re-entered Mr. Aspinwall's counting-house. In 1855 he began to study law. Next year he canvassed the most secluded districts of Pennsylvania on behalf of Mr. Fremont. The following year he went to practise law at St. Louis. The notoriously

bad climate of that town disagreeing with him, he returned to New York. Here he failed, not on account of the climate, but because of his inaptitude for legal pursuits. Having plenty of spare time, he occupied it in literary composition. A man of his fine culture and large experience could hardly fail to write something noteworthy. To many of us a life passed like his would seem to be valuable time recklessly squandered. Were the son of English parents to follow a similar course, he would probably be disowned by them. Even if they pardoned his folly, they would lecture him, at least once a day, on the text of a rolling stone gathering no moss. American parents, on the contrary, think it both natural and proper that a youth should endeavour to discover the sphere of life in which nature has qualified him to excel. They rightly suppose that a few years so employed are turned to better account than if occupied in what we are taught to regard as the very sensible occupation of "sowing wild oats." In one of Theodore Winthrop's novels, the American view is stated in an exaggerated, yet not untruthful manner, Robert Byng being asked his age, and answering, twenty-six, his questioner remarks, "the judge, in the name of the American people, demands, 'Why, then, haven't you been five years at the bar, or ten years at the desk? Why are not you in command of a clipper ship, or in Congress, or driving an omnibus, or clearing a farm? Where is your door-plate? Where is your wife? What school does your eldest son go to? Where is your mark on the nineteenth century?'" A young Englishman cares less about making a mark on the century than about making his living. His ambition is bounded by the possession of a fixed income, a wife, and a small family. He is trained to consider as akin to a deadly offence, the hankering after improving his position in the world by changing the profession for which he has been educated, or which he has embraced under compulsion. The principle of caste flourishes in England, although the thing itself is denounced as unchristian. That is one of our especial privileges. We may act as heathens, so long as we condemn whatever the heathens practise. A finer and freer life is within the grasp of our American brethren, and they enjoy it to the full. Their aspirations are as vast as their continent. Their failures do not deter them from resuming their attempts. Poor laws and workhouses are unknown to them. Starvation is a name, not a fact. With them, to persevere really means to succeed. The practical result is to render them self-denying and self-reliant, willing to labour and wait, because certain to prevail in the end. In the case of Theodore Winthrop, his training and his opportunities contributed to make of him one of the most original of modern American authors.

"Cecil Dreeme," the first of his novels, is open to adverse criticism as regards the construction of the plot. The tone is morbid. Some of the personages are untrue to nature. What is very remarkable is, that notwithstanding these grave shortcomings, the novel is a fascinating one. This is attributable to the liveliness of the dialogue, to the wonderful condensation and energy of the language. The personages converse like human beings. They say the most natural things in the most pointed way. This, we need hardly add, is of itself sufficient to counterbalance very weighty defects.

Robert Byng is the hero, Cecil Dreeme the heroine. The scene of action is New York. Robert Byng, returning thither after a visit to Europe, finds that Clara Denman, with whom he had once been passionately in love, had been engaged to a Mr. Densdeth, and had committed suicide a short time before the day appointed for the wedding. He suspected foul play, chiefly because he thought Densdeth capable of committing any crime. About Densdeth there is an air of mystery akin to that which would surround a modern Mephistopheles. He is drawn in a style which causes us to read, as it were, between the lines. This is the fashion in which his character is analysed. After reading the passage, we feel that Densdeth, though not a flesh-and-blood creation, is not wholly a stranger to us. "He was a keen, hard analyser of men, utterly sceptical to good motives. There is always just such a proportion of selfishness in every man's act; there must be, because there is a man in it. It may be the larger half, the lesser half, a fraction, the mere dust of an atom that makes the scale descend. Densdeth always discovered the selfish purpose, put it in focus, held up a lens of his own before it. At once it grew, and spread, and seemed the whole. Densdeth was the Apostle of Disenchantment. No Paradisiacal innocence where he entered. He revealed evil everywhere. That was at the core, according to him, however smooth the surface showed. Power over others consisted in finding that out. And that power was the only thing, except sensuality, worth having." "The memory of Densdeth's laugh misrepresented to me all laughter. Laughter, if I took that as its type, was only the loud sneer of a ruthless cynic. Such a laugh made honour seem folly, truth weakness, generosity a bid for richer requital, chivalry the hypocrisy of a knave."

The first thing Robert Byng does after landing is to take rooms in Chrysalis College, an edifice which, having been constructed to serve as a college, had been converted into chambers. It is kept by a man named Locksley, who is pictured very much in the style of a well known novelist. Locksley was "a bristly little man. His hair and beard were so stiff that I fancied at once he

could discharge a volley of hairs, as a porcupine shoots quills at a foe. This bristliness, and a pair of keen black eyes, gave him a sharp, alert, and warlike look, as if he were quick to take alarm, but not likely to be frightened. I detected him as a man who had seen better days, and hoped to see them again, by his shirt-collars. They were stiff as Calvinism and white as Spitzbergen. Such collars are the badge of men who, though low in the pocket, are not down in the mouth. So long as there is starch in the shirt, no matter how little nap the coat wears; but limp linen betokens a desponding spirit, and presently there will be no linen, and despair."—pp. 46, 47.

In Chrysalis College lives an artist named Cecil Dreeme. Before meeting this artist, Robert Byng feels interested in him. He says, "The melodious vagueness of the name greatly attracted me. It was to mine what the note of a flute is to the crack of a rifle. Cecil Dreeme—Robert Byng. There is a contrast to begin with, I thought. Our professions, too, are antagonistic. Chemistry—Art. Formulas—Inspirations. Analysis—Combination. I work with matter; he with spirit. I unmake; he makes. I split atoms, unravel gases; he grafts lovely image upon lovely image, and weaves a thousand gossamers of beauty into one transcendent fabric." With this artist Robert Byng becomes acquainted: the acquaintance ripens into a fast friendship. Meantime Byng renews his intimacy with the Denmans, and falls in love with Emma, the sister of her who had come to an untimely end. Over this household Densdeth exercises a strange fascination. Every one seems to fear him. They obey with trembling. Mr. Denman, one of the richest merchants of New York, appears to Byng to be oppressed by some brooding care, or with remorse for a secret crime. He regards him as "an overbusy man—a man over-weighted with social responsibilities. Too many banks choose him director. Too many companies want his administrative power. Too many charities must have him as trustee. One of the Caryatides of society. No wonder at his air of uneasy patience, or perhaps impatient endurance and eagerness to be free."—p. 196.

These, with the exception of a Mr. Turner, a victim of Densdeth's, and a Mr. Churm, are all the characters. The parts they play may be described in a few sentences. Robert Byng becomes engaged to Miss Denman, but he finds that the more intimately he knows her the cooler does his passion become. There is something about her which perplexes him. One evening he observes a look of intelligence between her and Densdeth, which excites suspicions he can neither quiet nor verify. He ceases to be the lover. When he does this, Miss Denman gives no token either of surprise or vexation. Cecil Dreeme, who has done wonders as an

artist, and has become more and more attached to Byng, suddenly disappears. It turns out that the artist had been spirited away by Densdeth, and placed in a private asylum. Moreover, it is discovered that Cecil Dreeme is the Clara Denman whose death by drowning had been the subject of disappointment to Densdeth and of mourning to her family. The winding-up is as tragical as the last act in "Hamlet." Densdeth is stabbed to the heart by a former victim, while the slayer is himself numbered among the dead, and Emma Denman poisons herself. We are led to infer that this sombre ending is eventually relieved by a brighter prospect, and that Clara Denman and Robert Byng eventually marry, and, we suppose it must be added, thereby become happy.

The improbabilities of the story do not require to be pointed out. It is in detached sentences and sketches, rather than in the construction of the plot, that we perceive its author's uncommon power. Of the concentration of his descriptive passages, we have already given examples. We shall only add a few bits which, of themselves, betoken the writer of genius. An obvious thought is very happily put as follows:—"Life cures, and Death renews. But Life should be a feast, not a medicine." (p. 95.) How apt and yet how fresh is the following epithet: "The insolent monotony of ocean." (p. 104.) In describing Emma Denman, it is said: "Grace she had—exquisite grace. Grace is perhaps a more subtle charm than beauty. Beauty is passive; grace is active. Beauty reveals the nature; grace interprets it. Beauty wins; grace woos." (p. 189.) American life is characterized as "an indefinitely adjourned to-morrow." Here is the American view of history, a view which is very similar to our own: "Give the world results, the means by which those results were attained cease to be of any profound value or interest. Everything ancient is perpetually on its trial whether its day has not come to be superannuated, and so respectably buried. Antiquity deserves commendation and gratitude; but no peculiar reverence or indulgence. The facts and systems of the past are mainly rubbish now; what is precious is the spirit of the present which those systems have reared, or at least failed to strangle, and those facts have mauled strong, and tempered fine." (pp. 282-3.)

That there are plenty of plums is certain; unfortunately, however, abundance of plums does not always insure a good pudding. The story is the backbone of a novel. In "Cecil Dreeme" the story is the weakest and least satisfactory part. It was on another field that Theodore Winthrop was qualified to conquer. His next novel, "John Brent," is the one we like best, and chiefly because it is among the most original of contemporary works of fiction.

A healthful tone pervades this romance. It seems to have

been composed while the author was still elate with the full life of a wanderer among the mountains and the plains which stretch from the Pacific to the Atlantic oceans. Not only do the incidents occur in a new country, but some of the characters have never before figured in a novel. Of California we have heard a great deal. The very name has come to be almost a synonym for auriferous. San Francisco, the capital of the Gold State, we know by repute as a city quite unequalled for its luxury and dissoluteness, as a city outstripping even the most notable of European capitals in the recklessness with which wealth is gained and lavished, in the effrontery with which all the vices are paraded and practised. But the gold-digger, as he is when pursuing his exhausting task, is more unfamiliar to us than the Esquimaux and his country of ice. New circumstances call into being new types of men. The backwoodsman of the United States is a man as unlike any other, as the domestic cat is to the same animal in its savage state. For a new kind of man we must have a new name. Accordingly we find the Californian digger rejoicing in the strange one of "Pike." Theodore Winthrop remarks, concerning him: "America is manufacturing several new types of men. The Pike is one of the newest. He is a bastard pioneer. With one hand he clutches the pioneer vices; with the other he beckons forward the vices of civilization." "He is a terrible shock, this unlucky Pike, to the hope that the new race on the new continent is to be a handsome race. I lose that faith which the people about me now have nourished, when I recall the Pike. He is hung together, not put together. He inserts his lank fathom of a man into a suit of molasses-coloured homespun. Frowzy and husky is the hair nature crowns him with; frowzy and stubby the beard. He shambles in his walk; he draws in his talk; he drinks whisky by the tank; his oaths are to his words as Falstaff's sack to his bread. I have seen Maltese beggars, Arab camel-drivers, Dominican friars, New York aldermen, Digger Indians; the foulest, frowziest creatures I have ever seen are thoroughbred Pikes."

Among these very unattractive companions, Richard Wade's lot was cast. He had been engaged in working a quartz mine, till he found that to sink gold in it was easier than to discover ore rich in the precious metal. The quartz was nearly everything that an adventurer could desire. Never had there been seen quartz in which "the matrix was better defined, better shaped to hold the gold that was not in it. For Macadam, what royal material it would have been. Park roads made of it would have glittered gayer than marble." Unfortunately, however, "the precious metal was to the crude mineral in the proportion of perhaps a hundred pin-heads to the ton. My partners down in

San Francisco wrote to me, 'only find twice as many pin-heads and our fortune is made.'" But the pin-heads could not be found, and something had to be done. He decided upon returning to New York, and journeying thither overland. In order to do this, he parted with his share in the profitless quartz mine for a magnificent black horse, of which the fame was spread abroad among the Pikes, chiefly because none of them could tame or mount him. The owner, a wealthy Pike, was only too happy to dispose, on any terms, of an animal which was virtually worthless. The account of the capture and taming of this stubborn steed is a stirring passage. Gerrian, the owner of the horse, sent his Mexican servant to catch him; this he was to accomplish either by ensnaring him in a lasso, or else by driving the whole band into a corral:—

"We halted to pass the coming army of riderless steeds in review.

"There they came! Gerrian's whole band of horses, in full career! First, their heads suddenly lifted above a crest of the prairie; then they burst over, like the foam and spray of a black, stormy wave when a blast strikes it, and wildly swept by us with manes and tails flaring in the wind. It was magnificent. My heart of a horseman leaped in my breast. 'Hurrah!' I cried. . . .

"They were just upon us, chased and chaser, thundering down the slope, when the vaquero, checking his wrist at the turn, flung his lasso straight as an arrow for the black's head.

"I could hear the hide rope sing through the summer air, for a moment breezeless.

"Will he be taken? Will horse or man be victor?"

"The loop of the lasso spread like a hoop. It hung poised for one instant, a few feet before the horse's head, vibrating in the air, keeping its circle perfect, waiting for the vaquero's pull to tighten about that proud neck, and those swelling shoulders.

"'Hurrah!'

"Through it went the black.

"With one brave bound he dashed through the open loop. He touched only to spurn its vain assault with his hindmost hoof.

"'Hurrah!' I cried.

"'Hurrah 'tis!' shouted Gerrian.

"José dragged in his spurned lasso.

"The black, with elated head and tail waving like a banner, sprang forward, closed in with the caballada; they parted for his passage, he took his leadership, and presently was lost with his suite over the swells of the prairie."

Eventually the horse was caught and subdued. He was named Don Fulano. This name, rather than that of "John Brent," should have been given to this novel, for the noble Don Fulano is its hero. Richard Wade tells us that he had put a whole mine into that horse. "He represented to me the whole visible,

tangible result of two long work-a-day years, dragged out in that dreary spot among the Pikes, with nothing in view except barren hill-sides ravaged by mines, and the unbeautiful shanties of miners as rough as the landscape." The fame of the horse, and name of his master, were noised abroad. John Brent, a man who, having failed at home, had sought another and a fuller life among the Indians, heard of the adventure, and recognised the horse-tamer's name as that of a schoolfellow. He sought out Richard Wade, and the pair set off on their long ride across the vast continent.

Richard Wade and John Brent suited each other exactly. "Camp life tests a man thoroughly. Common toil, hardship, peril, and sternly common *viaticum* of pork, dough-cakes, and coffee *sans* everything, are a daily ordeal of good nature. It is not hard for two men to be civil across a clean white tablecloth at a club. If they feel dull, they can study the *carte*; if spiteful, they can row the steward; if surly, they can muddle themselves cheerful; if they bore each other finally and hopelessly, they can exchange cigars and part for all time, and still be good friends, not foes. But the illusions of sham good-fellowship vanish when the *carte du jour* is *porc frit au naturel, damper à discrétion* and *café à rien*, always the same fare, plain days or lucky days, served on a blanket, on the ground. Brent and I stood the test. He was a model comrade, cavalier, poet, hunter, naturalist, cook. If there was any knowledge, skill, craft, or sleight-of-hand, or brain wanted, it always seemed as if his whole life had been devoted to the one study to gain it. He would spring out of his blankets after a night under the stars, improvise a matin song to Lucifer, sketch the morning's view into cloudland and the morning's earthly horizon, take a shot at a grey wolf, book a new plant, bag a new beetle, and then, reclining on the lonely prairie, take our breakfast, whose Soyer he had been, so full of Eden, Sybaris, the holocausts of Achilles, the triclinia of Lucullus, the automaton tables of the *Œil-de-Bœuf*, the cabinets of the *Frères Provençaux*, and the dinners of civilization, where the wise and the witty meet to shine and sparkle for the beautiful, that our meagre provender suffered 'change into something rich and strange;' the flakes of fried pork became peacocks' tongues, every quoit of tough roasted dough a *vol au vent*, and the coffee that never saw milk or muscovado, a diviner porridge than was ever sipped on the sunny summits of Olympus. Such a magician is priceless."

They reached Utah, stayed there a few days, then set forth again on their journey. Before long, they overtook the party carrying the mail eastwards. It was led by Jake Shamberlain, who, after being a policeman, acolyte, man-of-war's man, and

Yankee husband, had become Mormon, and one of the leaders of the Saints. They joined the party. Two other additions were soon made to it. The one man was lank and long; the other short and stout. They prove to be gamblers. They are strongly suspected of being blackguards. "I've seen villains just like those two, said Brent, in every hell in Europe and America. They always go in pairs; a tiger and a snake; a bully and a wheedler." "Sam Smith the gaunt affected a rough frankness of manner, Jim Robinson was low comedy; his head was packed with scurvy jokes and stories; he had a foul leer on his face whenever he was thinking his own thoughts. But either, if suddenly startled, showed the unmistakable look that announces worse crime than mere knavery."

The party halted at Bridger's Fort. While there, they beheld the approach of a caravan of Mormons. It consisted of two hundred wagons, containing about one thousand converts. The majority were from Lancashire, and had been persuaded by Elder Sizzum to exchange their native land for the shores of the Salt Lake, and abandon the religion in which they were educated for that attested by the miracles of Joseph Smith. Sizzum was one of the most successful of all the Mormon missionaries. He was half-pioneer and half-apostle. In appearance he was the type of the dissenting deacon. Over his proselytes he ruled like a tyrant. They believed that he held, as he declared, the keys of Heaven in his hand. His proselytes consisted of "the poorest class of townspeople from the great manufacturing towns—puny tradesmen, indoor craftsmen, factory operatives—a puny, withered set of beings; hardly men, if man means strength; hardly women, if woman means beauty." As John Brent and his friend were turning away in disgust from the contemplation of the dirty wagons and their squalid occupants, they remarked one which contrasted very strangely with the others. An old gentleman who had once been richer, and a girl whose face and manner were alike charming, were the occupants of this wagon. The former was named Clitheroe, and had once been master of Clitheroe Hall, Lancashire; his daughter was called Ellen. They were among the choicest prizes that Elder Sizzum had made. To him Sister Ellen was more than a lovely proselyte; being a lovely girl, she was destined to become an addition to his well-stocked harem. There was one, however, who would not assent to this arrangement: the lady herself. She obeyed her father, and followed him; but she did not believe in Mormonism. In addition, an obstacle to the consummation of Sizzum's hopes suddenly arose in the person of John Brent. He became madly in love with Ellen Clitheroe.

Life in the camp is vividly depicted. Among the amusements

was a ball. "Dancing is enjoined in the Latter-Day Church. They cite Jephthah's daughter and David dancing before the Ark as good Scriptural authority for the custom." Both the ball and the invitations to it were very different from those of civilized countries. A drummer and a fifer accompanied Jake Shamberlain, and while the former attracted notice, the latter issued his invitations. To John Brent and Richard Wade it was couched in these words :—" We're going to give a ball, gentlemen, and request the honour of your company in ten minutes, precisely. Kids not allowed on account of popular prejudice. Red flannel shirts and boots with yaller tops is rayther the go fur dress." After the ball, Smith and Robinson, or, as they ought to be called, Murker and Larrap, plied their trade, and won large sums from the half-drunken Mormons. When morning broke, the travellers left the camp and proceeded on their journey. They had not gone far before they were overtaken by a tall, gaunt man on a white horse. He was on the track of Murker and Larrap, who had murdered his brother, and tried to murder him also. He was named Armstrong, and was known to Jack Shamberlain, who characterized him in this very original style. " I've olluz said, ef the world was chock full of Armstrongs, Paradise wouldn't pay ; and Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob mout just as well blow out their candle and go under a bushel-basket, unless a half-bushel would kiver them." They were soon joined by Elder Sizzum and Mr. Clitheroe, who announced that Miss Clitheroe had been carried off, and who suspected that the two travellers were the culprits. When Elder Sizzum learned that Murker and Larrap had done the deed, he exclaimed, before riding back to his flock, " Ef them devils has got her, that's the end of her. I haint got no more interest in *her* case. I believe I'll go. I've wasted too much time now from the Lord's business." Mr. Clitheroe was left under the care of Jake Shamberlain, while Armstrong, Richard Wade, and John Brent set off in pursuit of the scoundrels, the former intent to revenge, the two latter resolved to save.

They made for Luggernel Alley, an opening in the Rocky Mountains, and the only pass through them by which the criminals could hope to escape pursuit. Murker and Larrap had seven or eight hours' start, but the others did not despair of overtaking them. The ride is one of the most thrilling passages of the kind we have ever read. It is too long for quotation here. To abridge it is to deprive it of half its interest. We will try, however, to condense it so as not to mar the effect of the more salient points :—

" We galloped abreast, Armstrong at the right ; his weird, gaunt white horse held his own with the best of us. No whip, no spur for that

deathly creature. He went as if his master's purposes were stirring him through and through. That stern intent made his sinews steel, and put an agony of power into every stride. The man never stirred save sometimes to put a hand to that bloody blanket bandage across his head and temple. He had told his story ; he had spoken his errand ; he breathed not a word ; but with his lean, pallid face set hard, his gentle blue eyes scourged of their kindness, and fixed upon the distant mountains, where his vengeance lay, he rode on like a relentless fate.

"Next in the line I galloped. O, my glorious black ! The great, killing pace seemed mere playful canter to him, such as one might ride beside a timid girl, thrilling with her first free dash across a flowery common, or a gold beach between sea and shore. But from time to time he surged a little forward with his great shoulders, and gave a mighty writhe of his body, while his hind legs came lifting his flanks under me, and telling of the giant reserve of speed and power he kept easily controlled. Then his ear would go back, and his large brown eye, with its purple black pupil would look round at my bridle hand, and then into my eye, saying, as well as words could have said it, 'This is mere sport, my friend and master. You do not know me. I have stuff in me that you do not dream of. Say the word, and I can double this, treble it. Say the word ! Let me show you how I can spurn the earth !' Then, with the lightest love-pressure on the snaffle, I would say, 'Not yet ! Not yet ! Patience, my noble friend ! Your time will come !'

"At the left rode Brent, our leader. He knew the region ; he made the plan ; he had the hope ; his was the ruling passion—stronger than brotherhood, than revenge. Love made him leader of that galloping three. His iron-grey went proudly, with white mane flapping the air like a signal flag of reprieve. Eager hope and kindling purpose made the rider's face more beautiful than ever. . . .

"So we galloped three abreast, neck and neck, hoof with hoof, steadily quickening our pace over the sere width of desert. . . . On we galloped, the avenger, the friend, the lover, on our errand, to save and to slay."

The heat became intolerable ; the ground harder and more trying for the hoofs of the horses ; of water, not a drop could be found. At length they espied a well, at which the steeds quenched their thirst. This had been dug by the murderers. They knew by this, and by a lady's glove, that they were on the right track. When attempting to leap a chasm, Brent's horse fell and broke his legs. The rider escaped unhurt, and mounted beside his friend on Don Fulano.

"Fulano stood steady till we were firm in our seats. Then he tore down the defile. Here was that vast reserve of power ; here the tireless spirit ; here the hoof striking true as a thunderbolt, when the brave eye saw footing ; here that writhing agony of speed ; here the great promise fulfilled, the great heart thrilling to mine, the grand body living to the beating heart. Noble Fulano !

"I rode with a snaffle. I left it hanging loose. I did not c██k or

guide him. He saw all. He knew all. All was his doing. We sat firm, clinging as we could, as we must. Fulano dashed along the resounding pass.

"Armstrong pressed after; the gaunt white horse struggled to emulate his leader. Presently we lost them behind the curves of the Alley. No other horse that ever lived could have held with the black in that headlong gallop to save. . . .

"It seemed one beat of time, it seemed an eternity, when between the ring of the hoofs I heard Brent whisper in my ear, 'We are there!' The crags flung apart, right and left. I saw a sylvan glade. I saw the gleam of gushing water. Fulano dashed on, uncontrollable! There they were—the murderers—arrived but one moment! the lady still bound to that pack-mule, branded A and A. Murker just beginning to dismount—Larrap not dismounted, in chase of the other animals as they strayed to graze. The men heard the tramp, and saw us as we sprang into the glade. Both my hands were at the bridle. Brent, grasping my waist with one arm, was awkward with his pistol. Murker saw us first. He snatched his six-shooter, and fired. Brent shook with a spasm. His pistol arm dropped. Before the murderer could fire again, Fulano was upon him! He was ridden down; he was beaten, trampled down upon the grass—crushed, abolished. . . . Fulano, and not we, had been executioner. *His was the stain of blood.*"

Armstrong pursued and shot Larrap; and thus the guilty pair met their righteous doom. The remainder of the story may be despatched in a few sentences. Brent had a hard tussle with death; but triumphed. Miss Clitheroe reciprocated his love. However, her father would not suffer her to remain in America. They returned to England. Brent and Wade started after them. By an accident they were discovered, and the result, though not stated by the author, may easily be guessed by the reader. As for Don Fulano, he met his death from a shot by a slaveholder. He had been lent by his master to a fugitive slave when hard pressed by bloodhounds. The slave gained his freedom; and the good horse met his death.

"Edwin Brothertoft" is a novel of a kind totally dissimilar to "Cecil Dreeme" and "John Brent." It treats of the time antecedent to the establishment of American independence. The incidents are, for the most part, drawn from, or connected with the revolutionary war. The hero is a descendant of a Lincolnshire gentleman, who had fought with Cromwell against his King. Colonel Brothertoft resolved to emigrate as soon as the advent of the Second Charles had restored all that was detestable under the First. The state of things which then prevailed is tersely depicted in one pregnant paragraph. "Time passed. Kingly Oliver died. There was no Protector blood in gentle Richard Cromwell. He could not wield the land. 'Ho for Cavaliers! hey for Cavaliers!' In came the Merrie Monarch.

Out Puritans, and in Nell Gwynne! Out crop-ears, and in love-locks! Away sad colours! only frippery is the mode. To prison, stout John Bunyan; to office, slight Sam Pepys! To your blind study, John Milton, and indite *Paradise Lost*; to Whitehall, John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester, and scribble *your* poem, 'Nothing!' Yes, go, Bigotry; your jack-boots smell un-savoury; enter, Prelacy, in fine linen and perfume! *Procul, O procul, libertas!* for, alas! English knees bend to the King's mistress, and English voices swear, 'The King can do no wrong.'" Disgusted with the new order of things, Colonel Brothertoft sold his goodly manor-house among the Lincolnshire fens, and went to build another mansion, and to perpetuate his race on the banks of the Hudson. His resolution held good; but he ceased to be the same man, as an exile, that he had been as a citizen of his native country. His sons inherited all his virtues and all his shortcomings. They were perfect gentlemen; but they wanted that energy, without which the settlers in a new country cannot attain to the pre-eminence to which their ancestors rose in the land of their birth. The fifth of the race is the hero of this story. He had been sent to Oxford to be educated, but before the appointed time, he was recalled by his dying father. Before his death, the latter told his son that the property was hopelessly involved; that after his death it would pass into the hands of a Colonel Billop, a man who had accumulated a large fortune under circumstances which would not bear minute investigation. Colonel Billop had an only daughter, who was the beauty, as well as the heiress of the country. Nearly at the same time as the body of the fourth Brothertoft was laid in the family vault, Colonel Billop went to his long home. His daughter became an orphan almost simultaneously with the son of the man whom her father had ruined.

"Handsome Jane Billop wanted a husband. She looked into the glass, and saw beauty: into the schedules of her father's will, and saw heiress. She determined to throw her handkerchief, as soon as she could discover the right person to pick it up." Her choice fell on Edwin Brothertoft. If she had the purse, he had the pedigree. He had the position, and she the money for enabling him to support it. Having determined upon marrying him, she found the means for succeeding in her object. He thought she loved him as he loved her; whereas her heart was fixed on the lord of Brothertoft Manor. The marriage was a mercenary one on her part. It proved a miserable union for them both.

Shortly after their marriage, Edwin Brothertoft, to the great joy of his wife, was commissioned to proceed to England as the bearer of a petition against the threatened undue interference of

Parliament with American affairs. He was received with open arms by the liberal statesmen. Even Doctor Johnson liked him. Everybody admired his wife. "She was a new sensation, with her bold, wilful beauty, and her imperious Americanism." "The Brothertoft embassy was a social success, but a political failure." It was a double failure. The wife desired to remain in England, there to be the cynosure of every eye and the mark for the most fulsome compliments. But her husband would not gratify her in this particular. Immediately after their return, a daughter was born to them. Instead of cementing a union which was rapidly parting asunder, this event served to widen the breach. The downfall of affection was not the worst. Love was succeeded by guilt.

Several years elapsed before the wrong was consummated. Not satisfied with being an unworthy wife, Mrs. Brothertoft became an unnatural parent. She poisoned her daughter's mind, persuading the innocent Lucy that her forgiving and long-suffering father was the greatest of scoundrels. The daughter learned her lesson only too well. In vain did her father try to induce her to show him that affection which it was his right to expect. Sickened at heart, he said farewell to his child, and quitted his home, as he then thought, for ever. Those who had treated him with such inhumanity professed to believe that he was dead. His wife bore his absence with fortitude. The society of several distinguished officers in scarlet uniforms served to cheer her loneliness, if not to banish her grief. She remained in Brothertoft Manor-house, and did her utmost to aid the cause of King George, as well as to solace his faithful servants. Meantime, her husband had enlisted among the rebels, of whom the general was George Washington.

The interest of the war centered for a time in the Brothertoft Manor-house. The rebels resolved to effect the capture of some of the fine soldiers who were accustomed to make merry there, chief among whom was a Major Kerr. Edwin Brothertoft wished to hinder a marriage which was about to take place there between Major Kerr—a rake whom his wife thought would become an eligible son-in-law—and his daughter. The latter loathed the very sight of her destined husband. Through the medium of Voltaire, a faithful negro-servant, the father and daughter communicated with each other. They resolved to take Major Kerr prisoner the night before the wedding.

The plot was skilfully planned and as skilfully executed: Major Kerr was carried off in triumph to the head-quarters of General Putnam. By accident, Brothertoft Manor-house was set on fire, and Mrs. Brothertoft's life was in danger. Her husband learned this only in time to make a desperate effort to rescue her. He

succeeded in saving her from the very jaws of death, but not till she was so severely burnt that she could only live long enough to acknowledge her error and receive his pardon. Having been rescued from the clutches of a lover she detested, Lucy Brother-toft soon found one whom she could ardently love, in the person of Major Peter Skerrett. He was one of the most valorous and skilful among the rebel officers. He it was who had planned the expedition which aided in the capture of Major Kerr. His good service met with its reward in the shape of Lucy's true love.

The minor characters are numerous and well drawn. They are well-distinguished the one from the other, and each fills his part in an appropriate way. Voltaire, the negro butler, is the most remarkable among them. The author says :—"Christy's Minstrels dance out their type negro, Jim Crowe, an impossible buffoon. Mrs. Beecher Stowe presents hers, Uncle Tom, an exceptional saint. Mr. Frederick Douglass introduces himself with a courtier's bow and an orator's tongue. The ghost of John C. Calhoun rushes forward, and points to a stuffed gorilla." In Voltaire, Theodore Winthrop presents us with his typical negro. He is a more lifelike personage than Uncle Tom ; but, like him, he is rather too good for this world. The same objection may be urged, indeed, against other characters in fiction, besides negroes. Voltaire does not greatly offend us by his barbarous lingo. As the author well says—"Black babble has become rather a bore in literature." We have given several specimens of this author's style, but have not yet quoted anything to show that in addition to writing well, he had the gift of seeing the humorous side of things. The following passage will both exemplify this, and also furnish those unacquainted with his writings with a new definition of faith. Sappho, the wife of Voltaire, says to him :—

"If you was a cook, you'd have more Faith. Just taste that soup now. How is it ?"

"Prime!" says Voltaire, blowing and sipping.

"You taste it, Plato," she repeated, dipping another ladle from the pot, and offering to her son, who had his father's philosophic dignity, and his mother's Socratic visage. "How is it ?"

"Prime!" says the second connoisseur.

"Now, what you guess is the most importantest thing in this soup ?"

"Conundrums is vulgar, particular for ladies," says Voltaire, loftily.

"That's because you can't guess."

"Poh! it's easy enough," says he. "Beef!"

"No. You guess, Plato."

"B'ilin' water," cries he, sure of his solution.

"Sappho shook her head.

“‘Turkey carcasses!’ propounded Voltaire, with excitement.

“‘Onions!’ offered Plato, with eagerness.

“‘No,’ says Sappho; ‘it’s Faith!’

“‘I was jest a goin’ to say Faith,’ Plato unblushingly asserted.

“‘You see,’ Sappho explained, ‘I takes beef—bery well! and b’ilin’ water—bery well! and turkey carcasses, and onions, and heaps of things, and puts ’em into a pot on the fire. Then I has Faith.’

“‘Poh!’ cried Voltaire. ‘Twasn’t a fair conundrum; you has the Faith into yourself.’

“‘Then I takes Faith,’ repeated Sappho, without noticing his interruption, ‘Faith, that these ’gredients which is not soup is comin’ soup, in de Lord’s time, and dey alluz comes soup.’

“‘And the primest kind!’ Plato interjected, authoritatively.

“‘So,’ continued Sappho, improving the lesson, ‘soup and roast geese, and pies and pancakes risin’ over night, has taught me dis yer proverb, ‘Wait, and things comes out right at last.’”

The “Canoe and the Saddle” is a book of travels, and like all good books of that class, is quite as entertaining as a novel. It contains a very interesting notice of the most imposing feature of Oregon—the majestic, and as yet untrodden Mount Tacoma. What Mont Blanc is to Europe, and Fusi-yama to Japan, that Tacoma is to America. Theodore Winthrop styles it a virginal mountain, “distant from the possibility of human approach and human inquisitiveness, as a marble goddess is from human loves.” He writes of it, in truth, with the warmth and force of one to whom Nature’s grandest scenes teach the noblest of lessons. He cannot believe that the shadow of giant mountains stunts men’s minds. The reflections he makes on this head merit attention; for speculations are more curious than those relating to the influence of natural scenery on the human species. Theodore Winthrop says: “Our race has never yet come into contact with great mountains as companions of daily life, nor felt that daily development of the finer and more comprehensive senses which these signal facts of nature compel. That is an influence of the future. The Oregon people, in a climate where being is bliss,—where every breath is a draught of vivid life,—these Oregon people, carrying to a new and grander New England of the West a fuller growth of the American Idea, under whose teaching the man of lowest ambitions must still have some little indestructible respect for himself, and the brute of most tyrannical aspirations some little respect for others; carrying there a religion two centuries farther on than the crude and cruel Hebraism of the Puritans; carrying the civilization of history where it will not suffer by the example of Europe,—with such material, that Western society, when it crystallizes, will elaborate new systems of thought and life.”

Quite as attractive as the account of his travels and escapes in

Oregon is that of his expedition through the woods and on the lakes of Maine. This fills the first part of the volume entitled "Life in the Open Air." Next comes a tale, "Love and Skates," then the papers of which we gave the titles at the opening of this article; and lastly, an elaborate criticism on Mr. Church's picture, "The Heart of the Andes."

As a tale, "Love and Skates" is very clever. Had the author worked out his subject at greater length it might have become the best of his novels. The subject is the success of the Dunderbank Iron Company, owing to the exertions of an energetic manager. Like all the works of Theodore Winthrop, it contains an episode of a thrilling kind. In "Cecil Dreeme" we have the abduction of Cecil Dreeme and the pursuit and death of Densdeth; in "John Brent," the ride after the two murderers; in "Edwin Brothertoft," the night-ride of the hero to save from death by fire the wife who had grievously wronged him. In "Love and Skates" is an episode as well told as any of these. This time, Mary Damer, who had gone to skate during a thaw, was carried off on a fragment of ice, and was in danger of drowning. Her lover, perceiving her peril, makes a vigorous and successful attempt to save her from death. The scene is depicted with the skill of an artist and the truth of an eye-witness.

This, in short, is the characteristic of all Theodore Winthrop's writings. He gives us the impression of always relating what he had witnessed. His heroes and heroines act as human beings who have really passed through the adventures in which they are made to figure. This impression of reality is produced without any straining after effect. He had experienced what life really is, before attempting to depict it in a novel.

The possession of this qualification for writing novels is much rarer than is generally supposed. We have authors and authoresses in abundance, who are renowned for their skill in photographing some phase of society, or a particular class of persons. Doubtless, these pictures are drawn with care. Sometimes, they are truthful as well as minute; but in general they will not bear analysis. We can readily perceive how artificial and how false the picture is as a whole. We feel that the touches, which are accepted by some as proving the accuracy of these sketches, are little bits taken at second-hand. Indeed, some of the most successful novel-writers are the greatest of plagiarists. They set to work in this fashion. Having chosen a striking title, and decided upon introducing certain incidents, they carefully read all that may give them information about the kind of personages they mean to portray. The best source for such information is the works of preceding or contemporary novelists. By judiciously commingling the ideas derived from

reflection, and those acquired by reading, they can sketch characters which are accepted as true to nature, chiefly because they are perfectly unlike what are met with in real life. If the mistakes contained in fashionable novels were extracted and exposed, the result would be surprising. The occupation would suit anyone having the ambition to compose an amusing "Dictionary of Blunders."

The truthfulness of Theodore Winthrop's pictures is their most striking characteristic. But his range is limited. His heroes and heroines are modelled after one type. It was wise in him to refrain from depicting what he did not know personally. That he should always have done so, indicates, however, the weakness of his imagination. For instance, we have, in Clara Denman, Ellen Clitheroe, Lucy Brothertoft, and Mary Damer, the repetitions of the same original—all of them being gentle, and ladylike in manner; but stern and determined in character—one-half Juliets, and one-half Lady Macbeths. The men are more varied. But all may be ranged in one of these opposite classes—the open-hearted, broad-chested, resolute and successful adventurer, and the smooth, oily, false, and crafty being who seems to have been created solely to meet his death at the hand of one whom he has duped and ruined. Villains are the most difficult of all characters to draw with fidelity. The man who acts a wicked part is not necessarily a villain, in the generally accepted sense of the word. The worst man, like the blackest cloud, has his bright side. The true artist should indicate this. He should also show that the good man has a spice of devilry in him.

What chiefly attracts us in Theodore Winthrop's writings is the definiteness of view and aim which characterises them. He is always in earnest. He writes as if he had reflected on the subjects he treats. There are few second-hand opinions advanced by him. It is always evident that he thinks for himself. His thoughts are generally those of a man for whom we can feel respect, even when we are obliged to express our disagreement with his opinions. Perhaps the most remarkable of his minor writings is his critique on "The Heart of the Andes," by Mr. Church. It contains views of art which are well worthy of attention. In it is manifested a genuine sympathy with the beautiful in nature. This is often professed, but very rarely felt in sincerity and truth. Some of the sentences we are about to quote might have proceeded from Mr. Ruskin when writing in his best style. Had not Theodore Winthrop given so many tokens of his thorough originality as a writer, we should, in the present case, have been disposed to style him a copyist. The coincidence is extraordinary; but we are convinced that it is merely a coincidence. In the first place, we have the following statement as to the position of

American thinkers as regards art. They are said to have much to learn, but little to unlearn.

“Young artists, errant with Nature, are not caught and cuffed by the despotism of effete schools, nor sneered down into inanity by conservative dilettantism. Superstition for the past is feeble here, to-day. We might tend to irreverence, but irreverence is soon scourged out of every sincere life. We have nearly a clear field for Art, and no rubbish to be burned. Europe has been wretchedly impeded and futilized in Art by worshipping men rather than God, finite works rather than infinite nature, and is now at pains to raze and reconstruct its theories. Our business is simpler, and this picture is a token of inevitable success—a proof and a promise, a lesson and a standard. The American landscape artist marches at Nature with immense civilization to back him. The trophies of old triumph are not disdained, but they are behind him. He is not compelled to serve apprenticeship in the world’s garrets of trash for inspiration, nor to kotou to any fetish, whether set up on the Acropolis, or the Capitoline, in the Court of the Louvre, or under the pepper-boxes of Trafalgar Square.”

The foregoing paragraph places before us in the clearest style the views which Americans, who think for themselves, are generally led to entertain. By the staid worthies of our own and other European countries, these opinions, would be scouted as heretical. Yet such men would probably be equally severe were the Americans to give up thinking and acting for themselves, and to copy or accept with eagerness the views and systems elaborated for them in Europe. As to the final result, we will not prophesy. Concerning the propriety of the means for attaining it, we see nothing to which exception should be taken. To speak of finality in Art is as absurd as to speak of perfection having been reached in any political arrangement or branch of science. We are too glad to welcome what is done well, to care much about the exactness with which the doer has been influenced by the maxims of preceding workers, or by the injunctions of living teachers.

Here is another example of the kind of writing in which Mr. Ruskin indulges. It requires little skill to perceive that, as it resembles many a passage in “*Modern Painters*,” the difference is even greater than the resemblance. Mr. Ruskin’s vigour consists mainly in words; in the volume and force of his epithets he shows himself a very woman. Theodore Winthrop, on the other hand, is a deep thinker, as well as a vigorous writer. He tells us:

“Habits of mind are in every man’s power, which will make him an infallible judge of artistic excellence at once. Does any one ask how to form those habits for comprehending landscape art? If we are pure lovers of the world of God; if we have recognised the palpitating infinite of blue sky, and loved to name it Heaven; if we have been

thrilled with the solemnity of violet dawn, and are rich with remembered pageantries of sunrise, and have known the calm and the promise of twilight glories over twilight glooms, and have chosen clouds to be the companions of our brightest earthly fancies ; if we have studied the modesty, the stateliness, and the delicate fiery quietness of the world of flowers, and have been showered with sunbeams and shadows in the tremulous woods ; if we have watched when surges come, with a gleam on their crest, to be lavish of light and music on glittering crags ; if, with the simple manly singer of old Greece, we deem ' water best,'—best for its majesty in Ocean, best in the brave dashes and massy plunge of a waterfall ; best in every shady dingle where it drifts dimples full of sweet sunlight, and best in twinkling dew-drops on a lily, tossed into showers of sparkles by a humming-bird ; if we have felt the large grandeur of plains sweeping up to sudden lifts of mountain, and if mountains have taught us their power and energy, and the topmost snow-peaks their transcendent holy calm ; if we have loved and studied Nature thus, and kept our hearts undebased by sense and unbewildered by mammon, then it is to us that noblest Art appeals, and we are its scholars and its tribunal. Then we have no mundane errors to recant, and will not keep up a shabby scuffle with our condition, and chuckle punily over some pinchbeck treasure-trove of our conceit, some minor fault in a noble work ; but, finding that a bold lover has gone nearer to Nature than we, will choose him for our guide, and follow straight in his track to the penetralia of beauty."

Far more surprising than the high character of these works is the fact that their author should have gone on producing them, in spite of the rebuffs he met with from those through whom he wished to give them to the world. It is easy to write in order to obtain applause ; but, to write without the prospect of ever attracting the notice of a single reader, is as difficult and dispiriting as to walk without an object. If other testimony were wanting, we should argue from this that Theodore Winthrop were a man of uncommon determination and energy. He was one of the men very much needed by his country. In America, bold and unscrupulous adventurers are as plentiful as brigands in Italy. They can easily force themselves before the public, and they can as easily climb to place and fortune. Their drawbacks contribute to their success. Were they better educated they would be more retiring. Were they more refined they would be less audacious.

The polish which culture gives to the mind, combined with native force of character and large experience of men and countries, are all manifested in Theodore Winthrop. He is, in our opinion, one of the most original of American writers, without being either vulgar or offensive to men of education. One-half of the best American writing is a pale reflection of English models ; the other half the coarse product of a rich but un-

cultivated soil. Judging from Theodore Winthrop's works, we may yet expect to receive from America something which is at once perfectly fresh and exceedingly attractive. We regret that he was not spared to do the work for which he was so well fitted. Our regrets, however, may be childish, as well as vain. Had he lived longer he might have acquired fame; but this would not have added to his enjoyment. If to die early be a sad lot, for an author to outlive his reputation is a still less enviable fate. Theodore Winthrop was spared long enough to learn what life is worth. Had his days been prolonged, his country would have been the gainer.



ART. VII.—THE PRINCIPLES OF OUR INDIAN POLICY.

A History of the Sepoy War in India, 1857-58. By JOHN WILLIAM KAYE.

THE first only of the three volumes in which the author proposes to narrate the history of the Sepoy war in India is before the public, bringing the course of events up to but the outbreak of the great mutiny. It might seem, therefore, at first view, premature to enter upon a review of the subject at so early a stage; but a careful consideration of the preliminary chapters in which the author develops his view of the predisposing causes of the mutiny has satisfied us that the most important part of his task has already been completed, and that, guided by the beacon lights he has afforded, we are already in a position to deduce valuable practical lessons for the conduct of our future policy in India from the experience of the past. "The thing that has been, that it is which shall be," is a pregnant historic truth as well as the preacher's homily text; and it will be equally profitable to the statesman and instructive to the student, while considering the several independent causes of dissatisfaction in India with our rule, to mark their concurrent action, and the cumulative force with which they operated to lead up to a state of things calculated to render rebellion in India first desirable to the people—then possible—at length inevitable. It may be premised that the lesson taught by this review we propose to apply especially to the present administration in India, and to take Sir John Lawrence's leading measures as the crucial test, whether the lesson of the rebellion has been read aright. The practical importance of the subject will at once be

conceded, if only in regard to its bearing on the question of the vast European force in India, the retention of which in undiminished permanence is necessitated by the character of our policy. There is a growing conviction in the public mind in England that it is impossible for us to hold India by a permanent garrison of 80,000 men, including the depôts. The diversion of so large a proportion of the British army from its ordinary fields of service to one notoriously deteriorating to its efficiency, both in respect of the physique of the men and the morale of the soldier, is felt to be becoming a national question of importance. Under any circumstances there is no doubt but that in the event of England becoming involved in war in Europe, many of the India regiments would be withdrawn to meet the exigencies of the occasion. What then would become of India if a policy of repression be persisted in up to the eleventh hour? Well said Prince Schwartzburg: "Vous pouvez tout faire avec les bayonnettes—excepté s'asseoir."

The predisposing causes of the rebellion as detailed by Mr. Kaye, may be summarized as follows:—

First. The annexation policy framed and inaugurated by Lord Dalhousie. The doctrine of the right of lapse on which he based that policy, while aiming at the absorption of all the native principalities of India, involved, incidentally, as is ably shown by our author, a religious question of the last moment to the Hindoos at large.

Second. Settlement and Resumption operations under the revenue administration, involving the destruction of the native aristocracy and the ousting of the Talookdars; the above operations, in pursuit of the "Dead-level," being assisted in the great war of extermination by the operation of the civil courts.

Third. Moral and material progress. Social reforms. Supposed attack on caste. Proselytism apprehended under the mask of secular education.

Fourth. Deterioration of discipline in the native army, and alienation of the attachment of the Sepoys individually by the measures of Government.

It will not be necessary to our purpose to notice the several instances adduced by the author in illustration of his views, under each of the above heads. It will suffice to indicate their general character and effects to enable us to proceed to the practical application of the lesson.

The annexation policy framed to effect the absorption of all the independent native states in India, was suggested to its author's mind by political considerations having reference to consolidation. Lord Dalhousie believed, and placed on record his conviction, that the existence of independent states within the

boundaries of our Indian empire must necessarily be a source of weakness to our Government, and consequently that to sweep them away must conduce to strengthen and consolidate our power. "To get all India within a ring-fence" was a favourite expression of the annexation school. But while enunciating this plausible doctrine, several important considerations bearing on the question of its safe and profitable accomplishment were entirely lost sight of. The breach of public faith involved in disallowing succession to states according to the terms of treaties, as understood by the original contracting parties, and corroborated by the universal usage in India, was naturally calculated to destroy the confidence of the people of India at large in British good faith and justice. But on our reputation for these qualities was built up our power in India from its earliest foundation. The inauguration of a policy, then, the inevitable tendency of which was to undermine that foundation, ought logically to have been, accompanied by a large accession of material force in the form of European troops. But how stood the fact on this head at the period of the last of the annexation series (Oude)? The total strength of European troops in India at large was actually less than in preceding years, the only difference being observable in their distribution, twelve thousand being massed in and about the Punjab—the first of the acquisitions under the Dalhousie régime—a form of distribution which left the rest of Upper India almost entirely denuded of European troops.

The heavy additional charge on the revenue of the vastly increased European force, by the support of which alone their policy of consolidation, so called, could be safely carried out, does not appear to have occurred to the annexationists. Nor, again, when their principles should have been carried to their legitimate consequence in the extinction of the native states, whom we hold to be the real Conservative elements in our Indian empire, do the advocates of the policy in question seem to apprehend the ruinous effect on the Indian revenue of having hundreds of thousands of square miles of desert and jungle thrown upon our hands. Such inaccessible tracts of country are ever the chosen retreat of marauders and other fugitives from justice. Under the rude but severe methods of the native rulers, a certain degree of order can be maintained at a comparatively slender charge for police and other administrative machinery. But such tracts, if ever thrown upon our hands and managed under our more enlightened system, and subject to the scrutiny of English public opinion, would eat up the revenues of fertile districts. Let hankering annexationists, then, understand—and they are yet legion, in spite of the terrible lesson of the rebellion which they have mis-read—that annexation, as a general policy in India, would not pay.

Prominent among the wrong readers of that lesson stands the present viceroy, Sir John Lawrence. He has recorded his opinion in a despatch, dated 29th April, 1858, that the convulsion was merely a military mutiny, which had its origin solely in the fears of the Sepoy for his caste—as affected by the incident of the greased cartridges—and that political causes formed no part of the question. Since Sir John Lawrence was the chosen instrument of Lord Dalhousie in carrying through the most notable of his annexation measures to an issue of ruthless spoliation of private property unheard of in the recognised maxims of international law defining rights of conquest; since Sir John Lawrence is now in a still higher position whence he may influence public policy in India in the direction of his political proclivities, it is important to the consideration of the question of India's future, to bear in mind that the present Viceroy does not believe that past political causes enter as an element into the question of the late mutinies.

For our own part, coinciding with the larger and more statesmanlike view of the subject taken by our author, we incline to the belief that political causes, long in operation, conspired to form the mine which the greased cartridge excitement only served as a spark to explode. Hence, it need hardly be added that we wholly concur in Mr. Kaye's view of the effect of the annexation of Oude, the last of the Dalhousie series. It was emphatically the last straw that broke the overladen, much-enduring camel's back. Not only did it stand in native estimation without the justification of even an alleged act of hostility or suspicion of intrigue preferred against the king; it was notorious, on the contrary, that he had ever been our faithful ally and friend, even to the extent of lending the British Government money from his private treasury in times of foreign war and domestic difficulty. A further cause in this instance conspired to render the measure of annexation more than ordinarily dangerous, and it is well delineated by our author. Oude being the recruiting-field of nine-tenths of the Bengal army, and of a large proportion of the Bombay army, the absorption of the kingdom into our government swept away the exclusive privileges enjoyed by the sepoys in their native state as soldiers of a paramount power; and to secure which privileges for their families as for themselves, had always been one principal object which attracted to our ranks one or more members of every family in Oude. Now all were reduced to the dead level under the *chuprassee Raj*.*

* A term of reproach applied by the natives to the British rule, on account of the oppressive conduct of the subordinate native employés called *chuprassees*, from the badged belt they wear in livery.

Hence the annexation of Oude severed one main link of attachment of the sepoys individually to the British Government.

There was yet one more aspect in which the annexation policy presented itself to the people, and that the religious, the most critical, perhaps, of all. Material losses by high-handed confiscation may be endured, life itself laid down under the pressure of unwonted hardships, all the more readily; perhaps, as affording a prospect of relief from the same. But "LAPSE," writes our author, "is a dreadful and an appalling word; for it pursues the victim beyond the grave. Its significance, in his eyes, is nothing short of eternal damnation." This may be explained by reference to the Hindoo usage, which renders it indispensable that the son should perform the funeral obsequies of his father, to deliver his soul from the Hindoo purgatory. These last offices as performed by an adopted son are equally efficacious as if performed by a direct heir of the body. Annexation, then, by the assumed right of Lapse, or refusal to permit succession by the recognised Hindoo law of adoption, destroyed not only the independent state concerned, but also, in native belief, the soul eternally of the late ruler.

So much for the character and tendency of Lord Dalhousie's annexation policy. Unfortunately he found willing and able instruments to carry it out, with a zeal inspired by a foregone conclusion of its justice and expediency. Prominent among these instruments was Sir John Lawrence, who, in virtue of his better adaptation to Lord Dalhousie's views, on account of identity of principles, was promoted by his lordship to be Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, in supercession of his brother, the wise, the chivalrous, and ever to be lamented Sir Henry Lawrence.

The system of Settlement and Resumptive Operations under the Revenue Administration, though not striking at such high game as that sketched under the preceding head, yet in the total destruction of the native aristocracy and landed gentry, and ousting of the talookhdars, which it involved, inflicted infinitely more widespread ruin, havoc, and dismay throughout the country. None so high as to be powerful enough to resist; none so lowly—if he were but in the position of a gentleman, raised ever so little above the dead level of the smallest village community—as to elude the searching scrutiny of the settlement officers. With what bias their cases were decided may be inferred from the principles of the administration of which these settlement officers were the appointed executive. The theory set up was, that the inalienable right to the soil resided in the peasant proprietary of the villages, and that all found above the level of that class, whether as individual proprietors or as hereditary revenue-col-

lectors and landholders combined (talookhdars), must necessarily have acquired such a position by an usurpation of the rights of the village communities, and whom consequently it was just and proper to evict.

It is unnecessary to enlarge on the natural tendency of such a policy to engender the deepest feelings of discontent and hatred to our rule on the part of the large class of heads of native society. Beggared and thrown broadcast over the land, it was not difficult for them to disseminate far and wide an impression against British justice, of which they were the living examples. Tears of shame from men, of anguish from despairing women, as they went forth from the happy homes of their ancestors, sank into the parched earth as very dragon's teeth. The crop of armed men, in the fulness of time, sprang forth in the general mutiny. The history of that troubled period paints no more aggravated instances of hostility carried to the utmost extremity of desperate resistance and infuriate hate than was presented by the conduct of the ousted talookhdars and other dispossessed native gentry. Oude was a notable example. And since the recent measures of the present Viceroy in regard to the province appear to us of a character to revive the anti-talookhdar policy which had already borne much bitter fruit, it may be worth while, in anticipation of the review of the measures in question to be taken in a subsequent part of our paper, to quote from our author the able sketch of the origin of the talookhdars, and his high authoritative opinion of the treatment to which they had been subjected :—

“There are few who have not become familiar with this word *talookhdar*, who do not know that an influential class of men, so styled in virtue of certain rights or interests in the land, were dispossessed of those rights or interests, and reduced to absolute ruin. It must be understood, however, that the proprietary rights of which I speak, were very different from the rights of landed property in England. The talookhdar was little more than a hereditary revenue contractor. His right was the right to all the just rents paid by the actual occupants, after satisfaction of the Government claims. His property was the rent, *minus* the revenue of a particular estate. The talookhdaree right, or right on collection, was distinct from the zemindaree right, or proprietary right in the soil. The talookhdar, who paid to Government the revenue of a large cluster of villages, had, perhaps, a proprietary right in some of these small estates; perhaps in none. The proprietor's right, in most instances, lay with the village communities; and it was the main effort of the English officers engaged in the settlement of the North-western Provinces, to bring these village occupants into direct relations with the Government, and to receive from them the amount of the assessment fixed upon their several estates.

“ Now it was a just and fitting thing that the rights of these village proprietors should be clearly defined. But it was not always just that the Government should enter into direct engagements with them, and drive out the intervening talookhdar. The actual occupants might, in a former generation, have been a consequence only of a pre-existing talookhdaree right, as in cases where cultivators had been located on waste lands by a contractor, or grantee of the State; or the talookhdar might have acquired his position by purchase, by force, perhaps by fraud, after the location of the actual occupants; still it was a proprietary interest, perhaps centuries old. Let us explain their position as we may, these talookhdars constituted the landed aristocracy of the country; they had recognised manorial rights; they had, in many instances, all the dignity and power of great feudal barons, and, doubtless, often turned that power to bad account. But whether for good or for evil, in past times we found them existing as a recognised institution; and it was, at the same time, a cruel wrong and a grievous error, to sweep it away as though it were an incumbrance and an usurpation.”*

Mr. Kaye gives the settlement officers credit for integrity of purpose in thus zealously carrying out “ the grand levelling system, reducing everything to first principles and a delving Adam. Who was a gentleman and a talookhdar, they asked, when these time-honoured village communities were first established on the soil ? ” and he characterizes their operations for the extermination of the landed gentry as in pursuit of “ the great scheme of restitution.” These subordinate functionaries, doubtless honestly, as well as zealously, did their duty in blindly obeying the orders they had received. All walk but according to their lights. The mole is not to be reproached for burrowing in the earth. It is difficult, however, to acquit the framers of the system of the charge of organizing a great scheme of confiscation rather than of restitution. In those days nearly the entire revenue of India was derived from the land; and since the total annual amount was often insufficient to meet the annual expenditure, the deficiency having to be supplemented by public loan, or occasionally by loans from our protected native princes, it was naturally an object of the Government of the day to raise the rental of the land as high as possible. Under such circumstances, the rent-free tenures of the landed gentry fell under the observation of the Government revenue authorities, and eventuated in the operations, above sketched, for their resumption. Some of the estates were confiscated directly to the use of the British Government; others were merged into the lands of village communities respectively, in pursuance, as our author indulgently puts it, as before

observed, of "a great scheme of restitution." But since the lands thus restored to the village communities served at the same time to swell the *jamma*, or aggregate revenue of each village payable to the Government, and subject to enhancement periodically at the discretion of the settlement officer, the palpable direct interest of the Government in the matter left "the trail of the serpent over it all."

And yet it would be more charitable to give the originator of the settlement policy above sketched credit for honest zeal, *pure et simple*, and good faith in intent. But what correlative admission does this not involve? Nothing less than his utter blindness to the natural tendency of such a system of levelling to engender wide-spread disaffection and hatred to British rule throughout India, leading inevitably to rebellion—an admission stamping the framer of the policy in question with political obtusity, the most dangerous disqualification for rule. It is hard in these degenerate days to have to choose our rulers between the clever-unscrupulous and the stupid-conscientious; but of the two classes, the former are the least unsafe. A right apprehension of the danger of losing all by grasping at too much may suggest moderation to an unscrupulous official; but who shall guard the State against the "unconscious machinations of stupidity," as Mr. Disraeli felicitously put it. Now who is it that in respect of the settlement operations in question stands impaled on one or the other horn of the above-stated dilemma? Who was the genius of that policy? Mr. Kaye informs us. "It was not the policy," he writes, "by which such statesmen as John Malcolm, George Clerk, and Henry Lawrence, sought to govern the people; but it was sanctified by the genius of John Lawrence."

We now understand the reasons for the desire of change of rulers which incited to the rebellion. But how it came to pass that rebellion in India, against a long-established and powerfully organized Government like the British, became *possible* to the degree of success which attended the earlier stages of that in 1857, is a vital question which we have to consider. Upon a right apprehension of it depends, in a great measure, the safety and stability of our position in India. Mr. Kaye's present volume affords important information on the point as far as it goes. Official records now before us complete the evidence, which enables us to place our readers in possession of full information on the question.

As early as the beginning of January, 1857, the dread of the Sepoys for their religion, in respect of the greased cartridges, began to manifest itself in murmurings at the depots for rifle practice, and by the more demonstrative and alarming symp-

toms of nightly recurring incendiarism. The excitement spread throughout the native regiments. Some broke out into open mutiny. Disbandment, executions, proclamations—all was of no avail to check the progress of the disaffection in the ranks. Day by day matters grew worse and worse, till culminating in the general revolt which commenced at Meerut on the 10th of May.

Now during all this time of between four and five months that the storm was brewing, was there no one in the ship of the State weather-wise enough to foretel it and sound a note of warning to put the ship in order, and lay her snug for the gale? How little of right apprehension there was in the Council of the Governor-General of India, of the dark shadows thrown before by the coming events, may be gathered from the despatch of the Government of India to the Court of Directors, dated 19th May, 1857, written in full knowledge of the rise of the native troops at Meerut and Delhee, of the ruthless massacres which had attended the revolt, and crowned by the seizure of the ancient imperial capital, and proclamation of the restored Mogul dynasty. What was the view taken by the Government of India of those events, and the remedial measures it submitted for the approval of the Home Government. Let us hear the despatch. After enumerating by number the six native regiments which had been concerned in the rise at Meerut and Delhee, the despatch observes: "Thus, at the present moment, the native strength of the Bengal establishment is reduced by six regiments. We recommend that the six native regiments, which are in effect no longer in existence, should not be replaced, whereby the establishment of regular native infantry would be reduced to sixty-eight regiments, and that the European officers of these late regiments should be used to officer three regiments of Europeans to be added to your establishment at this presidency." As if the defection of the six regiments were the first and last of the terrible drama, upon which the curtain had but just risen in yells and flames of successful universal revolt—in shrieks of slaughtered women, and in the pealing proclamation of a restored dynasty!

But were there no wise men of the East outside the council-chamber, to whose warning voice Lord Canning would naturally listen? Where, it would now naturally be inquired, where was Sir John Lawrence? In all the eventful months preceding the crash, during which the premonitory portents were so rife, did that reputed statesman of high mark and station make no sign? He did. We are indebted to our author for the careful research and faithful accuracy generally with which he has sought out and quoted *verbatim* the recorded words of approved authorities

whenever calculated to elucidate important or doubtful points. In the present instance our acknowledgments are especially due to Mr. Kaye, in presenting us with Sir John Lawrence's views of the state of matters up to within a week of the outbreak, in his own words. At page 582 of his first volume, Mr. Kaye quotes from a MS. letter of Sir John Lawrence to Lord Canning, dated 4th May, 1857. We give the extracts from Sir John Lawrence's letters in Mr. Kaye's words. Speaking of Sealkote, where there was one of the schools of musketry for the instruction of the detachments of native regiments, regular and irregular, in the firing of the new pieces, Mr. Kaye says—"Sir John Lawrence went to that station at the beginning of the month (May), 'to see the new school of musketry, as well as to judge with respect to the feeling among the sepoys;' and he wrote to Lord Canning that all were 'highly pleased with the new musket, and quite ready to adopt it. They already perceive how great an advantage it will give them in mountain warfare.' The officers assured him that no bad feeling had been shown, and he himself 'could perceive no hesitation or reluctance on the part of any of the sepoys.'"

Poor Lord Canning! Small matter for marvel that he suffered the first burst of the storm to catch him with skyscrapers aloft and ports not in, when the most trusty pilots of the State hailed *All's well!* up to the middle watch of the night. And thus it happened that the outburst of the revolt found the Government of India with its magazines, treasuries, and places of strength and prestige, including the ancient capital, in the hands of Native guards.

Well, the Government of that day have individually all passed away from their place of rule—the head of it alas, for ever! with his noble mien and calm courage. But one of the outside counsellors who, misinterpreting the signs of the times, as appears under his own hand, lulled Lord Canning into a false security, still remains in office; and as he has succeeded to the reins of government in India, him we must follow through his measures during the mutinies, the fame of which has obtained for Sir John Lawrence an elevation of such momentous import at once to India and to England.

How came it to pass that an administrator of such high repute, and holding a position affording such favourable opportunities for forming a correct judgment, should have exhibited such fatal blindness to the small cloud on the horizon, ay, even up to the last moment when it had spread its black mantle every side, and overshadowed the firmament like a pall?

Before answering this question by reference to Sir J. Lawrence's own recorded views, it may be as well to establish

conclusively, by further extracts from Mr. Kaye's History, the fact of his political blindness on the critical occasion in question, as revealed in the letter of the 4th May, 1857, to Lord Canning. That letter, it should be borne in mind, was written from Sealkote, one of the Rifle Depôts, and consequently main central points of danger, which Sir J. Lawrence had visited specially to observe passing events and report for the Governor-General's information. A further corroboration then of the blindness to the true significance of those events which misled the Governor-General as well as deceived himself, is to be found in the fact narrated at page 614 of Mr. Kaye's History, viz., that a short time before the outbreak of the mutiny, Sir J. Lawrence "had proposed to the Governor General to occupy a part of the approaching hot weather in a tour through Cashmeer, but Lord Canning, on political grounds, had discouraged the proposal." Now, is it conceivable that a functionary of the State holding the high and responsible position of Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, would have proposed to quit the capital of his government, and make a summer tour far beyond high mountain ranges for any consideration, had he had the faintest apprehension of the near approach of a crisis which would indeed demand the presence of every man at his post, high and low? But we are not left at all to conjecture on this point. We have but to trace the Chief Commissioner's further progress after writing his memorable letter to Lord Canning from Sealkote on the 4th May, and we find him wending his way towards the Muzzee Hills to pass the summer, and had actually reached Rawal Pindee, at the foot of the hills, hundreds of miles distant from Lahore, the seat of the Government, when the first intelligence of the outbreak of the mutiny reached him.*

To what, then, is Sir J. Lawrence's blindness on that critical occasion, here fully established, to be referred? Let us turn to his recorded views on the origin of the mutiny as conveyed in the published despatch of the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, dated 29th April, 1858, on the "Trial of the King of Delhee." At paragraph 8 we read: "Indeed, it is Sir John Lawrence's very decided impression that this mutiny had its origin in the army itself; that it is not attributable to any external or any antecedent conspiracy whatever, although it was afterwards taken advantage of by disaffected persons to compass their own ends; and that its proximate cause was the cartridge affair, and nothing else." This passage explains satisfactorily the proximate cause of Sir J. Lawrence's failure to

* "Kaye's History," p. 614.

apprehend the true significance of the premonitory signs of the mutiny. Believing the prevailing disaffection to be referrible exclusively to the fear of the Sepoy about his caste in connexion with the greased cartridge, the measures adopted by Government to remove this ground of apprehension naturally seemed to Sir J. Lawrence to be amply sufficient—as well they might. The Governor-General, in an earnest proclamation to the army, emphatically repudiated the remotest intention on the part of Government to interfere with their caste or religion in any way, pledging his honour to the disclaimer. All possible practical concessions were made in respect of the *origo mali*. The Sepoys were allowed to grease their cartridges for themselves; to pinch off the ends instead of biting them as before; in short, nothing was left undone to remove the alarming impression. Consequently, when a lull ensued, on the surface of the agitated mass, Sir J. Lawrence straightway comes to the conclusion that the danger was past, and writes the same to the Governor General, as we have seen. This was natural enough from his stand-point, holding the view that from the commencement it was all the cartridge affair and nothing else; but now comes the really important question in its bearing on the practical point for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government touching the character and tendency of the present rule. That question is this: whence did it arise that Sir J. Lawrence, after his lifetime experience of India, arrived at and acted upon his opinion that the disaffection in the ranks of the Native Army had its origin in the cartridge affair alone, and that political causes had nothing to do with it?

We apprehend the only answer can be found in the circumstances of his training in the revenue collectorate branch of the Administration under the Lieut.-Governor, Mr. Thomason. As one of the appointed officers for carrying out the grand levelling system of that ruler, John Lawrence's energy and force of character soon constituted him the genius of the movement, and marked him out to Lord Dalhousie as the fittest instrument for carrying out his policy in the Punjab. It was impossible to question the purity of his master's (Mr. Thomason's) motives, and the apparently prosperous, because unopposed, results of the system which the able disciple had adopted, in perfect faith in its righteousness, was not unnaturally calculated to warp his judgment as to its true and inevitable tendency, however remote the catastrophe. And thus it came to pass that Sir J. Lawrence failed to perceive that the measure, of which he himself was one of the most conscientious and well-meaning instruments, was in reality, as we have had so ably demonstrated in Mr. Kaye's

history, laying the mine of universal disaffection which the cartridge affair but served to explode.

The terrible experience of the rebellion bore, at least, this good fruit—the policy which had excited it was renounced. The Queen's Proclamation of November, 1858, on assuming the direct rule in India, which was issued under the able and tolerant administration of Lord Stanley, did more than our armies to restore order and tranquillity after the convulsion.

Lords Canning and Elgin were in succession fitting representatives of that toleration, equally political and religious, which prevailed in the councils of Her Majesty's Government, and found expression in the Queen's proclamation. But Sir J. Lawrence's known official bias and proclaimed religious zeal, working through his strong nature, caused his appointment to the supreme rule in India to be regarded both at home and abroad with anxious misgivings. The reactionary policy then which has resulted in the re-opening of the old dangerous sores, was only what might have been expected. But we are anticipating.

We left Sir John Lawrence at the foot of his summer retreat, whither, in apparent unconsciousness of the significance of all that was brewing under his very eyes, he had retired—only to receive there at a distance from his post the intelligence that the storm had burst. It is fortunate for India that that post, the capital of the Punjab, was held by able and energetic officers at the head of the Military and Civil departments respectively, viz., General, now Sir Stuart Corbett, and Mr., now Sir Robert Montgomery.

It must be premised that at that time about 12,000 European troops, by far the larger proportion of all the European troops in the whole presidency of Bengal, were massed in and about the Punjab. This distribution of European strength had been specially provided by Lord Dalhousie to enable his chosen instrument, Sir J. Lawrence, to carry out his policy of confiscation and repression in the Punjab with safety. This must be borne in mind when we come to speak of the reinforcements sent to Delhee.

On the intelligence of the events at Meerut and Delhee reaching Lahore, General Corbett and Mr. Montgomery, in consultation, promptly decided on disarming all the native troops at the post. This measure was ably and effectively carried out by the General. Sir John Lawrence appears to have remained stationary at the foot of his summer retreat during the two terribly eventful months that followed, having the protection, as a body-guard, of half a battery of European artillery, and two companies of European infantry. We learn from the History that he wrote letters thence to the Commander-in-Chief, and

to the Governor-General: to the former he addressed an earnest appeal to be "up and doing"—an obvious suggestion enough, we should have supposed, under the circumstances. From the Governor-General he sought permission to raise a body of Sikh Irregulars, up to the strength of one thousand. He also submitted a suggestion to intercept the Chinese regiments, but this suggestion had been already long anticipated by Lord Canning. This point is conclusively cleared up by Mr. Kaye. The suggestion was an obvious one enough, and was made, we learn, by many officers at the time besides Sir J. Lawrence, and long before him. It is important to note this point, for it was upon the bare fact of Sir J. Lawrence having made such a suggestion, that his eulogists claimed for him an exclusive possession of political sagacity and prescience in apprehending the real magnitude of the crisis. It is but due equally to Lord Canning, to whom it spontaneously occurred, and to other officers who submitted the like suggestion at an earlier date, that the real facts on this head should be known.

The next point that claims our attention in connexion with Sir J. Lawrence's action as Chief Commissioner of the Punjab during the mutinies, has reference to his having desired that our frontier post of Peshawar should be abandoned, and the garrison withdrawn to Lahore. Now clearly to understand the fatally disastrous consequences that must have ensued from such a step at such a time, it is necessary to consider that Peshawar has always been held to be the key of India. The eyes of all Afghanistan were turned upon it, and straining eagerly beyond, towards the rich plains and wealthy cities of Hindoostan. We have positive information that thirty thousand Afghans had shod their horses for the expected raid. The troublesome tribes also on our own N.W. frontier, including our recent enemies, the Sittana fanatics, among others, were eagerly watching for the first signal for safe inroad. The successful revolt of the large native force in garrison at Peshawar which was daily looked for by our enemies, might have afforded such a signal. The abandonment of Peshawar under any circumstances most assuredly would. A rise in the Punjab, that would probably have ensued on the retreat of our force from Peshawar, pursued, as it would inevitably have been, by the Afghans and N.W. tribes, presents to the mind such an aggravated view of our actual difficulties of that day that we can entertain no other conclusion but that in such an event India must have been lost. Fortunately the officers at the head of the military and civil departments at Peshawar were men of a similar calibre to those who had saved the position at Lahore. General Sir Sydney Cotton, then commanding the garrison at Peshawar,

strenuously opposed Sir John Lawrence's proposal to retire from and abandon Peshawar. He pointed out the certain disastrous consequences that must ensue from such a step in a tone indicative of his firm resolution to maintain the post. In this resolution Sir Sydney Cotton was ably seconded by his civil coadjutors, Colonel, now Sir Herbert Edwardes, and the heroic—the ever to be lamented Nicholson. A better method of meeting the difficulties by which his position was threatened suggested itself to the General's truly British instinct—to confront the danger and overcome it. The great danger was the presence of the large number of mutinous native regiments, with the comparatively small European force at his command. He decided on disarming all the native troops, and did so. By measures admirably planned and as boldly executed, each native regiment found itself confronted simultaneously by guns charged with grape, port fires lit, and a small party of European soldiers to support them. Taken completely by surprise, all laid down their arms without a sign of resistance. The General was then master of the situation. No more rumours of impending incursions from Afghanistan, no further trouble or danger from the surrounding frontier tribes. These, on the contrary, who had so lately been watching for a signal for safe inroad, when they saw the native troops powerless and the British star in the ascendant, true to the instincts of their race, flocked to offer their services for our ranks. Some of the best irregular regiments now in the Indian army were then raised.

The disarming movement in the Punjab, conceived with such political sagacity, and carried out so boldly by Sir Stuart Corbett at Lahore, was followed up, as we have seen by Sir Sydney Cotton at Peshawar, under the more critical circumstances and with the superadded responsibility of acting in opposition to the views of the Chief Commissioner. When the entire success of these operations, however, had laid the native troops in the Punjab disarmed and powerless at the Chief Commissioner's feet, and he found himself with the vast European force which was massed in the Punjab, free from all apprehension of a rising, Sir J. Lawrence then, and not till then, considered himself in a position to obey the distinct and positive orders which he had long since received from Lord Canning, to send down reinforcements to Delhee. The orders in question, sent through the Lieut.-Governor, North-Western Province, and given in the earliest days of the mutiny (May) will be found at page 603 of Mr. Kaye's History, in the following words: "Send word as quickly as possible to Sir John Lawrence that he is to send down such of the Punjab regiments and European regiments as he can safely spare. Every exertion must be made to regain Delhee.

Every hour is of importance." However, the time having at length arrived, in the Chief Commissioner's judgment, when he might, with safety to his position in the Punjab, spare troops for Delhee, the equipment and despatch of the successive columns was arranged with that talent for administrative detail for which Sir J. Lawrence is justly celebrated. And when by the aid of these reinforcements Delhee fell and India was saved, Lord Canning, with that generous magnanimity which formed a distinguishing feature of his character, recorded his public acknowledgments to Sir J. Lawrence in terms calculated to convey the impression that his action in the despatch of reinforcements was the spontaneous dictate of his own right and exclusive apprehension of the exigencies of the occasion, instead of being, as we have seen it was, in obedience to the orders of the Governor-General.

Time rolled on. Vicissitude, which marks the course of human affairs generally, is pre-eminently active in the East. Among the fitful changes through which she has asserted her dominion in that sphere, none is more remarkable, none more sad, than the destiny which has consigned four successive Governors-General of India to untimely tombs. The last, Lord Elgin, had scarcely settled down to his work when tidings came of his fatal illness. At the same time came intelligence that we were at war in the North-West. Having unnecessarily thrust our head into a hornet's nest, the buzzing of the adjoining tribes on the N. W. frontier would seem to have excited an apprehension in England that the Government of India was drifting into another Afghan war. Visions of difficulties, debt, and deficit, scared the peaceful slumbers of the Secretary of State for India. Naturally casting about for the fittest person to avert such a catastrophe, Sir J. Lawrence's presumed superior knowledge of the North-West and its troublesome frontier tribes, pointed him out as the man for the emergency, and he was appointed accordingly as Lord Elgin's successor. He arrived at the seat of his government on the 12th January of last year (1864), to find the little war over, the troops returned to their quarters, and no occasion whatever for his presence in the North-West. But there was a little cloud in the North-East which claimed his attention—Bhotan. The correspondence on this question has just been published in the form of a Parliamentary Blue Book, to which we must refer our readers for full details. It may suffice in this place to state briefly the points which are established by the correspondence, and the conclusions at which we have arrived.

The mission to the Court of Bhotan, which ended so unfortunately, and has now involved the Government of India in such

serious complications, was projected under the Government of Lord Elgin, the Honourable Ashley Eden being appointed the envoy. But, Sir J. Lawrence, on his arrival, found the mission in abeyance, owing to the neglect of the Bhotan Court to acknowledge in any way a communication which had been addressed to it by the Government of India, announcing the contemplated deputation of an Envoy. The new Governor-General was thus afforded time to review the proposed Bhotan policy, and an opportunity of reconsidering the question of the mission. An interval of between four and five months having elapsed since the despatch of the communication in question, the total silence of the Bhotan Court might, we should think, have impressed Sir J. Lawrence with a sense of the reluctance of the Bhotan Court to receive the mission in the terms proposed, and to have suggested to him the expediency of relinquishing it, unless, indeed, the contemplated objects were held to be so imperative that it should be considered worth while to support the Envoy with a preponderating force. And such a view of the matter would doubtless have presented itself to any officer of Eastern diplomatic training conversant with the usages of the Native States. But, unfortunately, Sir J. Lawrence's exclusive training in the revenue department, and his subsequent employment as chief commissioner, with the support of a vast European force, which rendered the practice of diplomacy in his office superfluous, had ill fitted him for weighing the chances of a successful issue to a mission undertaken under such unpromising circumstances. We are hardly surprised, then, to find by the correspondence that Sir J. Lawrence entertained no misgivings on the question. On the contrary, that he not only adopted the policy, but, disapproving the plea for postponing the advance of the mission, issued on the 8th February, 1864, definitive orders for the advance, and reported to the Secretary of State in a despatch of that date, that he had done so—and the ground of his decision, as stated in a previous despatch, viz., because “a substantive Government had been re-established in Bhotan.” Now, we should have imagined that, assuming this statement to be fact, the continued silence of the Court, so far from conveying an encouragement for the advance of the mission, afforded a strong presumption of the hostility of the Government alleged to have been re-established.

But the process of ratiocination in the collectorate mind on political questions defies all ordinary methods of diplomatic deduction, so the mission was ordered to march. Its reception from the first mile that it entered the Bhotan territory was just what might have been expected under the circum-

stances. The mission encountered difficulties and premeditated obstructions from the very outset. Mr. Eden duly reported them to the Governor-General on arriving at the post of Dalimkote. This fact of his having so reported, is clearly established by his letter of 25th July, 1864. It is important to bear this in mind, for a reason which will appear presently. Here, then, at another stage of the affair, Sir J. Lawrence had another opportunity afforded him of reconsidering the Bhotan policy—at an advanced stage, further, which in the facts before him of premeditated obstructiveness to the mission on the part of the local officials, presented the clearest indication of the hostile temper of the Court—for in a despotic state the local authorities take their tone entirely from the central authority. This is more particularly true of the native states of India; but, the Governor-General apprehended it not! for, in reply to Mr. Eden's letter from Dalimkote, above referred to, Colonel Durand, the foreign secretary, wrote to him that he "had laid his letter before the Governor-General, and that he did not think the state of affairs unfavourable to a successful issue" to the mission (*vide* Mr. Eden's despatch of 25th July, 1864, above referred to). The envoy's doubts regarding the advisability of prosecuting his mission in the face of such clear indication that it was unwelcome to the Bhotan Government, being thus overruled by the head of the Government of India, he proceeded on, in pursuance of the distinct intimation he had received of the views of his Excellency. British pluck, and his natural energy of character, enabled Mr. Eden to surmount the serious difficulties he had to contend with throughout his journey, and he reached the capital, Ponakh, only to experience the failure which might have been anticipated for a mission urged forward by the Government of India under such unpromising circumstances. We need not recount the tale of shame and humiliation, how the British envoy and his suite were cuffed, reviled, spat upon, and after suffering indignities worse than death, allowed to depart with life alone.

For this lamentable issue to the mission, the responsibility obviously rested with the Government of India, which had urged its continued prosecution in full possession of the significant report from the envoy of the indications afforded from the outset that it was unwelcome. But how does Sir John Lawrence act on the occasion? Throws the entire responsibility on Mr. Eden, his envoy! In the despatch to the Home Government, dated 1st June, 1864, announcing the failure of the mission, the Government of India absolves itself from blame at Mr. Eden's expense in the following words:—"In our opinion it would have been well had Mr. Eden given up the mission, par-

ticularly after he arrived at Paro.* It was clear at the outset that the Bhotanese had no intention of receiving him; they did much to deter him from marching forward almost from the very first."

The Secretary of State for India, in acknowledging this despatch through the India Office—letter dated 18th July, 1864—concurs with the Government of India in their censure of Mr. Eden's conduct in not giving up the mission. But what information had the Secretary of State before him to form a judgment upon? The précis of the Under-Secretary of the India Foreign Office, Mr. Aichison, which opens the Bhotan Blue Book, and purports to give an authentic précis of the question. It is dated the 19th May, 1864, therefore was before the Secretary of State to guide him in his judgment on the Government of India despatches of 1st June, 1864, announcing the failure of the mission, and their view of the party who was responsible for it. Now, this précis of the Under-Secretary Aichison contains a statement on the most important point on which the question of individual responsibility turns, which is in direct opposition to a statement in Mr. Eden's despatch of 25th July, 1864. The point in question has reference to the fact of Mr. Eden's having reported to the Government of India his departure, or progress. "The letter of 21st April, received here on 6th May, appears to be the first official report of any kind laid before Government. It communicates to Government the entire failure of the mission, after pressing into the country in spite of as plain warnings as any native government ever gives, that the mission was unacceptable," &c. This is the statement upon which the Secretary of State for India in Council was moved to express his concurrence in the censure pronounced by the Government of India on Mr. Eden. Now, in direct opposition to this statement, we have Mr. Eden's statement given in the letter of 25th July above referred to—corroborated by the reply he received, and has quoted, from Colonel Durand, the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India.

Now here is a matter which we are satisfied our readers will agree with us demands at once the fullest inquiry. The official reputation and the personal character of three public officers of the State, are involved, as further the efficiency of the local administration in India; for upon the Governor-General's successful vindication of the proceedings of his government in this matter against the charge suggested by implication in the public mind by Mr. Eden's emphatic and strongly corroborated statement, will depend the question of confidence in Sir J. Lawrence.

* A place but four days' journey short of Ponakh, the capital.

as a ruler among the officers of the Indian services at large. The full enquiry, then, which the public demands, we trust to see initiated without delay.

The succeeding course of the Bhotan question, in the weak conception of the requisite measures to be taken, and the reverses which resulted from the defective arrangements made for their execution, was only what was to be expected from the absence of political sagacity in the head of the Government to which we owe the misfortune of being involved in this calamitous "little war." The same blindness which urged on the mission to its fate without any of the ordinary guarantees for success at the outset, and in the face of palpable rocks ahead in progress, conceived a plan for avenging the outrage to our envoy which only resulted in still further national disgrace and humiliation. We will not dwell on the flight of our troops from Dewangiri—on the British guns abandoned—on the wounded left to the tender mercies of the barbarous enemy. That material position has since been recovered by the advance of a strong European force; but the unfavourable impression which went abroad at the reverse sustained by our arms at the hands of a despised enemy will not be so easily retrieved. Emboldened by their first success, the Bhotanese threaten incursions into our newly-annexed territory of the Doars; and at what cost must we defend this territory—a notoriously deadly tract—from malaria at certain seasons of the year? At the certain cost of the lives or shattered constitutions of the European troops sent to garrison it; of extraordinary increase to the annual army estimates, to replace casualties by death and exceptional invaliding, to meet the expense of erecting barracks and maintaining establishments which, in so unhealthy a region, must be on the most liberal scale to be efficient, and for the prosecution of border warfare with all its vicissitudes on a distant frontier. Sir J. Lawrence found a surplus revenue. Already, within barely a year of his administration, we are confronted by a deficit, caused mainly by this untoward Bhotan imbroglio. In view of the further prospective expenses which it must entail on the Indian revenue, the financial prospects of India are gloomy enough—unrelieved, or rather aggravated, by the means by which the Government of India has proposed to meet the deficit.

And what are these means? The imposition of export duties on several of the staples of India—tea, jute, wool, coffee, hides, sugar, silk. Reaching the very cultivator, these duties tend to depress production. By placing India as an exporting country at a disadvantage with other countries producing the same staples, they tend to drive the Indian products, at their arti-

ficially enhanced prices, out of the foreign markets. That Sir C. Trevelyan's extraordinary proposals should have received the sanction of the Viceroy at all, implies a want of apprehension on the part of his Excellency at once of the fundamental principles of political economy, and of the established commercial policy of England. Indeed, this is conclusively proved by Sir J. Lawrence's speech as president of the viceregal council; therein he states the ground on which he considers that "Government had exercised a wise discretion in proposing to supplement its ways and means by a moderate amount of export duty." But his support in council of this retrograde policy was not all. So little has he studied the progressive development of ideas in England on the subject, on the principles of taxation which we had found recommended by all our commercial experience, that without any misgivings as to the course he was pursuing, the Viceroy did not hesitate to commit his government to the public promulgation of the budget in question without awaiting the sanction of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, hopelessly compromising his Government further in the matter by rejecting an appeal from the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce against the promulgation of the export duties. That the announcement should have been received in England with astonishment, have formed the subject of question in Parliament, and should thereupon have been at once avowed as true and authoritatively repudiated in respect of the policy adopted by Her Majesty's Government, was only what was to be expected. But in what a position has Sir John Lawrence thereby placed his Government? Apart from the humiliation and attendant weakening of its authority, we need hardly remark on the natural tendency of such a reversal of a duly promulgated measure of policy to shake the confidence of the Indian public at large in the local legislature.

We will conclude this review with a brief notice of two further instances of retrograde policy on the part of the present Government of India, for which Sir John Lawrence is responsible, not merely primarily as head of the Government, but, from the initiative and individual action he has taken in the matters in question, may be regarded as solely responsible. It is with much concern we have to observe that the tendency of the Governor-General's action in both the instances referred to is of a more dangerous and revolutionary character in its effect upon the people of India at large than any of the others above cited, and calculated, consequently, to prolong indefinitely the retention in India of the vast European force at present garrisoning it.

The one has reference to the Burning Ghat question, which arose last year from the prohibition promulgated in the official

Government gazette against the Hindoos performing their ordinary funeral rites to the dead, such as had been practised without let or hindrance from time immemorial, throughout all the changing rules under which India has successively fallen. In the Ides of March last year, but a few weeks after Sir J. Lawrence had assumed the reins of government, the Hindoo community was startled by an announcement in the official gazette of the Government of Bengal, that for sanitary reasons the practice of throwing the "dead bodies of Hindoos, and carcases of animals," into the Hoogly, was prohibited, and decreeing the removal of the Burning Ghat, or place of cremation, from the spot on the bank of the river, where it had stood from time immemorial, to some other place at a distance, miles away from the bank of the river. Now, the civilized Christian reader need not smile in contempt at the reverence with which a certain river was regarded by the Hindoos as holy, and funeral obsequies performed on its banks deemed essential to their salvation, when we read in our Scriptures of the holy river of Jordan, and the efficacy which our Saviour ascribed to its waters on account of its sanctity. But at all events, to the Hindoos the Hoogly is now, as it had been from time immemorial, a holy river. Apart from the indecency and outrage upon the feelings of the Hindoo community, of classing the dead bodies of Hindoos in the same category with the carcases of animals, the attack on their religion involved in the Government notification in question was obviously calculated to excite the greatest possible alarm. The determined opposition, then, with which the proposed measure was met in Calcutta was only what might have been expected. To such a dangerous height did the excitement rise, that Government were fain to recede from their proclaimed resolution respecting the removal of the place of cremation, and succumbed before the popular clamour which its ill-judged measure had aroused. To a Government like that of the British in India, based on material force, such a humiliating result was more dangerous than confronting open rebellion. And to whom was the commotion owing that resulted in such a damaging defeat? We regret to learn, to Sir John Lawrence. Sailing one day from Calcutta up the Hoogly to the viceregal retreat of Barrackpoor, a corpse floating down the broad expanse of the river came "twixt the wind and his nobility." Forthwith he addressed a letter to the Lieut.-Governor, Mr. Beadon, directing him to take measures to abate the nuisance. Action initiated from so high a source, without reservation or modifying safeguard, was obviously calculated to run into extremes. This is well illustrated by Shaikh Sadi in his chapter on the morals of kings, in the *Gulistan*. "If the king pluck a single apple, his

followers will root up the orchard, root and branch. If the king take a single egg, his followers will spit a thousand fowls. If at midday the king should say, 'It is night,' the courtiers will exclaim, 'Behold the moon and the Pleiades!'" Hence, then, the outrageous proclamation of the Lieut.-Governor above referred to, in natural pursuance of the unreserved order he had received.

Now, in the conduct of Sir J. Lawrence in this instance, which, as we have seen, entailed upon the Government of India so humiliating and dangerous a defeat, we have presented before us two remarkable points which rivet the attention, and fill us with mingled wonder, regret, and alarm. The first is, that a man who had passed so many years of his life among the people of India should have evinced such intolerance for an immemorial custom of the people, which, however strange or disgusting it might have appeared in the eyes of a cadet fresh landed from England, would, it might be expected, be regarded by the appointed ruler over millions of people with some degree of respect and sympathy for the feelings of that people looking up to him for protection and governance. The next point for remark is, that an officer, who had placed on record his belief that the late mutiny and commotion in India had its origin solely in an alarm of the natives for their religion, should have so forgotten the lesson taught by that rebellion, as to excite similar alarm in an incalculably aggravated ratio, inasmuch as extending to all classes of the Hindoo race throughout India, high and low, civil as well as military. The interference with the religion of the Hindoos, which was involved in the Government proclamation in question, was a signal to all that an era of an intolerant régime had dawned, and, in connexion with the high source whence it had emanated, served but to confirm the worst apprehensions of all who were aware of Sir J. Lawrence's peculiar religious proclivities, burning with intolerant zeal, however conscientious. What made his action in this instance in question the more remarkable is, his manifest blindness to its inevitable political effect in a direction most dangerous to British supremacy. Having displaced the Mahometan rule in India, the British might reasonably look for Mahometan conspiracies and combinations against their power; and in this view of the question the Hindoos, distinct in race and differing in religion, might be regarded as an element of counterpoise—as a conservative element—in our system of Government. What are we to think, then, of the fatuity which wanted only struck a blow at the Hindoos which was naturally calculated to throw them into one hostile camp along with the Mahomedans, against the intolerant Feringhee? The humiliating concession on the part of the Government to the

clamour which its ill-judged measure had excited, averted the rebellion which might otherwise have broken out ; but the impression remains, only aggravated in a direction dangerous to British prestige by the concession by which it was sought to be removed.

Even admitting, for the sake of argument, what accurate data before us enables us to dispute as a matter of fact, that there was extraordinary sickness raging in Calcutta at the time, and that exceptional sanitary measures were demanded, there was a way of moving in so delicate a matter which would have obviated the danger and alarm excited by the course adopted. There are several native gentlemen in Calcutta of high position and wealth ; some of them members of the Legislative Council of Bengal, who, owing to the enlightenment of a superior European education, have risen superior to the superstitions of their countrymen. Baboo Ramgopal Ghose was one of these. In the public meeting which had been convened to protest against the measure of Government, he stated that he did not believe that his future salvation depended in any way on the manner in which his funeral rites might be performed. "But," added the Baboo, "there are millions of my countrymen who do think so, and in their interest I stand here to protest against this outrage upon their feelings involved in the Government measure, and feel bound, as a member of the Legislative Council, to declare that an attempt to carry it out will inevitably cause wide-spread alarm and discontent throughout India, endangering even another rebellion." The measure was abandoned. The place of cremation was left where it had always stood. But if, instead of placing his Government in so false a position, the Governor-General had moved in the matter unobtrusively, through such leaders of the Hindoo public in Calcutta as Ramgopal Ghose and others, he would have had the advantage of good counsel, and been admonished in time of the danger of the course he proposed.

Another point of the religious question has been raised by Sir J. Lawrence, only less momentous in its bearing on the contentment of the people of India with our rule than the attempted interference with their funeral rites above commented on. We allude to the social aspect of the question. Constituted as human nature is, we need not preface the facts and observations which we have to submit on this head with any metaphysical enquiry into the cause why social distinctions move men with equal, if not greater force, than their material interests. The position will be conceded. What are we to think, then, of Sir J. Lawrence's exclusion from the Viceregal State balls and assemblies, of natives of India, however exalted in rank or merit—saving and excepting

only Christian converts? The consistent endeavour and steadfast policy of all his predecessors in the Viceroyalty and Governor-Generalship of India, have been to obliterate distinctions of race. The Earl of Elgin, Earl Canning, Marquess of Dalhousie, back through the long roll of illustrious statesmen whom England has sent forth from the ranks of her highest nobility and most honoured gentlemen to represent her Sovereign and rule her Indian subjects, all have considered the maintenance of such race distinctions as equally impolitic as invidious, and have deemed it their first duty to seek to do away with them. Accordingly, the native nobility and gentry have been freely invited to their State entertainments, and in virtue of their rank have duly had the honour of handing down the countesses and ladies of the viceroys. Is it to be permitted to Sir J. Lawrence to reverse the consistent practice in State ceremonial of his predecessors upon grounds which lay the Government of India fairly open to the charge of religious intolerance, in violation at once of the progressive policy of the empire, and of the proclamation of the Queen, guaranteeing religious toleration to all?

In proof that the objection which we have here thought it our duty to take on principle to Sir John Lawrence's conduct in this matter rests not on mere presumption of its impolicy, we quote from the *Hindoo Patriot*, the leading organ of the native community in Calcutta, the following extracts, which serve conclusively to establish the fact of the deep personal offence and general alarm which has been excited by this further exhibition of religious intolerance in the head of the Government:—

Extract from the *Hindoo Patriot* of 9th January, 1865.

. . . . "As public journalists we are bound to enquire into the reasons of these distinctions. We would not have said a word if these balls and levees were private entertainments, given by the Viceroy at his own expense; but as they are State ceremonials, and as there is a separate budget allowance to defray their expenses, every citizen has a right to know why invidious distinctions of race and religion should be made for the first time in the regulation of these social festivities, which are held in the name of the Queen, who is the Sovereign Mistress alike of the white and the black, of the Englishman, the European, the Jew, the Parsee, the Hindoo, and the Mahometan. If successive Governors-General, from Lord William Bentinck downwards, considered it a point of policy to admit the European and the native on an equal footing to Government House parties, what is there that has led Sir John Lawrence to adopt a contrary policy? During the last thirty years for which this policy was in force, was there a single instance of native misbehaviour? Was there a single

breach of propriety on the part of the native? If not, why this institution of race distinctions at a place where above all there ought not to be such distinctions? Are the people of India to understand that the profession of Christianity is the only passport to viceregal parties—at any rate, in the reign of Sir John Lawrence? We know that Her Gracious Majesty recognises no distinctions of religion in the government of her Eastern dominions, but that does not appear to be the policy of our present viceroy. But we are not surprised at this. We know what Sir John Lawrence was when he ruled over the Punjab; and when he was elevated to the viceroyalty, the English and the Indian press with one voice expressed the greatest apprehensions on the score of his religious proclivities, and he would not be true to his creed if he did not already give some promise of the realization of those apprehensions.”

There is one explanation which has been offered for Sir John Lawrence's retrograde action in this social and religious question, which, to our apprehension, only serves to render the more painfully apparent the anachronism of his administration. It is alleged that having been trained in India, Sir John Lawrence is aware of the loose notions which the natives entertain about women—of the institution consequently of *purdah-mesheen*, or hiding women behind screens; so accordingly, he will not suffer his own wife or the ladies at his court, to be dishonoured by being looked upon by any unconverted native. This is certainly the social creed of the bigoted Mahometan, who goes even further than our Mahometan viceroy. For Peer Buksh not only hides his wife behind a screen, but if by accident the screen should fall and expose her for an instant to gaze profane, he looks upon his wife and himself as dishonoured, and straightway cuts first her throat, then his own. The liability to the warping influences of local prejudice which has hitherto been urged as an argument against the appointment of Indian officers to the highest post in the Government could hardly have been illustrated by a more unfortunate example than that afforded by Sir John Lawrence, the viceroy, sinking his high office to the level of the degrading prejudices imbibed by Mr. John Lawrence, the Deputy Collector, in his official intercourse with the people of the most corrupt city in Hindoostan. Blinded by such prejudices he does not perceive, on the one hand the wisdom of his predecessors in the viceroyalty, in trying to raise native thought to our level, instead of sinking to theirs, nor on the other hand the insult upon his predecessors and the society of their courts, implied in his present proceeding. If, as now virtually proclaimed by Sir John Lawrence, it be dishonour for the ladies of the viceregal court to be looked upon by uncon-

verted natives, in what position stand the peeresses of past viceroys, and the ladies of their court; at which native gentlemen were received on terms of equality—some of these ladies who are now told that it would be dishonour to them for natives to be admitted to their presence, being the self-same individuals who during past years had constantly met them at the courts of former viceroys?

The last instance we have to adducé in illustration of the retrograde policy of the present administration in India is one in which we trace with alarm the influence of Sir John Lawrence's levelling principles. Having failed to perceive their revolutionary tendency before the revolt, as we have seen by the proofs submitted in a previous part of this article; exhibiting, by his letter to Lord Canning of the 4th of May, and retreat to his summer-box, his utter unsuspecting innocence of the impending outbreak; so now, even after the warning lesson of that terrible crisis, Sir John Lawrence's early training and subsequent administrative experience based on force would seem utterly to have incapacitated him from reading the lesson aright. He still dreams, as from the first he fondly dreamt, that it was a mere military revolt, and the greased cartridges the origin and sole cause of the convulsion. We are hardly surprised, then, to observe Sir John Lawrence's action in the Oude Talookhdar question, in reversal of his predecessor, Lord Canning's policy. It is only necessary to advert to the great political object of Lord Canning's measure and the success which had attended it, to satisfy us of the danger of the course Sir John Lawrence is pursuing. The restoration of the talookhdars of Oude to their former position as hereditary lords of the manor, was designed to bring the country, still heaving with the convulsion of the rebellion, into a state of tranquillity, and through the cooperation of these powerful barons, to maintain it so. Accordingly the measure of restoration was inaugurated by Lord Canning with all the assurances and safeguards which viceregal utterances in open durbar and published proclamations in the Government Gazette, could impart to it. "Be assured," spake the viceroy to the talookhdars, specially convened to hear his words, "be assured that as long as each of you is a loyal and faithful subject, his rights and dignity as talookhdar will be upheld by me and every representative of your Queen, and no man shall disturb them!" An attentive perusal of the Blue Book of papers on this question, dated 20th February, 1865, has satisfied us that Sir John Lawrence's recent measure in the appointment of a Special Commissioner in supercession of the Chief Commissioner of Oude, to inquire into the existence of tenant right held under the talookhdars on the assumed basis

that permissive occupancy for a certain term shall be held to establish such right, irrespective of the interest of the landlord, is virtually a violation of the above pledge given by Lord Canning to the talookhdars. Sir John Lawrence, it will be observed,* denies that he proposes any reversal of Lord Canning's policy. In rejoinder to the objection taken by Mr. Grey, Member of Council, in his able minute of 23rd September, 1864, that "the deliberate action of the former Government in the matter should not be reversed," and contesting the Governor-General's position, that "the question is entirely an open one," Sir John Lawrence, in stating his views in favour of recognising an hereditary class of cultivators in occupants holding, by permission of the present proprietors, a little land at favourable rates, and of recording in the settlement their rights as such, declares—"I am therefore entitled to deny that I propose any reversal of the policy of a former Government. I maintain, indeed, that I am merely providing for its expansion to its contemplated dimensions." The benevolence of the viceroy's motives on behalf of the cultivator we can readily concede; one single example, however, will suffice to show the fatal fallacy that lurks in the position he has taken up. Take the case of a talookhdar who had obtained under the former Oude régime, by force, or fraud, or court influence, a grant of waste land. To bring the land under cultivation, he would locate upon it labourers out of employ, or houseless, perhaps criminal vagabonds, seeking likewise the bare means of subsistence. All the capital expended would have to be supplied by the landlord. The labourers he would pay by granting them holdings on the land at favourable rates at first. But will it be contended, that he would not be justified in raising the rent as his land became more valuable through his enterprise in reclaiming the waste, and by the expenditure of his own capital? or that if the original labourer refused to pay the enhanced rent after due warning, the landlord would not be justified in letting his land to others who might be willing to pay it? Yet this communistic and revolutionary doctrine, striking obviously at the very root of all right in landed property, is involved in Sir John Lawrence's measure for recognising and recording rights of ryot occupancy under the Oude talookhdars. He goes further. His proposal to fix a term of twelve years' occupancy as entitling the ryot to right of holding permanently at a fixed rent, tends to demoralize the landlord-class, inasmuch as mulcting in the penalty of loss of proprietary right in his own land the good and considerate landlord, who had treated his tenants well, and offer-

* *Vide* page 184 of "Blue Book."

ing a premium of immunity from such confiscation to the harsh and grasping landlord, for the frequent eviction of his tenants. This point was urged by the Chief Commissioner, Mr. Wingfield. Nothing, indeed, could be more enlightened and conclusive, both in respect of true policy and sound political economy, than his views on the general question, embodied in the despatch of his secretary, dated 26th March, 1864.*

Sir Hugh Rose, the Commander-in-Chief, in his minute of 17th Oct.,† while modestly disclaiming a mastery of "this purely civil question," exhibits, nevertheless, a statesmanlike grasp of its essentially important bearings, and his superiority to the petty professional pretexes on which a vital point of policy was about to be reversed. While the Governor-General was pulling straws with deputy commissioners and settlement officers as to the precise technical meaning of "beneficiary rights of occupancy," and the exact limits of the seigneurial rights of talookdars generally, Sir Hugh Rose, in three pithy sentences, brushed away the cobwebs of the question by pointing out that "in the present case of Oude there was no room for discussion at all; that the word of the late viceroy was plighted to maintain the talookdars undisturbed in the position in which, for a high political object, he had placed them, and that the institution at all of the proposed enquiry into tenant rights in Oude was calculated to endanger the success of that policy, excite agrarian agitation and discontent, and disturb the propitious calm of one of the most influential positions of India."

Sir J. Lawrence's coadjutors, Mr. Maine, Law Member, and Mr. Taylor, Ordinary Member of Council, support his policy in Oude, but in doing so, deal the unkindest cut of all to his Excellency's position that he is not reversing Lord Canning's policy. Mr. Maine, while admitting "as a matter of policy the inexpediency of abrupt recoils from one line of action to another," assigns as a reason for suggesting some change of detail from the course which the Governor-General had recommended, that "it did not appear to him to amount on the face of it to so open a departure from Lord Canning's policy."‡ And Mr. Taylor, in adverting to Mr. Maine's views, states his opinion that "they may be adopted without any breach of faith, although it may involve a departure from the previously declared policy of the Government."§ And indeed, Sir J. Lawrence himself would appear to have had some misgiving as to the tenability of his disclaimer on this score; for we find him subsequently remarking: "Even supposing Lord Canning's Government had purposed

* Page 106 of "Blue Book."

† Ibid. p. 174.

‡ Ibid. p. 184.

§ Ibid. p. 176.

not to acknowledge an occupancy rights, there are grave objections to admitting that a course of policy adopted or announced by the Government of India carried with it a pledge or promise to any class affected by it." A doctrine more calculated utterly to destroy the confidence of all classes in India in the Government under which they had fallen it would be impossible to enunciate. The conception was Mr. Maine's. Trained as that justly celebrated jurist has been in the constitutional school of English politics, where the action of a free people, self-governed through its representatives, may safely modify itself to changing circumstances—hardly aware, on the other hand, as he can as yet be from his short experience of India and its motley millions, composed of divers races and creeds, that confidence in the word of the Government is the key-stone of the arch that bridges over the gulf between the governors and the governed, as the Duke of Wellington found and testified, we may understand the grounds of Mr. Maine's doctrine which he crowns with the expression of his opinion that, "in point of fact, the very existence of a regular legislature in India is inconsistent with the notion of our faith being pledged to the policy of any particular year or period." We say, such doctrines on the part of the Law Member of Council, being comparatively a stranger to India, are intelligible, indeed natural, from his stand-point. But that they should be endorsed by a high officer of the Government of some thirty years' experience of India, and this while in the responsible position of Governor-General of the country, certainly places Sir J. Lawrence quite at the top of that school of Indian politicians, the error of whose principles it is the purpose of the present article to expose.

The Secretary of State, committed by the Governor-General's appointment of Mr. Davis as Financial Commissioner in Oude, sanctions the proposed enquiry to the letter, but manifestly only to save the credit of the local government of India, for the sanction is hedged with so many reservations as practically to take the sting out of the measure.* The Home Government would appear clearly to have apprehended its dangerous and revolutionary character; and so, while according an apparent sanction, take occasion to advert forcibly to the great political object of Lord Canning's policy in placing the talookhdars in an influential position, and add the expression of the "deep regret which it would be to Her Majesty's Government if, carrying these recent measures into execution, any reasonable cause of complaint were given to the talookhdars." The Indian Office despatch in question concludes with an injunction to take especial care "to maintain

* Indian Office Despatch, dated 10th February, 1865, p. 245, 13 B.

the talookhdars in Oude in that position of consideration and dignity which Lord Canning's Government contemplated conferring upon them." This ought to suffice to protect them, but Sir J. Lawrence has the credit of possessing the genius of a strong will. Already the Chief Commissioner, Mr. Wingfield, who advocated their rights, has been removed from the province, and thus the Government of India has lost the services of one of its ablest administrators at one of the most difficult centres of rule. The remote result is in the future, but it is to be hoped that it will not be of a complexion to make us regret that Sir J. Lawrence neglected Mr. Wingfield's entreaty to "take into serious consideration the effect that might be produced in the minds not only of the people of Oude, but of the upper classes throughout India, if the rights solemnly guaranteed by the Viceroy in open durbar in the name of Her Majesty, should be infringed."

Before concluding our remarks on the present administration in India in relation to the subject of our review, it may be worth while to advert to the opinions of the local press regarding the head of that administration, formed from close observation of his measures on the spot. It will be in the recollection of our readers who were watching the impression created by the appointment of Sir J. Lawrence to the Viceroyalty, that the press of India was unanimous in hailing it as a good omen. Judging from the apparent success of his administration in the Punjab, much advantage was anticipated from the elevation to the supreme rule in India of an Indian official conversant with the people of the country and its institutions, some misgivings on the score of his religious proclivities and strong personal prejudices notwithstanding. Loud among the *Io Pæans* was the voice of the leading journal of Calcutta, the *Englishman*, and of that of the N.W. Provinces, the *Delhi Gazette*. Let us hear the present opinion of these organs, speaking after fifteen months' experience of Sir J. Lawrence's rule. Adverting to the export duties, the *Englishman*, in his overland issue of 22nd April, has the following remarks:—

"We have every reason to believe, however, that in this matter the Financial Member is not the sole or the principal delinquent. The belief which attributes this great error to a higher source has been fully confirmed by the reception the Viceroy gave to the deputation of merchants who waited on him with their remonstrances. One of the best of executive officers, one of the most successful, if not brilliant of governors, has turned out one of the most narrow-minded of administrators. The impassible curtness of Sir J. Lawrence's reply to the deputation, which will be found elsewhere, shows that firmness of purpose may degenerate into obstinacy, and that the satrapy of a semi-barbarous

province is not the best school of either statesmanship or manners. It would indeed be fortunate for the country if this were the only evidence that the administration of the present Viceroy is an anachronism. The last few days have been prolific of events confirmatory of a truth which has long been painfully evident. Instead of a mutiny to crush, or a turbulent population to overawe, we have at this time peaceful interests to be nurtured by conciliation and encouragement—commercial prosperity impatient for the loosening of its time-knitted bonds—capital wanting only the assurance of administrative wisdom, to pour into and fertilize the land. That conciliation, the resolution and breadth of view necessary to loosen those bonds, and that administrative wisdom, are not in Sir John Lawrence. A ruler who in congenial times might certainly have been useful, perhaps great, is an obstruction, and threatened with the loss of a well-earned reputation because he is misplaced.”

And again, in commenting on the Oude question, the same journal concludes its remarks as follows:—

“The official papers which we publish elsewhere are in themselves so damnatory that we should, by further comment upon the viceroy’s policy, waste time and space which can be employed on less painful or more profitable subjects.”

The *Delhi Gazette* again, thus recants its faith in Sir John Lawrence:—

“It is almost unnecessary to say that *we* have been much disappointed, since only one opinion in regard to Sir J. Lawrence appears now to pervade every class of the community. For great ability, for breadth of mind or depth of thought, we never gave him credit; we were well aware that he owed to others, chiefly to subordinates, much of the reputation he possessed, but we *did* give him credit for that administrative ability which seizes on and converts to its own practical use (and thereby makes its own) the suggestions of abler minds; we *did* expect from him downright independence and unswerving resolution in times of danger and in matters of difficulty, and we have therefore been, in common with others, utterly astounded at the entire absence of those qualities that he has betrayed since his accession to the viceregal throne, and at the lamentable failures which have characterized almost every stage of his first campaign as Governor-General.”

We must here bring to a close our remarks on Mr. Kaye’s volume, with the expression of our acknowledgments for the interest and instruction it has afforded us. The abundant authentic materials at his disposal he has handled, as might be expected from his high literary reputation, with the pen of a master. But, above all, he has clearly indicated the deep-rooted sources of the long growing disaffection in India, which cropped out in the mutiny of the native army, and attendant rebellion of large and influential classes of the people. The light he has afforded we have availed ourselves of to scan attentively the proceedings

of the present administration in India, and in reference to the subject of our article, to judge whether the lesson of that great convulsion has been read aright. The reader who may have followed us through the preceding review, will, we think, concur with us in regarding the character of Sir J. Lawrence's administration as retrograde, and its tendency, in respect of some prominent points to which Mr. Kaye refers the origin of the late rebellion, as eminently dangerous. According the fullest credit to the purity and benevolence of his motives, we cannot but consider it a matter of serious public concern that Sir J. Lawrence should have been placed in a position demanding of him, on paramount considerations of policy, a repression of the impulses of our weaker nature—a calm judicial calculation of the possible, while regarding the desirable. To elevate a delving peasantry in the social scale was an amiable object, but to seek to accomplish it by reversing a settled policy and raising the inflaming question of "tenant-right" in the most inflammable province of the empire, is hardly the act of a statesman. To christianize the benighted millions of that heathen land was pre-eminently a great, a glorious object; but to seek to bring it about in a day by establishing invidious social distinctions at the Viceregal Court between the converted and unconverted, is hardly calculated to impress the natives at large with an idea of the charity and toleration of the Christian faith which they are asked to embrace, but rather to emulate the intolerance of the Mahometan. The history of the world presents no example of a sudden national conversion. In matters of faith, conviction is necessarily of slow growth. In the highest matter of religious faith, especially in a heathen land, the belief in the old faith with all its degrading superstitions has to die out before the mind can be fit to receive the impressions of the true. The "Centre of Indifference" is the transition state through which the pilgrim in his progress must pass from the "Everlasting No" to the "Everlasting Yea." Descending to details, we cannot but regard with great mistrust the purely professional character of Sir J. Lawrence's administration, which may be referred to his exclusive and uninterrupted official training. Nothing has so great a tendency to dwarf the mind and confine the ideas within a narrow groove of routine as uninterrupted office. In the earnest and zealous pursuit of official desiderata in detail, the larger interests often which lie on either side pass neglected, perhaps unobserved. Again, the genius of a dominant will, which Sir J. Lawrence has the credit of possessing, is apt to degenerate into obstinacy, a domineering spirit, impatience of difference in opinion, and incapacity for calm deliberation and suspense of judgment. We fear Sir J. Lawrence has not escaped the

natural result of the liability. "*Sic volo, sic jubeo*" would appear to be the motto of his administration.

If we thought that the maxims of Metcalfe found any acceptance with the present viceroy, we might ask if he ever heard of a saying of that wise, great man. Speaking of the conduct of our political relations in India, Metcalfe observed prophetically:—"May I never see the day when the *Hookum Shūd** of our judicial courts is introduced into the practice of our intercourse with the princes and chiefs of India."

Instances in illustration of the leading features of Sir J. Lawrence's administration will occur in plenty to those who have followed us through the preceding notice of his measures. They are very much of the complexion that might have been expected from the principles of that school of Indian politicians of which he is now the head, only intensified by the influence of the energetic and personal character and official ability for which Sir J. Lawrence is distinguished. We believe those principles of government, as applied to our empire in India, to be wrong: but waiving the discussion of that question in the abstract, one thing is certain, viz., that the present administration in India, in respect of many points of policy, is running in the same grooves which our author, Mr. Kaye, has clearly shown us led up to the recent rebellion; and that consequently such a course of policy being presumably distasteful to the aristocracy and people of India, can obviously only be safely persisted in during the presence of the vast European force which at present garrisons India. Are the people of England prepared to maintain seventy thousand men—the greater proportion of all the armies of the kingdom—in permanent garrison in India, subject to the deterioration in physique and demoralization in morale incidental to service in that country? Well might Mr. Cobden exclaim—"I am mute and silenced when I recollect that I have been protesting against war ever since I came into public life, but I have never succeeded in preventing wars all over the world." He might well be mute and silenced on beholding the meddling and muddling that brought on the wretched Sittana and Bhotan wars, converting the late flourishing finances to a condition of present and prospective deficit. However indifferently we may look on now at the diversion of so large a proportion of our troops to India, we can only repeat that, in the event of England being involved in war in Europe, many of the Indian regiments would probably be withdrawn to

* "It is ordered;" the heading of all recorded orders in the India law courts.

meet the exigencies of the occasion. What, then, would become of India, if a policy of repression within, and aggression without, be persisted in up to the eleventh hour?

But supposing, on the other hand, that it were decided upon in all contingencies to maintain the British force in India at its highest athletic standard, so as to render a second rebellion impossible, the danger to England would only assume another and perhaps more fatal form. This we cannot more appropriately indicate than by quoting, in conclusion, the words of Mr. Bright, which, though uttered years ago, are equally applicable now:—"I hope it will never be said that the time had come when the arms of England were irresistible in India, but that India was avenged, inasmuch as she broke the power of England by the intolerable evils she imposed upon her, the vast amount of men and money required to keep India in subjection being a burden she was unable to bear."*

* Speech in House of Commons on Indian Loan, 1st August, 1859.

CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE.

The Foreign Books noticed in the following sections are chiefly supplied by Messrs. WILLIAMS & NORGATE, Henrietta-street, Covent-garden, and Mr. NUTT, 270, Strand.

THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

IT is unfortunate on many accounts that so few people in England read the Dutch language with facility. Classical and academical persons in this country venture to touch on theological discussions only in a timid and superficial manner; they are carried on in the Netherlands with thoroughness, learning, and pure love of truth, with openness, and by the persons whose positions point them out as the proper persons to undertake the work. The Bishop of Natal deserves warmest thanks for introducing us to one, not the least distinguished of the Biblical critics with whom that country at this time abounds.¹ Professor Kuenen has brought a most complete critical inquiry on the Pentateuch and Book of Joshua into a wonderfully small compass. But in comparing the bulk of his work with that of the Bishop of Natal, it must be remembered that in the case of the latter, a great deal of matter was necessary in order to convince the English reader that the authorship of the Pentateuch was even a fair matter of discussion. Professor Kuenen is able to enter at once *in medias res*. The general results of the inquiries of the two authors coincide in the main, although with differences in detail, as was to be expected. The older part of the Pentateuch is assigned by the Bishop of Natal to the age of Samuel—by Professor Kuenen, with some exceptions, to the age of David or Solomon: the composition of Deuteronomy belongs, according to the former, to the reign of Josiah—according to the latter, to the days of Manasseh. At the same time Professor Kuenen speaks with more certainty than the English critic of the undoubted Mosaic basis of the Hebrew legislation. His general survey of the growth of the legislation is as follows—pp. 75-78.

Moses left the laws of the ten commandments in their original form, and perhaps a few other ordinances in writing, with oral directions for the regulation of the religious and political life of the Israelites. About the end of the time of the Judges, or in David's reign, the Book of the Covenant (Exod. xx. 22—xxiii.) came into existence, and songs and patriarchal traditions began to be written down. After the completion of the temple of Solomon, the origin and settlement of the theocracy was composed, beginning with the creation of heaven and earth, and ending with the conquest of Canaan. This "Book of Origins" remained in the hands of the priesthood, and received con-

¹ "The Pentateuch and the Book of Joshua critically examined." By Professor A. Kuenen, of Leyden. Translated from the Dutch, and edited, with Notes, by the Right Rev. J. W. Colenso, D.D., Bishop of Natal. London: Longmans. 1865.

tinual additions, although its legal system was never thoroughly carried into effect. A further effort was made by some unknown prophet—the author of Deuteronomy, in the time of Manasseh—to bring the Mosaic principles into supreme authority. He was inspired with the same conviction which had moved earlier authors, namely, that they were writing in the spirit of the great legislator, and he had no difficulty, according to the then notions of literary morality, in representing his addresses and laws as Mosaic, and even in attributing the writing of them to Moses himself. Lastly, the documents of the Pentateuch were brought into their present form shortly before the Babylonish captivity. And the Professor sums up—

“If a law can only *then* be called Mosaic, when it has been committed to writing by Moses himself, only very few of the ordinances of the Pentateuch can deserve this name. But inasmuch as the legislation comprised in the Pentateuch contains, as a whole, the development of the principles expressed by Moses—inasmuch as, for a great part, it is nothing else than a description, in a legislative form, of the usages and institutions called into life by Moses—it may throughout be regarded, in a wider sense of the word, as Mosaic. We must, consequently, admit that most of the laws originated after Moses, some even long after him; that the Pentateuch itself contains ordinances which conflict with Mosaic institutions. But, at the same time, we hold it to be certain that no prescriptions are found in it, which would not tend to maintain the principles, and to carry out the proper plan of Moses—the forming of a people dedicated to the service of Jehovah alone—in accordance with the lessons of experience and the continually changing necessities of the age.”—p. 78.

The majority in England do not yet understand that a law may be Mosaic, as having originated with Moses, though it were not written by him in its existing form, and in its existing connexion with the narrative. And, as Kuenen says elsewhere, “the traditional view according to which Moses wrote the whole Pentateuch, must always be well distinguished from the tradition concerning Moses, the lawgiver of Israel” (p. 130). It follows also that in the three middle books of the Pentateuch we have not a journal of events, but only a clothing for the legislation, partly taken from the popular traditions, and partly invented for the special purpose. Perhaps one of the most useful portions of Professor Kuenen’s work is to be found in the 20th chapter, pp. 59—65 on *The Pentateuch and the Literature of Israel*. It is frequently said that the truth and Mosaic authorship of the whole of the Pentateuch are implied in the whole of the subsequent history, and in the whole subsequent literature of Israel. Of this literature the writings of the prophets form the most important portion. It is remarkable that Malachi is the first of the prophets who mentions Moses as the lawgiver of Israel, then the author of the Book of Daniel. Other prophets speak of him as the deliverer of Israel from Egypt. But there is no reference in any of the prophets previous to the captivity to an ancient law handed down in writing from Moses. It was only with Ezra and Nehemiah that the obligation of the written law was enforced as the rule of faith and life. There are, moreover, but scanty references in the earlier prophets to the historical events recorded in the Pentateuch. And allusions to the

destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (Amos iv. 11), the story of Balaam (Micah vi. 5), of the passage of the Red Sea (Isaiah x. 26), imply the existence of the traditions, but not the then existence of the Pentateuchal narratives as we now have them, for their source. At a later period there is a great resemblance between Jeremiah and the Book of Deuteronomy, and Ezekiel seems to have been familiar with the whole of the legal institutions of the historical books. The writer of the Book of Kings refers to the Pentateuch, and the compiler of the Chronicles does so still more frequently; these references, however, belong properly to the age of the writers. With respect to the poetical books, it has been maintained that the Proverbs and Psalms imply the existence of the law in its present form in the Davidic or Solomonic age. But the expressions of "law," "statutes," and the like, have no necessary reference to any written law at all, and most of the Psalms which are ascribed to David are, as appears from internal evidence, of a later date. Hence our author is led to the conviction that the Pentateuch cannot be proved to have existed in its present form before the commencement of the Babylonish captivity.

In a previous number (Oct. 1864) we remarked on the interest which naturally attached to the posthumous lectures of Schleiermacher on the Life of Jesus, delivered by him in 1832, and before the great movement which took its origin from the "Life of Jesus," by Strauss; and we observed that the particular conclusions of Schleiermacher, though they might not be ultimately tenable, might serve for a halting-place for those who were not yet prepared to follow out a thorough criticism to its conclusions. Strauss justly considers, speaking of Germany, that the fact of the wide acceptance in the present day of the views of Schleiermacher concerning the person of Jesus and the Gospel history, is a sure indication of the more penetrating spirits—the van of the inquirers—having already made good their ground in advance of him. In the critique now before us,² the object of Strauss is to demonstrate how incapable the Christology of Schleiermacher is to furnish a resting place for the Christian inquirer—and he expresses it as his purpose to break the last barrier which shuts out as yet the full tide of reason and science from the haven of Christian theology. The essential part and kernel of Schleiermacher's doctrine was that which concerned the person of Jesus Christ—his half-rationalizing, half-mystical explanations of the miracles of the New Testament might give way before clearer scientific knowledge and before a cooler criticism. But he conceived of the person of Jesus as beyond the reach of science and criticism on one side, although subject to it on another. His is the last effort to represent one who, as an actual man, must have been subject to all conditions of human life, as at the same time an object of belief and worship—as true man and yet in his nature singular and above all men. The criticism of the writings which purport to be histories of Jesus, tends to prove, that while for the natural side of that life there may be a historical foundation, the supernatural has its source in the

² "Der Christus des Glaubens und der Jesus der Geschichte." Eine Kritik des Schleiermacherschen Leben Jesu. Von David Friederich Strauss. Berlin. London: D. Nutt. 1865.

imaginings, affections, or inferences of his followers, and that while their inferences may be accounted for from the conditions under which they lived, they do not supply any just ground for the drawing of like inferences by ourselves. In the present day we have learnt to regard all things in heaven and earth differently from the New Testament writers and the founders of the Christian doctrine. We can no longer regard as true the things which the Evangelists relate, as they relate them; we can no longer regard as necessary to salvation the things which were believed by them. In a certain sense our God is different from their God, our world is undoubtedly different, and our Christ can no longer be the same. And a truthful exegesis of their writings leads not to an adoption of their faith, but to make manifest the gulf which exists between their modes of thought and our own. This applies especially to the fourth Gospel. And it follows, according to Strauss, that if we can no longer conceive with the author of that Gospel, of Jesus Christ as the "Word made flesh," we ought to cease to apply to him such terms as "Redeemer," "Light of the World," which, used in different senses from those which they bore with the Scriptural writers, can only be misleading and deceptive.

In an appendix is given a reprint from the *National-Zeitung* of Strauss's critique of Dr. Schenkel's "Charakter-bild Jesu." The interest of this work of Dr. Schenkel's,³ which is in course of translation in the *Revue de Théologie*, consists partly in the immense progress which the learned professor has made since the publication of his *Dogmatik* in 1858, partly also in the fact of its having been the occasion of proceedings against him in the supreme Church consistory of Baden. One hundred and seventeen clergymen petitioned for his deprivation, but were defeated. Nevertheless, Strauss, as may be supposed, is not satisfied with the work, and characterizes it as resuming with one hand to satisfy the Creed, that which it has surrendered with the other to the demands of criticism—of which the issue is that a great deal too much is resumed to consist with criticism, but not enough to satisfy the Creed. Dr. Schenkel, indeed, pleads that as his object is to present a "portraiture" of Jesus, he is not engaged with the dogma which is concerned with his unseen divinity; but Strauss presses him with his concessions concerning the "infancy" which he surrenders as legendary—where, then, is the miraculous and divine conception? also concerning the miracles, which he resolves partly into natural influences operating through the moral nature of their subjects, partly into embellishments of real transactions; and especially with his apparent surrender of the Resurrection of Jesus himself, which is neither miracle nor natural recovery, but an inference on the part of the disciples from their finding the tomb empty. And Strauss protests with his usual energy against the application to Jesus of those titles which can belong to him properly only in an orthodox sense, against still constituting him the central object in worship, and still professing to observe the cycle of the Christian festivals. Strauss, from his point of

³ "Das Charakterbild Jesu." Ein biblischer Versuch von Dr. Daniel Schenkel, großherzogl. badischens Kirchenrath und Professor der Theologie. Wiesbaden. 3. Aufl. 1864.

view, may be logically consistent, but even he will find it a more arduous undertaking to abolish a *cultus* than to unsettle a belief.

The essays of M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire, on "Mahomet and the Coran," is a reprint of articles which have appeared in the *Journal des Savans*, suggested by the works of M. A. Sprenger and Mr. W. Muir on the "Life and Doctrine of the Prophet."⁴ We have long outgrown the vulgarity which would exalt Jesus into a divine teacher by stigmatizing Mahomet as an impostor, and it is only with those who from time to time would amuse women and children with readings from the Apocalypse, that the Arabian Prophet and the Pope are the two legs of the great Apostasy. Mahommedanism takes its place along with other religions in the history of the world. It may not be the purest, but it is one of the purest; it may not be capable of a universal spread, but it appears to be best fitted for a large portion of the human race. There is a considerable elegance in M. Saint Hilaire's reviews and compilations, but a want of thoroughness and precision of judgment. He has prefixed to this reprint a discussion on the relations between philosophy and religion, the object of which appears to be to obscure the inference which necessarily follows from the observation of the spread of other world-wide religious systems, that Christianity, whatever its relative superiority, had, like them, a natural origin. M. B. St. Hilaire appears to us to play fast and loose with the supernatural claims of Christianity, to confound religion with theology, and that abstract theology which is a "sister of philosophy" with the theology of a dogmatic system.

The Islamism⁵ of the learned Dr. Dozy of Leiden, author of "De Israeliten te Mecca," of which we noticed a translation into German in our number for October, 1864, is a far superior work on the same subject. It is most complete in its account of the historical circumstances and preparations out of which Mohammedanism sprang, and gives a well compiled account of its subsequent influence on the world, and of its sects and actual position at the present day. The more cautious observers are little disposed to think that its end is approaching. And the tenacity with which it seems likely to retain its hold of widespread populations, and those not barbarian or incapable of civilization, renders it, together with Judaism and the several forms of Christianity, most worthy of the attention of those who would build up a science of religion. For the concrete religions, it will be found, take their specific forms according to certain laws, which must be ascertained by means of the same pains-taking and dispassionate investigation which has been so amply rewarded in other departments of inquiry.

Serving to the same end, is another learned work, forming part of the same series of publications, and executed in the same calm and judicial spirit—the "Religion of Zoroaster," brought

⁴ "Mahomet et le Coran, précédé d'une Introduction sur les devoirs mutuels de la Philosophie et de la Religion." Par J. Barthélemy Saint Hilaire, Membre de l'Institut, &c. Paris. London: D. Nutt. 1865.

⁵ "De Voornaamste Godelieurtien." Het Islamisme. Door Dr. R. Dozy, Hoogleraar te Leiden. Haarlem. London: Trübner and Co.

down to the fall of the old Persian kingdom, by C. P. Tiele.⁶ If the religion of Zoroaster cannot be said to exist to the same extent as the religion of Mahomet, it yet lives in the tenets of the Parsees; and it has this claim upon our interest, that it modified Judaism, and through Judaism, Mahomedanism and Christianity themselves. All modern researches into the subject lead to the belief that the dualism which is found in the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures, is of Zoroastrian origin—the Fall, as we have it in the third chapter of Genesis, and the consequent doctrines of original sin and of atonement, as we find them in St. Paul and Augustine. It remains to be seen whether this dualism will abide as an essential of Christianity. It was essential to Zoroastrianism; it will perhaps be found, that it only remains among ourselves as a superstition, which the time has arrived for casting off.

A collection of sermons by Dr. Zaalberg, preached at the Hague, on “the religion of Jesus and modern tendencies,” forms a volume of singular interest.⁷ They are a vindication of his right to retain his place as a minister of the Reformed Church of the Netherlands, while deciding against the old orthodoxy every question at issue between it and the modern Christianity. In thoroughness and distinct grappling with the questions raised, these addresses are superior even to those of M. Colani and of Dr. Schwartz, and abound in passages of the greatest eloquence and vigour. The sermons themselves were provoked by repeated challenges to the liberal clergy to justify their position; and after their delivery, proceedings were taken against the author in the Church Court for having violated his subscriptions. It was decided that he had not done so. A conclusion which shows the Church of the Netherlands to be the most free of any of the regularly constituted Churches of Christendom. While fully acknowledging the Christian religion to be the most perfect of all religions, Dr. Zaalberg does not distinguish, by a difference in kind, the inspiration of the Biblical writers, teachers, and prophets, from that which has moved other good men and teachers. And he says, the great conflict of our day centres in the question as to the natural or supernatural origin of religion. “Has our religion become what it has become in a natural manner in the course of ages, or is it in its birth and earliest development, not the product of natural principles, but of miraculous interventions and operations of God?” (p. 37). Dr. Zaalberg extends his denial of miracle to those of the New Testament, which not only contradict the natural order of the Divine Government, but rest on insufficient evidence, and are not necessarily connected with the real kernel of this religion. Thus the visible Ascension, the corporeal Resurrection, the miraculous conception of Jesus, are eliminated. The portraiture of the Lord himself, and the description of His teaching,

⁶ “De Godsdienst van Zarthrusta van haar oustaan in Baktrië, tot den val van het Oud-Perzische Rijk,” door C. P. Tiele. Haarlem. London: Trübner and Co. 1865.

⁷ “De Godsdienst van Jezus en de moderne Rigting. Christelijke Toespraken over de Godsdienstige Vragen des Tijds,” door Dr. J. O. Zaalberg, Pz. 'SGravenhage. London: Trübner and Co. 1865.

Dr. Zaalberg finds rather in the three first Gospels than in the fourth. Nothing can be better done than the exposition given of the Gospel question—which it is shown can be sufficiently and intelligibly laid open to the understanding of a congregation of ordinary education in the compass of a single discourse. Especially worthy of remark is also the manner in which the learned divine vindicates the right of those who attach themselves to the New Reformation to claim kindred with the Old Reformed Church of the Netherlands. The essential doctrine of Calvinism is found in the recognition of the Divine sovereignty. The moderns, therefore, who acknowledge all human action and passion, will, and agency, to be embraced in one comprehending Divine order, hold to this fundamental principle of the Reformed Church. Pelagianism and Arminianism set man and God, nature and grace, in opposition: for they must be opposed or contrasted in order to co-operate. Miracle, indeed, can have no place, either in the material or spiritual universe; for that would be in contradiction to the unchangeable and omnipresent sovereignty of the Almighty. The old Calvinists deduced from the principle of the Divine sovereignty the doctrine of everlasting damnation, but it is equally consistent with it to look forward, with St. Paul, to the universal happiness of all mankind, when “God shall be all in all.” A greater service could not possibly be rendered to young ministers of religion, and inquiring students of theology, than by a translation into English of these most freespoken but thoroughly religious-minded sermons.

Little reliance can be placed upon a commentator who acknowledges himself bound by a principle which must oblige him, in certain cases, to frame his interpretation in a particular way. Therefore, while it will no doubt add to the popularity of his commentary for the Dean of Canterbury to be known to be safe on the cardinal question of inspiration, it will deprive his book of all real value for the truth-loving English student.⁸ The occasion for making a profession of faith on this subject arises on the interpretation to be given to St. Paul's “Man of Sin.” It is discussed in the introduction to the present volume, (ch. ix. § 8), under the heading of “Prophetic Import of 2 Thess. ii. 1-12.” The author has passed in review a variety of interpretations ancient and modern, and comes to speak of Professor Jowett's opinion that the Apostle was speaking, “not of some great conflict, decisive of the destinies of mankind,” but of a “spiritual combat” which he beheld externalized in the then history of the world. Of which hypothesis Dr. Alford says:—

“It will be manifest to anyone who exercises a moment's thought, that the question simply resolves itself into this: *Was the Apostle, or was he not, writing in the power of a spirit higher than his own?* In other words, we are here at the very central question of *Inspiration or no Inspiration*—not disputing about its details, which have ever been matter of doubt

⁸ “The New Testament for English Readers: containing the Authorized Version, with a revised English Text, Marginal References, and a Critical and Explanatory Commentary.” By Henry Alford, D.D., Dean of Canterbury. In two volumes. Vol. II. Part I. The Epistles of St. Paul. London; Rivingtons. 1865.

among Christians; but just asking, for the Church and for the world—*Have we, in any sense, God speaking the Bible, or have we not?* If we have, then of all passages it is in these which treat so confidently of futurity that we must recognise His voice: if we have it not in these passages, then where are we to listen for it at all? Does not this hypothesis, do not they who embrace it, at once reduce the Scriptures to books written by men—their declarations to the assertions of dogmatizing teachers—their warnings to the apprehensions of excited minds—their promises to the visions of enthusiasts—their prophecies to anticipations which may be accounted for by the circumstances of the writers, but have in them no objective permanent truth whatever?—p. 88.

On such terms the Dean is “not prepared” to deal with the question; he “believes the promise” (John xvi. 13) that the Spirit should lead the Apostles into all truth; and that we have the result in the Epistles. Nevertheless, what St. Paul meant by his expressions is “open to the widest and freest discussion,” with the safeguard, however, and proviso, that what he did mean is “truth for us to receive, not opinion for us to canvass.” Dr. Alford is incapable of understanding that God may be speaking in the Bible, without speaking miraculously; nor does he see the absurdity of talking of our receiving as truth propositions which we cannot understand, which are shut up in enigmatic language, or of which there may be a dozen more or less likely and unlikely interpretations between which it is impossible to choose. Nevertheless the Dean appears to get this much out of it. What St. Paul said concerning the Man of Sin must be true, for it occurs in a prophetic passage which claims a special inspiration, and therefore he could not have meant the Man of Sin of a person shortly to appear, or the coming of Christ,—of a personal coming soon to take place; because the event has shown that that could not have been true; and therefore it could not mean the Pope, or Mahomet, or Napoleon, and so forth. And thus we arrive at the conclusion that the lawless one, in the full prophetic sense, is not yet come, though 1800 years later we stand, with respect to him, where the Apostles stood, and “when it shall be is as much hidden from us as from them.” So that the Dean falls back upon an interpretation not very dissimilar from that of Professor Jowett, that the “lawless one” is the “lawlessness” which has ever been working in the lives and speeches and writings of men; in fact, is an externalization and personification of a principle which the Apostle saw at work when he looked about him. Only that which in the Professor is neology is sound exposition in the Dean, because he arrives at it through the profession of his belief in inspiration, specially of the prophetic Scriptures, and not the least, of those passages of them of which can only be affirmed that their meaning must be true, though we may not be able to determine which it is. For our own part, we should prefer the more natural solution of 2 Thess. ii. 1-12, namely, that St. Paul participated the Apocalyptic expectations with which we are familiar in the Book of Daniel, the Book of Enoch, and the Ascension of Isaiah,—that he looked for a personal *ἀνομος* shortly to be revealed, shortly to be destroyed at the *παρουσία* of the Lord; and that in this expectation he was mistaken.

Dr. Ryder's Donnellan Lecture for 1863⁹ is a well-meaning attempt to establish a "Theodicy" on the basis of the "revealed" doctrine of the "Atonement." The Author endeavours to steer clear of the shock to our moral sense which is given by the Calvinistic scheme on the one hand, and by Mr. Mansel's hypothesis of the suspension of the moral laws by their Divine author on the other, and also protests against what he conceives to be the pantheistic principles of the Essayists and Reviewers. Between the various shades of pantheism, properly or improperly so called, we apprehend Dr. Ryder is not very well able to discriminate. He apparently considers that to deny miracle and interposition is pantheism, and amounts to a denial of a "personal" Deity. Yet it is perfectly orthodox to hold that the Deity is everywhere throughout the universe actually present, and not only by omniscience and potentially; it therefore belongs to *à posteriori* inquiry, and not to *à priori* definition, to determine whether that universal presence is manifested by continued orderly operations, or by fitful energies; for in neither case is personality either necessarily implied or necessarily excluded. In opposition to the Calvinistic theory of the partial application of the benefits of the "Atonement," Dr. Ryder maintains that the remedy was as widely operating as the disease: "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." But he shrinks, although with hesitation, from inferring a universalist doctrine. As far as he has pushed this moral argument against the hypothesis of the vulgar Calvinism, Dr. Ryder has manifestly made good his ground; but if he will not follow his own premises to the issue of Universalism, he is but a milder Calvinist himself. And this reflection does not appear to have occurred to him: if the remedy of the Atonement is represented in Scripture to be as large in its operation as the disease of the Fall; if the stroke, as it is sometimes expressed, was arrested ere it fell; and if, consequently, every man here placed in probation will be equitably dealt with, it is precisely the same thing to the human agent as if there had been neither Fall nor Atonement,—the one neutralizes the other; man is neither the better nor worse off than he would otherwise have been; he will be judged in respect of his advantages; and allowance will be made for his disadvantages. Are we then sure that Fall and Atonement have actually taken place. The theodicy is as acceptable on the supposition of neither as on the supposition of both. There are some very fruitful thoughts in this volume of Dr. Ryder's, which he will, perhaps, feel himself at liberty on some other occasion to pursue to their legitimate conclusions.

In the year 1862 Mr. William Binny Webster founded a lectureship in Edinburgh in connexion with the Free Church of Scotland, to be called the Cunningham Lecture, in memory of the late Rev. Dr. Cunningham, Principal of the Free Church College, and Professor of Church

⁹ "The Scriptural Doctrine of Acceptance with God, considered in reference to Neologian Hermeneutics." In six Lectures. Preached before the University of Dublin, in 1863, on the foundation of the late Mrs. Anne Donnellan. By Arthur Gore Ryder, D.D., ex-Scholar of Trinity College, Dublin, and Head Master of the Erasmus Smith Grammar School, Tipperary. Dublin: Hodges, Smith, and Co. 1865.

History. Each course of lectures is not to consist of less than six, and the lecturer is to choose his own subject within the range of apologetical, doctrinal, controversial, exegetical, pastoral, or historical theology, subject to the consent of the council appointed under the trust. Dr. Candlish was nominated to deliver the first course of lectures in 1864. In these lectures we are presented with a somewhat remarkable attempt at Calvinistic development.¹⁰ With the highest reverence for the "Westminster Confession," which Dr. Candlish anticipates will eventually command the consent of universal Christendom, he is yet of opinion that on some points it requires to be supplemented. His opinion of creeds generally is, that they mark off the territory which has been seen and actually surveyed, and set up landmarks on it for the guidance of those who shall come after. Thus the dogmatism of the Christian Church is necessarily progressive. "The Augustinian doctrine of grace, and the Lutheran article of justification, were movements in advance." Dr. Candlish thinks he is able to indicate the direction in which may be made an advance of a similar kind. His notion appears to be that the original relation of man to God is not a filial relation, but a relation of servants or subjects. Nor does redemption or justification do more than absolve from penalty, or reinstate in a condition which is not as yet that of sonship.

"There is not a hint of sonship in all that is said of Paradise, or of man's sin and fall there. Nay, I hold that what is revealed of God's treatment of Adam in the garden is palpably irreconcilable with the idea of anything like the paternal and filial relation subsisting between them. Not a hint is given of his (Adam's) having violated, when he transgressed, any filial obligation. Nor, in the sentence pronounced upon him, is there any trace whatever of his being subjected to fatherly discipline and correction. All about it is strictly, I should say exclusively, forensic and judicial. It is the legal condemnation of a servant, not the fatherly chastisement of a son."—p. 127.

And, on the other hand, as to the redemption :

"Accordingly, the remedial work of Christ is always represented in Scripture in exact consistency with its representation of the evil to be remedied—as purely and wholly legal, forensic, and judicial. That is its character, so far as it consists in his becoming his people's surety and ransom. He redeems them from the curse of the law. It is nowhere said that he atones for any filial offence; any offence committed by them as sons against God as their Father. If they sinned in that character and relation, then sin, so far as appears from Scripture, is, up to this hour, unexpiated. Surely that is a conclusion somewhat startling. And yet it seems to me to follow inevitably, and by the inexorable force of logic, from the notion of man's original relation to God being filial."—p. 128.

Extremes meet; the doctrine that no atonement is revealed for offences committed in the filial relation, is not unlike that of the High Churchman, who maintains that the promises of forgiveness of sins in the Scripture do not apply to the regenerate who fall into sin, whose

¹⁰ "The Fatherhood of God." Being the First Course of the Cunningham Lectures delivered before the New College, Edinburgh, in March, 1864. By Robert S. Candlish, D.D., Principal of the New College, and Minister of Free St. George's Church. Edinburgh: Adam and Charles Black. 1865.

reconciliation is left to the ministry of the Church. But the extremes diverge again, because the new birth of Dr. Candlish is different from the regeneration of the Puseyite, in that it implies the perseverance of the converted. The sum of the matter is, that as fathers of the Church, reformers and divines, have, from other metaphors used by the Biblical writers in argument and illustration, drawn inferences incapable of verification concerning the nature of the Divine Being, and the relations, conscious or unconscious between him and mankind, so there is here a certain mine of inference hitherto not fully worked.

"I hold them, therefore, to have virtually left the whole of that department of theology which bears on God's paternal relation to his people, and their filial relation to Him, an entirely open question, a perfect *tabula rasa*, so far as any verdict or deliverance of theirs is concerned. I consider that we have the fullest liberty to sink shafts in this mine which they evidently had not explored, if only we take care that our digging shall do no damage to any of the far more important mines which they did explore, and explored so thoroughly and so well."—p. 286.

Perhaps, after all, Dr. Candlish may be disposed to exaggerate his claims to originality in the conception of the filial relation as subsisting only between those who have been born again in Christ, and their heavenly Father. Thus we have in volume iv. of Edward Irving's works,¹ now before us, several discourses, entitled "God our Father," of which two, the 19th and 20th, touch on many points relied upon by Dr. Candlish. Irving held that "the fatherhood of God could not be revealed before the revelation of the Son;" or that the name could be known before the truth was known upon which it rested. He is a Father because He hath an only-begotten Son, and a Father to those to whom the Son shall reveal him (p. 272). And though in the Old Testament He sometimes allowed Himself to be called Father, He seldom allowed Himself to be spoken of under that form or illustration. Irving, perhaps, allowed more foreshadowing of the doctrine of adoption in the Old Testament than Dr. Candlish does, and he connected the revelation of it in the New Testament more than Dr. Candlish with the mystery revealed under the Gospel of the Sonship of the only-begotten one. In other respects he said substantially the same thing:—

"In what condition, then, was the former Church? In the condition not of free-born children, but in the condition of bondsmen and slaves. There was no liberty nor adoption into the family till the Son was manifested, and thus they that were made free were free indeed; there was no power in visible existence which could make us children until He came unto His own, and His own received him not; but unto as many as received him gave he power to become sons of God."—p. 305.

The English public reads very greedily personal explanations and secret history of literary, political, and religious movements, which will account for the eagerness with which Dr. Newman's "Apologia" was received.¹² There was also the entertaining spectacle of a literary

¹¹ "The Collected Writings of Edward Irving." In five volumes. Edited by his nephew, the Rev. G. Carlyle, M.A. Vol. IV. London: Alexander Strahan, publisher. 1865.

¹² "History of my Religious Opinions." By John Henry Newman, D.D., of the Oratory of St. Philip Neri. London: Longmans. 1865.

duel between two authors of distinction. In the duel it has been generally acknowledged Dr. Newman had the advantage, especially when his adversary lost his opportunity of recovering the slip which he had made by a sufficiently ample *amende*. The other portion of the work, which is now reprinted by itself, possessed also some of the interest which attaches to the autobiographies of persons whose names have long been before the world. But it is an apology for the life of Dr. Newman, and nothing more. It can serve for no beacon or guidance to another. It is a defence of his own change of religion, but it would be useless to go to it for arguments which would justify a like change in anyone else. From beginning to end it is thoroughly and intensely personal. And it leaves a painful impression to observe how the opposition which Dr. Newman necessarily experienced in a long and arduous controversy should have rankled in his sensitive and retentive heart to this very day. For, in fact, during those controversies the imputations on his sincerity and truthfulness which he imagines have been since clinging to him, came from quarters—religious newspapers and the like—which he could very well afford to despise. The authorities of the university appear to have treated him with every consideration and respect. He could not reasonably make into a personal offence that he was “posted on every buttry-hatch in the university,” when it was the professed object of the Resolution of the Heads of Houses, to which he refers, to disclaim, on the part of the university, any authorization of a treat which, up to that time, had remained anonymous. It does not seem that when once Dr. Newman had avowed himself as the author of No. 90, any step whatever was taken by the authorities, or by any person of repute, to throw any stigma upon him; indeed, Mr. Kingsley has been the first person of name who from that time to the present has given Dr. Newman the opportunity for which he has been waiting of justifying himself from the charge of insincerity, which has been, as he conceives, floating in the popular mind. But the Heads of Houses in 1841 foresaw what Dr. Newman did not yet perceive, that his ideas of Catholicity must eventually lead him, and others who adopted them, out of the Anglican Church. Of the new matter in the present reprint there is an addendum (A.), in which Dr. Newman restates that it was the “Liberals” who drove him from Oxford. But the Liberals did not then exist as a party. The Heads of Houses who censured the tract were of the old high and dry and Evangelical schools. Arnold’s pupils were as yet quite young, hardly out of undergraduateship. The propositions which Dr. Newman enumerates (pp. 294-296) as familiar to him among the tenets of Liberalism thirty years ago, were certainly not professed by any persons who influenced the proceedings against No. 90 in 1841. It may be true that as there was a tendency in Dr. Newman and his friends towards Rome, or, as he would call it, to the Catholic Church, so there may have been at work the germs of a contrary tendency. Putting aside, however, all account of the school of Whately, which never issued in anything better than pettifogging distinctions, Dr. Newman undoubtedly sees to a great extent the past of 1841 through the spectacles of the present. We have not space to notice the paper in the

Appendix on "Miracles," which, however, tends to save miracle in some sense by blurring its definition; but must especially recommend to the notice of our High Churchmen the note E. on "the Anglican Church."

"—that it is something sacred—that it is an oracle of revealed doctrine—that it can claim a share in St. Ignatius or St. Cyprian—that it can take the rank, contest the teaching, and stop the path of the Church of St. Peter—that it can call itself the 'Bride of the Lamb'—this is the view of it which simply disappeared from my mind on my conversion, and which it would be almost a miracle to reproduce."

English bishops and priests who pride themselves on the Apostolical succession, and fancy themselves the channels of supernatural grace, are told that Dr. Newman would believe they have episcopal succession from the time of the Apostles, if the Holy See were so to decide—but for himself he could not otherwise acquiesce in it, "for antiquarian arguments are altogether unequal to the urgency of visible facts." Meanwhile, the English Church is to be tolerated by Catholics so long as they are "so small a number," but it is explained honourably and fairly enough, with a view to possible contingencies and the indefeasible claims of Catholicism, that "in secular history we read of hostile nations having long truces, and renewing them from time to time, and that seems to be the position which the Catholic Church may fairly take up at present in relation to the Anglican Establishment."—p. 342.¹³

If any of Dr. Newman's admirers should be disposed to infer from the literary success of the *Apologia* that he has also obtained any advantage in the great controversy of the day between Reason and Dogma, conscience and authority, we should recommend them to read an essay or paper, by Mr. Holbeach, entitled "Authoritative Truths," which contains a very vigorous criticism of some parts of it. Touching upon the passages of arms between Mr. Kingsley and Dr. Newman, while Mr. Holbeach does not acquit the former, and does not doubt the honour of his opponent, he draws a distinction which has a sting in it.

"I ask pardon of your sacred office, of your grey hairs, of your spotless life, of your 'transcendant gifts,' for the comparison I am going to make. But it seems to me that you have not so much the honour of an English gentleman as the honour of an English LADY. I think the honour of the celibate man (however sacred the motive of his celibacy) tends to assume this character—*always*. In other words, it tends to assume a character in which the sensibility to Truth, *quoad* Truth, becomes so deeply modified by personal loyalty, that it is very often scarcely recognisable to a purely critical or philosophic eye."—p. 159.

The author is what he calls a protesting Protestant, not laying much stress upon objections to particular doctrines of the Roman Church, such as that of transubstantiation, but recoiling from the Church itself 'as an institution whose basis is not moral at all, and which cannot, logically, invoke the sanction of a single controlling idea—except that of FEAR.'"

¹³ "Henry Holbeach, Student in Life and Philosophy." A Narrative and a Discussion. 2 vols. London: Alexander Strahan. 1865.

On the essential part of the argument, or rather scheme in the *Apologia*, it is urged that "you cannot get a final certainty or infallibility out of a process which begins with a probability." It appears evident indeed, from the whole of the personal confessions in the *Apologia*, that it was a necessity for the individual Newman to be sure that he was right; and he had the assurance of his being infallibly secure in the way that many Methodists enjoy it. But when his mind became occupied with the dogmas he required a further source of infallibility out of himself. The Church of England, though it talks about authority, does not claim an authority of that kind. So he was driven to throw himself into the arms of a Church which does claim it. But when Dr. Newman judged that infallibility belonged to the Pope, was he fallible or infallible? "Wherever the infallibility is supposed to reside it must justify itself to somebody's reason in order to be accepted." No chain can be stronger than its weakest link—"you can never push this matter any further than this, the infallible set up by the fallible?" Yet Henry Holbeach has his own theories of what a true Church might be, as may be seen in the paper on the "Sphere of Love," which is well worthy of perusal, as is that on Reason and Faith, a telling criticism on Mr. Mansel. We can much recommend these essays.

The Discourses by Dr. Beard,¹⁴ while entirely free from any superstitious view of the inspiration of the Bible, which in various places they combat, yet recognise a certain unity in the Biblical writings, and maintain that their essence is to be found in the teaching of Christ himself. There is prefixed to them a reactionary essay on the sources and guarantees of the Gospel history. Dr. Beard considers that Jesus is connected with Irenæus at the end of the second century, by ascertained historical links. "Thus Jesus, Peter, Matthew and John are contemporaries; while John, Arision and John the Presbyter are the same; and these through Papias are linked with Polycarp and Irenæus." Hence Dr. Beard concludes not only that we have a guarantee for a certain amount of historical truth as the basis of the Gospel narratives, but that the narratives themselves are historical, including the miracles which are related in them. "Although it is not wise or safe to insist on the historic certainty of everything found in the Gospels, yet in general, Matthew, Mark, and Luke do undoubtedly deserve our reliance. Whatever critics may object, practically those Scriptures may be taken as a true picture of the life of Christ," (p. 26). Dr. Beard appears to prefer the "Life" as represented in the Synoptics to that given in the fourth Gospel, and with reason. Yet Papias, the first who mentions Matthew and Mark as having written certain accounts of the words and deeds of Christ, had evidently not in view the "Gospels" which now go under their names. Of the author of the third Gospel we know nothing,

¹⁴ "Christ the Interpreter of Scripture: a Series of Discourses, showing how to read the Bible wisely and profitably; with a Preliminary Essay on the Sources and Guarantees of the Gospel History." By John R. Beard, D.D., Author of the "People's Dictionary of the Bible." London: Whitfield, Green, and Sons. 1865.

and Papias, who would naturally have spoken of John, says nothing whatever of him as committing to writing any description of the life of his Master. Indeed the guarantee amounts to no more than this, that early in the second century there was current, as we learn from Justin, an account nearly resembling that which we find in the first Gospel; but Dr. Beard has not enabled us to bridge over the space of a century between Justin and the time when the events are supposed to have happened—a space sufficient for mythical and legendary developments.

The "Outlines of Theology," from Vinet, consists of selections from his various works moulded into a consistent and consecutive whole.¹⁵ The principal divisions of the book fall under man and the Gospel; the doctrine and morality of the Gospel; historical Christianity and the Church. It need not be said that the basis of Vinet's theology reposes on the assumption of a fall of man, but that the loving-kindness of the author causes the reader to forget the real narrowness of the "evangelical" scheme, and he continually meets with sensible home thrusts.

"There is a Christianity which is, correctly speaking, nothing more than the other side of worldliness; there is a *Christian world*, which is world all over, and into which the whole spirit of the old world has been imparted; just as from a house that threatens to fall one would carry whatever one could into a new house. It is true that the furniture of the old house does not appear to have been made for the new, and is very ill adapted to it, but one can always make a shift, and at the end of a certain time house and furniture seem to suit very well. To be sure, some pieces of furniture were too large to be got in; these we were obliged to leave out, but enough remains, and, on the whole, one has a comfortable home feeling. In the same way certain sins, certain bad habits, were incompatible with the Christian arrangement of life, but, after all, the door was found wide enough for the most essential things—I mean those with which the natural man will on no account consent to part. It must be confessed that in the same way as, for certain classes of the worldly, to be in good society implies the doing politely what is done properly elsewhere; so, for certain Christians, to be Christian signifies the being censorious, selfish, sensual, with certain people, under certain forms, and in a certain language."—p. 546.

The "Orthodoxy, Scripture, and Reason" of Mr. Kirkus shows great vigour and freedom in many parts, which is damaged by too great diffuseness.¹⁶ The author feels himself obliged to modify the usually received evangelical doctrines on the subjects of original sin, the atonement, and justification by faith. We were also gratified to read that among Congregationalists there are unquestionably many, both of ministers and laymen, and probably a somewhat rapidly increasing number of ministers, who believe that God will either annihilate or restore those who die impenitent (p. 241). Mr. Kirkus in discussing the subject very fully and ably shows that even the scriptural

¹⁵ "Outlines of Theology." By Alexander Vinet. London: Alexander Strahan. 1865.

¹⁶ "Orthodoxy, Scripture and Reason: an Examination of some of the Principal Articles of the Creed of Christendom." By the Rev. William Kirkus, LL.B. London: Williams and Norgate. 1865.

authorities will hardly bear out the never-ending torment theory. He considers that "αἰώνιος indicates not the quantity but the quality of that of which it is predicated; that it indicates not the duration but the kind of punishment into which the wicked shall go away, and the kind rather than the duration of life which the righteous shall enjoy" (p. 309). And therefore when we read, "These shall go away into everlasting punishment, but the righteous into life eternal," we are to understand that the punishment, like the life, belongs to the spirit, and not to the flesh. There is some information in Appendix II. concerning a certain "Declaration of Faith and Church Order," put forth by a number of ministers and laymen in 1833, but which, according to Independent or Congregationalist principles, could not be made binding on any single church or congregation. Perhaps the fact is, that Independency has now become so widely spread as to need a certain system of organization, which it may be difficult to accomplish without some symbol of belief.

The edition of Burnet's History of the Reformation, recently issued from the Oxford University Press, has been prepared with great care by Mr. Pocock, of Queen's College, who has verified, supplied, and corrected the references throughout, and collated the records with their originals.¹⁷ Burnet executed his work in many parts in a most heedless and perfunctory manner, which has given occasion to his being severely handled by controversialists. The labour which Mr. Pocock has expended in following out, rectifying, and fairly estimating these inaccuracies and defects has been immense.

The second volume of the "Bibliotheca Rerum Germanicarum" comprises the letters or smaller register of Gregory VII.¹⁸ The present edition is completed by collation with the Vatican MS. The learned editor is of opinion that these letters can by no means represent the whole literary activity of the ambitious Pope, but that they are a selection from a larger register, made under his own direction about the year 1081, of documents bearing more or less on the great questions at issue between the papacy and the empire. If that be so, it is very possible that the *Dictatus Papæ*, which appears between the fifty-fifth and fifty-sixth epistles, Bk. II., may be an original part of the compilation. But, although in some of them the papal pretensions are concentrated—*Quod illi liceat imperatores deponere—Quod Catholicus non habeatur, qui non concordat Romanæ ecclesiæ—Quod a fidelitate iniquorum subjectos potest absolvere*, the same principles may be gathered from the epistles themselves.

The publication of a translation of Professor Fuerst's Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon, in numbers, at a moderate price, will place that most important instrument within the reach of all students.¹⁹ It will be

¹⁷ "The History of the Reformation of the Church of England." By Gilbert Burnet, D.D., Bishop of Salisbury. A new edition, carefully revised, and the records collated with the Originals. By Nicholas Pocock, M.A., late Michel Fellow of Queen's College. In seven volumes. Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. London: Macmillan. 1865.

¹⁸ "Bibliotheca Rerum Germanicarum." Tomus Secundus. Monumenta Gregoriana, edidit Philippus Jaffé. Berlin. London: D. Nutt. 1865.

¹⁹ "A Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon to the Old Testament." With an Intro-

found to surpass the lexicon of Gesenius, principally used in this country, in its illustrations derived from the cognate languages and from the more recent investigations of antiquarians, travellers, and philologists. The author has communicated his latest emendations and additions to the learned translator, in order to render the English edition as complete as possible.

Considerable additions and corrections have been made by Dr. Zeller in the third part of his second edition of the "Greek Philosophy," in that portion especially which treats of the doctrine of the Stoics.²⁰ A continually increasing interest has, of late years, been attached to the investigation of the Stoical system, not only on account of the contact chronologically of Seneca, Epictetus, and the Antonines with the nascent Christianity, but because of its observed efficiency in preparing the way, naturally, for the spread of the Christian teaching in many particulars—as in contempt of pain, in the recognition of mankind as one family, and in the stress laid on moral obligation. On other points, as in the conception of the nature of the Divine Being, and the expectation of individual immortality, Christianity borrowed rather from Platonism; on the latter subject, fluctuating in a singular manner between the Platonic notion of an immaterial soul to live on henceforward its true life when delivered from the bondage of the body, and the Jewish apocalyptic anticipation of a fleshly resurrection—a confusion which still prevails both in popular and dogmatic theology.

The Platonic epistles were naturally received as genuine upon the revival of classical literature, when they had been so received by such authorities as Cicero and Plutarch. More recent criticism has detected, as in so many other cases, reason for supposing that they are not the productions of the author whose name they bear. The essay of Dr. Karsten is a lucid exposition of the arguments for the spurious character of the epistles.²¹ He finds evidence in their style, which is frequently too abundant in Platonic forms and peculiarities, in their rhetorical cast, and in the fact that few or unimportant particulars are mentioned in them of the life of Plato, which are not preserved to us elsewhere. At the same time there may be genuine Platonic elements, as it were, in the letters, even though they be not Plato's own. For undoubtedly, his disciples and followers would be prompted to reproduce what they had heard or read in his works, and it would be a natural and legitimate design to justify under the name of Plato the relations of the philosopher with Dionysius and with Dio.

duction, giving a short History of Hebrew Lexicography. By Dr. Julius Fuerst, Professor at the University of Leipzig. Third edition, improved and enlarged, containing a Grammatical and Analytical Appendix. Translated from the German, by Samuel Davidson, D.D. of the University of Halle, and LL.D. London. Part I. Leipzig. London: Williams and Norgate. 1865.

²⁰ "Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung" dargestellt von Dr. Eduard Zeller. Dritter Theil, erste Abtheilung. Die nacharistotelische Philosophie, erste Hälfte. 2te Auflage. Leipzig. London: D. Nutt. 1865.

²¹ "Commentatio Critica de Platonis quæ feruntur Epistolia, præcipue tertia septima et octava." Scripsit H. T. Karsten, Litt. Doct. Trajecti ad Rhenum. London: D. Nutt. 1864.

POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY, VOYAGES AND TRAVELS.

WE are glad to see that so well abused a book as Mr. Hare's¹ has yet arrived at a third edition. The old method of refusing a hearing to truths that are unwelcome, by branding their advocates as crotchety theorists, has been almost worked to death in this instance. Full reliance has been placed, and not altogether in vain, by those who have not chosen to give the necessary attention to Mr. Hare's scheme, upon the indolence of like-minded persons, and the cheap and ready accusation of complexity and impracticableness has been thrown out as a scarecrow, to indispose the inert and indifferent to a study that would probably result in the destruction of either habit of mind. There is, perhaps, no state of the public mind more difficult to deal with than the apathy with which all questions of Parliamentary reform are now received. Those who do not consent to rest and be thankful are at least too prone to be thankful that things are no worse. Allowing for all the advances which have been made during the last generation, it must be confessed that, politically, we are in a position very similar to that which preceded the Reform Bill. The battle of the registers has as completely ranged the party forces as the proprietary boroughs had done in the times of our fathers, and rendered both great parties as averse to change. Opinion is more fully represented, but it must first conquer some borough or constituency, and each seat has now become a little fastness, that must be stormed like the house of the strong man armed, who keeps his own goods. Thus, only those opinions which are already strong enough to influence the House are able to arrive at a direct representation in it. The inveterate habit of Englishmen of putting new wine into old bottles, has, as it could not fail to do, resulted in giving the wine itself a tang of the old leather. Our superstitious attachment to the local foundations of our representative system blinds us to the absurd anomalies which are inherent in the present distribution of seats in Parliament. It is useless to assert that what is done in one place is counteracted in another, and that the average result is such a balance of interests and opinions that we could not be better off if opinion were directly represented. These arguments deceive no one; they are but evasions, the whole purpose of which is to put off the evil day dreaded by those who have recourse to them, when representation shall be a personal concern, and not merely a local privilege. This day, which looks so dreadful to those who have studied every local prejudice and provincial interest, and who, by flattering both, to say nothing of appeals to lower and baser motives, have got the smaller constituencies thoroughly well in hand, is yet that to which every intelligent man must look forward as the real advent of political enfranchisement. All the elaborate schemes and fancy franchises with

¹ "The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal." By Thomas Hare. Third Edition, with a Preface, Appendix, and other additions. London: Longman and Co. 1865.

which both Liberals and Conservatives have endeavoured to cajole the country, and outwit each other, are but mechanical contrivances which have had no principle of vitality to recommend them, and have met with the deserved rejection due to such stop-gaps. A great and unquestionable merit of Mr. Hare's scheme is, that it offers a means of adapting representation to opinion with a delicacy, completeness and adequacy that cannot be surpassed. If it is desirable that minorities should not be utterly swamped, here will be found a plan by which any consenting body of 2000 men can secure an advocate of their views in the House; this surely solves the problem which has been so much discussed, better than cumulative voting or a constant third member. But the greatest recommendation of this proposal is, that it affords the most powerful engine of political education that has ever been devised. In its operation it comes home to every elector with all the force that the direct personal appeals exerted, in ancient cities, on the minds of men listening to a living orator. The consciousness that his vote cannot be lost or overwhelmed, but must count for some one whom he admires and thinks worthy of a place in the government of the country, must force every elector to take thought how he exercises a responsibility so direct and unequivocal. No one would then be able scornfully to wash his hands of vestries and publicans' committees, while the inducement to keep a small borough in good temper would be so much weakened, that local influence and character would at last consent to rely only upon the wholesome elements involved in them, which would always carry, as they should, their full legitimate weight. We cannot here epitomize Mr. Hare's scheme; its principles are now becoming sufficiently known, and for the practical details we hope that a constantly increasing number will each day turn to the book itself. There is nothing complicated in it, but only an extraordinary effort to be complete, and a determination to leave no remote contingency unnoticed. This remarkable comprehensiveness is what those who dislike to turn round in their easy-chairs have chosen to call complexity. The two things are very distinct, though very easily confused in the minds of inattentive readers. It will be somewhat strange if we should find, as is by no means improbable, that his method of election, by which almost every political excess is guarded against, should find, in our colonies and elsewhere, the first field for its successful application; and that we who have so often taken Milton's flattery, "that England's office is to teach the nations how to live" as a simple truth, should yet wait, in the hope to be wise by others' experience rather than happy by our own insight. In the present edition Mr. Hare has collected all the information extant on the working of a similar system in Denmark, which has met with a success, qualified by the disturbed condition of the country, but unequivocal in its character; and full reports are given in the appendixes of the debates in Australia, where the question is still pending, whether this method shall be put to the test of practical experiment in a thoroughly democratic constitution.

The third edition of Mr. Mill's *Representative Government*² calls

² "Considerations on Representative Government." By J. S. Mill. London: Longman and Co. 1865.

for no criticism at our hands, but there is a feature connected with each succeeding edition of all his works to which we would willingly call the attention even of those who think themselves familiar with them, and which peculiarity may be studied in the present work with great advantage by every one. Those who will take the trouble to compare the careful alterations and amendments to which this third edition has been subjected by its author, will make a great step in their political education, and not in that respect only. The minute verbal changes which are constantly occurring, display, in the most remarkable manner, how Mr. Mill's works live in his mind, and how far they are from being dismissed as *faits accomplis* as soon as they are published. To trace the presumed grounds, whether of taste or principle, which have prompted these changes, is more instructive than perhaps even the first study of the volumes in which they are found, and no one can fully understand the remarkable writer who has thought them necessary, who shrinks from so interesting a task because it is a little laborious.

M. Jules Simons' recent volume on Education³ is chiefly concerned with the questions revolving round primary instruction. He starts by laying down the unquestionable position that the country which has the best schools, if it is not already the first among nations will be so in an immediate future. French liberals feel that their best chance for a recovery of national life and free political action in their country is inextricably connected with the education of the lower orders. In this view M. Simon is faithful to the traditions of the liberal party in France; for it may be asserted, that the more democratic its government the greater the effort which has there been made to give the elements of education to the whole people. During the Republic, education was gratuitous, and compulsory; with the Consulate, and during the first Empire, it was no longer compulsory, and gratuitous only in a very restricted measure; at the Restoration, primary instruction was but little better than a system of charity schools, the direction of which was gradually assumed by the clergy. In 1833, the limits of gratuitous instruction were extended to all who could not pay, but attendance was not enforced. The present conflict is with the ignorance of a large part of the rural population, who will not allow their children to give up the chance of any small profits they may make in the fields, and who think that what they have themselves dispensed with cannot be of the first importance to their children. This inertness is not confined to France; but universal suffrage there gives to the ignorance, which is the consequence of this temper, a political effect that explains at once the eagerness of the liberal party to force on the communes the absolute duty of maintaining schools, and on every peasant that of sending his children to them. The fullest and most interesting particulars are given by M. Simon concerning the condition of the teachers in the communal schools. Their salaries are so small, and many of the communes are so poor, that a subvention

³ "L'Ecole." Par Jules Simon. Paris: La Croix and Co. London: D. Nutt. 1865.

on the part of the State is absolutely necessary, if any efficiency is to be expected. The indignant comparisons which M. Simon draws between what we should call the charges on the Consolidated Fund for primary instruction, compared with the support given, for instance, to the Opera in Paris, are most natural and just. It is only by a certain level of instruction that democratic communities can escape from the fate which weighed so heavily on the imagination of De Tocqueville, and caused him to assume, as directly characteristic of democracy, that tendency to submit to a powerful executive, which he could not, with the political sagacity for which he was so remarkable, fail to observe in his countrymen. This is the only weak point in De Tocqueville's speculations. While speaking of America, he could not sufficiently distinguish between the American and French characters. Oppressed with thoughts of his own country, and recognising the democratic tendencies of both, he sometimes ascribes to what they had in common an almost inevitable result, which events have shown to be but too true of his own country, but which the terrible experiences of America have as yet shown no tendency to bring about in the United States. The education that makes an American proud of his citizenship has preserved the country, and will no doubt continue to do so, from any weak resignation of the practice of self-government, which has made its strength, and which lies at the root of all its past achievements and hopes of future greatness.

This mention of De Tocqueville's name reminds us that the eighth volume of his collected works has just appeared in Paris.⁴ It contains historical fragments which he left behind him, notes on the *ancien régime*, travels, and detached thoughts, which have not hitherto been published in France. The most important parts, however, of this volume are, curiously enough, familiar to the English reader. The fine essay on the social and political condition of France before and after 1789 appeared in the pages of this Review in 1836, and has since been published, together with many of his letters, and a biography, by his friend, Gustave de Beaumont, as well as some of his journals of voyages, by Messrs. Macmillan and Co., in 1861.

It is most curious to observe how, in the remarkable essay above alluded to, all the cardinal features of what is, perhaps, after all, De Tocqueville's greatest work (his *Ancien Régime et la Révolution*), had been already anticipated by him twenty years before the appearance of the book itself. A melancholy pleasure, if a pleasure can live so close to disappointment, will be found in the perusal of the first chapters of that History of the French Revolution which occupied the last years of his life. It must ever be a cause of inextinguishable regret that he was not spared to continue, from his impartial point of view, a history that could not have failed to exercise the deepest influence on the popular judgments, as yet so uncertain, which are passed on the great event of the 18th century. Among the frag-

⁴ "Œuvres complètes de Alexis de Tocqueville, Mélanges, Fragments Historiques, et Notes sur l'Ancien Régime, la Révolution et l'Empire, Voyages, Pensées." Entièrement inédits. Paris: M. Levy Frères. London: D. Nutt. 1865.

mentary remarks will be found many detached thoughts with which his readers are familiar; and it is most instructive to observe the elaboration which most of them have undergone before he chose to make use of them in his published works.

Some papers, which deserve a very serious consideration, have been published by the Hon. Henry Stanley, on our consular system in the East,⁵ and on the effects and practical abuses of the extra-territoriality which is granted to our diplomatic establishments in Turkey and Syria. The conflict of jurisdiction which is thus set up results in a confusion that often brings the greatest disgrace on our flag, and which is only disguised by the high-handed self-assertion that hides from us at home the real grounds of the combined unpopularity and disrespect with which we are regarded in the minds of the weaker foreign states that have any diplomatic or commercial relations with us. The questions which are constantly arising between the English Government and the Porte cannot be properly understood without a much fuller insight into the character of Eastern Christianity than is at all common among us, or, indeed, than is easily attainable in England. This state of things will make the essay on modern Christendom in the Levant peculiarly acceptable as a statement of facts that are too often disguised or studiously ignored. The "contempt for international law," which forms the subject of another of these papers, is a very able display of a certain tendency, which is too manifest among us to be denied, to look upon nations that we are pleased to call barbarous, as deprived, by the very term, of all appeal to any standard but our own, and of our confident assertion of the rights of civilization (as though it were only one), which falls little short of the thoroughness with which the rights of true believers were once asserted against the pretences of infidels to any rights at all. A most just account of Islam will be found in another of these papers, which will reward any one's attentive perusal, though it cannot be denied that an account of Christianity, compiled from the Sermon on the Mount, would be as good a portraiture of ourselves, as a vindication of Mahometanism drawn from the dogmatic portions of the Koran. Still, if it is unjust to refuse any attention to the Christian ideal in summary accounts of European character, it must be equally so to ignore what the best Mahometans draw as theirs from writings which form the basis of their life and thought, with a completeness the Bible can hardly be said to furnish in any Christian country. How many Europeans are able to give any account of the doctrines held by learned mollahs? too few, we fancy, to make the statements of the present writer otherwise than welcome to all who wish to arrive at an unprejudiced judgment on the condition and present prospects of Mahometanism in the East. A paper on the Greek and Russian churches, and on the intrigues of the Russian national church with the Papacy, though equally important, is too short and summary in its assertions to be of

⁵ "The East and West; our Dealings with our Neighbours." By different Hands. Edited by the Hon. Henry Stanley. London: Hatchard and Co. 1865.

much practical effect, though full of indications that call for a careful study of the state of religious opinion in the south of Russia and the Danubian Principalities. Altogether, this little volume, appealing as it does to nothing but a spirit of justice, and advocating nothing but a fuller inquiry into questions that are but imperfectly understood amongst us, is most opportune.

Mr. Baillie's digest of Mahometan law⁶ is the most complete account of the administration of justice in India to the believers in the Koran. It is based upon a celebrated body of doctrine published by the Emperor Arungzebe, and is consequently applicable only to the Suni division of the followers of the Prophet. This, however, renders it the more useful, as it is only in Oude, and there only since the establishment of its independence of Delhi, that the doctrines of the Shiah are considered in the administration of justice. The most complete insight is, of course, to be had into Mahometan ideas and ways of life from this book, as from every other code of laws. Its distinctive feature is the importance which is attached by Oriental legislation to the motives of actions and the nice distinctions which in consequence follow in their legal estimate of them. This, together with the difficulty of empanelling a trustworthy jury, and the general worthlessness of testimony in the East, is a sufficient explanation of the native preference of a summary jurisdiction where there exists the slightest confidence in the judge who pronounces on the disputes brought before him.

In the preface to his history of the American conflict,⁷ Mr. Greeley very justly remarks that "to the future historian much will be easy that is now difficult, as much will then be lucid which is now obscure; and he may take for granted, and dispatch in a sentence, truths that have now to be established by pains-taking research and elaborate citation." The sense of this truth has determined the character of the greater part of the present volume, which is devoted to an elaborate proof of the irrepressible nature of the conflict itself, to the display of the encroachments of the South, and to a history of the numerous compromises by which the North hoped to postpone the inevitable day when their great differences with the South should bring about an open rupture. If anything could excuse the conduct of the Southern States it would be the extent of the concessions they had wrung from the North before they quite exhausted its patience. It might very naturally have been concluded by them that where so much had been yielded nothing would be refused to a resolution so unequivocally manifested. But when once the reaction against a long endurance of Southern encroachments had set in, the leaders of the South exhibited a thorough appreciation of their position when they came to the conclusion that they must now prepare themselves for a series of defeats

⁶ "A Digest of Moohummudan Law, on the Subjects to which it is usually applied by British Courts of Justice in India." Compiled and Translated from Authorities in the original Arabic, with an Introduction and Explanatory Notes. By N. B. E. Baillie. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

⁷ "The American Conflict." By Horace Greeley. Vol. I. Hartford, U.S.: O. D. Case and Co. 1865. London: Bacon and Co.

in Congress, as prolonged as the successes on which they so greatly prided themselves, or at once endeavour to establish an independent power, founded on those social conditions which lay at the foundation of their antagonism with the North. Had it not been for the impatient temper of men habituated to success, and for many false reliances on the weaknesses, not only of their immediate antagonists, but also on hopes of European assistance, it is most probable the desperate attempt would never have been made. It may be urged that a calculation based on human weakness has no contemptible foundation; but one of the greatest results of the American conflict has been the display, both on the part of the Northern States, and of France and England, of a higher tone of morality than was compatible with the single consideration of immediate material interests. The great base calculation has proved itself shortsighted, though the sentiments which have in many places betrayed themselves during the conflict go far to excuse those who relied upon its conclusions. But to return to Mr. Greeley's volume: it is the best account of the origin of the war, and of its progress, up to the year 1862; it is temperate, and gives way to no vituperation, though thoroughly in earnest on the side it takes. Its most important part is the introduction to the war itself, though this part, when once fully understood, will, as he says, be one day dismissed in a very few words. The details of so many battles, sieges, marches, and campaigns, lose much of their interest to all but professional soldiers, as they become better understood, and no doubt much remains to be written on this subject before they assume the settled features of the great conflicts of European armies; much, too, they may be expected to add to our understanding of the probable effects of the more efficient weapons of the present day in all future warfare. But it is too early for reliable general conclusions to be arrived at on these points. The feature of the greatest present importance in Mr. Greeley's volume is the thorough refutation of that simple view, which has been so much relied on here by the sympathizers with the South, drawn from the right of rebellion, which cannot be refused to a discontented or oppressed people. This is at the best but a contingent, and no absolute right. It has been too much the fashion to forget that the discontent must show itself reasonable, and the oppression be made manifest, before the right in question can be allowed to exist. Mr. Greeley very plainly shows that there is no justification anywhere to be found for the rebellion of the Slave States, unless that diseased self-will, which is the natural consequence of slaveholding, be accepted as such; and the ultimate condemnation of such a ground, in which all men sooner or later will agree, is of itself, in its moral worth, an almost adequate return for the heavy price which the Americans have paid to make it universal in the world.

The third and concluding volume of Dr. Russell's *Diary North and South*, is devoted to Canada.⁸ He seems as glad to escape from the subject as many of his readers will be to have done with his treatment

⁸ "Canada: its Defences, Condition, and Resources." By W. H. Russell, LL.D. London: Bradbury and Evans. 1865.

of it. The first half of the volume is in the 'old style that we know so well, of which the chief aim seems to be, to say a simple thing in as roundabout a way as possible. For instance, if he wishes to compliment a companion on his courage, it is done after this fashion, at page 110 : "He was but an item among many, but I knew he was among the *braves des braves*, and had received a baptism of fire in the trenches of Sebastopol, which had rained a very font of glory in India, and scarcely paled in China." This is very fine, though not quite intelligible ; but perhaps that may be one of its recommendations in the eyes of its author, who we fancy would be delighted could he manage to say "Good morning" in a conundrum. There is a mixture of mystery and sublimity in the following : "His body [that of the American government] may be of that artificial stiffening which gives to worthless stuffs a temporary substantiality." Lest any one should give up this piece of fine writing in despair, we may as well contribute our guess that he means "shoddy." This is a style of writing about American affairs of which any one must now be heartily ashamed ; and if we may conjecture the character of much that the author says he has cancelled, it is to be hoped that he is not without a tinge of such a feeling. When Dr. Russell chooses merely to sketch his travelling adventures, he is often happy, though frightfully verbose ; but ethics and political philosophy are not to be picked up in railway cars and omnibuses, unless such subjects have been beforehand loved and studied for their own sakes. He tells a good story, very applicable to himself when at Niagara. "The Falls are like one of our great American statesmen," quoth the guide, "just now. There is nothing particular about them when you first catch a view of them ; but when you get close, and know them better, then the power comes out, and you feel small as potatoes." Should Dr. Russell ever get close enough to the American conflict really to appreciate its true significance, he will feel like a very small potato indeed. The diary and daily incidents run out before the volume is half finished, and the necessary bulk is arrived at by the freest appropriation of all that has been said or written on the climate, population, and resources of the colony. He is full of contempt for those who think that Canada may involve us in a war with the States ; and constantly returns to the notion of the Canadians, that it is their connexion with us which exposes them to the chance of American aggression. These apprehensions are now much less vivid than they were, and really they were never entertained with any force except by those who imagined the North must be worsted in its conflict with the seceding States. All those, and ourselves among the number, who have believed in their ultimate success, have constantly pointed out the superior attractiveness of a march to Mexico. We really think if Great Britain were at once to declare that Canada must henceforth shift for itself, the Americans would take no steps to conquer the country, feeling, as they must do, that proximity and common interests are far stronger than armies, and that the natural progress of events would bring about a cordial union before another generation had passed away. If it were not for foolish notions of national prestige and conceptions of honour, founded on the long exer-

cise of force, there would be no argument worth a moment's attention, which could be pleaded against such a course on the part of our government. However, if there be any who wish to form some idea of how Canada could be defended in a war with the United States, they will find some notion of its difficulties in Dr. Russell's pages, although he does his best to make them appear as small as possible. One thing he makes abundantly clear, that the waggoner will never put his own shoulders efficiently to the wheel as long as he can hope for help from Hercules.

Mr. Hutchings' scenes of wonder and curiosity in California,⁹ is a book for sight-seers of the description of the "Guide to Harrogate," or "A Tourist's Hand-Book of the Isle of Wight." The places to which he takes his readers are undoubtedly both curious and wonderful; but his descriptions stop short of all but the very natural feelings which they exercise. His book is, in a large measure, a compilation from letters and notices in the Californian papers. His account of the enormous Wellingtonia of Calaveros (*sequoia gigantea*) is very full of interesting particulars, and the profuse illustrations give an excellent notion of these wondrous trees. Trees which attain a height of three hundred feet, and a circumference of eighty-one feet, are indeed wonders. But more remarkable, perhaps, than even these gigantic trees is the beautiful valley of Yo Semite, which has not its equal in the world. Land-locked by granite precipices from three to four thousand feet high, and little more than a mile wide by eight miles long, it receives from the summits of the surrounding rocks many cascades of the most singular beauty, while the whole surface and much of the sides of the valley are richly covered with the most varied vegetation. The views from photographs, given by Mr. Hutchings, bring this strange and lovely scene well before his readers. A visit to the quicksilver mines of San José, an account of the islands in the Bay of San Francisco, and of the caves in Eldorado County, California, complete his list of the most remarkable and picturesque spots in the neighbourhood of San Francisco, where we should suppose the book was originally published.

Mr. Christie's notes on Brazilian questions¹⁰ is an elaborate indictment of the Brazilian Government. If it be admitted that when treaties are made between a strong and a weak nation, it becomes the duty of the former to enforce their observance without too much regard either for the feelings or situation of the latter, Mr. Christie very conclusively proves that England was not only right, but long-suffering in her quarrel with the Imperial Government. This, however, is the point in dispute. How far England was called upon to overlook the neglect of the treaties of 1826, was at any rate determined here by Lord Aberdeen's Act in 1845. That the Act was either conciliatory or complimentary to the Brazilian Government, can hardly

⁹ "Scenes of Wonder and Curiosity in California." By J. M. Hutchings. London: Chapman and Hall. 1865.

¹⁰ "Notes on Brazilian Questions." By W. D. Christie, late Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Brazil. London: Macmillan and Co. 1865.

be asserted; nor can it surprise anyone that a Government conscious of its weakness should exhibit an amount of temper and obstructiveness in proportion to its helplessness. The position of Brazil was one of great difficulty, both from the nature of the duties it had accepted, and from the state of opinion which stood in the way of their discharge. Even after the public abolition of the slave trade, and the active measures for its suppression which were at last resolved upon by the Brazilian ministry, the question of the Emancipados was one of great difficulty in a country so extensive, and in which the executive was consequently so weak. The duties accepted by the Brazilian Government with respect to all captured blacks, amounted to supervision of a fourteen years' apprenticeship, to which each of them was bound when brought by English cruisers into Brazilian ports, and to a guarantee of their ultimate liberation at the expiration of this apprenticeship. The policy of handing over the living cargoes of captured slaves to the custody and disposition of a slave-owning country may be fairly questioned, and was manifestly based only on our desire to escape from difficulties of the same kind as those we have visited upon the head of the Brazilian Government with constant remonstrance and an increasing acerbity, until other drops falling into the cup of wrath nearly filled by these disputes, have brought our diplomatic relations to the present dead-lock. To follow each individual negro to the place of his apprenticeship, and to keep so constant a supervision over those who have taken him into their service, as would prevent disreputable abuses of the trust, would require a considerable body of incorruptible public servants for the discharge of a duty that could hardly be highly paid, and which was in violent opposition to the public opinion of the country. The various devices by which, after the expiration of their term of service, the Emancipados were yet retained in what amounted to slavery, must have been very difficult to contend with, and no doubt would have been so considered by the English Government, had not the question unfortunately assumed the form of a conflict of *amour propre* between the two countries, until at last there really remained no course but that of a rupture, which only looked like oppression because the weaker State refused to conform to the common courtesies of diplomatic intercourse.

The conflict in which Brazil is at present engaged with Paraguay, and the possible complication it may bring about with the Argentine Republic, will give a temporary interest to a permanently valuable account of La Plata by M. Santiago Arcos.¹¹ The confused struggles of the South American republics have received far too little attention in England. They are full of the most important political lessons, and quite as interesting as the histories of mediæval towns and barons. In fact, there are few things more instructive than the reproduction on the South American continent of a state of society full of parallels with that of Europe at the death of Charlemagne. The ultimate triumph of the modern spirit represented by Buenos Ayres at one time, and by Montevideo at another, supports the most satisfactory conclusion that

¹¹ "La Plata, étude historique." Par Santiago Arcos. Paris: Levy Frères. London: D. Nutt. 1865.

the world has made a definite progress, and that an ignorant community need not now fall an inevitable prey to the more energetic or instructed few who may be found within it. M. Arcos not only gives the history of the Spanish conquest, but very full particulars of the native races, as well as all that is necessary of the geography and productions of the country. The forty years of disorder which followed the declaration of independence by the Spanish colonies, M. Arcos maintains to be the natural result of that state of pupillage in which the colonies were held by the dominant country; and thus, however painful an education these years have furnished, they have yet, so far as the Argentine Republic is concerned, resulted in the triumph of order and of self-regulated liberty. Union and education have at last triumphed over the prejudices and jealousies which have so long been utilized by the leaders of what was called the federal party, but which really consisted of the personal struggles of those who flattered the vices of their followers, that they might rule them the more arbitrarily. The varied narrative of this long struggle is told in the clearest manner by M. Arcos; his sketches of the chiefs concerned are full of character and life, and carry conviction of their truth by a consistency and coherence which is one of the rarest gifts in an historical portrait painter. The names of Lopez, Ramirez, Quiroga, Rosas, on the one side, and of Moreno, Belgrano, Rivadavia, Lavalle, Paz, Varelea, Sarmiento, and Mitre, on the other, need no longer be *nomina umbrarum*, nor the conflicts in which they were engaged be regarded as mere savage struggles for predominance. If this opinion has been too prevalent among us, it has arisen from the difficulty of arriving at a clear view of the politics of South America from the dispersed accounts which only have been accessible to the English reader. This need no longer be the case, M. Arcos has given the means of judgment to all who choose to take his book in hand, and we can assure them they will find as much interest as instruction in its pages. In a supplementary chapter he explains the strange career of Francia in Paraguay, and shows how only in a country brutalized by the benevolent despotism of the Jesuits, could it have been possible.

An incubation of from two to four years, gives us a right to expect something more than a mere diary at the hands of Dr. Rennie, in his account of the British arms in China and Japan.¹² It is utterly wearisome to wade through notices of the weather, the state of the roads, the condition of the author's health and spirits, the visits he makes each day, and all the trivialities of a long-winded journal, when we might reasonably expect the result of careful reflection on the singular nations he had the opportunity of observing. We do not believe, though we have read this tedious volume through, that it contains a single fact with which the public have not long since been made acquainted from other sources. The most striking opinions are those the author displays in a resolute determination to run down the Armstrong guns, and to contradict all that has been asserted of their

¹² "The British Arms in North China and Japan; Peking, 1860; Kagosima, 1862." By D. F. Rennie, M.D., Senior Medical Officer of the Force in the North of China, &c. London: J. Murray. 1865.

efficiency in the China war. The observations made on the effects of malarious situations for encampments, we leave to the judgment of those who are able to give a professional opinion; they are at least singular. The shorter account of the events of 1862, in Japan, is more interesting, a larger part of it being collected from our officers and residents there, and the opportunity of personal details being rather less; though even here, a desire is constantly betraying itself to assume a judicial position that carries with it but little weight.

The well-known art-critic, Dr. Förster, of Munich, has just published an interesting account of a trip taken last year to Belgium, Paris, and Beaune, in Burgundy,¹³ to which latter place he was attracted by the desire to make a complete study of the Last Judgment, by Roger Van der Weyden, in the Hospital of St. Anthony in that city. The early German school as represented in the towns of Belgium, finds in him a learned and acute critic. Some curious particulars of the life of Memmling, and of the origin of oil painting, will reward all who take up this excellent little volume, and they will find a style singularly clear and simple, which is not always met with in the works of the author's compatriots. A full description of the recent alterations in Paris and of the Napoleonic Museum in the Louvre, will interest many, while the general remarks on the compilation of catalogues for art-museums are worthy of the most attentive consideration at the hands of all who are engaged on such useful works, which so often contain all but the facts most desirable to be known, and which so frequently seem to be written upon no system whatever. If we might expect such a volume at his hands, we should heartily wish the author the opportunity of making a similar trip every year.

Those who are acquainted with the writings of an Old Bushman, know how thoroughly reliable is all that comes from his pen. A ten years' residence in Sweden has enabled him to give a full account of all the interesting features of a country that has much in common with our own.¹⁴ His chapters on the domestic life, forests, and field sports, contain some of the best descriptions that have, perhaps, ever been given of any country whatever. For national statistics he has consulted the best native authorities, and leaves few points untouched that can be of interest to an intelligent curiosity. The great merit of this as of all his other works, is found in the care with which he has verified all his facts by personal observation. The special value of the present volume will be thought by many to consist in the elaborate and complete notice which it contains of the entire fauna of the country. A ten years' study of the birds, beasts, and fishes of Sweden, has made him an authority on all questions connected with their habits and ways of life. Into its merits as a natural history of the northern peninsula we shall not here enter.

¹³ "Reise durch Belgien nach Paris und Burgund." Von Dr. Ernst Förster. Leipzig: Weigel. London: D. Nutt. 1865.

¹⁴ "Ten Years in Sweden." By an Old Bushman; author of "A Spring and Summer in Lapland," &c. London: Groombridge and Sons. 1865.

Any one who wishes for full and adequate notions of Swedish life, will here find all that he can desire, and every tourist who thinks of Sweden as a possible summer touring ground, will find all necessary information in the most reliable form.

While carrying out the survey of the coast of Crete, begun by the late Captain Greaves, an opportunity of settling the disputed sites of the hundred cities of the island offered a temptation to his successor, Captain Spratt, that he could not resist.¹⁵ There thus grew up under his hands, together with the excellent charts forwarded to the Admiralty, a mass of local information which he has done well to give to the public; the result is a very complete and interesting itinerary of the island. It is true that most of the ancient sites determined with so much care, show at present but the smallest traces of the Greek towns which once occupied them; a few coins and still fewer sculptures and inscriptions are all that now remain, except sometimes the massive substructures that have resisted every kind of devastation. The traces even of the long Venetian occupancy of the island are but small, and almost restricted to the neighbourhood of Candia, after which town the island itself was so long called. But if the antiquarian interest finds but little support, the beauty of the island would make it a most delightful touring ground, were it not for the poverty of the population and the unwholesomeness of the lower lands; of its beauty a fair notion may be formed from the very able views with which Captain Spratt's handsome volumes are adorned. The Turks and Greek Christians seem to have almost become reconciled to each other before the war of independence in 1820-29, and even to have overcome some of the evil memories of that conflict; but fresh animosities which broke out during the Crimean war have again embittered them, and thrust back their material prosperity for a whole generation. The mountaineers are Greeks, and hold the country at their command, but there is so little temptation to pillage from the poverty of the lowlands, that there is not much disturbance to be dreaded by visitors, but rather a want of decent shelter; while the constant temptation to sleep in the open air, which can hardly be ventured on without bringing on an attack of that fever and ague which are so well known to Mediterranean travellers, is a danger that should never be overlooked.

Captain Spratt gives full particulars concerning the geology and natural history of the island, and a very interesting account of the sponge trade which is carried on on its coasts. He never misses an illustrative legend or characteristic tale from the patriotic war, or from the descents of Algerine pirates—a scourge that used greatly to afflict these shores. From bad food and want of personal cleanliness, that frightful scourge, leprosy, is prevalent in the island, and near the large villages there is generally a lepers' settlement, some of which were visited and described by Captain Spratt.

Though chiefly useful as a handbook to future travellers, there is

¹⁵ "Travels and Researches in Crete." By Captain T. A. B. Spratt, R.N. C.B., F.R.S. London: J. Van Voorst. 1865.

so much which is generally interesting in these volumes, that they will well reward those who have no thought of visiting the scenes it describes.

With a large circle of readers Mr. Porter's last volume on Syria and its holy places¹⁶ will be unquestionably popular. No one will dispute his intimate acquaintance with the country, or his powers of animated description. He brings before us the ancient cities of Israel and Judah, and the lands of the hostile races by which they were surrounded; he connects each locality with all the interesting notices of them which occur in the Bible, and compares all that is known of their ancient glory with the feeble vestiges of it which can still be discovered; and all with singular effectiveness and vigour. On one point, however, we must protest in the interest of what, we fear, are but a few of those who will turn to his pages. We confess it is not without a feeling of moral repugnance that we meet in every page of Mr. Porter's book with the constant comparison of ancient Hebrew denunciations of the enemies of Israel with the wretched and ruinous condition of the country. Simply, this ardent search for the fulfilment of prophecy seems to us unnecessary, and to be, in fact, very far from carrying with it that seal of direct inspiration in the ancient writers who have called down God's wrath on the whole region, for the sake of which the present and ancient condition of the country are so learnedly compared. The denunciations against Bashan were delivered 600 years before Christ, and waited for their fulfilment for more than as many years after the Christian era. The ruin they called down upon the land fell not upon the same race who had provoked the prophets, but upon a Christian community which shared to the utmost of its light in the feelings which animated the curse that had been laid upon the land, and which was yet so long coming upon it. Not only in this divorce between fulfilled prophecy and really righteous retribution, are such views obnoxious to us, but the whole tone in which scriptural imagery is shown to have been truly taken from the land in which the Scriptures were written, implies much more than is fully expressed, and insinuates that such faithfulness in external description carries with it a claim to unquestioning belief and reliance where far more important things than oriental manners are concerned. The letter of Scripture seems to exercise over the minds of enquirers like Mr. Porter an overwhelming effect which almost shuts out all that is most noble and immortal in its spirit. There is a kind of self-congratulatory feeling in discovering a scene of predicted desolation that too often ranges the discoverer on the side of the denouncing prophet, and seems to shut his eyes to the strange morality involved in the fulfilment of a curse which escapes the persons cursed to fall only on the land they once inhabited. The veriest trifle that illustrates writings which have exercised such an influence on mankind as the Hebrew Scriptures, has an inestimable value; but the fullest light upon the entire text would be dearly bought if it brought with it a return to the narrow morality of the Old

¹⁶ "The Giant Cities of Bashan and Syria's Holy Places." By the Rev. J. L. Porter, M.A., author of "Five Years in Damascus," "Murray's Handbook for Syria and Palestine," &c. London: J. Nelson and Sons. 1865.

Testament. If these investigations are to result in a substitution of the notion of a wrathful Jehovah in the place of that of our Father which is in heaven, no amount of historical discovery can be looked upon as a sufficient compensation for such a retrogression in what are happily the common conceptions concerning a ruler of the universe. The spirit against which we have felt ourselves called upon to animadvert has the strongest tendency to mislead those it animates into the veriest trifling, and a mere word hunting that deprives the subject of all dignity. At page 120, Mr. Porter, describing the appearance of Jerusalem from Mount Moriah, says:—"The hill sinks into the Valley of Hinnom in steep terraced slopes, covered with vineyards, olives, and cornfields. As I looked, a moving object in one of the fields riveted my attention. 'Haste, give me my glass,' I said. I turned it upon the spot. Yes, I was right; a plough and a yoke of oxen were there at work. Jeremiah's prophecy was fulfilled before my eyes. 'Zion shall be ploughed like a field' (xxvi. 18.)" This is no doubt picturesque and effective in style, but where there was a cornfield it was hardly necessary to be in a hurry for a telescope to determine that a plough had passed over the ground. The primary title of Mr. Porter's book is the "Giant Cities of Bashan," and indicates that part of it which is devoted to the most unexplored district of the country. This most eastern corner of Syria had hardly been visited before, and from the massive and durable character of its architectural remains, offers the strangest sights of deserted towns which are even now, after a thousand years' desolation, in a state of repair that would admit of their immediate use, if only life and property could be secured from the constant excursions of the wandering Bedouins who have taken possession of the inaccessible Hauran.

It is seldom that the interior of a London hospital is described from the point of view of one of the patients; in the great majority of cases they belong to a class of society which is too little educated to be capable of an intelligent judgment. A few years since, Mr. Cooley, the author of several excellent books of reference, had the misfortune to be run over and very seriously injured in the neighbourhood of Charing Cross Hospital, to which institution he was conveyed, and owing to a very severe attack of erysipelas which followed, he was detained for two months within its walls. He has given a most excellent picture¹⁷ of the interior of a hospital in a little volume which leaves nothing to be desired in a full description of its daily routine. The most curious part, however, of his book is the detailed account he gives of the delirium which attended the fever accompanying his attack. About a hundred pages are devoted to a full description of all the strange, wild images which floated through his diseased imagination. This is a most remarkable mnemonic feat; with nothing to connect them but the arbitrary associations which in very few cases is he able to connect with any external objects, such an effort of pure memory is perhaps without example. Where there is no ratiocinative connexion, the

¹⁷ "Two Months in a London Hospital: its Inner Life and Scenes. A Personal Narrative." By A. J. Cooley. London: Groombridge and Sons. 1865.

memory of most men is very weak indeed; but in this case the utter absence of any connecting links makes the result, from its magnitude and minute particularity, one of the most curious psychological phenomena we have ever met with.

The close and intelligent observation of his own symptoms must render Mr. Cooley's book highly interesting to the medical profession, while his numerous illustrative anecdotes and detailed descriptions can hardly fail to make it equally attractive to the general reader.

Sportsmen know very well what they may expect in a book on hunting by *Scrutator*,¹⁸ but those who are no sportsmen will, if they have any sense of humour, be greatly delighted and tickled with his view of the world as seen from the kennel and cover side. The confidence with which he professes his faith that foxes are the final cause and last grace of a country life, is most amusing; but if it were not for this enthusiasm the book would not be so unquestionably good a manual of all that it professes to treat. To those to whom the author's name has not already done so, we strongly recommend his capital practical lessons.

It is hardly necessary to say anything of such well-known books as "Debrett's Peerage and Baronetage of the United Kingdom,"¹⁹ except that the edition of the present year is thoroughly revised, as well as amply and most completely illustrated with the armorial bearings of all the families who are mentioned in the two volumes. It fully comes up to the editor's object in being a complete repertory of useful knowledge concerning the titled classes of the realm.

SCIENCE.

PROFESSOR BERNAYS' "Notes for Students in Chemistry,"¹ of which a fourth edition lies before us, forms a sort of printed commonplace book, systematically arranged, and containing brief notes of the facts to be derived from the study of the principal textbooks of chemistry. The notes are, of course, valuable chiefly as memoranda of information obtained by more extended study, but for this purpose they are admirably adapted, and the work as it stands constitutes a most convenient outline of the science in all its bearings. The present edition contains a brief sketch of Gerhardt's doctrine of types, and of the new system of notation; the formulæ given for the various compounds are in accordance with the old system, but in many cases the new formulæ are appended in brackets.

Mr. Page, in a small pamphlet, advocates the adoption of geology as

¹⁸ "Practical Lessons in Hunting and Sporting." By *Scrutator*. London: Chapman and Hall. 1865.

¹⁹ "Debrett's Illustrated Peerage and Baronetage." 1865. 2 vols. London: Bosworth.

¹ "Notes for Students in Chemistry; being a Syllabus of Chemistry and Practical Chemistry." By Albert J. Bernays. Fourth edition, revised and corrected. 12mo. London: Churchill and Sons. 1865.

a branch of general education,² and maintains that it is not only practically a valuable study to the agriculturist, the miner, the engineer, the architect, the well-sinker, and others whose business brings them more or less directly in contact with the subjects of geological research, but that some knowledge of the structure and history of the crust of the earth cannot but prove both interesting and useful to every one, whilst as a means of intellectual training it may furnish results as valuable as those produced by any other course of study. Even when pursued as an amusement, the study of geology cannot but exercise a favourable influence on the mind, by the expansion of thought that must inevitably be produced even by an imperfect realization of the grand series of phenomena which it reveals; and Mr. Page accordingly urges that elementary geological instruction should be given in our schools, and that chairs of geology should be established in all colleges.

A small volume of "Lectures on Practical Geology,"³ by Professor Ansted, whilst professing to form only a popular sketch of the applications of that science in arts and manufactures, will furnish to many a sufficient amount of information on this special branch of scientific education. In this excellent little work, Professor Ansted indicates, in the first place, the connexion of geology with agriculture, showing how soils are produced by the disintegration of rocks, the modes in which this disintegration is effected, and the value of a knowledge of the nature of the soil, in determining the use of manure, and the management of crops. As the atmosphere and its water are the chief agents in breaking down the rock-surfaces and preparing them for the operations of the agriculturist, Professor Ansted, in his second lecture, treats of the relations of water to rocks *in situ*, and especially of the influence of the structure and position of the various beds, upon the accumulation and constitution of the water available for economic purposes. These may be regarded as indirect practical applications of geology: in the subsequent lectures the author describes the source and mode of obtaining the numerous mineral bodies which are directly useful to man. Here he passes in review the sands and clays used in pottery and brickmaking and for other purposes; the limestones burned for the production of mortars, plasters, and cements; the numerous varieties of building stones; the various metallic ores, and the mode of their occurrence and working; coal, petroleum, salt, &c. From the fact that Professor Ansted has for many years devoted much of his attention to the practical applications of Geology, especially in connexion with mining, cements, and building-stones, few of our geologists are so well qualified to speak with authority upon such subjects, and not only has he brought together in this little volume a great mass of instructive facts, but he has told his story in a plain and simple, but at the same time attractive

² "Geology as a Branch of General Education." By David Page, F.R.S.E., &c. Blackwood: Edinburgh and London. 1865.

³ "The Application of Geology to the Arts and Manufactures." Six Lectures on Practical Geology, delivered before the Society of Arts. By Professor D. T. Ansted, M.A., F.R.S. 12mo. London: Hardwicke. 1865.

way, which cannot fail to render it interesting to his readers. He indicates that it is only by the ceaseless change going on even among the mineral constituents of our planet, that organic life is possible on its surface, and sums up his results in the following words:—"All that is useful and beautiful, and all that is intrinsically valuable and employed in the arts, and indeed, all that conduces to life itself, is derived from the earth. To seek for it economically, you must study the structure of the earth; to obtain it without loss, or at as little cost as possible, you must learn the conditions of its existence—you must, in a word, study geology—and thus it is that geology, applied to the arts, is a subject of real and vital interest to all of us."

Whilst, as Professor Ansted tells us, the supply of ironstone in the Cleveland district of Yorkshire may be regarded practically as inexhaustible, it is a somewhat melancholy fact that the same statement by no means applies to the coal necessary for smelting it, as there is no doubt that we are rapidly using up our supply of fossil fuel. Mr. Hull gives us 1100 years for the entire exhaustion of our coal-mines, if we continue to consume coal at the present rate; but Mr. Jevons, in an elaborate treatise on the coal question⁴ just published, maintains that the matter cannot be estimated on this footing, and, assuming the consumption of coal to go on increasing in the same ratio as during the last few years, we shall come to the end of our store of mineral fuel in a much shorter time; indeed, the real question is, not how long will it take us to clear all the coals out of the coal-measures, but how soon shall we so far exhaust the workable seams as to render it impossible to raise coal at such a price that it may be available for manufacturing purposes. The whole of the statistics on this subject are ably discussed by Mr. Jevons; and although, considering the history of the last few years, during which the increase in the consumption of coal has been unprecedentedly great, we cannot believe that the future augmentation can take place in anything like the same ratio, there is nevertheless abundant reason why the attention of the public should be called to the probability of a comparatively early cessation of the supply of coal. For, as every thinking man must feel, and as Mr. Jevons proves by unanswerable evidence, the continuance of our supplies is the condition of our national prosperity, and it is chiefly to the present favourable position of our island in this respect that we owe our high position among nations. With its cessation the development and even the maintenance of our manufactures must also cease, for there is no present prospect, at any rate, of the application of any direct physical force to the working of our machinery. Mr. Jevons holds that by checking the waste and extravagance now practised to such a great extent much might be done, and regards the exportation of coal as an evil which might be prevented. The imposition of an export duty on coal, however, is beset with many difficulties, as it reacts upon the mercantile marine and upon the import trade.

⁴ "The Coal Question: an Inquiry concerning the Progress of the Nation and the Probable Exhaustion of our Coal Mines." By W. Stanley Jevons, M.A. London: Macmillan. 1865.

Mr. Jevons suggests that the legacy and succession duties should be applied to the reduction and ultimate extinction of the national debt, as this, he thinks, "would serve the three purposes of adding to the productive capital of the country, of slightly checking our present too rapid progress, and of lessening the future difficulties of the country."

"Modern Geology," says Mr. Campbell in the third chapter of his work, entitled "Frost and Fire," now before us,⁵ "treats of sedimentary and of igneous rocks; it recognises the activity of two mechanical forces, which act in opposite directions, upward and downward, from and towards a centre, in radiating and converging lines." These two forces are heat and weight, by the alternate or intermittent action of which all the various phenomena of the formation and moulding of the crust and surface of the earth may be said to be effected. To the elaboration of this view in almost every conceivable direction, Mr. Campbell (whose name, with a most unnecessary modesty, is only appended to his preface) has devoted two thick volumes, containing records of observations upon subjects of geology, meteorology, and physical geography, made in almost all parts of the northern hemisphere, and described with a vigour and point such as one rarely meets with. Amongst the most instructive portions of the book are the records of the ingenious experiments made by the author for the purpose of testing on a small scale theories proposed to explain the grand phenomena of nature; thus we find the action of heat and icebergs upon water, the working of heat and cold upon air, the production of ocean currents and numerous other important phenomena elucidated by the judicious use of a few simple materials and utensils, or illustrated by quaint references to the action of homely and everyday objects. Ice, according to Mr. Campbell, has been the main engine by which the denudation and moulding of the surface of our earth has been effected, and his chief journeyings have been in search of the "tool-marks" and "chips" which betray the operations of this mighty agent, to the doings of which the greater portion of the pages of his present work is devoted. Everywhere he finds traces of the action of ice, to which he attributes more importance than even Professor Ramsay, but he differs from most of his later predecessors by ascribing less of the work done to glaciers and more to icebergs carried along by marine currents. Glacial conditions exist at the present moment about Greenland, Labrador, and Newfoundland, in the same latitudes that bear witness to an ancient glacial epoch in Europe, but separated by several degrees of longitude. Mr. Campbell assumes that, during the European glacial epoch, a channel existed at the head of the Baltic giving access to the Arctic sea, and that it is by the closure of this passage by elevation of land that the seat of glacial action has been transferred to the western hemisphere. But our author by no means confines his attention to the action of ice, although that is evidently his favourite subject,—his book abounds

⁵ "Frost and Fire, Natural Engines, Tool-marks, and Chips, with Sketches taken at Home and Abroad." By a Traveller. Two Vols. Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas. 1865.

with descriptions of meteorological phenomena, of the action of rivers and other water in motion, of the deposition of sediment, of the action of heat and volcanoes, and indicates many a relation between things apparently most dissimilar, which, coupled with the energy and vivacity of its style, and the beauty of many of its descriptions of natural objects and scenery, render it one of the most charming books that we have ever had the gratification of perusing. The illustrations also, which are chiefly the work of the author's own hands, are deserving of great praise; many of them represent singular or beautiful natural scenery, others illustrate the ingenious experiments already alluded to, but all are exceedingly good. Even the cover of the volumes is made available for illustration—one side of it bears a representation of the ice-grooves on a slate rock at St. John's, New Brunswick, with the indications of their bearings.

In a small work on Fruit Trees,⁶ M. Laujoulet explains all the details of the management of the various trees grown in our orchards, describing the kind of soil and situation most suited to the successful cultivation of each, the mode of management of the orchard, the selection of the stock, and especially the methods of training and pruning the trees, so as to render them at once vigorous and productive. The last-mentioned operations, which constitute the greatest mystery of the professional gardener's proceedings, are explained in full detail, and in a very simple manner; and M. Laujoulet adds to the benefit which he has thus conferred on the possessors of orchards, by indicating the laws of vegetation which govern the evolution of fruit trees, and the physiological reasons for the adoption of each process. The concluding section of the work contains directions for the management of seedlings and grafting, together with a calendar of orchard operations, without which no gardener's book would be complete. The instructions given are illustrated by numerous figures on four folding plates, and the little volume forms a most convenient and excellent manual for the management of the orchard.

In the *Philosophia Zoologica*⁷ of Professor Van der Hoeven, we have a work which ought to exercise a favourable influence upon the rising generation of zoologists. In it the totality of the phenomena of animal life is treated in an aphoristic form, and the connexion of the different branches of zoological study is made manifest very successfully; indeed not only are the results of investigation stated with particular clearness, but an extraordinary mass of facts is cited in the notes appended to most of the paragraphs. The work, which is written throughout in Latin, is divided into four books. Of these, the first treats *De Animalium natura*, and after stating that all animals originate from cells, proceeds to describe the component tissues of the animal body, the mode of combination of these tissues to form organs, the functions of the latter, and their differences in the

⁶ "Taille et Culture des Arbres Fruitières." Par M. Laujoulet. Paris: Sacy. 1865.

⁷ "Philosophia Zoologica." Auctore J. Van der Hoeven. Leyden: E. J. Brill. 1864.

series of animals. A chapter in this book is also devoted to the consideration of the different types of animal structure, and another to that of the skeleton of the vertebrata, the latter treated in accordance with the views of Professor Owen. The second book has for its subject general and comparative embryology, and describes the mode of development of the different groups of animals in an ascending series, thus completing the statement of the anatomical and physiological phenomena of the animal kingdom. The third and fourth books treat of the systematic and geographical distribution of animals, their description and nomenclature, and contain many observations, especially in relation to descriptive zoology, which might be studied with advantage by most of our describers of genera and species.

From discussing the position of man in nature, and the difficult problem of the origin of the human species, Professor Vogt has descended to the consideration of "useful and injurious, misunderstood, and maligned animals,"⁸ thus adopting a sort of zoological bye-path, which, however, he has, as usual, rendered most interesting and attractive by his mode of treatment. Whilst protesting that no animal can be regarded abstractedly as either beneficial or injurious, Professor Vogt shows that, as far as man is concerned, a great number of animals must be regarded either as friends or foes, seeing that some of them are most hurtful by damaging his property, whilst others are either directly useful to him, or indirectly beneficial, by destroying the injurious species. By tracing the history of some of the more striking and important species belonging to both these categories in the lectures composing his present little volume, Professor Vogt not only furnishes his readers with much useful information on this special subject, but at the same time communicates a good deal of instruction in general natural history, and shows how the study of those animals which, as it were, force themselves upon our notice in the garden or the field, may open up broad views of the mutual relations and interdependence of the various forms of animals. At the same time these relations are in many cases, perhaps in most, by no means so simple as would at first appear; indeed, the more one studies this subject, the more astonishing do we find the complexity of the arrangements by which the balance of power is maintained in nature. In the course of his lectures Professor Vogt has, of course, frequent opportunities of showing that animals generally regarded as mischievous, are in reality benefactors of their human persecutors, and he also mentions a series of superstitious prejudices prevailing in different localities with regard to certain animals.

In his "Natural History of Injurious Invertebrate Animals of Germany,"⁹ Dr. Taschenberg has taken up a portion of the ground passed over by Professor Vogt, but has worked that portion out in detail. In this essay, which has received the first prize of the Royal

⁸ "Vorlesungen über nützliche und schädliche, verkaunte und verläumdete Thiere." Von Carl Vogt. Leipzig: Keil. 1864.

⁹ "Naturgeschichte der wirbellosen Thiere, die in Deutschland, &c., schädlich werden." Von Dr. E. L. Taschenberg. Leipzig: Kummer. 1865.

Prussian Agricultural College, the author gives the natural history of the invertebrate animals injurious to agriculture, occurring in various parts of Germany, describes the ravages committed by them upon various cultivated plants, and indicates the means of diminishing their numbers, when any such exist. The number of species mentioned is only eighty-one, so that many of the less important forms are omitted; most of the species are represented upon seven tolerably executed coloured plates, which illustrate the volume. The natural enemies of some destructive insects, especially those which prey upon the *Aphides*, are also indicated, but the agency of Ichneumonidæ, and other parasites, in checking the undue multiplication of plant-eating species, is hardly referred to with sufficient distinctness even for practical purposes. All treatises on noxious insects (and insects occupy the greater part of the present volume) ought to contain a section devoted to the indication of those which, on the contrary, are beneficial, as there is nothing more common than for the farmer, or the gardener, to charge his best friends with the commission of the damage, upon which they are doing their best to put a check. The second part of Dr. Taschenberg's work brings together the animals described in his first part, according to the plants which they attack, and under each plant there is a tabular arrangement, to lead the non-scientific reader to the ready determination of any specimens that may come in his way, by characters drawn from the nature of the injury inflicted by them upon the plant. This section also includes a bibliographic and synonymic appendix, referred to by numbers from the body of the work. Dr. Taschenberg's essay contains little or nothing new, but it has apparently been carefully and intelligently prepared with reference to all the recent original authorities on the insect pests of the farm.

The readers of the *Natural History Review* are already familiar with the labours of Mr. Lubbock in the field of prehistoric archæology, several of the most interesting chapters of the work before us having appeared in that journal; by the addition of others, treating on allied, or illustrative topics, he has produced a volume that cannot fail to be acceptable to students of this branch of archæology.¹⁰

By a comparison of the implements and customs of modern savages with what recent research has disclosed to us of the condition of prehistoric man, the author enables us to form some opinion of the state of civilization enjoyed by the fabricators of flint implements, the builders of pile habitations, and the dwellers on the coasts of Northern Europe, whose remains are found in shell mounds, &c.

Of the fourteen chapters into which the book is divided, two are devoted to a consideration of the bronze age, the knowledge of bronze and other metals possessed by the ancients, and generally the form and character of the various bronze implements found in different parts of Europe. The author at some length examines the question of the Phœnician sources of tin, and the criticisms of Sir G. C. Lewis and others on the voyages of Pytheas and Himilco. He does not believe

¹⁰ "Prehistoric Times, as illustrated by Ancient Remains and the Manners and Customs of Modern Savages." By John Lubbock, F.R.S. &c. London: Williams and Norgate. 1865.

in either a Phœnician or Roman origin of the bronze age civilization; whilst freely admitting the difficulty of fixing any period with certainty, he inclines to the opinion that Stonehenge and Abury may be regarded as specimens of the architecture of the bronze age.

In the third chapter the author gives a resumé of our knowledge of the stone age, which he divides into two periods, marked respectively by the chipped and polished implements. The fourth chapter is devoted to a consideration of tumuli and various methods of sepulture and disposal of the dead. In the fifth and sixth chapters the author at considerable length describes the various additions to our knowledge of primitive man, derived from an examination of pile dwellings and shell mounds: these have a special interest, being mainly the result of the author's personal investigations. Having recorded the present state of our knowledge of primitive European races as derived from an investigation into the ages of stone and bronze, and the indications afforded by an examination of tumuli, pile dwellings and shell mounds, Mr. Lubbock, in the seventh chapter, reviews the facts already ascertained in reference to the condition of primitive races in North America, the uses of copper, and the various facts derived from the investigation of the mounds and earthworks so abundantly scattered in this part of the world. In the eighth chapter he similarly records the various results derived from the exploration of caves both in this country and on the continent. In chapters nine and ten the author reviews most of the points bearing on the question of the antiquity of man. With these the readers of Sir C. Lyell's work on the subject are already familiar.

The three following chapters are occupied with a brief history of modern savages, more especially of those who at the time of their discovery were ignorant of the use of metal, Esquimaux, Fijis, Fuegians; these chapters are especially interesting, as regards the main question the author seeks to illustrate, indicating a condition of civilization probably closely approximating to that in existence in Europe during the stone age.

In the concluding chapter the author makes some interesting observations on the theory of "Natural selection" as applied to man (a theory which the author seems to accept) both as regards his mental and physical development. Of the work, of which the above is but a meagre outline, we can speak in the highest terms; it gives a faithful account of the present state of our knowledge of the primitive populations of our own country and the continent in a clear and accurate style, and indicates the zeal and assiduity with which the author has studied his subject.

The caverns of Poitou have furnished to the labours of MM. Brouillet and Meillet an abundant harvest of traces of the early inhabitants of France, which they have described and illustrated in an octavo volume lately published.¹¹ Stone implements of various forms,

¹¹ "Époques Antédiluviennne et Celtique du Poitou." Par A. Brouillet et A. Meillet. Poitiers: Girardin. Niort: Clouzot. Paris: Dumoulin.

and objects of bone and horn, form the chief part of the articles collected by them, and amongst the latter are some bearing curious outline figures of animals analogous to those discovered by MM. Lartet and Christy in Perigord, and evidently composed of the horn of the reindeer. The most singular of all these objects consist of certain fragments of bone, bearing upon their surface a considerable number of what appear to be unmistakable alphabetical characters, pronounced indeed, by Professor Pictet, to be for the most part identical with ancient Sanscrit letters! How far the existence of these inscribed bones is to be regarded as a proof that the human contemporaries of the reindeer in France were acquainted with alphabetical characters, must be left to the future to decide; it is certainly rather premature to assume, as the authors seem inclined to do, that the primæval reindeer hunters of France were the descendants of emigrants from the East, who brought with them a knowledge of the Sanscrit character. It is to be remarked, moreover, that these characters are placed together irregularly, so that they form no pronounceable combination; two of them occur on a bone which has been worked into a phallus. M. Meillet, however, has not only formed a theory of the origin of the ancient inhabitants of France, whose works he has disinterred from the caverns where they have been so long buried, but actually gives singularly precise dates for the events of the remote period of their existence. Thus the year 24,000 B.C. is "the probable epoch of the cataclysm which ravaged the North of Europe and Asia, and covered them with sands and erratic blocks in immense layers."

In these occur worked flints, mixed with bones of elephants, rhinoceroses, &c. Then comes a transition period of comparative repose, extending from 24,000 to 13,901 B.C., during which small cataclysms may have occurred by the bursting of lakes, &c., but it seems probable that Europe was without human inhabitants. "About the year 13,901, the epoch of the *débâcle* of the glacier of the South Pole," Asiatic populations, already too much compressed, fled from the partial deluge of India, and emigrated to the West, where they gave origin to the Celtic inhabitants of the French caves. Among the chipped flint implements made by these people are some polished stone weapons, supposed to have been brought by the emigrants from their eastern home. After another long period of repose, fresh deluges took place, arising from the *débâcle* of the glacier of the North Pole, about 2350 years B.C., but these were more partial than their predecessors, and may be identified with the floods recorded by history or tradition. In this way M. Meillet continues to trace the stream of time, with more satisfaction to himself than to his readers, down to the bronze period, of which, and of the polished stone period, he and his collaborateur describe and figure some interesting relics.

Each new edition of Dr. Aitken's valuable work¹² has been an improvement on the preceding one; and the third edition, which is now before us, is a complete systematic treatise on the Science and Practice

¹² "The Science and Practice of Medicine." By William Aitken, M.D. 2 vols. Third edition. Charles Griffin and Co. 1864.

of Medicine. The whole has evidently been carefully revised, while some portions have been entirely re-written, so that the two volumes now present, in an accessible and convenient form, a judicious compilation of all the latest observations in medical science, whether made at home or abroad. Diseases are described which have hitherto found no place in any English systematic work; and a short account of the geographical distribution of disease is an excellent feature in it which will not fail to be greatly appreciated.

In his preliminary pathological observations, Dr. Aitken lays great stress on the usefulness of the examination of the temperature of the body in different diseases, and gives numerous illustrations of the great advance which has recently been made in a knowledge of "the thermometry of disease." The particular attention given of late to exact investigation of this kind, especially in Germany, is a most important feature of recent medical progress; and the valuable results which have been already obtained plainly indicate that before long the thermometer will be as necessary an instrument to the physician as the stethoscope now is. Equally excellent is Dr. Aitken's account of the phenomena of inflammation and of their physiological import. Full credit is given to every one who has contributed anything to the elucidation of this difficult subject; and we have been particularly gratified to observe that the sagacious views of Simon, which, though long since published, have hitherto not received the attention which their philosophical character might justly have claimed, are clearly set forth, fairly weighed, and proved to be confirmed by the recent observations of Virchow and Lister. The laws of action of morbid persons, as far as these are at present known, are concisely stated; the description, here as elsewhere, consisting of a careful synopsis of what is to be found in the best works specially treating on the subject. In former systematic works on medicine syphilis scarcely received any mention, for it was looked upon as a disease falling almost entirely within the province of surgical writers; but the serious mischief which it has now been distinctly proved to produce in every internal organ of the body has rendered a full account of it henceforth a necessary part of a treatise on medicine. Dr. Aitken has not neglected so important a subject, although he does not appear to have seen the most recent pathological observations which have been made with regard to the ravages of the syphilitic virus. But if there is anything wanting in his account of syphilis, there is nothing more to be desired in his description of the numerous well-marked forms of entozoa which are now known to infest the human body. The remarkable peregrinations and the strange vicissitudes of the tapeworm are faithfully followed, and an excellent summary includes an account of the mischief done by that most dangerous of parasites, the *trichina spiralis*.

It would be possible, no doubt, to point out certain omissions in this treatise, as well as to indicate certain discussions that are abundant; but the wonder is that there are so few things omitted, and that there is so little that could with advantage be retrenched. As the volumes have now attained a bulk which is as great as suits the convenience of readers, it may be hoped that any additions of matter requisite in a

subsequent edition will be accompanied by condensation, where this may properly be made.

In an unpretending little volume¹³ Dr. Ringer gives the results of numerous observations which he has made on the temperature of the body in phthisis, and the conclusions which he believes himself entitled to draw from them. These are;—that there is a continued elevation of the temperature of the body in all cases in which a deposition of tubercle is taking place in any organ; that this elevation is probably due to the general constitutional state (tuberculosis) rather than to the particular deposition; that the increase of temperature may be taken as a measure of the severity of the disease and as a more accurate criterion thereof, than the physical signs or symptoms; that it is even possible, by means of the increase of temperature, to recognise the disease long before physical signs and symptoms would enable any one to do so, and in cases where such signs are not distinct; and, lastly, that we may conclude by means of a fall of temperature that the deposition of tubercle has ceased. The observations which have been made with great care and industry, appear to warrant the conclusions. Perhaps the author would not have done amiss to have introduced, by way of preface to his own researches, a brief account of what has hitherto been done in this matter, and to have modified somewhat the expression of his too exclusive admiration for the thermometer, as though it were *the* method of investigation, superior to and capable of superseding all other methods. Its use affords one amongst other indications of diseases, and that probably a very significant one; but to suppose that the thermometer placed in a patient's axilla must henceforth supersede the educated senses of the practical physician, is to suppose that man must see with his eye and not, as now, through it, that an aid to the senses will take the place of the mind to which the senses are but gateways. It is furthermore to assume as desirable a result which would be as great an injury as could possibly happen to the cause of medical science. Dr. Ringer's results have, however, clearly proved that the examination of the bodily temperature is most necessary in any case of phthisis; and his work affords a good example of patient and useful scientific research in a direction hitherto almost entirely neglected in this country.

A fourth edition of Dr. Carpenter's "Manual of Physiology" contains such additions and modifications as the progress of physiological research has rendered necessary.¹⁴ The section on embryonic development has been entirely re-written, and such modifications of what is called the "cell-doctrine" have been made, as the present state of knowledge seemed to demand. While holding it now established that the cell, with its membranous wall, nucleus, and contents, is not the primitive type of organization, but that the protoplasmic substance or germinal matter is, Dr. Carpenter does not fail to express his distinct dissent from the unphilosophical notion recently put forth that "formed

¹³ "On the Temperature of the Body as a means of Diagnosis in Phthisis and Tuberculosis." By Sydney Ringer, M.D. Walton and Maberley. 1865.

¹⁴ "A Manual of Physiology, including Physiological Anatomy." By W. B. Carpenter, M.D., F.R.S. Fourth edition. John Churchill and Sons. 1865.

material" is never possessed of vital activity. He enters into a somewhat elaborate discussion of vital force and vital property, which, though interesting and instructive, will scarce perhaps suffice, as Dr. Carpenter hopes, to enable the student "to attach definite ideas to each of them." Indeed, it may be a question whether uncertain discussions of the kind are not better omitted in a manual for students. It is truly surprising, however, that the author has been able to compress so much matter into so small a compass, and to present it in so clear and instructive a form. Scarce anything of real importance appears to be omitted, if we except perhaps Professor Lister's observations on the coagulation of the blood, and the researches of the same physiologist into the influence of the cerebro-spinal system upon the contraction of the small arteries and upon the movement of the pigment granules in the cells of the frog's skin—researches which mark out the direct influence of the nervous system upon nutrition. An admirable feature in this manual is the brief sketch of the simpler forms of any function in the lower animals previous to the more special description of its complex form in man; so that the gradual development from the simple and general to the complex and special is displayed, and just ideas of the relations of the particular function are conveyed to the student.

Some of the recent discoveries in ophthalmic science, and their practical application in the treatment of defects of vision, are set forth by Mr. Laurence¹⁵ in a simple but thoroughly scientific manner. After certain preliminary considerations with regard to optics and a short account of the optical properties of the eye, he proceeds to investigate the departures from the standard of health, to discuss the causes and nature of the abnormal conditions, and to point out the proper remedies for them. How necessary it is in any case of defective vision to make a searching examination into all the conditions which may conspire to produce it, is well shown by a discovery of Donders, that almost all cases of ordinary convergent squint are accompanied by that defect of the eye which is now called hypermetropia—in other words, a deficient converging power on the rays of light, which are consequently focussed behind the retina. Subsequent researches have further proved the important fact that hypermetropia is in these cases the *cause* of the squint, and that the latter is a mere symptom and nothing more. The tendency to squint will still exist, therefore, after the operation for convergent strabismus, and the patient will be apt to become as bad as ever after a time, if he does not, at any rate for close work, use such convex glasses as are fitted to counteract the hypermetropia. How much yet remains to be done in ophthalmic science is shown by the difference of opinion which still exists as to the process by which the eye accommodates itself to distances. This accommodation is usually attributed to a change in the convexity of the lens and an alteration of the axes of the two eyes, to which some add a change in the convexity of the cornea. Though Mr. Laurence says of this last theory

¹⁵ "The Optical Defects of the Eye, and their Consequences: Asthenopia and Strabismus." By John Z. Laurence, F.R.C.S. Robert Hardwicke. 1865.

that it is devoid of all demonstrated truth, yet some powerful arguments in its favour have again been brought forward by Dr. Lawson as recently as in a paper in the last number of the "Ophthalmic Review." Mr. Laurence's book is the work of one who evidently has a complete scientific and practical knowledge of his subject.

Dr. Druitt has published an excellent and very interesting report on the cheap and sound wine, which might advantageously be drunk in place of the mixture of spirits and water, or the manufactured compound which the British public now delights in as port or sherry.¹⁶ The natural fermented juice of the grape, not mixed with any additional spirit, such as we get it in clarets, Burgundies, hock, and Hungarian wines, contains about 21 per cent. of proof spirit; the average of several samples of natural port wine was 23·5 per cent. of proof spirit; but, as fortified for the English market, the quantity is 35·4 per cent. It appears that we sell every year to the Portuguese an enormous quantity of cheap spirits, which we afterwards buy back from them as wine: in 1864, for example, we took from the Portuguese 3,344,871 gallons of port wine, while they took from England 1,630,304 gallons of spirit. Hamburg and Bremen are two North German ports which also take from Great Britain a large quantity of spirits, which they send back to us, after due manipulation, as port and sherry. Sometimes it is found desirable and profitable to ship these "Hambro'" compounds from London to Cadiz and back, in order that they may thus get by the voyage what they lack of being real wine. Latterly, however, the Custom-house authorities have subjected many such spurious mixtures to additional duty as "mixed spirits," pronouncing them to be, not wine, but flavoured spirits and water; and great has been the indignation and the outcry of some engaged in the concocting trade. Dr. Druitt has tried, with a well-trained and discriminating palate, numerous specimens of cheap wines, bought at different wine merchants, and delivers it as his verdict that "we can get good wine cheap, but that neither the public nor the profession use it as it deserves." Nor do they know when to drink it:

"Monsieur A. Courty, the eminent surgeon of Montpellier, who visited England a year ago to study English surgery, and who has recorded his sentiments in his very interesting 'Excursion Chirurgicale in Angleterre,' remarked on some of our social customs with admiration, but our dinner barbarisms excited his horror, as well they might. With the best meat, wine, and vegetables, we cook and devour them like savages. You may see grown men—and M. Courty publishes the damning fact to civilized Europe—drinking sweet champagne with mutton! and reserving a fine bottle of Bourdeaux, worth, perhaps, ten shillings, till after dinner, when a parcel of yahoos sip it, while they are munching sweetmeats, biscuits, preserved ginger, &c."

Dr. Druitt's report contains a great deal of very useful information, given in a concise and pleasant form, and we can strongly recommend it to the attention of the public, who want to know what wine they

¹⁶ "Report on the Cheap Wines of France, Italy, Austria, Greece, and Hungary; their Quality, Wholesomeness, and Price, and their Use in Diet and Medicine." By Robert Druitt, Member of the Royal College of Physicians, &c. Henry Renshaw. 1865.

should drink, as well as to the attention of physicians, who may obtain from it valuable hints as to what kind of wine they may prescribe with benefit to their patients. The author is particularly and justly severe on those so-called scientific analyses and absurd medical theories which it is the fashion of some wine merchants to put in their circulars, but which truly are; for the most part, as he points out, transparent quackery.

Mr. Acton has published the fourth edition of a book¹⁷ which has, no doubt, done some good, as it has evidently been largely read. It is difficult to treat satisfactorily such matters as the work deals with; and we confess that we should like a professedly scientific work much better if the author did not so often go out of his way to make moral reflections and earnest adjurations, some of which are not very appropriate; none of which are very profound, however well-intentioned all of them may be. Anyone in good sound health of body and mind is not likely to read many pages of such a book; but if the perusal of it by anyone in need of the physician's skill should prevent him from falling into the hands of the unscrupulous quacks who make a merciless profit of human infirmity, no little good will be done.

Dr. Gosse endeavours to rest the use of the Turkish Bath on something like a scientific foundation, by pointing out its value as a preventative of disease, and indicating the diseases in which it may be employed as a curative agent.¹⁸ He justly remarks that the worst anyone can do to the cause of the bath is to declare its use to be curative of every disease. Its true value, however, as a remedial agent in disease yet remains to be pointed out.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

MR. CARLYLE has brought to a close the History of Frederick II. of Prussia, the last of the kings as he calls him, in the two final volumes now before us.¹ In its completed form the history seems to us rather a big work with great things in it than a great work. At any rate it is not great for Mr. Carlyle. Effective in parts, it is not effective as a whole. The canvas on which he has painted is so large that you cannot see to the end of it. What he gains in length he loses in breadth. His picture cannot be seen as one continuous presentment, but must be inspected fragment-wise. The author seems to have neglected rather than lost the glorious art, so conspicuous in his really great work *The French Revolution*—the art of picturesque condensation, of loading his sentences with profound meaning, and

¹⁷ "The Functions and Disorders of the Reproductive Organs." By William Acton, M.R.C.S. Fourth edition. John Churchill and Sons. 1865.

¹⁸ "Du Bain Turc et de son Introduction en Suisse." Par Dr. L. A. Gosse. Geneva. 1865.

¹ "History of Frederick II. of Prussia, called Frederick the Great." By Thomas Carlyle. Vols. V. and VI. London: Chapman and Hall. 1865.

flashing out his thoughts with swift emphatic precision. It is useless to quarrel with Mr. Carlyle for that almost limitless admiration of the heroic individual which makes him indifferent to collective influence, and even when he writes history leads him to convert it into biography, in which one man casts the gigantic shadow that eclipses humanity itself. Yet, after all, the critical deductions "that a literary tom-tit may make from the grandeur of the sun-gazing eagle, there remains much for praise and grateful estimation. In these six volumes we recognise an indomitable, herculean patience and power of labour, an almost exhaustive research, a knowledge of the persons and procedures of the last century which has an extraordinary completeness, insight into character, skill to describe it, a masterly use of rhetorical colouring, gleams of wit and humour, lighting up the grim element of battle in which the last of the kings moves supreme. The new instalment of Frederick's history opens with the famous seven years' war, which began in 1756 and ended in 1763, leaving in all outward points Austria and Prussia, "simply *as you were*;" but, as Mr. Carlyle explains, planting a nation in the world "to be a nation, and to believe as you are convinced, instead of pretending to believe as you are bribed or bullied by the devils about you." As Germany found Prussia, on the blowing over of the "infernal tornado," so England got liberty of the seas, secured America for the English, and swept away the French, while France for her share was left to bankrupt quiescence and the spontaneous combustion which blazed out in 1789. The first grand act of the drama, universally known as the battle of Prague, will be still better known in coming time by Mr. Carlyle's description:—"Battle of Prag, one of the furious battles of the world, loud as Doomsday, the very emblem of which done on the piano by females of energy scatters mankind who love their ease." Of the many battles, sieges, and marches which made up the seven campaigns, of the generals who conducted it, and the far-shining seats of victory of the one pre-eminent hero, and how he fed the war, a minute, laborious recital will be found in pages, wherein Mr. Carlyle paints towns, fields, hills, bogs, marshes, windmills, not omitting Frederick's bed of straw, as Mr. Carlyle only can paint them. The whole of the fifth volume is occupied with the first five acts of the war drama, from its culminating moment till the king's near exhaustion in 1760. The twentieth book with which the sixth volume opens shews how the heroic fire burnt out again, inextinguishably, till the final extinction of the war itself, in the Peace of Hubertsburg, in February, 1763. The twenty-first and last book of the history contains an account of "the afternoon and evening of Frederick's life;" shews how he repaired a ruined Prussia; describes the Polish troubles and anarchy preliminary to the partition of Poland, which, as being an operation of Almighty Providence and of the eternal laws of nature, is reverentially accepted rather than explicitly vindicated by Mr. Carlyle; and in a chapter of miscellanies introduces Doctor Zimmerman, "Sister Ulrique," Queen of Sweden, Wilhelmina's daughter, Sherlock, Voltaire, General Conway, and others. We have next an account of the Fürstenbund (Frederick's league of the Princes of the German empire) as a sort of protection-society against the

annexation policy of Joseph and Kaunitz, to frustrate "the ambitious adventure" which would have made Austria the mistress of the basin of the Danube, and give the House of Hapsburg the command over the still independent territories in the south and centre of Germany. Soon after the formation of this league, which fell away before the French revolution, came the last scene of all.

"Frederick is making exit on the common terms; you may hear the curtain rustling down. For most part he was unconscious; never more than half conscious. As the wall clock above his head struck eleven, he asked 'What clock?' 'Eleven,' answered they. 'At four,' murmured he, 'I will rise.' One of the dogs sat on its stool near him; about midnight he noticed it shivering for cold. 'Throw a quilt over it,' said or beckoned he: that, I think, was his last completely conscious utterance. Afterwards, in a severe choking fit, getting at last rid of the phlegm, he said, '*La montagne est passée, nous irons mieux*—we are over the hill, we shall get better now.'"

But we never did. At twenty minutes past two, Thursday morning, 17th August, 1786, the breathing paused, wavered, ceased. Frederick reigned more than 46 years and lived 74 years and a half. That he was a great strategist, a first-rate war-artist, seems generally allowed; and that he was in some sense a great king must be conceded also; but we find it impossible to love or admire him with any transcendental love or admiration. Mr. Carlyle says all he can for him, sometimes, perhaps, more than he ought; but we suppose we are among the bad readers to whom he bids adieu at the end of this eventful history, and have too much of the valet about us to appreciate his hero. Before we echo our historian's adieu, we must say how excellently done are many of the episodic portions of his book. Though persons and scenes introduced in them tend to overcrowd an already crowded canvas, yet we should be sorry to miss the pages in which he portrays the great Earl of Chatham a born king like Frederick, or describes Catherine of Russia "object grandiose, if not great," or shews us Gellert, Saldern, and Major Quintus Icilius, with the royal hero in winter quarters; or Dr. Zimmerman, who wrote a book which Carlyle "thanks for nothing or nearly so;" or recognises the high worth of Voltaire "delivering the Calases, the Sirvens, and the oppressed of various kinds, especially ardent upon the Infâme, as the real business Heaven has assigned him in his day." The table of contents and the copious index which close the sixth volume, as well as the maps interspersed throughout all the volumes, and the various illustrative portraits, testify to the workmanlike care with which Mr. Carlyle has equipped his book. The conscientious research and general accuracy of the historian are not to be questioned, but in some Homeric nap he has committed or accepted one preposterous blunder. He makes the famous text of the heavenly witnesses occur in the *Gospel* of St. John!

The influence of great families is the subject discussed and illustrated in the joint production of Mr. J. L. Sanford and Mr. Meredith Townsend.² This influence is well explained by Mr. Townsend in a

² "The Great Governing Families of England." By John Langton Sanford and Meredith Townsend. In Two Volumes. William Blackwood and Sons. Edinburgh and London. 1865.

vigorously written and sensible *Introduction*. The great families, he maintains, are represented by the larger landowners, and their influence is of a twofold character. It is direct, and results from the property which they possess, and through which they act on others, as by an immediate material force; and it is indirect, and exerted through social position, which attracts "the million of voters who are, in England, the trustees of the people." Conceding to Mr. Disraeli that their practice of submitting to the guidance of "the educated few" grows in part out of the imaginative influence secured "by the sustained splendour of their stately lives," Mr. Townsend traces its true origin to the confidence reposed in the disinterested patriotism of the great families. In proof of this position he points to their history, instancing that of the house of Percy, which has repeatedly staked its grand position, and the heads of its members, in defence of the popular cause, and thus has both earned the right of giving advice, and inspired an habitual trust in seeking it. This action Mr. Townsend pronounces beneficial in the main, since it economises popular force, and strains or purifies the popular sentiment. The one great disadvantage of the aristocratic influence is that it overshadows and represses all non-aristocratic merit, so that much of the ability and courage of the people is lost to the service of the State. Having these views, Mr. Townsend some time since arranged with Mr. Sanford to publish in the columns of the *Spectator* a series of histories of the great English families, connecting the leading ascertained facts with the results of recent research into our national history. Their principle of selection led to the inclusion in his series of only a limited group of families. No family, however old, will be found in it, unless it be also great, nor any family, however great, unless it had also a great political history. The thirty-one families whose histories are related in these volumes, "supply at this moment one clear fourth of the English House of Commons;" and as Mr. Townsend sagaciously observes, their social power is always on the increase, and unless a redivision of property supervene to destroy it, will continue to increase, so that a century hence, if dukedoms still exist, an English dukedom will be an almost regal prize. The underground wealth of the estate of the Duke of Northumberland has prodigiously increased the possessions of the house. Under the careful management of the seventh Duke of Bedford, the increase of the head of the house of Russell was raised to no less a sum than £300,000 per annum. The social inheritance, and the moral, or intellectual worth of the chiefs of these, and the other noble families dominant in England, are duly recognised in the household histories computed in these useful volumes. Some few of these sketches have been drawn up by Mr. Townsend, who has also contributed a few notes, and exercised a general supervision; but the majority of them are by his coadjutor, Mr. Langton Sanford, whose historical studies have been long since appreciated. Among the great houses whose fortunes are described, whose value is estimated, whose representative men, and, in some instances, women, are delineated in these records, are the Lowthers, the Stanleys of Knowsley, the Grosvenors, Cavendishes, Clintons, Stanhopes, Fitzroys, and Spencers,

the Grenvilles, Petty-Fitzmaurices, Herberts, Berkeleys, Seymours, and Howards. Some of these sketches, of these family pictures, are admirably done, none of them are otherwise than well done. Anecdote and comment serve to relieve or explain the narrative of incidents. The book is, in its kind, a thoroughly satisfactory book, showing research, thought, and decision.

The singular story of the Earl of Worcester's life,³ a member of the governing family of Somerset, briefly told in these volumes, is narrated at full length, and very effectively, by Mr. Henry Dircks, whose experience as civil engineer renders him a competent judge on the scientific pretensions of the inventor of the great water-works. Edward Somerset, variously known as Lord Herbert, the Earl of Glamorgan, and Earl and Marquis of Worcester, was born in or about 1601. The early part of his life was passed in foreign travel, and it was while on the Continent, in all probability, that he changed the religion in which he was brought up for that of Rome. When he was twenty-seven years of age he married Elizabeth, the daughter of Sir William Dormer, and sister of Lord Carnarvon. His precocious genius exhibited itself in a predilection for mathematical studies and mechanical pursuits. The first seven years after his marriage were, as Mr. Dirck conjectures, spent principally at Raglan. Here, perhaps with the assistance of the foreign engineer, Caspar Kaltoff, he erected water-works in connexion with the citadel, or keep of the castle. For eleven years Caspar continued to construct models and machines for his inventive employer. In 1641 we enter on the earl's critical era. In December of that year Charles I. directed him to repair, not only for his own particular use, but for the good of the kingdom, to Whitehall. Henceforward Somerset devoted himself to the king's service. His success as a soldier appears to have been considerable. He took Goodrich Castle, the Forest of Dean, and the City of Hereford, and made himself master of the strongly fortified town of Monmouth. He raised, at his own and his father's expense, recruits to attend His Majesty at Oxford, as well as Sir John Byron's regiment of horse, besides supplying his own troop of Life Guards, in great part at least, with arms and horses. In a letter to the earl, Charles I. admits that he had laid out £250,000 for his service. At the request of the king, who created him Earl of Glamorgan, he went in 1644 or 1645 to Ireland, to treat and conclude with the Confederate Roman Catholics, and to raise a body of 10,000 men, to be employed in England in the Royal cause. The extravagance of the demands made by the Catholics was certainly one element in the diplomatic failure that ensued. The secret of this extraordinary commission (it was known only to the earl and the king) transpired. Lord Digby, a Protestant, accused Glamorgan of high treason, and Ormond, the Lord Lieutenant, had him imprisoned, till an intimation from the king, that the earl had acted by his orders, led to his release. Mr. Dircks gives a sufficiently

³ "The Life, Times, and Scientific Labours of the Second Marquis of Worcester," to which is added a Reprint of his "Century of Inventions," 1683, with a Commentary thereon. By Henry Dircks, Esq.; Civil Engineer, &c. &c. London: Bernard Quaritch. 1835.

minute account of the whole transaction. He shows by documentary evidence the crafty, treacherous policy of Charles. He proves that the king not only gave the commission, but disavowed the commission that he had given; that he not only repudiated the diplomacy of Glamorgan, but that through Secretary Nicholas he asserted that the warrant on which Glamorgan had acted was "a very strange one," surreptitiously gotten, if not worse, and that while he himself addressed the earl as Glamorgan, he instructed the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland that not only had his patent of nobility not passed the Great Seal, but that he had arrogated a distinction to which he had no title. Now, as the original warrant, with the king's signature and private seal, endorsed as the Earl of Glamorgan's especial warrant for Ireland, still exists (it was in the possession of the late Dr. Lingard), it is very evident that we have in the whole of this procedure a capital instance of the dissimulation with which the king has often been accused. It was fortunate for the earl and fortunate for the country that the negotiation was frustrated. Disowned and betrayed by his king, the earl, who on the death of his father became Marquis of Worcester, was obliged in 1648 to escape to France, to avoid the fate that had befallen his royal master. A voluntary exile till 1652, he was, on his return from France, in that year apprehended and committed to the Tower. There is some difficulty in determining the exact period of his captivity. It appears to have lasted rather more than two years. On his release (upon bail) Cromwell granted him three pounds a week out of the Monmouthshire estate, valued at £2500, for his better support. It was in the year of his liberation, 1655, that he drew up his famous "Century of Inventions," the significance of which will henceforth, with the aid of Mr. Dirck's useful annotations, be less liable to misconstruction. One of these inventions, the sixty-eighth in order, is described as "an admirable and most forcible way to drive up water by fire." It is, in fact, "that great invention which has popularised and preserved the fame of the Marquis of Worcester in the public mind." His works at Vauxhall, on which he spent £50,000, were well known. His engine was examined or noticed by M. Sorbière in 1663, four or five years later by the prejudiced mathematician, Dr. Robert Hook. In 1669 it was seen by the Grand Duke Cosmo de Medici; and a letter from Walter Travers, a Roman Catholic priest, shows that it was in existence as late as 1670. What was its ultimate fate is not known, but it was patented, and a model of it was deposited, or was required by Act of Parliament to be deposited, in the Exchequer; so that the fire-water-works of Vauxhall, though too far in advance of its time to be appreciated, must have been an invention often seen and much talked of. There can be no doubt as to its existence, and no doubt Mr. Dirck's thinks that it was a true steam-engine. It preceded that of Savery, if it did not originate it, by no less a period than thirty-six years. Charles the Second's neglect of the great marquis is said by Mr. Dirck's to have "had the effect of retarding the full development of the steam-engine in this country for above half a century." The inventor died the 3rd of April, 1667. Disesteemed and ill-treated during his lifetime, tardy justice is at length done him by his present biographer,

for we cannot but think that the claim of the Marquis of Worcester to be the inventor of the steam-engine is now for the first time placed beyond all doubt. We have no space for further criticism, but we must not finish this notice without drawing attention to the refutation of the Worcester myths put forth by the biographer in Appendix II., particularly the "pot-lid story, the interview in the Bicêtre, a fiction already exposed by M. Figuier, and Cartes' theory, or unfounded charge of forgery. Mr. Dircks has written an able and interesting vindication of his hero, whose greatest fault seems to have been his anti-patriotic royalism. Worcester now stands forth as a bold, brilliant, devoted man, generous, trustful, and trustworthy—a mathematician, a scholar, and a great inventive genius.

Historical whitewashing is the order of the day. A Vindication of King John, however, seems to carry the purifying process almost beyond the legitimate range of the operations of the literary laundry.⁴ Yet as John has had no friends hitherto, and as Mr. William Chadwick has really taken some pains with his subject, though we can hardly congratulate him on his success, students of this period of history will do well to examine this outrageous attempt at royal rehabilitation. That the devil is not as black as he is painted is no news to us; and that John was not the *monstrum horrendum informe* of traditional rumour is quite possible. His military expeditions to Ireland and Wales; the reforms that he introduced into the country of the Shamrock, which during his reign was tolerably tranquil and prosperous; and two successful sea fights, one of which is allowed to have been highly important, though John personally can scarcely be allowed any credit for them, reflect some lustre on his generally disastrous reign. To vindicate his hero Mr. William Chadwick has recourse to two expedients. He either denies the value of the evidence brought against him, rejecting it as the mendacious invention of monkish chroniclers, or, accepting the statements, he transforms them into propositions of a totally different kind. Thus, he refuses to believe in John's licentiousness; he excuses his divorce and appropriation of the lady betrothed to the Count of La Marche, which speedily lost him Normandy, Anjou, &c., and afforded a pretext for the subsequent hostile machinations of the French king. He contends that the cruelty towards the Jews with which John is charged existed only in the lying records of his original aspersors, and adduces testimonies from the *Tower Records* in proof of the king's gentle and considerate care for the Jews. But as all Jewish property belonged in theory to the Exchequer, we can quite understand that John might command others to respect "his Jews" and his "special Jews," without having the slightest objection to draw their teeth as the legitimate preliminary to the extraction of something better worth drawing, when these favoured capitalists proved not sufficiently accommodating. Mr. Chadwick contrasts the filial behaviour of John with that of Richard and the other sons of Henry II; but he omits or rejects the

⁴ "King John of England. A History and Vindication based on the Original Authorities." By William Chadwick. London: John Russell Smith. 1865.

incident that the first name that met the eye of the dying king in the list of insurgent barons was that of his loved and trusted son Earl John. So too he passes lightly over John's treacherous conduct to Richard. As to the murder or alleged murder of his nephew Arthur, which filled all men with abhorrence, Mr. Chadwick admits the fact, not of assassination indeed, but of a "private execution." But this is not all. To whitewash John it is necessary to blacken the old English barons, as treacherous and cowardly deserters. John, it seems, dared to assert his prerogatives against the Church-loving nobles, and even his surrender of the kingdom to the pope and the payment of an annual tribute to the holy see, when rightly understood, testify to the statesmanly qualities of a king who, "by attestation of the Holy Ghost, was manifestly noble." The nobility of John, it appears, has for foil the baseness of the traitor Stephen Langton, one of the two great moderators in the famous national emprise, called Magna Charta. So at least thinkers and historians of some weight have regarded it, but Mr. Chadwick, who pronounces modern historians to be old women, describes the undertaking as a French conspiracy, and the Charter itself as a farce, a delusion, and a fraud, not worth the parchment on which it was written. He contends that when John became a vassal of the Church of Rome, all his barons, knights, and squires became copyholders, that is farmers or yeomen, but ceased to be legislators. To Mr. Chadwick's ingenious law argument we make no reply. It is enough that in the following reign the confirmation of the Charter was the condition of the assent to a subsidy, and that it has ever since retained its place at the head of English statutes. On the whole, Mr. Chadwick's attempt to represent the cause of John as "the cause of reform and progress," and that of Langton, Pembroke and the Barons as "superstitious and retrospective," is as good a joke as we have heard for a long time.

We are glad to find that Mr. Charles Knight may be classed with Hallam, Mackintosh and the other "old women historians." In this succinct account of John's reign, in his *School History of England* he does ample justice to the great "conservative reform" of Runnymede. Mr. Knight, whose *Popular History of England* has been so favourably received, has superintended the execution of an abridgment of it by a member of his own family, which is now before us.⁵ It embraces alike the State history and the domestic, and comprises some separate chapters on the national industry, literature and arts. It has all the completeness that an abridgment can be expected to have, is written carefully and in straightforward unpretending English, is lucid, candid and comprehensive. It brings down our nineteen hundred years of growth and development from the invasion of Cæsar to the close of the session of the English Parliament in September, 1848.

"*Julius Cæsar ordeneide by the Counselle of the senate sette in pomposite all the world to be dimencionate by men discreet and prudent.*" We give this as a specimen of an English translation of Higden's

⁵ "Charles Knight's *School History of England*," &c. Abridged from the "*Popular History of England*," under the superintendence of its Author. London: Bradbury and Evans. 1865.

Polychronicon, made, it would appear, some years before Edward IV. was raised to the throne.⁶ Mr. Churchill Babington, who introduces the work to us, may well say that the translation is often unintelligible without the Latin. The translation by Trevisa (A.D. 1387) is inserted in the same page, which, on the principle of two negatives making an affirmative, may enable the English reader, who uses both versions, to approximate to some understanding of the original. The translation by Trevisa is remarkable, because it contains many rare words and expressions, and is one of the earliest specimens of English prose. Higden, a Benedictine monk, was born in the West of England in the latter part of the thirteenth century. He is chiefly known as the author of the Polychronicon, in seven books, one of which, with its double interpretation, occupies the whole of the first and only volume yet published. There is nothing in the present instalment that is valuable except in the eyes of the philologist.

The "Calendar of State Papers," edited by Mr. Robert Lemon, contains numerous entries elucidating the domestic affairs of the ten years of Elizabeth's reign between 1581 and 1590.⁷ Among other things we notice abstracts of the correspondence of Burleigh and Walsingham; memoranda relating to Lord Henry Howard, the Queen of Scots, Sir John Hawkins, and the Shelley family in Sussex. The Mr. Shelley of that day, who was a Papist, seems to have given as much trouble to official persons as his famous namesake, and perhaps descendant, did in our own day. The volume has an ample index, but no preface.

Edward the Sixth died in his sixteenth year, as most people believe, of consumption. If it be true, as history tells us, that he had the measles and small-pox the year before he died, and if, as has been recorded, his health began to decline six months before he died, when he was attacked with a bad cough, we should think the belief extremely well founded. There seems, however, to have been a suspicion in some preternaturally suspicious quarters that his death was caused, or accelerated, by unfair means. In the case of P. V., the writer of the Latin tract, entitled *Narratio Historica, etc.*,⁸ the suspicion amounted to conviction, for he boldly ascribes the king's death to the agency of the Duke of Northumberland, his guardian, by violent means, poison or the dagger doing the thing handsomely. The dismissal of Edward's physicians, and his treatment by an ignorant woman, by order of the Duke and the Council, lent some sort of colour to this utterly preposterous accu-

⁶ "Polychron Ranulphi Higdeni Monach Cestrensis;" together with the English Translations of John Trevisa and of an unknown Writer of the Fifteenth Century. Edited by Churchill Babington, B.D., F.L.S., &c., Senior Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. Vol. I. Published by the authority of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, under the direction of the Master of the Rolls. London: Longmans. 1865.

⁷ "Calendar of State Papers. Domestic Series of the Reign of Elizabeth, 1581—1590. Preserved in Her Majesty's Public Record Office. Edited by Robert Lemon, Esq., F.S.A., under the direction of the Master of the Rolls, &c. London: Longmans. 1865.

⁸ "Historical Narration of certain Events that took place in the Kingdom of Great Britain in the month of July, in the year of our Lord 1553." Written by P. V. Now first reprinted from the Latin. London: Bell and Daldy. 1865.

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sation. The tract is a curious one, and its history is curious. It came, we know not how, into the possession of the late Mr. Rodd, "who never saw or heard of any other copy." After his death it passed into the hands of the present editor, Mr. J. Ph. Berjeau, who has reprinted the Latin original, with a not over accurate English translation by Mr. J. B. Inglis. *P. V. has been conjectured to be one of those German divines who came to England to assist in the establishment of the Reformed Church, or upon speculation, Peter Viret, or Peter Vermilly, alias Peter Martyr. It is stated in the preface by the editor, that a German translation of the tract, apparently of the same date as the Latin original, is now in the possession of Mr. Inglis.

Passing from England to Italy, we may trace the fortunes of the future capital of that kingdom, under the pleasant leadership of Mr. T. Adolphus Trollope.⁹ Of his projected "History of the Commonwealth of Florence," from the earliest independence of the commune to the fall of the Republic in 1531, we have the first half before us, bringing us down to the peace with Visconti, about a hundred years previously. Broken up into books, which very fairly represent a period, the narrative is clear and intelligible throughout, possessing the merit of distinct and orderly arrangement. A competent knowledge of his subject enables the author to become the popular historian of Florence. A full, free, lively recital of the events and incidents which make up the story of the new Italian metropolis, is the result of much studious and conscientious labour. It is, however, rather a valuable narrative than a profound history. It wants compression; it is deficient in *power*: it is diffuse, not to say loose in style. We decidedly condemn such writing as we find in page 41 of the second volume, or page 3 of the first, where, describing Italy as the favourite in the great race, the author says, "She knocked up and was nowhere." Such fine phrases, too, as "cosmic mind" and "normal sequence" are not much to our taste. If we look below the surface, however, we shall see that there is a good deal to commend in Mr. Trollope's "Florence." His recognition of the paramount importance of the municipal element in the social system of Italy, of the influential character of the imperial idea—"the idea of a Roman empire and a Roman emperor, bequeathed by the old to the new civilization"—and the nature of the relationship between the Empire and the Church, is very creditable. His exposition of the famous feud of the Guelph and Ghibelline, Neri and Bianchi factions, is remarkably clear for so obscure a subject, and, we are disposed to think, essentially sound. He shows that the party names of Guelph and Ghibelline were known in Florence long before the Buondelmonte tragedy, which was the immediate incentive to civil war, and that the real gist of the contest was between the encroachment of the popular element and the attempted repression of it by the classes above. The Ghibellines (from the castle of Weibling, near Augsburg) were the nobles, who wished to keep what they had got,

⁹ "A History of the Commonwealth of Florence, from the earliest Independence of the Commune to the Fall of the Republic in 1531." By T. Adolphus Trollope, author of the "Girlhood of Catherine de Medici," &c. In Four Volumes. Vols. I, and II. London: Chapman and Hall, 1865.

and were attached to the empire; the Guelphs (from the rival house of Bavaria) professed attachment to the Church only because the Papacy was in opposition to the empire, and formed the body of the people. Later an extraneous feud was imported into Florence from Pistoia. The family of Cancellieri, the prominent family in that factious little city, quarrelled, and parted into two "great septs," sprung one from the first, and the other from the second wife of the same common ancestor. As one of the ladies was called Bianca, or white, "her descendants took that distinctive appellation, and the other branch of the family called themselves by the name most naturally opposed to it." The "blacks" hated the "whites," and the "whites" the "blacks," from a sort of acquired taste, when they espoused this family quarrel. But (Mr. Trollope contends) "at bottom the real ground of contest, the real interests which caused a personal quarrel between two branches of a powerful family to be adopted by the masses of the body politic, the sympathies, opinions, and feelings which led one man to be a *Bianco* and another a *Nero*, turned in truth upon the great social question which has been stated." The application of this theory, in the development of his historical composition, gives a unity to it, and a moral purpose which, with more vigorous and searching treatment, would be very impressive. This is the key to the history of France, and Mr. Trollope uses it with considerable effect. Perhaps the most epical portion of this history, the very best bit of narrative in it, is that relating to the career of Castruccio Castracane, the hero of Mrs. Shelley's startling romance, the "Castle of Valperga." Among the more critical passages are those relating to Dante, who was, our author thinks, rather a cosmopolitan imperialist than a supporter of an independent united Italy. He would have put Italy under the strong hand of a German protector to secure it a tranquil prosperity. Originally a patriot, the poet became, after his wrongs had exasperated him into a burning hatred, the implacable foe of the "impious" Florence. Commenting on this exile, Mr. Trollope informs us of a curious and important discovery of the learned antiquarian, Lami. In a volume of the "State Papers" of the period, in which the sums paid by the signory to Charles de Valois are specified, a contemporary hand has written on the margin: "The true and secret cause of Dante's exile was his opposition to these payments."

From Florence to Paris is an obvious transition. In an ingenious and interesting little volume by M. Lucien Davesiés de Pontès, we have some picturesque but rather sketchy studies on the history of the beautiful capital of France, from a remote period down to the present day.¹⁰ The publication is a posthumous one, and has rather a composite character. It consists, in part, of the only two chapters of a projected work on the history of the Revolution of Paris which the author lived to finish, and of papers written at a different period of his life, advocating the transfer of the seat of government from the present metropolis to the centre of France. In the first chapter of the

¹⁰ "Études sur Histoire de Paris, ancien et moderne," Par Lucien Davesiés de Pontès, Paris: Michel Lévy Frères, 1865,

"History," M. de Pontès describes Paris as it was in the days of Roman invasion and Roman occupation. Though the situation of Lutetia was not central, and though the river did not admit of maritime navigation, it was early constituted a *municipium* by the Romans, who found the Seine available for inland water carriage. In the reign of Tiberius, Paris enjoyed a kind of secondary prosperity. At a later period it became the residence of three emperors, Julian, Valentinian, Gratian. In A.D. 508, Clovis made it the seat of his empire, and later still Sigebert established his quarters there. On the other hand, when Charlemagne, recovering to himself the government of *Roman France*, with Aix-la-Chapelle for a capital, confided to his son Louis the administration of Roman Gaul, Toulouse, and not Paris, was selected as the royal residence. Again, none of the *rois fainéants* resided in Paris, but at Clichy, Épinay, Meslay, &c. Without centralization, Paris was for a time only the capital of Neustria; and after the seclusion of Chilperic III., A.D. 750, it ceased to be anything more than the principal city of a province. After it had been taken and burned three or four times by pirates, it sustained a two years' siege, and under the direction of Count Eudes and Bishop Gozlin, offered a vigorous resistance to the invader. The assaults of the Northmen, however, proved so formidable, that Charles the Simple was compelled to cede to them a part of Neustria. The sceptre and crown of France, which fell from Charles's feeble hand, were picked up by Robert, Count of Paris, the grandfather of Hugues Capet, the founder of the third race of French kings. Under the first race (the Merovingians) royalty had been a hereditary magistracy; under the second (the Carolingians) an elective power within the same family; under the third (the Capetians) it became feudal and personal; it demanded a capital, and that capital was Paris. During the reign of Charles VI. occurred an episode in the history of Paris, which, under the title of "Les Bourguignons et les Cabochiens," is graphically related in the second division of this little volume. To this narrative is attached an essay on the Revolution of Paris, in which the author judges and condemns Paris, showing how it attained the dignity of the French capital, and how for five years it had revolutionized France. In another essay, published in 1850, and entitled "*Paris tuera la France*," De Pontès insists on the necessity of substituting for this city a different seat of government. The insurrection of June, 1848, seems to have inspired the author with apprehensions for the future of France. Alarmed at the revolutionary excesses of Paris, and fearing its intellectual and social dictatorship, he conceived the historical and political paradox which the essays explain and recommend, and the "Studies" serve to illustrate. We are not at all surprised to learn that the *brochure* of 1850 was the object of the violent polemics of the daily press of Paris, nor that the brilliant adhesions which it obtained from the provincial press failed to encourage the author to complete a work which M. Jacob in his preface designates original and remarkable alike in matter and in form.

The Abbé Paris, in his *post-mortem* state, gave the government of France as much trouble about 130 years ago as the city of similar-sounding name gave M. de Pontès during his lifetime. In the last

pages of the second volume of "*La France sous Louis XV.*"¹¹ may be read a condensed account of the miracles wrought at the tomb of that distinguished divine, and of the tremendous excitement that prevailed till the authorities closed the cemetery of Saint-Medard, and the frenzy had its euthanasia in an epigram—

"De par le roi, defense à Dieu,
De faire miracle en ce lieu."

M. Alphonse Jabez, the author of this work, begins the second volume with an account of the financial embarrassments during the regency, from 1717 to 1720, in which Law is depicted as a financial hero disinterestedly engaged in the laudable attempt to save the credit of the country, though his *combinations* eventually issued in organized robbery. The period comprised in the historical delineation of France, from the money-consultation in June, 1717, to the anti-celestial proclamation, terminating the religious outbreak of Saint-Medard, is a little less than fifteen years. During the ministry of the Duke of Bourbon and that of Cardinal de Fleury, occurred the events related in the fourth and fifth chapters of this agreeable and instructive history.

Louis XV. bequeathed a fatal inheritance to his young and feeble, but amiable son, in a kingdom in which all the social elements were in a state of mutual repulsion, in which a clerical power was challenged by Parliament, and religion by philosophy; in which the Court was careless and frivolous, while the people were silently awakening out of a long sleep to a desperate and destructive self-assertion. Old documents that tend to elucidate the French Revolution, or the antecedent period, are always acceptable; and the recent contribution of M. F. Feuillet de Conches is one that will be sure to attract numerous readers. The correspondence of the royal chiefs of the defeated party,—of Louis XVI., of Marie Antoinette and Madame Elisabeth,—reanimates that age of hope and despair, of enthusiastic joy and paralyzing sorrow. These letters attest the good intention of the young king, describe the radiant life of the ill-fated Marie Antoinette, or set forth the mischievous policy of the emigrants, the tenderness and often the good sense of the queen, and the slow advance of the inevitable fate that overtook the actors in that wild explosion.¹²

The anxiety of the royal pair to avoid civil war, and the opposition of the Queen to the rash schemes of the intriguing emigrants, are placed beyond doubt. Marie Antoinette, however, had her own counter-revolutionary project. In the famous manifesto of the king, which was drawn up just before the flight to Vincennes, the omitted passages have been restored by the editor. It is no news that Louis committed the fatal mistake of disowning all the acts which he had sanctioned during a period of a year and three-quarters, the period of what he called his captivity. In the second volume of this collection the state-

¹¹ "*La France sous Louis XV. (1715—1774).*" Par M. Alphonse Jabez, *Ancient Représentant*. Tom. II. Paris: Didier. 1866.

¹² "*Louis XVI., Marie Antoinette, et Madame Elisabeth.*" *Lettres et Documents inédits, publiés par F. Feuillet de Conches*. Vols. I, and II. Paris: Henri Plon. 1864.

ment may be found in the original document by all who care to read it. The letters and papers contained in the present instalment (for such it appears to be) begin with the spring of the year A.D. 1770, and end with the summer of A.D. 1791. The archives of France, Austria, Russia, and Sweden, have been ransacked for them, and private collections have been placed at the disposal of the indefatigable editor whose labours have been extended over a period of no less than twenty years. We are indebted to him for an explanatory preface, in which we can well allow him the tribute of sympathy he offers to the victims of the Revolution, and to a carefully prefaced analysis of contents immediately prefixed to each of the letters which it introduces.

Eleven years before the commencement of the insurrection which ended so disastrously for the ruling powers of France, the king of that country recognised the independence of the United States in a formal treaty, and himself unconsciously helped to inaugurate democracy in the world, by his defensive alliance and military aid to the rebellious colonists. In "A Popular History of America," by Miss Elizabeth Cooper, the narrative of the War of Independence, and establishment of the Federal Government, forms the third leading section of her compilation.¹³ It is preceded by an account of the colonization of the United States, which in its turn is introduced by the story of the discovery and conquest of the West Indies and South America. Miss Cooper has consulted numerous authorities, and has evidently worked in a diligent and conscientious spirit. Taking her book for what it is, a popular history based on accepted authorities, we think it a trustworthy and serviceable *résumé*. It is written in a simple unaffected style, with an easy quiet flow of homely yet graceful English words.

A collection of the letters of Mozart has been recently published by Herr Nohl, the author of a pleasant biography of that great musical composer.¹⁴ The letters are arranged in separate sections; the headings to the sections comprising the data of time and place. They show us Mozart as a correspondent in the fourteenth year of his age, and leave him only a year or so before his death. They do not, however, furnish a complete epistolary biography. Playful and devout, indignant and apologetic, these letters afford us glimpses into the inner as well as the external life of Mozart. Those addressed to his father, testify to his filial affection, while they evince a determination to "hold his own." Those written to his wife, display a sportive childlike feeling. Often we find sketches of the men and women whom he knew; and here and there we learn something of the manners of the age. For instance, Mozart complains bitterly of the Archbishop of Salzburg; of his impertinent and contemptuous treatment of himself. The most extraordinary of all German counts, was the Count Arco, who forcibly ejected the young composer from his house, adding

¹³ "A Popular History of America, from the Discovery by Columbus to the Establishment of the Federal Republic of the United States." In Three Periods. By Elizabeth Cooper. London: Longmans. 1865.

¹⁴ "Mozart's Briefe. Nach den Originalen herausgegeben von Ludwig Nohl." Mit einem Facsimile. London: David Nutt. 1865.

fresh momentum to the original impetus by an untranslatable application of his foot, which Mozart promised himself to return on the first opportunity. We trust one soon occurred, and that Mozart was as good as his word, and a great deal better. The "Lexicon and Register of Names and Things" at the end of the volume, will be found of service, in the attempt to discover "who's who and what's what," in a correspondence which is not systematically annotated.

Weber, another of the "dead kings of melody," was born about thirty years after his illustrious predecessor.¹⁵ The ample memoir of this celebrated composer, written by his son, Baron Max Maria Von Weber, was briefly noticed, not very long ago, in our pages. Of this memoir, what appears to be a very readable translation, is now offered to the public by Mr. J. Palgrave Simpson. Translation, indeed, is hardly a fitting word, for the work before us is, we learn from the preface, a condensation throughout, and in some portions a reconstruction.

The simultaneous cultivation of art and science has a practical expression in the next book on our list; the autobiography of the celebrated Dr. Carus.¹⁶ If there is any fault to be found with this work, it is that it is too like an echo of Goethe's *Dichtung und Wahrheit*. This resemblance is partly the result of a more or less conscious imitation; partly the result of moral and intellectual conformities. The style is beautifully clear and the treatment artistic, as we should expect it to be in the case of one who systematically combined the study of art with that of science. The life of Dr. Carus, like that of many eminent thinkers, was not in its earlier part, at least, an eventful one. Born at Leipsic on the 3rd of January, 1789, of respectable parents, he was indebted for elementary education to his maternal uncle, Daniel Jäger, who resided at Mühlhausen. During his boyish days he was forcibly impressed with the sight of the library, microscope, and scientific instruments, of Dr. Altenberg. The natural history pursuits and the talent for drawing of Tilesius, who married Altenberg's sister, also aided in eliciting the dawning intelligence of the child. In his twelfth year, his academical career commenced. His classical studies seem to have been scarcely congenial to him. At all events, while acknowledging the value of Greek and Latin literature, rightly applied, in stimulating and interesting the youthful mind, he complains of the defects in existing school systems, and compares the vestibule of philology to the Pool of Bethesda; he and his comrades being the sick persons who waited for an angel to come down and trouble the classical waters. Soon, however, we find him studying chemistry, physics, botany, at the same time as poetry and drawing. An enthusiasm for philosophical ideas, accompanied and succeeded his early progress. There was a great intellectual enthusiasm. The

¹⁵ "Carl Maria Von Weber, the Life of an Artist." From the German of his Son, Baron Max Maria Von Weber. By J. Palgrave Simpson, M.A., Author of "Pictures from Revolutionary Paris," &c. &c. In Two Volumes. London: Chapman and Hall. 1865.

¹⁶ "Lebenserinnerungen und Denkwürdigkeiten," von Carl Gustav Carus. Erster Theil. Leipsig: F. A. Brockhaus. 1865.

notion of the world-soul, the idea of an interdependent organic whole, taught by Schelling, attracted the young student. Oken, with his principle of development, his orphic saying that man was the measure and measurer of creation, and his splendid *aperçu*—that the structure of the skull is essentially that of the vertebral column, in which Goethe had silently anticipated him, exerted a still more powerful influence on his mind. To Oken's mysterious equation, that God = Zero, we find Carus afterwards objecting, as inadequate or inaccurate, and substituting his own philosophical equivalent, of the highest Eternal Mystery. We may mention here, his protest against the idea of power as an abstract, something mechanically superposed upon matter, and his averment that it is a purely subjective conception, as another illustration of a philosophical method, into which we cannot go further. In 1809, we find the young student engaged in hospital practice under Reinhold, as afterwards under Clarus. In the following year, he became assistant to Dr. Jörg. The year after was doubly important to him as that of his professional promotions and marriage. The French invasion gave the young practitioner abundant opportunities of increasing his hospital experience. He attended as many as 200 sick daily. In his twenty-fifth year, he was appointed Professor of Obstetrics at Dresden. His official duties, his anatomical and physiological studies, and the composition of a series of corresponding publications on the brain, the nervous system, &c., henceforth occupied most of his time. What hours of leisure he had, seem to have been spent in excursions, or social intercourse, or æsthetic pursuits. Though the principal portrait in this autobiography is naturally that of the author himself, the work abounds in sketches of friends and acquaintances, more or less noteworthy, and, among others, we find Tieck, Goethe, and Chladni, so famous for his investigations in acoustics, and his researches into the nature of meteoric stones. In the year 1821, Carus accepted a proposal from the Government, to undertake a scientific journey along the shores of the Mediterranean; and here, with a promise to report briefly the results of travel, Dr. Carus closes the present instalment of his reflective and graceful autobiography.

Going back nearly 400 years, we meet with a rather striking personage in Ulrich, the Duke of Wirtemberg. Born February, 1487, on the failure of the elder branch of the family, Ulrich, the son of Count Heiry, succeeded to the dukedom. At a very early age he married the Princess Sabina, of Bavaria, the niece of the Emperor Maximilian. The first years of his government were prosperous, and his court was the most brilliant in Germany; but about ten years after his accession (A.D. 1498), a series of bad harvests rendered it increasingly difficult to raise the large revenue which his hereditary and *acquired* debts, in addition to the ordinary expenditure, demanded. In 1514, the people broke out into open insurrection; an insurrection, however, which he contrived to quell. In the following year, he added to his difficulties by murdering with his own hand his retainer, Hans von Hutten, in revenge for what he regarded as his disloyalty in betraying the secret of his humiliating love for Hutten's young wife. Fresh enmities rapidly sprang up, and at

length he had to meet in arms the whole Swabian Confederacy. Of his strange adventures, his expulsion from his dominions, and his ultimate recovery of them, an account may be read in the pamphlet-biography, which bears his name, by Dr. Bernard Kugler, who partly follows his predecessor, Heyd, but differs from him in taking a more favourable view of the Duke's character. The strange psychological phenomenon, recorded by Heyd and quoted by Dr. Strauss in his new *Leben Jesu*, which followed the expulsion of the Duke, is recorded by Dr. Kugler also.¹⁷ Ulrich's adherents, it is said, cherished such a strong attachment for him, that night and day their thoughts were almost exclusively occupied with their banished lord. The very prohibition not to mention him invested him with a sort of mysterious obscurity. He became a mythical personage; the very stones and trees prated of his whereabouts; persons were found who declared that they had seen him or even sheltered him, in disguise, under their own roof; though this from the very nature of the case was impossible. It was with the mind's eye, therefore, that they saw the subject of their incessant meditation. The imagination realized the presence of the 'man of Theil,' whose rapid movements gave him a seemingly ubiquitous power. His enthusiastic followers saw him with their hearts, and then had little difficulty in seeing him with their eyes. The man who thus became a fable in life, died in 1550; but we cannot further recount his adventures.

A pamphlet¹⁸ drawn up by M. Achille Jubinal opens with a preface, in which we are introduced to M. Sismondi and the Emperor Napoleon conversing under the trees of the park which adjoined the *Elysée Bourbon*, "like a couple of Platonic philosophers at the decline of a beautiful day." Sismondi, who had opposed the imperial policy previous to the publication of the Constitution of the 20th March, after that event, did not hesitate in taking part with the great Emperor. The articles contributed by the historian to the *Moniteur* in vindication of the new policy, and to which he was indebted for the interview, and we for the curious conversation recorded in these pages, have been brought together by the editor and immediately followed his introductory explanation.

By a sudden transition in space and time we pass to the Rome of Augustus and his successors down to Commodus, the unworthy son of M. Aurelius Antoninus.¹⁹ The manners and customs of Roman society, during two hundred years, are satisfactorily treated by Herr Ludwig Friedländer in the work whose title we give below, and which was noticed in this *Review* on the appearance of the first edition. That a

¹⁷ "Ulrich Herzog zu Wirtemberg." Von Dr. Bernhard Kugler. Stuttgart, 1865.

¹⁸ "Napoleon et M. de Sismondi en 1815." Par Achille Jubinal, Député au Corps Législatif. Paris: Jules Gay. 1865.

¹⁹ "Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte Roms in der Zeit von August bis zum Ausgang der Antonine." Von Ludwig Friedländer, Professor in Königsberg. Zweite Vermehrte Auflage. Erster Theil. Leipzig: Hirzel. 1865.

second and that an enlarged edition has been called for is sufficient testimony to its merits.

In the fifth part of Welcker's "Alte Denkmäler," the student of the antique will find much to attract and interest.²⁰ This last volume of an apparently valuable work treats of statues, bas-reliefs, and paintings on vases, some of which, at least, have been recently discovered. Among the statues are those of Aristophanes, Menander, and other poets. Among the paintings are comprised "The Judgment of Paris," and "The Murder of Ægisthus." The volume is enriched with numerous outlines, placed together at the end, and obviously exemplifying the thesis in the preface, that the remains of plastic art interpret or illustrate the literature of the ancient world.

"The Holy Sepulchre and the Temple at Jerusalem" is the twofold title of an elaborate essay by Mr. James Fergusson, consisting of two lectures, delivered at the Royal Institution, in Albemarle-street, one in February, 1862, the other in March last.²¹ In this essay he undertakes to show that the Temple of Herod was a building 600 feet square, neither more nor less; that it was situated in the south-west angle of the Haram area; that both the Christians and the Moslems knew perfectly well, in the seventh century, what the dimensions of the temple were, and where it was situated; that Omar built a mosque within its precincts; that the Mogrebins and the Malakites afterwards built their mosques within the same Herodian area, and that the idea of their selecting a site exterior to it is intrinsically improbable, and is contradicted by all contemporary history. Hence he argues, if the "Dome of the Rock" was not built by the Saracens, it must have been built by the Christians, there being no third party; and, if this be so, he asks, "What church did Constantine, or any other Christian priest or monarch build in Jerusalem over a great rock, with one cave in it, but the Church of the Holy Sepulchre?" In other words, Mr. Fergusson maintains that the building popularly known as the Mosque of Omar, and which was always supposed to be of Saracenic architecture, was really of Christian origin, and "is in reality the sepulchral building which Constantine erected over what he believed to be the tomb of Christ." Mr. Fergusson appears to us to be an adequately informed inquirer and an able controversialist. His argument is well worth consideration. His book contains much interesting collateral discussion. The explanation of the plan of the Temple of Ezekiel, in particular, deserves examination. We are surprised, however, to find so instructed a writer repeating the traditionary view of the identity of the Temple of Herod with that of Zerubbabel. At least, he says the house itself was only repaired. Nothing can be clearer than the statement of Josephus, that, after Herod had taken away the old foundations and laid others, he erected the temple upon them, ἀνελὼν δὲ τοὺς ἀρχαίους θεμελίους, καὶ καταβαλόμενος ἕτερούς ἐπ' αὐτῶν τὸν ναὸν ἐγείρει. We agree

²⁰ "Alte Denkmäler" erklärt von F. G. Welcker. Fünfter Theil. Mit 26 lith. Tafeln. Göttingen. 1864.

²¹ "The Holy Sepulchre and the Temple at Jerusalem," &c. By James Fergusson, F.R.S., &c. &c. John Murray. 1865.

with Dr. Heberden, that if there be any difference between rebuilding and repairing, if Haggai's temple differed from Solomon's and was a second temple, then Herod's was not the same with Haggai's, but was truly a third temple.

BELLES LETTRES.

IT used to be a favourite argument against works of fiction, that they encouraged false views and exaggerated expectations, and that the young, ever prone to romance, should not have their feelings worked upon and their imaginations excited by dazzling visions of unattainable delight, beside which the inevitable prose of life would contrast with unnecessary harshness. Such fears may once have been well-grounded, but they make no part of our apprehensions for the rising generation. At present, the dangers of novel-reading lie in a totally different direction, and a loathing of all civilized life is more likely to be engendered by it than any disturbing dreams of ideal perfection. In the romances of chivalry man was heroic and brave, woman the queen of his heart, and the idol of his reverential homage; in the romances of to-day, man is sordid, dull, and careworn, and, instead of rescuing distressed damsels, or vowing eternal love to youthful beauty, he is looking out for some woman possessed of bank-stock, in consideration of which he may be induced to burden himself with a wife. Our most popular novelist has devoted two volumes¹ to the outer and inner history of an excellent spinster of five-and-thirty, who finds that the possession of eight hundred a-year has rendered her too attractive for her own peace, and whose life is a constant struggle to escape being run down and boarded against her will. With all a woman's instinctive readiness to trust herself to, and to take refuge with any man who would let her love him, she has to wage an unequal warfare against her own heart craving for affection, and her Scotch prudence that cannot be blinded to the greed of gold, which taught her to look upon her lovers "as so many men to whom her income would be convenient, and to feel herself to be almost under an obligation to them for their willingness to put up with the incumbrance which was attached to it." We all know with what mingled humour and kindness, Mr. Trollope can handle such a theme, and among his many female characters he has never drawn a better than this of Miss Mackenzie, with her homely face, her romantic heart, and her sterling uprightness—her innocent aspirations after the beautiful, and the desperately clayey nature of the fields wherein she dug for the treasure. From first to last she is admirable, and for her sake we bear with the odious company of her relations and admirers. But they are almost too much for mortal patience, and all Mr. Trollope's practised art hardly avails to carry the reader through chapter after chapter of too faithful description. It cannot be said that any of the story is badly done; good of their kind are the various members of the decayed family of the Balls; very good

¹ "Miss Mackenzie." By Anthony Trollope. Chapman and Hall. 1865.

the religious world of Littlebath ; and excellent the rival lovers, the Rev. Jeremiah Maguire, with his awful squint, and Mr. Rubb, with his greasy hair and yellow gloves ; but there is a limit not easy to define, beyond which pictures of human nature distorted by vulgarity, cease to amuse and become simply offensive, and this limit, we are fain to say, is overstepped in "Miss Mackenzie." For, though the story is not a bad one, it becomes dull from the persevering consistency with which this one obnoxious image—that of a good, loving woman, hunted for the sake of her gold by one disagreeable man after another—is kept always before us, and, though we accept thankfully the slight alleviation of such scenes as the Littlebath tea-parties, and Mrs. Tom Mackenzie's dinners *à la Russe*, even these are but a sorry diversion, and we have hardly patience to accompany the estimable heroine to the longed-for goal, when she becomes the wife of the least objectionable of her suitors.

In another of his recent works,² of which only the first volume is before us, we meet Mr. Trollope on the old familiar ground, and find ourselves again among the ladies and gentlemen who stay in country houses, read Mudie's books, and play at billiards. It is not fair to judge of the whole by one-half, further than to say that "Can You Forgive Her?" promises to be as amusing as its predecessors, and with the distinction of a more than usually difficult subject. Alice Vavasor, whom we are asked to forgive, is not a captivating heroine ; but a well-conceived and far from impossible young woman, who chafes under and breaks an engagement to an excellent high-minded gentleman, not, as she tells herself and her friends, because she has discovered that she is not good enough for him, but because she has, half unconsciously, become deeply infected with the nineteenth century idea, that there was something important for her to do with her life—in other words, she was restless and craving for excitement, and her heart failed her when she thought of long, quiet evenings in the monotonous comfort of a country home in Cambridgeshire. With his usual skill in depicting the working of half-acknowledged motives, and the influence of slight causes in determining the most important actions, Mr. Trollope has placed his heroine in circumstances that are admirably well adapted to make her conduct appear natural, if not inevitable, and he succeeds, as he always does, in interesting us in a struggle which we feel has many counterparts in real life. It is almost unnecessary to say that the female characters usurp the chief place, and, for once, we have a widow, who is more ridiculous than charming, and a young wife—the Lady Glencora Palliser—a sacrifice to the worldly wisdom of relations, who think that a cold, possible Chancellor of the Exchequer must be the right husband for a weak, thoughtless, clinging girl, whose heart is full of the image of a dissipated spendthrift, with an irresistible gift of pleasing, the face of an Adonis, and who "never reflected ;" for his family, the Fitzgeralds, famed for their beauty and their worthlessness, "never reflected till they were nearer forty than thirty, and then

² "Can You Forgive Her?" By Anthony Trollope. Vol. I. Chapman and Hall. 1864.

people began to think worse of them than they had thought before." A story composed mainly of such elements can hardly be called a pleasing one, and Mr. Trollope appears to have something of a casuist's satisfaction in trying to fix the exact culpability of a wrongdoer; but the thing in which he excels is that just appreciation of the manifold variety of influences which are brought to bear upon each unit in our closely-packed modern existence, and a certain tone of moral soundness redeems his least edifying scenes from the taint of a false sympathy with evil. As he deals simply and solely with human nature as it appears in its most conventional aspects (he rarely attempts children or rustics), he is naturally driven to vulgar people for his comedy, and very richly comical are Mrs. Greenhow and her lovers; but it is only another version of his old favourite joke—the rich woman and the men who want her money, and of this we have had more than enough in "Miss Mackenzie." When will a popular writer learn to care enough for his well-earned reputation to refrain from striking off more copies of an idea than the plate will bear?

A third edition of "George Geith"³ tells of the eagerness with which the public have made haste to read a book which every one warns his neighbour is too melancholy for a novel, and which breaks the commandment against an unhappy end. This objection is surely out of place when the demand for truth to nature and facts is so loud; for how many stories in real life end what is called happily, that is prosperously? It has been frequently said, that novels are to the present age what the drama was to bygone days, and what minstrels were to mediæval times—nourishment for which the imagination craves, escape from dull reality to the brighter realms of fancy—and even if this be but partially true, it should be a discouragement to the obtrusive realism so prevalent among writers of fiction, which degrades what might be a medium of refined and elevating pleasure into a vehicle for tawdry melodrama and low comedy. For if the sentiment conveyed, and the feelings appealed to, are no higher or stronger than can be called forth by the average mediocrity which dominates in society, instead of being refreshed by getting out of ourselves for an hour, we are only sent down a little lower than we were before in trivialities and commonplace. Great, therefore, is our obligation to such a writer as the author of "George Geith," who brings the dignity of real passion and the fervour of conscious power to illustrate a story in which the actors not only belong to ordinary modern life, but are immersed in its interests in their most prosaic form. A middle-aged accountant, toiling in the City, and an incorrigible mimic of seventeen, making game of every one she comes near, are not personages round whom many writers would venture to weave the web of romance; but no hero of tragedy of the most approved type, and no woman of the ideally angelic order, have ever been the theme of a more thrilling story than this which records the fatal error of George Geith and his ill-fated love for Beryl Molozone. It is so different from, as well as

³ "George Geith of Fen Court." By F. G. Trafford. Third Edition. London: Tinsley Brothers. 1865.

superior to ninety-nine hundredths of the novels that are written, that it claims to be judged by a different standard, and measured by a higher rule. It never deals with the surface of things, and but rarely with small individual peculiarities; the story being a most sad one, and the man whose agony we have to witness one in whom joyousness has long been quenched. The whole tone of the book is sombre and mournful, and a consciousness of impending woe seems to overcast even the least gloomy passages. But this fault, if fault it be, is soon forgotten in the strong current of deep passion that sets in and carries the reader's sympathies along with it. Beryl dies heartbroken, and her wonderful sister dies just as her childish dreams of poetic fame had begun to promise fruition in the shape of a poem accepted and paid for, but the pen that can describe such lives and such deathbeds would not be better employed in making us grin. If it were not for the exceeding pathos and the volume of unhappiness that is sometimes almost overwhelming, we should dwell more upon the gleams of gaiety which are by no means wanting to give light to the picture, and which make the glimpses of life at the Dower House, in Hertfordshire, so enchanting. And there is another alleviation of the pervading tone in the many beautiful descriptive passages of natural scenery, the effect of which is heightened by the intense sympathy with humanity which makes the author associate the external scene with the human being through whose eyes she makes us see it. The fault of the book appears to us to lie in the plot, which would have been much better without the trite complication of a supposititious heir and the needless infamy of his birth, for, excepting as he affects the hero, his cousin, Sir Mark Geith, is not a person of much consequence or interest to the reader. The terrible reappearance of Mrs. Geith, No. 1, could not have been dispensed with, nor do we think that the most captious criticism can detect a fault in the main characters and incidents worthy to be set against the striking merits of a book which for power and originality stands alone among recent novels, and deserves a place apart from the short-lived favourites of the circulating library.

Miss Yonge's novels can never be termed *light* reading, and her new work⁴ is quite as formidable as its title, nor are there any allurements of type to decoy the reader through its closely printed pages. There is the well-planned story, the group of truthfully drawn children, and the unsparingly long dialogue we knew of old, but there is also a new and slightly disturbing element which carries us a little way out of the narrow field to which the authoress usually confines herself. The heroine, Rachel Curtis, is intended to represent that last worst product of a questioning age, the female reformer—the “odd” young lady who will not bow her neck to curates, who dabbles in sociology and torments her fellow creatures with systematized philanthropy. The image held up before the eyes of the faithful is in truth an ugly one, unpleasing enough to deter any believing maiden from starting on an independent search for her place in nature, or

⁴ “The Clever Woman of the Family.” By the Author of “The Heir of Redclyffe,” London: Macmillan, 1865.

even for her parochial rights, nor can it be said to be overdrawn or unfairly distorted. An ignorant conceited young woman will inevitably do more mischief if she holds herself released from the usual restraints of parental authority and social law, than if she passed her life in placid and contented idleness; but the desire for work, for usefulness, for the excitement of a real object, cannot be repressed in all, and the usual style of female education renders it almost inevitable that it will show itself in inconvenient, often ill-advised, methods when it does break out in action. But how does our authoress remedy the faults and short-comings of her refractory heroine? By bringing her in contact with an elderly clergyman who unites scholarship and saintliness in equal proportions, and with two military men of almost faultless perfection, one of whom falls in love with and marries her. Happy the strong-minded young lady who is in such a case! But does not this miraculous interposition argue the desperate nature of the complaint? And what is to be done with the many whom no epauletted angel will come and set right? The story of Rachel Curtis throws no ray of light on this difficult problem, nor will all clever women find their honest dissatisfaction with the religious teaching vouchsafed to them altogether removed by dialogues like the following, even with one who quotes the Psalms in Hebrew and in Greek, and wants to refer to St. Augustine while writing his sermon:—

“I told him how unsettled my views were, and he did not seem to mind. ‘My dear, may I ask if this sense of being unsettled is with you still?’ ‘I don’t know! I had no power to read or think for a long time; and now, since I have been here, I hope it has not been hypocrisy, for going on in your way and his has been very sweet to me, and made me feel as I used when I was a young girl, with only an ugly dream between. I don’t like to look at it, and yet that dream was my real life that I made for myself.’ ‘Dear child, I have little doubt that Alick (her husband) knew it would come to this.’ Rachel paused. ‘What, you and he think a woman’s doubts so vague and shallow as to be always mastered by a husband’s influence.’ Mr. Clare was embarrassed. If he had thought so he had not expected her to make the inference. He asked her if she could venture to look back on her dream, so as to mention what had chiefly distressed her. He could not see her frowning effort at recollection, but after a pause, she said, ‘Things will seem to you like trifles, indeed individual criticism appears so to me; but the difficulty to my mind is that I don’t see these objections fairly grappled with. There is either denunciation or weak argument; but I can better recollect the impression on my own mind than what made it.’ ‘Yes, I know that feeling; but are you sure that you have seen all the arguments?’ ‘I cannot tell; perhaps not. Whenever I get a book with anything in it, somebody says it is not sound.’ ‘And you therefore conclude that a sound book can have nothing in it?’ he asked, smiling. ‘Well, most of the new “sound” books that I have met are just what my mother and sister like—either dull, or sentimental and trashy.’ ‘Perhaps those that get into popular circulation do deserve some of your terms for them. Illogical replies break down and carry off some who have pinned their faith to them; but are you sure that, though you have read much, you have read deep?’ ‘I have read more deeply than any one I know—woman, I mean—or than any man had ever showed me he had read.’ ‘I think you may be of great use to me, my dear, if you will help me. The bishop has desired me to preach the next visitation sermon, and he

wishes it to be on some of these subjects. Now, if you will help me with the book work, it will be very kind in you, and might serve to clear your mind about some of the details, though you must be prepared for some questions being unanswered.' 'Best so,' replied Rachel, 'I don't like small answers to great questions.' 'Nor I. Only let us take care not to get absorbed in admiring the boldness that picks out stones to be stumbled over.' 'Do you object to my having read, and thought, and tried?' 'Certainly not. Those who have the capability should, if they feel disturbed, work out the argument. Nothing is gained while it is felt that both sides have not been heard. I do not myself believe that a humble, patient, calmest spirit can go far wrong, though it may for a time be tried, and people often cry out at the first stumbling-block, and then feel committed to the exclamations they have made.'—Vol. ii. p. 241.

After which nothing more is heard of Rachel's difficulties, and it is to be inferred that, as one of her saucy nephews remarked upon her having left off long words and other "civilian" enormities, "military discipline made her conformable."

In contrast with the nominally clever woman is a crippled Miss Williams, who is the real clever woman, and who receives her lover after a separation of twelve years with a calm self-possession, as if they had parted yesterday, and plunges then and there into a conversation with him, ten pages long, on family distresses, after the manner of Miss Yonge's heroines. Lady Temple, the young widowed mother, whose mind Rachel was so eager to form, is very well drawn, and does not evaporate, like the clever woman, into something wholly different from her unregenerate, i.e. unmarried self; and the boys are, as they always are, among the best and most natural actors in the piece. The chief of the bad people is a swindler of a new type. He appears on the scene in the interesting character of a clergyman, with "views" unconformable with his calling, and he is, very characteristically, made to do all the rascality, showing thereby "what comes of" unorthodoxy, and the best form of imposition wherewith to take in a "clever woman." Some of the minor characters are sketched with much cleverness and even humour, and it is to be regretted that a book with so many of the requisite ingredients is made oppressive by overcrowding and over-talking, and tedious by the too minute attention to unimportant details.

"Once and Again" is a very pretty novel, bright with a brightness that is not of the British isles, and innocent of any direct attempts to be philosophical and improving. The scene is laid in France and Switzerland, and few of the characters are English. The story is a painful one, and tends in the concluding part to become rather too earnestly tragic; but there is real art in its gradual unfolding, and a certain vivacity and freshness in the style which impart a charm that is more easily felt than analysed. It is a *bonâ fide* love tale, and the figure of the poor little heroine stands out in soft and touching beauty beside her grim disappointed mother, one of those "sour elderly people who have no mercy in flagellating the hearts of the young with their

⁵ "Once and Again." By the Author of "Cousin Stella," &c. &c. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

cruel knowledge of poor human nature ;” a woman who “ had driven both her husbands more than once to the verge of desperation by her way of adding up past grievances and weighing them with most bitter insinuations,” and whose devotion to her daughter is combined with a capacity for misinterpreting, and consequently of tormenting her, that renders the lives of both miserable Here is a sample,—the mother has brought her beautiful child to Paris for finishing lessons, and the young lady is full of joy at meeting again the friends of her childhood :—

“ The first thing that Mrs. Templar said to Louisa after M. de Blacourt had taken his leave was,—‘ Now, Louisa, you are not to be chattering about the marquis to those Ehrtmanns ; I shall not introduce him to them.’ ‘ But I have already talked to Ismay about him.’ ‘ You are a perfect sieve,’ said Mrs. Templar, angrily. ‘ I didn’t know any reason why I should not talk of M. de Blacourt, mamma,’ said Louisa. ‘ You can’t bear the slightest reproof, Louisa ; you have been completely spoiled by those Gastineaus. Take this as a rule,—Silence is gold.’ Mrs. Templar added,—‘ You are not such a baby as to be crying, I hope ?’ ‘ No, mamma.’ ‘ I shall not take you out to dinner with red eyes.’ ‘ Mamma !’ ‘ Well ?’ ‘ Do be kind to me.’ ‘ How am I otherwise ? Have I not come to Paris on your account ? Didn’t you hear me asking for masters ? Do I deny you anything I have the power to give you ? What can you want more ?’ ‘ I want to be with you as other girls are with their mothers ; I want to feel at my ease with you.’ Mrs. Templar paused a minute, then said,—‘ I do not like being fondled, or to fondle. Perhaps I make more sacrifices for you than either Madame Gastineau or that painted *baronne* ever did for their children. You’ll find plenty of people to flatter you ; be thankful to hear the truth from your mother. Now then, I must unpack the trunks, to find decent clothes for you and me to wear to-day.’ Louisa, trying to look cheerful, went into the bed-room with her mother. ‘ Let alone !’ said Mrs. Templar. ‘ I won’t have you breaking your nails and fatiguing yourself.’ She pushed Louisa aside. ‘ Sit down, if you choose to stay here.’ Louisa sat down ; then, as if unable to control her feelings, she ran and threw her arms round her mother, saying—‘ Oh, mamma ! you are very kind to me ; forgive me for what I said.’ ‘ Show your affection by something else than kissing.’ Louisa bravely withstood this chill, and exerted herself to talk as if she really was at her ease ; but it was a mere pretence, that deceived neither herself nor her mother.”

M. de Blacourt is an impulsive chivalrous Frenchman, whom one unworthy woman has unhinged for life, “ given a twist to his intellect, and covered his heart with a crust.” The strife between his superinduced cynicism, his natural impetuosity, and his extreme love for the fair young English girl, who never suspects anything but fatherly affection, is well depicted. He appears again and again through the intricacies of poor Louisa’s troubled career, the story of which is very prettily told, and owes much of its interest to a class of ideas and a choice of circumstances which have not yet been worked to death. There is a certain similarity in plot with that of another new novel,⁶ which has nothing else in common with “ Once and Again.” In Miss

⁶ “ On Guard.” By Miss Annie Thomas, Author of “ Denis Donne,” &c. London : Tinsley Brothers. 1865.

Thomas's "On Guard," the heroine is also always getting into scrapes through incaution and anxiety to please; she too, like Louisa Templar, blights the life of a man who makes his brain the avenger of his heart, and writes a popular novel, which compels her to recognise herself as the cause of the ruined hopes and perverted mind which invest the hero with a Byronic halo. But here the resemblance ceases, and the taste and refinement of feeling which are conspicuous in the one book, are exchanged for the outspokenness, verging on coarseness, and the leaning towards a mild Bohemianism, which are becoming more and more developed in the author of "Denis Donne." She harps on a very old string; narrowness and uncharitableness in a respectable man or woman are in her eyes grievous sins, but she has a tender feeling for the generous vices of those without the pale. Virtue is fair, modesty a thing to be desired, propriety unobjectionable; but she takes pleasure in showing how base and hollow is the seemingly innocent maiden, how heartless the exemplary wife, how utterly tiresome the conscientious mother; whereas, for true amiability she goes to the woman who has "danced on a moral tight rope for any number of years," and with whom, until she had the good luck to be honestly married, "it was just an even chance whether she should remain aloft, or come down with damning violence into the mud;" and the really devoted, unselfish wife is a "baby-faced beauty" out of a milliner's shop, whose great ambition had been "to play professionally at grand parties, and go down to supper with the best." Miss Thomas is, as she expresses it, "cursed with the modern mind," and whatever is humdrum and monotonous, virtue not excepted, is abhorrent to her. Her hero remarks, "That's the devil of it: a dull wife with every womanly virtue, from whom there would be no escape, would bring me to an untimely grave;" and to avert this catastrophe, he takes to wife the impetuous young lady whose history is traced through three volumes, and whose breaking-in is a very serious matter to all connected with her. Unpleasing in tone and style as we consider this book, we are bound to say that it is clever, spirited and entertaining. There is no carelessness or weakness about it; the characters have a strongly-marked individuality, and we are not wearied by descriptions of furniture or dress. But these good qualities are an insufficient set-off to the kind of roystering excitement that is aimed at throughout, and the bad taste which leads a lady to adopt, among other violations of polite writing, a sporting phraseology, and describe a man as having "gone to perdition at a slinging trot," and her heroine as "bearing on the bit just so much as a well-mettled one would do, when taken unexpectedly over a little bit of rough ground." We may expect a familiarity with the mysteries of the ring from a lady novelist who adopts the slang of the turf and the technicalities of the stable into her vocabulary. For those who like sporting literature, but do not ask it at woman's hands, two volumes⁷ lately issued furnish a great

⁷ "Crumbs from a Sportsman's Table." By Charles Clarke, Author of "Charlie Thornhill," &c. Chapman and Hall. 1865.

variety of stories and reminiscences, some of which are republished from the *Sporting Magazine*, and one paper, among the "*Roadside Scrapings*," is rewritten from *Baily's Magazine*. It is an enthusiastic eulogy on the Prince of Wales, in that he hunts, and owns, moreover, "a conscience in the matter of fox-hunting, which nothing but the pastures and bullfinches of Northamptonshire could satisfy;" for did he not hunt for two days in the Pytchley country, holding his own with the best, and once "coming to grief," like other light weights on good horses? It was after these two glorious days that the irrefragable Charles Payne delivered his judgment on the future king of England, as thus:—"Well, Charles, and what do you think of the Prince of Wales?" "Make a capital king, my lord," replied Charles, touching his cap, and speaking in his short, quick, cheerful manner. "I'm glad you think so—and why?" "Sure to, sure to do that, my lord, *sits so well*."

"*Grey's Court*"⁸ is an oppressive story, like a sultry day with the threatening of a thunderstorm that does not come. In spite of many incidents of a most harrowing kind, and a liberal allowance of crime, it excites a very languid interest; startling events cause no surprise and fall as flat as if they were mere everyday occurrences, and it has the additional fault of being composed in the tiresome form of part autobiography, part journal, pieced together by explanatory additions and make-believe elucidatory notes. It affects something of the historical novel, inasmuch as one of the chief actors escapes from a French prison in 1800, and we have selections from the journal of one of his companions "translated from the French;" also, the story begins in that past and ever-to-be-regretted period, "before country houses had been deserted for want of society, and long before crowds had driven society out of London," and smugglers and duels were, and railroads and free trade were not. A bland, subdued air, as of conscious good breeding, pervades the book, which is adorned with choice mottoes, generally translated from the Greek, and among other proofs of familiarity with that language is this remarkable sentence: "Lora did not repeat her question in words, but her richly coloured eyes looked (what shall I call it?) conditional scorn—decided scorn, dependent on something undecided; her eyes expressed scorn by and with the optative." Nor are there wanting sage reflections and unanswerable moralizations, such as,—“Can we say how similar circumstances would have acted on ourselves? Can we say that they would not, if twenty times repeated, have acted on us in twenty different ways? Surely, any one who could answer ‘yes’ to this, would show more confidence in his own self-knowledge than knowledge of his own heart.”

Two German volumes of tales and sketches⁹ consist of short

⁸ "*Grey's Court*." Edited by Georgiana, Lady Chatterton. Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

⁹ "*Aus alter und neuer Zeit*." Novellen und Skizzen von Luise Ernesti. (Malwine von Humbracht.) Jena und Leipzig: Hermann Costenoble. London: Nutt. 1865.

novelettes, of the usual character of such compositions, with a good many impressive incidents, such as a duel occasioned by the challenger seeing a gentleman take what he considered a too affectionate leave of a young lady whom he admired himself; and when the shot has been fired, and the aggrieved admirer has fatally wounded his unfortunate antagonist, it turns out that the dying man had only been kissing his own sister. The sketches are better than the stories; one of them describes the fishing village of Sassnitz, in Rügen, which, it appears, is becoming a favourite and much frequented watering place, where persons from all parts of Germany are beginning to congregate for the sake of sea-bathing, and the beautiful scenery on the southern shores of the Baltic. Another gives an account of the Marcolini Palace, in Dresden, where the scene was enacted which forms the subject of Camphausen's picture at Düsseldorf. On the memorable 28th of June, 1813, the Emperor Napoleon met Prince Metternich in one of the rooms of, what was then, the stateliest private house in Dresden, and the Emperor, either by chance or design, let his hat fall; the Prince, with the insolence of a conscious victor, did not stir, and Napoleon picked it up himself. It is said, that when the old diplomatist revisited the spot, a few weeks before his death, and forty-six years after that day's conference, he confessed that the moments spent in that interview had been the most terrible (*furchbarsten*) he had ever known throughout his long career.

It ought to surprise no one now-a-days to find himself plunged into speculations on the origin of man, or disquisitions on missionary bishops to Central Africa, when he takes up a book, to all outward appearance a novel, and nothing more; but we were hardly prepared for the strain put upon our faculties by the endeavour to read a three-volumed production with the deceitful title of "Three Phases of Love."¹⁰ What it means we do not pretend to say, after sundry efforts to arrive at some clear understanding of its drift. To begin with, the heroine's name is Dharma, and Dharma is the title of a Buddhist book, and means "the truth," and when the young lady explains how she came by it, she goes on to observe that it is "rather an appropriate name, for I never could keep my own or another's secrets, without feeling all the discomfort which mother earth experienced, when that terrible secret about the ears of King Midas was whispered into her. The truth would out, though buried deep; and the grass grew up full of it, waving, nodding, and blabbing it to the winds, and the winds carried it far and wide. What a beautiful myth that is about the grass and King Midas!" She is apt, in conversation, to soar into mythology at a moment's notice; and, by right of having been born in Ceylon, and of having had a learned Brahmin for her friend in childhood, she is quite at home in, or at least ready to talk about, the Vedas and the Puranas, as well as every other branch of human knowledge. A prima donna, Camilla by name, intro-

¹⁰ "Dharma; or, Three Phases of Love." By E. Paulet. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

duces her to a wonderful musician and composer, D'Azzini, and other distinguished people in Paris, who encourage her in abstruse studies, and of whose conversation we quote a mild specimen. Dharma is being shown one of the oldest churches in Paris :—

“They were in one part of the cathedral, while early mass was going on in another : they were looking at a small oak carving of Christ, with the circle, the triangle, and the three mystic letters above the head ; Christ himself, with extended hands, rising out of the cup. Fritz was comparing this with the Indian half-egg, broken by the bull’s horns. Reading the letters on one-half of the triangle, made the sense of ‘*egg*,’ and on the other ‘*existence*.’ They were interrupted by the Abbé Duval, who came up exclaiming—‘Ah, are you Protestants seeking the holy grace?’ ‘Not exactly,’ answered Fritz, ‘but I am wandering about to find pieces of Antiquity. I enjoy examining your venerable churches, and finding the world-old emblems that various hierarchies of priests have handed down from age to age. Your festivals and ceremonials have the ancient significance to me, as well as the new. The blue star-covered altar cave, type of the cave of the heavens. The cold ‘ever-virgin’ Queen of Heaven, palm in hand, sailing on the moon, with the sea below her feet. The cross, emblem of ‘life and death,’ from generation to generation. The equinoctial lamb, with its curling Jupiter Ammon like horns, at the foot of the cross, as of old below the tree on which the Phrygian Atys was carried in procession. The solar robes of the most ancient priests are not forgotten. See that picture of the stable at Bethlehem opposite, and look at the cave of Mythra in my study, where the infant Mythra is surrounded by oxen, ‘*Mythra, the man of Light*,’ the first sunbeam of the new year, ‘*Mythra, the mediator*’ between Ormuzd and Ahryman, between light and darkness, was born in a cave, ‘surrounded by oxen.’ Justin Martyr calls the stable ‘the prototype of a cave,’ and in the apocryphal ‘*Gospel of Mary*,’ a cave figures instead of a stable. In short, much of the ceremonial, and even the vigils and festivals of the sun gods, may be traced, and various relics of solar-worship be found carefully preserved in your most conservative church, M. l’Abbé.’ ‘Solar-worship had other meanings beside the physical, well known to the initiated,’ answered the Abbé ; ‘but I believe, and am trying to prove (as you are aware, M. Angelo, for you have seen my MS.)—I firmly believe, that there was a revelation of the Redeemer’s life, death, and resurrection, given to the normal race of man ! traces of which are seen in the worship of all the solar Gods, Ossiris, Ormuzd, Mythra, and others. The sun was always a type of the godhead. Have not material objects ever been the symbols of things spiritual ? The universe itself is a great book of emblems and symbols, if we read it rightly.’ ‘Very true,’ said Fritz, ‘I have much respect for your church, as the great ark which has preserved so much of the past ?’ Angelo began to speak of Bramah, Vishnu, and Siva, as typified by the mystic word *Om*, but Dharma paid little attention till she heard the words ‘restoration’ and ‘millenium,’ on which she interrupted, ‘Do tell me what you believe about the millenium, M. l’Abbé ? I attended lectures with my aunt, at Milltown, on the millenium.’ The Abbé smiled, and said that he left unfulfilled prophecy to be discussed by her friends at Milltown. Fritz spoke of a corresponding ‘millenium’ in the heavens, which he made out astronomically, taking the slow procession of the equinoxes as the hour hand on the face of heaven, and from the dial of the stars, from one constellation to another, which he called his *hours of two thousand years*, he made out the ‘grand cycle,’ or ‘restoration,’ or ‘millenium.’

‘Why do you smile at those good women who cannot read, saying their rosary ?’ ‘I was thinking,’ Dharma answered, ‘of the ancient Persians and their rosary, and their mystic *Belt of Zoroaster*, uniting the

worshippers to his merits, and the merits of the saints. M. Angelo has been translating parts of the *Zendavesta* for me lately."—Vol. i. p. 78.

When this sage damsel comes across an ascetic Roman Catholic, and they fall in love with each other, their conversations are of the sublimest kind, and while she says that her Pope ought to be the Grand Lama, Vicar, or Earth of Fo, Pope of the East, he states that with him, "it is the Catholic Church, or Pantheism, or even atheism!" We cannot follow her either in her philosophical and mystical discourse, or her wonderful career, in the course of which she gets herself imprisoned in Rome, and appears at a window in Naples, strewing flowers on Garibaldi's head. But we can safely say that a more extraordinary jumble of ideas on a greater variety of subjects, has seldom been given to the world, and a heroine, who is as familiar with the philosophy of the Brahmins, as with porphyry and Proclus, Paracelsus and Jacob Böhmen, may be excused if her profundity verges on the unintelligible.

Mr. Henry Kingsley's last story¹¹ is an extragavanza of the wildest kind, full of daring improbabilities and reckless absurdity, as marvellous as a fairy tale, and sometimes as statistical as a handbook. If there be some deep significance in his choice of characters, we have not been so fortunate as to discover it, and can only find in his family of illustrious blacksmiths, another example of that determined rejection of fact and experience which are necessary to the advocates of his peculiar theory of equality. The Hillyars are the born gentlemen, and the Burtons are blacksmiths, who go out to Australia, and become rich and distinguished. By force of inherent nobleness, Emma Burton, the toiling daughter in a struggling crowded household at Chelsea, develops into a magnificent imperial woman, all ease and grace, going to the opera in white crape and diamonds; and her brother, the Honourable James Burton, brings his wife, formerly a maid of all work in Kentish Town, to London, when he was sent there as commissioner to the International Exhibition, and her extreme beauty and repose of manner obtain universal admiration. Mr. Kingsley has no difficulty in transforming young people, to whom good English is an unknown tongue, and refinement an unimagined luxury, into men and women who can play their part with dignity and good taste, under every variety of circumstances, and who never ask or speak with the less propriety than the best bred lady or gentleman. He would make us forget that "Nature's gentlemen" are subject to natural laws, and cannot learn the speech they have never heard and the manners they have never seen, all at once, let their talents and virtues be what they may; and having given us, in Emma Burton, a woman of the noblest and rarest perfection, it is as inconsistent as barbarous to endow her with scruples about "bringing down" a gentleman to her level, just as if she were an ordinary mortal, with the common prejudice of caste. But this is not the point of chief interest in the character of the heroine, who, as

¹¹ "The Hillyars and the Burtons: a Story of Two Families." By Henry Kingsley, Author of "Austin Elliot," &c. Macmillan, 1865.

the author explains in his preface, is arraigned before the reader for judgment, in that by an overstrained idea of duty, she devoted herself to her brother, and made her lover but a secondary person. The lover is Erne Hillyar, son of a baronet, a true, gallant youth, the ideal of the young English gentleman, and the brother is a cripple, the scholar and genius of the family, to whom wealth and distinction as a colonial legislator were not slow to come. Emma Burton's refusal to marry him drives the lover to the far-off gold diggings, where he barely escapes with life, and where at last her scruples are satisfied by the cripple, Joe, finding a rich, handsome young widow ready to accept him, and Emma sets off to join Erne, the vessel in which she embarked is lost, and nothing ever heard of her more. To paint the struggle between love and duty, or supposed duty, is not a new idea, nor is it one for Mr. Henry Kingsley to deal with; his tones are too broad, his style is too slashing, for any theme which demands delicate handling, and though most readers will probably be inclined to give a verdict against the heroine (for the facts of the case do not appear to make in favour of the duty of the sacrifice), those who do not read the preface, will not trouble themselves much about her. For it is not in her that the real charm of the book lies, any more than it is in Arcadian plans for the removal of class barriers, that our author shows his strength. The Hillyars and the Burtons are very well in their way, but we should have been very soon tired of them on their native soil. Mr. Henry Kingsley's special forte is description, and when he starts on Australian ground he has a theme worthy of his pen, and which calls forth his peculiar powers. He has looked on that strange land in its natural and its social aspects with an eye that nothing escapes, and he brings an imaginative fancy and a lively sense of the beautiful and grotesque to the aid of his keen perception, and the result is a series of such living pictures as are not to be found elsewhere. There is in the third volume a description of a cyclone, that is absolutely terrible in its powerful vividness, and whenever the scene shifts to Cooksland, we are sure to light upon passages that seem to bring the life of our brethren at the antipodes before our very eyes. Among the many surprising characters introduced, are two Australian-born beauties, one of whom goes to England with her husband, who, being all but a villain himself, and largely mixed up with other villains, finds it necessary to disappear. The poor, silly, half-crazy young creature, cannot bear England any longer, takes her passage back to Melbourne, and sets off to walk three hundred miles overland, through the bush, with her child, for, we are told—

“The Bush had no more terrors for her than Regent-street has for you. If she met a bush hand, and her honour was in question, why, she had provided herself with a revolver. One summer's day, when she was a child, after she and Aggy had been gathering quantongs by the creek, her father, old Mr. Morton, Mr. Dawson, and young Clayton had come suddenly home, said something which frightened their mother out of her wits, had barricaded the door, and loaded their guns. Soon after they began shooting at some men outside, and the men shot at them through the windows, and broke the claret.

jug on the sideboard. She remembered that these men, the bushrangers, had broken in the door, and that Mr. Dawson had shot down two of them, and killed another by bending his head back, and that her mother had kissed Mr. Dawson afterwards—that she had been sorry for the poor men, as she was for the inhabitants of Jericho, who had not shot into anyone's windows, or at least it was not mentioned—that her mother was very angry with her, and said that a girl who hadn't gumption enough to drive a knife into a bushranger's heart, would not have courage enough to drive it into her own, and was unfit to live. Gerty had learned from her mother how to defend her honour. How quaint that old Australian life seems to one! High refinement in many cases, but the devil always at the door. Not, as in India, a sudden, furious, unexpected devil, tearing all to pieces, but a recognised devil, standing always ready. 'This is the last of that seal of Lalitte, sir, and the blacks are crowding round and looking awkward. 'The Illustrated News' is come, sir, but no 'Spectators' this mail, and Mike Howe is out again, sir, and has struck up Dolly's, and burnt one of the children, sir. Do you think he will take us next, or the Macdonalds?' Those are the sort of little mare's tails you get at the outside of that vast cloud of English influence, which has now overshadowed fully one-sixth of the human race. And until you have been to the edge, you will find it difficult fully to appreciate the extreme meteoric disturbance which you will find there. Look at the case of a certain family the other day in Queensland—refined, hospitable people, beloved by everyone. The young squire, sent over to Rugby, where he turned out champion cricketer. They all got suddenly ruthlessly murdered by the blacks one summer's evening."—Vol. iii. p. 46.

And of that other element in Australian life—the convict population, our author sums up the result of his experience thus:—

"The history of the soul of a thorough-going rascal, like Samuel Burton, remains to be written. *We* can't do it; we can only describe the outside of such, and say what we saw them do under such circumstances, as we have done with Samuel Burton. As for what they think, feel, and believe, they lie so horribly and habitually, that the chances are ten to one that every other word they speak is false. Samuel Burton's character has been sketched after long and intimate confidences with many convicts. I used, at one time, to make after a new convict as I would after a new butterfly, and try—hopeless task!—to find out when he was lying and when he was telling the truth. The result has been Samuel Burton. But I have, at all events, found out two things; the first is, that a man who has just told you with infinite glee about the share he had in robbing a church, will invariably deny, with virtuous indignation, that he had any share whatever in the crime for which he was transported. His brother always did *that*; and his wife in a moment of misplaced confidence, received the stolen property into the house in a basket of greens, which was found standing on the sink when the 'traps' came. And the second is, that, until we can catch a thoroughbred scoundrel, with high literary ability, and strict regard to truth, we had better not talk too fast about the reformation of criminals." Vol. vi. p. 204.

Mr. Kingsley seems to have an unconquerable delight in sheer rhodomontade, and in saying unexpected things in a manner which has the effect on the nerves of a practical joke; they make you laugh, but leave the impression that you have had a liberty taken with your good taste; nor is the putting together of his story satisfactory. At the same time there is a mastery of language, a geniality of tone, and

a warmth and richness of colour, which, if they do not atone for a certain spice of rollicking over-familiarity, do undoubtedly make his novels very entertaining, and we are glad to find him returning to this original diggings which he worked with such good effect in "Geoffrey Hamlyn."

Mrs. Lynton's novel with the stinging title¹² tells the lamentable distresses which a gentleman of the name of Jasper Trelawney Carthew brought upon himself, and his innocent second wife, by dropping the third name, and thus laying himself open to the persecution of a diabolically wicked pair of people who knew his secret, and while one of them uses his knowledge to extort money, the other appears in the character of the first wife (supposed to have been long since dead), and owing to a strong resemblance, the deception is kept up, with some ingenuity, till the time comes for explaining and setting everything right in the third volume. The individuals who make up a genteel circle in a stagnant country village, are drawn with a good deal of malicious humour; and the wicked, half French brother and sister who do so much mischief, are not bad specimens of the accomplished swindlers. There is nothing, however, in either style or plot to distinguish this novel from a great number of its fellows, and there is an objectionable prominence given to scenes of heartrending agony and outpourings of passionate protestations of love between Mr. Carthew and his seraphic wife, his "aura della vita sua," whose woes and perfection fail to impress us properly, from both being overdone.

A small single volume story, entitled "The Conscript,"¹³ is a translation of a French tale, which has attained to so great a popularity, that, in France, sixteen thousand copies are said to have been sold. It is the history of a lame boy, a clockmaker's apprentice, whose infirmities are not enough to save him from the terrible conscription, and who finds himself drawn as "Number 17," and marched off with a party of Piedmontese and Genoese conscripts to Mayence. The first portion of the book is very good, describing with quaint simplicity how the great victories of 1811 and 1812 were thought of in a little town of Alsace, and at what a price to the community they were won. The weeks of anxiety that followed every *Te Deum*; the eager looking for lists of casualties that sometimes never came at all; the wagons drawn by half-starved oxen from beyond the Rhine, rumbling through for three weeks together, followed by the endless stream of regiments of all nations; the sons of butchers and coopers coming home colonels and barons of the empire. All these are written off with the truthful plainness of a deeply interested and horribly alarmed eye-witness, who tells his own story and dwells upon his own particular sufferings with natural minuteness. We follow him willingly through his hard experiences as a recruit, but when he gets to Leipzig and Lützen he attempts what others have done better; and we prefer

¹² "Grasp your Nettle." By E. Lynn Lynton, Author of "The Lake Country," &c. Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

¹³ "The Conscript: a Tale of the French War of 1813." Translated from the French of M. Erckmann Chatrian. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

his less ambitious chapters, with all their harrowing details of warfare as seen from the ranks.

The indefatigable traveller and writer, Friedrich Gerstäcker, has thrown some of his South American experiences into a three volume novel,¹⁴ full of life and movement, with plenty of fighting and incident amid florid tropical scenes and exciting revolutionary changes, well grouped and arranged, and affording a lively picture of the general confusion in matters political which is the chronic condition of these restless republics.

The next German book that claims our notice may be ranked among the curiosities of literature. It appears that the favoured city of Dresden boasts of no fewer than eight-and-forty authoresses among its inhabitants, and of these, nineteen have consented to impart a good deal of their private history to one who knows its scientific value, and who gives it to the world as "*Phrenologische Frauenbilder*."¹⁵ It is the happy privilege of Gustav Scheve to possess the confidence of all these fair votaries of literature, and also to have been permitted to examine their heads externally with a view to phrenological revelations. Thus we have several biographical notices, many of them contributed by the lady herself, and a tabular craniological summary of her mental and emotional peculiarities, by the author, with comments and elucidations all set forth with charming naïveté and frankness, and profound unconsciousness that the world outside may not be eager to know that Lilla von Bulzovsky, actress and newspaper correspondent, is tall, blue-eyed, and blest with a happily balanced mental constitution, or that Frau Henriette Heber, a philanthropic lady gifted with mesmeric and "spiritualist" powers, possesses a sanguine-choleric-nervous temperament. The princess Amalie of Schleswig-Holstein-Augustenburg figures among the distinguished characters about whom it is granted us to know so much; and we are informed that she was graciously pleased to allow the author to make a phrenological study of her head which led him to the conclusion that hers was a "mixed temperament in which the sanguine element is perhaps the most dominant." The author of this singular volume (which is not his first effort in phrenological biography) deserves some credit for having hit upon a combination so well calculated to gratify the idle-minded world; an appearance of scientific investigation, general remarks upon life, education, and character, and plenty of personal detail.

Mr. Edwards's bulky volume on *Libraries*,¹⁶ contains a vast amount of curious out-of-the-way information, and amusing gossip. A portion

¹⁴ "*Zwei Republiken. Erste Abtheilung: General Franco. Lebensbild aus Ecuador*," von Friedrich Gerstäcker. Jena und Leipzig: Hermann Costenoble. 1865. London: Nutt.

¹⁵ "*Phrenologische Frauenbilder Dresden's Schriftstellerinnen der Gegenwart*." Von Gustav Scheve. Dresden: Schöpf. 1865. London: Nutt.

¹⁶ "*Libraries and Founders of Libraries*." By Edward Edwards. Trübner. 1864.

of some of the introductory chapters is reprinted from the article on Libraries in the "Encyclopædia Britannica," but it is an inconsiderable portion of a work which is one of much labour and research. After a brief account of the little that can be known of ancient libraries and those of mediæval times, we have a history of the famous libraries collected by private scholars, and of the libraries of celebrated monarchs. Among anecdotes of Napoleon the First, is one that should be treasured by collectors of strange coincidences. He was an insatiable reader; filling volumes with notes upon what he read, and many of those made during his boyish studies have been preserved, including some on geography, in which the very last sentence ends with these words—"Sainte Hélène—petite île." In recording what the British Museum Library owes to the industry of Mr. Panizzi, the author informs us that when that gentleman became Keeper of Printed Books in 1837, there was not much over two hundred and thirty thousand volumes, and that on his promotion in 1856, he left nearly five hundred and sixty thousand. The most important part of this volume, and to which all the early chapters are preliminary, is that which relates to our own national records, and tells the curious, not to say disgraceful, history of how they have been ill-used and neglected, and how they are at last receiving the care and labour that are their due. This subject occupies more than two-thirds of the volume, and there are tabular and synoptical views of Rolls and State Papers, which must be of great value to those whose researches take them into that storehouse of precious materials. Mr. Edwards announces a companion volume shortly on the "Founders and Benefactors of the British Museum," which, judging by the table of contents, promises to address itself more completely to the general reader than the volume before us, which aims somewhat at two incompatible objects, and would have been better had the more exclusively technical portion been published separately, in a convenient compass, for the use of those whom it concerns, and the miscellaneous notes on libraries and bibliophiles had been kept apart for the benefit of the majority, who have no practical interest in classified tables of rolls and state papers.

A small volume of Lectures,¹⁷ by Mr. Burges, contains a great deal of good sense on a subject which stands much in need of wise advocacy, and upon which we have been slow to find out our backwardness and ignorance. He readily acknowledges the usefulness of Government Schools of Design, of Exhibitions, and of Museums like the Kensington and Architectural, but he sees great impediments to future progress from three causes: the want of a distinctive architecture, instead of the two bad styles at present in vogue—an impure Italian, and a variety of the architecture of the thirteenth century; the want of a good costume, instead of the colourless garments of modern fashion, which afford no opportunity to the artist for studying harmony of colour; and the want of a sufficient teaching of the figure, which is

¹⁷ "Art applied to Industry." A Series of Lectures by William Burges, F.R.I.B.A. J. H. and J. Parker. 1865.

fatal to art in detail. On this last deficiency the author dwells with reiterating persistency, and maintains that until it is remedied there will be no improvement in architecture. His suggestions for the removal of these impediments to the application of art to industry are shortly these: Increase the Government Schools of Design; multiply local museums and render them easy of access; educate the designer as thoroughly as possible, above all, teach him the figure, and if the artizan can be taught teach him as well. Mr. Burges thinks that, as the Church led the art movement in the Middle Ages—and, thanks to Pugin and the Camden Society, we have a notion of how ecclesiastical buildings should look—the next step will be a reformation of our domestic architecture, towards which he looks upon every improvement in internal decoration as a certain help. And he cherishes bright visions of “smoky London glowing with imperishable colour,” when we have got tired of using materials which we know must turn black in a few years, and when the law of leasehold is abolished. When these happy days come, and we abstain from stone, brick, and stucco, we shall see, if Mr. Burges succeeds in getting his views adopted, ornamentation applied in methods hitherto undreamed of by our sober architects. He says:

“We have, as far as I can see, but three courses open to us: the first is, to build the window-dressings, doors, &c., in majolica, plaster the walls between, paint them with subjects, and then cover them with sheets of plate glass. This is the first. The second would be to supply the place of the paintings covered with glass, by means of mosaics. Now, these mosaics might be made in various ways: 1, they might be of glass chopped up in the regular manner, as Signor Salvieto does it; 2, or made of sticks of glass broken off short, in Mr. Fisher’s manner (see the stained-glass exhibition); or they might be manufactured in earthenware and glazed. I do not think unglazed tesserae would do, as the smoke would stain them like bricks. It is by no means necessary that these mosaics should represent subjects, although it would be a gain for them to do so; on the contrary, they might be diapers, and the tesserae might be made like some discovered near Babylon—viz., in the shape of cones, with the bottom part glazed. Some system might also be found for making figures in pieces of stained glass, foiling them from behind, and then embedding them in mortar or lead. Messrs. Powell, of Whitefriars, have invented something of this kind, but I am afraid that their material would be too porous for external use. We now come to majolica, which, with mosaic, would, I think, solve the problem before us. It should be remembered that, thanks to Messrs. Minton and other manufacturers, we can now obtain majolica both in relief and painted; it is true, that at present it is rather dear, but should an increased demand arise, it would doubtless go down in price. M. Roussel’s system would give us great advantages in the pictorial part of the work, while it would rest with the manufacturers generally to give us a glaze that would not shine too much in a side light, and at the same time would stand the frost.”—p. 107.

In the lectures which treat of the application of metals, glass, and pottery to domestic uses, a brief sketch is given of the methods employed in ancient times, and of the revival and progress of decorative art in modern Europe. Our increasing knowledge of antiquity has taught us to what perfection many arts were carried, of which we imagined our-

selves the inventors. There was plate glass at Pompeii, and Signor Castellani is barely credited when he says that he has at last succeeded in producing frosted gold, like that of the Etruscans, which never tarnished. The art of making filagree glass, well known to the Romans, was revived in the celebrated Venetian glass of the fifteenth century, the process of making which was considered so precious a secret, that a law existed enacting that in case of a glass workman going to work abroad, in the first place he should be asked to return, and if he paid no attention his nearest relatives should be imprisoned; if he still held out, some one was to be despatched to kill him. In the lecture on the weaver's art, we are reminded of the superiority of Indian muslins and Chinese and Persian carpets, and the gorgeous costumes of the middle ages are contrasted with our own dark ungraceful garments. The Cufic inscriptions that have so perplexed antiquaries, were introduced with the rich Eastern stuffs so much sought after by the wealthy class, and though, as Mr. Burges observes—

“Nothing is more perishable than worn-out apparel, yet, thanks to documentary evidence, to the custom of burying people of high rank in their robes, and to the practice of wrapping up relics of saints in pieces of precious stuffs, we are enabled to form a very good idea of what these stuffs were like, and where they came from. In the first instance, they appear to have come from Byzantium, and from the East generally; but the manufacture afterwards extended to Sicily, and received great impetus at the Norman conquest of that island; Roger I. even transplanting Greek workmen from the towns sacked by his army, and settling them in Sicily. Of course, many of the workers would be Mahomedans, and the old patterns, perhaps with the addition of sundry animals, would still continue in use; hence the frequency of Arabic inscriptions in the borders, the Cufic character being one of the most ornamental ever used. In the Hotel de Clugny, at Paris, are preserved the remains of the vestments of a bishop of Bayonne, found when his sepulchre was opened in 1853, the date of the entombment being the twelfth century. Some of these remains are cloth of gold, but the most remarkable is a very deep border, ornamented with blue Cufic letters on a gold ground; the letters are fimbriated with white, and from them issue delicate red scrolls, which end in Arabic sort of flowers: this tissue probably is pure Eastern work. On the contrary, the coronation robes of the German emperors, although of an Eastern pattern, bear inscriptions which tell us very clearly when they were manufactured: thus, the Cufic characters on the cope inform us that it was made in the city of Palermo, in the year 1133, while the tunic has the date of 1181, but then the inscription is in the Latin language. The practice of putting Cufic inscriptions on precious stuffs was not confined to the Eastern and Sicilian manufacturers; in process of time other Italian cities took up the art, and, either because it was the fashion, or because they wished to pass off their own work as Sicilian or Eastern manufacture, imitations of Arabic characters are continually met with, both on the few examples that have come down to us of the stuffs themselves, or on painted statues or sculptured effigies. These are the inscriptions which used to be the despair of antiquaries, who vainly searched out their meaning until it was discovered that they had no meaning at all, and that they were ornaments. Sometimes the inscriptions appear to be imitations of the Greek, and sometimes even of the Hebrew. The celebrated ciborium of Limoges work in the Louvre, known as the work of Magister G. Alpais, bears an orna-

ment around its rim which a French antiquary has discovered to be nothing more than the upper part of a Cufic word repeated and made into a decoration."—p. 85.

We do not often meet with so much information in a small compass as is contained in these short lectures, and the practical suggestions are well worthy the attention of all who are interested in maintaining a standard of taste, in any degree commensurate with the wealth that is lavished on costly ornamentation.

A volume of "Characters and Criticisms"¹⁸ consists of one long essay on Plutarch, reprinted from the "Quarterly," and several short papers, contributed chiefly to the "Edinburgh Courant," on a great variety of subjects, reviews of books, and short notices of passing events. They are in the trenchant newspaper style, with plenty of pungent adjectives, and a few epigrams are interspersed, of which the following is an example:—

"ON AN ANSWERER OF RENAN.

"You answered Renan? That is strange, if true;
Men only answer when they're spoken to,
And Renan speaks to scholars, not to you."

This may be taken as a sample of the author's sprightliness of wit and originality of expression.

The first volume of the collected works of M. de Pontès,¹⁹ which we have noticed in a previous section, is already in a second edition. It was Augustin Thierry who advised him to write his *impressions de voyage*, promising him success equal to that of Alexandre Dumas, and many of the papers in this volume justify the opinion, and prove that at a very early age M. de Pontès was preparing himself for a literary career, which was cut short by his untimely death.

Yet another translator of Horace²⁰ offers his version of the two first books of the Odes, the *Camen Sæcular*, and a few specimens from the other books. We are promised the remaining odes and epodes by-and-bye. Mr. Jones pleads in excuse for his temerity "leisure and retirement," and the want of "an employment that served at least to fill up the blanks of time, and afford a welcome variety, to chequer the occupations of a country life, and the occasional resources of the chase." The preface is enough to deter any one who objects to rambling would-be fine writing, from going further; and the few pages devoted to a biography of Horace are provokingly tiresome; but the translations are not without merit, and the author has succeeded well in the Spenserian stanza which he has adopted in his version of

¹⁸ "Characters and Criticisms: a Book of Miscellanies." By James Hannay, Author of "Essays from the Quarterly," &c. Edinburgh: William P. Nimmo. 1865.

¹⁹ "Etudes sur L'Orient." Par Lucien Davesiès de Pontès. Seconde Edition. Paris: Michel Lévy. 1865.

²⁰ "The I. and II. Books of the Odes of Horace." Translated into English Verse. By Hugo Nicholas Jones. Williams and Norgate. 1865.

“*Motum ex Metello*,” with very good effect. After Mr. Connington’s rendering, his translation of “*Quis Desiderio*” falls flat, and though we are getting used to every variety of English verse measure, it is not without a shock that we read the twenty-second ode, beginning with—

“That man, O Aristius, whose conscience is pure,
Neither needs he the bow nor the shaft of the Moor;
’Mid the heat of the desert he safely may start,
Unoppressed with the quiver or poisonous dart.”

An edition of the first six books of the *Æneid*,²¹ with notes chiefly taken from Wagner, professes to be intended for the use of school-boys and passmen, and great pains have been taken to explain every phrase, grammatical peculiarity and allusion, which might prove a stumbling-block to the dullest scholar in the lowest form.

The sixth centenary of Dante’s birth is pleaded in justification of a new translation of the “*Inferno*,”²² which stands in no need of apology. Mr. Ford brings many of the requisite qualifications to his difficult task, and has produced a version remarkable for accuracy and elegance of diction. Side by side with the English, he has given Dr. Carlyle’s edition of the Italian text, which can thus be compared line for line with the translation. The original metre is kept to, and without more dilution of the sense than is inevitable in rendering language so terse and condensed as that of Dante into a tongue entirely different in sound, idiom, construction, the rhymes are easy, natural, and harmonious. We quote Mr. Ford’s version of the famous passage from the fifth canto, which has ever been the despair of translators, as a fair example of his verse :

“Then she to me: ‘No pain can greater prove,
Than the remembrance of past joys to wake,
When suffering; this thy Teacher will approve.
But, if the germ, whence our young love did break,
Such be thy strong desire from us to hear,
I’ll do as they, who weep, and weeping speak.
Reading we were, one day, for pastime dear,
Of Lancelot, how love him prisoner bound;
We were alone, and no suspicion near:
Full oft that reading did our thoughts confound,
Our eyes make meet, our faces change their hue;
But ’twas a single point, that fixed the wound.
For, as we read how by the lover true
Was kiss’d the dimpling smile, desir’d before,
This, who shall ne’er be parted from my view,
Kiss’d me upon the mouth, trembling all o’er.
Galeotto was the book; the writer, too:
In it, that day, we further read no more.’”

²¹ “*P. Virgiliti Maronis Æneidos*,” Libri I.—VI. With English Notes by T. Clayton, M.A., and C. S. Jerram, M.A. London: Rivington. 1865.

²² “*The Inferno of Dante*.” By James Ford, A.M., Prebendary of Exeter. Smith and Elder. 1865.

The "When suffering" is weak for "Nella miseria," and occasional weakness will strike the reader who turns to find a pet passage in Mr. Ford's translation; but though it may not always satisfy, it never falls below the standard of a good scholarly work, and as such it is a valuable one. To avoid bulkiness, no explanatory notes are appended.

A collection of more than a hundred popular songs and ballads²³ is the fruit of German industry in Venetia, and is owing to the researches of two friends who met by chance at Vicenza in the winter of 1861-62, and agreed to devote themselves to the study of the language, antiquities, and history of the country. In the course of their investigations, they picked up sundry old ballads and tales from the lips of old women and young maidens, which were handed over to Herr Wolf to edit. This he has done with much care, adding copious notes, and explaining the relation of these songs and fragments to the Volkslore of other nations.

²³ "Volkslieder aus Venetien." Gesammelt von Georg Widter: herausgegeben von Adolf Wolf. Wien: Aus der k. k. Hof- und Staatsdruckerei. 1864.

THE
WESTMINSTER
AND
FOREIGN QUARTERLY
REVIEW.

OCTOBER 1, 1865.

ART. I.—PERSONAL REPRESENTATION.

The Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal.
A Treatise by THOMAS HARE, Esq., Barrister-at-law. Third
Edition, with a Preface, Appendix, and other additions.
London: Longmans. 1865.

IN spite of some few well paid and prosperous optimists who assert that we are all so well off already that none of us could possibly be better off under any other than our present system, there is a widely-spread impression in all ranks and in every part of the country that some change in our political system is imminent, and that it must be in the direction of democracy. The very newspaper writers or parliamentary speakers who begin their articles or their speeches with declaring that parliamentary or any other fundamental reform is unnecessary, end them with acknowledging that nevertheless it seems certain to come. The lower classes do not want it, they say; the upper classes do not approve it; nevertheless both will unite to bring it about. They deplore this strange infatuation, and ask why no one will make a stand against it, and then make no stand against it themselves. The fact is they drift with the current, and the current of popular opinion at this moment in England is in favour of bold measures of political reform. The demonstrations that are publicly made of this tendency are merely the ripples on the surface; that they are so faint shows rather the weakness of opposing forces than any uncertainty in the direction of the main stream of opinion itself.

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Never was there a better example of how an idea may slowly and silently gain ground in spite of noisy triumph over its supposed extinction, and may permeate a whole people after having been pronounced too chimerical for consideration, than the progress of the agitation for a considerable enlargement of the Franchise amongst us of late years. As usually happens with all suggestions for real and important alterations in the constitution of society, it was received at first with mingled indifference and respect, which deceived all the more superficial of its supporters, and permitted them to suppose they had an easy task before them. It is not at the very beginning that proposals for reform excite the most violent antagonism, for at first they only attract the attention of those whose minds are in some degree prepared for them. But when the prospect of success began to look serious, then there arose strenuous opposition from all whose selfishness or whose prejudices were contrary to it. Every weak point was assailed, every defect pointed out in any practical scheme for change that could be suggested, and at the same time every possible amelioration was promised in the details of the obnoxious order of things that it had been proposed to subvert. At this stage vague discontent or vague philanthropy does not furnish stout enough arguments against the alarmed adherents of a comfortable state of things (to themselves), who know what they want and only ask to be let alone. But then by degrees the sincere advocates of the reform strengthen one by one the weak points that have been so usefully pointed out to them; the sincere opponents once having had their minds turned to the subject, begin to see some of the true objections to their own system. The real sufferers from the existing state of things who have been silenced for a while begin to murmur again, and when the subject revives, it is found that the idea has a hundred advocates for one that it had when it first aroused opposition. Just such has been the history of parliamentary reform, and the most remarkable evidence of the extent of the feeling in its favour, is the fact that its opponents now address themselves almost entirely to pointing out the evils to be expected from universal suffrage, and concede as a matter of course an extension of the franchise, which a short time ago was pronounced utterly unnecessary.

We have but to glance at the events of the last forty years to see that everything at the present time conduces towards a general feeling in favour of political reform, and against mere conservatism as such. Thirty years ago an important measure was carried through, which was only an instalment of the reform that had long been thought necessary by the most enlightened politicians. This measure succeeded perfectly so far as it went, its

working was thought satisfactory by those who had most opposed it at first, and it only fell short of the wishes of those who at the time it was passed would have desired something more, although they thought it prudent to advance by tentative steps.

It thus far completely justified their judgment, and in doing so has prepared all impartial observers to advance further in the same direction. Moreover it has been found that from that time to this the boldest measures have proved the most successful. Great changes have been made in our social, our commercial, our financial, administrative and legal systems. All these have been found beneficial so far as they have gone. Those who resisted their introduction are now those who are best satisfied with their results, of which no one complains except those who do not think they go far enough, and who want still greater changes. It is generally felt, even by those who do not found their impressions on any conscious reasoning, that if the result of all the change is prosperity, that very prosperity can be no argument in favour of standing still in future. It is at the same time universally admitted that none of all these successful changes would have been carried through, had they not been preceded by some measure of political reform. To grant this, on the part of a Conservative or Whig, is in fact to concede the whole argument of the advocates of parliamentary reform ; it is to subscribe to that great truth which the whole teaching of history brings out, and which happily has always found a place among the convictions of the English people, that political freedom is the only certain foundation of public prosperity or private happiness in civilized communities.

Each class in England, as it has, by the natural progress of civilization, in time advanced to a consciousness of its own condition, and a comparison between itself and others, has in turn demanded to be admitted to a share in the Government. Each in turn has been admitted, and the country has grown more powerful and the population more contented as the basis of freedom has gone down lower and spread out wider. Goethe relates in his autobiography, that, in his childhood his father wished to rebuild his house without taking it down. He began, therefore, at the top, and renewed it story by story till the whole was completed down to the foundations. If it is allowable to add one more to the many similes of which the British Constitution has been the subject, it may be compared to that house, and when those who inhabit it unite in an uneasy feeling that something must be done, it is quite time to get on with the building.

* An additional indication, if one were needed, that we are really advancing towards democratic institutions, is the general dis-

position to look closely into the defects of government by universal suffrage. It is no longer regarded as a subject of abstract politics to be dismissed with phrases and generalizations, whether laudatory or depreciatory, but as one which concerns ourselves, and to be carefully studied with a practical object. There remains still, it is true, a great disinclination to watch its working in other countries where it has already been tried, and this we cannot but think a remarkable refutation of the supposed practical tendency of the English mind. Whatever can be said against, if not all that can be said in favour of, universal suffrage, on *a priori* grounds, will probably have found a hearing in England before it has any chance of becoming the foundation of our political institutions. The fact that it exists in the only countries that rival us in power, wealth, and general prosperity, or the fact that these nations are, since its adoption, rapidly equalling, and in some points outstripping us in the advance we had gained during centuries of superior civilization and freedom, does not seem so sure to be taken into account in our speculations. Perhaps this is not to be regretted. In all human affairs the complication and the variety are so great that one case can scarcely ever be taken as an example for another, and what is commonly called the practical way of treating them is seldom anything but empiricism and quackery. To master the details of any one state of affairs, and to apply to it such first principles as have been maturely weighed, is as much as any one individual or one nation can fairly be expected to do. To collect statistical data and to deduce general laws from them is of the utmost importance for the future, and is likely to give rise to a science of which we as yet can form but a faint conception. But it will be long before conclusions from such a science can be formed; longer still before they can be so tested that they may be accepted with confidence as a foundation for further reasoning. If, therefore, the English persist in arguing the whole question of the comparative merits of pure or qualified democracy from an entirely abstract point of view, and contemptuously refuse to test their theories by any comparison with the actual experience of their contemporaries, we must perhaps admit that they have intuitively come to a wise decision, although, as in many other cases of so-called intuition, the reasons generally given for it are astonishingly inadequate.

In all discussions on the probable effects, either of universal suffrage or of a very wide extension of the franchise, the point upon which most attention has been fixed is the danger of class-legislation; legislation, that is, in favour of the real or supposed class-interests of the most numerous class in the country. Great importance is attached to the danger that class-interests may overpower in the minds of the numerical majority of the nation

the united interests of the nation as a whole, and even those of the most numerous class itself if considered, not in antagonism to some other class or classes, but with due regard to its share in the interests of humanity in general. It is argued against any thorough political representation of the whole people, that in the present state of England the population is divided by so sharply-defined a line between employers and employed that the feelings and interests created by this distinction may be expected to surpass all others in force; while the division is so numerically unequal that, if political power is distributed according to numbers, one side will be able to oppress the other. The large and distant interests even of a ruling class can never be really served by stifling other classes whose existence is itself legitimate, and it would be a rash experiment voluntarily to risk the prosperity of the nation on the wisdom and justice of any one class within it, even leaving out of consideration whether that class is in itself the most competent for government. The attention of our popular writers and politicians having of late years been especially attracted to certain questions of political economy, they are very desirous that this knowledge of theirs should not be lost to the world, and they manifest an almost unanimous opinion—not altogether flattering to the strength of their own convictions—that it would be hopeless to get those to admit the force of their reasonings whose interests are not evidently served by them. On some of these questions the interests of the working classes are supposed to be at least apparently antagonistic to those of the employers, and it is presumed that the working classes are, and are likely to remain, too ignorant to know their own real interests, or to be capable of understanding the laws of supply and demand, or the importance of encouraging the accumulation of capital. We are, therefore, told above all things to beware of making any change in the representative institutions of this country which would have the effect of throwing an overwhelming balance of power into the hands of any portion of the people who can suppose themselves united in interest against any other portion.

In all this there is certainly much truth, supposing it to be impossible to obtain any system of election better fitted than the present to call forth what is best in individuals, and to develop that variety of character which is the most valuable, but has hitherto been the most neglected peculiarity of a democracy; and supposing also that a wide extension of the suffrage would not be more likely than anything else to bring about a wide extension of education. But when we consider how heavy are the penalties through which a nation often has to work off the consequences of its political mistakes, and what a depressing effect upon the whole civilized

world is often produced by the temporary failure of great principles to work well in some conspicuous example, we must respect the prudence of such of the sincere friends of liberty as make use of these arguments. We must even acquiesce with them when they recommend to the public-spirited members of the disfranchised classes to abstain from claiming for themselves a share in the government until the whole question has been more thoroughly sifted. But we can only acquiesce in this on condition that the whole question is fairly stated, honestly argued, and not thrust aside in favour of the selfish or fantastic preferences of the minorities who now rule the country, and are chiefly represented in parliament and the press. Nothing can be more injurious to the cause of effectual reform than the attempt by pressing forward a £6 franchise to stop all rational discussion, and win away from any more comprehensive scheme many who might be expected to be its most efficient advocates. By limiting the franchise to the occupants of houses paying £6 yearly rent, a certain class of politicians evidently hope to limit the numbers of the working classes who will be represented. Their real object appears to be, to include the whole middle class in the governing body, and to exclude, at the same time, as large a number of the working classes as is consistent with obtaining their primary object. In so far as the proposers of this plan believe that the £6 limit will, as a matter of fact, exclude the majority of the working classes, they are not open to the accusation of rashness. Yet they are, in reality, far more rash than many more thorough democrats, for they propose to push on in the direction of democracy, casting aside all consideration of what are the fundamental dangers of democratic institutions and of how these may best be modified and averted. To enlarge the franchise in any considerable degree without putting it on a sound basis capable of future extension, and without adapting the details of our electoral system to the new state of things, is very much like attempting to work railway trains on ordinary roads with such brakes as were sufficient for mail coaches. Our middle-class reformers and their place-loving coadjutors, whether among the Conservatives or Whigs, who now advocate a slight enlargement of the franchise on our present system, belong to that dangerous class of temporizing politicians who are most to be dreaded in any important crisis of a nation's affairs. It is they who, in opposition to more consistent absolutists, are ready to stir up the people to assert a principle the practical working of which they propose to check at the point where its effects might begin to be felt and therefore to be fairly judged. They want popular enthusiasm to go just so far that they may ride into office on the tide, and then they would command it to go no farther, because they

will neither trouble themselves to consider nor dare make themselves responsible for the possible consequences of popular principles consistently carried out. It should be remembered that if only property, and that sort of intelligence which property usually secures, ought to have a voice in the government, the £10 limit is already low, and must become practically lower as prices rise. Those, therefore, who propose only to lower the present pecuniary test without introducing any new principle whatever, are fairly open to the taunts of those who would stand still altogether, for no valid reason can be given for going so far which would not justify going much farther.

It may well be doubted whether the dreaded omnipotence of the working classes would be more fatal to the future prosperity of the country than the continued preponderance in our government of the idle and frivolous men whom our present system has a tendency to bring to the top, who, while their character and position generally preclude them from either knowing the wants or caring for the fate of the great mass of suffering humanity that constitutes their fellow-countrymen, are too prejudiced to look at any subject from a philosophical point of view, and too indolent to examine into any in all its bearings. Such men as these, who have constituted the majority of the House of Commons (and a still larger majority of the House of Lords), are utterly ignorant of the very grounds on which political science must be built. Too limited in their mental powers to grasp effectually even any ready-made theory, they also have not present to their observation the realities of human life. Shut up within those barriers of comfort and luxury by which our well-to-do classes screen off the real facts of life, possessed of that sort of education a glimpse of which occasionally astonishes us in the revelations of some competitive examination, their knowledge of the world is confined to one very limited class of one nation and of one period. If they do not care for the interests of any other, their best excuse is that they are not, properly speaking, aware of the existence of any other. Foreigners, or the working classes, are to them, like women, not exactly fellow-creatures, but a kind of animal whom they have never dreamt of considering as on a level with themselves, nor, therefore, as altogether human. Hence such monstrous anomalies as our Game Laws and marriage legislation, and the fatuous exhibitions of unconscious want of principle which often take place in the discussions of the House of Commons on foreign policy.

If one class must legislate for another, it is not the mere-gentleman class that should legislate for the workers, since neither by numbers nor utility have they so good a claim to be considered first; and if we want intelligence, the sort of intelli-

gence that will teach men to avoid the evils to which the mass of mankind are most liable, is likely to be at least as well developed by having suffered from them as by having been guarded from them. Either experience will be one-sided and imperfect, but the blind eagerness for change created by the one may, in the long run, not be more injurious to human happiness than the selfish apathy maintained by the other. It is usual for admirers of things as they are in this country to appeal to results; to say—how rich, how powerful, how prosperous England has grown to be under the government of these mere gentlemen! Nothing could better show how limited is their knowledge of the world and of history than exactly this line of defence. The paternal despotism of Austria can point to the population of a large part of its dominions happier, more moral, more intelligent than any we can show in the most favoured districts of England, and we should seek in vain under its government for misery and demoralization greater than is to be found in our large cities. The democratic government of the free states of America has bestowed upon the people an amount of education which makes them the most economically productive people in the world, and therefore must make them, even without other advantages, the richest. The mixed and incessantly changing government of France has not prevented that nation from being at least as powerful as our own. There is a general level to which nations, neighbouring or nearly related to one another, will attain, unless placed under extraordinarily disadvantageous circumstances, and what we are now is the result, not merely of the positive but also of the comparative position of our ancestors as much as of the system under which we live. We do not stand alone in the world, isolated in space and time; we are benefited by the progress of cotemporaries, we profit by the foresight of those who preceded us. In the complication of human affairs it is quite as necessary to test practical results by the principles from which they seem to be derived as it is to test the correctness of theory by experiment. We may go on prospering for a long time after we have deserted the principles to which we owe our prosperity, and the most beneficent inventions may take a long while before they can be got to work smoothly. In either case we must go as far back as we can to the principles on which we are acting to know whether we are right or wrong. There is no more an easy road to success in politics than in other things, and in whatever way we look at the matter we are driven back to the discussion of the great fundamental difficulties of the subject.

When we look closely into the theory that the government of

the nation cannot be safely given to the whole nation because it will then be governed according to the interests or wishes of the majority, the first objection that strikes us is that the interest of the majority of the nation must surely be the interest of the nation itself.* To secure that it shall really be so it is necessary that every precaution shall be taken to obtain the representation of a real, that is, under any given circumstances, the largest possible majority; and it is, among other reasons, because Mr. Hare's system of Personal Representation is calculated to effect this, that we look upon it as essential to any complete scheme of parliamentary reform. The interests of a small majority are not necessarily more identical with those of the nation as a whole than are those of a large minority, and by our present radically vicious system of local representation even a majority in parliament may represent a minority of the people, and might do so still even with universal suffrage. The exclusion from a potential voice in the government, whether by accident or design, of some of the constituent parts that go to make up the nation, is itself a cause of artificial difficulties in balancing the remainder. It not merely reduces the number of electors represented, and may thereby cause individual injury to them, but it vitiates the quality of the representative body itself, and diminishes its power of understanding and weighing the wants of the whole people. It prevents the realization of the fundamental idea of representative government, exactly in proportion as it prevents the representative body from being really the epitome of the nation, a reproduction or representation of it on a small scale, but on a scale in which the actual proportions of what is represented are accurately preserved. The efficiency of the method of representation is thus an important element in the decision of who should be represented. But when once the wishes of the largest possible proportion of the population are known, on what grounds can it be maintained that it will not be for their good to carry them out? We think that this question should be reasoned on purely abstract grounds, because it is the almost universal practice for our political reasoners to reply to it by citing some case in which it may be presumed (for it is not known) that the wishes of the many will be in opposition to the interests of the few, and then because the honest convictions of the reasoners are in favour of these latter, to consider the matter judged. Yet would not the fact that the great majority of a civilized people agree in desiring some particular measure afford in itself a strong presumption that that measure would be desirable for them? Let us take an extreme case, the dread of the possible occurrence of which is at the bottom of much of the horror of numerical majorities prevailing among our politicians. Let

us suppose, for example, that the great mass of the English nation had arrived at the opinion that the present foundations of property are injurious to the welfare of the greater part of the community. We take it that this fact would be in itself strong evidence that there was something amiss in the laws of property as at present existing, and that some alterations in them (we do not say what) would be for the public good. It is not in itself at all improbable that the world may not yet have arrived at final truth and wisdom on such subjects, and it is very likely that the participation of a larger number of those who are interested in the result than have hitherto been heard in the settlement of them, might lead to the adoption of more equitable principles or more generally satisfactory compromises than have yet been hit upon. It cannot be said that there is any *à priori* absurdity in this view of the case, and the greater the number of people who are led by their own experience to adopt it, the more likely is it to have some foundation in fact.

We know it will be at once answered that any attempt to meddle with the laws of property would be, in the supremest degree, an instance of mischievous class-legislation. We shall be told that in such a case all who have property would be on one side and all who have none on the other, and that therefore (but we ask why *therefore*?) for those who have no property to legislate for their own interests instead of allowing those who have property to legislate for theirs, would be gross partiality, and utterly ruinous to the general interests. To this we reply, in the first place, that, so far as can be judged in the present state of things, it is not true that opinion would always follow external circumstances, for there are and always have been, in all times and countries, many rich people whose sympathies are with the poor, and poor people who sympathize with the rich. But putting this aside, and supposing (what we do not suppose) that people would be guided in their judgment of institutions solely by their own experience of them, does it not appear that that which is condemned by the unanimous experience of the great majority is not likely to conduce to their happiness? Is it not by uneasiness in their present circumstances that people are led to seek for better, and if we eliminate the action of discontent from political life, do we not shut out the very means through which by the laws of human nature, if not of animal life, all amelioration is procured, either individual or social?

This consideration leads us to the great question, whether the average tendencies of human nature are towards degeneracy or progress. If towards the former, we have of course nothing to do but to accept with gratitude any teaching that has even a chance of having been revealed to us from superhuman powers,

or to submit gladly to the dictation of any one who can show even a shadow of superiority to his fellow men. Pope Pius IX., and Mr. Carlyle, and the author of the "Life of Cæsar" are in the right, and proclaim merely the simple sober truth. But if human nature is so constituted that the general tendency of its working is towards improvement, then it appears likely that the more room is given for the general laws by which it is governed to come into play, and, perhaps, also, the larger the averages that can be obtained, the quicker and surer will be the progress made. The great achievements of mechanical science are won by the application of natural forces to the objects we have in view, and the study of political economy, in itself the mere statement and classification of facts, has led to progress, by showing the tendencies of the natural laws through which only any specific objects can be obtained. It will evidently be a step in the same direction, if the institutions of the country make the selfishness of the majority instrumental to the general good, and the fact that democratic institutions do this is an argument in their favour, the importance of which will be felt in proportion as people are accustomed to look beyond accidental effects to the underlying causes that produce them. If there is any general law of progress affecting the human race as a whole, it must work through the operation of the general characteristics of humanity, of which selfishness, or the instinct of self-preservation, is one of the most conspicuous, and rational government ought to adapt as many as possible of such universal instincts to the purposes of society.

If we believe that the laws of human nature tend towards progress, or at least that mankind will do well to act on that hypothesis till they have exhausted every possible experiment that can establish its truth, we can scarcely avoid the conclusion that the voice of the majority will most effectually secure the main object of government—the comfort of the governed—if only because each individual knows best what he himself likes. It is most truly remarked by Mr. Hare, that "neither science nor philanthropy can reach the depths of the knowledge painfully won in the daily life and experience of the man and woman." If the object of government is the happiness of the largest possible number of those governed, and if people generally know their own business best, it follows that the ends of government will be most effectually carried out where the largest number can be got to concur in it.

It may be answered that, although men may generally be relied on to know what they want, they do not generally know the best way to get it. This is very true; and one important consideration in regard to democratic government, is whether it

is or is not better calculated than any other to procure a high level of education and intelligence for the whole people. It is to meet this difficulty of the possible incompetence of the majority of the people to obtain those ends, the desirableness of which they are competent to see, that plurality of votes for the most educated has been suggested, and even recommended by some politicians who, like Mr. Mill, see clearly the evils that must result from giving plural votes in proportion to property, and are altogether opposed to doing so. The objections to plural voting, regulated by an educational test, are in some degree the same that apply to all plural voting; they are, however, much less strong, because the distinctions created by it would not be inevitable and inalterable, but could be, at least partially, removed at will by effort on the part of any individual. It would not be inconsistent with the principles that have here been attempted to be indicated, to apply some such plan temporarily, along with an otherwise much enlarged franchise, until a higher general level of education than now exists can be attained.

But any argument drawn from the ignorance of the majority rebounds against the advocates of government by a minority. However ignorant the majority may be, they have still a better chance of getting what they want by trying to get it for themselves than by leaving the management of their affairs to those who want something else. If nations are by the nature of things divided into permanent and numerically unequal classes, whose interests are essentially antagonistic, it is in the highest degree important to the general good to deprive the classes that constitute the minority of any direct power to carry out measures for their own advantage. And if these classes are necessarily the most intelligent, they possess already by this fact a powerful weapon for carrying out their own exclusive objects which, if their objects are not likely to be the same as those of the community as a whole, ought to be guarded against and not strengthened.

Thus far we have gone, on the supposition that class feelings and interests are really antagonistic; and we have only endeavoured to show that if so the probabilities are in favour of the interests of the most numerous classes being in consonance with those of humanity in general, if only because they are the most numerous. There are, however, many facts which point to the conclusion that class feelings are no essential part of human nature, but a merely accidental or transitory development of it, either the product of law or the remains of an imperfect civilization, useful temporarily as means of education for the human race, but not necessary in any well-adjusted society. Class feelings seem to be the instinctive means by which men strive to

protect themselves in semi-civilized societies, just as at first sheer egotism, and afterwards family union, are the natural safeguards in still ruder states. From being exclusive to himself, man's sympathies widen out to wife, children, and relations, and then again to his class and his country, exactly as the struggle for existence becomes milder; so that sometimes, even in a highly civilized condition, they narrow again to himself under the pressure of extreme danger. It is not inconsistent with this view that religion has been found, even in very rude and early states, to enlarge men's sympathies towards all mankind, because it does so by fixing the mind chiefly on dangers shared with humanity in general, and reducing the comparative value in life of the things in which men are rivals. Nothing is more evident throughout all history than that class feelings, even when founded on broad natural differences, are amenable to the influence of law and other extraneous circumstances. It may be doubted whether any class feelings, even those most firmly rooted in natural facts, would ever long continue to prevail in a state of civilization if they were not fostered by legal distinctions. We find that those distinctions between men which are most fundamental, such as differences of race, age, or sex, tend to lose their influence with time when the effect of civilization has been to make but a small part of life dependent on them. There is no difference between men more marked than that of age, for there is none which more necessarily induces more different states of mind on a larger proportion of subjects. Accordingly, in the earlier stages of history, the whole state of society was influenced by it. The elder men made laws to help them to retain throughout life in their own hands the power which circumstances naturally gave them in the childhood of their rivals, and the *Patria Potestas* of Roman law, as well as the whole system of patriarchal authority, was founded upon it. Young men are now so completely emancipated that, especially in England, we have difficulty in recalling a state of things that existed so long, and now throughout the civilized world class feeling as between young and old has completely died away. The same tendency of class feelings to fade away when legal disabilities disappear is at work now, before our eyes, in America, as between black men and white. And in aristocratic communities we see the converse power of institutions to substitute artificial class feelings for natural ones, in the feeling among the men of the aristocracy that women of their own class are nearer to an equality with themselves than men of the lower orders.

There has always been a tendency in law to perpetuate and often to enforce the combinations or unions which have grown up spontaneously between men in their efforts to ameliorate

their condition. But no sooner however does law or society relax any forced bond than the infinite variety of human nature begins to show itself, and will make new combinations, which, if left perfectly free, will be incessantly changing their component parts. Whether it is the forces of nature or the temporary conditions of an imperfect civilization which have obliged men to cling closely together, to imitate one another, and to keep within the same limits—to form a class, in short—they are equally glad to be released from restraint, and to be able, under the protection of strong and impartial government, to develop their own individual peculiarities. There is one tendency in human nature which, even under the most adverse circumstances, is constantly at work against the permanence of all class or caste feeling, and urging men to enter into new forms of association. This is the disposition to weary of those things or persons with whose faults we are most intimately acquainted, and to look at the bright side of what is presented only to the imagination. When people crowd together either physically or morally, it is always the result of fear or hardship, unless it be of mere temporary excitement. Even the ties of relationship and family life get slacker, as civilization and wealth ensure friends and safety outside the pale of the family. Thus within the family itself, the most voluntary tie—that of marriage—constantly rises in importance as compared to blood-relationship, and does so most in the most civilized societies. Even the comparative rarity in modern times, and absence from our own country of the ancient custom of voluntary adoption, is just one of those exceptions which prove the rule; it is just where the family is of least importance that men are most willing to let the family die out.

When we consider the immense variety of subjects included in politics, it does not seem likely that men would band together in classes unless induced to do so by privileges or disabilities in themselves political, for the occasions that would draw forth individual varieties of opinion, and accustom people to act in concert with those who differ from themselves in all except the immediate matter in hand, will naturally arise more often in political than in any other phase of life. It is from this point of view that the importance of Personal Representation appears most strikingly, and Mr. Hare has well said that:—

“The subject of Representation would be very inadequately conceived, if it were regarded as a mere question between majorities and minorities. The formation of electoral majorities and minorities is no more the natural means of arriving at political representation than it would be a natural result of any other association that it should be divided into two parties,

“one perpetually labouring to counteract the wishes of the other. The order and the occupations of mankind—the distribution of population and the supply of its necessities, are all provided for by physical and moral laws operating on the diversities of nature and of character which are found amongst men. These differences preserve the harmony and the vitality of social life. In political sentiment there is not less variety than in the other motives of human conduct; and abstractedly it would be no more likely that the political opinions of the electors of a borough should fall into two or three antagonistic divisions than that they should be composed of twenty, fifty, or a hundred distinct views or conceptions. The dissimilarity would be much more probable than the similarity. Opinion and action in politics would be as various as opinion and action in other sciences, if there were not causes that enter into political bodies, and create a disturbed and unhealthy movement, provoking antagonistic divisions.”*

If all forms of compact and binding association between men are but the means through which they endeavour to obtain individual freedom by one another's help, and if the highest civilization tends to restore to men as much of the individual freedom of savage life as can be possibly made consistent with personal security and mutual help against the forces of nature, political institutions should not foster any unnecessary source of class combination. Such causes as exist in the nature of things should have no additional strength added to them by political classification, and the most perfect political organization will be that which deals with individuals, leaving to them the utmost possible freedom of voluntary aggregation and segregation. Otherwise, political institutions will have a tendency to stereotype accidental and passing forms of society, will intensify their peculiarities, and either check new forms of growth in their very beginnings, or compress them till they have attained a development so out of proportion to what surrounds them that they will burst forth at last with revolutionary violence. This is the great objection to plurality of votes. It must necessarily proceed upon some artificial classification. It must affix arbitrary value to certain qualifications, and as we have no absolute wisdom to guide us in doing so, the progress of time may falsify all our appreciations. It is not a self-acting system, progressing and expanding with time and circumstances, but must be continually readapted by violent and arbitrary changes. All change in the political value of men, all increase or diminution in the number of votes allotted to them, must be referred to the will

* Hare on Representation, (3rd ed.) pp. xxix. xxx.

and judgment of individual men at a particular time; it is in its nature arbitrary government, and we fear its result would be a stationary society. Undoubtedly, plural voting might be made a means of carrying out ideal justice; it might be used to redress natural inequalities, and the weak by means of it might be made as powerful as the strong. The different elements of human nature too might be elaborately balanced, might perhaps be usefully balanced if we could only be sure that we know what is absolutely desirable. We are far from saying that some such expedient might not prove useful in a highly elaborate state of society if all other experiments fail; and it should ultimately prove that class feelings are ineradicable, and class interests universal. But whatever tends to lessen the comparative value of the individual tends to increase his disposition to combine with those who have some point of resemblance with himself, and plural voting should be looked at with the utmost suspicion on account of its effect on the minds of those who are valued at the lowest point, aggravating the very evil of class feeling against which it is employed. If one man finds his vote of less value than another's, to obtain an object which he desires, he will naturally seek out other men, who agree with himself, to strengthen his vote; he will, to a certain degree, be dependent upon them; he will be induced to sacrifice to uniformity with them objects for which he cares little in order to get them to co-operate with him in things for which he cares much. Independence is likely to be in this way discouraged, a habit of coalition created; and people will cultivate class feelings in order to constitute a certain bond of union which can always be appealed to with confidence. But where every individual unit is of equal weight, men will combine one day with those who agree with them in one thing, and another day with those who agree with them in another. The least possible inducement will then be given them to sacrifice individual variety of opinion, or to check its divergence from any average level. That this has not hitherto been among the advantages secured by the nominal equality of universal suffrage in the countries where universal suffrage prevails, must be attributed to the faulty arrangements by which elections are managed, neither originating in, nor suitable to, democratic institutions or modern society.

Individual political liberty will be best secured by that system of representation which gives to every single vote the greatest comparative importance, and leaves the smallest possible residuum of rejected votes—that is, the smallest defeated minority. It is by carrying out the true principle of democracy and giving to every single individual an effective voice in government as an

individual, and not as part of any section, majority or minority, that Mr. Hare has in his scheme of Personal Representation suggested the best safeguard, as we believe, against the danger of class-legislation. Although this method would be likely to act well on however small a scale it were applied, and to act in itself as a solvent to class-sympathies, and a stimulus to personal energy, still it is more peculiarly in a democratic state, where it would collect suffrages from a large average and be unimpeded by the passions that political privileges invariably arouse, that Personal Representation must be expected to produce the most valuable results, and to prove an important step both in Representative and Democratic government. Political classes being abolished, permanent community of interests between individuals will be reduced to what, as an actual element in society, has a claim to be represented. The removal of the great mass of mistake, prejudice, and exaggerated dislike which accumulates round all privileges on the one hand, and disabilities on the other, would itself clear away the greater part of class feeling. The scope for the action of private opinion given by personal representation to those whose individual convictions are in opposition to their class-sympathies would neutralize another large portion. Legislation in the interest of those classes who have hitherto been neglected or oppressed would, by removing the causes for combination, prevent the growth of the class-sympathies to which combination gives rise. And what, after all this, remained of disposition towards class-legislation would be no more than coincidence in that self-assertion which is one of the very facts in human nature on which free institutions or self-government are founded. In order that this instinct of self-assertion should be guided by rational judgment towards the attainment of its objects, it may be, we think it is, desirable to institute an educational test for the possession of a vote. Government is the application of means to ends, and before a man takes part in it he ought to be able to show an average command of these means according to the level of the society to which he belongs; but every man, as he is himself, has a right to his own objects, and to use his own individual influence to induce his fellow men to let him have them in peace. Education and individual liberty appear the two safeguards of Democracy, and it is some collateral evidence that Democracy is the most perfect form of political society that it requires, to work well, what are also the requisites of all social progress.

The representation of minorities, in favour of which so strong a feeling has grown up of late years, is, in fact, an effort to obtain a more perfect representation of all, and therefore of the real majority. It would give a rough approximation to true

representation, and is a transitional idea, valuable in itself, but still more valuable for having suggested and led up to that of personal representation. The representation of minorities ought not to be confounded, as it very often is, with government by a minority. The representation of minorities will give to each minority a share in the members of the representative, only proportional to its share in the electoral body, along with such influence as it may be able to obtain by the opportunity for statement and discussion of its opinions in the Legislative Assembly. Now to carry out this object thoroughly it is necessary to dissolve both the majority and all minorities into their constituent elements of individual voters, and to group these, solely according to political opinions, into unanimous groups of electors, so small as to leave scarcely any variety of opinion outside the pale of one or other of them. If to this could be added some principle of classification or grouping which should leave each individual free to choose his own place, and at the same time free to change it at pleasure, we should seem to have come as near to an ideal of thorough and genuine representation as the present state of political thought makes it easy to imagine.

These are precisely the objects proposed by Mr. Hare in his treatise on the election of representatives, and his scheme completely reconciles the rights of minorities with those of majorities, those of individuals with those of society as a whole, not by sacrificing any, but by giving more to each than has ever yet been claimed for them. The publication of Mr. Hare's work must be looked upon as an epoch in political philosophy, for it is only since then that the possibility of an effectual separation for political purposes of the individual members of the community, from the classes or localities to which they accidentally belong, has been clearly put before the world. Nevertheless it is certain that the course of political discussion has for a long time past been tending to define the peculiar dangers of democratic progress which Mr. Hare alone has seen how to avert, and the wants which his scheme is calculated to supply.

It is a remarkable evidence how widely felt this want has been, and how generally this method is adapted to supply it, that Mr. Hare's idea has already attracted attention, and found advocates in Belgium, in Switzerland, in France, Germany and Holland, in the Free States of America, and in the colonies of New South Wales and Victoria. In the parliament of New South Wales a bill was introduced in 1862, for adapting the principle to the election of the Upper House. It was introduced by the then Ministry, whose resignation soon afterwards caused it to be dropped; but it gave rise to a discussion, and to a re-

port of a Select Committee appointed to examine into it, which do the highest honour to colonial statesmanship and the representatives of a very enlarged suffrage. In the report occurs the following statement of the characteristics of the scheme:—

“The leading feature of the plan is the representation of *all* the electors, in the proportion of the numbers of their respective parties and sections, instead of the representation merely of the majorities prevailing in each local electorate, while leaving the defeated minorities wholly without representation. Under the usual system, if one interest or prejudice be prevalent in a majority of the electors in twenty constituencies, twenty members may be elected to represent those majorities, although the minorities may collectively amount to a number not far short of the successful majorities. A difference of one vote in each electorate might determine the election, and twenty votes might thus determine the fate of twenty elections, leaving thousands of electors, forming the minorities, without a single representative. This is doubtless an extreme supposition: but the merits of any system may be fairly illustrated by showing to what it tends when carried to its utmost length. The system of Mr. Hare provides a remedy: but while it renders this injustice to minorities impossible, it equally maintains all the just rights of majorities. It establishes a true representation of the whole society, with its various interests and opinions represented in due proportion; and the manner in which this is effected, is, when fully explained and understood, extremely simple.”*

A still more remarkable evidence that this plan is not in advance of what we have a right to hope for in our present stage of progress is the coincidence of thought between Mr. Hare and Mr. Andræ. This latter having been commissioned, in 1855, by the Danish Government to draw up a scheme for the election of representatives for the Rigsraad, an assembly common to Denmark and Schleswig, recommended a plan very closely resembling that of Mr. Hare. It was adopted, and no difficulty was found in the working of it during the eight years that elapsed before the separation of the Duchies from Denmark.

The special characteristics of Mr. Hare's system may be defined as—1st, the liberty of the elector to choose whomsoever he will to represent him; and 2nd, the fact that every representative represents an unanimous constituency. If we follow out the working of these two principles, we see that their first effect upon the elector will be to induce him to choose for himself, by giving him just hope that his vote will not be useless. An elector can never know, on this system, until after an election, whether there may

* “Treatise on Representation,” Appendix F, p. 308.

not be, throughout the whole country, enough other electors, of like opinions with himself, to secure the return of the person he prefers, and therefore he has a motive to name the candidate who stands first in his own estimation, there being always room to hope that this one may prove successful. The dwellers in every borough, says Mr. Hare, are not bound together by any indissoluble bond :—

“They may be told to be, if they can, unanimous in the choice of a representative ; but if an elector cannot agree with the majority on one side of a parish boundary, there would be no necessary breach of the order, or even of the courtesies of society, if he be permitted to unite himself with a number of his fellow-countrymen on the other side. He is not precluded from choosing his friends or associates beyond the limits of his own borough, and there does not seem to be any sound reason why he should not be allowed, with a like freedom, to seek elsewhere his fellow-constituents. If the legal obstacles in the way of this exercise of individual volition were removed, and the elector were enabled to add his vote to the votes of any other of his countrymen, agreeing with him in sympathy and opinion, and sufficient to form a constituency, it is obvious that, so far as representation is concerned, the question as to minorities would cease, for the minorities would be absorbed. An age which has achieved the freedom of commercial intercourse in spite of the pretensions of local protection and monopoly, may not unreasonably hope to find advocates for the free interchange and communication, as well of political action as of political thought, against the far less plausible and more insolent claims of dominant inhabitants of arbitrarily selected and privileged boroughs and districts to a monopoly of the great right of national representation.”

The freedom of the elector to name any person he chooses to represent him in parliament is, in fact, the mere evident complement of the franchise, and it is a curious example of how slowly ideas are developed that it should not have been long ago recognised as a necessary part of all free representative institutions.

The second provision, that every representative represents an unanimous constituency, is no less essential to thorough than the first is to genuine representation, and it provides as effectually for the due weight of the majority as the other does for the liberty of the individual. The balance between them is complete, and each follows from the other. The perfection with which these two parts of Mr. Hare's scheme work into and through each other, and the numbers of concurrent advantages flowing from them, are

* Hare on Representation, pp. 21, 22, 3rd ed.

among the surest indications that they are the true solution of the political problem which has occupied so many minds. The simplicity of these two ideas is so great and their harmony with the first principles of free representative government is so evident, that when once the mind has grasped them it has difficulty in realizing the fact that it can ever have dispensed with them. This method has, indeed, the essential characteristics of scientific progress; it seems to have been arrived at by the following out of principles step by step, and when once hit upon, it is confirmed by a mass both of negative and positive evidence, ramifying in many directions. It is at the same time so clear and simple, that even when pointed out, many people miss it by looking for something which shall seem more novel and elaborate.

To decide how many members we wish to have in our House of Commons, to divide the population of the country by this number, to leave every individual elector free to name any man he will as his choice, and then to send to parliament every man who has been named by the necessary number of electors, is, in a few words, the plan Mr. Hare proposes.

This being the object, the means of attaining it are open to discussion, and can scarcely fail to be perfected with time. Mr. Hare himself has worked out the details of a scheme for carrying out his plan, and, as might be expected, the consequence is that he has been reproached with extreme elaboration, and those who have found difficulty in following out the steps of the operation, have confused the details with the plan itself. Had he only proposed the object and left the details to others, he would have been reproached with the imperfect and immature state of the scheme, and told to show how such a plan could ever be carried into practice. As he has himself remarked—

“In what is proposed there is much less complexity than is daily encountered and overcome by the purest mechanical arrangements in the clearing-house of the London Bankers, or in the General Post Office. In conveying to the mind, in the shape of a written narrative, the process of operation, every sort of machinery has an appearance of complexity. This would be immediately felt by any one who should endeavour, in words, to explain to another, who had not seen it, the operation of Jacquard’s loom, or of the steam engine.”—pp. 158, 159.

It may indeed be cited as a humorous example of practical paradox, that any English lawyer should declare the difficulty of understanding Mr. Hare’s system a reason why it could not work well.

Some inventions begin to be put into practice in a rough form,

and get elaborated by degrees, little by little. These are often the most elaborate at last, but people have grown up accustomed to them, and find no difficulty in understanding what they find no difficulty in doing, but what they would mostly find it impossible to explain in words. There are few people who could tell us the history of a loaf of bread, beginning with a geological theory of the formation of the soil, and ending with the rules and customs of the baker's trade, yet we get our bread for all that. Each person concerned knows enough to fulfil his own part in the process, and is urged to do so by the same simple motives we have advocated as motive-power in politics; while many different pursuits—chemistry, political economy, philanthropy—help to suggest some new improvements, and combine to make the whole thing more elaborately incomprehensible and more conveniently good and cheap. Other inventions (and it is the tendency of civilization to multiply the proportion of these latter) are brought to a high degree of perfection by their first inventors. Although they are thus calculated to be more useful at once, yet this very fact raises a repugnance against them in a large class of minds, such as are either indolent or naturally indisposed to the organization of details. In this case it is sufficient to recommend the principle itself to all candid persons. If it be once admitted that the object is desirable, let the method be tried on a small scale, and let every one be urged to take it into consideration, and to contribute his mite towards the object to be achieved.



ART. II.—RATIONALISM IN EUROPE.

History of the Rise and Influence of the Spirit of Rationalism in Europe. By W. F. H. LECKY, M.A. In two volumes. London: Longmans. 1865.

FOR eighteen hundred years civilization in its ebb and flow has exhibited the working of a principle, which under certain conditions substitutes a spirit of unselfish tenderness for the hard and cold ideals of Greek and Roman polity. With whatever success, the society which professes to embody this principle has striven to teach men that the self-dependent magnanimity of Aristotelian ethics is a mere dream, and that its realization would fill the earth with tyrants. It has obliterated generally the cruel

distinction which Athenian philosophy drew between natural freemen and natural slaves. By its beneficent influence slavery, in Europe at least, has given place to serfdom, and serfdom has been gradually merged in liberty. It has taught men that their mutual relations have no meaning and no force except as based on an eternal and inalienable relation of all mankind to a Father whose justice cannot be wearied with iniquity, and whose love is not to be conquered by ingratitude. It has striven to throw down many barriers which ignorance, superstition, and mistrust have interposed between man and his Maker; to teach them that the empire of an all-righteous God cannot be shared with apostate spirits or malignant demons; to transfer to the oppressed and suffering the sympathy which had been reserved for heroes and philosophers; to show them that in the sight of Him with whom we have to do, there is no distinction of Greek, Roman, barbarian, Scythian, bond or free. In this slowly-working leaven of Christianity we discern a living spirit, for which we look in vain in the dreamy *Theoria* of Aristotle, or the ideal polity of Plato. We see it in the vehement conviction of Saul of Tarsus, that the final issue of the great conflict will be the victory of Truth and Love, a victory by which the last enemy of man shall be destroyed, and God shall be all in all. We trace it in the art of the Catacombs, which refused to delineate not only the sufferings of martyrs, but even the passion of Christ; which, instead of exhibiting the terrors of the Day of Judgment, displayed in its merciful and loving emblems a hope and a forgiveness alike pathetic and sublime.

Yet even in this dawn of brilliant promise there were ominous signs of coming storms. The strong conviction of impending doom presented fatal hindrances to the development of a civilization which might be stigmatized as secular and carnal. The obstinate assurance that Christians were already in possession of all truth was an evil augury for the free exercise of human thought. In the firm belief that without the Church there was no salvation, lay the guarantee that they who now submitted eagerly to tortures and to death, would, if they rose to power, inflict in their turn tortures and death on others. The hour of triumph was not long delayed; and from the first moment of victory the dominant church began to furnish the materials for a great indictment, which in the sacred interests of truth must be plainly and unequivocally drawn. If the several counts exhibit a catalogue of crimes almost incredible from their very magnitude, we must for the present beg the reader to remember that the charges are urged not by ourselves, but by Mr. Lecky. We have simply compressed into a few pages the grounds of accusation which he has exhibited in a minute and elaborate analysis.

If his facts may be trusted (and his opponents, probably, will rather evade than meet them), the following sketch may give some idea of the working of a society, which, from the day of its establishment as the Imperial Church, has been struggling to obtain dominion over the bodies as well as over the souls of men. During the ages which have since passed away, it has won great victories and undergone some humiliations. On the nations which have been brought within its reach, its influence has been in part beneficent and in part disastrous. By its own profession, it has laboured for peace; but its words have commonly been the signal for battles, not altogether befitting the Bride of the Lamb. It has proclaimed its mission of rescuing mankind from unrighteousness and sin; and beyond all doubt it has wrought a work which, with those who accept the yoke, passes for the regeneration of mankind, and from all who look on it with the temper of impartial judges calls for patient and serious thought. With startling vehemence or cold formality, it has announced the impending destruction of the world, has declared that human life is a feverish dream, has anathematized all who treat it as a sober reality. Sometimes it may have modified the haughtiness of its tone; but, on the whole, it has proclaimed, with praiseworthy consistency, the utter blindness, misery, and degradation of mankind. It has taught men that they are living in an accursed world, which has brought forth thorns and briars from the moment of the great aboriginal catastrophe. Denouncing the reasoning faculty as the very source and root of all evil, it has insisted on absolute submission to the Church, in which alone there is safety for the soul. On this basis of authority it has been no hard task to raise the superstructure of traditional theology. The human mind could never by searching find out God: it could conceive no limit to his power: it could not presume to define his morality. There was nothing, therefore, for man to do but to accept the teaching of the society through which alone He had been pleased to impart the knowledge of Himself.

The claim was unqualified; but there was not much reluctance in admitting it. The appeal was made to feelings which in the infancy of mankind were all-powerful, and which, even under the highest civilization of Athens and Rome, had never died away. The worshipper of Zeus and Mithras believed not less heartily than did the Christian apostles in the commingling of things visible and invisible, and in the action of spiritual agencies, not only on the human mind, but on the inert matter of the universe. As in the old Hellenic creed Athênê spake face to face with Achilleus, and Aphroditê lured on Paris to his ruin, so in the belief of the Christian disciples the angels were descending continually from heaven upon the children of

men. The sun might know his going down, the stars might seem to rise and set in fixed order, but the functions of all created things were subject to arbitrary interference at the will of beings who sought either the welfare or the misery of man. Thus far the spirit of the new belief was congenial with the temper of the Paganism which it sought to vanquish. It only remained to turn the old heathen faith into the channel of Iranian dualism, to tell them that the world was a battle-field in which the souls of men were a prize for the contending powers of good and evil. Henceforth the Christian moved amidst crowds of invisible warriors. His impure and carnal thoughts were blasted from the abode of rebellious devils; his heavenward aspirations were breathings of immaculate angels who stand before the throne of God. The end of all things earthly was not far off; but whether the number of the elect should be fulfilled in one generation or in more, the moment of death was to each man the end of the brief and fearful struggle. The earth was not his home; its business was for him full of snares and delusions; he had nothing to do with its interests and its wants. The impressions of his senses were not to be trusted: his passions were to be crushed, his appetites utterly mortified; and if the work was not done before he came to die, he fell for ever into an abyss of endless and irremediable woe.

The enthusiasm of a faith thus fighting hand to hand with a world which lay in wickedness imparted an irresistible weight to the Christian phalanx. The gods of heathenism were hurled from their thrones; but they became no mere nonentities. In the city and in the desert they exhibited to the Christian warrior their true character of malignant demons, and exercised over the unwary or the depraved a power even more tremendous than that which they had wielded of old time. With this victory of Christianity over Paganism began the real action of the Church upon the world. The true soldier of Christ was dead to its corrupt society; but he was not left alone as he fought the good fight of faith in his march through the weary wilderness. Surrounded by wonders in his own day, he had also inherited vast stores of supernatural wealth. For him the sun and moon had stood still in the heavens; for him an ark had moved upon the waters which destroyed all flesh that had not sought the saving shelter; for him dumb beasts had spoken in human language, the iron axe had floated on the stream, the dead bones had sprung to life on the touch of a prophet's body. What, then, to him were the rise and fall, the progress and decay of empires? what for him the calculations of statesmen, or the welfare and rights of citizens? But although these were in themselves as nothing, reasons of most constraining

power impelled the new society to grasp at temporal dominion. It had to do battle with the world, the flesh, and the devil; and it became a blessed work to wield the secular sword on behalf of the Lamb of God. Its influence was soon felt. Henceforth the functions of government were construed more and more into obligations to maintain the truth, and to punish not only crime, but sin. The Catholic belief had got the upper hand; and the instincts of humanity, or, as the phrase ran, the corrupt longings of the unregenerate heart, met with little indulgence in the unequal warfare. The weak barriers presented by natural affection were breached or stormed in rapid succession; and a gross darkness fell upon the nations for many a weary age. The stoutest hearts were cowed into abject submission, or took a desperate delight in making earth a hell. In the utter enervation and thralldom of mind and body, there was nothing else worth living for. If men multiplied on the earth, they did so only by yielding to a brutal necessity. The true relation of man and woman was that of deadly antagonism. To the fervent Christian, woman was, in the belief of Chrysostom, "a natural temptation, a desirable calamity, a domestic peril, a deadly fascination, and a painted ill." For the relations of parents to their children there was reserved a still more potent curse. All men at the instant of death passed to a state of endless bliss or never-ending torment: and hell was the doom not only of the wilfully impenitent, but of all who had died without baptism. For the heathen of mature years, who had led a decent life, some evasive theory might perhaps open the gates of heaven or of a colourless and monotonous limbo. For the infant dying unbaptized there was no such hope. The mother, to whom the premature death of her child must bring a biting agony even in the kindest age, was assured "that not only men who have obtained the use of their reason, but also little children who have begun to live in their mother's womb and have there died, or who, having been just born, have passed away from the world without the sacrament of holy baptism, administered in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, must be punished by the eternal torture of undying fire." Life was indeed a dismal mockery. St. Mary of Egypt, after years of debauchery, received the reward of her macerations in heaven—the babe unborn and the infant of a span long crawled upon the floor of hell. The Church, like Atê in the old myth, had done her work effectually. The poison had spread through the veins of humanity, and (in Lucretian phrase) the taint of religion had passed on the world of sense and the world of thought. If the Greek of the Homeric age looked on every man as his foe until a special compact made him his friend, so to the Christian his father, his wife, his child,

were less than nothing, if lack of faith or perversity of belief placed a gulf between them. The priests had sown the seeds of terror; the crop came up in a frightful indifference to human suffering, and ran to waste in an exquisite delight at the infliction of ingenious and artistic tortures. Why indeed should they feel compunction? Why listen to the foolish dictates of a carnal mercy? The sinner, and more especially the heretic, as the worst of sinners, walked on the very verge of hell. All things might be done to snatch the brand from the burning. The mortal body might be thrust into the flame to save the undying soul; and if a slow fire added to the bitterness of death, so much the better, whether as a means of bringing the victim to repentance, or as a foretaste of the mightier pains of hell.

Mere human instinct might kick against the pricks for a little while. In spite of all corrupting influences, in spite of the logic which followed to its extremest conclusions a theology astoundingly iniquitous, the shedding of blood for heresy still remained distasteful to the writer, who, as Mr. Lecky has remarked, "was destined to consolidate the whole system of persecution, to furnish the arguments of all its later defenders, and to give to it the sanction of a name that long silenced every pleading of mercy, and became the glory and watchword of every persecutor." But while Mr. Lecky is fully justified in maintaining that on Augustine, "more than on any other theologian, more, perhaps, even than on Dominic and Innocent, rests the responsibility of this fearful curse," he has, we think, been tempted by the richness of Augustine's imagery and the superfluous wealth of illustrations not seldom fallacious, to present in too flattering colours his portrait of this great offender against the well-being of mankind:—

"A sensualist and a Manichæan, a philosopher and a theologian, a saint of the most tender and exquisite piety, and a supporter of atrocious persecution, the life of this father exhibits a strange instance of the combination of the most discordant agencies to the development of a single mind, and of the influence of that mind over the most conflicting interests. Neither the unbridled passions of his youth, nor the extravagances of the heresy he so long maintained, could cloud the splendour of his majestic intellect, which was even then sweeping over the whole field of knowledge, and acquiring in the most unpropitious spheres new elements of strength. In the arms of the frail beauties of Carthage, he learnt to touch the chords of passion with consummate skill; and the subtleties of Persian metaphysics, the awful problems of the origin of evil, and of the essence of the soul, which he vainly sought to fathom, gave him a sense of the darkness around us, that coloured every portion of his teaching. The weight and compass of his genius, his knowledge both of men and of books, a certain aroma of sanctity that imparted an almost inexpressible charm to all his

later writings, and a certain impetuosity of character that overbore every obstacle, soon made him the master intellect of the Church. Others may have had a larger share in the construction of her formulae; no one, since the days of the Apostles, infused into her a larger measure of his spirit. He made it his mission to map out her theology with inflexible precision, to develop its principles to their full consequences, and to co-ordinate its various parts into one authoritative and symmetrical whole. Inpatient of doubt, he shrunk from no conclusion, however unpalatable; he seemed to exult in trampling human instincts in the dust, and in accustoming men to accept submissively the most revolting tenets. He was the most staunch and enthusiastic defender of all those doctrines that grow out of the habits of mind that lead to persecution. No one else had developed so fully the material character of the torments of hell, no one else had plunged so deeply into the speculations of predestinarianism, very few had dwelt so emphatically on the damnation of the unbaptized. For a time he shrunk from, and even condemned persecution; but he soon perceived in it the necessary consequences of his principles. He recanted his condemnation; he flung his whole genius into the cause; he recurred to it again and again, and he became the framer and the representative of the theology of intolerance."—Vol. II., p. 23.

The world has heard much of the intellect of Augustine, because he used it chiefly to extend the power of a system which even without him was fast acquiring predominance: it has heard little of the intellect of others whose instinctive truthfulness led them to question statements regarded by Catholics as fundamental, and whose difficulties were at least as great as any that beset the path of Augustine. A really dispassionate critic might find reason to modify, if not to reverse the verdict, after a close comparison of the Augustinian reasoning with that of Pelagius, Cassian, Julianus of Eclana, and others, who for saying that man is not wholly bad and God not wholly unjust, have been flung aside by the church as mere refuse. But Mr. Lecky himself has dealt roughly with the lingering humanity of Augustine. If that great ecclesiastical saint shrank from shedding the blood of heretics, he did not hesitate, with Catholics and Donatists alike, to praise enactments enjoining the sentence of death on all "who celebrated the rites of the religion which had a few centuries before been universal in the empire."—ii. 26.

But Augustine was concerned not with the welfare of men, but in building up the City of God. His tender and exquisite piety never turned his thoughts to the fortunes of the women whose hearts he had wounded, or of the men whom he had seduced into grievous error. The Manichæan philosophy he had thrust aside, because, professing to start with demonstration, it went on to propound fanciful and absurd theories about the Divine nature and the government of the world; and he had

felt a sensible relief in embracing a system which, bidding him receive absurdities not less extravagant as matters of faith and not of evidence, insisted formally on the duty of credulity. In this new atmosphere he had learnt to make short work of human ethics. The lies with which the Israelites cheated the Egyptians were acts of piety, the omission of which would have been sinful. They were commanded by God, who likewise commanded Samson to destroy himself; and in all such cases "who shall criminate obedience? who accuse the service of piety?"* If the holy books seemed here and there "to teach something unsound,"† the drawing aside of the mystical veil would display the beauty hidden beneath the ghastly covering. In his new school he had discovered that there was no wrong in sending away the mother of his son, because he had promised to marry another woman.‡ The philosophy which had taught him that Moses was right in lying to Pharaoh, and Samson right in destroying himself, had shown him also that the leaves of the New Testament furnished an excellent substitute for those of the Sibyl. The strong man was hopelessly fettered; he had abandoned himself to the belief that the Divine mercy could not be exercised beyond the pale of the Catholic Church, and he could not resist its logical sequence of a predetermination of human destiny irrespectively of the human will. This doctrine, Mr. Lecky remarks, "Augustine illustrated by the case of a mother who had two infants. Each of these is but 'a lump of perdition;' neither has ever performed a moral act. The mother overlies one, and it perishes unbaptized: the other is baptized, and is saved." It is but fair to add that Augustine was singularly rich in illustrations pointing this consolatory moral, and that he postponed his own baptism to lessen the heinousness of sins which he might commit before the reception of that sacrament.

The lot of Augustine had fallen on palmy days. The church was singing its hymn of victory over the prostrate gods of heathenism; but if it was a comfort still to know that the executioner's sword was ready to smite the remnant of their besotted worshippers, we may well understand how keen a satisfaction in seasons of persecution might be derived from the

* We confine ourselves to passages quoted by Dr. Pusey in support of a statement in the "Confessions," that God may at certain times command the performance of acts which he has forbidden at others.—Confessions of Augustine (Library of the Fathers), p. 41.

† "Confessions," vi. 4.

‡ The sequel of the story, as given by himself, heightens the cold-blooded cruelty of the whole transaction; and even to the last, while he deploras the sin of incontinence, the thought of his real duty seems never to have crossed his mind.

thought of those undying flames which should soon engulf the persecutor. At such times we can scarcely wonder that Christians should fasten on the idea that the bliss of heaven received its keenest relish from the sight of the agonizing torments of the damned. With a subtle and concentrated malice, for which persecution inflicted on himself furnished the only palliation, Tertullian chuckled at the coming contrast when he should feast his eyes on his enemies in Hades, while he himself reposed in Abraham's bosom. "How shall I wonder? How shall I laugh? How shall I rejoice? How shall I triumph when I behold so many and such illustrious kings, who were said to have mounted into heaven, groaning with Jupiter their God in the lowest darkness of hell. Then shall the tragedians pour forth in their own misfortune more piteous cries than those with which they had made the theatre to resound, while the comedian's powers shall be better seen as his limbs become more flexible by the heat. Compared with such spectacles, with such subjects of triumph as these, what can prætor or consul, quæstor or pontiff afford? and even now faith can bring them near, imagination can depict them as present."

When, some centuries later, Christian priests sat in the seat of kings and wielded more than regal power, the orthodox instincts of Tertullian and Augustine demanded their legitimate satisfaction. Then came a time during which the sun was blotted out of heaven, and the unclean fungus of superstition spawned everywhere under the baneful atmosphere of religious terror. All rare or unusual phenomena, comets and eclipses, famine and pestilence, storms and wars, were judgments inflicted by an angry God, or plagues wrought by devils, or by human beings acting in league with devils. The flood-gates were now opened, and the foul stream of cold-blooded and calm malignity could overspread the earth unchecked. If the heretic could sin against God and the Church by calling into question the utter depravity of man or the justice of endless punishment, the sorcerer and the witch might pollute the world with their enchantments, and kill the bodies while they imperilled the souls of the righteous. The contagion spread through every class of society. Philosophers who could speak soberly on other subjects, judges who could be impartial in dealing with ordinary crimes, swallowed with unhesitating credulity the most grotesque and sickening tales of the intercourse of men and women with incubi and succubi. How indeed could they dare to doubt facts to which the infallible Church had set its seal, and for which there was a mass of evidence more overwhelming in its weight and worth than any that could be brought forward for the commonest accidents of life? If the facts of witchcraft were not certain, nothing was certain. The Levitical

law, which was the absolute utterance of God, had given vivid pictures of witches, and enjoined the infliction of death on all without exception. No punishment could be too great for such blasphemous exercise of spiritual powers. The horrible orgies of the witches' Sabbath, the mad excitement of nocturnal journeys through the air, could not be atoned by the slow torture of a half smothered fire, the faint foretaste of a fiercer flame which should never be put out. To strangle the poor wretch before the burning was in itself an outrage against the majesty of Divine justice; and fathers and mothers could look on with dry eyes while young girls and aged crones, who had sprung half-burnt from the fires, were forced back into the smouldering pile. Orthodox cruelty could scarcely go further. The heretic might die with some faint comfort from the thought that he had done battle for the truth, and that after ages might hold his name in honour. For the wizard or the witch there was nothing but the blackness of darkness here, and tortures unimaginably awful hereafter. With minds weakened and maddened by the traditional theology, they believed themselves to be what their judges represented them; and, smitten down by the execrations of their fellow men, sank into the flames, raving in a hideous despair, and cursing the Christian's faith, the Christian's practice, and the Christian's God.

Such in Catholic lands, and in those which called themselves Protestant, was the working of dogmatic Christianity; and as being its genuine work, it was wrought without compunction and without shame. Judges boasted of the thousands whom they had slain, and avowed a keen appetite for slaying more. But these things could not be done without method; and the bloody code of Christendom was accordingly based on an elaborate philosophy, which embraced all social life and defined the functions of civil government. The magistrate was set in his place not for the protection of person and property, but to uphold and advance Christian truth. It was his office to pry into secret chambers and regulate the private life of the citizens, because his duty bound him to the "maintenance of true religion and virtue." The idea of justice gave way before that of vengeance, and punishment, even for the most trivial offences, assumed the form of retaliation. The God who ruled in Heaven was a God of vengeance, who tortured the new-born babe and transmitted the guilt of fathers to their children. If a few might be favoured by a gleam of mercy, His anger rose at the slightest provocation. Causes purely spiritual produced physical effects. Priests of unholy lives infected with St. Vitus's dance the children whom they baptized; and the reception of a sacrament in a wrong frame of mind called down sore judgments of disease, madness, or death. Nay, the very benefits which Catholic Christianity seemed to

confer upon mankind, turned, slowly perhaps, but surely, into poison. The slavery of the heathen world had deprived labour of its due honours; the monk strove earnestly, and with some success, to restore the balance. But the toil which he enforced was a toil of mortification. It was right that men should eat bread by the sweat of their brow; it was wrong that their labour should yield them profit, that their profit should create new wants, should lead to appliances of decency, comfort, or luxury—should bring about a traffic between nation and nation—should render wars less frequent, in the end perhaps impossible—should realize, in a sense which was not orthodox, the brotherhood of mankind. Nothing less than a negation of the whole faith was involved in a development which led to usury, which made men lukewarm in the suppression of vice and heresy and tempted them to doubt the reality of witchcraft, which placed secular on a level with (if not above) theological interests, which regarded the education of mankind as little more than begun, which looked forward to mighty physical results through an indefinite vista of progress, while the Church proclaimed that the friendship of the world was enmity with God, and that each generation was the last time.

If from this picture of a deadly conspiracy against the welfare and happiness of mankind, we turn to the spirit already dominant in some countries of Europe, and gradually gaining strength in all, we see nothing but a contemptuous disregard or an open defiance of every principle which has marked the career of the Catholic Church. Where this spirit has gained full sway, the belief in angelic or diabolical agency has died out. Famines are no longer traced to divine interposition; diseases and thunderstorms are no longer ascribed to the charms and spells of witches and sorcerers. The whole fabric of modern civilization has risen on the basis of an inductive philosophy, which receives no evidence but that of fact, and owns no authority but that which is derived from experience. The new method has unfolded wonder after wonder. Marvellous discoveries, before which the mightiest miracles of the old faith dwindle into insignificance, have enormously extended the empire of man, and promise to extend it still more; but each discovery has at the same time established on a surer footing the dominion of law. Wherever science has found its way, in all the phenomena which it has recorded or analysed, the evidence of an unfailling and unbroken order has been accumulated with astonishing rapidity. Gradually, but steadily, the region of miracle has been circumscribed. *Æneas Sylvius Piccolomini* sought vainly in Scotland for the Barnacle Goose; and the sober defenders of authoritative belief now content themselves for the most part with maintain-

ing the truth of Biblical miracles only, and maintain these chiefly or wholly on the ground that in their general character they are more seemly and solemn and more calculated to confirm a wavering faith, than the marvels of ecclesiastical history. While this repugnance to any idea of arbitrary interference with the order of the natural world has been gaining strength, the laws of evidence have been anxiously scrutinized; and belief is accorded, suspended, or withheld, according to the measure in which alleged historical narratives meet the tests which must be applied to all. Narratives palpably contradictory are set aside at once. Inconsistencies and absurdities in one book are treated like inconsistencies or absurdities in another; and the mythology of the Jews is handled like that of Greeks, Romans, or Hindoos. The history of Christianity has not failed to impart further wisdom. In faint tones, perhaps, or with faltering accents, the voice of human instinct has made itself heard, even in ages of the darkest superstition. If Tertullian made merry over the grotesque postures of emperors in hell fire, Origen could maintain that the Divine Being must be able to heal every creature that He has made. If Augustine could consider it an article of faith to affirm the ceaseless torturing of infants, Pelagius could reply that God cannot punish the innocent for the guilty, and that guilt can never be transmitted. The interminable tomes of the schoolmen showed at least that even within the limits of orthodoxy there might be vast differences of belief, and bitter conflicts of theory. The philosophy of Abelard, or Scotus Erigena, might not produce conviction, but it served to attest the sinlessness of honest error. With this conclusion the fabric of authority, as such, fell to the ground. If any portion of Christian dogma was henceforth to be received, it must be received only by the consent of the mind which has tested its truth. If any one dogma was rejected as false, if any one narrative in an alleged infallible book was shown to be impossible or absurd, the doubt must extend to all dogmas and all narratives without exception. Theologians might be left to discuss the principles on which God would punish sinners hereafter; it was quite certain that earthly legislators had nothing to do with the chastisement of sin as sin. The limits of government were more and more strictly defined. The idea of retaliation was in increasing measure rejected from the theory of punishment, and punishment itself was inflicted almost as much for the benefit of the offender as for the protection of society. The accumulation of wealth created highly-complicated interests, and exploded fallacy after fallacy, which had ruined kingdoms and plunged whole nations into barbarism, but on which the Church in every age had bestowed her enthusiastic approbation. The progress of

commerce depended wholly on the recognition of self-interest as the motive of action, and made it simply impossible to hate the world or the things of the world. The Catholic Church, when wearied with the work of slaughtering Saracens in Palestine, or heretics in Provence, could proclaim a truce of God and suspend for a moment the feuds of quarrelsome princes. It was reserved for the spirit of traffic to link nations together by ties which cannot be snapped without causing wide-spread ruin. The teaching of the Church has deluged the earth with blood; the working of trade has made wars more costly and warfare less savage, while it promises to substitute the doctrine of a brotherhood of nations in place of that so-called charity which is confined chiefly to the household of faith, and at best seeks only to heal wounds when it might have destroyed the weapons which inflicted them. It has shown men how they may in the end come even to love one another, and made them slow to believe that the Divine Mind can take pleasure in inflicting tortures from which the human mind turns away with utter loathing. It has striven to smooth the path of life, to lessen the wretchedness of poverty, and is content to look forward cheerfully to another state, where even theologians and ecclesiastics may learn not to hate those whom they have anathematized and tormented here.

It is impossible to exaggerate the antagonism of these two systems, which exhibit the old Iranian dualism with the parts of the actors inverted. Science, commerce, and civil legislation are ranged on the side of Ormuzd, while the traditional Christianity strives as zealously to debase and impoverish mankind as if it were fighting under the banner of Ahriman. Whatever uncertainty may hang over other points, this at least is clear, that if the latter could have full sway, it would promote the interests of man in a future state at the cost of all that makes life valuable in the present. To the inductive method of philosophy all dogmatic Christians, as such, must feel in secret the bitter antagonism which a few like Dr. Newman are not ashamed to avow openly. The acceptance of facts without regard to consequences must be fatal to a system which rests, not on conclusions drawn from experience, but on an authority which is perpetually clashing with experience. The two cannot permanently exist together. The observation of facts may lead to the formation of a system of ethics; but the very rise of this moral philosophy marks the decay and ensures the fall of dogmatic religions. Morality must be based on dogmas, or dogmas must derive all their sanction from morality. In the latter case they stand obviously in a secondary position, and the spell of their authority is broken. The even harmony of ethical science rebukes the shifting discords

of theology. The one admits of no exceptions, the other strives to pass off a piece of wretched patchwork as the seamless robe of truth. The war between sacerdotal authority and rationalism is internecine.

Of this mighty struggle all must be conscious, and few impartial judges will care to deny that the balance inclines to the side of the Rationalists. The names given to the opposing forces may not be altogether clear and definite; but for all practical purposes the adherents of every school of dogmatic Christianity may be ranged together as Sacerdotalists, while they who refuse to accept any doctrine on the mere ground of authority, are Rationalists in heart, if not in profession. The question of a sacramental or a non-sacramental religion is manifestly secondary. The fiercest opponents of ecclesiastical authority will in the long run take shelter behind its bulwarks, so long as they enforce on others a single precept on the ground that so it is written. When Martin Luther insulted humanity by his blasphemous nonsense about free-will, he made his appeal to the page of an infallible book, as Bellarmine appealed to the teaching of an infallible Church. His monstrous proposition that the manifest iniquity of God was the true ground of Christian faith, was itself the evidence that he would have cast aside that faith with indignation, if he could but have freed himself from the shackles of authority. When Wesley said that they who abandon belief in witchcraft are in fact abandoning their belief in the Bible, he was speaking with a prophetic foresight with which all adherents of traditional Christianity sympathize in heart, and which they would justify openly if they dared. To them as well as to him the gradual weakening of a belief which was once coextensive with Christendom, and which, as asserting the constant action of the invisible on the visible world, has beyond every other the emphatic sanction of the Old Testament and the New, is the presage of the last great defection, when the mysterious being whom they are pleased to term the man of sin shall defy the hierarchy of heaven.

The growth of the spirit which assigns to conscience a supreme authority in matters of religion, and analyses with fatal severity all assertions of facts transcending ordinary experience, Mr. Lecky has treated in a history which places him in the foremost rank of English thinkers. The "Latin Christianity" of Dean Milman had exhibited in vivid contrast the dull stagnation of Eastern speculation, and the restless vehemence of Western energy. It had shown that, when compared with the orthodox communion, even the Roman Church was liberal and progressive, and that there was hope of better things for a body in which Scotus Erigena could preserve his fame and Robert Hallam could die without suspicion of heresy. But no writer before Mr. Lecky

has scrutinized every phase of the long warfare which promises to end in the triumph of that spirit which, for lack of a better name, he has termed the spirit of rationalism. Few writers before him have so struck chords which must vibrate through the hearts of all men. None owe their eloquence so much to an intensity of sympathy with the victims of undeserved suffering and disproportioned punishment. His book is written with a sobriety of feeling which, when we think of the tale that he has to tell, is nothing less than astonishing. The reader may be pardoned if the narrative rouses in him a spirit of antagonism from which the writer, by a noble effort of judicial impartiality, has kept himself free. The records of the world contain no history more mournful than that of Christianity. Its brilliant dawn was soon blotted out by the storms of angry passion and furious zeal; and from that time to the present the world has suffered grievous wrong from societies which profess to establish peace on earth and goodwill among men. Mr. Lecky has sketched forcibly the rapid change from a religion of love to a religion of terrorism, over which brooded an atmosphere of miracles, fantastic, profane, or ludicrous. He has traced the influence of this appalling power on Christian art, and in the destruction of every sentiment which was not congenial to gross and brutal superstition. In the doctrines of exclusive salvation and transmitted guilt, he has laid bare the source of that indifference to human suffering which has raised Christian persecutors above all possibility of rivalry. He has shown the terrible consequences of converting emotion into dogma, and the real affinity of the dogmatic Protestantism, whether of Calvin or of Luther, to that ecclesiastical despotism against which they had rebelled. But more especially he has earned our gratitude for the plainness of speech with which he has proclaimed his conviction that there is a long and bright future before the nations, and that a science with so secular a name as that of political economy can furnish the only corrective for evils which are imbedded in the very heart of traditional Christianity.

But when we turn from the changes effected in the religious and social belief of Europe, to the causes which have produced those changes, we cannot but feel some regret that Mr. Lecky has been tempted to generalize on evidence too slender to warrant his conclusion; that he has treated causes which abundantly explain a portion of the phenomena as if they explained the whole, and that he is, therefore, led from time to time (perhaps unconsciously) to modify his own statements. For, although he admits that changes in public opinion "may be the result of a controversy which has conclusively settled the question," he yet avows his belief that the most important changes have been

brought about not by any direct arguments, but wholly by the spirit of the age. (I. 11.) The main object of his whole work is to show "that there is a law of orderly and progressive transformation, to which our speculative opinions are subject, and the causes of which are to be sought in the general intellectual condition of society." (I. 317.) If, since the days of Luther and Calvin, the notion of transmitted guilt has been indefinitely weakened, this, he says, is "entirely due to the diffusion of a rationalistic spirit, and not at all to any active propagandism, or to any definite arguments." (I. 411.) At the end of his work he repeats the broad proposition that "a great religious change is effected not by direct arguments, but by a predisposition to receive them, or, in other words, by change of sympathies and bias." (II. 318.) But if this predisposition be produced by an atmosphere of thought which results from the arguments of the few, it is not easy to see what is gained by stopping short with the proximate cause. Mr. Lecky betrays the weakness of his generalization when he admits that the work in which Beccaria denounced the practice of torture, "vastly accelerated the movement that produced it;" (I. 363;) and still more, when he allows that one of the two "main causes" of theological change is "the appearance from time to time of great religious teachers," who "cast abroad the seeds of religious truth," while the successive phases of civilization provide the different atmospheres by which those seeds are in turn developed. (II. 10.) In either case the change is traced ultimately to thought and direct argument; and the unqualified proposition becomes rather a specious than a real basis for philosophy.

In truth, Mr. Lecky seems to us not only to underrate the force of direct argument, but to exaggerate the extent of changes produced by the spirit of the age. A hearty agreement with his moral conviction might tempt us to acquiesce in his statement of fact; but a wider experience of the world as it is can scarcely fail to show him that the battle is not quite so nearly won as he takes it to be. The ideas of exclusive salvation, of penal torments, and of vicarious atonement, may be (and we believe that they are) rejected by the really-educated portion of the people; but the number of such persons is at once enormously reduced if we take the term in the only sense in which it can be so applied with truth. If we put aside the comparatively few who are able to form an independent judgment, the fetters of ancient dogmatism are not yet broken. We may have no doubt of the direction in which the thoughts of even the most priest-ridden are gravitating, but Mr. Lecky draws an ideal rather than an actual picture of society, when, of the doctrine of endless torture, he asserts that "it has now been thrown so much into the back-

ground, it has been so modified and softened, and explained away, that it scarcely retains a shadow of its ancient repulsiveness." (I. 341.) He has so thoroughly convinced himself of the reality of this change, that he repeats the statement again and again with a natural satisfaction. "How completely that teaching has passed away, must be evident," he assures us, "to anyone who will take the pains of comparing old theological literature with modern teaching. The hideous pictures of material fire and of endless torture which were once so carefully elaborated, and so constantly enforced, have been replaced by a few vague sentences on the subject of perdition, or by the general assertion of a future adjustment of the inequalities of life; and a doctrine which grows out of the moral faculty, and is an element in every truly moral religion, has been thus silently substituted for a doctrine which was the greatest of all moral difficulties." (I. 368.) The realities of fact break somewhat rudely on Mr. Lecky's pleasing dream. Eleven thousand of the clergy of the Church of England have recently set their seal to this doctrine in its most unqualified form; and their leaders leave us in no doubt of the meaning which they attach to it. After all abatements made for the decay of ecclesiastical influence, it must be admitted that the clergy of the English Church have some share of moral power, and that this power is not wholly confined to the section which rejects these inhuman doctrines.* It is a mere delusion

* Mr. Lecky does full justice to the beneficial influence of Christianity in tempering the sterner characteristics of the ancient civilization, in which "the pathos of life was habitually repressed." (II. 110.) But, while seeking to prove that in the Jews theological zeal answered to that feeling of Roman patriotism which sacrificed the individual to the community, he has strangely brought forward an ideal picture as the evidence of historical fact. If a careful analysis of Jewish history can teach us anything, it teaches us that, down at least to the time of the Babylonish captivity, the people were utterly incapable of realizing any idea of theocratic union. A few earnest thinkers, deeply moved by the degradation of their countrymen, might strive to raise up a polity based on unity of religious conviction; but the events of Josiah's reign furnish abundant evidence of the scanty success which attended their efforts. For the notion that their frequent relapses into idolatry are to be ascribed to a wilful rejection of spiritual blessings long familiar and once cherished, there is absolutely no historical ground whatever. The clumsy contradictions of the Book of Deuteronomy should have made Mr. Lecky pause before he treated as historical facts the "awful punishments" inflicted for such alleged rebellion. (I. 215.) Still more should the manifest mythology of the Exodus have checked the broad assertion that "all the traditions of their religion were identified with splendid national triumphs. The rescue from Egypt, the conquest of Canaan, and the massacre of its inhabitants, the long series of inspired warriors who had broken the chains of a foreign master, . . . had all contributed to interweave in the Jewish mind the association of the Church and of the State." (II. 112.) Even the Dean of Westminster has confessed his inability to trace this association, by frankly admitting that down to the time of the captivity the religion

to suppose that the old dogma is softened in the hands of English Sacerdotalists and Bibliolaters. It would be more true to say that the physical hell of mediæval theology has, by not a few of them, been intensified in horror. That gloomy realm, with the scenery of which Catholic historians and chroniclers were so familiar, was an abode of passive suffering. Instruments of white-hot iron tore the flesh of unbelievers. Tyrants and heretics were plunged into freezing water, or imprisoned in thick ribbed ice. The images under which their sufferings are portrayed may be repulsive, ghastly, or ludicrous; but there is something indefinitely more disgusting in the hell of the Bishop of Oxford, in which all condemned sinners are hurled into a chaos where passion, violence, and lust riot without check or hindrance. The essential torture of this pandemonium is the utter anarchy in which brutal murderers and lustful savages are left to smite and buffet men like Gibbon, Shelley, and Voltaire. The very sting in the agony of the truant schoolgirl is, that she lies physically at the mercy of the most ferocious and abandoned miscreants. Something more than a shadow of ancient repulsiveness falls on the pictures which Bishop Wilberforce, for the special edification of the young, draws of devils torturing drunkards by the instrument of their intemperance, and seizing the lustful man by the instrument of his lust.* We have not yet done with this disgusting subject. The University of Oxford has lately listened to an enumeration of hell-torments, which might have won laurels for any preacher of the Middle Ages. Dr. Pusey, who, because the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council failed to find his favourite dogma in the Thirty-nine Articles, accused the Lord Chancellor of poisoning the springs of English justice and branded him as the enemy of the faith and of God, has stood forth in the cathedral church of Oxford to repeat the old tale which Mr. Lecky regards as a worn-out fable, and has received no rebuke. We do as Dr. Pusey bids us: "Gather in your mind all which is most loathsome, most revolting; the most treacherous, malicious, coarse, brutal, inventive, fiendish cruelty, unsoftened by any remains of human feeling; conceive the fierce, fiery eyes of hate, spite, phrenzied rage,

of the Jews was simply the idolatry of the groves. Mr. Lecky is seldom wrong in his inferences from facts belonging to periods strictly historical in character; but he has not surveyed with sufficient care the debateable land which lies between mere oral tradition and real contemporary history. We must candidly confess our astonishment at his statement that, after the two earliest and most degraded periods of art had passed away, a higher art was created by Dædalus. (1. 254.) This is no better than the criticisms of Thucydides on the tale of the war at Troy.

* "Eternal Punishment." By Presbyter Anglicanus, p. 18.

ever fixed on thee, glaring on thee, looking thee through and through with hate, sleepless in their horrible gaze; hear those yells of blaspheming, concentrated hate, as they echo along the lurid vault of hell." We weigh well his words; and we say deliberately that, as uttering such thoughts, Dr. Pusey lays himself open to the retort that he is an enemy, not indeed of the traditional faith, but alike of God and of mankind. The phenomenon before us is full of instruction. Here we have a man of kindly feeling, living in what is perhaps a somewhat sentimental age, yet betraying an utter indifference to the infliction of vindictive tortures. Mr. Lecky, in tracing the history of persecution, has remarked that its most important emotional cause is to be found in the teaching concerning the future world. "It was the natural result of that teaching, that men whose lives present, in many respects, examples of the noblest virtue, were nevertheless conspicuous for ages as prodigies of barbarity, and proved absolutely indifferent to the sufferings of all who dissented from their doctrines. Nor was it only towards the heretic that this inhumanity was displayed. It was reflected more or less in the whole penal system of the time." (I. 360.) He has further contrasted the old system with that spirit which is gradually acquiring more and more power in modern politics, and which makes it "a main object of legislation to inflict the smallest possible amount of suffering." (I. 383.) We might therefore have anticipated that Dr. Pusey would have no liking for a code softened on such principles; and he does not disappoint our expectations. In the same sermon which paints the agonies of the damned, he expresses his emphatic disapproval of a system in which the reformation of the individual offender is made the prominent object of human punishment; and this condemnation is grounded on the assertion that reformation is not the object of divine punishment. The spirit of the old inquisitor still lives in the kindly English gentleman. We see before us, in Mr. Lecky's words, the "tendency or disposition of feeling that harmonizes with persecution, removes the natural reluctance on the subject, and predisposes men to accept any reasoning of which persecution is the conclusion." (I. 360.)*

* Mr. Lecky rightly asserts that Protestants have persecuted as fiercely and cruelly as Catholics; but the Protestant may at any time be led to take his stand distinctly on the ground of reason as contrasted with faith. The sacerdotalist, in proportion to the sincerity of his conviction, must feel that liberty of thought is the very abomination of desolation. In the present age he may fancy that he dislikes the idea of secular penalties for intellectual error; but while he denounces the Inquisition, he must, by insisting on the necessity of submission, maintain the theory of which the Inquisition is the direct result. A curious example of this dilemma is furnished by the "Christian Remem-

But when there is a sincere conviction that salvation is to be found in the Church alone, there will be not merely a readiness to persecute, but an eagerness to be persecuted. As in England it would be scarcely prudent to avow the former, the advocates of authority in belief are obliged to content themselves with the latter; and so, as in the church of St. Alban's, Holborn, they make the people sing—

“ Our fathers chained in prisons dark,
Were still in heart and conscience free,
How sweet would be their children's fate,
If they, like them, could die for thee.”

We have to thank them for the information that, when the country is won back to this faith of Augustine and Jonathan Edwards,

“ England shall then indeed be free.”

We do not in the least question their sincerity; but the English people has good reason to be thankful that the lion has had his claws cut, and his teeth drawn.

But these wholesome safeguards come wholly from the civil power. Mr. Lecky has weighed—on the whole, impartially—the merits and shortcomings of the Anglican clergy. He does not forget that Anglicanism was, “from the beginning, at once the most servile and the most efficient agent of tyranny;” and that “no other Church so uniformly betrayed and trampled on the liberties of her country.” (II. 193.) Yet he seems inclined to attribute to her system in itself an amount of flexibility which is the result simply of pressure applied to it from without. He feels satisfaction in the thought that in this Church “we find the

brancer” for July, 1853, art. “Cloister Life of Charles V.” The reviewer asserts that, “if either side be justified in assuming a control over men's minds, it is the Church of Rome: the Protestant, aiming at the same object, stands self-condemned before the whole world.” He allows “that more blood has been shed by Catholic princes and inquisitors than by Protestant kings and peoples. But the former act on a principle which in their eyes furnishes a full justification; the latter profess one which proclaims their own entire condemnation. But without adverting to the excess of persecution, it is plain that the infliction of *any* punishment for intellectual delinquencies at once breaks through the principle. The question, thereafter, remains one not of kind but of degree. For ourselves this subject involves very little perplexity. We do not believe that any system can allow liberty of thought in a direction alien to its own; the idea of such liberty is a delusive phantom which we may pursue, but which we can never grasp.” We have no quarrel with the reviewer's minor premiss; but the utter futility and iniquity of all dogmatic systems follows from it as readily as the correctness of any one system. A writer who can so clearly grasp principles, may, like Saul of Tarsus, come to regard as a duty that exercise of reason which he now anathematizes as the greatest of sins.

phraseology, the ceremonies, the formularies, the external aspect of some phase of belief that has long since perished, connected with a system that has been created by the wants and is thrilling with the life of modern civilization." (I. xxi.) We wish that it were so; but the truth of facts compels us to admit that, regarded in itself, the Church of England sanctions and justifies the principle of all those fallacies and superstitions which have made the history of Christian nations a weary tale of lamentation, mourning, and woe. The statements may be more guarded or more refined, but the theory involved in them is not less deadly. The whole course of modern civilization tends to establish the proposition that the people is the source of all authority; and society, to use the words of Abraham Lincoln, is seeking to solve the problem, how the government of the people by the people for the benefit of the people may be made most thorough and most efficient. The Church of England still attributes to the sovereign a direct divine authority without intervention of the people, and maintains, with a laudable disregard of ethics, that the hearts of kings are in all cases disposed and turned as seems best to the Divine wisdom. The tendency of modern politics is to restrict, with a zealous care and within narrow limits, the province of government, to leave the citizen perfectly free in his private habits and his private life, to deal with vices only when they take the form of offences against individual citizens or against the state, and to grapple with manifest physical evils in the condition of the people without heeding the denunciations of theologians that we are thereby legalizing sin. The Church of England holds that the office of the civil magistrate is to maintain the truth, and that the indifferent administration of justice lies in the punishment not of crimes but of vice, and in the maintenance of true religion and virtue.* The enthusiasm of Dominic and Torquemada never propounded a theory more directly tend-

* The difficulties involved in this theory forced themselves thirty years ago on the attention of Lord John Russell. Speaking of the uncertainty of the Criminal Law, he said:—

"Two men, for instance, are tried at Launceston for sheep-stealing: both are found guilty; one is sentenced to death, and the other to be transported seven years to Botany Bay. It is evident there is no proportion in the punishments. What is the reason? The one has a good character, the other a bad one. So that an Englishman is hanged, not for the crime of which he has been found guilty, but for the general course of his life (*i.e.*, for his wickedness and vice.) Now this is a matter far above any earthly tribunal—such a system leads to injustice, cruelty, and confusion."

These remarks acquire still greater significance when taken along with the conclusions at which Earl Russell has arrived respecting capital punishment, and which he has avowed in the recent edition of his "*History of the Reform Bill.*"

ing, unless forcibly repressed, to the cool precept of the Albigensian crusader, "Slay on: God will know His own." The same bigotry still hinders all attempts to deal with the grave physical evils attendant on unregulated prostitution, because to apply the remedy of police is to take part in sin and do violence to the Christian faith. If the doctrine of exclusive salvation and transmitted guilt issues logically in persecution and torture, the Church of England has fully allied herself in spirit with the most oppressive churches, by cursing all who maintain the sinlessness of honest intellectual error.* Nay, even for the theories of witchcraft and possession she has been careful to allot a place in canons on exorcism and in prayers directed against evils which the craft and subtlety of the devil or man may work against us. If mediæval Christianity filled the world with misery by linking the idea of physical judgments with strictly spiritual offences, the Church of England still cherishes in her sacramental theory the hydra-headed superstition which saw in sickness, epidemics, and thunderstorms, chastisements for sacraments wrongly administered or unworthily received. By retaining the threatenings of the second commandment, it preaches the doctrine of transmitted guilt in a form which incurred the indignant reprobation of Ezekiel. By keeping silence on the destiny of infants dying unbaptized, it justifies the theology which invests Augustine with the character of a cold-blooded murderer. By proclaiming that an unworthy participation in the Lord's supper provokes God to plague us with divers diseases and sundry kinds of death, she keeps alive the fetishism which Mr. Lecky thinks is dying or dead. All this the Church of England does wilfully, and in statements more or less explicit. By the whole tone of her offices, her articles, her homilies, her canons, she upholds that spirit of the old theology which is thoroughly antagonistic to all the interests of modern civilization.† If the principles of political economy are allowed to work

XVIIIth Article.

† The portrait which, in his "History of My Religious Opinions," Dr. Newman has drawn of Mr. Keble, must suffice to acquit us of all exaggeration in so speaking. Possibly by some genuine moral superiority, Mr. Keble has won for himself a reverence so general among the adherents of the sacramental system, that he may be fairly taken as the ideal of nineteenth century sacerdotalism. Nor must it be forgotten that, though he has talked some nonsense about the abolition of hell and the devil by the Judicial Committee, he has not indulged in the sanguinary scene-painting of Dr. Pusey, or mapped out the regions of Pandemonium with the familiarity of Dr. Wilberforce. He is willing to soften differences, and to keep things which may be unlovely in the eyes of sceptical Englishmen, as far as he honestly can, out of sight. But this characteristic makes his antagonism to the whole spirit of modern society only the more significant. The latter trusts only to reason, and receives only the

out their result, it will be because the Church of England is tightly fettered, and not because it is free.

With some reluctance, in the last place, we have to charge Mr. Lecky with the use of an ambiguous phrase; and we do so because in some quarters, where but for this phrase the fallacy would soon be exploded, it covers a real confusion of ideas. Probably Mr. Lecky knows well what he means by Christianity. Unfortunately he has not told us what he means by it. After sketching with unequalled force the stupendous evils wrought by what Lucretius termed religion—after showing that in almost every conceivable way dogmatic Christianity has insulted and defied the deepest and most sacred of human instincts, and given full play to the foulest oppression, falsehood, and cruelty—Mr. Lecky asserts that “the great characteristic of Christianity, and the great moral proof of its divinity, is that it has been the main source of the moral development of Europe;” and he tells us that it has done this “not so much by the inculcation of a system of ethics, however pure, as by the assimilating and attractive influence of a perfect ideal.” (I. 337.) But what is that ideal? From the several portraitures of Christ, as given in the

evidence of facts. “Keble was a man who guided himself and formed his judgments, not by processes of reason, by inquiry, or by argument, but, to use the word in a broad sense, by authority. Conscience is an authority, the Bible is an authority, such is the Church, such is antiquity, such are the words of the wise, such are hereditary lessons, such are ethical truths, such are historical memories, such are legal saws and state maxims, such are proverbs, such are sentiments, presages and prepossessions. It seemed to me as if he ever felt happiest when he could speak or act under some such primary or external sanction, and could use argument mainly as a means of recommending or explaining what had claims on his reception prior to proof. He even felt a tenderness, I think, in spite of Bacon, for the idols of the tribe and the den, of the market and the theatre. What he hated instinctively was heresy, insubordination, resistance to things established, claims of independence, disloyalty, innovation, a critical, censorious spirit.” (p. 290.)

Little more need be said. If the recent Encyclical of Pius IX. is taken as proving that the Pope and his advisers are hopelessly blind to the spirit of the age, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that Mr. Keble is ranged on the same side with the vicegerent of St. Peter. We acquit Dr. Newman of any wish to flout in the eyes of Englishmen a gratuitously offensive picture; but it remains for Mr. Keble to disavow a portrait, not much less contemptible than that of the miserable devotees who in feverish anxiety turned over the Sibylline pages or trembled in the cave of Trophonius. Like Dr. Newman, he may try to throw dust into the eyes of his countrymen by drawing distinctions between true and false liberty of thought; but the day is past for distinctions which, if admitted, would stultify all modern legislation and government. If any mischief has ensued in the exercise of reason, it has arisen not from liberty of thought, but from defective or vicious education. To avoid it for the future, men must learn to judge not less but more, and be convinced that without the exercise of reason on first principles an assertion of those principles is worth nothing.

Gospels, are we to get rid of every feature that may seem to us harsh, forbidding, or repulsive? From his discourses are we to reject every assertion which harmonizes (and many do so harmonize) with the Christianity of the Middle Ages? If we do so, what will remain? What scope is there for the industrial development of rationalism in the charge that, like the birds who neither toil nor spin, we should take no thought for the morrow? What room is there for ethical science in the assertion that an inchoate phantasy is not less sinful than a completed act; what space for theories of civil government in the warning that the whole order of society may be broken at any moment, and must inevitably be broken soon by the coming of the Lord to judgment? If, because we do not like the conclusion that follows, we affirm that he never said these things, would it not be better to say plainly at once that we are taking our stand on certain principles which, with the growth of modern society, are continually acquiring more strength, and which seem likely in the issue to receive their full justification? Even an Anglican sacerdotalist may demur to Dr. Newman's axiom that Christianity is a phenomenon, one and indivisible; but where is the line of severance to be drawn between ideal Christianity and the religion which, almost within a generation, we see that it became? Mr. Lecky leaves us in no doubt of the nature of that religion almost before it had left its cradle.

“At a time when the Christian Church formed but an infinitesimal portion of the community, at a time when almost all the members who composed it were themselves converts from Paganism, and reckoned among the Pagans those who were bound to them by the closest ties of gratitude and affection, the great majority of the Fathers deliberately taught that the entire Pagan world was doomed to that state of punishment which they invariably described as literal and undying fire. In any age, and under any circumstances, such a doctrine must have seemed inexpressibly shocking; but it appears most peculiarly so, when the convert who accepted it, and who, with a view to his own felicity, proclaimed the system, of which he believed it to form a part, to be a message of good tidings, must have acquiesced in the eternal perdition of the mother who had borne him, of the father upon whose knees he had played, of the friends who were associated with the happy years of childhood and early manhood, of the immense mass of his fellow countrymen, and of all those heroes and sages who, by their lives or precepts, had first kindled the moral enthusiasm within his breast. All these were doomed by one sweeping sentence, nor were they alone in their condemnation. The heretics, no matter how trivial may have been their error, were reserved for the same fearful fate. The Church, according to the favourite image of the Fathers, was a solitary ark floating upon a boundless sea of ruin.” (I. 414.)

There is indeed (and we admit it with thankfulness) a sense

in which we may say with truth that neither the progress of science nor the development of the arts of trade carry with them any danger to religion and Christianity. But although dogmatic theologians may find a grateful shelter under smooth, ambiguous phrases, all their parading of true religion and true Christianity will not save the traditional faith of the Middle Ages or our own. The Dean of St. Paul's is more cautious as well as more earnest when he assumes that only the primal and indefeasible truths of Christianity shall not pass away, and that all else is transient and mutable; but that his assertion should not have been indignantly disclaimed by the adherents of all authoritative systems, is among the most astonishing phenomena of the day. These primal truths may, for all that the dean has said, be confined to the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of mankind. They may mean simply that God has made us, that He loves us, and that He is guiding us all to our highest good. If this be Christianity, it may with truth be said to stand on the rock which shall never be moved; but if Dean Milman and Mr. Lecky mean this and no more, it would be better to say so openly. Such, indeed, is the faith to which the world is hastening—a faith which may make men better and happier, but for which none can ever have the wish to persecute, torment, or slay. It may do as much good as ever was wrought by the traditional religion, and it may achieve much more; but it can never be guilty of the execrable wickedness which has filled the prisons of Protestant England and the dungeons of the Catholic Inquisition. But while the struggle still lasts, it must never be forgotten that not the most monstrous of Christian superstitions, not the most grotesque of Christian miracles, not the most inhuman of Christian dogmas, fail to find their prototype in the books of the old Testament and the new. Kings and Popes, witchfinders and miracle-mongers, may all plead their cause in words taken from that medley of documents which, with much that is true, pathetic, and sublime, contains not a little that is false, inhuman, or immoral.

It will be long before the laws which political economists have brought to light shall be generally recognised, and thoroughly acted upon. It may be longer still before men really learn that the Divine order is never disturbed, and that we are in the hands of a Being who can know no passion, who can take no vengeance—a Being into whose mind the idea of retaliation cannot enter—a Being who loves all His creatures, who is righteous in all His ways and holy in all His works, as men, with all their defects and misdoings, understand justice and goodness. It is possible that Mr. Mansel's fallacies may for a brief season impart a factitious strength to dogmatic systems which independent thinkers

are determined to scrutinize on their merits; they may increase the hardness of the struggle, those who cannot cut the Gordian knot with the sword of Mr. Mill;* but we must remember that—

“In our age these struggles are diffused over a very wide circle, and are felt by men of many grades of intellect. This fact, however, while it accounts for the perturbation and instability that characterize a large portion of contemporary literature, should materially lighten the burden of each individual inquirer. The great majority of the ablest intellects of the century have preceded him, and their genius radiates the path. The hands of many sympathizers are extended to assist him. The disintegration around him will facilitate his course. He who, believing that the search for truth can never be offensive to the God of Truth, pursues his way with an unswerving energy, may not unreasonably hope that he may assist others in their struggle towards the light, and may, in some small degree, contribute to that consummation when the professed belief shall have been adjusted to the requirements of the age, when the old tyranny shall have been broken, and the anarchy of transition shall have passed away.” (II. 105.)

Mr. Lecky's hope will assuredly be fulfilled. The true human feeling which pervades his pages will lighten the path of many who need only to know the full extent of the evil wrought by the traditional creeds of Christendom. He has fought bravely against the most potent curse that has ever desolated the world. He has laid bare the great catalogue of crimes perpetrated by the Churches which curse “the human intellect, by cursing the doubts that are the necessary consequence of its exercise,” and curse “even the moral faculty by asserting the guilt of honest error.” (I. 54.) The seed has been well sown. When the harvest is ready, mankind will have avenged itself of its cruel adversary; and the vengeance taken will be the proclamation of a real peace and a lasting love—the peace and the love of Christ himself—in place of the miserable counterfeit with which dogmatic Christianity has cheated a suffering world.

* “Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy,” ch. vii.

ART. III.—CAPACITIES OF WOMEN.

1. *Essays on Woman's Work.* By BESSIE RAYNER PARKES. London : Alexander Strahan. 1865.
2. *The Agamemnon, Choephoroi, and Eumenides of Æschylus.* Translated into English verse. By ANNA SWANWICK. Translator of Faust, Tasso, Iphigenia, &c. London : Bell and Daldy. 1865.
3. *Studies ; New and Old, of Ethical and Social Subjects.* By FRANCES POWER COBBE. London : Trübner and Co. 1865.
4. *Broken Lights.* By the same. Second Edition. 1865.
5. *Italics (Italica). Brief Notes on Politics, People, and Places in Italy.* By the same. 1864.
6. *Theory of Morals.* By the same. Third Edition. London : Trübner. Boston : Crosby, Nichols, and Co. 1864.
7. *Religious Duty.* By the same. Second Edition. Trübner. 1864.
8. *The Cities of the Past.* By the same. Trübner. 1864.
9. *Essays on the Pursuits of Women.* By the same. Trübner. 1863.

“**W**HERE the condition of women is bad, there the nation is nearly half unhappy.” So declared the sententious Aristotle. We are not about to pretend that his measure of the good and bad state of women was or could be ours ; but it remains a fact, that half the world—more than half the British nation—consists of women. It is then impossible to deny the vast importance of the topic. But neither are we at present intending to invite our readers’ attention to the details of that vast question the Rights and Wrongs of Women. It will be enough to limit ourselves to general principles, and to vindicate the propriety and necessity of gifted women standing forward in behalf of the rights of their sex ; or rather, we wish so to write, as to elicit our readers’ own judgment on the question whether any vindication is needful. We have placed at the head of this article the names of three women, all authoresses, but diverse, as all must be, who diligently develop their several talents. We will not call them representative women, as though collectively they could suffice to exhibit what, in their present cultivation, English women can achieve ; yet at least they will show how much their talents and their sound accomplishments deserve respect : how unjust and how superficial is that tone of disparagement, so easily (we had almost said, so naturally) assumed by an anonymous reviewer, whose task it is to write down a woman, or the cause which she is maintaining.

The self-complacent vanity of the male sex swallows with full assurance any statements which ascribe to it the exclusive possession of solid faculties; just as a false patriotism lays us open to believe compliments paid to our morality or our sound sense at the expense of other nations. Men who are not personally conceited, often display conceit; at once offensive and injurious, in the claims which they make for their church, their country, their race, or (we will add) for their sex. The ancient Jew was apt to appropriate divine favour to his nation: yet a time came, when *some* Jews rejoiced to discover that even Gentiles were admissible to common blessing. We claim that at least men will cultivate a willingness to enlarge their judgments and hearts, and a humility which shall apply not to their single selves alone, but to every class of which they are a unit. But, let us at once insist, we have nothing here to do with the question, whether the female sex, *collectively*, has equal talents or powers to the male sex *collectively*. The fallacy of parading this topic, to the darkening of the real questions before the public, is constantly practised; exactly as in the effort to maintain injustices against coloured men in America or in India, the "inferiority of the race" is insisted on. To clear our way, and avoid this popular confusion, it may be of use to consider class-exclusions a moment from a wider point of view.

The comparative weakness of a class may no doubt be a reason for special legislation concerning it, in order to protect it where it cannot protect itself, or in order to debar it from powers which it could not use rightly—by which indeed it might harm itself or society. The case of *minors* is here undeniably demonstrative. On those of tender years, and necessarily inexperienced, we must not bestow the rights or impose the duties of adults. Nevertheless, even in this most necessary form of exceptional legislation, the universal tendency has been to *oppress* those whom we ought to *protect*. The father was a despot over his children in ancient times; and with increasing enlightenment his power has been lessened. Among the old Romans the father retained power of life and death over his adult son: the old Germans regarded a youth as "part of the state" only after he was able to bear arms in the public service; but English law claims even new-born children as part of the State. The right of young people to perform some legal acts is now conceded; much domestic oppression is still possible and common, nor is it by any means certain that we have yet perfected all the legal reforms here needful, much less the moral and religious influences of society. Again, wherever a more civilized people, or one accidentally superior, has within it, or on its borders, another nation which it does not admit into political equality, we are safe

in saying, that even if the laws were honestly made, with the intention of protecting the inferior race, they invariably in fact oppress it. And the reason of this is manifest. Well-meaning persons may delude themselves by the plausible metaphor, "we treat them as *minors*;" but in truth they do not: the analogy is false. A minor grows up and soon ceases to be a minor; his limitations drop off from him by mere lapse of time. His place is filled by new births, and his successors need the legal restrictions as much as ever he needed them. But if a tribe of Kafirs live mixed with British settlers, fifteen or thirty years make a great change in the inferior race; yet the law concerning them does not change; they do not pass into the English ranks by learning our arts, or even our habits and sentiments; and in a short time it is felt that the law is made *against* them. Much more is this true, when the two races concerned are like those of England and of India; where the race politically inferior has individuals highly accomplished, born of a stock in which mental cultivation is hereditary, and so populous that its exceptional and superior men outnumber the mediocre talents of our limited officials. Yet even in this glaringly unjust state of law the fallacy which we denounce is displayed as a triumphant defence: "It is *necessary* to maintain exclusions, *because* the race is collectively inferior to ours." Nay, surely one ought rather to replace the word *necessary* by *unnecessary*. Needless restrictions do but irritate. Without peculiar acuteness, one must see that the secret logic of the case is more truly expressed by the opposite reason to that alleged: namely, "it is necessary to *us* to maintain exclusions, because (it is to be feared) the race which we treat as inferior would else soon prove itself our equal." And nothing is more certain, than that many of the exclusions which Englishmen uphold against women, perhaps under decorous pretences, are really valued for securing profit or power to men. So the Irishman at New York fears the competition of the negro, and swells the cry against negro-equality.

Nothing is more certain than that a race which has been oppressed for centuries, and has been denied mental cultivation, and even the leisure for acquiring it, will be collectively in a low state of intellect; yet it is at the same time obvious to all who have no sinister bias, first, that this collective inferiority does not justify continued oppression (although it is always adduced by the oppressors as a justification); secondly, that the inferiority being largely accounted for by the past oppression, is likely to lessen or to vanish under juster treatment; thirdly, that already perhaps exceptional individuals of the lower race are superior to hundreds of the higher race. For all these reasons, the topic of "collective inferiority" should affect a race, legally and socially,

only in the same mode and under the same limitations as it is just towards the lower classes of a homogeneous nation: especially, it is never just to invent and maintain by law artificial barriers, or to deny to industry and merit their natural rewards.

So much may suffice to indicate that we have nothing to do with the abstract question of women's collective inferiority, if it be a fact: on one thing we firmly insist—that no one has a right to try to *make* it a fact. But here a curious question has of late been opened. A traveller, recently returned from Africa, spoke at the first annual meeting of the Female Medical Society this summer a short speech, of which the following is the substance. (We do not venture to say more than that his remarkable testimony deserves a careful hearing, and dictates further inquiry.) He said:—

“I am a medical man. I have spent several years in Africa, and have seen human nature among tribes whose habits are utterly unlike those of Europe. I had been accustomed to believe that the *muscular* system of women is necessarily feebler than that of men, and perhaps I might have dogmatized to that effect; but to my astonishment I found the African women to be as strong as our men. Not only did I see the proof of it in their work, and in the weights which they lifted, but on examining their arms I found them large and hard beyond all my previous experience. On the contrary, I saw the men of those tribes to be weak; their muscles small and flabby. Both facts are accounted for by the habits of the people. The men there are lazy in the extreme: all the hard work is done by the women.”

If we remember, he added, “even the fighting and the running,” with some allusion to the celebrated Amazon guards of African potentates. He continued: “This experience has further led me to consider whether the *mental* inferiority which we ascribe to our women may not be due wholly to the habits of our nation, which do not allow to women the same mental exercise as to men.” Concerning the relative stature of the sexes there, he said nothing. If it be a law of nature that the average woman shall be smaller than the average man; then, with equal cultivation of strength, we presume that the average man will be the stronger. There *may* be a like relation of minds; but no such opinion, true or false, concerns our practical duties. It suffices for us just now to insist, that no one has a right to treat as *abnormal*, the powers and accomplishments of such women as Harriet Martineau, Mrs. Somerville, and others of preceding times, who have been illustrious for mental capacity. The whole sex ought to have the credit of them, in this sense, that they show what women can attain when circumstances favour their cultivation. When we see one woman among us excel in a particular study

or art, the natural and reasonable inference (which has a right to stand until disproved) is, that there is nothing in it, which may not be counted on under similar conditions. No age, no country in Europe has been without women, who in powers and accomplishment far surpassed average men; and their solid attainments have been greatest where society most opened a career to their talents. In the United States this fact is every five years more developing itself. We claim, therefore, that the talents and attainments of individual women shall not be idly set down as exceptional, or still more idly scoffed at as unfeminine; but shall be made an index to the powers of the sex in general.

Miss Bessie Rayner Parkes has met, we are sorry to say, with rudeness from anonymous male writers, who seem to imagine that she is bent on unsexing women, or is unalive to the essential necessity of some feminine virtues. The small book before us, "Essays on Woman's Work," appears to us a model of good sound sense, and keeps eminently aloof from any extreme views. She does not fall into the error of her male assailants, who set up their own ideal of the world, instead of manfully accepting what they find, and seeking to make the best of it. She refuses to shut her eyes to facts. She finds that machinery, free trade, competition, emigration of men, and premature death of husbands, draw great numbers of women away from their homes. Domestic work being no longer profitable, they are doomed to work in factories. This (she says) is the great and, for women, often the terrible fact:—

"On no small body of ladies in London, on no committees or societies trying to struggle with the wants of the time, can rest the charge of *unsexing women* by advising them to follow new paths away from household shelter and natural duties, when a mighty and all-pervading power, the power of trade, renders the workman's home empty of the housemother's presence for ten hours of the day, and teaches English-women the advantage of being *out on strike*."

In every rank of life women are exposed to peculiar misery from events over which they have no control. If a trade be stopped through the breaking out of a war, or the imposition of a tariff, the women and girls working in the mills are the worst sufferers. Needlework may pay the skilful while their eyes and health last, but the number of competitors has always been too great, and the sewing-machine will soon make the competition of hand-workers hopeless. The state of governesses is still more deplorable: at least, we believe that "distressed needlewomen" are not always guiltless of their own distress. If space allowed, we would gladly make large quotations from Miss Parkes, but we rather recommend the perusal of her compact and very readable

volume. When the scheme first took shape "for affording assistance privately and delicately to ladies in temporary distress:—

"The committee met once a fortnight, and the amount of actual *destitution* among educated women which thus came to their ears is appalling. . . . The committee examined 102 cases and assisted 56; of the remainder the greater number were reluctantly declined for want of sufficient funds. The report gives a sad classification. . . . One woman had saved nothing during twenty-six years of exertion, *having supported her mother, three younger sisters, and a brother, and educated the four.* Three were entirely impoverished by attempts to uphold their *fathers'* efforts in business. Six were burdened by the support of invalid *sisters*, who had no other props in life; and three were incapable of taking another situation from extreme nervous excitement, caused by *over-exertion* and anxiety."—p. 91.

"The report for 1857 states, that on a recent occasion there were 120 candidates for three annuities of 20*l.* each—all accustomed to the comforts and luxuries of at least our middle classes. Of these 99 were unmarried; and out of this number 14 had incomes of or above 20*l.*; 23 had incomes varying from *twenty shillings* to 17*l.*; and 83 had absolutely NOTHING. . . . All are [by the conditions] above 50 years of age, and of the utterly destitute 49 were above 60."—p. 98.

In short, the worst impoverishment was through working *for others*; then if ill-health come, and enforce cessation of industry, any small fund is soon absorbed. Miss Parkes proceeds to detail the further benevolent efforts elicited by such discoveries; but all that can be done is only as a few drops in an ocean of misery. It requires moral courage, and a strong sense of duty, to come forward and propound remedies, where remedies are so difficult to find: but we had not supposed that any man with a heart in his bosom could meet such efforts by taunts—by declaring that a woman's only business is to get married, and that (a widow? or) an old maid is to be considered as having "failed in business," though how that relieves the question is not clear. Miss Parkes faces the problem bravely. She says that it may not be quite right, yet it seems to be a fact, that young men like their bride to have some dowry; and if certain reviewers rightly call marriage "a business," the dowry is the woman's capital, which is as needful to her as mercantile capital to her brothers. Where a young woman is not trained to any gainful art, it is unjust in a father to leave her portionless.

"It seems as if no extensive relief of our suffering class of educated women could be achieved until fathers are won over to see the matter in its true light. But it may be said that fathers cannot afford to give capital, of however small an amount, to their sons and daughters too; but I submit that they are equally bound to their children of either

sex, and that in very many cases where they bring their sons up to *professions* and leave their daughters *portionless*, they ought in justice to give the sons a lower and less expensive start in life, and keep some money laid by for their girls.”—p. 146.

“It is absurd to keep servants and to bring up daughters to *idleness* and *penury*, unable to do household work, and disgusted at the idea of marrying in a rank where it would be necessary to do it. The way in which all girls who can possibly be supported in idleness shrink from real active household work is a great mistake and a great misfortune. *It does not help their intellectual development the least in the world.* They would be a great deal cleverer and healthier and happier if they did it; and if poor middle-class fathers would bring up their little daughters to do the housework, after the fashion of Mary in the ‘Minister’s Wooing,’ and pay the money, which they would otherwise give to a servant for wages and board, to an assurance office to secure their daughters dowries, it would be a great deal the better plan in innumerable cases, and plenty of time would remain for mental cultivation, though less for shabby and showy accomplishments.”—p. 152.

A woman who writes thus may be called prosaic, but our readers must judge whether she is not more solid, more sensible, and more bent on the real welfare of her sex, than the men who talk high of the refined and beautiful accomplishments which we have a right to demand in the female sex, reckless of the widespread misery that the universal striving after them entails. As long as tender fathers may, without loss of repute, rear their daughters to be mere ornaments of the drawing-room in their youth, and leave them to a middle age of privation, with the chance of an old age of misery, so long, we fear, younger men will pass unreprieved for making women their toys for a short space, and then abandoning them to the streets. But if we confine our attention to women wholly free from reproach, the evil is certainly on a scale to be called national. The number of the distressed is so vast, that Miss Parkes deliberately reiterates from Madame Bodichon a paragraph which, she says, has been called the *ne plus ultra* of wild arithmetic:—

“Apprentice 10,000 to watchmakers; train 10,000 for teachers to the young; make 10,000 good accountants; put 10,000 more to be nurses under deaconesses trained by Florence Nightingale; put some thousands in the electric telegraph offices all over the country; educate 1000 lecturers for mechanics’ institutions; 1000 readers to read the best books to the working people; train up 10,000 to manage washing-machines, sewing-machines, &c. Then the distressed needlewomen would vanish; the decayed gentlewomen and broken-down governesses would no longer exist.”—p. 106.

In short, very many new trades, and on a very large scale, must be opened to women: to try to shut them out is little short

of inhumanity. Scruples of a very honourable kind have been broken down for the convenience of trade, and women now work in gangs away from their home. So much the worse, says Miss Parkes; but it is a fact. Now, in a rank a little higher, *other* scruples must give way—when ladies are liable to suffer real cold, real hunger, sickness, and terrible anxiety. Medical men judge a woman's suffering to be acute when her feminine susceptibility to their intermeddling with her is small: how cruel it would be to taunt her for this! We think it is hardly less cruel to jibe at women as unfeminine, when for the sake of earning an independence, they lay aside the artificial limitations with which pampered wealth surrounds itself. The men who struggle in this bad cause will, no doubt, prolong the sufferings of the weaker and tenderer half of humanity, but they cannot succeed. With the example of France and the United States before them, the rising women of England cannot be repressed. Miss Parkes is but one of a resolute noble band which will multiply year by year, and their success is assured by the high predominance which *moral* interests hold in their mind over all mere economics. We cannot quote on this head as much from Miss Parkes as we desire:—

“The wife, in our civilization, is the centre of domestic and also of social life. She is the mistress of a social circle and of a group of children and of servants. When sensible men say that the vast majority of women are destined to marriage, what they mean—the idea which really lies at the bottom of their minds—is, that were it otherwise the whole constitution of modern society would literally go to pieces. . . . As I believe therefore firmly, that the married household is the first constituent element in national life, so I consequently believe that the immense *majority* of women are, and ought to be, employed in the noble duties which go to make up the Christian household; and while I fully admit the principle of vocations to religious and also to intellectual and practical life apart from marriage, I think that people are quite right who say that these will ever be, and ought ever to be, in the *minority*.”

We may add that a minority is absolutely assured by the imperial position of England, by the waste of male life in her armies, her fleets, her fisheries, her engineering; also by the large emigration of unmarried men. When the United Kingdom has perhaps 200,000 more women than men, what a stupid as well as unmanly insult it is, to tell women that they must not seek to maintain *themselves*, but must set their caps to get *husbands* who will maintain them! At the same time every man of common sense must be aware, that the woman who is most in need of getting a husband is the most likely to get a bad one—

which, especially under English law, is ten times worse than being unmarried.

We pass abruptly from Miss B. R. Parkes and her economics to a totally different atmosphere, into which Miss Anna Swanwick leads us. This lady was already favourably known to the public by her elegant translations from Goethe and Tasso. If we do not mistake, the eminent publisher, Mr. Bohn, summed up the opinion of critics by pronouncing her, beyond a doubt, our most accomplished female translator. The late Baron Bunsen was so much struck by the skill and faithfulness which she had displayed in dealing with so very difficult a poem as Faust, that he initiated a suggestion to her—that she would undertake the translation of Æschylus. The suggestion from such a quarter was in itself a very high compliment; and it is made higher still, if we are rightly informed, that Professor Blackie's translation of Æschylus had been aided by Prussian funds through Bunsen, to whom Blackie dedicates his volumes. The coincidence has led us to compare the translations carefully, and we must say that Miss Swanwick has achieved a high credit, not for herself only, but for her sex. Blackie is generally admitted to be a man of genius, if somewhat too rollicking: he is undoubtedly a man of active mind and much learning; but in accuracy* of scholarship he is probably deficient, as he certainly is in conscientiousness of translation. We are not reviewing Professor Blackie—indeed, writing anonymously, we dare not express any opinion on the score of mere taste without enabling the reader to verify our remark; nor shall we comment on Mr. Blackie at all. But the reader (who cannot be presumed familiar with Æschylus) will have no measure of Miss Swanwick's merit unless, in some passages at least, we exhibit another translation side by side. We only add our testimony that hers is beyond comparison more faithful to the original, and that the things which the reader may perhaps wonder to find in Blackie and miss in her, are not in Æschylus.

The first passage which we selected as a comparison was one of peculiar beauty from the second choral ode of the Agamemnon:—

* As a small gage that we do not speak at random we point to Agam. 824, where he does not understand that *δαίκος* (*monster*) is in apposition to *νεοσσός*, and renders it *bite*. In Agam. 932, he translates the masculine partic. *διαφθ-ερούντρα* as if it were feminine. In Agam. 1082, he renders *οὐ μάλισ* with *light labour*. In Agam. 911, *δῶμ' ἄελλπον*, an unlooked-for home (*i.e.*, the home of Pluto), he renders, against all grammar and without a particle of excuse, "his long-lost home with *unexpected train*." In short, in many instances he seems to us not to understand the original, or to be perfect in Greek grammar; but his extreme laxity often makes it hard to bring him to test.

1. *Blackie*.

She went, and to the Argive city left
 Squadrons shield-bearing, battle-preparing,
 Swords many-flashing, oars many-plashing,
 She went, destruction for her dowry bearing,
 To the Sigean shore.
 Light with swift foot she brush'd the doorstead, daring
 A deed undar'd before.
 The prophets of the house, loud wailing,
 Cried with sorrow unavailing.

1. *Swanwick*.

Bequeathing to her people deadly stour
 Of spear, of shield, and ships' array,
 And Ilion's ruin bearing as her dow'r,
 Swift thro' the gates she took her way,
 Daring what none may dare. With many a wail
 The palace-seers peal'd forth the tale.

(The latter is line for line with the original, and as close as a prose translation need be.)

2. *Blackie*.

"Woe to the Atridans, woe!
 The lofty palaces fallen low!
 The marriage, and the marriage-bed,
 The steps once faithful, fond to follow
 There where the faithful husband led!"
 He silent stood in sadness, not in wrath,
 His own eye scarce believing,
 As he follow'd her flight beyond the path
 Of the sea-wave broadly heaving.
 And phantoms sway each haunt well-known,
 Which the lost lov'd one wont to own.
 And the statued forms that look from their seats (?)
 With a cold smile serenely, (?)
 He loathes to look on; in his eye
 Pines Aphrodité* leanly. (!)

2. *Swanwick*.

"Alas, the royal line, the princely house!
 Alas, the couch, the trace of her once true!"
 Dishonour'd, yet without rebuke, the spouse
 Stands speechless, yearning still her form to view
 Lost o'er the salt sea-wave. His dreamy pain
 Conjures her phantom in his home to reign.

He loathes the sculptor's plastic skill
 Which living grace belies :
 Not Aphrodité's self can still
 The hunger of his eyes.

(The third and fourth lines are very corrupt in the Greek MS. Both translators seem to have followed the same conventional but imperfect correction : neither of them accounts for the future tense, *δόξει*).

3. *Blackie.*

In vain he sleeps ; for in the fretful night
 Shapes of fair seeming slit thro' his dreaming,
 Soothing him sweetly, leaving him fleetly,
 Of bliss all barren. The shape fond Fancy weaves him
 His eager grasp would keep,
 In vain : it cheats the hand, and leaves him, '
 Sweeping swift o'er the paths of sleep.
 These sorrows pierce the Atridan chiefs,
 And, worse than these, their private griefs.
 But general Greece, that to the fray
 Sent her thousands, mourns to-day ;
 And Grief stouthearted at each door
 Sits to bear the burden sore
 Of deathful news from the Trojan shore.
 Ah ! many an Argive heart to-day
 Is prick'd with wail and mourning,
 Knowing how many went to Troy,
 From Troy how few returning.
 The mothers of each house shall wait
 To greet their sons at every gate :
 But, alas ! not men, but dust of men
 Each sorrowing house receiveth,
 The urn in which the fleshy case
 Its cinder'd ruin leaveth.

3. *Swanwick.*

And dreamy fancies, coinage of the brain,
 Come o'er the troubled heart with vain delight.
 For, rapture deem I vain,
 When forms belov'd, in visions of the night,
 With changeful aspect mock our grasp, and sweep
 On noiseless wing adown the paths of sleep.
 Such sorrows o'er the hearth brood evermore,
 And woes o'ertow'ring these. The warrior train,
 Comrades in danger, steer'd from Hellas' shore,
 Leaving in Hellas' homes heart-withering pain,
 For, many sorrows rankle at the core.

Each household keeps in faithful ken
 The lov'd ones to the battle sent,
 But back receives for living men
 Their arms and ashes, sad equivalent !

(Miss Swanwick has rightly understood that in vv. 3—6 the poet generalizes.)

4. *Blackie.*

For Mars doth market bodies, and for gold
 Gives dust, and in the battle of the bold
 Holds the dread scales of Fate.
 Burnt cinders, a light burden, but to friends
 A heavy freight,
 He sends from Troy. The beautiful vase he sends
 With dust, for hearts, well lin'd, on which descends
 The frequent tear.
 And friends do wail their praise : this here (!!)
 Expert to wield the pointed spear ;
 And this, who cast his life away
 Nobly in ignoble fray (?)
 For a strange (?) woman's sake :
 And in their silent hearts hate burns.
 Against the kings
 The moody-mutter'd grudge creeps forth
 And points its stings. (?)
 Others (?) they mourn, who, 'neath Troy's wall
 Entomb'd, dark sleep prolong,
 Low press'd beneath the hostile sod,
 The beautiful, the strong !

4. *Swanwick.*

For Mars, who traffics not in gold
 But flesh of man, the scales doth hold
 In battle of the spear.
 From Ilion, back to sorrowing friends
 Rich dust fire-purified he sends
 And wash'd with many a tear.
 To their embrace, hears'd in sepulchral urn
 Ashes, not men, return.
 Weeping, each hero's praise they tell :—
 How one excell'd in strife ;
 And how in war one nobly fell,
 Wag'd for *another's wife*.
 Breathing such murmurs, jealous hate
 Doth on the Atridan champions wait.
 Achaians, cast in fairest mould,
 Entomb'd 'neath Ilion's wall,
 The foughten shore now firmly hold,
 The hostile sod their pall.

Miss Swanwick, in the opening of the last strophe, has more clearly brought out the poet's ingenious metaphor. A common money-changer traffics in gold or gold-dust, but Mars in flesh and in man-dust. Each holds the scales—the one to weigh precious metal, the other to weigh out victory. The gold-dust is washed with water, the human dust with tears: each is refined by the fire. The four strophes above quoted suffice to show that not only in tenderness, dignity, weight, and in that masculine attribute, *terseness*, but also in understanding and intimate feeling of the Greek, the lady need not fear comparison with the Greek professor. We venture to add that she has a truer sense of the poet's rhythm, which is highly chastened and accurate, and is ill represented by the jerkings and roughnesses which Blackie imports—imitating Shakspeare's negligence, where Milton, and poets later than Milton, are a truer parallel. Our limits forbid further comparison of passages, but we may exhibit single lines characteristic of the poet and trying to translators:—

Ag. 17. ὕπνου τόδ' ἀντίμολπον ἐντέμνων ἄκος.

Bl. making song,

Sleep's substitute, surgeon my nightly care.

Sw. Such against sleep my tuneful counter-charm.

Ag. 34. τὰ δ' ἄλλα σιγῶ' βοῦς ἐπὶ γλώσση μέγας

βέβηκεν.

Bl. The rest I whisper not: for on my tongue

Is laid a seal.

Sw. The rest I speak not: o'er my tongue hath pass'd

An ox with heavy tread.

Ag. 95. φαρμασσομένη χρίματος ἀγνοῦ

μαλακαῖς ἀδόλοισι παρηγορίας—

Bl. With the gentle soothings cherish'd

Of the oil that knows no malice—

Sw. Charm'd with pure unguent's soothing spell—

Ag. 120. βλαβέντα λισθίων δρόμων.

Bl. —a timorous hare,

Whose* strength could run no more—

Sw. Amerc'd of future courses.

Ag. 155. οἰκονόμος δολία μνάμων Μῆνις τέκνονίους.

Bl. Stern-purpos'd waits the child-avenging Wrath

About the foredoom'd halls,

Weaving dark wiles, *while with sure-memoried sting (!)*

Fury to Fury calls. (!)

Sw. For child-avenging Wrath, with fear and fraud,

Dread palace-warden, doth untiring wait.

Ag. 643. δῖλον γον ἄτην, φοινίαν ξυνοπίδα—

* βλαβέντα, *neut. pl.* Miss Swanwick applies it to the unborn young, who are amerç'd of their *reversionary* runnings. Professor Blackie limits βλαβέντα to the mother-hare, though if *accus. singular* it will be a masculine.

Bl. A twinspear'd harm, a yoke (!) of crimson slaughter—

Sw. Twinspear'd calamity, a gory pair—

Ag. 1123, &c. — ξυνανύρει βίον δυντός αἰγῶς.

Bl. The blithe blood, that crimson ran

In my veins, runs pale and wan

With the taint of yellow fear,

As when in the mortal anguish

Life's last fitful glimpses languish,

And Fate, as now, is near.

Sw. Pallid through every vein

Blood to my heart doth run,

Which to the battle-slain

Quencheth life's sun.

Ag. 1281. μητρόκτονον φίλυμα, ποιῶντων πατρός—

Bl. A mother-murdering shoot (!)

The gods shall send from far to avenge his sire.

Sw. Seed matricidal, venger of his sire.

We picked these lines from the Greek and then turned to the English. They bring us always to one conclusion, but our readers may form their own. Next, we must allow them to see in continuity the vigour of Miss Swanwick's version :—

Ag. 914. (887. *Sw.*)

Daughter of Leda, guardian of my home !

Such as my absence was, is now thy speech,

Drawn out to ample length. With better grace

My praise had come from others than from thee.

And for the rest, seek not in woman's fashion

To pamper me, nor in barbaric guise

Gape out loud cries in homage at my feet.

Make not my path, with royal purple strewn,

A mark for envy. To the gods belong

Such signal honours ; but for mortal man

On rich embroidery to plant his foot

(I own it) is to me not free from dread.

As mortal honour me, but not as god.

Without rich carpeting or gorgeous web

Glory resoundeth. An untainted mind

Is Heav'n's best gift : him only call we blest

Who ends in fair prosperity his days.

If thus I bear myself, I need not fear.

Choeph. 183. (175. *Sw.*)

Rolls o'er my heart a surge of bitterness :

Smitten am I, as with a piercing shaft ;

And from these eyes, while gazing on this lock,

The thirsty drops of sorrow's wintry flood

Flow unrestrain'd. For how may I conceive

That other of the townsmen owns this hair ?

And certès, she who slew him shear'd it not,—
 My mother,—all unworthy of the name,
 Who tow'rds her children bears a godless mind.
 Though not with full assurance may I call
 This off'ring his, dearest of mortal men,
 Orestes,—still, hope fawns upon my heart.

Choeph. 585.

Full many a horror, drear
 And ghastly, Earth doth rear :
 With direful monsters teems encircling Ocean.
 Meteors, with threatening sheen,
 Hang heaven and earth between :
 The tempest's wrath still raves with wild commotion.
 These, and dire wingèd things, and things that crawl,
 Thou mayst describe them all.

But man's audacious might
 What words can paint aright ?
 Or woman's daring spirit who may tell ?
 Her passion's frenzied throes,
 Co-mates of mortal woes ?
 For love unlovely, when its evil spell
 'Mong brutes or men the feeble sex befools,
 Conjugal bands o'errules.

* * * * *

But first of woes in every clime
 The *Lemnian* is deplored ;
 And still the most detested crime
 As *Lemnian* is abhorred.
 Branded with infamy by men
 The impious disappear ;
 For, whom the righteous gods condemn,
 No mortal dares revere.
 The lore, which thus we chant in choral strain,
 Say ye,—doth Reason at her bar arraign ?

Right thro' the lungs doth Justice's hand
 Drive home the bitter steel :
 For all must perish, who withstand
 Her mandates, and with reckless heel
 Trample high Jove's command.

Firm-bas'd is Justice. Fate of yore
 Forg'd weapon for the blow.
 Deep-soul'd Erinnyes* doth restore
 The Avenger to his home, and lo !
 He pays the bloody score.

* The Fury.

We have felt it worth while to go through with great care the *whole* of Miss Swanwick's translation, comparing it minutely with the original, and we find, first, that it is everywhere conscientious in the extreme, and that she is fully possessed with the principle avowed in her preface, that "any wilful or unacknowledged deviation from the original is *tantamount to a breach of trust.*" Every line bears the mark of honest laborious thought, with delicate sense of the Greek. Next, the passages adduced above are not peculiarly successful, but are fair averages. We could extract dozens equally good; nay, if we open the book at random, we find a general equability, though not all passages are alike convenient to extract. Thus we think we have given to the reader samples which are materials for a fair judgment.

Besides a moderate preface, Miss Swanwick has prefixed an introduction, which is really an ample, elaborate, and learned essay on the growth and improvement of Greek religion. All who have taste for mythology will read it with interest. In outline its truth is unquestionable—but Mythology is a slippery subject, and we hesitate to say that in detail we can follow her. At any rate, she goes with such authorities as Welcker, and Max Müller, men of genius; and shows at once a hearty enthusiasm and an independent judgment. The close of the essay is designed to urge a topic which is likely to become more and more important in the public mind with the increase of intelligence, viz.—the *moral* uses of Poetry and Art as national educators. Many look to Religion alone, as fulfilling this function; many others to what they call Knowledge—putting on the word a very limited and dry sense. The former perhaps overlook the poetical element involved in religion itself. Be this as it may, neither Religion, nor Poetry, nor Art, can educate a nation, except in proportion as these influences are themselves pure. The palsyng superstitions mixed with Religion, the lasciviousness of Poetry and Art, are the detestable mischiefs which make these great powers sources of corruption—and, it would seem, priests are not more bent on preserving the base alloy in religion, than are many literary and artistic pontiffs in perpetuating the voluptuousness of poetry and art. Undoubtedly, the Theatre and the Opera House ought to be great schools of *virtue* and intellect, but who will now dare to call them so? Under a virtuous queen, in a reign of twenty-eight years, one might have hoped some sensible improvement. How vain it is to blame Puritans as sour for totally avoiding and preaching against these places, if no hope is shown of purifying them! But looking to the future (oh, might it be a near future!), we see the dream of Madame Bodichon, Miss Parkes, and Miss Swanwick fulfilled. It will be a *profession* for women as well as men, to read aloud to large companies,

and also to definite classes of pupils, select literature and select Poetry, with correct and melodious elocution, mental improvement and the imbibing of noble sentiment being the ends definitely proposed. Elocution classes will be more effective still : for when the pupil has to repeat with right intonation the words which have been heard from the teacher, they sink far deeper into the imagination and memory. A new and a nobler poetry will rise, free from old pollutions. Let those who fancy Inspiration to be dead, and that all religion is to be learned from parchment, believe also that the heart of Poetry is exhausted—in fact, old poets are in some sense like dead languages. Even when an old poet is singularly noble, it is generally the *few* only who sympathize with him or can learn from him. They have to translate him for the *many*. But let that pass. So much is to us certain : *first*, that in the very proportion in which men cease to find their national religion to be an elevating and purifying influence (a common case both with artizans and with academicians), they need the best influences of Poetry and of Art, and, *next*, that neither Poetry nor Art has yet attained its noble state. How could they indeed ? They retain all the weaknesses of the individual and national mind which generated them ; and the age which has made any genuine advancement is able to develop higher expressions of itself, and is equally bound to do so as to improve its tools.

The numerous volumes bearing the name of Frances Power Cobbe impose on a reviewer a troublesome and anxious task. The versatility of this lady is certainly remarkable. If she had dealt with only half of her subjects, no one would have suspected that she was able to write on the other half. Hence we are reminded that a reviewer puts himself into a false and silly position, who affects to give an exhaustive account of one who is as likely to comprehend, as to be comprehended by him. We trust we shall not assume any position of wrongful superiority, with whatever freedom we write. It is not merely in the variety and rapidity of her works that Miss Cobbe leaves upon one a sense of *power* ; but still more in a certain directness and simplicity with which she approaches every subject, though in a manner and tone varied with the nature of it. If she deals with topics of a practical and popular kind—workhouses, hospitals, poor-laws, celibacy, female charity—nothing can be more unpretending and businesslike. She everywhere leaves on one an impress of simplicity of purpose, truthfulness, and high, noble sentiment. Indeed, in every moral question she rises and kindles, as soon as the argument passes into the domain of theory and motive. The moral and the religious are intimately, indissolubly combined in her view ; and in treating such topics she displays an ardour and

an intensity truly rare. Whether she is born to be a prophetess of Theism it is not for us to say ; but if she is not, it will not be from lack of living enthusiasm. Even if she had not written the little volume on the "Cities of the Past," we could have discerned the strong poetical element in her ; but without this and her book on Italy, we probably could not have guessed her descriptive powers. It is quite clear that if she would condescend to write popular novels (which, especially when "sensational," appear to pay better than anything else), her exuberance of humour and her rich graphic ability would secure her an immense circle of readers. But she evidently is studying, not how to enrich herself most, but how best to make her talents bear the fruit for which they are designed. We despair of giving any suitable and complete account of the works before us : yet we must try to say something. But first, we may remark, that women who have on the whole so great an impetus and momentum as Frances Cobbe, have been (as far as we know) rather esteemed or respected than loved, and perhaps are generally feared. No one indeed could easily love a Medea or a Queen Elizabeth ; and the remark may be applied to some energetic women nearer to these times. But we make bold to say (for we believe we state notorious fact) that the qualities in *this* lady which inspire affection in both sexes, are more active than those which excite admiration. Therefore let the orthodox beware, lest she prove a dangerous apostle.

Miss Cobbe's first work was her book on the "Theory of Morals" in 1855, which has been twice reprinted without any changes that we discover. This we much regret, for (as might be expected from an inexperienced writer) it has very grave faults of composition, which damage its sterling and characteristic excellences. Probably she found that the changes needed were so large as to amount to a re-writing of the book, and she has been too much occupied in new work to encounter the effort. It is the work of a person who has lived in mental solitude with books and philosophers, and is profoundly unaware how bewildering to common minds is metaphysical language ; how wide the interval of the scholastic and the popular.

Not only is the style overrun with phraseology which, when sufficiently irritated by it, we call *jargon* ; but it occasionally steps from English into French, as when she talks of *envisaging* a question, instead of *viewing* it ; and *resuming it*, when she means *summing it up* : so, *motived* for *animated*, *rehabilitate* for *re-establish*. (These blots, we submit, ought to have been corrected at any rate, in the recent edition ; a corrector of the press could do it, if allowed.) Even the learned illustrations

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have often a pedantic sound, from being presented in too purely scholastic a form, for instance :—

“He who should argue, that because people ignorant of geometry did not know the *sesquialterate ratio* of the sphere, cylinder and cone, therefore no man could know it; or, that because they disputed it, therefore it was uncertain; would argue no more absurdly than he, &c. . . .”

In place of the words which we print in italics, *relative capacities* should be substituted, in mercy to common mortals. Does Miss Cobbe suppose that we all know what *sesquialterate* means? We confess it puzzles us, to hear speak of a *ratio* of three figures. “Sesquialter” means one and a half. The cone is one *third* of the cylinder, one *half* of the sphere: but this does not suggest to us anything “sesquialterate.”

Nor is this the worst. Miss Cobbe’s learning, though very extensive on the subject of human religion, and such as commands our high respect, is not accurate in respect to the Latin and Greek languages. This circumstance, which is not difficult to discover, requires of her somewhat more diffidence in her quotations, and makes it appear ostentatious in her to obtrude on us pieces of Plato untranslated, as though Platonic Greek were familiar to all. She is fond of the following sentence from Seneca, which is quoted by her in three different places recently noticed by us:—“Hic (Deus) prout a nobis tractatus est, ita nos ipse tractat;” According as God is treated by us, so He Himself treats us. She always translates it: “As we draw nigh to Him, so He draws nigh to us,” as though *tractare rem* meant “to draw nigh to a thing!” It is marvellous that she should persevere in such a blunder.* Presently she adds (Ed. 3, p. 123), “Menander sung ‘God is with mortals by conscience.’† By the Greeks such *συνείδησις* was commonly spoken of as the household guardian, the domestic god, the spirit of the place.” A note to verify this, stands as follows, †*Βροτοῖς ἅπασι συνείδησις θεός . . . οἰκίως φύλαξ, ἔνοικος θεός, ἐπίτροπος δαίμων.*

We complain, that learning thus administered is a disagreeable potion; for we cannot trust it, can but half understand it, and have not the means of verifying it. The only thing quite certain is, that Miss Cobbe does not understand the Greek: why then

* Remarkable as is the passage, Seneca writes it as a *polytheist*. He says (Epist. 41): “O Lucilius, a sacred spirit sits within us, observer and watch of our good and evil. No man is good without (a) god. . . . In every good man there dwells,—*what god, is uncertain.*” The last words either make the translation *sine Deo*, “without a god,” correct, or show a rapid vacillation from Theism to Polytheism.

does she meddle with it, and leave absurd mistakes in a third edition? Has no kind friend pointed it out? 'Επίτροπος δαίμων does not mean "the spirit of the place" (τόπος for τρόπος seems to mislead her), but means, Guardian spirit;—*Guardian* or *Trustee* in relation to a *Ward*. Οικεῖος φύλαξ probably means, not *household* guardian, but *familiar* (or *personal*) protector. Ἐνοικος θεός, we believe, means *indwelling* god, not the *domestic* god. She does not denote whence the phrases come, hence we cannot tell whither to look for the context. We can only conjecture that this solemn scriptural phraseology belongs to the most highly developed school of New Platonic Theism. But it is startling to find her say (what is to us quite incredible) that conscience was by the Greeks *commonly* thus spoken of; and the form of her note would imply that these words are a continuation of the passage quoted from the *comedian* Menander. Menander's rhythm would be completed by:—

βροτοῖς ἅπασιν ἡ συνείδησις θεός.

"(for) to all mortals Conscience is a god."

But Miss Cobbe unjustly elevates it into "God is *with* mortals by conscience," and coolly uses *συνείδησις* in an English sentence as though Greek letters and Greek sounds were universally understood.

We notice a still wilder blunder in the long note to p. 151 (3rd Ed.—p. 99 of 1st Ed.), where an invective of St. Jerome against the heretic Pelagius is quoted: "Nec recordatur stolidissimus et Scotorum pultibus prægravatus——" "and this very stupid man, surfeited with British (?) porridge, *does not remember*——" But she translates it, "*Neither let him be set down as stupid and unwieldy with Irish stirabout.*" It surpasses conjecture what can have misled her. Now since the number of Englishmen who can understand an easy Latin sentence is very large, and those who can judge of a metaphysical controversy are very few, Miss Cobbe damages her book extremely by such absurdities: for those who see her haste and inaccuracy in Latin quotations, will be apt to impute a like inaccuracy to her fundamental philosophy.

But this leads us to another defect, almost graver than any error of detail; namely, that she commits the great unfairness to her own moral system, and to those whom she means to edify, of insisting that it shall be received through the door of the Kantian philosophy. This is like Judaical Christians, who would not admit Gentiles into the Church except through the door of circumcision and the Sabbath. Sound morality is matter of universal need; but all have not taste for metaphysics, nor have we all stomach for Kant's doctrine about *homo noume-*

non and *homo plurnomenon*. When we go to church and wish to be edified, it is very vexatious to be *bored* by metaphysics, and we get sick with technical terms, in every one of which we justly suspect a trap. Such words as necessary and contingent seem to Miss Cobbe conducive to accurate demonstration: to us they seem pregnant with fallacy. But they are only a small fraction of her copious metaphysical vocabulary. Words, according to the proverbs, are the counters of wise men, but the money of fools. In metaphysics too many of us are certainly fools, as our sharp and pertinacious oppositions prove. The only way to have a chance of avoiding delusion, is, perpetually to recur to first principles, by resolving our words back into their definitions. Technical terms are expressly invented to save us the trouble of going back to first principles. Hereby they are of great value when our foundations are undoubtedly sound, as in mathematics, but they are the densest covert of fallacy, whenever there is unsoundness beneath; and at best they are always apt to cheat us with mere shadows, unless we diligently cultivate the habit of looking through them to the bottom of their meaning. If we *cannot* translate them into a more popular dialect, it is all but a proof that they are deluding us: hence we look with extreme jealousy on every writer on metaphysics, who finds technical terms necessary; and the history of past systems justifies us in this. The late eminent Professor Boole, than whom no modern mathematician has made more splendid generalizations of and by technical nomenclature, enunciated it as an axiom, that "there is no more certain way of *emasculating* the mind, than by early overlaying it with technical forms of high generalization." He spoke as a mathematician. With equal confidence do we predict that it would be ruinous to young minds to bring them to morals through the portal of Kantism, and initiate them into the artificial phraseology which overflows on Miss Cobbe's pages. We are aware that it is no more possible wholly to avoid metaphysical controversy in morals than controversy in religion: there are in all, fundamental points on which men are not agreed. But the metaphysics of the question should be brought to the minimum, not driven to the maximum, as by Miss Cobbe; and if controversy, more or less, be unavoidable, at least technical terms can almost always be avoided; and certainly it is an urgent duty to avoid them, whenever they involve ambiguity. As we are not disposed here (or anywhere) for needless metaphysics, we decline altogether to enter the question whether Miss Cobbe's Kantism be *sound*: it suffices to say that it is wholly *unnecessary* to her moral theory. (Alas for the world, if it were otherwise!) Indeed in her preface she says that her *main design* is, to make *Morals a popular science*.

Her theory is simple, noble, and speaks for itself. If any one do not receive it, when stated in her eloquent and fervid words, they certainly will not the more be brought to assent, when it is argued for through a nauseous phraseology, or pressed by geometrical analogies, which to many minds will seem wholly out of place.

What then is the Moral Theory for which she contends? It is this: that Virtue is forgetful of self, is *disinterested*, in proportion to its purity and elevation; that the highest end of our being is Virtue, not Happiness; that the Good, the Right, is something higher than the Useful, inasmuch as the end is higher than the means, and that the pure love of Absolute Goodness is fundamentally the same thing as the love of God. For this reason her morals ever culminate into religion. We give a specimen of her style when not deformed by tasteless technicalities. (Ed. 3, p. 43.)

“But it is not only the Justice, it is the Goodness of God, which makes Virtue and not Happiness the primary end of creation. Those who have believed that this happiness is his sole aim, have rested exclusively on this attribute of goodness. But has love *indeed* nothing better to desire for its object than the gratifications of intellect, affection, and sense? It seems to me that there is something more precious than these that it would far rather bestow. Who, that has loved deeply, nobly, worthily, does not know that the honour, goodness, truth, purity of our friend is dearer to us than his enjoyment of all the pleasures of life, fondly as we would pour them also at his feet? How base would be the love which should regard our friend's virtue with indifference, and, while praying for his worldly prosperity, breathe no aspiration for his moral perfection! They were *mothers* who have said—‘I would rather have seen my son in the grave than prosperous in iniquity.’ But if this be so with *us*—if poor short-sighted human love, so often dazzled with the glitter of earthly happiness, so incapable of comprehending the true grandeur of virtue, can yet choose that virtue before all things for the one beloved, what must be the choice of that Divine love which from heaven looks down to see happiness a grain of dust in the balance against virtue!”

“If we believe in this unbounded power of growth in the human soul, its capacity for endless progress, we cannot, I think, fail to recognise such capacity as the most important attribute of a finite intelligence. In comparison of [with?] the ideas of Godlike goodness, ineffable peace, purity and magnanimity, which thus open to us, as possible for us, all the delights of this life, the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them, seem unworthy of a thought. We feel that the one thing real in this world of shadows is the state of the soul; its progression towards, or its retrogression from, this glorious bourne. And God, who sees even now down the far-off cycles of the future the blessed virtue to which the child of clay may, ay, *shall* assuredly attain, must not He set forth that consummation so prominently as

the end of His creation, that in comparison thereof the pleasures of this life shall be accounted but as the toys of an infant to the throne he shall inherit hereafter? Who will say, Goodness seeks but the happiness of the creature? It would be, not goodness, but direst cruelty, which should set our happiness on earth before our virtue through all eternity."

Many persons suppose that the doctrine of "Intuition" is Miss Cobbe's great peculiarity. To that doctrine we shall recur; but the opinion is a mistake. Her peculiarity lies in her indissoluble union of God and Immortality with Morals. Ever since Lord Herbert of Cherbury, we believe, Theism has been formulated into three articles—God, Duty, and Immortality; but no reasoners before Miss Cobbe, as far as we know, have embraced the first and third article as developments of the second. Whether she is right or wrong, we are not now arguing; but we desire to call attention, wherein lies the essential importance of human immortality to her theory. As she abhors the idea that God is always studying His own *glory*, equally does she disdain the miserable meanness which teaches that each man is to study his own *interests* on the other side of the grave, to sacrifice happiness on this side in exchange for more on that, and look to be reimbursed for present losses. On this subject she intensely rejects the doctrine of Jesus. But Immortality is that which gives the element of *infinity* to the human soul—making its virtue so precious, that it is worth while to cherish it to the last at any amount of sacrifice. It is also that which soothes and comforts us in the anguishing sight of unrelieved and apparently purposeless human miseries. Now we may be wrong; but we have seemed to observe that persons who have not Miss Cobbe's full assurance of faith in immortality, are angry with her for getting it, as seems, so cheaply and easily. (As a clever amiable nobleman is said to have said, "What I do not like in Macaulay is, he is so *cocksure* about things.") To us her faith appears enviable. Like Theodore Parker, she sees Immortality with equal directness, clearness, and certainty, as Duty and God, and does not, like others, work towards it by elaborate, complicated argument, which when soundest can never have the power, the momentum of direct perception, and is apt to fail us in the very day of trial. If anything would make us doubt the sound simplicity of her faith, it is the greediness with which she grasps at the belief that it is the faith of universal man. We cannot but feel that here both she and Theodore Parker greatly overstate facts. But until each of us can be sure that in fervent love of pure goodness he is the equal of these two persons, it is wise rather to suspect defect of vision in himself, than to cast scorn on

a doctrine of ennobling and mighty power which cannot be sneered down.

Now as to Intuition, Miss Cobbe could not help using the word, or something equivalent, because here she is undeniably in collision with certain unreligious moralists. But perhaps she has made the word too prominent, and at any rate her opponents (Christian Missionaries primarily!) are blind to the fact, that only those who are willing to dispense with all religion whatsoever, can dispense with her doctrine of Intuition. Let it be conceded as admissible for an avowed Atheist to say, that he believes nothing by Intuition, not even the Axioms of Euclid, but only by Experience—yet it is ludicrous for a religious person to say that he knows by *experience*, or by *induction*, that God is eternal, is blessed, is pure, is free from malice and falsehood, &c. Most of the truths discerned as axioms have after-verifications, but such a truth as that God is eternal, or God is blessed, never can have any verification at all—but *either* stands for ever as a truth of mere Intuition (or it may be of Deduction), *else* it must be absolutely renounced. Christians are absurd who scoff at Miss Cobbe's doctrine of Intuition: Atheists have no right to single her out for reprobation. All that they can justly say is, that she partakes in the common error of believing in God's perfections, but is more discerning than her religious opponents as to the ground of their common belief.

We have not exhausted the excellences and defects of her first treatise. It abounds with lengthy notes, which contain the fruits of enormous reading, aptly and powerfully applied. Such tedious passages of Christian controversies as most active-minded members of our old Universities once read in their youth, but have gladly forgotten—more of the same sort in the polemics of Romanists with Protestants, or Protestants among themselves, and a scattering of Neo-Platonic, Mohammedan, or Indian religion—may be found in these notes, besides modern metaphysics. Notes of enormous length are a deformity to a treatise, but most of the matter here is very valuable. Now if the useless and hurtful excess of metaphysics were cut out from the book, these notes might profitably be worked up into the text. Since Miss Cobbe does not do it herself, we murmur against the law of Copyright, which forbids our getting it done by another. By reprinting without improvement this first and crude essay of her pen, Miss Cobbe may naturally seem to be enamoured of its blemishes. To any who are severe against those blemishes, we would suggest how very buoyant must be its excellences, when,—weighed down by that heaviest of cargoes, metaphysics—launched anonymously, damaged by the revelation that the metaphysics came from an unknown female mind—the book could reach a

third edition in nine years. The operation which we think to be needed is similar to that which Bentham endured from Dumont, who "threw overboard tons of unreadable matter," translated execrable, unintelligible phraseology into pure clear French, and thus out of Bentham's materials produced a work which has enlightened Latin Europe and the whole of South America in jurisprudence.

Miss Cobbe's second treatise of this series is called "Religious Duty." As far as we have gathered opinions concerning it from religious persons, it is judged to be somewhat too severe in its exactions, and (what may be called) too stoical. Yet it is like a keen shower-bath, bracing and exciting. As we may say of her first treatise, that we never before read a book on morality which seemed to kindle one to a love of goodness; so of the second we may say, that of the sermons we have heard, there are indeed few that have so purifying and invigorating a power.

A third treatise was promised on the *details* of Practical Duty. Of this we have valuable instalments in the volume which is called "Studies, Ethical and Social." In it we particularly advert to four essays—that of Self-Development and Self-Abnegation, that on the Philosophy of the Poor Laws, that on the Claims of Brutes, and that on the Morals of Literature. All are valuable—the first which we name is peculiarly original, and is to us a promise how large a crop of important moral truth will be gathered, when minds and hearts, ardent at once and pure, approach the study systematically. There is indeed in Miss Cobbe a form of bravery which, appropriately enough, yet very rarely, is found in a person of intense religious conviction and considerable stoicism: she is not at all afraid to rebuke an excess of self-sacrifice, and extravagant claims of honour and obedience to parents. The whole essay ought to be read; the parts which we fain would quote are too long. One short paragraph may suggest the spirit of the whole:—

"Self-abnegation may be noble or base. It is noble when its sacrifice is inspired by the conviction, that thereby God's work may best be done and man's wants best supplied. It is base when it springs—first, from cowardice; second, from indolence; third, *from a readiness to make spiritual capital out of the selfishness of others*, whom it encourages in a soul-destroying vice, while it tries to build itself up in a celestial virtue; fourth, *from an immoral acceptance of the principle of passive endurance*, which relieves the mind from the agony of strife or the solemn weight of responsibility."—p. 58.

This passage suggests what in many other places we might say, that Miss Cobbe is as yet most imperfectly aware how intensely opposed to the dogmatic ethics of the New Testament

are her practical ethics. When, most inconsistently, she eulogizes the precepts of the three gospels, she builds up with one hand and destroys with the other. Whether old associations or affection for persons blinds her to her own self-antagonism in this whole matter, we have not the means of conjecturing.

In the same volume there is a remarkable essay on ART, occupying 56 pages, which shows that she has not only studied the subject largely and keenly, but has digested her thoughts upon it with great care, and reduced them to a system. Even if space here allowed, it would be unbecoming in the immediate writer of these pages to pass his judgment upon her. He can but testify that her pages eminently deserve a candid and careful perusal. The main question seems to be, what is the Truth and what the Poetry which is to enter all Art. Miss Cobbe, we gather, has an intense belief that Art must be truthful and must be a revelation of the beautiful—will, in fact, be religious:—

“When we have aided a man to acquire a high and pure taste for poetry, we may be assured we have aided him to somewhat more than a refined and blameless pleasure—we have aided him to receive a Revelation of God.”—p. 312.

What a revolution of thought is this, side by side with the idea that the Church Catechism, with the Natural History and Geography of the Bible, are a liberal mode of elevating and refining mankind! What a contrast also to those who pardon and almost admire the voluptuousness of Art, if it be but beautiful! Miss Cobbe also demands for Art *a worthy subject*, and deprecates as false the admiration for great powers applied to a subject intrinsically unworthy of them. With much diffidence, we earnestly recommend the study of that question to students of Art.

The Essay on “Christian Ethics and the Ethics of Christ” was written for a theological review, and might probably have received modification, had the author been free to speak her whole mind. Yet we fear that we should still have to remark on her gross inconsistency, for we find the same in her beautiful little treatise called “Broken Lights,” concerning which we need say little—because we believe the public has rightly appreciated it; at least, in less than a year they called for a second edition. It has also been reprinted in America. Her earnest desire to discover and display the best side of every system of religion, to see it from the point of view taken by its noblest or most respectable advocates, is in refreshing contrast not only to ordinary malignant or narrow-minded controversialists, but also to Theodore Parker, whose weakness in this matter she reluctantly admits.

Her preface to Parker’s works is a very vigorous piece of writing, and may almost be called a moral and spiritual biography. Here,

as in her "Broken Lights," she shows a grasp of mind very rare among men—doubly rare hitherto among women; yet through all, how beautifully feminine affection and enthusiasm shines transparent! Though this consists of only 31 pages, it is so closely printed as to be a little book in itself, and is well worth a perusal by those for whom Theodore Parker's own writings are too voluminous. We find it is to be had separately.

Among Miss Cobbe's less-noticed works are her volume on the "Pursuits of Women" and that on "Italy," which by a strange error of taste has been called "*Italies*." (It might have been "*Italica*.") The character of the former book assimilates it to the writings of Miss Parkes, Madame Bodichon, Miss Nightingale, Miss Elliot, and other estimable ladies. It did not give room for Miss Cobbe's more characteristic powers: yet it is not the less valuable, as her contribution to great, difficult questions, urgent on every philanthropist and every patriot; and she has evidently worked out her problems with great zeal and conscientiousness, never neglecting statistics and practical fact under any attractions of theory. But her book on "Italy" seems to need here more particular notice.

If we had been asked an opinion—What is the weak side of Miss Cobbe's intellect? we might have been tempted to reply, History. Like Plutarch, she seems to have a mind too vehemently moral to retain historical impartiality. Plutarch, it is observed, is very untrustworthy as to mythical characters—as Romulus, Numa, Theseus; nay, as to those who, though strictly historical,—as Solon, Publicola, Camillus,—yet lived before the times of copious literature: apparently because he is too eager for moral results. Miss Cobbe, in our opinion, is generally superficial and delusive, when she ventures to quote from classical history. She is unaware of the great uncertainty, both as to facts and characters, in the traditional tales, and of the severe criticism which they need; but she snatches at some moral result from them. So, her treatment of the deeds and words of Jesus is wholly arbitrary: she seems to receive or reject, just as pleases her moral taste, without any grounds historically justifiable. Nevertheless, as Plutarch is eminently trustworthy and valuable when he deals with the life of one, concerning whom the literary documents were abundant and accessible, because his pure amiableness made him unbiassed, and glad to give even to the worst men such praise as they deserved; so we find Miss Cobbe, when dealing with men and things as they were before her in Italy, beyond comparison more trustworthy than in a problem of the distant past, where truth is to be gleaned from few and doubtful documents. Her book on "Italy" has perhaps nowhere been rightly represented; we were ourselves surprised on reading it.

A very large part of it is a most unpretending but useful summary of recent facts, not easy to get collectively anywhere else. After a short introduction concerning Italy in the travail of new birth, she treats in successive chapters on the new *Roads*; on the new *Schools* and Reform of Colleges or Universities; on the new *Armies*, with a short notice of the Navy; on the new *Jury* system and its difficulties, with the efforts for a new code of law; on the *Newspapers*, and the slight beginnings of literature. In these five chapters is an honest and elaborate effort to furnish the readers with all the statistics; indeed, she goes so far as to give a list of the principal newspapers and of all the magazines of which she could learn. In her chapter on the Political Parties of Italy she is on ground, on which everyone's perceptions are liable to be coloured by their own political opinions; but we do not see that she has any opinions *for* or *against* Monarchy, Aristocracy, or Republicanism to bias her. At the same time, her warm sympathy with the United States, otherwise known, forbids us to believe that she has any anti-republican sentiment.

In this chapter she enters on a digression, entitled "How can we most certainly provide that the Right shall be done?" which is virtually a little treatise on the Suffrage. If an angel wrote a treatise on that subject he would leave many unconvinced, and perhaps would be called prejudiced, narrow-minded, or wild. We may, however, here state her conclusion:—

"We are shut up in a circle. The aristocrat may argue, that he alone who possesses power should always keep it; and that the plebeian never having had it [and therefore being unqualified to use it] ought never to get it. The democrat, on the contrary, may argue, that the plebeian should be given it, precisely because by possessing it he will become capable of exercising it rightly. *Very little doubt, I think, can exist, that this last is the true view of the case* and the only problem that remains is, *how* this power should be extended. . . ."

—p. 157.

She decides for a gradual, steady enfranchisement descending in society. There is nothing in this at all original; but neither is there anything to offend or startle. Concerning Mazzini she has a passage of noble recognition and admiration, though she thinks that the Mazzinians, through an unreasonable impatience, hurtfully aggravate the difficulties of the Government; which, with the best intentions, cannot succeed in repressing crime, where witnesses so fear assassination that they will not give evidence. We find her chapter on the brigands, and that on Father Passaglia, very interesting. Without presuming to guarantee the truth of her colouring as to the women of Italy—through whom the priests hope to recover their dominion—and a few other

topics as to which no two minds see quite alike, we certainly feel that this book is a valuable and interesting contribution to our knowledge of Italy in transition.

Her description of Baron Usedom's villa is striking and graphic, and reminds one of her light and elegant book, "The Cities of the Past." Occasionally grand metaphors in her other writings show the hidden poet. Thus in the opening of her preface to Theodore Parker's works:—

"The progress of religious belief from a less to a more enlightened stage is carried on apparently by a series of waves of thought, which sweep over the minds of men at distant intervals. There are periods of comparative calm and stagnation, and then times of gradual swelling and upheaving of the deep, till some great billow slowly rears its crest above the surface, higher and still higher, to the last; when, with a mighty convulsion, amid foam and spray and noise of many waters, it topples over and bursts in thunder up the beach, bearing the flood-line higher than it had ever reached before. *A great national reformation has been accomplished.*"

But in "The Cities of the Past," Miss Cobbe shows a temperament not merely poetical, but romantic, such as makes one say, "Had she been a *boy* what a *harun-skarum* being that boy would have been!" We are heartily glad that she is a woman, has come home from Mount Lebanon with her neck safe, and that her horse never failed her. There may be too much "champagne" in this little volume for elder people; but unless mammas are afraid of exciting their daughters to imitate Miss Cobbe's audacious travelling, we think it is likely to become a favourite parlour book. She is certainly at home everywhere under God's heaven, and sees the world everywhere smiling with the hues of her own happy heart.

We approach the end of the task which we prescribed to ourselves—to give some exhibition of the quality of mind displayed by three women, as some very imperfect sample of the work which Englishwomen are about to perform. It is surely high time that a man who dares to write insolently concerning the female intellect, should not only be regarded as rude, but should incur the imputation of deficiency in his own powers. If we have not yet reached that point, we cannot be far off from it; for it is only the meaner male intellects that are capable of jealousy, or of ungenerous appreciation.

ART. IV.—PALGRAVE'S TRAVELS IN ARABIA.

Narrative of a Year's Journey through Central and Eastern Arabia (1862-1863). By WILLIAM GIFFORD PALGRAVE. London: Macmillan.

IF it be true that the chief aim and end of all the rivulets of human knowledge is to construct by their sedimentary deposit a Science of History, then a really good book of travels is not the least precious of the tributary streams. It is now a truism that the most arbitrary exercises of human volition, no less than the most capricious accidents of the physical world, are sternly regulated by undeviating rules. These rules or laws can only be ascertained by Induction, and the process of Induction rests from first to last, for its efficient performance, upon Comparison. Now no class of intellectual labourers have it in their power to supply more numerous, more varied, more reproductive data for comparison with a view to establishing some general principles of civilization, than travellers in different lands. For such a purpose the estimate of a given traveller's tale will be made partly from a consideration of his own personal achievements, literary and locomotive—partly from regard had to the special situation or circumstances of the lands he has visited. A book of travels does not admit of the test of cross-examination. It will, therefore, be reliable and serviceable so far only as by its particularity of detail, by its varied and copious anticipation of every question and every want, and by a certain ingenuous transference of the author's own personality into the story, it at once supersedes and forbids a judicial scrutiny. It depends on the traveller himself how he makes his observations, and what observations he makes; how he multiplies them, and how he records them. It is for his readers to classify those observations, to select from them, and turn them to account as best they may—each appropriating what is adapted to his own special needs and independent province of inquiry. So much for the qualifications of the traveller. Further, the maximum of value will be attained by a book of travels where the special circumstances of the territory visited are such that in the smallest geographical area there is found the widest possible diversity in all that belongs to the necessities, conveniences, and refinements of human life—where, if it be possible, every intermediate chord is played upon in the ascending scale from anarchy to constitutional liberty, from pauperism to luxury, from brutality to manhood—where, religions being different under the same climate, and climates differing

with the same religion, the resulting condition of the people in either case is the most accurately transcribed. These advantages will be enhanced if special historical associations, and a certain traditional and romantic splendour have for ages invested the country, and tinged with a brighter or darker glow the spirits of its inhabitants.

It is no more than according to Mr. Palgrave the reward due to his perseverance, sagacity, and courage to say, that taking into account the exceptional conditions which hemmed him in on every side, and restricted and limited all his investigations, he has done his work after a manner that deserves all praise and congratulation. Fortunate in the country he has selected—a country which, standing midway between East and West, both historically and topographically, has at all times ineffaceably impressed the imagination of the philosophic student and the politician, and yet which, for all purposes of precise inquiry, has been up to the present day shrouded under a mist of ignorance and prejudice—Mr. Palgrave is thrice fortunate in the intellectual and social qualifications which have fitted him for the brilliant task he has achieved. Of those who read this work, few will be they whose sympathies will not be kindled at the evolution of the grave, pathetic, yet severely human drama, as the stately procession of places, people, and incidents moves along. Few will be they whose curiosity will not be stimulated at the representation of modes of life, ceremonies, intrigues, religious formalities, so distinct not only from familiar usages in Europe, but from what has been told of all other Eastern climes. Few, again, will accompany the traveller from one Khāwah, or reception-room, to another, and from one royal court to another, who will not heartily respond to his generous hope, that the best blood of Arabia—blood not more colourless than that of the proudest Europeans—may one day be free from the paralyzing yoke of a bigoted and intolerant despotism, and nobly develop its instinctive tendencies in commercial and political rivalry with the progressive states of the West.

In what may be called the first distillation of the results of travel, by which the total process of applying those results to the ultimate uses of mankind is initiated, the desultory or gossiping mode of story-telling is by far preferable. It is far the best for the traveller to tell us everything he sees or hears, just as he sees or hears it; and everything that happens, just as it happens. As he approaches a city, we shall thus have first a piece of pictorial description or scene-painting, then a chapter of politics, then a sprinkling of economical notices, then some careful architectural drawings, and the whole varied and enlivened by personal incidents, views of manners and customs, and recollected scraps of anecdote and

conversation. The same must be done all over again for the next place, and so on. This is not only the most convenient style for the traveller and his readers, discharging the former from the inappropriate functions of selecting, systematizing, and classifying, and leaving the latter to arrange as they will, but it is also, however apparently cumbersome and unscientific, the most likely avenue to truth. For the religious life of a people, least of all an Eastern people, cannot be severed from their political life without disfigurement and loss—nor, again, can the life of the family be safely dismembered from that of the city and the state. It is in the union of all modes of life and energy, and the reciprocal reactions of each, that the aggregate human result is attained.

It is however otherwise in what may be called the second distillation, when the circumstantial details are in everybody's hand, and it is of moment to call the attention of the public to certain conclusions to be evolved out of those details, or to certain important aspects in which those details admit of being viewed. In such cases it is more convenient, though undoubtedly with the sacrifice above noticed, to distribute the leading results under a few obvious and interesting titles, and to show the bearing of the results comprised under the several titles upon the chief countries visited in succession, and thence on the general interests of mankind. Thus, descending from such phenomena as are generally common to the largest areas to those differentiated throughout the smallest integral portions, we may consider the facts brought to light by Mr. Palgrave as included under one or other of four titles in order, that is to say, physical, political, social, religious. Such is an obvious mode of classification when applied to almost any other land than Arabia. Here, however, the political and religious phenomena have been at all times so intermixed, and the former has been (to speak mathematically) so invariably a "function" of the latter that we shall give the religious phenomena the precedence of the political and the social, and shall further be under the necessity of combining at times the religious and political history in one.

First, however, briefly to notice the conditions under which Mr. Palgrave made his observations. He assumed the character of a physician and a Christian from Syria, and had with him as a companion a native of the village of Zahleh, in the plains of Cœlo-Syria. He also took with him on setting out from Māān, a small town situated on the great pilgrim road from Damascus to Mecca, and at the south-eastern corner of Syria, a number of articles for exchange in case it might seem expedient to alternate the rôle of doctor with that of travelling merchant. Such articles were an ample provision of cloth, handkerchiefs, glass necklaces,

pipe-bowls, and two large sacks of coffee. His dress was that of an ordinary middle-class traveller of Minor Syria. It consisted of a long stout blouse of Egyptian hemp, and under it loose cotton drawers. Round his head were coloured head-kerchiefs girt by head-bands of some pretension to elegance. Loose red leathern boots completed the toilet. This was the dress for the desert. For better inhabited and more civilized districts, travelling-sacks at his camels' sides contained suits of a more elegant appearance, rendered necessary by the assumed character of travelling doctor. This reserve toilet numbered articles like the following: coloured over-dresses, the Syrian combay, handkerchiefs, where silk stripes relieved the plebeian cotton, and girdles of good material and tasteful colouring. Mr. Palgrave tells us in his preface, that he was at the time of his undertaking in connexion with the Order of the Jesuits, and that, having passed the best part of his life in the East, he possessed such a familiarity with the Arabic language as to make it to him almost a mother tongue. In an interesting passage of his work Mr. Palgrave treats on what may be called the theory of successful personation in the East. He deals with the subject from a practical, as well as a casuistical point of view. It is his belief that the worst of all possible disguises is that of a wandering Darweesh, and that none of those who are rumoured to have followed this plan in Mahometan countries really passed undiscovered. The Asiatic Mahometan, even where he has best reasons for doubt, is designedly unsuspecting with regard to any one who outwardly professes the same faith, and he is so in accordance with a duty enjoined him in the strongest terms by the Koran: "Do not say to one who meets you and salutes you, 'You are not a true believer;'" and, "O ye true believers, avoid suspicion, for suspicion is often a crime." So also, "He who casts on a believer the slur of infidelity, is himself an infidel," is a saying attributed by tradition to the Prophet. A melancholy story is added of an European traveller who assumed the Darweesh disguise, and on being enticed with delusive promises into the capital of the Wahhabee empire, was told on reaching it, "that the Wahhabees stand in no need of Darweeshes in their territory; so let the stranger put himself early to-morrow morning on his way to Mecca, where he will assuredly be more at home than we can make him here." The message was accompanied by a sum of money, a camel for riding, and a promise of guides to the next halt. Orders had been given to conduct him by a road leading through a ruined town, where the fiercest fanatics of the Wahhabee sect reside. The villagers were warned that under the fictitious appearance of a Darweesh was concealed an European spy. A

few minutes later the traveller was lying dead under the palm-trees, with several musket shots through the body.

Mr. Palgrave's opinion is that the chief danger lies, not in being detected for a Christian, but for an European. To be known, he says, in Arabia for a Christian (Mecca and its appurtenances excepted, in a certain degree and under certain coincidences,) occasions no danger, and hardly any inconvenience. To be recognised for an European, or the agent of Europeans, might probably enough be fatal, and at the best would assuredly cut short the traveller's explorations by a premature and compulsory return to the frontiers, he being closely watched, too, on the way. We cannot stay to follow Mr. Palgrave into his casuistical reasoning, which opens out more numerous and more complex problems than he has solved. It is certainly by no means clear that the line dividing moral from immoral personation can be determinately drawn between occasions of direct religious observances on the one hand, and of social and political intercourse on the other. The natural and popular tendency to make such a demarcation has no root whatever in absolute morality, nor can be countenanced by any professedly moral creed. It is not for us to untie the knot.

Such are the general circumstances under which an European traveller must make his way, if he make it at all, through Arabia. We now proceed to give a concise account of the most noticeable facts which the successful enterprise of at least one traveller has brought to light. Following out the mode of distribution suggested above, we proceed to give a brief description of (1) the physical features of the country explored.

Most people's idea of the geographical limits of Arabia is, perhaps, only less vague than that of its historical and social characteristics. For the purpose of clearing up all confusion, we will adopt the concise description given by our traveller himself, which will be found sufficiently intelligible to all who have any lingering reminiscence of the relative position of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

* Arabia and Arabs begin south of Syria and Palestine, west of Basrah and Zobeyr, east of Herah and the Red Sea. Draw a line across from the top of the Red Sea to the top of the Persian Gulf: what is below that line is alone Arab; and even then we do not reckon the pilgrim route, it is half Turkish; nor Medinah, it is cosmopolitan; nor the sea-coast of Yemen, it is Indo-Abyssinian; least of all Mecca, the common sewer of Mahometans of all kinds, nations, and lands, and where every trace of Arab identity has long since been effaced by promiscuous immorality and the corruption of ages."

Now, the subject of the present narrative is that portion of the peninsula which does not include the scenes of the early life of
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Mahomet and the rise of his sect—that is, Hejaz and Yemen on the west—nor the great Sandy Desert or Dahna, with the territory of Hadrimaut, on the south. Thus the northern, central, and eastern provinces of Arabia are the special subjects of the present description. These provinces are represented by four distinct seats of independent government—that is, independent of all mutual control or interference; though in some cases recognising their subordination one to another by fealty, services, or tribute. The seats of government are Djowf, Hayel, Riad, and Mascat. The respective provinces having these towns for their capitals, and ranging in order from the north-western to the south-western corner of the peninsula, are the Djowf, Shomer, Nejed, and Oman. Each of these provinces and each of the capitals were visited by Mr. Palgrave in succession. At Hayel and Riad he remained for weeks together, and practised his assumed profession; thus making himself familiarly acquainted with persons of all ages and conditions. He represents himself as going in and out of the hovel and the palace, now discussing politics or medicine with kings and ministers, now entrapping the shop-keeper or the casual passer-by into easy dialogue, now among a few chosen friends in his private lodgings, beguiling the time with Arab songs, Nabtee poetry, or unrestricted gaiety and fun.

As Mr. Palgrave was not in a position to make minute geological or botanical investigations, we can only gather from scattered notices the superficial aspects of the scenery through which he passed. Much of this scenery is familiar to the imagination of all. We have brought before us the long black desert, now covered with pebbles, now with patches of sand, and relieved at long and refreshing intervals by deep crater-like pits, containing water, vegetation, and in some cases a few scattered human habitations. Then, on passing from Shomer into Nejed, the whole platform rises into a vast table-land, formed by the flattened ridges of Djebel Toweik, stretching like a vast crescent from Shomer and Kaseem to the north-west, round and through the very centre of the imperial province of Nejed to the east, and abruptly twisting round into the desert to the south-west, along the pilgrim route from Nejed to Mecca. Not the least characteristic and harassing part of the journey was that comprised in two slips of the southern desert that have long ramifications to the north. They are called Nefood. One of these slips had to be traversed before reaching the city of Hayel, the other before attaining the high lands of Toweik. They are described as presenting to the eye—

“An immense ocean of loose reddish sand, unlimited in extent, heaped up in enormous ridges, running parallel to each other from north to south, undulation after undulation, each swell two or three

hundred feet in average height, with slant sides and rounded crests, furrowed in every direction by the capricious gales of the desert. In the depths between, the traveller finds himself as it were imprisoned in a suffocating sand-pit, hemmed in by burning walls on every side; while at other times labouring up the slope, he overlooks what seems a vast sea of fire, swelling under a heavy monsoon wind, and ruffled by a cross-blast into little red-hot waves. Neither shelter nor rest for eye or limb, amid torrents of light and heat, poured from above on an unswerving glare reflected below. . . . The tepid and discoloured water in the skins rapidly diminishes even more by evaporation than by use, and a vertical sun—such a sun—strikes blazing down till clothes, baggage, and housings all take the smell of burning and scarce permit the touch.”

Mr. Palgrave, having practised so long and extensively as a doctor among the people, is able to give us some interesting and important information about their pathological condition and medical acquirements. With respect to the latter, the traditional reputation of Arabia is certainly not supported at the present day. We are told—

“that their first glimmerings of science and of method were soon effectually closed and cross-barred by Islamitic immobility and its misplaced supernaturalism. . . . The fated and all-pervading interference, for such Islam makes it, of the Divine Omnipotence, came in to preclude research, by reducing every phenomenon to the one immediate, universal, and arbitrary cause, and thus cut every knot instead of untying it. Moreover, autopsy and anatomical studies were held, and still are so, in horror, because a violation of the rights of Munkow and Nekeer, grave angels.”

Senna and colocynth are almost the only drugs used or understood; sulphur, the sulphuret of mercury, and that of arsenic, constitute the entire ordinary list of external applications. Bleeding is known, but seldom practised. The actual cautery is lavishly employed, and borne with amazing patience. The Arabians exhibit great obtuseness in their general nervous sensibility. While Mr. Palgrave was at Riad, a young fellow insisted on having a bullet, which had lodged deep in his forearm and gave him some annoyance, cut out. The operation was a difficult one; the muscular fasciæ had to be divided down to the bone; meanwhile, the Nejdean held out the arm steady and inflexible, as though it belonged to some one else, and never changed colour, shortly after getting up and walking home, carrying his bullet with him.

The whole central plateau of Arabia is one of the healthiest countries in the world; there seems to be no gout, cancer, nor hysteria. Intermittent fever is extremely rare; typhus and typhoid are unknown throughout Nejed, nor has the plague,

whether imported from Egypt or from Persia, ever found its way to the up-hill country. The land is however occasionally visited by contagious or epidemic diseases. Thus, the cholera made an inroad in Nejed, where it seems to have been attended by all its well-known symptoms and horrors. The small-pox has been known in Arabia from time immemorial, and inoculation is still in use throughout Nejed. The scrofulous diathesis is remarkably frequent in the Arab race. The stress of this constitutional malady falls more frequently on the abdominal than on the pectoral cavity. Pure pulmonary phthisis, offering no other prominent symptoms, is comparatively unfrequent. Rheumatism of all possible forms and degrees, sciatica, lumbago, with kindred diseases, are, perhaps, the commonest complaints, more especially among the Bedouins and the poorer villagers. Dyspepsia, and chronic gastritis, are hardly less common than rheumatism. Dysentery, and chronic diarrhoea, are considerably less frequent than in India. We need not further particularise the diseases found prevalent in the country, but will refer the inquisitive reader to the very interesting portion of Mr. Palgrave's second volume, which treats this subject at length.

We have some useful observations recorded on the natural history of the beasts of burden, and the most valuable vegetable products found in the country. We are told that the camel is only "docile" in the sense of being stupid; that he takes no heed of his rider, pays no attention whether he be on his back or not, walks straight on when once he is set a going, merely because he is too stupid to turn aside. He will never attempt to throw you off his back, such a trick being far beyond his limited comprehension; but if you fall off, he will never dream of stopping for you, and walks on just the same, grazing while he goes, without knowing or caring one atom what has become of you. If turned loose, it is a thousand to one that he will never find his way back to his accustomed home or pasture, and the first comer who picks him up will have no particular shyness to get over; the loss of his old master and his former cameline companions gives him no regret and occasions no endeavour to find them again. One passion alone he possesses—that of revenge. A lad of about fourteen had conducted a large camel laden with wood from a village in the plain of Ba'albec, where Mr. Palgrave was residing at the time, to another village at half an hour's distance; as the animal loitered or turned out of the way its conductor struck it repeatedly. A few days later the same boy had to re-conduct the beast, unladen, to his own village. When they were about half way on the road, and at some distance from any habitation, the camel suddenly stopped, looked deliberately round to assure itself that nobody was within

sight, and, making a step forward, seized the unlucky boy's head in its monstrous mouth, and, lifting him up in the air, flung him down again on the earth with the upper part of his skull completely torn off, and his brains scattered on the ground.

We have some extremely interesting particulars given us as to the celebrated breed of Arab horses. When Mr. Palgrave was at Riad, the capital of the Wahabee empire, one of the mares of the imperial stud had received a bite close behind the shoulder from some sportive comrade. The wound, ill-dressed and ill-managed, had festered into a sore. Mr. Palgrave was requested by the heir-apparent to see the animal and undertake its cure. This gave him an opportunity of inspecting the royal stables from day to day—an opportunity his genuine fondness and appreciation of the horse enabled him to make good use of. He tells us that he had never seen or imagined so lovely a collection of horses; about three hundred in number. Their stature was somewhat low—fourteen hands seemed about their average height; but they were so exquisitely well-shaped that want of greater size seemed hardly a defect. They were remarkably full in the haunches, having a shoulder shaped with exquisite elegance, a little saddle-backed, “just the curve which indicates springiness without any weakness;” a head broad above and tapering down to the finest nose; a most intelligent and yet a singularly gentle look, full eye, sharp thorn-like ear, legs fore and hind that seemed as if made of hammered iron, so clean and yet so well-twisted with sinew; a neat round hoof, just the requisite for hard ground; the tail set, or rather thrown out, at a perfect arch; coat smooth, shining, and light; the mane long but not overgrown nor heavy. The prevailing colour is chestnut or grey. The specially distinctive points of the Nejde horse are the slope of the shoulder, the extreme cleanness of the shank, and the full rounded haunch, though every other part too has a perfection and a harmony unwitnessed anywhere else.

The genuine Nejdean breed is to be met with only in Nejed itself, nor are the animals common even there; none but chiefs or individuals of considerable wealth and rank possess them. Nor are they ever sold—they are said to pass only by war, by legacy, or by free gift. When policy requires a present to Egypt, Persia, or Constantinople, mares are never sent, and the poorest stallions, though deserving to pass elsewhere for real beauties, are picked out for the purpose. No Arab dreams of tying up a horse by the neck; a tether replaces the halter. In Arabia horses are much less vicious and refractory than in Europe.

Some readers will be curious to hear a little about Arabian coffee, and the mode of its preparation, even at the expense of mingling in their morning's draught an infusion of scepticism

and dissatisfaction. The best coffee is that of Yemen, commonly called "Mokha," from the main port of exportation. Very little of the Mokha or Yemen berry ever finds its way westward of Constantinople; Arabia itself, Syria, and Egypt, consume full two-thirds, and the remainder is almost exclusively absorbed by Turks and Armenians. Before reaching the harbours of Alexandria, Jaffa, Beyrouth, &c., for further exportation, the Mokha bales have been while yet on their way sifted and re-sifted, grain by grain, and whatever they may have contained of the hard, rounded, half-transparent, greenish-brown berry, has been carefully picked out by experienced fingers; and it is the less generous residue of flattened, opaque, and whitish grains which alone, or almost alone, goes on board the shipping. So constant is this selecting process, that a gradation, regular as the degrees on a map, may be observed in the quality of Mokha coffee even within the limits of Arabia itself, in proportion as one recedes from the neighbourhood of Mecca. The second species of coffee is the Abyssinian, but inferior to the former. With this stops, says Mr. Palgrave, at least in Eastern opinion and taste, the list of coffees, and begins the list of beans, among which are the produce of India, America, and Batavia.

Coffee is in Arabia the chief medium of social communication and hospitality: it is offered, as of course, to every visitor and stranger on his arrival, and the preparation of it always forms the first stage of every social entertainment. There is a stove in every reception-room, or *K'hawah*, and a slave whose office it is to prepare and pour out the coffee. The stove is formed of a huge block of granite, hollowed inwardly into a deep funnel, open above and half full of lighted charcoal. The bottom of the funnel communicates with a horizontal tube, to which a bellows is applied when it is required to heat the water for the copper. A large coffee-pot about two-thirds full of water is then placed close by the edge of the glowing charcoal and becomes gradually warm, while other operations are in progress. Three or four handfuls of unroasted coffee are in the meantime taken out of a niche in the wall close by, scrupulously cleansed from all heterogeneous substances, and being poured into a large open iron ladle, are placed over the mouth of the funnel. They crackle, redden, and smoke a little, but are carefully withdrawn long before they turn black or are charred. They are then ground in a mortar till they are smashed, but not reduced to powder; a smaller coffee-pot is then half filled from the larger with water, and the pounded coffee is shaken into it. A few aromatic seeds or saffron are added, and the boiling stage is not allowed to be long or vehement. Last of all the liquor is strained off through some fibres of the inner palm-bark placed for that purpose in the jug spout.

We cannot avoid saying a few words about the date, the fruit of the palm-tree, which Mr. Palgrave describes as the bread of the land, the staff of life, and the staple of commerce. Mahomet is said to have addressed his followers in these words: "Honour the palm-tree, for she is your mother." In the Djowf it is a main object of cultivation, but the richest fruit is obtained in Nejed and Hasa, on the north-western shore of the Persian Gulf. The best are those called "Khalas." They are of a rich amber colour verging on ruddiness, and semi-transparent. Its cultivation is an important item among the rural occupations of Hasa; its harvest an abundant source of wealth, and its exportation, which reaches from Mosoul on the north-west to Bombay on the south-east, forms a large branch of the local commerce. During his stay in Arabia, Mr. Palgrave counted a dozen kinds of date, each perfectly distinct from all the rest.

It may seem somewhat unmannerly to reserve for the close of our review of the physical features of the country what we are told about the women. Mr. Palgrave has constructed for us, what he calls a "beauty scale," on which the Bedouin women are represented by zero or at most 1°; a degree higher would represent the female sex of Nejed; above them rank the women of Shomer, who are in their turn surmounted by those of Djowf. The fifth or sixth degree symbolises the ladies of Hasa, the seventh those of Katar; and lastly, by a sudden rise of ten degrees at least, the seventeenth or eighteenth would denote the pre-eminent beauties of 'Omān.

Having thus noticed some of the most important traits in the physical circumstances of Arabia which Mr. Palgrave's narrative has brought into relief, we may pass on to our second and third titles, which comprise all matters (2) religious and (3) political. The extraordinary resurrection of Mahometanism in the middle of last century, resulting in the formation of the fanatical sect of the Wahhabees and in the political influence gradually usurped by that sect over two-thirds of the peninsula, is the event which most of all arrests the attention and warms the imagination. But inasmuch as the series of events which comprise this Mahometan reformation form the natural transition between the religious and political aspects of the country, it will be more convenient, before proceeding to that more signal religious crisis, first to notice certain special forms of faith that are found on the Arabian soil. The most prominent of these are a sort of Sabæan worship, practised by the Bedouins, the Carmathian rationalism or anti-idolism, and the creed of the Biadeeyah.

Mr. Palgrave is of opinion, that a general belief in a Supreme Being, Author and Ruler of all things, has from time immemo-

rial prevailed throughout Arabia. This dogma has been somewhat obscured, and even occasionally thrown into the background by two different tendencies: one, the credit given to astral and planetary powers; the other, a grosser fetichism, prevalent for the most part among the lower and less cultivated classes. About the eleventh century of our era, there arose in Kaseem, the territory intermediate between Shomer and Nejed Proper, a hero of the name of Darim, who succeeded in making himself absolute master of his own town, and in no long time in bringing under his sway the rest of Kaseem. He then attacked Nejed, and reduced the greater part of it to submission. Thereupon turning his arms against Yemen, he defeated her chiefs in the valley of Nejrān. His history is important for our immediate purpose, because it was coterminously with the rule of Darim and his race that the old forms of Arab superstition, and especially of planetary worship, reappeared in Kaseem. Indeed to Darim is ascribed the official restoration of planetary or Sabæan worship. In the very first stage of his journey from Ma'ān to the Djowf, Mr. Palgrave had an opportunity of noticing the hold still retained by this primitive form of belief on the Bedouin mind. Hardly had the first clear rays of the rising sun struck level across the horizon, than his Bedouin companions, facing the rising disk, began to recite alternately certain formulas of adoration and invocation, nor desisted till the entire orb rode clear above the desert edge. Mr. Palgrave adds that, among the great mass of the nomad population, Mahometanism has made little or no impression for good or ill; they were one and all no better acquainted than any honest English drover might be with the customary forms of Mahometan worship, with its prostrations and rehearsals, its ablutions and rites; of the pilgrimage they knew nothing except in the way of plundering the pilgrims; and to the obligations and merits of the fast of Ramadan they seemed totally indifferent. On the other hand, sacrifices, in which sheep and camels are devoutly slaughtered at the tombs of their dead kinsmen, are of frequent occurrence.

The proper historical pedigree of the Carmathian sect is to be traced to Mahomet's celebrated rival, Moseylumah. The latter, born about the same time as Mahomet, assumed in Nejed the prophetic character already claimed by his countryman in Hejaz. After seeking in vain the co-operation of his competitor, he employed every resource of eloquence and satire to render Mahomet and his work odious and ridiculous in the eyes of Nejdeans, an attempt in which he fully succeeded. Whenever a new chapter of the Koran appeared, Gabriel-brought from heaven, a burlesque imitation awaited it, the work of Moseylumah. He was joined by a third impostor, a woman named Shejah;

who, after first starting on her own account, subsequently entered into controversial correspondence with Moseylumah, and then married him. For eight or ten years Moseylumah enjoyed the quiet possession of his Nejdean pre-eminence, but at last, in a drawn battle between himself and Aboo-bekr, then caliph, he fell, fighting sword in hand, together with a countless multitude of the warriors of Nejed. The sect received a mortal blow, and Islam was now the official religion of the land. A few constant adherents of the fallen cause emigrated to Hasa and Basrah, where, in common with other malcontents, they laid the foundations of the Carmathian faction. This faction was named after El-Karmoot, who, about three hundred years later, headed a great popular outbreak in Hasa; the armies of Islam were cut to pieces by the infuriated Carmathians, whose hatred of Mahometanism led them so far as to burn all their surviving prisoners alive. El-Karmoot then burst forth with his followers from Hasa, and extended his ravages far and wide over Mesopotamia and Syria. These exploits were thrown into the shade by those of his son and successor. After a struggle of more than a century the fortunes of Islam prevailed, but the province of Hasa remained permanently alienated from the national faith. It is described as a heap of moral and religious ruins, where naturalism and materialism are mixed and confused with Shiya'ee transmigrations and incarnations, with the now reviving relics of Sabæism, and with the fetichism common among the lower and uneducated classes all over the globe.

The sect of the Biadeeyah, comprising the greater part of the population of 'Omān, is an offshoot of the Carmathians, but though hating and hated by their orthodox fellow-countrymen, is not pledged either in feeling or practice to such inveterate opposition to Islam. They very rarely assemble for any stated worship: the prayers are muttered in a low and inaudible voice, accompanied by inflexions and prostrations different from those employed in Mahometan devotion. Their annual fast of a month is even stricter than that of the Mahometans. One lady alone is admitted to the legal title and honours of spouse. Women are much more on a footing of equality with men in 'Omān than elsewhere, nor are their faces subjected to the Islamitic veil. The market-places of Mascat and of the other towns of 'Omān are full of tobacco-shops, and the mouths full of pipes. This last feature would be an abomination in the eyes of a good Mussulman.

We have noticed those special forms[†] of religious faith found in the peninsula of Arabia which are either deflexions from, distortions of, or reactions against the pure and primitive faith of Mahomet. We have now to enter upon what is the most cha-

racteristic and entrancing portion of the work before us: the description of the recent Mahometan Reformation, or in other words, the courageous and triumphant attempt made to go back upon the primary essence of Islam, to cleanse it from the incrustations of ages, to curtail its license, to enforce and extend its logical consequences, and to establish its empire for ever at the point of the sword.

No more fearful lesson could be given than this extract from almost cotemporary history of the danger to the liberties of a nation that may accrue from a weak and easy indulgence shown to the earliest displays of intemperate fanaticism, obtrusive self-sufficiency, and indiscriminate hero-worship. There are bodies of men even in England and Scotland who only need the power of numbers to emulate the atrocities committed in the name of religion by the sect of the Wahhabees. The result of the fatal success of the latter is written in glowing characters upon every page of the unsophisticated narrative, and is brought into relief by the contrasted example of neighbouring countries, alike in fertility, climate, and inhabitants, but fortunately as yet unswept by the desolating scourge. Prostrated intellects, public hypocrisy, political stagnation, arrested commerce, and every form of injustice and barbarity, are only some of the most unmistakable accompaniments of Wahhabee rule. We can only afford here to give the briefest possible sketch of the origin and course of this momentous revolution.

The keystone of primitive Mahometanism is contained in the formula, "There is no God but God." This expression, though it would seem on the face of it to affirm nothing more than the unity of the Godhead, yet, according to Mr. Palgrave, is tantamount to an authoritative assertion of the principles of pantheism, fatalism, and the abortiveness and impotency of all human effort:—

"Thus immeasurably and eternally exalted above, and dissimilar from, all creatures, which lie levelled before Him on one common plane of instrumentality and inertness, God is One in the totality of omnipotent and omnipresent action, which acknowledges no rule, standard, or limit, save His own sole and absolute will. . . . All His creatures are alike tools of the one solitary Force which employs them to crush or to benefit, in the interests of truth or error, honour or shame, happiness or misery, quite independently of their individual fitness, deserts, or advantage, and simply because He wills it, and as He wills it."

This was the central idea of Mahomet's creed, but by way of isolating for ever his followers from all other sects, and chiefly from his most dangerous rivals, the Christians, he further imposed divers ascetic practices and recurring ceremonies which should

at once serve as notorious marks of all true believers, and prevent their allegiance, even for a few hours, fading out of their memories. These principles go to clear up much in the religion of Islam otherwise inexplicable, such as the ascetic abstinence from wine and the analogous extension of the same severe rule in after times to tobacco, the assiduous meetings for prayer throughout the day, the profound aversion evinced by Mahomet to imagery or painting, so essential to the Oriental idea of Christianity, the anathema of bells, and the discouragement of commerce conveyed in the words—"He who twice embarks on the sea is an infidel."

Now as these rigorous and unsocial principles had naturally been relaxed in the course of ages, it occurred to a young, ardent, and aspiring fanatic to devote his life to their restoration in their primitive integrity. This man, named Mohammed-ebn-'Abd-el-Wahhab, was born somewhere about the middle of last century. He began life as a travelling merchant, and, when at Damascus, fell in with some bigoted sheyks of that town, whose lessons enabled him to combine once for all, and render precise, notions that he had long before, it seems, entertained in a floating and unsystematized condition. He now learned to distinguish between the essential elements of Islam and its accidental or recent admixtures, and at last found himself in possession of what had been the primal view and starting-point of the Prophet and his companions in Hejāz, twelve ages before. He formed a fixed and solemn resolution to restore the days of the Prophet and his companions, the Sahhābah, and he was confident of success. He first attempted a religious revolution in the city of Eyānah, and succeeded in attracting a numerous party, but was subsequently obliged to depart from the town. He then went to Derey'eeyah, and laid before the chief of the district, Sa'ood, the following proposition: "Pledge me your word that you will make the cause of God your cause and the sword of Islam your sword, and I will pledge you mine that before your death you shall be sole monarch of Nejed and the first potentate in Arabia." Sa'ood unhesitatingly accepted the offer, and gave himself out as the apostle of the new doctrine and sword of the faith. In the name of God and Islam he attacked one after another his misbelieving neighbours, while to all he held forth, after the fashion of Mahomet, the option between the Koran and the sword. Weaker wills bent or broke before the stronger, and every year added to the territory of Derey'eeyah and the number of the Wahhabee faction. Sa'ood left to his sons the undisputed sovereignty of Inner Arabia, and a name respected and even dreaded throughout the entire peninsula. We cannot here follow farther the history of the Wahhabee dynasty, though it

far outstrips in real interest the most enthralling romance. To exhibit the spirit and complete triumph of the principles of the Wahhabees, we will describe a peculiar institution which has lately been founded in Riad, the capital of the Wahhabee empire, for the purpose of chastising the growing laxity of the inhabitants.

In the year 1854 the cholera fell on Nejed like a thunderbolt, and began its usual ravages with a success totally unchecked by any preventive or sanative measures. The capital was depopulated—a third of its inhabitants are said to have perished within a few weeks. The king, Feysul, convoked an assembly of all the principal men in the town, and pointed out to them the need for national repentance and amendment of manners, which had no doubt become shamefully deteriorated. Indeed it was true that relaxation in religious and sectarian peculiarities had been gradually introduced: prosperity and intercourse with the men and government of Cairo had combined to promote this falling away. Tobacco, or the “shameful,” had sent up its vapours in the khāwahs of the capital, and heads had been seen profaned by the iniquity of silk and gold thread. The only remedy for the epidemic was a speedy reform. The elders of the town retired, held long conversation, and returning, proposed the following scheme, which received the kingly ratification. From amongst the most exemplary and zealous of the inhabitants twenty-two were selected, and entitled “meddeyyeeyah,” “men of zeal,” or “zelators.” On these twenty-two absolute power was conferred for the extirpation of whatever was contrary to the Wahhabee doctrine and practice, and to good manners in general. Not only were these zelators to denounce offenders, but they might also inflict the penalty incurred, and beat and fine at discretion; nor was any limit assigned to the amount of the mulct or to the number of the blows. The offences brought under the animadversion of these censors are such as absence from public prayers, regular attendance five times a day in the public mosques being henceforth of strict obligation; smoking tobacco, taking snuff, or chewing a quid; wearing silk or gold; talking or having a light in the house after night-prayers; singing, or playing on any musical instrument. Pacing from street to street, or unexpectedly entering the houses to see if there is anything incorrect going on there, the zelators do not hesitate to inflict at once, and without any preliminary form of trial or judgment, the penalty of stripes on the detected culprit, be he who he may; and should their own slaves prove insufficient, they straightway call in the assistance of bystanders or slaves, who throw the guilty person on the ground, and then in concert with the zelators belabour him at pleasure. Such is the capital of the Wahhabee empire,

which extends either its dominion or protectoratè over the richest cities and most fertile provinces of Arabia.

Captain Burton, on a late occasion, spoke of himself as favourably impressed with the civilizing influences of Mahometan colonists in Africa. But before he can venture to recommend, in the interests of Africa, the propagation of the Prophet's creed, he must pause to consider the embryonic seeds of fatalism, intolerance, and immorality which that creed implicitly contains. The seeds, indeed, of fatalism and intolerance are necessarily to be found involved more or less in the principles of all possible forms of religious belief. When the soil is propitious those seeds bear their natural fruit, as is conspicuously manifested in certain modes of Christianity professed at this day in Great Britain; nor are the seeds and fruit of immorality likewise always away. Some forms of belief, however, possess intrinsically, and have proved themselves to possess historically, a counter-principle of reaction by which the growth of all those pestilent seeds is arrested, and the claims of human individuality and liberty abundantly secured. Among these last forms of belief it will scarcely be pretended that the religion of Islam can hold its place.

It is refreshing to remove out of the noxious and oppressive atmosphere at Nejed, blighting as it does all the aspirations of the noblest manhood with a upas-shade of bigotry and despotism, into the healthier air of Shomer and 'Omān: the former presenting the spectacle of a wisely-administered paternal government, the latter of an approximately constitutional or limited monarchy.

The ruler of Shomer, Telāl, forms one of the most interesting portraits that Mr. Palgrave brings before us. His father was established in the government by the Sultan of Nejed as a reward for important services rendered at a critical time. But Telāl has a bad reputation at the court of Riad for orthodoxy, and is considered as little better than an unbeliever. In return for which, Telāl keeps himself and his country as independent as he can of all connexion and intercourse with the neighbouring empire, at the same time doing his best to mislead and hoodwink the imperial spies. If he smokes it is in private, and by way of remedy, prescribed by the best physicians, for some occult disease. The commerce of Häyel is not his, but the work of private individuals, with whom, much to his regret, he could not interfere. If he is obliged by business to absent himself from the mosque, he always takes care that his uncle, or some one of his family, shall be there to represent him. Mr. Palgrave tells us that among all rulers or governors, European or Asiatic, whose ac-

quaintance he had ever made, he knew few equal to Telāl in the true art of government.

When he came to the throne his first care was to adorn and civilize the capital. He built a long row of warehouses, the dependencies and property of a new palace commenced by his father and completed by himself. He further built a market-place, consisting of about eighty shops or magazines, destined for public commerce and trade. Round the palace, and in many other parts of the town, he opened streets, dug wells, and laid out extensive gardens, besides strengthening the old fortifications all round and adding new ones. In order to carry out his views for enriching the country by the benefits of free and regular commerce, he so effectually stopped the plundering forays on the high roads that henceforth no Bedouin throughout the whole kingdom could dare to molest traveller or peasant. Merchants from Basrah, shopkeepers from Medinah and Yemen, he invited by liberal offers to come and establish themselves in the new market of Hā'yel. With some Telāl made government contracts, equally lucrative to himself and to them; to others he granted privileges and immunities; to all, protection and countenance. He affected not to observe their religious discrepancies, and showed even special favour to the dissenters of the Shiya'a sect, fervently hated as they were by all good Wahhabees. He even did his best to persuade Jews and Christians from the north to take up their abode in the capital, where he promised them entire security and free exercise of their religion. Once a day, oftentime, he gives public audience, hears patiently and decides in person the minutest causes with great good sense. To the Bedouin he makes up for the restraint he imposes and the tribute he levies by a profusion of hospitality not to be found elsewhere in Arabia. The townsmen and villagers love him for the solid advantages of undisturbed peace at home, flourishing commerce, extended dominion, and military glory. With his numerous retainers he is almost over-indulgent, and readily pardons a mistake or act of negligence; falsehood alone he never forgives; and it is notorious that he who has once lied to Telāl must give up all hopes of future favour. His reign has now lasted more than twenty years, and hitherto with unvaried prosperity. He has gone far, we are told, to civilize the most barbarous third of the Arabian continent, and has established law and security where they had been unknown for ages past.

We have dwelt perhaps at somewhat disproportionate length on the lineaments of this remarkable man, partly because it is only by looking on them as a whole that their accurate truthfulness is irresistibly brought home; and partly because the existence of such a man, or even the possibility of such, is not the

least impressive and suggestive phenomenon described in the narrative before us. This one fact at once blows to the winds all arbitrary lines of demarcation drawn between the highly-civilized European and an Asiatic with like factitious advantages. Again, what has been attained in the case of one man may be hereafter attained in that of a whole race. And lastly, if the very reverse of this social prosperity, commercial enterprise, and manly development is witnessed throughout the adjoining province of Nejed, it may reasonably be attributed solely to the crushing incubus of intolerance, ignorance, and fanaticism.

Passing over the mountain-range of Toweyk and reaching the south-eastern corner of the peninsula, we have another government which also deserves our warm sympathies and interest. The sultan of 'Omān is indeed the sovereign of the province, but the chiefs scattered about have independent authority in their own neighbourhood in all matters except of life and death. The principles of the government are absolute toleration and non-interference. We think the general advantages of such a principle stated rather too broadly by Mr. Palgrave, if he intends his animadversions on meddling governments to apply to all governments, however constituted, and to all states in whatever condition of social advancement. It is obvious that a government should be a centre of light and knowledge, a centre of co-operation, a centre of distributive administration. And where a government is amenable to effective popular control, and exposed on all hands to assiduous suspicion, but none the less secured against all spasmodic interference from any quarter whatever, the powers entrusted to such a government can never become viciously intrusive or dangerously great. The case is, however, very different with an Eastern government in the present day. There control from without is of the weakest, and interference in public concerns is pretty sure to be exercised in the wrong direction.

The liberal principles of the 'Omānee constitution have certainly resulted in great material prosperity.

“With a territory containing in square miles scarce half the extent ruled by the Wahabee, they have full twice as numerous a population and twenty times the revenue and wealth. And if their pages present fewer exploits of military prowess, fewer men killed before their time in the field of glory, and less brilliant or bloody events than what signalize the history of power concentrated in one individual hand, they can offer in requital centuries of quiet, well-doing, thriving towns, a thickly-peopled land, princes loved by their subjects, and subjects rendered prosperous by their princes.”

Lastly, we have to complete our survey of the facts brought to our notice by Mr. Palgrave by a very brief consideration of those which fall under the head of (4) social phenomena. Among

these the condition of the negro slaves imported from Africa into 'Omān is not the least important. More than a thousand negroes, men, women and children, are imported into 'Omān every year. Most of these sooner or later obtain their liberty, and thus a new element is added to and freely mixed up with the original or white population. Mr. Palgrave, however, tells us that a negro seldom adapts himself to any position in society except the lowest and the least intellectual. Hence the emancipated blacks remain mostly servants, water-carriers, gardeners, ploughmen, common sailors, divers, and the like; they are only superior to the Arabs in superstition and immorality. Fetichists on their own soil, negroes remain so no less on Arab soil; and with Fetichism they bring all its Libyan accompaniments of juggling, magic, spells, poisoning, and the like, till these discreditable practices have passed to a certain extent into the white society.

In one passage of his work Mr. Palgrave traces an interesting resemblance between the Arab and English character. He finds in each the same depth, seriousness, energy, cautiousness, and friendliness. He also thinks that there is the same amount of actual work accomplished by the eastern as by the western labourer, though the latter has an instinctive notion and acquired habits of combination and co-operation which multiply the result of the work done a hundred-fold. The Arabs are "reverential" but not naturally a "religious" people, whereas the English are "religious" but by no means "reverential."

Arab nationality has been from the earliest times based on the division of families and clans. These clans or tribes were soon by the nature of the land itself divided into two branches of unequal size and importance: the greater section remained as townsmen or peasants in the districts best susceptible of culture and permanent occupation, where they still kept up much of their original clannish denominations and forms, though often blended and even at times obliterated by the fusion inseparable from civil and social organization. The other and lesser portion devoted themselves to a pastoral life, for which the desert, that is, about a third in extent of the Arabian peninsula, affords ample scope.

There are many other significant features of the narrative before us which nothing but lack of space could induce us to pass unnoticed. It would have been a grateful task to record the manly and triumphant resistance opposed by Mr. Palgrave to Abd-Allah, the heir-apparent of the monarch of Nejed, when, with threats of present death, the prince in vain strained every nerve to extort from the travelling doctor some strychnia wherewith to poison his enemies. We should like to have visited and described accurately one at least of the great Arab cities, 'Hāyel,

or Riād, or Bereydah, or Hofhoof, or Sharjah, or Mascat. Well worthy too of special notice are the interesting characters of Abd-el-Mahsir, Aboo-eysa, and the Shirazee ambassador. Gladly too would we linger over the siege of Oneyzah just on the point of becoming absorbed into the Wahhabee empire, and pertinaciously upholding its independence to the last. The story of the shipwreck in the sea of 'Omān, indeed, we could in no case touch, for its sublime and pathetic interest would hardly survive the harsh process of abbreviation; it must be read in the original, with all the breathless anxiety and respectful homage to the personal qualities of Mr. Palgrave it will not fail to carry with it.

In fine, Mr. Palgrave has successfully accomplished the task he undertook, and established the position for which he has contended: he has stirred up a fresh interest in the inhabitants of the Arabian peninsula, which, founded as it now at last is, upon accurate knowledge, and stimulated by those sympathies, religious, political, and social, which touch all men at some points and some men at all, will not readily be let die. He has brought before our too sluggish imaginations, with all the grave authority of one who hazarded his life to see what he wished to see and saw it, the life of a people gifted with the noblest capacities, teeming with lordly aspirations, not destitute of the best physical advantages, and yet apparently doomed to dwell alone, and not to be reckoned among the nations. It is a solemn and only too eloquent picture, which will sink deep into the hearts of Englishmen as they complacently look round on their own ocean waves bearing to their ports the ships of all nations, and then turn away to meditate gloomily on those trackless deserts which shut off so mightily a people from the ken and help of their kind.

ART. V.—THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE.

The Holy Roman Empire. By JAMES BRYCE, B.A. London and Cambridge: Macmillan & Co. Oxford: T. & G. Shrimpton.

THE university to which Mr. Bryce belongs might, we think, learn a useful lesson from his essay. Repeated efforts have of late been made to alter a system of education, the deficiencies of which become more glaring every day. No sweeping changes indeed are possible in that ancestral stronghold of privileged indolence. To many men it would seem profane to raise an outcry against abuses that are as hallowed in their eyes as the crumbling grey stones of their old college walls. Crowds of candi-

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dates will continue to purchase the most paltry apology for an education at the most exorbitant cost. Degrees will continue to be devices by which ignorance is for a heavy bribe decently venerated. Fellowships will continue to be the premium on lifelong laziness. But that without any violent assault upon venerable abuses a great improvement is possible, this essay clearly demonstrates. Here is a work that bears the stamp of genuine merit. Here, upon a vast dust-heap of dross, lies one piece, at least, of good solid gold. Now, were one or more fellowships each year (two or three annual hundreds, that is, out of a huge and idle income) held out as a reward for essays written on a similar plan, the university would before long acquire a series of really valuable treatises, and utilize instead of lose for ever or paralyse for ever, as under its present system, the energies of its younger men. How many a man not by taste or nature idle ends his university career mortified and unsuccessful, simply because he could not bend his mind to studies which he loathed! Hundreds who would have toiled like slaves at the study of their choice, had the prospect of a substantial reward for proficiency in that study solely been held out as an inducement to them, have recoiled in dismay from what appeared to them rightly or wrongly as a dismal jumble of history, theology, philosophy, and scholarship. To some it appears a hopeless task to master with the indispensable minuteness the dreary wisdom of the Ethics, the alternately crabbed, alternately pretty inanities of the Republic. To others the niceties of scholarship seem either not worth mastering, or beyond their capacity to master. And so they fritter away their time, and somehow or other subside into society, cursing, it may be, their own want of resolution, but at the same time execrating their university and its proffered education. Surely it would be worth the while of the university out of its abundance to toss a crumb or two to such starvelings. Already there exists at Oxford a precedent for another and a better system. Already a few out of the crowd of students can look forward with hope to a reward for special excellence. If fellowships for natural science solely already exist, why should not historical fellowships be created, and the test be something already realized by the university, something tangible and valuable, something it might point to as some return for its money, if it never obtained from its elected fellow another line or syllable worth preservation. In nine cases out of ten the fellowship would not be, as now, a snare to lifelong inaction, but a stimulus to future effort. Instead of an examination which is simply a nauseous means to an end, we would substitute an examination the work of which would itself be a labour of love. Mr. Bryce, we are sure, would bear witness how love of his work grew on

him as it progressed ; and his preface shows how, after the prize was won, he returned to his work with fresh ardour, instead of flinging it aside with the triumphant consciousness that he never need handle it again.

But it may be objected that the calibre of Mr. Bryce's essay is beyond the reach of other men of his age and standing at the university ; and it is certainly highly improbable that an equally good essay would be produced every year ; but under the influence of a greater stimulus, the average calibre of university essays would be infinitely improved. No brilliantly original theory, it should be remembered, is necessary. Even in this exceptionally able essay of Mr. Bryce the theory which he works out is contained in a few pages of Mr. Maine's treatise on Ancient Law. But with that theory to guide him, Mr. Bryce has with admirable industry gathered together each fact which bore on his subject, and told a story which is not stale, in language which is not stilted. From the polemic of Boeclerus to the sarcasm of Voltaire, all the lore of his subject has been carefully collated and is absolutely at his command. He introduces the right comments in the right place, and has, in short, produced a compendious treatise which may hold its own with far more pretentious works supposed to be essential to an educated man's library. That it is compendious is of itself a strong recommendation. Mr. Bryce, it is true, alludes with some regret to the inexhaustibility of his subject as contrasted with the limited space at his disposal. We congratulate him on having not launched into inexhaustibility. The reigning fashion of writing history not by the page or the book, but by the ream and the dozen volumes, is both ludicrous and alarming. Though half involuntarily, Mr. Bryce has shown wisdom in compressing his narrative, and we are sure the time is close at hand when more than one six or twelve-volume history will be read only in an abridged form corresponding much more nearly with the size of his treatise than with their present dimensions. A series of such treatises we should consider both possible and profitable : possible, because were the standard raised competition would be increased ; and profitable, because in the wide waste of historical literature such miniature histories would occupy a distinct position and acquire a peculiar value of their own.

Mr. Bryce was, we think, very fortunate in his subject. As we glance over his synopsis of contents, a vast historical vista opens to our view. If traced from its first origin to its final extinction, the Holy Roman Empire stretches over a compass of well nigh two thousand years. Its foundations were laid by the greatest constructive genius the world has ever seen. It was finally destroyed by one who to his contemporaries seemed the

very archangel of destruction. Yet his contemporaries are our contemporaries, while the contemporaries of its creator were the companions of Cicero, of Sulla, of Marius, and of the Gracchi. Inquire into its extinction, and you meet the great name of Napoleon. Inquire into its origin, and you meet the yet greater name of Caius Julius Cæsar. The epitaph that Cæsar uttered over the aristocratic government of Rome might have been, with equal truth, pronounced by Napoleon over the empire erected on the ruins of that government by Cæsar: "—*nihil esse rempublicanum, appellationem modo sine corpore ac specie.*" —(SÜETON.)

How the Holy Roman Empire rose out of the old Roman Empire may very shortly be described. In the fourth and fifth centuries all the bulwarks of civilization built up by imperialism went down before the reiterated shocks of barbaric conquest, like ripe sheaves before the reaper's sickle. The world that had slumbered so long under the shadow of one great name woke up suddenly to the commencement of an era of confusion. Another chapter in the history of human progress was closed. Never again were men to gaze on the spectacle of one town the mistress of all nations, of countless myriads the slaves of a slavish senate, of a world prostrate before a single throne. The last and greatest experiment in government had failed. Where it should have been most effective, its failure was most conspicuous. The middle classes, the real props of its power, had been extinguished by taxation. The sturdy plebeians of the old Republic had degenerated into spiritless lazzaroni; its iron-hearted senators had sunk into a herd of sensual idlers; and the emperor was too often but a military puppet. Sapped to its foundation by internal weakness, the majestic fabric of imperialism tottered to its fall. Then, as each wild wave of barbarism swept over the wreck of order, the world fell into a chaos and anarchy which was the more frightful and the more sharply defined from the marked unity of the government by which it had been preceded. But amid the disruption of society, the memory of the blessings diffused by that ancient and venerable system was still vivid in men's minds. It was no mean legacy to leave, this grand tradition of the happiness of order which nothing could obliterate. It lived as a tradition among the sons of those who had enjoyed it, and it was embodied with undying force in that code which was to be the basis of almost all modern law. And while it enthralled men mentally by laws to which they could suggest no improvement, materially, it might be said to be graven upon the earth in characters to be effaced only by time. As Alaric and Attila marched on Rome, the very stones of the roads upon which they trod must have cried aloud

to them of the contrast between their victim's humane munificence and their own desolating career. And a strong sentiment of veneration is in fact traceable in each great chieftain who in turn aspired to be master or conqueror of the West, in Alaric, in Attila, in Aulph, in Odoacer, in Theodoric, in Clovis, and finally, and to some purpose, in Charlemagne.

In spite of Mr. Bryce's arguments to the contrary, we are inclined to regard Charlemagne, not Otho, as the real founder of the Holy Roman Empire. To any one who thoroughly comprehends the essentially heterogeneous elements and composite character of that institution, it may seem of infinitesimal importance to tack to any individual's name the title of First Founder. But if we *must* burn our incense, let it at least be at the shrine of the genuine Θεός Πατριῶος. We shall find as we proceed, that a misapprehension on this elementary point involves other and important conclusions which, as we think, are untenable. We may identify it either by its title or by certain select characteristics. In accordance with the former theory, we may conceive the Holy Roman Empire as having come into existence, when the full title was first adopted. In accordance with the latter, we must ascend the empire's annals till we come in contact with the characteristics required. As Mr. Bryce himself shows, Otho was not author of the title. He has not been able to discover, nor have we, any extant instance of the title written in full before the year 1156. It remains, therefore, to inquire what the characteristics of the empire were, and whether they were not as clearly represented by Charlemagne as by Otho.

In describing the empire under Otho, Mr. Bryce, of course, treats of it as inseparably connected with the papacy. It is in his estimate of that connexion that we think he has been led astray. In his elaborate description of the mutual interdependence of the two powers, he seems to us to have confused that which many good men wished them to be, with what they actually were. The "perfect harmony," the "sublime accord," the "complete union" on which he dilates, we regard as a mystic vision which never dazzled the fancy of any one of the great emperors or popes. Mr. Bryce himself admits that it was realized only at few points in their history. We should like some proof of its ever having been realized for a single instant, or of its ever having formed even the daydream of any representative-in-chief of either interest. For that it was the dream of speculative politicians devising an ideal government, and scandalized by the sight of eternal discord, we do not pretend to deny. While Mr. Bryce is urging most strongly his theory of coequality, the inveterate dualism of the two systems in spite of himself crops out.

From such quotations as "Potestas sæcularis subordinatur spirituali sicut corpus animæ," he gathers that so closely were they knit together, that not in thought even could they be divided. What we gather from them is, that such dicta are the dicta of mere theorists or papal partisans. In Frederic Barbarossa's mouth, or at all events in his heart, the maxim would have been exactly reversed—Potestas spiritualis subordinatur sæculari sicut corpus animæ. When Mr. Bryce says, "The complete accord" * * * * "was finally supplanted by another view of their relations, which professing to be a development of a principle recognised as fundamental, the superior importance of the religious life, found increasing favour in the eyes of fervent churchmen," he seems to us to be engaged in the curious task of assigning reasons for the severance of ties which never existed. Yet it is from the existence of those fancied ties that Mr. Bryce dates and deduces the commencement of the Holy Roman Empire, making their and its existence contemporaneous with and created by Otho the Great. He was bound to give some proofs of the existence of the relation. What he does prove is, that there existed in men's minds a strong yearning after such a relation. We may perhaps best illustrate the point at issue between Mr. Bryce and ourselves by a metaphor. We see two brothers sprung from the same father, each claiming the parental estate, the one on the principle of primogeniture, the other by virtue of a supernatural dispensation. Mr. Bryce sees twins, with an identical and indissoluble claim to the parental estate. An outsider would probably have harmonized the claims of Esau and Jacob in a twinkling. But the true view of their relations must, we take it, be derived from the reciprocal sentiments of Esau and Jacob themselves. Esau thought himself in the right and Jacob in the wrong, himself superior, Jacob inferior. Jacob thought just the opposite. Now each emperor was, in more points of similarity than one, the Esau of the Middle Ages. Each pope was the Jacob of the Middle Ages. The disputed inheritance was, we think, on all ordinary mundane principles of justice, the birth-right of the Charles', the Othos, the Frederics. But there, as in Jacob's case, the prize was awarded to superior craft. The theory of both sides was the same. But they never consented to share the theory, to make, as it were, a joint-stock concern of the advantages to be derived from it. Mr. Bryce will have it, that in Otho's reign, they twain became one flesh, and that then was born the Holy Roman Empire. Theoretically at all events, pope and emperor were, according to him, from that time, copartners and allies. We contend that then, as ever, they were rivals and monopolists to the back-

bone. Their power, identical though it really was in origin and aim, rested in theory on perfectly different bases. Their advocates appealed to totally distinct warrants for their authority. The credentials they produced in support of their antagonistic claims were alike only in far-fetched extravagance. They dated from different epochs and were grafted upon alien creeds. Where Mr. Bryce sees only evidence of unity, we can see nothing but repulsion. In the famous simile of the sun and moon, the pope, we imagine, had only in view the superiority of the one luminary over the other. That the two institutions had one fundamental point in common was a fact which he could not ignore. His object was to show that his was the cause of justice, and that it was his rival who was the usurper. This too was the object of the emperors, one and all. They had derived their authority from the pagan Cæsars, who had absorbed the pontificate as they had absorbed all the other engines of government. In their turn, the emperors imagined themselves devolving the Christian pontificate upon others, the truth being of course, that religious supremacy had long ago slipped out of the imperial grasp. Did Mr. Bryce's distinction between the Holy Empire and the Western Empire of Charlemagne hold good, we should expect to find a deference shown to papal authority by the Othos, in contradistinction to the haughty assumption of absolute authority by Charles. On the contrary, no emperors ever vindicated more despotically the right of deposition and election than they. Again, on Mr. Bryce's supposition, how are we to account for the fact, that Frederic Barbarossa was the first emperor who used the title in full? How could he, the incarnate essence of imperialism, loyal to the very letter of the old imperial traditions, have voluntarily assumed a title which, even on Mr. Bryce's showing, carried with it a certain confession of inferiority? If he assumed it, it was, we may be sure, a title of which he was proud, not the brand of his humiliation before a dependent who had grown up under the shadow of the throne of his ancestors.

With this premise, therefore, that though an intimate connexion always existed between the empire and the papacy, yet that this connexion never took the shape of co-equality, we can see no difference whatever between the empire of Otho and the empire of Charles, except such as would naturally result from the lapse of time. Differences there were of detail, but not of principle. In all essentials the two empires were identical, Charlemagne being every whit as much the founder of the empire of Otho, as Napoleon the First was of the empire of Napoleon the Third. Nay, rather, his title is infinitely superior to that of Napoleon.

But it may be asked, how then is the line to be drawn between the old Roman Empire and the Holy-Roman Empire? Is the name utterly without significance, or if it has significance, what is it? Whence did it come? Our answer shall be as concise and clear as we can make it. Three properties the new empire had in common with the old empire. It was the bulwark against barbarism. It was supreme over all other governments. It was cosmopolitan, not national. One property it had peculiar to itself, to which it owed its special nature, and, as we think, its special name. The religious side of its supremacy was brought out into strong and novel prominence. In the old empire the religious element was completely dwarfed and overshadowed by the political element. The emperors had grasped the symbols of religion as they had all the other insignia of authority, but its ancient virtue had departed from the pontificate. The salt of religion had lost its savour in a society which tolerated all creeds and believed in none. In Charlemagne's time the face of the world had changed. In the room of an all-tolerant, passive, undemonstrative paganism, had sprung up a persecuting, proselytizing church, which had already more than once summoned the whole world to conform to its dictates. If the chief bishops of this church were permitted to pursue a separate path, they would plainly soon acquire a separate and independent dominion, and the eagle-eye of Charlemagne descried the gigantic obstacle it might prove to his autocratic pretensions. The Iconoclastic schism had produced two churches. There were now also two empires. It was only natural that he should have seized on the idea of merging the empire and church of the West, so as to present a bold front to the empire and church of the East. He determined to convert the possible rival into a serviceable dependent. He too would have his patriarch, the pale reflection of his own omnipotence, bound by gratitude to use the spells of superstition only to inculcate obedience to his will. While reserving to himself an absolute supremacy in all matters ecclesiastical, while dictating theological tenets with the infallibility of one who was "manifest lord of the whole mind of the West," while sternly checking all sacerdotal encroachments, prohibiting, for instance, all ecclesiastics from accompanying his expeditions, in order to show that he was himself missionary as well as warrior, priest as well as king, he yet made use of the church as the old kings of Rome had made use of the pontiffs, as the old kings of Israel had made use of the prophets, and deigned to accept their blessing as the sign and seal set by heaven on his august office.

He miscalculated the strength and character of the institution he was attempting to bind to his own interests. The

weakest place in his magnificent scheme of policy lay here. Mediæval Christendom was not the scene whereon pope and emperor might re-enact the rôle of Samuel and Saul. "Aut Cæsar aut nullus" was to be the motto of the modern prince of the people, no more than of the modern exponent of the decrees of God. But though implacable rivalry was inevitable between the two systems, the plan so far succeeded that the stamp of sanctity was set upon the empire for ever, and if Charlemagne could not obtain for his successors the monopoly and sole movement of this new and potent lever Religion, he at least secured for them as much as might be of its invincible strength. And thus it was, and then it was, that the Roman Empire became the Holy Roman Empire. Carolus serenissimus Augustus a Deo coronatus magnus Pacificus Imperator Romanum gubernans Imperium—this was the proud style in which he asserted to be centred in himself one and indivisible supremacy over the whole political heritage of the past, as well as over the whole intellectual kingdom that the new religion seemed to be unfolding in the future. Nor was the validity of his assumptions impugned by his successors. It was not on his grandfather's fame that Otho the Third relied as a warrant for his all too magnificent pretensions. It was by solemnly entering the tomb of Charlemagne that he sought to wipe away the stain of a broken succession by direct contact with one in whom alone the original right to universal sovereignty was vested, and from whom alone it could be legitimately derived.

We need not discuss here why it was that the empire fell into apparent dissolution at Charlemagne's death. That its dissolution was only apparent is the important point. Just as the old empire remained for centuries "suspended but not extinct" till the time of Charlemagne, so his empire remained in abeyance till the time of Otho. In either case it was a time "of transition, of fluctuation, and uncertainty, in which the office passing from one dynasty and country to another had not time to acquire a settled character and claims, and was without the power that would have enabled it to support them." In either case, too, the principle, the form, the idea proved undying. Whether the title Holy Roman Empire was in use in Charlemagne's epoch we cannot determine. Nor do we think the question of material importance. What is material is the indisputable fact that the idea of "sacredness" was attached to the empire in the popular mind. Possibly in name, positively in popular estimation and in fact, the Roman Empire was turned into the Holy Roman Empire by Charlemagne.

And never, with perhaps one exception, had so splendid a scheme floated before the vision of a statesman as that on which

the eye of Charlemagne was fixed. In his view the emperor was to combine in himself the justice and dignity of one far above all common temptations. He was to govern as the living impersonation of law and order, and as the elect of God. Under him German independence and Roman organization were to coalesce. His subjects were to make themselves heard in the Diet, but the emperor was to be at its head—a prince of a senate which should not consist of slaves. In his own person he was to unite the functions of statesman, general, and judge. His importance was to be derived not from territorial magnificence merely, but from the universal consent of subordinate rulers to admit him supreme by a right differing from their own. Internally he was to be the arbiter of Europe in matters spiritual and temporal. Externally he was to be the bulwark against all future barbaric invasion. In the one character the last seal would be set to his splendour by the coronation at Rome. In the other, the emperor was to fix his central residence on the outskirts of civilization, amid the new memorials of the second empire's magnificence at Aix-la-Chapelle. Laws that would reconcile liberty with wholesome control would arise from custom. Governments would derive authority from time. Society undisturbed by fresh seeds of anarchy would gradually pass from a chaotic state into one of security and order beneath his paternal supervision. The reconstitution of disorganized Europe, the re-establishment of one government over jarring systems and alien races and conflicting creeds, the restoration of the golden age of the best of the Cæsars, this was the hope, this the life-long labour of the first of the new line of emperors, the true hero of the Middle Ages.

It was only partially that this grand ideal was realized. The anarchical tendencies of nascent feudalism were too strong, the immediate successors of Charlemagne were too feeble, to admit of its full accomplishment. Above all, the papacy, with a pardonable treason, turned on its benefactor, usurped his functions, and attacked his system with such blind and relentless hatred, that it unconsciously cut away the ground from beneath its own feet as it undermined the authority of its rival. Before, however, we take up the history of that great struggle, we must glance at the influence of feudalism upon the imperial system.

Passing over a century we find that the feudal spirit, on which it had been part of Charlemagne's scheme to put bit and bridle, had triumphed over every effort to control its progress. Not even a succession of Charlemagnes could perhaps have checked the progress of disintegration. At all events, it was not for Louis the Gentle, Louis the Stammerer, Charles the Bald, and Charles the Fat, to bear the burden which might have broken

down the energies even of Charles the Great. To stem the torrent of barbarism on the Eastern frontier was the only portion of the imperial duty that any ordinarily able emperor could hope successfully to perform. So that less than a hundred years after its creator's death, the imperial government had diverged into a course very different from that which he had mapped out for it. Imperialism, or society converging to one centre, was Charlemagne's dream. Feudalism, or society in dissolution, was the fact of the age. What was this feudalism? Whence arose this seemingly irrepressible antagonism to unity in Europe? It sprang from two sources, and its germs existed, as the germs of all that was important in the new empire existed, in the old empire of Rome. In the decay of central authority, the inhabitants of the outlying provinces had been taught the bitter necessity of self-defence. Each proprietor of the soil was forced to assert his right to it by being ever ready to stake his life on its possession. So long as he succeeded he was an irresponsible autocrat. But the strongest hand was the strongest title, and he was surest who was girt by the firmest and faithfullest circle of dependents and friends. This state of things was, of course, only intensified by the irruptions of the barbarians. Grappling as it were at each other's throats, jostling one another in a rival race, in turn conquerors and conquered, they presented all the elements of disorganization, none of unity. Each horde was in the end inevitably forced into a posture of self-defence. But the old wild spirit of independence still animated them, and they were less amenable to the feeling of fealty which always binds the clansman to his chief. Nor was any other sentiment yet arisen to take its place. Loyalty with them meant attachment to a bold general. Patriotism with them meant the determination to keep with the sword what the sword had won. To weld such discordant materials into unity it was necessary that a man should possess either the genius of a Charlemagne, or the semi-religious, semi-heroic character which had compensated for the absence of it in chieftains like Clovis. Only slowly and by degrees did royalty take the place of chieftainship, did the unity of the country take the place of the unity of the clan. The parent of this feudal royalty was imperialism, which, failing to crush out feudalism, put itself at its head, thus becoming the link between the barbaric and the modern systems of government. Emperor after emperor accepted his fate after a resistance proportionate to his ability. All other sovereigns were to him but *Reges Provinciales*; and he was but *Primus inter Pares* among his own vassals.

By thus taking as it were the hue of feudalism, the emperor both lost and gained. He gained, because amid the mutual

jealousy of his vassals some material aid was always at the command of the crown. They, too, were made participators in the grandeur of his position, something of a reflected glory singling them out as above the vassals of other sovereigns, just as their king was lord of all other kings. But his plans were always liable to be thwarted by some powerful noble. He was always opposed by a discontented minority. The first act of his reign was always the chastisement of some mortified rival or refractory vassal. Above all, there were not only open foes but traitors in his own camp. The nobles might individually and at different times be his rivals, but the clerical nobility were leagued together in the interest of his one great rival, the pope. Most gallantly did the emperors make head against such formidable opponents; too gallantly, in fact, for the good of Germany. They tried to be at once emperors and kings, not seeing that the functions of the two were utterly disparate. Till the old disunion of society ended in Europe, they were not on the whole unsuccessful. But as society settled itself under royalty in France and England, and under the moral influence of the popes of Rome, the need of imperialism proportionately diminished. As feudal sovereigns the emperors were by far the most powerful monarchs in Europe. But as feudal royalty was supplanted by independent royalty in other countries, the power of the emperor, which in its very essence was to a great extent nominal, became dwarfed by the power of the king. Thus it was that while in France the central power steadily progressed towards despotism and in England towards constitutional monarchy, in Germany—the very hotbed of feudalism—it grew weaker and weaker, till the emperor remained little more than the chief of a federation, with a title less honoured at home than abroad. It must be admitted that the temptations which seduced the emperors to adhere to the grand policy of a Charlemagne in preference to the safe but narrower path of a Philip Augustus, were very strong. Their pride summoned them to a splendid rivalry. Their shame forbade them tamely to surrender the glories of a triple crown. They would not abandon one iota of their ancient pretensions, even though they had to pit themselves against the tremendous power of the papacy, and fight the fight out upon a foreign soil. Nor was their ambition entirely unwarranted by their resources. Frederic the First, as he girded himself up for the struggle, had at his command means which might well make him confident of victory without his being foolhardy, and which, at all events, were far too substantial to admit of his shrinking from what in his eyes was only his duty. There was still a prestige about his office which overawed his vassal dukes and kings. "It is always ill fighting against the emperor," was the language of one of them

when pressed to rebel, and doubtless he expressed the general sentiment. The ban of the empire was as solemn a measure and as rigidly enforced as ever. The duke who had trenched closest on an equality with the emperor—Henry the Lion—was utterly ruined and put to shame when Barbarossa was at last provoked out of his forbearance. In default of an overwhelming superiority on the part of the crown, there was no stronger support for it than the feuds of the nobility. Collectively they could keep the imperial power in check, but there was less scope for united opposition to one of themselves, unless they were under the imperial leadership. Besides this spontaneous obedience of their subjects, the emperors were as a rule more than a match for any one of them singly. Lombardy was still their *regnum proprium*. They were still in possession of many domains over the whole extent of their empire. Their immediate vassals were still numerous. The gratitude of the free towns of Germany would supply them with men and money in lieu of imperial charters. Their purse was filled by tribute from the half-conquered Slavonic tribes on the north-east, and by various tolls and taxes in the empire. If their feudal army grew weary of a campaign, they were generally rich enough to bribe it to prolong its service, or to supply its place by mercenaries. They could allure adventurers by their right to create titles. They could summon the Diet at pleasure, and whether or not they could act without its consent in important measures, such as the declaration of war or the filling up of fiefs, they could at all events largely influence its decision. Proud of such strength, confident in their own ability, the Suabian monarchs, while struggling to make their power in Germany despotic, refused to adopt the only policy by which they could have succeeded—that of rigid non-intervention in the affairs of Italy. But such a policy they would have regarded as treason to their name.

There had always been in Italy some influence adverse to the emperors which had taxed their energies to the utmost. The Othos, besides their struggles in the South, where one had been defeated by the Saracens, and another had died, had been bearded by the single state of Rome, which was still tenacious of its departed glory, and aspired to give Italy a king. As the pretensions of the city receded into the background of the pretensions of the papacy, the Lombard states caught up the mantle of rebellion. While the popes were striving against the Franconian Henrys, they either sided with the emperor, or, taking advantage of the revolt of his German vassals, defied his control. And thus unchecked, and almost without notice, they were rapidly advancing in power and wealth. And now as the

emperors marched down the Alps into Lombardy, they entered an atmosphere foreign and fatal to their nature. As the heads of Christendom, their pretensions jarred with those of the papacy. As the heads of Feudalism, their authority was set at nought by the mushroom republics. In Germany, the free towns, which had grown up and prospered under the shadow of the throne, were uniformly ranged on the imperial side. Their inhabitants dating as a body their origin to Henry the Fowler, and their civic freedom to the Emperors Henry the Fourth and Henry the Fifth, were well contented with a government from which they received nothing but favours. Their phlegmatic German temperament had not yet been roused to take any part in politics except when their own interest or that of their friends the emperors was threatened by their foes the feudal nobles. In Italy the case was different. Feudalism, dominant elsewhere, had there been outstripped by Democracy. None of the various conquerors of Italy had been left in undisturbed possession, and a feudal nobility had never had time to establish itself. On the other hand, the municipal system of Rome maintained all along a precarious existence. Strengthened by Charlemagne's alliance with them against the Lombards, the towns continued to be the chief local centres of strength. Gradually they absorbed the remnants of their conquerors, and the barbaric spirit of independence, without losing in intensity, took a republican instead of a feudal shape. Hence the precocious development of democracy, with its fierce political partisanship, its intestine discord, and its defiant attitude towards the emperors. If the emperors could have allied themselves with the Italian towns against the popes, as they were allied with the German towns against the feudal nobles, they might have possibly triumphed over both. Courad the Third was actually invited by the Roman Republic to realize the dream of Otho, and with Rome as his capital, to put an end to the secular dominion of the papacy. And it was in the same spirit that the demagogue Rienzi and the poet Petrarch subsequently summoned Charles the Fourth to Rome. But the emperors shrank aghast at the thought of leaguings themselves with a spirit which was as much opposed to their own power as to the papacy; and the two rivals suspended for a time their hostility, in order to crush the common enemy, Arnold of Brescia. But, this peril surmounted, the unnatural compact was soon dissolved, and the emperors were left to struggle single-handed against three formidable foes—against feudal anarchy, papal jealousy, and democratic insubordination. There was indeed no innate hatred to the emperors in the republics any more than there was any innate attachment to them. In the days of Gregory the Seventh, the Lombard towns were hot par-

tisans of Henry the Fourth. And, a century and a-half later, swayed solely by their interest or individual antipathies, they constantly changed sides, sometimes calling themselves Ghibelline, sometimes Guelph. Milan, the arch-conspirator against the imperial authority, sided with Otho the Fourth against the pope. By a less just, and a more selfish policy, Frederic Barbarossa might perhaps have played off his temporal against his spiritual foes. But he was not the man to be content with that nominal authority which the republics did not dispute. His stern punishment of Milan for its cruel oppression of Lodi, ending as it did in the Lombard league and the battle of Legnano, struck a mortal blow at imperial power in Italy. Though himself nominally reconciled with Milan, he left a legacy of ill-will to his grandson Frederic II., and the wars which ensued at once broke the power of the House of Suabia, aggrandized its adversaries the popes, and irretrievably widened the breach between Italy and Germany.

Such then was the emperor's situation with regard to his vassals, and the free towns on both sides of the Alps. We may now consider in detail the causes and consequences of the great controversy with the papacy.

Imperialism, sorely harassed though it might be by the republican spirit, found in Italy the focus of a still more bitter animosity. The republics were troublesome subjects; but the popes were dangerous rivals. The animosity between popes and emperors was made the more implacable by the consciousness of identity, to a great extent, of origin and aim. Both boasted of a high antiquity, the one pluming itself as the heir of the title, the other on its possession of the metropolis of the old Roman Empire. "For peace one must rule. Mankind is most like God when under a monarchy. An universal monarchy is absolutely necessary for the welfare of the world." Such was the language of the imperialist Dante. "Yes," retorted the Guelphs, "and the monarchy most like the monarchy of God is the monarchy of God's vicegerent. As the sun is to the moon, so is the papacy to the empire. The empire is but the sword of the church." Each, in short, with indefinite pretensions, aimed at infinite power, and each in its struggle to scale the summit of universal dominion, recognised the other as the lion lying in its path. To attain the same end they adopted different means. The popes relied chiefly on spiritual, the emperors on temporal weapons. If the one challenged veneration as the successor of St. Peter, the other pointed to a long line of predecessors, to one of whom St. Peter himself by his Master's command had paid the tribute-money. If the one rewarded its adherents with fiefs and titles, the champions of the other were rewarded by the assu-

rance that they were earning for themselves hereafter exemption from the pains of hell. If the one tried to bridle the lawlessness of feudalism, to substitute legal decisions for appeals to the sword, the other appropriated the idea, clothed it with a more imposing name, and proclaimed "The truce of God." If the one subdued the barbarians with the sword of the flesh, the other despatched its missionaries on the same errand girt with the sword of the spirit. Their rivalry in the West was repeated in the East. While the successors of Augustus intrigued for the incorporation of Constantinople with the second Roman Empire, it was the ruling passion with each successive pope that the healing of the schism between Greek and Latin Christianity should be identified with his name. If the emperor's supremacy were anywhere unquestioned, it might have been supposed to be so in a war against his hereditary foes, the infidels. Yet the arm of the church stretched to the Holy City and thwarted him even when he was fighting for the Cross. And if he chafed at a treatment which degraded him to the rank of a mere papal lieutenant, he might find himself, as Frederic the Second did, while the captain of a crusade abroad, the proscribed object of one at home. To the pretensions of the emperors to a supremacy over all earthly kings, the popes replied by the still more arrogant assumption that the crowns of kings and emperors alike were theirs to give and theirs to take away. The emperors might arbitrate at the option of other potentates, but the popes excommunicated at their own option. The terrors of the imperial ban paled by those of the papal interdict. One gleam of hope shone on the imperial cause at the beginning of the twelfth century, but it was soon dispelled. The emperors, hailing the revival of jurisprudence as a counterpoise to sacerdotalism, thought by means of it to strike their adversary a fatal blow. But the other snatched his shield from the same armoury. The civilian was followed by the monk, Irnerius of Bologna by Gratian of Bologna. The civil law might favour the emperor, but the keynote of the canon law was the autocracy of the pope. And thus at every point the pontiffs met their competitor on his own ground, and there foiled him by a grander audacity or outbid him by a larger munificence. The prize they struggled for was in truth splendid enough to excuse the keenest rivalry. It was nothing less than the reorganization of society with the conqueror enthroned on its summit. Imperialism had had its day. The papacy was to supersede it. But already the progress of the latter was looked upon with suspicion, and when the Suabian emperors came into collision with it, they fought in the van of a line of kings and nobles who were part of the same army, though their forces came later into the field.

In the ninth century, the power of the papacy was wholly spiritual. When an emperor marched on Rome to chastise the pontiff's contumacy, he met with no show of resistance, but with a parade of sacred ceremonies and solemn anthems, until he shrank appalled from the sacrilege he had been about to commit. But in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, instead of its previously slow and cautious progress, it advanced with alarming strides. From the time of Gregory the Great to the time of Charlemagne, its efforts had been directed to the establishment of its primacy and metropolitan jurisdiction over the whole church. But even after it had obtained high authority as the chief antagonist of Iconoclasm and Islamism, and as the *protégée* of Charlemagne, an authority which was indefinitely increased by the False Decretals, it found this no easy task. The French bishops of Louis le Débonnaire retorted on the pope, who menaced them with his thunders if they persisted in their loyalty, by a counter-threat of excommunication—"Si excommunicatus venerit, excommunicatus abibit." Already had one bold voice, that of Claudius of Turin, broached the heretical doctrine that the apostolical power of St. Peter ceased with St. Peter. Nevertheless the papal pretensions became more and more overweening during the later Carlovingsians, till they almost anticipated the daring aggressions made on the crown in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. During the tenth century, the pontiffs were men of worthless character personally; their power was crippled by the progress of feudalism, and the Hungarian and Saxon invasions; and they found it their interest to take shelter again under the wing of the empire. The Othos, if they did not pretend to dictate on theological tenets as Charlemagne had done, were, at all events, ecclesiastically as well as civilly supreme at Rome. From the time of Otho the Great, the nomination of the popes and confirmation of their election was the established imperial prerogative, and in the middle of the eleventh century three popes in succession were actually appointed by Henry the Third. Even Hildebrand refused to assume the tiara till Henry the Fourth had ratified the cardinals' choice. But he soon threw aside the mask of moderation. The reformation of the church was followed by the successful excommunication of the emperor, and the disappearance of the imperial stamp from the Roman coinage, together with the abandonment of imperial interference in the papal election, marked the reversed position of the two parties. Then came the era of the crusades, and along with it the immense aggrandizement of the clergy generally, and the papacy in particular. The violence of Henry the Fifth only injured his own cause. French influence began to preponderate over German

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influence at Rome. And finally, at the election of Lothaire, it is no longer the imperial sanction which is considered requisite to the election of the pope, but the papal sanction to the election of the emperor.

It does not require a minute analysis of the technical points in dispute between the Church on the one side and the Franco-German and Saxon dynasties on the other, in order clearly to understand their general tenour. The Church is by this time clearly taking the offensive. The Crown stands on the defensive. And it is emphatically a struggle between the Church and the Crown, and not between individual popes and emperors. A Ghibelline cardinal is transformed into the most inflexible anti-imperialist, almost ere he is well seated in St. Peter's chair. A Guelph candidate for the throne has scarcely obtained it before he turns on his former patron and ally, the pope. The standing quarrel about investitures, and the disputed minutiae of etiquette, such as the holding of the stirrup and the kiss of peace, are only important as signs of the double policy which led first to the papal success, and subsequently to the papal downfall. As the champions of the independence of the clergy, the popes merited the gratitude of Europe. In an age when physical force was the only familiar deity, when the nobles were mere bandits, and when war was the normal state of society, we can only praise an institution which acted as a counterpoise to such anarchical tendencies, which afforded protection to the oppressed of both sexes, and bound their oppressors in moral chains, which gave a strong stimulus to intellectual progress, and impartially raised men of the humblest origin to the proudest honours which it was able to bestow. The imperial, regal, and republican systems had proved incapable of the same influence. The barons as yet defied the king, the republics preyed upon one another, and in vain did the unfortunate commonalty implore the emperor to crush their hard taskmasters the nobles. The constant exercise of physical force made his moral influence too feeble. But now a new power had risen up. The spiritual supremacy of the papacy was both a wise and beneficent idea. Even as its pretensions became exorbitant, there was a noble element in them which attracted hosts of adherents. To depose kings if kings were tyrants, to force peace on a country if it were being ruined by civil war, to wring from the superstition of brutal nobles the means for the spread of learning, would have been actions admirable in themselves, if a superhuman purity could have been guaranteed in the agent. But the overbearing and headstrong conduct of otherwise estimable men like Gregory the Seventh, Innocent the Third, and Gregory the Ninth, proved such indispensable perfection to

be merely ideal. Those worldly spirits disdained a merely ethical dominion. Theirs was the dream of Charlemagne over again, only now it was the spiritual power in the ascendant, struggling to absorb the temporal power; whereas with him it was the temporal power trying to absorb the spiritual. In its new rôle, the papacy contracted in an aggravated form the vices which it was its avowed object to suppress. A rapacity worse than feudal, a tyranny and immorality worse than regal, a simony more shameless than the imperial simony, stained its representatives. It would not relinquish its professions of protecting the oppressed, but they excited only derision, as coming from an exorbitant and intolerant despotism. Its first encroachment had been on the hierarchy, and then it had the emperors as its allies. Triumphant over its own class, it turned its united and organized forces against the crown. Again it triumphed, but the very brilliance of its success woke up Europe to its true character. Intoxicated by its past achievements, it little dreamt that after coercing bishops, kings, and emperors, it would be baffled by the lay nobility, and that gradually even the foreign clergy would be alienated from its avaricious and oppressive sway. Even before it reached the acmé of its influence, there were ominous signs of future rebellion. The barons of England and the saintly King of France united in condemnation of Gregory's implacability towards Frederic the Second. Its decay dates from the thirteenth century. The abandonment of the imperial city was followed by sixty years of schism: At the close of the fifteenth century, it had lost the regard of the people and its own self-respect. The disposal of it by councils robbed it of the charm of infallibility. Kings were learning to league with the laity against its delegates. Sedition was rife among its once fanatical champions, the mendicant friars. The gross immorality and cupidity of the friars themselves broke its moral prestige, and excited an universal scorn and detestation which found vent in the sarcasms or invective of a Valla, a Reuchlin, an Erasmus, and a Von Hutten. Lastly, intellectual activity produced a recoil from its superstition, and the final blow was struck at its mental despotism by the Reformation.

With the Reformation also ceases the importance of the Empire. Till then it represented, in common with its rival the Papacy, the ideas of the Past. In some degree they both anticipated the ideas of the Future. In the pursuit of a similar end, they both fell into the same snare. The mistake of Charlemagne was the mistake of Innocent the Third and Gregory the Ninth. All of them discerned one requisite of society—moral unity. Charlemagne, misled by the specious systems of antiquity, thought that this unity could be obtained by vesting

temporal and religious supremacy in a single hand. But as the spiritual element was subordinate, the secular predominated in his scheme, his empire soon came into competition with other forms of government, with a proportionate declension from his ideal. The papal authority, on the contrary, as long as it confined itself within its special limits, was not vulgarized by entering the lists as the rival of any other power of its own type. But as it grasped at temporal dominion, it lost this advantage, and, like the empire, failed in its object. Both tried to fill up a confessed void in society, but each by a cramped and narrow action. They tried to produce a moral effect by mechanical means. The world was to be regulated by the machinery of a despotism. The empire struggled against the anarchical tendencies of feudalism and barbarism, and was gradually replaced by the papacy in the same functions. As society passed into a new phase, both systems became inadequate to its new wants. With the emancipation of the human mind by the Reformation, there came a period of intellectual anarchy, answering to the social anarchy of feudalism. Out of this anarchy rose, and is still rising, the only, it may be, possible form of unity, of which both the papacy and the empire were imperfect foreshadowings, the unity of public opinion.

No greater error can be committed than to regard the Reformation as a purely religious movement. It was the epoch of universal revolution—revolution political, social, and intellectual, no less than religious. It is important as the principal outbreak of a cloud which had long been gathering—as the first shock of that recoil from centuries of stagnation, the full effects of which we ourselves have perhaps not yet witnessed. It is true that its immediate violence was chiefly felt by the papacy, but it was only because the papacy had dethroned the empire, and remained the centre of all those hated associations in antipathy to which the very spirit of the Reformation was evoked. But in striking at the papacy it struck at the empire too. The former staggered beneath the mortal blow, but still possessed strength enough indefinitely to protract its fall. The latter, which was crumbling already in natural decay, was at once annihilated. There had been many heralds of the approaching storm—many signs that the efficacy of that great idea of the centralization of all authority in one person, which had been omnipotent for so many centuries, was at last worn out; and bitterly though the emperors and pontiffs had hated one another, their sagacity always united them in persecution of the common foe. Barbarossa and Adrian forgot their animosity for a while as they gazed on the fires which consumed Arnold of Brescia, at once an innovator in politics and a heretic in religion. Not heresy merely

or chiefly, but the unflinching anti-monarchical audacity of John Huss, induced Sigismund to play the traitor to his own honour. Wickliffe and the Commons, Luther and the peasants, were fighting against what appeared to them a beast with two heads. Luther, indeed, turned against the peasants, but his writings were their watchword. "Il faut convenir," says a French historian, "aussi que les écrits de Luther y avaient contribué ; car comme ils étaient extrêmement injurieux aux évêques et au clergé, qu'ils s'opposaient à la réformation, ils enflammaient la haine des peuples contre leurs souverains, ecclésiastiques et séculiers." The fortunes of the two powers were as inseparable during the last two centuries before the Reformation as previously they had been irreconcilably hostile. "One cannot be attacked without attacking the other," said Zwingli, the Swiss reformer. The language of Nicholas von Kus, an opponent of the papacy on different grounds, is very similar. It was impossible to improve the Church, he said, without reforming the Empire, since it was impossible to sever them even in thought. Æneas Silvius sagaciously discerned the signs of the times. "The emperor stood in need of the pope, and the pope of the emperor. The chiefs must ally against the multitude." That last sentence is most suggestive. We see no more two lordly antagonists brushing away disdainfully all minor questions in order to contend for the empire of the world. Pope and Pagan had already well nigh sunk into the imbecility of the cave by the highway. A feeble but desperate effort was made by them in common in 1466 to work once more on a threadbare sentiment. They proclaimed an universal tax for a new crusade and a public peace. The attempt betrays at once the secret of their weakness and the secret of their fellow-feeling. Individual popes might still quarrel with individual emperors, but the last emperor excommunicated was Louis of Bavaria, in 1320 ; and the ludicrous vehemence of the anathema displays the weakness of him who launched it. The paramount characteristic of the two succeeding centuries is the league of the two decrepit systems forced by common fears to unite in staving off a common doom. This instructive consciousness of mutual interests was the chief incentive to union, but there was still enough of the semblance of power resident in the emperors to make their alliance valuable. It is important to discriminate between the fortuitous weakness in which the empire was involved at the death of Frederic the Second, and the final extinction of the spirit which was its life in the age of Charles the Fifth. The fate of imperialism was not bound up with the fate of any single dynasty. The truth is that it was already in decay during Frederic's life ; and though its pomp was never greater than at the Diet of Mayence, the

canker was already gnawing at its heart, and ten years later it received a warning of its coming fate at the Council of Lyons. But that decay was greatly precipitated by what may be fairly called an accident—the premature death, first of Frederic and then of his son Conrad. Thus much we may be sure of from the importance of the emperors even subsequent to those twenty disastrous years. Any able emperor, strong in those vague pretensions on which his ancestors had always relied, could still make himself respected even by the proudest sovereigns of England and France. When Sigismund came to England in 1416 it was thought necessary to demand a disclaimer of all superiority over as powerful a king as Henry the Fifth, before he was permitted to land. And, strange though it may appear to us, it passed for flattery with the haughty Henry the Eighth to be assured that he was an independent king and not an imperial vassal. When the Kings of France were crowned at Rheims they still swore obedience to the Roman Empire; and on the accession of Frederic the Third, the King of Poland wrote to congratulate him on “receiving the diadem of the monarchy of the world.” Even so late as the year 1599, the University of Saragossa could gravely debate whether the emperor was or was not the sovereign of the whole world. When such language as the Ghibellines used in the time of Frederic the Second could be used without exciting derision, it proved that the sentiment in favour of imperialism was still too strong in Europe to be easily or utterly forgotten; and showed, moreover, how that sentiment had lain at the base of imperial power. “God Almighty,” they said, “seeing by Adam’s fall that mankind would abuse free will, and would become involved in the midst of contentions, set up the Holy Roman Empire, that its Lord, like a God upon earth, might rule kings and nations, and maintain peace and justice,” &c. Other signs that the spell which Rome had cast over the world was yet unbroken were numerous. While Dante consigns popes and kings to an impartial doom, he seems to be overawed by the mysterious and immemorial majesty of the imperial name, so that once only, and then in a single line, does he venture to condemn an emperor by name as sharing a similar fate. Henry of Luxembourg, Louis of Bavaria, Charles the Fourth, Sigismund, and Frederic the Third, were all the true descendants of the old Cæsars, as far as they could be made so by the splendid pageantry of a Roman coronation. For one brief moment, one of them, Sigismund, seemed to stand forth at the Council of Constance as the avenger of his Hohenstaufen predecessors. The position of the papacy and the empire was once again reversed, the pope being the object of contempt and ignominy, the emperor appearing as the champion.

of the faith, and, amid the rivalry of France and England, once more "the greatest monarch in Christendom." Such was the deference still shown to the empire in Europe. In the empire itself the emperor was long regarded as a kind of living guarantee for the rights of property. What a title is to us when we purchase a house, that was each successive emperor's confirmation of their duties to the German nobles. They could not divest themselves of the idea graven upon their minds by custom that the imperial authority was the one saving link which prevented all society from falling into dissolution. "Take away from us the rights of the emperors," says a law-book of the second half of the fifteenth century, "and who can say, this house is mine, this village is mine?"

But though the emperors still possessed the shadow of their past magnificence, there is no mistaking the altered character of their power after the death of Frederic the Second. That sudden alteration we may indeed consider to have been fortuitous, for had Frederic lived he might have crushed the second Anti-Cæsar as he had crushed the first, and Italy might not have been invaded by Charles of Anjou. In that case the fall of the empire might have been for some time protracted. But as a fact, its immediate and precipitate decline is undeniable. Italy and Germany were practically severed asunder after the battle of Beneventum; and the disputed succession and the interregnum in the empire weakened it, just as the residence at Avignon and the Great Schism weakened the papacy. Henceforth if the emperor became the ally of England, it was, practically, as an equal ally, even though the English king might from policy submit to be called the Imperial Vicar. If he dominated over France or the papacy, it was by taking advantage of internal dissensions or by a long course of intrigue. France and England were united, each under a single sovereign. Germany, on the contrary, was governed by two hundred independent princes. The Golden Bull of Charles the Fourth marks the final triumph of the aristocracy over the crown. That crown was no longer permitted to be handed down from father to son. It became the temporary prize of rival houses, each of which was in turn played off against the other by the all-powerful electors. Gradually almost the entire executive authority passed from the sovereign's hands, so that the latter did not think it worth while even to reside within the empire's limits. This was literally the case with Albert the Second and Frederic the Third; and one of the emperors, Wenceslas, was long a prisoner in Bohemia, without it being even known in Germany. It was no longer the emperor who drove back the barbarians eastwards, or led the empire's armies. In Sigismund's reign the war against the Hus-

sites and Bohemians was conducted, not by the emperor, but by the electors. The Teutonic order was left alone and unaided to struggle against and be despoiled by the King of Poland. Belgrade was relieved by Hunniades. Vienna might have surrendered to the Turks for all the help that Charles the Fifth vouchsafed it. Dynastic selfishness had uprooted from the emperors' hearts all sense of the imperial duties. The House of Burgundy encroached on the western frontier till the empire extended, not to the Scheldt as of old, but only to the right bank of the Rhine. On the south, Switzerland slowly and reluctantly seceded. Maximilian was compelled to call the Swiss "kinsmen" instead of subjects of the empire, and to pay their contingent as a mercenary force. The free towns, conscious that they were without a master, vied with the nobles in bold assertion of their independence. Even before the close of the thirteenth century they had been admitted as constituent members of the Diet. And thus, as the two representatives of centralized authority, the pope and the emperor, joined their forces, all around them was anarchy or liberty predominant. Imperialism under different forms had been on its trial for fifteen centuries, when, at the Reformation, it was found hopelessly to have broken down. The universal sentiment found a mouthpiece in a single monk, and at once, as by an enchanter's wand, the worn but still stately fabric crumbled away. Religious despotism was still to maintain a doubtful conflict with the new doctrine, but its pretensions were henceforth only religious pretensions, and its weapons only religious weapons. If it still meddled in international politics it was as a spiritual power making the superstition of its devotees an engine against heresy. It is true, that during the rest of the fifteenth century the papacy showed some of its pristine vigour. But the institution of the Jesuits, to which it owed its renewed vitality, is in reality the clearest index of its effete condition. In condescending to argue, even through the mouth of Bellarmine, it confessed its abandonment of that haughty spirit in which it had claimed an irresponsible, infallible, indefeasible authority. If in a moment of passion or despair it had recourse to its old weapons, excommunication and deposition, it was only to find, as in the case of Henry the Eighth and Elizabeth, how blunted they were become. In so far as it was imperial, the papacy was utterly destroyed. The lofty eminence, whether papal or imperial, whence, as in a serener air, arbitration had been dispensed with theoretical impartiality among inferior princes, became the mere rallying point of a faction. The feudal ties were dissolved, and religious ties took their place, at once overriding all other bonds, whether national or geographical. The old religion remained dominant in France. The new was established in Eng-

land. But Germany was divided against itself, each creed being supported by numerous partisans. Nor was it only one of the antagonists of the empire which was involved in its ruin. Political power was no longer evenly parcelled out in Germany among four or five duchies. If imperialism had perished, its ancient foe the feudal oligarchy had perished with it. That feudal oligarchy was now supplanted by a numerous hereditary aristocracy. The old houses were losing their territories, which were either broken up into infinite subdivisions, or reunited under some hitherto insignificant family. It is not therefore a merely fanciful date which we have assigned to the close of the imperial system. Its rise had been contemporaneous with the rise of feudalism, and now they both perished together. The Church had rivalled it and headed it in the race, and now the Church too had fallen from its high estate. Torn by religious dissensions, by the feuds of a hundred petty dynasties, by the open insubordination of its towns, the empire was no more. In an old book, published in the seventeenth century, entitled "A Discourse of the Empire and of the Election of a King of the Romans the greatest Business now in Agitation," its author, Howell, thus writes:—"But indeed it may be wondred ther shold be any ambition at all of aspiring to the Roman German Empire, *in statu quo nunc*, it being but an ayrie bare shadowy title or a skeleton of the old Roman Monarchy. Therefore a late German Author confesseth, 'Quod nobis est magnum politicum momentum, externis est magnum deridiculum.'" Truly the sceptre had departed from Germany.

At the Reformation, the emperors had long lost their actual authority. Even the old ceremonies had passed into desuetude. The last emperor crowned at Rome was Frederic the Third. Maximilian's policy might seem imperial, but it was really only devotion to his house. "If I were Duke of Austria," he said, "I should be thought something of; as emperor, I am nothing." We may look on Charles the Fifth in a double light, either as the last of the old or the first of the modern emperors. The latter seems the truest estimate, though, in one sense, he was not a German emperor at all. His ambition, if vast enough to be called imperial, was wholly personal. He was not born on German soil. He could not speak the German tongue. The German empire was but a unit in another empire—that empire of many crowns, concentrated by his fortune or wisdom in himself. The traditional imperialism of the past had died out, only to be rekindled in the breasts of men of one idea, like Joseph the Second. It would be a mere perversity to insist on the existence of an institution merely because it lingered on in Germany. In pointing out how long its nominal supremacy

survived its real power in Europe, we purposely adduced proofs almost solely from foreign countries. German pretensions would be of little importance. The material point is, to decide how long such pretensions were recognised through Europe. It was naturally hard for Germans to forget the past, while the House of Austria, in its ambition and well nigh in its power, remained to keep alive among them their old memories. Among them, at least, the fiction of imperial unity retained credit to the last. In the war between France and Austria, in 1794, we find the King of Prussia threatening to withdraw his contingent from the German army, with the exception of the force which he contributed as a Prince of the Empire. And even after the empire's formal abolition, in accordance with Napoleon's wish, the now unmeaning name of Elector had still such fascination for the Prince of Hesse that he could obstinately refuse to exchange it for the more sounding title of Grand Duke.

But, in Europe generally, as the *de facto* power of the empire ceased with Frederic the Second, so its *de jure* power ceased with the Reformation. Down to that time, the most inveterate, the most universal of political ideas had been the supremacy of a single power. The sentiment no less indelibly ingrained on the minds of modern politicians, the very antipodes of the other, is the balance of power, which sprang up in the sixteenth century. An interesting comparison might be drawn between these two ideas, which may almost be said to have formed the main-spring of politics for two thousand years. However we may regard the reign of Charles the Fifth, after his reign, at all events, the Holy Roman Empire is truly described in the sarcasm of Voltaire. It was an enormous lie, containing nothing Holy, nothing Roman, nothing Imperial. The old dream of the world being united politically and morally under one headship was again dissipated. It had lost its popularity, that old tradition of one faith, one realm, one emperor. Some faint relics of fellow-feeling might still from time to time appear, to remind men of the past unity of Western Europe; but the great features of the next age are rival kingdoms and rival religions. Individual kings might still strive to erect an universal monarchy, but the ambitious bigot, or the selfish conqueror, met with no other approval, as he consulted no other interest than his own. In vain had Dante, in words of gloomy fire, adjured the emperors to assume their birthright. In vain had Petrarch tuned his song to the same strain. In vain had the Othos conquered the popes, in vain had the popes conquered the Hohenstaufen, in vain had pope and emperor at last united; the dream of Charlemagne, of the Othos, of the Frederics, of Hildebrand, of Innocent, of Gregory the Ninth, of Henry of Luxembourg, and of the

great Italian poets, was for ever past realization. The old order of things was changed, and no genius, practical or intellectual, could avert the dawning of the new day. A new empire, with no traditions, was to lord it for a time in Spain. Then came the French empire, and with it the humiliation of Germany before the Grand Monarque. Finally, in the latest phase of empire, the popular empire of Napoleon, the world witnessed unmoved the abolition of what had long been an idle name.

In thus expressing some of our own views on a most interesting subject, we perhaps owe an apology to our readers for not introducing them to more of Mr. Bryce's treatment of it. It would have been impossible however, without occupying the whole of our space, to have entered minutely into questions on which we might have dissented from his views, and we have preferred to take a bird's-eye glance at the whole subject; or, perhaps, we should say the whole of half of the subject, for of the Eastern empire we have been compelled to omit all mention. Mr. Bryce, too, has devoted to it but scant limits. Yet it played an important part in the history of modern civilization, and is most intimately connected with the Western empire, as well by ties of destiny as of descent. M. Amédée Thierry has some suggestive remarks on this point.

"Quand les Huns," he says, "eurent balayé vers l'ouest et le midi, la partie la plus intelligente des nations teutoniques, le nord-est de l'Europe ne fut plus qu'une annexe de l'Asie, le domaine incontesté d'une barbarie qui repoussait la civilisation, et que celle-ci repoussait à son tour. Constantinople eut à combattre successivement sur le Danube trois dominations asiatiques redoutables, même après celles des Huns: les Avars, les Hongrois, et les Mongols; tandis que le fanatisme Mahométan déchaînait sur les provinces grecques d'Asie, l'Arabie, la Perse et les tribus du Turkestan. Le christianisme, attaqué en Asie par l'islamisme, en Europe par le chamanisme, s'identifia de plus en plus avec la civilisation et prolongea autour de la Rome de Constantin la durée de l'unité romaine. La part de l'empire byzantin dans ces nobles et saintes luttes fut la plus héroïque peut-être; et lorsque enfin au bout de neuf siècles de combats, il acheva de périr sous les coups d'un peuple dont les ancêtres figuraient dans les bandes d'Attila, il remit aux nations latines, dégagées alors des entraves du moyen âge, le dépôt des lettres et des sciences religieusement préservé; son dernier souffle fut comme une nouvelle âme qui vint vivifier l'Occident."

In our remarks we may have possibly incurred the stigma affixed by Mr. Bryce on those who presume to "analyse" a system like the papacy, "to enumerate and measure the forces that moved it, and give in conclusion a sort of tabular view of its results for good and for evil." We confess that we think this an unfortunate sentence. Anyone who should refrain from

analysing such a system, and trying to measure the forces that moved it, who should refrain from comparing and weighing in his mind its results for good or evil, should refrain also from turning over another page of history. Mr. Bryce, we imagine, felt a little overwhelmed by his subject when he propounded this maxim, and when he proceeded to pass a verdict on his own essay, which, we are sure, it by no means deserves. "So too," he says, "is the empire above all description or explanation. Something, yet still how little, we should know of it if we knew what were the thoughts of Julius Cæsar when he laid the foundations on which Augustus built; of Charles when he reared the stately pile; of Barbarossa and his grandson when they strove to avert the surely coming ruin." Surely this is just a little extravagant, a trifle peroratory, as we may call it. We yield to none in admiration of Julius Cæsar's extraordinary genius, but his intentions with regard to the empire were not mysteries. Nay, as is well shown by the author we have quoted before, in the fifth chapter of his "*Tableau de l'Empire Romain*," his views were to a great extent the views also of his contemporaries. We cannot conceive how the knowledge of Cæsar's thoughts would throw any light upon, or add to our knowledge of the idea of the Holy Roman Empire. Hero-worship becomes excessive when it exalts prescience of the future in any individual however great, at the expense of the judgment pronounced by history upon the past. That Cæsar would have materially altered the nature of the empire from what it actually was, had he lived longer, we think highly improbable. That he in whom the idea of the new government was just dawning (a government not created by him, but created by a long series of events) should have been able to comprehend its scope and character, better than we who have witnessed its fully developed career, we think impossible. There is nothing conceded in the assumption that we can judge better of work completed than the person who presided over its commencement, because in asserting our superior experience we do not in the least depreciate his superior genius. Any ordinary engineer may, we suppose, be said to know now more of the properties of steam than James Watt did. Standing on the shoulders of past ages we see how far Cæsar's schemes were realized, and we see also why and how far they fell short of perfection. * Facts that are so patent, he who runs may read. If he can write about them so as to inform others, so much the better; and in proportion as he is careful to use "neat phrases," the more likely is what he writes to be worth reading. If we thought it true that the Empire "was above all description or explanation," we should be at a loss to imagine the use or purpose of Mr. Bryce's Essay. But as this

is not our notion, we heartily recommend its perusal to persons who are not curious about the lost thoughts of Cæsar, but are fond of copious information combined with clear analysis and logical deduction.



ART. VI.—THE DOCTRINE OF NATIONALITIES AND
SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN.

1. *Denmark and Germany. Correspondence presented to both Houses of Parliament.* 1863-4.
2. *Protocols of Conferences held in London relative to the Affairs of Denmark. Presented to both Houses of Parliament.* 1864.
3. *Die Nationalitäten-Frage.* Von JOSEPH EÖRVÖS. Uebersetzt von Dr. Max. Falk. Pest. 1865.
4. *Denmark and Germany since 1815.* By C. A. GOSCH. 1862.

IT is remarkable that, with the single exception of the Belgian question, not one of the many questions which have agitated Europe during the past half-century has yet received a definite solution. The Schleswig-Holstein question, the Italian question, the Hungarian question, are still the questions of the day; and although the Eastern and Polish questions have for the moment been set aside, their solution seems to be as distant and as difficult as ever. We think that our modern diplomacy, miserably inefficient as it has often shown itself, is not entirely to blame for this fruitless result of its labours. In the good old days of legitimacy and frequent wars, when populations were transferred from one state to another like cattle, and objected as little to the process, and when a war was the certain result of an unsuccessful negotiation, the diplomatists had comparatively an easy task. But war has now ceased to be the *ultima ratio* in a diplomatic controversy; nations are beginning to find that the disorganization of their commerce and the raising of their taxes are sacrifices which it is not worth making for the mere purpose of supporting their view of a political question against an obstinate adversary, and accordingly it has become quite as often the task of the diplomatist of the present day to back out of a quarrel as to adjust it. This, however, is but a minor difficulty compared with that endless source of confusion and mistakes, the doctrine of nationalities, which has now come to be the recognised panacea

for all political complications. In Italy, in Poland, in Schleswig-Holstein, the right of a nationality to choose its own mode of government—the *selbstbestimmungsrecht* of the Germans—has been more or less universally admitted; and unquestionably this is the principle which should be adopted in the settlement of all matters where the fate of a nationality is involved. But here arises the question, What is a nationality? Is it an aggregation of people of the same race, as in Alsace; or speaking the same language, as in Italy; or possessing a common history, as in Poland; or having marked geographical boundaries, as in Schleswig-Holstein—the sea-embraced? Or is it merely a province, like Savoy, where universal suffrage, tempered by French bayonets, elicits the wish of the people for annexation to a powerful neighbour to which they are neither attached by ties of race, language, history, or geographical affinity? Russia denies the right of Poland to be called a nationality, and claims it for Ruthenia; Austria makes herself the champion of the principle of nationality in Schleswig-Holstein, and remains its bitterest foe in Venetia; Prussia makes war on Denmark because it refuses to give the Duchies a separate administration, and forces German institutions and the German language on the inhabitants of Posen. This principle of nationalities has broken treaties, dissolved alliances, and acquired so great an influence on the destinies of Europe, that a clear idea of its real meaning has become indispensable to the correct appreciation of any continental difficulty.

The well-known Hungarian Liberal leader, M. Eötvös, in his able and interesting essay "on the question of nationalities," defines the idea of nationality as "a consciousness of community, produced in a large number of persons by the same recollections of the past, the same geographical position, and the community of interests and feelings arising from it. Everything that binds society into a whole, and awakes the feeling of community, constitutes a source from which the idea of nationality springs. . . . The feeling of nationality in a people is the same as that of individuality in a man; every political organism, therefore, which feels itself to be a separate whole, is entitled to call itself a nationality." This definition seems to us in the main accurate; but it is put in somewhat too metaphysical a way to have much practical value in its present shape. We should rather define a nationality to be a body of people with strong distinctive national characteristics and an evident tendency to independent political action. Identity of race, language, or religion, does not constitute a nationality: it is only one of the causes which produce the conditions above stated. We should not call the Scotch, nor the

people of the Southern States of America, a nationality; for the first do not fulfil the latter of these conditions, and the second do not fulfil the former. In our own country, although the distinctions of race, religion, and character are strongly marked, there is much less difference, as regards general characteristics, between a Scotchman and a Welshman than there is between either of these types and a member of one of the Continental nations; and there can be no question at all as to the political cohesion between Scotland, England, and Wales, or their unwillingness to be attached to any other nation. The same conditions exist in France, in Italy, in Poland, in Hungary, and in Spain, in all of which countries the feeling of nationality is strong and unmistakable. It is obvious that with this feeling identity of race has had very little to do. In England and France half-a-dozen different races hold so firmly together that it would be mere folly to think of separating them into different "nationalities;" in Poland, the Ruthenians, the Lithuanians, and the Poles proper only the other day fought for political re-union after a century of partition; and even in Italy and Spain it would be very difficult to assign a common race to the populations which in each of those countries combine to form one harmonious and independent political organization. In these days, when even despotic powers seek the approval of public opinion for their acts, the confusion which exists in many people's minds in regard to the words "race" and "nationality" has been cleverly taken advantage of to give a liberal and righteous colour to more than one political crime. Austria has set up Croat against Magyar in Hungary, and the Ruthenians against the so-called Poles (who, however, are by race Ruthenians too,) in Galicia; Russia has pursued a similar policy with terrible effect in Podolia and Volhynia during the late insurrection; and France, ingeniously inverting the process, has forced on the Mexican nationality a rule it detests in pursuance of the principle of the "solidarity" of the Latin races. Such are the political crimes which have been committed in the name of nationality, and they would certainly not have been regarded with such comparative indifference by the liberal opinion of Europe had clearer ideas prevailed on the subject. It is entirely to this confusion of thought in regard to the real meaning of the word that are to be attributed the wide differences of opinion which have been generated among Liberals by the Schleswig-Holstein question. It is known that even our ministers were anything but unanimous in this matter, and some of them did not hesitate to state in Parliament that the question was so complicated that it was impossible to understand it. We shall endeavour, by a careful and impartial review

of the leading facts of the case, to enable our readers to arrive at a more satisfactory conclusion.

The Schleswig-Holstein question was, as is known, originally a question of nationality. Germany—a heterogeneous collection of States differing from each other almost as much in political organization as in size and population, but a powerful and most important nationality nevertheless—first opened this question by claiming the Duchies as a nationality akin to her own, and therefore having a right to be embodied with herself. The development which the feeling of nationality has acquired in the last half century is curiously illustrated by the reluctance which the German Governments at first showed to interfere in the affairs of the Duchies. At the time when Dahlmann, the father of Schleswig-Holsteinism, as he has been called, drew up his famous memoir of the 8th October, 1816, advocating the restoration to the nobles of both Schleswig and Holstein of their class privileges, the idea of nationality was still in its infancy, and there was as yet no thought either in the Duchies or in Germany of separating the former from Denmark on the ground that they constituted a German State. So much was this the case, that when, seven years afterwards, the Holstein nobles claimed from the Diet a constitution in common with that of Schleswig, it rejected the claim, and the Prussian Plenipotentiary made the following important declaration on the occasion :—

“The petitioners wish for the maintenance of a union between the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig by one and the same constitution—a union alleged to have been confirmed in 1816 as an essential portion of the rights enjoyed by the estates of Holstein. But upon the maintenance of this union—apart from all other scruples that might suggest themselves against it—the Federal Diet *cannot exercise any imaginable influence, for this reason*, that the Duchy of Schleswig does not belong to the German federal territories, and, consequently, lies altogether beyond the limits of the influence of the Confederation.”

How both Prussia and the Confederation have changed their opinion on this point we all know. The date of this change may be fixed (at least as regards Germany) at about the time when the national-unity movement began in that country. And it cannot but be confessed that, looking at the question only from the point of view of the nationality doctrine, the Germans had some ground for claiming that Schleswig as well as Holstein should be admitted into the Confederation. Putting out of the question all the puerile discussion about agnates and cognates, which has added so much unnecessary complication to the matter, it is clear that in 1830, whatever may have been the case in past ages, there was a certain administrative connexion*

* This connexion is thus defined in the declaration made by the King of

between Schleswig and Holstein, that the laws and customs of Schleswig were very much more German than Danish, and that the majority of its inhabitants who had any will at all in political matters were for a union with Germany. That the latter result was in a great measure produced by a literary propaganda, pursued by the professors of the German universities with extraordinary energy and persistence, and even sometimes with not too strict a regard for honesty and fairness, is quite true; but the result was there, and it was hardly to be expected that the German nation should ignore it. A circumstance which considerably facilitated the "Germanization," as it has been called, of Schleswig was the close proximity to its frontier of the University of Kiel, which was at that time the head-quarters of the Liberals of Germany, being the only German university where they could express their opinions with freedom. To this university the upper classes in Schleswig, most of whom are of German origin, sent their sons, who returned to their homes full of enthusiasm for the cause of German unity, and naturally did their best to spread their opinions over the whole Duchy. Still more dangerous to the Danish cause in Schleswig were the officials, who, by the law called *biennium universitatis*, were only eligible for their appointments after having resided two years in the University of Kiel, and showed such zeal in carrying out in practice the principles they had imbibed there, that they habitually neglected to fulfil any orders they received from Copenhagen, the tendency of which was to stay the progress of Germanism in Schleswig. A Danish agitation was attempted in the northern part of the Duchy, but its effect was only partial, and it only stimulated the German party to increased efforts.

A very important event in the history of the question was the appearance of the Duke of Augustenburg as a candidate for the sovereignty of the Duchies (1837). In him the German party found an able and unscrupulous leader, eminently qualified by his position and talents to give them the organization and unity of action they wanted. He laboured assiduously to increase the influence and popularity of his party, and the Schleswig Diets at length became so penetrated with Germanism that in 1842 the president forbade a deputy to speak Danish in the assembly, and in 1846 the king was petitioned "to make the administration of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein in its totality

Denmark on the 7th September, 1846:—"Both Duchies have a common public law and common public institutions, a common or similar administration and legislation, and the common *nexus socialis* of the Schleswig-Holstein equestrian corporation."

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separate from that of the kingdom, especially with regard to the finances and the War Department, and to arrange for the Duchies a common administration for these affairs." This petition was refused, and was followed by the letters patent of July 8, 1846, in which the king protested against both the Augustenburg pretensions and the doctrine of the union of Schleswig and Holstein. The Danish Government being now thoroughly alarmed, began a very mild opposition against the German agitation, which culminated in the decree of the 28th January, 1848. By this decree the new king (Frederick VII.) established a common representation for the whole of Denmark, including both Schleswig and Holstein, but at the same time maintained the provincial diets which the Duchies enjoyed in common with other parts of the monarchy. The arrangement thus effected was somewhat similar to that afterwards introduced by Herr von Schmerling's centralization ministry in Austria, and was as little liked in the Duchies as the *Reichsrath* was in Hungary and Galicia. It came at a time, too, when revolution was in the air; and the insurrections of February in Paris and Germany were followed by one in the Duchies in March. On the 24th of March the king announced his intention to make Holstein an independent federal state with an independent constitution, but adhered to his previous decision as regards Schleswig. It was too late, however, to make half-concessions, for the insurrection had already begun. The Danish troops then entered Schleswig, and the insurrectionary government appealed to Germany for assistance. At that time the ruling power in Germany was the revolutionary *Vorparlament*, which at once proclaimed both the Duchies to be German territory. More substantial was the assistance given by Prussia, which, as the "mediating" power, sent 13,000 men into the Duchies, with the avowed object of annexing Schleswig to the Confederation. A desultory contest ensued, which lasted three years, and was finally closed by the intervention of the Great Powers of Europe.

Of all the popular insurrections that the world has yet seen, there has not been one where the leaders on the national side acted with such utter baseness and duplicity, or where the Government attacked had given so little cause for the extreme animosity of its opponents, as the Schleswig-Holstein insurrection of 1848. It is, indeed, impossible to go through the history of the German agitation in the Duchies without feeling a strong sympathy for Denmark, although, if we hold to the doctrine of nationality, we cannot acknowledge that she was justified in opposing the strongly-expressed wishes of the people of Schleswig and Holstein, whose national characteristics differed from her own in so many important points, for a distinct autonomy and

administrative union among themselves. Never before was a Government so innocently unfortunate, or a struggling nationality so little oppressed. The extraordinary partiality of the Danish monarchs for that race of German professors which was afterwards to be the chief cause of the dismemberment of their kingdom; the accession of King Frederick VI. to the German Confederation as Duke of Holstein, giving the Confederation the right of interfering in the affairs of the Duchy; the continual alterations in the constitution, constantly keeping before the minds of the population of the Duchies their distinct institutions; the law of the *biennium universitatis*, in consequence of which all the officials in the Duchies came from the University of Kiel, the hot-bed of the German agitation; and, finally, the almost incredible blindness of King Christian VIII. to the intrigues of the Duke of Augustenburg, formed a succession of mistakes and misfortunes to which the history of no other country can furnish a parallel. There can be no doubt, too, that the extraordinary mildness and tolerance of the Danish Government considerably facilitated the task of the German agitators; so that Denmark may be said to have suffered through her very virtues. In regard to the popular party in the Duchies, on the other hand, little can be said, except that they gave evidence of a great deal of that attachment to the "Fatherland" which in Germany takes the place of patriotism, and that their agitation among the people was perfectly fair in itself, although the means by which it was conducted were not always unobjectionable. But their cause was stained with indelible disgrace by the miserable intriguing and treachery of the leaders into whose hands they fell. Of these, the ablest and most unscrupulous was the Duke Christian of Augustenburg, brother-in-law of King Frederick VI. The pretensions of this prince to the sovereignty in the Duchies were first given to the world in an anonymous pamphlet published at Halle, in 1837, and written by the duke himself. The question of nationality in the Duchies was thus complicated with a question of succession, and the duke cleverly made use of the popular party as a tool for carrying out his personal views.* Nor was this all: while keeping up a secret correspondence with the German party in the Duchies, and doing their utmost to foment the anti-Danish agitation, the duke and his brother, Prince Frederick of Noër, took advantage of the high position they held at court and the confidence with which they inspired the king, to blind him to what was actually passing in Schleswig

* See the collection of extracts from letters seized in 1848 in the Castle of Augustenburg, published in Wezener's work: *Ueber das Verhältniss der Herzoge von Augustenburg zum Holsteiniischen Aufzuge*. Copenhagen, 1849.

and Holstein, and persuade him of the loyalty of their inhabitants to the Danish throne. The Prince of Noër, who was so much trusted by the king that he obtained from him the important appointment of Commander-in-Chief of the forces in the Duchies, officially reported to his sovereign that the officials and the population in Schleswig and Holstein were more loyal than in Denmark Proper, recommended for advancement the most active promoters of the German agitation, and represented the violent articles in the local press, in favour of a union of the Duchies, as having no real significance; while the Duke of Augustenburg even went so far as to cause a passage in the official speech of the Royal Commissioner to the Schleswig Diet, declaring that Schleswig was under the Danish crown, and which was inserted by the king's special desire, to be omitted when the speech was delivered. It is impossible to explain these facts, all of which appear in official documents, in any other way than that the duke and his brother secured the extraordinary confidence which the king placed in them by the exercise of the basest duplicity and hypocrisy. When the insurrection broke out, the Prince of Noër became a member of the revolutionary government, and his brother practically assumed the direction of the movement. The very first step taken by the agitators was an unworthy manœuvre to give a colour in the eyes of Europe to the insurrection. They sent a deputation, with demands which they knew would not be granted, to the king; but the members of the deputation were delayed at Copenhagen longer than was anticipated, so that the insurrection, which had been some time preparing, broke out before they returned. The Duke of Augustenburg next published the following proclamation, which was purposely so worded as to chime in with the feeling which prevailed among the people of the Duchies at that time, and is therefore a valuable indication of the real sentiments of the population on the question:—

“To the people of Schleswig-Holstein.—The present serious circumstances impose upon me the duty of explaining simply and plainly, before every one of our people, my position with regard to our holy cause. The inimical measures by which the rights of our Duchies have been destroyed, have been forced upon *our King-Duke* by the Danish people. *The King is in the power of the wildly-excited Danes who surround him; his resolutions are not free; others make use of his authority in order to impose upon us unjust laws.* These are not phrases made to save appearances; it is a notorious fact. In this state of things the Provisional Government has formed itself in order to *protect our well-founded rights*, and has in its proclamation expressed the sense and the resolve of our people. I subscribe unconditionally, and without reserve, to this declaration. What we wish completely,

and in honest truth, is the following:—Maintenance of the rights of our country and our people, *as well as those of our hereditary sovereign*, which are conditioned by the former; we intend also intimately and honestly to join the exertions now made for the unity and freedom of Germany, whose history and fate our Duchies will and must share. For this aim I, and all of us, are ready to stake all in our power, to sacrifice goods and blood, and to give up all that man holds most dear. *If, however, our sovereign should again be free, and acknowledge the rights and the nationality of the Duchies* in the sense indicated, and also offer guarantees, then I and all of us would be ready joyfully to support him in the exercise of *his sovereign rights*.—Rendsburg, March 31, 1848. CHRISTIAN AUGUSTUS, Duke of Schleswig-Holstein.”

It is evident that in the above document the duke sought above all to make his cause a popular one, by identifying it with the wishes of the people. He carefully avoids all reference to his personal pretensions; he calls upon the Schleswig-Holsteiners to protect their rights and their nationality, and by an ingenious juggle identifies those rights with the independence of the King of Denmark. This singular piece of political conjuring is, we believe, without a precedent in history. It has been by no means unusual for insurgents, at the commencement of a rebellion, to represent themselves as fighting for a redress of grievances, and not against their sovereign; but the Duke of Augustenburg pushed this sham loyalty so far as to declare that “the king can do no wrong,” and that he has been misled by his advisers. The falsehood of this assertion is so transparent that one cannot but wonder at the eagerness with which it was accepted both by the people of the Duchies and the Liberals of Germany. Even if we could suppose the king to have been so totally blind to his own interests as to desire the union of the two Duchies, and their consequent separation from his kingdom, it is clear from his acts, both before and after the insurrection, that he had never had any such desire. It is true that, when the insurrection began, the cabinet at Copenhagen belonged to the Eider party, whose object was to place the boundary of Denmark at the Eider, and thus effectually to shut out the German agitation; but the decree of January, which was alleged as the ground for the insurrection, was signed two months before that party came into power, and during the whole of the rest of the king’s reign all his acts showed a firm determination to resist the union of the Duchies. It is, of course, possible to explain the king’s conduct by his fear of his Danish subjects, who felt very strongly on the subject of the German agitation; but this explanation would be only admissible on the supposition that he was a most skilful hypocrite, which is very inconsistent with what is known of his character.

Besides the conduct of the Duke of Augustenburg and his brother, the intervention of Prussia in the Duchies was an incident which powerfully contributed to alienate the generous minds of Europe from the Schleswig-Holstein cause. It is natural to take the side of the weaker party in a struggle of which the merits appear doubtful, and in this case Prussia, who, as we have already seen (p. 432), had on a previous occasion strongly denied the right of the Confederation to interfere in the question of the maintenance of the union of the Duchies, was now acting in direct opposition to the principle it then professed. We certainly have no wish to defend the conduct of Prussia, and in strict law perhaps she was not justified in her interference; but we should be sorry to condemn the assistance given to the insurgents in Schleswig-Holstein by their countrymen, so long as there is a Venetia or a Poland to deliver from foreign rule. We will only here observe to what miserable shifts that effete and cumbrous body, the German Confederation, was obliged to have recourse in order to render its new policy compatible with its organization. On the 4th of April it requested Prussia to continue the struggle against Denmark; but being unable by its constitution lawfully to interfere in the affairs of a non-federal state, it made the notable discovery that "there was danger of an attack on the German federal territory of Holstein," and, therefore, called upon Prussia to avert that danger. It went a step further, however, on the 8th. It was now no longer the territory, but the rights, of a German federal territory that were in danger; the right, namely, of Holstein to be united to Schleswig. In order to secure this right, Prussia was requested to force Denmark to evacuate the Duchies, and to exert herself, as much as possible, in obtaining the accession of Schleswig to the Confederation. At the same time the Diet acknowledged the Provisional Government as acting for the King of Denmark, who was still supposed to be morally tied hand and foot by the Eider party. This pleasant fiction was afterwards abandoned by the Diet, but Prussia has continued it in a new shape adapted to the change of circumstances—refusing to acknowledge the right of the Duchies to independence on the ground that they are the property of the King of Denmark, and afterwards depriving him of them for her own benefit.

It is impossible not to feel intense disgust at the chicanery and intrigue which characterized the conduct of Germany at this period. At the same time we should not forget that it was not the German people who were the actors in the drama, but Prussia and the petty princes of the Confederation. The cause was, no doubt, that of the German people; but it was taken out of their hands by their reactionary sovereigns, who were really

quite indifferent as to what became of Schleswig-Holstein, and only took up the matter to cheat their subjects out of their liberties by helping them to run after the shadow of an extension of German territory. It is in this that lies the true explanation of the baseness and deceit which were displayed on the German side, and we need not be surprised to find that the means were as unworthy as the end. To the remonstrances of England and Russia against the occupation of Schleswig by the Prussian troops, the cabinet of Berlin replied, as it did last year, that it was not its intention to deprive the King of Denmark of the Duchy, although a better proof of such intention could scarcely have been given than by invading it. The same "splitting of words," as Lord Palmerston called it, occurred a few months after, when the Prussian General Wrangel refused to sign an armistice concluded by his government, ostensibly on the ground that he was the soldier of the Confederation, who had not concurred in it, and not of Prussia, but really because the Berlin cabinet thought that by temporizing it might obtain better terms. During the armistice, which was another piece of ill-luck for Denmark, as it gave the revolutionary party in the Duchies an opportunity of strengthening its position and gaining a large number of partisans, Prussia continued her perfidious policy, purposely delaying the formation of the board of administration which was provisionally to govern the Duchies, and taking a prominent part in the organization of the Schleswig-Holstein army. A few short months, however, in the course of which the revolutionary fever of 1848 had subsided, soon changed the attitude of Prussia. In the "preliminaries of peace," which accompanied the second armistice of July 10, 1849, she already consented to the separation of the Duchies, as provided by the first article:—

"The Duchy of Schleswig is to have a *separate constitution*, in so far as legislation and internal administration are concerned, *without being connected with the Duchy of Holstein*, and so that the political union which connects the Duchy of Schleswig with the Danish crown be left untouched."

This article was afterwards agreed to by the princes of the Diet, and Prussia not only withdrew from the Duchies, declaring by the mouth of her Minister, Baron Schleinitz, that "Germany had no right to claim the incorporation of Schleswig into the Confederation," but suppressed the insurrection she had mainly helped to maintain. And this was the power which barely a twelvemonth before had entered the Duchies for the avowed purpose of uniting Schleswig to Holstein, and thus bringing both into the Confederation! Recent events have taught us, how-

ever, that there is a consistency even in her inconsistency. Within the last two years we have again seen Prussia fighting ostensibly for the union of the Duchies, and now she has not only cheerfully consented to, but actually proposed, their separation. It must be confessed that the German people are peculiarly unfortunate in their champion, for he not only appropriates to himself the prize which he professes to seek in their behalf, but covers them with disgrace by associating their cause with his own dark designs.

In the diplomatic contest which followed the suppression of the insurrection, the German powers took an entirely fresh ground. The catastrophe of Olmütz having for a time made Prussia descend into the second rank in the Confederation, Austria now took the lead in the negotiations, at a period when the national movement had been completely put down, and a strong reaction against Liberalism had set in all over Germany. The Confederation now no longer looked upon the Duchies as parts of the great German nation, to be recovered for the Fatherland, but as centres of revolution to be drilled into order according to the principles of the Manteuffels and the Schwarzenbergs. When the King of Denmark made the proposal in March, 1850, of giving a separate Liberal constitution to Denmark and Schleswig, and maintaining the old constitution of Holstein, Austria protested, on the ground that such an arrangement would not agree "*with the Conservative interests of Europe and Denmark, with the intentions of the subscribers to the London protocol, and the obligations flowing from the position of the imperial courts.*" So violent, indeed, was the reaction in even the most Liberal States of Germany, that Herr von der Pfordten, the Bavarian Minister, who has since been so zealous in his advocacy of Schleswig-Holsteinism, declared to a deputation of Holsteiners who came to him with complaints against the Danes, that the German Governments had made a great mistake in espousing the cause of the Duchies, and that if he were Minister for Holstein he would make the country Danish, even at the price of a forced emigration of its inhabitants. And again, in the Prussian despatch accepting the final arrangement proposed by Denmark for the re-organization of the monarchy, it was expressly stipulated that "the Royal Danish Government shall not introduce into the German federal Duchies of Holstein and Lauenburg, or the Duchy of Schleswig, the constitution or the electoral law now obtaining in the Kingdom of Denmark, but rather, in establishing a common constitution for the monarchy, have regard to the institution of estates in the German Duchies, and the special relations of the Duchy of Schleswig. *Particularly* the electoral law obtaining in Den-

mark—*i.e.*, universal suffrage—“will not be introduced either into Schleswig or into the German Duchies.” Thus, in 1851, as in 1864, the principal object of Prussian intervention in the Duchies was, not to secure their autonomy, but to prevent the introduction of Liberal institutions in a German state. The memorable words of Herr von Bismarck, “that Germany would never be on good terms with Denmark so long as the democratic institutions of the latter country are maintained,” are indeed the key to the policy of Prussia in this question, which had never really aimed at making the Duchies part of Germany. As for Herr von Bismarck, the “liberator” of Schleswig-Holstein—the man without whom the Duchies would in all probability never have been separated from Denmark—he has always been known as a violent opponent of Schleswig-Holsteinism. While still a deputy for the Marches of Brandenburg he openly deplored in the Berlin Chamber that the Prussian troops should have been sent “to defend the revolution in Schleswig against the legitimate sovereign of that country, the King of Denmark,” and qualified the enterprise as “eminently iniquitous, frivolous, disastrous, and revolutionary.” Since then, although his position as minister has prevented him from using such plain language, he has always shown in his diplomatic communications with foreign courts a great contempt for the Schleswig-Holstein pretensions, and a desire to counteract the designs of his countrymen against Denmark.

It can scarcely be doubted that a much more satisfactory settlement would have been arrived at than that effected by the treaty of London if this tendency of the German Powers to reactionary principles had not in some degree also spread among the other Powers of Europe. The situation was then certainly very much more favourable for an equitable arrangement than in 1863-4. Prussia had not yet succeeded in making Austria her accomplice in her designs on the Duchies; there were Swedish troops in Denmark ready to act as auxiliaries to the Danes; Russia, led by that most legitimist of despots, the Emperor Nicholas, protested energetically against the policy of Germany, threatening war if any attempt were made to aggrandize the federal territory; and England and France had then not been estranged by a diplomatic failure in the Polish question and the uncourteous rejection of the proposal of a visionary congress. Had the European Powers really cared anything about the fate of the people of the Duchies, they were more than strong enough to enforce a definitive settlement of the question, such, for instance, as the union of Schleswig and Holstein into a federal state having a personal connexion only with the crown of Denmark. But the will of the people of the Duchies was just the

thing which the Powers banished entirely from their consideration. The integrity of the Danish monarchy—the succession to the Danish crown—these were the only points they thought deserving of notice, as if both did not depend on the contentedness of the populations under Danish rule, and as if either was really of equal importance to the securing of the latter result. It is true that Lord Palmerston made certain proposals in 1848 with regard to the government of the Duchies ; but these were mere suggestions, and were never made a matter of European arrangement. The treaty of London merely acknowledged the integrity of the Danish monarchy as a principle in the political organization of Europe, and bound the signatories to recognise the succession of Prince Christian to the territories under Frederick VII. in the case of the male line of the royal family of Denmark becoming extinct, and even this last provision, which settled who was to be the future sovereign of the Duchies, was not submitted to their estates.

If the Northern and Western Powers showed utter indifference to the mode of government which was to be introduced in the Duchies, this cannot be said of Austria and Prussia, who, during the interval between the London protocol (July 4, 1850) and the London treaty (May 8, 1852), obtained important explanations from Denmark of its views in this respect. We have already seen that the strong interest which the great German Powers showed in this matter was mainly due to their anxiety lest democratic institutions in Denmark should revive the liberal agitation in Germany. Accordingly they did all in their power to prevent the isolation of Holstein, so as to keep up through that Duchy the connexion with Denmark, and expose her to the influence of their reactionary policy. In the "explanations" above referred to, Denmark engaged to give a common constitution to all the territories under her rule, and a separate representation to each of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, adding, however, that she would entirely dissolve the political connexion which had formerly subsisted between them. On the other hand, Schleswig was not to be incorporated with the kingdom, but the latter was to enjoy the representative institutions granted by the charter of 1849. These engagements were embodied in the royal proclamation of January 28, 1852, a copy of which was communicated to the cabinets of Berlin and Vienna, and afterwards by them to the German Diet, which expressed its approval of the arrangements respecting the Duchies contained in it. Shortly after the proclamation, the re-organization of the Danish monarchy commenced. A common parliament (*Rigsraad*) was established for the purpose of deliberating on the general affairs of the monarchy, and the powers of the estates

of the Duchies were extended. The subjects debated in the *Rigsraad* were to be foreign affairs, the army, the navy, the court, the public debt, customs, the post, and the coinage; the consideration of other public matters was left to the special parliaments. The *Rigsraad* was to consist of eighty members, twenty to be named by the king, thirty elected by the special parliaments of Denmark Proper (*Rigsdag*) and those of the Duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, and the remaining thirty by voters with an income of £150, or paying £25 in direct taxes. In the *Rigsraad* the kingdom had forty-seven votes, and the Duchies thirty-three. The powers of this assembly were very limited: it had but a nominal control over the budget, and was not allowed to initiate a bill, or even to introduce an amendment in those laid before it by the Government. Such was the arrangement completed in October, 1855. It bore distinct traces of the reactionary influence of Austria and Prussia, while at the same time it showed a disposition on the part of Denmark to be as liberal as she dared. It was, in fact, an attempt to please all parties; and, like most such attempts, it worked ill, and only courted the evils it was intended to avert.

The ground of dispute between Denmark and Germany was now cleared from most of the archaeological subtleties with which the pedantry of the German professors had obscured it. The evidence, derived from obsolete documents and doubtful traditions, on which the alleged legal right of Schleswig and Holstein to be united was based, ceased to be an element in the question since the arrangement effected between Denmark and the Confederation in 1852, and the dispute about the succession was laid at rest, at least for a time, by the renunciation on the part of the Duke of Augustenburg of his pretensions to the sovereignty in the Duchies. Unfortunately, the terms of the arrangement of 1852 were so vague that they opened a very wide field for interpretation according to the interests of each of the parties concerned, and all of them were too eager in the dispute not to take the fullest advantage of any expression which was liable to such interpretation. Denmark naturally strove to make the connexion between herself and the Duchies as close as possible; Austria and Prussia desired her to return to the almost absolute *régime* of 1848; while the German people would be satisfied with nothing less than a totally independent constitution for the Duchies. It was to be expected, therefore, that unless Denmark held to the strict letter of the arrangement, Austria and Prussia should endeavour to overthrow her liberal constitution by objecting that it did not give to the Duchies the degree of autonomy which had been agreed upon. The attack was begun by the Holstein

estates, who claimed, through their representatives in the *Rigsraad*, to be allowed to be heard with regard to the new constitution, and to submit the draft of an amended one which would be more in accordance with their wishes. The claim was rejected, but was supported by Austria and Prussia. The grounds alleged by these Powers for their opposition to the new charter show a curious combination of the reactionist tendencies of the German governments with the national aspirations of the German people. One of the objections to the charter was, that by Art. 5 every new Danish sovereign was bound to swear to preserve the constitution before his accession, whereas, according to the principle adopted by the Confederation, the right of sovereignty depends only on the laws of succession. This objection could only have been made in the interests of despotism, as there is no law in the Confederation against the oath in question, and the same or similar enactments are contained in the constitutions of other German states. A far more important objection was the allegation that the new charter had not given to Holstein the "autonomy and equality of rights" which had been stipulated in the Austrian despatch of the 26th December, 1852, and agreed to by Denmark. It was argued, that as in the Privy Council there were three special ministers for Denmark Proper, whereas there was but one for Schleswig and one for Holstein and Lauenburg, and the number of deputies for the Duchies in the *Rigsraad* was fixed according to their population, and was therefore less than that for Denmark Proper, there was no "equality of rights" between the two parts of the State, and that the estates of the Duchies, having no control over the budget, the general taxes, or the recruiting among their population, could not be said to have an "autonomy." Another objection was, that the new charter had not been submitted to the Holstein estates, and was therefore not valid, as having been introduced without their consent. The German Diet, on its part, also complained that the mobilization of the Holstein and Lauenburg forces had been made dependent on the *Rigsraad*, and thus impeded the liberty of action of the king in furnishing his contingent as a German duke to the Confederation. On the whole, although many of the objections of Germany to the charter were conceived in a spirit of mere cavilling, it is impossible to deny that Denmark did not, in framing her new constitution, fully act in the spirit of the arrangements of 1852.

The representations of the German Powers with respect to the charter met with an obstinate resistance on the part of the cabinet of Copenhagen, and it was not until the German Diet threatened "execution" (Nov. 11, 1858) that the new constitution, so far as it related to Holstein and Lauenburg, was abolished.

This, however, created a new difficulty. Before the insurrection of 1848 the general affairs of the whole of the Danish State were conducted by the king and his ministers, without the intervention of the provincial assemblies. This state of things was now revived for Holstein and Lauenburg, but not for the rest of the monarchy, which by the new constitution directed the general policy of the State in the *Rigsraad*; so that practically Holstein, which was formerly under the rule of the king, was now under that of Denmark Proper and Schleswig as well. It was in the case of the budget that the inconvenience of this arrangement was most felt. That Holstein should be taxed by Denmark was obviously very objectionable, and Denmark was so sensible to the evil that she was the first to propose a remedy. On the 3rd of January, 1859, the Holstein estates were convoked, and a modified general charter for the monarchy, together with a new special charter for Holstein, were submitted for their consideration. Unfortunately, although these charters were even more liberal in their provisions than those they were intended to replace, they were open to the same objections as the latter on the score of not treating Holstein as a separate nationality, with a distinct autonomy. As might have been expected, the estates rejected the proposals of the Government; and they offered some counter-proposals, which, though doubtless absurdly exacting on some points, were on the whole not unreasonable, and at least offered a basis for an arrangement in which concessions could be made by both parties. They proposed, among other things, that in the privy council Denmark Proper, Schleswig, and Holstein should have each one representative only; that a general administrative council for the whole monarchy, and a separate legislative assembly in each of the four parts of the State should be established; and that no bills relating to the whole country should become law until passed by each of the four legislatures. The plan was no doubt a clumsy one, but, as was sensibly remarked by the Holstein assembly, no plan for the reorganization of the monarchy could be good so long as the Government persisted in ignoring the special position of Schleswig and Holstein. The monarchy consisted of a Danish part, and a part where the political life of the people was unquestionably German; and it was mere folly to attempt to treat the two parts precisely alike, and to give them a representation in the State Diet based on population only, as if they were mere departments, with boundaries arbitrarily marked out for the sake of official convenience. The Government, however, was obstinate, and summarily rejected the proposals of the estates. At the same time, in order to prevent the interference of the *Rigsraad* in the financial affairs of the Duchy, a decree was issued

(Sept. 23, 1859) by which the contribution of Holstein to the revenues of the State was to be fixed by the king before the budget was brought under the consideration of the representatives of the other parts of the monarchy. This decree was communicated by Denmark to the Confederation in November, 1859, and on the 8th of March of the following year a Federal resolution was passed, urging the speedy grant of an autonomy to Holstein, and demanding that, "in order to secure the equal rights of the German federal lands in their relation to the other parts of the monarchy during the time a provisional state of things might last, all laws which were to be submitted to the Council General should also be submitted to the estates of Holstein and Lauenburg, and no law concerning common affairs, especially no financial laws, should be enacted for these Duchies, except with the previous consent of their representative assemblies, the Diet declaring that it would not consider as lawfully binding upon the German Duchies any enactments which did not conform with this resolution." This demand on the part of the Confederation was at least as unjust and oppressive as the absolute rejection by Denmark of the proposals of the Holstein estates was ill-considered. No independent State could consent to have the whole of its internal policy placed at the mercy of the deputies of a single province, and this was still less to be expected from Denmark, who had already suffered so much from German dictation. The demands of the Confederation were refused; and in February, 1861, "execution" was again threatened if within six weeks Denmark did not give a formal promise to comply with those demands. A second attempt was now made to obtain the consent of the Holstein estates to a modified charter: but as the principal modification was merely the addition of an upper chamber to the *Rigsraad*, this charter was rejected by the estates like its predecessor. War now being imminent, the Great Powers interfered, and persuaded Denmark to agree to the Prussian proposal that she should provisionally renounce the payment of any further contribution by Holstein to the state treasury than that of previous years, and that no general laws affecting Holstein should for the present be issued. Upon this the Diet determined that the intended "execution" should not take place, and Europe was again saved from the danger of a general war.

While the deputies of Holstein thus steadfastly refused to agree to the constitution of 1853, those of Schleswig were not idle. In 1860 they passed an address to the king, repeating the objections of the Holstein estates to the constitution, protesting against any severance of the bonds by which Schleswig and Holstein are connected, and complaining of oppression of the

German nationality. The chief ground alleged for this complaint was the introduction, by the "language-regulations" of 1851-2, of a division of Schleswig into the "officially Danish districts," the "officially mixed districts," and the "officially German districts," and the predominance of the Danish language which was then established in the first two of these divisions, the predominant language in those divisions having before 1851 been the German. The regulations in question were framed by the Danish Government for the avowed purpose of checking the spread of Germanism in Schleswig; and, so far as the actual distribution of the Schleswigers that speak Danish and those that speak German is concerned, the arrangement appears to have been a fair one. But it may well be doubted whether the object of this arrangement was either just or politic. We have already seen that in its political conduct Schleswig was uniformly German, not Danish; its historical and literary sympathies are German; and it has a German educated class. In determining the nationality of a people the language test is of all tests the most fallacious. There is scarcely a country in Europe where a great number of the ignorant classes do not speak a different language from that of the educated classes, who are of course in the minority. The language test applied to that most vigorous of nationalities, Switzerland, would give large districts inhabited by Swiss to France, Italy, and Germany. In Poland, where the feeling of nationality is equally vigorous, the great majority of the people in the largest and wealthiest provinces, such as Lithuania and Volhynia, do not speak Polish. Yet who would call a citizen of the canton of Berne a Frenchman, or an inhabitant of Volhynia (unless, indeed, it be a partisan of the Russian Government) a Ruthenian? The truth is, that in the northern countries of Europe the peasant has as yet very indistinct political notions. Travellers in Galicia, where Austria has long been striving to foment a struggle of nationalities, have often remarked that if a Galician peasant is asked whether he is a Pole or a Ruthenian, he invariably answers that he is an "imperialist," *i.e.*, a partisan of the powers that be. We suspect that a similar answer would be given by the peasant of Schleswig to the question whether he is a Dane or a German. Certainly, judging by his conduct during the struggle between the two nationalities, he has not shown any decided partiality for either. It has been said by an able advocate of the Danish Government that Denmark was at least as much justified in "protecting the Danish nationality" in Schleswig as Prussia in forcing the German language and German institutions on Posen. But the cases are not parallel. Posen has always shown itself thoroughly Polish, both by its political conduct and its

national sympathies. The deputies from Posen in the Prussian Parliament are not only almost all of them Poles, but they form a party among themselves, whose political and national instincts are totally opposed to those of their German colleagues in the Chamber; and the conduct of the Poseners during the late Polish insurrection amply proves the strength of their sympathies for their fellow-countrymen in Russian Poland. In Schleswig, though there have been no such strong evidences of nationality, it is indisputable that such national tendencies as have manifested themselves have been all German. The parallel between Posen and Schleswig is only in so far correct that in both countries there has been a struggle of nationalities. In the former the Poles have conquered, in the latter the Germans; and the case of Posen only proves that it is not by government interference such as that of Denmark in Schleswig, even if carried to a most violent extent, that the feeling of nationality in a people is to be extinguished.

The complaints of the Schleswigers did not pass unnoticed in Germany. The liberal ministry of Baron Schleinitz in Prussia warmly took up the case, and put forward a claim, which looks very like a legal quibble, on behalf of the Confederation, to interfere in the affairs of Schleswig on the ground of the promises made by Denmark with reference to that Duchy in 1861. These promises were simply contained in a despatch addressed to the German Governments, in which Denmark informed them of the arrangements it contemplated making with regard to the new Danish constitution, and they certainly did not possess the character which Baron Schleinitz ascribed to them, of "international obligations towards the Germanic Confederation with regard to Schleswig contracted by the King of Denmark, as Duke of Schleswig, for the sake of the settlement of the debated claims of Holstein." On the other hand, one of these promises, that of an "autonomy" to Schleswig, can hardly be said to have been fulfilled, for that Duchy was given no special institutions which were not possessed by the other parts of the monarchy, and it had to send its deputies to the *Rigsraad* in the same way as Denmark Proper. The Danish Government, however, refused to listen to any representations in regard to Schleswig. In October, 1861, it offered to compromise the Holstein difficulty by making all laws which were not agreed to, both by the Holstein estates and the *Rigsraad*, only valid in that part of the monarchy where they were passed; but the German governments, adhering to their new policy, rejected the proposal, chiefly on the ground that it did not refer to Schleswig as well as Holstein. The negotiations thus dragged on a few months longer, when matters again came to a crisis by the Confederation pro-

testing (Feb. 14, 1862) against the continued existence for Schleswig of the *Rigsraad*, whose powers the Danish Government had since attempted to increase. Then came Lord Russell's famous Gotha despatch of the 24th September, 1862, in which our foreign minister showed himself more German than the Germans themselves, by making the extraordinary proposal to divide Denmark into four parts, each with a distinct autonomy and an independent parliament, thus still further endangering the unity of the Danish State, already shaken by the discontent in Schleswig and Holstein. This plan was of course hailed with joy by the German Governments, but it did not find favour in England, and was soon abandoned by our cabinet.

While these negotiations were going on, an important event occurred in Prussia. The liberal Prince Regent, on ascending the throne at Berlin, suddenly changed his principles, turned on his old adherents, and, after a brief parliamentary struggle, appointed Herr von Bismarck the head of his cabinet. The new Minister-President was known as a violent adversary of Schleswig-Holsteinism, and one of the most bigoted members of the feudal or reactionist party in Prussia. His advent to power, therefore, was regarded as a severe blow to the Schleswig-Holstein agitation, which, it was thought, would now lose its chief support in the abandonment by Prussia of the cause of the Duchies. The Danish Government began to breathe more freely; and when, in February, 1863, the famous convention with Russia regarding the Polish insurgents raised a unanimous outcry of indignation against Prussia from all the civilized nations of Europe, Denmark thought herself so safe against Prussian intervention that she took the opportunity of further strengthening her hold on Schleswig. In March, 1863, a proclamation was issued, establishing an administrative separation between Holstein and the rest of the monarchy. The laws of Holstein, the budget of Holstein, even the army of Holstein, were to be under the control of the Holstein Estates, and made entirely independent of the *Rigsraad*, which was only allowed to deliberate on those subjects so far as they regarded Denmark Proper and Schleswig. The object of this arrangement was evidently to cut off Schleswig from the German influence of Holstein by separating the latter as much as possible from the rest of the state, and thus leaving the Danes unimpeded in their attempts to make Schleswig Danish. On the 14th of July, the Federal Diet protested against the proclamation, and threatened execution unless it was withdrawn. The Danish Government, however, disregarded the protest and the threat. The new arrangements, so far as they related to Schleswig and Denmark Proper, were submitted to the *Rigsraad*, adopted, and

embodied in a charter on the 14th November, 1863. War now again impended over the Duchies; and this time the force of events and the cunning of an unprincipled and ambitious statesman were too much for the peacemakers of Europe.

In the diplomatic campaign which preceded and accompanied the military one, the palm for political insight and strategic skill belongs beyond all question to Herr von Bismarck. It is true that his cynical contempt for political morality, and the utter unscrupulousness with which he shifted his policy as it suited his ends, gave him a great advantage over some of his antagonists; but his triumph would certainly not have been so great, had he not been far superior to them in adroitness and sagacity. His first step, on coming to power, was to secure the firm support of Russia by assisting her in a policy which was condemned by the united voice of Europe. The February convention, no doubt, brought a great deal of obloquy on its author; but he knew well what the alliance of Russia was worth, and the result proved that he had no cause to fear the hostility of France or England. In the Danish question, his predecessors left him the opportunity of attacking a weak power; and he was not the man to throw away such an opportunity. He began by cautiously feeling his way with some modest expressions of opinion, such as that Denmark was bound in honour to fulfil her engagements towards Germany, and that she was blameable for having resisted the mediation of a friendly and impartial nation (*i. e.*, England, in the Gotha despatch). After the proclamation of the 30th March, he joined in the protest of Austria against the new Danish projects, but his peculiar genius for political mystification did not show itself until execution was threatened by the Federal Diet, and Lord Russell, in alarm, mildly suggested to that body, that it would be "desirable that nothing should occur to augment the already existing dangers and complications of Europe." When all the German Governments hastened to calm the fears of his lordship by the allegation that an execution did not mean a war, Herr von Bismarck had the assurance to declare that "if a war did take place, it would be an offensive war on the part of Denmark against the Germanic Confederation."* The situation was, indeed, at that time sufficiently perilous for Prussia to necessitate the greatest caution on the part of her minister. England, France, and Austria were united on the Polish question, and it almost seemed as if a general crusade was preparing against Russia and her audacious ally. There is now no doubt that the unfortunate declarations

* Despatch from Herr von Bismarck to Herr von Katte, *chargé d'affaires* in London, 11th September, 1863.

made by Lords Russell and Palmerston in July, 1863, which were afterwards appealed to as giving Denmark a claim to the armed assistance of England, were the fruit of the general feeling that, in any European difficulty, the policy of France and England would be identical; and if Prussia had then taken any precipitate step in the Danish affair, it is pretty certain she would at once have received a humiliating check. But Herr von Bismarck was far too wary to expose himself to such a danger. He quietly abided his time, expressing himself to foreign powers in ambiguous terms about the Duchies, firmly adhering to the Russian alliance, and rivalizing with Austria for influence in Germany. He had not to wait long. The failure of the Polish negotiations produced a coolness between France and England, and when Lord Russell proposed to the French Government, on the 16th of September, a common intervention in favour of Denmark, he was answered with a refusal. Herr von Bismarck now began to assume a more decisive attitude, and proposed to the Diet that Prussian troops only should be employed in the "execution" which was now imminent. But towards the end of September, the famous speech of Lord Russell at Blairgowrie seemed to offer a chance of reviving the Anglo-French alliance. The despatch declaring that the Czar had forfeited his rights to Poland was fully agreed to by France, and Herr von Bismarck, with that ready adaptation to circumstances which is so characteristic of him, immediately proposed, much to the disappointment of Germany, a compromise with Denmark. The terms of this compromise, namely, that Denmark should declare herself ready to give satisfaction to the Diet in regard to the claim of Holstein and Lauenburg to control their own legislation and expenditure of all moneys raised in the Duchies, and to accept the mediation of Great Britain for the arrangement of the international question (*i. e.*, Schleswig), were agreed to by Denmark; and all seemed to be going well, when suddenly Herr von Bismarck dropped his plan, and prepared to carry out the "execution." This apparently unaccountable conduct was easily explained by those who were behind the scenes. The "forfeiture" despatch, which was to have consolidated the Anglo-French alliance, never reached its destination, but, at the earnest representation of Herr von Bismarck, who expressed his conviction that Russia would regard it as a *casus belli*, was stopped on its way to St. Petersburg, and a meaningless document, without object or conclusion, was sent in its place. The situation was now completely changed; France and England were isolated, Prussia had the support of Russia and the Confederation, and Austria, though unwillingly, was forced by the break-up of the western alliance to join Russia. Herr von Bismarck triumphed

on every side, and could now give full scope to that audacious policy which is most in accordance with his character and abilities.

The proposal of the Congress, which followed close upon the affair of the "forfeiture" despatch, strikingly displayed the changes which the last few months had brought about in the relative positions of the European Powers. England refused, in a dictatorial and somewhat snappish tone, the proposal of France, and these two powers, which in the summer of that very year had haughtily rebuked Russia and Prussia for their conduct towards Poland and Denmark, now eagerly sought the aid of the cabinets of Berlin and St. Petersburg for carrying out their respective views. After a long negotiation, Russia adopted the English view, and talked of the "perfect harmony" with which "the four governments" (*i. e.* Russia, Austria, Prussia, and England) thought and acted in "a question of much greater importance than the Schleswig-Holstein question."* Herr von Bismarck, however, was more difficult to manage. He had his policy to carry out on the Eider, and was in no hurry to put an end to a situation where France and England both strove for his favour; he therefore coquetted with them both, and satisfied neither, until the matter dropped of itself. Meanwhile he took the greatest pains to convince Denmark and her friends that in the Schleswig-Holstein quarrel he was on the Danish side. On the 21st of October, he assured M. Quaade, the Danish ambassador at Berlin, that he was "in favour of an arrangement;" on the 23rd, that he was "sincere in his efforts to discover a pacific solution," and that "surely no one would go to war about Schleswig;" and M. Quaade was so convinced of the sincerity of these declarations that he informed his government that even in London their cause was not so warmly taken up as in Berlin.† In his conversations with Sir Andrew Buchanan, then our ambassador at the Prussian Court, he expressed himself in a similar sense, and repeatedly declared that the proper solution of the Schleswig-Holstein question would be to make an independent Denmark on one side of the Eider, and an independent Holstein on the other side.

These "moderate views," as they were called by Prince Gortschakoff, of Herr von Bismarck were soon changed when the publication of the November charter and the death of King Frederick VII. made it necessary for him to assume a more active attitude. The right of succession established by the Treaty of London now came into force, and under the treaty Christian IX. became the new King of Denmark and the Duchies; but the

* Despatch from Lord Napier, of 6th January, 1864.

† Correspondence presented to the *Rigsraad* in August, 1864.

Confederation refused to be bound by the treaty, which it had not signed, and appointed a committee to inquire into the pretensions of the young Duke of Augustenburg, who now claimed the sovereignty in Schleswig and Holstein. We do not think that any blame is to be attached in this case either to the Confederation—for that body was clearly not bound by a treaty to which it had not adhered, and which was in direct opposition to the wishes of the German nation—or to Prince Frederick, who had in no way participated in the act of renunciation which his father had been compelled to sign, under a threat of losing his estates. The fault really lay with Austria and Prussia, who ought not to have signed the Treaty of London—a treaty regulating the succession in a German Federal State—except as representatives of the Confederation, and with the mediating powers, who did not negotiate in this question with the Confederation, but with Austria and Prussia. These two powers had now determined not to let the matter out of their hands. Count Reclberg, before whom Herr von Bismarck incessantly dangled the bait of “a moral victory” in Germany, and an alliance with a strong power capable of assisting Austria in the defence of her Italian possessions, at length fell into the snare, and sold himself body and soul to the scheming Minister-President. The two accomplices held firmly to the Treaty of London; they rejected the pretensions of Prince Frederick; but they felt themselves, they said, unable to stem the current of democracy in Germany. They represented a German attack on Denmark as imminent, and declared themselves ready to come forward as the champions of peace and order by effecting the threatened execution in Holstein with their own troops in the name of the Confederation. Strange to say, this language (which was of course echoed by Russia, who owed a heavy debt of gratitude to Herr von Bismarck) imposed on our credulous foreign minister to such a degree that, after inducing the government at Copenhagen to revoke the proclamation of the 30th of March, he further advised it to evacuate Holstein, and make way for the Austrian and Prussian troops, the “protectors” of Denmark and the peace of Europe. The occupation of Holstein took place on the 21st of December; but, instead of appeasing the clamorous demands of the national party in Germany, it only increased them, and Herr von Bismarck, who before the occupation had appeared as a universal peacemaker and the firm friend of Denmark and supporter of the London treaty, now roundly declared that, unless the constitution of November was abolished by the 1st of January, 1864, the German powers would consider themselves freed from all their engagements towards the Copenhagen Government, the London treaty included. Then came the famous hint, so charac-

teristic of the man, that a *coup-d'état* would be the best way of settling the difficulty, and the declaration that Prussia could not bind herself to any particular line of policy in a question the aspect of which was constantly changing. It would seem after this that there could be no further doubt as to the intentions of Herr von Bismarck. But Lord Russell's stock of hope was inexhaustible. Finding Prussia intractable, he turned to Denmark with the advice that she should give up the November constitution, and thus deprive Herr von Bismarck of the ground on which he proposed to continue his interference with her affairs. As if the astute Minister-President could not, if he were so minded, have produced a dozen other pretexts for his interference! The constitution was not given up, and on the 28th December Herr von Bismarck proposed to the Diet that the Austrian and Prussian troops should occupy Schleswig as a guarantee for the performance by Denmark of her engagements of 1851-2. Count Rechberg now became alarmed at the audacity of his ally, and joined Lord Russell, who was just beginning to perceive that Europe was in danger of a war, in the attempt to bring about a conference. The attempt failed, mainly in consequence of the opposition of France, who was still sore about the Congress. Meanwhile, the smaller German States organized a strong opposition against Prussia. Their plan was to install Prince Frederick as the Duke of Holstein, and then send him volunteers from all parts of Germany to assist him in seizing Schleswig from Denmark by a war. Already everything was prepared for the realization of this project; the Prince had taken up his residence at Kiel, and demonstrations in his favour were openly encouraged by the Saxon and other Federal troops in Holstein. But an exclusive occupation of Schleswig by Austria and Prussia in the name of the King of Denmark would obviously be fatal to the designs of the Middle States; and accordingly the Diet opposed the proposed occupation (14th January) by a majority of 11 to 5. Herr von Bismarck, however, was not to be daunted by the votes of the Middle States. He simply declared that he found it necessary "to defend the rights of the Confederation in Schleswig," and marched his troops on Holstein, followed obediently by his Austrian allies. The Diet was obliged to yield, and on the 20th January General Hake, the Saxon commander-in-chief, evacuated Kiel.

Herr von Bismarck was now master of the situation. He was sure of the support of Russia;* he had triumphed over the

* Despatches from Lord Napier, 10th and 11th January, 1864. See also the very curious documents published in the *Morning Post* of the 4th and 5th July, 1864. The authenticity of these documents is now generally recognised, notwithstanding the official contradictions which appeared at the time.

Middle States; and he had nothing to fear from England, France having sided with the national party in Germany, and Lord Russell's isolated representations in favour of Denmark producing no more effect at Paris or St. Petersburg than at Berlin. On the 16th of January he summoned King Christian to abolish the November constitution within the space of two days. The Danish Government asked for six weeks; but Herr von Bismarck had resolved on a war, and sent the Prussian troops into Schleswig on the 1st of February, the day after he made his famous statement in answer to Lord Russell, that "the case might arise when the Treaty of London would not offer a result proportionate to the sacrifices which events had imposed on the German Powers." Austria, still fearing for the safety of her Italian possessions, which she thought were again placed in peril by the French proposal of a Congress, followed unwillingly in the wake of her enterprising ally; and Denmark had to fight alone against her invaders, in spite of Lord Palmerston's prophecy, even Sweden being restrained from assisting her by the fear of Russia. Meanwhile the Middle States again prepared a demonstration against Herr von Bismarck. On the 19th of February their ministers assembled in conference at Würzburg, and unanimously decided to press the Diet for a speedy and decisive vote on the question of the succession, the convocation of the Estates of Holstein, and a considerable augmentation of the Federal army in that Duchy. Herr von Bismarck, on his side, was not idle. He arranged with Russia to play off another candidate—the Duke of Oldenburg—against Prince Frederick; and, at the same time, he sent General Manteuffel on an extraordinary mission to the Courts of Germany in order to intimidate the Middle States into a compliance with his views. The effect of this mission was almost magical. On the 25th of February Austria and Prussia declared to the Diet that they were about to assume the military and civil command in the Duchies, which had hitherto been under the authority of the Confederation; and to this astounding declaration one or two small States only dared to object. So deep, indeed, was the humiliation of the smaller German sovereigns, that the death of the King of Bavaria, which occurred a few days afterwards, is generally believed to have been caused by his disappointment at the failure of his cherished designs. Having thus routed the Middle States, Herr von Bismarck still further strengthened his position by concluding a convention with Austria, binding his government to give her material assistance in case her possessions in Italy should be attacked, and, at the same time, consolidated the alliance between the three Northern Courts by persuading Count Rechberg to proclaim a state of siege in Galicia, and thus give the final blow to the Polish insur-

rection. Seven days afterwards the troops of Austria and Prussia entered Jutland.

The proposal of a conference for the settlement of the Danish question was now renewed, and found more favour than on the previous occasion. France was growing alarmed at the indications of a revival of the Holy Alliance, and again sought the friendship of England; Austria and Prussia, being in possession of the Duchies, had no objection to a little diplomatic acting, which they knew would have no serious result; and the Confederation hoped to gain some advantage at the expense of Austria and Prussia. The conference met on the 26th of April; but the real question at issue was not discussed until the 12th of May. During the interval the idea of an annexation of the Duchies to Prussia was first started and vigorously supported at Berlin; and the Prussian plenipotentiary at the conference began the discussion by laying down the principle that Austria and Prussia considered themselves freed from any engagement with regard to the Duchies which they may have contracted towards Denmark before the war. The various proposals for the settlement of the question which followed were all rejected one after the other, for the simple reason that the German Powers were not sincere in their professed desire for an arrangement. The most important of these proposals was that of the 28th May, when Austria and Prussia asked for the complete separation of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein from the kingdom, and their reunion in a single State under the sovereignty of the Duke of Augustenburg. This proposition filled all Germany with joy, and the Duke immediately proceeded to Berlin on a visit to Herr von Bismarck; but the results of his conference with the Minister were not satisfactory. It appeared that Herr von Bismarck was not going to give up the Duchies without conditions; he wanted Prussia to occupy Kiel, to have the use of the military and naval resources of the Duchies, and to be allowed the right of navigation over the projected Schleswig-Holstein canal. To these conditions the Duke refused to accede, and his supporters resumed their old hostility to the Minister-President. The next scene in this diplomatic farce was very curious. The very day after the interview between Herr von Bismarck and the Duke, the Russian plenipotentiary announced to the conference the cession by the Czar of his rights in the Duchies to the Duke of Oldenburg. This, it will be observed, was a repetition of the manœuvre which Herr von Bismarck had already executed with effect against the Middle States, and the instrumentality by which it was performed in the present case was especially significant, as a proof of the complete understanding which had been arrived at between Prussia and Russia. After six weeks' useless

parleying, the Conference closed ; the war was renewed, and on the 27th of July Denmark signed the Treaty of Vienna, by which she ceded to Austria and Prussia the Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg.

The period of "co-possession," which has lasted just a twelve-month, now commenced, and soon disturbed the harmony which had existed between the two great German powers. The double government under an Austrian and a Prussian commissioner offered endless opportunities for the old rivalry between the two countries to break out, and the known desire of Prussia to annex the Duchies was alone sufficient to excite a natural jealousy in her ally, which manifested itself by a secret but efficacious support to the party of the Duke of Augustenburg. The estrangement between the two powers grew still greater when, on the announcement of the September Convention concluded between Italy and France, Herr von Bismarck refused to acknowledge the claim of Austria to a fulfilment of the engagements he had contracted towards her during the Danish war (p. 455). The Prussian minister based his refusal on the allegation that he had only promised to assist Austria in case her Italian possessions were attacked in consequence of her participation in the Danish war, and that this promise could therefore in no way apply to the September Convention. The indignation felt at Vienna towards Count Rechberg for having thus allowed himself to be duped was so great that shortly afterwards he was forced to resign ; and from that time it became evident that Austria only sought a pretext to rid herself of the alliance of her now thoroughly detested neighbour. The remainder of the history of the "co-possession" period is merely a tedious record of incessant disputes between the two powers, who were constantly on the eve of a rupture without actually resorting to hostilities. The position of Austria, indeed, was such, that she was quite unable to go to war with Prussia, however willing she might have been to do so. Under the centralising government of Herr von Schmerling her finances became so crippled, and the nationalities under her rule so discontented, that a war would inevitably have led her to bankruptcy and dismemberment. It is true that the Middle States supported her in opposing the designs of Prussia ; but their support in a war would have been of little value, and would certainly not have preserved her from financial and political ruin. Strange to say, the only formidable opponent to Herr von Bismarck in his aggressive designs on the Duchies has been the Chamber of Deputies at Berlin. The fact of the representatives of a nation refusing to sanction an increase of its territory, on the ground that the means by which it is to be obtained are unjust, is without a precedent in parliamentary

history, and the magnanimity and disinterestedness of the Prussian deputies stand out in striking contrast to the low cunning and shameless greed which has marked the conduct of the German Governments in this question.

But even the refusal of the Chamber to vote the supplies he required for his aggressive projects did not hinder Herr von Bismarck from steadfastly pursuing the policy he had adopted since the beginning of the war. The occupation of Kiel, in spite of the protests of Austria and the Confederation, was consummated with his usual daring and success, and the decision of the crown lawyers against the pretensions of the Duke of Augustenburg, about which so much noise has been made in the press of England and France, was simply a repetition of the doctrine to which he had always adhered, in opposition to the Middle States of Germany, and which now offered so convenient a ground for the annexation of the Duchies to Prussia. His plans have been only too well and carefully laid; and, unhappily for the peace of Germany and Europe, the obstacles to their realization are gradually disappearing before his indomitable will and his cynical contempt for every obligation.

The question of the nationality of the Duchies, which a year ago was the principal element of the dispute between Germany and Denmark, has now been entirely laid aside by their despotic possessors. But indications have not been wanting, even during the last few months, that this will be the only firm basis for a definite settlement. Even Herr von Bismarck, who is so sagacious in his dealings with foreign governments, found all his penetration and acuteness at fault when he had a population to deal with. He soon perceived his mistake in thinking he could drill the Schleswig-Holstein deputies into a compliance with his views, and was forced to abandon the idea of convoking the Estates of the Duchies, with the object of turning the tables on Austria, and bringing over to his side the liberal opinion of Germany. The Gastein Convention was, in fact, the result of a conviction on the part of Herr von Bismarck that, though he was in possession of the territory of Schleswig-Holstein, its inhabitants were gradually escaping from his grasp. A deep and undisguised detestation of Prussia, which was secretly fomented by Austria, has grown up among the Schleswig-Holsteiners; and the Prussian minister hopes, by securing the connivance of Austria, and taking in hand the most refractory of the two Duchies himself, to crush out all opposition among the people to his designs. But he will find this no easy task. History teaches us that when a nationality is held in subjection by a strong military despotism, oppression only has the effect of strengthening its aspirations towards independence; and we

may be sure that the Schleswig-Holstein question will continue to agitate Europe, so long as it is not settled in conformity with the wishes of the Schleswig-Holstein nationality.

ART. VII.—MR. GROTE'S PLATO.

Plato, and the other Companions of Sokrates. By GEORGE GROTE, F.R.S. 3 vols. London: John Murray. 1865.

OF this book we venture to predict that it will be talked of by many, read by few, and thoroughly appreciated by fewer still. Yet it is a long time since a work has issued from the press more entirely deserving of careful attention.

Plato is, perhaps, the greatest name in ancient literature. Mr. Grote himself ranks among the first of Greek scholars, and is undoubtedly the first of living historians. When a critic like Mr. Grote takes in hand a thinker like Plato, we have a right to expect something unusually interesting. That it should not be popular as well, is more a matter of regret than surprise. There is a prejudice, well founded as a rule, against vast systems of philosophy; life is thought not to be long enough for the orderly arrangement of our knowledge, and far too short for information on theories admitted to be obsolete; so people are content to wander in the wide field of letters, picking up here a fact and there an opinion, like cattle (to borrow a simile of Sokrates) grazing in the enclosure of a temple. Those who can see no use in anything which does not issue in an immediate result, may be pardoned for esteeming lightly the works which have come down to us from the pre-Aristotelian times. Of Plato in particular they may justly say that we owe little to him of direct practical value—*philosophiam pulchre multis locis inchoavit; ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum*. Looked at, however, from a wider point of view, the Platonic writings have a value which justifies the admiration which they have always received, and the enormous amount of labour which has been spent upon them. They describe an important phase in the history of Greek—that is to say, of European—thought, and their historical relations are thus especially interesting. It is from this side that Mr. Grote approaches them. The present work was undertaken in fulfilment of a promise long ago made to himself, that when he had finished the political history of Hellas, he would complete its intellectual history from his own point of

view. It is, therefore, no mere fragment, but part of a larger and completed whole.

Readers of Mr. Grote's History will remember that in his 68th chapter he described the life of Sokrates, and dwelt at some length on the influence exerted by that extraordinary teacher. We are here shown the result of this influence exhibited in the writings of Plato, and the other companions of Sokrates. These men, Xenophon, Æschines, Eukleides, Antisthenes, Aristippus, and the rest, to whom the title *Sokratici viri* properly belongs, were, it is true, rather admirers and friends of their great master than his disciples; yet, from constantly listening to his conversation, they borrowed something of a common method, which passed from them into various derivative systems of philosophy. Respecting the less known members of the group, Mr. Grote has collected much curious information, and the way in which later speculations lead up to Sokrates through some of these his friends is traced in a particularly clear and interesting manner. The criticism of the Megarian and Kyrenaic schools, for example, which is connected with the account of Eukleides and Aristippus, is as well worth reading as anything in the book, and is especially suggestive to students of Aristotle, who will find in it an explanation of many obscure allusions and references. But the chief interest of these volumes centres, as is natural, in Plato. To him, as undoubtedly the most distinguished of all the admirers of Sokrates, the chief part of the entire work has been devoted, that part, moreover, on which the greatest labour has been expended, and by which the whole will certainly be judged. This section (which is nothing less than a critical digest of the whole body of the Platonic philosophy) is not inferior in value to anything which Mr. Grote has yet written. To make Plato interesting and intelligible to the English reader—to explain his method, to rescue his doctrine from the perversions it has undergone—is about as difficult a task as anyone can have undertaken, and we question whether any living scholar could have discharged it so completely and so well. Mr. Grote has devoted a lifetime to the study of Grecian life and character. The social, political, and literary antecedents of the Sokratic age are perfectly familiar to him, and in this case such knowledge is indispensable. We lately had occasion to remark, in reference to Mr. Lewes' essay on Aristotle, on the importance in philosophy of an historical method of treatment. Now, Plato, even more than Aristotle, requires to be read in immediate sequence with the thinkers who preceded him. And for this reason. Aristotle's works have come down to us in the form of treatises, in which the reasoning is carried on from principles originally assumed or established. Except in the way

of criticism, there is not much reference to earlier speculations ; indeed, it is one of the charges which Bacon brings against him that he established his intellectual supremacy by putting his rivals out of the way—*Ottomanorum more erga fratres*—just as the Sultans begin their reign by cutting their brothers' throats. In the Platonic writings, on the contrary, the personal element is constantly present ; Parmenides, Protagoras, Hippias, Polus, Gorgias, Sokrates, are brought vividly before us, and their character and opinions are an essential part of the discussions in which they join. Add to this that Plato abounds in allusions which only those can understand who are acquainted with the habits of the ancient world, and it must be admitted that a commentator has every opportunity of bringing into play a minute and extensive knowledge of history. In this qualification Mr. Grote has no rival. His "History of Greece" is not only an astonishing example of erudition, but it is written in the best spirit and with a thoroughly comprehensive aim. If we except "The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire," there is nothing in the English language which can be compared with it. Nor will the readers of this great work require any evidence of its author's philosophical accomplishments. The chapters* in which he describes the Grecian mythopœic spirit ; the account of the Ionic philosophers ; of Pythagoras ;† and the elaborate excursus on Sokrates and the Sophists contained in the eighth volume,‡ will have prepared everyone to expect a masterly treatment of any subject requiring a knowledge of metaphysics and ethics.

It is quite time that a little vigorous and wholesome criticism was applied to Plato ; for, to say the truth, he has been too long the stalking-horse of a philosophical party, who have somewhat abused the privilege of dressing up a lay figure in their own clothes. Many who have read Plato by the light of their prepossessions, and a still greater number who have not read him at all, are fond of appealing to him as the champion of the theory of inborn essential truth. Aristotle they regard as the representative of conceptualism ; and whenever it is necessary to oppose the flash of spiritual insight to the process of inductive investigation, we are sure to hear of the authority of "the divine philosopher"—of his theory of ideas, and of his subordination of the world of sense to that of mind.§ Others, who

* "Hist. Greece," vol. i. cc. xvi. xvii.

† Ibid. vol. iv. c. xxxvii.

‡ cc. lxvii. lxxviii.

§ 'Εφίλοσόφησε δὲ Πλάτων, εἰ καὶ τις ἄλλος τῶν πρότερον, γνησίως καὶ τελείων. Ἡξίον δὲ μὴ δυνασθαι τὰ ἀνθρώπινα καταδεῖν ἡμᾶς, εἰ μὴ τὰ θεῖα πρότερον ὀφθῆναι. "Aristoc. apud Euseb. Cæsar. Prepar. Evangel." xi. c. iii. (Quoted by Coleridge, "Friend," vol. iii. p. 120.)

approach the subject rather from the side of theology than philosophy, read into the mind of Plato much of the religious feeling which, no doubt, characterized Sokrates. The mysticism of the Academy is set against the infidelity of the Peripatetics, and we have a highly-coloured picture of a Greek philosopher looking at the world and its relations from an outpost spiritual and divine.* Examples of this view may be found in most popular manuals of philosophy. Need we add that Plato has been at all times the philosophical bulwark of the great Conservative party? It must be admitted that he embodies their favourite theory of Athenian history. That, dating from the Persian invasion, private and public life in Athens began to be corrupted; that this corruption may be traced to the ascendancy of its democracy; that the Sophists offered to the vanity of youth and the ambition of wealth a substitute for that authority which the laws of Solon had attached to birth and property, are propositions unhesitatingly believed in by those to whom monarchy is the only type of well-being. Of course, too, popular and fashionable writers often have a word to say on Plato. To them he appears in the disguise of a melancholy man, with dreamy eyes and a pale brow—the Byron of the fifth century B.C. He is thought to have invented a plan for making love without committing oneself. This system, under the name of “Platonic affection,” is supposed to be described in one or more dialogues, for which reason, among others, the name of Plato is frequently given by well-educated young ladies, in answer to the question, “Who is your favourite author?” To this order of criticism, also, belong such expressions as “the moonlit abyss of Plato,” by which Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton conveys the impression produced upon his mind by a study of the Sokratic philosophy.

The elaborate exposition of Mr. Grote will modify considerably these and similar views. Adopting the principle that Plato is his own best interpreter, he examines how far one consistent scheme can be deduced from the various dialogues. His conclusion is, that this great writer is not at one with himself; that numerous contradictions and inconsistencies may be observed, a result arrived at in one dialogue being not infrequently refuted in another; that, as regards method, the negative procedure,

* It should be added that Mr. Coleridge (who adopts this view) seems to have thought that the use of the *à posteriori* method in Plato was preparatory and subsidiary only; that it was to be employed in explaining the results of a more scientific process to those for whom knowledge of the results was alone requisite and sufficient. In this view, Plato's neglect of the process itself would not be absolute but relative. See “The Friend,” vol. iii. essay v.

borrowed by Sokrates from Zeno, was treated as co-ordinate in value with the affirmative; that some portions of the Platonic writings give prominence to one, and some portions to the other, and that it is a mistake to suppose that where no issue is arrived at Plato must have had some ulterior conviction in his mind—held but not expressed.

We will now attempt to describe somewhat in detail the manner in which these propositions are established.

Mr. Grote prefaces his inquiry by examining the authenticity of the Platonic writings. The works usually received as genuine comprise thirty-five dialogues and thirteen epistles. The *editio princeps* of Aldus printed all these, mainly on the authority of a catalogue, compiled by Thrasyllus in the first century A.D., and subsequent editors for the most part have not questioned the propriety of this decision. Some modern critics, however, amongst whom is Schleiermacher, have made light of Thrasyllus and his catalogue. Their view is, that the title of any given dialogue to be considered the work of Plato depends far more on the internal evidence of style, handling, and thought, than on historical tradition. They proceed as if the burden of proof lay on those who accept, rather than on those who reject the received canon. This principle Mr. Grote refuses to adopt. He considers that the presumption in favour of the catalogue of Thrasyllus is particularly strong when the Platonic writings are compared with those of the same age and country, and that the positive evidence for the authenticity of the compositions comprised in it is considerable. Mr. Grote supports his opinion by a bibliographical history of the MSS., from the time of their being deposited in the school library of the Lykeum; by way of contrast, he sketches the history of the Aristotelian MSS.; and he adds some interesting details regarding the great Alexandrine collection, and its chief librarians Kallimachus and Aristophanes of Byzantium. Altogether this chapter is very learned and curious. On the question of the genuineness of the commonly received canon, Mr. Grote considers the following facts either proved or fairly presunable.

1. The canon rests on the authority of the Alexandrine library and its erudite librarians, whose written records went back to the days of Ptolemy Soter and Demetrius Phalereus, within a generation after the death of Plato.

2. The manuscripts of Plato, at his death, were preserved in the school which he founded, where they continued for more than thirty years, under the care of Speusippus and Xenokrates, who possessed personal knowledge of all that Plato had really written. After Xenokrates, they came under the care of Polemon and the succeeding scholarchs, from whom Demetrius Phalereus

probably obtained permission to take copies of them for the nascent museum or library at Alexandria, or through whom at least (if he purchased from booksellers,) he could easily ascertain which were Plato's works, and which, if any, were spurious.

This being the positive evidence on the subject, Mr. Grote proceeds (in his 5th chapter) to consider the case set up by Schleiermacher, Ast, Socher, Munk, Hermann, and other recent critics. These writers, who differ from one another considerably, both in principle and detail, agree in disregarding the traditional authority of the Thrasyllean canon, and they agree in having created a typical or ideal Plato, which furnishes a standard whereby to measure off his writings. Anything which does not approximate to this standard, which does not satisfy "internal reasons," which is inconsistent with Sokratic and Platonic feeling, according to their estimate of it, they reject. To all this Mr. Grote objects, and with considerable vigour. He points out that these critics are by no means agreed on their type; that "Platonic feeling" is a very fickle element, which has led to the most various and inconsistent results. He asserts the theories which have been laid down respecting the general and systematic purposes of Plato to be uncertified and gratuitous, and the "internal reasons" to be only another phrase for expressing the different theories of the critics themselves respecting Plato as a philosopher and a writer.

"While adhering, therefore," (he concludes) "to the canon of Thrasyllus, I do not think myself obliged to make out that Plato is either like to himself, or equal to himself, or consistent with himself, throughout all the dialogues included therein, and throughout the period of 50 years during which these dialogues were composed. Plato is to be found in all and each of the dialogues, not in an imaginary type abstracted from some to the exclusion of the rest. The critics reverence so much the type of their own creation, that they insist on bringing out a result consistent with it, either by interpretation specially contrived, or by repudiating what will not harmonize. Such sacrifice of the inherent diversity and separate individuality of the dialogues to the maintenance of a supposed unity of type, style, or purpose, appears to me an error. In fact, there exists for us no personal Plato any more than there is a personal Shakespeare. Plato (except in the *Epistolæ*) never appears before us, nor gives us any opinion as his own; he is the unseen prompter of different characters, who converse aloud in a number of distinct dramas, each drama a separate work, manifesting its own point of view, affirmative or negative, consistent or inconsistent with the others, as the case may be. In so far as I venture to present a general view of one who keeps himself constantly in the dark—who delights to dive and hide himself, not less difficult to catch than the supposed Sophist in his own dialogue called 'Sophistes'—I shall consider it as subordinate to the dialogues, each and all: and,

above all, it must be such as to include and acknowledge not merely diversities, but also inconsistencies and contradictions."

In this view we entirely agree. But we are far from supposing that the majority of the readers of Plato will receive it. Mr. Coleridge used to say that everybody was either a Platonist or an Aristotelian, by which he meant that those who had any definite opinions usually looked at things either from the real or the ideal side. No doubt the mental peculiarities observable in people who think, and the prejudices and prepossessions of others, may be roughly opposed by some such classification as this; no doubt, also, that it is exceedingly convenient for each party to have a representative man. Now the idealists have long clung to Plato with affectionate tenacity. His is the greatest name which can be invoked in favour of the opinion that there is an unconditioned and absolute ground for all that exists conditionally—that this ground may be reached by the exercise of philosophic imagination, and that human knowledge may thereby be reduced to a system. But if Plato speaks with an uncertain voice, who shall follow him? If, as Mr. Grote maintains, it is the fact that the dialogues disclose no systematic unity of theme and purpose—that different, and even contradictory, views are worked out in them—and that the greater number do not even attempt to work out any view at all, what becomes of "the grand problem, the solution of which forms, according to Plato, the final object and distinctive character of philosophy"? Schleiermacher, Coleridge, and οἱ περὶ Coleridge, would unite in strong opposition to this theory.

Mr. Grote's criticism of the form of the Platonic writings is followed by a detailed exposition of their aim and character. Adopting the principle that the various manifestations of their author's mind cannot be resolved into one higher unity, there is no attempt to systematize, but the result of each dialogue is independently given. We believe this plan to be legitimate, but it gives to Mr. Grote's book a somewhat fragmentary appearance, and it has led him to repeat himself more than once. It also makes it somewhat difficult to throw his conclusions into a shape in which they can be conveniently represented.

We are first of all led to ask, what is the scheme and method of philosophy according to Plato? What in his opinion is knowledge? and how far (if at all) has he adhered to an authoritative creed? On these questions, which are among the most important that can be asked, this great writer announced little of his own. He was content to borrow a great part of his

dogmatic teaching from the Pythagoreans, and the most striking portion of his method from Sokrates. Now-a-days (as Mr. Grote says), in appreciating a philosopher, it is usual to ask, what positive truths, previously unknown or unproved, has he established? By what arguments has he enforced or made them good? This was not the way in which the matter presented itself to Plato or to the older thinkers whose opinions Plato followed. Philosophers are almost everywhere spoken of in the dialogues as learners and inquirers rather than teachers. In the "Phædrus" Sokrates declares the possession of wisdom to be the distinctive attribute of God—*θεῶν μόνῳ πρόκειται*: it is sufficient for man to desire it. And, in the "Republic," the essence of the philosophic character is said to consist in a keen appetite for every kind of knowledge. For this reason Plato is eloquent on the advantages of an active, restless spirit. To be astonished at everything is the feeling which will most surely rouse the habit of inquiry, and therefore constitutes the most beautiful quality of the human mind. As he poetically phrases it, "the author who described the rainbow as the daughter of Wonder, traced her genealogy well."* In nineteen dialogues out of thirty-five, this theory of philosophy is consistently kept up: all the interlocutors are at once ignorant and eager to know; all of them are jointly engaged in searching for the unknown. We find here debate, refutation, several points of view canvassed, and some shown to be untenable; but there is no affirmative result established, or even announced as established, at the close. In the remaining sixteen dialogues, together with much of the same vein of inquiry, a positive teaching may be found. Nothing can be more various than the forms into which this teaching is cast. Sometimes it is an allegory, sometimes a burst of impassioned declamation, and sometimes it takes the guise of an historical narrative; while in the amount of certainty claimed for it there is almost every degree in the scale, from rigid dogmatism to the bare suggestion of an indifferent opinion. If we inquire into the real value of this doctrinal teaching, we shall have to content ourselves for the most part with the language of apology. While every reader gratefully acknowledges that many elevating thoughts, many striking and beautiful images, are to be found in the writings of Plato, no one who reads those writings candidly will deny that the main positions enforced in them—those, that is, which are positive and Platonic—are utterly untenable. More than this: there is no first-rate genius, professedly dealing with such subjects as physics and politics, whose works have contri-

* Theat. 155. D. Καὶ ἔειπεν ὁ τῆν Ἴριον Θαύμαντος ἔργον φήσας, οὐ κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν.

buted so little to the advancement of science or to the resources of life. Take, for instance, the "Timæus," with its elaborate kosmical theory and its long disquisitions on Zoology, Anatomy, and Physiology: how much is there in the whole which it is of importance to remember? Does any anatomist, does any physiologist, owe anything to Plato in the sense in which he is under obligations to Hippocrates? Or take the "Republic"—a splendid example, it must be owned, of constructive genius,—are any of the practical problems of politics solved in it? Does it even contain the material for their after solution in the manner in which such material is supplied by Aristotle in his "Politics?" Of the "Phædrus," of the "Symposium," of the "Kritias," as of all the dialogues of exposition, it may with equal truth be said that while they give us a high opinion of their author's dramatic and imaginative powers, they contain nothing which by any stretch of probability is likely to be made of use. As to the dialogues of pure investigation our verdict must be very different. They contain a protest as emphatic as has ever been recorded against loose and hap-hazard induction, and they bring out most clearly "the force of the negative instance" on which Bacon so peremptorily insists. On the whole, then (as Mr. Grote puts it), whether we look to the quantity or quality of the writings, it will appear that the true relation which Plato bears to philosophy is more that of a searcher, tester, and impugner than that of an expositor and dogmatist: that he is more negative than affirmative, more ingenious in pointing out difficulties than successful in solving them. Now this was the idea which Plato inherited from Sokrates, and which he has carried out in fully one half of his writings—that philosophy is a process of investigation, and that only; a method, not a body of truth; a search in which the object looked for may or may not be found, but which is at all events profitable and invigorating. To the manner in which this notion is worked out may be ascribed what is really valuable in Plato. His philosophy thus centres in its method, and the key to that method is Sokrates.

Sokrates affords a striking example of the immortality which can be conferred by the admiration of a great writer. Except on two occasions his name nowhere occurs in the political history of Athens. Of the circumstances of his private life we know little or nothing. And yet there is no one either in ancient or modern times with whom we are really so well acquainted, or whom, could he be brought to life again, we should more certainly recognise. His appearance, his habits, his character, were each perfectly distinctive. A man of unusually coarse and ugly features, with thick lips, staring eyes, and a flat nose, unshod, ill-dressed, ungainly, Dr. Johnson himself was

hardly more unprepossessing. But the greatest exquisite of Athens declared that under the form of a Satyr was concealed the image of a God.* This is not too strong a way of pointing the contrast between Sokrates as he seemed to be and Sokrates as he actually was. He combined in a very unusual degree strength of body with vigour of mind and determination of character. When serving as a hoplite in the winter expedition against Potidæa he distinguished himself not merely by his activity and courage, but by his indifference to the hardships of the campaign. He was on principle, and in practice remarkably abstemious. Alcibiades mentions with admiration the fact that no one ever saw Sokrates drunk. Yet when occasion required he could show that his abstinence did not proceed from blind asceticism. Thus Plato in the "Banquet" represents him as entering freely into the pleasures of the table and being the hardest drinker of the whole party: a description which he justifies by seeing all his companions under the table, after which, it being then morning, he gets up wholly unaffected, has a bath, and proceeds as usual to the Lykeum, where he engages all day in philosophical argument and discussion. This hardihood of constitution found its analogy in his character and disposition. On the only occasion on which he was called upon to take a leading part in politics—the day on which the motion was made in the Assembly against the six generals at Arginusæ—he steadily refused, at great personal risk, to put an illegal proposition to the vote. A few years afterwards, when he was tried for his life, he showed the same independence and contempt for consequences.

"No man," he says, in the speech which he addressed on his own behalf to the jury, "knows what death is; yet men fear it as if they knew well that it was the greatest of all evils: which is just a case of that worst of all ignorance—the conceit of knowing what you do not really know. For my part, this is the exact point on which I differ from most other men, if there be any one thing in which I am wiser than they. As I know nothing about Hades, so do I not pretend to any knowledge; but I do know well, that disobedience to a person better than myself, either God or man, is both an evil and a shame; nor will I ever embrace evil certain in order to escape evil which may, for aught I know, be a good. Perhaps you may feel indignant at the resolute tone of my defence. You may have expected that I should do as most others do in less dangerous trials than mine—that I should weep, beg and entreat for my life, and bring forward my children and relatives to do the same. I have relatives, like other men, and three children, but not one of them shall appear before you for any such

* Alcibiades in Plat. "Sympos." 215.

purpose; not from any insolent disposition on my part, nor any wish to put a slight upon you, but because I hold such conduct to be degrading to the reputation which I enjoy; for I *have* a reputation for superiority among you, deserved or undeserved as it may be. It is a disgrace to Athens when her esteemed men lower themselves, as they do but too often by such mean and cowardly supplications; and you, Dikasts, instead of being prompted thereby to spare them, ought rather to condemn them the more for so dishonouring the city. Apart from any reputation of mine, too, I should be a guilty man if I sought to bias you by supplications. My duty is to instruct and persuade you, if I can; but you have sworn to follow your convictions in judging according to the laws, not to make the laws bend to your partiality; and it is your duty to do so. Far be it from me to habituate you to perjury: far be it from you to contract any such habit. Do not, therefore, require of me proceedings dishonourable in reference to myself, as well as criminal and impious in regard to you; especially at a moment when I am myself rebutting an accusation of impiety advanced by Meletus. I leave to you and to the Gods to decide as may turn out best both for me and for you.*

Had Sokrates been merely an independent, brave, and good man, he might easily have been forgotten, as many have been forgotten not less entitled to our respect and admiration. But his mind was of that order which never fails to leave a mark behind. Mr. Grote sums him up by saying that he was "the rarest intellectual phenomenon of ancient times, and the originator of the most powerful scientific impulse which the Greek mind ever underwent."† It is in this light chiefly, though not exclusively, that he appears in Plato, and in order to apprehend the view taken in these volumes of the Platonic philosophy it is necessary to form a distinct idea of the intellectual life of Sokrates and of the peculiarities of his method. The story of his life is soon told. It was spent in public discussion. For a long time, from middle age to his seventieth year, he talked and cross-questioned, and did little else. His avowed purpose was to stimulate the Athenian public to take stock of their ideas, to realize their objects in life, and to pursue them with an intelligent and conscious purpose. In his "Defence," he describes his relation to his countrymen by one of those homely and humorous images of which he was so fond. He likens the people of Athens to a large and well-bred horse, which had been suffered to become sleek and sluggish from want of work. He himself was like a gadfly, always irritating and worrying the animal, and leaving it no rest. "In this manner," he adds, "I am constantly stimulating, exhorting, and reproach-

* Grote's "Hist. Greece," viii. pp. 659-61, quoting Plat. Apol. p. 24-29.

† Preface to "Hist. Greece," vol. viii.

ing you, one by one, from morning to night, fastening on you everywhere." These words are scarcely an exaggeration of the fact. Day by day, he might have been found talking—incessantly talking—with anyone who chose to converse with him. It was a matter of perfect indifference who was the interlocutor; he was equally careless as to the time and place of his discourse. In the streets, in the market, in the pleasant suburbs of the city, at dinner with his friends, in the houses of casual acquaintance, early in the morning, far into the night, at all times and in all places, Sokrates was engaged in familiar and unrestrained conversation with men of every class and occupation. He looked on the world at large much as we may fancy an acute Nisi Prius lawyer looks at the people he meets in society. "This is a remarkable man: I wonder whether he would cross-examine well? Here is a very interesting woman: could I make anything of her, if I got her into the witness-box?" This perfect publicity and unreserve was one of the distinguishing characteristics of Sokrates as compared with other teachers. He was ready at any time to give up a long morning to the first comer. He had no school—no recognised band of disciples. He took no fee; indeed he did not profess to be able to teach. All he could do, was "to stimulate, exhort, and abuse," and by judicious questioning help his hearers to think and doubt for themselves. He neglected all profitable labour as well as all political business, and no doubt, in the eyes of industrious and ambitious citizens, he seemed to lead a remarkably idle and purposeless life. No such reproach however can justly be brought against him. His manner of spending his time is more than justified by the great results he achieved and by the strong conviction under which he acted. He fully believed that the Gods had entrusted him with a mission; that they spoke to him by oracles and in dreams, and especially by a warning or restraining voice, to which he was continually subject, which manifested itself to him when he was a child, and continued to the latest moment of his life. This voice, or sign, of whose supernatural character he was firmly convinced—*θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον*, he calls it,—would check him in the most trifling matters if he were about to do anything wrong. He was accustomed to obey it implicitly; in deference to it, he kept aloof from public life, and when he was beginning to prepare a set speech in answer to the accusation of Meletus, he abandoned his design in obedience to the injunction of his monitor. There is no reason to doubt that he felt himself constantly in the presence of a divine guide, under whose sanction he acted, and whose approval he assumed whenever he was not interfered with. It is necessary to keep in view this side of Sokrates' character, inasmuch

as he is often represented, and was, in fact, indicted, as a religious sceptic. It is true that his dialectical method, had he employed it consistently, might easily have led him in the direction of theological doubt. That, on the contrary, notwithstanding the negative vein of his philosophy, he should have been an orthodox believer, exact and attentive in his religious observances, is owing partly to a strong element of superstition in his character, and in a still greater degree to the subject to which he confined himself. The choice of that subject, and the manner in which it was handled, mark a most important era in the history of speculation, and constitute Sokrates' real claim to the title of a great and original thinker.

From the time of Thales down to the commencement of the Peloponnesian war, there had been a long course of speculation on the constitution of the physical universe. The earliest theorists found nature disguised under the forms in which it had been represented by the mythical and religious poets. To Homer and Hesiod the idea of an orderly whole never presented itself. The world, as they looked at it, was the manifestation of divine or semi-divine agency—a Pantheon or a Pandemonium, but not a Kosmos. The first effort of scientific thought was directed to the task of disengaging nature from the personal attributes which entangled it. The Ionic philosophers, and their immediate successors, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Leukippus, Demokritus, Anaxagoras, sought for a more scientific basis than the popular notion could supply—some cause and beginning of things, something, if more obscure, at least more universal and regular, than the action and volition of a God. "They fixed upon the common, familiar, widely extended material substances, water, air, fire, and they could hardly fix upon any others."* They failed in this search, but their systems (as Bacon says) have an element of natural philosophy and taste of the nature of things. This was the point which had been arrived at about the time when Sokrates was born, in the generation which witnessed the Persian invasion of Greece. Many attempts had been made to generalize the principles of physics, but there had been no effort to think out the more complicated questions of moral and political philosophy. Meanwhile a great change had been slowly operating in literature. Lyric and gnomic poetry had given way to tragedy and comedy. It was during the century of Athenian democracy—from its establishment by Cleisthenes to its abolition in the last year of the Peloponnesian war—that all the masterpieces of dramatic art were produced. Phrynichus gained his first prize in the year in which Hippias and his family were banished. Sophocles and

* Grote's "Plato," vol. i. p. 90.

Euripides both died just before the capture of Athens by Lysander. Without pretending to determine how far the democratic constitution of Athens was a necessary condition of the existence of the drama, we may safely assume that it tended greatly to its perfection. In Æschylus, and still more in Euripides, we constantly witness the contests of the dikastery and of the assembly. Difficult cases of conflicting duty, such as that which forms the subject of the *Antigone*, are perpetually arising. To argue, to persuade, to defend, to confute, is the constant business of the poet. His subject is no longer Nature, but Man. He writes with the purpose of rousing the sympathies of a vast indiscriminate audience, and to this end he uses the ordinary weapons of political warfare in a free state, appealing without reserve to the common ethical sentiment, and to the prevailing opinions and prejudices of his hearers. "In place of unexpanded results, or the mere communication of single-minded sentiment, we have a large latitude of dissent and debate—a shifting point of view—a case better or worse, made out for distinct and contending parties—and a divination of the future advent of sovereign and instructed reason."* In comparing a writer like Æschylus with one like Pindar we cannot fail to be struck with the wider range of subject and higher interest of the problems which tragedy permits itself.

It was to these questions of moral casuistry and political debate, with which the public had become familiar through the instrumentality of dramatic literature, that Sokrates turned his attention. It is important to remark that the way to this inquiry was paved for him by the literature and constitution of the democracy. A century earlier—under the paternal government of Hippias and Hipparchus—he would probably have found no one who cared to listen to him. But in an age in which every one took part in public discussion and in which every one went to the theatre, when motives both of conflicting policy, and conflicting duty were being constantly urged before the people, some kind of opinion on morals and politics would be sure to prevail. It was to these topics that Sokrates applied the resources of a singularly subtle and logical mind. He set himself to probe the mass of undefined association which constituted the basis of ordinary thought and action. He was the first, as Aristotle pointedly says, who busied himself about Ethics and sought for a definition of general terms. His position in reference to the questions he treated was analogous to that of Thales and his followers in regard to the problems of physics. Like them he sought for something wider, more accurate and

* Grote's "Hist. Greece," vol. viii. p. 462.

scientific, than the popular phraseology supplied. But here the resemblance ends. He had no sympathy with the objects of the earlier investigation. Indeed he considered it useless and irreligious to inquire into the constitution of the heavenly bodies or to speculate about the Kosmos. These were matters which in his opinion the Gods had shut out from human ken. His motto was, *Satis magnum alter alteri theatrum sumus*. His queries related exclusively to matters of everyday life, and to the sentiments and ideas prevailing in common practice—sentiments of recognised power, and ideas which were being constantly appealed to, and of which for that reason every one assumed himself to know the grounds. What is justice? What is injustice? What is knowledge? What is ignorance? What is happiness? What is virtue? What is a state?—these questions he never ceased asking. In the speech already referred to he states in a lively manner the result of his long inquiry.

“ His friend and admirer, Chærephon, had asked the oracle at Delphi whether anyone was wiser than Sokrates? The oracle declared that no one was wiser. On hearing this declaration from an infallible authority, Sokrates represents himself as having been greatly perplexed: for he was conscious of not being wise on any matter, great or small. What in the world, he thought, can the Delphian God mean by this saying? For a long time he debated the matter, and at length concluded that the declaration of the oracle could be proved to be true only on the supposition that other persons were less wise than they seemed or fancied themselves to be. To verify this hypothesis, he proceeded to cross-examine the most eminent persons in many different walks—political men, rhetors, sophists, poets, artisans. On testing them by questions, he found them all, without exception, destitute of any real wisdom, yet fully persuaded that they *were* wise, and incapable of being shaken in that persuasion. The artisans, indeed, did really know each his own special trade; but then, on account of this knowledge, they believed themselves to be wise on other matters also. So also the poets were great in their own compositions; but on being questioned respecting these very compositions they were unable to give any rational or consistent explanations—so that they plainly appeared to have written beautiful verses, not from any wisdom of their own, but through inspiration from the Gods, or spontaneous promptings of nature. The result was that these men were all proved to possess no more real wisdom than Sokrates; but he was aware of his deficiency, while they were fully convinced of their own wisdom, and could not be made sensible of the contrary. In this way Sokrates justified the certificate of superiority vouchsafed to him by the oracle. He, like all other persons, was destitute of wisdom; but he was the only one who knew or could be made to feel his own real mental condition. With others, and most of all with the most conspicuous men, the false persuasion of their own wisdom was universal and inexpugnable.”*

* Vol. i. pp. 284-5.

Any description of Sokrates would be incomplete without an example of his peculiar and original manner. The following is taken from the "Republic."* The speakers are Sokrates and Polemarchus. Polemarchus having quoted a saying of Simonides, that justice consists in giving to each man his due, is led to admit that this must mean that justice lies in doing good to our friends and harm to our enemies. Upon which Sokrates interrogates him as follows:—

S. In cases of illness, who is best able to do good to friends, and harm to enemies, with reference to health and disease?

P. A physician.

S. And, on a voyage, who is best able to do good to friends, and harm to enemies, with reference to the perils of the sea?

P. A pilot.

S. Well: in what transaction, and with reference to what object, is the just man best able to help his friends and injure his enemies?

P. In the transactions of war, I imagine—as the ally of the former, and the antagonist of the latter.

S. Good. You will grant, my dear Polemarchus, that a physician is useless to persons in sound health?

P. Certainly.

S. And a pilot, to persons on shore?

P. Yes.

S. Is the just man, also, useless to those who are not at war?

P. I do not quite think that.

S. Then justice is useful in time of peace too, is it?

P. It is.

S. And so is agriculture, is it not?

P. Yes.

S. That is to say, as a means of acquiring the fruits of the earth?

P. Yes.

S. And further, the shoemaker's art is also useful, is it not?

P. Yes.

S. As a means of acquiring shoes, I suppose you will say?

P. Certainly.

S. Well then, of what does justice, according to you, promote the use or acquisition in time of peace?

P. Of covenants, Sokrates.

S. And by covenants do you understand co-partnerships; or something different?

P. Co-partnerships, certainly.

S. Then, is it the just man, or the skilful draught-player, that makes a good and useful partner in playing draughts?

P. The draught-player.

S. Well; in bricklaying and stonemasonry is the just man a more useful and better partner than the regular builder?

P. By no means.

S. Well, then, in what partnership is the just man superior to the harp-player, in the sense in which the harp-player is a better partner than the just man in playing music ?

P. In a money-partnership, I think.

S. Excepting perhaps, Polemarchus, when the object is to lay out money ; as when a horse is to be bought or sold by the partners ; in which case, I imagine, the horse-dealer is better. Is he not ?

P. Apparently, he is.

S. And again, when a ship is to be bought or sold, the shipwright or pilot is better ?

P. It would seem so.

S. That being the case, when does the opportunity arise for that joint use of silver or gold, in which the just man is more useful than any one else ?

P. When you want to place your money in trust, and have it safe, Sokrates.

S. That is to say, when it is to be laid by, and not to be put to any use ?

P. Just so.

S. So that justice can only be usefully applied to money, when the money is useless ?

P. It looks like it.

S. In the same way, when you want to keep a pruning hook, justice is useful, whether you be in partnership or not ; but when you want to use it, justice gives way to the art of the vine-dresser ?

P. Apparently.

S. Do you also maintain that when you want to keep a shield or a lyre without using them, justice is useful ; but when you want to use them, you require the art of the soldier or of the musician ?

P. I must.

S. And so of everything else : justice is useless when a thing is in use, but useful when it is out of use ?

P. So it would seem.

S. Then, my friend, justice cannot be a very valuable thing if it is only useful as applied to things useless. But let us continue the inquiry thus : is not the man who is most expert in dealing blows in an encounter, whether pugilistic or otherwise, also most expert in parrying blows ?

P. Certainly.

S. Is it not also true that whoever is expert in repelling a disease and evading its attack, is also extremely expert in producing it in others ?

P. I think so.

S. And undoubtedly a man is well able to guard an army, provided he has a talent for stealing the enemy's plans and all his other operations ?

P. Certainly.

S. That is to say, a man can guard expertly whatever he can steal expertly ?

P. So it would seem.

S. Hence, if the just man is expert in guarding money, he is also expert in stealing it?

P. I confess the argument points that way.

S. Then, to all appearance, it turns out that the just man is a kind of thief; a doctrine which you have probably learnt from Homer, with whom Autolyceus, the maternal grandfather of Odysseus, is a favourite, because, as the poet says, he outdid all men in thievishness and perjury. Justice, therefore, according to you, Homer, and Simonides, appears to be a kind of art of stealing, whose object, however, is to help one's friends and injure one's enemies. Was not that your meaning?

P. Most certainly it was not, he replied; but I no longer know what I did mean. However, it is still my opinion that it is justice to help one's friends, and hurt one's enemies."

The effect of cross-questioning such as this was to produce on candid minds a painful feeling of incompetence and doubt. So far as we can judge, this was the precise result intended by the author. It was in like manner the result at which Plato aimed in the whole of that large portion of his writings in which he deals with the process of investigation simply. Philosophy presented itself to his mind as a tentative process, the value of which consisted far more in its mental and moral discipline, than in any body of ascertained truth as its result.

Modern readers find it difficult to share the enthusiasm which Sokrates and his disciples undoubtedly felt for this process. To spend a lifetime in talking without any hope of coming to a conclusion seems to the majority of people now, as it seemed to the public in the time of Parmenides, *ἀδολεσχία*, *useless prising*—a fruitless and a wanton waste of time. So much is this the case, that the majority of modern critics treat Sokrates' disclaimer of knowledge as a mere affectation of ignorance. And the same presumption is usually made with regard to Plato in the negative or generally Sokratic dialogues. He is regarded as a theorist employing a method expressly calculated to enforce premeditated doctrines of his own. Mr. Grote declines to take this view either of Sokrates or Plato.

Each of them, he thinks, had affirmative convictions, though not both the same. But the affirmative theory had its roots *abundant*, and was neither generated nor adapted with a view to reconcile the contradictions, or elucidate the obscurities which the negative Elenchus had exposed. It may further be observed that this negative method had a direct value in and for itself fully sufficient to justify the exclusive use made of it by Sokrates, and the great relative importance attributed to it by Plato. It bore then, as it bears now, with considerable force in two directions, one of which belongs to the theory of education, and

the other to social ethics. In different parts of his book, and without expressly connecting them, Mr. Grote dwells at length on each of these issues.

“Those,” he says, “who depreciate the negative process simply, unless followed up by some new positive doctrine which shall be proof against all such attack, cannot be expected to admire Sokrates greatly, even as he stands rated by himself. Even if I concurred in this opinion, I should still think myself obliged to exhibit him as he really was. But I do not concur in the opinion. I think that the creation and furtherance of individual, self-thinking minds, each instigated to form some rational and consistent theory for itself, is a material benefit, even though no farther aid be rendered to the process except in the way of negative suggestion. That such minds should be made to feel the arbitrary and incoherent character of that which they have imbibed by passive association as ethics and æsthetics, and that they should endeavour to test it by some rational and consistent standard—would be an improving process, though no one theory could be framed satisfactory to all.”

But not only does the habit of seeing what a thing is not, give caution to the individual mind, and put it on its guard against those hastily formed conclusions which prevail in the opinions of everyday life; it also familiarizes people with the idea of there being others who disagree with them, and thus it tends indirectly to set up a reaction against the intolerable supremacy of mere custom. We do not require to be told how great is the prejudice in our own day against any form of opposition to established traditions—what Mr. Grote calls “King law.” In the department of physical science, indeed, it is generally admitted that we are not necessarily bound by received opinion. But in politics, in ethics, in the innumerable details and relations of social life, questioning, inasmuch as it may possibly lead to change, is still felt by most people to be wrong. “No innovation, no turnpikes, no reading, no writing, no Popery! The fool saith in his heart, and crieth with his lips, ‘I will have nothing new.’”

This feeling is now universally recognised and allowed for whenever we seek to account for the action of modern society; but an effort is required to keep in view its equally constant operation in ancient times as well. Because the universal belief of the 5th century B.C. sounds ridiculous in our ears, we assume that it must have been insincere; yet there can be no doubt that the body of accustomed opinion was as strongly and firmly held in the 5th century B.C. as in the 19th century A.D. The great majority of staid respectable citizens in democratic Athens, of whom Nicias was the type,—men who had a stake in the country, who paid their way regularly, who discharged their liturgies

with judicious liberality, and always kept a stock of good heady wine in their cellars,—devoutly believed that the Gods dined together on the top of Mount Olympus, that Hermes stole the cattle of the far-darting Apollo when he was a day old, and that the forces enumerated in the second book of the "Iliad" occupied a hostile country for ten years without ostensible supplies. More than this; they considered it highly neological and wrong to question these facts, which were all authenticated by the infallible authority of Homer; and before the time of Sokrates the facts had never been publicly questioned. It is true that the critical spirit had not been inactive. For some generations indeed it had been gradually acquiring strength. More than a century before that time Xenophanes had censured many of the current narratives about the Gods. Hecataeus, a little later, rejected certain of the myths as inconsistent with historic credibility; and two generations later still Herodotus ridiculed several of Hecataeus' best stories, and treated with much contempt the Homeric notion of a circumfluous ocean-stream, the existence of the Hyperboreans, and the story of the marvellous travels of Abaris; while to the more educated judgment of Thucydides the whole Trojan legend, together with parts of the Herodotean narrative, seemed to want the necessary historical evidence. Thus there had been a partial inroad into the territory of the great king. These writers, however, appealed to a comparatively limited audience, and before it they impugned isolated portions only of the traditionary popular belief. It was reserved for Sokrates to carry the spirit and the habit of questioning into the streets—to make the defenders of common opinion publicly ridiculous, and thereby to demonstrate the insufficiency of the ordinary creed throughout the whole length of its range. This must have been a sharp, but most valuable lesson. It familiarized the public at large with the idea that there were two sides to many questions which they had always thought only to have one. A people so quick-witted as the Athenians could scarcely have heard many conversations like those reported in the "Gorgias," or that quoted above from the "Republic," without drawing some conclusions. They might dislike Sokrates personally, and think that he made the better opinion appear the worse and the worse the better. But they could not possibly fail to see that his adversaries' views had their weak side; from which they would be likely to infer that there was a stronger side elsewhere. "You, Polus," (says Sokrates in the "Gorgias,") "bring against me the authority of the multitude, as well as that of the most eminent citizens, all of whom agree in upholding your view. But I, one man standing here alone, do

not agree with you. And I engage to compel you, my one respondent, to agree with me."

Now no ordinary Athenian would have compared himself with Polus, Hippias, or Gorgias. And when these men—the professional representatives of all that was customary and of good repute—proved unable to defend their position in debate, the notion would be likely to arise, especially in the minds of the younger hearers, that, after all, the case was not so clear as it seemed, and that the other side might be worth a hearing. When such a conviction gains ground the first step is already taken towards tolerance and liberty of individual opinion.

Such and so great being the value of the negative process in Plato, what is the worth of the positive and affirmative side of his teaching? His scientific speculations, as they do not even profess to be anything more than pure imagination, may be set aside at once; but a genius like Plato may have a general system of belief whose grounds he either cannot or does not choose to lay before us, and it may nevertheless be eminently worth consideration. It is, however, indispensable that such a scheme should be coherent. If the teacher says one thing at one time and retracts or modifies it at another time, it loses the *prestige* which his unsupported authority would otherwise convey; and we are sorry to say that this is greatly the character of the Platonic philosophy. We are not at this moment referring to his theory of ideas, or of the pre-natal existence and condition of the soul, or to his description of the "heavenly place" in which the absolute forms of earthly objects are to be found. It would be quite out of place to criticise or to reflect upon these transcendental dogmas—they have their value, but they do not belong to philosophy: *ἰστί μιν οὖν ὡς ἡμῖν γέ δοκεῖ ἱερόσ μῦθος, ἀληθέστατον καὶ ἀρχαιότατον φιλοσόφημα, ἔξ δέ το πᾶν ἐρμηνέως χατίζει*. There is, however, a considerable body of teaching on more intelligible subjects—politics, education, morals, and so on, to which the objection applies, and as Mr. Grote's readers will see, in some force. We will give a few examples, out of several.

"In the 'Republic' Plato announced intoxication to be most unbecoming for his guardians. He places it in the same class of defects as indolence and effeminacy. He also repudiates those varieties of musical harmony called *Ionian* and *Lydian*, because they were languid, effeminate, and suitable for a drinking party. Various musical critics of the day impugned this opinion of Plato. They affirmed that drunkenness was exciting and stimulating, not relaxing nor favourable to languor, and that the effeminate musical modes were not congenial to drunkenness. When we read the treatise 'De Legibus,' we observe that Plato had come round to agree with these musical critics. He condemns intoxication decidedly, when considered simply as a

mode of enjoyment, and left to the taste of the company, without any president or regulation. But he considers that intoxication, if properly regulated, may be made conducive to valuable ends—~~the~~ ethical and social. Without it the old men cannot be wound up to the pitch of choric activity; without such activity, the rectitude of the choric system has no adequate security against corruption: without such security, the emotional training of the citizen generally will degenerate. Furthermore, Plato takes occasion from drunkenness to lay down a general doctrine respecting pleasures. Men must be trained to self-command against pleasures, as they are against pains, not by keeping out of the way of temptation, but by regulated exposure to temptations, with motives at hand to help them in the task of resistance. Both these views are original and suggestive, like so many other in the Platonic writings, tending to rescue ethics from that tissue of rhetorical and emotional commonplace in which it so frequently appears, and to keep present before those who handle it those ideas of an end to be attained and of discrimination as to means which are essential to its pretensions as a science.”*

In the general spirit of the treatise “*De Legibus*,” Plato approximates to Xenophon and the Spartan model. He keeps his eye fixed on the perpetual coercive discipline of the average citizen. This discipline, prescribed in all its details by the law-giver, includes a modicum of literary teaching equal to all; small in quantity, and vigorously sifted as to quality through the censorial sieve. The intellectual and speculative genius of the community, which other Platonic dialogues bring into the foreground, has disappeared from the treatise “*De Legibus*.” We find here no youths pregnant with undisclosed original thought, which Sokrates assists them in bringing forth; such as Theætetus, Charmides, Kleinias, and others—pictures among the most interesting which the ancient world presents, and lending peculiar charm to the earlier dialogues. Not only no provision is made for them, but severe precautions are taken against them. Even in the “*Republic*,” Plato had banished poets, or had at least forbidden them to follow the free inspirations of the Muse, and had subjected them to censorial control. But such control was presumed to be exercised by highly-trained speculative and philosophical minds, for the perpetual succession of whom express provision was made. In the treatise “*De Legibus*” such speculative minds are no longer admitted. Philosophy is interdicted and put in chains as well as poetry. An orthodox religious creed is exalted into exclusive ascendancy. All crime or immorality is ascribed to a departure from this creed. The early communities (Plato tells us), who were simple and ignorant, destitute of arts and letters,

* Plato, vol. iii. pp. 328-9.

but who at the same time believed implicitly all that they heard from their seniors respecting Gods and men, and adopted the dicta of their seniors respecting good and evil, without inquiry or suspicion, were decidedly superior to his contemporaries in all the departments of virtue—justice, temperance, and courage.

In the dialogue called by the name of "Hippias Major," there is a long discussion on the sentiment of Beauty—one of those attempts, of which there have been many, to ascertain the common quality the possession of which justifies us in calling a thing "beautiful." Sokrates suggests three distinct explanations, successively accepted by Hippias, and afterwards successively refuted by Sokrates:—1. The beautiful is the suitable. 2. The beautiful is the useful. 3. The beautiful is a variety of the pleasurable. The upshot is that no result is arrived at. Now in the "Gorgias" Sokrates again takes upon himself to define the Beautiful. He proposes as a definition, "that which either confers pleasure upon the spectator when he looks at it, or produces ulterior profit or good," which corresponds with two out of the three accounts given of it in the "Hippias," and there shown to be untenable. This definition is accepted without even a remark, much less an objection: Xenophon, in his "Memorabilia," has preserved a conversation between Sokrates and Aristippus on the same subject, in which the former declares that the Beautiful is coincident with the Good, and that both of them are resolvable into the Useful. This is also one of the three explanations refuted by Sokrates in the "Hippias." Now, assuming, as is likely from this coincidence, that the doctrine advanced by Sokrates in the "Gorgias" was really maintained by him,—that he thought the beauty of a thing to be determined, in a measure at least, by the usefulness of it—by the perfect adaptation of its means to its end—we have here an example of the manner in which Plato managed the reasoning of his dialogues. His object could scarcely have been to inculcate any specific teaching on the subject, or he would not have affirmed in one place what he expressly denied in another. But his intention was to get round a subject and present it in many different lights, to discuss, analyze, and distinguish, and if he did this he cared little for either inconsistency or for accurate portraiture.

If we cannot say with Mr. Coleridge that Plato's method is inductive throughout, we may fully admit the philosophical character of many of his inductions. There are isolated suggestions on education, on the nature of moral sanctions, on the relation of learner and teacher, and on the theory of punishment, which contain the substance of what the best of succeeding

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writers on these subjects have been able to say.* But they do not constitute the sum, or even the chief part of the sum of what we owe to him. The comprehensive manner in which he himself applied the method of "the double-tongued and all-objecting Zeno," and the halo of immortality which he has thrown around Sokrates—the great champion of that method—are the titles by which he holds the gratitude of the scientific world—a gratitude which his own labours in positive science would never have enabled him to earn.

Such is in substance Mr Grote's estimate of the philosophical character of Plato. He looks on him, not as a great constructive genius who occasionally made use of the negative arm of philosophy for the purpose of strengthening its positive side, still less as the idealist and poetic dreamer he is often taken to be, but as one who gave prominence at different times in his career to distinct intellectual impulses. So far as he was a pupil of Sokrates he followed out the vein so consistently worked by that eminent man, pursuing it nevertheless for its own sake, and with a distinct consciousness of its advantages, educational and scientific. So far as he was an original speculator, he yielded to the influence of an unusually fertile imagination, and constructed a scheme of the universe which would have been a good scheme had there been any evidence of its truth or any possibility of its practical application. It probably would never have been heard of in our times but for the pure and beautiful language in which it is described and for the varied resources which were brought to bear in illustrating it. In these respects the Platonic philosophy has neither rival nor second. True or false, it is the most perfect example of literary art which any age or country has produced.

ART. VIII.—LETTERS FROM EGYPT.

Letters from Egypt, 1863-65. By Lady DUFF GORDON. Second Edition. London: Macmillan and Co. 1865.

IT is beyond doubt that, generally speaking, the common English mind is peculiarly unfitted to receive, and the common English pen peculiarly unfitted to convey, just and true impressions of Eastern life and manners. Our national exclu-

* Protag. p. 324, c. ó μετὰ λόγον ἐπιχειρῶν κολάζειν οὐ τοῦ παρεληλυθότος ἔνεκα ἀδικήματος τιμωρεῖται οὐ γὰρ ἂν τὸ γε πρῶτον ἀγένητον θεῖν... ἀλλὰ τοῦ μελλοντος χάριν. ἀποτροπῆς γούν ἔνεκα κολάζει. "You are not hung for stealing a horse, but that horses may not be stolen."

siveness, our national respectability, and our national religious views, conspire to make us prejudiced observers and describers of Oriental doctrines and manners; and what is true of male writers is in a greater degree true of female writers. With the latter—or, at any rate, with the majority of them—the bigotry or partiality of our race is intensified to such a degree as to render any fair and liberal estimate of Moslem habits and feelings almost wholly impossible. The general character of books written by English ladies about Eastern people may be pretty accurately conjectured beforehand. There will be in them a certain amount of pious pity for the darkness of an unconverted people—a stereotyped Jeremiad over the profession of a faith which, at all events, has substituted the belief in one God for the belief in many gods and demons throughout the many civilized portions of the Eastern world—and a perverse interpretation of sentiments and opinions in which liberal and candid minds will recognise no very distant resemblance to the feelings and thoughts which mould the ordinary life of most Christian communities. There will be that mixture of supercilious compassion and contemptuous depreciation which betokens at once the sense of national and of sectarian superiority, and which proves the great difficulty of our acquiring a thorough acquaintance with the reality of Eastern life through the medium of such observers.

The book before us is singularly and conspicuously free from errors and impertinences of this kind. Written in the first instance to her mother and her husband, Lady Duff Gordon's letters from Egypt owe their value and effect to that outspoken frankness and vivid personality which would be lost in the conventional phraseology of a book designed for public reading. She writes as one who wishes to transfer her own thoughts and impressions to familiar minds in language which they will at once recognise and understand. Hence much that will startle some people accustomed to regard Eastern life from a certain English point of view, but more that will stamp the picture of Oriental habits and feelings on the mental retina of thoughtful readers, and will awaken a tone of reflection far deeper and more enduring than the hackneyed phrases of the humdrum tourist, or the obvious speculations of even an accomplished bookmaker.

Those who have read Lady Gordon's letters from the Cape of Good Hope will be prepared for the true liberality of mind, the generous appreciation of alien races, and the genuine admiration of goodness and intelligence which are so characteristic of these volumes. And those who have been repelled by the language of superficial astonishment and supercilious pity with which the mob of English lady-writers are accustomed to touch on the religious and social habits of "unenlightened" and "uncon-

verted" barbarians, will note with pleasure the kindly feeling and catholic charity by which Lady Gordon elicited corresponding sentiments in her Moslem followers and friends. The same respect for the opinions, and sympathy with the sufferings of others which made her the friend of the Malay and negro at the Cape, made her the friend of the Nubian and the Arab in Egypt. The same recognition of their human brotherhood evoked confidence and love, and—if her letters contained nothing beyond this—they would be valuable for the evidence which they afford of the power of charity to pierce the mail of sectarian animosity, and break down the barrier of national prejudice. That Lady Gordon may sometimes have erred in her lenient judgment of her Arab friends is not improbable; but if so, she has erred on the right and merciful side, and, had she judged more hastily of them or spoken more harshly to them it seems very questionable whether she could have extracted from them the amount of information respecting their tenets, their opinions, and their practice, which is contained in these volumes. We much doubt whether any European woman in recent times has, without a long residence in the country, and without a much profounder knowledge of Arabic than Lady Gordon professes to have attained, seen more thoroughly into the popular mind of modern Egypt, or caught its general tone more truthfully than she has done.

She differs in one striking respect from the generality of modern travellers. She does not, like them, look upon the people as mere accessories to a strange Eastern scene—like a man or woman barely visible in the foreground of one of Martin's magnificent pictures,—and having as little to do with our thoughts, feelings, and ideas, as the Sphinx, the pyramids, or the Nile. On the contrary, she regards them as men and women, of like passions as ourselves, with customs and habits moulded and modified—as are the customs and habits of all nations—by the imperious conditions of climate, soil, and government. Moreover, in these customs and forms of speech, she fully recognises the Egypt of the Bible, the Egypt over which Pharaoh reigned, and which Joseph administered. Instead of calling out for Bibles, she finds it all Bible. In the language of self-depreciation, which is still used by men of lower to men of a higher rank, she sees an illustration of the respectful modesty with which the Patriarch Jacob extenuated his own prosperity, when questioned by the Egyptian monarch. She sees Boaz sitting in the cornfield, as he has sat for so many thousand years. As she well expresses it, "this country is a palimpsest, in which the Bible is written over Herodotus, and the Koran over that: in the towns, the Koran is most visible, in the country, Herodotus." There are many ceremonies of a date

long anterior, some contrary, to those enjoined by the religion of the Moslems. And no wonder that, viewing it with so comprehensive a gaze, she shrinks from the false colouring daubed over the biblical story by the good little books with which a certain school of religious compilers seeks to saturate the minds of English youth; and she exclaims, with ingenuous indignation, "All the vulgarised associations with Puritanism and abominable little scripture tales and pictures peel off here, as the inimitably truthful representation of life and character comes out." On the pernicious effect of these "abominable little scripture tales and pictures" it would be irrelevant to dilate here: but no one who is familiar with the operations of middle-class Puritanism in Eastern countries can have failed to observe and to deplore the acid dogmatism and ignorant bigotry of the men who learned the first rudiments of religion from such a source. And—as these pages show—no more serious obstacle to the admission of Christian precepts and to a recognition of their beauty could well be conceived than the intellectual narrowness of the men who venture on the task of proselytizing the professors of another faith by obtruding on them what is new and repulsive, rather than by showing and commending the truths and excellences which are common to the two religions. That there is a common ground, not only of ethical but of Christian doctrine, between the Arabic and the European mind, several incidents narrated in these letters are sufficient to prove. Lady Gordon hints that the separation between the Turk and the Christian is more complete than between the Egyptian and the Christian; and it is not improbable that the political relations of Turkey to Christian Europe—its dependence upon states formerly despised and almost unknown, combined with a mournful retrospect of past greatness—may render the Turk an unfair observer and a partial judge even of the ethics of the Nazarene faith. Or it may be that the Turks of whom Europeans speak the most, are those who have seen the greatest number and the worst specimens of Franks,—viz., the Turks of Constantinople. And, certainly, it would be hardly reasonable to expect that a tolerant appreciation of Christian morals could be readily attained by infidels whose field of contemplation had been limited to those professors of the Christian faith whose daily life adorns that city of barbarous luxury and splendid squalor. But that the Arab and the Egyptian regard Christianity, not only without horror but even as having some principles in common with their own religion, will, we think, be clear from the following passages of this volume.

Lady Gordon is visiting a Coptic church at Bibeh, which is undergoing repairs, under the superintendence of one Girgis,

who, although a Copt, has been chosen head of a Muslim village :

"Presently," she relates, "we were joined by the mason who was repairing the church : a fine, burly, rough-bearded old Muslim, who told how the Sheykh buried in the church of Bibeh had appeared to him three nights running at Cairo, and ordered him to leave his work and go to Bibeh and mend his church ; how he came, and offered to do so without pay, if the Copts would find the materials. He spoke with evident pride, as one who had received a divine command, and the Copts all confirmed the story, and every one was highly gratified by the miracle.

"I asked Omar if he thought it was all true, and he had no doubt of it ; the mason he knew to be a man in full work, and Girgis added that for years he had tried to get a man to come for the purpose without success. It is not often that a dead saint contrives to be equally agreeable to Christians and Muslims, and here was the staunch old 'true believer' working away, in the sanctuary which they would not allow an English fellow-Christian to enter!"

Again, she says :—

"The thing that strikes me most is the tolerant spirit that I find everywhere. They say, 'Ah, it is your custom!' and express no sort of condemnation ; and Muslims and Christians appear perfectly good friends, as my story of Bibeh goes to prove. I have yet to see the much-talked-of fanaticism ; at present I had not met with a symptom of it. There were thirteen Coptic families at Bibeh, and also a considerable Muslim population who had elected Girgis their head man, and kissed his hand very heartily as our procession moved through the streets. Omar said he was a very good man and much liked."

And she loves to dwell on the pleasure invariably afforded to the more unsophisticated people of the country (out of the way of average tourists and Baksheesh) by the mere act of partaking a cup of coffee, and sitting down on the mat with them.

On the whole, Lady Gordon's narrative impresses us with the conviction that the character of the good Muslim Arab contains many qualities of the good Christian gentleman. Indeed, how could the type of Christian chivalry be better described than in the following words of the father of her donkey-driver, Hasan ?—

"I asked," says Lady Gordon, "if Abd-el-Kádir were coming here, as I had heard ; he did not know, and asked me if he were not 'Akhu-l-Benát' (a brother of girls) ? I prosaically said, I did not know if he had sisters. 'The Arabs, O Lady ! call that man a 'brother of girls' to whom God has given a clean heart to love all women as his sisters, and strength and courage to fight for their protection.'"

Or how could the great Christian virtues of justice and charity be more emphatically and comprehensibly enforced than in the

following sermon preached by the Sheikh Yoosuf among the graves of Luxor? First Yoosuf pointed to the graves—

“Where are all those people?” and to the ancient temples, “Where are those who built them? Do not strangers from a far country take away their very corpses to wonder at? What did their splendour avail them? etc. etc. What, then, O Muslims, will avail that you may be happy when that comes which will come for all? Truly God is just, and will defraud no man, and he will reward you if you do what is right; and that is, to wrong no man, neither in his person, nor in his family, nor in his possessions. *Cease then to cheat one another, O men!* and to be greedy; and do not think that you can make amends by afterwards giving alms or praying or fasting, or giving gifts to the servants of the mosques. *Benefits come from God; it is enough for you if you do no injury to any man, and, above all, to any woman or little one!*”

It might not be disadvantageous to the morality or consciences of our own snug suburban congregations, if the Evangelical incumbents who are entrusted with the task of looking after the souls of our metropolitan brokers and dealers were to diverge occasionally from the beaten path of their verbal traditions into the homely doctrines of Sheikh Yoosuf's strict and comprehensive code. “To do no injury to any man, and, above all, to any woman or little one,” is an injunction which might be profitably borne in mind by Christian bankers, trustees, and others, to whose keeping is often confided the whole worldly substance of the widow, the fatherless, and the friendless. And they might learn more accurately than many of them have hitherto learned, the harmony of the Muslim and Christian creeds in the punishment with which the Divine and the human lawgiver alike visit the oppressors of those “little ones!”

We have cited Muslim inculcations of justice, charity, and chivalry. There is another virtue which we are apt to imagine is peculiarly Christian, both in its origin and its practice, but which the disciple of the Prophet claims as a particular quality of the true believer. Those who know the Muslim only from Turkish or Indian examples, would hardly give him credit either for a practical or for a theoretical admiration of humility. Certainly it is not the Muslim virtue which is most frequently and impressively brought under the observation of Christian tourists; but this may perhaps be explained—indeed, the context of the following story indicates that it should be explained—by our own incapacity to elicit it. However this may be, the little anecdote we are about to quote shows that it is classed among the virtues of their religion. There had been an endemic sickness among the people in the neighbourhood of Luxor, aggravated by the

long fast of the Ramadán. Lady Gordon, with her usual kindness, prepared broth and other messes for the sufferers:—

“One poor peevish little man,” she says, “refused the chicken broth, and told me that we Europeans had our heaven in *this* world. Omar let out a ‘Kelb!’ (dog!) But I stopped him, and said, ‘O my brother, God has made the Christians of England unlike those of Egypt, and surely will condemn neither of us on that account; mayest thou find a better heaven hereafter than I now enjoy here!’ Omar threw his arms round me, and said, ‘O thou good one! surely our Lord will reward thee for acting thus with the *meekness of a Muslimeh*, and kissing the hand of him who strikes thy face.’”

The anecdote which we have quoted above is the key-note to the success of our author in winning the respect and love of her Muslim acquaintance. She knew neither colour, caste, nor creed in her dealings with them when they were sorry or sick. It sufficed that they were men and women afflicted and distressed, for her to minister aid and consolation. The novelty of this conduct on the part of a great Frank lady touched a chord long strange to such tenderness, and provoked from the young Sheikh Yoosuf another sermon, wherein he taught his hearers a lesson which might be of use to some of our own propagandists, viz., to look on all men—not Mussulman only—as brothers, and to regard the good deeds of others rather than their erroneous faith. Nothing can be more touching than the gratitude of the old father of Sheikh Mohammed, whom Lady Gordon tended and supplied with medicines as he lay dying in his Arab hovel. And no wonder that when she returned to Luxor from Esneh, a host of people should gather to meet her at the landing-place, and salute her with this beautiful address—“Welcome home to your place! We have tasted your absence, and found it bitter.” Nor were the advantages of this mutual good-will exclusively of a sentimental character. During the whole of her journey from Cairo to Upper Egypt, she reaped the substantial fruits of courtesy and good-nature; for she paid a little less than one-half of the ordinary price for her Nile boat and the wages of her servant Omar, who—to the great disgust of his compatriots—undertook to be cook and dragoman, both in one, and who let his Frankish mistress know that he volunteered these services in consideration of her politeness to his countrymen. English travellers are paying more and more extravagantly every year for their boats and attendance. But then, they take it out in that despotic insolence which too often accompanies the first travels of youthful opulence. This kind of man seems to travel in the East with the fixed idea that the people of the country should be alternately belaboured with cudgels and drenched with tracts.

He knocks down his donkey-drivers or his boatmen, while his mother and sisters inundate them with twopenny pamphlets, showing that they are in an utterly lost state, and are doomed to extreme perdition, unless they become Low Churchmen of the Clapham and Cheltenham type. Taken separately, the cudgelling and the tract-distributing are each sufficient to rouse a temper far more accustomed to the insolence of oppression than even that of the people of modern Egypt: taken together, they would, of course, simply be intolerable, but for the accompanying baksheesh, direct or indirect, admitted or implied, which mitigates either grievance. But although money may, in part, reconcile a servile people to whacks and thumps, it cannot reconcile a people, who love their religion, to the slights and sneers with which the arrogant Englishman regards it. "I wish," says Lady Gordon, and we share the wish—

"I wish the English could know how unpleasant and mischievous their manner of talking to their servants about religion is. Omar confided to me how bad he felt to be questioned and then to see the Englishman laugh, or put up his lip and say nothing. 'I don't want to talk about his religion at all, but if he talks about mine, he ought to speak of his own too. You, my lady, say when I tell you things, 'that is the same with us,' or that is different, or good or not good, in your mind; and that is the proper way,—not to look like thinking, *all nonsense.*'"

When shall we learn manners? When shall we learn that the highest virtue of the Christian faith involves the most tolerant judgment of opinion; and that the mode in which the great old races of mankind worship the Almighty Father of All is a subject which no truly religious mind can contemplate in any other spirit but that of reverence and humility?

But mischievous as may be the example, and painful the spectacle of the Frank traveller, cigar in mouth, arrogantly catechising the Muslim Arabs as to the rites and tenets of a faith which is to them the fullest consolation and the highest hope, more pernicious is the practice, and more odious the spectacle of the same insolent foreigner "licking the beggars," as he terms his performance, in the streets of Cairo or Alexandria. Upon this point Lady Gordon writes with strong, but not too strong indignation:—

"It is," says she, "really heart-breaking to see *what* we are sending to India now. The mail days are dreaded. We never know when some brutal outrage may possibly excite Mussulman fanaticism. They try their hands on the Arabs, in order to be in good training for insulting Hindoos. The English tradesmen here complain as much as any of the natives."

If any one wishes to see the full-fleshed insolence of vulgar English superciliousness, let him wait for the arrival of the bi-monthly mail in Alexandria, and let him see—as we have seen—the beardless ensigns, the offshoots of our bourgeoisie, hurling their schoolboy slang at the Arabs and Nubians indiscriminately, flinging sticks at their heads, and calling them “liars,” “blackguards,” “thieves,” with a profusion of supplementary Billingsgate. The puzzle of the thing is, whence comes this contempt for the Oriental races? It certainly is new—i.e., not a generation old. It seems to be a reflex of that hatred for the negro which is now so curiously characteristic of almost all Anglo-Saxons but the professional or sectarian philanthropists of Exeter Hall. But the negro of Western Africa, the negro seen in the West Indies and the North American States, is in every respect different from, and inferior to, the Arab of Egypt—inferior even to the more ignoble type of Arab who has been corrupted by the example and extravagance of the Frank sojourn in Alexandria and Cairo. He is also far inferior to the negro of Nubia, which supplies not only vigorous forms, but also acute intellects to the commercial capitals of Egypt. Why, then, should young ensigns and Calcutta clerks conspire to nickname all the dissimilar races with whom they come in contact, Arabs and Copts of Egypt—Moormen of Ceylon—Madrassesees and Bengalees—all by the contemptuous designation of “niggers?” The dislike to the negro is probably associated with some real and some imputed shortcomings of the ex-apprentice in our West Indies. And certainly those who have seen specimens of the race only in the sea-port towns of Barbadoes and Jamaica, may be pardoned for not admiring his social or industrial qualities. His slothful, dilettante, and self-satisfied style of work, his impertinence, his intense self-conceit—these prominent qualities entirely obliterate the impression made by his general cheerfulness and passive good-nature, which are more apparent in purely agricultural districts. Indeed, these worse qualities quite tried and wore out Lady Gordon’s native tolerance of disposition. Nothing can be more graphic than her story of the little black slave-girl, Zeyneb, whom she took under her protection at Cairo. This child had been sent to the American Consul from Kharthum, at eight years of age, and, when first seen by Lady Gordon, was a timid, crouching, shrinking, cowed little creature, with no will, and no semblance of a will of her own. Lady Gordon became her mistress and protector, had her taught the common domestic arts of civilized life, and when she herself went up the country, left the tiny negress under safe and kindly keeping at Alexandria. Zeyneb became a proficient in all the accomplishments of the Franks. She learned to sew, wash, cook, &c. &c. But unfortunately as

she became accomplished, she also became sulky, sullen, and self-conceited. The cowed, crouching little slave learned to be ungrateful and contemptuous; she learned to despise the mistress who had been so kind to her, and also her Arab servant, because he loved his mistress. At last Lady Gordon—the most tolerant of women—is forced to exclaim, “There is no conceit like *black* conceit;” to which all those who have had opportunities of judging will say “Amen!”

But to retrace our steps. Granted the shortcomings of the negro, or rather of that section of the negro population of Western Africa, best known in English colonies—why should all other negroes, and especially the Nubian—why should races as unlike any negro race as possible, old and noble races like the Arab, the Copt, or the higher races of India, be nicknamed “niggers?” They have not even the negro colour. They have histories and traditions of their own, as glorious as those of Highland Clans or Irish septs. They have also manners—the traditionary bequest of an immemorial civilization—which may put to shame those of the civil or military tyro who introduces himself to the Eastern world at Alexandria or Point de Galle, or Madras, by kicking, cuffing, and swearing at the people whose pens or arms he is to direct for the next thirty years of his life. There is not a Jones, Brown, or Robinson, who issues from an English grammar-school or Scotch university into the civil departments of our Indian service, who may not find himself daily confronted in his own office at Calcutta by a peon whose courteous *salâam* and dignified mien are to the shuffling awkwardness of his young master as the bearing of a cavalier to that of a Yorkshire peasant. “But they are such liars, and such lazy brutes, those Eastern fellows!” We remember when it was the fashion to talk so of all Italians. We fancy that it would not now be easy to find an Englishman bold enough to apply to the whole people of Italy language originally true only of the scum of Naples, Rome, or Leghorn.

In the same way it may become rare to apply to the mass of the people of the East, terms only applicable to the donkey-drivers or *laquais de place* of Alexandria and Constantinople. That the better classes of the East will long be misunderstood by the mob of Englishmen and Englishwomen, whether travelling or settled in the East, is probable enough. Lord Macaulay long ago pointed out the origin of the error which attributed invariable and intentional mendacity to Italians. A similar explanation may be offered on behalf of the Arabs. While bullying and “licking” may have rendered the wretched donkey-boy utterly indifferent to truth or falsehood, educated Englishman may understand that a sense of politeness, and of the cour-

tesy which he considers due to the stranger, prevents an Eastern gentleman from giving a direct negative to an assertion made with the absolute positiveness of Western speech. And, making due allowance for the different forms of language and of manner, it might not be difficult to remark in a London drawing-room, instances of a polite reticence, differing only in degree from the polite assent of the cultivated Arab.

But the wonder is, after all, why they are not all arrant liars and scoundrels, bullied as they are by strangers, and plundered no less than bullied by their own government. This is a subject of painful interest. It touches not only our moral sensibilities, but our material interests. Egypt has become one of the outlying colonies of England. It is the seat of a great English trade, and—so to speak—of an important English cultivation. We import from Egypt grain to the value of 611,880*l.* annually. We import already cotton to the value of two millions. We hope to extend this importation indefinitely. We have already invested a large capital in the country. The rare excellence of its climate and fertility of its soil seem to promise fair returns for larger investments. Much of our future wealth is bound up with the fortunes of Egypt. But those fortunes depend on the tranquillity of the country; and the tranquillity of the country depends on the security which its government extends to life, liberty, and property. We have no fear for the lives, liberties, and properties of the European population settled in the pacha's viceroyalty. They are safe enough. No pacha will lay violent hands on the subjects of France or England. No kadééh will pervert the law to their injury—at least, not in favour of a native. But this security is not all-sufficient. It is not enough that an exclusive and exceptional immunity should be given to the English, French, or Italian sojourner. Nay, this aggravates the existing evil. It tends to confirm and foster that disposition to bully the natives, which is exhibited by our beardless clerks and ensigns, but which is exhibited in a tenfold odious form by the scum of French and Italian adventurers. Without an even-handed justice—without an evenly administered law, the operations of commerce are as unsteady and uncertain as the ministrations of industry are desultory and untrustworthy. After all, the great incentive to labour is hope. But what hope is there for the man whose industry is chalked out, whose earnings may be assigned, and whose savings may be appropriated by the Government of his country? If it is thought desirable that European enterprise and capital should be introduced into Egypt, then it is absolutely necessary that the spirit of Muslim justice should pervade all contracts of hire between labourers and proprietors on the one hand, and between pro-

prietors and the Government on the other. That this is not the rule at present, may be inferred from the following account given by Lady Gordon:—

“ — is my near neighbour, and he comes in, and we discuss the government. His heart is sore with disinterested grief for the sufferings of the people. ‘Don’t they deserve to be decently governed,—to be allowed a little happiness and prosperity? they are so docile, so contented; are they not a good people?’ Those were his words as he was recounting some new iniquity. Of course, half these acts are done under pretext of improving and civilizing, and the Europeans applaud and say, ‘Oh, but nothing could be done without forced labour,’ and the poor Felláheen are marched off in gangs like convicts, and their families starve, and (who would have thought it?) the population keeps diminishing. No wonder the cry is, ‘Let the English Queen come and take us.’ You know that I don’t see things quite as our countrymen generally do, for mine is another *Standpunkt*, and my heart is with the Arabs. I care less about opening up the trade with the Soodán, or about all the new railways, and I should like to see person and property safe, which no one’s is here,—Europeans of course excepted.

“ Ismaeel Pasha got the Sultan to allow him to take 90,000 feddans of uncultivated land for himself as private property. Very well. But the late Viceroy granted, eight years ago, certain uncultivated lands to a good many Turks, his *employés*,—in hopes of founding a landed aristocracy, and inducing them to spend their capital in cultivation. They did so; and now Ismaeel takes their improved land, and gives them feddan for feddan of his new land (which will take five years to bring into cultivation) instead. He forces them to sign a *voluntary* deed of exchange, or they go off to Feyzóghloo,—a hot Siberia, whence none return. I saw a Turk, the other day, who was ruined by the transaction.

“ The Sultan also left a large sum of money for religious institutions and charities, Muslim, Jew, and Christian. None have received a faddah. It is true, the Sultan and his suite plundered the Pasha and the people here; but, from all I hear, the Sultan really wishes to do good. What is wanted here, is, hands to till the soil; wages are very high; food, of course, gets dearer, the forced labour inflicts more suffering than before, and the population will decrease yet faster. This appears to me to be a state of things in which it is of no use to say that public works *must* be made at any cost. I dare say the wealth will be increased, if, meanwhile, the people are not exterminated. Then every new Pasha builds a huge new palace, whilst those of his predecessors fall to ruin. Mohammad Alee’s sons even cut down the trees of his beautiful botanical garden, and planted beans there; so money is constantly wasted more utterly than if it were thrown into the Nile, for then the Felláheen would not have to spend the time, so much wanted for agriculture, in building hideous barrack-like so-called palaces. What chokes me is, to hear Englishmen talk of the stick being ‘the only way to manage Arabs,’ as if there could

be any doubt that it is the easiest way to manage anybody, where it can be used with impunity."

Doubtless, it would be unsafe to leave the Felláheen to labour at their own discretion for fixed wages, without careful supervision. It is not a safe thing to leave English labourers unwatched and undirected, as every country gentleman who amuses himself with amateur farming can abundantly testify. But if our countrymen are to settle in Egypt, we would suggest to them whether a little less of the "stick," and a little more of fairness (with firmness) and good wages might not procure the requisite amount of labour. And here we have great pleasure in quoting a little story which illustrates the value of "a good character" in the East. The scene is laid at Luxor.

"A worthy Copt here, one Todoros, took 'a piece of paper' for 20*l.*, in payment for antiquities sold to an Englishman, and after the Englishman was gone, brought it to me to ask what sort of paper it was, and how he could get it changed; or was he perhaps to keep it till the gentleman sent him the money? It was a circular note, which I had difficulty in explaining; but I offered to send it to Cairo to the bankers to get it cashed; as to when he would get the money, I could not say, as they must wait for an opportunity to send up gold. I told him to put his name on the back of the note, and Todoros thought I wanted it as a receipt for the money, *which was yet to come*, and was going cheerfully to write me a receipt for the 20*l.* he was entrusting to me. Now a Copt is not at all green where his pocket is concerned; but they will take anything from the English.

"Mr. Close told me, that when his boat sank in the cataract, and he remained half dressed on the rock without a farthing, four men came and offered to lend him anything. While I was in England last year, an Englishman, to whom Omar acted as *laquais de place*, went away, owing him seven pounds for things bought for him. Omar had money enough to pay all the tradespeople, and kept it secret, for fear any of the other Europeans should say 'shame for the English;' he did not even tell his own family. Luckily, the Englishman sent the money by the next mail from Malta, and the sheykh of the dragomans proclaimed it, and so Omar got it; but he never would have mentioned it otherwise."

A character of this kind, proved and tested by daily practice, would, with the co-operation of just laws, raise the moral standard of the neighbouring people, and increase the material wealth of the country, beyond the hopes of the most intelligent natives, or the most benevolent strangers.

Nor has the old Biblical virtue of mercifulness to animals lost its savour in the East, though Christian ministers in England seldom deign to inculcate its observance on their congregations. The Dean of Westminster will be gratified to learn that his old

dragoman, Mahommad, has remembered him—as, “Sheykh Stanley”—in connexion with this virtue. “And in truth,” he said, “he is a Sheykh, and one who teaches the excellent things of religion. Why, he was kind even to his horse, and it is of the mercies of God to the English, that such a one is the Imâm of your Queen and Prince.”

We cannot conclude without a brief notice of the Muslim theory of married life. Of course, all untravelled Englishmen have made up their minds that a harem is merely a convenient phrase for a systematized and unlimited sensuality. Despite what preceding travellers have said, and Lady Gordon says here, a notion, justified perhaps by the usual conditions of a sultan’s or a pacha’s life, continues to retain its place among the conventional superstitions of Englishmen. But in Egypt, and indeed in Turkey, among the middle and lower classes, it would seem as if polygamy had its duties as well as its privileges; perhaps we ought rather to say, that it is regarded more as a duty under certain circumstances, than as a privilege: at least, we should infer this from the following story:—

“I heard a curious illustration of Arab manners to-day. I met Hasan, the janissary of the American Consulate, a very respectable, good man. He told me he had married another wife since last year. I asked, What for?

“It was the widow of his brother, who had always lived in the same house with him, like one family, and who died, leaving two boys. She is neither young nor handsome, but he considered it was his duty to provide for her and the children, and not let her marry a stranger. So you see that polygamy is not always sensual indulgence; and a man may thus practise greater sacrifice than by talking sentiment about deceased wives’ sisters. I said, laughing, to Omar, as we went on, that I do not think the two wives sounded very comfortable. ‘Oh, no! not comfortable at all for the man, but he take care of the woman; that is what is proper. That is the good Muslim.’”

But it is almost impossible for us English folk thoroughly to understand the delicate rules of etiquette which govern the relations of the sexes in the East. For instance, it is quite shocking for a married woman to speak of her “husband.” She must talk of him as “the master,” “my lord,” or “father of my son.” On the other hand, a man never mentions his wife to another man; but there is no impropriety in his discussing the most sacred and secret subjects of conjugal life with a woman. As her faithful servant Omar expressed it: “Of course, I not speak my harem to English gentleman; but to good lady can speak it.” To those Englishmen who have a notion that unlimited and

irresponsible indulgence of the passions is sanctioned by Muslim practice and religion, we commend the answer given by an old Turk, whom an Englishman was chaffing about his domestic arrangements in that delicate manner peculiar to our race in foreign parts: "Well, young man, I am old, and was married at twelve; I have seen, in *all* my life, seven women; four are dead; three are happy and comfortable in my house; *where are all yours?*" We may remark, by the way, that as a woman is never "seen" but by her lord and master, the word has acquired a peculiar signification.

It is clear to us that the life of the harem has yet to be written; and it can only be written by a woman, for none but a woman can ever see it; and to be of any use at all, it must be written by one who unites several distinct qualifications. First, she must know Arabic; next, she must have some previous knowledge of the customs of the country; thirdly, she must bring to her task a mind free from prejudice, tolerant of foreign maxims and usages, together with a kindness and courtesy of manner, which will remove suspicion and inspire confidence. An educated Englishwoman, whose social position, catholic charity, largeness of view, and accuracy of observation, while they gave her a passport to the best native families, would also enable her to see and comprehend not only the external fringe of the domestic economy, but the nature and direction of domestic opinion in Egypt, might render a great service to Egypt and to England, by bridging over the gulf which now separates the intelligent classes of both countries. There is, indeed, already a kind of social intercourse between Europeans and Egyptians at Cairo and Alexandria, as there is between Europeans and Turks at Constantinople; but it is not exactly the most satisfactory kind. Raffish adventurers, unscrupulous speculators, loose men, and fast or eccentric women, are as unsatisfactory representatives of French or English life as those semi-Europeanized orientals, who return from the lycées of France, or academies of Scotland, eunuchs in religion and epicenes in patriotism, are of the sterling qualities of the East. It is only when the best female culture of Europe has penetrated the recesses of the harem, and given a flavour to the life of Eastern women, that intercourse, easy, friendly, and familiar, can take place between the races. And it seems to us that Lady Gordon has some of the special qualifications for such a mission as we have spoken of. She has no bitterness of sectarian belief; she has no prejudices of colour. She does not go into an Arab family with a cut-and-dried lecture on their "blindness and ignorance," and her own superior "privileges." She does not see unmixed goodness, justice, charity, and rectitude in the most ultra-christian propagandist. She does not

—like the characteristic presbyterian whom she quotes—see in the tried virtues of the trustworthy Arab servant only the operations of the devil. She recognises, in the disciple of the Koran, many of the principles which the disciple of the Bible is bound to carry out in practice, and was once not too spiritual to recommend by preaching. Her whole intercourse with the people among whom she dwelt, and the narrative of that intercourse which these pages embody, bear witness to the accuracy of observation, justness of thought, and love of equity, which characterized the writings of John Austin, and have been inherited by his daughter.

To women of this kind, possessing, perhaps, a profounder knowledge of Arabic than Lady Gordon professes to have acquired, and endowed with robuster health than she, unfortunately, enjoys, it may be reserved to effect the greatest social revolution in the East, by contributing to the emancipation of Eastern women from those trammels of ignorance and frivolity which most fetter them in the early education of their children, and thus prevent their sons from attaining the virile standard of European principle and thought. When the women of the East have been educated—not so much by books and lectures as by the companionship of accomplished and kindly European women—then we may expect to see a race of men arise superior to their fathers, not only in learning and science, but in the diffused practice of those virtues which we are too apt to consider the special inheritance of Western civilization. And for such teaching as this Egypt offers a field of greater and readier promise than any other portion of the Eastern world.



CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE.

The Foreign Books noticed in the following sections are chiefly supplied by Messrs. WILLIAMS & NORGATE, Henrietta-street, Covent-garden, and Mr. NUTT, 270, Strand.

THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

THE instalment now before us of the Bishop of Natal's work on the Pentateuch is in many respects the most important of any which have appeared.¹ As the author has entered more fully into his subject, he has acquired a firmness of grasp upon it which shows itself in an increased vigour of style, and some of the new matter to which we are here introduced is of the highest interest. It is, however, a volume especially for the student, and, from the multifariousness of its divisions, not altogether inviting to any who are not anxious to grapple with the whole subject of which it treats. We have first a preface, pp. xlvi., in which the Bishop deals in his usual kindly and courteous manner with some of his critics and opponents, principally with Bishop Browne of Ely, whose efforts to extricate himself from the accumulated proofs of a composite authorship of the Pentateuch are really pitiable. In the work itself Bishop Colenso displays in detail the proofs of the diversity of hands which have been employed upon the book of Genesis, and undertakes to distribute the several portions of it as nearly as possible to the several authors, endeavouring to fix from internal evidence (for external evidence is, of course, entirely absent) the times about which they must have lived. It is still generally supposed, even by those who have been compelled to admit that the diversity in the divine names implies some diversity of authorship in the earlier parts of the Pentateuch, that this is the only phenomenon which points to that conclusion. It is, however, only one of many others. It is in this work shown in detail that the style and verbal usages or phrases common in the other parts of Genesis do not occur in the Elohist portions; while the distinction is equally remarkable in sentiment and religious conceptions between the Elohist and Jehovist portions of Genesis. The strong anthropomorphic expressions which ascribe human actions, passions, and affections to the Deity are characteristic of the latter; as, for example, the details of the second history of creation, the events in Paradise, the repenting and being grieved; shutting up Noah and smelling a sweet savour; coming down to see Babel and Sodom; eating bread and meat; tempting Abraham. Moreover, it is only the Jehovist who multiplies curses, and dwells upon the darkest passages in the histories of the patriarchs. So that if the history of Abraham, for instance, be taken solely from the supposed Elohist document, his character is

¹ "The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua critically examined." By the Right Rev. John William Colenso, D.D., Bishop of Natal. Part V. London: Longman and Co. 1865.

without flaw ; to the later additions are due the story of his deception as to Sarah at the court of Pharaoh, and afterwards at the court of Abimelech—on which latter occasion Sarah was an old woman of ninety, yet miraculously pregnant with Isaac—the hard-hearted expulsion of Hagar and Ishmael, the willingness to make a burnt-offering of Isaac, the taking Keturah to wife when he was apparently a hundred and thirty-seven years old (xxiii. 1), and having six children by her, although he had been too old, naturally, for begetting children at ninety-nine (xvii. 17 ; xviii. 12). There are also discrepancies in the duplicate narrative of the Deluge, and of the lives of the patriarchs (pp. 45—47). But neither is the whole of the non-Elohistic matter homogeneous, of which a salient instance is found in Genesis xiv., which has no relation with any other part of Genesis, is a mere episode, and represents Abraham as a powerful sheikh, with 318 trained servants in his house, of which there is no trace in any other part of the history, and which is inconsistent with the timidity which he subsequently shows at the court of the petty prince of Gerar, who takes his wife from him. There appear also to be a small number of verses even in Genesis due to the author of Deuteronomy, who has been shown already to have written about the time of Josiah, and who revised or edited the previously existing Tetrateuch. Moreover, there seems reason to believe that there was a second Elohistic writer, who may possibly be the same with the Jehovist, writing under some variation of purpose or circumstances. On a more thorough analysis of the documents, Bishop Colenso finds his original opinion confirmed, that Samuel may have been the Elohistic—which, on the whole, is the most conservative hypothesis of which the facts admit—and he arranges the results of his investigation of the signs of time to be found in the books in the following table, according to the usual chronology:—

	B. C.	Contemp. Prophet.
<i>Elohistic</i> . . .	1100—1060 Samuel.
<i>Second Elohistic</i> . . .	} 1060—1010 Nathan.
<i>Jehovist</i> . . .		
<i>Second Jehovist</i> . . .	1035 Gad.
<i>Deuteronomist</i> . . .	641—624 Jeremiah."—p. 180.

After a detailed analysis of the book of Genesis by means of other marks and signs of time than the use in its several portions of the names Elohim or Jehovah, it remains to compare the result so obtained with that which would be presented if the use of those names were considered as the test of the authorship of the several parts. And it appears that the Elohistic, writing, as is supposed, in the time of Samuel, has used Elohim eighty-eight times—Jehovah not at all ; the second Elohistic or first Jehovist (in the last years of Saul), Elohim, twenty-two times—Jehovah not at all ; the second Jehovist (in the second decade of David's reign), Elohim, sixty-seven times—Jehovah, seven ; the third Jehovist (in the latter part of David's reign), Elohim twenty-nine times, and Jehovah eighty-nine ; the fourth Jehovist (in the time of Solomon), Elohim twenty times, and Jehovah fifty-two. And the conclusion is, that the name Jehovah became more and more freely

used as the name of the covenant God of Israel after the days of Samuel. It is possible the passages distributed in sets to the first, second, third, and fourth Jehovist, may not have been written by more than one hand, for such a man as Nathan may have written the first of these sets, in which Elohim is still used exclusively, under Saul at the age of twenty, and the last, in which Jehovah predominates as five to two, under Solomon at the age of seventy. It is, however, evident, from the thorough analysis to which the Pentateuchal writing have been subjected by continental scholars, and now in our own country by Bishop Colenso, that the personal identification of the authors is at once beyond our reach, and of altogether inferior or of no importance. The only really important conclusion on that side of the inquiry is a negative one, determining that the books are not those of Moses, and are, in fact, anonymous. But the positive conclusions which follow from these examinations are of great consequence; namely, that we have evidence in these writings of the growth and variation of the religious conceptions of the Jews as to the object of their worship. The thorough analysis which has been presented in this volume of the book of Genesis, may seem to some to be unnecessarily detailed; but it should be borne in mind that the detail was not only necessitated to the author from the nature of the case, but that he would naturally feel himself compelled, by the unfairness with which his criticisms have been treated in England, to omit no step or particular of the investigation which has led him to his particular conclusions. If a single jot or tittle had been omitted, it would have been said that he had not stated the whole of the case—however unimportant it may be to the majority of readers to discuss whether this or that verse belongs to the second or third set of Jehovistic insertions. In order to place the main result more clearly before the reader, our author has exhibited *in extenso*, in a new translation, the several documents of which the book of Genesis has been made up. Not that documents is the word we should employ, for it does not appear that the history was welded together out of so many independent narratives: rather, there existed an original narrative, called here the Elohistie, to which various additions were made from time to time during that period in the life of the Israelitish nation, when certain changes in their ecclesiastical constitution were going on, and certain modifications in their ideas as to their national Deity. Of the separate constituents of the book as here drawn out, the "Elohistie narrative" is incomparably the most important, and carries conviction that it must have existed very nearly as now exhibited, as a consistent and coherent whole, before the other parts of the book, as we now have it, were added to it.

After setting forth the order in which the additional layers may be conceived to have been superimposed upon the original history, and showing thereby how the worship of God as Jehovah came to preponderate more and more, the enquiry naturally arises—whence came the name of Jehovah, what was really implied in that name or title, and in what way does He seem to have been actually worshipped among the Jews? For these enquiries, though they belong in a certain sense to a later period of the history itself, are naturally anticipated

here by reason of the introduction of the name Jehovah, by the later interpolators, into a period to which it did not chronologically belong. The name Jehovah, or Jahveh, has, as Ewald acknowledges, no certain derivation in Hebrew, and there is considerable probability that it was derived from the Phœnicians. It is at least clear that the name of the Phœnician sun god, in one of his attributes, was expressed both by heathen and christian writers by the same letters in Greek, ΙΑΩ, which they used to express the Hebrew Jah or Jahveh. The Bishop gives, in an appendix, a translation, abridged from Movers, on this subject. Then, connected with this enquiry, arises another—whether there are traces of the worship of Jehovah among the Jews having resembled that which the Phœnicians are known to have offered to their god Baal. In Chapters 19 and 20, which will be read with the greatest interest, perhaps, of any in the book, are drawn out the proofs of the prevalence in Israel of corrupt forms of worship, both in the way of bloody and sexual pollutions, intimately intermingled, to say the least, with the worship of Jehovah:—

“In all this, then, we have very strong evidence to show that the worship of Jehovah began among the Hebrews, and was long continued among them, as regards the great mass of the people, in the same low form in which it already existed among the Canaanite tribes; and that it was only gradually purified from its grosser pollutions by the long-continued efforts of those great prophets whom God raised up for the purpose from time to time in different ages—aided, no doubt, in this work by the sorrowful national calamities which befel them, and probably also in some measure by their coming in contact, during the time of the captivity, with those divine truths which were taught in the Zoroastrian religion.”—p. 299.

It would not be possible to give any view which can do justice to it, of the complete “Critical Analysis of Genesis,” extending through 261 pp. of a separate paging, in which each verse and word when necessary is submitted to a thorough scrutiny, and the criticisms examined in detail of the most eminent modern scholars who have gone over the same ground, particularly Boehmer and Hupfeld; nor can we afford space for more than a mere referencé to the extremely interesting matter in the appendix. Appendix I. gives an abridgment of Professor Dozy’s work “*De Israelieten te Mekka*” (“Westminster Review,” No. LII. p. 484), of which the design is to show the probability of Mekka having been founded by the Sineonites, who disappear in a remarkable manner from the history of the Jews before the time of Solomon, as already remarked by Bishop Colenso himself (Part III., 817). Appendix II. treats of the Elohistic and Jehovistic Psalms in reference to the remarks made upon the author’s previously expressed opinion by Mr. Perowne and Bishop Browne of Ely. It is difficult to suppose otherwise than that these controversialists merely wrote for the sake of persons who would never read Bishop Colenso—they certainly meet here with an exposure of haste and inconsistency as ruthless as it is courteous. The third appendix consists of the abstract from Movers, “*Die Phœnizier*,” already mentioned. And thus while the Bishop of Natal has been denounced by persons of narrow understandings for undermining the foundations of the faith in demonstrating the base-

less character of much of the Pentateuchal history, he has been contributing most valuable material to history of a higher kind than any which his persecutors are capable of appreciating, and the general bearing of his labours may be illustrated in the following passage:—

“The beggarly condition of the Levites in the early days of David, as revealed in Gen. xlix. 5—7,—the claims advanced on their behalf in a later day for a liberal maintenance, as shown in the laws of Leviticus and Numbers,—their increased influence but diminished numbers in Josiah’s time, as implied in the Book of Deuteronomy,—the elaborate ritualistic directory which may perhaps have been copied from that of the Tyrian worship, and may represent the system which was meant to be enforced—but never actually was enforced—in the Temple of Solomon,—the minute specifications for the building of the Tabernacle, which read almost as if they were actually taken from the ‘working drawings’ of the Temple itself by some one who was personally concerned in its erection, and may perhaps give us some idea of the gorgeous Temple which Hiram built for the ‘Tyrian Hercules,’ and which Solomon is believed to have imitated,—the injunction which *commands* human sacrifices, Lev. xxvii. 28, 29, and the narrative in Gen. xxii., which, while not condemning—rather approving—yet seems intended to discourage them;—all these, and a multitude of other similar notices, require only to be freed from the restraints of conventional, traditionary interpretations, and they will at once become instinct with life and meaning. In short, the whole Pentateuch, to the critical eye, is pregnant with history; and the driest details of the Levitical law may yield some fact of interest and importance, to illustrate the course of religious development in Israel.”—p. 309.

Only a few clergymen here and there have ventured, in the face of an organized discouragement of free opinions, ecclesiastical, political, and social, to avail themselves of the liberty of criticising the Biblical writings unfettered by any theory of supernatural inspiration.² The timidity exhibited by them as a body would excite our unbounded surprise, if we did not believe it to be largely due to a *bonâ fide* ignorance. Mr. Desprez is not one of these timid people; and he has shown a sincere purpose of finding out the truth, and of enabling others to appreciate it also. Some years ago, Mr. Desprez published a work on the Apocalypse, which has gone through three editions, and met with great approval in many quarters;³ he maintained from the internal evidence of the book that the accomplishment of its visions was to be sought for in the events of the great Jewish war, and the date of its writing therefore to be fixed somewhat earlier; but he did not abandon the supposition of its being a prophecy in the usual sense of the word. Many, therefore, who applauded the former work, will no doubt be greatly shocked at the more recent one; for Mr. Desprez may be said to have been the first clergyman who has availed himself in a practical and effectual manner of the liberty which has been declared to belong to them. The result

² “Daniel; or, the Apocalypse of the Old Testament.” By Philip S. Desprez, B.D., Incumbent of Alvediston, Wilts. With an Introduction by Rowland Williams, D.D., Vicar of Broad-Chalke, Wilts. London: Williams and Norgate. 1865.

³ “The Apocalypse fulfilled in the consummation of the Mosaic Economy and the Coming of the Son of Man.”

is very shattering to a stronghold of orthodoxy. The book of Daniel is generally supposed to contain in more than one passage chronological prophecies fixing the time of the appearing of Messiah, and thereby identifying him inevitably with Jesus of Nazareth. If Mr. Desprez shall prove to have been as successful in his treatment of the Apocalypse of the Old Testament as he was acknowledged to be in the case of the Apocalypse of the New, he will have dealt as severe a blow at the whole theory of Messianic prophecy applicable to Jesus, as he did in the other work at the "Evangelical" identification of the Scarlet Woman of the Revelation with Papal Rome.

"In endeavouring," says Mr. Desprez, "to establish for the book of Daniel a date later by more than four centuries than that usually assigned to it, and in attempting to show, that however it may incorporate fragments of more ancient history, in its present form it is not earlier than the age of Antiochus Epiphanes, it will be necessary to enter into the consideration of the following points of inquiry:—I. *The diversity of style in which the book is written.* II. *The place occupied by the book in the Hebrew Canon.* III. *The use of Greek words.* IV. *The style of the book differing from the writings of the Captivity* V. *The historical character of the book extending to, but not far beyond, the Age of Antiochus Epiphanes.* VI. *The seemingly marvellous narrations and historical inaccuracies which have aroused suspicion from the earliest times.*"—pp. 8, 9.

On all these grounds he finds reason for affixing to the book a later date than that usually assigned to it. And whatever the date to which it might be attributable, the predictive, or quasi-predictive portions of it, admit of no other solution than that which is presented by the circumstances of the Maccabean period. When the issue of the struggle between the Jews and their oppressors yet hung doubtful in the scale, our author conceives a patriotic Jew to have encouraged his countrymen by setting before them visions of success under the name and authority of Daniel. Mr. Desprez shows very successfully that the several visions met with in the book of Daniel relate to the same, or to parts of the same series of events; that the symbols of the Great Image (ch. ii.), the Four Great Beasts (ch. vii.), the Ram and the Goat (ch. viii.), together with the explanatory vision (chs. x. xi. xii.), refer to events comprised within a definite period during the sway of certain Babylonian, Medo-Persian, Macedonian, and Syro-Egyptian kings. It is customary to identify the fourth kingdom with the Roman Empire, in order to be able to interpret the Stone cut out of the mountains of the establishment of Christianity. But Mr. Desprez says:—

"That by the Fourth Great Beast the Roman empire is not signified, would seem plain from the circumstance that the above-named kingdom cannot with accuracy be said to succeed the three first kingdoms; the sway exercised by these being chiefly, if not entirely, Asiatic, and extending beyond the River Euphrates, whereas that river was the eastern limit of the Roman empire. Added to this, the Romans were not the immediate successors of the empire of Alexander, neither can their kingdom be said to have followed the Macedonian as the Babylonian was followed by the Medo-Persian; the kingdom immediately succeeding the Asiatic rule of the successors of Alexander being

that of the Parthians, and these were never brought under the Roman yoke." —p. 87.

The fourth kingdom being acknowledged to be the Syro-Egyptian, and not the Roman, there is little difficulty in the identification of the "little horn" (vii. 8, 24; viii. 9) with the king of the fierce countenance (viii. 23), and the vile person (xi. 20) as Antiochus Epiphanes. And there remains only one important prophecy for discussion—that of the seventy weeks, in respect to which Mr. Desprez makes a suggestion of great ingenuity and, as we believe, original. It is easy to show that any interpretation which assumes the cutting off Messiah the Prince to be a prediction of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ, is hopelessly at a loss for a *terminus a quo*, a starting-point for the weeks, and equally at a loss for an accomplishment of the 'confirming the covenant with many for one week,' &c. In fact, if the prophecy were a prediction miraculously inspired of the time at which Christ should suffer, it would be inconceivable that there should be any difficulty in verifying the epochs of commencement and of close of the period embraced by it—the anticipated calendar of the prophecy and the actual almanac of events would be found to coincide like two equal triangles laid one upon the other. But although such observations may be fatal to the ordinary interpretation of this celebrated passage, is it possible to show a historical correspondence with what it requires, supposing it to be a prophecy *post eventum*, for in that case also it must have had a meaning, and must have been intended to describe, not what was about to happen, but what had happened? For, even if we date the commencement of the seventy weeks, as is most probable, from the going forth of the word [of the Lord] to Jeremiah, when Nebuchadnezzar set himself against Jerusalem (Jer. xxxii.) B.C. 590, the seventy weeks would run out about a century before the Christian era, when the history is not seen to be culminating in any remarkable events. Observing, then, that the sum of seventy weeks is made up of seven weeks, sixty-two weeks, and one week, Mr. Desprez suggests that it is not necessary to suppose the sixty-two weeks to be subsequent to the first seven; they may have had the same starting-point; the rebuilding of the city at the end of the seven weeks being typical, as it were, of the second rebuilding by Judas Maccabeus at the end of the sixty-two weeks. Judas then is the Messiah cut off—*ve ayn lo*, 'and there is not (a helper) to him.' Of the identification of the Messiah cut off with Judas Maccabeus we have no doubt, but feel considerable difficulty in counting the sixty-two weeks and the seven weeks from the same starting-point, in the face of the words, "seventy weeks are determined," &c. We can only further slightly notice the concluding chapter of Mr. Desprez's work, in which, while rejecting the notion that Daniel spake consciously of Jesus Christ, he considers the book of Daniel, together with the book of Enoch and other writings of the same class, to have contributed to form the Messianic conceptions which were current among the Jews in the time of Christ, and which were shared by Jesus Christ himself. It is possible, indeed, that the eschatology attributed to Jesus in the Synoptics may be due to a distortion of what he really said through the medium of the imaginations of his followers; but if his

sayings as to the last day and the revelation of the Son of Man, &c. are accurately reported, he must have shared expectations which were falsified by the event. The whole of this last chapter we very much recommend for perusal. What will become of the "argument from prophecy" after such investigations as Mr. Desprez's does not at this moment concern us, nor does he feel, perhaps, that it concerns him as a follower of truth: as such we wish him God speed.

The variations which the Christian doctrine has undergone in the course of ages proves a great difficulty to High Church and Low Church, to Roman Catholics and Protestants. These variations are not the least striking in reference to the doctrine of the Atonement;⁴ and in the case of this, as of other dogmas, controversialists are more successful in showing the developments held by their opponents to be inconsistent with original or primitive Christianity, than in justifying their own. Thus Mr. Oxenham is triumphant in proving the absence of the "Evangelical" conception of the Atonement from the writings of the fathers and doctors of the Church, but less so in vindicating or reconciling their teaching severally. Of the first three centuries he says, as we believe, correctly, "There is no trace of the notion of vicarious satisfaction, in the sense of our sins being imputed to Christ, and His obedience imputed to us;" or again, "of the notion that God was angry with His Son for our sakes, and inflicted on him the punishment due to us;" "there is no mention of the justice of God in the forensic sense of the word;" "the term satisfaction does not appear in this connexion at all, and when Christ is said to suffer for us, *ὑπὲρ* (not *ἀντι*) is the word always used;" the early patristic writers "speak of our being reconciled to God, not of God being reconciled to us."—pp. 28, 29. In Irenæus and Origen the death of Christ becomes a ransom from Satan, the latter father combining the notion of a satisfying of the claim which Satan had acquired over mankind with that of a sacrifice to God. Throughout the subsequent patristic period these two views are also concurrent, but it was not imagined that "either the Incarnation or the Cross effected a *change* in the mind of God towards us." Mr. Oxenham then shows how the *Cur Deus homo* of Anselm formed an epoch in the history of the doctrine of the Atonement. The theory which had prevailed in the Church for a thousand years, of a ransom paid to Satan by the death of Christ, is in it expressly rejected; but the theory of a debt incurred to God takes its place. By sin man has robbed Him of his honour. The consequent debt is greater than the whole universe, and man has nothing wherewith to pay it. But God cannot suffer anything to mar the perfection of his kingdom. The satisfaction, to be equal to the sin, must be greater than anything outside God. "The debt was so great that none but God could pay it, and none but man owes it; therefore One must pay it who is God and man." So that

⁴ "The Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement: an Historical Inquiry into its Development in the Church. With an Introduction on the Principle of Theological Developments." By Henry Nutcombe Oxenham, M.A., formerly Scholar of Balliol College, Oxford. London: Longmans. 1866.

Christ's death was regarded by Anselm, not as a punishment inflicted on Him by the Father for our sins, but as a voluntary payment of a debt which we could not discharge for ourselves. In the system of Thomas Aquinas the idea of vicarious satisfaction is developed: "satisfaction is defined as giving to the offended party something he loves as much as he hates the offence, or more." Duns Scotus, on the other hand, contradicted much of the Thomist "and the whole Anselmic view of satisfaction." The punishment due to sin is no otherwise infinite than as the will continues sinful, and God might punish it for a single day, and then annihilate the soul. There was therefore no *necessity* for a restoration of the human race at all, and the redemption might have been effected in other ways. But Christ offered his Passion to the Father for us, and we are not the less indebted, but more, since he might have redeemed us without it. For an infinite merit is here substituted a voluntary acceptance, "while the denial of an infinite debt removes any plea for the necessity of an infinite satisfaction." But further, according to the Thomist view, had there been no Fall, there would have been no Incarnation, for no satisfaction would have been requisite; according to Scotus, "Christ would in any case have come to be the Second Adam and Head of the mystical body." The doctrine of the Reformation, which had been already shadowed forth by Wickliffe, of an imputation of our guilt to Christ, of a punishment vicariously endured by Him, and of an imputation of his merits to us, is foreign both to the earlier patristic and to the Scotist modes of representation, which latter has become chiefly prevalent in the more recent Roman Theology. There is even a recoil from the old Lutheran doctrines in some modern Lutheran divines, such as Nägelsbach and Rothe, who present the redemption operated by Christ as a full union of God and man, to which self-oblation or sacrifice is necessary, but not substitution. Nor can the Incarnation have been contingent upon the Fall, for "it is opposed," as Kurtz says, "to all Christian feeling and consciousness, that we should owe it and the deification of our nature only to sin" (p. 180). Mr. Oxenhan, as may be supposed, considers the restoration wrought out for man by the Incarnation to be continually operating in the Church in the Eucharist, wherein are ever present the true deity and humanity of the Lord—for "there is an inseparable union between the sacrifice of the altar and the sacrifice of the Cross." The sacrifice is not repeated, but continued; for, by a wondrous miracle, Christ, at his Last Supper consecrated the eucharistic elements to be for ever the veil and vehicle of his perpetual oblation of himself. Here on earth the sacrifice is continued "through the ministry of his representatives, as in the courts of heaven directly by himself." And in the doctrine of the One Sacrifice is implied that of the real presence; for "if the oblation is the same, the thing offered must be the same too," though the manner of the oblation be different. If, indeed, the unity of the sacrifice be pressed, of which "the duration does not prevent its being one and indivisible" (Döllinger), it not only carries with it the doctrine of transubstantiation of the sacramental elements, but, as far as we can see, the transubstantiation of the priest. This doctrine has not as

yet been developed. Mr. Oxenham contents himself with quoting a statement in the Tridentine Catechism :—

“Sed unus etiam atque idem Sacerdos est, Christus Dominus; nam ministri, qui sacrificium faciunt, non suam, sed Christi Personam suscipiunt, cum ejus Corpus et Sanguinem consociunt. Id quod et ipsius consecrationis verbis ostenditur. Neque enim sacerdos inquit ‘Hoc est Corpus Christi,’ sed ‘Hoc est Corpus Meum,’ Personam scilicet Christi Domini gerens, panis et vini substantiam in veram Ejus Corporis et Sanguinis substantiam convertit.”—p. 177.

Here is at least the germ of another “development.” Nor is it pretended by Mr. Oxenham that the Catholic would be justified in pronouncing the developments of his Church to be final. His object is to vindicate the Catholic theory of development, on the one side against the cut-and-dried theology of the Protestant confessions, and on the other against the “rationalistic theory of development.” For he has thus much in common with the “rationalist.”

“While development is the law of all God’s natural dispensations, are we to predicate an exceptional stagnation of the kingdom of grace? To imagine that theology, as we now possess it, sprang full grown from the mind of the first century, like Pallas from the head of Zeus, is but to transfer to the moral what we have learnt to discard from our conceptions of the material world, a succession of miraculous cataclysms, with another succession of supplementary miracles to obliterate all traces of them.”—p. xxxix.

We apprehend the “rationalists,” acknowledging with Mr. Oxenham “the gradual education of the Gentile world,” and the “growing tone of spirituality” among the Jewish people from patriarchs to prophets, and from prophets to later psalmists and apocryphal writers, would maintain their own theory as the more consistent, which does not require the “cataclysm” of a miraculous incarnation. Nor, as we apprehend, would they be disinclined to acknowledge the evidences of an increasing purpose in the spiritual education of the world since the Christian era. But they would not, with Mr. Oxenham, conceive this spiritual growth to be confined within the limits of one church, nor would they illustrate the principle of development by variations of doctrine often utterly antagonistic to each other; they would, above all, object to that which is a characteristic of the so-called Catholic developments, the deducing logical conclusions from mystical premises—as of eucharistic flesh and blood from a figurative victim. Nor, indeed, is it clear how the motto from St. Bernard, “Non mors sed voluntas placuit sponte morientis,” can serve as a foundation for the doctrine of the perpetual sacrifice of the mass, if it is fatal to the Lutheran fictions of the transfer of Christ’s merits and of his vicarious punishment. Mr. Oxenham’s is the treatise of a scholarly divine, and is worthy both of his first training at Oxford, and of the countenance of his eminent Roman Catholic friend, Dr. Döllinger, who suggested it. We will only further commend the following passage to the attention of some high Anglican Churchmen :—

“Another opinion, which has widely prevailed among Catholics, though borrowed originally from Protestants, but which is now known to be untenable,

is a belief in the verbal inspiration of Scripture, first dogmatically laid down in the *Formula Consensus Helvetica* in 1675, but previously maintained by the great body of the Reformed. Biblical criticism is yet in its infancy, and discoveries like that of the *Codex Sinaiticus* (now established beyond dispute) may seriously affect it. Should the controversies of our own day ultimately lead to some definition on the meaning and limits of inspiration, or the nature of future retribution—subjects on which the Church has hitherto been silent—this in its turn would open out fresh sources of speculation in other directions.”—p. xxix.

The fifth volume of the collected works of Edward Irving contains Sermons on the Incarnation and on the Gifts of the Holy Spirit.⁵ In the former he set forth the views for which he was ostensibly deposed from his ministry in the Scotch Church; in the latter, he began to encourage the expectation of miraculous manifestations in the church, and especially of some gift of tongues. Whether orthodox or heterodox, he was, on the former subject, still within the acknowledged field of theological discussion; on the latter, it began to be surmised that his genius and eloquence were leading him beyond any bounds of common sense. The peculiarity of his notion of the Incarnation touched only the humanity of Christ; he was perfectly orthodox on the side of his Divinity. But he held that the human nature which the Saviour took upon him was the human nature inherited from Adam since his Fall, not the human nature of Adam in his sinless state anterior to the Fall; and it was thus he was fitted to become the Redeemer of humanity; in that he participated in the very nature which he came to restore, and in his own person raised it from the depth to which it had fallen. Irving held, indeed, that while Christ took on him the fallen human nature, He took it as regenerate, and this, if we understand rightly, *in utero Mariæ Virginis*. The conflict, therefore, which was carried through by him was the conflict in which regenerate men are likewise through him promised the victory. Irving, it need not be said, held firmly with the other Scotch Calvinists the doctrine of particular election.

“That this gift is to be communicated to a part only of the human race is evident as well from the fact as from the language of Scripture and the continual doctrine of the Church; universalism having always been regarded as a most damnable heresy.”—p. 248.

To this *élite* of humanity Christ came to show the way of salvation, and to this same *élite* the Holy Spirit which dwelt in him is exclusively communicated. Thus the sinlessness which according to the more orthodox opinion is secured to the person of the Redeemer by the supposition of his having participated in a human nature which contracted no stain or corruption by its birth, belongs to him on Irving's hypothesis as the first of the regenerate. He maintained that “Christ's flesh was as rebellious, as fallen as ours,” but his flesh was not the whole of his being; “it is His humanity, inhabited by

⁵ “The Collected Works of Edward Irving.” In five volumes. Edited by his nephew, the Rev. G. Carlyle, M.A. Vol. V. London: Alexander Strahan, 1866.

the Holy Ghost, which maketh up His creature being," and through that power "acting to the overcoming of the evil propensity of the fallen man, it is that the fallen manhood of Christ is made mighty and holy and good" (p. 169). Though he touched, however, necessarily, upon the Nestorian and Monothelite controversies, Irving did not at all attempt a psychological solution of the difficulties which beset the doctrine of the union of the two natures, and which beset his own, as it seems to us, no less than others; nor does he deal at all successfully with the text "tempted in all points like as we are," (Heb. iv. 15,) which is the strong point of his position. "The Son of Man was tried with every trial with which it is possible for human nature to be tried by the putting forth of all the power and subtlety of Satan" (p. 276); for He could not have succoured the tempted unless He had undergone "the sum and substance of all possible temptation." (*ib.*) But the force of temptation to us is derived from the weakness of our will to good, and from the *concupiscentia carnis*, inherited, according to theologians, from the fallen Adam. If this corruption was neutralized in the Son of Man at the very moment of the Annunciation, it does not appear how his life would serve "for imitation, consolation, or assurance," for his temptation, upon neither theory, was the same as ours. It will, however, be a lasting reproach to the Kirk of Scotland, to have deposed a minister on account of such an obscure and fine-drawn speculation. The Church which in the nineteenth century could depose Edward Irving, would certainly, with the power, in the sixteenth have burnt Servetus.

Whenever the statements of the Bible and the conclusions of science have come in collision, the verdict of science has always stood its ground, and the Biblical statements have always given way.⁶ They have given way before astronomy, before geology, before geography and ethnology. Unwise defenders of the Bible prolong the defence of untenable positions: its more prudent friends counsel an orderly retreat in time to save the appearance of defeat. An "Essex Rector" is of this latter class. He is too timid to give his name, and careful not to intimate what inferences must follow from the surrender which he makes of the verity of the narratives of the Creation, of Paradise, of the Deluge, and of the Tower of Babel. With many apologies, he is exercising a portion of the liberty which others have won for him and his brother clergy. The sum of his argument he states as follows:—

"1. That the excavation of the valley of the Somme and the formation of its gravels, as is admitted by the most careful school of geologists, require a longer period than the received age of man. 2. That the change of a white people into black from Egypt to the tropics, and their return into a lighter colour from the tropics to the Cape, are incompatible with the time allowed us by the chronologers of the Expulsion from Eden, and are impossible, from natural causes, with the received dates of the Deluge. 3. The statements of Moses, which were not made from his own personal knowledge and observa-

⁶ "Man's Age in the World according to Holy Scripture and Science." By an Essex Rector. London: Lovell Reeve and Co. 1865.

tion, were drawn from traditions, which preserved only fragments of truth. He embodied many of these fragments as symbols only, and not as history. 4. From these traditions, which Moses was inspired to collect or preserve, we may learn all that is needed to ground the work of God in Creation, and the work of Christ in Redemption. . . . Conclusion: Therefore, the free investigation and full acceptance of these opinions will not destroy, but support, Faith."—p. 236.

The English critics are sometimes reproached with clothing themselves in the cast-off clothes of the Germans. We are certainly invited to do so by Mr. Glover, who translates and edits Ewald's most feeble and sentimental "Life of Christ."⁷ The editor's object is to set it forth as an antidote to the works of Strauss and Renan, yet he does so with certain misgivings and apologies:—

"The author's disbelief," he says, "in the Old Testament miracles serves as a dark background which makes us more admire the firm faith in the works of Christ which shines forth in this volume. On one fundamental point this author's protest may, I hope, be useful—his protest, I mean, in favour of the genuineness of St. John's Gospel. Modern scepticism is using every effort to throw discredit on this Gospel as a record of the words and sayings of our Lord. It feels that this is the grand bulwark of the Christian's faith in the divinity of Christ. The narrative of the supernatural birth of Christ and of the Resurrection it may explain as myths; but our Lord's language about himself, as given in this Gospel, can only be set aside by denying the truth of the Gospel."—p. xv.

We do not understand the value of a "protest" in a critical inquiry, nor has the assumption of the genuineness of the fourth Gospel served altogether as a bulwark of the faith to M. Renan.

The collection of the works of W. J. Fox enables us to mark the theological movement of the last forty years.⁸ We are here carried back to the time (1819) when Mr. Carlile could be prosecuted and convicted for the republication of Paine's Age of Reason, and when the Unitarian body itself little dreamt of the modifications which scientific education and historical criticism would bring about in their own creed. Mr. Fox himself protested against the Carlile prosecution in a discourse entitled, "The Duties of Christians towards Deists," but he held at that time to the belief of a supernatural revelation, commencing with Abraham, carried on by prophets, who foretold the particulars of the manifestation of the Messiah, fully made known in the mission of Jesus, which was vouched by his miracles and crowned by his Resurrection and Ascension. Mr. Fox came, indeed, to reject the miraculous element in Christianity altogether.

The twelfth volume of Theodore Parker's works⁹ contains, besides

⁷ "The Life of Jesus Christ." By H. Ewald. Translated and edited by Octavius Glover, B.D., Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge. Cambridge: Deighton. London: Bell and Daldy. 1865.

⁸ "Memorial Edition of Collected Works of W. J. Fox." Vol. I. Lectures, Sermons, &c., prior to 1824. Vol. II. Christ and Christianity. London: Charles Fox; Trübner and Co. 1865.

⁹ "The Collected Works of Theodore Parker," &c., &c. Edited by Frances Power Cobbe. Vol. XII. Autobiographical and Miscellaneous Pieces. London: Trübner and Co. 1865.

other reviews and discourses, his own "Account" of his Ministry, his "Experience as a Minister," and his telling "Letter to the American Unitarian Association." As the summary of a controversy it is incomparable, and as a controversial weapon unanswerable.

"The Dictionary of Christian Antiquities," by the Abbé Martigny,¹⁰ contains a great deal of information, only accessible in the costly works of the Italian antiquaries. Some of the principal results with which he presents his readers are derived from researches in the Roman catacombs. The discoveries there made, as well as other remains of Christian antiquity, are of course interpreted from the Catholic point of view and in submission to the voice of the Church.

According to the accounts of recent travellers, the Samaritan people seem to be drawing near to their extinction.¹¹ From many passages in the Old Testament it appears that the tribe of Ephraim claimed a prerogative as a royal tribe, and that the parting of the ten tribes from the two under Jeroboam was only the carrying out of a rivalry between Judah and Ephraim, which had its origin long before. Nor, however these Samaritans and Ephraimites may have become mixed with other people (2 Kings, xvii. 24) can it be fairly doubted that they have continued a real traditional descent down to modern times. The "Samaritan Annals," edited by Vilmar, were compiled by one Abulfath in the fourteenth century; he was probably not a priest himself, but in the service of the then high priest Phinehas. Of these annals, which are written in a corrupt Arabic, there exist four manuscripts, more or less complete, which the editor has collated for his edition. The annals themselves commence with Adam, and present, with some well-known variations, the outline of the Pentateuchal story. The origin of the Jewish sect they attribute to Eli, who forsook the worship in Gerizim, and unlawfully assumed the priesthood, which of right belonged exclusively to the descendants of Eleazar, he being descended from Ithamar. Samuel, the false prophet, was the next great favourer of the Jewish schism, and Saul, anointed king by him, prevented the faithful for twenty-two years from assembling for worship on Mount Gerizim. David carried still further the secession from the true religion, for though in the beginning of his reign he worshipped on Gerizim, he afterwards consecrated the hill of Jerusalem, and laid there the foundation of the temple which was completed by his son Solomon. Nevertheless, it is allowed in the annals that the whole of the tribes did in fact acknowledge the sovereignty of David and of Solomon, and that the separation between the ten tribes and the two took place under Rehoboam. The prophets of Jerusalem

¹⁰ "Dictionnaire des Antiquités Chrétiennes, contenant le Résumé de tout ce qu'il est essentiel de connaître sur les Origines Chrétiennes jusqu'au moyen Âge exclusivement." 1. Étude des Mœurs et Coutumes des Premiers Chrétiens. 2. Étude des Monuments Figurés. 3. Vêtements et Meubles. Par M. l'Abbé Martigny. Ouvrage accompagné de 270 Gravures. Paris. London: D. Nutt. 1865.

¹¹ "Abulfathi Annales Samaritani. Quos ad fidem codicum manuscriptorum Berolinensium, Bodleyani, Parisini, edidit et Prolegomenis instruxit Eduardus Vilmar." Gotha. London: D. Nutt. 1865.

are thenceforward stigmatized as promoters of false doctrines, and Elijah and Elisha are especially reprobated. The invasion of Nebuchadnezzar and the captivity of seventy years is recorded, but the previous transplantation of the ten tribes by Shalmanezar is ignored. And so throughout, the history is twisted to the Samaritan point of view. So recklessly is this done, that the whole Jewish war, ending in the ruin of Jerusalem, is passed over in silence; but the baptism of Jesus by John, his assumption of the prophetic character, the beheading of John, and the crucifixion of Jesus are recited. It is apparent that the greatest part of the material of these annals has been derived from the histories of other people, and principally from the books of the Jews; yet there may here and there be found a trace of genuine independent tradition. However rudely this particular work has been executed, it is nevertheless an instructive example of the maxim that no people can be thoroughly trusted when recounting their own history or the history of their enemies, and however great the literary superiority of the Jewish records, this maxim must be taken as applying to them likewise. The tenets of the Samaritan religion are here comprised under five heads: 1, Concerning the One God; 2, Concerning Moses the prophet of God; 3, Concerning the divine law revealed by Moses; 4, Concerning the Mount Gerizim; and 5, Concerning the judgment of the last day. The fifth head was probably of later addition, although the Samaritans appear to have entertained an expectation, parallel as it were to that of the Jews, of a "restitution," and of a Messiah who should "restore again the kingdom," but not originally to have defined the judgment of the last day as it is imagined in the Christian and Mahometan theology. The volume before us consists of the Arabic text of the Chronicle with pp. cxx. of prolegomena.

The treatise of Augustus Gladisch, entitled "Anaxagoras,"¹² is intended to illustrate one portion of the comparative history of religion and philosophy which is treated in its larger outlines in his previously published work.¹³ He considers the founders of the renowned schools of Greek philosophy not to have originated doctrines disconnected from all other religious or philosophical speculation; at least that among other peoples opinions had been held analogous to or parallel with them. And in illustrative treatises he has already compared the Pythagoreans and the Chinese philosophers, the Eclectics and the Hindus, Empedocles and the Egyptians, Heraclitus and Zoroaster. He now draws a parallel between the conceptions of the Deity as pure spirit and intelligence according to Anaxagoras and according to the Jewish writers. The treatise is extremely well worth perusal, although we think the author has not sufficiently noticed how the Israelites entertained very different ideas of God at different periods of their

¹² "Anaxagoras und die Israeliten." Eine historische Untersuchung von Aug. Gladisch Director des Gymnasiums zu Krotoschin. Leipzig. London: D. Nutt. 1864.

¹³ "Die Religion und die Philosophie in ihrer Weltgeschichtlichen Entwicklung und Stellung zu einander nach den Urkunden dargelegt." 1852.

history, and that he has derived his principal illustrations and founded his argument too much upon those of the Jewish writings which belong to the Apocryphal period and show an Alexandrian influence.

Von Kirchmann's "Treatise on Immortality"¹⁴ deserves great praise for the clearness with which the whole subject is treated: the various attempts, philosophical and religious, to present a satisfactory solution of the problem are fairly set forth; and the author's own answer, startling as it may be to many, fearlessly presented. In fact, philosophers and teachers of religion have failed hitherto in their endeavour to deliver some theory or doctrine of immortality which should satisfy the intellect, for they have represented immortality as life to take place after death. Hence, as our perception fails to reach into that region, we are incapable of verifying any facts which are assumed in these several systems, or of testing their coherence with other facts and laws already known to us. Thus the descriptions of immortal life which various religions present are mere imaginary creations, unsatisfying to the intelligence. It may be urged, indeed, that such a science as astronomy leads men to adopt conclusions respecting the properties and laws of things which lie beyond human observation and verification. But the ground itself on which the universality of certain laws is assumed in astronomy does lie in the field of human observation; whereas the supposed law of immortality, according to its usual definition, has no empirical basis whatever to rest upon, on which account it has always been sought to establish the law of immortality deductively, because of the absence of material for induction. Now, if sensitive perception—which is the root, or necessary constituent at least, of all our consciousness—be untrustworthy, there is nothing to be relied upon from which this method of deduction can derive itself. On the other hand, if our perception is to be trusted, we infer necessarily the reality of "Being." It is true, "Being" presents itself to us in a continual flux, or "Becoming," but this flux belongs to our "Knowing." And hence the proposition which the author conceives to contain the solution of the whole difficulty concerning immortality, "*Nur das Wissen stirbt, nicht das Sein.*" Thus there is got rid of entirely the notion of immortality being a life "after death." "Being" is immortal because it continues, not because it begins again after dissolution. Nevertheless there is no obvious impossibility in a renewal of "Knowing" in relation to "Being."

Mr. John Stuart Mill's Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy has undoubtedly blown away some very prevalent illusions respecting the value of that distinguished person's contributions to mental science. Admiring cordially the unrivalled learning of the Scotch professor, he has shown that notwithstanding, or perhaps in consequence in some degree, of that very learning, Sir William Hamil-

¹⁴ "Ueber die Unsterblichkeit." Ein philosophischer Versuch. Von J. H. von Kirchmann. Berlin. London: D. Nutt. 1865.

¹⁵ "An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, and of the principal Philosophical Questions Discussed in his Writings." By John Stuart Mill. London: Longmans. 1865.

ton's system abounds with inconsistencies, while his great discoveries in philosophy as well as in logic are found to have had an imposing appearance but little solid worth. Mr. Mill has here shown, as we think effectually, that the famous "Law of the Conditioned" breaks down in both its parts.

"It is not proved that the Conditioned lies between two hypotheses concerning the Unconditioned, neither of which hypotheses we can conceive as possible. And it is not proved, that as regards the Unconditioned, one or the other of these hypotheses must be true. Both propositions must be placed in that numerous class of metaphysical doctrines which have a magnificent sound, but are empty of the smallest substance."—p. 87.

Following up his strokes, he has shown, in relation to Mr. Mansel's celebrated application of the philosophy of the conditioned to religion—

"that he has not made out any connexion between his philosophical premises and his conclusion. The relativity of human knowledge, the uncognoscibility of the Absolute, and the contradictions which follow the attempt to conceive a Being with all or without any Attributes, are no obstacles to our having the same kind of knowledge of God which we have of other things, namely, not as they exist absolutely, but relatively."—p. 105.

Equally successful is the review of Sir William Hamilton's criticism of the grounds of belief, according to Cosmothetic Idealism, of the existence of an external world:—

"The theory of the third form of Cosmothetic Idealism is, that though we are conscious only of the sensations which an object gives us, we are determined by a necessity of our nature, which some call an instinct, others an intuition, others a fundamental law of belief, to ascribe these sensations to something external, as their substratum or as their cause. There is surely nothing *a priori* impossible in this supposition. The supposed instinct or intuition seems to be of the same family with many other Laws of Thought, or Natural Beliefs, which our author not only admits without scruple, but enjoins obedience to, under the usual sanction that otherwise our intelligence must be a lie. . . . He says that we cannot infer a reality from a mental representation, unless we already know the reality independently of the mental representation. Now, he could hardly help being aware that this is the very matter in dispute. Those who hold the opinion he argues against, do not admit the premise upon which he argues. They say, that we may be, and are, necessitated to infer a cause, of which we know nothing except its effect."—p. 168.

Mr. Mill's statement of the theory of those who hold that the belief in an external world is not intuitive, but an acquired product, is as follows:—The mind is capable of expectation; we expect the recurrence of sensations already experienced; they become to us possible sensations; and by the law of the association of ideas, phenomena which have heretofore been experienced in connexion tend to be thought of in connexion: the ideas answering to such connected facts or phenomena become blended, and the facts or phenomena themselves come to imply each other. So that what seems to be an experience of a single object is really a heap of inferences. Moreover, by means of reminiscence, expectation, and association, we assume the existence

of objects which, having heretofore excited certain sensations, would excite them again if we were in similar circumstances. Hence—

“The conception I form of the world existing at any moment comprises, along with the sensations I am feeling, a countless variety of possibilities of sensation, namely, the whole of those which past observation tells me that I could, under any supposable circumstances, experience at this moment, together with an indefinite and illimitable number of others which, though I do not know that I could, yet it is possible that I might, experience in circumstances not known to me.”—p. 193.

Moreover, our sensations occur not only in groups, but in a fixed order of succession, thus giving rise to the ideas of Cause and Effect. A like order of succession we necessarily infer holds between the antecedents and consequents in nature—which is by no means always, nay seldom, represented to us by parallel or simultaneous order of succession to us in sensation. Whether we are asleep or awake, the fire goes out and puts an end to the possibility of our receiving warmth and light, or the fire may be burning in another room, where it would warm me if I were. Thus the sensations, though the original foundation of the whole, come to be looked upon as a sort of accident, and the permanent possibilities to be the actual realities of which they (the sensations) are representations, the causes, of which they are effects. “The groundwork in sensation of these permanent possibilities is forgotten,” and they come to be supposed something intrinsically distinct from it. And though the sensations cease, the “possibilities remain in existence,” and we find they belong as much to other sentient beings as to ourselves.—(pp. 192—196.)

And then he goes on:—

“Matter, then, may be defined a Permanent Possibility of Sensation. If I am asked whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner accepts this definition of it. If he does, I believe in matter: and so do all Berkeleians. In any other sense than this I do not. But I affirm with confidence, that this conception of matter includes the whole meaning attached to it by the common world.”—p. 198.

If we rightly understand this doctrine, this “possibility of sensation” has no objective existence, but is objectified psychologically. And we apprehend many, who would go a certain way with Mr. Mill, would accept a description of matter as that which is permanently capable of effecting sensation, and without which sensation does not arise, would not feel that the arguments in this eleventh chapter carry them to the conclusion, that the external world is an abstraction generated by the mind out of its own processes. Consequently, however, upon what has been said, though the Ego and the Non-ego are now in our consciousness, there is no reason for supposing that the latter was co-existent with the Ego from the beginning; we can see the way in which it grows up. And more than that, our conception of self or Ego, is a growth likewise. We have no conception of mind itself, as distinguished from its conscious manifestations, but we figure to ourselves a something which is permanent, while our particular feelings change. Hence “the belief I entertain that my mind exists, when it is not feeling nor thinking nor conscious of its own existence, resolves

itself into the belief of a permanent possibility of these states.”—(p.205.) According to this theory, the mind would be a series of feelings “with a background of possibilities of feeling.” Mr. Mill argues that this theory would leave our conviction of the existence of other spiritual or rational existences just where it now is, for we are irresistibly led to infer, on any theory, the existence of other beings like ourselves, from the outward manifestations like our own which they display. So it leaves as before the evidence for the existence of God. “Supposing me to believe that the Divine mind is simply the series of the Divine thoughts and feelings prolonged throughout eternity, that would be at any rate believing God’s existence to be as real as my own.”—(p. 210). And “as to immortality, it is precisely as easy to conceive, that a succession of feelings, a thread of consciousness, may be prolonged to eternity, as that a spiritual substance continues to exist.”—(p.211.) But although, according to our author, this theory can withstand the most invidious arguments directed against it, there is this difficulty attending it:—

“If we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series.”

And he terminates by saying,—

“I have stated the difficulties attending the attempt to frame a theory of mind, or the Ego, similar to what I have called the psychological theory of matter, or the Non-ego. No such difficulties attend the theory in its application to matter; and I leave it as set forth, to pass for whatever it is worth as an antagonistic doctrine to that of Sir W. Hamilton and the Scottish school, respecting the Non-ego as a deliverance of consciousness.”—p. 213.

We have been able only to notice very briefly a few of the questions on which Mr. Mill criticises the Hamiltonian philosophy, but most of our readers, we do not doubt, have perused and studied the book for themselves, and will not require to be directed by us, especially to the chapters on the Law of Inseparable Association, on the Doctrine of Concepts, and on the Freedom of the Will.

Very much concerned also with Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy is Professor Grote’s volume.¹⁶ We wish we could give it the praise which belongs to the above noticed work of clearness of style and method. The Professor does great injustice to himself by his rambling treatment of his subject and his involved sentences. Take the following:—

“Matter is a thing that we are conscious of; this is my cardinal doctrine. I put it two ways: it is because matter is *after all*, so far as we can tell, *only* a thing that we are conscious of—a thought of ours supposed warranted, a

¹⁶ “Exploratio Philosophica.” Rough Notes on Modern Intellectual Science. Part I. By John Grote, B.D., Fellow of Trinity College, and Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Cambridge. Cambridge: Deighton. London: Bell and Daldy. 1865.

mental creation properly created, a something the certainty of the existence of which depends for us on the certainty of our own existence, and the trustworthiness of our own feeling—that the study of consciousness is higher than the study of matter (in my language, philosophy than phenomenalism), and that we ourselves who are conscious, know ourselves pre-eminently with a different knowledge from that with which we know matter *of which we are* conscious, just as we know also our own thoughts and feelings with a consciousness more intimate and immediate than that with which we know matter, since we mean by matter something which we suppose to give occasion to varieties of such feelings; that is one way; again, because matter is a thing which we are conscious of, therefore there is a study of it *as* we are conscious of it, which we may pursue without at all troubling ourselves what the *being conscious of it* means, and this is what I call “phenomenalism.”—p. 126.

Mr. Grote goes on in the next paragraph with considerable force, but in equally long sentences, to point out an inconsistency in the use of the term “consciousness” by Sir William Hamilton. For he makes it sometimes to be synonymous with mental modification and matter is set over against it, at other times matter is a portion of its contents. And so throughout the work are many excellent things, but as a book it is almost unreadable.

POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY, VOYAGES AND TRAVELS.

IN a collection of essays on political and legal reform, Mr. Boyd Kinnear¹ discusses the question of the extension of the franchise, which he wishes to bestow on all who can read and write, and enters into some estimate of the modifications which such a franchise would produce in the various constituencies. There can be but little question that whatever form any numerical increase in the constituencies of the kingdom may ultimately assume, the ability to read and write should certainly be demanded as one at least of the qualifications of a voter. The chief value of the possession of the franchise consists in the educative influences which it is to be hoped it may exert on those who exercise it, and in the means which it affords of interesting them in a larger circle of ideas than those of their immediate personal interests. Mr. Kinnear has reduced his proposal to the practical shape of a draft bill to be laid before the House, which has the advantage of bringing in a short compass before his readers the collateral changes involved in the project, and of displaying the working of the required machinery. In his chapter on the principle of non-intervention, he does little else than expand and weaken the arguments of Mr. J. S. Mill. On taxation, he is a thorough-going adherent of the party which exclaims against our expensive armaments, both naval and military,

¹ “Principles of Reform: Political and Legal.” By J. Boyd Kinnear. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

and he goes at great length into a comparison of our present resources with those at our command in 1805. After a very full discussion of our means of defence, and of the modifications to which they have been subjected by steam navigation and the more powerful artillery of the present day, he comes to the conclusion that when the effect of every change is duly weighed, the balance is rather in favour of defence than of attack, and that, consequently, we are under no necessity to maintain a force so greatly in excess of that which was considered sufficient when we were exposed to an imminent risk which is not likely to recur without ample warning. The legal reforms which he advocates are a simplification of our laws by codification in the first place, and a system of authorized reports in the second. This latter desideratum he would arrive at by making it obligatory on the judges to deliver their decisions in writing, which should then be the only authoritative precedents producible in a court of law. On the two questions of the assimilation of the law in England and Scotland, and the law of marriage in the two countries, he is much more conservative and tender in his criticisms than on his other topics: local customs are defended by old associations, and by the convenience which it is assumed has led to their origination; but there is nothing not defensible, if we look back exclusively to its beginnings; there are no customs whatever to which men, growing up where they are prevalent, will not become at last attached. Not the less must they, in every case, submit to be criticised by a larger estimate of public utility, and where they stand unquestionably in the way of a general improvement, they can claim no exemption from reform on the ground of their pretended convenience to a small section of the community. The marriage laws of the two countries, reposing as they do on opposite principles, cannot be brought into harmony. The question ultimately resolves itself into, whether it be the duty of the state to regulate the marriage contract in the interests of society at large, or in those of the contracting parties? In England the former purpose is chiefly kept in view, and the aim of all English law on the subject is directed to protect, by a legalized publicity, not only the sacredness of the contract itself, but the interests of all those who can in any way be affected by its existence. The system of banns, licences, and registrars is based upon the principle of providing evidence of a fact which, if concealed, may injuriously affect all who come in contact with those to whom it applies. The Scotch system is not so much concerned with the interests of society as with those of the contracting parties, and is primarily directed to establish in any possible way that consent which is by necessity essential to a valid marriage here as elsewhere. The religious sanctions differ in the two countries only as their ecclesiastical systems differ. But while, in the civil aspect of marriage, England has delivered its legislature from all clerical influence, in Scotland there is still an effort made to throw a religious sanction over the most irregular and clandestine connexions, at the cost of depriving society at large of the protection which it is the chief object of the English system to secure. Mr. Kinnear's predilections naturally follow his earliest associations; but he is very clear

and full in the statement of the questions he discusses, and his book is a valuable contribution to the controversies it handles.

Mr. Masheder has taken remarkable pains in a review of Mr. Gladstone's expressed opinions on Church Government² to prove what is as notorious as that the sun shines at mid-day; but what purpose he supposes himself to serve by demonstrating that there is but little harmony between the early ecclesiastical views entertained by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the character of some of his later acts, to say nothing of the tendency of some of his most recent expressions, it is difficult to discover. If the whole tone of the book were not decidedly opposed to such a conclusion, we should suppose that Mr. Masheder intended to compose an elaborate recommendation of the statesman he criticises to the unreserved confidence of the liberal party. The gradual conquest which life and experience have gained, in Mr. Gladstone's mind, over study and sentiment, can hardly be better displayed than in this attack on his so-called tergiversation. It seems that, in Mr. Masheder's opinion, it is the primary duty of every man to remain faithful to the earliest convictions he may acquire, and that development is nothing better than dereliction.

While this "apostasy" is laid bare to all Conservatives, a note of warning is sounded in the ears of timid Liberals by a constantly recurring insinuation that the old church principles are still vital and operative in the mind of him who was once their warm advocate, and that nothing but the mode of attack is altered. This insinuation has a certain partisan acuteness, but will deceive none but those who are acquainted with the external history only of the Tractarian movement. No party in England has been so well served by that school of thought as the advanced Liberals. Had it not been for the thorough criticism to which their views were subjected by the Oxford party, there would have been far less consistency and complete insight into their own principles among them. In fact, the period whence Mr. Masheder dates the first vacillation in Mr. Gladstone's mind is precisely that in which all those who had been attracted by the cultivation and serious purpose of the Tractarian party, felt themselves called upon to choose between the alternatives which offered themselves as the ultimate result of their views, and which proved the destruction of the party as a ruling power in England. The premises on which they relied, and which found their most complete expression in Dr. Newman's book on "Development," led as logically to the fullest freethinking as to the complete resignation of all personal thought. Individual character weighed far more in the final choice than anything else whatever. Had Mr. Gladstone entered the Church, as it has been said was once his intention, there is every probability that he would have been influenced by the circumstances of his position, as all richly-endowed minds are, and would have had but small chance of escaping from the fate which has led so many imaginative

² "The Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone, M.P.," &c., &c. A Political Review. By R. Masheder, B.A., author of "Dissent and Democracy." London: Saunders, Odey, and Co. 1865.

men out of it. But, fortunately for himself and for England, the free intercourse of public life, and the large practical interests which have occupied his mind ever since the commencement of his parliamentary career, have, as we think is plainly shown by Mr. Masheder's quotations, liberated him from the conclusions which have been drawn by the school in which he was educated, conclusions drawn rather by moral persuasion, if not intimidation, than by any really logical process. To our mind, there is no such sound Liberalism as that which is the result of a reaction against the Church principles of twenty years since, and we look upon all who have overcome that dragon as possessing something of the invulnerability of the horny Siegfried.

As a party manifesto, we look upon Mr. Masheder's book as an utter failure, and think it far more calculated to serve than injure the object of his attack, for it gives the fairest grounds of confidence to many who, upon the single point it treats, still entertain doubts as to the direction of Mr. Gladstone's personal views on points connected with the Established Church.

The great experiment upon which so much labour and thought has been bestowed, "how far Irish Roman Catholics and Protestants could proceed together with perfect unanimity, in introducing scriptural light among the population generally," after maintaining itself for more than thirty years by every imaginable compromise, is now threatened with an attack upon its fundamental principles which it will with great difficulty resist. The difficulties of a neutral system of education offered to the most violent partisans are too great for any human ingenuity; the more enlarged and liberal the education, the greater these difficulties become.

It might have been supposed that a system which met with the support of two such men as the late Archbishops Whately and Murray must be in its ultimate character irreproachable. But no! in religion, as well as in other things, we pride ourselves more upon some paltry distinctions from our fellows, than upon the common humanity which comprehends them; any trifling speciality seems more important to its possessor than all the generic qualities he has in common with his kind. The appeal which Mr. Butt makes,³ in a very clear review of the history of the Irish national system, to the principles of complete liberty of teaching, is not easily answered on any grounds that do not assume the Irish people to be in a state of tutelage. We must be content to accept, what appears to us an evil, at the hands of our general principles, as well as the good, by which they recommend themselves to our convictions. For a whole generation we have tried to bribe the Irish nation to be tolerant; but the moral virtues are not purchaseable, and we now find the bribe claimed as a right, and the toleration refused as absolutely as ever. The virtue we have not been able to purchase we are ourselves called upon to exercise without fee or reward, and it is difficult to discover direct arguments by which we can excuse ourselves. All collateral arguments drawn from the

³ "Reflections and Proposals on the Subject of Irish National Education." By Isaac Butt. Dublin: W. B. Kelly. 1865.

anticipated consequences of supporting the kind of education which will be given in unrestrained Roman Catholic schools, partake too much of the character of foregone conclusions to be valid and admissible; in spite of the different circumstances of the two countries, it is impossible to found on them a refusal to Ireland of a freedom enjoyed by every form of religious confession in England. This is a position from which it is impossible to drive the advocates of sectarian education in Ireland; but if the Irish National Board is to be accommodated in all respects to the English educational system, we hope that the Irish Catholics are fully prepared to accept the sound principle that they must earn the national subsidy by "results" which have no connexion with the principles for which they are at present contending with a considerable prospect of success.

The necessity of explaining the Sepoy revolt has induced both Mr. Kaye and Mr. Arnold to look out for a cause as extensive as the lamentable event they had to explain; this has led them to subject Lord Dalhousie's administration to a closeness of criticism which might afford a cumulative reason for an event which, we think, is sufficiently explained by a far simpler cause. This course has naturally called forth replies from those who knew the incriminated nobleman, and among them the recent volume of Sir Charles Jackson⁴ deserves an attentive study. The violent attacks of Major Bell, and the strong language he uses in condemnation of the general policy of annexation, are too extreme to carry with them any judicial weight; but the supposably calmer inquiries of the other two gentlemen called loudly for such a vindication as Sir Charles Jackson attempts. We think that an attentive consideration of his remarks will go far to exonerate the memory of his friend from the gravity of the accusations which have been brought against him. None but those who are wedded to theories connected with the dynastic interests of dependent princes and rajahs can fail to be influenced by his clear statements. That we must conquer India by our arts, as our fathers did by their arms, if we wish to hold it as a peaceable possession, is the only conclusion to which any reasonable person can come. Whether the maintenance of particular native families will contribute to our security in the interval which must elapse before that desirable consummation is brought about, is a very large question, which has never been fully argued, except by those who have taken it up with a foregone conclusion. We are not without our fears that we have committed ourselves by Lord Canning's celebrated proclamation to a policy that will be most difficult to sustain; the whole history of our past relations with the native princes is full of warnings which threaten its permanency.

The cry of India for the Indians, or the more moderate form in which it is stated that we must govern the peninsula for the benefit of its inhabitants, by no means implies that we are to support in every case, and under every circumstance, the existing executive

⁴ "Vindication of the Marquis of Dalhousie's Indian Administration." By Sir C. Jackson. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

power of the native princes; indeed it may be argued that it is incompatible with such a course. A free and open career for native ability is the one thing needful, and we are likely to be in need of it for a long time to come, both on account of English prejudices and native shortcomings. These are the things to be overcome by every educative influence which can be brought to bear upon them. It is useless to fall back upon the native character as utterly unworthy of trust in the higher departments of executive government.

The much-maligned commercial community of Calcutta has shown that it can educate natives to a point of mercantile honour and good faith which will bear, in very many cases, the closest comparison with English probity. A permanent native interest in the English supremacy must strike deeper and wider roots than there is room for under the musnud of Indian princes and petty rajahs.

Until we thoroughly set ourselves to work on the native character, we cannot expect any good and lasting sympathy to grow up between the ruling power and those it governs by means and on principles in which they have so little share. But to return to Sir Charles Jackson, who is concerned with a much more restricted question. In his pages, the other side of the shield is held up in the cases of Nagpore, Sattarah, Bajee Rao, and the Bhonsla fund, Tanjore, and Azcem Jah, while, on the crowning fact of Oude, Lord Dalhousie is shown as acting under orders which he loyally carried out against his own expressed opinion. In fact, we are almost led to the conclusion that had it been possible for the great Governor-General to have ruled in India for another eight years, and to have ruled with an unfettered power, the measures he advocated in vain would have rendered the mutiny impossible, in spite of any predilection he may have entertained for the native army—a feeling in his time shared by too many to justify any peculiar blame that subsequent events have induced so many to heap upon his shoulders.

Another book on Indian affairs,⁵ which gives the whole history of our connexion with the native court at Hyderabad, goes far to support the views we have just indicated. Our faithful ally the Nizam would probably have been far from so staunch in his adherence to our alliance had he not, during the eventful period of the mutiny, been fortified by the advice of a really superior minister in the person of Salar Jung, who, with an intelligence and honesty that may some time or other be less exceptional, kept his immediate superior free from the temptations which beset so many other native princes. The relations between this faithful servant and his lord are of themselves sufficient to show of what stuff even the most trustworthy of our Indian allies are made, and how little is to be hoped from a race of men brought up in the seclusion of an oriental family, even when they are possessed of the remarkable personal vigour of the present ruler of the Deccan. The incidental remarks which are made by Captain Fraser give no force to the accusations which are brought

⁵ "Our Faithful Ally the Nizam." By Captain Hastings Fraser, Madras Staff Corps. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

against Lord Dalhousie, but rather support the general judgment of the skill and care with which he selected his executive officers, and the remarkable courage and constancy with which he sustained their authority. The exploits of the Hyderabad Contingent, with which the author served during the suppression of the mutiny, are related *con amore*, while the advantages which he enjoyed from his father having been for many years political resident at the Court of the Nizam, give a certain authority to his general narrative.

Prefaced by a rapid and able summary of the state of education in the various countries of Europe, Mr. Staunton⁶ has gathered together a complete account of the management and resources of the great public schools of England. Anyone who may wish to compare the routine of education, and the expense attendant on it, at any of these great establishments, has in this volume, ready to his hand, what could not otherwise be arrived at without an extended research. Though an ardent admirer of these ancient seats of education, Mr. Staunton does not allow himself to be carried away by their associations into an unqualified panegyric, but lays the report of the late commission on these schools before his reader, for the most part heartily endorsing all the recommendations it contains. The chief, and we fear ineradicable, defect of these establishments is, that monastic and clerical element which can hardly be eradicated without great risk of pulling up much good as well as evil. This feature, and their great expense, will for a long time secure a conservative education for the bulk of the more wealthy part of the nation. Even when an endeavour is made to obviate the latter of these difficulties in the way of the great mass of the middle class, old associations give an advantage to clergymen as masters which, it is to be hoped, a new class of educated laymen will soon successfully dispute with them. There is no danger of our moving too fast in this direction, for we may be sure that English prejudices on this point will only be overcome by genuine performance of what is one of the most difficult of duties, but which is also, we are glad to think, fast becoming one of the most honourable employments.

A series of papers reprinted from the *Pall Mall Gazette*, called *Sketches from Cambridge*,⁷ gives a very clear and vivid picture of life at that university. They are coloured by a peculiar humour, of which the key-note is struck in the first few lines. "The world may be divided into two classes—of those who have and those who have not received a university education. With regard to the latter—they, too, are God's creatures." This is certainly donnish, but though the author is unquestionably intimate with the society he paints, we entertain our doubts whether he does not in some degree overdo the character he assumes. There is a certain tone of calm cynicism which we do not think would be willingly paraded by the genuine Don. However this may be, he is unquestionably amusing, and

⁶ "The Great Schools of England." By Howard Staunton. London: Sampson Low, Sons, and Co. 1865.

⁷ "Sketches from Cambridge by a Don." London: Macmillan and Co. 1865.

describes the various types of undergraduate and the characteristic features of university authorities with a penetration and a humour that loses none of its pungency on account of its general kindness. The customary pictures of college life are usually drawn from the student's point of view, and it was certainly an original idea to exchange it for that of a tutor bored by his duties, but highly appreciating the advantages of his position. The author does not cultivate the usual good stories of pluck questions and answers, but has some very amusing instances of them, and a theory of their production which bears too much the aspect of truth to be very encouraging to paterfamilias. The rest of God's creatures who have foregone the advantages of a university education may draw considerable comfort from his pictures of its average result.

Another collection of sketches from the same paper, by Anthony Trollope, is devoted to hunting,⁸ and gives, after his manner, an account of the different kinds of persons who are found in an average field. The man who likes it, and the man who don't, the hunting parson, farmer, and lady who rides to hounds, are all described in that facile style to which Mr. Trollope owes so much of his popularity, the chief feature of which is the undeniable talent with which he makes gossip inoffensive. Decidedly inferior in grasp to the sketches just noticed, they can offend no one; the standard to which they appeal is that universally received one of average good sense and general respectability of sentiment which is exactly suited to the large circle of readers for which the author so assiduously labours. The pros and cons of conventional propriety were never better handled than by Mr. Trollope, and where they are not wearisome are sure to be highly attractive. In these slight sketches, as well as in his novels, the author knows his subject, and his directions, "how to ride to hounds," give just that degree of practical advice which will save many of his readers from failure and annoyance, as well as judicious warnings against some bad habits which are but too easily acquired in the scenes he describes.

Among books which treat of the condition of women, of their means of independent livelihood, or of the influence they exercise on society, so many are vitiated by peculiar theories of their position in relation to men, or are substantially protests in favour of some imaginary state of society, that a book which is entitled "Essays on Woman's Work"⁹ will meet with but little attention. But if those who have been annoyed by unpractical disquisition on the subject, will for one moment lay aside prejudices, which are not indeed without some foundation, but which are usually much stronger than are justifiable, and turn to a little volume by Miss Parkes with that title, they will find that in this instance at least the writer's feelings do not get the better of her judgment, nor her heart run away with her head. A more temperate and, within its limits, a more full discussion, not of women's

⁸ "Hunting Sketches." By A. Trollope. London: Chapman and Hall. 1865.

⁹ "Essays on Woman's Work." By B. R. Parkes. London: A. Strahan. 1865.

rights but of their present position, it is impossible to imagine. Miss Parkes has no theory to thrust upon her readers, and is wedded to no foregone conclusion, but she has given a long and attentive consideration to the question she writes upon, and is as fully informed of the real facts of the case as anyone in England. It is from these facts that she endeavours to extract that better wisdom which every one desires; it is an existing evil that she attempts to redress by calling attention to the shape it really assumes. As she most justly points out, the question of female labour has been settled already in the lower orders, or with two-thirds of the population; there is no hesitation with those classes who look to factory employment or domestic service, about the position which their daughters shall assume in life; while with the upper class, by which she means those who have an assured means of life, some sort of provision is absolutely demanded by the moral feelings of those who compose it. Substantially the question of female employment is concerned at present with three-thirteenths only of the population who ape the manners of the upper classes, while they are, in the great majority of cases, quite unable to make a provision for the female members of their families, whom they bring up with tastes and prejudices that are utterly unsuited to any but those whose means of life are beyond doubt, and are but a poor provision for happiness even when that is the case. Miss Parkes then gives a full account of all the really practical plans which have been set on foot for improving the education and extending the sphere of usefulness of unoccupied women, and offers to all who are in search of it the most valuable advice. The good feeling and temperate judgment of these essays ought to recommend them to a much larger circle of readers than that which is commonly interested in books on this subject.

The more general question of master and workman has been treated by Dr. Blaikie¹⁰ in a very different spirit. His review of the improved relations between employers and employed is little better than a pulpit moralizing on facts which have grown out of the necessity of the case under the fostering care of much more practical men. His book bears about the same relation to the various endeavours which have been made and are still making, all over the country, to improve the habits and condition of the working classes, that Dr. Trussler's "Hogarth Moralized" does to the healthy and manly morality of the artist. We look in vain through his volume for any practical suggestion to which he can lay a personal claim; but find abundant professional "improvement" of the efforts of other men. Even the copious collection of facts in almost every field of labour is marred, to our taste, by frequent inaccuracies of statement in details, and by a prevailing tone of religious sentimentality that but ill represents the earnestness of the various efforts he distorts in describing.

Mr. Marras' essay on the secret fraternities of the Middle Ages, which gained the Arnold prize of the present year at Oxford, not only treats of the subject named on its title page, but also of secret societies in

¹⁰ "Heads and Hands in the World of Labour." By W. G. Blaikie, D.D., F.R.S.E. London: A. Strahan. 1865.

general.¹¹ The little that is positively known, and the affected filiation of modern masonry on the earliest secret societies of which there is any notice, sharpen curiosity, and often give a fictitious interest to very unsubstantial conclusions. Though a very rapid survey, Mr. Marras' essay contains all that is really worth knowing. Secret and mysterious fraternities afford much better material for poetry than history. The most vital and efficient of them were but natural protests against an intolerable condition of society like that which gave birth to the Westphalian Vehmgericht, which maintained its enormous power only so long as the conditions which called it into existence lasted. The assumed connexion between the Assassins and the Templars, who, after all, can hardly be called a secret society, and the presence of Gnostic doctrine with some fragmentary remains of their symbolism among the Rosicrucians, Illuminati, and Freemasons, is traceable to no more positive source than the desire for that importance which is always attached to mystery. The refuge which justice and free thought have at times found in the bosom of these societies was never a permanent one; sooner or later all secret associations become corrupted and perish by the inevitable introduction of members who abuse the mutual confidence to personal and evil purposes. Where thought has no public shackles and justice is open to all, a secret society—if it aims at anything more than mutual mystification in its doctrines, or benevolent and social purposes in its action—soon perishes for want of sustenance. The extended history of such secret associations among the Egyptians and Greeks in their religious mysteries, as among the ancient Persians, Christians, and Mahometans, is always found to contain some account of immoral practices or other perversions which have been their destruction as soon as a free and wholesome public life has supplied that protection of which the weak must always stand in need.

In two very handsome volumes Mr. Newton has gathered together his correspondence while engaged in his researches in the Levant.¹² They not only contain a more popular account of his great discoveries at Budrum, but give the particulars of his visits to Rhodes, Branchida, and the various islands within the circle of his consulship at Mytilene. The history of his prolonged negotiations with the Turkish proprietors of the ground he wished to excavate at Halicarnassus gives a fresh and very characteristically dramatic interest to his narrative. All the sculptures recovered from the mausoleum are engraved in these volumes with singular fidelity and beauty, the drawings preserving the tone and style of art displayed in the originals with a skill that is highly remarkable; this is particularly the case with those by Mrs. Newton. The value of these remains can hardly be exaggerated. The strange good fortune by which Mr. Newton has in some cases recovered fragments in the course of his excavations that have fitted

¹¹ "The Secret Societies of the Middle Ages." By A. P. Marras, B.A. London: Rivingtons. 1865.

¹² "Travels and Discoveries in the Levant." By C. T. Newton, M.A., Keeper of the Greek and Roman Antiquities in the British Museum. London: Day and Son. 1865.

to the broken limbs of bas-reliefs which had been removed from Budrum four hundred years ago, affords a striking instance of the most appropriate reward to so much labour and patience. One of the most noteworthy features of these sculptures is the marked decadence which they betray when compared with the works of the Parthenon, completed only eighty-five years before them. But, though in style very inferior, they have a quasi-domestic interest that gives them a peculiar value. They also illustrate in a very striking manner the freedom with which the Ionian artists treated natural objects, and the principles of characteristic selection on which they worked. It will hardly be denied that these principles are often carried to a vicious extent. The lions stand with claws protruded as no living lions ever stood. This is, no doubt, the result of a doctrine which inculcated a full development of the most striking peculiarities of the object treated; but it at the same time gives evidence that the doctrine had already become a dead rule, and was no longer animated by that profound judgment in execution which accompanied its first enunciation. The human figures of the frieze, too, have a violence of attitude and almost operatic elegance which contrast disadvantageously with the noble calm of the corresponding sculptures in the Parthenon. On the whole, we are almost tempted to think that the ancient renown of this celebrated monument reposed as much upon the lavish expenditure bestowed upon its construction as upon any very elevated beauty. We are accustomed to suppose the Greeks too artistic to have been betrayed in their judgment by so vulgar a standard; but we have here, in our opinion, some trace of a general human weakness which they shared in common with a less cultivated posterity. From the mode in which these volumes are put together we reap the advantage of many excellent reflections on the effects of our consular system in the East, and gather not a few interesting particulars of modern Turkish life which will make them welcome to those persons, if such there be, who take but a small interest in their antiquarian contents.

Mr. Hutchinson very properly calls his volume on Buenos Ayres and the Argentine Republic, "Gleanings,"¹³ for there is very little coherence and arrangement, except such as is afforded by the routes he followed in his journeys through the country. The result is a mass of hasty sketches that would be almost useless to anyone who had not previously paid some attention to the history of the country; this can fortunately be done in the book lately published by M. Santiago Arcos, which we noticed in a late number of this Review. A fair notion, however, of the semi-savagery of the country is well given in his pages, and though in the last degree desultory, we are inclined to think that the results at which the author arrives are reliable and trustworthy. The object of his most extended journey up the valley of the Salado, was to ascertain the capabilities of the district as a field for the production of cotton, and to determine the truth of a report that the plant was indigenous. The conclusion to which he comes,

¹³ "Buenos Ayres and Argentine Gleanings." By Thomas J. Hutchinson, H.B.M. Consul for Rosario, Santa Fé. London: E. Stanford. 1866.

in which he was supported by the opinions of the most well-informed natives was, that if England were prepared to send out seed, capital, and labour, an indefinite amount of the desired commodity could be raised in the province of Santa Fé. This conclusion is more reasonable than encouraging; had there been room for any other, the strange inroad of the Paraguayans, and the disturbed state of the country, would have been fatal to any extended enterprise in this direction. The statistical summaries and general reports on trade and emigration will be found valuable, and the remarks on the latter subject are worthy of attentive consideration.

Under the title of "East and West," Mr. Stefanos Xenos gives a history from the Greek point of view, of the annexation of the Ionian Islands to the kingdom of Greece.¹⁴ He is far from thinking that the mouth of a gift horse should not be too closely examined, and leaves untouched none of those features of the cession, which were forced upon England by the co-signatories of the treaties of 1815, and which were very naturally far from pleasing to his countrymen. There is an amusing contrast throughout the volume between the reasons he gives for Greek attachment to England, and the ground to which he appeals when England is to be induced to reward that attachment with more solid recompenses. To the Greeks, he speaks of the commercial advantages which they must and do draw from a cordial union with this country; to the English, he expatiates upon the ancient glories of the land, and declaims on the "great idea" that the Greeks are the natural inheritors of the Byzantine empire. He very unblushingly shows, that if heirs, they are ready with immediate homage to any one who may appear as executor to the present possessor of the assumed heritage. There is something utterly absurd in a political writer dwelling on the effect produced on the minds of Candioties by the remains of Gnossus, Apollonia, Rithymna, Cydonia, Amphimalia, and of many other beautiful towns of the kingdom of Minos (!), remains which they do not know by name, and which only the most patient and learned research enables a modern traveller to recognise. This kind of rhetoric does harm to any conclusions it is used to support. That English influence should be used to retard instead of to accelerate the expected dissolution of the Turkish power in the East, is the chief and almost only burthen of M. Xenos' complaints. Had his compatriots cared as much for the great idea as for the more enticing and immediate rewards of commercial enterprise, the last thirty years might have brought them far nearer to the realization of that splendid dream; their attitude during the Crimean war, however easily explainable to a Greek public, is full of suggestions as to what kind of gratitude England would meet with, even could she be persuaded to enter on a crusade for their advantage. There is an absurd mixture of coaxing and bullying about the whole of this narrative, either of which is equally out of place. Two-thirds of the volume are filled with the principal treaties, conventions, and protocols concerning

¹⁴ "East and West." By Stefanos Xenos. London: Trübner and Co. 1865.

the Ionian Islands and Greece, concluded between 1797 and 1864; these at least give it some value as a book of reference to their contents.

In an essay on the condition of Servia and other states to the north of Greece, edited by Dr. Sandwith,¹⁵ we find no notice of an answering desire on the part of the Slavonian population for a union with that kingdom which M. Xenos assumes as a matter of course. An equal impatience of Turkish supremacy leads rather to a desire for direct independence than for an union with the more southerly provinces. The present condition of Servia and Bulgaria is very well described by the authors, two English ladies, who have for some time resided in and travelled through these countries; but they notice no tendency towards a common union among the European tributaries to the Turkish empire. Sympathies with France or England grounded on hopes and expectations they found on either, are the chief features of their foreign-politics. If any fresh justification were needed for the waiting attitude of English policy in the East, it would be abundantly found in the discord and contradictions which reign supreme on every branch of the Eastern question. Scarce two observers agree, and every one seems rather governed by chance predilections than by a well-grounded insight into the condition of the country.

If it were not for its affectations and attitudinizing style, Mr. Dixon's *Holy Land*¹⁶ would be a useful book. His object is to be picturesque, and he certainly possesses considerable powers of vivid description. He sets aside all criticism of the Gospel history, and accepts the Scripture narrative in the simplest shape, endeavouring, and not without a large degree of success, to fill it up with the civil history of the times, and to supply a framework of Roman and Jewish life among the events of which the days of Christ were spent. The result, however, though orthodox in form, is quite otherwise in the impression it will leave on most readers, and we think that a certain sentimental and affectionate familiarity of tone which closely approaches an offensive flippancy will jar on the feelings of many who put forth no very high pretensions to any kind of orthodoxy. The affectation which leads him to say in his preface that these operose and elaborate descriptions were not intended to serve as chapters of a book, but merely as notes for a few fire-side friends, will make most people smile. If any one ever presented himself to the public more completely got up for the occasion, and more characteristically dressed out for that very purpose, we have not been so fortunate as to meet with his performance. The conception of the book is undoubtedly good; we wish we could say as much for the taste displayed in its execution.

In June, 1862, Viscount Milton and Dr. Cheadle undertook a most adventurous journey across the whole breadth of British North America, with a view of exploring a direct route to British Columbia

¹⁵ "Notes on the South Slavonian Countries in Austria and Turkey in Europe." Edited, with a Preface, by H. Sandwith, C.B., D.C.L. London: W. Blackwood and Sons. 1865.

¹⁶ "The Holy Land." By W. Hepworth Dixon. London: Chapman and Hall. 1865.

by the Red River and the Saskatchewan, across one of the more northerly passes of the Rocky Mountains. The account¹⁷ which they give in common of their adventures forms one of the most interesting volumes of modern travel. They wintered in 1862 in the woods around La Belle Prairie, a station about 140 miles north-west of Fort St. George, and prepared themselves for the trials of their further journey by living like the natives, and relying for the most part on their guns for their subsistence. During this winter they had the fullest opportunity of studying Indian character, and their book abounds in genuine traits of savage life that supply even now one of the most complete views of the strange contrasts of which it is made up. The alternations between a rude abundance and imminent starvation in which such a race of hunters lives is not only described from hearsay, but shown in actual existence, together with the equally violent moral contrasts which such a life develops in the native character. The most heroic self-denial and control is found side by side with the most violent passions, a power of abstinence which seems to exceed the limits of human endurance, is associated with a ferocity of pursuit equally excessive where any trifling gratification is in view, a kind consideration for their families, which, without blows, extorts from their women and children an amount of patient labour and an implicitness of immediate obedience that admits of not a moment's question. These features of savage nature have hardly ever been so well brought before the English reader. There is no romance about their life; their virtues and their vices are extreme and momentary, looking neither before nor after, but reaching heights and depths of each which civilization happily renders impossible to the great majority of those who have enjoyed its advantages.

After breaking up from their winter quarters in the spring of 1863, they proceeded to Edmonton, on the Saskatchewan, to organize their party for its further journey. Here they engaged an Assiniboine hunter, with his wife and son, to act as guides through the passes of the Rocky Mountains; and here also they picked up a strange adventurer, an Irish classical tutor, who had been knocked about in all quarters of the world, and who was living on the charity of those around the station, in the hope of meeting with some party who would take him on to Columbia, where he hoped to turn his talents to some account. Among these talents woodcraft held no place, nor, in fact, any of the qualities of self-help which go to its acquisition. His selfish refusal of all work, and his incessant discourses on how the work ought to be done by others, had caused him to be shaken off by all the different parties he had hitherto joined; but his forlorn position induced the authors to take him by the hand, and though he proved a sore burthen on their journey, he considerably lightens the account of it by the amusing contrast he constantly exhibited between his position and his powers. The contempt he aroused in the minds of the Indian

¹⁷ "The North West Passage by Land." By Viscount Milton, F.R.G.S., F.G.S., &c., and W. B. Cheadle, M.A., M.D. Cantab., and F.R.G.S. London: Cassell, Petter, and Galpin. 1865.

guide and his family is evidently shared in by the authors; but they give it a good-humoured expression in spite of the trials to which he subjected them. After striking the Rocky Mountains at the watershed of the Athabasca and Yellow Rivers, they found their further progress in a direct line utterly shut out by an impassable forest, and were forced to turn southward, following the track of a large party of Canadian emigrants who had made for the Thompson river, which runs down to join the Fraser at Lytton. On this route they suffered the greatest hardships; losing the track of their predecessors, who had taken to the swollen and dangerous stream, they were obliged to cut their way through a forest so encumbered with fallen timber that they frequently made only two miles a day. They had but one hatchet among them, having lost much of their accoutrement in crossing the swollen rivers. Their provisions became exhausted, and, after a month's wandering in these woods, so completely without food or the means of procuring any that they were obliged to kill and eat their half-starved horses, they at last fought their way safely out. But only the day before they came upon the open country they found the corpse of an Indian who had starved to death in these forests some time before, and which, dried up and without a head, was sitting over the ashes of a burnt-out fire. Some notion of the perils of this part of their journey will be gained from the following account of some emigrants who had shortly before attempted the same route:—

“A party, consisting of five Canadians—three brothers, named Rennie, and two others, Helstone and Wright—crossed later in the autumn, and obtained canoes at the cache to descend the Fraser. The Shushwaps there had informed us that they had discovered the canoes lying bottom upwards, and their property strewn along the shore, below some rapids, and believed the whole party had been drowned. But three of their number met with a far more horrible fate than this. We now learnt that, in order to shoot the dangerous rapids with greater safety, they had lashed the two canoes together; but, in spite of this precaution, the boats were swamped. Two of the Rennies succeeded in reaching the shore, and the other three men a rock, in the middle of the stream. For two days and nights the latter remained exposed to the bitter cold of the commencing winter, without a morsel of food, before their companions were able to effect their release. A rope was at last passed to the rock, and the men hauled ashore, half dead with hunger and fearfully frost-bitten. They were so helpless as to be quite unable to proceed farther; and the two Rennies, having cut a quantity of firewood, and given them almost the whole of their scanty stock of provisions, set out on foot to seek assistance at Fort George, which they calculated on reaching in six days; but they had underrated the distance. Their path lay through dense encumbered forests, and the snow had fallen to considerable depth before they reached the Fort, frostbitten and almost dead from hunger and exhaustion, after twenty-eight days' travelling. Indians were immediately sent out to the assistance of the unfortunate men left behind, but returned in a few days, declaring the snow was too deep for them to proceed. Other Indians, however, discovered the party some time afterwards. Helstone and Wright were still alive, but, maddened by hunger, had killed Rennie. When they were found, they had eaten all but his legs, which they held in their hands at the time. They were covered with blood, being engaged in tearing the raw flesh from the bones with their teeth. The Indians attempted to light a fire for them, when the

two cannibals drew their revolvers, and looked so wild and savage, that the Indians fled and left them to their fate, not daring to return.

"The following spring, a party of miners, on their way to Peace River, were guided by Indians to the place where these men were seen by them. The bones of two were found piled in a heap; one skull had been split open by an axe, and many of the other bones showed the marks of teeth; the third was missing, but was afterwards discovered a few hundred yards from the camp. The skull had been cloven by an axe, and the clothes stripped from the body, which was little decomposed. The interpretation of these signs could hardly be mistaken: the last survivor had killed his fellow-murderer and eaten him, as shown by the gnawed bones so carefully piled in a heap. He had in turn probably been murdered by Indians, for the principal part of the dead men's property was found in their possession."

On reaching New Westminster they made an excursion to the gold diggings at Richfield, on the Upper Fraser, which they had hoped to reach by a much more direct route, and give a very full and interesting account of the wild life among the miners. As a practical result of so much labour and toil, both Viscount Milton and Dr. Cheadle come to the conclusion that a direct route to the North Pacific through the gold regions of Columbia is so essentially practicable as only to be a question of time; while the large and fruitful districts on the banks of the Saskatchewan will supply all that can be necessary, not only for the support of the line of travel, but for a large and prosperous population, so soon as its vegetable and animal resources are adequately utilized. This book of travel is as amusing as the most romantic fiction, and abounds with interesting anecdotes of the wild animals of North America with which the authors were obliged to make that intimate acquaintance which results from depending on them for the means of life. We have never met with so impressive a picture of the desolation of a virgin forest, and agree most heartily with the epigraph on the title from "*As You Like It*," where Touchstone says, "If this is Arden, when I was at home I was in a better place."

Of Columbia and the neighbouring colony, Vancouver Island, an excellent account has been compiled by Mr. Macfie,¹⁸ who was a resident in Victoria during the difficulties with the Americans on the San Juan question, and who witnessed the first rush to the colony on the report of gold being discovered in the Fraser. It is so important to all who think of emigrating to these colonies to be able to form just notions both of what they may expect there and of the qualifications they should themselves possess, if they wish to avoid failure and distress, that a thorough review of the history, resources, and prospects of these colonies, like the present, is of the highest value; and to those who have no such thoughts, but find an interest in the study of the strange tumultuous fashion of modern colonization, Mr. Macfie's volume will prove a complete treasury of well-observed facts. The miscellaneous community which is now gathered together on the West coast of the Pacific is admirably described, and not without considerable sympathy with their avid ambition to become the connecting link between Eng-

¹⁸ "*Vancouver Island and British Columbia.*" By Matthew Macfie, F.R.G.S. London: Longman and Co. 1865.

land and the East. It seems but a small thing to these colonists, warmed with the idea of such a future, to demand of the mother country a railway from Canada to Victoria. Colonies, like children, seem very often to suppose that it is the chief duty of their parents to spare them all the labour of the first difficult steps; but this claim of the Western colonies of British North America is perhaps as large and bold a one as ever colonists have yet made. Visions of the stream of commerce directing itself across the Pacific, and leaving the old route round the Cape, may indeed be prophetic, but, like many other prophecies, they will, if true, fulfil themselves when their time is fully come. It is not the less admirable that a small community, scarce twelve years old, should entertain such lofty notions of their future greatness, for these notions, too, bring about the grandeur dreamt of. At present, however, the practical thing is to know what can at once be done, and this is as little neglected by Mr. Macfie as the more enticing topics of colonial ambition. The best attainable returns of the productiveness of the various crops, of the wages rate, and of the mining prospects of these colonies, are brought together in his pages; while his graphic sketch of society in Vancouver Island and Columbia is full of warning to the thoughtless and incompetent class which so much infests an infant colony, and abounds in curious and dramatic incidents. Of the perishing Indian population he has gathered with great judgment, while it is yet time, what can be ascertained of their habits and superstitions, and shows how the mere presence of a white community is gradually pushing them off the face of the earth. The author's colonial sympathies extend even to the adoption of colonial English, and many new words, which will some day flourish in our dictionaries, may be here found putting forth their claim to that distinction. On the whole, we do not think a better book on its subject is anywhere to be had.

In May, 1860, Capt. Hall,¹⁹ of the U.S. mercantile marine, who had long reflected on the possibility of ascertaining some trustworthy particulars of the fate of Franklin and his companions, started from New London, Connecticut, with the adventurous purpose of making an overland journey from Hudson's Straits to King William's Island. He purposed familiarizing himself with the Esquimaux, and, by acquiring their language and confidence, he hoped to gather from them a knowledge which he firmly persuaded himself some of them must possess. He was supported in his enterprise by Mr. Grinnell and some other equally devoted friends of arctic discovery. Having accepted a free passage in the whaling barque *George Henry*, he sailed for Northumberland Inlet, but unfortunately lost his boat and much of his equipment in a storm at the mouth of Frobisher's Straits in the following September. The main purpose of his voyage being thus frustrated, he devoted himself to the study of the locality to which he was fixed for the winter, and established the fact that the so-called straits are really a bay. He surveyed the whole coast line on each side, and

¹⁹ "Life with the Esquimaux." By Captain Charles F. Hall. London: Sampson Low, Son, and Co. 1865.

on one of the islands in the bay discovered remains of Frobisher's expedition, being led to the spot by traditions among the Esquimaux. This, as corroborating the views with which he started, was as encouraging to himself as it must be interesting to everyone. It is certainly a remarkable circumstance that a tradition of the presence of white men in these latitudes should have been handed down among the wandering natives for 300 years, with a particularity which unquestionably connected it with Frobisher's expedition in 1578.

Many of the relics in question he sent, on his return in 1862, to England. The bulk of his present book is composed of a very detailed account of Esquimaux, or, as he prefers to call it, Inuit life. The *George Henry* being caught in the pack ice at the close of the season of 1861, Captain Hall was compelled to spend a second winter among them. When not travelling about the shores of the bay, he lived in the ice-houses or igloos of the natives, accommodating himself to their customs and diet, with a view of determining the possibility of a European sustaining life on the resources of the country. These are not inviting, and it is somewhat strange to hear him expatiating on raw rein-deer fat and the uncooked blood and brains of a seal as appetizing delicacies that he would often have been but too glad to have had at his command. Tough whale-skin does not appear a very nourishing diet, and the general habit of dispensing with any kind of cooking or condiments does not seem pleasant; but Captain Hall assures us that these things are, after all, very unessential civilized luxuries. No European has had so full an opportunity of studying the character of the natives, but the personal friendships he formed among them (a couple returned with him to the United States) lead him to give the fairest representation of their peculiarities, while it is incidentally evident that they have all the generic qualities of semi-savages. Their amiability is a fair-weather good nature which will not withstand any great trial, and their whole life is exposed to such severe hardship, aggravated by the thoughtlessness of all races in similar circumstances, that it is not surprising to find them abandoning their sick to die alone, immured in an ice house, as soon as their feeble remedies have been exhausted and there is nothing left but a burthen which they can shake off. They are generous in plenty, but often savagely and capriciously cruel. The numerous well-authenticated instances of their plundering and killing shipwrecked Europeans seem to exercise no influence on Captain Hall's judgment of them, for he started on another expedition in June, 1864, in the hope of yet being able to solve the sad riddle which has taken so strong a hold on his imagination. It is much to be regretted that some experienced friend had not expunged a great mass of moralizing reflections and jejune remarks which encumber the pages of this most interesting book, and enormously detract from the pleasure which the strangeness and novelty of the life it brings before us would otherwise give to every reader.

SCIENCE.

IN his account of the state of science in 1865 M. V. Meunier¹ takes a much narrower field than M. L. Figuier in his "Année Scientifique," confining his attention for the most part to subjects more or less connected with biology; and having little to say except upon French works or discoveries. In fact, from the general structure of the articles, as also from some statements which occur here and there in the book, they would seem to be reviews and essays contributed by the author to journals, and now given to the world in a separate form. M. Meunier evidently belongs to the advanced school of naturalists; he commences with an attack upon the foolish manifesto which was got up in this country about a year ago deprecating the pursuit of scientific investigations which might seem to invalidate the statements of scripture, and in subsequent articles maintains the antiquity of man, the Darwinian theory of the origin of species, and even the doctrine of heterogeny. Besides these and other essays on various departments of science, we find several vigorous articles charging certain leading French naturalists with gross favoritism in their recommendations of candidates for vacant chairs of Natural History. The whole of the articles are written with much spirit, and the book will well repay perusal.

Dr. Fliedner's "Problems in Physics,"² of which a third enlarged edition has recently appeared, furnishes a large series of most useful questions for solution by the student, in all departments of pure physics and mechanics. The present edition contains two new sections, one consisting of problems relating to the theory of heat, the other of chemical questions. The little volume concludes with an elaborate series of tables containing the empirical data necessary for working out the problems.

In a large, handsome, and profusely illustrated volume, bearing the fanciful title of "Astra Castra,"³ Mr. C. H. Turnor has published a very elaborate history of aeronautics from the earliest periods to the present time; indeed, he may be said to carry his researches considerably beyond the domain of history, for in his second chapter, which relates chiefly to the "normal clairvoyance" of poets' imagination, he cites long passages from the ancient poets descriptive of the little misadventures which, according to those authorities, befel Phaëton and Icarus, the deeds of Bellerophon on Pegasus, and others, which, from their having some reference to aerial locomotion, serve to indicate the prevalence of a wish for the power of flight at all periods of the history of mankind. The general notions of the means by which this desirable result might be attained, as late as the Middle

¹ "La Science et les Savants en 1865." Deuxième année, premier semestre. Par Victor Meunier. 12mo. Paris: G. Baillière. 1865.

² "Aufgaben aus der Physik, nebst einem Anhang, physikalische Tabellen enthaltend." Von Dr. C. Fliedner, 8vo. Brunswick: Vieweg. 1865.

³ "Astra Castra; Experiments and Adventures in the Atmosphere." By Hatton Turnor. 4to. London: Chapman and Hall. 1865.

Ages, at any rate, seem to have been more or less in accordance with those of the draughtsman of the woodcut on p. 27 of this volume, where we find a representation of a "Witch riding on the Devill through the Aire." The earlier plans proposed for ascending in the air by mechanical means were hardly more practicable than those in which the devil was concerned,—such as flying chariots, light vehicles with birds harnessed to them, and finally the attachment of wings to the human body, a notion as old as the story of Icarus, and which came down nearly to our own day. The idea of a balloon seems first to have occurred to Roger Bacon; but, as his proposed balloons were copper balls, any experiments he may have made could hardly have been successful. These copper balloons crop up again during the seventeenth century, but it was not until the latter part of the eighteenth that the experiments of the brothers Montgolfier demonstrated the possibility of aeronautic expeditions. The account of these first ascents forms the subject matter of Mr. Turnor's third chapter; and from this period his history of the doings of aeronauts is very copious; almost too much so, indeed, seeing that frequently many pages are occupied by reprints of newspaper reports. In fact, Mr. Turnor seems to have determined to bring together every scrap that has been written in connexion with his subject; and although by this means he has undoubtedly increased the bulk of his book more than was absolutely necessary, there are certainly considerable advantages in this monographic mode of treatment. After the completion of his history of balloons and ballooning, including Mr. Glaisher's ascents of last year, Mr. Turnor proceeds to the consideration of the means of directing the course of balloons and other aerial vehicles, such as the "Aerial Machine" of Mr. Henson, which attracted so much attention about twenty years ago, and the numerous combinations of balloons with locomotive powers, which have been suggested at various times. Many of these are sufficiently curious, but none of them give much promise of success. Upon all branches of aerostation our author has collected a great fund of information, most of which is interesting, and many of the anecdotes interspersed with it exceedingly amusing; but we cannot understand what has led him to conclude his appendix with a piece of rhapsodical pietistic writing having no apparent connexion with the subject of his book. The introduction of the translation of Enoch and the ascension of Christ into a book on aeronautics is, to say the least of it, in bad taste. The illustrations are partly woodcuts and partly photozincographic copies of old plates: most of them are curious and interesting.

Mr. Kilgour has published a small pamphlet with the object of showing that nitrogen is only carbonic oxide in an allotropic state.⁴ He founds his opinion on the facts that the two bodies possess the same atomic weight and combining volume, and nearly the same specific gravity, and indicates certain other properties which are equally characteristic of both of them. However possible it may be that many of the supposed elements of modern chemistry will hereafter prove to

⁴ "Nitrogen shown to be Carbonic Oxide in an Allotropic State." By Henry Kilgour. 8vo. London: John Churchill and Sons. 1865.

be either compounds or peculiar forms of other bodies, chemists will certainly require more positive evidence than any adduced by our author, before admitting the identity of two apparently distinct substances.

The second edition of Mr. Fairbairn's work on the manufacture of iron⁵ has been improved by the introduction of numerous details upon matters connected with that department of industry which have come into notice chiefly within the last few years. It contains an elaborate description of Mr. Bessemer's process for the production of steel, which promises to effect an important revolution in the iron manufacture. The author likewise has a chapter on the manufacture and properties of armour plates for casing ships of war; and the metallurgical portion has been improved by frequent references to Dr. Percy's researches on the metallurgy of iron. In its present form Mr. Fairbairn's work forms an excellent handbook of the iron manufacture.

The eighth part of Mr. Colburn's "Locomotive Engineering,"⁶ now before us, commences the detailed description of the structure of the locomotive engine and of the principles of its action. It is illustrated, like the preceding parts, with three large outline plates.

The first part of the second edition of Professor Quenstedt's "Manual of Palæontology,"⁷ which has recently appeared, is devoted to the consideration of the fossil vertebrata, and forms an admirable and very cheap summary of our knowledge of those objects. After a brief sketch of the history of palæontology, the author gives an equally condensed but hardly equally satisfactory sketch of the different formations recognised by geologists, and a table of the classes of animals, and then proceeds to the description of the characters of the fossils belonging to the vertebrate subkingdom, precluding each great group with a sufficient amount of information on its comparative anatomy to render his work a complete handbook in itself. The present part includes, besides the vertebrata, the commencement of the crustacea. The illustrations consist of numerous tolerably-executed woodcuts printed with the text, and twenty-four lithographed plates, which, although sometimes rather rough, will serve all the purposes of the student.

There is no department of Geology more interesting to the student or more attractive to the general reader than that which treats of the means by which the present features presented by the surface of the earth have been produced; at the same time there is none more environed with difficulties. In his book on "Scottish Scenery,"⁸ Mr. Geikie has laboured, and in general successfully, to indicate the succes-

⁵ "Iron: its History, Properties, and Processes of Manufacture." By William Fairbairn, C.E., LL.D., F.R.S., &c. New edition. 8vo. Edinburgh: Black. 1865.

⁶ "Locomotive Engineering and the Mechanism of Railways, &c." By Zerah Colburn. Part VIII. 4to. London, Edinburgh, and Glasgow: Collins.

⁷ "Handbuch der Petrefaktenkunde." Von Friedr. Aug. Quenstedt. Erste Lieferung. 8vo. Tübingen: Laupp. 1865.

⁸ "The Scenery of Scotland viewed in Connexion with its Physical Geology." By Archibald Geikie, F.R.S. 8vo. London: Macmillan. 1865.

sion of processes by which the wild and varied scenery of his native country has acquired its present aspect, at the same time furnishing an instructive lesson on the general agencies by which geological changes are brought about. He traces the operation of marine denudation in the production of an undulating plateau, from which the mountains and valleys have been subsequently carved out by the long continuance of subaërial agencies; he describes the probable condition of the country during the glacial period, and the effects of alternate movements of upheaval and depression, and shows how, by the successive action of these various forces, the existing state of things has been produced. The most important ice-action is ascribed by Mr. Geikie to glaciers, in opposition to the views of Mr. Campbell, who attributes greater efficiency to the action of floating icebergs. This work will be read with much pleasure by visitors to Scotland, and will greatly enhance the interest of their residence among its hills and valleys, especially as it is illustrated with an excellent revised geological map of the country, and with numerous sketches of characteristic pieces of scenery by the author.

It has long been known that certain caverns in various mountain ranges of Europe contain ice throughout the summer, and thus some of them serve as natural ice-cellars for the inhabitants of their vicinity. But it has been reserved for Mr. G. F. Browne to enter upon the investigation of these curious caves with something of the same enthusiasm which impels the members of the Alpine Club to risk their necks continually in the effort to scale inaccessible icy peaks, and his ardour of exploration seems to have been rewarded by the sight of some exceedingly interesting spectacles. His book lately published on the "Ice-Caves of France and Switzerland"⁹ contains a description of several of these caverns, locally denominated *glacières*, which he succeeded in investigating, not without sufficient difficulty to give a zest to his proceedings; for although the examination of the ice-caves is not attended with any of those grand perils which environ those who venture upon an Alpine glacier, there is, nevertheless, some chance of gliding away—no one knows whither—upon the slippery, sloping floor; and as most of them are situated in out-of-the-way districts, the hardships which the traveller has to undergo in the matter of hotel accommodation, are obstacles, although perhaps ridiculous ones, in his way. The ice-caves examined by Mr. Browne are for the most part situated in the chain of the Jura: they consist of caverns of various sizes and forms, situated at a depth of from 50 to 200 feet beneath the surface, and communicating with the outer world by one or more passages, which are sometimes perpendicular shafts, and always present a very steep incline. The cavern itself frequently gives origin to branches extending far into the rock, or consists of several chambers at different elevations, through which the smooth ice-floor flows at various inclinations, sometimes producing the effect of a great waterfall arrested by sudden frost in its subterranean channel. Stalagmitic ice-columns, of great size and beauty, are also to be found in these caves, the spectacle presented by some of

⁹ "Ice-Caves of France and Switzerland: a Narrative of Subterranean Exploration." By the Rev. G. F. Browne. 8vo. London: Longmans. 1865.

which, as described by our author, appears to be exceedingly beautiful. Mr. Browne found that the ice of these caverns exhibited a curious structure, being formed of prisms laid side by side perpendicular to the surface of the ice, a character which does not occur elsewhere in ice. Mr. Browne adopts Deluc's theory of the formation and preservation of the ice in these caves, modified, however, by some observations of his own; he also gives a note of similar caverns in other districts not visited by him, and his personal experiences are described in so charming and racy a style that we fancy many of his readers will feel a desire to follow in his footsteps.

Professor Cotta's "Geology and History,"¹⁰ translated by Mr. Noel, furnishes an excellent popular exposition of the present state of our knowledge on the subject of the antiquity of man. The author starts from the principle that no definite line can be drawn in nature between the domains of geology and history, and indicates that this is especially shown by the recent discoveries of the remains of pile-dwellings in Switzerland and elsewhere. He gives an interesting account of the evidence extant as to the condition and mode of life of the pile-dwellers, and describes the changes which have taken place in the scenes in which they resided since their singular habitations were finally deserted, probably not much before the Roman period. The other evidence in favour of the great antiquity of man, such as that furnished by the Danish peat-bogs and *kjökkenmöddingar*, by the remains of ancient tribes found in France and elsewhere, by the co-existence of human remains in caverns with bones of extinct animals, and by the borings of Leonard Horner in the Nile Valley, are discussed by the author, who accepts, as the result of all these investigations, the necessity for carrying back the origin of the human genus to a distance of many thousand years. In the concluding portion of his memoir he discusses the Darwinian theory, which he considers to be rather supported than disproved by our available palæontological data, maintaining that if we can discover unmetamorphosed portions of the lowest metamorphic rocks, we shall probably find that the organic remains contained in them stand on a lower grade of development than those occurring in the lowest known fossiliferous rocks. In fact, he holds that from the Silurians upwards we have only about one half of the records before us, but the greater part of the rest have been unfortunately hopelessly destroyed. He therefore accepts the theory of evolution, and admits its application to man as well as to the rest of the animal creation. Mr. Noel's translation appears to be carefully executed, but we notice some misprints, due no doubt to an imperfect acquaintance with some details connected with the subject. Thus, many of the zoological names are misspelt, as for instance at p. 43, where the Great Auk figures as the "Penguin," with the Latin name "*Aleo impennis*." Again, at pp. 65 and 67, we find "*Lima*," instead of "*Lingula*," and on p. 44 we have 1200 years instead of 12,000 as the time required for the production of sixty feet of Nile mud.

¹⁰ "Geology and History: a Popular Exposition of all that is known of the Earth and its Inhabitants in Pre-historic Times." By Bernhard von Cotta. 12mo. London: Trübner. 1865.

In a pamphlet on this same subject,¹¹ Sir William Denison takes the opposite view, and endeavours to prove from the statistics of the increase of population that the Bible narrative gives quite sufficient time for the production of the human inhabitants of the earth. His main inference from the returns of population is "that population increases in a geometrical ratio, doubling its numbers in periods varying in different countries," and he takes the normal period under no disturbing influences at 25 years. Then assuming the population of the globe at 1073 millions, the number of years since Noah's flood at 4212, and the number of survivors of that catastrophe at 8, he finds the period of doubling to be 156 years. It is evident that the whole of this argument, as also the author's opposition to the views of Bunsen and others, rests upon the assumption of a uniform, or at all events uniformly continuous increase in the human population of the earth, whereas it seems rather to be subject to local oscillations dependent chiefly on states of civilization.

Professor Gastaldi of Turin has collected numerous notices of the discovery in Italy of remains of prehistoric man, and his memoir on this interesting subject has been translated by Mr. Chambers, and published by the Anthropological Society.¹² Objects belonging to the stone and bronze ages have been found in several parts of northern and central Italy; in some places evident traces of pile-dwellings are met with in a peculiar marly soil, richly impregnated with organic matter, and also on the borders of certain lakes, and some caverns have furnished bones and flint implements, the latter, at Chiampo, intermixed with bones of a large bear. At Finale a cavern was examined which contained human bones hacked and calcined, possibly indicating cannibalism among these early inhabitants of North Italy.

Dr. Daubeney, in his "Essay on the Trees of the Ancients,"¹³ finds another argument in favour of the antiquity of man, in the fact that almost all our fruit-trees appear to have been generally known from the very earliest historical periods. From the author's statement it appears that the number of species described by Pliny, Dioscorides, and Theophrastus, or referred to by other writers of antiquity, which can be positively identified with those of modern botanists, is very small, owing to the vagueness with which the ancient writers characterized the plants observed by them; so that, as a general rule, we can only arrive at the genus to which a given plant probably belongs. Dr. Daubeney has availed himself of the materials already collected by Dr. Sibthorp, and of those published in various works both in France and Germany; but it must be confessed that, in too many cases, the discussion of all the extant evidence leads to no very definite conclusion.

¹¹ "An Attempt to Approximate to the Antiquity of Man by Induction from well-established Facts." By Sir Wm. Denison, K.C.B. 8vo. Madras: Higginbotham. 1865.

¹² "Lake Habitations and Prehistoric Remains in the Turbaries and Marl-beds of Northern and Central Italy." By Bartolomeo Gastaldi. Translated and edited by Charles Harcourt Chambers. 8vo. London: Longmans. 1865.

¹³ "Essay on the Trees and Shrubs of the Ancients: being the Substance of Four Lectures delivered before the University of Oxford, &c." By C. Daubeney, M.D., F.R.S. 8vo. Oxford and London: Parker. 1865.

The architecture of animals, the nature and mode of construction of the dwelling-places which they prepare either for their own shelter or for the protection of their young, may be regarded as one of the most curious and generally interesting branches of zoology, and in devoting his bulky volume, entitled "Homes without Hands,"¹⁴ to the elaboration of this subject, the Rev. J. G. Wood has certainly shown his judgment. He has also brought together a large amount of information, and communicated it in a readable form, so that, although his work can hardly lay claim to a scientific position, we may predict for it a wide-spread popularity. At the same time we find too evident traces of the hand of the book-maker in its pages, in the shape of diffuse writing, and the introduction of irrelevant statements and remarks, and a very considerable number of animals are referred to which have no business to appear in such a volume at all, such as the wood-boring beetles, the parasitic ichneumons, and above all the serpulæ, corals, and polyzoa! If the latter be admissible, we can see no reason for the exclusion of the whole of the shell-bearing mollusca.

At a time when many lives are being destroyed in England by diarrhœa, and when there are grave fears of the destructive advent of cholera itself, the publication of Dr. Chapman's pamphlet is very opportune.¹⁵ Having satisfied himself of the successful application of his new method of vaso-motor therapeutics to the treatment of diarrhœa and cholera, he has reprinted, with some important additions, from the "Medical Times and Gazette," an account of what he holds to be the proximate cause of these diseases, and the true method of their cure. The causes of diarrhœa he conceives to be—*heat, motion, nervous irritation, and mental emotion.*

Under the head of *diarrhœa originated by heat*, come the ordinary summer diarrhœa, and the premonitory diarrhœa of cholera; these maladies being essentially the same both in nature and origin, and the treatment of one the treatment of the other. The mode of causation of the diarrhœa of cholera he traces in the following order:—Owing to the stimulant effects of excessive external heat, and especially to the action of the direct rays of the sun on the back, there is produced a hyperæmia of those spinal nervous centres which directly govern the alimentary canal; the immediate consequences being,—(a) That a larger supply of nervous influence is sent to the blood-vessels through the vaso-motor nerves, whereby contraction of them takes place, and the supply of blood to the intestinal walls is partly cut off. "The bowels thus lose their wonted robustness, and so become, like a delicate lady with very little blood in her system, 'highly nervous,' and susceptible of being excited and thrown into excessive or convulsive activity by a stimulus which in their healthy condition would but

¹⁴ "Homes without Hands: being a Description of the Habitations of Animals, classed according to their Principle of Construction." By the Rev. J. G. Wood, M.A., &c. 8vo. London: Longmans. 1865.

¹⁵ "Diarrhœa and Cholera: their Origin, Proximate Cause, and Cure, through the Agency of the Nervous System, by means of Ice." By John Chapman, M.D., &c. London: Trübner and Co. 1865.

slightly affect them." (b) That a copious exudation of mucus takes place in the intestinal canal, in like manner as it takes place when heat is artificially applied to the dorso-lumbar regions of the spinal cord, or as bronchial mucus is freely secreted in the first or dry stage of bronchitis when heat is applied between the scapulae. (c) That with the hyperæmic state of the nervous centres there is an excessive exaltation of their excito-motor or reflex functions, so that they transmit a more than normal stimulating influence to the muscular fibres of the intestine.

"The association of these three conditions, viz., enfeeblement of the muscular wall of the intestine, preternatural exudation from its mucous membrane, and excessive muscular activity—all dependent, as I have shown them to be, upon hyperæmia of the nervous centres, constitutes the premonitory diarrhœa of cholera, and indeed, all those choleraic forms of intestinal flux known as the summer diarrhœa of temperate climates. I may add, that while the hypothesis here propounded accounts for all the phenomena of the maladies in question, it receives striking confirmation, not only from the experience which I have already had in treating cases by means of ice along the spine, but also from the fact that I have induced diarrhœa by applying heat to the dorso-lumbar region."

Of the *diarrhœa induced by motion*, that which frequently accompanies sea-sickness is an illustration. The abnormal impressions from the pelvic and abdominal viscera produce irritation of the spinal nervous centres, which is in turn followed by an unwonted afflux of blood, and consequent increase of their reflex functions; so that the condition of things is in reality closely analogous to that which in choleraic diarrhœa is induced by heat, and the effects upon the bowels are of the same kind, though less in intensity. In like manner when diarrhœa is induced by *nervous irritation*, or by *mental emotion*—of which latter mode of causation Dr. Chapman gives several instructive examples—though the *primary* cause is different, the *proximate* cause is the same—viz., hyperæmia of the spinal and sympathetic nervous centres which preside over the bowels, and especially of the superior and inferior mesenteric plexuses.

Such being the pathological condition of diarrhœa, it follows that the logical treatment of it is to exercise a sedative influence over the above-mentioned nervous centres by lessening the amount of blood in them. And, as a matter of fact, this can be done, as Dr. Chapman has discovered, by the application of ice, in suitably-constructed bags, along the appropriate segments of the spinal cord, when, the cause being removed, the morbid intestinal actions will commonly soon cease.

"I freely recognise," Dr. Chapman adds, "that this method of treatment requires a long-continued trial before it can be regarded as an established curative agency of the high scientific order in which I confidently hope it will ultimately rank, and as yet my own experience in thus treating diarrhœa is comparatively slight. I have, however, as stated in my pamphlet on Sea-sickness, ascertained by experience that the diarrhœa which sometimes accompanies that malady is arrested by means of ice: this fact has been proved in several cases. I have also treated several cases of summer diarrhœa in like

manner, and with like success; and the infantile diarrhœa occasioned by dentition can, as I have also experienced, be subdued with wonderful rapidity in the same way. In these cases this particular symptom of spinal irritation, diarrhœa, is not only subdued, but the restlessness, fretfulness, and general irritability of the little sufferer are simultaneously overcome. Soon after the ice is applied along the back the child usually goes fast asleep with the ice on, and when it awakes is refreshed and calm, the diarrhœa having quite ceased meanwhile."

As the author has in preparation a full exposition of his views concerning the origin, proximate cause, and rational treatment of cholera, he has contented himself on this occasion with a brief summary of the doctrines which he holds with regard to it. He maintains that the *primary* cause of cholera is, as a general rule, the excessive heat of hot climates and of temperate climates in summer; that its *proximate* cause is of precisely the same nature as, though more intense than, that of choleraic diarrhœa—viz., *an extreme hyperæmia of the spinal and sympathetic nervous centres*; that the general arterial contractions throughout the system, which are secondary results of this hyperæmia, induce the muscular debility, tremors, vertigo, coldness, and lividness of the body, as also the nausea, vomiting, cold sweats, and "rice-water stools;" that cholera is neither contagious nor infectious in any sense whatever, except through the depressing influence of fear; and lastly, and most important of all, that cholera may be completely averted, and when developed, cured, by the persistent application of the spinal ice-bag along the whole of the spine. Dr. Chapman gives full and exact directions with regard to the application of the ice-bag, and the cautions to be observed; and describes the *auxiliary remedies* which may be advantageously combined with its application in severe cases. Among these remedies are *not* to be included opium and alcoholic stimulants, which, so far from being of any benefit, are likely to prolong and intensify the disease, and to ensure the death of many who would otherwise recover.

"All influences—whether intellectual, moral, or physical—which tend to exalt the activity or susceptibility of the nervous system, increase its liability to derangement, and notably predispose it to those perverted actions called 'functional diseases,' of which, as I maintain, diarrhœa and cholera are examples. It seems to me probable that among the physical agencies in question, opium, alcohol, coffee, and tea stand conspicuous; that the large amount of opium consumed in Eastern countries, and especially in India, creates in the nervous system a condition peculiarly favourable for the generation of cholera by the solar heat; that this condition, though in a lesser degree, is also induced by the free consumption of alcoholic fluids; and that the increase of cholera in Europe and America within the present century may be referred not only to the increased activity of the nervous system as expressed in the intense excitements, anxieties, and struggles incident to the present phase of civilization, but also to the free indulgence by the people in nervous stimulants of various kinds, including opium chewing, alcoholic drinks of all kinds, and, especially during the present century, to the daily consumption in large quantities of coffee and tea."

He concludes with the account of a severe case of cholera that

was successfully treated by means of ice, though under peculiar difficulties.

"No witness," he adds, "of the effects of the ice in subduing the arterial spasms, on which the coldness and dark discoloration of the skin, especially of the face and hands, depended; in subduing the muscular contractions, which caused the pinched and sunken aspect of the countenance; in stopping those vigorous vermicular motions of the bowels which the patient described as like the wavy movement to and fro of a live object against the inner wall of the abdomen, and which resulted in the perilously rapid expulsion of their contents; in stopping the vomiting; and, above all, in dispelling, as if by magic, the remarkable anxiety which was evinced, and in quickly soothing the patient into refreshing sleep,—could fail to become convinced that at length we have gained possession of a weapon with which we may fight successfully the battle of life, even with that awful destroyer the mere report of whose invasion is the terror of nations."

A concise summary of all that is really known concerning chloroform and its effects, the conditions of its safe administration, and the means to be adopted when it does produce ill consequences, has for some time been felt as a want in medical literature. There has been much vague theorizing as to the nature of its action, and the manner in which it sometimes proves fatal; but it is truly remarkable how little has been done in the way of exact study of the effects of an agent which, though it has been of incalculable benefit to mankind, has already counted many victims. This want Mr. Sansom has, not without considerable success, endeavoured to supply.¹⁶ He has aimed to combine the experience and teaching of different individuals into something like a consistent whole, and has added the results of his own observations and experience. By microscopical examination of the capillaries of the frog's-foot, when chloroform had been administered to the animal by the mouth, he has found the effects of it, as of other anæsthetics, upon the circulation, to be, in the order of their sequence—first, an increase of the flow of blood through the arterial system; secondly, a decided contraction of the arteries, the current maintaining its original force; thirdly, a sluggishness of the flow of blood in the capillaries, the corpuscles showing a tendency to aggregate and to choke many of the capillaries; and fourthly, dilatation of the artery, with an increasing sluggishness of the flow of blood that may pass to actual stasis. A state of anæsthesia does not then, as has been commonly thought, imply hyperæmia of the brain; but the quantity of blood in the vessels is diminished, as it is also now known to be in natural sleep. This has been actually seen in the case of a patient in America, who had suffered a fracture of the skull that exposed the brain: when he was fully under the influence of chloroform, the brain was remarkably pale, but its surface became florid and injected as the anæsthesia passed off. Impressed with these and other facts, Mr. Sansom argues somewhat confidently against those who believe that chloroform directly affects the nervous element through some elective affinity, maintaining that it acts directly upon the blood,

¹⁶ "Chloroform: its Action and Administration." By Arthur Ernest Sansom, M.B. London, &c. London: John Churchill and Sons. 1865.

and that it produces narcosis indirectly by virtue of a property which it shares with all other narcotics, of diminishing the power of the organic constituents of the blood to unite with oxygen and to give off carbonic acid. Herein we fear that the author exhibits either some deficiency of knowledge, or defect of logic: deficient knowledge, if he is ignorant of the intrinsic property which nervous element has in common with other individual organic elements, of primarily modifying, according to its own states, the local circulation; or want of logical insight, if, knowing this, he conceives the observed disturbance of the circulation to disprove the direct action of the narcotic upon the nervous element, or to prove its direct action upon the blood. It must not be supposed, however, that the book is much tainted with the vice of vague theory; its merits are those of a practical manual, and it contains a good summary of all that is known of chloroform, and of the rules which experience has proved should guide its use. With due skill and caution on the part of him who administers the anæsthetic, with a scrupulous attention to its perfect purity, and with the use of an apparatus by which the proper dilution of the vapour may be secured and the quantity given exactly measured, there can be no doubt that the dangers of chloroform are but small.

When we consider the immense energy and perseverance which must be applied in order to obtain due attention to, much more to obtain acceptance of, a new therapeutical means, we cannot but congratulate Mr. Urquhart on the encouraging success which he has already had both with the medical profession and with the public. It is now some years since Sir John Fife, having satisfied his own mind of the efficacy of the Turkish Bath in the treatment of disease, induced the committee of the Newcastle Infirmary to construct such a bath for the hospital. A continued experience since that time has strengthened his convictions of the value of the bath; from what he has witnessed of its effects in health for training, in convalescence for enabling the valetudinarian to commence exercise, and in disease as a remedy or palliation, "I am not afraid," he says, "to stake my professional character by declaring my belief in its efficacy." Accordingly, he has collected, from the writings and speeches of Mr. Urquhart, an account of the principles of its action, a description of the best mode of its construction, and practical instructions as to its employment, and has edited the whole as a "Manual of the Turkish Bath."¹⁷ Its beneficial effects appear to be most remarkable in diseases of the liver and the kidney; the dropsy attending the latter certainly sometimes disappearing as if by magic under its regular use. In all diseases of a rheumatic nature, however, the bath is likely to produce improvement; in most cutaneous diseases it is an effectual remedy or an important auxiliary of treatment; and Sir John Fife has found it to be most valuable in bronchial and laryngeal affections. The book contains also the testimony of other physicians to the benefit which they have witnessed from the therapeutical use of heat

¹⁷ "Manual of the Turkish Bath. Heat, a mode of Cure, and a Source of Strength, for Men and Animals." From writings of Mr. Urquhart. Edited by Sir John Fife, M.D. London: Churchill and Sons. 1865.

by means of the bath. Mr. Urquhart, with that enthusiastic faith which is so needful in a reformer, appears to believe that no disease, not hydrophobia, nor cholera, nor consumption, nor cancer, could long withstand the proper use of the Turkish Bath at a sufficiently high temperature; and certainly this strong faith is nowise surprising in one who believes himself to have been more than once rescued from the very jaws of death by its means. Though it cannot quite be admitted that the use of heat, however carefully graduated in its application, and however high the temperature may be raised, will do all that Mr. Urquhart claims for it, and is in every case as harmless as he seems disposed to think, and though assent must be withheld from some of the startling physiological principles which he boldly enunciates, yet everyone must heartily sympathize with that unparalleled energy and unflinching perseverance which has succeeded in forcing the acceptance of a great boon in spite of strong prejudice and general opposition. What is most needed now, however, is that the medical profession, having accepted the bath as a valuable remedial agent, should no longer vaguely extol it, but determine, by exact investigation of its effects, those diseases in which it may be properly used.

Much as diseases of the skin have been studied of late, and largely as they have been written about, there is far from being agreement among different writers as to their nature and proper classification. Mr. Wilson, in a book which he announces as "*The Student's Book*,"¹⁸ adopts a classification which he calls clinical, and which is founded on the salient and striking characters of each disease. Although this classification presents such anomalies as one group of disease founded on a physiological, another on an etiological, and another on a pathological basis, and cannot, therefore, be called philosophical, it has practical advantages which make it, perhaps, most suitable for the student. Moreover, the author gives in an appendix the scientific classification of Professor Hebra. The descriptions of diseases are, for the most part, clear, concise, and graphic; the rules of treatment plain and practical; and the wide views of the constitutional origin of local eruptions which the author inculcates, are likely to be of service to the student. With regard, however, to the nature of the so-called parasitic disease of the skin, Mr. Wilson is either a very long way behind the knowledge of the day, or a very long way in advance of it. He maintains that the so-called vegetable parasites, the *Microsporon*, *Tricophyton*, and *Achorion*, are no parasites at all, and that their so-called sporules, sporidia, and mycelium, are nothing else but the altered elementary components of the cell-tissue of the rete mucosum. The young epidermal cells are supposed by him to suffer an arrest of development at their foetal stage, and thereupon to undergo that exuberant increase, or proliferation, which is characteristic of immature organic matter; and he does not forbear to speak somewhat sneeringly of what he calls the medical parasiticides of France, who go the

¹⁸ "*The Student's Book of Cutaneous Medicine, and Diseases of the Skin.*" By Erasmus Wilson, F.R.S. London: John Churchill and Sons. 1866.

length of pulling out every individual diseased hair. Now when we consider on the one hand, that the foremost scientific men of every country do not entertain any manner of doubt of the nature of these parasites, and observe on the other hand how summarily the author disposes of their well-considered views, we can scarcely recommend the student to be content with the knowledge of the parasitic diseases of the skin that is to be got from Mr. Wilson's brief and defective account. At any rate, he must not suppose that opinions are sound because they are dogmatically expressed. Mr. Wilson conceives it to be a physiological impossibility for the sporule of the vegetable parasites to penetrate the horny cuticle; and yet he has seen several examples of vicarious effusions of blood containing true blood corpuscles from unbroken skin in hysterical young women; and he once saw "an infant bleed to death by the palms of the hand and fingers, without any existing abrasion of surface."

A paper read before the Midland Medical Society, and already printed in a medical journal,¹⁹ has now been published by its author as a book. At first sight this book is most remarkable for a very narrow strip of text that is almost lost in vast deserts of margin; the proportion of text to margin being actually about one to four. By this excessive liberality of margin, by the further help of thick paper, and by the addition of a publisher's long list of advertisements, a presentable book has, not without ingenuity, been made. The subject of it is one which has of late excited great attention and earnest discussion; and Mr. Solomon's contribution to its elucidation is not the least valuable that have appeared. He proves satisfactorily that it is by no means necessary to perform iridectomy in every case of glaucoma, but that the disease may often be cured by other less formidable means—as by constitutional treatment, and especially by intra-ocular division of the ciliary muscle. We are sorry, however, to see that much of Mr. Solomon's energy is wasted in a tedious dispute about priority; the broad issues of which are, so far as we can detect any, first, that some one who claims the division of the ciliary muscle as his discovery has no right to do so, inasmuch as it was practised more or less effectually by the oculists of the past; and secondly, that if the merit of a discovery is due to any one, it is due to Mr. Solomon himself, because he has done the operation most effectually, and has called it *intra-ocular myotomy*. Were it not an excellent thing if any one who finds his originality questioned should, instead of wasting his energies in discussions that rarely lead to any satisfactory result, set himself earnestly to work to make a new discovery? Thereby he would do no small service to science, and would not fail at the same time to give incontestible proof of his capacity to have made the disputed discovery, and the probability that he did make it.

To give an account of those morbid processes by which ovarian cysts are formed, as he has observed them, and a summary of the results of the labours of others in the same field, as these are scattered

¹⁹ "Tension of the Eyeball: Glaucoma, &c.; their Operations, also Clinical Illustrations of Five Methods of Treatment." By J. Vose Solomon, F.R.C.S., &c. London: John Churchill and Sons. 1865.

through foreign and English journals, is the expressed view of Dr. Ritchie's book.²⁰ We are sorry to be obliged to add that a lame performance falls short of an excellent conception. As much as two-thirds of the two hundred pages consists of papers published by the author's father more than twenty years ago, and which, though valuable at the time, are of little interest now, except as family documents. It is true that it may be regarded as a pious task to rescue from seeming oblivion opinions of his father the revival of which, as the author thinks, is bringing honour to more recent investigators, but it is unfortunate that great errors are unnecessarily dragged into the light at the same time: it may be well that the world should not forget that more than twenty years ago Dr. Ritchie clearly maintained the fact that active changes are going on in the ovary independently of menstruation, but it is scarcely well that the world should not be allowed to forget that he at the same time maintained by an elaborate display of argument that the normal seat of conception is not the ovary, but the uterus. A short chapter following the reprint of his father's papers, and consisting of a historical sketch of recent observations in ovarian pathology, scarcely fulfils the promise of a summary of the labours of English and foreign observers; and a concluding chapter containing a sketch of the modes of cyst-formation in the ovary, with an indication of the conclusions towards which the author tends, "after honestly working at the subject for many months," might have found its proper place in the pages of some journal.

A series of most useful tables, industriously compiled for the purpose of comparing the internal economy of the various hospitals of England and Wales, has been published by Dr. Buckle.²¹ It appears that there are nearly two millions of patients yearly treated in the hospitals and dispensaries of England and Wales, at a cost of about half a million sterling; but the difference in the cost of the patients in the different institutions is so great as to produce an unavoidable conviction that there must be either great waste and extravagance in some, or great defect in others. If Bartholomew's Hospital requires on an average one nurse to every six patients, it is not easy to understand how the North Staffordshire Infirmary at Etruria can successfully manage with one nurse to thirty-seven patients. The full diet of Bartholomew again consists of half-a-pound of meat every day, whilst the full diet of the Lynn Hospital contains only six ounces of meat on alternate days. The yearly cost of a bed in one hospital is sometimes as much as double that which it is in another: in the Royal Infirmary of Liverpool, where there are 240 beds, the average cost per bed, exclusive of out-patients, is 18*l.* 9*s.* 10*d.*; in the General Hospital at Birmingham, where there is the same number of beds, the corresponding cost is 26*l.* 18*s.* 6*d.* per bed; in the

²⁰ "Contributions to assist the Study of Ovarian Physiology and Pathology." By C. G. Ritchie, M.D., &c. London: John Churchill and Sons. 1865.

²¹ "Vital and Economical Statistics of the Hospitals and Infirmarys of England and Wales, for the year 1863." By Fleetwood Buckle, M.D., &c. London: Churchill and Sons. 1865.

Queen's Hospital, Birmingham, with 180 beds, the average cost of a bed is 44*l.* 14*s.* 10*d.* In the London hospitals, the average cost per bed ranges from 20*l.* 9*s.*, at the Westminster Hospital, to 54*l.* 8*s.*, at the Metropolitan Free Hospital. This wide variation in the average cost of patients, or in other words, in the use made of the funds, would point, Dr. Buckle thinks, to

“the necessity of a general inspector appointed by Government or some central body, to act as a check upon the local committees, and to endeavour, by annual comparison with other institutions similarly situated, to economize or obtain the greatest good out of the least possible expenditure of money; or, at all events, to secure a proper and uniform set of records being kept in each charity.”

Dr. Buckle gives a second table of the operations performed at the various hospitals during the year 1863, with the results of them and the mortality after them, and a third table showing the diseases and injuries of 188,630 patients treated in the different hospitals during the same year. His labours have been most usefully bestowed, and we sincerely hope that one result of them will be to arouse the attention of the authorities of our hospitals to the need of a more effectual supervision of the management.

Having given much attention to a slight but troublesome disease, Mr. Smith appears to have estimated its importance according to the labour which he has bestowed rather than according to the gravity of the affection, otherwise he would scarce have written a book with so little matter in it.²² He advocates the application of the potassa fusa for the destruction of enlarged tonsils; and he finds that complete destruction of the tonsils produces so little impediment to the voice that a vocalist may follow his profession after the loss of his tonsils.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

PERHAPS the most valuable, if not the most original, historical productions that we have to examine for the present quarter will be found in the series of “Chronicles and Records” published under the direction of the Master of the Rolls;—an issue of the raw material of history which we have frequently commended, and doubt not shall find future occasion for commending anew. The first work on our list is an additional volume of the “Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I.,” edited from a Lambeth MS. by the Rev. William Stubbs, Vicar of Navestock, and Librarian to the Archbishop of Canterbury.¹ This volume consists of an

²² “On the Treatment of Enlarged Tonsils at any Period of Life, without the Operation of Excision.” By William J. Smith, M.B. London: Hardwicke. 1865.

¹ “Chronicles and Memorials of the Reign of Richard I.” Vol. II. “Epistolæ Cantuarienses; the Letters of the Prior and Convent of Christ Church, Canterbury, from A.D. 1187 to A.D. 1199.” Edited from a MS. in the Archi-

excellent introductory essay by the editor of the "Letters of the Prior and Convent of Christ Church, Canterbury;" of the requisite auxiliary apparatus, a calendar, a catalogue, an appendix and index, and useful explanatory notes in the margin of the pages. The period occupied by the Correspondence extends from A.D. 1187 to A.D. 1199. Of the five great disputes which made up the history of the Church of England during the reign of Richard I., the Canterbury Appeal, the principal subject of the volume before us, is perhaps the most significant. A record of this appeal is contained in the collection of letters on the dispute which arose from the attempts of Archbishops Baldwin and Hubert to found a great church and college of secular canons, to the indignation of the monks of Canterbury, who detected in this project a design to supplant them in their metropolitan character, and to substitute a corporation, not attached, like their own order, to the Court of Rome, but amenable to the influence of the king and the primate. The "Collection of Letters" was formed between the year 1201, when the suit was finally decided, and the year 1205, when the new and more famous one, which turned on the election of Stephen Langton, began. The original editor appears to have borne the name of Reginald, and was probably the person who, as sub-prior, was elected by the younger portion of the monks to supply the place of Archbishop Hubert in 1205. In the struggle recorded in these letters principles of great importance were involved, and men of the highest, or all but the highest, position were actors. Monachism, coeval with English Christianity, having brought its missionary work to a close, began to degenerate. Its claims at last became exorbitant: its attitude anti-national. In the Introduction the leading *dramatis personæ* are particularized: Baldwin, "a man who lived but little for the world, and that to make it better;" Peter of Blois, Gervase the historian, Nigel the poet, the imperious Cœur de Lion, in his glittering robes; Hubert Walter, at once bishop, lawyer, soldier, and statesman; Richard of London, with his organizing head; the ambitious Hugh of Puiset; his quiet namesake of Lincoln; and the scheming Reginald of Bath. In short, the personal element and the historical circumstances are so clearly exhibited, that those who are unable or disinclined to read the original Latin letters, may turn with pleasure to the instructive pages which introduce and elucidate them.

The next work that meets us is rather an archæological curiosity than an historical document.² The first volume of "The History and Cartulary of the Monastery of St. Peter of Gloucester" has already been published. The second, the one now before us, has neither preface nor index. Apparently, it contains a succession of deeds embodying the property rights, fishing privileges, &c., of the

episcopal Library at Lambeth, by William Stubbs, M.A., &c. &c. Published by the authority of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, &c. London: Longman, Green, and Co. 1865.

² "Historia et Cartularium Monasterii Sancti Petri Gloucestris." Vol. II. Edited by William Henry Hart, of the Public Record Office, &c. &c. Published by the authority, &c. London: Longman, Green, and Co. 1865.

monastery. Any one tolerably familiar with Latin might be induced to read them all, if he were handsomely paid for his work beforehand.

The third volume in our series is more promising. Though, like the foregoing, not an initial volume, it has the advantage of being prefaced by a judicious editor, the Rev. H. R. Luard.³ It comprises two chronicles—"The Annals of the Monastery of Winchester," and "The Annals of the Monastery of Waverley." The probable author of the former, or of the earlier portion of it, is Richard of Devizes, who wrote "The Life of Richard I." during his residence at Winchester. Throughout this earlier Chronicle "Winchester and its Cathedral" are the centre of everything, from the first paragraph, where the burial of Cerdic at Winchester is mentioned, down to the time of the donation of Godwin's wife Githa in 1053. The latter portion of the Chronicle, from 1267 to 1277, contains a careful report of the transactions of the year following the Battle of Evesham. Of the "Annals of Waverley," which begin with the Incarnation and are carried down to nearly the end of the thirteenth century, the first portion draws principally on Bede, Eusebius, Martinus, and St. Jerome. Of the second portion, the sources are the "Anglo-Saxon Chronicle," Henry of Huntingdon, Robert de Monte, Ralph de Diceto. For nine years the Chronicle is identical with the Winchester Annals. The latter portion, it appears, was written by anonymous contemporary writers. Among the points treated at length by the Waverley Chronicle is Stephen Langton's banishment by John, and that unhappy king's attempts at reconciliation previously to his final submission. The events of the last days of Simon de Montfort, who is a favourite with the annalist, and the events which preceded and followed the Battle of Evesham, are also reported with some valuable detail. Both Chronicles are regarded by Mr. Luard as authorities for the times which they illustrate. It may interest Dr. Cumming, and other persons of millennial expectations, to know that the Last Judgment having been fixed for 17th September, 1249, Henry III. and a number of other wise men sat up all night, in a tremendous fright, to see it come off. We are not told whether its postponement was a relief or disappointment to them.

Another valuable instalment of this national library will be found in the fasciculus of Annals attributed, not in every instance correctly, to William Rishanger, the Monk of St. Albans, and edited by one of the ablest of the staff selected by the Master of the Rolls.⁴ In an intelligent critical introduction, Mr. Riley places before us such

³ "Annales Monastici." Vol. II. "Annales Monasterii de Wintonia." A.D. 519—1277. "Annales Monasterii de Waverleia." A.D. 1—1291. Edited by Henry Richards Luard, M.A., Fellow and Assistant Tutor of Trinity College, &c. &c. Published by the authority, &c. London: Longman, Green, and Co. 1865.

⁴ "Chronica Monasterii S. Albani: Wilhelmi Rishanger, quondam monachi S. Albani, et quorundam anonymorum Chronica et Annales, regnantibus Henrico Tertio et Edwardo Primo." Edited by Henry Thomas Riley, M.A., &c. A.D. 1269—1307. Published by the authority, &c. London: Longman, Green, and Co. 1865.

information as is to be had respecting the individuality and identity of the author. William Rishanger, Rissanger, or Rysangre, is conjectured to have been born at a small village, which now bears the name of Rishangles, and is situate about four miles from the market town of Eye, in Kent. The earliest notice of Rishanger is to be found in a work by John Bale, who makes him the successor of Matthew Paris, in the "shadowy office" of chronographer royal to Henry III.—a representation which the editor shows to be preposterous. Of the seven documents comprised in Mr. Riley's volume the earlier part of "The Chronicle" may, he thinks, be ascribed with a fair degree of certainty to Rishanger, but the latter part cannot be pronounced his with an equal degree of assurance. The *Gesta Edwardi Primi*, the fourth in order of arrangement, is undoubtedly from the pen of Rishanger. The editor characterizes it as a poor and weak performance. It gives some account of Edward's expedition to Flanders, the ravages committed by Wallace in the North of England, the king's marriage, his "extortionate proclivities," and the punishment inflicted on his corrupt justiciars. The *Annals of the Kingdom of Scotland* is a more important document. It contains a report of the pleadings of the candidates for the Scottish crown not given in Rymer. Though attributed by Bale to Rishanger, there seems little doubt that it is really the composition of Jean Erturi of Caen, a notary of that time. The *Annals of England and Scotland*, the third in the list of documents, is claimed by Mr. Riley for the anonymous author of the *Chronicorum Opus*; to be printed in the succeeding volume of the *Chronicles of St. Alban's*. Of the three fragmentary pieces which follow the *Gesta*, the authorship is left undetermined. In the first of them authorities are found for several statements in "Walsingham's History" which are probably nowhere else to be traced; in the second, the exactions of the king and the opposition of the Archbishop of Canterbury are set forth, and some details, mostly of a local interest, are recited. The third commences with an elegy on the death* of Prince Alfonso, Edward's eldest son, and concludes with some extracts from the formal proceedings of Philip of France against the Knights Templars, a proof that it was not composed till after the year 1307. The two most conspicuous characters in this collection of chronicles are Edward I. and William Wallace. Of Edward, the author of the *Gesta* (Rishanger) says,— "Inter omnes principes orbis terrarum Christianos sapientiæ et prudentiæ virtute creditur præeminisse." Very different is the estimate he gives of the far-famed Scottish chief, Edward's antagonist and victim, in the *Chronica*, p. 226; in which this flower of chivalry is said to have rivalled Herod in cruelty and Nero in his frantic outbreaks, flogging and torturing naked men and women, eviscerating infants in their cradles, and burning boys in schools and churches. The patriot Scot meets with no pity from the remorseless Rishanger, who pronounces his sentence *crudelissima sed dignissima*. In addition to the ample index which we find at the end of the volume, Mr. Riley has inserted a short and serviceable glossary of the barbarous Latin words which occur in these chronicles. We protest, however, against

the inclusion of the word *infortunium* in his list. It occurs once at least in the *Bacchides*, and twice in the first act of the *Amphitruo* of Plautus.

The fifth and last contribution to the history of England, preserved in the State Paper Department, is Mr. Bruce's calendar, domestic series, of the reign of Charles I.⁵ The volume, with its preface and extremely copious index, comprising upwards of 700 pages, yet illustrates the events and incidents of one year only. The editor, in an interesting preface, sketches the leading characteristics of the time. He describes the policy of Archbishop Laud as centred in the eradication of Puritanism, uniformity of ceremonial, and universal submission to king and clergy as divinely appointed authorities in Church and State. In his account of the Ship Money transaction, Mr. Bruce indicates the discovery of a connecting circumstance in its history. The obnoxious tribute was alleged by the king's advisers to have been levied in ancient times, but if so it was levied in cases of great national emergency, as for example a threatened invasion. Now what was the real or pretended emergency that justified such an outfit in Charles the First's days? While distinctly allowing that we cannot yet fully answer this question, the accomplished editor suggests that a proximate and provisional answer may be found in the proposed conference between Nicolaldi, the Spanish resident, Portland, Cottington, and Windebank. The authority for this statement is in part a letter from Windebank, a secretary of state, to Hopton, the English ambassador in Spain. From this letter it appears that Charles considered it his interest to oppose the increasing greatness of the United Provinces, and assist the King of Spain to stop the current of the Hollanders' conquests. To effect this object it was proposed that His Majesty of Great Britain should presently arm twenty ships of war, of which five were to be wholly at the charge of the King of Spain, and that the pretext of this arming should be to secure the coasts of Great Britain and Ireland, &c. As the negotiation proceeded but slowly, it occurred to Noy that an emergency being supposed, the ports might, on ancient precedent, be called on to supply the requisite aid. The pretext (security from pirates, &c.) suggested in the proposed treaty was thereupon alleged as an emergency, and twenty ships, the exact number mentioned in the treaty, were fitted out. The progress of the negotiation and the development of events are well sketched by Mr. Bruce, to whose pages we refer all who are curious to know more on this point. Among the papers calendared in this volume we have a valuable series of Lord Lindsey's letters, whose experience only tended to prove that the emergency which was presumed to have called forth the fleet which accompanied him "did not exist, and therefore that there was no justification for the levy of ship money." These letters are followed by a number of important papers illustrative of the characters of the

⁵ "Calendar of State Papers. Domestic Series of the Reign of Charles I., 1635. Preserved in the State Paper Department of Her Majesty's Public Record Office." Edited by John Bruce, Esq., F.S.A., under the direction of the Master of the Rolls, &c. London: Longman, Green, and Co. 1865.

several sheriffs. Notices are interspersed of Denzil Hollis, Sir John Stanhope, and other recusants, with letters from the younger Vane, Laud, Montagu, Sir Henry Wotton, and Francis à Sancta Clara; and mention of George Wither's Hymns, Sandys's Paraphrases, and of a treatise on the Ecclesiastical Supremacy by Lord Herbert of Cherbury, is made in its pages. Nor must we omit to specify the grant to Archibald Lumsden for the sole supply of the requisites for playing the ancient game of pall-mall within his grounds in St. James's Fields, and the payment to him of the prescribed sums of money from such as resorted thither.

A modern work of somewhat kindred character to the "Chronicles and Calendars" of the past, may receive a passing commendation in this place.⁶ The "Annual Register" for the year 1864 furnishes a rapid and compact narrative of home and foreign history, a chronicle of remarkable occurrences, an appendix of public documents, among others a report of the clerical subscription commission, of finance-accounts, promotions and appointments. In the retrospect of literature, the principal historical and biographical works are noticed, as well as the novels, which most of us read and abuse while reading, and favourite poems, like "Enoch Arden," and Lord Derby's "Homer." In the obituary of eminent persons we observe the names of Lucy Aikin, John Clare, Lord Carlisle, Dr. Cureton, Hawthorne, Ferrier, Speke, Senior, Torrens, Miss Adelaide Ann Procter, and Walter Savage Landor.

The documentary character still distinguishes our library for the quarter. Before us lies a new volume of the "Papers" of one of the great actors of the European drama in the generation which is rapidly becoming extinct.⁷ The supplementary volumes of "Despatches and Correspondence of the Duke of Wellington," edited by his son, already number twelve. The present volume concludes the series, though some documents, which came too late to be inserted in chronological order, are announced, with a copious index, for publication as an additional supplement, in the next volume. The letters and memoranda contained in the present instalment deal with such topics as the settlement of claims on France, the financial state of that country, the negotiations respecting the Spanish colonies in America, the evacuation of France by the allied armies, and the plot and attempt to assassinate the Duke of Wellington. The period occupied by these transactions is included between 21st July, 1817, and the end of December, 1818. A letter or two, written in the following year, with a statistical paper of notes on the expenses of the army in France, complete the volume. The editor promises us a continuation of the "Wellington Papers," in the form of a new series of Correspondence, from January, 1819, to the termination of the great duke's administration, in October, 1830.

⁶ "The Annual Register; a Review of Public Events at Home and Abroad, for the Year 1864." New Series. London: Rivingtons, Longman and Co. 1865.

⁷ "Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field-Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington, K.G." Edited by his Son, the Duke of Wellington, K.G. Volume XII. London: John Murray. 1865.

Another renowned English captain; the Duke of Marlborough, figures among the eminent soldiers whose biographies Major-General Mitchell has drawn up with a sufficiently attractive, though necessarily partial execution.⁸ The author somewhat dogmatically rules, that the charges of corruption and avarice brought against this distinguished commander require no refutation. The treachery imputed to Marlborough in reference to the Brest expedition he pronounces unproved and improbable, and he justifies his secession from the service of James II., regarding that step as in every sense disinterested and honourable. The sketch of the life of Frederick the Great, the last in the list, will perhaps induce some into whose hands the volume may fall to compare a soldier's account of certain incidents in that monarch's career with that given by Mr. Carlyle in his portly volumes. While acknowledging the many gifts and great qualities of the king, Mitchell indicates his numerous weaknesses and defects of character. In particular, he accuses Frederick of a want of personal courage. He maintains that he not only ran away at Molwitz, but sent orders to retreat at the battle of Lowositz (or Lobositz); "an order which the Duke of Bevern, who in the meantime had made a movement which gained the victory, took good care not to *have received*." The loss of the battle of Collin, or Kolin, he directly imputes to Frederick's ill-judged interference, an interference which his last and greatest biographer so ingeniously explains and vindicates. Of the other eminent soldiers whom our soldier-author has described and appreciated, we may mention the blind Ziska, the high-minded but fanatical and sanguinary leader of the Hussites; Scanderbeg the Albanian prince, for twenty-four years the terror of the Osmanli and the support of Christian Greece; Bayard, Alba, the Constable of Bourbon, Suwaroff, Prince Eugene, the first of Austrian generals, and Charles XII., whom Major Mitchell pronounces to have been certainly killed by a grape-shot, not by a pistol-ball, and therefore not to have been assassinated, as some have supposed. This conclusion is based on an examination of a paper representation of the aperture made by a ball in the royal hat. It would have been more satisfactory had the author examined the hat itself. The concluding sections of his book are entitled "Historical Sketch of the French Army," and "The British Army in the World of 1850." The author was strongly interested in the movement for reform of the army. He advocates instruction for the soldier, better pay, and gymnastic training. He was strenuously opposed to the pipeclay or martinet principle, and Conservative as he was, he condemned the system of promotion by purchase, as calculated to discourage merit and professional knowledge. This distinguished officer and able writer died in the year 1859. Among the admirers of his "Life of Wallenstein" and "Fall of Napoleon" were Varnhagen von Ense and the late Sir Robert Peel.

The story of Marshal Saxe, related in outline by Major-General

⁸ "Biographies of Eminent Soldiers of the last Four Centuries." By Major-General John Mitchell, Author of the "Life of Wellington," "Fall of Napoleon," &c. Edited, with a Memoir of the Author, by Leonhard Schnitz, LL.D. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1865.

Mitchell, is told with ample detail by M. Saint-René Taillandier,⁹ who, availing himself of the previous labours of Dr. Karl von Weber, the "Memoirs of the Duke de Luynes," and the journals, souvenirs, &c., of Barbier, Valfons, and d'Argenson, has constructed an agreeable and animated narrative of the fortunes of the daring and brilliant offspring of that physically strong king of Poland whom Mr. Carlyle delights to designate the Man of Sin. Marshal Saxe was born at Dresden in 1696; his mother, Aurora of Königsmark, was as distinguished for her wit and beauty as his father was for his unparalleled anti-Malthusian accomplishments. An active and spirited youth, Maurice, as the boy was called, became at twelve years of age a sub-officer under the famous Count de Schulenburg, took part in the long march from Lützen to Hanover in the severe winter of 1709, and in the following year was present at the sieges of Douay, Béthune and Aire. In 1711 he served at the siege of Stralsund, where Charles XII: was attacked at once by the kings of Prussia, Denmark, and Poland. Some years after, when the young soldier returned from foreign travel, he received permission to join Prince Eugene, then besieging Belgrade. In 1720 he entered the French service as *maréchal de camp*. We next find him at Mitau, when he was elected Duke of Courland, an election, however, which the Poles and Russians refused to ratify. Early married to the Countess Victoria of Leoben and early divorced, he was now, matrimonially speaking, unattached. Anna Iwanowna, whose cheeks Carlyle complimentarily compares to Westphalia ham, would have gladly made him her husband, and placed him on the throne of Russia, but the fortunate youth, "not liking Westphalia ham in that particular form," declined the honour and received his dismissal. In 1733 Maurice led the advanced guard of the French in the war of the Polish succession. In 1741 he held a similar distinguished position in the invasion of Bohemia, and successfully directed the attack on Prague. Four years after he was placed at the head of the army intended by Louis XV. for the conquest of the Austrian Netherlands. "The capture of Ghent, Brussels, and Maestricht, the battles of Lafeldt, Roucoux, and Fontenoy, were all splendid deeds of arms." It was not the Duc de Richelieu, as Voltaire was pleased to say, who won the last-mentioned battle, but Marshal Saxe, who was suffering from dropsy when he fought it, and fainted from exhaustion after its close. This was his last exploit. The rest of his life was passed in the society of men of letters and artists. Scientific pursuits and projects of ideal sovereignty occupied much of his time. He dreamt of a government in the island of Tobago; he became a candidate for the crown of Corsica; he formed a plan for the re-establishment of the kingdom of David in South America; and finally, dying at Chambord in 1750, bade an eternal farewell to all these visions of empire, exclaiming, "Life is but a dream, and I have had a fine one." His French biographer and Major-General Mitchell have a very high

⁹ "Maurice de Saxe: Étude Historique d'après des Documents inédits." Par Saint-René Taillandier. Paris. 1865.

opinion of his merits. The General thinks his military talents superior to those of Frederick II., and affirms that he saw farther into the science and was endowed with more genius for tactical invention than that far-famed king. Carlyle, with whom the Marshal is no favourite, yet testifies to his perfect intrepidity, his inarticulate good sense, wild natural ingenuity, and rapid whirls of contrivance; but while assimilating Frederick to a sun, he likens Saxe to an immense tar-barrel or atmospheric meteor, taken for a sun. The Marshal's "multifarious voracities" are undeniable, and we suppose orthodox Christianity will agree with Carlyle's view of the brilliant 'Tar-barrel's probable prospects of futurity, according to which "the Devil (I am afraid it was he, though clad in roscate effulgence and melodious exceedingly,) carried him home on those kind terms as from a universe all of opera." Our vision of judgment not extending so far as this, we give no opinion on the subject. Neither can we decide which of the two critics is right, Carlyle or Mitchell, in the widely different estimates they offer of the *Rêveries* of the resplendent marshal; the man of arms assuring us that the treatise evinces "a far deeper insight into the science of tactics than any other work written on the subject," that "every page is full of energy, and every sentence a deep lash inflicted on the mere martinet and blind adorer of the pipeclay system;" while the man of letters is equally certain that it is "a strange military Farrago, dictated, I should think, under opium." M. Taillandier, with all his new lights and abundant space, does not help us to solve the question, though he mentions the Marshal's *Manual* more than once. We cannot conclude this notice without calling attention to one proud distinction that Mr. Carlyle's military Don Juan may claim from his brimstone bed. Marshal Saxe was the only general that ever achieved a victory proper over a British army. "Except at Fontenoy, no British army was ever defeated in what the French term *une bataille rangée*. May it ever be so," continues Major-General Mitchell, "and may Marshal Saxe, as he was the first, be the last of our conquerors."

A biographical sketch of an armed missionary of Protestantism, Gustavus Adolphus, by the present Archbishop of Dublin,¹⁰ is written with real knowledge of the subject, with a diffuse grace though occasional clumsiness, and an earnestness of purpose such as we might expect to find in its accomplished author. Though he, perhaps, overestimates the force of individual genius, and underrates the permanent and imperial influence of collective humanity, he is nowhere led by his hero-worship to make a faultless monster of the great warrior whom, in his belief, "God raised up for the suffering members of the Reformed Faith in Germany," and but for whose prowess the great religious movement in the first half of the seventeenth century "would have been crushed in Germany, and probably in all northern Europe with the exception of England." He admits the ambition of the soldier king, and concedes that if there was something of Luther

¹⁰ "Gustavus Adolphus," "Social Aspects of the Thirty Years' War." Two Lectures. By Richard Chenevix Trench, Archbishop of Dublin. London and Cambridge: Macmillan and Co. 1865.

in him, there was also something of Alexander in him. The remarkable man thus characterized fell on the field of Lützen, near Leipsic, A.D. 1632, some hours before the termination of the battle. In narrating his fall, Archbishop Trench corrects the inaccuracies which intrude into Michelet's account of that event. The evidence adduced to show that the king fell in a *mêlée*, and was *not* assassinated, he accepts as decisive. To the lecture on the "Life of Gustavus Adolphus" (delivered several times) succeeds one (never delivered) on the "Social Aspects of the Thirty Years' War," in which, while the Catholics are pronounced to be the chief offenders, the Protestant princes, theologians, and people are by no means regarded as guiltless. The materials for these two lectures have been drawn from various sources, among others, from a work by G. Freitag, "Bilder aus der Deutschen Vergangenheit."

Descending to a later period, we find in Mr. Trevelyan's "Cawnpore," an almost epical narrative of the awful tragedy that befell there.¹¹ The author, who in general writes with equal power and skill, affirms that he has made it his aim to preserve a scrupulous fidelity, even to the slightest touches, to the original sources of his information, in particular the depositions of sixty-three witnesses, "Nanukhund's Narrative," "Captain Thomson's Story of Cawnpore," and the government accounts of the mutiny. The tale is admirably told. The candour of Mr. Trevelyan is as conspicuous as his literary ability. If he execrates the atrocities of the Sepoys, he does not forget to condemn the cruelties of which our own countrymen were guilty or to stigmatize our conscious or unconscious lying. In our author's view, the effective cause of the mutiny was the ambition of a spoilt, flattered, idle, and insolent soldiery; the proximate cause was the fancied insult which had been offered to their national religion. The memory, he says, of the greased cartridges (five parts tallow, five parts stearine, and one part wax) will "never perish as long as England has history and India has tradition." On this point he thinks, and we conceive rightly, that there can be no room for doubt. Both authoritative opinion and documentary evidence can be adduced to show that the use of this Tartarean compound was to the prejudiced Sepoy intellect what the mutilation of the Hermes busts was to the superstitious Hellenic mind in the days of Alcibiades. The pages preparing us for the great catastrophe (which Mr. Trevelyan attributes to the Nana's readiness to head the mutineers, and the error of Major-General Wheeler) are full of striking detail and intelligent expository comment. For non-Indians the opening chapter, "The Station," is a valuable picture. The story of the Nana, whose claims we treated with a fatal contempt, and his agent Azimolah, is related with a graphic clearness; and the progress and close of the sad tragedy, in tears, blood, pity, and vengeance, are excellently told, though not always with the necessary condensation. Indeed, the narrative is in some places positively prolix, and we could wish that

¹¹ "Cawnpore." By G. O. Trevelyan, Author of the "Competition Wallah." London and Cambridge: Macmillan and Co. 1865.

Mr. Trevelyan had abstained, sometimes at least, from Biblical application, and Homeric illustrative reference. In his severe condemnation of the vindictive sentiment of Anglo-Indians, our author quotes a poetical effusion from the "Englishman," published in 1857, which we recommend as a contribution to the hymnology of damnation, premising that "the humanity-pretenders" esteemed unworthy of the secondary felicity held out to Teeka Singh and Mungal Pandy, were men like Lord Canning, Sir John Grant, and Mr. Charles Buxton :

"Barring Humanity-pretenders,
To hell of none are we the willing senders :
But if to Sepoys mercy must be given,
Locate them, Lord, in the back-slums of heaven."

We do not know whether Mr. Neil had any particular motive for re-writing the lives of notable persons, which for the most part have so often been written before.¹² In his "Epoch Men," we have Charlemagne, Gregory VII., Roger Bacon, Dante, Chaucer, Copernicus, Clive, and Watt, pourtrayed, and not ill-pourtrayed by one who adopts the axiom of that profound philosopher, Sir E. Bulwer Lytton—"History is rarely more than the biography of great men." It is a pity that Mr. Neil writes in a heavy and pretentious style, as it renders his book less acceptable than it would otherwise have been to those who may be led to consult its not uninteresting pages. What is the use of talking about "an intexturing and combination of personal qualifications and providential causation," or expatiating on the sublime results of the "far-stretching explorations into the vast indefinitudes of space"? Why does he tell us that no part of time can be *sectionalized*, if he doesn't want to frighten us, or why does he insist that there is that within us which "effloresces through the centuries," unless he intends to terrify us with the prospect of an eternal small-pox or perpetual measles in our immortal part?

It is in a very different style that Captain Lionel Trotter has drawn up his attractive volume of "Studies in Biography."¹³ Easy, flowing, simple, and unaffected, the language is such as an English gentleman may well employ, in describing the fortunes, or depicting the characters of his heroes. The studies, so called, are reprints of articles published in the "Dublin Review," and other high-class serials, which the author, admiring himself, republishes in a collective form, with the natural wish, as he says, that others also should have the chance of admiring them—if they can. These essays appear in most, if not all instances, to have been occasional compositions, called forth by the law or principle which impels so many of us to write assenting or dissenting reports of the more ambitious efforts of other literary aspirants. Thus, the "Study of Mahomet" was written after the publication of Muir's work on the prophet; that of Frederick II., after the publication of King's Life of the great German Emperor; that of Becket, after

¹² "Epoch Men and the Results of their Lives." By Samuel Neil, Author of "Shakespeare, a Biography," &c. Edinburgh: William Nimmo. 1863.

¹³ "Studies in Biography." By Lionel James Trotter, late Captain 2nd Bengal Fusiliers. London: Edward Moxon. 1865.

Canon Robertson had published his biography of that fighting churchman. This circumstance, however, by no means implies the absence of independent research, and in the case of the charitable estimate of Sheridan, Captain Trotter distinctly shows that he has read other works besides the "wretchedly composed" volumes of the "Octogenarian," whose new materials he has turned to account in his revised abridgment of the story of that brilliant statesman. We are as well satisfied, in most instances, with the impartial and moderate spirit in which these studies are conceived, as with the style in which they are written. In some cases, as in that of Mahomet and Savonarola, we seem to want some completing detail indeed; but limitation of space excuses the omission. One study—that of Pitt—is almost exhaustive, except that the question of finance is touched too lightly. This paper is very well done, and with much that its author says in Pitt's favour, we agree. His estimate, however, requires occasional qualification. As a war minister, we cannot admire Pitt. A bold, brilliant, and inventive financier, his fiscal procedure is sometimes open to censure, or defensible only on the "Hobson's choice" principle, the hard-pushed statesman's last resource, not the deliberate operation of the sober-minded minister of finance. Those of Captain Trotter's readers who think his estimate of Pitt too laudatory, will perhaps find some compensation in his extremely dyslogistic review of the life and conduct of Lord Bacon. Of course this "Study" had its *raison d'être* in Mr. Hepworth Dixon's rhetorical and immature vindication of the great Chancellor. We have no intention of adjudicating on the vexed question of Bacon's good or evil repute, but we may point out that as regards the Essex charge, Mr. Spedding, to whose "Life of Bacon" we find no allusion in Captain Trotter's book, is in general agreement with Mr. Dixon. Right or wrong, Captain Trotter is quite entitled to a place between Lord Macaulay and Professor Draper, as an uncompromising denouncer of Bacon's immoralities. His epigram on the "broad-browed Verulam," which may be compared with the immortal verse of Pope, deserves quotation:—"In him the intellect of a Solomon was yoked to the spirit of a slave and the conscience of a housemaid." Captain Trotter is rather hard on the housemaid, though!

In Josiah Wedgwood we are happy to find a man whose excellent moral principles harmonized with his fine inventive genius. It is not long since Mr. Gladstone, in laying the first stone of the institute at Burslem, recognised, in an able and eloquent address, the character, ability, and attainments of the great Josiah. And now Mr. Jewitt, in an ingenious, and, we may almost say, scientific memoir, reiterates and illustrates the panegyric of Her Majesty's Chancellor of the Exchequer.¹⁴ The *science* of the author is shown in the preliminary chapter on the early potteries of Staffordshire, from the Celtic period

¹⁴ "The Wedgwoods; being a Life of Josiah Wedgwood, with Notices of his Works and their productions, Memoirs of the Wedgwoods and other Families, and a History of the Early Potteries of Staffordshire." By Llewellyn Jewitt, F.S.A., &c. With Portrait and numerous Illustrations. London: Virtue Brothers and Co. 1865.

down to the Wedgwood era. The mysteries of potter's clay in all its varieties, the divisions of the Ceramic art, the numerous vessels for use or ornament, are all exhibited in Mr. Jewitt's literary and pictorial repository. The biographical portion, succeeding to this instructive prelude of about seventy pages, begins with an account of Burslem, the mother of the potteries, and birthplace of Wedgwood, the father of potters, as it was a hundred and fifty years ago. The name of Josiah's family seems to have been borrowed from the parish of Wedgwood, in the very centre of the potteries. The name itself can be traced back to the fourteenth century. Towards the end of the fifteenth, John Wedgwood, of Blackwood or Dunwood, is recognisable, and in 1614, Thomas, ancestor of Josiah, is shown to have been born, or at any rate baptized. Josiah himself, eldest son of Thomas Wedgwood Potter, and his wife, Mary Leigh, made his first appearance in July, 1730. The boy grew up a pattern for emulation, but of his habits or occupation, his progress at the wheel or mould during the term of his apprenticeship, little is known. Whether, as Mr. Gladstone fancies, an attack of small pox, probably about his sixteenth year, was the occasion of his subsequent excellence, may be doubted. Mr. Jewitt is of opinion that the boy's natural genius and energy would have driven him to meditate on the laws and secrets of his art, without this providential incitement. Meditations of this kind the youth unquestionably had, and those who care to trace them in their results, will find their curiosity gratified by a perusal of Mr. Jewitt's artistic exposition. The biographical portion of his book contains pleasing glimpses of life and manners discernible through the didactic foreground. The description of Etruria, a village in Staffordshire, built by Wedgwood, the seat of the famous Etrurian works, where the artist "produced vases comparable with the best period of ancient Etruscan art," is read with a sentiment of delightful surprise. The fiction which made the son of the famous Bentley an associate with Wedgwood, is shown to be a fiction. The account of the discovery by Thomas and Ralph Wedgwood of the *Fulguri-Polygraph*, founded on the capacity of electricity to produce motion in the act of acquiring an equilibrium, and giving the rapidity of lightning to correspondence; the anecdote of the Portland vase; of the connexion of Flaxman, the sculptor, with Wedgwood, and of the generous protection accorded to Coleridge by his sons, with several other passages, imparts additional attraction to this instructive, if not always very lively work. Josiah died on the third of January, 1795. His eldest daughter married Dr. Robert Darwin, of Shrewsbury, son of the botanical Darwin, and was the mother of Charles Darwin, author of the "Origin of Species." The Wedgwoods, we may remark, seem to have had a natural affinity for poets, artists, and literary genius; Ralph, the inventor of the electric telegraph, corresponding with P. B. Shelley on the formation of a universal language, being the second of the distinguished poets of our time to whom some attraction was experienced.

Other illustrious men, lords of peace, or masters of war, pass before admiring eyes in a characteristic and workmanly little book, entitled "Etoniana," and embodying the history and traditions of that

ancient foundation.¹⁵ We learn from its pages nearly all we care to learn of the masters of Eton, and especially of "Cocky Keate," to whom we confess we have an invincible repugnance. We learn also enough of the old institutions and usages of Eton—of its merits and of its abuses. There is a chapter on the Montem, abolished in 1847, one on boating, one on cricket, one on amateur theatricals and Eton literature. H. Walpole, Gray, Bryant, George III., C. J. Fox, Porson, Marquis Wellesley, and his renowned kinsman, the great Duke, all figure in this academical tableau. Here we may see the hero of Waterloo in the character of a shy, retiring boy, in whom neither master nor schoolfellows detected the germs of future greatness; Porson, with his voracious reading and inaccurate prosody, who, because he could not write Latin verses, was never remarkable as an Etonian; and James Macdonald of Sleat, the Marcellus of his day, who learned to versify at Eton till he could write lines that Horace might have approved; Sidney Walker, who knew Homer, Horace, and Virgil by heart, and could turn the "Court Guide" into Greek verse; H. Nelson, Coleridge, Moultrie, Præd, and others, who reflect honour on this princely English school, which we trust will never cease to cultivate Greek and Latin literature, or be the great playing ground of future statesmen and field-m Marshals. Besides its flying sketches of notable men, the book has both a graver and a more humorous side. It is not only an informing record of the Etonian past; it has many an anecdote, and some fun in it. Perhaps the richest story in the book is that of Keate and his splendid misapplication of the inevitable birch. The tale goes that a list of the candidates for confirmation was once sent in to this lord of the nether world, in the shape of the familiar "flogging bill," and that in spite of their protestations, the regenerated expectants of "manifold gifts of grace," instead of receiving "the laying on of hands," on the rubrically-appointed head, had the honour of admitting that fatherly benediction to a precisely opposite and more unworthy locality. The joke is a capital one; but while we allow its superiority, we are strongly disposed to think that if the grim humourist had been removable at our pleasure, we should have sent him, from the distant spires and antique towers of Eton, to exercise his grotesque wit and sway his infamous sceptre elsewhere.

Taking leave of "Etoniana,"—a little book which has a good right to its place in the world,—let us glance for a moment at the pride and pomp belonging to kings and cardinals. When the powerful Richelieu died in 1642, he had a successor scarcely less famous in Cardinal Mazarin, the Concini, as Michelet says, of the new Mary of Medicis, Anne of Austria. Of the Italian minister's trial year, M. Victor Cousin has furnished us with a very full account.¹⁶ He has a very high opinion of the talents of his hero, who, after this critical twelvemonth, rose gradually to the appointed height of his glory, termina-

¹⁵ "Etoniana, Ancient and Modern; being Notes of the History and Traditions of Eton College." Republished from "Blackwood's Magazine." With additions. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons. 1865.

¹⁶ "La Jeunesse de Mazarin." Par M. Victor Cousin. Paris. 1865.

ting long and sanguinary discord by a peaceful triumph, rallying all classes, all religions, all interests, around emancipated royalty, covering France with glory by the victories of Condé and the brilliant generalship of Turenne, guaranteeing to that country by the treaty of Westphalia her barriers of Artois, Alsace, and Roussillon, and giving her Gravelines, Landrecy, Thionville, and Montmedy by that of the Pyrenees. It was not, however, in a prosperous or victorious hour that Mazarin commenced his ministerial dictatorship. His commencement, above all, was inglorious. A clever and amiable young man, he was first a soldier in a foot regiment, then a private secretary, then secretary of a pontifical legation, occasionally assuming the purely honorary title of a Minister of the Holy See. After a hurried picture of the early life of Mazarin, his biographer sketches with a slow and steady hand incidents of the years 1629-1630, and shows us by the side of Louis XIII. and his first minister, the subordinate characters Hemery, Servier, Montmorenci, Crequi, Schomberg, and others. In writing this historical review, M. Cousin has consulted the ordinary biographies of Mazarin, both of early and recent publication, the correspondence of the Cardinal with various French agents, family letters received from Rome, those of François Barberini, Père Joseph, and other eminent personages, and the papers of Richelieu and Mazarin himself, which the French minister for foreign affairs has rendered accessible to him. The author of this minute study professes to strike out from his pages the conjectural element, and to give, sometimes with, sometimes without curtailment, the documents of contemporary origin, which he considers necessary to lay before the reader, in order to control his own statements or test the correctness of his own decisions. His narrative ends with Mazarin's appearance on the plain of Casal, and his proclamation of the peace which saved Italy from the war that menaced her, and introduced the pacific politician on the historical stage.

Shortly after the conclusion of the Treaty of Vincennes with the Duke of Lorraine, Mazarin died (February, 1661). From that moment Louis XIV. took the reins of government into his own hands. The system of centralization which he established is described by Dr. Krohn as one which paralyzed political consciousness, annihilated the national will, degraded the nobility, and enslaved the church. But the general decomposition which characterized the social state was succeeded by a compensating movement of a constructive kind: the growing development of the middle classes, with corresponding interests, ideas, commercial and scientific activity, and an energetic popular life. This development had its true beginning in the period of the Regency—that is, the period which followed the death of the Grand Monarque in 1715, and was terminated by the official majority of his great grandson in 1723. Dr. Krohn's "Last Years of the Life of Louis XIV." are designed as a preliminary study to the History of the Regency,¹⁷ and relate the principal events or describe

¹⁷ "Die letzten Lebensjahre Ludwig's des Vierzehnten. Geschichtliche Studie," &c. Von Dr. Wilhelm Krohn. London: David Nutt. 1865.

the leading personages of the period. Thus, as the subject of the chapter we have Madame de Maintenon, of another Philip of Orleans, of a third the war in Italy, and of a fourth the occurrences in Spain. The desolation of the royal family, the testament of Louis XIV., the future regent, and the end of the despotism, are the chief topics of the four concluding chapters.

Just a century after the collapse of the absolutism of Louis another great despotic régime broke down in France, The history of its rise and progress, as recorded by a brilliant writer, M. Thiers, is the object of a deliberate and systematic attack by M. Jules Barni, a professor at Geneva, who protests against the version of Napoleon's career entitled "The History of the Consulate and the Empire," as deficient in morality, in logic, and in critical appreciation.¹⁸ Regarding it as a dangerous legend, and detesting Cæsarism or Napoleonism as only a good hater can, M. Barni investigates, in this reproduction of a course of twelve lectures delivered in Geneva, the value of the views and statements which are advanced by the historian whom he undertakes to demolish. In pursuance of his purpose, he maintains against Thiers that Napoleon was not the continuator of the Revolution, but a counter-revolutionist; that the eighteenth *Brumaire*, far from being the salvation of France, was a misfortune as well as a crime; that the Consulate was as culpable as the Empire; that Napoleon's political conversion, after his return from Elba, is a fiction, and that his exile to St. Helena was a just punishment for the *coup d'état* of December. He condemns his conduct in deserting the army of Egypt, not as an act of cowardice, but as a violation of duty for unpatriotic and ambitious purposes. He allows him but a secondary share in the famous codification of French law, which he asserts was a revolutionary conception inaugurated by the convention, or rather by the constitutional and legislative assemblies; he attributes the loss of the battle of Waterloo (following General Charras and Quinet, and showing that Thiers, though from a different point of view, is virtually of the same opinion) to Napoleon himself; for, even if Grouchy was the material cause of the disaster, the failure, morally considered, was the result of the emperor's mischievous policy. It is curious to note the variations of judgment in the three inquirers just mentioned. According to Thiers, Grouchy's misconduct occasioned the loss of the battle; according to Charras, Grouchy was undoubtedly to blame, but, nevertheless, if he had done all that he might have done, he could not have secured the victory; according to Quinet, Grouchy might have saved the army, but Grouchy's errors were independent of those of Napoleon, who was accordingly really answerable for the defeat at Waterloo. Having destroyed the *biographical legend*, M. Barni ends with destroying the *craniological legend*. Napoleon, far from having "ce front prodigieux, ce crâne fait au moule du globe impérial," as Victor Hugo sings, or "la tête la plus vaste dont la science anatomique ait constaté l'existence," as M. Thiers says in prose, our author contends, on the

¹⁸ "Napoleon et son Historien, M. Thiers." Par Jules Barni, &c. London: David Nutt. 1865.

authority of M. Piesse, that Napoleon's head was chiefly remarkable for the smallness of the skull. The vehement protest contained in this uncompromising demolition of the legendary Napoleon, and the research which its pages evince, may procure for it many readers in this country, but not, we fear, in the land where the people still worship the memory of the captive of St. Helena.

Among the sworn enemies of Napoleonism, in its first and most terrific manifestation, the German poet, Ernst Moritz Arndt, held a conspicuous place. Arndt was born in 1769, the birth-year of Napoleon I., of respectable but poor parents, at Schoritz (in Pomerania?).¹⁹ On the completion of his seventeenth year he entered on his academical career at Stralsund, where he appears to have led but a cheerless and solitary life. Next we find him travelling, then marrying, and in 1806 assuming the duties of a Professor at Greifswald, where he continued, till Marshal Soult, two years after, struck his name off the list of the university officials. About this time, too, we find him publishing addresses to the German people, to incite them to a sustained resistance against Napoleon, and throwing off various lyrical and dramatic poems. Arndt wrote also on education, history, poetry, and on the mission of woman and her sphere of action. In 1810 he returned to Greifswald; but finding himself in a minority among its Napoleon-worshipping inhabitants, he once more departed from it, proceeding to Berlin, and thence travelling into Russia. During a subsequent residence at Leipsic, patriotic pamphlets and martial songs were his principal compositions. He married Maria, the sister of Dr. Friedrich Schleiermacher, his first wife having died in giving birth to a son in 1801. After this he seems to have passed a quiet, happy life, lecturing at Bonn, and writing endless *brochures* on history and politics, with poems, translations, and stories. In 1848 the arena of public life opened to him, and he sat, as deputy for Solingen, in the Parliament in Frankfort. 'The death of Arndt, who is best known in England by his song, "Was ist des Deutschen Vaterland," took place in January, 1860, when he was about 90 years of age. His "Biography," by E. Langenberg, from which we have derived this sketch, will put the reader in possession of the facts, thoughts, and feelings, so far as he need care to know them, that made up the outward and inward life of the patriotic poet. It contains also ample information about the writings of Arndt.

Arndt is not, we think, included in the catalogue of the correspondents of Tieck, whose letters have recently been given to the world by Karl von Holtei, one of that privileged company.²⁰ In this selection there are but few letters from Tieck himself. On the other hand, those from Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Varuhagen and his gifted wife, Sulpice Boisserée, Alexander von Humboldt, K. Otfried Müller, and a long list of illustrious men and women, may be considered as a compensation. In the fourth volume of the Selec-

¹⁹ "Ernst Moritz Arndt. Sein Leben und seine Schriften." Von E. Langenberg, &c. Bonn: Weber. 1865.

²⁰ "Briefe an Ludwig Tieck." Ausgewählt und herausgegeben von Karl von Holtei. Four Volumes. Breslau: Trewendt. 1864.

tion there is a letter from Adolf Wagner to Tieck, which contains a rapid and truthful estimate of Ben Jonson's dramatic genius; and a letter from Raume, p. 92, vol. iii., &c., is amusing. The writer complains that Tieck destroys all the characters in his works—Tannhäuser, Ekbert, Walter, Christian, all come to a bad end; whereas the poet, like God, should have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but let them all live. He is also annoyed with Tieck for the indulgence he shows to the false pietists, while he deals out a very hard measure to the genuine saint. He admits, with great *naïveté*, that as the "old man" decays, the fairest gifts of the Divine Being pass away, just as when Pagans leave off worshipping the sun, moon, and stars, and worship their Maker, those fascinating luminaries lose all their interest; but this, he thinks, is the devil's doing. He ends his letter with tender greetings, and a textual consolation (1 Cor. xv.), which forms part of the English burial service, and is a little too long for citation. In the same volume are also a couple of letters from Dr. D. Strauss, in one of which he speaks of an old friend who had gone to America, and turned preacher, and who, on the eve of his own wedding, was present at a grand devotional demonstration, when he had a foretaste, as he says with unconscious humour, of the blessings of that kingdom in which they neither marry nor are given in marriage! J. P. Richter, Andersen, Carove, Carus, Creutzer, the American Ticknor, and English J. Payne Collier, corresponded with Tieck. We fear to say that these four epistolary volumes will be found as interesting as our readers may conjecture from our list of notabilities, but of course it is quite understood that a judgment founded on a partial examination of upwards of 1400 pages must be conditional and precarious.

To the second volume of the collected writings of the Italian patriot, Joseph Mazzini, whose name will be inscribed by future historians in the roll of those illustrious men who have wrought so victoriously for the unity and restoration of their country, we can do little more than draw the attention of our readers.²¹ It contains a series of critical and literary essays, written in the decade 1829-39. The first of any importance is one on European literature. This is followed by four papers on the Historical Drama, and the Dramatic art. There is also a review of Italian literature since 1830; a passage from an article on Paolo Sarpi; an article on the poems of Victor Hugo, and another on those of Lamartine, which are well worth reading. These essays were not originally written in *English*, though Mazzini writes in our language with a perspicuity and a prophet-like eloquence which but few command, but in *Italian*. The translator would do well to consult a classical friend in cases of Greek or Latin proper names for the future. We shall not then read of Petus Thræseus or of the struggle symbolized in Oro and Trifone, personages far more difficult to identify in their Italian dress than our old French acquaintances, Pythagore and Tite-Live.

²¹ "Life and Writings of Joseph Mazzini." Vol. II. Critical and Literary. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

Disinclined to take a more favourable view of Cicero's character than Drumann or Mommsen, M. Gaston Boissier has produced an interesting volume entitled "Cicero and his Friends,"²² in which he relates the private and public life of the great orator, explains the relations existing between him and Cæsar; has special chapters on Atticus, Cælius, Brutus, and Octavius. The work betrays a decided, though moderate anti-Cæsarism, and the author does not bear so hard upon Brutus as some recent historians have done. He thinks he was narrow but honest, and unfitted for action. As to Cicero, he contends that if he was sometimes weak and hesitating, he always ended in defending the cause of justice and right, and when it was vanquished did all that remained for its champions to do, honoured it by his death.

The celebrated inscription of Ancyra recording the actions of Augustus, to which M. Boissier refers in his delineation of Octavius, has been edited with great care by the accomplished and learned German historian, Th. Mommsen.²³ Since the explorations of Perrot and Guillaume in Galatia and Bithynia in 1861, both the Greek and Latin copies of the inscription have gained in completeness. The "Monumentum Ancyranum" is followed by the "Monumentum Apolloniense," which after all that Perrot has done for its restoration, appears to have only a slight confirmatory value. For the logical student the *Titulus Tibertinus*, discovered at Tivoli in 1764, has acquired a peculiar interest. This inscription indicates that a triumph was granted to a pro-consul in the reign of Augustus, who *twice* administered the government of Syria and Phœnicia. It is well known that the Evangelist St. Luke places the birth of Christ in the period when Cyrenius was Governor of Syria, and that Josephus refers this governorship to the years 759-760 u.c., ten years after the death of Herod, in whose days Christ is declared by the same St. Luke to have been born. But if Cyrenius was *twice* governor of Syria, Christ may very well have been born during his administration, the years 751-752 u.c. forming part of the interval in which history has not recorded the names of the Syrian præsides, and in which the office is more likely to have been held by Cyrenius than any other known pro-consul. This was pointed out by Zumpt some years ago, but Mommsen discusses the question with an appropriate independence. Of course, that Cyrenius was the missing governor is conjectural; but there is a good deal to be said for the conjecture. It must also be remembered that this hypothetical discovery leaves the other difficulties in the Evangelical narrative pretty much what they were.

²² "Cicero et ses Amis. Etude sur la Société Romaine du temps de César." Par Gaston Boissier. Paris: Hachette. 1865.

²³ "Res Gestæ Divi Augusti. Ex Monumentis Ancyrano et Apolloniensi." Edidit Th. Mommsen. Accedunt Tabulæ Tres. Berlin: Weidmann. 1865.

BELLES LETTRES.

NOVELS first of all, for they are most read, before poetry, or history, or science. And first of all novels, the Sensational. For the last three or four years, each new work of Miss Braddon's has been hailed by the press in language which would have been laudatory if applied to a new "Hamlet." The *Times* has lately held her up as a guide to the philosopher, and a model for the moralist. The consequence of all this is that we now enjoy a kind of Braddon literature. It is very wide, and ranges in one direction from "The Woman in White" to the "London Journal," and in another from "Aurora Floyd" to Holywell-street.

The last new specimen—the latest development, we would rather call it—is now before us.¹ The words are those of Guy Livingstone, but the plot is that of Miss Braddon. It mixes in equal proportions, the animalism in which Mr. Lawrence appears so to delight with the philosophy and the big capitals of Sir Bulwer Lytton. The text is—

"Balnea, vina, Venus, corrumpunt corpora nostra,
Sed faciunt vitam, balnea, vina, Venus."

more especially Venus. But the sermon is, "Oh, fie! fie!" "Pleasant but wrong," screams our preacher. This is very delicious. It is in itself a new kind of sensation. The creature is pleased, and the Christian is appeased. Here, too, we find the new creed about woman. The New Woman, as we read of her in recent novels, possesses not only the velvet, but the claws of the tiger. She is no longer the Angel, but the Devil in the House. "Who is she?" is again the cry, when any crime is committed. Man proposes, woman disposes, is the new proverb. The Fathers, after all, were right when they said Adam was more tempted by Eve than by the Devil. Such is the pleasant doctrine developed in "Strathmore."

Here, too, we find the New Man. We all know him since the days of Guy Livingstone, with the cruel look, and the stern, pitiless smile. He rules everybody, especially the women, with that pitiless smile. But Lord Cecil Strathmore has a peculiarity which we have never before observed in a hero. He makes love with his nose. Thus the author says: "Lord Cecil stooped over her, spending breathless kisses on her lips, and passing his hands through the golden-scented hair which floated on her shoulders. Every single shining thread might have been a sorcery-twisted withe, that bound him powerless, so utterly he bowed before her power, so utterly he was blinded to all that lay beyond the delicious languor and the sensuous joys which steeped his present in their rich delight" (vol. i. pp. 265-266). The hero's friend, too, is aware of his lordship's weakness, for he writes: "Pity me! forgive me! you who know her accursed sorceress be-

¹ "Strathmore." A Romance. By Ounida. London: Chapman and Hall. 1865.

guilt, her subtle tempting that lies in the languor of a glance, in the passing fragrance of her hair" (vol. ii. p. 40). And the hero not only makes love with his nose, but thinks other people do. Thus he describes his idea of the Marquis of Vavasour's courtship: "The woman had him alone in a verandah, where she lay fanning herself amidst a pile of flowers, with the air scented with pastilles, and everything planned to take him in a moment of weakness" (vol. i. p. 95). The author himself would seem to be equally impressed with the love-making and love-receiving powers of the nose; for he writes: "It was not either in jest or flattery that Strathmore spoke such words. The roses had the perfume for him, with which they had wooed Manuel in the Isles of Delight" (vol. i. p. 236). After reading these and other similar passages we begin to understand the reason of Socrates' dislike to perfumes. The author's style, too, is peculiar. His rule seems to be to use a French word whenever an English one will do. There is not much humour, but a great deal of cynicism and light badinage. To be just, let us add that "Strathmore" possesses mystery enough for a sensation story, passion enough for a melo-drama, epigrams enough for a comedy, and cleverness enough for a whole circulating library of ordinary novels. Lastly, it possesses a great knowledge of the World, but not so much a knowledge of the World as of the Flesh and the Devil.

It is a positive relief to turn from such high lights, false glare, and false sentiment, to the quiet Devonshire seaport in "Miss Russell's Hobby."² Here we have no lords, no ladies, no French, but very commonplace people—Betty with her Devonshire dialect, and a fixed idea "that the Apostles were all alike." Miss Russell, too, with her fixed ideas, "keystones of her castles in the air," and Miss Anna Russell with her "tract-sowing," and Mr. Mitchell, "who left everything to his wife's management except his geraniums," and who used "to count the spots on them as a draper would his prints." All these good people are a trifle dull, but dulness is preferable to clever wickedness and attractive vice. The book is evidently written by a lady, and is eminently fit for ladies. It is probably, too, a first attempt. The authoress belongs to Miss Austen's school, or rather that section of it represented by Mrs. Gaskell. Miss Austen herself has pointed out the difficulties that attend her special style. Nice observation, minute touches, delicate rendering of light and shade, fine strokes of satire, all contribute to make her portraits so lifelike. The authoress of "Miss Russell's Hobby" has undoubted capacities, but she has yet her art to learn. Pains have been taken, but still more pains are required. The greatest deficiency is in the characters of her men. They are not men, but women's men. She has a tendency to describe actions rather than represent them, and to tell us people are brilliant. To take a writer's word for her hero's wit requires an amount of faith which in a sceptical age is not often found amongst reviewers. The authoress, too, plays the part of a good-natured Medea, for

² "Miss Russell's Hobby." A Novel. London and Cambridge: Macmillan and Co. 1865.

without any cauldron she manages to bestow the gift of youth on her hero. Though years pass by, he does not become bald, or even suffer from grey hairs. This certainly gives the book a great charm for the middle-aged. So much for the defects. Its quiet tone, and its unassuming style, however, make us easily forgive them. As no novel is now quite complete without a shipwreck, we will quote one on which the fortunes of more than one person depend.

"Crowds were there, watching a few determined men who silently prepared to unmoor a boat. Between the gusts was heard that ominous sound—a gun. It was immediately answered from the shore. 'Ay, ay, let 'em know we hear 'em, if we can do nought else, poor souls!' said the weather-beaten man, who stood glass in hand. Anxious faces grouped about him. 'Can you make out any more, Crowther?' 'Ay! I'd lose my last fardin' if that isn't the *Wareham Trader*. Bless you! I know her by her jibboom; and look 'ee, d'ye see, her topmast is clean gone. I wouldn't wonder if her helm is gone, for, to my seeming, she's tossed about no way. She'll drift into they rocks to a dead certainty, and then the Lord deliver them!' A small thin man, whose face was stern with anxiety, pushed his way among them. He was buttoned up tightly, and came to the steps. 'Give me a seat, Jack,' he said. 'Sir, what good in that? No; let's risk no more lives than is necessary. What good can you do?' 'The good of a clear head. I'll go. If he dies, the world's gone for me. Go I must.' . . . Janet watched him. A few low words were exchanged between the sailors, and then, with dark faces, but brave hearts, they guided the boat over the breakers. There was a suppressed stifled cheer, which dropped into a 'God bring you home again,' from husky voices, and then all eyes turned again to the Point. There, half hid in the thick cloud of vapour, a grey object was seen, which, to Janet's eyes, looked very unlike a ship, but which the seamen pronounced to be the brig in which Jack had sailed. A low murmur passed through the crowd. She was certainly drifting ashore. At this, a heart-rending scream was heard. It came from a woman, who stood with clasped hands striving to see. She was the wife of the skipper."—pp. 149-150.

There is a shipwreck, we may add, in "Strathmore." It is of course a very much grander affair than this. The billows curl twice as high, and make ten times as much noise, whilst the hero almost walks upon them. But on the whole we do not think it quite so natural.

For many years past we have been puzzled to account for the phenomenon of the uniform bad printing and the invariable dullness of Mr. Newby's novels. The type is difficult to read, and the text is not worth reading. The type hurts your eyes, whilst the story is not worth the candle by which you read it. Sometimes we have thought that Mr. Newby writes all the stories himself, which might account for their dullness; or else that the authors themselves set up the types, which might account for the wretched printing. There is a peculiarity, too, about these novels which we have noticed in no others. The advertisements are characteristic—they cannot be called literary. At first sight they seem like a reprint of some bit of hoarding. They look as if all those fly-leaves which are showered about at Exhibition times had been carefully collected and pasted in. They are, however, doubtless meant as a commentary on the text. When the breathless reader is enamoured with the beauty of the heroine, he has only to turn

to the last pages, and he will see where she obtained the brilliance of her complexion, and the whiteness of her teeth, at half-a-crown a box. When he comes upon a death-scene—there are generally two or three in a Newby novel—an advertisement will assuage his grief and dry his eyes with the cheapness of its mourning; and when, in the third volume, the happy couple are at last married, he may find out, without moving from his arm-chair, where they will probably procure their clocks, and their household furniture. The advertisements, we are bound to say, are the least objectionable part of the Newby novel. For instance, here is a story by Mrs. Bunbury,³ which is dulness itself. And we must tell Mrs. Bunbury, and all other ladies, that dulness in a novel is as great a fault as ugliness in a woman—men will shun both in consequence. The evil genius is a Miss Thomas, “with a step as soft as a cat, or even of a mouse.” This woman with the cat-like step has a nephew, who rejoices in the name of Cadwallader Llewellen Williams, and who has the further peculiarity of possessing a pair of whiskers “which stare at people.” A young heiress, already in love, is placed in the calculating woman’s charge, and any one who likes may work out the problem by which the calculating woman, in the second volume, brings the money of the heiress into the pocket of the nephew. But it is not in the mysteries of plot or the evolution of character that Mrs. Bunbury shines. Descriptions of nature and moral reflections are her strong points. The first might have been written by a maid-of-all-work, and the latter by Tupper. Thus, she speaks of “large trees garnished with ivy” (vol. i. p. 56), as if they were hams; and paints the beauties of a “rain-distilling sky” (vol. i. p. 89), which also bears the same kitchen mark. The moral reflections are of all kinds, and, as Parr says of his pills, suitable for all climates. For death, as Sterne puts it, she has a complete set of fine sayings. Thus, in one place she observes, “It is seldom that death comes to us just at the time we have prognosticated.” She might just as well have said, “It is seldom that a Derby prophet’s tip comes just as the prophet foretold.” Sometimes she is more mysterious, as when she utters such a dark saying as “pronouns are the axioms of love” (vol. i. p. 101). This, like a great deal else in her book, we don’t understand. Of it, however, as a whole, we can very confidently say that any one wishing to know how a novel should not be written had best read “Florence Manvers.”

Another novel from the same publisher asks for criticism.⁴ For a moment we thought we discovered a family likeness to “Florence Manvers,” when we read of “Blanche Stewart with a look demure as a church mouse” (p. 18). The story, however, is founded on very different principles of art. Here we have no axioms. Philosophy is not Mr. Frank Trollope’s strong point; humanity is rather his study. He moulds the chin of his hero, and delicately chisels his heroine’s

³ “Florence Manvers.” In Three Volumes. By Selina Bunbury. London : T. C. Newby. 1865.

⁴ “A Right-Minded Woman.” A Novel. In Three Volumes. By Frank Trollope. London : T. C. Newby. 1865.

features. He makes brows lower and eyes flash, and does an immense deal of tragic business in a little time. Lest our strictures upon him should seem too severe, we will allow him to speak for himself—

“‘You’re wrong! quite wrong!’ cried the snarling Sir John Barleycorn; ‘ugh! ugh!’ a short cough impeding his speech, ‘you’re wrong, I tell you, Master Overwise. I’s played the play a hundred times on May-day, and never before did I ever see the bower women come afore the garland bearers.’ The pedagogue eyed Sir John Barleycorn with the most sovereign contempt; but the old grumbler went on, nothing daunted, but somewhat out of breath with his cough, caused by the hard trotting of his donkey. ‘I tell you, Master Overwise, you are wrong, for I have seen little Snip, the tailor, play the master of the revels better than any I ever did see. He was a merry fellow, too, afore he died.’ ‘Well, peace to his memory,’ said the school-master, somewhat impatiently. ‘I’ve heard that he was like his own buckram—stiff.’ ‘No such thing, no such thing; but where is the Queen of the May?’ ‘She has not condescended to honour us with a sight of her royal face; but do not be impatient, Sir John. I will invoke her, and she will descend to bless the eyes of her loving subjects. Stand aside, ye masters and mistresses of the borough of Thorpeton, while I pour forth, in eloquent verse, the overflowing of a loving and loyal heart—

‘There’s none on earth to whom we owe such duty,
As our loved queen of such beafic beauty.’

‘Hallo! hallo!’ exclaimed Sir John, ‘what do you mean by beafic; that’s Hebrew, or some other popish lingo; and I’ll be bound it’s something indecent, and not fit to be spoken to a lady.’ ‘Indecent!’ cried the offended poet, ‘why, it’s Latin, man.’ ‘I thought as much; it’s just the lingo the lawyers and doctors talk, and not fit for women’s ears.’ ‘Stupid dolt!’ thought the schoolmaster, and then said aloud—‘but thou art in error this time, most sapient sapientissimus, for beafic is only a contraction for beatific, which would make the line a foot too long.’ ‘A foot too long! Why didn’t you cut off the other feet? and then we should have been spared the nonsense.’ Master Overwise, however, did not condescend to take any further notice, except by another withering look of contempt upon the wheezing old man, and then went on with his invocation—

‘With eyes quite as bright,
And as full of light
As either sun or moon,
Or the belt of Orion.’

‘O’Ryan, O’Ryan, who the devil’s O’Ryan?’ shouted Sir John. ‘Stop not my invocation, old man—

‘By all that’s dear to love, beauty and thee,
We invoke thee to crown our festivity.’

‘Ugh! ugh! I have played——’—Vol. i. pp. 258-262.

Here the scene is interrupted by the presence of Rebecca Stumps, whose eyes appear “to look up and down at the same moment with something beyond a squint, and whose long chin is covered with a most masculine down.”

Now this, be it remembered, is an attempt to describe May^{Day} in

James II.'s time, and to give a picture of its wit and mirth. If any theme could inspire a man it would be this. It has been idealized by our poets, and is now vulgarized by Mr. Frank Trollope. His, however, is a very fair specimen of the Newby novel—a novel which we generally take up with hesitation and nearly always lay down with disgust.

Dr. Collier's "Pictures of the Periods,"⁵ may not unfairly be classed with the novels. It is an attempt to popularize English history, or, in this case, to be more precise, English archæology, after the fashion of *Charicles* and *Gallus*. Such performances have often been compared to the mixtures of powder and jam with which children are dosed. They much more resemble, as far as results are concerned, the bread and lard which careful housewives give to cats. The grease is all eaten, and the wholesome bread left. The great objection to this method of teaching history is that it is fiction. There is no way of checking the writer. When an historian takes a new view of any period of history, we can determine the question by the evidence of facts. There is a common ground between the critic and the historian, on which both take their stand. But in books like the present, where not a single reference is given, it is not easy to test the author. If you accuse him of distorting history, he replies, I am writing fiction, and the case falls to the ground. Scott, probably, has done more harm to the cause of truth by his historical novels, than all the most prejudiced historians put together. As long as his stories are read, the cavaliers will always be more popular than the puritans. And this bias is unavoidable. The judicial impartiality, which is so commendable in an historian, would be the ruin of a novelist. Truth is the object of an historian; to give pleasure, that of a novelist. But we do not think that our English history and our English antiquities are so dull as to require the aid of fiction. Their popularity may be seen in the number of historians, competent and incompetent, who load our shelves with books. If, however, fiction is permissible, it must be of the highest kind. Shakespeare and Scott may take liberties with history which cannot be permitted to Dr. Collier. A real gift for story-telling, humour, insight into human nature, dramatic power, and poetry, make us for a time forget that the situations never occurred, and that the speakers never lived. Genius here, as elsewhere, makes its own laws, but talent is bound by those of criticism. The six tales which compose the present volume, are evidently written by a clever man, with a large vocabulary, and a style like Harrison Ainsworth's. The surface of things, the armour and dress of men and women, he describes picturesquely enough, but the springs of action and the motives of conduct, he is quite powerless to realize. His constant attempts at picturesqueness often betray him into sad absurdities of language. Thus, to take examples from one tale alone, he writes:—"The effort brought a gush of blood from his wound; and he sunk back dead upon the reddened mass of trampled straw, which last sunrise had seen a field of ripening rye." ("Satin and Sad Colour," p. 193). "Walls have ears,

⁵ "Pictures of the Periods." A Sketch-Book of Old English Life. By William Francis Collier. Edinburgh: William P. Nimmo. 1865.

and trees have eyes," says the old proverb, but the notion that straw can see is certainly new to us. Again: "He was delayed for a time by a rush of white-gowned choristers, who came like clamorous sea-gulls round him" (pp. 202, 203), is a little Ossianic in its character, whilst the following is in the style of a sensational novelist: "The trigger clicked—the furrowed wheel of steel revolved, showering sparks upon the priming from the smitten fire-stone in the lock—the charge exploded; but, instead of driving out the heavy ball, it blew stock and barrel into a thousand flying splinters of brass and walnut-wood. The wheel of the lock struck Averil's temple, and sunk into his brain. He fell dead across the open coffer, while drops from his cloven skull oozed in among the coins, gilding them with a redness not their own." (p. 224.) If, however, the interior of the book does not quite please us, the exterior is certainly nearly perfect. The simplicity, good taste, and feeling of the design, make the cover quite a model for book-binders. Mr. Ruskin, with his curious views about paternal government, has lately proposed that it should publish handsome editions of all really genuine books for the nation. If, however, Mr. Nimmo will only continue to give us such paper, such type, and such binding as we find in the present volume, Mr. Ruskin will have no need to ask help from Government. If, too, publishers only knew how much authors and scholars valued handsome bindings and good "getting up," and how much the public is attracted by them, they would certainly pay more attention to these details than they generally do.

Mr. Ruskin⁶ has lately been stoned by the critics. They have flung enough stones at him to build his monument, and enough mud to cement it together. Doubtless, his book is very provoking to some minds. In his logic he draws too large conclusions from too small premises, and in his political economy draws them from none at all. Then he is transcendental, carries himself on his own shoulders, jumps down his own throat, eats the wind, and drinks the clouds. Sometimes, however, it is the duty of the critic to leave the faults alone, and dwell only on what is valuable and explain what is likely to be misunderstood. And this book especially demands such criticism. Everybody has enjoyed their joke at it, but nobody brought a grain of sympathy. Even the passage printed in red ink, which has produced such peals of laughter, is really not quite meaningless. Just as in the *Libro d'Oro*, and the *Libri Vitæ* of the Catholic Church, men's noble actions and deeds of charity were chronicled in letters of gold and silver, to typify their nobleness, so, we suppose, did Mr. Ruskin by his rubric intend to typify the sins that are scarlet. Nonsense there is enough in the book, but Mr. Ruskin's nonsense is sometimes more valuable than his critics' sense.

Its great value, however, is in the tone of its feeling, pitched often far too high, and most difficult to be understood by a certain class of minds; and yet it is not at all difficult to be understood by those who have suffered from the flippancy and hardness of the day. When Mr.

⁶ "Sesame and Lilies." By John Ruskin, M.A. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

Ruskin speaks of our national taste, or rather distaste, of art, and says that if "we heard that all the Titians in Europe were made sand-bags to-morrow on the Austrian forts, it would not trouble us so much as the chance of a brace or two of game less in our own bags in a day's shooting" (page 84), he is only stating in an exaggerated form what many at times of exasperation have felt. We ourselves know a country squire, who hangs a magnificent Reynolds in a dark corner of his gun-room. Remonstrance with him is useless: he prefers the copies of Frith which panel his drawing-room walls. Again, what Mr. Ruskin says about our apathy concerning science (pp. 32-34) has some truth. We ourselves have been nearly taken up as a poacher for watching the habits of birds, and hunted down like a thief by keepers for venturing upon some grouse-moors in search of the site of a British fort. Still such cases are exceptional. Besides, it is to be hoped that even the most unenlightened British squire may some day learn the difference between Reynolds and Frith. Mr. Ruskin's fault is that he too often magnifies the exception into the rule. Besides, it is not good to dwell on what is base. Let us rather rejoice at the little light which is dawning, than repine at the great darkness which is so feebly yet so surely melting. Still, Mr. Ruskin's strictures upon the national hard-heartedness and the national lust for money are needed. Any one who has lived for the last four years, that is to say, during the space of the American civil war, in one of our large manufacturing towns, and has heard, as we have heard, Southern brutalities applauded by men and slavery upheld by women, will not say that Mr. Ruskin has overcoloured one line or overcharged one sentence. Utopianism is at times good for us, if it be only to lift us out of our usual atmosphere of prudence and pence. And we can sympathize with, though we feel how purely utopian for the present they are, his visions of a kingdom where only the great and good shall be kings, and where the sword shall be beaten into the ploughshare, and men shall cease to stab one another, and revel in a scientific murder, which is now dignified by the name of war (pp. 108, 118). Others, beside Mr. Ruskin, have set themselves to bring about the millennium of peace,—peace which is so often more chivalrous than war,—but they have all paid the penalty of being too far in advance of their day; and Mr. Ruskin's eloquent sentences will, equally with the plain words of Cobden, fall upon deaf ears. However, he is not wholly impracticable, wholly utopian, and we feel real pleasure in quoting a passage where delicate fancy serves to brighten and illustrate one at least of the duties which every English lady can perform:—

"Have you ever considered what a deep under-meaning there lies, or at least may be read, if we choose, in our custom of strewing flowers before those whom we think most happy? Do you suppose it is merely to deceive them into the hope that happiness is always to fall thus in showers at their feet? that wherever they pass they will tread on herbs of sweet scent, and that the rough ground will be made smooth for them by depth of roses? So surely as they believe that, they will have instead to walk on bitter herbs and thorns; and the only softness to their feet will be of snow. But it is not thus intended they should believe; there is a better meaning in that old custom.

The path of a good woman is indeed strewn with flowers; but they rise behind her steps, not before them. 'Her feet have touched the meadows, and left the daisies rosy.' You think that only a lover's fancy: false and vain. How if it could be true? You think this also perhaps only a poet's fancy—

Even the light harebell raised its head
Elastic from her airy tread.

But it is little to say of a woman that she only does not destroy where she passes. She should revive; the harebells should bloom, not stoop as she passes. You think I am going into wild hyperbole? Pardon me, not a whit—I mean what I say, in calm English, spoken in resolute truth. You have heard it said (and I believe there is more than fancy even in that saying, but let it pass for a fanciful one) that flowers only flourish rightly in the garden of some one who loves them. I know you would like that to be true; you would think it a pleasant magic if you could flush your flowers into brighter bloom by a kind look upon them; nay more, if your look had the power not only to cheer but to guard them—if you could bid the black blight turn away, and the knotted caterpillars spare—if you could bid the dew fall upon them in the drought, and say to the south wind in frost—'Come, thou south, and breathe upon my garden, that the spices of it may flow out.' This you would think a great thing. And do you think it not a greater thing that all this (and how much more than this?) you can do, for fairer flowers than these—flowers that could bless you for having blessed them, and will love you for having loved them:—flowers that have eyes like yours, and thoughts like yours; which, once loved, you love for ever? Is this only a little power? Far among the moorlands and the rocks,—far in the darkness of the terrible streets—these feeble florets are lying, with all their fresh leaves torn, and their stems broken—will you never go down to them, nor set them in order in their little fragrant beds, nor fence them in their shuddering from the fierce wind? . . . Will you not go down among them; among those sweet living things, whose new courage, sprung from the earth with the deep colour of heaven upon it, is starting up in strength of goodly spire: and whose purity, washed from the dust, is opening, bud by bud, into the flower of promise."—pp. 189-194.

After this protest we shall hardly be accused of a wish to deal harshly with Mr. Ruskin or the school to which he belongs, yet here is a book which most certainly provokes criticism.⁷ Mr. Japp is one of those damned good-natured friends, who are always doing mischief. He writes in the treacly, sticky style; and if Carlyle, Tennyson, and Ruskin have never tasted sugar-candy, they can have plenty of it from him. When Mr. Japp is not treacly, he is in a state of eruption with epithets like "noble-hearted," "god-fearing," and all the rest of it, which the two Kingsleys have done their best to make ridiculous. There are just now a certain class of semi-pious words, which we would avoid as carefully as puns. His theology is about up to the standard of an intelligent Bible-reader, and his grammar somewhat below. He constantly treats us to such offensive phrases as "a Tennyson," "a Carlyle," (preface, p. xii.) "a Retzch," (p. 173,) "a Burns," "a Wordsworth," (p. 37,) and hopelessly confuses "will" and "shall" (p. 171). Further, he talks of how "self-renunciation pulses with the movement of the blood" (p. 25), and how "pebbles

⁷ "Three Great Teachers of our own Time: Being an attempt to deduce the Spirit and Purpose animating Carlyle, Tennyson, and Ruskin." By Alexander H. Japp. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

pulse a lake," and calls milk, in the genuine penny-a-liner style, "lacteal wealth" (p. 12). In his playfulness, he terms Novalis "a strange literary witch" (p. 157), and writes of Mr. Tennyson "emptying his waste-basket on the devoted heads of critics" (p. 169); "how Shakespeare knew better than Voltaire, and folk of that kidney" (p. 116), and calls the former "gentle Will, a puzzling fellow," and in the next page proceeds to make some remarks which show that he has never read, or else never understood, a word of "Will's" sonnets. He not only coins for us new words, as "textlet" (p. 109), but such odoriferous images as "writers should wait, like nature, till the dung of life has nurtured the tree of will into beautiful blossom" (p. 123), and such novel similes as "a man, as straight as a rush" (p. 64). If we proceed in this style, we shall soon hear of a giant as strong as a reed. Too much learning, it has been thought, makes people mad, but too much reading evidently makes them ridiculous. His intellectual standard may, however, be judged by the fact of his appealing to "an independent minister of note" as an authority (p. 195). After this, we are not surprised by a perfect plague of pulpit cant. Thus he talks about "my readers" (p. 17), just in the same way that an unctuous preacher "dear-readers" his congregation, writes about thoughts "being borne in upon his mind" (p. 249), and warns Mr. MacDonald with "solemn brotherly advice" (p. 119). Orthodoxy he curiously discovers in our instincts, and more easily in "In Memoriam" (p. 109). And it gives him the highest pleasure to think that Tennyson's "Maud" is a more Christian poem than "Hamlet" (p. 136). Evidently to such a man Tate's and Brady's version of the Psalms will be a work of art.

But in what we have ventured to call the treacly and sticky style, Mr. Japp shows his highest skill. Thus he says of "In Memoriam," "its conclusion melts into a psalm,—a psalm sung with some of our later accompaniments, such as David knew not of" (p. 128). To exalt Mr. Tennyson over David strikes us as rather profane, but it is certainly very flattering, which is more important to Mr. Japp. So again, of Mr. Ruskin we are told that he is "endowed by nature with rare gifts, and has also been blessed by Providence with ample means" (p. 191). Here it will be noticed that a little butter has been added to the treacle. To praise in one sentence a man's spiritual and worldly endowments appears to us the finest stroke of art which we have ever met in that school which professes to teach us how to make the best of both worlds.

Such are a few of the details of Mr. Japp's book. Of its general scope we can only say that it is entirely wrong from beginning to end. In no single sense can any one of the three, Carlyle, Tennyson, and Ruskin, be said to be the teachers of the day. Quite in another direction must the true teacher be sought; quite in another school the thoughts that are governing men's minds, and moulding the destinies of the future. It would be absurd to deny that they all three are not men of genius, and have not exercised a certain influence on the time; but we do deny the permanency of that influence. Mr. Carlyle's views have lately landed him into strange ground—into excusing tyranny, playing the

devil's advocate, and upholding slavery. Mr. Tennyson's philosophy, as summed up in "The Two Voices," is the philosophy of a dying creed, whilst "In Memoriam" is an unavailing attempt to reconcile the fictions of historical Christianity with the truths of science. How far Mr. Ruskin understands the day may be seen in the political economy of "Unto This Last," and his senseless outbursts against commerce.

After all, Mr. Japp means well. In his mild way he is very harmless, and perhaps does not deserve such severe condemnation as we have given him. The best parts of his book, however, are the quotations.

The poetry this quarter is rather less in quantity, and worse in quality, than usual. Dean Alford warbles for us in a volume⁸ made up of that kind which, as Horace long ago said, is tolerated by neither gods nor men, but apparently only by women. His is the perfect type of the poetry of the commonplace. We know the sort well. It is religious in the spirit, but very prosy in the letter. It generally contains an "Ode to a Baby lately born," and another to one lately dead, and a note on the author's grandmother. *Bradshaw* on the whole is more poetical, and decidedly more useful.

Dean Alford, however, has his mission. Read him, and then you know, once for all, what all those little thin purple, blue, and green octavos of "Lyrics of the Heart," and "Leaves of my Childhood," are about. His book is a compendium of them all. It is the *Gradus* of platitudes, and the *florilegium* of faded metaphors. It contains alike the sighs of love-lorn curates, and the gushings of spinsters. He is Bavius and Mævia combined. "Midnight Thoughts," "On the Birth of my First Child," "To a Moonbeam by our Fireside," are the subjects which his Muse loves to adorn.

Evidently Wordsworth has been Dean Alford's model. And the Dean's verses have all the simplicity of his great master, without any of his thought. They are in places quite Preraphaelite. Thus the lines, "A few Hours after the Birth of my First Child," are in the first part so scientifically realistic, so lovingly filled in with the minutest details of midwifery, that they might have been written by an accoucheur. They are partly a commentary on *δεινὸν τὸ τίκτειν*, and partly the service for the churching of women in blank verso. But gradually the philosopher, the accoucheur, and the churchman disappear; the father prevails, and the conclusion does more than justice to the parental feelings. The Dean usurps the functions of the Prophet, and to "Welcome Little Stranger" adds some interesting prophecies.

The Dean's rhymes, too, are often Preraphaelite. Thus "east" pairs off with "blest" (p. 232); "search" matches to "torch" (p. 236), and "increasing" makes a kind of Irish Preraphaelite rhyme with "chasing" (p. 263). We venture, however, to say that the Dean carries his

⁸ "The Poetical Works of Henry Alford, Dean of Canterbury." Fourth Edition, containing many New Pieces now first collected. London: Alexander Strahan. 1865.

Preraphaelitism a little too far, when he makes a child asks his mother on a fine spring day—

“Mama, will the weather be as fine in heaven?”—p. 141.

This, we think, although a most natural question for an English child, smacks a little too much of our insular climate. To forecast heaven with a barometer is hardly what we should expect from a Dean. Again, we think the Dean should not call stars “lanping potentates” (p. 74), nor speak of “blosmy hawthorn” (p. 141), nor talk of “the river’s silver swathes” (p. 217), as probably nobody will know what he means.

A local colouring, however, which is very pleasing, pervades some of his pieces. It is commonly supposed that one of the many duties of a Dean is hospitality, and the following stanza consequently seems to us very natural:—

“The pretty lambs welcome their life,
In the fresh morning of the year;
Taking no forethought of the knife,
They play and do not fear.”—p. 213.

We admire, too, the way in which the Dean deals with the great “nude” question. With equal delicacy and equal taste he clothes everything. With him the earth, even in the winter, generally considered the most naked time of the year, is “clad for her bridal glad” (p. 237), and the hills with him wear good thick “robes of purple and gold” (p. 100), and even the Morning is thoughtfully “kerchiefed in wind and rain” (p. 212), two elements whose only connexion with clothes has hitherto been to spoil them. As for the spring—but the poet himself shall speak—

“Come, come, thou dallying Spring,
Over the hills that rise to the West,
Show us the gleam of thy sky-blue vest.”—p. 238.

We can only parallel this with the beautiful expression of an American writer—

“Night drew her sable mantle around her, and pinned it with a star.”

Further, we need scarcely say that the Dean’s volume contains, “Fragments of a Proposed Drama” (p. 152), and “Fragments of a Long-pondered Poem” (p. 305), “The End of a Charade” (p. 311), and “A Letter to a Friend” (p. 319). No little monograph of rhymed silliness is ever complete without these; they are as sure to turn up as the “Portrait of a Gentleman” in the Academy, or a grey horse in a lady’s novel.

One peculiarity there is, however, about the Dean’s book—that he takes the public into his confidence about his future state. Generally speaking, Bavius and Mævia only confide to us their present joys and sorrows. From various passages in his book the Alford family would seem likely to enjoy that position which was denied the sons of

Zebedee. The Dean, too, is not ashamed to describe his own personal apotheosis—

“When I am spirit clear,
More pure than is the ocean-moon.”—p. 214.

For all this sort of thing we are of course prepared in tombstone poetry, when it is written by the parish clerk or the churchwarden. But we do think that good feeling and good taste should prevent a dignitary of the Church of England from publicly exalting himself, his family, and his personal friends to that Kingdom of Glory where, if he believes the Book which he so often unconsciously makes ridiculous, many are called, but few chosen; in which a special clause, too, is directed against the rich, amongst whom Deans, we suppose, may be classed.

Mr. Tennyson suffers the same fate as a popular opera—a hundred barrel-organs vulgarize the one, and a hundred poetasters parody the other. We most of us know some sucking bard, who, in his republican moments, dashes off a copy of “Locksley Hall,” and who, when in love or when bilious, takes to imitating “In Memoriam.” Ladies, too, suffer from this weakness. They have their models, whom they copy with a fidelity which by their admirers will be called reverence, by critics a monomania. For instance, here is Mrs. Prideaux, who thus begins her “Claudia”⁹—

“The unrelenting summer sun of Rome
Poured from the zenith—not a line of shade
Edged the white streets,—when Brán, a British prince,
The son of Llyr, the sire of Caradoc,
Sat wrapped in sadness at Narcissus’ gate:
Narcissus, freedman and chief favourite
Of Claudius Cæsar.

“For when Llyr, the king
Of the fierce tribe that held the Cymric coast
North of the tawny channel which receives
The rivers of the West, had passed away,
His son, the patient, many-thoughted Brán,
Searching his spirit, could not find the skill
To rule their turbulence in times of war.
Though brave like all his sires, the noble prince
Was minded otherwise. He could not hear
The trumpets of ambition; they were drowned
By a still voice which drew him from the midst
Of evil men, to stand above the world
And wait the dawning of a better day.
Wherefore, withdrawing from the sovereignty,
He left it in the hands of Caradoc,
His younger son: the elder prince had fallen
In Llyr’s last battle with the Roman power
Led on by Aulus Plautius. For himself,
He passed, a willing exile, from the court
Of grey Trefrân; and crossed the tawny sea,
The Summer-country, and the Deep-valled Land;

“Claudia.” By Mrs. Frederick Prideaux. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

And paused not, save for needful rest and food,
Till in the centre of the granite horn,
That pierces far into the unknown seas,
He found the solitude his soul desired,
And grew alive again."—pp. 1, 2.

Now this in its way is really fine; and had Mr. Matthew Arnold and Mr. Tennyson never written, we should have certainly ranked Mrs. Prideaux very high amongst modern poets. As it is, however, the lines only suggest others far finer. Captain Cory¹⁰ certainly cannot be accused of imitation. His fault is that of being rather too original. In everything the gallant captain seems to see the image of war. Though love is his theme, yet "Arma virumque cano" is his motto. The style betrays the soldier. Thus, in his "Prefatory Remarks," he gracefully says, "An interval of unwonted leisure, made by circumstance a time of almost enforced inaction, occurring in the mid career of a very restless life, has permitted thought to bring my mind to bay." Again, in the very first lines in his "Poem to Egeria," he writes—

"The Spring has broken Winter's ward,
And glades are green again."—p. 1.

We are sorry, however, to learn that he suffers so from the south wind; the east wind, we know, in spite of Mr. Kingsley's eulogy, is apt to inflict bronchitis and sore throats. The south we always imagined was the wind that lovers and poets admired. The gallant captain, however, says—

"But it chokes me oft, when it brings to mind
That it used to blow,—as now!"—p. 1.

But originality is the mark of the book, except where some plagiarism occurs, as in the very first stanza, where we read how "the mysterious stars kept callous watch" (p. 9). Campbell, we think, has said something of this sort before.

Mr. Locker's poems¹¹ are like most albums—they contain a few good things, and a great many very poor ones. "Sunt plura mala," as Martial said of his epigrams. He has an ugly knack of punning, which does him much injustice. Such lines as—

"The trees have cut their ancient sticks,"—p. 6,

"My bank of early violets,
Is now a bank of savings,"—p. 7,

are bad enough; but to have recourse to another language, as in—

"O *Cara* mine, what lines of care are these?"—(p. 161)

suggests not a sense of humour, but its dearth. We have, too, another charge against him. Mr. Locker is a joker of jokes. The

¹⁰ "The Reconquest." A Love Story. In Two Cantos. By Arthur Cory, Captain H.M. Indian Army. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

¹¹ "Selections from the Works of Frederick Locker." With Illustrations, by Richard Doyle. London: Moxon and Co. 1865.

jester's cap sits very well upon his head, but the gown of the moralist hardly suits him. Thus, there is something very jarring about the conclusion of a little piece, "To my Grandmother." He has been laughing very pleasantly about her, as represented in a picture by Romney, when she was seventeen, and then suddenly says he should like to meet her in heaven—

"I'm fain to meet you there—
If as witching as you were,
Grandmama."—p. 19.

What with Dean Alford applying an atmospheric test to heaven, and Mr. Locker making the personal beauty of his grandmother one of its chief attractions, the orthodox will be rather shocked. Mr. Locker, however, does not always write with his left hand. He is fertile in the resources of rhythm, and can find plenty of rhymes to "tempora mutantur," and "Piccadilly," and, we dare say, to the famous "porringer," and "Timbuctoo," those great crucial tests to rhymesters. He is always happy when he sings of Geraldine in particular, and young ladies in general. If, as he says, life is a bubble, he sees the rainbow in it. He hits playfully, rather than hard; and his philosophy resembles his satire. Young ladies show their ankles, but wives wear balmorals, and widows return to the ways of girlhood. The world fears God, but it fears Mrs. Grundy a great deal more. These are the themes on which he loves to write with more or less vigour.

From America we receive a sensible book upon Shakespeare.¹² After the vagaries of Miss Delia Bacon in the New, and the follies of the Tercentenary Orgie in the Old World, such a work is as welcome as it is unexpected. Mr. White brings what is so much wanted, good sound common sense. Many may differ from him, but nobody will find him extravagant. We wish that he had more often given us his authorities, and that when he did give them he would omit the name of Mr. Fullom. Of all the ridiculous books published upon Shakespeare, Mr. Fullom's book is pre-eminently the most ridiculous. To quote him is to throw discredit on your own judgment. Among Shakespearian students in England such a reference as at p. 166 will do Mr. White's work more harm than all his well-digested learning and well-considered remarks will be able to erase. To all those, however, who wish to learn what is known about Shakespeare's life, put well and in a brief compass, together with the history of our English drama, we would say, read Mr. White's book. He is no mere idolater of Shakespeare, and he has no wish to overlook his faults. He accepts the hard facts of his life, and makes no attempt to explain them away. The position of the poet's father is stated without any gloss. The deer-stealing, the marriage, even the supposed cause of his death, are noted down in all their ugly literalness. Consequently there is in Mr. White's book a human interest about Shakespeare which is entirely lost in those

¹² "Memoirs of the Life of William Shakespeare; with an Essay towards the Expression of his Genius; and an Account of the Rise and Progress of the English Drama." By Richard Grant White. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co. 1865.

biographies where he is treated as an immaculate being. To those who take the latter view the following extract is worth pondering over:—

“Whether or no Anne Hathaway had a fair face and a winning way which spontaneously captivated William Shakespeare, or whether he yielded to arts to which his inexperience made him an easy victim, we cannot surely tell. But we do know that she, though not vestally inclined, as we shall see, remained unmarried till 1582, and that then the woman of twenty-six took to husband the boy of eighteen. They were married upon once asking of the banns; and the bond given to the Bishop of Worcester for his security in licensing this departure from custom was given in that year, on the 28th day of November. About those days there was great need that Anne Hathaway should provide herself with a husband of some sort, and that speedily; for in less than five months after she obtained one she was delivered of a daughter. The parish register shows that Susanna, the daughter of William and Anne Shakespeare, was baptised May 26th, 1583. There have been attempts to turn aside the obvious bearings of these facts upon the character of Anne Hathaway. But it is a stubborn and unwise idolatry which resists such evidence as this—an idolatry which would exempt Shakespeare, and not only him, but all with whom he became connected, from human passion and human frailty. That temperament is cruel, and that morality pharisaic, which treats all cases of this kind with inexorable and indiscriminating severity, and that judgment outrageously unjust which visits all the sin upon the weaker and already suffering party.”—pp. 47-49.

It is in this strain of even-handed justice that Mr. White writes throughout his book. He extenuates nothing, and he sets down naught in malice. One broad lesson he has at all events learnt from Shakespeare, and he well applies it to Shakespeare's own life, that “best men are oft moulded out of faults.”

Mr. Young, in his “Sea Fishing as a Sport,”¹³ flings a wide net, and catches alike fisherman and fishmonger, housewife and epicure. He discourses to the first two about the habits of fish, and to the last two about their merits. The only fault we have to find with the book is from a literary and not a practical point of view. Thus he tells us (pp. 151, 152) that the Romans used to bring the oysters from beds near Richborough, but forgets altogether to quote the witty and apposite passages from Juvenal of the senator who,

“Circæis nata forent, an
Lucinum ad saxum, Rutupinove edita fundo
Ostrea, callebat primo deprendere morsu.”

And we think, too, that under turbot, some mention might be made of that historical fish which figures so humorously in the same fourth satire.

The Early English Text Society give us Lancelot of the Laik,¹⁴

¹³ “Sea-Fishing as a Sport: Being an Account of the various kinds of Sea-Fish; How, When, and Where to Catch them, in their various Seasons and Localities.” By Lambton J. H. Young. London: Groombridge and Sons. 1865.

¹⁴ “Lancelot of the Laik.” A Scottish Metrical Romance. Re-edited from a Manuscript in the Cambridge University Library, by the Rev. W. W. Skeat. London: Published for the Early English Text Society, by Trübner and Co. 1865.

re-edited from a manuscript in the Cambridge University Library. We cannot, of course, form any opinion as to the accuracy of the reprint. The glossary, however, is carefully done, but it should have been much fuller and its usefulness would have been greatly extended by distinguishing those words which are used in Shakespeare, or which may still be found as provincialisms.

We may here briefly notice two works, which, from some cause or another, have only just reached us. The Muses first. From the Blue Mountains in Australia Mr. Horne sends forth "Prometheus"¹⁵—that Prometheus who cried to the earth, and sea, and sun—

"Ἴδεσθέ μοιὰ πρὸς θεῶν πάσχω θεός.

We fear that Mr. Horne is too classical to become popular. A few students, however, are sure to welcome his drama, and the poet must find his reward in the fitness of his readers. The other work appeals to a much larger audience.¹⁶ Mr. Rimmel teaches us the history of perfumes, and how the dead were adorned and how the living are disfigured by cosmetics. The book is written by one who thoroughly understands the subjects he treats. This is as it should be. The only danger in such cases as these is lest the author may be betrayed into mere fine writing on the one hand, or into puffing his own goods on the other. Mr. Rimmel has sometimes fallen into the former, but he carefully avoids the latter mistake. A few slips of the pen, too, here and there, rather interfere with the beauty of the book, and our pleasure in reading it. Thus, at page 5, we have Hippolites for Hippolitus. At page 101 the reference to Juvenal is wrong: it should be the second and not the first satire. Indeed, the references throughout the book are very vague. The way, too, in which Mr. Rimmel, in the earlier part of his work, writes the scientific names of plants, will hardly satisfy botanists. This blunder is curious, for in the latter part the names are all correctly given. In these and some other particulars the book requires careful revision. On the whole, however, we can say that it is as amusing as it is instructive.

Lastly, we have to acknowledge three volumes of Messrs. Smith, Elder, and Co.'s novels by standard authors.¹⁷ The series is in every way good, and we trust may do something towards checking the torrent of sensationalism by which we are just now inundated. The central figure in Mr. Crane's frontispiece to "Farina" is excellent, and full of promise. The others are too conventional, and are not nature, but Gilbert.

¹⁵ "Prometheus the Fire-Bringer." By Richard Henry Horne. Edinburgh: Edmonston and Douglas. 1864.

¹⁶ "The Book of Perfumes." By Eugene Rimmel. London: Chapman and Hall. 1865.

¹⁷ "Farina." A Legend of Cologne. By George Meredith. "A Simple Woman," by the Author of "Nut-Brown Maids." "Normanton," by A. J. Barrowcliffe. London: Smith, Elder, and Co. 1865.

