

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will
3 inquire, Colonel.

4 Mr. Murphy: Colonel Bratton, do you have any memorandum
5 or any recollection as to the delivery of these pilot
6 message?

7 Colonel Bratton: I have no memorandum as to the de-
8 livery, sir, but my recollection is fairly clear that that
9 pilot message was delivered at about 3:00 o'clock on
10 Saturday afternoon and that I did discuss its contents with
11 General Gerow and General Miles.

12 Mr. Murphy: Did the pilot message come from the Navy
13 or was it translated by the Army?

14 Colonel Bratton: It was intercepted by the Navy at
15 Bainbridge Island at 7:20 a.m. 6 December 1941, Washington
16 time. The teletype copy of the intercept was delivered
17 to the SIS at 12:05 p.m. 6 December, Washington time. It
18 was translated by the Army SIS and delivered to me, sir.

19 Mr. Murphy: What time was it translated by the Army?

20 Colonel Bratton: There is no record of that, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: I understood Captain Kramer to say he
22 did not get the pilot message from the Navy until Sunday
23 morning.

24 Colonel Bratton: No, sir, he said he got it late
25 Sunday evening.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: Later on he came back and said to Senator
3 Ferguson sometime Sunday morning.

4 The Vice Chairman: You did not mean to say "late
5 Sunday evening", did you?

6 Colonel Bratton: Late Saturday. I heard portions
7 of Captain Kramer's testimony myself.

8 Mr. Murphy: After he made a check, at the request
9 of the distinguished Senator from Michigan, it is my under-
10 standing he then placed it as having not been delivered
11 until Sunday morning.

12 Colonel Bratton: I cannot account for that.

13 Mr. Murphy: I wonder where it could have been, if
14 he got it on Sunday morning and delivered it to a Navy man,
15 and you say you think it was delivered at 3:00 o'clock
16 Saturday afternoon.

17 Colonel Bratton: Well, I am not the best witness on
18 that procedure, sir. It was automatic between the Navy
19 code and cipher people and Army SIS. They exchanged this
20 stuff, in bulk.

21 Mr. Murphy: Do they have any record at all in SIS
22 as to the translation of this particular message?

23 Colonel Bratton: I do not think there is any such
24 record at this time, sir.

25 Mr. Murphy: They had no time stamps either then?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Colonel Bratton: Sir?

Mr. Murphy: They had no time stamps as to the receipt of these important messages, as to when they came in and went out?

Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Do you have any distinct recollection of discussing the pilot message on Saturday afternoon?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: When did General Marshall get that, and under what circumstances?

Colonel Bratton: I did not discuss that with General Marshall. I do not know where he was at that time.

Mr. Murphy: Who delivered it to him and when did he get it, do you know?

Colonel Bratton: I do not know, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Who does know? Do you know that?

Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Is there anybody in the Army who has got a record or who could tell as to when these things were delivered? Kramer said he could tell by the numbers that were assigned to them approximately what pouch they were contained in. I would like to know, and I think the record should show, if General Marshall got that pilot message on Saturday night, and if he got it, whom did he get it from?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Colonel Bratton: I do not know of any record that
3 could prove that, which is now in existence, sir.

4 Mr. Murphy: Then I would like to go over with you a
5 bit your testimony before the Grunert Board, on page 58.

6 "General Russell: Not by you. Now, did you ever
7 get information, from any source, relating to this, I will
8 call it, weather intercept about which you have testified
9 that you made some requests on the FCC?

10 "Colonel Bratton: As I have stated, sir, I got several
11 reports from the FCC about an intercept of a weather broad-
12 cast which they thought might be what I was looking for.
13 The message that I was waiting for, that is, the one which,
14 deciphered, would indicate a break in the relations between
15 Japan and the United States, never reached me from any
16 source whatever prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor."

17 That was what you testified to today, was it not?

18 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Murphy: "I had conversations on one of two occasions
20 with Colonel Sadtler of the Signal Corps, with Lieutenant
21 Kramer of the Navy, and with Commander McCollum of the
22 Navy, the latter being my opposite number in ONI, concerning
23 messages that had been picked up, either by the Navy or
24 by the FCC, containing weather broadcasts and containing
25 phrases similar to those that we were waiting for."

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Colonel Bratton: Yes.

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Mr. Murphy: Did you ever hear from any of them about any weather implementing message having been received up to December 7?

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Colonel Bratton: Not any implementing message, but the Navy got a number of false alarms, just as the FCC did.

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Mr. Murphy: Now you said on page 59:

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"On the morning of December the 5th I have a vague recollection of a meeting in General Miles' office where Colonel Sadtler was present, in which he said something to the effect that the message had come through. Questioning developed the fact, however, that the message he was talking about was one which indicated a break in diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Japan."

16

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

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(7)

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Mr. Murphy: Now do you have any recollection as to just what it did mean?

19

20

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir, I remember now that that is what he said.

21

Mr. Murphy: Between Great Britain and Japan?

22

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

23

Mr. Murphy: Now to go further:

24

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"That was beside the point at that time because it was our belief that relations between Japan and

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Great Britain were on the point of rupture and had been
3 for several days. The message that we were waiting for was
4 one which would indicate a break in relations between
5 Japan and the United States. I never received that message
6 from any source prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor."

7 And again at the bottom of the page:

8 "General Russell: Colonel, I am going to show you
9 a discussion of this message of December 4. I think we
10 can take it up about here (indicating) and read down to
11 that point."

12 That was referring to the Safford testimony, was it
13 not? The Safford testimony is contained on page 361 of
14 the record.

15 "Will you please read that, and after which I will
16 ask you a question or two."

17 I understood he handed you a paper at that time.

18 Your answer:

19 "This message never reached me, sir, prior to the
20 attack on Pearl Harbor nor, to the best of my knowledge
21 and belief, did it reach any other official of G-2 or
22 the War Department."

23 . You were then referring, were you not, to the testimony
24 of Captain Safford?

25 Colonel Bratton: I think so, yes, sir.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Now, then, on the bottom of page 60:

"Colonel Bratton: As to the first phrase, 'Higashi no kaze ame', that has been correctly translated.

"General Russell: And what was that translation?"

By the way, were you here during the testimony of Captain Kramer when he talked about the translation of that particular set of words?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir. What page are you reading from now?

Mr. Murphy: Page 60, at the bottom of the page.

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Do you have it there?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: "General Russell: And what was that translation?

"Colonel Bratton: War with -- it meant a break in diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States."

Captain Kramer said that he would not have translated that as meaning war. You are a Japanese student, are you?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, but the Japanese has got nothing to do with war or diplomatic relations, or anything else.

Mr. Murphy: In other words, these words would mean "East Wind Rain"?

Colonel Bratton: It simply means "East Wind Rain".

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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: "East Wind Rain"?

Colonel Bratton: Yes.

Mr. Murphy: In other words, if it was translated that is all it would mean, is "East Wind Rain".

Now, then, "Higashi no kaze ame" would mean strictly a reference to the weather itself?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: And then to decide what particular significance that had you would have to go, would you not, back to the basic message, to the code itself on page 154 of Exhibit 1?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: And what did that say on page 154? That was a strained diplomatic relation, was it not? Will you give us the exact words?

Colonel Bratton: "In case of a Japanese-U.S. relations in danger".

Mr. Murphy: Right. Now in your testimony you said:

"General Russell: And what was that translation?

"Colonel Bratton: War with -- it meant a break in diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. The code message that we intercepted and deciphered did not say that when this 'winds' message came through it meant war. It did say that it meant a break in diplomatic

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 relations. Stop."

2 Now when you were saying "Stop" there, you were
3 referring to the hidden word message, were you not?

4 Colonel Bratton: I do not remember saying "Stop", sir.
5 I think that was the stenographer's contribution.

6 Mr. Murphy: Do you see it there?

7 Colonel Bratton: I see it there.

8 Mr. Murphy: There was a winds code, a hidden words
9 message that would also indicate a break in relations that
10 had a stop in it?

11 Colonel Bratton: I was not referring to that at all.

12 Mr. Murphy: You just put a "Stop" in there to mean
13 stop, is that it?

14 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Murphy: Now on page 61:

16 "I believe that the second phrase, 'Nishi no kaze hare',
17 is correctly translated: War with Britain: That is, a
18 break in diplomatic relations between Japan and Great Britain."

19 Did you mean it meant war with Britain?

20 Colonel Bratton: No, it simply meant diplomatic rela-
21 tions were in danger.

22 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, I go to page 62. On the 5th,
23 after you had your conversation in General Miles' office
24 with Captain Sadtler, there was a message sent at that time,
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 was there not, to Hawaii, the so-called Rochefort message?

2 Colonel Bratton: That was sent on the 5th, sir.

3 Mr. Murphy: Now in that connection you said on page 62:

4 "There were several codes sent out by the Japanese
5 Foreign Office at about this time, to their diplomatic
6 officials abroad, which they hoped to use in the case or
7 in the event of a sudden rupture of communications. There
8 were several versions of this wind and weather code sent
9 out. I discussed these codes with my opposite number in the
10 ONI, Commander McCollum, on a number of occasions. Learning
11 from him that they were monitoring the Japanese communication
12 system in Honolulu as a function of Naval Communications,
13 and learning also from him that their expert there was a
14 Commander Rochefort, who was thoroughly familiar with the
15 whole matter, I deemed it advisable, on or about the 5th
16 of December, to have our G-2 in Honolulu contact Colonel
17 Rochefort, with the end in view that the latter could
18 explain to G-2 what it was we were waiting for, and could
19 explain to him orally, with complete security, the signifi-
20 cance of this message. G-2 did send a message."

21 Now why did you send that message? Let me refresh
22 your recollection. Shall I read your answer to that question
23 at that time?

24 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 Mr. Murphy: "General Frank: G-2 in Washington?

2 "Colonel Bratton: G-2, the A.C. of S. G-2 in the
3 War Department, then General Miles, upon my recommendation,
4 did send a message to G-2 in Honolulu, on or about the
5 morning of the 5th of December, directing him to contact
6 immediately Commander Rochefort with respect to the signifi-
7 cance of certain weather broadcasts coming from Tokyo.
8 That document is available in the files of G-2 now, sir.
9 The message did go out. I did it this way as a means of
10 saving time and for security reasons."

11 Now why was the message sent?

12 Colonel Bratton: Well, as I have stated here, as a
13 means of saving time and for security reasons.

14 Mr. Murphy: Were you giving information or seeking
15 information?

16 Colonel Bratton: I had had a discussion with Commander
17 McCollum, now Captain McCollum, as to the amount of knowledge
18 that the Navy had in Hawaii. He assured me his man Rochefort
19 there at that time knew practically everything that there
20 was to be known about the U.S.-Japanese relations through
21 one means or another. I knew that suitable warning messages
22 had been sent out to Hawaii and elsewhere. I had not
23 read the messages and did not know their exact contents.
24 I wanted to make sure that our G-2 in Hawaii got in touch
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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 with the ONI man in Hawaii, to get from him all the
2 intelligence that he had in his possession, and I knew
3 that if they got together on the subject of this winds
4 message -- I did not know, but I felt that they were going
5 from there, and that there would be a complete exchange of
6 intelligence and that the Army G-2 would then be in possession
7 of just as much intelligence as Rochefort, the ONI man, had.

8 Mr. Murphy: Did the Army at any time up to December
9 5 send to their G-2 in Hawaii the material on the winds
10 message set-up?

11 Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

12 Mr. Murphy: Fielder said he never heard about it,
13 didn't he, at Hawaii?

14 Colonel Bratton: I do not know.

15 Mr. Murphy: The fact is, I believe you will find from
16 the record, the Navy had it and did not give it to the
17 Army, and Fielder knew nothing about it even though the
18 Navy knew about it for days at Hawaii.

19 Colonel Bratton: I felt, and I know my opposite number
20 in the Navy felt, there was much closer liaison between
21 those two people than actually existed. We had the very
22 closest liaison and cooperation in Washington between ONI
23 and myself with respect to the Far East. I was told on
24 innumerable occasions by my opposite number in ONI that
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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 they were giving all this stuff to the Army.

2 Mr. Murphy: In other words, if you had seen General
3 Short's message "Liaison with the Navy" you would expect
4 just that, would you not?

5 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Murphy: You would not expect the Navy to have
7 something in Hawaii that the Army would not know about,
8 would you?

9 Colonel Bratton: I was told if the Navy was informed
10 that the Japanese Ambassador was burning his codes and
11 ciphers, and other diplomatic officials in this country
12 and American possessions were doing the same, that the
13 information would be transmitted to the Army.

14 Mr. Murphy: The difficulty there, Colonel, was that
15 the FBI, who apparently supplied the information, informed
16 Washington that the Japanese Consul was destroying most
17 of his important papers and yet the Navy and Army felt it
18 was a routine process, just burning some papers, one of
19 these day-to-day transactions.

20 Colonel Bratton: What I meant is this: A message
21 did go out from Naval Operations or Naval Intelligence
22 informing Admiral Kimmel that the Japanese were burning
23 certain codes and ciphers in Washington and elsewhere.
24 That is the message that I was told would be repeated to the
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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 Army, so I felt that it was not necessary for us to send
2 the same message in a different code, because that jeopardized
3 the security of the code.

4 Mr. Murphy: You have learned from these records, have
5 you not, that Admiral Kimmel did not give that information
6 to General Short?

7 Colonel Bratton: I have heard that in the testimony.

8 Mr. Murphy: Now when you sent this message on the 5th,
9 as I understand it, you wanted to have Fielder contact
10 Rochefort and go over the whole situation.

11 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Murphy: Did you mean, as I understood Captain
13 Safford to indicate, that you were informing Hawaii that
14 there was a winds intercept?

15 Colonel Bratton: No.

16 Mr. Murphy: And that that information would be available
17 there?

18 Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

19 Mr. Murphy: All right. Now then, I go to page 64.
20 On page 64 you were discussing with the Grunert Board the
21 question of the necessity of secrecy in connection with
22 these codes, and particularly the one setting up the winds
23 code. This is at the bottom of the page:

24 "Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir. I think, if I understand
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 your question, if the Japanese knew today that we were
2 reading any of their codes or ciphers, they could so
3 effectively change them as to make them unreadable from
4 now on over a period of considerable time."

5 By the way, this is on September 30, 1944.

6 "General Russell: Two to six weeks?

7 "Colonel Bratton: Such an act on their part might
8 well prolong our war with Japan much longer than necessary."

9 Would you think it would be proper, Colonel Bratton,
10 as an Intelligence man, during the month of September, 1944,
11 to be sending through the mails in English letters describing
12 the winds code and discussing it in detail?

13 Colonel Bratton: No, I think it would have been very
14 inadvisable to indulge in any such practice.

15 Mr. Murphy: Now continuing:

16 "General Russell: If they knew, therefore, that we
17 had intercepted these messages and had broken that code
18 at that time, it would convey to them no information as to
19 whether or not we had broken the code which they are using
20 today, would it?

21 "Colonel Bratton: Oh, yes, sir, it would, because
22 these code phrases are a code within a cipher. I didn't
23 make that clear. The whole message about this 'winds'
24 signal was in a very secret cipher, and these code expressions
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 were contained in that. This was their most secret
2 cipher, and it contained a code which was to be broadcast
3 as part of a weather broadcast.
4

5 "General Russell: And they are continuing to use that
6 cipher?

7 "Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

8 "General Russell: And this would disclose the fact
9 that we did have information on that secret cipher which
10 they do not know that we have, if they should learn that
11 we have picked this up?

12 "Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

13 "General Russell: Yes.

14 "General Grunert: Therefore, the danger of any leak
15 exists now as much as ever? "

16 That is September 30, 1944.

17 "Colonel Bratton: Sir?

18 "General Grunert: Therefore, the danger that any leak
19 of this thing might affect the war effort exists now as
20 it has in the past?

21 "Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir."

22 You made those answers to those questions at that time?

23 Colonel Bratton: Yes.

24 Mr. Murphy: Now on page 66:

25 "Colonel Bratton: Yes, there is this point to it: My

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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recollection is very definite to the effect that I did not get it prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. It may have been made available to me thereafter, and it would not have made much impression on me at that time because the attack had been made; it would no longer have as much significance in my mind.

* * *

"Colonel Bratton: My recollection of that is very vague, General, and I have discussed the matter with General Miles and his memory is equally vague. I have seen a statement made by Colonel Sadtler to the effect that on the morning of the 5th of December 1941 he went to General Miles with the oral statement that the 'winds' implementing message had been received by the Navy. He says that General Miles then sent for me and the three of us discussed it in General Miles' office. Colonel Sadtler further stated that he got this information from Admiral Noyes of the Navy, and it was to the effect that the phrase had come through which meant a break in the diplomatic relations between Japan and Great Britain. I don't remember the incident. Colonel Sadtler is so positive in his statement, however, that something of the sort must have happened. But the point I wish to emphasize is this: We knew that relations between Japan and Great Britain were on the point of being

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 broken at any minute. We had been telling everybody so.
3 That is not the message that we were waiting for. The one
4 we were waiting for was one which would indicate a break
5 between Japan and the United States.

6 "General Frank: Since you were waiting for this, and
7 you did have some information on a message that did come
8 through, so far as you remember you did not investigate it
9 further to find out if the 'winds' message concerning the
10 United States had come through; is that correct?

11 "Colonel Bratton: Yes, I did make further inquiries
12 about this message, but prior to investigating the thing
13 more thoroughly I had dispatched to G-2 in Hawaii the
14 message that I have previously referred to, so that if
15 this 'winds' code implementing message did come through,
16 they in Hawaii would be alerted just as quickly as we
17 were."

18 Now, that leads to the possible inference that on
19 the 5th of December you felt that there should be special
20 precautions taken about Hawaii. Did you mean to create
21 that inference?

22 Do you understand me?

23 Colonel Bratton: No, sir, I do not understand you.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Colonel Bratton, you say here:

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"Yes, I did make further inquiries about this message but prior to investigating the thing more thoroughly, I had dispatched to G-2 in Hawaii the message that I have previously referred to, so that if this 'winds code' implementing message did come through they in Hawaii would be alerted just as quickly as we were."

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Which, I understand to mean that after the event you felt Hawaii at least had as much information as you did. Is that what you mean?

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Colonel Bratton: Well, everybody was making such a hullabaloo about this winds business, I thought, to be on the safe side, we might as well alert Hawaii to this thing, to let them listen in and get it, just as soon, if not sooner than we did.

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Mr. Murphy: Well, did you send the message to the Philippines? I mean it was Hawaii you were alerting now, you were singling them out. How about the Philippines? How about the Panama Canal, and how about the Aleutians? Or was it that you were going to Rochefort, because you understood he was an expert?

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Colonel Bratton: That was one of the reasons, yes, sir.

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Mr. Murphy: If it was an alert, the question is why

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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1 did not it go to the Philippines where there was more
2 danger? Why would not you alert them?

3 Colonel Bratton: I do not know from what source I
4 got the information, but my feeling at that time was that
5 the Philippines had been adequately alerted, and that the
6 replies from the Commanding General there were satisfac-
7 tory.

8 Mr. Murphy: This is on the 5th.

9 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: What replies? There were no replies
11 then -- I see. The replies that came in to the message of
12 the 27th. All right.

13 Now, then, I would like to ask you some questions
14 about this paper here, called Secret Summary of Far Eastern
15 Documents. What do you know about that? Who prepared it
16 and why?

17 Mr. Chairman, there is something of immediate import-
18 ance that has just come up. I ask permission to pass the
19 question and pass the examination, with the right to ask
20 a few questions after I return. I mean, after the others
21 have completed their examination .

22 The Vice Chairman: Without objection, it is so ordered.

23 Colonel Bratton: This was prepared as the result of
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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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a letter written by the President of the United States to
2 the Chief of Staff on the 14th of July, 1943. I have a
3 copy of the letter here, sir, if you would like to have
4 me read it.

5

The Vice Chairman: Suppose you just hold that until
6 Mr. Murphy is able to return, Colonel. He had to go to
7 answer a roll call in the House.

8

Senator Brewster would be next. He is not present at
9 the moment.

10

Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire, Colonel.

11

Mr. Gearhart: You have listened to the testimony,
12 Colonel, of Captain Kramer?

13

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

14

Mr. Gearhart: Did you understand his testimony in
15 reference to the deliveries he made on December 6, that
16 he delivered one to the White House and left it there in
17 what they call the plan room?

18

The Vice Chairman: The situation room.

19

Mr. Gearhart: The situation room.

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Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

21

Mr. Gearhart: That he delivered another one to Colonel
22 Knox, that he read them and returned them to him?

23

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Gearhart: That he delivered a third set to Admiral
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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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1 Wilkinson and General Miles who were dining together in
2 Alexandria?

3 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Those are the only three deliveries
5 he made of the 13 parts on the 6th day of December?

6 Colonel Bratton: I believe so, yes, sir.

7 Mr. Gearhart: Now, on the 6th you made how many
8 deliveries of the 13 parts?

9 Colonel Bratton: One that I can positively recall.
10 That was to the Secretary of State, through his night duty
11 officer.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Are you positive, in your present memory
13 of your deliveries, that you did not make a delivery to
14 the office of the Secretary of the Chief of Staff of the
15 Army?

16 Colonel Bratton: No, sir, I am not positive. Neither
17 am I positive that I did. The only thing that I am positive
18 about in connection with the copy that went to the Chief of
19 Staff is that he had it on his desk in front of him, all
20 14 parts, when I reached him Sunday morning. I am quite
21 positive that I did not make that delivery, and I did not
22 put it on his desk.

23 Mr. Gearhart: You say now that you are positive that
24 you did not make a delivery of the 13 part message to the
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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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office of the Secretary or to General Marshall himself

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on the night of the 6th?

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Colonel Bratton: I am not positive, sir.

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Mr. Gearhart: You are not positive?

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Colonel Bratton: I am not positive whether the delivery

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was made or not.

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Mr. Gearhart: Have you on a prior occasion testified

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that you did?

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Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Gearhart: But today, as you look back through the

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years and consider all that you have learned in the meantime

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you are now not positive that you made that delivery?

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Colonel Bratton: My memory must have been at fault

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when I made those statements before the Grunert Board,

15

sir.

16

Mr. Gearhart: Now, do you remember the testimony of

17

Admiral Kramer, as to the morning of the 7th?

18

The Vice Chairman: Captain Kramer.

19

Mr. Gearhart: Or Captain Kramer?

20

He testified, did he not that he delivered a full set

21

14 parts, to the White House at about 9 o'clock in the

22

morning; is that correct?

23

Colonel Bratton: Yes. That was a duplication of my

24

effort. There was no necessity for his doing so, and that

25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

h6

1 was my task at the time.

2 Mr. Gearhart: To deliver to the White House?

3 Colonel Bratton: Not to the White House, but to the
4 State Department.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Yes, but he testified, as you remember,
6 and I think you will verify my memory of it, he testified
7 at these proceedings he delivered at nine o'clock a full
8 set of 14 parts to the White House.

9 Colonel Bratton: I believe I remember that statement,
10 yes.

11 Mr. Gearhart: And around 10 o'clock he delivered a
12 full set of the 14 parts to the Secretary of State's
13 office.

14 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Gearhart: Did he testify -- I am not sure about
16 this -- that he made any other deliveries on the morning
17 of the 7th?

18 Colonel Bratton: Captain Kramer?

19 Mr. Gearhart: Captain Kramer. They are the only two,
20 is that not correct?

21 Colonel Bratton: My recollection is that he testified
22 that he delivered the 14 parts to the Chief of Naval Opera-
23 tions in his office sometime that morning.

24 Mr. Gearhart: That is right. I remember that.
25

Witness Bratton

Questionsby: Mr. Gearhart

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As you remember it, that is all?

Colonel Bratton: I haven't any clear recollection about what Captain Kramer did, Mr. Gearhart. His evidence is before the committee.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, you listened to it, just as I have been listening to it.

Colonel Bratton: I listened to an awful lot of evidence here. I remember some of it, and some of it I do not.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, what deliveries did you make on Sunday morning of the 14th part?

Colonel Bratton: I may have delivered the 14th part of this message to Mr. Stone, the confidential secretary of the Secretary of State, over in his office sometime between 8 and 9, but I do not remember doing so.

I do remember calling Mr. Stone on the telephone to make sure that the Secretary of State had all 14 parts that morning.

Now, Captain Kramer has testified that he saw me over in the State Department sometime around 10 o'clock. Captain Kramer's memory is at fault in that respect, because he could not possibly have seen me there at that time of day. I was busy doing something else.

Mr. Gearhart: But you know that the State Department

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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got its 14th part?

Colonel Bratton: I know that because I verified it by telephone.

Mr. Gearhart: And you know, from hearing Captain Kramer testify, that the White House got the 14th part?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: At nine o'clock?

Colonel Bratton: Yes.

Mr. Gearhart: Delivered by Captain Kramer. Did you deliver the 14th part to the Secretary of the Chief of Staff, in his office?

Colonel Bratton: I have no recollection of making any delivery that morning, except of the 1 p.m. delivery message which I handed to General Marshall in person.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, you rang up General Marshall and told him you had a very important message, that you could get it to him in ten minutes if he would wait there. That was nine o'clock in the morning.

Colonel Bratton: Shortly after nine o'clock, between 9 and 9:15 I would say, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Did not you talk with General Marshall himself?

Colonel Bratton: Not until he called me back sometime after ten.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Gearhart: You first talked to the orderly; then
3 he called you back and you said to General Marshall that
4 you would bring out to him a very important message if
5 he would stay there, that you would get out there in ten
6 minutes.

7 Colonel Bratton: I did not mention how long it would
8 take me to give it to him. I said if he would stay where
9 he was I would bring the message to him.

10 Mr. Gearhart: Did not you, at sometime in your testi-
11 mony use the phrase "ten minutes"?

12 Colonel Bratton: I do not think so, sir.

13 Mr. Gearhart: You could have gotten out there in how
14 short a time?

15 Colonel Bratton: I could have gotten there in ten
16 minutes, I think.

17 Mr. Gearhart: But he said he was coming in and you
18 would meet him in his office.

19 Colonel Bratton: Yes.

20 Mr. Gearhart: When did you enter his office?

21 Colonel Bratton: After my conversation with General
22 Miles, I went up towards General Marshall's office, and
23 stood around there in the hall, or in the office of the
24 Secretary of the General Staff, waiting for General Marshall
25 to arrive.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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Mr. Gearhart: You got there ahead of General Marshall then?

Colonel Bratton: Oh, I had been there ever since half-past eight in the morning.

Mr. Gearhart: And waited for the General to come in?

Colonel Bratton: I was waiting for him to come in after he told me he was coming, yes.

Mr. Gearhart: And you were in the reception room of General Marshall's office?

Colonel Bratton: In the office of the Secretary of the General Staff.

Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

Colonel Bratton: Either there or standing in the door or out in the hall.

Mr. Gearhart: And General Marshall entered from the hall directly into his office, is that right?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 Mr. Gearhart: And when you went into General Marshall's
2 office it was about what time?

3 Colonel Bratton: 11:25.

4 Mr. Gearhart: So although you could have gotten out to
5 him in 10 minutes, it took General Marshall from 9:00 or
6 9:15 to 11:45 to get in to his office; is that correct?

7 Colonel Bratton: I did not see him until 11:25, sir.

8 Mr. Gearhart: And when you saw him he was sitting at
9 his desk reading the 14-part message?

10 Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

11 Mr. Gearhart: That was a long document?

12 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Gearhart: And you had to wait awhile until he
14 completed reading it?

15 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Gearhart: And he had all 14 parts?

17 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Gearhart: And the only places that the 14 parts
19 had been delivered before that meeting at 11:25 was at the
20 White House and the State Department and to Admiral Stark?

21 Colonel Bratton: That was by the Navy, sir.

22 Mr. Gearhart: That is the Navy and Army together making
23 deliveries of the 14 parts.

24 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I do not want to break in
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 on the Congressman --

3 Mr. Gearhart: I would just as soon suspend for a few
4 minutes.

5 Senator Lucas: The assumption is wrong.

6 Colonel Bratton: I know the 14th part got over to the
7 State Department shortly after it reached me. I do not
8 know whether I took it or sent Colonel Dusenbury over with it.

9 Mr. Gearhart: You heard Captain Kramer testify he
10 delivered one at 9:00 o'clock or shortly after 9:00 o'clock
11 to the State Department, too?

12 Colonel Bratton: That means by that time the State
13 Department must have had two complete sets.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. And you heard Kramer testify he
15 delivered one to the White House?

16 Colonel Bratton: I think so, sir.

17 Mr. Gearhart: And you have heard Kramer testify he
18 delivered one to General Stark -- I mean Admiral Stark?

19 Colonel Bratton: I think I remember his saying that
20 he delivered one to him in his office that morning, yes, sir.

21 Mr. Gearhart: You did not deliver one to General
22 Marshall's office?

23 Colonel Bratton: I do not remember delivering anything
24 to General Marshall that morning except the 1:00 p.m.
25 delivery message.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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2 Mr. Gearhart: It took General Marshall two hours and
3 a quarter to make the trip that you could have made in
4 ten minutes, and when you saw him he had the 14 parts in
5 his hand?

6
7 Colonel Bratton: That is very definite, sir. He had
8 it on the desk in front of him and was reading it. I think
9 if you will go back and look at General Miles' testimony
10 you will find that he supports me in the statement that
11 we tried to interrupt him with this 1:00 p.m. delivery
12 business but he would not be interrupted, and he went right
13 ahead with his reading until he got to the end of the 14
14 parts.

15
16 Mr. Gearhart: Then the sum total of this is that
17 General Marshall, at 11:25, had the 14th part and 13 other
18 parts in his possession. You did not deliver it to him,
19 and the only place he could have gotten it would be from
20 the State Department, from Admiral Stark, or from the
21 White House?

22
23 Colonel Bratton: No, it could have been delivered to
24 his secretary by Colonel Dusenbury, my assistant, because
25 Colonel Dusenbury reached the office, oh, sometime after
26 9:00 o'clock that morning and he could very readily have
27 grabbed up all these pouches, assembled them together,
28 locked them up and made his rounds in the building, as well

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 as in the State Department. But from the time that
 2 I received this 1:00 p.m. delivery message I just wiped
 3 everything else out of my mind and let him run the rest
 4 of the office.
 5

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C

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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Mr. Gearhart: Did Colonel Dusenbury ever tell you that
3 he had made such delivery?

4 Colonel Bratton: Colonel Dusenbury's memory is worse
5 than mine. He doesn't remember what he did that morning.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Well, then, you have been very definite
7 on these questions I have been asking you in reference to
8 where deliveries had been made by you and Captain Kramer, have
9 you not? Your memory is pretty good on those deliveries so
10 far as your testimony is concerned now?

11 Colonel Bratton: Fairly good, but I have heard these
12 statements by Captain Kramer within the last day or so. All
13 this happened five years ago.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Is Colonel Dusenbury in the city now?

15 Colonel Bratton: He is on duty in G-2, War Department
16 General Staff.

17 Mr. Gearhart: In Washington?

18 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Gearhart: What makes you think his memory is so
20 vague?

21 Colonel Bratton: Because I have talked to him since his
22 return from Chungking trying to get this thing straightened
23 out in our two minds.

24 Mr. Gearhart: And he has told you that he does not re-
25 member about what he did on the morning of the 7th of December

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

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1941 in reference to the delivery of the fourteenth part of
the message?

3

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Colonel Bratton: He has no definite recollection as to
what he did on the night of the 6th or the morning of the 7th.

5

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Mr. Keefe: So that I can relate that last remark, did
you say, Colonel, that Colonel Dusenbury has no recollection
of what he did on the evening of the 6th or the 7th?

7

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Colonel Bratton: I mean at this moment, Mr. Keefe, or,
rather the last time I talked to him, which was some three
weeks ago, he did not have a definite recollection at that time
as to the details of what he did on the night of the 6th or
the morning of the 7th.

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Mr. Keefe: I was interested because we have Colonel
Clausen's affidavit in here.

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Colonel Bratton: It interested me, too.

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Mr. Keefe: Yes.

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Mr. Gearhart: Then you haven't any explanation of what
caused General Marshall to spend two hours and a half, ap-
proximately, in making a trip that you could make in ten min-
utes?

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Mr. Kaufman: Mr. Chairman --

Colonel Bratton: I haven't any idea.

Mr. Kaufman: Mr. Chairman, may I suggest to the Con-
gressman that the testimony of the witness is that he called

Witness Bra tton

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1

2 General Marshall's home, his orderly, at 9:15; that General
3 Marshall called him back somewhat after 10 o'clock and the
4 time between the time General Marshall called Colonel Bratton
5 and 11:25 is the time, not the two hours, I think.

6 Mr. Gearhart: Is that correct, Colonel?

7 Colonel Bra tton: That is correct, sir.

8 Mr. Gearhart: All right. What time did you receive a
9 call back from General Marshall?

10 Colonel Bratton: Some time between 10 and 10:30; about
11 10:25 I would say.

12 Mr. Gearhart: An hour before you saw him at his office?

13 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Can you account why it took him an hour
15 to make a trip that you could have made in ten minutes?

16 Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

17 Mr. Gearhart: When you told him there was a very, very
18 important message that you had to deliver to him?

19 Colonel Bratton: No, sir, except that I remember hearing
20 General Marshall say that he was taking a bath some time that
21 morning. He may not have been fully dressed at the time.

22 Mr. Gearhart: Mr. Chairman, I was relieving the Gentleman
23 from Pennsylvania who was examining some papers and I have
24 completed my examination at this point and will let him
25 make his own examination.

1 Witness Bratton

Questions by: The ViceChairman

2 The Vice Chairman: Thank you very much. Would it be
3 agreeable for me to ask a question while you are getting your
4 papers together, Mr. Murphy?

5 Mr. Murphy: Yes, surely.

6 The Vice Chairman: As I recall General Marshall's testi-
7 mony, Colonel, - you doubtless were present when he testified
8 about that. As I remember -- see if you can help straighten
9 me out -- didn't he state that he had returned from the horse-
10 back ride and was in the act of taking a shower when he got
11 word that you wanted to come out to see him?

12 Colonel Bratton: That is my recollection of his testi-
13 mony, yes, sir.

14 Senator George: That is what he said.

15 The Vice Chairman: And when he got this message while he
16 was in the act of taking a shower, that you wanted to come out
17 there and see him, he then told whoever it was that delivered
18 that message to you to tell you that he was coming right on
19 to the Department and he stated that he thought he got there
20 within about ten minutes.

21 Colonel Bratton: That is my recollection of General Mar-
22 shall's testimony, yes, sir.

23 The Vice Chairman: But in the light of what he stated
24 it is still your recollection as you have given it to us here?

25 Colonel Bratton: As I have given it to you today, sir.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 The Vice Chairman: That you called his home and talked
3 to an orderly about 9:15?

4 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

5 The Vice Chairman: And left the message that you were
6 very anxious to talk to General Marshall and that General
7 Marshall called you about 10:25 and you told him that you
8 wanted to see him and he told you that he was coming on to
9 the Department and about 11:25 you saw him in his office?

10 Colonel Bratton: Well, a possible explanation for this
11 may lie in the fact that the orderly did go out to look for
12 him and missed him and did not contact him until the General
13 himself had gotten back to his quarters and was taking a bath.
14 That is the only explanation I can think of to account for
15 this long gap.

16 The Vice Chairman: But as I recall General Marshall's
17 testimony, he did not indicate that he talked to you on the
18 phone that morning at all.

19 Colonel Bratton: I know that, sir, but my recollection
20 on that point is very clear.

21 The Vice Chairman: That you talked to him on the phone?

22 Colonel Bratton: I did talk to General Marshall in per-
23 son. He called me at my office.

24 The Vice Chairman: Well, General Marshall stated, as I
25 recall, that he was called at his home and was in the act of

1 Witness Bratton

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 taking a shower bath and whoever talked to you on the phone
3 told him that you wanted to come out there and see him and
4 that he told them to tell you that he was coming right in to
5 his office.

6 Colonel Bratton: Well, of course, there is a conflict
7 between General Marshall's recollection and mine but mine is
8 just as positive as his was.

9 The Vice Chairman: I see, all right. And you do defin-
10 itely remember that he did call you back and you talked to
11 him on the phone?

12 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

13 The Vice Chairman: And that that was not later than
14 10:30?

15 Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

16 The Vice Chairman: And you waited then till he came in
17 and you saw him at 11:25?

18 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

19 The Vice Chairman: Thank you. Mr. Murphy.

20 Mr. Gearhart: You cannot offer any explanation, however,
21 as to how General Marshall got that fourteenth part?

22 Colonel Bratton: Other than I have given you, sir, I
23 have no explanation.

24 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Murphy will continue his inquiry.

25 Mr. Murphy: I now refer to page 76, Colonel, of the tes-

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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timony before the Grunert Board and --

3

Colonel Bratton: What page is that, sir?

4

Mr. Murphy: Page 76. You were talking there about the memorandum. (Reading)

6

"General Russell: Yes. Now let us consider the long memorandum which you stated a moment ago that you placed on the Chief of Staff's desk that morning. From what source did you get the long memorandum?"

7

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Colonel Bratton: I would like to correct that statement at this time if I may, sir. That is not in accordance with my recollection.

11

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Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate, before the Grunert Board you said you placed it on the Chief of Staff's desk and now you say your recollection is that you did not?

14

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16

Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

17

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Mr. Murphy: All right. Now, down at the bottom of the page you say:

19

20

"May I refer to some notes that I made at the time, sir?"

21

Where are the notes?

22

Colonel Bratton: You say where are the notes?

23

24

Mr. Murphy: Yes. "May I refer to some notes that I made at the time, sir?" You said:

25

"I handed it to him in person.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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"General Russell: About what time?"

3

He was referring then to the one o'clock message.

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"Colonel Bratton: May I refer to some notes that I made at the time, sir?"

5

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Where are the notes?

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Colonel Bratton: These are the notes that General Miles and I compiled together some time between the 10th and the 15th of December, as I understood it at the request of the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff asked General Gerow and General Miles both to prepare memoranda as to what transpired in his office on the morning of the 7th of December. General Miles wrote it out and then asked me to edit it for him and make such corrections as I thought were necessary based upon my own recollection.

Mr. Murphy: At any rate, you restricted your notes entirely and exclusively as to what happened at Marshall's office after his arrival, is that it? If you were going to cover that morning and you thought it important enough to cover some of the high-lights, I am wondering why you did not make a memo --

Colonel Bratton: As I recall it now, sir, it was the events that took place after his arrival in the office.

Mr. Murphy: But you did not include anything as to what happened before?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Colonel Bratton: Not in that memorandum, no, sir.

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Mr. Murphy: Did you make any memoranda yourself when you knew that this was the day that war started and being an expert in intelligence and knowing the importance of notes and knowing in all likelihood you would want to refer back to it did you make any memorandum of the events of that morning if for no other reason for historical purposes?

9

Colonel Bratton: Sir?

10

11

Mr. Murphy: If for no other reason for historical purposes did you make any notes?

12

13

Colonel Bratton: No, sir, I don't remember making any notes.

14

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Mr. Murphy: Then the notes you referred to there were the notes, the memoranda as to what had happened in Marshall's office?

17

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Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir, and as I remember it I then read to General Russell the statement that I had made before the Clarke Board, which was a direct quotation from the combined notes that General Miles and I made.

21

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Mr. Murphy: You then read :

"The message in question was delivered to me from the Navy some time between 8:30 and 9:00 that morning.

It was immediately apparent that it was of such importance that it ought to be communicated to the Chief of

3
W itness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Staff, the A. C. of S. G-2, and the Chief of WPD with the least practicable delay. Neither of these officers were in their offices at that time."

3

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Now, did you go to their offices or did you call them?

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Colonel Bratton: Well, I seem to have contradicted myself here, sir.

7

8

Mr. Murphy: In what way, Colonel? I don't think you did but if you can tell me how you think you did I may be able to help you out. What contradiction do you find there?

9

10

Colonel Bratton: Down to line 4 on page 77 I was quoting from my memory. From there on I think I was quoting from the combined memorandum that General Miles and I made.

11

12

Mr. Murphy: As I understand it, you got this message between 8:30 and 9 o'clock and you told the Board that you called Marshall's quarters around 9 o'clock. You told us that you called General Miles about the same time. Now, there was some --

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Colonel Bratton: No, not about the same time. I called General Miles to report to him what I had done with respect to trying to get ahold of General Marshall.

17

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Mr. Murphy: Well, you found out that when you could not locate General Marshall -- that would take about two or three minutes, wouldn't it, to make a phone call?

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Colonel Bratton: Five minutes at the most.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: Well, that would make it, say, 9:15.

3

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

4

Mr. Murphy: Then you called General Miles?

5

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

6

Mr. Murphy: Why did it take from 9:15 to 11:25 for

7

General Miles to get down, do you know that?

8

Colonel Bratton: It did not. General Miles got down to his office some time around 10 o'clock, sir.

10

Mr. Murphy: Let us go into that:

11

"I called General Marshall's quarters by telephone and was informed that he had gone horseback riding. I requested his orderly to go out and find him at once and ask him to call me on the telephone as soon as practicable, as I had an important message to deliver to him. I then called General Miles and reported to him the step that I had taken, and recommended that he come down to the office at once. I do not remember whether I called General Gerow or whether General Miles called him, but we had some discussion as to which one of us would do it, and I don't remember now which one of us did, but in any event General Gerow was summoned to his office.

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"I waited for the telephone call from General Marshall, which I received some time between ten and eleven."
As I understand it, when you are testifying to us you

1 Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 made it a definite time, did you not? Do you recall what time
3 it was you said you called Marshall when you were testifying
4 to us?

5 Colonel Bratton: I said a little while ago that it was
6 about half past ten, sir.

7 Mr. Murphy: All right. Well, here you said between ten
8 and eleven. (Reading)

9 "I informed him that I had a message of extreme im-
10 portance which he should see at once, and told him that
11 I would bring it to his quarters if he so desired. He
12 said to report to him in his office, as he was on his
13 way there. I reported to him in his office at about
14 11:25, immediately upon his arrival. Shortly thereafter
15 General Miles arrived."

16 Now, where did he arrive from?

17 Colonel Bratton: That statement in the light of my pre-
18 sent recollection is incorrect. General Miles and I went in
19 together.

20 Mr. Murphy: Now it is quite important. You said that
21 you called General Marshall around 9:15 and that it took
22 from then until 11:25 in order for him to show up at his of-
23 fice; that you talked to him about 10:30 and it took from
24 10:30 till 11:25 for him to show up at his office.

25 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: You say that you talked to General Miles about 9:15 and then he shows up at 11:25.

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Colonel Bratton: No, sir, General Miles got to his office at 10 o'clock.

5

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Mr. Murphy: Where do you say that? You say:

7

"He said to report to him in his office, as he was on his way there. I reported to him in his office at about 11:25, immediately upon his arrival. Shortly thereafter General Miles arrived."

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Now, do you mean arrived from his office or from his home?

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Colonel Bratton: I meant there that General Miles arrived in General Marshall's office.

14

Mr. Murphy: All right.

15

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Colonel Bratton: And the statement is incorrect because General Miles and I went into General Marshall's office together.

18

19

Mr. Murphy: Do you know when General Miles got to his office that morning?

20

21

Colonel Bratton: Do I know when General Miles got to his office?

22

Mr. Murphy: Yes.

23

24

25

Colonel Bratton: I think it was about ten o'clock, sir, because I had a conversation with him in his office before we went up to see the Chief of Staff.

1 Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate, you meant that he arrived
3 and you were incorrect on that because he went with you in-
4 stead of arriving?

5 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Murphy: After you got there?

7 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Murphy: And you were incorrect in that detail. Now,
9 then, General Miles at page 78 (Reading):

10 "General Miles and I stated that we believed there
11 was important significance in the time of the delivery of
12 the reply, one P.M., an indication that some military
13 action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time.
14 We thought it probable that the Japanese line of action
15 would be into Thailand but that it might be into any one
16 or more of a number of other areas. General Miles urged
17 that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and the West Coast
18 be informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be
19 delivered at one o'clock that afternoon, Washington time,
20 and that they, the Commanders in the areas indicated,
21 should be on the alert."

22 Is that your recollection at present?

23 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Murphy: Now, at the bottom of the second paragraph:

25 (Reading)

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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"There was some discussion at this time, I believe, as to whether or not the Philippines should be included."

Why would there be any doubt about the Philippines when the war warning said they were going to raid there, or that they would? Would that be because --

Colonel Bratton: Well, I believe -- my recollection as to the details of this conversation between General Gerow and Colonel Bundy and General Marshall are not very clear, but my recollection is that General Gerow mentioned the fact that the Philippines had been adequately alerted and that General Mac Arthur's reply indicated that he was on the alert.

Mr. Murphy: Now, right there: If you saw MacArthur's reply why didn't you see Hawaii's reply?

Colonel Bratton: If I saw what?

Mr. Murphy: You are here discussing the kind of replies that were received and that the Philippines were on the alert. You said you knew that because you saw the reply. Why would you see one and not the other?

Colonel Bratton: I never testified that I had seen any of them.

Mr. Murphy: Well, you say that General Miles said they were adequately alerted.

Colonel Bratton: I said General Gerow said that.

Mr. Murphy: General Gerow. Well, did you discuss whether

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Hawaii was adequately alerted at that time?

3 Colonel Bratton: Not that I remember, no, sir.

4 Mr. Murphy: Gerow said that the Philippines were ade-
5 quately alerted. Was there some doubt about that?

6 Colonel Bratton: I prefaced my remark, Mr. Murphy, with
7 the statement that my recollection as to the details of the
8 discussion about the Philippines was not clear.

9 Mr. Murphy: Well, I am just wondering why --

10 Colonel Bratton: Now, if there was a discussion about
11 whether or not the Philippines should be alerted it must have
12 stemmed from the facts that I have stated.

13 Mr. Murphy: Well, isn't it rather singular that there
14 should be some discussion about the Philippines being ade-
15 quately alerted and that would lead to the inference that
16 Hawaii was not adequately alerted if you were going to send it
17 to Hawaii and not to the Philippines? Isn't that a pretty
18 fair argument or thought to follow, or are you in doubt?

19 Colonel Bratton: Well, I have no explanation to make at
20 this time as to why Hawaii was not discussed, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: Well, on page 79 you said:

22 "General Miles said he thought it probably meant an
23 attack on Thailand but that the timing had some signifi-
24 cance, and that warning messages to our people should be
25 sent. General Gerow, Colonel Bundy and I concurred."

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Now, then, on this question of sending the message, you testified that your recollection was that it would take thirty to forty minutes to send a message. I direct your attention to page 80 -- well, the bottom of page 79 first.

(Reading)

"I took the message to Colonel French, Signal Corps officer in charge of the message center, explained to him that it was General Marshall's desire that the message be transmitted to the addressees by the fastest possible safe means, giving the Philippines first priority. Colonel French said that he would give it his personal attention and processing of the message would commence immediately.

"I then returned to the office of the Chief of Staff. The latter directed me to find out how long it would take for the delivery of the message to the addressees. I returned to the message center and talked the matter over with Colonel French, who informed me that the message would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes."

Now, would that be your best recollection, or would thirty to forty minutes be?

Colonel Bratton: Well, it is about thirty to forty min-

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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: But he did tell you that it would be encoded in about three minutes, is that right?

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Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

6

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Mr. Murphy: And he told you it would be on the air in about eight minutes?

8

Colonel Bratton: That is correct, too.

9

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Mr. Murphy: And be delivered in Hawaii in Short's hands in an overall period of thirty minutes?

11

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Colonel Bratton: He didn't say that. He said it would be delivered --

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Mr. Murphy: He said, "in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes." That is what you said, isn't it? Will you look at the top of the page? I am reading your words in this record, - "and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes."

18

Did Colonel French tell you that?

19

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Colonel Bratton: Yes, but that does not mean that it would be in General Short's hands. This message would be sent out in secret cipher. It had to be deciphered, then decoded and delivered to General Short so that he could read it.

23

24

Mr. Murphy: Let me read the line here: "And in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes."

25

You meant what you said there, did you not? Isn't that

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 English and doesn't that say, "In the hands of the addressees"
3 and wasn't General Short an addressee?

4 Colonel Bratton: I do not mean and I don't think Colonel
5 French meant that this message would be in General Short's
6 hands in readable form in that time.

7 Mr. Murphy: What does it mean, "In the hands of ad-
8 dressees?" Who was the addressee? Wasn't it Short?

9 Colonel Bratton: Well, a message that goes out in code
10 and cipher addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
11 partment, first goes to his Signal Officer for decoding or
12 deciphering, then it is typed up, and it goes to the Adjutant
13 General for delivery.

14 Mr. Murphy: Did you say anything like that before Gen-
15 eral Marshall, or anything like that before the Board?

16 Colonel Bratton: It wasn't necessary to say anything
17 like that to General Marshall. He is just as familiar with
18 Army procedure as I was, or more so.

19 Mr. Murphy: "Let me see exactly what you said in English,
20 "And in the hands of the addressees in thirty minutes. I
21 looked at my watch at this time and saw that it was 11:50 A.M.
22 I returned to the Chief of Staff's office and reported to him
23 the information as to speed of delivery that had been given me
24 by Colonel French."

25 Did you so testify before the Army Board? You did so

1 Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 testify before the Army Board, did you not?

3 Colonel Bratton: I did return to the Chief of Staff's
4 office and report to him on the information that I had gotten
5 from Colonel French, yes, sir.

6 Mr. Murphy: And you also testified that it would be in
7 the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes, did you
8 tell him that?

9 Colonel Bratton: I told him just exactly what Colonel
10 French had told me.

11 Mr. Murphy: What is it?

12 Colonel Bratton: I told him just exactly what Colonel
13 French had told me.

14 Mr. Murphy: Isn't that what you said?

15 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: I mean is that it in the record?

17 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Murphy: I now direct your attention to page 82 --
19 well, I will pass that. That is just that you made your memo-
20 randum on the 10th of December. You did not make any memo on
21 what French had told you? I mean you did not make any memo-
22 randa covering your recollection of what Colonel French had
23 told you when you went over to him?

24 Colonel Bratton: I cannot remember at this time, sir.

25 Mr. Murphy: All right.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Colonel Bratton: I would like to correct that last statement I made, sir. I think that this whole business is incorporated in the memorandum that General Miles read into the record when he testified and was part of the combined memorandum that he and I prepared.

Mr. Murphy: How does it compare with what you told the Grunert Board, do you know, about the thirty minutes, being in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes?

Colonel Bratton: I think it is the same thing; that is, in other words, about three minutes to encode and thirty minutes to be in the hands of the addressees. I think you will find that in the memorandum that General Miles submitted in evidence.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, I go to page 85. I come back to Miles. You say that General Miles came to his office at 10 o'clock. I direct your attention to the bottom of page 84:

(Reading)

"General Russell: Well, when did G-2 get to the office that morning?

"Colonel Bratton: My recollection is, sir, that he came in at about the same time General Marshall reached his office."

Colonel Bratton: That statement is incorrect, sir.

Mr. Murphy: You were off an hour and a half on that one,

1 Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 weren't you?

3 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Murphy: You say:

5 "I had been waiting in the anteroom or in the hall
6 so I could catch them the minute they got there, and my
7 recollection is that General Miles came in right on the
8 heels of General Marshall, and I followed them both to
9 the latter's office."

10 That is what you told the Army Grunert Board, wasn't it?

11 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir, and I was giving my best
12 recollection at the time.

13 Mr. Murphy: I am not quarreling with you. I am just
14 trying to find out what time they did come in. At any rate,
15 in September 1944 that was your testimony about General Miles'
16 arrival?

17 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, I come to page 87. On page 87
19 General Russell places in the record the following:

20 "On November 26 we received specific evidence of
21 Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both
22 Britain and the United States."

23 What information did we receive of that intention on the
24 26th of November, do you know? He said:

25 "Independently of records, do you know whether or

1 Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 not such a message as that was received by the War De-
3 partment from the Navy Department?"

4 And you say --

5 Colonel Bratton: I think General Russell was reading
6 there from some statement made by Captain Safford, sir, and I
7 notice that I have a notation here in this evidence in my
8 handwriting which says, "Wrong".

9 Mr. Murphy: Well, I wish you would refer to page 87
10 and see what General Russell put in.

11 Colonel Bratton: I am looking at page 87.

12 Mr. Murphy: He said to you:

13 "Independently of records, do you know whether or
14 not such a message as that was received by the War De-
15 partment from the Navy Department?"

16 Mr. Keefe: I would like to find some place along in
17 these notations where it says "Right". All the testimony is
18 being completely shifted about now in so many of the import-
19 ant things. I am getting disturbed about it.

20 Mr. Murphy: You mean right, r-i-g-h-t?

21 Mr. Keefe: R-i-g-h-t, yes.

22 Mr. Murphy: Right.

23 Mr. Keefe: I would like to find one of those things.

24 Mr. Murphy: Now then, at any rate you say:

25 "Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir. On page 34 of this

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Summary of Far Eastern Documents you will find under

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'G-2 153' this statement",

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and then you refer to a statement, but is there anything at

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all there that shows the United States is going to be attacked?

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Colonel Bratton: This whole thing stems from the fact that there was a misunderstanding between General Russell and myself as to this document that he was reading from. If you go on further down the page you will see where General Grunert says:

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"Let the record show that that is continuing quo-

12

tations from the document."

13

Well, General Grunert is referring to the Summary of Far Eastern Documents and General Russell was talking about something else. We never did get that thing straightened out until.

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Mr. Murphy: You think the Board was confused?

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Colonel Bratton: Sir?

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Mr. Murphy: You think the Board was confused? I mean if they are both, - if General Russell is talking about one thing and General Grunert is talking about another there was some apparent confusion.

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Colonel Bratton: There was, yes, sir.

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Mr. Murphy: Well, now, do you know now of any record of November 26th that gave specific evidence than of Japan's

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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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intention to wage war against the United States?

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Colonel Bratton: No, sir; of course not.

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Mr. Murphy: Well, I have been looking for that in this record and I am wondering where it is and here we have been here three months or more and I have seen nothing like that. I would like to know what they were referring to, if you know?

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Colonel Bratton: Well, I have gone over this thing a number of times trying to figure out what it was that General Russell was referring to and I cannot place it. I don't know what the document was.

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Mr. Murphy: Now, then, he says:

"On December 1st we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States."

What were those sources, do you know?

Colonel Bratton: Captain Safford.

Mr. Murphy: Captain Safford?

Colonel Bratton: I think now --

Mr. Murphy: I will pass that.

Colonel Bratton: I think what he was reading from was a statement from Captain Safford, sir.

Mr. Murphy: You mean Captain Safford presented something about us having information we were going to be attacked?

Colonel Bratton: They had in their hands at this time

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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some of Captain Safford's evidence about Japan's intentions to go to war with us on a certain date and all that sort of thing. He was reading from that document and I was trying to read from another document and we got rather confused.

The Vice Chairman: It is now five o'clock. We will recess until eight o'clock this evening, Colonel.

(Whereupon, at 5 o'clock P.M., a recess was taken until 8 o'clock P.M. of the same day.)

- - -

8:00 P.M.

Shefner

EVENING SESSION

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The Vice Chairman: The committee will be in order.

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Mr. Murphy will resume his inquiry, Colonel.

3

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL RUFUS S. BRATTON

4

(resumed)

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Mr. Murphy: Colonel Bratton, I would like to direct your attention to a message which you sent to Pearl Harbor in the month of November 1941 referring to a meeting of the Black Dragon Society. Do you remember that? I will get the page for you. It was in the last appearance October 6th, 1944.

10

Do you recall that?

11

Colonel Bratton: I think I do, sir. I think it is quoted in full in part of my testimony before the Grunert Board.

12

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Mr. Murphy: It is quoted in full at page 289 of your testimony before the Grunert Board. You did, did you not, send that message to Hawaii under date of November 3, 1941 in which Hawaii was notified of a meeting of the Black Dragon Society and of the fact that the Japanese were to have full preparations completed in November and that war with the United States would begin in December or February? That is on page 290, under paragraph 2:

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"Hirota and others are said to have stated that war with the United States would best begin in December or February."

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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir, I see it.

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Mr. Murphy: That letter was sent to Hawaii.

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Now I direct your attention to page 292 which shows that you received a letter from General Fielder and General Fielder suggested you stop sending summaries of information to Hawaii, did he not?

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Colonel Bratton: Yes, and this first letter that you have mentioned is typical of the type of summaries that we were sending him.

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Mr. Murphy: In other words, you had been sending him material which you felt was pertinent to Hawaii and then under date of September the 6th, 1941, received September 17, 1941, General Fielder said:

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"It has been noted that many of the summaries of information received from your office originated with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and have already been furnished this advice by the Navy", and in that letter he asked you not to duplicate it by sending copies to him, isn't that true?

21

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Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir. The important paragraph of that letter, to my mind, was paragraph 2.

24

25

Mr. Murphy: Paragraph 2:

"Cooperation of contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation and the

1 Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Military Intelligence Division in this Department is
3 most complete and all such data is received simultaneous
4 with the dispatch of information to the respective Wash-
5 ington offices."

6 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Murphy: So after the receipt of that you took it,
8 as I understand, that there was complete liaison between the
9 departments of the Navy and the FBI and the Army at Hawaii?

10 Colonel Bratton: I had it right here in his own words.

11 Mr. Murphy: That was from General Fielder himself.

12 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Murphy: Now I direct your attention to the testi-
14 mony of General Miles before this committee. On page 4118
15 General Miles said:

16 "I had a conversation, on my return from Admiral
17 Wilkinson's house, as I testified, with Colonel Bratton.
18 I take full responsibility for that 13-part not going to
19 the Chief of Staff that night."

20 Do you recall the conversation with General Miles?

21 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir, I recall it in a general
22 way, not in detail.

23 Mr. Murphy: Now, he says at page 4119:

24 "I returned to my house and telephoned Colonel
25 Bratton, and my recollection is that he said the message

1 Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 was not complete. I knew its substance. I did not con-
3 sider that it was necessary to accuse the Chief of Staff
4 at that time of night for that message."

5 And again --

6 Senator Lucas: Is that Miles testifying?

7 Mr. Murphy: Yes, General Miles.

8 And again at page 2438:

9 "General Miles: These thirteen parts had little
10 military significance. They concluded only with a
11 Japanese refusal to accept the American proposal of
12 November 26 as a basis of negotiation -- a result which
13 had been expected and discounted for some time. I there-
14 fore contented myself that night by calling Colonel
15 Bratton at his home about 11:30 P.M., and assuring my-
16 self that the full reply would be disseminated the next
17 morning on Sunday, and that he and I would be in our
18 offices then."

19 And then again at page 2464:

20 "General Miles: I do remember telephoning Colonel
21 Bratton when I returned home that evening. I do re-
22 member what I have testified to, and what I wrote out
23 eight days after Pearl Harbor as to what happened on
24 Sunday morning. Beyond that I cannot recall."

25 And again at page 2483:

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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"There was no reason for alerting or waking up the Chief of Staff, we will say, or certainly Secretary Hull, on the night of December 6th that I could see."

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"Senator Ferguson: So, then, is it your"--

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Colonel Bratton: May I interrupt you there just a moment, sir?

8

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Mr. Murphy: Yes.

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Colonel Bratton: I think he meant Secretary Stimson instead of Secretary Hull.

11

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Mr. Murphy: Yes, because Hull would be the Navy obligation, wouldn't it?

13

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Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

15

Mr. Murphy: (Reading)

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"Senator Ferguson: So, then, is it your opinion now that you told Bratton it would be all right to wait and deliver the remaining sections on the morning?"

18

19

"General Miles: I think that is probably what happened, sir. When the total message was in he was to see that it was promptly delivered, but I am not sure."

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Is your recollection different from General Miles' on that subject?

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Colonel Bratton: No, sir.

25

Mr. Murphy: No other questions.

Witness Bra tton

Questions by: Sen.Ferguson

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The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

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Senator Ferguson: I think Congressman Gearhart is next.

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The Vice Chairman: Had you finished?

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Mr. Gearhart: I think I have finished.

6

The Vice Chairman: All right, Senator Ferguson will inquire.

7

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Senator Ferguson: What was the year, Colonel Bratton, that you went into the Far Eastern section?

9

Colonel Bratton: In September of 1936.

10

Senator Ferguson: You speak and write and read the

11

Japanese language?

12

Colonel Bratton: I used to be able to, sir, but through lack of practice I have forgotten a great deal of it.

13

Senator Ferguson: Well, at the time you were in that service did you read the language?

14

Colonel Bratton: I was reasonably proficient in it, yes, sir.

15

Senator Ferguson: You were the top of that section?

16

Colonel Bratton: Not when I first joined it, sir. I was the assistant to Colonel Homer Slaughter, now retired, who at that time was the chief of the section. He left G-2 in February or March of 1937 and I took over the section upon his departure.

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Senator Ferguson: Now, this Far Eastern Section had the

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

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duty of evaluating the intelligence in relation to the Far East, which included Japan?

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Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

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Senator Ferguson: And the head of your department was Miles?

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Colonel Bratton: He was the chief of the Military Intelligence Division, sir. The Military Intelligence Division--

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Senator Ferguson: You need not explain it. He was, in effect, chief of the whole division?

11

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

12

Senator Ferguson: Who was chief of the Far Eastern?

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Colonel Bratton: I was chief of the Far Eastern Section, sir. Now, the chief of the Intelligence Branch when I joined G-2 was Colonel Fay Brabson.

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Senator Ferguson: Now, do I understand, then, that you as chief of the Far Eastern Division, that one of your duties was to deliver these messages to these respective parties?

18

19

Colonel Bratton: Deliver what, sir?

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Senator Ferguson: These decoded messages. You as Chief were delivering the messages?

22

23

Colonel Bratton: That was one of my primary duties, yes, sir.

24

25

Senator Ferguson: Well, now, who else delivered? Who else was authorized to deliver these messages?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

Colonel Bratton: Nobody else until the fall of 1941, when the volume of this material increased so that I had to have help and at that time I secured from General Miles permission to utilize one or more of my assistant commissioned officers in this work.

Senator Ferguson: Who did you authorized to deliver? Who beside you?

Colonel Bratton: General Miles authorites me to use assistants.

Senator Ferguson: What assistants did you use to deliver these messages?

Colonel Bratton: Colonel Dusenbury for one, Major Moore, a reserve officer who had had long experience in Japan and was on duty in my section, and a Lieutenant Schindel, another reserve officer.

Senator Ferguson: Now, by the end of November and during November I assume that the duty of the Far Eastern Section was to try to correlate all intelligence in relation to that section to ascertain three facts: First, - probably connected with the first one was whether or not there was going to be a war between the United States and Japan; second, as to where that war might start; third, the capabilities of the enemy.

Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1 Senator Ferguson: Would you say that that was the
2 purpose of your section?

3 Colonel Bratton: Well, let me put it in another way,
4 sir, for further clarification. My section was charged with
5 the collection, compilation, evaluation, and dissemination
6 of intelligence concerning Japan, the Japanese Empire among
7 other countries bordering on the Pacific.

8 Senator Ferguson: Other countries in the Far East.

9 Now, did you ever send Pettingill out -- was it
10 Pettingill?

11 Colonel Bratton: In the Army it was Pettigrew.

12 Senator Ferguson: Pettigrew? He was in the Army?

13 Colonel Bratton: He was one of my assistants, yes, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever send him to the Far East
15 on a mission?

16 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Will you explain that, as to when it
18 was?

19 Colonel Bratton: In the spring of 1941. It was perfectly
20 apparent to us in the Far Eastern Section that Japan's war
21 potential was increasing by leaps and bounds. It was be-
22 coming increasingly evident that war between Japan and
23 the United States ranked high on the list of probabilities
24 unless either or both countries changed their policies.
25

Witness Bratton.

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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h2 2 It became evident that we needed an inspection, a
3 tightening up, a revision and general betterment of our
4 intelligence system.

5 Senator Ferguson: You were not satisfied then with
6 the set-up of the intelligence system, as far as the Army
7 was concerned, as it related to the Far East?

8 Colonel Bratton: No. It lacked coordination, coopera-
9 tion, and collaboration among the various agencies in the
10 field.

11 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

12 Colonel Bratton: Those agencies themselves, it was
13 apparent, were not themselves functioning in some respects,
14 as they should. So, with General Miles' concurrence, I
15 had Colonel Pettigrew sent to all of our agencies in the
16 Pacific area. He traveled mostly by air. He went to
17 Hawaii, the Philippines, Tokyo, Hongkong, Shanghai, the
18 Netherlands East Indies, and one or two other places that
19 I may have omitted, for the purpose of inspecting our G-2
20 set-up, making such corrections on the spot as were possible,
21 getting these people in line, so that their trend of thought
22 followed ours in Washington, improving our communications,
23 our systems of report, mail and otherwise, informing them
24 as to our trend of thought in Washington, and in general
25 tightening the net up.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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He was gone a month or two, returned, reported what progress he had made in writing to the A. C. of S., G-2, and submitted a number of recommendations as to changes here and there in set-ups, personnel, reassignments, improvements in communications, lateral exchange of intelligence, so on and so forth, that he himself had not been able to effect.

I scanned his report -- or rather I studied his report very carefully, found it was an excellent one and forwarded it to my Chief, General Miles, for such action as might be found possible in complying with Colonel Pettigrew's recommendations which I thought were perfectly sound.

Senator Ferguson: Now, what month did you submit that to your Chief, General Marshall?

Colonel Bratton: Sir?

Senator Ferguson: What month was it in 1941?

Colonel Bratton: I think it was in May. I am not sure sir, I would have to look at the record.

Senator Ferguson: In May. Now when did you next hear from those recommendations?

Colonel Bratton: From the recommendations, you mean?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

You made certain recommendations.

Colonel Bratton: Yes.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: That certain things be done to improve the services between Washington and Hawaii and the Philippines, and the various places, in the correlation of intelligence.

When did you next hear of that?

Colonel Bratton: I do not think I ever got the paper back.

Senator Ferguson: Well, did you ever get any of those things done?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir. I followed the thing up to the best of my ability, as did Colonel Pettigrew. We encountered a number of administrative obstacles that at the time seemed insurmountable.

Senator Ferguson: Will you name those?

Colonel Bratton: Sir?

Senator Ferguson: Will you name those?

Colonel Bratton: Yes.

At that time we were suffering under a number of limitations as to personnel available for duty in Washington. We were then under the Manchu laws which prohibited the detail of officers in certain positions for longer than a fixed period of time.

There was a great dearth of trained Japanese specialists in the Army. They were all, or many of them were serving

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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with troops, as was required by law at that time, and were not available for detail service, or for special assignments.

Senator Ferguson: You mean statutory law required them to be with troops and not here in Washington?

Colonel Bratton: Oh, yes, sir. Those regulations all stem from laws passed by the Congress.

Senator Ferguson: What law required the United States Army to put a man with troops and not put him here in Washington, if he can do the job here in Washington?

Colonel Bratton: That is what we call the Menchu law. I vaguely remember now that it requires an officer to serve with troops two years running out of every six.

Senator Ferguson: Did you ask Congress to change that law, that you knew a war was coming on, and that you needed some more intelligence officers, or did you just let it ride?

Colonel Bratton: I did not myself, sir, but I did go to a committee of Congress on another matter at about that time, trying to get a law passed which would give us some control over these dual citizens of Japanese ancestry.

General Miles and I, and my assistants in the Far Eastern Section argued this thing with a committee of Congress for about two months, and did not get anywhere, so we just stopped.

Witness Bratton

Questions: Senator Ferguson

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We had other things to do.

Senator Ferguson: I appreciate that.

That was in 1941?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did you try to get the rule changed so you could get more men in this intelligence branch here to do the job that you saw coming, and coming very fast?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir, we did the best we could under the circumstances.

Senator Ferguson: Will you be able to get the memorandum which you gave to General Miles?

Colonel Bratton: It should be somewhere in the files of G-2 in the War Department sir. I am not connected with that office in any way at all, but I am sure the liaison officer can secure the document.

Senator Ferguson: Will the liaison officer obtain that document?

Lientenant Hoskey: We will try to, sir.

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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: When did war between the United
2 States and Japan, in your opinion, become imminent?

3 Colonel Bratton: I myself thought that war between
4 Japan and the United States ranked high on the list of
5 probabilities in 1940. In 1941, in the spring of 1941,
6 I was convinced that war was inevitable. It was simply
7 a questioning of timing. In the latter part of 1941 it
8 was apparent to all of us that the time was running out,
9 that a crisis was approaching. My personal feeling was
10 that Japan's major effort would be a drive to the Southwest
11 Pacific to secure the tin, rubber and oil that she so badly
12 needed, that she would run over any installation of ours
13 that stood in her path. That seemed to be the logical
14 procedure.

15 It did not appear logical to me for Japan to go out
16 of her way deliberately to attack an American installation.
17 As a matter of fact, I think the attack on Pearl Harbor
18 was the stupidest thing the Japanese ever did. If they
19 had gone about their way down through the Netherlands Indies,
20 Malaya, Indo-China and leave us stewing in our own juices
21 the war might still be on, or we might still be arguing
22 here as to what to do about it. We might never have
23 declared war on Japan.

24 But by this deliberate attack upon an American fortress
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 in the mid-Pacific she inflamed the American people to
2 such an extent that we had nothing left to do, we had to
3 go to war.

4 Senator Ferguson: Then do I understand you feel if
5 Japan had not attacked an American possession we would
6 not have gone to war, and that you did not anticipate she
7 would attack an American possession?

8 Colonel Bratton: If she had by-passed the Philippines
9 and had not attacked any American installation, had simply
10 invaded Malaya, or the Netherlands Indies and Indo-China,
11 we might have been dragged into the war eventually, yes.
12 We had certain tentative commitments with the British and
13 the Dutch and the Chinese. Those commitments were tentative,
14 but pressure might have been brought to bear upon us so
15 great that we would have been dragged into that conflict.
16 But it would not have happened the way it did as the result
17 of the attack upon Pearl Harbor.

18 Senator Ferguson: Now you have mentioned our tentative
19 commitments with the British. What were those tentative
20 commitments with the British?

21 Colonel Bratton: I am not the best witness on that, sir.
22 My knowledge of the ABCD agreement is only general.

23 Senator Ferguson: If you are not the best witness on
24 that, will you be the witness that you are?
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Colonel Bratton: My understanding was and is that we had a tentative agreement that had been initiated by a meeting of Army and Navy representatives of those Powers in the South Pacific. Their recommendations had been forwarded to Washington and were considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who in turn prepared memoranda for the President, recommending that certain action be taken, or that certain recommendations of ours be tentatively approved.

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I believe that this paper was later withdrawn and held in a suspense file when they learned that the President would not approve it, and it remained in that status for some time.

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Senator Ferguson: Now where did you get your knowledge on that?

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16
Colonel Bratton: Oh, I saw the documents as they came into Washington.

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18
Senator Ferguson: Were they in the suspense file on the day of the attack?

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Colonel Bratton: To the best of my knowledge they were, sir.

21
Senator Ferguson: Where was that suspense file?

22
23
Colonel Bratton: I think it was in the files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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25
Senator Ferguson: In your affidavit you use this sentence:

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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2 "I did not mention to the Chief of Staff the subject
3 of Colonel Sadtler's report, nor do I know that anyone else
4 in G-2 did. General Miles and I, by reason of our knowledge,
5 among other things, of the existence of the ABCD Bloc, were
6 aware of the implications which would be inherent in any
7 implementing message in the wind code indicating Japanese
8 aggression against Great Britain."

9 Now if the ABCD agreement was in the suspense file on
10 the day of the outbreak, what obligation did America have
11 under it, and then why did you make this affidavit?

12 You say, "We were aware of the implication which would
13 be inherent in any implementing message to the wind code
14 indicating Japanese aggression against Great Britain".

15 Colonel Bratton: Well, the obligation was only a
16 tentative one. It had not been signed or approved by the
17 President, it had not been approved by the Congress. We
18 just do not barge off to war whenever the spirit moves us,
19 we have to go through certain formalities.

20 Senator Ferguson: You knew the war was on in the
21 Atlantic and you did not go through the formalities.

22 Colonel Bratton: An unofficial war, yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Now what did you mean by this "We
24 were aware of the implications which would be inherent in
25 any implementing message to the wind code indicating

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Japanese aggression against Great Britain"? What were
2 the implications?

3 Colonel Bratton: Well, I meant those that were tenta-
4 tively agreed upon in this ABCD conference down in the
5 Southwest Pacific. That is the one that was initiated there,
6 that the United States would take certain action if the
7 Japanese crossed a certain line or invaded a certain body
8 of water.

9 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever see a message that
10 came from Australia about the 6th of December?

11 Colonel Bratton: I don't think I saw it until after
12 the attack, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: You are familiar with Exhibit A to
14 Army Pearl Harbor Board top secret transcript, Summary
15 of Far Eastern Documents?

16 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Page 36 under FE 366 -- what is that,
18 Far Eastern Document - 366?

19 Colonel Bratton: You refer to FE-366?

20 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

21 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir, I see it.

22 Senator Ferguson: (Reading)

23 "Melbourne radioed that on 6 December the Netherlands
24 Far East Command had ordered the execution of mobilization
25

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

hl 1 Plan A-2 upon learning of Japanese Naval movements out
2 of Palau."

3 What was that?

4 Colonel Bratton: I don't remember sir, but the docu-
5 ment which this refers to is in the files of G-2 and can be
6 produced for the committee.

7 Senator Ferguson: Well, I will show you this document.

8 Colonel Bratton: I think you will find that that docu-
9 ment was held up, that message was held up by the Australian
10 authorities for some reason best known to them, and did not
11 reach us until after the attack on the 7th of December.

12 Senator Ferguson: Do you know how many hours it was
13 held up by the Australian Government?

14 Colonel Bratton: Not at this time, no, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether it was held up
16 17 hours by the Australian Government?

17 Colonel Bratton: I was going to say --

18 Senator Ferguson: Wouldn't allow our military attache
19 to send it out?

20 Colonel Bratton: I was going to say that I think it
21 was held up for a day.

22 Senator Ferguson: Did you ever learn why the Australian
23 Government held up a message from our own authorities to
24 Washington advising them in relation to this war that was
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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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breaking out?

Colonel Bratton: I was told that the Australian authorities wished to take the matter up with their own parliament before they released the information to us.

Senator Ferguson: Well, didn't they release it first and then demand that we hold it up and not give it to our Government until they could have a Cabinet meeting?

Colonel Bratton: I think that was it, sir. That is my recollection.

Senator Ferguson: I show you this exhibit and ask you whether Merle Smith -- well I will put it in the record. Read it into the record.

Colonel Bratton: It states here in the message, "This message held 17 hours by Government."

Senator Ferguson: Blank government isn't it?

Colonel Bratton: Blank government, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: That is the Australian Government?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Read the whole message into the record.

Colonel Bratton (reading):

"December 7, 1941.

"7:58 P. M.

"From Melbourne, Australia, via Honolulu,

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1 "To War Department and Commanding General Hawaiian
2 Department.

3 "Secret.

4 "Number 24. December 6th.

5 "BASED ON DUTCH INTELLIGENCE REPORT (UNCONFIRMED
6 HERE) OF NAVAL MOVEMENTS FROM PELAU OBJECTIVE MENADO AND/OR
7 AMBON, DUTCH ORDERED EXECUTION PLAN A - 2 AND SUGGESTED
8 RAAF RECIPROCAL MOVEMENT BE DIRECTED LAHA AMBON AND KOEPANG.
9 SO ORDERED PM YESTERDAY INCLUDING FLIGHT CATALINA TO RABAU
10 TASK RECONNAISSANCE BUKA AND NORTHWEST PASSAGE AUSTRALIAN
11 ARMY REINFORCEMENTS AMBON KEOPANG SUBJECT TO REQUEST DUTCH
12 EAST INDIES. THIS MESSAGE HELD 17 HOURS BY GOVERNMENT
13 EIGHT AM DUTCH REPORTED ADVANCING PLANES TO BE ON KEOPANG
14 NOT NOW CONSIDERED NECESSARY. ELEVEN AM CHIEF OF AIR CORPS
15 DESIRED PROCEED WITH ALL AIRCRAFT FORWARD MOVEMENTS MANILA
16 INFORMED.

17 MERLESMITH"

18 Senator Ferguson: What investigation was Carter Clarke
19 carrying on? General Carter Clarke?

20 Colonel Bratton: At present?

21 Senator Ferguson: No. Is he carrying on one now in
22 relation to Pearl Harbor?

23 Colonel Bratton: Not that I know of, sir. You say
24 what investigation was he carrying on?
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: Yes. Was he carrying on an investigation about Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Bratton: Upon my return to this country in the fall of 1944, I found that Colonel, now General, Carter Clarke was carrying on an investigation directed by the office of the Chief of Staff, as to the details of the handling of magic when I was the Chief of Far Eastern Section.

Senator Ferguson: Now, was the Carter Clarke investigation going along at the same time as the Clausen investigation?

Colonel Bratton: No, sir. This was a year before Clausen -- a year before the Army Board started operating.

Senator Ferguson: It was going on before the Army Board even started to operate?

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Did it continue while the Army Board was in operation?

Colonel Bratton: The Army Board was in operation but not in Washington when I appeared before the Clarke board the first time.

Senator Ferguson: What I am trying to get at is this: Was the Army Board in operation and functioning while the Carter Clarke investigation was going on?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: How do you account for these two investigations going along at the same time in relation to Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Bratton: The Clarke Board's primary objective, as I remember it had no relation specifically to the Pearl Harbor disaster. It was an investigation of the handling, processing and delivery of Japanese intercepts which we now know as magic at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Senator Ferguson: But that was, wasn't it, one of the very things that the Pearl Harbor Board was looking into?

Colonel Bratton: The Pearl Harbor Board was investigating that at that time, but, as you have heard from Colonel Clausen today, did not have complete access to magic information.

Senator Ferguson: But the only person that kept them from having access was the Chief of Staff; isn't that correct? And at the same time, he was carrying on his own investigation into it by General Clarke; isn't that correct?

Colonel Bratton: In general, that is correct, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: And Carter Clarke's investigation of magic was not turned over to the Army Board?

Colonel Bratton: I don't know whether a report of Colonel Clarke's investigation was turned over to the Army

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Board or not, but I, after being examined by the Clarke Board as to my part in the handling of magic, and after some discussion between General Clarke and General Bissell, and I believe either General Marshall or General McNarney, I was given a free hand in testifying before the Grunert as to what I knew about magic, with the understanding that every time I touched upon that subject in that testimony before the Grunert Board I would call the attention of the President of the Board to the fact that I was now about to state that which was classified as top secret.

Senator Ferguson: Now, what I want to get at on this Carter Clarke investigation, on the 6th of October, 1944, at 9 a.m. -- do you know whether the Board, the Army Board was functioning at that time?

Colonel Bratton: Well, I know that they were functioning on the 30th of September, because I testified before them on that day.

Senator Ferguson: Now, a man by the name of Lieutenant Odell appeared before the Carter Clarke investigation on the 6th of October, 1944, at 9 a.m., and he was asked these questions by Colonel Clarke:

"All right, now tell me your story. We got the story that you wrote to Kemper and said you knew who did Pearl Harbor, or something to that effect, so you can start

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h7

1 telling us what you know."

2 Lieutenant O'Dell said:

3 "Well, sir, here's the part of the information that I
4 thought might not have come out through other sources.

5 "There was a cable that was sent on the fifth of
6 December to the Commanding Generals of the Hawaii and Philip-
7 pine Departments concerning the movement of a Japanese task
8 force in the South China Sea. The information had come to
9 the Military Attache through the Australian Government, Air
10 Chief Marshall Sir Charles Burnett, who called Colonel
11 Merle Smith and myself to his office."

12 General Clarke said:

13 "You were then Merle Smith's assistant?"

14 Lieutenant O'Dell said:

15 "That's right. There were the two of us and he is
16 now dead. That's the reason I stuck my nose in this. We
17 were called over on Thursday afternoon about 5 o'clock."

18 That would be the 5th.

19 "Air Chief Marshall Sir Charles Burnett, myself, and
20 Colonel Merle Smith and Commander Saom, who is the Naval
21 Liaison Officer from the Dutch East Indies. The information
22 was primarily in regard to the Netherlands, through the
23 Indies, and principally concerned itself with the movement
24 of a Japanese task force in the South China Sea.
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1 "However, within an hour after we had gotten there
2 some additional information came in, the exact nature of
3 which I wasn't told at the time, but when we went out,
4 Colonel Merle Smith had be prepare a cable which he revised
5 to send out and the principal part of that other than the
6 movement of this convoy was that the Dutch had ordered the
7 execution of the Rainbow Plan A-2.

8 "I remember it's been almost three years now, and I
9 can distinctly remember that particular part of the cable
10 where it said A-2, repeat A-2, which was a part of the joint
11 Abducan Plan only to be taken in the event of war. It pro-
12 vided for specific occurrences they would counteract by
13 certain other action.

14 "In other words A-1 would have been some other direction
15 expected attack, A-2 was from a particular direction, and
16 they ordered the execution of this A-2. That was significant
17 because the plan called for joint operations for the Australians
18 and the Dutch, and to the best of my knowledge, our Navy
19 if nothing else."

20 In other words, our Navy was to take part in it.

21 "That was to go into effect only in case of war and
22 here the Dutch had ordered it. That was the definite informa-
23 tion that it had gone into effect. There was a bit of
24 flurried excitement with that, and Sir Charles Burnett asked
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h9

1 us not to send that cable and Colonel Merle Smith, although
2 impatient to send it, said that he would wait 12 hours at
3 Sir Charles Burnett's specific request.

4 "In other words, they didn't say they wouldn't let
5 that cable go out, but I dare say they probably would have
6 stopped it had we tried to launch it."

7 Now, we get the cable and we find that the Australian
8 Government held it up 17 hours and we didn't get it until
9 after the war started; is that correct? Is that what you
10 found out?

11 Colonel Bratton: To the best of my recollection, yes,
12 sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: Doesn't that indicate just what you
14 said in your affidavit:

15 " -- by reason of our knowledge among other things
16 of the existence of the ABCD Bloc, were aware of the impli-
17 cations which would be inherent in any implementing message
18 to be 'winds code,' indicating Japanese aggression against
19 Great Britain."

20 Now, the ABCD involved the Dutch too, did it not, down
21 there?

22 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: And didn't it provide that in case
24 of war with any of these countries we had certain obligations
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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1 and isn't that just exactly what the Australians held up?

2 Colonel Bratton: That was the hope of the people who
3 drew up this tentative agreement. As far as I know it was
4 never officially agreed by our Joint Chiefs of Staff that
5 we would take this action, nor was the proposed action
6 ever approved by the President.

7 Senator Ferguson: Well, then, I want to ask you this,
8 Colonel:

9 To you, at the time and up until the time of the attack,
10 it didn't make a particle of difference, as far as the
11 United States was concerned, that there was a war being
12 started against the Dutch, that didn't mean anything to you?

13 Colonel Bratton: Oh, in what way, sir?

14 Senator Ferguson: That we would get into it at that
15 time.

16 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir, but we wouldn't get into
17 it within the next 24 hours, until certain formalities were
18 gone through and certain Government action take.

19 Senator Ferguson: Isn't that the point, that everybody
20 in your Department had the understanding that you would have
21 24-hours notice after they had struck against the Dutch or
22 the English?

23 Colonel Bratton: That we would have 24 hours notice?

24 Senator Ferguson: Yes, that you would have something,
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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you would have some time, some notice.

Colonel Bratton: No, sir. You are out of my depth now. I am afraid I don't follow you.

Senator Ferguson: Did you know on the 6th that the Japanese were going to attack theKra Peninsula?

Colonel Bratton: On the 6th?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Colonel Bratton: All the evidence pointed to that event, sir.

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Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: Did you see the Winant message?

2 Colonel Bratton: Which message? No, sir, not until
3 after the attack.

4 Senator Ferguson: Not until after the attack, and
5 it came in at 10:40 on the morning of the 6th, saying that
6 there would be an attack in 14 hours on the Kra Peninsula.

7 Colonel Bratton: I don't doubt that, sir, but it didn't
8 filter down to me until long after the attack.

9 Senator Ferguson: If it had filtered down to the
10 Intelligence Department -- as I understood it the Intelligence
11 Department was to filter things up, it ought to come to
12 the Intelligence Department first?

13 Colonel Bratton: Quite so, but this was a State Depart-
14 ment dispatch.

15 Senator Ferguson: Then do I understand that if the
16 State Department got a message that involved the question
17 of intelligence, that they were on a higher level and there-
18 fore it took quite a long time to filter down to you?

19 Colonel Bratton: It took what I thought was an un-
20 reasonably long time for us to get any type of intelligence
21 out of the State Department during this time.

22 Senator Ferguson: Well, how did you account for that?
23 Was it a higher level there?

24 Colonel Bratton: Due in a large measure to the way the
25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 State Department handles its dispatches. Certain dispatches
2 were of such a highly secret nature that they would not
3 given them to other Departments of Government. Those of
4 the lower level had to be processed, reproduced in quantity,
5 distributed, and so on. All that took time. That is
6 under the set-up they had at that time.

7 Senator Ferguson: Could anything have been more
8 secret than the codes that you were intercepting from the
9 Japanese?

10 Colonel Bratton: Our own codes and ciphers were equally
11 secret.

12 Senator Ferguson: Equally. Then why didn't you get
13 them so that you could evaluate them with the Japanese
14 information? In other words, Colonel --

15 Colonel Bratton: I understand, Senator.

16 Senator Ferguson: If you had the Winant message from
17 the Royal Navy that there was going to be an attack and
18 you had the pilot message which showed we were going to get
19 an answer to our note of the 26th, that it was going to be
20 delivered at a specific time, later to be announced, and
21 that that note was to be typed, not by a typist or anyone
22 else, but was to be put in good shape, would that have
23 helped you to evaluate the first 13 parts that it meant
24 war with America?
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I don't like to object
3 but I don't see how this witness can answer that question
4 intelligently unless he had the Winant message in front
5 of him and studied it and had all the other things.

6 Senator Ferguson: Well, I don't know of a better
7 witness to get on the question of Intelligence in the Far
8 East. This was the man in charge.

9 Colonel Bratton: I think I understand your question.
10 It is to the effect that if I had this message from
11 Melbourne before me --

12 Senator Ferguson: Not from Melbourne.

13 Colonel Bratton: From Winant.

14 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

15 Colonel Bratton: Together with the pilot message
16 and several other communications --

17 Senator Ferguson: Yes, sir.

18 Colonel Bratton: Would it not have led me to arrive
19 at the conclusion that war between Japan and America was
20 imminent.

21 Senator Ferguson: That is right.

22 Colonel Bratton: I didn't need those extra messages
23 to know that war between Japan and the United States was
24 highly probable at that time, sir, but if I had had these
25 other messages it would have confirmed my already arrived at

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 estimate of the situation.

2
3 Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, when you got the
4 announcement that bombs had been dropped on an American
5 possession at Hawaii, were you or were you not surprised?

6
7 Colonel Bratton: I was not surprised that war had
8 broken out. I was not surprised that the Japanese had
9 attacked. I was surprised at the point that they attacked.

10
11 Senator Ferguson: Then, as I understand it, you
12 anticipated an attack at 1:00 o'clock our time?

13
14 Colonel Bratton: Afternoon.

15
16 Senator Ferguson: Yes, 1:00 o'clock afternoon, our time
17 on Sunday.

18
19 Colonel Bratton: Immediately.

20
21 Senator Ferguson: But you didn't anticipate it at
22 Pearl Harbor?

23
24 Colonel Bratton: Immediately upon receipt of this
25 1:00 o'clock delivery message I became convinced the
Japanese were going to attack some American installation
in the Pacific area.

Senator Ferguson: At 1:00 o'clock?

Colonel Bratton: At or shortly after 1:00 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson: Yes. All right. So at 9:00
o'clock on Sunday morning you came to the conclusion that
an American possession in the Pacific would be attacked by

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 the Japanese at 1:00 o'clock or shortly thereafter on
2 that same day?

3 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: And at that time you conveyed that
5 information to what superior?

6 Colonel Bratton: I tried to convey that impression to
7 the Chief of Staff at once.

8 Senator Ferguson: All right. And by trying you say
9 that you called his home in Virginia at about 9:00 o'clock?

10 Colonel Bratton: Between 9:00 and 9:15, yes, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: I said about 9:00 o'clock.

12 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

13 Senator Ferguson: And you talked to his orderly?

14 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: And you told him that you had a
16 very vital and important message, did you?

17 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: And you asked him if he knew how
19 to locate the General and he said he did?

20 Colonel Bratton: He said he thought he knew where
21 the General was riding and thought he could find him.

22 Senator Ferguson: Then you waited until 10:00 o'clock
23 before the General called you and you held this information
24 for one hour or practically an hour?
25

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 Colonel Bratton: No, I didn't hold it exclusively
3 in my possession. I got the information to the Secretary
4 of State. I called General Miles and either he or I called
5 General Gerow. I told General Miles, in a guarded way,
6 what this thing was and recommended, or requested, that he
7 come to the office at once. I told him that I was trying
8 to get in touch with General Marshall and I felt sure that
9 General Marshall would come to the office and would want
10 to see him, General Miles, and General Gerow, as soon as
11 they could get together.

12 Senator Ferguson: Now, what time did you reach Gerow
13 on the telephone after you came to this conclusion about
14 the attack on American possessions?

15 Colonel Bratton: As I stated before, sir, I don't
16 remember whether it was General Miles that called General
17 Gerow or myself. If it was myself it was immediately after
18 calling General Miles.

19 Senator Ferguson: All right. That would be around 9:15?

20 Colonel Bratton: Around about 9:30, yes, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: About 9:30. So General Gerow was
22 reached at 9:30?

23 Colonel Bratton: Approximately.

24 Senator Ferguson: Approximately?

25 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Senator Ferguson: And then you don't get to see him for two hours, which is 11:25, and you have in your possession this message that brought you to the conclusion that there was going to be an attack upon an American possession at 1:00 o'clock?

Colonel Bratton: The Secretary of State and myself had it in our possession at that time.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, and it took two hours before you reached General Gerow; is that correct?

Colonel Bratton: No, that isn't correct, sir. General Gerow, I didn't see General Gerow until 11:00, sometime after 11:00 in General Marshall's office.

WARD & PAUL, WASH. D. C.

Shefner follows 9:00

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1
2 Colonel Bratton: Well, it was two hours, Senator, ap-
3 proximately between the time I tried to get all these people
4 together and the time they all did get together, if that is
5 what you mean.

6 Senator Ferguson: No, I want to take them separately.
7 The War Plans was General Gerow and it took two hours in order
8 that you might show him this pilot message, is that correct?

9 Colonel Bratton: Two hours elapsed before he saw it,
10 yes, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: All right, that is what I am talking
12 about. Now, General Marshall called you at ten o'clock?

13 Colonel Bratton: No, I think I testified that he called
14 me at about half past ten, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: All right. Then it took his orderly
16 from between nine and a quarter after nine and 10:30 to get
17 General Marshall to call you back on the phone?

18 Colonel Bratton: Presumably so, yes, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: All right. Then it took you another
20 hour before you could show this pilot message to General
21 Marshall because he did not come down and he told you not to
22 come out?

23 Colonel Bratton: That is correct, sir.

24 Senator Ferguson: All right. And this is the message
25 that made you feel there was going to be the attack that you

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1

2 have explained?

3

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

4

5 Senator Ferguson: Now, when you went to General Marshall's
6 office was General Marshall in his office? When you got
7 into his outer office, we will call it the waiting room, was
8 he in his office?

8

9 Colonel Bratton: He was in his office sitting at his
10 desk.

10

11 Senator Ferguson: Sitting at his desk. And when you
12 walked in there you saw a brown folder with the thirteen part
13 message in it?

13

14 Colonel Bratton: All fourteen parts in it; all four-
15 teen parts were in it.

15

16 Senator Ferguson: Fourteen parts were in it?

16

17 Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

17

18 Senator Ferguson: Now, did you make inquiry -- well,
19 I will first ask you, do you know how long General Marshall
20 had been in his office?

20

21 Colonel Bratton: He had just gotten into his office,
22 sir. He went into his office from the door that opens into the
23 hall and General Miles and I, oh, in not more than a minute
24 or two minutes after that walked in through the other door.

24

25 Senator Ferguson: All right. Then you arrived prac-
tically at the same time?

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

2

3

Senator Ferguson: Now, had he started to read the thirteen part message before you got into his office?

4

5

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

6

7

Senator Ferguson: He was reading the fourteen parts of the message when you entered his office?

8

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

9

10

Senator Ferguson: And you attempted to stop him to show him what you had?

11

12

13

14

15

Colonel Bratton: Well, I had this message in my hand and made a statement to the effect, "General, I have a very important message here which I think you should see at once," and he did not look at it until after he had finished reading the fourteen parts.

16

17

18

19

Senator Ferguson: All right. Now, how do you account for General Marshall having in a folder before him and reading it when you went into his office at 11:25 if you did not give them to someone Saturday night?

20

21

22

23

24

Colonel Bratton: Well, if I did not give it to someone Saturday night or Colonel Dusenbury, my assistant, did not give it to someone Saturday night, Colonel Dusenbury must have delivered it to one Dean, who was the secretary on duty Sunday morning, to place on General Marshall's desk.

25

Senator Ferguson: Well, you said that that is the man

1 Witness Bratton

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

2 General Marshall to arrive.

3 Senator Ferguson: Now, you delivered the pilot message
4 at what time, or had it delivered?

5 Colonel Bratton: About three o'clock Saturday afternoon
6 the 6th.

7 Senator Ferguson: Did the Army translate that pilot
8 message?

9 Colonel Bratton: I think so, yes, sir. I can tell by
10 looking at this.

11 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

12 Colonel Bratton: Army translation.

13 Senator Ferguson: Now, do you know when that was de-
14 livered to the Navy?

15 Colonel Bratton: No, sir, and there is no way that I
16 would know that because I did not do the delivering to the
17 Navy. That was done by the SIS.

18 Senator Ferguson: Well, how would you suggest we find
19 out what time it was delivered to the Navy? You got it at
20 three o'clock and delivered it at three?

21 Colonel Bratton: I got it at about two o'clock.

22 Senator Ferguson: About two o'clock.

23 Colonel Bratton: And delivered it among other messages
24 that Saturday afternoon at about three o'clock.

25 Senator Ferguson: Now, do you know of any other reason

Witness Bratton

Questions by: Sen. Ferguson

1

2

that it would not go to the Navy at two o'clock, at the time

3

you get it?

4

Colonel Bratton: I think it probably did but it was

5

buried in a mass of other intercepts in an envelope that had

6

to be sorted and sifted out and evaluated.

7

Senator Ferguson: But it was translated?

8

Colonel Bratton: They were all translated when they

9

went out of the translating section, sir.

10

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

11

Colonel Bratton: They were all translated; they were all

12

in English when they reached my desk.

13

Senator Ferguson: That is right, at two o'clock, and

14

the ordinary procedure was that the message, together with

15

whatever other messages were translated, would be taken to

16

the Navy?

17

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

18

Senator Ferguson: Is that correct?

19

Colonel Bratton: Yes, sir.

20

Senator Ferguson: Then there is no reason to doubt in

21

your mind that at two o'clock or shortly thereafter on

22

Saturday the 6th the Navy had the translated pilot message?

23

Colonel Bratton: No, I can't say that, Senator.

24

Senator Ferguson: Well, what can you say along that

25

line?