

INTERVIEW OF KIDO (23 Jan 46)

DOC 4127

(19)

(93)

INTERROGATION OF (MARQUIS) KIDO, KOICHI

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 23 January 1946, 1430 - 1630 hours

PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Sackett

Q Do you know Colonel Doihara?

A I just learned of him recently.

Q I see. Didn't you know him back in 1931 and 1932 when he was active in Manchuria?

A No, I did not know him.

Q Didn't you hear of him in those days or of his activities in those days?

A I didn't hear much of him.

Q My information is that he was the resident officer in charge at Mukden at the time of the incident in September, 1931.

A He was the Special Resident Officer.

Q Was that an Army position as distinguished from a governmental position?

A I do not know his exact character but I believe it was designated by the Kwantung Army.

Q I see. You didn't know his attitude about the Manchurian-China situation in those days, then? Did you know anything about his attitude with reference to the Manchurian-China situation in those days?

A I did not know what sort of an attitude he had because I heard of him only after he became Special Resident Officer.

Q Wasn't that on or about the time of the September 19th incident that he was Resident Officer?

A I don't believe that is so. I believe he was appointed after the Kwantung Army occupied Manchuria.

Q I see. What was his attitude about the time of his appointment with reference to Manchuria?

A I don't believe it was anything special. I have no accurate knowledge of it.

Q As I understand it, there were two schools of thought - one that advocated the use of force in Manchuria and another group that advocated peaceful settlement of differences. Which school did Colonel Doihara belong to?

A I do not know anything about that.

Q Did you ever talk to him about the Mukden incident?

A I never talked to him. Only after he became a full general did I see him. I only bowed to him but I never spoke to him.

Q There was a lot of agitation, as I understand it, in the press early in September 1931 which advocated the use of force in Manchuria. Is that correct?

A I believe that some of the papers did advocate such things but I do not know exactly what ones it is.

Q Did the Government exercise some control over the press in those days?

A To some extent but it wasn't anything like the present censorship.

Q How did they exercise control of the press at that time, in 1931 and 1932? What mechanical means did they use to control the press?

A On anything that disturbed the peace, they had some control, but on other matters, they were practically free.

Q What agency of the Government was concerned with the press?

A The Home Ministry and the Police Bureau.

Q Did they require that articles in the paper be submitted to them for censorship in those days before they were printed?

A I believe it was done. I have no accurate recollection.

Q When you were Secretary to the Lord Keeper in those days, didn't you realize there was some influence being exercised over the press and that it wasn't entirely a free press?

A On political matters, I believe it was comparatively free.

Q There came a time when there wasn't such freedom of the press but you think in those days a person could say what he wanted to and it would be printed?

A I believe it was possible for anyone to express his opinion but only with respect to newspapers which differed individually.

Q Did the Army group have a newspaper of its own or control such a paper in those days?

A It wasn't to that extent. They never did actually control a newspaper but later on they used high pressure.

Q Did OKAWA, in those days, have any interest or control over any particular newspapers, to your knowledge?

A I do not know.

Q What was the political party which OKAWA headed at that time? Do you recall the name of it?

A I believe he had a right-wing organization.

Q Did he head up a political party that had a name such as the MINSEITO Party? Is that what they called one of the parties?

A He did not have any political party. He just had some of his friends. He was more or less a political organizer.

Q He had a following, but he didn't have a political party that carried a name or title?

A No.

- Q I'm looking at your diary as of October 5, 1931. On that day you indicated that you talked to the Imperial Household Minister Ikki. What was his attitude about the Army and the Manchurian situation at that time?
- A He explained the fact that the situation would become more and more serious instead of conforming to the attitude of the Government which should be kept from UGAKI.
- Q He was opposed to the Army increasing its control of the Government, did you say?
- A Yes, IKKI was more or less concerned and was opposed to the Army's policy.
- Q What did he propose to do to try to keep the Army from increasing its power.
- A As Imperial Household Minister, nothing can be done. Only grave concern has been voiced about the trend of the matter.
- Q You mean by that, that the Imperial Household wouldn't have official responsibility for administrative affairs but it is a fact that they rendered advice, didn't they?
- A The Imperial Household Minister cannot voice his opinion on political matters.
- Q Who was Mr. FUMIO GOTO?
- A He was an official of the Home Ministry. He was my friend.
- Q I notice from some information that I have, he was Home Minister in the OKADA Cabinet. What was he doing insofar as government service is concerned prior to that time, in 1931?
- A He was working in the Home Ministry for a long time. He was Chief of the Police Bureau and also was Chief Administrator of Formosa.
- Q So he, in those days, was really in charge of the internal police of Japan. Is that right?
- A I have no accurate recollection. I believe he was more or less only a member of the House of Peers.
- Q On October 6, he discussed with you some of the conditions of the MINSEITO. Was that the political party?
- A Yes.

- Q What did he say to you and what was it he thought about the MINSEITO party?
- A I have no recollection as to the contents here (indicating diary). Only I heard that the MINSEITO will be victorious in local elections.
- Q What was the position of the MINSEITO Party in those days with reference to the Army, as you recall?
- A It was opposed to the Army.
- Q What was the other main party?
- A SEIYUK AI.
- Q What was their attitude with reference to the Army in those days?
- A The political parties were generally opposed to the Army. Both of them were.
- Q The Army really wanted to rid the country of both political parties. Is that correct?
- A Yes, that is why in all the incidents where the Army tried to capture governmental power they ignored the political parties.
- Q In your diary, you mention concern about the possible collision between the Army and the government on the question of the other negotiation party to the Manchurian problem. What did you have in mind when you wrote that?
- A I have no recollection as to what this part means.
- Q On October 7, you made an entry with reference to the activities of Lt. Colonel Suzuki. What were his actions in the days that you refer to?
- A He is the Lt. Colonel Suzuki we spoke about the other day. He was in the Bureau of Military Affairs. At the beginning, we thought he was more or less a hot-headed radical, who was trying to take on high pressure measures. Later on, we found out that he more or less restrained the younger officers' group and as a result of that, our anxiety toward him was lessened immensely.

Q Is he the same Lt. Colonel Suzuki who later became head of the Planning Board of the Cabinet?

A Yes

Q So, you would say that in those days, Colonel Suzuki was trying to suppress the Army's belligerent attitude?

A Yes, he was trying to keep down the younger officers who tended to take on radical measures.

Q Did you talk to him on October 7, according to your diary?

A Yes, I talked to him.

Q What did he say he was trying to do to help relieve the situation?

A I never received any concrete or definite report - only the fact that he is suppressing the tendencies of these radicals.

Q He told you that on that occasion?

A Yes.

Q Did his actions thereafter bear out the fact that he was trying to suppress these young Army officers?

A I never heard definite results to that effect.

Q Who was Count ARIMA?

A He was my friend. He was a member of the House of Peers, I believe.

Q And KOZUI OTANI, who was he?

A He was a priest of the NISHIHONGWANJI.

Q Will you read your diary of October 8 and tell me what the significance was of OTANI meeting OKAWA?

A ARIMA tried to introduce him to KONOYE so that they can meet. I do not know if they actually met.

Q Were you concerned at all about the incident, or was that just a casual notation?

A I never heard anything later concerning this incident.

Q This is the same OKAWA we have been referring to from time to time?

A Yes. I believe he was going to make a high pressure speech concerning the China Incident.

- Q Whom do you mean by "he"?
- A By "he", I meant OTANI and OKAWA, who are radicalists and they were going to give a high pressure talk to KONOYE regarding the China incident.
- Q Did OTANI favor the Army's position in Manchuria, as you say OKAWA did?
- A Since OTANI was living in China, he had much concern over the China problem, but I don't know if he was concerned over the Manchurian problem.
- Q Did OTANI advocate the use of force in China by the Japanese?
- A Since he was living in Shanghai, that matter is not clear to me.
- Q When you say they were going to make a high pressure speech, what do you think the nature of the speech was going to be?
- A Because he was allied with OKAWA and since KONOYE phoned me to that effect.
- Q Were the priests active in politics in those days? Did they take an active stand one way or another on political questions?
- A There was no actual interference, but this person was a particular person. This person has a home in Shanghai and in Java and he traveled extensively around the world.
- Q Generally speaking, you would say the priests did not take an active part in politics?
- A No.
- Q Was the Chief of Information, SHIRATORI, in the foreign office?
- A Yes.
- Q You made an entry on October 10 with reference to the attitude of the foreign office on the Manchurian problem. What was the attitude of the foreign office in 1931 in the fall?
- A This was gained from the newspaper correspondents' meeting and I believe there was nothing significant but I believe he wanted to keep the incident from developing.

- Q The Foreign Minister, SHIDEHARA, was somewhat noted for wanting a peaceful settlement of the Manchurian question, wasn't he?
- A He was a very peaceful man and wanted to solve the matter in a peaceful way.
- Q The Army was opposed to his attitude on the matter, wasn't it?
- A Yes, the Army was very much opposed to SHIDEHARA's policy toward China.
- Q Was that one of the reasons you were fearful the Cabinet might fall at that time?
- A Yes.
- Q And that was one of the reasons the Lord Keeper requested the elder statesmen to come to Tokyo, wasn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q As of October 12, you indicate that the visit of Count KIYONRA to the Lord Keeper was viewed seriously. What were you thinking about when you wrote that?
- A The reporters of the newspapers came and they were very much concerned over the fact that KIYONRA came up to visit the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. They thought there was going to be a change in the Government.
- Q Who was Count KIYONRA?
- A He was the President of the Privy Council and he, at one time, formed a Cabinet. He is one of the senior statesmen.
- Q Who was YOSHIDA, whose first name was SHIGERU?
- A He was an official in the Home Ministry.
- Q Who was YASUOKA?
- A He was a scholar of the study of Japan.
- Q Apparently, he was quite concerned about the Army situation, according to your diary of October 14. What did he know about the situation?

- A Because he is a scholar dealing with Japan and he has various informations concerning it and he became worried that the militarists would become more and more violent and that it would spread even to the RONIN and to the students.
- Q What did he advocate, if anything, to be done about it to stop the movement?
- A Since he deals with spiritual matters, he tried to start spiritual movements among these groups.
- Q What was to be the program of the spiritual movement?
- A I did not hear anything definite about it.
- Q Was it to be in opposition to the Army program?
- A Yes, undoubtedly so.
- Q Was HAYASHI in the War Ministry in his capacity as Chief of the Maintenance Bureau?
- A He was a War Minister.
- Q He wasn't War Minister in 1931 and 1932?
- A No. He only became a division commander at that time.
- Q But, was his office as Chief of the Maintenance Bureau under the War Ministry?
- A Yes.
- Q What was his attitude with reference to the Army program in those days.
- A Because of the fact that the Army became more and more undisciplined and out of control, he felt it would be best to institute a government in Manchuria.
- Q By that, did he propose an independent state that Japan could do business with?
- A That was not clear but I believe he had that sort of a feeling.
- Q That really was the Army program - to set up an independent state as Manchukuo, and then do business with it?
- A I believe such a feeling came out inadvertently.
- Q I don't understand what you mean by that, will you explain?

A Inadvertently - without thinking. It is presumably such a story and I believe that was the real thing.

Q In other words, HAYASHI was one of the Army group that advocated the use of force in Manchuria and set up a new state there rather than pulling out of Manchuria. Is that correct?

A HAYASHI was not a radicalist but I believe that the intention of the Army inadvertently came out, as written here. (diary)

Q In other words, when he talked with you on October 15, he inadvertently disclosed the thoughts of the Army group?

A Yes, I believe so.

Q By "inadvertently", you mean he didn't mean to tell you about them and just forgot himself and told you?

A As I have written here (diary), it was a presumption and I believe later on he disclosed everything inadvertently. He made a presumption to the effect that the intention of the Army was so.

Q Would you classify him as one of the leaders of the Army movement to use force in taking over the Government?

A I don't believe so. He is more or less a scholar. That is why he attends the meetings of the newspaper correspondents.

Q The War Minister MINAMI was a strong advocate of the Army program, wasn't he?

A Yes.

Q He would have to be classified as one of the leaders in the Army movement to take over political power, wouldn't he?

A He was looked upon as such, but I have no accurate evidence to that effect.

Q He was one of the men whose activities you were concerned about in those days, wasn't he?

A Yes.

Q Tell us in your own words about this October 17 incident concerning which you have written in your diary.

A It is written in the diary that from a report, an officer of the staff headquarters has been arrested so I visited Marquis INOUE and I asked him if he knew anything about it and I learned that MINAMI and our other Army staff officers met in an important conference at which time they reached a decision and through the military police they arrested Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO of the Staff Headquarters and Lt. Colonel NEMOTO.

Q What did this group plot to do - this group they arrested?

A They planned to execute a coup d'etat by occupying the staff headquarters and the War Ministry.

Q Did they plan to take over the Government or a branch of the Army?

A It seems as though they tried to take over the Cabinet by capturing the Staff Headquarters.

Q How would capturing the Staff Headquarters accomplish the result of taking over the Cabinet?

A I have no accurate information to that effect but I believe they had such a plan.

Q The Chief of the General Staff, KANAYA, was one of the leaders of the Army movement to take over political power, wasn't he?

A I don't believe so. I am positive he never got involved in such a plot.

Q Did you know him?

A Not very well.

Q What men other than KANAYE were on the General Staff in those days that wanted to take over political control?

A KANAYE was not of the mind of trying to seize the Government but the followers of HASHIMOTO and others of the Staff Headquarters were of the mind that they wanted to seize the Government.

Q What offices did you say HASHIMOTO later held in the Government?

A He only went up to full colonelship.

Q Did he ever hold a government office?

A He never held any.

- Q How about this fellow NEMOTO. Did he ever become active in the Army or in the Government in later years?
- A I do not know him at all.
- Q Apparently, it was the plan of this group that was arrested on the 17th of October to assassinate several of the ministers, wasn't it?
- A The entire aspect of the plan wasn't clear at this time. I only thought they were going to capture the Staff Headquarters and the War Ministry and proceed from there.
- Q Your notations as of October 20 indicate a very comprehensive plot to assassinate the greater part of the Cabinet.
- A There was such a theory at that time. I did not believe it at that time.
- Q I will confess that it is difficult for me to understand how there can be so many different schemes and plots going on in Japan to kill people. Wasn't there any authority in the country that was strong enough to stop that sort of thing?
- A Popular opinion in Japan was very weak so attempts to stop such movements was inadequate.
- Q What was the nature of the report made by Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA to the Emperor with reference to the League of Nations. Look at your diary as of October 21.
- A I do not remember anything about the three proposals that were given. I have completely forgotten about it.
- Q What was the attitude of the Foreign Office at that time with reference to the League of Nations?
- A It was of the attitude that they wanted to continue relations as much as possible with the League of Nations.
- Q Didn't they realize that the Manchurian Incident tended to cause them to be called upon by the League of Nations to explain their military actions?
- A Therefore, the Government wanted to solve the Manchurian Incident as fast as possible and they wanted to continue with the League of Nations. Because the Army was so strong, everything did not go accordingly.

- Q What was the Army's attitude towards Japan belonging to the League of Nations and submitting to advice from the League of Nations.
- A On the surface, the war Ministry and others were in conflict with the League of Nations, such as wanting to withdraw from it or things like that but actual events in Manchuria have changed completely from time to time.
- Q In other words, the fact that the League of Nations took an interest in the Manchurian affair was resented by Japan. Is that right?
- A A faction, especially the Rightists' organization presented such a thing but I believe the people at large did not.
- Q By the Rightists, you mean principally the Army factions?
- A Yes, the Army was included in it.
- Q Who in the Army was the leader in advocating the League of Nations' suggestions and advice should not be followed?
- A I do not remember any person in particular.
- Q Well-the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, would be one, wouldn't he?
- A That is not clear. It is because I did not know who was the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army at that time.
- Q Well, you certainly realized in those days that there was a faction you were opposed to and when you thought of that faction, whom did you think of as individuals you were opposed to in that faction?
- A Just as I said - in the Staff Headquarters such a person as Lt Colonel HASHIMOTO and NEMOTO and men like ISHIWARA in the Kwantung Army. I believe that such persons were more or less the leaders of the group.
- Q And who in Japan proper would you say were the leaders of the opposition group?
- A They were HASHIMOTO and NEMOTO of the Staff Headquarters.
- Q So, when you were fearful of the Army attitude in wanting to take over political power, you really were fearful of ISHIWARA, HASHIMOTO and NEMOTO. Are those the people you were worried about?

A I felt that they were the ones who were really powerful and were exercising their power.

Q They were the leaders of the opposition movement, you would say?

A Rather than leaders, they were the ones who were the intriguers and plotters.

Q Then, who were the leaders if they were merely the plotters? Who directed the plotters what to do?

A The leaders are these plotters.

Q How about MINAMI. He was one of the advocates of the Army taking over political power, wasn't he?

A In the March incident, Ugaki was said to be the leader but in the October incident, the leader is not clear.

Q Who in the Army was the strongest and most outstanding advocate in those days of the use of force in Manchuria, would you say?

A They were the plotters I mentioned - no one in particular.

Q You think the same individuals who plotted to overthrow the Government were the ones who advocated moving in throughout Manchuria?

A In the same way that they instituted Manchukuo, they wanted to reconstruct Japan.

Q And MINAMI was favorable to the Manchukuo enterprise, wasn't he?

A He was persistently advocating it in the Cabinet conferences.

Q And ARAKI Was also in that same category, wasn't he?

A I believe ARAKI was also of the same mind . . .

Q And, FUMIO GOTO likely sponsored and favored the use of force in Manchuria, didn't he?

A It is absolutely different. Goto was not of that mind because he was a civil official and that is why he was not concerned with such a thing.

Q What was the Lord Keeper's attitude with reference to submitting to arbitration of the Manchurian incident through the League of Nations.

A He advocated harmony with the League of Nations. He was Ambassador plenipotentiary to the Versailles Conference.

- Q MINAMI was opposed to cooperation with the League officials, was he not?
- A As I said before, MINAMI on the surface was strongly in favor of the League of Nations but the action of the Army was in direct opposition.
- Q Who was General MUTO? You made reference to him in your diary as of October 28.
- A I believe he was the Superintendent of Military Training.
- Q And, he was one of the Army group that advocated the use of force in Manchuria, wasn't he?
- A I don't believe that is so. He was of the mind of dealing stiff penalty to Lt. Colonel HASHIMOTO.
- Q What was it you wrote in your diary on October 28 about General MUTO?
- A Mr. OTSUBA is a newspaper correspondent and I heard the reports from him.
- Q What reports did you hear from him, as noted?
- A That the policy of punishment or the measure of punishment concerning the October incident was not decided upon; that General MUTO and other division leaders advocated stiff punishment to those perpetrators. I felt that if such a measure was carried out it would be to the great benefit of the nation. I felt that law and spiritual morality must go hand in hand and be maintained.
- Q You don't think that Chief of the General Staff KANAYE was one of the leaders in the use of force in Manchuria?
- A He was not a radical.
- Q He must have had some radical men on his staff, didn't he?
- A Yes, and he was more or less taken by those radicals.
- Q What particular radicals on his staff do you think influenced him the most?
- A They were men in the positions of chiefs of the sections or bureaus but I do not know their names.

- Q The situation caused by the Army attitude became so serious that on November 1, according to your diary, the elder statesman came to Tokyo. Is that right?
- A I don't believe he came for any special reason. He occasionally came out to Tokyo.
- Q You don't think he came to Tokyo because of the acute political situation?
- A Yes, I don't believe it was for that reason.
- Q In your diary on October 23, you mention the Prime Minister, WAKATSUKI's attitude as being indifferent. In what respect was his attitude indifferent. What was he indifferent to?
- A It was a very private confidential matter as HARADA was a private secretary to WAKATSUKI and he was being invited occasionally to his home and HARADA complained on various political matters. He, HARADA, said a stronger attitude was desired.
- Q In other words, HARADA began to fear that the Prime Minister was indifferent to the serious situation which existed and didn't propose to do anything about it. Is that what you mean?
- A It means that he understood the serious situation alright but that his attitude was not strong enough.
- Q Then, again, on November 7, in your diary you write that the Prime Minister in your opinion at that time was "week-kneed". Do you mean by that he wasn't putting up any effort to solve the problems created by the Army?
- A I meant that he gave/^{it}much concern but he was unable to do anything about it.
- Q So, by November 7, you and some of your friends concluded that the situation could never be solved by the present Prime Minister and that there would have to be a change.
- A Yes.
- Q All during this time, the Army was moving further and further into Manchuria, wasn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q And their aggressive attitude as to Manchuria was becoming stronger and stronger, wasn't it?
- A Yes.

- Q What, if anything, did the Emperor do to try to lessen this aggression in Manchuria.
- A The Emperor advised that the situation be kept from developing any further but the War Minister was unable to cope with the situation. There were even worries that the forces would cross the Great Wall into China and at that time, the Emperor personally ordered the Vice-Minister to stop it and the Vice Chief of the Staff stopped the attempt to cross into China. So, the Emperor did his utmost in trying to prevent the spread of the incident.
- Q In other words, the Emperor, among others, was fearful that the Army would just keep on going and go on into China? Not just stop in Manchuria?
- A Yes, he felt it would be terrible for such a thing to happen.
- Q So, the Emperor called in the vice Chief of Staff?
- A The Vice Chief of Staff was dispatched there.
- Q Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, you mean?
- A Yes.
- Q Did the Emperor first call in the Vice Chief of Staff and talk to him about it?
- A I do not know that procedure. I know the person that was dispatched was the Vice Chief of Staff.
- Q What was his name?
- A It is not clear but I believe it was MASAKI.
- Q Was that a written order to the Vice Chief of Staff to proceed to Manchukuo or was it done orally?
- A I do not know. Such a thing is not known to us. I only heard about it later on.
- Q Do you know whether the Emperor talked to KANAYA, the Chief of Staff, about the possible movement into China?
- A I do not know.
- Q All you know is that the Vice Chief of Staff did go to Manchuria to try to stop further expansion?
- A I heard a story to that effect.

Q Where did you hear that story?

A I do not know exactly. I heard such a story when I was having conversations with my numerous friends.

Q In other words, there were occasions when the situation got serious enough, the Emperor would come forth and take a definite stand, wouldn't he?

A That is not clear. The Emperor did not directly order it but he, through the Vice Chief of Staff would give such an order.

Q In other words, from time to time, the Chief of Staff of the Army would come to see the Emperor about military affairs, wouldn't he and ^{at} some one of the conferences, the Emperor expressed the desire that the Army dispatch someone to Manchuria to stop the expansion?

A I believe that is so.

Q Did the Emperor ever express a desire or cause anyone to be dispatched to Manchuria to stop the Army from spreading further into Manchuria instead of into China?

A Concerning the abrogation of the Manchurian incident, the Emperor did not have anything to say.

Q In other words, the Emperor took the position that the Army shouldn't go into China, itself, but insofar as what the Army did in Manchuria, he never took a stand.

A Yes, he stood as the intermediary and let everything be handled through the Cabinet.

Q In other words, the Emperor was willing to let the Army, the Cabinet, and ordinary Government bureaus control what happened in Manchuria but when it came to China, the Emperor in effect said "Hands off"? Is that right?

A Ordinarily, the Emperor does not have any authority or is not customarily in the habit of doing things by himself but lets a matter be handled through the Cabinet but later on because the situation had become so grave that I believe he personally - I do not know if he personally ordered it or whether the Chief of Staff supported the opinion of the Emperor.

Q The Emperor wasn't willing to interfere in what was taking place in Manchuria but he was willing to express an opinion to interfere so as to prevent the thing from spreading into China.

A Yes.

414

INTERROGATION OF (MARQUIS) KIDO, KOICHI

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 24 January 1946, 1415 - 1400 hours

PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Sackett

A I would like to make an addition to what I said yesterday.

Q I might say that at any time you think you want to add^{anything}, I want you to feel perfectly free to say so. Any of the things you want to say, I want to hear.

A Concerning General MUTO, I believe there has been a mistranslation of the diary.

Q What date was that, do you recall?

A I would like to check on the translation.

Q What does your diary actually say with reference to General MUTO?

A I meant to say that in the punishment of the perpetrators, no definite decisions were given and General MUTO and other division commanders advocated a stiff penalty of the perpetrators. If such a course is taken, it would be highly beneficial to the Nation.

Q I understand your reaction is that General MUTO was for stern justice being meted out to the plotters in that event we were discussing as of October 28, 1931?

A Yes.

- Q The translation is not necessarily a mistranslation but it did not convey the idea you have now given. This not in your diary, I want to ask you when you first heard about the Tanaka Memorial or whether you are familiar with what I mean by the Tanaka Memorial.
- A There were stories about it but I do not remember when I started hearing about it.
- Q To the best of your recollection, how far back does your knowledge of the Takana Memorial go?
- A I believe it was in 1930 but I do not accurately remember.
- Q What did you first learn about it and how?
- A Such a story was given during the conversation with KONOYE and HARADA but I did not give much attention to it.
- Q What was said, as you recall it, in that conversation?
- A I do not remember accurately concerning that.
- Q What did you first learn about the Tanaka Memorial as to what it was, who said it, and the significance of it?
- A It was to the extent that there were elements in the Army that had such a plan in mind.
- Q Was Tanaka an Army man?
- A Yes.
- Q That was the Premier back in 1927 to 1929?
- A Seiyukai.
- Q You mean, he was a member of the Seiyukai Party but he was a General?
- A Yes.
- Q According to your understanding, what did the Tanaka Memorial advocate?
- A I do not know anything about it and I do not know if such a thing existed.
- Q In later years, at least, you heard discussions about the Tanaka Memorial, didn't you?

- A It wasn't to the extent of discussion. It was only to the extent of a rumor saying that such an opinion was existing in the Army.
- Q What was your understanding as to what that Army opinion was?
- A I thought at that time it might be concerned with the independence of Manchuria.
- Q Did you ever learn later the purported contents of the Tanaka Memorial?
- A I do not know. I have never seen it.
- Q Is it a fact that the Tanaka Memorial advocated the use of force and expansion of the Japanese influence into Asia.
- A I do not know.
- Q I don't mean to imply that you had anything to do with the Tanaka Memorial. I'm trying to find out what your knowledge is, being a citizen and a resident of this country. I'm trying to find out what this document is.
- A I do not know anything about it.
- Q It wasn't a matter that was discussed in Government circles?
- A There were not many stories about it.
- Q What was the attitude of Premier TANAKA with reference to China and Manchuria?
- A He was a radicalist toward the China problem.
- Q What do you mean by that?
- A He was aggressive.
- Q He advocated, didn't he, the expansion of Japanese influence into China and Manchuria and the use of force if necessary to do so?
- A I do not know anything about that at all. I know he was at the head of the Seiyukai Party and as a party, the Seiyukai did not advocate such a thing. That is, openly, they did not advocate such things.
- Q I thought you just said he did advocate aggression in China and Manchuria.

- A As a military man, he was vigorously of that opinion but after becoming head of the Seiyukai Party, his attitude became obscure.
- Q What was his attitude in his capacity as premier so far as Manchuria and China were concerned?
- A I didn't concern myself so much so I do not know anything about the TANAKA cabinet.
- Q What was the attitude of Premier HAMAGUCHI with reference to Manchuria and China as compared or distinguished from Premier TANAKA?
- A HAMAGUCHI was a very peaceful man so he was an advocate of peace in dealing with Manchuria.
- Q As compared with TANAKA, you would say TANAKA was for aggression while HAMAGUCHI was for a peaceful settlement of Chinese affairs? Is that a fair statement?
- A Yes.
- Q What was the general attitude of Premier WAKATSUKI?
- A Wakatsuki was of the same mind as HAMAGUCHI.
- Q Neither one of those premiers advocated an aggressive policy in China?
- A They were opposed to an aggressive policy.
- Q As a matter of fact that was one of the reasons that the WAKATSUKI Cabinet fell and was succeeded by INUKAI, wasn't it - the fact that the Army didn't feel they were aggressive enough so far as the China question was concerned? Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q To your recollection, what were the principal complaints that the Army had and made about the WAKATSUKI Government? What did they criticise in that Government?
- A I didn't hear much about the criticism given by the Army but generally, the Army was very much dissatisfied with the policy of non-development of the incident.
- Q They advocated a more aggressive policy in Manchuria?

- A Yes. A faction of the Army desired it.
- Q Those were the sentiments of the War Minister MINAMI?
- A Yes.
- Q In your diary under the date of November 7, you refer to certain conversations with SENTARO EDO with reference to Manchuria. Do you recall his explanation of the Army's attitude on that date?
- A I don't know the exact content but I believe that because the Army has been advancing rapidly I felt that the activities of the Army became quite clear.
- Q And what do you mean by "quite clear"? What does that signify?
- A It is that certain Armies create a certain situation and has been advancing or acting accordingly.
- Q In other words, you mean it was quite apparent the Army was moving further and further into Manchuria?
- A Yes.
- Q Under November 10, you mention an investigation of the Navy Department. Why did they have occasion to investigate themselves. For what purpose?
- A There were rumors to the effect that there were radicalists advocating the policy within the Navy circles so the Minister of the Navy investigated the matter and because of the lack of evidence, the matter was suspended.
- Q When you say they were advocating the "same thing", what do you have in mind by that statement ?
- A It's content is not clear but I believe it is the same thing as they advocated by the Army.
- Q And by that you mean an aggressive policy towards Manchuria and China?
- A I believe rather than the aggressive policy toward China and Manchuria, it dealt primarily with internal conditions such as reconstruction of the Government or making a united cabinet.
- Q In Manchuria?
- A In Japan, itself.

- Q Part of that Army policy was to expand Japanese influence in Manchuria, wasn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q And that was one of the things the civilian members of the Government were concerned about?
- A Yes.
- Q What do you mean in your diary as of the same date (Nov. 10) when you indicate there was evidence that soldiers were entering the right-wing group at night? What did you have in mind when you wrote that?
- A I heard the story to the effect that the Army was joining Rightists organizations and were visiting them. Later on the rightists and the military united which has made the Government very unstable.
- Q Was the Seiyukai considered a right-wing or left-wing organization or neither.
- A It is neither.
- Q What would you designate it in that parlance?
- A It is conservative.
- Q What about the MINSEITO Party?
- A Conservative. They are both conservative.
- Q In other words, both leading political parties were on the opposite side of the fence from the Army group?
- A From the Army's viewpoint, it was unsatisfactory.
- Q By that you mean that the Army didn't approve of the policy of either one of those two leading parties?
- A Yes.
- Q Under November 12, you make a note with reference to the escape from Tientsin into Manchukuo of HSUAN-TUNG-TI and that the escape had certain significance. What was the significance of this escape?

- A It was concerned with the departure from Tientsin of HSUAN-TUNG-TI which can only mean that Manchukuo will be created and this would have an unfavorable repercussion throughout the world and I was very much worried.
- Q You mean that the event was indicative of the formation of an independent state of Manchukuo which might arouse the concern of the League of Nations and eventually did, didn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q What is the JUICHI-KAI?
- A It is an organization composed of my friends.
- Q What does it mean in English? Can you translate it?
- A It is called that because it was organized on the eleventh year of TAISHO. It is an organization composed of my friends.
- Q It is a name which you created for a group of your friends?
- A It was started on the day we all got together.
- Q I understand. What was the purpose of this group - just to discuss current affairs?
- A When it was organized we were still young men and we started out as a reading club. Later on, we began to discuss current affairs. The members were generally liberal.
- Q You mention the "Northward Advance Continental Politics" - policy, I presume. What does that refer to and was that the Army platform or program?
- A The Army had such a policy but the Government did not have any policy which opposed the Army's policy. Neither did the political parties have anything to oppose it.
- Q Where did the term "Northward Advance Continental Politics" come from? Was that a phrase invented by you or was that something ^{that} was generally in the newspapers, press and things in those days?
- A This was a term given by us. I don't believe such a term came out in the newspapers.
- Q In other words, you and your friends called the Army "Northward Advance Continental Politics"?
- A Yes, we spoke of it as such

Q By that you meant the Army group had ideas of expanding northward into Manchuria and possibly China?

A Yes.

Q And when we speak of the Army in this interrogation as of those days, we are referring, as I understand it, to a group of people led by MINAMI, ARAKI, MASAKI, HASHIMOTO and NEMOTO, and ISHIWARA of the Kwantung Army? Who else were we speaking of as the leaders you recall of that Army movement.

Q They were the principal ones.

Q I would like to ask if they were all of the top leaders or were they just the top leaders you are able to remember?

A The younger group followed MASAKI and ARAKI.

Q Do you think those men we have named are all of the outstanding leaders of that movement or were there others that you can't recall?

A I believe there were others but I cannot remember their names.

Q Others equally as important so far as leadership is concerned?

A No.

Q None as outstanding as those mentioned?

A No.

Q Did you ever talk to any of those men even in those days or later as to what they themselves said their program or policy was.

A I never spoke with any of them.

Q You never had any direct contact as to what their ideas were?

A I would speak with ARAKI who was in the KONOYE Cabinet with me. He was very mild at that time so he never said anything in that respect.

Q You mean his attitude toward the Chinese situation wasn't nearly so aggressive in later years as it was in the early days?

A At that time, he didn't say such aggressive things. ARAKI was very much worried about the Soviet Union.

- Q Did we agree that UGAKI was one of these men who should be on our list of leaders that we are talking about?
- A UGAKI was entirely separate from this group concerned with the China problem.
- Q UGAKI was interested in the Army becoming more active in home politics, wasn't he?
- A UGAKI was connected with the disarmament matter after the First World War, so he handled that matter.
- Q You wouldn't say he was one who advocated this expansion into Manchuria?
- A I believe he is not involved so much in that.
- Q Do you recall any statements that were made in speeches or in the newspapers by any of these men with reference to that northward expansion program, even if you didn't talk to them personally? If so, what was the gist of what they said publicly?
- A I have no recollection.
- Q Who was ITO?
- A ITO is my friend.
- Q What was his business or government capacity, if any?
- A He was a baron and a business man engaged in the mining business and things like that.
- Q I take it from your diary that by that time you thought the Army had a very strong and organized program while the opposition was completely disorganized and didn't have a solid or substantial program. Is that right?
- A It seems as though the Government and the political parties were pulled along by the Army.
- Q You felt that there was no definite program in opposition to what the Army advocated?
- A Yes.
- Q I notice in your diary, as of November 17, INOUYE expressed the opinion that if the Army didn't quit advancing in Manchuria, it would be necessary for Japan to withdraw from the League of Nations. Was that the general attitude of the Government in those days and their feeling?

- A INOUE's attitude was very stable and it does not necessarily reflect on the entire Government's spirit because at that time the opinion was quite divided and ADACHI, the Home Minister, proposed a coalition cabinet and there were stories to that effect.
- Q What was ADACHI's attitude toward the Army program in Manchuria as you recall?
- A Generally, the whole Cabinet felt the Manchurian problem should be solved immediately.
- Q What was Minister ADACHI's feeling on that subject?
- A ADACHI wanted to have a coalition cabinet and make a powerful cabinet out of it.
- Q He was the leader of one of the political parties, wasn't he?
- A He was leader of the Minseito Party. There were rumors to the extent that he had connections with the Army.
- Q Just how did the WAKATSUKI Cabinet fall and how was the new cabinet formed? What was the immediate cause of its falling?
- A The outstanding cause was that there was a split between the Home Minister ADACHI and the other members of the Cabinet.
- Q What was that split over or about? Where did they differ in opinion?
- A Because ADACHIE favored a coalition cabinet while on the other hand, there were the sentiment following INOUE which couldn't agree so the Cabinet fell.
- Q What did INOUE say?
- A INOUE was of the opinion that the present national unity cabinet or coalition cabinet was not strong enough to control the military and later they were more or less siding with the militarists so such a cabinet could not be allowed to exist.
- Q What sort of a cabinet did INOUE propose should be formed to cope with this Army situation?
- A He was of the opinion that the present cabinet should be supported because it had been checking the militarists even though it was not powerful enough.
- Q And what did the Army faction do in connection with the formation of the new cabinet. What influence and pressure did they exert?

- A The Army was of the opinion that if the Cabinet should fall they would like to have a national unity cabinet or a coalition cabinet.
- Q Did they advocate a cabinet headed by military men?
- A It wasn't clear to that extent.
- Q Do you think they were willing to go along with a coalition cabinet without going so far as to insist on a military cabinet?
- A There were rumors to the effect that ADACHI was supported by the militarists and that he was siding with the militarists, according to the Minister of Finance INOUE.
- Q Was War Minister MINAMI active in the formation of this new cabinet?
- A I have no special impression left.
- Q Who in the Army group was most active in representing the Army in the formation of the new cabinet?
- A I have heard that a member of the staff headquarters was active but I do not know his name.
- Q I realize how difficult it is for you to remember things back that far but I am trying to refresh your memory with your diary so that I can get the picture.
- A And it is because of the fact that the general staff members change so frequently.
- Q On November 25, you mention various rumors of the Imperial families and their retainers creating a problem. What did you have in mind.
- A There were stories circulated as to the effect that the Imperial household ministry should be reorganized and they made personal attack against MAKINO, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and SUZUKI, the grand chamberlain.
- Q And who is "they" you refer to as making the attacks?
- A "They" refers to the rightist organization.
- Q In other words, it is the same group I insist on calling the Army group?
- A The Army group was part of them. MAKINO and SUZUKI were attacked in the February 26th incident.

- Q That was in 1936, you mean?
- A Yes.
- Q But the right-wing organizations we keep referring to were really being led by the Army, were they not?
- A Not entirely so. But it had connections.
- Q The names we mentioned a little while ago were the members of the Army that participated in that movement, weren't they?
- A Yes.
- Q Do you recall the names of the non-Army or civilian leaders that were the leaders of the civilian part of that right-wing group?
- A There was such a person as TAKUNO but he is not exactly a leader.
- Q What was his business if you remember, or profession?
- A He was an artist but he is one of these political Ronin.
- Q I understand. Did he later become active as a government official?
- A No.
- Q Who else besides this last gentleman mentioned do you recall?
- A I don't remember others.
- Q But after a period of time, the Army group really took over in influence, the right-wing movement, didn't they?
- A Yes.
- Q What was Mr. INUKAI's background before he became Prime Minister?
- A He was the leader or the head of the Seiyukai Party.
- Q That is the same party to which ADACHI belonged?
- A ADACHI was a Minseito.
- Q What was his attitude with reference to the expansion into Manchuria and China as compared to TANAKA and other prime ministers?
- A He was an advocator of peace.

- Q How did it happen that the Army agreed to his appointment as Prime Minister if his philosophy was opposed to their policy?
- A I don't know if the Army supported him or not-because of the fact the Emperor appointed him, they had to support him. Later on, in the May 15 incident, he was killed.
- Q Well, the Army could have prevented his formation of a cabinet by refusing to come forward with a War Minister, if they wanted to, couldn't they?
- A At that time, they didn't do such things. It was because the work in Manchuria was progressing so rapidly.
- Q In other words, it was later on that the Army prevented the formation of cabinets by failure to approve a war minister?
- A Yes.
- Q When did that first take place? When was that principle first exercised by the Army to prevent the formation of a cabinet?
- A It was one of the reasons why the UGACHI cabinet did not form.
- Q What year approximately was that you are referring to?
- A It was 1937.
- Q In other words, that was the first time the Army, as such, prevented the formation of a cabinet by a premier appointed by the Emperor?
- A Yes.
- Q They presumably always had the power to do that before but never were quite so bold as to do it. Is that correct?
- A I believe there wasn't an occasion that necessitated such means.
- Q What was the occasion in 1937 when UGACHI tried to form a cabinet that necessitated such action on the Army's part for the first time?
- A According to the Army's version, UGACHI was reputedly connected with the March incident and also because of the February 26th incident, the Army considered it to be a block upon his reputation. The Army felt that any person of such reputation cannot be made a premier and at this time when a clearance or reformation of the Army was being undertaken, such a personality would not be consistent with the program, so they did not support him.

- Q They felt UGACHI was sufficiently connected with the March 31st and February 26th incidents so that they didn't want him to be Premier?
- A Yes, there is a rumor to that effect. They felt that a person who has been active in that way would not be consistent with the Army's program of clean-up.
- Q By "clean-up", what do you mean?
- A It was the assumption that the Army was out of control and disorganized which lead to the February 26 incident and because the Emperor, himself, ordered the reconstruction of the Army.
- Q And establishment of more discipline?
- A Yes.
- Q On December 16, in your diary, you have some things to say about the appointment of Prince KANIN As Chief of the General Staff. How does one become appointed Chief of General Staff under the Japanese procedure? What are the mechanics?
- A Generally, he is recommended by the War Minister and is thereby appointed.
- Q By the Emperor?
- A Yes.
- Q When we speak of the Army exerting influence in the selection of the War Minister in the Cabinet, who in the Army - what officials in the Army makes those decisions?
- A Generally he is selected by the three officers; that is, Chief of Staff, Inspector General of Military Training and the incumbent war minister.
- Q Does the Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs participate in such a selection?
- A I don't believe he participates in it.
- Q When it comes to deciding the top policy questions of the Army, what officers generally make the decisions on policy?
- A The policies of the Army are made by the War Minister and such matters with reference to operations are handled by the Chief of Staff.

- Q But the War Minister is usually selected, indirectly at least, by Army personnel, is he not, when a new cabinet is formed?
- A Every time a cabinet is formed, the War Minister is selected by the recommendation of those three men, the Chief of Staff, Inspector General of Military Training and the incumbent War Minister.
- Q So, those men who control the selection of a new war minister really speak with higher authority, than the War Minister himself when it comes to policy questions?
- A Those three persons mentioned select the person himself as far as policy is concerned the War Minister makes it.
- Q By War Minister, do you mean the Minister of War, himself, or he with others surrounding him?
- A The entire staff members of the War Minister engage in it and the bill or the draft of the plan is made by the Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs.
- Q What was Prince KANIN's attitude in those days toward Manchuria and China, as you recall?
- A I have no accurate recollection as to him.
- Q You don't recall whether he was in sympathy with the Army program of the expansion in Manchuria or not?
- A According to the stories, he was not a radical and as far as his attitude toward that was concerned, it is not clear.
- Q ADACHI wasn't in office very long until there was a serious incident on our about January 8. Is that right. I refer to the attempted bombing of the Emperor.
- A Yes.
- Q Who was back of that incident and what inspired it in your opinion?
- A I heard that a Korean had held a bomb, therefore, there wasn't much behind the incident. I heard that the plot did not have any root.
- Q Was there any indication that the Army or Army group was involved in that attempt?
- A No, absolutely not.

- Q There were Army groups that were always creating incidents but you don't think this was one of their affairs?
- A This was absolutely different. The Army would not do anything directly to the Emperor.
- Q That was the main reason, I guess, that the Cabinet didn't fall - because it wasn't a premeditated plot of any great roots? Is that your feeling on the subject?
- A Yes.
- Q You mention in your January 11th entry Colonel ITAGAKI of the Kwantung Army. Would you say he was one of the leaders in this right-wing Army group advocating the expansion in Manchuria and China?
- A Yes, he is one of them.
- Q We could well add him to the list of names we have been referring to?
- A He is together with ISHIWARA.
- Q What did he have to say about the bandit activities in Manchuria?
- A I did not hear any stories concerning it.
- Q It was mentioned in your diary as of January 11th.
- A He explained about the punitive measures being exacted against the bandits in Manchuria.
- Q What was his attitude with reference to setting up an independent state in Manchuria?
- A I was very much surprised at his opinion which differed greatly from ours to the extent that he advocated the creation of a Governor General in Manchuria and thereby the creation of an independent state.
- Q Was what he advocated the general policy of the right-wing Army group? Did he speak with authority for them, in your opinion?
- A He spoke for himself but I believe his opinion was generally that of the Army, particularly the Kwantung Army.
- Q And what he and that group advocated was the setting up of a government in Manchuria which would be completely controlled by Japan, is that right?
- A Yes.

- Q Where did this plan of ITAGAKI differ from what you say your ideas were on the subject?
- A I was absolutely against the creation of an independent Manchuria, so I was desiring to end this problem as quickly as possible.
- Q What were your thoughts with reference as to what should happen to the civil government in Manchuria in view of the situation you found yourselves in in those days.
- A I felt that even if Manchuria was separated from China, it should be put under the control of the Manchurians themselves, rather than under the control of Japan.
- Q This policy of creating what we call a puppet government in Manchuria was just another part of the original Army group to expand Japanese control in Manchuria, wasn't it?
- A I don't know exactly because I don't know the real nature of the Army.
- Q Well, it certainly was in line with what the Army was advocating when it started out on the Manchurian incident, wasn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q And you weren't particularly surprised that the Army faction would think in those kind of terms were you?
- A I was very much surprised that it progressed to that extent.
- Q But it was certainly in line with the philosophy of the Army on that subject, wasn't it?
- A Yes, consequently so.
- Q Did you hear any discussion at that time as to whether such recognition of a puppet government might be in violation of Japan's treaties?
- A Yes, I was very much worried about that but the opinion of the Government was that of self-defense.
- Q Was it the Government's opinion that the formation of a puppet government involved self-defense?
- A I don't remember accurately on that.

- Q In other words, it might have been one thing to defend Japanese nationals with force in connection with the Manchurian incident but don't you agree it was a much larger step to set up a new government in Manchuria controlled by Japan?
- A If the Government did such a thing on the surface, it would be a terrible thing but since everything went accordingly beneath the surface that it took on such a shape and so it seemed as though it was being done by the Manchurians and Chinese themselves and I think it was highly deceptive.
- Q But you will agree with me that these men we have been mentioning here, were the ones who really thought up that program and put it into effect.
- A I believe it was so.
- Q Although they didn't necessarily come completely out in the open, behind the scenes they saw to it that that took place, didn't they?
- A Unless they come out and do it in the open, we have no way of controlling them.
- Q I understand, but they actually did it behind the scenes, didn't they?
- A Yes.
- Q What was their real purpose in proceeding in this fashion. What did they seek to attain, in your opinion?
- A The institution of Japanese power in Manchuria will be a bulwark against the Soviet in the opinion of the Army.
- Q That was one of their theories but another theory was that this procedure would acquire great natural resources for Japan. Isn't that likely one of their policies and objectives?
- A On the assumption of national defense, natural resources would be necessary.
- Q They also felt that this would create new markets for Japan, too, wouldn't they?
- A Yes, such a thing is true but that can also be accomplished by peaceful means.

- Q But this group of whom we are talking had a policy of accomplishing it either by peaceful means or by force, if necessary, didn't they?
- A Yes, such a means can be had by peaceful instruments, but the Army felt that it was necessary for national defense.
- Q Well, can we say it this way? That the Japanese Government favored expanding its influence into Manchuria and China for the sake of markets and defense but the Government as a whole didn't go so far as to advocate going to war to do this while the Army faction did resort to war, if necessary, to accomplish this result. Is that a fair statement?
- A The Government wanted to trade with China in a peaceful way but the Army wanted to control Manchuria.
- Q Well, for many years there had been a feeling in Japan that they would like to exercise great influence over Asia and China but it was the Army group, in your opinion, that was willing to go to war in order to accomplish that result?
- A They did not desire war if it could be had without resorting to force but they got hasty and resorted to force.
- Q There isn't any question but what this Army group and the individuals we mentioned realized when they did this they might be violating the Japanese treaties, is there?
- A According to the explanation given by the Government at that time it wasn't clear whether that was a violation of the treaties.
- Q There was certainly a question in the minds of a lot of thinking people in Japan whether this amounted to self-defense, wasn't there?
- A The enlightened people of Japan were of the opinion that the Army had gone to far and that as far as the treaty was concerned, they had gone beyond it.
- Q Were there people in Japan in those days that felt that the United States was justified along with other countries in protesting at what was taking place in Manchuria and China.
- A It wasn't very clear but I know that some did support America's protest and others that had the militarists' opinion criticized against it.

- Q What was the general attitude in those days as to the action which was taken by the League of Nations, as you remember.
- A I was very much worried about cleavage with the League of Nations and Japan being isolated by the rest of the world.
- Q Were there any factions in Japan in those days that felt that the League of Nations was justified in making an investigation of the Manchurian incident and announcing a decision as to what it determined to be the facts?
- A Yes.
- Q As I understand it, the result of the investigation of the League of Nations and the conclusion arrive at was that the Manchurian incident was not in self-defense. How was that decision received in Japan in those days.
- A Yes, there were some that agreed to the decision but the Army group criticized and commented vigorously against it. Do you recall what any of these individuals we have mentioned had to say about it?
- A I don't remember very much because they didn't say clearly.
- Q But you know very well that they didn't agree with the finding of the League?
- A Yes.
- Q Was it this Army group that advocated Japan's withdrawal from the League?
- A I never heard any direct stories to that effect but I know that there existed within the Army group, persons who favored accomplishing the matter even by withdrawing from the League.
- Q How was the decision to withdraw from the League of Nations arrived at, as you recall it?
- A That was decided by the Government.
- Q Do you remember what the arguments were pro and con in those days that were with reference to the withdrawal?
- A I have no recollection.
- Q What was the Emperor's attitude about setting up this independent state in Manchuria under Japanese control?
- A Undoubtedly, he didn't favor it very much but because I had no contact with him at that time, I do not know.

- Q What, if anything, did he do to exercise his influence in opposition to the movement, if he didn't favor it?
- A I didn't hear anything special concerning it, but I did hear of the fact from the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal that he requested that Japan not withdraw from the League of Nations.
- Q Did the Government in those days exert any influence in opposition to the setting up of a puppet government in Manchuria?
- A I do not know whether he opposed it or not. But I feel he is generally opposed to such a policy.
- Q Couldn't the Emperor, under your system of Government, take a more positive stand in those sort of affairs if he really felt that way about them?
- A Under the Japanese system, it became a habit that the Emperor will conform to that desired by the Cabinet.
- Q In other words, in the final analysis, the extremists in the Army were running the Government and also the Emperor, were they not?
- A Consequently, when the Army started to do things, the usual thing happened.
- Q I notice that the Emperor became quite active in ending the war when things got in a desperate condition. By the same authority, couldn't he have been active in directing the policy in those days, if he wanted to?
- A The reason why the Emperor ended the war is because the life of the nation was at stake but before that it has been customary for the Emperor to accept anything proposed by the Cabinet and it can be put in the record that the Emperor never rejected any proposed bills submitted to him by the Cabinet heretofore.
- Q That has not always been the policy of the Emperor, has it? By that I mean there have been Emperors who had a firmer and more direct policy than the present Emperor, such as Meiji?
- A Emperor Meiji did not use his power of rejecting anything proposed by the Cabinet.
- Q I'm not implying that I'm trying to tell you how to run your government, I am interested in finding out why the Emperor did not take a firmer stand in this situation.

- A Because it was unavoidable under this system of constitutional monarchy under the Japanese system.
- Q In your diary, under January 21, 1932, the latter part of the entry on that day, you write about another attempt to overthrow the government. What was the motive behind this move?
- A This is just a report and I have no accurate recollection.
- Q Do you know who inspired that plot?
- A I believe it was plotted by those persons who was behind the October incident.
- Q Look at your diary on January 28, where you indicate that you heard an address delivered by General MINAMI, you were present at that, were you, and heard that speech?
- A Yes
- Q What did General MINAMI have to say about the activities in Manchuria on that occasion?
- A He was speaking on having a joint defense program with Japan and Manchuria together and of establishing a railway line to Manchuria and other grandiose things.
- Q Why did he say you wanted to establish a new railroad line in Manchuria.
- A I believe it had to do with national defense.
- Q Didn't he say at that time that ... would make it possible for Japan to continue to advance northwards in order to consummate the complete conquest of Manchuria?
- A I do not know accurately in that respect.
- Q Read the last couple sentences in your diary and see if that refreshes your memory.
- A [Reading] "There were various organs in Manchuria and Mongolia and felt that we should be united to Manchuria and Mongolia".
- Q You heard him say, in effect, didn't you, that he recommended the completion of a railroad in order to make it possible for Japan to further advance in Manchuria and secure territory to help bolster the defense of Japan from Russia?

- A I believe it meant both of them but I just heard his speech and I don't know anything clear about it.
- Q Read to me in your own words what General MINAMI said in the first part of his speech.
- A Reading "The reason why the Japanese Army has taken decisive and courageous steps is because the people were united in supporting it. They were certain of victory and because of the confidence they had in their armed strength and techniques. As a conclusion concerning the Manchurian and Mongolian problems concerned with the national defense matter, they are trusting or depending upon Japan for national defense by a new government in Manchuria or a new regime of Manchuria will be instituted."
- Q Are you reading from your diary as of January 28? Read that part where you refer to the completion of the Kirin-Kwainei Railway.
- A "To hasten the completion of that railway."
- Q In other words, the General advocated, according to what you wrote down, the early completion of this railroad, didn't he?
- A Yes.
- Q What did he say last, according to your notes?
- A Reading "And make Japan Sea a Japanese lake and facilitate the advance into North Manchuria."
- Q In other words, in his speech, the General advocated the building of this railroad in order that Japan might move further north into Manchuria and according to him, thereby better the defense of Japan. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q In this speech, the General advocated further military action, if necessary, in Manchuria under the theory that it was well and best for the defense of Japan?
- A Yes, I believe that is right.
- Q That is your recollection in what you heard him say in making that speech?
- A Yes, it seems as though he wanted to stabilize Manchuria for just a purpose.

- Q This speech he made further verified your opinion that General MINAMI advocated the expansion into Manchuria by force, if necessary?
- A Yes.
- Q Is General MINAMI still living?
- A Yes.
- Q In his speech, he further advocated the supervision and control of the Government of Manchuria by Japanese authorities, did he not?
- A Yes, he wanted to put Japanese organs in Manchuria.
- Q And in making the statements he did on that occasion to the Emperor, was he voicing the opinions of the Army, would you say, and the Army group we keep referring to?
- A No, that was just his impression that he received upon making a tour of inspection there.
- Q But what he advocated taking in the future referred to policy questions and didn't he speak the attitude and policy of the Army in that respect.
- A Yes, generally so.
- Q What was General MINAMI's capacity in the Government as of January 28, 1932?
- A I believe he was just an ordinary General officer because he retired from his ministerial post at that time.
- Q In other words, he was x-War Minister. Did he hold any such position as of that date as Chief of Staff or was he on the Supreme War Council or in any other such Army group?
- A I don't believe he was a Chief of Staff. As to other posts, I do not know.
- Q Would you say that in making this report to the Emperor, he was acting in any official capacity?
- A No, he was just giving a report of his inspection as an individual.
- Q He went further and gave more than a report. He gave his views as to what ought to take place in the future as well, didn't he?
- A It is just his personal opinion.

Q Would you say that the then Minister of War ARAKI concurred in the opinions of MINAMI at that time?

A I do not know.

Q Do you know any others in the Army group in those days that held the same opinions about the further expansion in Manchuria as General MINAMI?

A I believe that ARAKI can be included in the group because he was very much concerned about the policy toward RUSSIA.

Q It would be your opinion that General MINAMI in making his report to the Emperor spoke the general attitude of the Army as it was in those days, wouldn't it?

A I don't know if it is consistent with the Army's policy or objective but he just gave his own personal opinion. It is not an official report this is just a talk.

Q But it summed up pretty well the attitude of the Army toward Manchuria at that time, didn't it?

A Yes.

INTERROGATION OF

(Marquis) KIDO, Koicho

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 28 January, 1946, 1400 - 1600 hours

PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koicho
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Sackett

- Q The other day when we were talking, we had come to January 28, 1932 in your diary and we were talking somewhat about the little talk that General MINAMI had delivered to the Emperor. In this talk, as I understand it from the notation in your diary, MINAMI advocated the further expansion northward into Manchuria. Was that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q In addition to that, he suggested that a Manchurian state should be set up with Japan supervising the Government through a Governor General. Was that his theory as to what should be done in Manchuria?
- A I believe that it wasn't expressed to the point that a Governor General should be instituted to supervise completely all affairs but that more or less that the Nation be unified; that the central dispatch from Japan not be divided into three or four different organs but one unified organ in Manchuria. It doesn't imply that an organ will be instituted to supersede that Nation.
- Q He had in mind the separation of Manchuria from China and the supervision of Manchuria by Japan. Is that a fair statement?
- A I believe that he had that sort of an intent within his mind but his explanation here (pointing) did not clarify things to that extent.

- Q I see. What is your impression as to what he actually did say to the Emperor on that with reference to this point?
- A As far as what he said to the Emperor, it is just as written here in the diary.
- Q I don't know whether my translation conforms with your idea. Did he say that the Government of Manchuria be brought under the general supervision of a Governor General appointed by Japan?
- A No.
- Q What was it then?
- A That the organs placed in Manchuria be unified as one. The various organs were divided into three sub-sections.
- Q By "organs", do you mean Japanese organs?
- A Yes, the Japanese organs. The Japanese organs that were dispatched there but it wasn't for the purpose of controlling the State, but I believe underneath such an intention was present.
- Q What you mean is instead of having the Manchurian Railway Company controlled by one part, the Army by another part, and some other agency another part, you would have one unified control. Is that what he had in mind to be accomplished after Manchuria was recognized as an independent state?
- A As written here (diary), it was right after the nation is established.
- Q Which implies that he was advocating the recognition of a separate nation from China. Is that true?
- A Yes.
- Q One of the reasons the General advocated recognizing an independent country was that it tended to provide a buffer state between Japan and Russia and made the defense of Japan easier. Is that right?
- A Yes, that is so.
- Q In fact that was really the reasoning of the Army group; that it would help the defense of the Island, to have a state in between Japan and Russia?
- A Yes.

- Q The whole active program in Manchuria was really undertaken by the Army so as to create such a situation as to have a buffer state. That was the reasoning and thinking behind the Manchurian program, wasn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q It also would have certain economic advantages for Japan to have supervision over Manchuria, wouldn't it?
- A Undoubtedly so, because there are coal, iron and other natural resources there.
- Q And the Army or military group was anxious to have those resources from the point of view of being able to defend Japan?
- A Yes.
- Q Did it not likewise have the possibility as a place for the expansion of the Japanese population?
- A Yes, that was taken into consideration, too.
- Q The Japanese population was growing quite rapidly in those years, wasn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q I think I read some place that it was increasing at the rate of 1 million people a year. Does that sound about right to you?
- A Yes.
- Q That was really one of the problems that was facing Japan in those days as to where its people were going to exist, wasn't it?
- A Yes, at that time there was one faction/^{that}was advocating birth control.
- Q That was one of the suggestions that someone came forward with to solve the population problem?
- A Yes.
- Q Did the Government, generally, in addition to the Army, desire to find new territory for the Japanese people to live in whether by war or peaceably - was that their policy or program; to find a place for Japanese citizens to move into and exist?

- A A movement of the population to Manchuria was planned. Also, the South Sea area and the mandated areas were taken into consideration because immigration into America and South America, as well as Australia was prohibited.
- Q Then the Government was concerned about finding places for its citizens to move and live in, wasn't it?
- A I don't know the exact measures that were taken up or considered but I do know that much thought had been given to go out to foreign countries.
- Q Wasn't it possible for Japanese citizens to move into certain territories without having to fight a war and conquer those territories?
- A It was very difficult to immigrate to other countries by peaceful means but there was no plan made to the extent that means of war will be used to gain that end.
- Q You wouldn't go so far as to say that there weren't men in the Army group who weren't thinking in those terms, would you?
- A I believe that the Army did not have any such plan, excluding that in regard to Manchuria.
- Q In other words, you mean that the Army did think that moving into Manchuria might solve the population question but they didn't have bigger ideas for other places in which to move?
- A No, I did not hear of any larger plans.
- Q But you did hear statements being made with reference to Manchuria helping solve the population question?
- A Yes.
- Q You mentioned the possibility of Japanese nationals moving into the South Sea Islands and the mandated islands. Was there any program set up to accomplish that result?
- A I do not know the exact Government measures taken in that respect. I do know that the Government advocated or encouraged immigration to the South Seas and encouraged the Japanese immigrants to raise sugar and other things.
- Q The control of Manchuria would also accomplish the result of making it more difficult to have an economic blockade of Japan in case she did find herself in war. Isn't that true?

A I do not know anything to that extent.

Q Wasn't it one of the reasons that motivated the Army group to be desirous of expanding in Manchuria - the fact that Japan was not self-sufficient and in case of war she needed many things she did not have and control of Manchuria would help to solve that problem?

A Yes, it is a fact that they^{have}/striven to make natural resources and materials more abundant.

Q In those days, with the increase of population, was Japan producing sufficient food for the people on the main island to exist or did she have to import food to live?

A Yes, import of foods was necessary from Korea and Formosa and I believe it was imported from other foreign countries.

Q Japan was greatly in need of additional food in those days, wasn't she?

A Yes.

Q Isn't it true that in fighting a war with anybody, there are some twenty basic materials that any country has to have and Japan had very few of those on the Island - probably three or four or five? Isn't that, generally speaking, a correct statement?

A Yes, generally so.

Q And, the control of Manchuria would have helped solve that sort of a problem if you were confronted with fighting a war, wouldn't it?

A Not to the extent of food, but it would have helped immensely.

Q I am trying to think out loud as to the motivating reasons why Japan, principally the military group, were so desirous of going so far into Manchuria as they did. I think you will agree with me that a buffer state between Russia, China, and Japan was one motivating reason, won't you?

A Yes.

Q Another possible reason is that the Japanese needed more living space - ironically, something like Germany did. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Another reason that might have motivated the military group is that the control of Manchuria would make it more difficult to have a blockade in case Japan got into a war with anyone. Is that correct?

A Yes.

- Q Do you think those motivating influences were so strong that the military group was willing to push forward into Manchuria without giving very serious consideration to the treaties that Japan had signed?
- A I believe that ultimately was so but in the early phase of the incident, the War Minister was advocating immediate settlement of the dispute. Therefore, there are many discrepancies between what the Government was saying and the actual events that took place.
- Q I understand that there were people in Japan that actually thought what was done in Manchuria was in the nature of self-defense, at first, at least. There was also the other group who wanted to minimize the Manchurian incident and get it over with and not let it spread. It is also true, isn't it, that there was a faction, the faction which we have been calling the Army or military group, that aggravated or insisted in moving throughout Manchuria and setting up an independent state?
- A Yes.
- Q The real motivating reasons we have been talking about are population, buffer state, freedom from blockade, food, and minerals. Fundamentally, those questions were part of the motivating forces, were they not, in what happened in Manchuria?
- A Despite those problems facing Japan, the fact that the political parties did not have any programs or measures for solving such problems was the great weakness of Japan.
- Q In other words, you think it was difficult to answer those problems. When the Army put forth that argument, it was hard to answer as to what other alternative could be taken?
- A Yes.
- Q Didn't there come a time when the Army by other Government officials was confronted with the fact that their activities were in violation of Japanese treaties so far as China was concerned?
- A I believe that the Government was making lots of arguments with respect to that. I do not remember the details.
- Q At least, it was a subject matter that was discussed in those days?
- A I believe so.

- Q What answer did the Army group give to that kind of an argument; that Japan had pledged itself to live up to those treaties? What answer did they have to that?
- A I do not remember the details about that but the militarists were stubbornly insisting that it was in self-defense.
- Q The true situation was, wasn't it, that the militarists were really indifferent to the treaties in view of the problems that confronted the Nation and they took the stand that they had to solve the problems irrespective of the treaties?
- A Ultimately so. The most unfortunate thing was that no strong argument was given against it from the political parties.
- Q Don't you consider the argument that Japan had soundly pledged herself not to violate the integrity of China or other nations would be a pretty good argument against action in Manchuria, or wasn't that considered a good argument?
- A The political parties did not have the power to explain fully such an argument.
- Q At least the militarists didn't consider the argument to be very strong, did they?
- A No, they did not give consideration to such an argument and the situation kept on developing.
- Q When General MINAMI gave his talk before the Emperor and advocated the view that there should be further expansion in Manchuria and implied that the state should be recognized there with unified control, was there anything said about the possibility that they might violate the Japanese treaties, as you recall?
- A No such story about the violation of treaties was given.
- Q Isn't it a little unusual that someone didn't come forth with that thought on an occasion such as that?
- A On this occasion it was merely a tea party.
- Q I realize it wasn't an official meeting of any kind. The Emperor wasn't in favor of Japan arbitrarily violating all of its treaties was he?
- A The Emperor naturally was worried about the violation of the treaty so the foreign minister had made an investigation of the matter.

- Q And what conclusion did the Foreign Minister come to in reporting to the Emperor?
- A I do not know about that. I believe that the arguments was had by the Foreign Minister at that time.
- Q But you don't think the Emperor personally advocated the violation of Japanese treaties, do you?
- A He absolutely does not have such an intent.
- Q Under January 31, Marquis, apparently there was another plot by the Army to take control and you indicate some concern about it. Do you remember the circumstances of that plot, who was back of it and what they sought to accomplish?
- A This is just one of the rumors and it really did not have much root.
- Q Who was NAKABASHI?
- A Mr. NAKABASHI is a member of the Seiyukai and he has held ministerial posts.
- Q Was it the theory of that plot to get an Army government into office as distinguished from a political party government?
- A At that time, the militarists was having various plots made with that intent and this is just one of the rumors emanating from such plot.
- Q Is this all part of one big plot carried on in this period we have been talking about or were they various plots, all part of one big plot?
- A I believe this is just one of the numerous small plots. It had not developed to the point of becoming a large plot.
- Q You mention General ARAKI in your notes. Do you know how active he was in this particular plot?
- A I don't believe ARAKI knew anything about it.
- Q I believe other groups more or less utilized him; that is, his name? In other words, this Army group involved in the plot

would like to have had him at the head of it if they were successful because ARAKI was thinking along those lines and wanted an Army government. Is that a fair statement?

A I believe that ARAKI did not have any thoughts of seizing the Government at that time. He was very easily used by others.

Q He would like to have been premier in those days, wouldn't he if it could be brought about conveniently?

A I don't believe that he was of that mind at that time.

Q You think that came later?

A I don't believe that he was thought to have the desire of becoming prime minister then because he was only a War Minister then.

Q This Mr. MORI, you mention. Is that the same MORI that was heading the Socialist party?

A He is a member of the Seiyukai Party.

Q And KUHARA, you mention? Is he likewise a member of the Seiyukai Party?

A Yes.

Q That was just another movement that had as its purpose, getting in an Army government into office rather than a political party government?

A Yes.

Q Shortly after the first of the year in 1932 and after the Manchurian Incident, the Shanghai incident broke out. What is your honest opinion as to what brought that about?

A I believe it was the incident started by the shooting of a Japanese officer.

Q Wasn't the action taken by Japan in sending in a large number of troops the use of considerable more force than normally would be required in a situation of that kind?

A At that time, there were many Japanese nationals residing in Shanghai so a considerable force was necessary to protect them. I believe that this incident was settled quite fast.

Q Do you think that the Shanghai Incident was strictly a self-defense move on the part of Japan?

A I had such an impression. I do not believe Japan made a special attack.

Q Well, if the Manchurian Incident hadn't taken on the proportions that it did and had been limited to strictly self-defense, there wouldn't likely have been a Shanghai incident, would there? To put it another way, didn't the Shanghai incident come about because there was the aggressive movement in Manchuria rather than a strictly self-defense movement there?

A I believe there might be such a relationship. Japan at that time did not desire any development with Shanghai, Tientsin and Peiping, and desired that the incidents be solved as quickly as possible.

Q But those incidents came about more or less because of the extreme aggressive attitude that Japan was taking up in Manchuria and they might not have had those incidents if the Manchurian incident had been minimized. Isn't that true?

A Yes.

Q In other words, you say that at that time Japan didn't have aspirations to move into China proper but you will agree with me that the incidents in China would likely not have happened if there wasn't the aggressive attitude in Manchuria.

A Yes, that is true.

Q The Chinese people were concerned about what was happening in Manchuria and that tended to create incidents elsewhere?

A Yes.

Q In your February 3rd notes, apparently the Finance Minister, TAKAHASHI, became very concerned about the happenings in Manchuria because of the financial difficulties it was creating with foreign powers. Did he do anything to try to convince the Army of the seriousness of what was going on in order to induce them to hold back?

A As written here, such a thing was explained to them by Prince KONOYE.

Q And what was the attitude of the Army authorities?

- A Because the China incident became more and more involved, such a thing was explained by Prince Konoye to KOISO of the Bureau of Military Affairs and NAGATA of the Military Affairs Section. Prince KONOYE explained that the Manchurian problem had become more or less improved and therefore movement toward Shanghai would be very unfavorable internationally because Shanghai had a very complex international problem. Therefore, Prince KONOYE did not desire any incident arising in Shanghai.
- Q Why did he go to see KOISO, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau? Did he speak with authority for the Army in such matters?
- A Because the Bureau of Military Affairs drafts plans relating to such matters and Prince KONOYE knew KOISO very well.
- Q I would like to ask you what Prince KONOYE's official capacity with the Government of Japan was in those days and why he was selected to have this interview.
- A He had no political or official power but as a politician, he was highly respected by everyone.
- Q He was in the House of Peers, I believe, was he not?
- A Yes.
- Q Was that his only direct government connection in those days?
- A I believe so.
- Q Wouldn't the War Minister ARAKI have been the more logical person to see on such a situation as that?
- A I do not know ARAKI's attitude very well but I believe he was opposed to becoming involved in Shanghai.
- Q In other words, the Finance Minister was very much concerned about the effect it was having on foreign finances?
- A Yes .
- Q And the Foreign Office was concerned about the effect on relationships and foreign trade and the Army still insisted on sending troops into Shanghai?
- A Yes.

Q How could they justify their actions in view of the effect it was having on Japan's relations with other nations? What justification did they give for going forward with sending troops into Shanghai?

A Because such a situation arose, the Army explained it as self-defense.

Q I see. Do you think the Shanghai Incident was truly a self-defense situation?

A In the beginning I thought it was a self-defense measure because a Japanese officer was shot, but later on, because of the employment of Army forces, I thought it went beyond the scope of self-defense.

Q Was KOISO a strong supporter of the attitude of ITAGAKI and ISHIWARA? Did he back them up in his thinking?

A They were of the same mind as MINAMI.

Q By that you mean "who"?

A I mean Mr. KOISO.

Q In other words, to our general list of names of the men in those days who advocated aggressive action in Manchuria, we could well add the Chief of Military Affairs, KOISO. Do you think he fits into that category with the other men?

A I believe he can be fitted into that group.

Q In other words, you feel that he advocated using more force in Manchuria than/the mere self-defense of Japanese nationals?
for

A Yes.

Q How about NAGATA, the Sectional Chief in the same Bureau you mentioned?

A I don't know what sort of an attitude he had at that time.

Q What, if any, military or Government positions did KOISO later hold after 1932, to your recollection?

A I can't remember.

- Q Did he hold any other Government or military offices in later years?
- A He was a chief of staff of the Kwantung Army.
- Q About what year was that, approximately, that he was chief of staff in the Kwantung Army?
- A I believe it was around 1934.
- Q Was he in the Kwantung Army along with ITAGAKI and ISHIWARA?
- A I don't know if he was with them.
- Q You think he might have been a little after their time?
- A Yes.
- Q But your impression of KOISO was that he also had an expansionist's attitude so far as Manchuria was concerned?
- A Yes, he was of the opinion of making Manchuria a buffer state.
- Q Did he contend that what was happening in Manchuria was a matter of self-defense or do you know?
- A I don't know what he advocated or what he said the Manchurian Incident was but I believe he was of that mind because of his position.
- Q But you do know that he participated in the activities in Manchuria and was an active participant.
- A Yes, because he was in the Bureau of Military Affairs, he actively participated.
- Q In your diary, on the date we are talking about (Feb. 3) is this statement. I am interested in what it means. "KOISO further said that the Japanese Army should not dispatch troops to Shanghai in the same way they experienced when they had sent troops to Shantung." What was the experience in Shantung he thought should be avoided?
- A Because the reason for the dispatch of troops to Shantung was not made clear; therefore, Japan was placed in a difficult position when they had to withdraw the troops from there.
- Q Approximately what year did the Shantung affair occur? Was it many years before?

- A It is quite recent because it was right after the Siberian expedition.
- Q Was it within four or five years prior to the Manchurian Incident or earlier than that?
- A It is longer - much longer before the Manchurian Incident.
- Q That fixes it sufficiently for me.
- A I believe it was some time between the Siberian expedition and the Manchurian Incident.
- Q What he was trying to say then was that Japan had sent troops into Shantung and had difficulty in justifying its action and shouldn't get herself into a similar position again. Is that the thought you were trying to express?
- A It was said that the forces were dispatched in order to combat the military cliques in China at that time and to protect the Japanese nationals residing in Tsinan. Because that reason wasn't made clear or was not clear at that time, the withdrawal of troops was made difficult.
- Q The China Incident stirred up a considerable lot of trouble for the reason that it involved the international settlement of several nations in addition to China, didn't it?
- A Yes, because of that reason, Japan did not want to send any forces there.
- Q But Mr. KOISO was still willing that a certain number of forces go and indicated they should proceed no further than to drive the Chinese out of the international settlement?
- A Yes.
- Q As a matter of fact, however, after the troops arrived, they went considerably further than just to drive the Chinese out of the international settlement and invaded further into China, did they not?
- A At this time, the incident was settled without much further encouragement elsewhere. At this time, the Army Commander SHIRAKAWA was highly instrumental.
- Q Well, it was the attitude of Prince KONOYE that Japan had enough difficulty in trying to justify the Manchurian Incident to the world without inviting more trouble in China. Wasn't that about his attitude?

- A Yes, Prince KONOYE was very much worried and he hoped that no incident will be arising from it.
- Q The real reason that the Premier and K ONOYE, the Finance Minister, and other such people in the Government were opposed to the sending of troops into China was that they realized they might well violate their treaties, wasn't it?
- A I don't believe that such an argument has been given because it was said to be self-defense.
- Q Was any consideration given to evacuating Japanese nationals out of Shanghai as a means of settling the incident?
- A There was argument to that effect because there were numerous Japanese residing in Shanghai. It was difficult to execute and also if such a thing was executed, it would mean that Japan has been defeated, so that has been more or less opposed by certain groups.
- Q Japan never took such a conservative attitude toward the Manchurian Incident as it did the Shanghai incident, did she?
- A Japan was worried to the same extent regarding the Manchurian Incident as it did the Shanghai incident.
- Q But she handled the two incidents entirely different. In one case she settled the incident and went no further while in Manchuria, she set up a Japanese-controlled state. Why were the two situations handled so differently?
- A It is because of the peculiarity of Shanghai and that SHIRAKAWA, the Army Commander, was so effective and sturdy. From the outlook, Mr. SHIRAKAWA was determined to solve the incident amicably.
- Q That is the Shanghai incident?
inter-
- A Yes. The/national aspects of the Shanghai incident was known to the military.
- Q In other words, the militarists thought they had a better chance of getting away with the Manchurian incident where just the Japanese Government was involved than in Shanghai where lots of governments were in the territory?
- A In Manchuria, there were important Manchurian railways which were under the control of Japan and because Manchuria was so close to Japan in many respects while Shanghai was more or less less involved and wasn't so near or close to Japan; that is, economically. Because of the different atmosphere and different aspects involved, the feeling against the Shanghai incident was very strong. Then, there was opposition from the military and the War Minister.

- Q In other words, even the Army could see that there wasn't nearly so much to gain out of expanding the China incident as there was out of expanding the Manchurian incident. The stakes were greater in Manchuria than in China at that time. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q You are familiar, are you not, with the old slogan we read about in your literature - the eight corners of the earth that were supposed to have been advocated by the first emperor?
- A HAKKO ICHIU.
- Q What does that particular word mean in Japan. Is it a man's name or does it have some other significance?
- A That word was used by Emperor JIMMU upon access to his throne and he uttered it upon viewing the territories he had under him on the mountain side and recently that word has been mis-used. At first it did not have any aggressive meaning. Emperor JIMMU just expressed his own thoughts at that time and did not have any spirit of aggression in it.
- Q What do you think his thoughts were? I am interested in what he thought. What did Emperor JIMMU have in mind when he expressed that?
- A He only meant that he will make the territories he viewed as his house.
- Q And it is your thought he didn't have in mind when uttering that phrase, any control of the whole world by Japan?
- A No, because at that time, entire Japan wasn't subjugated.
- Q When was it that the time came when that slogan was abused and used for the other purposes that you imply?
- A I believe it was very recently.
- Q By "recently", what do you mean? When you talk about 2600 years ago, "recent" is a relative term.
- A I believe it was on or about the start of the China incident.
- Q You mean in 1937 or back in 1931?

- A I believe it was about 1937.
- Q Back in 1931, at the time of the Manchurian Incident, was this slogan used in that enterprise.
- A No, I didn't hear hardly anything about it. It may have been used among the groups of fanatics.
- Q What makes you feel that this was used in 1937, at the time of the China Incident. What do you remember that causes you to feel that way?
- A It seems as though the rightists groups were giving wrong use of that term. But the interpretation by the scholars was not aggressive like that of the rightists.
- Q Who was it, would you say, that commenced the use of this slogan for aggressive purposes?
- A I don't know. It came out "no time"; that is, without any memorable notice.
- Q Where did it first appear? In what form? How did you learn about it?
- A I believe it came out in magazines printed by the rightists and in speeches.
- Q In other words, your conclusion is that the rightists started using this slogan to help justify their attitude in Manchuria?
- A Yes, I believe so.
- Q And, do you think a considerable portion of the public came to believe in the slogan as an aggressive teaching?
- A I don't believe they felt that way, especially the enlightened class. They didn't feel so.
- Q Was it taught in the schools after 1937?
- A No, I don't believe so.
- Q You don't think that the Minister of Education introduced it into the text books?
- A No.

- Q Although you say there wasn't this policy of world conquest involved in such a slogan, isn't it true there was for many years at least a latent feeling in Japan that she should some day control East Asia as distinguished from the world?
- A There were no such thought by responsible circles in Japan.
- Q Well, at least about the time of the China incident it came into being. There were a lot of speeches and articles and conversations with reference to the Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere. What is the background of that and how did it come into existence?
- Q Because the slogan came out from the utterances of the Greater East Asia Society and the Government followed the three basic principals given by KONOYE so the Government did not have any idea of controlling Asia.
- Q What was the Greater East Asia Society?
- A It was more or less the rightists organization which advocated the solution of the Chinese problem in collaboration with the Army in China but within the group there were some who advocated Japan taking on leadership of a higher esteemed position.
- Q As early as 1930 and 1931, there were those among the rightists group, were there not, that felt it was Japan's destiny and purpose to control and influence all activities in East Asia?
- A At this time, the term "East Asia" only applied to China, Manchuria and Japan. No thoughts were given to southern countries.
- Q You would say, as early as 1930, the rightists groups were thinking in terms of Japan exercising control over China and Manchuria; that being for all practical purposes East Asia?
- A Yes.
- Q When do you recall that thinking coming out into the open so that it could be recognized that Japan should exercise influence over that sphere?
- A Such a thought was prevalent long before among the group concerning the East China problem.
- Q How long before, approximately?

- A I don't know how long ago such an idea has been prevalent but I do know that the Black Dragon Society did have such ideas.
- Q In other words, between 1900 and 1930, there were people thinking in those terms - that Japan should take a strong position as to China and Manchuria and by one method or another gain control and influence there?
- A I believe such an idea was prevalent at the time of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 - 1905 but it wasn't so strong at that time. It was an argument held by a group associated with the China problem.
- Q Was it a sort of attitude or theory as to China relations that died down to some extent about 1905 and then revived more or less in 1931 when the Manchurian Incident came along, would you say?
- A Up to World War I, Japan was allied with Britain and America so in relation with China, she was able to progress smoothly but after World War I, Japan more or less became isolated and and China's position became very harmonious with Britain and America. For that reason, difficulties and troubles began to arise between Japan and China and around the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, the anti-Japanese feeling prevailed among the Chinese and became more or less a Japanese-abusing sentiment.
- Q More outspoken?
- A Yes, more outspoken or abusive.
- Q In other words, when the military group in 1931 started taking an aggressive attitude toward Manchuria, these factions that were through the years anti-Chinese naturally supported the militarists in that movement and rallied to that cause. Approximately when was the Black Dragon Society formed or did it come into sufficient strength to be noticeable?
- A I do not know when the Black Dragon Society took on that name but I knew such a society existed from the time of the first Sino-Japanese War. The Sino-Japanese War was in 1894.

- Q What did they advocate with reference to China and what were the primary principles of the Black Dragon Society, as you understood them?
- A I don't know anything about that society so I can't explain.
- Q Well, as you understood it, they took a position with reference to China, didn't they? What was that attitude with reference to China.
- A As far as being concerned with China, that was their main concern.
- Q What did they advocate with reference to China.
- A On the surface, it was advocating harmony with China and it allied itself with some of the revolutionary groups of China and had close relations with Chinese groups.
- Q By that you mean that it was an organization that favored good relations between Japan and China - friendly relations?
- A I do not have any accurate information regarding the Society but it had friendly relations with China as its main purpose and it also had aggressive designs; that is, it allied with some revolutionary factions of China and had itself involved with Chinese groups.
- Q It was the desire of the organization that eventually Japan should exercise influence and control over China, wasn't it?
- A It wanted to maintain friendly relations with China but it also wanted to form a China that would be favorable and beneficial to Japan. Therefore, it allied itself with some of the revolutionary factions of China.
- Q Well, by so allying itself, what did it hope to accomplish? What did the organization think that the revolutionists in China could do for its program?
- A So that a China favorable to Japan will be established. In other words, Japan wanted to create a China that could come to terms with Japan.
- Q In other words, the Society desired a Government in China that Japan could do business with and could influence in Japan's favor?
- A Yes.

- Q Were there any Government officials that were openly outstanding in the Black Dragon Society that you know of?
- A No, such a person was not concerned. It was an organization of civilians.
- Q Did the civilians who made up the Black Dragon Society support the militarists group in 1931 in the Manchurian incident, generally speaking?
- A I do not know to what extent they supported it but I do know that they encouraged it from behind.
- Q As I understand it, the Society, itself, has gone out of existence some time ago. Is that correct?
- A Yes, it was dissolved.
- Q When was it dissolved?
- A It was dissolved under directives from the MacArthur people.
- Q Was it active and did it exist as an active organization up until that time?
- A I believe they did not have any form of power.
- Q During what period would you say the Society was the most active?
- A I believe about ten years ago.
- Q Around about the time of the Manchurian Incident and shortly thereafter?
- A Yes, right after and around then.
- Q Well, if we would refer to Greater East Asia as being China and Manchuria, it could be said that the Black Dragon Society favored the extension of Japanese influence into greater East Asia. It was one of the groups that sponsored and advocated the East Asia program. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q As I recall, you told me the other day that prior to 1930, the people generally didn't think of the Emperor in terms of being a deity but along about that time, certain groups began to advocate that and the people were taught, at least, that the Emperor was a deity. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Did that go so far as to become a part of the educational program of Japan in the schools?

A No, such a thing was not taught in the schools.

Q You don't think that the Educational Minister saw to it that that teaching got into the textbooks?

A I don't believe the textbooks taught such things.

Q There was a great deal of that material in the press and in the magazines and the published periodicals?

A Yes, such things are contended in the rightists' organizations, pamphlets and magazines.

Q It likewise was prevalent in the newspapers, was it not?

A Yes, because the newspapers were controlled by militarists.

A That type of teaching could not have appeared in magazines or newspapers unless the Government permitted it in view of the censorship of the press that existed, could it.

A I don't believe such an argument was controlled by the censors. The censorship of the newspapers in Japan was very limited in scope and such a thing was permitted.

Q If the Government as a matter of policy disapproved of that teaching, it would have been a comparatively easy matter to have kept it out of the press, wouldn't it?

A Because such a feeling or such a propaganda did not create public unrest and disorder, it was for that reason permitted.

Q But I think you feel that the rightists groups and militarists' groups cultivated such a thought and sponsored it in order to bolster and support their program of aggression. Is that true?

A Yes, it consequently became so but it gradually came out and did not come out all of a sudden.

Q I appreciate that. Weren't you and other such people who were generally opposed to the militarists and rightists groups concerned about this teaching and effect it might have on future events?

- A I was very much worried that it was going beyond its limit and also I was worried but I did not personally feel that the Emperor was a god. I don't think the people believed the newspapers to that extent.
- Q This idea of the Emperor being a deity which you say started to come out in the open about 1930 and thereafter, wasn't a new and entirely novel idea was it? Had it not existed way back in Japanese thinking and wasn't it more a question of it being revived and brought to the surface again?
- A Yes, certain groups among the Japanese from long ago have been certain that the Emperor was god.
- Q In other words, prior to 1930 there were people who thought and talked that the Emperor was a deity but they were so much in the minority no one paid attention to it.
- A There was one part of the people saying such things.
- Q That thinking of the Emperor being a deity is part of the folklore of Japan, way back, wasn't it.
- A Yes, it seems to be part of the folklore and the mythology of Japan.
- Q But you honestly believe in the 20's, for example, from 1900 to 1930, the average individual didn't believe or pay much attention to that and didn't consider the Emperor as a deity?
- A I did not feel that the Emperor was a deity and I believe the general public felt the same.
- Q But after all this propaganda for a period of some ten to twelve years, there was a definite feeling among the populists that the Emperor was a god, wasn't there?
- A I don't think so. I think the propagandists were blowing off steam.
- Q Don't you think it had a psychological effect on many young people which lead them to be fanatical in support of the Emperor, or more fanatical than they normally would have been?

- A No, I don't think so, not among the young individuals.
- Q You are confident that this teaching did not get into the educational system of the schools?
- A I don't believe that such a thing has been inserted.
- Q What connection is there between this thought and thinking and Shintoism, if any?
- A Such an argument or belief is prevalent among a group of Shintoists.
- Q Is it one of the cardinal principles of Shintoism?
- A I don't know much about the Shintoists or Shintoism.
- Q I don't know anything. You know more than I.
- A I don't believe that all Shintoists believe that the Emperor is a deity.
- Q What, if I may ask, is your religion, as for example, christianity, Buddhist, Shintoism - you, personally.
- A I do not have any particular religion so I guess I am a Buddhist.
- Q You would classify yourself as a Buddhist?
- A Yes.

INTERROGATION OF

(Marquis) KIDO, Koichi

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME : 29 January 1946, 1400 - 1600 hours

PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan

PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Sackett

Q Let us look at your diary as of February 3, 1932, Marquis, the Finance Minister in those days was very much concerned about the aggression in China and Manchuria, wasn't he?

A Yes, because the financial situation was very grave so he was very much concerned.

Q He had the responsibility of conducting the financial affairs of Japan and the attitude and activities of Japan in China made that very difficult?

A Yes.

Q The Finance Minister realized, did he not, what was going on was aggressive rather than a matter of self-defense, wouldn't you say?

A Yes, the Minister of Finance was aware of the fact that the militarists were taking aggressive action.

- Q Who else would you say, for instance, the Cabinet, in those days, also realized that the activities were aggressive rather than defensive.
- A At that time, I did not know many of the ministers so I do not know but generally speaking, the political parties were very much concerned about the aggression.
- Q Was it common talk in Government circles that the action that was being taken in Manchuria was more than mere self-defense?
- A The reason of self-defense has been usurped. From some time ago, it has been reiterated and re-emphasized so the people concerned were very much worried about the matter of aggression.
- Q I don't believe I quite understand your answer. Will you say that in another way?
- A The dominant officials were very much afraid they had gone beyond the scope of self-defense and for that reason they were very much worried.
- Q Do you think the Army men, such as the War Minister, also realized that they had gone past the self-defense stage?
- A I don't know much about the militarists.
- Q You think the political party men, were worrying about the aggression passing the self-defense stage more than the Army?
- A I believe that the military was putting forth all sorts of arguments.
- Q By that you mean that they were trying to satisfy their conscience with the self-defense theory but actually it wasn't true?
- A Yes.
- Q I notice from your diary that the Finance Minister was so much concerned about it that it was his suggestion that the Emperor warn the military men to cease being so aggressive. Is that correct?
- A I believe so.

- Q Look at February 5, where you indicate in your diary that the Chief of the Navy General Staff and the Vice Chief of the Army General Staff had an audience with the Emperor. Is there anything to refresh your memory as to what the nature of that audience was and the purpose of it?
- A I have no accurate recollection as to this audience with the Emperor but I believe it was concerned with the Shanghai incident.
- Q The Prime Minister INUKAI also was very much concerned about the aggressive activities of the Army, was he not?
- A Yes.
- Q Both the Prime Minister and the Cabinet realized that the situation had gone to the extent that it was endangering Japanese relations with foreign countries?
- A Yes.
- Q Didn't the Cabinet and the Premier and the Government officials realize that there was very likely a violation of the nine-power treaty involved in the activities of Japan in China?
- A I don't know if they realized it to that extent, because at this time it was just a short while after it broke out and the reason of self-defense was expressed and they also said that it was for the protection of the Japanese nationals.
- Q But there was serious doubt in the Premier's mind and other members of the Cabinet that it was self-defense, even in those days, wasn't there?
- A I believe he was very much worried about the future. Even I was worried.
- Q He was concerned that if the attitude of the Army and militarists persisted, it might well violate the Japanese treaties. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q The Premier even went so far as to state that he was going to warn the War and Navy Ministers to cease their aggression?
- A Yes.

- Q Do you know whether he ever did so or not?
- A I don't remember if they did or not.
- Q But he talked about doing it?
- A I heard that they had such an intent according to Mr. HARADA.
- Q The Premier and the Finance Minister were very outspoken in their opposition to the military aggression in China?
- A Yes.
- Q Do you recall who else was outspoken in that respect?
- A I have no recollection.
- Q What position did the War Minister ARAKI take in those days when the Finance Minister and the Premier were complaining about the aggression?
- A I believe ARAKI more or less was expressing self-defense and the protection of Japanese nationals in China as the main reason.
- Q He was for strong action in Manchuria and China and taking a firm stand, wasn't he?
- A Yes, generally so.
- Q What was the Navy's attitude at or about that time as nearly as you can recall from your diary? (Feb. 6)
- A I believe that the Navy understood the situation so well that they did not favor the dispatch of forces.
- Q You don't think the Navy had nearly the aggressive attitude in those days as the Army?
- A No they had no aggressiveness. I believe it had thoughts of protecting the Japanese nationals in China by use of Marines that were already stationed in China.
- Q Did the military faction in those days express the thought that Japan should acquire territory in China and Manchuria?
- A I don't believe the Army faction had any thoughts of seizing territories along the Yangtze Basin.

- Q How about Manchuria? Did they talk in terms of Japan acquiring ownership of Manchuria?
- A I understand they had much thought of making Manchuria an independent state.
- Q They expressed the thought that Japan should control that independent state, too, did they not?
- A Yes, either to control it or to bring it under its influence.
- Q But you don't think there was much said or printed about acquiring territory in China in those days as distinguished from Manchuria. Do you think that came later?
- A There is a great distinction between China and Manchuria so that in that respect the attitude was very much different.
- Q By that you mean the Army groups advocated control and activity in Manchuria but not in China in those days?
- A No, not in China.
- Q That came later on, didn't it?
- A I believe it was so, even from the beginning.
- Q But that came later on, didn't it?
- A I believe it was so even from the beginning.
- Q By that came later on, I meant the attitude of acquiring control and territorial control in China came at a later time as distinguished from 1932?
- A Yes.
- Q Back in those days, did the Army group begin to talk about the slogan "Hakko Ichiu" or did that come later on?
- A At that time, I didn't hear much about it.

- Q To the best of your recollection, when did that come to the front?
- A I believe at the outbreak of the China Incident.
- Q That was in 1937. How about the Greater Asia sphere of influence? When did that come in?
- A That was after the start of the Greater East Asia War - 1940.
- Q By that you mean the war starting with Pearl Harbor?
- A Yes. The Far East until that time included only Manchuria, China and Japan.
- Q You mean up until Pearl Harbor?
- A Yes.
- Q After Pearl Harbor what was it construed to include?
- A After that, because forces were dispatched to Malay and Singapore, all those regions were included.
- Q I notice that Baron GOH indicated that the situation that existed in 1932 was comparable to the early Meiji period. What did he have in mind when he said that?
- A He expressed the fact that the military has executed a revolution or change to such an extent that it must be rectified or be led through the proper channel.
- Q In the early Meiji period, wasn't the situation one where the Emperor came back into power and the militarists moved into the background to some extent?
- A Yes.
- Q It would seem to me that the situation in 1932 was just the opposite.
- A Yes, the military faction is being compared with the Shogun ate.
- Q What he meant was that in the early Meiji period, the Government as such was confronted with suppressing the Shogunate or military faction and they had the same situation again in 1932; that the Government would have to suppress the militarists.

A Yes.

Q By 1932, was the Army so independent of the Government that the Government couldn't dictate to the Army or tell the Army what to do in peace time.

A Technically the Government can control the Army but actually it can not and therefore it was very much concerned.

Q Can you explain that a little further as to why as a technical matter it can but as a practical matter it cannot? How did that situation exist?

A It is because the military became such a large organization and it had forces out in China and elsewhere so that the Government became unable to control it.

Q In other words, if the Government, through the Cabinet or Ministry directed the Army to do something, they wouldn't necessarily do it.

A There are many occasions where they did not obey orders and then they created new situations outside.

Q Then there was always the feeling that the Army might by military force move in and take over the Government

A Yes, there were fears of the military so doing.

Q Therefore, Baron GOH was very much concerned on that point. Apparently a lot of people were very much concerned about the militarists and the Army and what they were going to do.

A Yes, other persons were very much concerned, too.

Q Whom would you say the two or three people in the Army group were most feared by this class of people you were talking to?

A I believe that ARAKI and MASAKI were the center of such activities.

Q ARAKI was War Minister, wasn't he?

A Yes, in the INUKAI Cabinet.

Q And MASAKI was Vice Minister in the Bureau of Military Affairs, wasn't he?

A He was the Vice Chief of Staff.

Q Do you recall who the Chief of Staff was?

A He was Prince KANIN.

Q You don't think Prince KANIN was to be feared as much as MASAKI?

A Prince KANIN is quite old and is very gentle.

Q The aggressive character in the Office of Chief of Staff was MASAKI?

A Yes.

Q Is there anyone else that really ought to be classified on an equal basis with those two men as far as representing the group of whom you were afraid in those days of pushing the military influence?

A The Chief of the Bureau of Military Affairs KOISO was a radicalist.

Q He was about on the same level as far as responsibility goes as the other two men?

A A little lower.

Q The real leaders were ARAKI and MASAKI?

A Yes, and others, too, because the young men were following those two.

Q These other men were were talking about in the past few days are in that category but you wouldn't say that they were on the top, as ARAKI and MASAKI? Is that right?

A Yes.

Q ARAKI and MASAKI were really the ones who were advocating aggressive action in Manchuria in those days, weren't they?

A Yes, I believe so.

Q In addition to advocating that the Army take control of the political Government?

A Yes .

- Q Your diary as of February 8 indicates a discussion with reference to the proposed resignation of General UGAKI as Governor General of Korea. Do you recall why he tendered his resignation about that time?
- A I don't remember the circumstances.
- Q Isn't it a fact that General UGAKI felt that the activities in Manchuria were too aggressive and he opposed what was going on on the continent?
- A I don't believe it was such a clear-cut reason as that.
- Q You don't think it had anything to do with the Army's policy in Manchuria?
- A I have no such recollection.
- Q UGAKI, I guess, would sympathize with the Army's program to some extent but was not as outspoken as the others?
- A Because he was connected with the March Incident, I believe he was in favor of the Government by the military.
- Q But he was not as radical or outspoken as some of the others?
- A No, he was not a radical.
- Q You indicate you attended a lecture of Mr. MATSUOKA in the presence of the Emperor about the Manchurian situation. When did you first become acquainted with Mr. MATSUOKA?
- A At this time, I did not know him very well. I was just carrying on the formality of bowing to him.
- Q What was his business or government capacity in those days?
- A He was the Director of the Manchurian Railway and before that he was sent to Shanghai. He was working for the Ministry.
- Q Was he Vice Minister to the Foreign Minister, would you say?
- A He was just doing special work on request.
- Q Was he an Army man at any time?
- A No, he is not an Army man. He was educated in America and he is an official working for the Foreign Ministry.

- Q He is the same Mr. MATSUOKA that later became the Ambassador to Germany, is he not?
- A No.
- Q Was he a special emissary of the foreign office that was in Germany?
- A In the KONOYE Cabinet, there was one time when he went to Germany as the Foreign Minister.
- Q He went there in connection with the negotiation of the Tripartite Alliance, didn't he?
- A Yes, he concluded the Tripartite Pact.
- Q That was in his capacity as Foreign Minister?
- A Yes.
- Q What was his attitude, he being a director of the South Manchurian Railroad with reference to the Japanese expansion in Manchuria?
- A I did not know any of his clear-cut attitudes. He was just one of the directors and not a president of the firm.
- Q Then, you indicate in your diary that Lt. General BANZAKI also delivered an address in the presence of the Emperor. Who was he?
- A He was adviser to CHUNG CHO LIN and he was very well versed in Chinese affairs.
- Q Was he a Chinese citizen or a Japanese citizen.
- A He was a Japanese citizen.
- Q Who was CHUNG CHO LIN?
- A He was a Manchurian General.
- Q I see, what was the purpose of these lectures in the Imperial presence? Why were they held?
- A It was an informal meeting like the one held with Mr. MINAMI.
- Q In the nature of a tea, as you say?

- A Yes, because he knows so much about China, the Emperor inquired of him about Chinese affairs.
- Q Would you say the Emperor in those days was under the impression that Japan was going too far in the Manchurian Incident and was interested in making somewhat of a personal investigation?
- A Yes, he had the impression that they went beyond its limit and he emphasized Chinese-Japanese friendship.
- Q That would be one of the reasons he held these meetings in order that he might for himself ascertain whether this had passed the stage of self-defense? Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q On February 9, Mr. INOUE was assassinated. What is the story about that?
- A INOUE is a member of the Minseito Party and at that time an election was being held and he went to attend a special mass meeting conducted by the Minseito Party for a Minseito candidate. Just as he alighted from his car, he was shot by a pistol.
- Q He was the man who was Finance Minister in the previous WAKATSUKI Cabinet?
- A Yes. He was a very strong man.
- Q While he was in the Cabinet, wasn't it true that he was rather an outspoken opponent of the militarists and Army group?
- A Yes, he was quite strong in that respect.
- Q He was opposed to the militarists taking over the Government, wasn't he?
- A Yes.
- Q And he was also opposed to the activities of Japan in Manchuria, wasn't he?
- A Yes.

Q Didn't he make speeches and statements to that effect?

A I don't know about speeches.

Q Well, statements, then.

A I don't believe he made such vigorous statements.

Q Well, he was known generally as an opponent to the militarists wasn't he?

A Yes, that is right.

Q What did the militarists have to do with his assassination?

A I don't believe they had direct connection. Indirectly, the military might be concerned but not directly. It seems as though INOUE NISSHO was the chief conspirator and he had a personal grudge against the Zaibatsu. He was assigned to kill this man with subordinates of about five or six henchmen.

Q By whom was he assigned to do that job?

A That was determined by INOUE NISSHO, who is chief conspirator and that is done through his henchmen.

Q You wouldn't say that this killing was Army inspired then?

A I don't believe they led it directly. In attacking the Zaibatsu, he held the same opinion as he did of the military; that the existence of such a group of men would not be beneficial.

Q In other words, they had that in common with the military group but they didn't believe in everything the military group stood for.

A It had no direct relations with the military.

Q Will you read a little further in your diary - your February 9 entry. Who was Marquis TOKUGAWA? You mentioned that General ARAKI and Lt. General MASAKI were outstanding leaders of this Army Group. Where did OKAWA fit into the picture. Was he closely associated with those two men in those days?

A Because Mr. OKAWA was quite radical in his attitude toward various problems, he was close to the Army and the militarists.

- Q He was one man who strongly advocated expansion of Japan into China?
- A Yes.
- Q Did Mr. MORI of the Seiyukai have the same philosophy and policy in those days?
- A I don't know much about Mr. MORI's attitude but he was very well versed in Chinese affairs.
- Q There was an effort being made in those days to bring the forces of the Seiyukai party and the Army group together, wasn't there?
- A It seems as though the Socialists were becoming more close to the Army so the Seiyukai which was a longer existant party thought they would curry favor with the militarists.
- Q Who was Marquis TOKUGAWA?
- A Marquis TOKUGAWA was a daimyo of NAGOYA and he was a specialist in the field of biology.
- Q He was not a politician?
- A He was a member of the House of Peers.
- Q Would you say that General ARAKI and Lt. General MASAKI were very close friends in those days and consulted frequently and had similar ideas with reference to China and Manchuria, wouldn't you?
- A Yes, I believe so because those two men were very close friends.
- Q And Dr. OKAWA would also be one that would be taken into their confidence on various occasions? Is that right?
- A I don't know much about that.
- Q You indicate under February 13 that you were much concerned about the cooperation between the militarists and the Socialist party. What sort of a problem did that present that caused you concern? Anything new or novel about it?
- A I was very much worried because of the fact that the Socialist Party was joining hands with the militarists and that would mean some form of revolution would occur.

Q In other words, that added considerable strength to the military movement, didn't it?

A It was because the militarists would more or less operate behind the scenes of political affairs.

Q You talked with Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA on February 15. He expressed the foreign policy of Japan. What did he tell you with reference to the Government's then foreign policy so far as Manchuria and China were concerned?

A I have no accurate recollection as to that.

Q Will you read your diary as of February 16. Why did the Lord Keeper desire to be informed as to the law with reference to treaty violations?

A Because a treaty violation would pose a great problem in relation to the League of Nations and this was informed to us by an authorized source.

Q In other words, the Lord Keeper was so much concerned about what was going on in Manchuria, he wanted some expert advice as to what the international law was?

A Yes.

Q And this Dr. TATE that he consulted with advised him that the establishment of a separate state in Manchuria would be a breach of the nine-power treaty?

A Yes.

Q So as a result of this consultation, the Lord Keeper at least realized what was going on in Manchuria was a violation of Japan's treaty, didn't he?

A Yes.

Q Did he consult the Emperor about it?

A I have no recollection.

Q Wouldn't it be a subject of such importance that he would likely consult the Emperor about it?

A I believe so.

- Q Did he talk to any cabinet members or other Government officials about the legal situation involved?
- A I have no recollection.
- Q As a matter of fact, the Lord Keeper, the Emperor and the Cabinet, itself, realized that as a matter of strict law, the activities in Manchuria were in violation of the nine-power treaty, didn't they?
- A I believe they were very much concerned but as far as the Cabinet's attitude was concerned, it was not clear.
- Q What do you mean "not clear" - some felt one way and some felt another?
- A Like the War Minister, his attitude was not clear.
- Q You don't know whether he realized the treaty was being violated or not?
- A I don't know if he was thinking that the treaties were being violated?
- Q In other words, the attitude of General Araki was one of indifference as to whether it was violated or not ?
- A Yes, that part was not clear.
- Q Do you think it made any particular difference to ARAKI whether the treaty was being violated or not insofar as what he was going to do?
- A Because the general attitude of the Army was not clear.
- Q Premier INUKAI realized that this was a violation of the nine-power treaty, didn't he?
- A I believe so.
- Q Just like the Finance Minister, TAKAHASHI, he also realized as a matter of international law the nine-power treaty had been violated didn't he?
- A Yes.

Q Do you know whether there was ever anything done by the Lord Keeper or the Emperor to call it to the attention of the Cabinet that they felt the nine-power treaty was violated?

A I believe that the Lord Keeper informed to that extent but I haven't heard anything about it.

Q If he informed anyone, who would he likely inform?

A He informed the Primer Minister to that extent in my estimation.

Q There isn't any question in your mind, is there, that the Minister of War, at least had information that there were members in his Cabinet that felt that the nine-power treaty had been violated?

A I believe so.

Q Do you have any knowledge as to what the attitude of General MASAKI was with reference to the nine-power treaty?

A I haven't heard anything about it.

Q It is quite likely that his attitude would have been similar to that of General ARAKI, wouldn't it?

A I believe so - I am not clear about it.

Q So, we can say at least, that responsible members of the Japanese Government in those days realized that the recognition of Manchuria as an independent state was a clear violation of the nine-power treaty, couldn't we?

A Yes, they had such an impression.

Q In spite of that fact, recognition took place due to the pressure of the military group.

A Yes, in my estimation, I believe that the Japanese were putting up puppet Manchurian rulers and therefore through that means Japan was not violating the treaty.

Q Why did the putting up of puppet rulers prevent a violation of the treaty in your opinion?

A I believe that such an explanation was given.

- Q But wouldn't the recognition of puppet rulers in the final analysis clearly be a violation of the territorial integrity of China?
- A Yes, but I believe that the militarists just as a formality put up puppet rulers.
- Q In other words, the non-military group realized that the recognition of the Manchurian state was a violation of the treaty and was being forced through by the military group. Is that correct?
- A Yes.
- Q And they also believed that the military group was concocting the puppet theory to justify their position. Is that right?
- A Yes.
- Q And the non-military group felt that this was done deliberately by the military people to accomplish their purpose, didn't they?
- A Yes, undoubtedly so.
- Q They didn't feel that the military group was in good faith in their argument, did they?
- A No.
- Q What was the Emperor's reaction to this puppet government theory that was concocted by the military faction?
- A I don't know much about it because I haven't heard from him directly.
- Q Didn't you ever talk with the Emperor in those days, personally?
- A No.
- Q Would you say that the then Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA was of the opinion that the activities in Manchuria were a violation of the nine-power treaty?
- A I never heard about YOSHIZAWA's opinion. I believe that the foreign minister made a thorough investigation of that matter.
- Q And what conclusion did they come to?

- A I didn't hear anything about the conclusion.
- Q Your diary indicates an extensive conference between the the Foreign Minister and the Emperor. Does that refresh your recollection?
- A It was concerned mainly with the Shanghai Incident.
- Q Did the non-military group feel that the Shanghai Incident also was a violation of the nine-power treaty?
- A In this conference, the matter of self-defense has been taken as the valid reason.
- Q You mean insofar as Shanghai was concerned, the thought was that it was strictly self-defense?
- A Yes.
- Q But you can't really separate the Shanghai incident from the Manchurian Incident. They are tied together in a sense. If there wasn't a Manchurian Incident, there likely would not have been a Shanghai incident.
- A I am not sure that the Shanghai Incident would not have occurred if there was no Manchurian Incident but I believe that the Shanghai Incident was taken as a separate incident.
- Q You feel that the Shanghai situation was more clearly a self-defense one than the Manchurian activities?
- A At this conference "yes".
- Q Do you still feel that way about it today in the light of what you knew later?
- A My opinion now is still the same as then.
- Q I notice that it is quite common for General MASAKI to make reports to the Emperor. Why did he as Vice Chief of Staff go rather than the Chief of Staff?
- A I don't know the circumstances but perhaps the Prince was ill at that time.

- Q In other words, even though MASAKI wasn't Chief of Staff in those days, he was the active leader of the staff because the Prince was ill - the Chief was ill?
- A Yes, he was a powerful leader.
- Q For all practical purposes, General MASAKI really was Chief of Staff. Is that right?
- A Not to that extent.
- Q According to your diary, when he reported to the Emperor on February 17, he indicated that Japan might have to send more troops and take an even stronger position in China, didn't he?
- A Yes.
- Q That was indicative of his general attitude toward Manchuria and China, wasn't it?
- A I believe he just explained his concern about it. He is not thinking of developing the incident as the incident in Manchuria has developed. He is of a passive nature.
- Q Who is "he" you are referring to now?
- A MASAKI.
- Q You meant that as of that moment he was of a passive nature?
- A Yes.
- Q He didn't advocate withdrawing or suppressing the incident, did he? His attitude was more one of using sufficient force to defeat the opposition troops?
- A He meant that if the Chinese forces would more or less oppose the Japanese, that is under Chiang-kai-Shek, Japan might reinforce her forces so the Emperor worried in that event the incident would develop into a big clash and that all the Japanese nationals in China may have to be evacuated.
- Q The Emperor even suggested such evacuation.
- A Yes, the Emperor asked if wholesale evacuation was possible.

Q But General MASAKI was strenuously opposed to that, wasn't he?

A I don't know whether he opposed it or whether he did take that into consideration.

Q General MASAKI's attitude was really one that he would like to have a "show down" with China. Wasn't that his general feeling?

A Yes.

Q In later years, in what capacity did General MASAKI serve in the Army to your recollection? In other words, did he always continue to be a Vice Chief of Staff or did he advance to a higher position?

A I believe he was later on a member of the Supreme War Council.

Q Was he ever an active general in the field?

A I don't believe he ever was.

Q Apparently on or about the 17th of February, the Privy Council met, at which time Premier INUKAI took the stand that his Government would never recognize Manchuria.

A Yes, I heard such a story.

Q That was in direct opposition to the program of the militarists, wasn't it?

A Undoubtedly so.

Q Do you know why he took such a stand. What his reason was?

A Probably for the reason it would constitute a violation of the treaty.

Q That undoubtedly was the reason for he refused to recognize Manchuria as it was a violation of Japan's treaty?

A I believe so.

Q And his definite stand to stay within the treaty provisions was really one of the things that caused his assassination later, wasn't it?

- A It is not clear to that extent but I believe it influenced it.
- Q It certainly contributed to what took place later, didn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q What was the reaction to his statement at the Privy Council meeting in the face of the militarists' program. Did it cause any comment at the time?
- A I haven't heard of any direct repercussion.
- Q Wasn't it rather a brave and startling thing for him to take such a stand in view of the strength of the military group and their program?
- A Yes, Mr. INUKAI is a very brave and courageous man.
- Q Did the War Minister ARAKI have any comment to make at the Privy Council about the position of the Premier?
- A I didn't hear anything about it.
- Q Was there anything to indicate that his statement might cause the Cabinet to fall?
- A There wasn't any such atmosphere at that time.
- Q Who was Mr. YASUOKA?
- A He was a scholar of China.
- Q I think you indicated once before that Mr. GOTO was also a scholar, did you not?
- A No, Mr. GOTO was working in the Home Ministry.
- Q Was he a supporter of the Premier's views that the recognition of Manchuria would be a violation of the nine-power treaty, would you say?
- A Yes, he was one of the group that was very much concerned about it.
- Q What was the attitude of the Navy Minister, Mr. OSUMI, with reference to the nine-power treaty violation in those days?

- A I didn't hear anything directly about it but I believe that the Navy generally was in favor of abiding by the treaties so it may have been in opposition to it.
- Q You indicated that you were much concerned about news from the Imperial Palace leaking out. Why should you be concerned about that? Why were you afraid?
- A Because rumors emanating from the Imperial Palace has been contributing to much unrest.
- Q Under the Japanese system of Government, couldn't the Emperor say what he wanted to or was there some restraint upon his views being made public?
- A Yes, there is such a point to consider.
- Q Why? What is the reason back of not having the public know what the Emperor believes or thinks?
- A At this point, only the matter of the Emperor's living conditions were discussed and there emanated many false rumors concerning the Emperor's living conditions so as to be a source of criticizing or attacking the Emperor and there was the fear that it may be utilized for a revolution against the Emperor.
- Q You mean that there was an organized effort in those days to keep the Japanese people, as well as the world, from knowing how the Emperor lived, what he thought, or what he stood for?
- A It didn't do any harm to let the public know but the details were not actually given out.
- Q You mean that if the Japanese people learned that the Emperor was living in luxury, shall we say, compared to them, that they might revolt because they might be jealous of his position?
- A At this time it was rumored that the Emperor was taking up most of his time studying biology and neglecting state affairs and therefore it was a bad report or bad news.

Q You were afraid that the information might be taken up by radical groups and enlarged?

A Yes.

Q I notice that General ARAKI in those days indicated his preference for new premiers by stating to Mr. YASUOKA that for a political premier he would prefer HIRANUMA and for a military premier, he would prefer TANAKA. What is the background of and who is General TANAKA?

A He is an Army General and was highly respected by the Army group.

Q Was he one of ARAKI's close friends and advisers, such as MASAKI?

A I do not know to what extent the relationship went. It is not clear.

Q He likely must have thought along the same lines as ARAKI with reference to China and Manchuria, wouldn't he?

A I believe so. I do not know him at all.

Q Was Baron HIRANUMA a close friend of ARAKI and one of his followers in those days?

A Yes, he was a good friend of ARAKI.

Q Do you know what his attitude was with reference to Manchuria and China?

A I believe on that matter, he was in harmony.

Q In other words, he favored expansion into Manchuria, you would say?

A I may say he is not.

Q Why do you think that he met with ARAKI's approval to be a new premier?

A Because he is connected with the radicalists' organizations.

Q General ARAKI even went so far as to make statement to the effect that if there was an uprising by the militarists, he didn't propose to interfere, even though he was Minister of War in the Cabinet at that time. Is that right?

- A I believe he had such an attitude because ARAKI sympathized with the young men's opinion - the young men assembled at his home.
- Q Did you hear him make any such statement as that?
- A No, I didn't hear him say it.
- Q In other words, it was rumored, m you would say?
- A Mr. YASUOKA said to that effect.
- Q That ARAKI took the position that even though he was Minister of War and, as such, a responsible party for maintaining order in Japan, if the militarists rose up, he wouldn't do anything about it?
- A He said that the capitol will be put in order but that the militarists will be given more support. I did not quite well understand this relationship.
- Q The rumo~~r~~, at least, was indicative of ARAKI's attitude toward the militarists becoming strong in the Government, wasn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q Who is Marquis INOUYE? Was he related to the man who was assassinated?
- A No, absolutely different. He is an Army officer who retired upon reaching major generalship. He is a close friend of the Army group and also my friend.
- Q Was he a strong supporter of ARAKI's policy, would you say?
- A He is absolutely opposed to him.
- Q How about Colonel OBATA that you mention?
- A He was the Chief of the Operations Section of the General Staff Headquarters.
- Q Did he subscribe to the program and thinking of ARAKI?

- A I do not know how close he was to ARAKI.
- Q You don't know what his attitude was with reference to the Manchurian and Chinese situation?
- A I believe he had the same attitude because as Chief of the Operations Section he was directly under MASAKI.
- Q There is no question but what Colonel Suzuki was a strong supporter of ARAKI, was there?
- A I don't believe that SUZUKI can be classed categorically with ARAKI because he opposed the March incident.
- Q Do you think we can add Colonel OBATA to our list of the militarists that were advocating expansion in Manchuria in violation of the nine-power treaty?
- A I believe so from his position; that is, looking at his position. I haven't heard anything directly concerning him.
- Q Was he a leader or more or less a follower in that faction, would you say?
- A He didn't go up to the extent of being classed as a leader.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Fred F. Suzukawa, Lt., 0-203605
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 131 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred F. Suzukawa
2nd Lt. PVS

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 8 day of August, 1946.

[Signature]
(Name and Rank)

Duty Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S. M. Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, ~~(us)~~ Henry Sackett, _____,

~~and~~ _____,

certify that on 23rd day of January, 1946, personally appeared before me ~~(us)~~ Marquis Koichi Kido, and according to Lt. Fred Suzukawa, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan
Place

8 August 1946
Date

[Signature]