TO:		

FROM: Mr. Roosevelt

1. the Cashqai Khans have stated that:

- A. They will fight only if attacked.
  - B. They have confidence in Prime Minister Zahedi whom they consider a friend of thirty years' standing. However, they do not trust the Shah (because of past betrayals) and, therefore, must be prepared to protect themselves against him.
  - C. They intend to obey laws, pay taxes, etc.
  - D. They would, if provided with a "face saving" device, swear (and keep) allegiance to the Shah and Zahedi.
  - E. They will not join in any Tudeh plans nor tolerate Tudeh activity in their area.
- 2. The Qashqai Khans hope that the Iranian government will consider favorably a proposal that the Shah pardon former Prime Minister Mossadeq and permit him to retire to a village or to leave the country. This would provide the Khans with "face saving" and would release them from their promise to Mossadeq to support him "to the end". If assured of such action on the part of the government, the Qashqai Khans would bow before the Shah and guarantee to support him "one hundred per cent;" to have no further dealings with Mossadeq or his followers; and to leave Iran if the Shah felt that their absence would benefit the country.
- 3. If the above proposal is not acceptable to the government, the Cashqai Khans state that they will welcome any other acceptable proposal under which they could bow before the Shah without violating their word to Mossadeq, whom they hold in the greatest respect. Once they considered that their pledge to Mossadeq was fulfilled, they would be ready to assure to the Shah and Zahedi the same degree of loyalty.
- 4. On a conference concerning the above proposals, the Cashqais (including the chieftains and the minor leaders of all eighteen Cashqai sub-tribes and one Boir Ahmad unit) stated:

SECRET

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

APPROVED FOR RELEASE□: 06-21-2011

- A. Previously (except under the Mossadeq government) they had been delegated to the role of second-class citizens and were subject to the "control" of Army groups which had despised and insulted them, molested their women, and stole their goods.
- B. Under Mossadeq, their welfare had been "considered" and there had been no trouble in the Qashqai area.
- C. In the past their enemies had saddled them with an unwarranted reputation for double-dealing. The Cashqais had given their word to Mossadeq twenty-eight months ago and considered themselves bound to their promise.
- D. They had not caused any trouble since Mossadeq's downfall. However, they believe that a "bolt to Zahedi's bandwagon" would cheapen them and would tend to confirm the accusations of their enemies.
- 5. Nasr Khan, paramount Qashqai chieftain, expressed confidence in the commanding general at the Shiraz Carrison and, in order to relieve local anxiety regarding tribal concentration, stated that the Qashqai groups were on their southward migration in spite of the obvious shortage of forage.
  - A. On 24 September hordes of Cashqai tribesmen and flocks were jamming thirty-mile mountain trails, moving southward toward their winter quarters.
  - B. The following remark was made by a close friend of the Qashqai Khans:
    "The wound is fresh now. Give them (the Qashqai Khans) three months and this will heal itself."

Carried Labor