

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: And when you intercepted a dispatch or information that you were unable to decode, what was your duty then with respect to that information?

Captain Rochefort: If it were other than Navy, we would send it to Washington. But I might point out, sir, that the circuits that we were covering were all naval circuits in which no diplomatic traffic would be passed.

Mr. Richardson: By way of illustration, Captain, let me show you two dispatches here that appear to have been intercepted by the Army at Hawaii -- not by the Navy but by the Army, and ask you what codes they came in on? What is the page, please, so it may be identified for the record?

Captain Rochefort: On page 21 of Exhibit 2, I see two dispatches, the first one No. 123, which was translated on 30 December, 1941, and it is in the J-19 system.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

2 Mr. Richardson: Now if the Army had presented that
3 dispatch to you could you have decoded it in Hawaii?

4 Captain Rochefort: Not without special equipment.

5 Mr. Richardson: Well, did you have the equipment in
6 Hawaii that would permit you to decode that message?

7 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

8 Mr. Richardson: On December 2, 1941?

9 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

10 Mr. Richardson: Now let me show you the message number
11 128 on page 26 of Exhibit 2, dated 5 December. Will you
12 tell me what code that came in on? That is also an Army
13 message.

14 Captain Rochefort: That came in the PA-K2 system.

15 Mr. Richardson: If you had been requested by the Army
16 to decode that dispatch would you have been able to do it
17 at Hawaii?

18 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Richardson: In about how long a time from the time
20 it was presented to you?

21 Captain Rochefort: Probably six hours to six days.
22 Three days may be a good average.

23 Mr. Richardson: Who was in charge of G-2 in Hawaii for
24 the Army?

25 Captain Rochefort: Colonel Fielder, sir.

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 Mr. Richardson: And who was under Fielder as his
3 Chief Assistant?

4 Captain Rochefort: Colonel Bicknell was at that time, sir.

5 Mr. Richardson: You knew both of those gentlemen?

6 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Richardson: Were your relations with them cordial?

8 Captain Rochefort: My relations, I should say particu-
9 larly with Colonel Fielder, were most cordial.

10 Mr. Richardson: How frequently would you see them?

11 Captain Rochefort: Perhaps twice a week, sir.

12 Mr. Richardson: Was there any discussion between you
13 as to the intelligence that you were handling and the in-
14 telligence they were handling?

15 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, but it would be in very
16 general terms, because our jobs were different.

17 Mr. Richardson: Was there ever any request by the
18 Army for assistance from you and your outfit?

19 Captain Rochefort: In my particular work, sir?

20 Mr. Richardson: Yes.

21 Captain Rochefort: To the best of my recollection
22 not until after the 7th. After the 7th there was.

23 Mr. Richardson: To whom was the information that you
24 picked up in Hawaii transmitted by you?

25 Captain Rochefort: To the Commander in Chief verbally,

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 and by means of written summaries to the Navy Department
3 and Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet, by dispatch or by
4 air mail.

5 Mr. Richardson: Then you would turn over what you had
6 to Layton and Layton had the duty of transmitting it to the
7 Commander in Chief?

8 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. In addition to that we
9 would send over with the summary a qualified officer to dis-
10 cuss the matter in detail with Layton, if he so wished.

11 Mr. Richardson: Are you familiar, Captain, with a
12 dispatch that appears in the record here, sent through the
13 Army, requesting G-2 in Hawaii to contact you for information
14 with reference to weather broadcasts?

15 Captain Rochefort: I have heard of such a message, sir,
16 but I did not hear of it up until a short time ago.

17 Mr. Richardson: There never at any time was presented
18 any communication to you to contact you?

19 Captain Rochefort: Not for that express purpose.

20 Mr. Richardson: Based upon such a dispatch, as far as
21 you knew?

22 Captain Rochefort: Not for that express purpose, sir.

23 Mr. Richardson: Do you know how the messages went out
24 from Hawaii, from the Japanese Consuls to Tokyo?

25 Captain Rochefort: I have no first-hand information on

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 that, sir.

2 Mr. Richardson: I did not understand.

3 Captain Rochefort: I have no first-hand information
4 on that.
5

6 Mr. Richardson: With reference to the dispatches from
7 Honolulu to Tokyo during the first week in December, such
8 as is illustrated by the number 247 here, indicating the
9 message went out under PA-K2, would such a message as that
10 go by cable or would it go by some other form of transmission?

11 Captain Rochefort: It would go either by cable or by
12 radio.

13 Mr. Richardson: Were there any arrangements that you
14 had which would have enabled you to know what was being
15 sent out by cable?

16 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. If we had been asked to
17 do it or directed to do it we could have possibly obtained
18 the information.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Richardson: What is the basis for that statement, Captain?

Captain Rochefort: The basis for the statement is, sir, I have had considerable experience in attempting to obtain so-called commercial traffic over a period of years, and there are one or two Federal statutes in the matter which made the thing rather delicate to try.

Furthermore, I knew that the authorities in Washington were obtaining the information in sufficient detail, and if they required any assistance, they would ask me to get some information from Honolulu.

In other words, not receiving any requests, or direction from the Navy Department, I assumed they were getting all the information they needed from the diplomatic traffic.

Mr. Richardson: Then, such a dispatch as this shown on page 29 of Exhibit 2, might have gone to Tokyo either by cable or by radio broadcast?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: And if you had made the effort, would it have been possible for you to have intercepted and decoded that message?

Captain Rochefort: If it had gone by radio, we could, of course, have intercepted it. If it had gone by cable, special arrangements would have to have been made in order to obtain copies of the cable traffic.

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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Mr. Richardson: Why were not such arrangements made with reference to knowledge of cable transmissions?

Captain Rochefort: Speaking of Honolulu, sir?

Mr. Richardson: Yes.

Captain Rochefort: Because attempts had been made in previous years to obtain the same information, without success, and I had been led to believe, without making any specific inquiries, that the Navy Department, or the War Department, or both were receiving that information from sources known only to them.

Senator Lucas: What was your last statement based on? You said you were led to believe.

Captain Rochefort: In personel conversation, sir, with officers from Washington on their way to or from the Far East.

Senator Brewster: Will you name any of them?

Captain Rochefort: No, sir. Of course, I was in communication with Captain Safford. He was in charge of the entire organization. The others I cannot recall their names at this time. They were officers going and coming from the Asiatic Fleet.

Mr. Richardson: During the week prior to December 7, were you actively translating for the information of the Commander in Chief in Hawaii all of the messages coming

Witness Rochefort

questions by: Mr. Richardson

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in to Honolulu and going out of Honolulu, which it was possible for you to decode?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: Could you, by any arrangement with the cable company have increased the number of messages that you could have translated and reported to the Commander in Chief?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, Mr. Counsel, that had been done on either the 3rd or the 4th of December, on which certain messages were made available to me by the District Intelligence Officer. They were being handled in Washington, but I undertook to attempt to handle them myself in Honolulu, as well as send back copies to Washington immediately, and thus we did read some before the 7th, but the important ones after the 7th.

Mr. Richardson: And those that you read were transmitted by you?

Captain Rochefort: To the Commander in Chief.

Mr. Richardson: To the Commander in Chief, in due course?

Captain Rochefort: Yes. Actually, I think what happened, sir, as I told Layton, that we had some messages but they were absolutely of no value then. They involved such things as wages, visas, and that sort of thing.

Mr. Richardson: Then, it is very definite, is it not,

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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that there never was any time prior to Pearl Harbor when
your station in Hawaii could handle any of the purple or
other high Japanese code transmissions?

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Captain Rochefort: No, sir, we could not handle them.

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Mr. Richardson: And that, of course, would include
the code J-19 that you spoke of a moment ago?

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Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Richardson: But it would not include the PA-K2?

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Captain Rochefort: We could handle the PA-K2 and
lower classifications.

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Mr. Richardson: Now, did you make up, while you were
there, a communications intelligence summary covering speci-
fic periods?

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21
Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

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Mr. Richardson: For transmission from your department
to the Commander in Chief?

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Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson: What was that?

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Captain Rochefort: The communications intelligence
summary was a daily report to the Commander in Chief, Pacific,
of all information obtained, estimates made, and deductions
drawn from the previous day's traffic.

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Mr. Richardson: How often? Daily?

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33
Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, daily.

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Mr. Richardson: And covering the period of a week
3 or ten days prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster, you furnished,
4 as part of your duty to the Commander in Chief, a daily
5 intelligence summary, to acquaint him with everything that
6 had passed through your unit during the preceding 24 hours?

7 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Richardson: I show you our Exhibit 115, and ask
9 you whether those are samples of that intelligence summary.

10 (The document was handed to Captain Rochefort.)

11 Captain Rochefort: Yes, they are.

12 Mr. Richardson: Then the fact is, Captain, that your
13 activities there, as is indicated by these intelligence
14 summaries, were quite definitely confined to Japanese ship
15 movements, and other matters connected with naval operations
16 which came in codes which you were able to handle and trans-
17 late?

18 Captain Rochefort: About 10 percent of which we were
19 able to handle and translate, sir.

20 Mr. Richardson: Well, all that did come to you that
21 you were able to handle and translate came from ship move-
22 ments?

23 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Richardson: And other similar activities of the
25 Japanese naval forces?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 Mr. Richardson: And did not include the diplomatic
3 intercepts, which, it was your understanding, as I under-
4 stood your testimony, were being handled by Washington,
5 and at Cavite?

6 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Richardson: Was there any arrangement, so far as
8 you know, between your station in Hawaii and Cavite with
9 respect to the interchange of communications?

10 Captain Rochefort: There had been an arrangement,
11 which had existed for some years, in which one of the three
12 stations, that is Cavite, Pearl Harbor, or Washington, if
13 they had information of value to one or more of the other
14 stations, it was immediately passed to that station by
15 radio, or by airmail.

16 Mr. Richardson: When was that stopped?

17 Captain Rochefort: I do not think it was ever stopped;
18 not to my knowledge, sir.

19 Mr. Richardson: Was there any cessation of it?

20 Captain Rochefort: No, sir. There might have been a
21 possible lowering in the number of messages which were sent
22 to us for information, but that would be because they felt
23 they were more technical in nature and did not interest us.

24 Mr. Richardson: Captain, if there had been suitable
25 empowering directions from Washington, could there have

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

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2 been closer and better cooperation between your unit and
3 G-2 in Hawaii?

4 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. When I say "yes, sir"
5 that may sound as if there were not full cooperation. We
6 did cooperate to the fullest extent possible, bearing in
7 mind the different jobs we had.

8 Mr. Richardson: Do you know anything of your own
9 knowledge about the G-2 set-up there?

10 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, from conversations with
11 Colonel Fielder.

12 Mr. Richardson: Do you know what they were able to
13 intercept and decode?

14 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, we did not discuss that
15 matter.

16 Mr. Richardson: You were unable, in many instances
17 to discuss with G-2 the character of the intelligence that
18 you were receiving, were you?

19 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir ; by reason of the fact
20 that, insofar as I knew, Colonel Fielder, as G-2, was not
21 authorized to receive " ultra."

22 Mr. Richardson: Then there was a large field of
23 intelligence that would pass through your unit that you
24 could not communicate to G-2, or any officer in G-2?

25 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. I could not communicate

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Richardson
The Chairman

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2 it to G-2 as ultra, but I could communicate the sense of
3 it, which I did.

4 Mr. Richardson: Would you be able to say that that
5 duty was carried out to the extent that you feel G-2 got
6 all of the information from you that would have been use-
7 ful to them?

8 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Richardson: I have no further questions.

10 The Chairman: What is your assignment now?

11 Captain Rochefort: On duty in the Office of Naval
12 Intelligence, sir.

13 The Chairman: Here in Washington?

14 Captain Rochefort: Here in Washington.

15 The Chairman: How long have you had that assignment?

16 Captain Rochefort: Since approximately the middle of
17 December, 1945, sir.

18 The Chairman: And prior to that, where have you been?

19 Captain Rochefort: I have been ordered to sea duty,
20 sir, at my own request, in October.

21 The Chairman: How long after the attack on Pearl
22 Harbor before you were assigned to some other place?

23 Captain Rochefort: In October, 1942, sir.

24 The Chairman: Nearly a year?

25 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: The Chairman

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2 The Chairman: You were not in Washington at any
3 time immediately prior to the attack and immediately after?

4 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, I was not.

5 The Chairman: Mr. Cooper.

6 The Vice Chairman: No questions.

7 The Chairman: Senator George?

8 Senator George: I have no questions.

9 The Chairman: Mr. Clark.

10 Mr. Clark isn't here.

11 Senator Lucas.

12 Senator Lucas: I would like to pass for the moment.

13 The Chairman: Mr. Murphy?

14 Mr. Murphy: Is it Commander or Captain?

15 Captain Rochefort: Captain, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: Captain Rochefort, as I understand it, each
17 day at Pearl Harbor you prepared an intelligence summary,
18 which in turn was turned over by you to Layton. That would
19 be Captain Layton?

20 Captain Rochefort: Captain Layton now, sir.

21 Mr. M urphy: Then Captain Layton himself would make
22 his own estimate of the situation, and present it to Admial
23 Kimmel, or would he present your intelligence summary?

24 Captain Rochefort: He would present our intelligence
25 summary, sir, in addition to which he would prepare for

1 Witness Rochefort Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Admiral Kimmel, at infrequent intervals perhaps an over-
3 all general estimate.

4 Mr. Murphy: But, at any rate, each of your summaries
5 would, in the ordinary course of events, be presented to
6 Admiral Kimmel daily?

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7 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, on November 1st, the Japanese
9 changed their code signals, did they not?

10 Captain Rochefort: Call sign, sir.

11 Mr. Murphy: Cell sign.

12 Then sometime towards the end of November you predicted
13 that the Japs were about to change their call sign signals
14 again?

15 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: In Navy parlance, that would be pretty
17 extraordinary, wouldn't it, a change within less than 30
18 days of call sign signals?

19 Captain Rochefort: It would have been the first time
20 it had happened, to my knowledge, yes, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: And you conveyed that information to
22 Leyton, and he in turn to Kimmel, did he not?

23 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Murphy: Then, about the first of December there
25 was an actual change of the call signs again, was there not?

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Captain Rochefort: Yes.

3 Mr. Murphy : That too was quite unusual, wasn't it,
4 the fact that they actually changed it?

5 Captain Rochefort: Yes.

6 Mr. Murphy: Ordinarily it would be six months to
7 a year before they would make such a change; isn't that
8 right?

9 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. The periods in which
10 they were being kept in effect were comparatively smaller.

11 Mr. Murphy: It is also a fact, is it not, sir, that
12 in your daily intelligence summaries, you stated definitely
13 and positively that the Japanese appeared to be preparing
14 for a major offense in the Pacific?

15 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: About when was it that you stated that
17 in your summary?

18 Captain Rochefort: We prepared a special dispatch
19 along that line on the 26th of November, sir.

20 Mr. Murphy: And on that day you felt the Japanese
21 were prepared for a move on a large scale?

22 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Murphy: You also predicted in your daily summaries
24 the fact that the Japanese were moving in the direction of
25 Hawaii with their submarines, did you not?

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Captain Rochefort: We did not say they were moving
3 in the direction of Hawaii.

4 Mr. Murphy: You said they were moving eastward?

5 Captain Rochefort: Yes.

6 Mr. Murphy: And moving eastward was in the direction
7 of Hawaii, so far as our possessions were concerned, Midway,
8 and the United States?

9 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: They were moving, at any rate, from the
11 Asiatic Coast and from the Japanese Coast in the direction
12 generally due east, weren't they?

13 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

14 Mr. Murphy: And due east would be Midway, Johnston,
15 Hawaii, and the West Coast of the United States, wouldn't
16 it?

17 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Murphy: And you showed that in your summaries,
19 that that progressive move was occurring, did you not?

20 Captain Rochefort: Perhaps not in those words, sir,
21 but that was the sense of it.

22 Mr. Murphy: Well, to a naval man, it would mean you
23 predicted the gradual move east of submarine activity of
24 the Japanese, would it not?

25 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. As I recall, sir, we

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1 Witness Rochefort questions by: Mr. Murphy
2 said they were going to the Marshalls.
3 Mr. Murphy: They were going to the Marshalls?
4 Captain Rochefort: Yes.
5 Mr. Murphy: As far as the Marshalls were concerned,
6 there was some controversy over how many carriers were in
7 the Marshalls, wasn't there?
8 Captain Rochefort: Yes.
9 Mr. Murphy: You felt there were only two carriers
10 there did you not?
11 Captain Rochefort: Yes.
12 Mr. Murphy: You were right, weren't you?
13 Captain Rochefort: We said one carrier, or carrier
14 division -- at the most, two carriers.
15 Mr. Murphy: At the most two carriers?
16 Captain Rochefort: Yes.
17 Mr. Murphy: You were right and the others were wrong?
18 Captain Rochefort: I would hesitate to say.
19 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, you were right. There were
20 only two down there.
21 Captain Rochefort: There would be a maximum of two
22 down there.
23 Mr. Murphy: And that was your report on your daily
24 intelligence summary?
25 Captain Rochefort: That was a special summary.

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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2 Mr. Murphy: That was a special summary.

3 On the 26th of November you said there were only two
4 carriers at the Marshalls, and you later learned there were
5 only two carriers at the Marshalls?

6 Captain Rochefort: There were two carriers actually
7 at Palau, sir.

8 Mr. Murphy: There were two carriers at Palau?

9 Captain Rochefort: Yes.

10 Mr. Murphy: Then, in addition to that, you had located
11 en masse practically the entire Japanese fleet which attacked
12 Pearl Harbor, had you not? I mean in your daily intelligence
13 summary.

14 Captain Rochefort: We located them in a negative sense,
15 sir. We had lost them. We did not know where they were.

16 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, you made reference in one
17 of your summaries, did you not, to the actual group or
18 block, almost without exception, of the actual ships that
19 had come to Pearl Harbor?

20 Captain Rochefort: I do not recall that sir. We may
21 have. I do not recall that.

22 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, the fact is you did, on your
23 daily intelligence summary, show that the carriers were
24 not accounted for, did you not?

25 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

Witness Rochefort

questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: You got to the point where you could not account for them, you just left them out of your report, to indicate that nothing was known about them?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

As I recall, we said "Nothing is known about carriers."

Mr. Murphy: And the reason for doing that, as a Navy man, as a communications expert, was you did not want to venture an opinion on an unknown quantity; isn't that correct?

Captain Rochefort: Yes. The idea there was, by means short of cryptanalysis, in other words, radio intelligence, we could obtain a considerable amount of information. That is, without actually reading the messages.

From that information, we found we did not know anything about the carriers.

Mr. Murphy: The fact you did not know anything about them, and the fact that you did not put in your intelligence summary anything as to their being in home waters meant to indicate, did it not, to those who read it, that there was a danger signal?

Captain Rochefort: I would not say that, sir, because that condition had obtained before.

Mr. Murphy: Well, the fact is, you said you knew nothing about them.

Captain Rochefort: Yes.

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: And, therefore, when there is an uncertainty you usually look for the worst, don't you?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. Of course they could have gone out on a fleet problem, or they could have gone into radio silence, or a variety of other things. That happened before, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Is it the usual plan, when you have a war warning and you cannot account for carriers, that you prepare for the worst?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, the fact is that you did say on your summaries that they could not be accounted for, and then you gave that to Captain Layton, and Captain Layton went to Admiral Kimmel, and presented it to him and Admiral Kimmel said to Captain Layton, "You mean to say they might even be coming around Diamond Head?" Do you remember that?

Captain Rochefort: I had heard that later, sir.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

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1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: Captain, did you, as the Communications
3 expert at Pearl Harbor, know anything about the war warning
4 of November 27?

5 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, I did see it on or
6 about November 27.

7 Mr. Murphy: So that you had knowledge of that and you
8 took that into consideration when you were preparing your
9 Intelligence summaries about the location of the carriers;
10 isn't that right?

11 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

12 Mr. Murphy: Were you alarmed approaching December 2nd
13 about those carriers?

14 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Murphy: You expected trouble was coming, did you?

16 Captain Rochefort: We all knew it was coming, sir. It
17 was a question of where.

18 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, what facilities did you have
19 for interchanging what you had with your counterpart of the
20 Army?

21 Captain Rochefort: Personal conversation, sir, with
22 Colonel Fielder in Shafter and Colonel Fielder in Pearl Harbor;
23 meeting Colonel Fielder in Captain Layton's office and
24 perhaps seeing him down town with Captain Mayfield.

25 Mr. Murphy: Now, it has come to the committee's attention

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 that the FBI sent a message to Washington to the effect
2 that the Japanese were destroying most of their important
3 papers as a result of an intercept of a conversation of a
4 cook in the Japanese Consulate with Japan; did you know
5 about that?
6

7 Captain Rochefort: I did not know about the conversa-
8 tion at the time, sir. I had been informed by the District
9 Intelligence Officer of the fact that the Japanese Consulate
10 was destroying certain papers and codes.

11 Mr. Murphy: The only difference is that the information
12 that Admiral Kimmel and General Short appeared to have
13 gotten was that the Japanese were reported destroying papers
14 but the FBI reported to Washington that they were destroying
15 most of their important papers. Did you know that?

16 Captain Rochefort: No, sir. The information was given
17 to me that they were destroying their codes.

18 Mr. Murphy: Codes?

19 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, there was a message from
21 Honolulu to Washington on the 6th day of December that the
22 Japanese were destroying their codes. Did you know about
23 that?

24 Captain Rochefort: I originated that message, sir, from
25 Honolulu to Washington.

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: General Short said that he never heard about that. Do you know whether he did or not?

Captain Rochefort: No, sir, I do not.

Mr. Murphy: At any rate, do you know whether your counterpart in the Army knew the Japanese were destroying their codes on December 6 at Hawaii?

Captain Rochefort: No, sir, because I received that information from the District Intelligence Officer. I was fairly sure without asking that he had received it either from the FBI or the Army and in either event the Army would have known about it either from the FBI or themselves.

Mr. Murphy: At any rate, General Short said he never heard it. Would you be surprised at that?

Captain Rochefort: No, sir; it could very well be that it was a matter which was known perhaps to somebody in General Short's staff and was not considered important. I don't know.

Mr. Murphy: As a Communications expert, Captain, when you heard of the destruction of the codes at the very place where you were located, what did it mean to you?

Captain Rochefort: Well, I am trying to keep hindsight out of it.

Mr. Murphy: Yes. I don't want present day quarterbacks. What did it mean to you on the 6th with the carriers not

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Murphy
Senator Lucas

1 located, with the war warning message before, with the
2 feeling that war was coming, and then the sign that right
3 where you are they are destroying their codes, the expected
4 enemy?
5

6 Captain Rochefort: I think that my reaction at that
7 time would have been that Admiral Hart is going to have
8 himself quite a job very shortly.

9 Mr. Murphy: You felt that at least some of the forces
10 of the United States were going to be in for action?

11 Captain Rochefort: That Admiral Hart was going to have
12 himself quite a bit of work to do.

13 Mr. Murphy: I have just one other question.

14 Senator Lucas: Will the Congressman yield?

15 Mr. Murphy: Yes.

16 Senator Lucas: Captain, in order to straighten out
17 my own mind I would like to ask you one or two questions.

18 You originated that message that was sent to Washington?

19 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Lucas: Wherein you advised the Navy that the
21 Japanese Consul was destroying codes?

22 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Lucas: Now, was that information disseminated
24 after you sent the code or where did the information come
25 from in the first instance?

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Captain Rochefort: The reason for sending the message
3 was twofold. First, we received a message either from
4 Washington or from Admiral Hart, Commander in Chief Asiatic
5 Fleet, to the effect that the Japanese were destroying
6 communications equipment in various places throughout the
7 world, and my message to Washington was in amplification
8 of that message in part.

9 Senator Lucas: What I am trying to find out, Captain,
10 is what means you had or what liaison did you have with
11 the Army so that everyone of importance in the Army, and
12 in the Navy, would know about the burning of the codes in
13 the Consulate at Hawaii?

14 Captain Rochefort: I don't think I follow you there, sir.

15 Senator Lucas: Well, you knew the codes were being
16 burned?

17 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

18 Senator Lucas: You sent a message to Washington?

19 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Lucas: Who else knew?

21 Captain Rochefort: Layton.

22 Senator Lucas: That codes were being burned?

23 Captain Rochefort: Layton, I was informed.

24 Senator Lucas: What was your arrangement between
25 the Army and Navy to get that information to the Army?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(2)

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Captain Rochefort: As I said, sir, the information
3 came to me from the District Intelligence Officer.

4 Senator Lucas: Who was he?

5 Captain Rochefort: It was Captain Mayfield, sir.

6 He was a Naval officer. Captain Mayfield. He gave me the
7 information. In other words, the District Intelligence Officer
8 then was familiar with the situation. He informed me and
9 I undertook to inform Washington and the Commander in Chief
10 of the Fleet and, as I said before, I was fairly sure that
11 Captain Mayfield had obtained the information in the first
12 instance either from the FBI or from the Army. In any
13 event I would not consider it my job to have informed
14 either the FBI or the Army.

15 Senator Lucas: I understand. I am trying to ascertain
16 as to whose responsibility it was to disseminate that in-
17 formation between the Army and the Navy, assuming that
18 the Navy got it first?

19 Captain Rochefort: The District Intelligence Officer,
20 sir.

21 Senator Lucas: That was Captain Mayfield?

22 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Lucas: And it was his duty to inform the
24 Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet as well as the
25 Army?

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Captain Rochefort: No, sir. Captain Mayfield actually
3 informed me and I undertook to see that the Commander in
4 Chief of the Pacific Fleet was informed.

5 Senator Lucas: So it was your duty then to see that
6 the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet was informed?

7 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

8 Senator Lucas: Whose duty was it in the Navy -- I
9 assume they got the message first -- whose duty was it in
10 the Navy in Hawaii to advise General Short and his staff of
11 this important message?

12 Captain Rochefort: I would say the District Intelligence
13 Officer, sir.

14 Senator Lucas: That would be Captain Mayfield?

15 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Lucas: They must have had an arrangement for
17 the exchange of information, intelligence.

18 Captain Rochefort: From what I observed they worked
19 in close contact.

20 Senator Lucas: Wouldn't you know about that?

21 Captain Rochefort: I would not know first-hand.

22 Senator Lucas: We would have to rely upon Captain
23 Mayfield for that information as to whether or not he
24 exchanged information with the Army on such vital informa-
25 tion as the burning of codes at that particular time?

1 Witness Rochefort Questions by: Senator Lucas
2 Mr. Murphy

3 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. I would have no first-
4 hand information of that.

5 Senator Lucas: Thank you.

6 Mr. Murphy: Captain, is there any doubt in your mind
7 that Admiral Kimmel knew of this message that you sent to
8 Washington on the 6th? I believe you said that was sent
9 by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to
10 Washington.

11 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. That would be the office
12 clearing the message that I had prepared.

13 Mr. Murphy: What I mean is do you know whether or not
14 that message, that information about the destruction of codes
15 on the 6th in Hawaii, got to Admiral Kimmel?

16 Captain Rochefort: I naturally couldn't say positively,
17 sir, but I am quite sure it would have; quite sure.

18 Mr. Murphy: How would it get there, who would be the
19 one, Layton?

20 Captain Rochefort: From Layton, yes, sir.

21 Mr. Murphy: Now, then, one other question. In Exhibit
22 2 there are a number of messages concerning ship locations
23 in Hawaii. Do you recall whether or not you were translating
24 any of the PA-K2 dispatches?

25 Captain Rochefort: Not until the 3rd or 4th of December,
sir.

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 Mr. Murphy: And some of these, though, that you did
3 decode had something to do with the number of ships that
4 were actually in Pearl Harbor, did they not?

5 Captain Rochefort: As I recall one or two of them did, sir.

6 Mr. Murphy: I wonder if you would be able to tell which
7 ones -- you did refer to them in your previous testimony,
8 not before this committee but before another committee. It
9 may be that you didn't. Somebody at Hawaii did, Captain.

10 Captain Rochefort: The only message that I would
11 recall, sir, of any importance in the group that we worked
12 on at Pearl subsequent to the night of 3 December was the
13 rather long message pertaining to lights in homes and that
14 sort of thing.

15 Mr. Murphy: Had you succeeded in getting enough out
16 of that to know pretty much what they were doing?

17 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. Unfortunately that was
18 not translated until the evening of the 10th.

19 Mr. Murphy: At any rate, you didn't know what was in
20 it on the 7th?

21 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

22 Mr. Murphy: Had you translated any messages before
23 the 7th which indicated an interest on the part of Tokyo
24 in what was going on at Hawaii?

25 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

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Mr. Murphy: None at all?

Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Did you know that Tokyo was making inquiry of Honolulu for any purpose up to the 7th?

Captain Rochefort: No, sir, I recall of no messages that indicated that, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, then, my final question: You said you expected there would be a lot of trouble in store for Admiral Hart. How soon after you heard that about the codes being destroyed at Hawaii?

Captain Rochefort: Not more than three or four days, sir, at the outside.

Mr. Murphy: Thank you, sir. That is all.

The Chairman: Senator Brewster is next.

Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, I have to leave now.

Captain, are you going to be in the city for awhile?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas: I don't know that I shall want to further interrogate you but if you will be here tomorrow I will appreciate it.

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart: Captain, how many kinds of codes are there?

1 Witness Rochefort Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 The Chairman: Just a moment. Senator Brewster is next.

3 Senator Brewster: I will pass.

4 The Chairman: Go ahead.

5 Mr. Gearhart: I have heard of the Army, the Navy, and
6 the diplomatic. Are there any other classifications of codes
7 and ciphers?

8 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. Most any government agency
9 would have its own system or systems as well as the various
10 commercial systems.

11 Mr. Gearhart: Of course, when you are monitoring for,
12 picking up these codes, you don't know what they are while
13 you are getting them, it is only after you get them and
14 study them that you can classify them; is that correct?

15 Captain Rochefort: No, sir. Over a period of years
16 we had developed a pretty fair knowledge of the Japanese
17 naval communication system which involved, among other things,
18 a rather detailed knowledge of the radio circuits that were
19 plied, such as between Tokyo and ships at sea, that sort
20 of thing. In Pearl Harbor we merely covered or monitored,
21 if you will, the circuits that we felt the most information
22 was available on.

23 Mr. Gearhart: Well, do we have respected channels when
24 using radio?

25 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. Even if there weren't, sir,

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1 we would still find it, because we maintain special watches
2 for searching the whole spectrum.

3 Mr. Gearhart: You broke some of the Naval codes.

4 Captain Rochefort: Sir?

5 Mr. Gearhart: You were able to crack some of the Naval
6 codes.

7 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

8 Mr. Gearhart: Some of the diplomatic codes.

9 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Gearhart: Were you able to crack any of the Army,
11 Japanese Army codes?

12 Captain Rochefort: We didn't try anything with the
13 Army systems at all, sir.

14 Mr. Gearhart: The Army systems would come over the air
15 once in awhile?

16 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, they would, but we were
17 not covering any of those circuits. Our primary concern
18 was with the Navy. When I say that I do not wish to be
19 misunderstood. We were only able to cover a part of the
20 Naval communications system through a lack of personnel.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Because you were way out in the middle
22 of the Pacific I suppose there weren't many Army messages
23 coming, were there?

24 Captain Rochefort: We could have probably picked up
25

1 Witness Rochefort Questions by: Mr. Gearhart
2 quite a few had we had the personnel to do it with. Senator Ferguson

3 Mr. Gearhart: Once in awhile the Navy could be caught?

4 Captain Rochefort: We could have, sir, but I conceived
5 my first job was to put my own house in order, which was
6 the Japanese Navy. Then when we were able to do that, we
7 could look around and offer whatever help we could.

8 Mr. Gearhart: I believe that is all.

9 The Chairman: Senator Brewster.

10 Senator Brewster: I pass.

11 The Chairman: Senator Ferguson.

12 Senator Ferguson: Captain, there was a message sent
13 from OPNAV, Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet, for Commander
14 in Chief Asiatic Fleet, No. 061743.

15 Mr. Masten, will you show him that message.

16 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: Now, that reads:

18 "In view of the international situation and the exposed
19 position of our outlying Pacific Islands, you may authorize
20 the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents
21 now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means
22 of communication to support our current operations and
23 special intelligence should of course be maintained until
24 the last moment."

25 That is the way that reads.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

2
3 Senator Ferguson: Do you know when that was received
4 by CINCPAC, which is Pearl Harbor?

5 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, I do not.

6 Senator Ferguson: Now, will you note whether or not
7 it is marked "Urgent" or "Priority"?

8 Captain Rochefort: I can't see from this copy, sir,
9 what the classification was. This copy that I have is not
10 marked at all as far as the classification.

11 Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether in the Navy if
12 it wasn't marked "Priority" or "Urgent" that it would not
13 go "Priority" or "Urgent"?

14 What hour was it sent out of Washington?

15 Captain Rochefort: 1743, which would be 12:43 Washington
16 time. In other words, 43 minutes after noon.

17 Senator Ferguson: On the 6th?

18 Captain Rochefort: 6 December, Saturday.

19 Senator Ferguson: Now, did you receive that prior to
20 the attack?

21 Captain Rochefort: I did not see this message prior
22 to the attack, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: Do you know when it did come to your
24 attention?

25 Captain Rochefort: I recall having seen it, sir, and

1 Witness Rochefort Questions by: Senator Ferguson
2 it must have been some time after the 7th.

3 Senator Ferguson: Where were you at the time of the
4 attack on Sunday morning at Hawaii?

5 Captain Rochefort: At Pearl Harbor, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Were you on duty?

7 Captain Rochefort: No, sir. I got out there about
8 20 minutes after the attack started.

9 Senator Ferguson: Were you surprised at an attack?

10 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir, at Pearl Harbor.

11 Senator Ferguson: Had you anticipated an attack Sunday
12 morning?

13 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

14 Senator Ferguson: Anywhere?

15 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: Where?

17 Mr. Murphy: May we get the answer as to whether he was
18 surprised at an attack.

19 (The answer was read as follows:

20 "Yes, sir, at Pearl Harbor.")

21 Senator Ferguson: Did you anticipate an attack Sunday
22 morning?

23 Captain Rochefort: I anticipated an attack might occur
24 any morning or any afternoon certainly definitely along the
25 China Coast, possibly in the Philippines.

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Senator Ferguson: Was that because of your Intelligence?
3 What would you draw that conclusion from? I mean, when I
4 say your "Intelligence", I mean the information that you had.

5 Captain Rochefort: Probably it was due on my part at
6 least to a feeling that the Japanese had more or less
7 committed themselves in Southeast Asia, possibly the Philippines,
8 which would not leave very much for an attack on Pearl Harbor.

9 Senator Ferguson: I didn't understand.

10 Captain Rochefort: Which would not leave them very much
11 in the way of ships and planes for an attack on any other
12 spot.

13 Senator Ferguson: Wasn't the only deterrent to the
14 Japanese movement to the south in Pearl Harbor in the form
15 of ships?

16 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: And airplanes?

18 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

19 Senator Ferguson: Where was the deterrent?

20 Captain Rochefort: Considering the fact that we had
21 a 5-5-3 ratio in the two fleets, Pearl Harbor, some 5,000
22 miles aloof from Tokyo, and one of the reasons for the
23 5-5-3 ratio was to give the Japanese a parity in their own
24 waters, it follows that if they were going to the south
25 that the existence or non-existence of a fleet 5,000 miles

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 to the eastward was certainly not a major deterrent.

3 Senator Ferguson: Was it a deterrent?

4 Captain Rochefort: In my opinion not.

5 Senator Ferguson: Was there any deterrent at all to them
6 moving?

7 Captain Rochefort: There would be a deterrent if the
8 entire Japanese Fleet moved to the south and thereby risked
9 a hit and run attack on a certain part of their territory,
10 yes, to that extent.

11 Senator Ferguson: Well, didn't you know that the entire
12 fleet was not moving south, didn't you know from the British
13 how many ships were moving into the Kra Peninsula?

14 Captain Rochefort: We could count, both from our own
15 sources and other sources, a group of ships going to the
16 south, which comprised, I would say, probably a majority of
17 the Japanese forces available.

18 Senator Ferguson: The majority. Would you say over half?

19 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Well, where did you think the other
21 half was going to strike?

22 Captain Rochefort: Some, of course, would be in overhaul.
23 Some we just plain lost.

24 Senator Ferguson: What about those you lost? Didn't
25 you think there may be danger that they would strike?

1 Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Captain Rochefort: They could, yes, sir.

3 Senator Ferguson: Then why weren't you prepared at
4 Pearl Harbor?

5 Captain Rochefort: You will pardon me, sir, but I had
6 a rather relatively junior position in Pearl Harbor in
7 connection with preparations.

8 Senator Ferguson: You were the head of the Intelligence
9 Section?

10 Captain Rochefort: I was the head of the Combat In-
11 telligence Section, radio intelligence section.

12 Senator Ferguson: You were the head of the Radio Combat
13 Intelligence Section?

14 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

15 Senator Ferguson: Wouldn't it be your duty to appraise
16 as to where Japan was going to attack, when Japan was
17 going to attack and where she was going to attack, and with
18 what force?

19 Captain Rochefort: Based on radio intelligence only, sir,
20 we would.

21 Senator Ferguson: Now, do I understand then that we
22 had our Intelligence so divided that you only operated on
23 radio intelligence?

24 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Then what did you mean by your last

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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answer?

Captain Rochefort: We gave all the information that we had available or that we had deduced or estimated that had been obtained by means of radio intelligence to the Fleet Intelligence Officer.

Senator Ferguson: That was --

Captain Rochefort: Captain Layton.

Senator Ferguson: And then you didn't pay any attention after you had given it to him and had drawn the appraisal of it?

Captain Rochefort: We gave him our best estimate, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Now, did you estimate to him that there was going to be an attack somewhere on Sunday?

Captain Rochefort: No, sir, not on Sunday. We did not specify any date, as I recall.

Senator Ferguson: Well, when did you give him the last estimate?

Captain Rochefort: Saturday, sir, December 6.

Senator Ferguson: When did you tell him it would happen?

Captain Rochefort: We did not tell them, to the best of my knowledge, on Saturday, 6 December, when it would happen.

Senator Ferguson: Did you tell them it was going to happen?

1 Witness Rochefort Questions by: Senator Ferguson

2 Captain Rochefort: We indicated very strongly there
3 was an offensive movement.

4 Senator Ferguson: An offensive movement where?

5 Captain Rochefort: I think perhaps the best statement
6 on that, sir, would be the November 26 message.

7 Senator Ferguson: What did you say to him on the 26th?
8 I am trying to find out now -- you are the Radio Intelligence
9 man there -- why they didn't know about this attack coming,
10 I am trying to find out why the Intelligence System didn't
11 work out there.

12 Captain Rochefort: As to that I have no answer, Mr.
13 Senator.

14 Senator Ferguson: You have no answer as to why it
15 didn't work?

16 Captain Rochefort: No, sir. I cannot explain to you
17 why we did not specify a certain date or a day in the week.

18 Senator Ferguson: Well, if you had known under your
19 radio system that there was a message being delivered in
20 Washington Sunday morning and it was to be delivered to
21 the Secretary of State at 1:00 o'clock and that it was
22 even more than an ultimatum, would that have given you
23 the hour?

24 Captain Rochefort: I believe it would have, sir.

25 Senator Ferguson: Did you get such a message?

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

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Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson: No, not now.

Mr. Murphy: I am wondering the basis for the Senator's statement about it being more than an ultimatum.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know what I am talking about, the 14th part message?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir. I did not see that message until 1944-1945.

Senator Ferguson: Now, when you had this, as you call it, the radio intelligence, did you get other intelligence so that you could appraise the entire situation?

Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Hook follows

Witness Rochefort

Questions by: senator Ferguson

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1
2 Senator Ferguson: Well then, did you give to Captain
3 Layton an entire appraisal, as far as the Navy was con-
4 cerned of the situation as to whether or not to expect
5 war and where to expect it?

6 Captain Rochefort: Yes, sir.

7 Senator Ferguson: When did you give it to him?

8 Captain Rochefort: Daily.

9 Senator Ferguson: Well, did you ever call it to his
10 attention that there was going to be war as far as the
11 United States was concerned?

12 Captain Rochefort: No, I would not say in writing that
13 we made the flat statement that there was or was not going
14 to be war. We gave them indications as we saw it.

15 Senator Ferguson: Were those indications that we were
16 going to have war with Japan, America was?

17 Captain Rochefort: No, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: You never gave him such an appraisal?

19 Captain Rochefort: No, sir, not in writing. We may
20 have discussed the matter and undoubtedly did at great length.

21 Senator Ferguson: If you had the foundation for such
22 appraisal, why didn't you put it in writing?

23 The Chairman: It is five o'clock. Obviously we can't
24 finish with the witness. We will recess until 10 o'clock
tomorrow morning.

25 Mr. Murphy: May we have available in the morning that
26 summary?

(Whereupon, at 5 o'clock p.m., the committee recessed
until 10 o'clock a.m., Saturday, February 16, 1946.)

