

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Senator Ferguson
The Chairman

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General Marshall: I do not recall, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: What is the date of it?

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General Marshall: It is "CRO 222". I haven't the key
to interpret it, and I do not know what it is.

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Senator Ferguson: Is there anything on it indicating
that it came in on the 5th?

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General Marshall: It says "Date time group CRO 222".

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(11)

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Senator Ferguson: I will try to find that out from
another witness, as to the time. If it came on the 5th should
it have come to you as information?

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General Marshall: I presume it probably would have.

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Senator Ferguson: That is all I have.

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The Chairman: Does counsel wish to ask any questions?

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Mr. Mitchell: I think not.

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The Chairman: General, I wish to ask you just one or
two questions.

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In military circles, and especially in high ranking
military circles, is there such identity of meaning between
the word "sabotage" and an order to engage in general re-
connaissance as would lead an officer to misinterpret or
confuse the meaning of those two terms?

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General Marshall: I do not think so.

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The Chairman: In this photostat that was read yesterday,
which seems to be undated, but must have been prior to June 24,

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: The Chairman

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C. PHOTOGRAPHY

1940, in which the Chief of Naval Operations advised the Commander in Chief United States Fleet, who was Admiral Richardson at that time, that "Reliable sources presistently report any movement in force by major Fleet unit toward Atlantic will occasion extensive sabotage in Canal", that would mean that any movement of large portions of the Fleet through the Panama Canal?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: And in order to test that Admiral Richardson was ordered to pretend that he was starting towards the Panama Canal and let it be known that he was, and that that leak or rumor would not be denied by high authorities, and presumably he did go on out for two days as if he was headed for Panama and then turned back.

Do you know whether, as the result of that, there was any sabotage in Panama?

General Marshall: I have no recollection of any sabotage. Incidentally, I do not think it appeared in the record yesterday--

The Chairman: How is that?

General Marshall: Incidentally, with regard to that message, I do not believe it appeared in the record yesterday that the note at the bottom, when carefully translated, dated the 20th of June, states "Shown to General Marshall. He sent msg. to Canal Zone." This is the message from me to

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: The Chairman
Mr. Mitchell

2 the Canal Zone, "Fleet may proceed to Atlantic possibility
3 sabotage continue alert accordingly."

4 The Chairman: In the message intercepted, on page 154
5 of this Exhibit 1, which is the message from Togo to Washington,
6 to the Japanese Ambassador, this language is used:

7 "In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplo-
8 matic relations), and the cutting off of international communi-
9 cations, the following warning will be added in the middle of
10 the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast."

11 That is cutting off any sort of communications, private
12 or otherwise, by any means?

13 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

14 The Chairman: In the case of those conditions, this
15 Winds message would come, "East Wind rain", and so forth,
16 were the conditions under which that message was to be im-
17 plemented ever fulfilled by the breaking off of diplomatic
18 relations or severing communications up until the attack?

19 General Marshall: Not to my knowledge.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Just a moment, please. I said I had no
21 more questions, but I remember that one of the interested
22 officers has asked to have five questions submitted to the
23 General. I think I ought to take the time to ask them.

24 Have you seen this request?

25 General Marshall: What is that, sir?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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Mr. Mitchell: I will hand it to you.

General Marshall: Do you wish me to proceed with it?

Mr. Mitchell: Read the first question there, General.

General Marshall: This is:

"Memo for Mr. Mitchell.

"Subject: General Marshall.

"In addition to the matters mentioned in my previous memo dated 3 December 1945, I suggest the following questions for General Marshall. I believe that point 1 and 10 of the previous memo have been sufficiently covered.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C. NOTED IN DRAW

Witness Marshall Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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1. The tentative SOP of 14 July, 1941, copy of which I handed you yesterday, to show 3-alert system was known in War Department."

I assume that is a question to me: Was it known in the War Department.

Mr. Mitchell: Yes. Before you answer it, I will have marked as Exhibit 64, the Standing Operating Procedure that General Short had submitted under date of July 14, 1941.

I might shorten the matter by explaining that that was not the one that was in effect on December 7.

General Marshall: That particular paper SOP of the 14th of July, came to my attention not through the operations section, and I do not know whether they ever received a copy of not, but from General Arnold, the Chief of the Air Force, who took exception to a portion of the Standing Operating Procedure as to the employment of numbers of the ground forces in the Air Corps in connection with the operating procedure in case the command was put on the alert.

He states:

"This memorandum provides, page 4, paragraph 14d(8) and (9) as follows:

"(8) Release to Department Provost Marshal a provisional battalion of four companies totalling 500 men, to

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 assist Auxiliary Police Force when necessary."

3 I have knowledge of that, and it is shown in my letters
4 to General Short on the subject. I wrote to him in regard
5 to that, at the request of General Arnold, and got his
6 views as to the use of these men, and then replied as to
7 my vinal views. That is the extent of my recollection of
8 the alert message, but General Arnold transmitted to me the
9 entire message, the Standing Operating Procedure.

10 Mr. Mitchell: That consideration of Exhibit 64 came
11 up in connection with the question of using air force men
12 for guard duty that you testified to before?

13 General Marshall: Yes, sir, and it is covered in my
14 correspondence to General Short.

15 Mr. Mitchell: I call your attention to the fact that in
16 that document, on page 3, there is Alert No. 1, which he
17 proposed to establish.

18 General Marshall: Alert No. 1.

19 "Alert No. 1 requires the occupation of all field posi-
20 tions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu
21 and the Army installations on outlying islands."

22 Mr. Mitchell: Now, Alert No. 1 was an all-out alert?

23 General Marshall: That is not quite all.

24 "b. The Hawaiian Division (s) (less detachments)
25 attached 298th Infantry will;

"(1) defend Oahu;

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

"(2) be responsible for all military traffic regulations except in the area" -- and so forth.

Mr. Mitchell: That is an all-out alert?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: It was there in that document, Alert No.

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General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: Will you please turn to page 5, I think it is, and find what Alert No. 2 is at the bottom of the page? Maybe I got the page wrong, not having it before me.

General Marshall: "Alert No. 2.

"a. Alert No. 2 is applicable to a condition not sufficiently serious to require occupation of field positions as in Alert No. 1, but does require the availability at all times of 50 percent of all troops, either in garrison or in the field, and the guarding of important installations."

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Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Mitchell: Will you stop there, General. Does guarding of port and installations include a sabotage protection?

General Marshall: I would assume so.

Mr. Mitchell: Then turn to the bottom of page 5 and you have Alert No. 3.

General Marshall: "Alert No. 3 is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the Islands, with no particular threat from without."

Mr. Mitchell: Now, General Gerow has testified that the operating order that was in force on December 7, 1941 was an order made November 5, 1941, which is in evidence as part of Exhibit 44, and that exhibit has the numbers of the alerts reversed. That is to say, with the No. 1 Alert, which is the all-out alert, in the document you saw, becoming No. 3 Alert under the new system. And General Gerow has explained that that final order of November 5 never reached the War Department until after the 1st of January 1942.

Does that conform with your recollection as to the second document or have you anything on that?

General Marshall: That was what I was told, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: If the report from General Short had said Alert No. 1 or No. 3 without having the existing order number of the alert before you, you couldn't have told what he referred to or if you had gone back to Exhibit 64 you would

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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2 have had the wrong number, would you not?

3 General Marshall: That evidently would have been the
4 case.

5 Mr. Mitchell: If the report of November 5, the operating
6 order of November 5, had been in the War Department, had been
7 transmitted to the War Department by General Short, and you
8 had had before you his existing numbers to identify his alerts,
9 and the report had said, "I put in Alert No. 1", "Alert No. 3",
10 you would have had a definite way of ascertaining just what
11 he did, would you not?

12 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Will you please read the second question
14 there.

15 General Marshall: "What were the instructions of the
16 Staff Duty Officer in the Office of the Chief of Staff, 27
17 November to 6 December, 1941, and how much did he know about
18 the alert status overseas and the importance of incoming
19 messages."

20 Mr. Mitchell: How would you answer that?

21 General Marshall: I would say that any instructions
22 were to the Secretary of the General Staff to see that there
23 was someone on duty there who could get in touch with the
24 proper people in case of anything of importance and to see
25 that I was informed of anything of sufficient importance to

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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come to my attention. What the exact arrangements were I never went into because I had confidence in Colonel, now General, Smith and his assistants, particularly Colonel, now General, Dean, who were the Secretary and the First Assistant Secretary of the General Staff. Just what their detailed arrangements were I do not know.

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Mr. Mitchell: Was there a 24-hour service there?

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General Marshall: There was.

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Mr. Mitchell: What is the third question?

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General Marshall: "Could not a message similar to that of June 17, 1940, have been told to Short over the scrambler phone on December 7, without stating anything that would compromise our crypt analytical systems."

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Possibly that might have been done. I would have to analyze that. Possibly it could have been done.

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Mr. Mitchell: The fourth question.

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General Marshall: I might say that the message that we endeavored to send was a very clear statement of the case.

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Mr. Mitchell: I think the fourth question, about General McNarney, has already been answered.

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General Marshall: "Was not General McNarney assigned to War Plans Division on his return to Washington on December 15, 1941,***"

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He was already a member and had been since 1939, though

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

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he had been in England since the previous April.

"*** and during the time that he was sitting with the Roberts Commission supposedly investigating the Pearl Harbor attack and the question of responsibility both in Washington and in Hawaii?" And I think I am accurate, did not sit in the War Plans Division after he proceeded to England in April, 1941, and on his return he was merely carried that way. There was no change until he was made Deputy Chief of Staff.

I testified he was brought back for a specific purpose, borrowed by the Pearl Harbor Board and returned to that service, which was itself an independent agency, directly under me, for the entire reorganization of the War Department.

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Hook follows

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I don't think the record
3 shows who is asking those questions.

4 Mr. Mitchell: It was the counsel for General Short
5 that asked me to submit those questions to General Marshall.
6 That is all.

7 The Chairman: The Chair wishes, on behalf of the com-
8 mittee, to thank you, General Marshall, for your patient
9 cooperation in attempting, so far as you have been able
10 to reveal the facts involved in this investigation.

11 I am sure the committee wishes for you, on your new
12 mission, as high a degree of success as you have received
13 in other fields. We wish for you a safe journey, and as
14 prompt return as possible, and the greatest possible success.

15 The Chair would like to say personally that if after
16 you get to China, you discover that you cannot successfully
17 cultivate your Leesburg farm from Chungking and need a
18 good farm-hand, the Chairman of the committee feels that by
19 spring he will be available.

20 (Laughter)

21 General Marshall: Thank you very much.

22 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, might I ask about two ques-
23 tions of General Marshall, before concluding?

24 The Chairman: Go ahead.

25 Mr. Keefe: General Marshall, in the testimony which you

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1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 gave in the secret report under date of Monday, August
3 17, 1944, on page 18, General Russell asked you this ques-
4 tion:

5 "In this letter of February 7, General, the statement
6 is made by you to General Short that 'the risk of sabotage
7 and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by
8 submarine constitutes the real perils of the situation.'

9 "Did anything that occurred between the date of this
10 letter of February 7, 1941, and the attack on Pearl Harbor
11 on December 7, 1941, cause you to change in any way that
12 estimate of the situation in Hawaii?

13 "General Marshall. Nothing occurred."

14 General Marshall: That is correct. That is still my
15 view.

16 Mr. Keefe: Now, this morning and yesterday, you testi-
17 fied that sabotage was practically never mentioned in re-
18 gard to Hawaii in 1941, and that the whole emphasis was on
19 air attack. Did I so understand you?

20 General Marshall: You did.

21 Mr. Keefe: My question then is, if the whole emphasis
22 was on air attack, would not the reply of General Short to
23 your alert message, where he says "Department alerted against
24 sabotage," certainly tend to challenge the attention of any-
25 body in the department?

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 General Marshall: It did not, sir.

3 Mr. Keefe: Now, when you say that sabotage was practi-
4 cally unmentioned during the year 1941, I have read the
5 exchange of letters between Secretary Stimson and Knox,
6 and your letter which I have quoted from of February 7,
7 1941, Exhibit 53, and then in Exhibit 59, in this paper
8 that is entitled "Aide Memoire," -

9 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: You stated specifically, or it is stated
11 specifically:

12 "In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected
13 and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage. On
14 this account, and in order to assure strong control, it
15 would be highly desirable to set up a military control
16 of the Islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement
17 in the Far East."

18 General Marshall: I recall that.

19 Mr. Keefe: Then you are familiar with the fact that
20 the Joint Army-Navy Agreement out at Pearl Harbor or at
21 Hawaii had allocated the anti-sabotage defense to the Army?

22 General Marshall: I am familiar with that.

23 Mr. Keefe: That is true, is it not?

24 General Marshall: That is true.

25 Mr. Keefe: That was in 1941, wasn't it?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And that the Army and the Navy and the FBI had made extensive arrangements apportioning the responsibility as to sabotage and subversive activities all through 1941?

General Marshall: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And you are familiar with the fact that on November 27 and 28, 1941, the War Department, through its various agencies, sent three separate warnings to Hawaii emphasizing the danger from sabotage and subversive activities, all of which came to Short's attention after he had sent his message "Department alerted to prevent sabotage"?

General Marshall: I am aware of that, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Then there was a flow of information coming to Short during 1941, and especially in the latter part of November, 1941, other than from you as Chief of Staff, advising him as to the necessity for alert against sabotage, was there not?

General Marshall: Prior to November 27 or 28, I think the correspondence between myself and General Short gives the emphasis I indicated on air and submarine attacks. He was not appealing to be about sabotage. He was appealing to me to help him in this, and emphasizing the necessity

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 for assistance relating specifically to the defense
3 against air attack.

4 Mr. Keefe: I wanted to get this in the record, and
5 call attention to those specific exhibits.

6 General Marshall: Those are correct.

7 Mr. Keefe: That is all.

8 Senator Lucas: Just one statement, Mr. Chairman,
9 before we recess.

10 General, I want to concur in what the able Chairman of
11 this committee has said, with the exception that I hope
12 General Marshall doesn't take his bid to go on the farm
13 too seriously, because we can ill-afford to lose him here
14 in the Senate.

15 The Chairman: Thank you very much.

16 (Witness excused)

17 The Chairman: We will recess until 2 o'clock.

18 (Whereupon, at 12:45 o'clock p. m., the committee
19 recessed until 2:00 o'clock p. m., of the same day.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

General Miles.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL SHERMAN MILES -- (Resumed)

The Chairman: The Chair thinks that Senator Ferguson was examining General Miles when we suspended with him yesterday and, therefore, the Senator may proceed.

Mr. Mitchell: I would like, in closing up General Marshall's testimony, to verify the fact that several exhibits are in evidence.

The Chairman: Very well.

Mr. Mitchell: There was a joint memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, to the Special Naval Observer, London, and the Special Army Observer, London, on the subject, "Comment on the report of the American-Dutch-British conversations."

General Marshall read a part of it. I suggest handing it to the reporter and letting the whole document be transcribed in the daily transcript.

The Chairman: That will be done.

(The document referred to above is as follows:)

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 Op-12-VED
2 (SC)A16-1/RF13-13
3 Serial 075112

SECRET

4 SECRET

July 3, 1941

5 From: The Chief of Naval Operations, and
6 The Chief of Staff, U. S. Army

7 To: The Special Naval Observer, London.
8 The Special Army Observer, London.

9 Subject: Comment on the report of the American-Dutch-British
10 Conversations, Singapore, April, 1941. (Short title
11 "A.D.B.")

12 Reference: (a) United States - British Staff Conversations,
13 ABC-1.

14 1. You are directed to advise the British Chiefs of
15 Staff that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of
16 Staff regret that they are unable to approve the subject
17 report, because in several major, as well as numerous minor,
18 particulars, it is at variance with reference (a).

19 2. The major differences between the two reports may
20 be summarized as follows:

21 (a) The Singapore report contains political
22 matters which must be omitted from this military
23 agreement. The Chief of Naval Operations and the
24 Chief of Staff are unable to recommend approval, as
25 being beyond the scope of their authority, such poli-

1 tical proposals as are contained in paragraphs 6, 8, 25,
2 26, 27, and 78. These should be taken up by the
3 political departments of the governments, should these
4 departments deem it possible to arrive at definite
5 agreements.

6 (b) The scope of the naval strategic matters
7 discussed is too broad. The Singapore report aims to
8 set up a new intermediate command not envisaged by ABC-1.
9 The "Eastern Theater," and the "Commander in Chief, Far
10 Eastern Fleet," though not mentioned in ABC-1, form the
11 basis for the naval strategic concept in the ADB Report.
12 Under ABC-1, the United States proposed to commit its
13 Naval forces in the Far Eastern Area, except such forces
14 as were operating in the defense of the Philippines, to
15 British naval strategic direction only for employment in
16 the Far Eastern Area. The United States has not agreed,
17 and does not at this time propose to agree, to enter into
18 any commitment for the employment of the naval forces of
19 the U. S. Asiatic Fleet in areas outside of the Far Eastern
20 Area, except as to limited operations having a direct
21 relation to those in the Far Eastern Area. Should it be-
22 come necessary in the future to retire from that area,
23 further plans may then be concerted. This subject is dis-
24 cussed in detail in a subsequent paragraph.

25 (c) There is apparent a failure by the Delegates

1 to appreciate the great strategic importance of holding
2 the Netherlands East Indies, and particularly Sumatra and
3 Java, and preventing enemy use of _____ and Loubok Straits.
4 It will be impossible to hold Singapore if these Dutch
5 Islands are captured by Japan.

6 (d) At British insistence during the ABC conversa-
7 tions the following was inserted in paragraph 11 (b) of
8 the Report:

9 "A permanent feature of British strategic
10 Policy is the retention of a position in the Far
11 East such as will insure the cohesion and security
12 of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of
13 its war effort."

14 In other exchanges during the ABC conversations the British
15 Delegates emphasized repeatedly their view that the reten-
16 tion of the general line of the Malay Barrier was vital to
17 the continued security of the United Kingdom itself. Never-
18 theless, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of
19 Staff note in Appendix 1 of the ADB Report that, of forty-
20 eight British naval vessels available in the "Eastern
21 Theater," only three British vessels are to operate in the
22 vicinity of the Malay Barrier. No British vessels whatso-
23 ever are committed to the naval defense of the Barrier
24 against Japanese naval forces advancing southward, nor to
25 offensive operations designed to close the passages of the

1 Barrier to the passage of Japanese raiders. All British
2 naval forces are assigned to escort and patrol work, most
3 of them at great distances from the position which the
4 British Chiefs of Staff have asserted to be "vital". It
5 may be pointed out that the naval defense of this position
6 is entrusted, by the ADB Report, solely to United States
7 and Dutch forces. Even the British Force II would not be
8 placed in a position to operate offensively. It would
9 only be during Phase II, which contemplates sending a
10 strong British Fleet to the Far East, that British naval
11 forces would be employed in a manner which might support
12 the defense of the Malay Barrier. Since the eventual
13 despatch of a strong British Fleet to the Far East is
14 considered problematical, the Chief of Naval Operations
15 and the Chief of Staff advise you that, until such time
16 as a plan is evolved whereby British naval forces take a
17 predominant part in the defense of the British position
18 in the Far East Area, they will be constrained to with-
19 draw their agreement to permit the United States Asiatic
20 Fleet to operate under British strategic direction in that
21 Area.

22 (e) The ABD Report contravenes the agreement
23 set forth in paragraph 14 (f) of the reference. The Chief
24 of Naval Operations cannot agree to permit aviation forces
25 of the United States Navy to operate for other than naval

1 purposes, or to be placed under other than naval command.
2 It is particularly important, in the case of a naval force
3 of inferior strength, to have available naval aviation
4 units which are well trained in naval operations.

5 (f) After conclusion of the ABC conversations the
6 Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff advised
7 the British Chiefs of Staff of their desire that, as soon
8 as practicable, delegates be assembled in Singapore for
9 the purpose of drawing up a practical operating plan for
10 the Far East Area in accordance with the ABC agreements.
11 Their view was that a plan should be gotten ready for
12 immediate use in case of eventualities. The report of
13 ADB conversations cannot be considered as a practical
14 operating plan. In it, proposed United States operations
15 in the Philippines are clearly outlined. Dutch plans are
16 fairly definite. British plans may be approximately deduced
17 only from the deployment proposed in Appendix 1. There is
18 no strategic operating plan set forth for operations in
19 common by the three Powers involved. The ADB Report
20 cannot take the place of such a plan, and the opinion
21 is entertained that, until such a plan is drawn up,
22 the cooperative effort of the Associated Powers in the
23 Far East Area will be largely ineffective.

24 3. The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of
25 Staff can see no particular advantage in establishing the

1 "Eastern Theater." and appointing a new British Commander
2 termed the "Commander in Chief, FAR EASTERN FLEET." It is
3 suggested that the same purposes could be served by giving
4 appropriate authority to the British Commander in Chief, China,
5 and have that officer, familiar with the general situation,
6 continue to exercise direction even after the arrival on that
7 station of additional British naval forces. It is agreed
8 that there is no objection to giving this officer general
9 strategic control of the various British naval stations in
10 the Indian Ocean and the China Sea, but the establishment of
11 an officer in a superior echelon, in command of all is con-
12 sidered of questionable value. The Chief of Naval Operations
13 and the Chief of Staff are disposed to discuss this matter
14 further, if so requested by the British Chiefs of Staff, but
15 question the present utility of such discussion, in view of
16 the length of time before it would be practicable to establish
17 such an office.

18 4. Details of the subject report which either vary
19 from ABC-1, or appear to be unacceptable for other reasons,
20 are indicated below. The numbers referred to are the
21 paragraph numbers of the report.

22 3 (a): The operating plan should be confined
23 to the plan for the Far East Area, rather than for the
24 "Eastern Theater."

25 4: This paragraph does not give sufficient

1 emphasis to the security of the Dutch position, nor to
2 the necessity for the greatest possible degree of offen-
3 sive operations. Attention in this connection is invited
4 to the naval tasks set forth in paragraph 35, Annex 3, ABC-1.
5 It is not agreed that Japanese expeditions against the
6 Netherlands East Indies can be outflanked from Luzon if
7 such expeditions go south via the protected line of the
8 Pelews. This latter remark applies also to paragraph 13.

9 13: As indicated in previous correspondence, the
10 usefulness of HongKong depends on its ability to contain
11 Japanese blockade forces, as that base is unlikely to be
12 usable for naval base purposes.

13 17: The opinion is held that, if the Pelews line
14 of southward movement is taken by the Japanese, the early
15 capture of Borneo and the northern line of the Dutch
16 Islands is essential to a serious Japanese attempt against
17 Java.

18 29: With respect to strengthening the defenses
19 of Luzon, the conference apparently failed to give appro-
20 priate importance to paragraph 13 (d) of reference (a).
21 Because of the greater needs of other strategic areas,
22 the United States is not now able to provide any con-
23 siderable additional reenforcement to the Philippines.
24 Under present world conditions, it is not considered
25 possible to hope to launch a strong offensive from the

1 Philippines. The United States is taking steps to
2 strengthen the defenses of the Philippines through im-
3 proving the quality of native troops, and by providing
4 additional modern material.

5 32: This subject was discussed during the ABC con-
6 versations, and decision reached to forego inclusion of
7 it in the report, as the right is sovereign. Reference
8 to it should be omitted from the ADB Report.

9 35: (last subparagraph) - The establishment of a
10 combined staff, (presumably for all Services and all
11 Powers), in Singapore is not considered advisable, there
12 being no agreement, nor possibility of agreement, for a
13 single commander of all of the military forces of the
14 Associated Powers. Appropriate liaison should, of course,
15 be established. Existing liaison for the purposes
16 indicated is considered adequate, so far as the United
17 States is concerned.

18 38 and 39: These paragraphs cannot be accepted
19 as to United States naval aircraft, for the reason given
20 previously.

21 41: This paragraph should be omitted as it has
22 already been covered by reference (a). It differs in
23 certain respects from that reference. The United States
24 does not agree that the United States Pacific Fleet
25 must under all circumstances be equal in strength to

1 the Japanese Fleet.

2 42: The matter of cooperation in the Tasman Sea
3 between the United States Pacific Fleet and the British
4 Naval Forces has been clarified in other correspondence.

5 45 and 46: This is not in accord with ABC-1, which
6 requires that the Associated Powers, except in an emergency,
7 will exercise command over their own forces. United States
8 Naval Forces would not be "released" to British operation,
9 in the sense in which paragraph 46 is construed, but would
10 be assigned appropriate strategic tasks, derived from those
11 listed in ABC-1, under the strategic direction of the
12 British Commander in Chief, China.

13 47: As previously indicated, the small part which
14 is proposed for British Naval Forces in the Far East
15 Area is not acceptable. This and succeeding paragraphs
16 should be clarified.

17 53, 54 and 55: Since this plan should apply
18 particularly to the Far East Area, the details listed
19 in these three paragraphs cover too wide a scope.

20 57: This paragraph seems rather indefinite.

21 61, 62, 63, and 64: It is suggested that reference
22 to Phase II might be omitted from the present considera-
23 tion, since plans as to operations in that Phase must
24 necessarily be highly speculative at this time.

25 Appendix II: United States naval aircraft should

1 be listed under the United States Asiatic Fleet.

2 Subparagraph (d) is not acceptable as regards United
3 States naval aviation.

4 5. If further conferences are to be held in Singapore
5 for drawing up an operating plan for the Associated Powers,
6 it is suggested that the conference would have its work
7 simplified were its deliberations to be guided by an agenda
8 which had been agreed upon in advance between the United
9 States, the United Kingdom, and the Government of the Nether-
10 lands East Indies. Therefore, you will inform the British
11 Chiefs of Staff that, after they have had sufficient oppor-
12 tunity to give further study to this matter, the Chief of
13 Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff will be pleased to
14 entertain suggestions which they may have to offer with
15 respect to such an agenda.

16 (Sgd.) H. R. STARK

(Sgd.) G. C. MARSHALL

17
18 Chief of Naval Operations.

Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

19 Copy to:

JUL 25 1941
Out OCS

20 Cincac To CNO for dispatch) Room 2055
21 Cincpac To CNO for dispatch) Serial #261
22 Comdg. Gen., Philippine Dept. Reg.No.900051,7-26-41
23 British Jt. Staff Mission in Washington

24 2 Copies to C. N. O. - Rm. 2055

25 1 Carbn cy accompanied

original to S.P.O.B. (checked him)

7-26-41

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1
2 Mr. Mitchell: Then we have another document, which
3 the reporter has -- I don't have it right now, which we
4 marked Exhibit 64, and which is a draft of a Proposed
5 Standing Operating Procedural Order made by General Short
6 and transmitted to the War Department, and which General
7 Marshall saw.

8 The Chairman: Wasn't that referred to before we re-
9 cessed?

10 Mr. Mitchell: Yes, just before, and I didn't formally
11 offer it, and would like to have the record show that it
12 is received.

13 The Chairman: It is now offered and made Exhibit 64.
14 That will be ordered.

15 (The document referred to was marked
16 Exhibit No. 64.)

17 Mr. Mitchell: There is one other thing while we are
18 on it.

19 Exhibit 13 is General Martin's study on the air defenses
20 in Pearl Harbor dated August 20, 1941. You remember that
21 is the report in which he estimated the manner of the attack
22 as being by carriers coming in to a distance of 233-odd
23 miles and making a dawn attack.

24 As part of this exhibit there should have been added to
25 it the endorsement by General Short, which we didn't get

h2

1
2 in, and I would like to have this endorsement made part
3 of that exhibit, and I will read it into the record so
4 it won't be lost again. (Reading)

"C O N F I D E N T I A L

321.1
Hawaii
8/20/41

5
6
7
8 "Basic: (Ltr. HAF, 20 August 1941, 'Study of the Air Situa-
9 tion in Hawaii.')

10 "AG 381/264 HDP 1st Ind.

11 "HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, Fort Shafter, T.H.,
12 August 1941. To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces,
13 Washington, D. C.

14 "I concur in this study.

(Signed) "Walter C. Short

"WALTER C. SHORT
"Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
"Commanding

15
16 "3 incls (dup).

"X 381 (General
&
Hawaii

17
18
19
20 "Sept. 8, 1941 To AWPD.

21 "Jan. 30, 1942. Recvd. back from AWPD for file in Air AGO.

22 "11 March 44. To Classified Files for file

23 (*)

321.1 Hawaii

24
25 (*) (Illegible)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

381-Hawaii-(2)-B-

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1
2 The Chairman: It has been read into the transcript
3 and is made a part of Exhibit -- what exhibit is that?

4 Mr. Mitchell: Exhibit 13.

5 The Chairman: Exhibit 13.

6 All right, Senator Ferguson.

7 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire whether the
8 minutes of the Joint Board, about which so many questions
9 were asked, was made an exhibit?

10 Mr. Mitchell: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Murphy: What number is it? I can get it later.

12 Mr. Hannaford: Exhibit 62, Mr. Murphy.

13 The Chairman: That is all?

14 Mr. Mitchell: That is all.

15 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

16 Senator Ferguson: General Miles, did you hear all of
17 of General Marshall's testimony? Were you here during
18 his testimony?

19 General Miles: I was present during General Marshall's
20 testimony; I heard most of it.

21 Senator Ferguson: Were you familiar with the fact that
22 the code had been broken in Portugal, it had been deciphered
23 there, and the Japs got on to the idea that we had broken
24 their code, were you familiar with that fact?

25 General Miles: No, sir. The first time I knew of

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 that was when I heard it in this room, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: Of course, you weren't with the
4 services at that time?

5 General Miles: I was not what?

6 Senator Ferguson: Were you with the Intelligence De-
7 partment?

8 General Miles: I believe that was after I was relieved
9 of G-2.

10 Senator Ferguson: Did you consider that the War Depart-
11 ment was responsible for breaking the code, that this
12 country was able to get magic --

13 Mr. Keefe: Before he answers, Mr. Chairman, will the
14 gentleman yield?

15 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

16 Mr. Keefe: Just so that I might be clear, in response
17 to the question asked with respect to breaking the code
18 in Portugal, I understand the testimony was there had been
19 a raid by the Office of Strategic Service, or somebody
20 under some other Intelligence Service, and that they obtained
21 certain codes over there in Portugal, but that there was
22 no evidence of an actual breaking of the code; am I right?

23 Senator Ferguson: That would give us the information
24 by which we could break it.

25 Mr. Mitchell: No.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h5

1
2 Senator Ferguson: That particular code.

3 Mr. Mitchell: The record shows, it is in the letter
4 from General Marshall to Governor Dewey, where General
5 Marshall states that the OSS had broken into the Japanese
6 Legation in Portugal and had there gotten hold of the
7 Japanese Military Attache's code.

8 When the Japs found out that we had seized their
9 attache code, they stopped using it, and the new attache
10 code hadn't yet been deciphered. That is the exact state
11 of the evidence.

12 Senator Ferguson: You mean we were never able, General,
13 to decipher the new code?

14 Mr. Mitchell: The letter that General Marshall wrote,
15 which is the only evidence on the subject, is that for at
16 least a year after that incident, the United States was not
17 able to crack the Jap military attache code. He said so
18 in his letter. There has been no proof as to when we sub-
19 sequently succeeded.

c3
20 Senator Ferguson: At least, General Miles, you have
21 no knowledge on that subject?

22 General Miles: I had no knowledge on that subject.

23 Senator Ferguson: Who was responsible and in what
24 department was he for actually breaking the code, the
25 Japanese code?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h6

1
2 General Miles: The Signal Corps, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: Who should get credit for that?

4 General Miles: General Mauborgne, Chief Signal Officer,
5 up to, I think, the summer of 1941, was intensely interested
6 in it. He directed all of the operations. His interest
7 stimulated his men. I think he should have great credit
8 for it.

9 Of course, he was not himself a cryptographic expert.

10 Senator Ferguson: Is there any cryptographic expert
11 who should get credit for breaking it? Is there any parti-
12 cular individual that should be credited with breaking
13 this code?

14 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I would like to know whether
15 that has anything to do with the inquiry, and whether it
16 should be spread on the record.

17 The Chairman: The Chair can't answer that question.
18 He doesn't know the answer.

19 General Miles: I do not know. I wouldn't be able to
20 give you that information.

21 Senator Ferguson: It was the War Department that actually
22 was responsible and should get credit for doing it?

23 General Miles: It was a joint operation, War and Navy
24 Departments, Senator. I am only speaking for the War Depart-
25 ment side.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h7

1
2 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever see the message that
3 came from Batavia in relation to the wind code message?

4 General Miles: May I see it, sir? I think it was on
5 the table this morning.

6 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Mitchell, do you have it?

7 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Greaves has it.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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3 Senator Ferguson: It is in Secret Navy testimony and
4 I think the date would be on the previous page, General.

5
6 General Miles: I do not recall at this time having seen
7 that message, Senator.

8
9 Senator Ferguson: Now, that is a different interpreta-
10 tion than what you had placed on the original two messages.
11 This was a severance of relations, was it, or what was your
12 interpretation? It is in exhibit 1.

13
14 General Miles: Yes, sir.

15
16 Mr. Gesell: Page 154.

17
18 Mr. Mitchell: That is the translator's interpretation.
19 I don't know as it is the General's.

20
21 General Miles: I do not know that we put any particular
22 interpretation on it other than the ordinary English language,
23 Senator. We had these two messages which were translated.
24 I had no doubt as to the accuracy of the translations and
25 gave them the interpretation which the English words would
convey.

26
27 Senator Ferguson: Well, now, one of them says, "When
28 our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous." The other
29 one reads, "In case of emergency", but the interpretation
30 given by the Dutch was, "Decision of war."

31
32 General Miles: Yes, sir, I noticed that.

33
34 Senator Ferguson: Do they mean the same things, our

Witness Miles

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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translation and theirs?

General Miles: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, will you look on the page before and see whether that refreshes your memory as to when you got that message? It is addressed to you, is it not?

General Miles: Yes, sir, from Thoro to Miles.

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Miles: I cannot find here any indication as to when it was received.

Senator Ferguson: Well, when was it sent?

General Miles: But the time "Group CRO" --

Senator Ferguson: You do not have to use the words. Just interpret them. When was it received?

General Miles: I cannot interpret that, Senator. I do not know what "CRO 222" means.

Senator Ferguson: Will you be able to find out when that message was received in your department, when it came to your attention?

General Miles: I will endeavor to find that out, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Do you recall whether it came before you sent the message to Rochefort in Hawaii?

General Miles: I do not recall ever seeing this message.

Senator Ferguson: Not to Rochefort. The message to the

1 Witness Miles Questions by: Sen. Ferguson
2 G-2 of Hawaii to see Rochefort. You know who I am talking
3 about.

4 General Miles: This message from Thorp, did it reach
5 me before that?

6 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

7 General Miles: I do not recall ever seeing the message
8 from Thorp, Senator, so, therefore, I cannot place it. I
9 may have seen it but I do not recall.

10 Senator Ferguson: This is a very important message,
11 isn't it? It indicates that war would be declared upon a
12 certain code message?

13 General Miles: Yes, if accurate, but we had two mes-
14 sages which were of entirely different import to the wind
15 code.

16 Senator Ferguson: So, then, this message did not im-
17 press you at all, I mean to remember it?

18 General Miles: Senator, I do not recall seeing it.

19 Senator Ferguson: It has not impressed you so as to
20 remember it?

21 General Miles: If I saw it, it has not left a lasting
22 impression on my mind, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Do you know when the British at
24 Singapore as far as their army was concerned was alerted?
25 Did you get any information on that?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 General Miles: I do not now recall getting that in-
3 formation.

4 Senator Ferguson: You had not heard then, or at least
5 your memory is not refreshed now, that they were fully alerted
6 on the 6th?

7 General Miles: I may have, sir. I very probably did
8 because I was in pretty close communication with the British.
9 I had a special section in my department for interchange
10 of information with the British but I do not now recall it.

11 Senator Ferguson: Would you find out whether the
12 British ever notified us so that it came to your attention,
13 that they were fully alerted --

14 General Miles: I will try to find that out.

15 Senator Ferguson: (Continuing) -- some time prior to
16 the attack on Pearl Harbor?

17 General Miles: I will attempt to find that out, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: Did you know about when the first
19 bomb was dropped on the Philippines?

20 General Miles: Did I know at the time?

21 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

22 General Miles: I think that I heard of it very shortly
23 afterwards.

24 Senator Ferguson: How long after Pearl Harbor was it,
25 after they dropped them on Pearl Harbor?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 General Miles: My recollection is now, sir, that it was
3 a matter of ten or twelve hours.

4 Senator Ferguson: Now, did you understand that the
5 planes at Pearl Harbor were bombed on the ground and had not
6 been up at all, or was it when they came back to re-fuel that
7 they were bombed? Had you ever heard any information on that?

8 General Miles: I have heard since that the planes were
9 bombed and machine gunned, - our planes were bombed and ma-
10 chine gunned by the Japanese while they were on the ground
11 and before they had a chance to take the air.

12 Senator Ferguson: Before they even had a chance to take
13 the air?

14 General Miles: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: That is, they had not been up, came
16 back to re-fuel, you never heard that, and were then bombed
17 on the ground?

18 General Miles: There may have been some of them that had
19 been up and came back to re-fuel but as I understand it,
20 though, the large majority were attacked while they were on
21 the field and before they had been up in the air.

22 Senator Ferguson: Before they got up in the air. Now,
23 did you give any message of alert after Pearl Harbor to Gen-
24 eral MacArthur, after you knew and, as you say, it was about
25 ten or twelve hours before they attacked the Philippines, did

Witness Miles

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1 you give another alert?

2 General Miles: No, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: Was any other alert given?

4 General Miles: Not to my knowledge, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: Other than the one that was sent out
6 about 12 o'clock. There was a message sent, you remember that
7 message, the one that was sent out on Sunday?

8 General Miles: On the 7th of December?

9 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

10 General Miles: Yes, sir, but that was before the at-
11 tack.

12 Senator Ferguson: Yes, that was before the attack.

13 General Miles: Yes.

14 Senator Ferguson: But no message was sent out after
15 the Pearl Harbor attack again warning General MacArthur that
16 there had been an attack at Pearl Harbor?

17 General Miles: None was sent out by G-2. I knew at
18 the time, I am pretty sure, that the Chief of Staff or War
19 Plans Division were in contact with Hawaii and Philippines
20 and Panama.

21 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

22 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I will yield.

23 Mr. Keefe: I am very much confused on this examination
24 and I would like to ascertain whether or not the questions
25

Witness Miles

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 that were directed to General Miles referred to the planes
3 that were on the ground at Manila or the planes that were
4 on the ground at Honolulu.

5 The answer that he gave would give the impression that
6 he thought you were talking about Honolulu, but your questions
7 might have been interpreted to mean the planes that had been
8 on reconnaissance and came back to re-fuel, as I understand
9 it, out there at Manila.

10 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

11 Mr. Keefe: Now, I would like to get the record clear
12 as to what he was talking about.

13 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I will ask him.

14 You and I were talking about the Philippines, were we
15 not?

16 General Miles: I beg your pardon. I thought you were
17 asking me about Hawaii.

18 Mr. Keefe: That is what I thought.

19 Senator Ferguson: Let us go to the Philippines. Did you
20 get any report on the bombing at the Philippines, - away from
21 Hawaii entirely, - the bombing of the airplanes in the Philip-
22 pines?

23 General Miles: Yes, sir, information came in to the
24 War Department that the Philippines, that Clark Field, I think
25 it was, first was attacked. Now, when that came in I do not

Witness Miles

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

remember, sir.

Senator Ferguson: How long after the attack at Pearl Harbor was the attack at the Philippines?

General Miles: To the best of my knowledge now, sir, it was in the neighborhood of ten or twelve hours.

Senator Ferguson: Now do you know whether or not the planes that were damaged at the Philippines were planes that had not been in the air that morning? Do you know that?

General Miles: I do not know that, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Have you any knowledge on that question? Have you ever heard that the planes had been up, ran out of fuel and came back and were attacked while they were re-fueling?

General Miles: I read in the public press descriptions of the attack on our air fields in the Philippines, Senator, but beyond that I have no knowledge.

Senator Ferguson: You had no Intelligence information on that?

General Miles: None that I can now recall, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, the question is during this lapse of ten or twelve hours did G-2 send any messages to General MacArthur after the Pearl Harbor attack, during the next ten or twelve hours?

General Miles: We sent no messages that I can recall

Witness Miles

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 to the Philippines immediately after the attack on Pearl Har-
3 bor. If your question implies that we had knowledge of how
4 the planes in Hawaii were disposed and, therefore, could have
5 warned General MacArthur, I think I am correct in saying that
6 we did not. I remember very vividly the afternoon and even-
7 ing of December 7th and it was hours before we could deter-
8 mine what in heaven's name had happened in Hawaii. I do not
9 believe that I knew that those planes were lined up on the
10 fields in Hawaii and were attacked there before they got in
11 the air for some time after the attack.

12 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that an alert against
13 sabotage would place the planes together, bunching them, did
14 you know that? That anyone who wanted to put an alert in
15 against sabotage would naturally put his planes together so
16 they would be able to protect them from sabotage, and they
17 would not have ammunition in them? Did you know that?

18 General Miles: I did not, sir, and I do not now know
19 that.

20 Senator Ferguson: I see.

21 General Miles: There are two schools of thought on that,
22 sir. I agree perfectly that if you want to protect your
23 planes against sabotage alone, you do not arm them because
24 the very presence of ammunition is a danger, but if you line
25 up your planes on a field it is true that you can guard them

Witness Miles

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 with fewer men than if you disperse them and have one man
3 guarding each plane, but it is also true that on certain forms
4 of sabotage, like, for instance, getting a vehicle in there
5 with gasoline or something like that into the field, you can
6 do a very much handsomer job if you have got the planes all
7 lined up there together.

8 Senator Ferguson: I believe you have already testified
9 that you did not see the reply message of the 28th of Short
10 to the General Marshall message alerting?

11 General Miles: That is correct, Senator.

12 Senator Ferguson: And that would not come back to you
13 as an Intelligence officer?

14 General Miles: No, sir, I never saw that message.

15 Senator Ferguson: Now, was it your sole responsibility
16 for the distribution of the magic messages, actual distribu-
17 tion?

18 General Miles: That was my responsibility within the
19 War Department and for the Secretary of State that those mes-
20 sages in their locked boxes were made available to the offi-
21 cers on that list.

22 Senator Ferguson: That was your sole responsibility?

23 General Miles: That was my responsibility. I personally
24 did not carry that out. I carried it out through my officers.

25 Senator Ferguson: Yes, but a superior officer has the

Witness Miles

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 sole responsibility and he delegates the work to be done by
3 another officer?

4 General Miles: Yes, sir. It was my responsibility and
5 mine alone that that work should be properly done.

6 Senator Ferguson: Yes. Now, who was the man that had
7 the sole responsibility of the actual delivery of those mes-
8 sages as far as the War Department was concerned?

9 General Miles: That duty I delegated to Colonel Bratton
10 and his assistant, Colonel Dusingberry. They were sometimes
11 not able to deliver the locked pouch to the actual person
12 who had the key. It very frequently happened with the Secre-
13 tary of State and by special arrangement a certain secretary
14 or I think two secretaries of the Secretary of State were
15 authorized to receive the pouch for him. It also sometimes
16 happened in the case of the Chief of Staff or the Secretary
17 of War.

18 Senator Ferguson: Now, who was the man that was respon-
19 sible for the delivery? You say Dusingberry and Bratton, both
20 Colonels?

21 General Miles: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: Were they both responsible for that
23 task?

24 General Miles: Colonel Bratton was the head of the
25 section.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Senator Ferguson: Therefore, he had the responsibility
3 for that?

4 General Miles: Yes, sir.

5 Senator Ferguson: When the Winant message came in at
6 10:40 to the Secretary of State about the movement of the
7 ships, do you remember seeing that?

8 General Miles: Could I see that message, sir, that you
9 are referring to?

10 Senator Ferguson: I will try and find it. Does counsel
11 have it? It is the one Winant made on the 6th of December.
12 I am showing it to you. There are two of them.

13 General Miles: Yes, sir, I have them before me.

14 Senator Ferguson: Have you gone over it now, General?

15 General Miles: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: Do you know when the first of those
17 messages came to you?

18 General Miles: I do not now recall when they first
19 came to me. According to the stamps, the State Department
20 stamps on them, it would certainly indicate that we did not
21 see them until the 8th or 9th of December. You notice that
22 the first one was received in the office of the Secretary
23 of State on December 6th, and the advisor of political rela-
24 tions on the same day, but not to the Division of Far Eastern
25 Affairs until December 8th.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Now, does that mean that you would not get this important message, although it was received at 10:40 A.M. on December the 6th, about the movement of these ships to the Kra Peninsula?

General Miles: I doubt very much if I would, sir. Our liaison with the State Department consisted, as I have already testified, of an officer from the Military Intelligence Division that went there every day to get this information. I have also testified that I finally got through a plan or a policy of inter-departmental liaison so that there was one officer, in the case of the State Department Mr. Gordon, who was charged with seeing that important messages, important to other departments, got out to them, but these matters all took some time. That dispatch on its face would not be given to us in toto until it had been paraphrased.

If it were in Mr. Gordon's office or in any office to whom my liaison officer, at that time Colonel Montague -- no, Colonel Sands, - visited, he would probably have been allowed to read that message but not take it with him, but I have no recollection at this moment of when that message reached the Military Intelligence Division.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Now, if your colonel in the State Department was allowed to read that message and not take it with him, what would be his duty?

General Miles: He would make a note of it, and bring it back as soon as possible, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Bring it to your department?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, would that be the kind of a message that, in the reverse, coming from the State Department to you, that you would just be permitted to read it and then it would be destroyed and sent back?

General Miles: No, sir. If it were sent by the State Department through this inter-departmental liaison that we established, it would be sent over in paraphrase form.

Senator Ferguson: Now, did you have a system whereby then that paper would be stamped by an hour and day stamp so anyone getting it later would know exactly when it was received in your department?

General Miles: That was the system that was in vogue at the time.

Senator Ferguson: Then, we should be able to find in your department the paraphrased copy, or the copy delivered to the War Department from the State Department if it has a stamp on it?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Miles: If it was sent over to our department it should have a time stamp over it, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: I would like to ask counsel if it is possible to get that from the Army so we might tell when it was delivered.

Now, at the time, on the 6th, were you familiar with Exhibit 17? Do you know what Exhibit 17 is? It is the memorandum for the President.

General Miles: At the time was I familiar with it?

Senator Ferguson: Yes, on the 6th.

General Miles: On the 6th of December, 1941, I did not know of the existence of this memorandum, as far as I can remember.

Senator Ferguson: What information had you in your department up until 12 o'clock on the 7th of December, 1941, indicating that there was a movement of the Japs to the south, that the ships were on the move, the troop ships were on the move? What information have you in your office?

General Miles: I had quite a lot of information, Senator.

Senator Ferguson: Would you collect it? I will not take the time now. Will you collect it and bring it back sometime later in a collected form? I want to try to cover the same subject as far as the movement of any

1 Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 other troop ships is concerned, the information that you had
3 in your office. I am talking about this being the one
4 that Winant wired us.

5 General Miles: Beginning at what time, sir?

6 Senator Ferguson: From the 26th.

7 General Miles: From the 26th of November to the 7th
8 of December?

9 Senator Ferguson: Yes, to the 7th of December. You
10 can bring that in sometime later.

11 Do you recall being present with Commander McCullom or
12 anyone else on Saturday morning, that is the day before the
13 7th, where you discussed a desire -- not you personally,
14 but there was discussed a desire to get more information
15 to the theatres, various theatres, or any of the theatres?

16 General Miles: Get more information?

17 Senator Ferguson: More information to the theatres.
18 That means to Hawaii, to the Philippines, Panama, or any-
19 where. Were you present at any meeting where Colonel McCullom
20 was present where that was discussed?

21 General Miles: I have no recollection of any such discus-
22 sion on the 6th of December, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Do you remember any discussion at
24 any time on that subject prior to the attack?

25 General Miles: Only that I knew and thoroughly approved

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1
2 of the Navy messages going out with regard to our informa-
3 tion on the Japs burning codes. They are the only
4 ones. That is the only case in which I can remember of
5 any discussion about further information being sent to
6 the overseas theatres.
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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Shack (2) p.m
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Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Senator Ferguson: Did you know that someone in your
3 department had prepared a statement to send with information
4 in it?

5 General Miles: Other than what was sent, no, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Did you know McCullom, did you ever
7 hear that McCullom had prepared a document or memorandum to
8 send to the theaters?

9 General Miles: Not at that time, no, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: When did you learn that? Later?

11 General Miles: I think I read it in Top Secret Army
12 Report, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: That is the first that you recall
14 knowing anything about it?

15 General Miles: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: Well, if you had close liaison between
17 the two departments, how do you account for the fact that
18 you did not know about that during that period?

19 General Miles: Well, Senator, I did not know, and I do
20 not know that it is a fact now, sir. I understand Captain
21 McCullom later questioned it. But our liaison was very close
22 personally with Admiral Wilkinson, and my Far Eastern man,
23 Colonel Bratton, with his Far Eastern man, I believe it was
24 Commander, now Captain, McCullom.

25 Senator Ferguson: Now do I understand that you, after

AL-2

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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seeing the 14-part message and the other messages, that you were responsible for getting them to General Marshall at the time they were actually delivered, sometime on Sunday?

General Miles: I was responsible for getting messages to the Chief of Staff, among others, the magic messages. I used my own discretion and judgment as to what messages had to be sent to him at out-of-office hours.

Senator Ferguson: And did you exercise that judgment on the night or afternoon of the 6th, so that he did not get these messages, the 13 parts, or the 1:00 o'clock message, or the breaking of the code -- there were three messages there, and I think it was Sunday morning that two of them were ready, but I am referring particularly to the 13 parts.

General Miles: The 13-part message?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

General Miles: I had a conversation, on my return from Admiral Wilkinson's house, as I testified, with Colonel Bratton. I take full responsibility for that 13-part not going to the Chief of Staff that night.

Senator Ferguson: You knew he had an officer on duty that night?

General Miles: He had an officer on duty every night, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And had you read this 13-part message,

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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or these 13 parts very carefully?

General Miles: I testified, sir, that I am not sure whether I saw the text or a summary, or whether I was told a summary of it.

Senator Ferguson: And with that much knowledge you decided that that should not be delivered on the night of the 6th?

General Miles: I returned to my house and telephoned Colonel Bratton, and my recollection is that he said the message was not complete. I knew its substance. I did not consider that it was necessary to arouse the Chief of Staff at that time of night for that message.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know what time the Chief of Staff got up the next morning? I mean what time he arose on Sunday morning.

General Miles: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What did you do about having it go to him early the next morning, the 13-parts?

General Miles: I refer now to my records only because I want to make my testimony the same as before. I testified, sir, that I therefore contented myself that night, that is the Saturday night, by calling Colonel Bratton at his house about 11:30 p.m. on my return and assuring myself that the full reply would be disseminated the next Sunday morning and

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

(3)

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 he and I would be in our offices then. Early on the morning
3 of the 7th Colonel Bratton called me at my house and told me
4 that important information was in and he was trying to get
5 in touch with General Marshall.

6 I asked Colonel Bratton to tell General Marshall that
7 I would come out to Fort Myer to see him if he desired, and
8 so forth.

9 Senator Ferguson: Now you say you had a conversation
10 with Colonel Bratton Sunday morning on the telephone at your
11 home.

12 General Miles: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Well, you knew the pilot message --
14 and you know what I mean by the "pilot message" -- was in on
15 the 6th?

16 General Miles: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Did you have any reason why that
18 was not delivered to General Marshall?

19 General Miles: I testified, sir, to the best of my
20 knowledge and belief it was in the Saturday afternoon locked
21 pouch among several other messages, which you will find were
22 translated on that day, and that it did go to General Marshall.
23 He does not remember seeing it.

24 Senator Ferguson: What messages would you say were in
25 that pouch? Would you identify them for the record from

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 Exhibit 1, the messages that were in the pouch that carried
3 the pilot message?

4 General Miles: On page 226, the message translated on
5 the 6th of December, the middle of the page.

6 Senator Ferguson: What page again, please, General?

7 General Miles: Page 226, sir. Then also on page 228
8 and 229.

9 Senator Ferguson: Which one of the messages on page
10 226? There are two of them there.

11 General Miles: The small one in the middle of the page,
12 sir, from Tokyo to (circular), 3 December, 1941.

13 Senator Ferguson: "Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE)
14 (including those in connection with broadcasts) until the
15 last moment, and if by any chance you have already destroyed
16 them they will have to be resent to you, so please notify us
17 of this fact immediately.

18 "This message is a precaution."

19 General Miles: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Is that the one?

21 General Miles: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Ferguson: What about the one under it?

23 General Miles: Well, according to the record, that
24 was not translated until the 24th of December.

25 Senator Ferguson: So the one that was translated on

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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the 6th was received on the 3rd went with the pilot message.

3

Any others?

4

General Miles: Yes, sir.

5

Senator Ferguson: Which one?

6

General Miles: On pages 228 and 229, the long message from Rome to Tokyo, translated on December 6th.

7

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Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

9

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

10

Mr. Murphy: You said received on the 6th, or translated on the 6th and received on the 3rd?

11

12

Senator Ferguson: That is right.

13

Mr. Murphy: All right.

14

Senator Ferguson: What is the page there?

15

16

General Miles: Pages 228 and 229, sir. I do not know, Senator, whether you want them one by one, but I have every

17

reason to believe that all of these messages translated on the 6th were in the pouch on the 6th.

18

19

Senator Ferguson: Except the 13th part?

20

General Miles: The last of the 13 parts was not in until late on the night of the 6th.

21

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Senator Ferguson: All right. We are talking about the 13 parts out of the 14-part message. Is there any doubt in your mind that 13 parts of the 14-part message were in and translated on the day of the 6th?

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Miles: On the night of the 6th, I think, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: During that day on the 6th?

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General Miles: I think, Senator, you asked me about the pilot message and what other messages I would assume were in the pouch with the pilot message.

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Senator Ferguson: Now the pilot message indicated that that there would be 14 parts in this message, did it not?

9

General Miles: Yes, sir.

10

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Senator Ferguson: It also indicated that they would get a separate message giving them the time of delivery?

12

General Miles: Yes, sir.

13

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Senator Ferguson: So, as I understand it now, you say that all messages except the 13 parts translated on the 6th were delivered to General Marshall, the Secretary of State, General Gerow -- who else would get them outside of those three -- the Secretary of War?

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General Miles: The Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Chief of War Plans Division, and G-2.

19

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Senator Ferguson: And G-2. So they would all have every message translated on the 6th except the 13 parts?

21

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General Miles: That came in on the night of the 6th, yes, sir.

23

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Senator Ferguson: We are talking about the night of the 6th. That is up to midnight, so there can be no question

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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about it?

2

General Miles: Yes, sir.

3

Senator Ferguson: That is all.

4

Mr. Murphy: Before the gentleman suspends I want to make one suggestion, and he may want to cover it.

5

6

It is an angle that has not been developed so far in this case.

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On page 33 of General Arnold's report of January 4, 1944, there is a statement at the bottom of the page to this effect:

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"On Luzon it must be said we had maintained an air alert since November 15."

11

12

Senator Ferguson: Did you know that, General? Did you know there had been an air alert on Luzon in the Philippines from the 15th of November?

13

14

General Miles: I do not recall having any such knowledge at the time, sir.

15

16

Senator Ferguson: Had you any information in your Intelligence branch that the Japs were scouting over the Philippines prior to the 7th?

17

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General Miles: I do not recall having that information at the time, sir.

19

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Senator Ferguson: Do you know of any reason why that would be kept from you? That would be essential to your department, would it not?

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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General Miles: Yes, and no, Senator. Information coming in about our own troops was not ordinarily sent to the Intelligence department, unless it pertained particularly to that.

Senator Ferguson: This was Jap scouting planes over the Philippines.

General Miles: I thought you were referring to the air alert.

Senator Ferguson: Jap reconnaissance, photographing planes.

General Miles: Oh, yes, sir, that should have come to me.

Senator Ferguson: And if they went over the Philippines you know of no reason why you should not obtain that information?

General Miles: That should have been sent by the G-2 of the Philippines to me.

Hook follows

WARD & BYRD, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Now, on whose authority did you send the message to destroy our code in Tokyo?

General Miles: On the authority of the Chief of Staff. Now whether I got that directly from him or from General Bryden, I do not know. I have been trying to remember. General Marshall says he authorized it. I am sure it was authorized in his name, but exactly how it was done, I do not now remember.

Senator Ferguson: Did you have a talk with the General, if you recall? It is an important message, isn't it?

General Miles: Yes, it was important. We were destroying our own military attache codes in those particular places.

Senator Ferguson: Did General Bryden have access to magic?

General Miles: Not that I know of, sir. He certainly did not have a locked pouch delivered to him.

Senator Ferguson: Therefore he would have to read it at the behest of General Marshall, or come to your office to read it?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Because the General would open the pouch, read it, and put it back in?

1 Witness Miles

Questions by: Senator Ferguson
Mr. Keefe

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2 General Miles: Yes, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: Were you of equal rank with General
4 Gerow? Were your departments of equal rank?

5 General Miles: Yes, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: That is all.

7 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

8 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Keefe is next. Would it be
9 agreeable for Senator Lucas to ask questions, Mr. Keefe?

10 Senator Lucas: I do not care to. I thought this was
11 the end of the testimony.

12 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire.

13 Mr. Keefe: General Miles, as a result of the interruption
14 of your testimony, I confess to some confusion of thoughts
15 on what I conceive to be rather material matters in connec-
16 tion with this inquiry, and I want to direct my attention
17 to a few of those things, if I can, to see if I can under-
18 stand the testimony that you have heretofore given.

19 Now, you were the Chief of G-2?

20 General Miles: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Keefe: Am I correct in the assumption that that
22 was at least the top intelligence section in the Army?

23 General Miles: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Keefe: All right. Then I also understand that
25 there is another section called S.I.S., Signal Intelligence

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Service; is that right?

3 General Miles: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Keefe: That was not under your direction?

5 General Miles: No, sir.

6 Mr. Keefe: That was under the direction of whom?

7 General Miles: The Chief Signal Officer of the Army,
8 sir.

9 Mr. Keefe: Then I understand there was another branch
10 called the Signal Corps; is that right?

11 General Miles: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Keefe: Which included the S.I.S., so we have the
13 G-2, and then the Signal Corps, which included the S.I.S. --

14 General Miles: That is correct, sir.

15 Mr. Keefe: And the S.I.S. and Signal Corps were under
16 the direction of one man?

17 General Miles: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Keefe: Who was that man during this period?

19 General Miles: Colonel, or General Mauborgne was
20 Chief Signal Officer until sometime, I think, in the summer
21 of 1941, and he was relieved by General Olmstead.

22 Mr. Keefe: All right.

23 Now, I got the impression from your testimony, - and
24 I listened to it very carefully, and took rather extensive
25 notes, - that this magic business was considered to be of

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 extreme secrecy.

3 General Miles: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Keefe: So secret, in fact, as I gathered from you,
5 that its dissemination was limited, on the Army side, to
6 certain specific individuals, namely, the Secretary of War,
7 the Chief of Staff, the White House in the beginning, General
8 Watson, General Gerow, Chief of War Plans, and yourself
9 as Chief of G-2; is that correct?

10 General Miles: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: And I gathered from your testimony that
12 efforts were being made to keep these magic messages so
13 secret that when they were delivered the Army had a special,
14 trusted courier in the person of Colonel Bratton to make
15 the deliveries; is that right?

16 General Miles: Yes, sir.

17 Mr. Keefe: And that the custom and orders were to
18 take these magic messages that were to be delivered to the
19 persons I have designated, lock them in a locked pouch, to
20 which only these people designated had the key; is that
21 right?

22 General Miles: To take them to those individuals,
23 Congressman, if they could be reached. Obviously, if the
24 Secretary of War was in conference and could not be reached,
25 the message had to be delivered to an aide, or to some

1 Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 designed person, and similarly for the Secretary of
3 State.

4 Mr. Keefe: That is the point I wanted to get, right
5 there. I understood your testimony to be that it was
6 the order to this courier, Colonel Bratton, that he was
7 to deliver this magic to the individual entitled to see
8 it, and then to stay there while it was read, and then
9 put the magic message back in the pouch and take it back
10 to the G-2 headquarters where it was burned, and one copy
11 kept for the files.

12 Did I misunderstand you?

13 General Miles: I do not think that I testified to all
14 of that, sir. Colonel Bratton, or his assistant, was to
15 take this locked pouch to the office indicated, and if
16 possible see the officer, say the Secretary of War or the
17 Chief of Staff and give him the locked pouch.

18 He was not required to stand over this individual while
19 he read it. It could not be done with the Secretary of
20 War, the Secretary of State, or the Chief of Staff. He
21 was, however, to see that that locked pouch got back to
22 his office. He was then to unlock it and burn the contents.

23 Mr. Keefe: When was he to see that the pouch got back?

24 General Miles: That day, if possible. Certainly the
25 next day early.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Mr. Keefe: Did that practice continue right through until the 7th of December?

General Miles: That practice had been going on for many months before the 7th of December, and continued through until that date.

Mr. Keefe: Do I understand then when these raw messages, as they were called, were delivered to General Marshall for his inspection, that that procedure was indulged in, that they would go to him in this locked pouch, with instructions to Colonel Bratton to see to it that those messages, after General Marshall saw them, were returned to G-2 to be burned?

General Miles: Yes, sir. That was the custom, the orders, and they had been carried out both before and after we, on the orders of the Chief of Staff, sent what we called the raw messages.

Mr. Keefe: I understand your testimony to be to the effect that the decoding of these intercepts took place only at Washington. Is that right?

General Miles: It was my understanding. I now know sir, that there was a very secret Navy cryptographic section in Manila, established there --

Mr. Keefe: Now, General Miles, every time we go along, we get --

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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General Miles: May I finish my answer, sir?

Mr. Keefe: All right. Go ahead.

General Miles: Established in Manila. It was put there to serve the Asiatic Fleet. I knew nothing about it. I cannot remember knowing anything about it at that time. It actually operated, so I am told now, in a secret part of the tunnel on Corregidor.

Mr. Keefe: Now, then, the testimony which you first gave is subject to correction to the extent that you now find, from some source, or other, that the Navy, in the Asiatic section, had the facilities for decoding these Jap intercepts; is that right?

General Miles: I am still not sure what Japanese code they were able to break in the Philippines.

Mr. Keefe: Who would know, if you would not?

General Miles: Oh, your Naval witnesses will be able to tell you that, undoubtedly, sir.

Mr. Keefe: That is on the Naval side?

General Miles: That is on the Naval side. That is why I did not know anything about it.

Mr. Keefe: I see.

General Miles: It was a secret Navy cryptographic section for the service of their fleet.

Mr. Keefe: It also appears now, by other testimony

1 Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 that the ability to decode these intercepts was given to
3 the British.

4 General Miles: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Keefe: Did you know that?

6 General Miles: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: You knew that all the time?

8 General Miles: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Keefe: So that outside of Washington it now develops
10 that the British had the facilities given to them to decode
11 these intercepts, and on the Navy side, the Navy made the
12 facilities available to Admiral Hart out in the Asiatic
13 Fleet at Manila in some recess at Corregidor; is that
14 right?

15 General Miles: I believe that is correct, sir.

16 I would like to say, Mr. Congressman, that I am not
17 correcting my testimony, as I understand it, with regard
18 to the British having this facility. I was never asked
19 before directly about the British. I think my previous
20 testimony was solely concerned with our American crypt
21 analysis of the messages.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: Well, I am very happy to have that explanation,
3 General Miles, and accept it as such. There have been so many
4 changes of testimony relative to this matter, produced by the
5 Clausen Report, and testimony under oath in the Army-Navy Report,
6 and so on, that I am having difficulty finding out what the
7 fact is.

8 Mr. Murphy: The gentleman is testifying.

9 Mr. Keefe: I ask, Mr. Chairman --

10 The Chairman: The committee will be in order.

11 Mr. Keefe: I would like to go ahead without interruption,
12 please.

13 Mr. Murphy: Well, go ahead.

14 Mr. Keefe: Those are the familiar tactics of a lawyer
15 in the trial of a small police court, to interrupt the
16 counsel who is examining the witness, to throw him off his
17 chain of thought. I had that experience for 35 years. There
18 is nothing new about that.

19 What record was kept of the burning of these intercepts,
20 if any?

21 General Miles: Checks were made. I am not able, how-
22 ever, to give you any detailed testimony on that, sir.

23 Colonel Bratton, I understand, will appear as a witness and
24 he had that directly in his charge.

25 Mr. Keefe: Did not you have it directly in your charge?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Were not you the Chief of this outfit?

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General Miles: Yes, sir, but I did not personally attend to the burning of those intercepts.

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Mr. Keefe: Was not that an important matter, the burning of the messages, and wasn't it important to see that there was a record kept, so that nobody saw them outside of these few people?

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General Miles: I knew at the time that there was available a record which was kept.

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Mr. Keefe: Do you know what that was?

General Miles: It can be produced for you. The man who kept the record will appear before you, and I think I am not the proper witness in that case.

Mr. Keefe: Do you have any present knowledge of the fact that there is such a record?

General Miles: I am sure there was such a record kept.

Mr. Keefe: Well, I will ask the counsel to have that record, if there was such a record, at the time Colonel Bratton appears before us, so when we ask him questions we can have that record before us.

Mr. Gesell: May I understand what we are talking about? Is it the record of the messages that were burned?

Mr. Keefe: Yes, that is it. When they were destroyed, there would be a record made of the destruction.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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That is as I understand you, General Miles.

General Miles: As I understand, they were checked off from a list of the records received.

Mr. Keefe: Now I am a little confused about the handling of this decoding thing. I do not want to go into any details as to how it was done, or anything of that kind, but I know the testimony shows that Commander Cramer was the opposite in the Navy of Colonel Bratton. Is that right? Did you know Commander Cramer?

General Miles: I know Commander Cramer, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Yes. Well, he was the courier that delivered these messages around on the Navy side, was he not?

General Miles: At Pearl Harbor time I understand that he was the Naval Officer who did that work.

Mr. Keefe: Did you understand he was the Naval Officer that did it prior to Pearl Harbor time?

General Miles: I do not remember how long prior to Pearl Harbor this officer, who was not in any way under my command, did that work, sir.

Hook follows

W. G. NOTENHEIM - JUAN & DRAV
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, am I correct in the assumption
3 that when the Jap message came in for decoding, that that
4 was a sort of a joint action between the Army and Navy?

5 General Miles: So I understand, sir.

6 Mr. Keefe: You were not separated there. You had
7 a unity of command there that day, didn't you?

8 General Miles: I understand that there was a joint
9 operation of the Navy communication, and S.I.S. of the
10 Army.

11 Mr. Keefe: And you named another officer besides
12 Colonel Bratton; what was that man's name?

13 General Miles: Colonel Dusenberry.

14 Mr. Keefe: So Colonel Bratton and Colonel Dusenberry
15 were the two officers that were assigned to this task
16 of watching these intercepts on the Army side?

17 General Miles: The intercepts were directly under the
18 charge of the Far Eastern section of the Military Intelli-
19 gence Division, which was under Colonel Bratton. Colonel
20 Dusenberry was one of his assistants. He had others.

21 Mr. Keefe: Who was the person, or who were the persons
22 that actually did the decoding? Were they Army men or
23 Navy men?

24 General Miles I understand that they were both Army
25 and Navy men, sir, employees of the War and Navy Departments.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 I would not say they were enlisted men, or officers of
3 the Army and Navy.

4 Mr. Keefe: They must have had a highly secret place
5 in which they worked, did they not?

6 General Miles: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Keefe: The Army and Navy people worked in that
8 same place together, did they?

9 General Miles: I do not know, sir. I believe there
10 was some separation there. I know of no place in the
11 Munitions Building where they could have all been together.

12 Mr. Keefe: Well, was one intercept first assigned to
13 the Army to decode and one intercept assigned to the Navy
14 or how did it work?

15 General Miles: I am told that their operation was joint
16 in the sense that when one got a backlog of work he would
17 transfer it to the other. I am not a good witness on the
18 details of the S.I.S., because I deliberately never looked
19 into them. Other officers will come up and you can ask
20 them what questions you want.

21 Mr. Keefe: You mean S.I.S.? Is that their job?

22 General Miles: The Signal Intelligence Service.

23 Mr. Keefe: Were they the ones that were doing the de-
24 coding?

25 General Miles: Yes, sir.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: Then, Bratton was with S.I.S.?

3 General Miles: No, sir. I think I could explain it
4 to you, Mr. Congressman.

5 Mr. Keefe: I wish you would. The further we go the
6 more confused this thing gets to me.

7 The Vice Chairman: The committee will be in order.

8 General Miles: The decoding, deciphering, translating
9 from Japanese, decoding, deciphering Japanese into English
10 was done by two services of the Army and Navy, the Army
11 Signal Intelligence Service, which is part of the Signal
12 Corps, and the Navy Naval Communications Service.

13 Now, those were highly specialized services. They
14 served the intelligence of the two services, Army and Navy.

15 Mr. Keefe: I see.

16 General Miles: It became our paper only when delivered
17 to us in typed English. We had nothing whatever to do
18 with the deciphering, decoding, or translating of that docu-
19 ment.

20 Mr. Keefe: Well, where were these messages filed, the
21 ones that were actually filed in your Department?

22 General Miles: The retained messages were filed in
23 the Far Eastern Section of my department.

24 Mr. Keefe: What is that?

25 General Miles: The retained messages were filed in

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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Colonel Bratton's office, the Far Eastern Section of my
Department.

Mr. Keefe: And how were they filed? Were they filed
consecutively by number?

General Miles: That is a detail that I do not remember,
Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Keefe: Who would remember that?

General Miles: Colonel Bratton undoubtedly would
remember it.

Mr. Keefe: I see. I am advised by the Chairman that
a good deal of this material was gone into on a Monday that
I was compelled to be absent, and when you were a witness,
General Miles, and that is why I am going through my notes
so I will not be covering this ground again.

The Vice Chairman: That was my recollection about it.

Mr. Keefe: I can perhaps read it all, that is, if it
has been covered, and you give me that assurance. I will
get his full testimony and read it.

The Vice Chairman: I believe General Miles was a witness
on Monday, wasn't he?

Mr. Gesell: Last Monday.

Mr. Keefe: A week ago?

The Vice Chairman: Monday a week ago.

Mr. Murphy: He started on the 29th, November 29.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 General Miles: I testified Monday and Tuesday.

3 Mr. Murphy: And he testified on November 30.

4 The Vice Chairman: Monday a week ago?

5 General Miles: Yes, sir.

6 The Vice Chairman: That was my recollection.

7 General Miles: And Tuesday.

8 Mr. Keefe: This is a matter that I want to ask you a
9 few questions about, General Miles, if you can answer them.

10 From an examination of the intercepts that were coming
11 in, there was an effort being made to keep track of the
12 movement of the Jap fleets, and that had been going on for
13 some time. My reading of the record of the testimony in
14 this case indicates that sometime prior, a short time prior
15 to the 7th of December, there was a certain Jap task force
16 that went into radio silence. Do you recall that?

17 General Miles: I recall hearing such a report, yes, sir.

18 Mr. Keefe: And evidence given before the Army and Navy
19 Board indicated that there was some concern expressed over
20 the fact that this fleet had gone apparently into radio silence,
21 and wonder was expressed as to where it was. Do you recall
22 that situation?

23 General Miles: I recall that a certain number of Japanese
24 ships could not be located by our Naval Intelligence.

25 Mr. Keefe: Those ships were carriers, weren't they?

General Miles: I don't remember what class of ships
they were, sir.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: Well, how long did that radio silence con-
3 tinue so far as this Fleet was concerned, do you recall?

4 General Miles: No, sir, I do not recall. You under-
5 stand, of course --

6 Mr. Keefe: That would have been a Navy matter, would it?

7 General Miles: Pardon me. You understand, of course,
8 that all of this work of tracking the Japanese ships was
9 Naval Intelligence, and I got my information from them.

10 Mr. Keefe: All right, we will try and get it from the
11 Navy then.

12 But I understood that you were working in such close
13 liaison in a matter of this character that you perhaps as
14 head of G-2 would know something about that also.

15 General Miles: I think I did know at the time the
16 important items, such as the fact that they could not locate
17 certain of the Japanese ships.

18 Mr. Keefe: That would be a pretty important matter,
19 wouldn't it, in view of the tension that existed at that time?

20 General Miles: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Keefe: To know where that Fleet was and what it
22 was doing, it was a very important matter, wasn't it?

23 General Miles: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Keefe: Did you make any report to anybody, in your
25 analysis of those intercepts, or the lack of them, when you

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 were making your report to the Army Chief of Staff, did you
3 make any comment upon the sudden blackout of these radio
4 messages from this Fleet?

5 General Miles: I do not believe that I made any such
6 report, sir. I do not know, Mr. Congressman, that that was
7 anything extraordinary at the time. I remember that such
8 things occurred but, of course, it was fairly normal that
9 Naval Intelligence, good as they were, were not able to place
10 certain Japanese ships.

11 Mr. Gesell: May I intervene, Mr. Congressman?

12 Mr. Keefe: Yes, surely.

13 Mr. Gesell: On the direct examination by counsel of
14 General Miles item 25 of Exhibit 33 was reviewed, a memorandum
15 by him of November 26, 1941 to the Chief of Staff, concerning
16 the location of the Japanese Fleet, in which he commented
17 that "present location other units of this task force are
18 not known."

19 Mr. Keefe: I had a recollection of that, Mr. Gesell,
20 but in the mountain of things here some of these details are
21 liable to escape, and I can't wonder that some of the witnesses
22 can't recall everything that transpired.

23 Does that refresh your recollection?

24 General Miles: Yes, sir.

25 Mr. Keefe: You did comment on it, according to counsel.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Do you recall that now?

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General Miles: I recall it now, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: In view of the tension that existed on the 26th of November and the fact that the evidence shows here that almost everybody in the top echelons of command felt that the Japs might strike any place at any time that was an important fact?

9

General Miles: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: The fact they had lost contact with one of the Japanese Fleets, that was quite important, wasn't it?

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General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Was that followed through from day to day from that time on to try to find out what had happened, so far as radio was concerned, and did this blackout continue right up to the attack?

General Miles: I am sure it was, by Naval Intelligence, and I feel reasonably certain that I kept in touch with it, sir, but, as you see, my memory of what I knew four years ago is sometimes quite defective.

Mr. Keefe: Yes, I have observed that.

Well, now, as head of G-2, you were supposed to keep pretty well posted to give information to the Chief of Staff on what was going on, that was your job, in plain English, wasn't it?

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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General Miles: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: Now, we had the Navy Intelligence, we had the FBI, and other sources, did we not, that were working in more or less close liaison?

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General Miles: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Keefe: And furnishing information back and forth between these various intelligence services; is that true?

9

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General Miles: Yes, sir, that is true.

11

Mr. Keefe: And what was going on out in Hawaii was of some importance during 1940 and 1941, wasn't it?

12

13

General Miles: Yes, sir.

14

Mr. Keefe; And it was very important because of the fact that after the so-called China incident started in 1937 the overwhelming alien Japanese population and Americanized Japanese population was very tremendous in Hawaii, was it not?

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General Miles: It was a very considerable part of the population, yes, sir.

19

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Mr. Keefe: And you had means through your G-2 office in Hawaii of getting information as to what was going on there in Hawaii, did you not?

21

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General Miles: Among the Japanese population?

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Mr. Keefe: Yes.

25

General Miles: We were always striving to do that, sir,

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 and got a good deal of information.

3 Mr. Keefe: The threat of possible sabotage was always
4 present there, wasn't it?

5 General Miles: The threat of possible sabotage was always
6 present, or subversive activity of some sort.

7 Mr. Keefe: In fact, that had been so impressed upon your
8 mind as Chief of G-2 that you actually sent a message out to
9 Short on the 27th warning him against sabotage?

10 General Miles: Among other things. I also warned against
11 war itself.

12 Mr. Keefe: Yes. Now --

13 General Miles: But that message was not directed solely
14 to Hawaii.

15 Mr. Keefe: Did you have the benefit of the investigation
16 that was conducted by the SEC out in Hawaii as to the illegal
17 sale of Japanese war bonds in Hawaii and on the West Coast
18 of the United States and the prosecution in court of those
19 people responsible for it, did you have, as head of G-2, the
20 benefit of that investigation?

21 General Miles: I do not recall it, sir.

22 Mr. Keefe: Do you know anything about it?

23 General Miles: No, sir, I do not now know anything about
24 it.

25 Mr. Keefe: You have no present recollection that it ever

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 came to your attention as head of G-2?

3 General Miles: I do not recall it, sir.

4 Mr. Keefe: Did you have any knowledge of the fact that
5 the Navy had tapped a telephone wire of the Japanese Consul
6 at Hawaii prior to the 26th day of November, 1941?

7 General Miles: Mr. Congressman, I presume I did if it
8 were done, if it were known to my Naval colleagues, but it
9 was one of those things I would have been very careful to
10 forget as soon as I knew it or shortly thereafter.

11 Mr. Keefe: I am asking you a simple question, General
12 Miles. I understand the reasons for your answer, but I am
13 asking you a simple question.

14 You were the head of G-2. Now, as head of G-2 did you
15 know that the Navy had tapped the telephone wires of the
16 Japanese Consul prior to the 27th of November 1941?

17 General Miles: I am not sure that I knew that, sir.
18 I have not a definite recollection now of knowing that specific
19 item of information.

20 Mr. Keefe: Did any information come to you that you
21 now recall, through your liaison with the Navy, as to the
22 contents of any intercepts obtained by the Navy through tapping
23 the wires of the Japanese Consul at Hawaii?

24 General Miles: I do not recall any, sir.

25 Mr. Keefe: Do you know that the FBI had tapped the

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 telephone in the house of the Jap Consul and maintained that
3 tap right up until the 7th of December, 1941.

4 General Miles: I may have, sir, but I do not now recall.
5 What I do recall, Mr. Congressman, is many discussions with
6 FBI and ONI regarding the tapping of telephones. You may
7 remember there was a law passed by Congress --

8 Mr. Keefe: Yes, they had to get authority to do it.

9 General Miles: May I finish?

10 We had weekly meetings, the head of FBI, ONI, and NID,
11 and I remember that that was a very serious question at that
12 time, the months preceding Pearl Harbor. Whether I knew
13 that my colleagues were tapping the wires of the Japanese
14 Consul in Hawaii I do not now recall.

15 Mr. Keefe: Well, the only purpose of it would be to
16 get vital information, isn't that true?

17 General Miles: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Keefe: If any vital information was secured through
19 that source, did it come to your attention?

20 General Miles: I do not now recall any vital information
21 that came to me from that source.

22 Mr. Keefe: Do you recall any information that came from
23 that source, vital or otherwise?

24 General Miles: No, sir.

25 Mr. Keefe: In fact, you have no present recollection of

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 anything connected with the incident?

3 General Miles: With the tapping of the telephone wires
4 of the Japanese Consul, I do not recall.

5 Mr. Keefe: Were you familiar with the fact that the
6 President had issued an order restricting certain areas for
7 defensive purposes around the Hawaiian Islands?

8 General Miles: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Keefe: You were going to get that, Mr. Gesell. Did
10 you get it?

11 Mr. Gesell: I did, Congressman. I had it in front of
12 me and the question didn't come up again. It is item 3 of
13 the Navy Exhibit which was introduced on the first day of
14 the hearing and the actual demarcations of those various areas
15 are plotted on a chart. Item 3.

16 Mr. Keefe: Well, you were familiar with this order,
17 whatever it was?

18 General Miles: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Keefe: And do you know how extensive it was, as to
20 how many miles of water it included around the Islands?

21 General Miles: No, sir, I cannot now recall.

22 Mr. Keefe: And do you recall its terms at all, as to
23 what it prohibited?

24 General Miles: It was a defensive sea area, as I remember
25 it, and prohibited, I think, ships without special permission

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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from passing through those waters.

Mr. Keefe: Well, there were a lot of Japanese fishing boats operating around the Hawaiian Islands in the period of 1941, were there not?

General Miles: There was, sir.

Hook follows

WARD & PAUL WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Mr. Keefe: You knew about that?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Did you know that there were a large number of arrests of Jap operators of boats and convictions had for violation of the terms of this order, in the United States Court out there in Hawaii in the year 1941?

General Miles: I don't remember knowing of how many arrests or what arrests were made. I do have a definite recollection of coming here before a committee of Congress in the summer of 1941, advocating very strongly a bill still further limiting the Japanese fishermen, particularly on the West Coast, and in Hawaiian waters.

Mr. Keefe: Well, Jap fishermen during 1941, were fishing right in Pearl Harbor itself. That would be a matter of some interest, wouldn't it?

General Miles: It was a matter of great interest. The trouble was they were American citizens, very largely; couldn't get them.

Mr. Keefe: Then you do know about the incident?

General Miles: I remember well we were very much worried about the Japanese fishermen in Hawaii and on the West Coast waters, both the Army and Navy made strong representations to tighten the laws in that regard.

Mr. Keefe: Did you know that starting in early 1941

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 alien Japs in Hawaii converted their assets, put all assets
3 out of their hands, and it was well-known out there. Did
4 you know it?

5 General Miles: I do not now recall that instance, sir.

6 Mr. Keefe: Would such a matter as that, if it had been
7 called to your attention, have been considered to be of any
8 importance?

9 General Miles: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Keefe: Well, weren't you furnished with that in-
11 formation by your intelligence out there in Hawaii?

12 General Miles: I presume I was, sir, but I do not now
13 recall it.

14 Mr. Congressman, there is before this committee exhibit
15 A to the Army Pearl Harbor Board which is a document called
16 "Secret Summary of Far Eastern Documents, Military Intelli-
17 gence Division." It is quite voluminous. It is, as a matter
18 of fact, supported by some 15 or 16 volumes of photostats
19 of documents.

20 Now, a great many of those things, all of these things
21 of any importance, passed over my desk during the quite
22 considerable time that I was G-2. I regret to have to say
23 that I do not recall an incident now, but I am trying to
24 tellyou, to give you the reason that I do not recall a
25 great many things that undoubtedly I saw or knew at the

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 time.

3 Mr. Keefe: Well, did you know that early in 1941,
4 the civilian community out there in Hawaii formed special
5 anti-sabotage squads, at the request of the commander of
6 the local National Guard, and set up a complete system in
7 Hawaii among the civilians to aid in the prevention of
8 sabotage. Did you know that?

9 General Miles: That is one of those things that I do
10 not now recall, sir.

11 Mr. Keefe: Did you know that early in 1941 under the
12 auspices of local people in Hawaii they started a system
13 of blood banks and that it was those blood banks which
14 saved the lives of many, many people in this disaster on
15 December 7? Did you ever hear of that as head of G-2?

16 General Miles: I may have, sir, but I do not now recall
17 it.

18 Mr. Keefe: Did you know that the Japs were using the
19 radio out there in 1941 to broadcast certain innocent
20 appeals for help or offers to sell this or that, over the
21 radio, which, it later turned out, were coded messages
22 being sent out over the commercial radio?

23 General Miles: I knew that there was commercial radio
24 in Hawaii, and I knew some of it was in the Japanese language.
25 I had heard it while out there.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

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2 Mr. Keefe: Did your intelligence services report
3 what I have stated to you?

4 General Miles: That radio broadcasts were made in
5 Japanese?

6 Mr. Keefe: No, not necessarily, but innocent broadcasts
7 of -- like a want-ad, in which these people were using a
8 code to get information out over the radio that could be
9 interpreted by the Japs? Did you know that?

10 General Miles: I do not now recall that any specific
11 case of code being used in radio broadcasts in Hawaii was
12 brought to my attention.

13 Mr. Keefe: Who was the head of your G-2 in Hawaii in
14 1941?

15 General Miles: Colonel Fielder was G-2 of General
16 Short's command in Hawaii.

17 Mr. Keefe: Do you know a Colonel George C. Bicknell?

18 General Miles: He was assistant to Colonel Fielder.

19 Mr. Keefe: Where did he come from?

20 General Miles: Where did he come from, sir?

21 Mr. Keefe: Yes. What were his qualifications for that
22 job?

23 General Miles: I don't know, sir. He was selected
24 by the Commanding General, undoubtedly, or by the Commanding
25 General, G-2. The overseas staffs, all the staffs of major

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Keefe
Mr. Gearhart

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2 units of the Army, were selected by their own commanding
3 generals, not by the War Department.

4 Mr. Keefe: That is all, Mr. Chairman.

5 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Gearhart of California will
6 inquire.

7 Mr. Gearhart: General Miles, a great many questions
8 have been asked you about intercepts and matters of that
9 kind.

10 As a matter, you had under your jurisdiction the whole
11 case of intelligence, didn't you?

12 General Miles: Yes, sir, as prescribed by our Army
13 regulations.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Then the handling of intercepts was
15 just one of your responsibilities?

16 General Miles: Yes, sir, one of numerous responsibili-
17 ties.

18 Mr. Gearhart: Did you, for the purpose of getting
19 clues that might lead to important evidence, cause the
20 newspapers of the country to be followed from day to day?

21 General Miles: Yes, sir, that was a regular routine
22 duty of the military attaches of the countries to which they
23 were attached, or military observers.

24 Mr. Gearhart: And if you obtained what you thought was
25 important information from that source, that was reported to

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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1 the Chief of Staff just the same as any other evidence
2 that you thought was -- well, the same as the magic evi-
3 dence?
4

5 General Miles: Yes, sir.

6 Whether information was brought to the Chief Staff
7 depended solely on the value of that information, not its
8 source.

9 Mr. Gearhart: In other words, in the first place, you
10 would evaluate it, and if you reached the conclusion that
11 it was of importance, or might lead to something of import-
12 ance, you brought it to the attention of the Chief of Staff?

13 General Miles: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Now, I notice in the Army report, on
15 page 51 of the United States News printing of that report,
16 there is a quotation from the diary of Secretary Stimson
17 as follows:

18 "Then, at 12 o'clock I went to the White House where
19 we were until nearly half-past one. At the meeting were
20 Hull, Knox, Marshall, Stark and myself. There the President
21 brought up the relationship with the Japanese. He brought
22 up the event that we were likely to be attack, perhaps as
23 soon as -- perhaps next Monday, for the Japs are notorious
24 for making an attack without warning, and the question was
25 what we should do. We conferred on the general problem."

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Now, that Monday would have been December 1st, wouldn't it?

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: That was one week before Pearl Harbor.

General Miles: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Was there a rumor or a belief running through Naval and military circles to the effect that there probably would be an attack a week ahead of the time that it occurred?

General Miles: I never heard that. I can't remember any rumor running through military and naval circles of a probability of attack on Pearl Harbor or Hawaii at any particular day.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, I don't mean at Pearl Harbor. I mean any place an attack upon the United States by the Japanese.

General Miles: On that particular day, no, sir, I do not remember.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, you read in the newspapers of December 1st that President Roosevelt rushed back to the Capital from Warm Springs, because of a crisis in the Far East, didn't you read that?

General Miles: I am sure that I read that, sir. I read my papers every day.

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Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: And did you not observe during that first week in the papers that the Japanese embassy was advertising and selling their automobiles for cash only?

General Miles: I do not now recall that that particular point was brought to my attention.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, do you remember this headline appearing in the Washington News at page 6 on December 3rd:

"Japanese embassy sells four automobiles, demands cash - sign of the times - Japanese embassy is selling its cars"?

General Miles: No, Congressman Gearhart, I am afraid I cannot remember that particular item. It was a week of growing crises and many, many bits of information came to my attention but I do not recall that particular one.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, in view of the fact that they were demanding cash for their automobiles ought to be significant in view of the fact that the times were becoming very tense and war was considered to be imminent. Did you follow those kinds of things closely?

General Miles: Yes sir, but I think we had even better information from their own words in magic.

Mr. Gearhart: Did you observe the article which appeared in the papers on Saturday, November 29th, an article

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 which quoted Prime Minister Tojo of Japan, in which he was
3 quoted as saying that he intended to purge the United States
4 and Britain out of the Orient?

5 General Miles: I feel very sure that I read that at the
6 time, sir. That speech created, as you know, quite a stir.

7 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. To quote the article or his state-
8 ment, rather, in order that the significance may appear in the
9 record, it is:

10 "Chiang Kai-shek is dancing to the tune of American
11 and British communism because the United States and Britain
12 desire to fish in troubled waters, throwing the Asiatic
13 peoples against each other. This is the stock in trade
14 of Britain and the United States and, therefore, we must
15 purge this sort of action with a vengeance."

16 Now, did a speech by the Premier of Japan, who is sup-
17 posed to lead the public in Japan, have any special impression
18 upon your mind or cause you to do anything or to say anything
19 which you would not otherwise have done or said?

20 General Miles: Congressman Gearhart, that speech made
21 a great stir in this country. It, of course, was well known
22 to the Chief of Staff as well as to me through reading it in
23 the papers. I remember also that the Japanese then began to
24 back water on it and say that it had not been reported ac-
25 curately from the vernacular, and so forth, and there was a

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 good deal about it in magic, all of which was known to higher
3 authorities in the United States government.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Well, did you ascertain through your In-
5 telligence system that the Japanese embassy in Washington
6 was writing letters, sending them around the United States,
7 calling upon people to whom the embassy or Japanese nationals
8 were indebted to get their bills in before December 7th at
9 the latest?

10 General Miles: That is an item that I do not now re-
11 call that came to my attention.

12 Mr. Gearhart: I have here the photostat of a letter that
13 was furnished me by the State Department as long ago as April
14 9th, which I think ought to be spread upon the record and I
15 will read it: (Reading)

16 "JAPANESE EMBASSY

17 WASHINGTON

18 November 25, 1941

19 "Dear Sir:

20 "Referring to the booklet which you were so kind as
21 to send to me at my request, I wish to have the articles
22 of the annexed list delivered to me. I should like to
23 have them before December 7th at the latest. As regards
24 the payment, I will be much obliged if you will designate
25 an agent in Washington, D.C. (or in New York) to whom I

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 may be able to pay in cash; this may save me from en-
3 counterering many technical difficulties of transfer of
4 funds under the freezing order.

5 "I may add that the delivery of the commodities to
6 me will be effected duty free at the American border. I
7 must, however, notify the State Department beforehand and
8 for that purpose I ask you to inform me of the approxi-
9 mate date of the passage of the goods.

10 Yours sincerely,

11 Koto Matsudaira,

12 First Secretary."

13 In the lower left hand corner is the name of the addressee:

14 "Mr. Herbert S. Mills

15 Hamilton (Ontario) Canada."

16 Did your Intelligence Service encounter any other letters
17 of that type?

18 General Miles: I do not remember ever to have heard of
19 that instance. May I ask when that letter was intercepted?

20 Mr. Gearhart: Well, I do not know when it was inter-
21 cepted but it bears the date of November 25, 1941.

22 General Miles: That is when it was sent.

23 Mr. Gearhart: That is the date the letter bears.

24 Now, did any of your men read the various magazines and
25 try to keep abreast with what was happening which might throw

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 light on the work which was yours?

3 General Miles: Yes, sir, I think there was a good deal
4 of magazine reading in the department.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Did you or any of your men read The New
6 Yorker of November 1941?

7 General Miles: I subscribe for The New Yorker, sir. I
8 think I read it.

9 Mr. Gearhart: Did you encounter or did any of your men
10 encounter and report to you an advertisement which appeared
11 on several pages of one of those November issues, I have for-
12 gotten the exact date, which contained the word "warning" in
13 German, in English and Italian and a picture of a dice, upon
14 one side of which appeared "12" and on the other side "7"?

15 General Miles: No, sir, I have no recollection of that
16 incident of seeing that advertisement.

17 Mr. Gearhart: Well, it was alright to miss that one be-
18 cause that turned out to be a clever advertising scheme, but
19 what I wanted to ask you about --

20 Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to the
21 spelling of the word "dice"? Was it "d-i-e-s" or "d-i-c-e"?

22 Mr. Gearhart: I am not referring to the Dies Committee.
23 I am referring to dice that you throw to hook that number 7.

24 Mr. Murphy: I wondered how you got a 12 on it?

25 Mr. Gearhart: These were special dice.

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 The Chairman: The chair hopes the committee will not
3 get too much information on it.

4 Mr. Gearhart: The gentleman from Pennsylvania indicated
5 a considerable knowledge of such things.

6 Mr. Murphy: I heard about it.

7 Mr. Gearhart: The point is that the advertisement was
8 strikingly conspicuous and strikingly significant, apparent-
9 ly, but it was not observed by your Intelligence Service or
10 reported to you?

11 General Miles: I do not remember it as having been re-
12 ported to me, sir.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Well, it threw the FBI into a dither.
14 They sent out a thousand agents to find out what it meant but
15 they finally ascertained that it was just good advertising.

16 General Miles: That occurred, I presume, after the at-
17 tack.

18 Mr. Gearhart: I think so. Now, during the closing mo-
19 ments of the gentleman from Wisconsin's examination of you,
20 or I think it was during the course of the examination by
21 the Senator from Michigan, it was brought out that there had
22 been an air alert in the Philippines for some time prior to
23 December 7th.

24 I will ask you if anything went over your desk or was
25 brought to your attention which indicated there had been an

1 Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 air alert just prior to December 7th on Oahu, on Hawaii?

3 General Miles: I remember no such report, sir.

4 Mr. Gearhart: As a matter of fact, wasn't there an air
5 alert ordered at Hickam Field on December 1st and continued
6 throughout the week and called off on the afternoon of De-
7 cember 6th, 1941?

8 General Miles: Not that I remember knowing of at the
9 time, sir, or having heard of since.

10 Mr. Gearhart: You do not know of any reason why air
11 alerts were called or staged as drills or as actual war
12 exercises prior to December 7th?

13 General Miles: Well, I, like all other officials of
14 the War Department, supposed that they were on the alert.
15 Anyway, it would be perfectly normal to have what I think you
16 mean by air alerts; in other words, unexpected drills or
17 calls on the air force as a matter of training and practice.

18 Mr. Gearhart: I will ask counsel to investigate and
19 ascertain for me if in fact there was not an all-out air alert
20 at Hickam Field that began on December 1st and ended on De-
21 cember 6th, a full all-out air alert which required the
22 manning of antiaircraft guns constantly for twenty-four hours
23 a day, the wearing of steel helmets and side arms or rifles.
24 In other words, a complete air alert for that one week.

25 I have a letter on my desk from a boy who went through

Witness Miles

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 it and went through the attack and he tells me that is the
3 case and that is the source of my information. I would like
4 to have it verified. That is all.

5 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask one or two
6 questions.

7 Mr. Gearhart: And my inquiry, of course, would include
8 the orders for the alert and the orders calling off the alert,
9 the inspiration for those orders as far as they can be ascer-
10 tained.

11 The Chairman: Congressman Keefe has another question.

12 The Vice Chairman: I have one I want to ask some time
13 also.

14 Mr. Keefe: All right.

15 General, I have been making a little research to try to
16 get myself adjusted to conditions out at Hawaii prior to this
17 attack and among other things I show you an advertisement
18 taken from the Honolulu Advertiser on August 24, 1941 which
19 reads:

20 "An important announcement concerning war risk and
21 bombardment insurance. It is not too late to secure
22 Lloyd's coverage for your property and home. Our con-
23 nections are accepting individual commitments not in
24 excess of one-quarter million dollars provided orders
25 are placed on or before August 26th at 12 o'clock noon."