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SUBCOMMITTEE FOREIGN POLICY INFORMATION

No. 3 Series



64

S E C R E T

COPY NO.       

SWNCC - FPI 3/2

14 March 1947

Pages 1 - 4 incl.

330  
JAE

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE  
SWNC SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN POLICY INFORMATION

PUBLIC INFORMATION ON ARMED FORCES IN THE  
PHILIPPINES AND RELATED MATTERS

References: SWNCC 340/1  
SWNCC 340/3  
FPI 3/1

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, FPI 3/2, approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information on 13 March 1947, is circulated for information and guidance and, where appropriate, implementation.

2. In approving this paper, the Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information agreed that under the terms of its charter, it is within the competence of the Subcommittee to direct the implementation of this program without further reference to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. It is to be implemented by the Department of State in collaboration with proper agencies in the other Departments or as otherwise specified in the body of the paper.

H. W. MOSELEY  
W. A. SCHULGEN  
V. L. LOWRANCE  
Secretariat

SWNCC - FPI 3/2

S E C R E T



SECRETE N C L O S U R ESWNC SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN POLICY INFORMATIONPUBLIC INFORMATION ON ARMED FORCES IN THE  
PHILIPPINES AND RELATED MATTERSSITUATION

1. Action by the Governments of the United States and the Philippines with regard to U. S. Army Forces and bases to be maintained in the Philippines is likely to be interpreted in many quarters as a sign that the United States is losing interest in the defense of the Philippines and in security measures in the Far East generally. Such an interpretation would alarm many elements friendly to the United States in these areas, and thus impair the United States position.

2. It is of yet greater importance for the attitude of Oriental peoples toward the United States that they understand the sincerely democratic and friendly attitude of this Government toward colonial peoples in order not to be misled by propaganda charging the United States with imperialism. The Philippines are "Exhibit A" for the United States in this respect, being tangible proof that this country really does assist dependent peoples to progress, socially and politically, toward independence and increased well-being. The considerate handling of the bases and military forces question is a further chapter in this very creditable story and should be fully used to the United States' advantage, particularly since hostile propaganda has exploited the continued presence of United States forces in the Philippines as evidence of continuing United States imperialism.

PROBLEM

3. To assure the U. S. public that U. S. defense requirements will not be impaired. To point out to the world that the withdrawal of most U. S. troops from the Philippines does not mean that the U. S. is losing interest in the Far East. To utilize the withdrawal of troops to demonstrate to the world that the increasing U. S. interest in the Far East is not based on plans of military domination, aggression or 'imperialism.'



SECRETINFORMATION THEMES

4. U. S. military activities in the Philippines are in accordance with existing U. S.-Philippine agreements and commitments, and consistent with the statement by the Acting Secretary of State.

5. The reduction of U.S. Forces in the Philippines does not jeopardize the U. S. strategic position in the Far East.

6. The War and Navy Departments have acted in concert with each other and with the State Department in determining military requirements for bases and forces in the Philippines.

7. All U. S. base requirements now or previously envisioned as being necessary in the Philippines were as agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

8. The exact size of U. S. Forces in the Philippines required to meet U.S. obligations is now under study.

9. Negotiation of the base agreement between the United States and the Philippines, as parties of equal status and comparable sovereignty, provides evidence that the United States, contrary to charges of continued manipulation, is in fact scrupulously maintaining its respect for the sovereignty of the Philippines.

a. Long before the actual formation of the United Nations, the United States has been on record as favoring the ultimate independence or self-government of dependent areas. At the United Nations Conference, the United States delegation from the beginning was outstanding in its spokesmanship of the principle of self-government for dependent areas. The proposed joint statement of the two presidents makes direct reference to the tenet of United Nations philosophy, and the reference to the mutual commitments of the two nations bears further evidence to the non-imperialistic policy of the United States in this regard.

b. The withdrawal of a substantial portion of the US Army Forces in the Philippines is another instance of the US policy of fair treatment for smaller and less powerful states. No



S E C R E T

pressure has been applied to obtain either the right to maintain bases or the right to maintain forces in the Philippines. On the contrary, the maintenance of any forces in the Philippines has been agreed to at the specific request of the Philippine Government. Not even the tie of friendship arising from a long history of friendly relations between the peoples of the two nations and from their wartime association in defense of the Philippines has been utilized to influence the Government of the Philippines in any manner.

c. The action under discussion constitutes a further step in the history of US fair treatment of the Philippines. Although the Philippines are an outstanding example of US policy toward dependent areas, it is worthy of note that US policy in regard to other areas, as illustrated by the liberation of Cuba and US insistence that all foreign countries refrain from intervention in the affairs of China, likewise affords evidence of America's respect for the integrity of smaller or less powerful nations.

10. On the other hand, the withdrawal of a substantial portion of the US Army Forces in the Philippines and the reduction in the number of bases originally contemplated does not constitute evidence that the US is losing interest in the Far East generally or in the Philippines particularly.

a. On the contrary, the United States maintains and reaffirms its concern as to the security of the Philippines as indicated by the proposed joint statement which clearly recognizes a policy of actions toward mutual protection of the Philippines and which affirms the intention of both Governments to provide a continuing review of security requirements for the Philippines

b. In the non-military aspects of US interest in the Philippines, the evidence is no less impressive. By its extensive programs of economic and technical assistance and cultural exchange, not only in the Philippines but in all countries of the Far East, the US is demonstrating its continued interest in the Far East generally and the Philippines in particular. The large scale program of technical assistance is particularly



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evident in the case of the Philippines where the terms of the Rehabilitation Act provide for a program even larger than that contemplated for the other countries of the Far East. Under the Fulbright Act, proceeds of the sale of surplus property will be devoted to educational purposes in China, Japan, and the countries of Southeast Asia, as well as the Philippines. Further, the educational and economic reconstruction program for South Korea, the US insistence on unity and independence for Korea, the large scale undertakings of the US in the demilitarization and democratization of Japan are additional evidences of the direct and continuing interest of the United States in all areas of the Far East.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

11. Approach. Information operations should take a positive, affirmative tone in accordance with broad U. S. policy established by high level statements, rather than take the form of defensive denials in response to items appearing in the press.
  
12. Information to the U.S. Public. Paragraphs 4 through 10 should be used as guidance in responses to questions at press conferences and to written inquiries, and used in the other regular media of communication to the public where appropriate.
  
13. Overseas Information. Statements made in connection with joint US-Philippines action should be carefully calculated for their effect abroad. A most important area in this regard is China, where public opinion may be expected to react to the announcement by interpreting the action as withdrawal of American interest in the Pacific. In the Philippines themselves, statements should be made with a view to assuring the people of the Philippines that the US is not withdrawing from its undertaking to assist in the mutual defense of the Philippines. In other portions of the Far East, a reaction similar to that of China may be expected, and information materials should be provided to exploit the theme of US non-imperialism and the accompanying theme of continuing US interest in the Far East.



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FPI 3/2  
14 March  
11 February 1947

Pages 1 - 4, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

SWNC SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN POLICY INFORMATION

PUBLIC INFORMATION ON ARMED FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINES AND RELATED MATTERS

References: SWNCC 340/1  
SWNCC 340/3  
**FPI 3/1**

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, FPI 3/2 approved by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information on <sup>*13 March*</sup> ~~7 February~~ 1947, is circulated for information and guidance and, where appropriate, implementation.

2. In approving this paper, the Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information agreed that under the terms of its charter, it is within the competence of the Subcommittee to direct the implementation of this program without further reference to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee. It is to be implemented by the Department of State in collaboration with proper agencies in the other Departments or as otherwise specified in the body of the paper.

H. W. MOSELEY  
W. A. SCHULGEN  
V. L. LOWRANCE  
Secretariat

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FPI 3/2

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~~SECRET~~E N C L O S U R ESWNC SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN POLICY INFORMATIONPUBLIC INFORMATION ON ARMED FORCES IN THE  
PHILIPPINES AND RELATED MATTERSSITUATION

1. Action by the Governments of the United States and the Philippines with regard to U. S. Army Forces and bases to be maintained in the Philippines is likely to be interpreted in many quarters as a sign that the United States is losing interest in the defense of the Philippines and in security measures in the Far East generally. Such an interpretation would alarm many elements friendly to the United States in these areas, and thus impair the United States position.

2. It is of yet greater importance for the attitude of Oriental peoples toward the United States that they understand the sincerely democratic and friendly attitude of this Government toward colonial peoples in order not to be misled by propaganda charging the United States with imperialism. The Philippines are "Exhibit A" for the United States in this respect, being tangible proof that this country really does assist dependent peoples to progress, socially and politically, toward independence and increased well-being. The considerate handling of the bases and military forces question is a further chapter in this very creditable story and should be fully used to the United States' advantage, particularly since hostile propaganda has exploited the continued presence of United States forces in the Philippines as evidence of continuing United States imperialism.

PROBLEM

3. To assure the U. S. public that U. S. defense requirements will not be impaired. To point out to the world that the withdrawal of most U. S. troops from the Philippines does not mean that the U. S. is losing interest in the Far East. To utilize the withdrawal of troops to demonstrate to the world that the increasing U. S. interest in the Far East is not based on plans of military domination, aggression or "imperialism."

FPI 3/2



~~SECRET~~INFORMATION THEMES

a. Negotiation of the base agreement between the United States and the Philippines, as parties of equal status and comparable sovereignty, provides evidence that the United States, contrary to charges of continued manipulation, is in fact scrupulously maintaining its respect for the sovereignty of the Philippines.

a. Long before the actual formation of the United Nations, the United States has been on record as favoring the ultimate independence or self-government of dependent areas. At the United Nations conference, the United States delegation from the beginning was outstanding in its spokesmanship of the principle of self-government for dependent areas. The proposed joint statement of the two presidents makes direct reference to the tenet of United Nations philosophy, and the reference to the mutual commitments of the two nations bears further evidence to the non-imperialistic policy of the United States in this regard.

b. The withdrawal of a substantial portion of the US Army Forces in the Philippines is another instance of the US policy of fair treatment for smaller and less powerful states. No pressure has been applied to obtain either the right to maintain bases or the right to maintain forces in the Philippines. On the contrary, the maintenance of any forces in the Philippines has been agreed to at the specific request of the Philippine Government. Not even the tie of friendship arising from a long history of friendly relations between the peoples of the two nations and from their wartime association in defense of the Philippines has been utilized to influence the Government of the Philippines in any manner.

c. The action under discussion constitutes a further step in the history of US fair treatment of the Philippines. Although the Philippines are an outstanding example of US policy toward dependent areas, it is worthy of note that US policy in regard to other areas, as illustrated by the liberation of Cuba and US insistence that all foreign countries refrain from intervention

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INFORMATION THEMES

4. ~~That~~ U.S. military activities in the Philippines are in accordance with existing U.S.-Philippine agreements and commitments, and consistent with the ~~Joint Chiefs of Staff's~~ *statement by the Acting Secretary of State*.

5. ~~That~~ The reduction of U.S. Forces in the Philippines does not jeopardize the U.S. strategic position in the Far East.

6. ~~That~~ The War and Navy Departments have acted in concert with each other and with the State Department in determining military requirements for bases and forces in the Philippines.

7. ~~That~~ All U.S. base requirements now or previously envisioned as being necessary in the Philippines were as agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

8. ~~That~~ The exact size of U.S. Forces in the Philippines required to meet U.S. obligations is now under study.



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in the affairs of China, likewise affords evidence of America's respect for the integrity of smaller or less powerful nations.

104. On the other hand, the withdrawal of a substantial portion of the US Army Forces in the Philippines and the reduction in the number of bases originally contemplated does not constitute evidence that the US is losing interest in the Far East generally or in the Philippines particularly.

a. On the contrary, the United States maintains and reaffirms its concern as to the security of the Philippines as indicated by the proposed joint statement which clearly recognizes a policy of actions toward mutual protection of the Philippines and which affirms the intention of both Governments to provide a continuing review of security requirements for the Philippines.

b. In the non-military aspects of US interest in the Philippines, the evidence is no less impressive. By its extensive programs of economic and technical assistance and cultural exchange, not only in the Philippines but in all countries of the Far East, the US is demonstrating its continued interest in the Far East generally and the Philippines in particular. The large scale program of technical assistance is particularly evident in the case of the Philippines where the terms of the Rehabilitation Act provide for a program even larger than that contemplated for the other countries of the Far East. Under the Fulbright **Act**, proceeds of the sale of surplus property will be devoted to educational purposes in China, Japan, and the countries of Southeast Asia, as well as the Philippines. Further, the educational and economic reconstruction program for South Korea, the US insistence on unity and independence for Korea, the large scale undertakings of the US in the demilitarization and democratization of Japan are additional evidences of the direct and continuing interest of the United States in all areas of the Far East.

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INFORMATION OPERATIONS

~~11. Press Engines~~  
~~6. Timing. The utmost dispatch is necessary if the first reactions of the press are to be well informed. Implementation will be synchronized with implementation of SINOC 3/10/3 or its successor.~~

~~11. Approach. Information operations should take a positive, affirmative tone in accordance with broad U. S. policy established by high level statements, rather than take the form of defensive denials in response to items appearing in the press.~~

13. ~~14.14.~~ Overseas Information. Statements made in connection with joint US-Philippines action should be carefully calculated for their effects abroad. A most important area in this regard is China, where public opinion may be expected to react to the announcement by interpreting the action as withdrawal of American interest in the Pacific. In the Philippines themselves, statements should be made with a view to assuring the people of the Philippines that the US is not withdrawing from its undertaking to assist in the mutual defense of the Philippines. In other portions of the Far East, a reaction similar to that of China may be expected, and information materials should be provided to exploit the theme of US non-imperialism and the accompanying theme of continuing US interest in the Far East.

~~12.12.~~ Information to the U. S. Public. *Paragraphs 4 through 10 as guidance*  
~~indicated in paragraphs 4 and 5~~ should be used in responses to questions at press conferences and to written inquiries, and used in the other regular media of communication to the public where appropriate.

*17. Phil. It is recommended that  
 that D issue the following press release.*

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20 March 1947

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF SWNCC 340/3

WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PHILIPPINES

Note by the Secretaries

1. SWNCC 340/3, circulated for consideration by the Committee on 20 January 1947, was withdrawn by the originators on 29 January 1947.

2. In view of the action taken by the SWNCC Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information in FPI 3/2, 14 March 1947, the directive in SWN-5016 dated 2 January 1947 is hereby cancelled.

H. W. MOSELEY

W. A. SCHULGEN

V. L. LOWRANCE

Secretariat

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SWNCC 340/3

20 January 1947

*3PI 3/1* **TOP SECRET**

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Pages 36 - 45, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PHILIPPINES

References: a. SWNCC 340/1  
b. SWN-5016 dtd 2 Jan 47

Note by the Secretaries

1. The enclosure, FPI 3 prepared by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information in response to reference b, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

2. The Subcommittee deemed it necessary to submit the paper to SWNCC because it recommends action which involves political as well as purely informational questions and thus to that extent exceeds the Charter of the Subcommittee.

3. The Subcommittee feels some action on the matter at hand is needed at the earliest possible date because distorted versions of the matter have already appeared in the Philippine press quoting a statement attributed to Romulo to the effect that the United States is withdrawing its forces from the Philippines.

4. In view of the critical urgency of the time factor the Subcommittee has requested the State Department to cable the substance of Appendix "C" to Ambassador McNutt for his information but for no action except comment. Ambassador McNutt is to be asked whether pending action by SWNCC on this matter he considers it advisable that he should make an immediate non-committal statement and, if so, to cable the text of his proposed statement for approval.

H. W. MOSELEY  
V. F. FIELD  
V. L. LOWRANCE  
Secretariat

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SWNCC 340/3

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b. SWN-5016THE PROBLEM

1. To determine appropriate publicity and informational policy to preclude any unfavorable public reaction when the information becomes general that there will be a substantial reduction of U.S. Forces in the Philippines.

DISCUSSION

2. Pursuant to the President's decision of 4 December 1946, the decision has been made to withdraw the bulk of U.S. Forces from the Philippines at an early date, leaving only small ground, air and naval forces. A number of Army contracts in the Philippines have accordingly been suspended and are being substantially revised. Consequently, the Army's reduction in forces cannot be kept from the press much longer and is presumably already the subject of local rumor. Unless this reduction in U.S. Forces is presented to the public in proper perspective from the very first, it is likely to be interpreted in many quarters as a sign that the U.S. is losing interest in the defense of the Philippines and in Far Eastern matters generally and is withdrawing from the Philippines. There is also the possibility that this reduction may be interpreted in the Philippines as an action of pique by the U.S. Government as a result of failure to obtain the number of bases which had been requested. Either of these interpretations would impair the prestige and political position of the U.S. in the Far East.

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3. The Congress of the U.S. has authorized the President to acquire bases in the Philippines for the mutual protection of the Philippines and the U.S. The Congress of the Philippine Republic has authorized the President of the Philippine Republic to negotiate with the President of the U.S. for the establishment of such bases with a view to insuring the territorial integrity of the Philippines, the mutual protection of the Philippines and the U.S. and the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. In this connection, the Philippine Government requests the retention of at least token U.S. Forces as a requirement in achieving these purposes.

4. Because of the facts as outlined above, in particular the necessity for allaying the fears and suspicions of those advocating retention of large U.S. Forces in the Philippines, as well as of those advocating complete withdrawal from the Philippines, before a distorted view of the reduction of U.S. Forces appears in the press, it is believed that the following course of action will have a beneficial effect from the informational and public relations point of view:

a. A ~~joint~~ statement (See Appendix "A") by President Truman <sup>on the day when the U.S.-Philippine Base Agreement is signed</sup> and ~~Roxas~~, summing up in general terms the mutual agreements and commitments of the two nations. Such a statement would be of assistance in assuring the U.S. and the Filipino people, as well as the rest of the world, that despite a reduction in forces in the Philippines, the U.S. has a continuing interest in the future of the Philippine Republic. Such a statement should preclude charges that the U.S. is withdrawing from the Philippines as an action of pique by the United States Government as a result of failure to obtain the number of bases which had been requested, and will also indicate that the Philippine Government desires that U.S. troops remain.

b. Press inquiries regarding such a joint Presidential statement may be expected after its issuance. The State, War and Navy Departments should base their comments on the following points:



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(1) That U.S. military activities in the Philippines are in accordance with existing U.S.-Philippine agreements and commitments, and consistent with the ~~joint~~ Presidential statement.

(2) That the reduction of U.S. Forces in the Philippines does not jeopardize the U.S. strategic position in the Far East.

(3) That the War and Navy Departments have acted in concert with each other and with the State Department in determining military requirements for bases and forces in the Philippines.

(4) That all U.S. base requirements now or previously envisioned as being necessary in the Philippines were as agreed upon by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(5) That the exact size of U.S. Forces in the Philippines required to meet U.S. obligations is now under study.

~~c. A unilateral statement by President Roxas in which he expands further on the Philippines' desire to retain U.S. forces in the Philippines and in which he may point out to the Filipino people the advantage of such retention. This statement should be discussed with President Roxas by Ambassador McNutt at the same time as he suggests President Roxas participation in the joint statement discussed in subparagraph a above (See Appendix "C").~~

*Situation*  
c. A statement issued by the War Department with regard to the Philippine Scouts so as to assure the Scouts and the Filipino people that the U.S. will fulfill its obligation to the Scouts. It is believed that this is required, even though, in paragraph 4 c of SWNCC 340/1, the War Department has been directed to prepare a detailed study of the problem of the future status of the Philippine Scouts. Such a study, however, may not have been completed by the time the publicity steps suggested above have been initiated. If

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there were not some early reassurance to the Scouts, there might be some unrest and uneasiness among them with deleterious effects on the internal politics of the Philippine Republic (See Appendix "~~B~~<sup>C</sup>").

5. It is realized that these publicity measures suggested above are largely political in nature and as such the formulation of these statements must of necessity be beyond the scope of the Subcommittee on Foreign Policy Information. In recognition of this, the Subcommittee has discussed the proposed drafts contained in Appendices "A" through "~~B~~<sup>C</sup>" informally with the representatives of the appropriate Policy Divisions of the three Departments. For the reasons stated in paragraph 2 above, it was felt that, in the interest of obtaining favorable publicity as soon as possible, the Foreign Policy Information Subcommittee should present these views to SWNCC as a matter of priority without formal reference to any other Subcommittee.

CONCLUSIONS

6. It is concluded that:

a. From the public relations and informational point of view, a ~~joint~~ statement on the Philippines should be issued by President ~~Truman and Roxas~~ along the lines of that contained in Appendix "A". *on the day the Base Agreement is signed.* The draft of this statement, along with suggestions of a unilateral statement by President ~~Roxas~~, should be discussed with President Roxas by Ambassador McNutt *in order that President Roxas may associate himself with it publicly, or make an appropriate statement of his own for the occasion, if he desires.* ~~in order that President Roxas may associate himself with it publicly, or make an appropriate statement of his own for the occasion, if he desires.~~ Appendix "C" should, therefore, be sent to Ambassador McNutt.

b. In order to effect concerted governmental comment with respect to the ~~joint~~ Presidential statements, the State, War and Navy Departments should adhere to a common viewpoint in any comments which may be made for publication in any of the Departments relative to the statement. These comments should be based on the points raised in Appendix "B".



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c. The War Department should issue a general and reassuring statement on the Philippine Scouts along the lines of Appendix "~~D~~".

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended:

a. That the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee request the State Department to <sup>take appropriate steps:</sup> ~~send the message in Appendix "C" to Ambassador McNutt as a matter of priority.~~

~~b. If a favorable response is received from Ambassador McNutt, that SWNCC:~~

~~(1) Request the State Department to take appropriate steps~~ <sup>(1)</sup> To obtain Presidential approval and issuance of Appendix "A".

~~c. (2) That SWNCC~~ <sup>(2)</sup> approve Appendices "B" and "~~D~~", and request the Departments concerned to take the indicated action.

~~c. If the reply from Ambassador McNutt is such as to preclude the implementation recommended in subparagraph b above, that SWNCC consider further action in the light of the reply from Ambassador McNutt.~~

(2) To inform President Roxas of the Presidential statement, if approved by President Truman, in order that President Roxas may have opportunity to associate himself with it or to make a suitable statement of his own on the occasion of the signing of the Base Agreement.



TOP SECRET

c. The War Department should issue a general and reassuring statement on the Philippine Scouts along the lines of Appendix "D".

RECOMMENDATIONS

7. It is recommended:

a. That the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee request the State Department to <sup>take appropriate steps:</sup> ~~send the message in Appendix "C" to Ambassador McNutt as a matter of priority.~~

~~b. If a favorable response is received from Ambassador McNutt, that SWNCC:~~

~~(1) Request the State Department to take appropriate steps~~ <sup>(1)</sup> To obtain Presidential approval and issuance of Appendix "A".

~~c. (2) Approve Appendices "B" and "D", and request the Departments concerned to take the indicated action.~~

~~c. If the reply from Ambassador McNutt is such as to preclude the implementation recommended in subparagraph b above, that SWNCC consider further action in the light of the reply from Ambassador McNutt.~~

(2) To inform President Roxas of the Presidential statement, if approved by President Truman, in order that President Roxas may have opportunity to associate himself with it or to make a suitable statement of his own on the occasion of the signing of the Base Agreement.



TOP SECRETAPPENDIX "A"JOINT STATEMENT BY PRESIDENTS TRUMAN AND ROXAS

The war in the Pacific has confirmed the mutual nature of the interests of the United States and the Republic of the Philippines in matters relating to the defense of the two nations. The Congresses of the two nations have recognized this fact in formal resolutions authorizing arrangements for the mutual protection of the United States and the Philippines. Pursuant to these resolutions, discussions are now in progress designed to effect such arrangements, consonant with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and based on the fundamental principle of the sovereign equality of the two countries as Members of the United Nations.

Both countries are committed, by virtue of membership in the United Nations, to work for the maintenance of international peace. This commitment is being taken into full account in the arrangements under discussion. These discussions envisage the provision of military advice and assistance by the United States Government to the Philippine Government, and the provision of a small number of bases by the Republic of the Philippines, to be manned by a small number of United States forces. This will allow the greater part of the United States forces now in the Philippines to be withdrawn, in keeping with the desire of both Governments to reduce their wartime military establishments to a peacetime basis.

It is contemplated that the two Governments will keep under continuous review all aspects of the requirements for mutual protection so that the United States forces stationed in the Philippines may be kept to a size commensurate with these requirements.



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APPENDIX "B"

GUIDANCE FOR GOVERNMENTAL COMMENT TO THE PRESS ON THE ~~JOINT~~ PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT

Press inquiries regarding the ~~joint Presidential statement~~ *statement by the Secretary of State*

may be expected by the State, War and Navy Departments. The Departments will base their comments on the ~~following points~~ *which are set forth in paragraphs 4 through 10.*

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Appendix "B" /



TOP SECRETAPPENDIX "C"SUGGESTED TELEGRAM FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
TO AMBASSADOR McNUTT

Following approved by SWNCC for transmission to you:

The suspension and imminent material revision of base contracts, as well as possibility of leaks upon resumption of base negotiations, assure that reduction of U.S. military forces in Philippines will soon be subject of public speculation in both countries and world. Adverse criticism and propaganda attacks anticipated unless true facts and motivating principles are publicly stated beforehand.

Therefore, series of two or three public statements is proposed to set whole matter in proper perspective, forestall attacks and turn situation to U.S. and Philippine advantage. First would be joint Truman-Roxas statement at earliest possible date. Text suggested and approved here is:

(Appendix "A")

To assure coordinated governmental press comment State, War and Navy Departments will be guided by the following:

(Appendix "B")

It is assumed that publicized misinterpretations of projected move would be as harmful to interests of Philippine Government as to U.S. U.S. recognizes handling of publicity this matter equally important to Philippine Government, hence suggests joint statement and wants be assured that further press comment along the lines indicated meets needs and has full approval Philippine Government.

You are authorized discuss entire subject with Roxas including suggested texts, ascertain his comments or suggestions. Appreciating Roxas cooperation heretofore, in your discretion you might suggest Roxas could well capitalize on many elements of situation in statement issued shortly after joint Presidential



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statement. He could point out inter alia success his administration carrying out terms Philippine Congress resolution 4, forecast in general terms that number and location U.S. bases will be in accordance Philippine views, and bluntly state that presence and number U.S. forces in exact accord Philippine wishes to which he has found U.S. made no objection.

For your guidance, in return for maintaining troops in Philippines and to justify this to economy-minded Congress and to U.S. and foreign publics, public statement is needed from Roxas that Philippine Government wants and requests presence of U.S. forces.

U.S. feels statements should be made soon as possible. Realize you must handle project delicately to avoid giving impression to Philippine negotiators that U.S. is under compulsion hurry base negotiations for its own reasons. However, reduction in number of bases and fact that U.S.-Philippine Governments would be equally vulnerable unfavorable publicity seem reasonable grounds for action. Your comments on project and possible effects on negotiations urgently requested.

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Appendix "C"

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRETAPPENDIX "D"<sup>c</sup>PROPOSED PRESS RELEASE TO BE ISSUED BY  
THE WAR DEPARTMENT

The recent ~~joint~~ statement by <sup>the Sec of State</sup> ~~President Truman and President Roxas~~ with respect to the reduction of U.S. forces in the Philippines has raised a question as to the future of the Philippine Scouts. The U.S. Government will meet its obligations to the Philippine Scouts who have enlisted in the U.S. Armed Forces. The Philippine Scouts is an old organization with an excellent record. The question of its future status is receiving the close attention of the War Department.

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Appendix "D"<sup>c</sup>TOP SECRET