

- acts in the Japanese occupied zone. Merger between "Chu-Rensha" or the Central Associated Press and "Chu-Ka-sha" or the Central China Press will be arranged some day later; subsequently a new press agency will be established by the Central Government itself. Foreign Press agencies will then be allowed to conclude contracts with such a governmental machinery which may be called the Central Press Agency.
3. The question of the Central Associated Press: The new Central government will in line with the policy of the 'Reformed Government' give guidance and assistance to the Central Associated Press just as has heretofore been done by the latter government, and establish by bringing forth a merger between the Central China Associated Press and the Central China Press a new press agency, namely the Central Press after inauguration of the new government.
4. The question of the Central China Press' opening its office in Nanking. We do not see the need of opening a branch or a subordinate machine in Nanking by the above press agency since the merger between the Central China Press and the Central Associated Press has been already decided. Until such merger is put into effect, the Central Associated Press will give us their cooperation in the whole field of our operations.

5. Problem of our cooperation with "Domei". We will avail of the relation existing between Domei and the Central Associated Press, who have so far been collaborating one another.

Domei will, after the inauguration of the Central Press, be parted from the Central Associated Press, and its shape be so modified as would permit it a close collaboration with the Central Press Agency. Until the date when the Central Press Agency is opened to business, the Nanting Domei will continue to undertake the job of circulating "the Central China Press News".

6. The Problem of a central broadcast station.

7. The Problem concerning the existing broadcast station.

With regard to these two items, the Wang side will use the radio installation which is at present being managed and operated by the Army Press Section, and the latter will give the Wang side the fullest possible convenience in this connection. It will therefore not be necessary for the Wang side to establish a new central broadcast station itself right now. As to the broadcast facilities located in Central China, North China and South China, the Army Press Section will control these so that they will relay the broadcast by the Wang block. For this purpose, we will name a person and put him on a post to take charge

of the broadcast originating from the Wang Block, starting from Feb. 12 and let him keep contact with the Chief of the Broadcast Dept. of the Army Press Section direct.

The current broadcast facilities which are situated within the battlefields are the systems installed by our Army to cover the strategic requirements. The Wang side fully admits the fact the importance of these installations for our military operations still persists; while the Army Press Section will permit the Wang side to utilize them to the extent that it will not jeopardize our military operations and maintenance of the public order.

8. The Problem of examining newspapers, postal matters and Telegrams. The censorship has so far been and is still being conducted by the Army through various reasons connected with the military operations as well as with the maintenance of the public order. It is a matter of course that the central government, when founded, should undertake the job of censorship. The Army, however, in view of the present status, acutely feels the need of conducting the examination itself too from its own viewpoint for maintenance of the public order. We should like to add that the censorship of anti-Japanese press news and reports in the true sense of the term can be effected only by Japanese.

9. Problem of examining newspapers, press reports, radio broadcast, films and phonograph records inside the International Concessions:

On occupation of Shanghai and its vicinity, the Japanese Army Press Section took over the Nationalist Government's examining office located in the International Concession, and has since been undertaking the job of examining. In future, this is to be done by the new government. There is, however, a need of practising the censorship by the hands of the Army itself from the viewpoint of maintenance of public order while the warfare is under way, and thus the Army finds it necessary to take part in the matter of examining these for the time being just as is described in the Paragraph 8. The Third Countries are adhering to our censorship just because they admit the strategic standpoint of our Army. The Central Government, when inaugurated, will have to conduct the examination until further in cooperation with the Army Press Section.

10. Problem of Slogans: We feel it necessary to go over the slogans which have heretofore been employed by both the Japanese side and the old government. For example, such words like 'Overthrow of the Party', "Party's armed forces", etc. are to be discarded. The Wang side will also make positive efforts in the way of forging out and spreading some touching slogans for the cause of the anti-Comintern and

the peace-making in the International Concessions and the rest of the country.

11. The question of Publicity Organ in North China.

12. The question of Publicity Organ in Wuchang and Hankow.

The Wang side is now studying these points, and we expect to discuss them sometime later.

13. The question of extending the circulation radius of "Chinca Nippo" or the Central China Daily. We know that there were some instances in the past where the circulation of the paper was impeded or suspended in some parts of North China and Central China. This, however, was due to some frictions in feeling or due to the fact that the subject matters contained therein were found by the Japanese Army as inadequate.

We see in this respect the need on the part of the Central China Daily of being a little more careful. The Japanese Army Press Section has no idea at all to limit the circulation of this newspaper as long as it gives no undesirable reports.

Furthermore, the Army Press Section has no objection to the intention of the said paper's opening a branch in Nanking.

14. Problem of Kwangchow Broadcast Station: a Kwangchow journal, viz. "Chuzan Nippo" has a radio broadcast system at its disposal, but a part of its operation, namely its transmission service has so far been and is still being

suspended by the Japanese Expeditionary Force in South China. The Army Press Section will, in this connection, communicate with the South China Expeditionary Force and see to arrange things so that this system can resume its full operation.

15. The question of Propaganda upon the Third Countries: under a close cooperation between Japan and China, both sides will carry out a coordinated propaganda. For this purpose, we will put Tong Liang-li on the post for taking charge of the overseas propaganda, and let him keep a close contact with Lt. Colonel Saito of the Army Press Section.

16. The relation between the Central Government and the Nationalist Party after the inauguration of the Central Government. The Nationalist Party has at present its own publicity organ; whereas the Central Government will create a propaganda section for itself. The publicity activities of the Nationalist Party will in future be placed within the framework of policy of the Government's Propaganda Section. Radio broadcast and press reports will accordingly be put under control of these authorities. As regards newspapers, the largest proportion of which will be placed under the control of the Government, while the Nationalist Party will retain some papers for itself.

17. As regards the fundamental problems confronting with both countries in the field of radio broadcast, films, etc. we

We will leave things as they are until further, and expect to discuss on these aspects sometime later.

/ AKITA /

XVI

~~What is the meaning?~~  
Draft drawn by the "Koa-in"

The Important points of the Premier's Speech <sup>regarding</sup> the new Central Government. (At the secret conference.)

The Japanese Government thinks it important to establish a new central government in order to dispose of the Incident.

1. Destruction of the Chanking Government.

2. Increase of the Japanese defensive power.

3. Establishment of the foundation of the activity of the Japanese in the continent. (The new government will be the foundation.)

The Claims made by the Japanese Government to China.

1. Political, diplomatic, and cultural matters.

2. Japan's superiority in local districts.

3. Economical Cooperation

a. Through out the Chinese country

b. In Mongolia and Kiangsi.

c. In north China

d. The lower stream of the Yungtzi-kiang.



XVI

Outline of the Premier's speech to be made  
at a secret meeting regarding the question of  
the central government.

Draft drawn by the Asia Development Board  
Feb. 1940

In November last, the attitude of the Japanese  
government toward the new government in China  
was decided at a "Koa-in" conference, and  
later on 30 December Wang Ching-wei and our  
representatives finally came to an agreement.  
The provisional government in North China and  
the restoration government in Central China showed  
the Japanese influences too clearly so that they  
did not rapidly fuse into Chinese community.  
Therefore, we needed a new government which had  
a stronger influence and was run by the Chinese  
themselves. Wang Ching-wei parted with Chiang as  
early as in 1912 and although they joined hands  
at the beginning of the incident, they were again  
separated due to the difference of opinions and  
Wang Ching-wei came to cooperate with Japan.  
The private agreement of the 30 Dec. had, as its  
<sup>main</sup> objective, the establishment of a new government,  
and it did not lay the foundation for the final treaty between  
Japan and China.

2/1  
The Japanese who carried on negotiations had in mind the following points.

- 1) To strengthen the Empire's national defensive power and the self-defensive power of East Asia.
- 2) To establish the foundation for the development of the Japanese people in the continent. (Relations with the third powers must be taken into accounts)
- 3) In order to establish <sup>and cultivate</sup> the new government ~~and~~ the political influences of its central figures must be increased.
- 4) To weaken and destroy the Chungking regime.
- 5) Not to bring about drastic change and disturbances to the Japanese who are now active in the continent.

Important results to be obtained through carrying out the private agreement.

1. Regarding politics, diplomacy and culture
  - 1) Recognition of the Manchurian Empire
  - 2) cooperation in the respective field of

3/

- diplomacy education, propaganda and culture.
- 3) Cooperation in defence against Communism outside of military matters.
2. Regarding local special position
- 1) Comprehensive special position of Inner Mongolia
  - 2) Special position of North China in connection with national defence and important economics.
  - 3) Special positions of special cities of Shanghai and Amoy regarding administration and economy
  - 4) Special position of Hainan Island and other islands in its vicinity regarding strategy and exploiting natural resources.
3. Regarding military affairs  
Omitted for the sake of military secret.
4. Regarding economic cooperation
- A. Items covering entire China
- 1) aviation
  - 2) Exploitation and utilization of certain resources necessary for national defence.

4/

3) main marine transportation along the coasts.

4) Enforcement of pro-Japanese policies regarding tariff and clearance.

5) Employment by the central government of financial, economic, technical advisers of Japanese nationality.

B. Items concerning Inner Mongolia cooperation in ~~the~~ every and all fields of economy.

C. Items concerning North China

1) Railroads.

2) management of communication (with the exception of wire telegraph)

3) Exploitation and utilization of specific ~~survived~~ resources — especially of those necessary for national defence.

4) Joint management of specific businesses necessary for national defence.

5) Cooperation regarding economic administration of North China political committee.

5  
D. Items concerning lower valleys of the Yang-tze

1) Japanese-Chinese co-operation in trade, finance, industry and transportation.

2) Employment of Japanese technicians and technical advisers in establishing new special city of Shanghai.

14  
IX  
Main points of the Plans for newly adjusting  
the Japanese-Chinese Relations (Draft)

Issued from the Cabinet's  
Information Section  
in January 1940

Policies in adjusting Sino-Japanese relations are  
agreed upon by both Japanese and Chinese  
political agents at Shanghai on 30 Dec 1939.  
The Imperial government ~~will~~, with the co-operation  
of the ~~national~~ central government, will  
decide the time and terms of the readjust-  
ment of Sino-Japanese relations.

(1) Fundamental principles in readjustment

With the establishment of new order in East Asia  
as ideal, and the restoration of peace in Orient  
as objective, Japan, China and Manchukuo will  
unite themselves as good neighbors in the  
common cause. The following is the  
basic items to be observed.

1. Friendship and mutual good will, common defence against communism and economic co-operation must be established.
2. Setting up of a specific area ~~where~~ in North China and Inner Mongolia, where we closely cooperate in the fields of national defence and economy. In Inner Mongolia especially a special district should be set aside for our joint military and political co-operation.
3. Realization of close economic collaboration in the lower valleys of the Yangtze.
4. Realization of close military collaboration on designated islands on the South China coast.
5. Regarding concrete expression of the above-mentioned principles, we will later conclude treaties.

2  
(2) Concrete principles regarding readjustment  
I. Good will and friendship  
Japan, Manchukuo and China will respect the  
inmate characteristic of ~~each~~ <sup>one</sup> another, maintain  
Oriental peace through mutual co-operation.

1. China will recognize the Manchurian Empire.  
Japan will respect the territorial integrity  
and the independence of sovereignty and  
there will be a new relationship between  
the three powers.
2. Japan, Manchukuo and China will, in the  
fields of politics, diplomacy, education,  
propaganda and trading, exterminate  
the measures and causes that may destroy  
the mutual good will.
3. Diplomacy will be on the foundation of mutual  
co-operation.
4. Japan, Manchukuo and China will work  
together in uniting, creating and developing  
cultures of the three nations.
5. When the good neighborhood relationship  
is established, Japan will deliberate on  
on returning settlement and extraterritorial  
to China.



**II. Common defence against communism.**

1. Japan, Manchukuo and China will remove communists and their organizations in respective country and will work together in getting informations and making propaganda against communism.
2. Japan and China will cooperate with each other in driving away the Comintern. ~~to~~ ~~the front~~ Japanese troops will be stationed in areas necessary for the execution of the common cause.
3. Japan and China will co-operate in maintaining ~~the~~ public peace and order.
4. according to a separate agreement, ~~Japan~~ China will comply with Japan's demand ~~concerning~~ military necessities regarding railway, aviation, correspondence, <sup>main</sup> stationing ports and watercourses in the area and in the areas connected with it. Japan will, however, respect China's rights of administration and management in peace time.

(Note. Item 2, 3, 4 are military secret, and, if disclosed, will have bad effect upon China's internal policies. Handle with care)

### III Economic cooperation

In order to effectuate the co-prosperity and the common defence against communism, Japan, Manchukuo and China will closely co-operate with one another, balancing merits and demerits and ministering to one another's wants

1. Regarding specific natural resources especially those necessary for national defence, Japan and China will work together in exploiting them ----- and as for their utilization, special convenience should be afforded to Japan ----- in North China and Inner Mongolia
2. Regarding industries in general, Japan will give necessary aids to China according to the agreement concluded between Japan and China.
3. Japan will give necessary aids to China in establishing her financial and economic policies. (Especially in establishing new central banks and issuing new currency.)
4. Concerning trade, we will esteem one another's interests and tariff autonomy, and will adopt appropriate tariff rates and clearance, thus developing general commerce between the three countries as well as facilitating and rationalizing demand and supply of

6/ commodities between Japan, Manchuria and China (especially North China), without disturbing each self-supply.

5. Japan will give necessary aid and co-operation to China—regarding the development of transportation, communication, atmospheric science and mensuration in China.
6. Japan will give necessary aid and co-operation to China—in establishing new Shanghai.

#### IV

1. according to a separate agreement, China will employ advisers and staff of Japanese nationality in businesses requiring Japanese-Chinese co-operation.
2. Japan will cooperate in giving relief to Chinese afflicted people who suffered in the incident.
3. China will make reparation for the loss of rights and interests suffered by the Japanese nationals staying in China since the outbreak of the incident.

Wang Ko-min IV.

and Ota

KITA (AKITA /  
general)

Wang versus Kita Shanghai Parley on the  
question of creating a new central government  
(Jan. 17-19, 1940).

Principally between Wang and Kita among those who joined  
this conference were discussed the details concerning the  
rule which governs the process of founding the North China  
Political <sup>affairs</sup> Commission, a regional administrative machine  
which has the seat of its activity in Peking and also  
the functional boundary of the above administrative body  
in relation to the Central Government.

The Article 11 of this rule covers the military unit  
known as Sui-Ching Corps which is put under control of  
the above regional government for maintenance of the public  
order in North China. As to the shape in which this  
military unit has to reshuffle, the Chief Executive of the  
above Commission and Wang Ching-wei were then scheduled  
to have discussions between them before the Central Political  
Council is convened as to the substance of its structure, the  
size of its troops, and also as to whether this unit should be  
organized as an army corps or in the form of a police  
force.

In the course of the 2nd session of the above parley, Wang

took up the question of relationship between the Central Government and the Regional Government, which constitutes the Item # 1 of the secret understanding concerning the adjustment of the Sino-Japanese relations. Wang, in this connection, questioned whether the Honan Province shall be placed under the direct control of the Central Government. Ota, in response, assumed <sup>him</sup> in the affirmative, adding as to the time when would this be put into effect, <sup>that</sup> this should not necessarily coordinate with the enactment of the rule covering the process of founding the Political Affairs Commission in North China.

As to the military unit under control of the above commission, Wang expresses his view as his private, and not official, opinion that its headquarters might better be set up in Tientsin or in Peking instead of in Peiping.

Between Wang and Kita as well as Ota was also discussed the question, among others, of adjusting the relation between the Central Government and the Regional Government in North China, principally with regard to the rule which covers the process of founding the latter establishment. Kita presenting to Wang a draft program in this connection stated that in case Wang finds any major alterations desirable, such points might better be discussed between Wang and Wang J-tang, giving Kita an earliest possible advice thereof.

These men also had a preliminary discussion on the Central Political Council scheduled to convene in Tientsin shortly.

As to Chi Hsieh-yuan, a Chinese general, Wang <sup>Ko-min</sup> ~~Ching-wei~~ stated that he would prefer this senior military man being placed either to the post of Chief to the Central Military Headquarters or to the head of an establishment which takes charge of the public order within the structure of the Political Affairs Commission in North China on a full time basis instead of his taking up these two offices concurrently.

On the occasion of the 3rd session of the Parley took place on Jan. 19th, Chi Hsieh-yuan, Wang Ko-min and several other prominent Chinese politicians took up for discussion the draft program for formation of the Central Political Council, the problem of adjusting the Sino-Japanese relations, the question of tax reform with reference to the revenue of the regional government in North China, etc. They also touched upon the problem of Inner Mongolia. They agree in that Inner Mongolia is still far way off from the state of being a full-fledged independent state, and on this ground they consider that this region might better be placed under the jurisdiction of the North China Political Affairs Commission.

The attached represents a passage, followed item by item, of the talks had between Wang ~~Chingwei~~<sup>Ko-min</sup>, Kita and Ota when these persons met on Jan. 17.

Session 1 of Jan. 17, 1940:

Ota: The document handed over to you contains, among others, one item with the heading: "Secret Understanding concerning the rule which governs the set-up of the Political Affairs Commission in North China". We have now supplemented an additional item thereto, namely Paragraph 3, which please note.

Wang: with regard to the boundary within which this North China Administrative Body can practise its function, the meaning of the words "its characteristic feature" is rather ambiguous. Does it mean that the regional government can take up whatever measure which it may deem fit within the scope stipulated in a rule which the Central Government may set forth? With regard to the rules of the Central Government, I have a question: whether do they mean the "central regulations" promulgated by the former Nationalist Government, or whether the regulations enacted by both the former and the new governments are to be construed as coming under this heading.

Ota: In principle, by "the central regulations" are meant the rules which have so far been set forth by the Nationalist Government. It is, however, arranged that any of these rules which proved to be against the interest of Japan or to be a stumbling block on the way towards Sino-Japanese cooperation shall be modified to the extent as would suffice. As to the regulations enacted by the Interim Government, it is our idea to leave them as they are for the time being, so that the Central Government may later modify them from the view point of cooperation between the two nations. With regard to the characteristic feature of the regional government in North China, this point is described in the rule which governs the set-up of this administrative structure as well as in the basic principles for adjustment of the Sino-Japanese relations under the heading: "jurisdictional boundary of North China".

Kita: The relationships between the interim government and the central government is indicated in Paragraph 1 of the Secret Understanding.

Wang: I notice that two types of Commission, i.e. Economic Commission and Public Order Commission are referred to at the bottom of Paragraph 6 of the rule governing the



set-up of the Regional Government in North China but to nothing else. In other words, <sup>only</sup> these two are the commissions contained therein, but no more. What is the real significance of this?

Ota: The proposition which I put forward on the occasion when I tripped over to Shanghai in December last was to set up Education Dept., Home Dept., Public order Dept., and Finance Dept within the structure of the Interim Government. Major General Kagesa advocated to it; whereas Mr. Wang opposed to this idea on the ground that considered from the view point of unity of the whole China this is not advisable since the Central Government has mechanisms known by the term: Department, whereby if this idea is followed, the provincial government too would engage some persons who are to head the "Departments". Thus, in order to meet Mr. Wang in this respect, we gave up our idea to create mechanisms of such set-up, and as an alternative we established two administrative machines <sup>each</sup> with the title of "Commission", charged with the task of undertaking the constructive economic measures and the affairs of public order, which are considered by Mr. Wang's group to be the administrative mechanisms of paramount importance as far as North China is concerned. It appears that in Mr. Wang's

opinion, the supreme structure among various offices of government is the "Department", while the Commission comes to the next, this followed by the "Board of General Affairs" and other subordinates.

Wang: If we take up the form of Commission, there must be a personnel in the form of Committee to operate it. Otherwise we can hardly call any administrative machine as Commission. In other words, chairman alone can constitute no Commission; thus we must get a group of men who can take the post of committee.

Kita: We may then call the head of the Department of Industry as the chairman of the Economic Commission instead.

Wang: Legal Department should after all be put under control of the Central Government.

Kita: Yes. This mechanism might better be created inside the General Affairs Board.

Wang: If we open a Legislation Bureau, such mechanism may become a body which studies and examines and analyses laws and regulations. Such structure may be engaged in the job of law- and regulation-making, but we should not expect it to control or lead the process of judiciary.

Ota: In those days when the Chi-Tsa Interim Administrative Commission existed, all the administrative affairs had been attended by this administrative establishment as far as the regions included in its jurisdiction are concerned. Similarly, the Regional Government of North China should have been allowed to undertake all the aspects of administrative duty for North China, Shantung Province, Shansi Province and the Special Cities. Mr. Wang's side, however, opposed to this idea, maintaining that the activities of such administrative structure must be confined to the field of anti-Communist measures, maintenance of public order and provincial economy. Mr. Wang's side seemed to be difficult to permit such establishment to take care of the whole field of administration. Thus, we have compromised to the extent that the North China Regional government can take up anti-Communist measures, maintenance of public order and provincial economy, and in addition any other administrative jobs in the shape that it undertakes such duties authorized by the Central Government. The idea of creating an organ: Department of Internal Affairs within the structure of the Regional Government met an objection through the reason that this would trespass the administrative right of the Central Government.

Wang: The administrative duties authorized by the Central Government are described at a later passage. Are you referring to those?

Ota: Yes.

Wang: I wonder if the Kuomintang Government would wield its sway over <sup>the people of</sup> these three provinces direct in future.

Kita: It is arranged that any order which the Central Government may issue comes forward only through the Regional Government.

Wang: Now I wish to refer to the Article 3. According to this article, the Chief Executive of the Regional Government controls the administrative jobs of this government. In order that we can retain a harmony with the Chinese traditional usage, this article should go further, prescribing that the Chief Executive of the Regional Government shall have the authority to supervise and control the whole personnel of the government.

Kita: Have you ever had a chance to go over the basic program for founding a central government, in connection with which a conference is now scheduled to be met in Tsingtao shortly? I believe there is no material difference between this and the one produced earlier.

Wang: I agree with you. I do not want to do a great deal to meddle in the matter of the Central Government at this moment.

Kita: Have you read the program of the Nationalist Government?

Wang: Yes, I read it.

Kita: Now, putting aside the regulation for formation of the provisional government, how do you find the program for formation of the Central Political Council, and also the draft regulation for formation thereof? I believe that these are almost the same as the previous ones.

Ota: I find that they remain almost unchanged. The only difference I find in the latter document is that that part of the earlier draft which reads "during the training and edificational period" has now been replaced by the phrase "during the period of preparation for the constitutional administration".

Kita: I will check these up once again tomorrow. I believe that there is no material difference in opinion except on the rule for formation of the Regional Government in North China. At our next meeting tomorrow, I will pick up what parts of the draft program are desirable for improvement.

/AKITA/

over—

19 Dec. 1939

III // IV  
II To Nomura, Foreign Minister

From Okazaki, Consul General

at Hongkong

Mr. Takeuchi heard from a certain quarter that the Hongkong Government would sell the arms (1000 revolvers and 60 machine guns) that it had confiscated from a German merchant there in near future. He ordered a certain person of his side to gain my assistance in order that he might buy the above said arms <sup>under</sup> the name of a Japanese and send them to Taiwan, for under a Chinese name he could not buy them unless he obtained the permission of the Chungking Government. But I have always been requesting the Government to be neutral and neither to sell nor transport arms to the Chungking Government. Therefore it is not proper to buy arms (except for police) at Hongkong and I told Mrs. Takeuchi that I couldn't comply with her husband's asking. <sup>the necessity of</sup> Being not satisfied with my reply, she frequently sent a messenger to me saying that <sup>the necessity of</sup> obtaining arms would be more keenly felt, that buying so many arms at a time would be more difficult and that as the Chungking Gov. wanted the arms, Japan must hinder Changkai-shek from acquiring them.

It seems to me that there is no need of altering my principle for the purchase of such <sup>a small</sup> number of arms and that it may bring<sup>a</sup> bad effect on the Japan-French Indo-China conference.

Mrs. Takeuchi's frequent requests make me ask your instruction, in spite of me.

on 29 Dec 39.

III, Telegram from <sup>Minister KATO</sup> ~~Counsel General~~ at Shanghai to Arita  
Jute. Three Japanese Lieutenant Generals, Hoshashi, Fujita and Wirono met a certain influential person of WANG's side.

The generals said, that Japan would not <sup>be able to</sup> ~~put an end to~~ <sup>put an end to</sup> the war unless peace be made between Japan and Chungking <sup>even</sup> if the WANG's Government be established, that <sup>it was only because</sup> Japan did not wish to have a <sup>direct</sup> negotiation with Changkai-shek on peace that WANG came forward, that if WANG cooperates with Chang for peace overture, Japan would have no objection to it.

III

Japanese Minister to Shanghai, Kato's cable #ju/80 of December 29, 1940, sent to Foreign Minister Arita.

The cable in question reads in part as follows:  
 "On December 29th "Ho-Ki-Min", the Chief of the Preparatory Committee of the "Koa-Ken-goku Undo" or the Asia Development and State founding Movement" heard from Tang, member of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang Party headed by Wang a confidential information that when Tang recently met Lt. Generals Dobashi, Fujita and Hirose et al, these generals stated that in the light of the status in which the Wang group stands now, the warfare might continue still further as long as Wang could bring forth no peaceful solution with the Chungking block even when a new central regime came into being.

—OVER—

/ Referring to the Index, Item III, I find that no definite date is given in the cable in question as to when the talk between Tang and the Japanese generals had taken place

— AKITA —



1/7 I ~~II~~

Maruyama

1. [Japan's] Guiding Principle of the [Chinese] Central Political Conference. (Decided at the Koa-in conference / Nov / 1939)  
The object of this conference is to organize the central government. In order <sup>to</sup> attain this object, the following points must be considered. (Page 16)

- (1) Before the conference be opened, the principal members of the new government must thoroughly understand Japan's claims and must <sup>so</sup> arrange that no contradiction will exist between Japan's claims and China's decisions.
- (2) The Central Political Conference must adopt the Japanese plan <sup>as the basis of</sup> establishing the central government.
- (3) The important points of China's arrangements must be settling its political sphere, deciding its policy against Chungking, regulating army, raising money, inviting influential members, especially from the Chongking Government, by undermining it, the chief members of which being WANG CHIN-WEI (as centre), WU PEI-fu and other members of the already established governments.
- (4) The time of the establishment of the new government must be decided by the Sino-Japanese conference, according to the progress of the preparations and consideration of the whole affairs.

→ The name, capital and national flag will be decided according to the pre-arranged policies.

(5) The new Government's political programme and policy must include the principle of regulating the relations between China and Japan, acknowledgement of existing facts and other claims of Japan. They must not contradict with the above mentioned Japanese claims.

(6) The abolition of the names of the existing governments, and matters regarding autonomy of local districts, and local political system must be based upon the "Principle of Regulation Of The Relations Between The New Central Government And The Existing Governments"

(8) The principal members of the New Government must promise Japan to perform the items of the annexed document 4, regarding the regulation of the new relations between Japan and China, soon after the Central Political Conference and before the establishment of the Government.

(9) The common welfare and prosperity of Japan, Manchukuo, China and the third powers must be respected and promoted, but the third powers must acknowledge the existence of special affairs during the Incident. According as the affairs gradually improve, the interests of the third powers will be respected more and more till <sup>the third</sup> powers perfectly comply with the <sup>char-</sup>

Four documents are attached to this one, available of which on the next page

Attached document No 4

1. Regarding Shanghai, Tsintao and Amoy, they must recognize that these districts are special administration districts.
2. at Hai-nan Island, local administrative organization directly under the central government will be

attached document I

Items to be decided upon at the central Political conference.

The new central government will consist of the nationalist party, existing regimes and other parties, and, if possible, the Chungking government.

attached document II

Items to be understood as Japan's demands.

- 1 adjustment of relations between the Federal autonomous government of Mongolia
- 2 adjustment of relations between the provisional government and the new central government.
- 3 adjustment of relations between the restoration government and the new central government

attached document III

- 1 Mongolia will be recognized as highly autonomous area.
- 2 North China will be administered by North China political commission and military affairs transaction organization.
- 3 Central China. The new central government will take over the restoration government realizing closer economic collaboration between Japan and China.

4. Amoy will be recognized as special administrative district

5. Hai-nan Island will be governed by the local administrative organization directly under the central government (with the military affairs transaction organization attached)

attached document IV

Items to be pledged by the constituents of the new central government before the said government comes into existence.

1. Relations between Japan and China shall be readjusted according to the "main points of the plans for newly adjusting the Japanese-Chinese Relations" (Item IV of this file)

2. Specified situations arose during the incident will be recognized as established facts.

1. The leading main points of the Central political Conference. (Regarding the establishment of the Chinese new central government, in 1939)
2. Telegram from consul-general at Hongkong to the Foreign Minister
3. Telegram from Minister at Shanghai to the Foreign Minister
4. Interview of both Wang Ko-min and KITA (called governor) Gen. General concerning the problem of establishment of the Central government.
5. Main Managements relating the establishment of the Central government. (1940)
6. A control for the movement opposing to the establishment of the new regime.
7. Telegram from ~~the Foreign Minister to the~~ ~~legation in China,~~ regarding the Hongkong's paper, Daikoho's exposure of the establishment of the new central regime.
8. Telegrams and newspaper clippings regarding the letter of both Kao Tsung-wu and Tao Hsi-sion
9. Main points of the adjusting plans of the diplomatic relation between Japan and China.

and in other parts  
of the world

10. Reports from the legations in China relating Wan Ching-wei's deeds exposed by Chinese papers. (~~Dem of fundit~~)
11. The drafts of answers in case foreign military officers interrogate about the establishing movement of the central regime, by the War Office.
12. Report from the <sup>consulate</sup> ~~legation~~ at Suchow to the Foreign Minister regarding the intentions of Chinese representatives for the establishment of new regime.
13. The main points of explanation of the problem of the central regime at the meeting with leaders of all political parties.
14. ~~The main~~ <sup>duplicate of item 8</sup> plan to adjust the diplomatic relation between Japan and China -  
Telegraphic reports regarding the new central government.
15. Comments of home and foreign people and conditions of watching, for the Ching-Tao Conference
16. The gist of the Prime Minister's explanation concerning the problem of the central regime. (The secret conference)
17. Reports from the legations at Hankow <sup>regarding</sup> to the Foreign Minister relating the recent

movements of Nanjing citizen for the establishment of the Central regime. <sup>and other telegraphic report.</sup>

(18) The essential points of the plans of propaganda in parallel with the central governmental conference, by the information division of the Japanese despatched <sup>Japanese</sup> army in China.

(19) Secret telegram by the chief of the general staff, about the central governmental conference.

20. records of the Shanghai conference.

21. Draft of the part of China of the simultaneous declaration.

(22) The organization of special corps belonging to the new central regime.

→ Various telegrams including a document about 40000000 Yen loan to the new central government.

by KOIZUMI



7/

(ctd)

21. "Koa-in" 's decision regarding the loan to the Wang's government made on 19 Feb. 30.

Draft of the Premier YONAI's speech concerning Wang's declaration which is to be made before the central political conference is opened.

Draft of the guiding principles regarding the new central government's treatment of the national flag, Kuomintang and Sun Yat-sen's three principles on Democracy.

Item 22 Telegram from Tientsin to Tokyo regarding the organization of special corps belonging to the new central regime, and a telegram from Changchiakow regarding the background of the Mongolian delegates to the central conference.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1814-F

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, URABE, Katsuma ----- hereby certify  
that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the  
following capacity: Assistant Chief, Archives Section, -----  
----- FOREIGN MINISTRY -----

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto  
attached consisting of two -- pages, dated 19, February, 1949 and  
described as follows: THE TERMS OF A LOAN OF FORTY MILLION YUAN  
FROM THE YOKOHAMA SPECIES BANK TO THE NEW CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.  
(The decision of the China Affairs Board Conference)

I further certify that the attached record and document is an  
official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part  
of the official archives and files of the following named ministry  
or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any,  
or any other official designation of the regular location of the  
document in the archives or files): Archives Section,  
----- Foreign Ministry -----

Signed at Tokyo on this  
18th day of September, 1949.

K. Urabe  
Signature of Official  
SEAL  
Ass't Chief, Archives Section  
Official Capacity

Witness: J. Sato

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Henry A Dolan, Jr, hereby certify  
that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme  
Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification  
was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese  
Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this  
18th day of September, 1949

Henry A Dolan  
NAME  
Investigator  
Official Capacity

Witness: J. J. Murray

證明書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 號  
國際 檢察 部 第 號

典據及ビ公正ニ關スル證明

余、浦部勝馬ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省  
文書課長代理トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ル  
モノナルコト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラ  
レタル、貳 頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十年ノ昭和  
十五年ノ二月十九日附、下記題名、即チ横濱正金銀行  
ヨリ新中央政府ニ對スル四千萬元貸付ノ條件ノ文書ノ  
保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。  
余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及ビ文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類  
及ビ綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。(若シアラバ綴番號又  
ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名  
稱ヲモ特記スベシ)

千九百四十<sup>七</sup>年ノ昭和二十二年ノ九月十八日

東京ニ於テ署名

當該官吏署名欄 浦部勝馬

右ノ者ノ公的資格外務省文書課長代理

證人 佐々武五郎

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ハ、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官總司令  
部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、竝ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ  
余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタ  
ルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十二年ノ九月十八日

東京ニ於テ署名

氏名欄

右ノ者ノ公的資格

證人

Henry J. Park  
R. H. Sanki

Doc. 1814-7

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1814 B

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, URABE Katsuma hereby certify  
that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the  
following capacity: Assistant Chief of the Archives,  
Section, Japanese Foreign Office

and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto  
attached consisting of 1 page, dated Jan. 8, 1940 and  
described as follows: MANAGEMENT POLICY FOR THE ESTABLISH-  
MENT OF THE NEW CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OF CHINA. ( Decided  
at Cabinet Meeting. January 8, 1940 )

I further certify that the attached record and document is an  
official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part  
of the official archives and files of the following named ministry  
or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any,  
or any other official designation of the regular location of the  
document in the archives or files): \_\_\_\_\_

Foreign Ministry

Signed at Tokyo on this  
18th day of Sept., 1948.

Witness: J. Sato

K. Urabe  
Signature of Official

Ass't, Chief, Archives, Sec. SEAL  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, HENRY A. DOLAN, JR., hereby certify  
that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme  
Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above certification  
was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese  
Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at TOKYO on this  
18<sup>TH</sup> day of SEPT, 1948

Witness: J. J. Munson

Henry A. Dolan, Jr.  
NAME

Investigator, I.P.S.  
Official Capacity

Doc. 1814-B

證明書

「ワシントン」文書局 第 號  
國際 檢 察 部 第 號

典據及び公正ニ關スル證明

余、浦部勝馬ハ余ガ下記ノ資格ニ於テ、即チ外務省  
文書課長代理 トシテ、日本政府ト公的關係ニ在ル  
モノナルコト、竝ニ該官吏トシテ余ガ茲ニ添附セラ  
レタル、壹 頁ヨリ成ル、千九百四十年ノ昭和  
十五年ノ一月八日附、下記題名、即チ支那中央政府  
樹立ニ關聯スル處理方針（昭和十五年八月）ノ文書ノ  
保管ニ任ジ居ルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

余ハ更ニ添附ノ記録及び文書ガ日本政府ノ公文書ナ  
ルコト、竝ニ右ガ下記名稱ノ省又ハ部局ノ公式書類  
及び綴ノ一部ナルコトヲ證明ス。（若シアラバ綴番號又  
ハ引用、其ノ他公式書類又ハ綴ニ於ケル該文書ノ成規所在ノ公式名  
稱ヲモ特記スベシ）

千九百四十年ノ昭和二十二年ノ九月十八日

東 京 二 於 テ 署 名

當該官吏署名欄

浦 部 勝 馬

右ノ者ノ公的資格外務省文書課長代理

人 坂 本 武 五 郎

公式入手ニ關スル證明

余、ハ、余ガ聯合國最高指揮官總司令  
部ニ關係アルモノナルコト、竝ニ上記題名ノ文書ハ  
余ガ公務上、日本政府ノ上記署名官吏ヨリ入手シタ  
ルモノナルコトヲ茲ニ證明ス。

千九百四十六年ノ昭和二十二年ノ九月十八日

東 京 二 於 テ 署 名

氏 名 欄

右ノ者ノ公的資格  
人 R. H. Davis

Doc No. 1815

6 April 1946

STATEMENT OF MRS CHOW PAO YIN

24 Shio CHEN Niu Hsiang NANKING

I am native of the city WHACHING, but lived in NANKING in December 1937. About the 15th of December 1937 a group of Japanese soldiers, numbering five, came to my home for purpose of searching for Chinese troops. They found none, and departed. A little later three other Japanese soldiers came, one of them handed an arm band to my husband and asked him to attach it to his arm. He did so, but unknown reasons the Japanese soldiers laughed at him, and one of them suddenly fired a shot, which struck him in the throat, and killed him instantly. They then departed. The four small children of ours were in the room. Their ages were 11, 9, 5 and I was pregnant. The arm band had a Rising Sun insignia. I do not know why they killed him. I am now a widow. The soldiers laughed when they killed my husband both before and after he was shot.

My children and I were eye witnesses to this.

Henry Chiu has translated this and this Statement is correct.

WITNESS:

Thomas H. Morrow

J. J. Crowley

Signed by  
Jaya print