

INTERP OF KIDS (7 Feb 46)

DOC 4131

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INTERROGATION OF

(Marquis) KIDO, Koichi

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 7 February 1946, 1030 - 1500 hours

PLACE : Hattori House, Tokyo, Japan

PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer

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- Q In your diary, about the middle of January 5, 1933, you mention again that War Minister ARAKI was shouting about the difficulties and problems of the political parties. Do you remember anything in particular he said about that time? Was it just more of his complaint about the political parties, or was it something in particular, according to your recollection?
- A At that time, the political parties were still powerful and therefore, the military was unable to press its demands effectively against the political parties. Therefore, the younger militarists called ARAKI a weakling because the militarists were not able to be carried through.
- Q In other words, ARAKI was even being criticized by people in the military for not being strong enough?
- A And the character of ARAKI is that of a weak-natured individual and he was actually used as a stooge by others.
- Q There wasn't any question, though, that he personally was in favor of eliminating the political parties and also in favor of these activities in Manchuria, but you think he wasn't a very strong leader?
- A Rather than a leader, he was a stooge.

- Q Who was really the leader, MASAKI?
- A I believe that MASAKI was much stronger but it is questionable whether he can be considered as a leader.
- Q Who would you call a leader if ARAKI and MASAKI were not?
- A I believe that the actual leaders were these younger officers like HASHIMOTO and such and these young officers utilized ARAKI and MASAKI.
- Q Well, MASAKI was a stronger character than ARAKI in your opinion and he was more of a schemer than ARAKI, would you say?
- A Yes.
- Q I notice in your diary, you mention that the Army group was relying mainly on MASAKI. They thought he was a stronger man and could do them more good than ARAKI.
- A Yes.
- Q Of the two - ARAKI and MASAKI - you would place MASAKI as more prominent in the Manchurian movement, would you?
- A Generally so.
- Q Who was OBATA? Is he the man we mentioned the other day in connection with the Bureau of Military Affairs?
- A Yes.
- Q What is the Satsuma influence that you mention in your diary?
- A The Satsuma is a faction which carried over from the feudal period and which was concerned with the political parties and it came from Kagoshima.
- Q What did it advocate - this philosophy - the Satsuma teaching or program?
- A It is just a meeting of all those persons who came from Satsuma - more or less a meeting together of the fellows from Satsuma.
- Q You mention in here something about the Satsuma influence. What was the Satsuma influence?
- A I believe that the Satsuma faction was getting itself involved in political matters.

- Q And was OBATA opposed to what was going on in the Satsuma group?
- A He was critical of HIRANUMA taking on the Satsuma - more or less becoming close to the Satsuma faction.
- Q In other words, the Satsuma group in the Army were making up with the politicians? Is that the idea? And OBATA was opposed to that?
- A The Satsuma faction is not an Army group, it is a political gathering.
- Q OBATA, as Operations Chief, was opposed to political parties, just like MASAKI and ARAKI. Is that correct?
- A I don't believe that OBATA is opposed to MASAKI and ARAKI?
- Q He was more connected with the Manchurian Incident by virtue of his operations in the Army than with political disputes, isn't that right?
- A Yes.
- Q You mention some disgraceful conduct on the part of the Prime Minister at a New Year's Party. What did he do, get drunk, or did he make speeches or statements that were embarrassing to his followers?
- A It was a very foolish thing. It was more or less a breach of etiquette which has been committed in which the speech giving a reply or comment upon the Emperor's speech was prematurely commented on.
- Q What did he say about the Emperor's speech? Anything of importance?
- A It was only that he was very happy to be able to celebrate along with the rest of the members present at the banquet and the Prime Minister is supposed to give a speech of congratulations or thanks to the speech but he happened to give the speech before hand.
- Q Had he been drinking?
- A No, it is not from drinking - just a breach of etiquette.

- Q Just a breach of etiquette?
- A Yes. It is a formal banquet with representatives of foreign countries present.
- Q What he did was to make the speech before he was supposed to. Is that the breach of etiquette?
- A Yes.
- Q On January 26, I notice you mention a report by the Chief of General Staff to the Emperor. How often did the Chief of Staff make reports to the Emperor in those days?
- A I do not know because it is not entirely within my capacity to know.
- Q Could the Chief of Staff make a report to the Emperor whenever he wanted if he thought it was sufficiently important?
- A On a grave matter, he is always present.
- Q He has direct access to the Emperor without going through other channels if he wants to make a report. Is that right?
- A Yes, through the Aide-de-camp.
- Q I note in your diary what the Emperor was supposed to have said, which is as follows: "The Jehol problem facing us, everything must be done with utmost care, otherwise our successful merits secured up to now might be ruined, even by the slightest carelessness". What was the Jehol problem in those days?
- A It was feared that the momentum of the Jehol encouragement would carry the Japanese forces beyond the Great Wall of China.
- Q In connection with the Manchurian campaign, had Jehol been incorporated into Manchuria?
- A Jehol is generally outside of the Great Wall of China.
- Q Jehol is a Province between the Great Wall in China and Manchuria?
- A Yes.
- Q Is Jehol a province, incorporated as a part of Manchuria?
- A It is recognized.

- Q When the puppet government was set up for Manchuria, was JEHOL Province a part of Manchuria, governed by Prince FUYI?
- A Yes.
- Q And who was advocating the expansion of Japan across the Great Wall into China.
- A I believe the Kwantung Army.
- Q Were the Chiefs of Staff in Tokyo also advocating further expansion?
- A I believe that the Chief of Staff in Tokyo did not have such a view in mind.
- Q Do you think they were fearful that the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army would just keep going on and move across the Great Wall into China? Was that the problem?
- A Yes.
- Q Would that action be initiated by ITAGAKI and ISHIWARA?
- A Yes.
- Q They would have led such a movement?
- A Yes
- Q What did the Emperor have in mind when he made the statement I just quoted?
- A I do not know. I believe he was very much concerned about it, though.
- Q He refers to "our successful merits secured up to now" - what did he mean by that?
- A I believe he means that we have been able to come up to this point without severe criticism and difficulties.
- Q Would you say by virtue of this statement, the Emperor approved and gave his approval as to what had taken place in Manchuria?
- A I don't believe he mentioned it that way. He has been very much concerned previously on that matter. He was unavoidably swept away by the course of events which happened to take place successively.

- Q Do you think he was still trying to put an end to military activities in Manchuria and North China?
- A Yes, if such a thing was possible, he would have done it.
- Q Do you recall whether at that stage the Emperor did anything to try to prevent the Kwantung Army from going into China across the Great Wall?
- A On that matter, under Imperial Order, MASAKI, the Vice Chief of Staff, was ordered to go to Manchuria to give personal orders saying that the Japanese forces must never cross the Great Wall of China.
- Q How was that order given to MASAKI. Was he called into the Imperial presence and so instructed?
- A I do not know.
- Q But you do know that about the time this fear of crossing the Great China Wall was in the wind, the Emperor instructed MASAKI to go to Manchuria and see it didn't happen?
- A Yes.
- Q Did MASAKI go to Manchuria?
- A I believe he did.
- Q What did he report back to the Emperor, if you know?
- A I do not know but actually the Japanese Army did not cross the Great Wall.
- Q Do you think that was, in the final analysis, prevented by the action of the Emperor; otherwise, the Kwantung Army might have gone further than they did?
- A Yes, there was such a danger.
- Q What sort of reaction, if any, did the Emperor's activities have in the Army or military group? Did they resent what he had done?
- A There wasn't any special repercussion.
- Q Do you think MASAKI agreed with the attitude of the Emperor as to stopping these activities or did he merely carry out the command because he was obligated to do so?
- A I do not know the details of that?

Q Where is your friend, HARADA? Is he living in Tokyo?

A He is living at Oiso.

Q How far is that from here?

A About a half-hour's rider on the train.

Q Did he remain private secretary to the elder statesman up until his death in 1940?

A Yes.

Q What did HARADA do after that - in Government work?

A Nothing.

Q During the war, did he participate in Government or military affairs?

A He became ill.

Q Was he in private business?

A Nominally, he was working for ^{the} SUMITO Bank but he was ill and had been confined to his bed ever since.

Q Is he still in poor health?

A Yes.

Q How old a man is he, approximately?

A Fifty-eight, I think

Q He probably would be able to give us some information about what we have been discussing here, would he not?

A He is too ill.

Q He is too ill to be talked to?

A Yes.

Q Is he confined to his bed?

A Yes.

Q Where is Count MAKINO?

A He is at Abiko.

Q Is that near here?

A About one hour's ride northward.

Q How old is he, approximately?

A Eighty-six, I think.

Q Is he in good health?

A Yes.

Q He is a man that might well be able to give us some information, you would say?

A Yes.

Q Do you think he would be willing to sit down and discuss these matters with us?

A Because he is so old and weak, he might have difficulty in coming out here.

Q I meant if we went to see him at home.

A I think if that is the case, he would be glad to see you.

Q Do you think we could talk to HARADA if we went to his home?

A For a short period of time, I believe that is possible. The doctors are of the opinion that if he can carry himself through the winter, he will be alright.

Q You indicate in your diary that you talked to the Emperor about the Chief of Staff Conference or report. Did you personally talk to the Emperor?

A No, I never personally talked to him.

Q The way my translation reads is that you talked and advised the Emperor with reference to your conversations. Isn't that what your diary says?

A Where is it?

- Q As of January 26, immediately following the place where you quote what the Emperor said about Jehol.
- A I believe that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal had an audience with the Emperor.
- Q But you didn't, personally?
- A I don't believe I had ever seen the Emperor at this time.
- Q The way my translation reads, is "I advised the Emperor to that effect".
- A I believe that I have written erroneously, myself.
- Q What you meant in your diary was that the Lord Keeper, himself, conferred with the Emperor about it.
- A The Chief Secretary cannot directly talk to the Emperor.
- Q You were present on many occasions when the Lord Keeper did talk to the Emperor, weren't you but you didn't enter into the conversation?
- A The Chief Secretary cannot be present with the Lord Keeper while the Lord Keeper is having an audience with the Emperor.
- Q During those years while you were Chief Secretary, there were times when you saw the Emperor, at least, even though you didn't talk with him?
- A No.
- Q You mean during 1930 to 1937, you never saw the Emperor, personally?
- A No, not those cases - only when the Emperor has been presiding at banquets or business meetings or things like that.
- Q Or some of these teas where reports were made, you were present then, were you not?
- A In the matter of teas or formal ceremonies we have been able to meet him but not in an official capacity.
- Q In a social way, you would have the opportunity of talking with the Emperor on different matters - and on business?
- A There is a rule I cannot see him in an official way.

- Q You can't even be present when the Lord Keeper talked to him officially? Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q There was a lot of discussion in those days about Japan withdrawing from the League of Nations. Just who was it that thought Japan should withdraw from the League. Who were the proponents of that move?
- A I do not know the names or persons actually but I believe it was the military men. I also believe the foreign minister was leaning in that direction.
- Q That would be UCHIDA?
- A Yes.
- Q Why was it that a certain influential group was insisting that Japan withdraw from the League? Why didn't they want to stay in the League?
- A That isn't clear to me.
- Q Wasn't it because the League itself gave indications that it felt the activities in Japan and Manchuria were in violation of the treaties and international law? That is true, isn't it?
- A I believe so.
- Q Why wasn't Japan willing to let the League function and serve the purpose for which it was formed in the first place?
- A I believe that no one actually did want to withdraw from the League but because events more or less made no other alternative possible, I believe that is the reason it became so. I believe that the military has swept the tides to that extent.
- Q Well, one of the functions of the League was in case of dispute between nations, the League was supposed to arbitrate the matter and come to an impartial decision as to who was right and who was wrong. That was the theory of the League, wasn't it?
- A The military was very much in opposition to such a procedure.

- Q In other words, even though Japan was a formal member of the League, the military faction was not willing to let the League function?
- A Yes, and because the military has created incidents and created a puppet state, the Government was unavoidably forced into a circumstance where it was completely swept away by the course taken by the militarists.
- Q If the indications were that the League might have approved what Japan did in Manchuria, the militarists wouldn't have been opposed to the League, then, would they?
- A Yes, but it is hard to make conclusions to that extent.
- Q The truth of the matter is that by virtue of the pressure of the military, Japan just reneged on its obligation to arbitrate matters with the League of Nations. Is that correct?
- A Yes, the military felt that it would not be able to carry out its policy, and, therefore, it disliked arbitration by the League of Nations.
- Q The League prior to that time had arbitrated several other incidents around the world with the participation of Japan, had it not? I mean disputes not involving Japan.
- A I believe so.
- Q And Japan was perfectly willing that the League should arbitrate other people's disputes but not its own disputes?
- A Yes, consequently so. That is why the civilian officers were very much indignant.
- Q The truth of the matter is that by 1933, the Army or military people had a sufficiently planned program for their activities in Manchuria and China and they felt that the League of Nations was standing in the way of accomplishing that program, didn't they?
- A Yes, the result would be so.
- Q There were those among the military group as early as 1933 that were thinking in terms of territorial expansion by Japan into China in addition to Manchuria?

A I don't believe so - not in China.

Q Do you think it was pretty much limited to Manchuria in those days?

A Yes .

Q When did the military group start thinking in terms of expansion in China, territorially? Approximately - I realize you don't know the exact date?

A I don't believe such a feeling existed until the outbreak of the China Incident and there was opposition among the military to the effect that as long as Manchuria is not as yet settled and developed, we should not get involved in China.

Q It was a long-range plan in the military faction that after Manchuria had been properly controlled and brought into the Japanese sphere of influence, the militarists then would move into China. Was that it?

A There were certain persons discussing to that effect but I don't believe there actually was a plan.

Q And those that were discussing that were Chief of Staff officers, were they?

A I do not know but I believe that those young officers of which I previously mentioned had such an idea.

Q The most outspoken all through those days were the younger officers? Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Was HASHIMOTO one of them?

A Yes.

Q And the other ones who stand out in your mind are who?

A MUTO, SHIGETO and such persons as that.

Q Those three men, then, SHIGETO, MUTO and HASHIMOTO? Those three?

A Yes.

- Q In those days, were they stationed in Tokyo or Japan proper as distinguished from Kuomintang?
- A I believe he was out here. I do not know very accurately.
- Q You mean by "he" - HASHIMOTO?
- A Yes, HASHIMOTO.
- Q You mention next in your diary about a mandate. Does that recall to your mind what the mandate was?
- A At that time, the Emperor asked him if Japan withdrew from the League of Nations, what would happen in the South Seas.
- Q Do you mean the mandated islands she was controlling in the South Pacific?
- A Yes. And UCHIDA was not able to give a satisfactory reply. The Emperor was very much displeased.
- Q In other words, Japan was concerned that if she withdrew from the League of Nations, she might be called upon to withdraw from the mandated islands? Is that correct?
- A There was no study made whether to abandon the mandated islands with the withdrawal from the League of Nations.
- Q Japan certainly didn't propose to give up the mandated islands without a fight, did she?
- A The abandonment of the mandated islands would bring severe opposition from the Navy.
- Q The Navy felt they were necessary to the defense of Japan, I presume?
- A Yes.
- Q What was the Army's attitude with reference to the abandonment of the mandated islands?
- A The Army's attitude was not known.
- Q The question never did arise, did it? Was Japan, after her withdrawal from the League, ever called upon formally to abandon the mandated islands?
- A I don't remember any such problem arising.

- Q You were just fearful that might be involved in your withdrawal from the League?
- A Even though it was ordered to abandon the islands, Japan could not because of the relationship with the Army and the Navy.
- Q In other words, had the League directed the abandonment of the islands, Japan would have refused?
- A Yes, and for that reason, I believe that the international situation would have become extremely grave.
- Q Apparently, in those days you had a very definite feeling that the Army might move into Peking and Tientsin. Do you recall what was said or who said things in those days that gave you that fear or feeling? Your diary reflects you were very much concerned about that going to happen. You must have gotten that impression from someone.
- A I believe most of those things were obtained from war correspondents attached to the Army.
- Q Do you know any war correspondents that are here in Japan that would have valuable information along the lines I have been talking to you that I might talk to?
- A The war correspondents are all scattered and I don't know where they are.
- Q Do you know any outstanding war correspondents that I might talk with if I located them irrespective of where they are?
- A I don't know any such war correspondents.
- Q There isn't any outstanding war correspondent in the Japanese Army but in the Japanese Navy there is an outstanding war correspondent, like ITO SEITOKOHU. Was he a correspondent during Pearl Harbor days?
- A No, he has retired from quite a while ago.
- Q What contact, if any, did the Lord Keeper, or you, as his Secretary have with the press in those days we are talking about?

- A I only met the newspaper correspondents who usually met at the Kazan Kiken, which is a hall, or many of the news correspondents would come up to my home and we would have a chat.
- Q Do you recall the names of any of those that were particularly outstanding that also interviewed people like ARAKI and MASAKI and had direct contact with them?
- A Because they are close to MASAKI and ARAKI, they would not come visiting me.
- Q Do you know the names of any of those that were close to MASAKI and ARAKI even though they didn't visit you?
- A I don't know.
- Q As of February 20, you indicate that the Government about that time concluded that it was necessary for Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations. Do you mean by that that the Cabinet as well as the military concluded that withdrawal should take place?
- A I believe so because the warning or the ultimatum from the League of Nations had been published so that ultimately Japan had to withdraw from the League of Nations.
- Q What was that warning or ultimatum in effect, as you recall. What did the League say Japan had to do?
- A I don't remember the details.
- Q In effect, what was the issue that Japan had to meet and decide? What alternative did she have other than withdrawing from the League?
- A I believe that the warning has been built around the viewpoint that Japan has violated the Treaty.
- Q And what could Japan have done other than withdrawing from the League. Was the other alternative to withdraw from Manchuria and withdraw her influence from Manchuria?
- A I don't remember that part.
- Q But the Government, itself, such as the Cabinet, finally agreed that Japan should withdraw? Is that right?

- A Ultimately, the Cabinet felt that it would not be able to support or hold on to Manchuria.
- Q You mean that you wouldn't be able to hold on to Manchuria unless you withdrew from the League?
- A I believe that was the meaning.
- Q So the Japanese official Government, as well as the military, finally came to the conclusion that they wanted to hold on to Manchuria so that they would withdraw from the League in order to accomplish that result. Is that right?
- A Yes, Japan had only two alternatives; one to abide by and stay in the League and thereby lose all that has been accomplished in Manchuria and the other was to withdraw from the League of Nations.
- Q So even though there were many in the Government who thought the activities in Manchuria violated the treaties and the decision of the League of Nations, they finally got in line and followed the military and agreed to withdraw and hold on to Manchuria? Is that correct?
- A Yes, because at this stage of the course of events, it was practically impossible for them to abandon everything that has been done just in order to stay in the League.
- Q In other words, even though Manchuria had been brought into the Japanese sphere of influence by the violation of its treaties, the Government was not willing to go on record and recognize that fact?
- A I believe that the Government officials within their hearts were very much indignant and very much sorrowful that such an event came through but on the surface they were in an inextricable position and had to go through with it.
- Q Was there anyone that openly advocated in Government circles that Japan should stay in the League and abide by the treaties rather than withdraw from the League.
- A There wasn't such a person.
- Q It is quite easy to blame the military for everything but when you come right down to the important decision that had to be made, you find that not only the military but the civil government got on the band wagon and agreed that what was done in Manchuria was alright?

- A Yes, it consequently became so.
- Q Then, if we were trying to fix responsibility or find who was to blame for Japan violating her treaties, assuming she did, we would have to say that not only the military faction was responsible but also the Government, itself, sanctioned the procedure. That is true, isn't it?
- A Yes, they had no other recourse.
- Q You had another recourse but Japan wasn't willing to accept the other recourse.
- A I believe the situation was unavoidable.
- Q Theoretically, at least, Japan could have taken the position that her military groups got too enthusiastic and went further than was necessary in Manchuria; she could have returned to status quo and not control Manchuria through a puppet government. If she wanted to, she could have done that, couldn't she?
- A I don't believe it was possible.
- Q It was physically possible, wasn't it?
- A I believe it was possible theoretically but not actually.
- Q Why did you say it was impossible as a practical matter?
- A Because at the beginning the reason was a defense measure and the situation kept on developing into war and the country was swept into it. If the political parties had enough power, they would have been able to do what was agreeable to the other nations but because the Army had overwhelming power, the Government had no means of carrying its opinion into effect.
- Q Well, certainly the Government, then, could have refused to go on record approving withdrawal from the League even though it caused the Cabinet to fall. It had the legal right to express its opinion, didn't it?
- A The Government can bring forth such an argument but because at this stage, Manchukuo has already to some extent been established, it was impossible.

- Q The truth of the matter is that once Manchukuo was established and Japan had control, she valued that control and the markets and resources of Manchuria as much greater than her membership in the League of Nations.
- A Rather than the trade coming from Manchuria, I think the thing that had the greatest import was the fact that a new nation of Manchuria has been established.
- Q Everybody realized that it wasn't strictly an independent nation but was under Japanese dominance. Isn't that right?
- A Yes.
- Q No one, not even the Japanese actually believed that Manchukuo was strictly an independent nation, did they?
- A No.
- Q As I see it, on one side of the scale was the problem involving the possibility that Japan withdraw from Manchuria and stay in the League and live up to her treaties. On the other side of the scale was the influence Japan had in Manchuria, the new markets and the resources of Manchuria. Between the two alternatives, Japan valued her control over Manchuria greater than staying in the League of Nations.
- A Yes, looking at the result, that is true.
- Q I realize we are looking at it today in the light of what has happened in the last few years but that is really what took place, is it not?
- A At that time, there was no alternative.
- Q I guess there was some face-saving involved. After once having moved into Manchuria, it would have been embarrassing to pull out.
- A Also the Japanese Government was worried that if Japan abandoned Manchuria after establishing the state, it will leave Manchuria in chaos and disorder and Japan, herself, would not be able to manage the Manchurian Railway. Such an argument was proposed by the military also.

- Q By that theory of reasoning which took place in Japan in the Manchurian Incident, a nation could always very readily violate its treaties, couldn't it - by that process?
- A Yes.
- Q The truth of the matter was that the Nine-Power Treaty by 1932 or 1933 was not popular in Japan and Japan took this means to circumvent it. Isn't that correct?
- A I don't believe that was a problem among the civilians in general.
- Q No, I mean the Japanese Government - we have to speak in terms of responsible people in Japan. Do you think the Japanese Nation is inclined, generally, to take its treaties lightly - to pledge its national honor on treaties and then not give much concern over violating them?
- A I don't believe the Japanese people, as a rule, have such an intention or that point of view but the militarists are actually advocates of force and carried things through.
- Q You don't think the military group, as a group, is much concerned about whether treaties are violated or not if they want to accomplish a result?
- A Yes, and the thing that perplexed the politicians of Japan greatly was the fact that Japanese Army was dispatched to China and Manchuria and therefore the dispatched Japanese Army had been causing incidents and troubles there. I believe that these dispatched forces had been creating incidents under the guise of self-defense.
- Q By that you mean the Army or military had a plan to move into Manchuria and they created the self-defense theory in order to minimize the aggressive effect of it?
- A Yes, that is why we have had so much trouble.
- Q It seems to me that the situation existing in those days was one where the Emperor might well have taken a much firmer stand in reference to the aggressive action of the Army in Manchuria and the withdrawal from the League. Why did he sit by and permit this all to happen if, as you say, he was opposed to it?

- A I believe that the Emperor was opposed but because the Government was united in its viewpoint, the Emperor cannot oppose the consensus of opinion because that has been the past tradition since Emperor Meiji.
- Q Well, we can't very well say this was all the fault of the military and free the civilian government from blame. On that theory, if the civilian government had stood its ground or resigned, or refused to go along with the withdrawal from the League, the Emperor might well have refused approval of the withdrawal. That is right, isn't it?
- A The Emperor had been objecting to the withdrawal from the League of Nations but the Cabinet upon study of the matter of the withdrawal were repeatedly suggesting that withdrawal was unavoidable so the Emperor can only consent to withdraw.
- Q In other words, the Cabinet finally came around and agreed with the militarists, didn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q What was the Premier, SAITO's, attitude with reference to the League withdrawal in those days?
- A Characteristically, SAITO advocated harmony with the other nations and was an advocator of international relationships but in the light of circumstances, I believe that he felt that withdrawal was unavoidable and probably for that reason, he supported it.
- Q On that same theory, I take it that the Lord Keeper MAKINO, himself, finally came around to the view that Japan should finally withdraw from the League. Is that right?
- A I believe so.
- Q You mean he really didn't think that Japan should withdraw from the League but because of this situation, he finally went along with the group and felt that Japan should withdraw?
- A I believe that MAKINO was of the opinion if things have come up to this stage, it was unavoidable, or there was no other way but to let the Government's decision take its course.

- Q The truth of the matter was, as it seems to me, there wasn't anyone in the Government that came forward with a program of adhering to the League. They just permitted the situation to sweep them into withdrawal from the League. Am I right?
- A Yes.
- Q Looking at it in the light of the present day, it seems to me that the leaders in the civilian government in those days were very "weak-kneed" and didn't openly express their opinions in all fairness to the people they represented. Is that true?
- A Because at that time, the political parties lost completely their powers and because of that, there were no political opinions and thoughts brought out.
- Q They either had the choice of going along with the Army or resigning and the cabinet falling and if they did that, the Army would appoint a more favorable cabinet which would approve the Army program? Is that the situation?
- A Yes, at this time, the militarists were bringing forth various cabinets like the SAITO Cabinet and the OKADA Cabinet, which were both admirals, and the Government was very much in difficulty trying to check the military bringing forth more of the cabinets.
- Q March 18, in your diary. You indicate that the Emperor gave a warning to the Minister of War and the Chief of Staff about certain advances in Shanghai. The other day, when we were talking, you indicated one or more occasions where the Emperor had warned the Chief of Staff about aggressiveness. Is this another instance when the Emperor warned the Chief of Staff to be less aggressive.
- A It is because again the Emperor felt that the Japanese Army might be crossing the Great Wall of China.
- Q My question is-is this another occasion when the Emperor warned the War Minister and Chief of Staff to be less aggressive?
- A Yes.
- Q He apparently did that on several occasions in those days?
- A Yes.

Q But they didn't pay any attention to him. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q The Emperor kept warning the Chief of Staff and the Minister of War but they didn't pay any attention to his warning?

A I believe for that reason the Japanese Army did not cross the Great Wall.

Q In other words, you think they did heed the Emperor's advice insofar as crossing into China in those days?

A Yes.

Q Earlier, the Emperor warned the military not to expand further into Manchuria but they didn't pay attention to that, did they?

A Because he was completely fooled by the Army's plea of self-defense.

Q This created plea of self-defense - can we say it was ARAKI's idea?

A I think it was the Kwantung Army and because actually war has arisen, the protection of Japanese nationals and things like that involved a self-defense nature.

Q What were the duties of Inspector General of Military Education HAYASHI, generally speaking. As I understand it, that is a very important office in the military.

A He supervised the entire military training of the Army.

Q And wouldn't he be one that was in a position to have great influence over the Army group as to their policy of aggression or non-aggression?

A He hasn't much influence in drafting policy but he takes part in the selection of the War Minister.

Q How does he take part in that? What function does he perform?

A There is a tradition that the incumbent war minister, the Chief of Staff and the Inspector General of Military Education select the suitable man for War Minister.

- Q Wasn't it true in those days that in the military education end of the Army, the Army recruits were taught a philosophy of Japan expanding into Manchuria and China?
- A I do not know but I don't believe that such propoganda is being given to the Japanese soldiers.
- Q It certainly existed among the military group, did it not?
- A Yes.
- Q But you don't think it was taught as part of the curriculum of studies?
- A I don't believe it is taught in schools.
- Q Don't you think it was emphasized in military education that it was necessary for Japan to expand northward into China and Manchuria as part of the future of Japanese affairs?
- A I do not know.
- Q You have some notes in your diary about the middle of March (18th) with reference to the division of China among various nations. What was proposed in those days that there be done with reference to the division of China?
- A The Saionji gave us a talk on a very old story during the early part of the Meiji Era in which divisions of China has been proposed.
- Q What was that story as you recall it?
- A SAIONJI said that ANOTO, who was a foreign minister of France, discussed the matter of partitioning China and he said that would be very difficult and Prince ITO of Japan remarked that it would be very difficult, too and he said that from a long time ago the matter of partitioning China has been discussed. He more or less thought it was a very comical story.
- Q What prompted the discussions of the partitioning of China at that particular time. Was there any movement in Japan in those days to partition China?
- A No, there wasn't actually such a movement but there was talk among the military to that extent.

- Q Just what was the military saying with reference to the partitioning of China in those days?
- A I don't believe that it was a clear-cut problem.
- Q As you recall it, what was in the wind?
- A I believe that it was said that North China will be put under Japanese control and that the Yangtze Basin be put under British control and South China under French control.
- Q That was a program that some people in the military thought would be a solution of the China problem?
- A Yes, such a matter has been taken up but on the other hand there was strong sentiment against the partitioning of China.
- Q Do you mean in the military or in the civilian government?
- A Within the military. Among the civilians, only a small section of those affiliated with the rightists' organizations had such an idea in mind.
- Q As early as March 1933, there were those in the military who were thinking in terms of further expansion of Japan into the Far East.
- A Yes, it has been existing within the section from a long time before.
- Q Is this about the situation; that after Japan had obtained its prominence and influence in Manchuria, the Emperor and the civil government was inclined to want to stop there but even in those days there were those among the military who were thinking of going forth into North China?
- A Yes
- Q That was the early stages of what later developed into the East Asia Program and finally the Greater East Asia Program. Is that correct?
- A Yes, there was such a tendency.
- Q The Emperor in those days was emphasizing Japan tending to its own internal affairs and not considering further expansion but some of the military group were starting to say, "Now that we have Manchuria, we want to go further". Is that correct?
- A It wasn't general but it was in a section of the military.

- Q On March 15, I notice that there were some proposals that SUZ UKI form a cabinet. Is that Lt. Colonel SUZUKI?
- A No, this is a different SUZUKI.
- Q Who was this man you refer to? What was his first name - do you recall?
- A This SUZ UKI is a member of the political parties and he became Home Minister.
- Q In whose Cabinet?
- A KISABURO (first name). In the INUKAI Cabinet.
- Q Was he a party man or a military man?
- A No, he is not a military man. He is a party man and he majored in jurisprudence.
- Q Who is KUHARA that you mention in your diary?
- A He was a member of the Seiyukai and he is a business man.
- Q This Prince HAYASHI that we mentioned - was his thinking lined up pretty much with ARAKI and MASAKI?
- A I believe their opinions generally were the same at the beginning but later on they happened to disagree.
- Q Over what did they disagree?
- A I don't know the details, I just heard rumors concerning it.
- Q Did they disagree over the military program in the Far East, would you say?
- A I don't believe there was much great difference in the viewpoint regarding the Manchurian and China situation.
- Q In other words, HAYASHI was one of those militarists that favored the expansion of Japanese influence into Manchuria and China?
- A Yes.
- Q He was somewhat of a leader in that movement, was he?
- A I don't believe he is a leader in the sense of MASAKI and ARAKI.

- Q When plans were made and groups got together to discuss things in military circles, would you say that HAYASHI would be one to be called in by MASAKI and ARAKI or was he outside of that inner clique?
- A During an ordinary planning matter, the Inspector General of Military Training remains outside - he does not join.
- Q You don't think he was very close to them in their planning of Manchurian and Chinese affairs?
- A I don't believe he was much involved.
- Q But he was a follower of their program in Manchuria and China?
- A Yes.
- Q Will you read your diary on March 27 and describe to me what the War Minister did that you wrote about on that particular occasion?
- A At that time, the Emperor told the Minister of War concerning the Imperial rescript regarding the withdrawal from the League of Nations that the civil heads and the military heads must be in complete agreement in carrying out their respective duties in accordance with the Imperial Rescript. He emphasized the peace of the world and that these matters were included within the Imperial Rescript and the Emperor cautioned them that these matters should not be altered or revised through Cabinet discussions or meetings later on.
- Q Wasn't it claimed that the Minister of War misquoted the Emperor?
- A Because of the fear that the War Minister might misuse this Rescript, he cautioned against revision in the future.
- Q And what did he fear the War Minister might do - or how would he misuse the rescript? What was his concern as to what he might do?
- A It implies that if the War Minister changes the position at the Cabinet meeting again and more or less goes back on the Rescript, it would be rather difficult so the Emperor cautioned him on that matter.
- Q In other words, the Emperor wanted the Rescript to contain these things about world peace and for that to be always quoted, the Rescript must not be briefed or parts of it left out. Is that right?
- A Yes.

Q Why was he fearful that the Minister of War might change the Rescript in quoting it?

A He was worried because the War Minister's influence and his power of expressing his opinion in the Cabinet was very strong. He was stronger and stronger.

Q The Emperor really didn't trust the War Minister too much, then. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q That was War Minister, ARAKI, I guess?

A Yes.

Q What is the function of a Cabinet conference? When is a Cabinet conference held and what do they do?

A Ordinarily, the Cabinet meeting is held semi-weekly and at that meeting various matters regarding the laws of the Nation are determined.

Q A Cabinet conference is ordinarily a Cabinet meeting. Is that right?

A Yes.

Q I notice that the Privy Council approved the bill whereby Japan decided to withdraw from the League of Nations. Was that decision to withdraw from the League of Nations a sufficiently important question to call an Imperial Conference?

A No, an Imperial Conference was not called because they felt it wasn't necessary.

Q If it was thought that the situation was sufficiently critical, an Imperial Conference could have been called for such a purpose? Is that right?

A It was alright for them to call an Imperial Conference and that is determined by the Cabinet, itself.

Q I was thinking yesterday that you indicated that Imperial conferences were only called by the War and Navy Ministers and the Premier. Is it possible for the Cabinet, itself, to bring about an Imperial Conference without these three men themselves arranging for it?

- A If the Chiefs of Staff oppose it, they wouldn't be able to do it.
- Q Could an individual cabinet member bring about an Imperial Conference if he wanted to?
- A No.
- Q Still, the Cabinet would have to work through the Premier and get the consent of the Chiefs of Staff to get an Imperial Conference?
- A That is because when a great problem necessitates an Imperial Conference, it usually involves a military matter and the men in charge of military matters have to be consulted.
- Q If a cabinet member thought an imperial conference should be held, he would approach the matter through the Prime Minister and the Prime Minister contacts the Chiefs of Staff in order to bring about an Imperial Conference?
- A Yes.
- Q And before you got through, it would take those three men we mentioned to call an Imperial Conference?
- A Yes.
- Q Was the decision to withdraw from the League of Nations made in the form of a law enacted by the Diet?
- A Yes.
- Q What form did it take. I notice where the Privy Council passed upon it.
- A That was only to notify the League of Nations and as far as Japan is concerned, the Imperial Rescript does that.
- Q The Diet didn't have anything to do with deciding whether to withdraw from the League or not?
- A The Diet was not involved at all.
- Q It was really decided within the Cabinet? Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q Did the military participate in that decision other than through the Ministers of War and Navy?

- A Yes, the military and the Navy was involved and through them the Cabinet made its decision.
- Q In other words, the Chiefs of Staff of the Army or Navy didn't participate directly in the decision. They work through their Ministers in the Cabinet. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q I notice on about April 14 that there was a change in the Ministry of the Imperial Household. Did the previous Minister die or what was the occasion for the change?
- A It was because the previous Imperial Household Minister IKKI was considered unfit for the post because of his illness and for that reason YUWASA became Imperial Household Minister.
- Q Had anyone brought any pressure to bear to cause him to resign? How did the change come about?
- A It is an ordinary change due to the illness of one.
- Q The Emperor selects the Household Minister. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q Who recommends to the Emperor who should be the successor?
- A The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal.
- Q It is the same as in the selection of the Premier?
- A No, that comes from the Genro.
- Q Does the Army or the Navy participate in any way in the selection of the Imperial Household Minister?
- A No.
- Q Did they ever try to bring pressure or influence on the Lord Keeper in his recommendations or nominations of a Household Minister?
- A No.
- Q They don't interfere with Imperial Household Affairs?
- A No.

- Q Who was Commander SUZUKI in your April 18 diary? Is he a different individual than Lt. Colonel SUZUKI?
- A Same man.
- Q He was the man that was in the Bureau of Military Affairs of the Army?
- A He was the senior member of the Bureau of Military Affairs.
- Q Apparently he was quite an advocate of the protection of Japan against Russia.
- A Yes.
- Q What were his ideas with reference to Russia?
- A The military was very much fearful of Russia because it was unprepared to cope with Russia and it also wanted to be able to cope with Russia spiritually by combating communistic influences.
- Q SUZUKI was sympathetic to the attitude of ARAKI and MASAKI with reference to expansion in the Manchurian Campaign primarily because he wanted a buffer state between Japan and Russia? Was that his main reason?
- A He may have had that same idea regarding Manchuria but he differed in his group affiliation with MASAKI and ARAKI.
- Q Where did he differ so far as MASAKI and ARAKI were concerned? Wasn't he closely allied with them in the Manchurian thinking?
- A In regards to the opinions that differed, I do not know, but I do know that his group affiliation differed from that of ARAKI and MASAKI.
- Q What group did he belong to as distinguished from the groups of MASAKI and ARAKI.
- A I believe he was close to General HAYASHI, who was Inspector General of Military Education.
- Q He was closer to HAYASHI than to ARAKI and MASAKI?
- A Yes.
- Q All four of those men favored the expansion of Japanese influence in Manchuria, didn't they?
- A Yes.

- Q They advocated and more or less led that movement?
- A Yes.
- Q You say that there is a distinction between the positions of ARAKI and MASAKI on one side and HAYASHI and SUZUKI on the other side in this program? What is the difference? What did the one group advocate that the other didn't?
- A As far as the program was concerned, there is hardly any difference.
- Q What was the difference?
- A In internal administration, they differed slightly.
- Q Internal administration? Do you mean of the Army or of Home affairs?
- A Of the Japanese Government - about the organization of the Japanese Government.
- Q Now ARAKI and MASAKI advocated what with reference to internal affairs and the other men advocated what?
- A ARAKI and MASAKI advocated active participation in politics and HAYASHI and SUZUKI advocated government through the use of political parties.
- Q Therefore, those two factions differed insofar as political parties were concerned but on the Manchurian campaign, they were all together?
- A Yes.
- Q I think you indicated once before that you would consider ARAKI and MASAKI on a higher level in the planning of the Manchurian Incident than HAYASHI and SUZUKI primarily because they held higher positions? Is that a correct statement?
- A Yes.
- Q Who was Prince HIGASHIKUNI?
- A Prince HIGASHIKUNI is a member of the Peers and he has a military background. He is a member of the Imperial Household and at the cessation of hostilities he was asked to form a cabinet.

- Q I notice in your diary as of April 27, he was requested by MASAKI to convey MASAKI's feeling to the Emperor that the Army was disappointed that the Emperor wasn't supporting the Army one hundred per cent. Wasn't that a rather bold position for MASAKI to take with reference to the Emperor?
- A Yes, I believe that was a very superior attitude toward the Emperor.
- Q In the years immediately preceding that, it would have been unusual for the Vice Chief of Staff to so express himself, wouldn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q That is indicative of the degree of strength and boldness the Army was acquiring, wasn't it?
- A I thought that was a very uncouth thing to do and I was very much indignant.
- Q It amounted to the Army attempting to dictate to the Emperor?
- A Yes, I guess it can be summed up to that.
- Q In view of what we have discussed heretofore as to the Emperor's participating in the making of laws or Government policy, how would the Emperor oppose these bills that the Army were in favor of. I got the impression from ^{you} that the Emperor ordinarily didn't take a stand; that he just did what was recommended to him by the Cabinet. You implied that the Emperor was interfering with the Army program. How was the Emperor interfering in those days?
- A Because there were numerous instances where the requests made has been cautioned or has been admonished and for that reason the Emperor asked them to study the matter over again and when they come back with the same request, the Emperor is placed in a difficult position whereby he cannot refuse and there have been numerous instances in which the Emperor did not willingly accept the requests.
- Q Do you recall any plans that the Army had proposed in those days that the Emperor had refused to consent to or express his desire not to consent to? Can you give me an example?
- A I have no direct contact with the Emperor so I wouldn't be able to name instances but in the Jehol Incident when the Emperor told the War Minister not to cross the Great Wall - that stand is one illustration.

- Q Do you mean that the Chief of Staff or the military group had proposed a plan to cross into China and that the Emperor indicated that he wasn't willing that that take place?
- A I don't know the details up to that point but I believe the Kwantung Army had such a plan.
- Q And you think the plan was called to the attention of the Emperor and he indicated he didn't favor it?
- A I believe so.
- Q And it was over such a situation as that that MASAKI complained about the fact that the Emperor didn't accept whatever the Army thought was right?
- A And I think that MASAKI is also complaining about the fact that the Emperor was in disagreement with the entire Manchurian Affair and he did not consent willingly to many things submitted to him so MASAKI, I believe, is complaining on that.
- Q Just for my information, what sort of things would be submitted to the Emperor with reference to the Manchurian Affair and would they be submitted by the Chief of Staff having a conference with the Emperor?
- A I am not able to give a clear explanation because I have no connection with the Army.
- Q Isn't it true from time to time the Chief of Staff would make appointments with the Emperor and advise him about military affairs?
- A Yes.
- Q And no doubt during the Manchurian Incident, the Chief of Staff would discuss Manchurian affairs with the Emperor, wouldn't he?
- A Yes.
- Q And you were referring to the occasions when the Emperor didn't see eye-to-eye with the Chief of Staff or the Army as to what was going on?
- A I believe so.
- Q And MASAKI was complaining that the Emperor should take the Army's word for military affairs and never question them?
- A Yes, I believe so.

- Q Wouldn't MASAKI as Vice Chief of Staff have access or the opportunity to go to see the Emperor as well as the Chief of Staff, himself?
- A As long as the Chief of Staff can do it, the Chief of Staff goes.
- Q The Chief of Staff, as I understood it, in those days was ill part of the time?
- A In that event, the Vice Chief of Staff would go.
- Q Why was it that MASAKI, do you think, sought to approach the Emperor through this Prince rather than going direct to the Emperor, himself, or have the Vice Chief of Staff go to the Emperor, which to my way of thinking would be normal procedure?
- A At this time, HIGASHIKUNI was attached to General Staff Headquarters and they tried to utilize that situation and this wasn't a type of matter to be presented by the Chief of Staff.
- Q In other words, MASAKI wanted someone to let the Emperor know he was displeased with the Emperor's attitude on military affairs?
- A I believe so.
- Q And in order to be able to voice such a feeling, the military would have to be very strong, wouldn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q What did you have in mind when you mention in your May 6 entry the secret instructions prohibiting the participation of militarists? I take it to mean in political affairs. What were you referring to?
- A There were some in the military that said that ARAKI was interfering too much with political matters and the military dispatched an order cautioning interference into political matters by the military.
- Q I don't know whether I understand you or not. You say some faction in the military issued an order to the effect that military personnel should not participate in politics.
- A The War Minister issued an order.
- Q The War Minister was ARAKI. I thought you said the complaint was that ARAKI was participating in political affairs excessively. He certainly didn't issue the order himself?

- A I believe that ARAKI issued such an order himself because there were too many persons saying that he is interfering in politics.
- Q I see. In other words, ARAKI was being criticized because he is politically active, so he issued an order saying there should be no activity in politics by Army personnel?
- A Yes.
- Q Was that a secret order of some kind.
- A I believe it was an order restricted only to the military and of a confidential nature.
- Q I see that you resigned as Councillor about that time. What was the position of Councillor and what were your duties? When were you appointed Councillor?
- A At the time I became Chief Secretary, I took on the task of Councillor in addition to the other post.
- Q And what is the office of Councillor? What does a Councillor do?
- A It is to discuss or take part in discussions of making rules and regulations of the Imperial Household Ministry. Because that task requires so much time, I quit it.
- Q I don't understand your entry of May 19 in your diary. What is the gist of your thought on that day?
- A I talked about the fact that the Naval General Staff with regard to the Japanese-American War was taking on the type of attitude which was in conformity with the attitude of the Emperor - that of being peaceful and not belligerent and I felt that was a very good thing.
- Q You also indicated that the Army had followed the Emperor's wishes with reference to the Jehol problem.
- A Yes.
- Q Who was Major General NAGATA? Was he associated with ARAKI and MASAKI closely?
- A NAGATA is also of the HAYASHI faction.

- Q What was his capacity in those days with reference to the General Staff?
- A I believe he was the Chief of the Military Affairs Section in the War Ministry.
- Q Was he a close friend of ARAKI?
- A He was closer to HAYASHI than ARAKI.
- Q He also was one of the advocates of expansion in Manchuria, wasn't he?
- A Most of the militarists of this time had the same idea regarding Manchuria; that they support it.
- Q What were the recent conditions in Navy circles that you refer to in your diary as of June 10?
- A This is the report on the situation given by the Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs, TERASHIMA and I have no recollection whatsoever as to what was said. I believe the story was concerned with the inquiry as to what happened after the Naval officers at the Kasumitaura Naval Air Station has been implicated in the May 15th plot.
- Q Who was back of the plot that was uncovered on July 11? What do you recall with reference to that plot? What took place on that day?
- A That was the Shimpei tai Incident. It was an organization composed of Rightists under the leadership of MAEDA and AMANO of Ibaragi Prefecture and they plotted to kill the senior statesmen on the pretense of going to the Meiji Shrine to offer a prayer of request to the god.
- Q Who was back of these two men - AMANO and MAEDA?
- A I believe that the persons responsible were MAEDA, KAGEYAMA and AMANO.
- Q Were the military people involved in this plot?
- A I don't believe they had any direct connection.
- Q What was this group opposed to and why did they want to kill the elder statesmen?

- A I believe for the internal reconstruction of Japan.
- Q Was this group in sympathy with the Army program for the nationalization of the Japanese Government?
- A I believe they were of the same mind but as far as methods is concerned, it is different.
- Q What connections, if any, do you think they had with the Army? Was it part of the Rightists group?
- A I believe there is no special connection with the Army.
- Q Don't you think there were those in the Army group that encouraged these incidents in order to foster their program?
- A There may have been but I do not know. This has been put under trial before a court but the involvement of Army personnel has not been clarified.
- Q I notice that Mr. SUZUKI became a member of the Cabinet on July 15 without portfolio. Why did he enter the cabinet? What was his reason for that, if you know?
- A Because SUZUKI is the President of the Seiyukai, he thought that his entry into the Cabinet would strengthen the Cabinet.
- Q Who advocated his entry into the Cabinet and who sponsored it?
- A I believe that HATOYAMA of the Seiyukai was instrumental in bringing him into that position.
- Q Would it have any significance insofar as the relationship between the political parties and military group was concerned?
- A I believe it was the Prime Minister who thought of strengthening the political parties in view of the future.
- Q On July 20, you indicate that you heard a report from FURUSHIMA, Chief of the Bureau of General Affairs. This report had reference to the American-Japanese relations. Do you recall what he had to say in those days on that subject?
- A I have no special recollection.
- Q I notice under August 4, this same gentleman brought up the subject of a plan for an independent Navy General Staff so that the Navy might be organized along similar lines as the Army. What was the difference in those days between the Navy structure and the Army structure so far as organization is concerned and why did they want to change it?

- A That is something that is not discernible to me even at the present time. Even now, there is a technical difference between the War Ministry and the General Staff and the Navy Ministry and the Navy General Staff. It was just a change of the name of the post that was involved.
- Q I notice in your diary, you have quite a bit about the plan to change it. Did this change have any great significance in affecting the military policy of Japan?
- A I don't believe it had any influence.
- Q I notice the last remark you make on August 4 is to the effect that it appears to you that it would be impossible to check this plan unless the Navy would check it, itself. Why were you concerned as to whether the plan went into effect or not?
- A I believe it was a proposal to separate and make it an independent body like the General Staff Headquarters.
- Q My point is that you were interested in checking the proposal. Why were you opposed to it?
- A If it becomes like the General Staff Headquarters, the Cabinet will have difficulty in controlling it. Heretofore, the Naval General Staff was directly under the Navy Ministry but under this new system, it would be an independent organ of an equal standing as the Navy Ministry.
- Q In other words, prior to that time, the War Department was so organized that the Chief of Staff had equal standing and authority with the War Minister while in Navy circles, the Navy Minister was really higher in rank than the Chief of Staff of the Navy and controlled and dictated to the Chief of the Navy Staff?
- A Yes.
- Q And it was a proposal to have the Navy revise its organization to have an independent Chief of Staff. Is that the problem?
- A Heretofore, the Navy General Staff was not below the Navy Minister in rank but as an organization and it had the same high ranking officers.
- Q Yes, but when it came to making decisions as to policy, the decision of the Navy Minister in the final analysis would control while in the Army that didn't hold true. Their decisions were of equal importance.
- A Yes.

- Q Well, this was just another tendency in those days to strengthen and put more emphasis on the military, wasn't it?
- A The Navy, itself, started to take on the same attitude as the Army.
- Q Who is Mr. SAKATANI?
- A Mr. SAKATANI is my friend and he worked for the Bank of Japan and he was sent to Manchuria on financial matters.
- Q And what did he have to say about the Manchurian situation when he returned.
- A He informed me of the feeling generally. He felt that PUYI will be the head of the new Manchurian state.
- Q Hadn't he already been appointed head of the State by October 1933?
- A I don't believe he was still made Emperor.
- Q He indicated that from his trip to Manchuria, he was satisfied that PUYI would be made Governor or put in charge of Manchuria? Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q He also indicated it would be a puppet state and Japan would really control its affairs? He expressed that opinion to you?
- A Yes.
- Q And what did he express with reference to the creation of a buffer state in China?
- A He informed that the Army leaders wanted to make a buffer state in North China because hitherto he had been highly critical of the Army.
- Q Where did he get his information that the Army was contemplating the creation of this buffer state in China?
- A Because being in Manchuria, he is probably subjected to all sorts of rumors to that extent.
- Q Is he still living?
- A I believe he is now in Peking, China

Q Did he say he had talked with the Kwantung Army officers while in China with reference to this buffer state in North China?

A I believe that is just a rumor.

Q When he came back from his business in China, he was informed that the Army circles in Manchuria were talking in terms of a buffer state in North China. Is that right?

A I don't have any recollection to that extent.

Q At least he had heard rumors to that effect while he was in Manchuria. Is that right?

A Yes.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Lt. Fred Suzukawa, 0-2034605
(Name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 39 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred J. Suzukawa
2nd Lt AUS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8 day of August, 1946.

[Signature]
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, S.C.P.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S. M. Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (we) Henry Sackett,
and _____,

certify that on 7 day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me (us) Marquis Koichi Kido, and according to Lt. Fred Suzukawa, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan
Place

8 August 1946
Date

[Signature]