

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

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ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT.

Title and Nature: Book, "Japan's Decision to Fight"
(ATIS Doc. #131)

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Has it been translated? Yes No

Has it been photostated? Yes No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL (also WITNESS if applicable)

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SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: ATIS (SCAP)

PERSONS IMPLICATED:

CLASSIFICATION: Restricted.

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE: Planning and preparation for war of aggression.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS (with page references):

Covers:

General plans for war, (including orders to detachments); further preparations; military publications of significance; conclusions; and illustrations. Some discussion of the 2 Sept 1941 War Games, and other preparations.

/A.N. Prepared from captured Jap Documents, an annotated diary of Japan's preparations for war, 10 Oct-7 Dec 1941./

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Page one

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Allied Translator and Interpreter Section
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

RESEARCH REPORT

No. 131

Date. 1 Dec. 45

JAPAN'S DECISION TO FIGHT - page 7

(e) Policy toward the SOVIET UNION.

The strength of SOVIET forces on the SOVIET-MANCHUKUOAN border is formidable.

The UNION OF SOCIALISTIC SOVIET REPUBLICS is maintaining a vigilant alert, awaiting developments. However, if the Empire does not attack the SOVIET UNION, it is believed that the SOVIET UNION will not commence hostilities.

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

SOUTH WEST PACIFIC AREA

RESEARCH REPORT

SUBJECT: Japan's Decision to Fight

DATE OF ISSUE:

NO. 131

SUMMARY:

1. This report attempts tentatively to establish the date upon which the Imperial JAPANESE Government positively committed itself to the launching of attacks on AMERICAN, BRITISH and DUTCH possessions in the PACIFIC Area. In the formulation of this decision several stages are identifiable. During the preliminary stages, with which this report is only incidentally concerned, the JAPANESE military authorities took certain steps indicative of the probable imminence of war. These did not, however, commit JAPANESE forces to positive action on any particular date. During the final stage operation orders were issued, land and naval striking forces were mobilized and transported to assembly areas, and strikes were launched. It is the date of initiation of this final stage which this report attempts to establish.
2. Pertinent evidence presently available is far from complete or definitive. Any conclusions arrived at in this report must, therefore, be regarded as tentative and subject to modification in the light of further evidence. It is believed, however, that certain broad outlines have herein been established, and that, in the light of these it may be claimed that the Imperial JAPANESE Government positively committed itself to war before 1 November 1941.
3. It is not the purpose of this report to convey a detailed picture of the mounting and execution of the several attacks launched by JAPANESE forces between 8-10

Sidney F. Mashbir
Colonel, S.C.
Co-ordinator

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December 1941. Such accounts will be given in subsequent reports.

4. All evidence adduced in this report is derived from JAPANESE sources.

5. Except where the contrary is specifically stated, dates and times used in this report are East Longitude Time.

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SECTION I. CHRONOLOGY OF JAPANESE MILITARY PREPARATIONS,
JANUARY 1941 - 8 DECEMBER 1941

1. INTRODUCTION

a. General

Japanese preparations for the "War for Greater East ASIA" far antedate the actual outbreak of hostilities on 8 December 1941. Available references documenting these preparations are as yet fragmentary, especially in respect to specialized training operations in tropical warfare reputed to have taken place throughout the summer and fall of 1941. As the date of the opening of hostilities is approached, however, pertinent references grow more plentiful, until for the month of November 1941 it is possible to piece together a fairly comprehensive picture of Japanese military preparations. The main aspects of these preparations which have been established to date (December 1944) are as follows:

(1) Pre-War Reconnaissance of KOTA BHARU.- As early as January 1941, the Yoko Air Expeditionary Unit made a preliminary aerial survey of precisely that section of the Northeast Malayan Coast at KOTA BHARU where the Japanese invasion force landed on 8 December 1941. By July 1941, the Hydrographic Office had carried out the necessary supplemental mapping of this same area. Upon the basis of the combined data from these surveys, the Naval General Staff issued in October 1941 a detailed map of KOTA BHARU and vicinity, scale 1:28,000. This map is elaborately annotated with navigational instructions, bathymetric data and the results of coastal reconnaissance. The position of pill boxes, wire entanglements and air field installations is also recorded. (See paragraph 2, below)

(2) Specialized Training Programs.- Their official unit reports refer to the periods 27 July - 7 December 1941, 12 October - 14 November 1941 and 10 October - 8 December 1941 as having been devoted to preparation for the PHILIPPINE Operations, the MALAYAN Operations and for the landing operations which were to accompany the Greater East Asia War. Units receiving this training were stationed in MANCHURIA, the vicinity of SHANGHAI and at PALAU, respectively.

(3) The Overall Plan.- During August 1941 an extraordinary number of war games were held by the Japanese Navy. From 2-13 September 1941 the final war game convened at the Naval War College in TOKYO, participated in by a large number of top-ranking naval officers. The problems set were twofold: first, the working out of the details of a naval air strike at PEARL HARBOR; secondly, the establishment of a schedule of operations for the occupation of MALAYA, BURMA, THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, the PHILIPPINE Islands and the SOLOMON and CENTRAL PACIFIC ISLANDS (including HAWAII). The outline of conditions under which these problems were to be worked out constituted the essence of the forthcoming order specifying the actual attacks. By 1 November 1941 the final text of Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1 had been agreed upon and printing was begun. The order, together with its annexes, detailed the plans and schedules for attacks on Pearl Harbor and various other British, American and Dutch possessions. This order was to become effective on Y-Day. War was to be declared on X-Day. Combined Fleet Secret Operation Orders Nos. 2 and 3 designated these as 23 November and 8 December 1941 respectively. (See Paragraph 7 below for details of overall plan).

(4) "Just Read This and the War is Won."- By 10 November 1941, copies of a pamphlet entitled, "Just Read This and the War is Won", had been received by 55 Division Infantry Group. The text is clearly premonitory of the imminence of war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS. (See excerpts therefrom in Paragraph 9 below.) Copies of this were issued to each Japanese soldier before embarkation for overseas. The date of publication of this pamphlet is not definitely known, but its length and the nature of the contents are such as to indicate original preparation at a date considerably prior to 10 November.

(5) Organization of South Seas Detachment.- The significantly named South Seas Detachment was already organized, on paper at least

by 15 November 1941. It comprised the force which took GUAM on 10 December and later moved on to RABAUL and NEW GUINEA.

(6) "Message to Warriors in the South Seas." - On 15 November, the commander of the South Seas Detachment, Major-General HORII, Tomitaro, issued a "Message to Warriors in the South Seas," addressed to all personnel serving under his command. This message forecasts with great explicitness the coming of war. No date of outbreak is mentioned, but the tenor of the communication is that of a commander to his troops on the eve of battle. (See text reproduced in Paragraph 10 below).

(7) Mounting of Attack on GUAM. - Certain elements of the newly formed South Seas Detachment were being routed to a staging area in JAPAN as early as 14 November 1941. A part of 47 Anti-aircraft Battalion, for example, left its station in MANCHURIA and was transported to the port of SAKAIDE in Northern SHIKOKU, via FUSAN and UJINA. A major portion of the South Seas Detachment appears to have rendezvoused there. On 22, 23 and 24 November, various units embarked and departed for the OGASAWARA (BONIN) Islands. The transports arrived at their destination on 27 November 1941, some touching briefly at CHIGHIJIMA en route to HAHAJIMA. At HAHAJIMA the troops rested, and trained. On 4 December, the convoy sailed to carry out the attack on GUAM.

(8) Operation Order Specifying Attack on GUAM. - On 29 November 1941 at 1500 hours, First Lieutenant SAKIGAWA, Commanding Officer of 2 Company, 55 Transport Regiment, issued SAKI Operation Order No. 2. This read in part, "The Detachment will attack GUAM Island."

(9) Mounting of Attack on PEARL HARBOR. - The mounting of the attack on PEARL HARBOR has been reconstructed from one official map and the testimony of four prisoners of war who participated in the operation. The latter accounts reveal slight discrepancies as to dates but the following schedule appears to be substantially accurate: The aircraft carrier KAGA left SASEBO on or about 15 November 1941 for a rendezvous with other members of the task force at TANKAN (HITOKAPPU) Bay on the island of ETOROFU in the KURILES. It arrived there on or about 23 November. 18 Destroyer Division left YOKOSUKA on 15 November, and arrived at TANKAN on 21 November. The aircraft carrier SHOKAKU sailed from OITA on 20 November and arrived at TANKAN on or about 25 November. The date of departure from JAPAN of the other ships comprising the task force is not known, but between 22 and 25 November a force comprising two battleships, the KIRISHIMA and the HIEI; six aircraft carriers, the KAGA, SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU, AKAGI, HIRYU and SORYU; heavy cruisers TONE and CHIKUMA and the light cruiser ABUKUMA; 18 Destroyer Division consisting of the FUCHIKA, KASUMI, ARARE and YOEN, and 16 Destroyer Division, of 4 ships including the OBORO, KAGERO, and SHIRANUHI; assembled in HITOKAPPU Bay. On 26 or 27 November, the task force sailed. Three "I" class submarines joined it outside the harbor. The task force sailed east to about 178° west longitude and then altered course southeast toward HAWAII. Planes were launched about 0100-0200 hours, 8 December, TOKYO Time.

(10) Mounting of Attack on BRITISH MALAYA. - The mounting of the attack on BRITISH MALAYA has been partially reconstructed from official documents and diaries deriving from 41 Infantry Regiment, 106 Land Duty Company, Sasebo 5 Special Naval Landing Party and 77 Flying Regiment, elements of all of which participated in the operation. The following account is believed to be substantially accurate:

On 17 November 1941, 41 Infantry Regiment, which had been stationed in the vicinity of SHANGHAI since at least early October, training for the MALAYAN Operations, (See Paragraph 6 below), held a review and ceremony in honor of their "departure for the field." On 18 November, elements of the regiment left SHANGHAI on the RYUJO MARU for the assembly point at SAMA on the southern shore of HAINAN Island. The diary of one member contained the following entry under date of 18 November: "...orders have finally arrived. The time has finally come for us to display activity. Are we going to be at war with A, B and D?" On 21 November, the RYUJO MARU was anchored at TAKAO. Its date of arrival at SAMA is not known, but other parts of 41 Infantry Regiment had reached HAIKOW in Northern HAINAN by 20 November. On the

same date further elements of 41 Infantry Regiment embarked on the AOBAYAMA MARU and on 21 - 22 November sailed from WOOSUNG for SAMA. Part of 106 Land Duty Company left SAIGON on the TOKOKAWA MARU on 23 November and arrived at SAMA on 25 November. On 25 November also, elements of Sasebo 5 Special Naval Landing Party, while en route to PALAU, were ordered to change course and head for SAMA. A second section of 106 Land Duty Company embarked on the TAIKAI MARU at SAIGON on 27 November and arrived at HAINAN on 1 December. On 3 December, 2 Squadron of 77 Flying Regiment was ordered to cooperate with 70 Airfield Company in the air defense of SAMA. By 4 December, the assembly was complete. On 4-5 December, the convoy sailed for MALAYA.

(11) Mounting of Attack on PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. - Available evidence concerning the mounting of the attack on the PHILIPPINE Islands is meagre. It has been established, however, that the TANAKA Detachment embarked at TAKAO in FORMOSA between 23 and 25 November 1941. On 26 November, TANAKA Detachment came under the direct control of Lieutenant General HOMMA, Masaharu, Commanding General of 14 Army and in Command of PHILIPPINE Operations. Between 25 November and 7 December, TANAKA Detachment left TAKAO for the naval port of MAKU in the PESCADORES. They remained there until 7 December when, at 1700 hours, they departed for the attack on APARRI in Northern Luzon.

(12) Official Speeches Foreshadowing War. - On 16 November and 26 November respectively, the Commanders of the Heavy Cruiser KAKO and the Light Cruiser KATORI addressed their crews in terms clearly indicative of the imminence of war. (See Paragraphs 11 and 15b below). On the latter date also, Vice-Admiral MINAGUMO, Tadaichi informed some of the personnel of the task force assembled at TANKAN Bay that they were to attack PEARL HARBOR.

(13) Knowledge of Imminence of War Displayed by Individuals. - Various individuals displayed advance knowledge or suspicion of the imminence of war. It is not certain in some cases whether this was based on information derived from reliable official sources or from rumor and popular gossip. Nevertheless, as early as October 1941, the rumor was current at TRUK that war would break out with the United States between 25 December 1941 and 1 February 1942. On 18 November, a member of 41 Infantry Regiment commented on the probable imminence of war with "A, B and D." On 26 November, a member of 44 Infantry Regiment, South Seas Detachment, wrote, "Our battle zone will be GUAM Island." Two other members of the South Seas Detachment displayed similar knowledge of impending hostilities, on 29 November.

Between 2 - 7 December, knowledge of the scheduled outbreak of hostilities on 8 December became quite general among members of striking forces. On 2 December, the Captain of the Aircraft Carrier KAGA announced to the crew that war would commence on 8 December. On 4 December, Major General HORII, Tomitaro, Commanding General of the South Seas Detachment, issued a formal statement to the effect that Imperial JAPAN had, on 2 December 1941, decided to declare war on the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, and the NETHERLANDS (See Paragraphs 18b, 20a and 22a below). Thereafter knowledge of their objective appears widespread among members of the South Seas Detachment. Evidence of similarly widespread knowledge among the forces assembled at SAMA for the MALAYAN Operation is more scanty, but there appears to have been some awareness of their goal.

(14) Air Defense Precautions. - On 1 and 3 December, orders for the air defense of KEELUNG and SAMA respectively were issued by 48 Field Antiaircraft Battalion and 77 Flying Regiment. These clearly anticipated the possibility of enemy air attacks.

(b) Organization of Material

The evidence upon which the foregoing summary is based is set forth in full in the following paragraphs. References have been arranged chronologically in accordance with the date of the most significant entry contained in the diary or other captured document under examination.

In order further to clarify the sequence of JAPANESE military preparations, a table setting forth a day by day breakdown of significant activities for the period 10 October - 7 December 1941 has been included as Appendix A.

2. JANUARY 1941

A translation of an annotated map of KOTA BHARU and Vicinity, entitled "Aerial Military Map of East Coast of BRITISH MALAYA, Section 1,"

and showing data pertinent to landing operations in this area is reproduced as Figure 1. (Figure 1 will be found in pocket of rear cover). KOTA BHARU was the site of the initial Japanese landing in BRITISH MALAYA. This particular map was produced by the Naval General Staff in October 1941. It is notable, however, that the aerial photography upon which the map is based was carried out during January 1941, while additional mapping by the Hydrographic Office was completed in July 1941.

Figure 1. Translation of Japanese Map of KOTA BHARU and Vicinity issued in October 1941.

3. 27 JULY 1941

An extract from 4 Air Army Ordnance Order No. 12, dated 26 March 1944 reads as follows:

"Death certificate and service record of Sergeant GOTO, Takeo:
Unit - 25 Water Purification Unit
Year of conscription - 1939....
Service: 27 July 1941 to 7 December 1941 - Manchurian Border Defense and preparation for the PHILIPPINE Operations."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 1060, page 10)

4. OCTOBER 1941

Prisoner of War FUSEI, Iwataro (JA 145118), a civilian laborer in naval employ present at TRUK throughout October 1941, stated that:

"When he was at TRUK in October 1941 there were rumors that a war with the UNITED STATES would start about 25 December 1941 at the earliest and 1 February 1942 at the latest. When he returned to JAPAN in November 1941 rumors of war were far less current than at TRUK."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 97, page 4)

5. 10 OCTOBER 1941

A "Report on Conditions" issued by Lieutenant Colonel RYUTO, Commanding Officer of 42 Anchorage Group, dated 15 June 1942, states that:

"Record of General Situation since Mobilization.

"The mobilization order was issued on 12 September 1941. Organization from the HIROSHIMA Western District No. 2 Force was completed by 17 September. We left UJINA on 29 September, sailing to OSAKA where 40 Sea Duty Company was attached to us. We left OSAKA on 1 October and reached our destination at PALAU on 10 October where we established an anchorage headquarters. Then we made preparations for the landing operations which were to accompany the War for Greater East ASIA."

(SOPAC Translations, Serial No 01479, Item No. 655, page 1)

6. 12 OCTOBER 1941

Personal history register of Leading Private KASHINO, Hisazo of 41 Infantry Regiment contains the following entries:

"10 October 1941 - Left NINGPO

11 October - Landed at SHANGHAI

12 October to 14 November - Prepared for MALAYAN Operations in the vicinity of SHANGHAI.

22 November - Left WOOSUNG, SHANGHAI

8 December - Landed at SINGORA, THAILAND."

(ATIS Current Translations No. 64, pages 16-17)

7. 1 NOVEMBER 1941

"When Japanese planes struck clustered United States warships and aircraft at PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941, the enemy was carrying into effect pinpointed plans conceived months in advance and long cloaked in secrecy. Until recently, little has been known of the planning stage prior to the sneak raid on HAWAII.

"The first concrete intimations of early enemy intentions are revealed in the interrogation of a Japanese Chief Yeoman who worked

closely with top-ranking Japanese Navy personnel during critical months in mid-1941. The prisoner, who was captured on SAIPAN, had access to highly confidential documents as well as behind-the-scenes rumors while plans for PEARL HARBOR were being perfected.

"The prisoner appears both exceptionally intelligent and cooperative. Testimony capable of confirmation from other sources checked closely. Tactical information proved reliable.

"Most remarkable of the prisoner of war's assets is his memory of details, as indicated in his reconstruction of the historic Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1, of 1 November 1941. This document, reproduced entirely by memory, is believed to be fairly accurately transcribed, and will be printed in full later in this article.

"As a yeoman attached to the Staff of Commander in Chief Combined Fleet (Admiral YAMAMOTO), the prisoner became familiar with JAPANESE war games. Staffs of the various Japanese Fleets worked these out on a large game board. Games were held frequently, sometimes as often as twice a month.

"Prior to late August (1941), war games were held at such anchorages as SUKUMO, SAIKI, KAGOSHIMA, and KANOYA. Close attention was devoted to current experimental data, which was incorporated in tactics employed. Although the prisoner insists that enemy countries were not specifically designated during these games, the identity of possible Japanese foes could scarcely have been obscure.

"During this period, the prisoner added, there was a constant interchange of personnel between Commander in Chief Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff. Men on these staffs were reportedly "definitely much keener" than members of other fleet staffs.

"Final planning stages were presaged late in August, when Commander in Chief Combined Fleet ordered all fleet commanders and their key staff members to TOKYO for further war games. Offices at the Naval General Staff at Japan's Capital were found inadequate, and the games were thereafter held in the Naval War College. The prisoner of war claimed that security measures at the War College were woefully inadequate. Classes at the College continued as usual; "any man with a half-official air could easily have walked in".

"On 2 September, the final all-important "games" got under-way, with an introductory speech to all officers taking part. Rooms were assigned to the "N" Team, the "A" Team, and the "E" Team (NIPPON, AMERICA, and ENGLAND) and to the umpires. The teams, composed of virtually every top-notch Japanese naval officer, were made up as follows:

<u>"UMPIRES;</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>OFFICIAL DUTIES</u>
<u>NAVAL GENERAL STAFF:</u>		
NAGANO, Osami	Admiral	
FUKUTOME, Shigeru	Rear Admiral	Head of First Section (War Plans and Operations).
UOZUMI, Jisaku	Captain	Member First Section
YAMAMOTO, Chikao	Captain	Head of Sub-Section, First Section
MAYUZUMI, Harue	Commander	Member Sub-Section, First Section
TAMURA, Saburo	Commander	Member Sub-Section, First Section
SANAGI, Tsuyoshi	Commander	Member Sub-Section, First Section
UOZUMI, Yoriichi	Commander	Member Sub-Section, First Section

<u>NAVY MINISTRY:</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>OFFICIAL DUTIES</u>
TAKATA, Toshitane	Captain	Member of Military Affairs Bureau
SHIKI, Tsunoo	Commander	Member of Military Affairs Bureau
TOIBATA, Kurie	Commander	Member of Office of Military Supply
FUJII, Shigeru	Commander	Private Secretary to Navy Minister (Admiral SHIMADA, Shigetaro).
<u>N-TEAM:</u>		
<u>COMBINED FLEET:</u>		
YAMAMOTO, Isoroku	Admiral	Commander in Chief Combined Fleet
ITO, Seiehi	Rear Admiral	Chief of Staff
KUROJIMA, Kameto	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff
GOTO, Shigeru	Commander	Staff Adjutant
ISOBE, Taro	Commander	Staff Engineering Officer
SUGI, Toma	Commander	Staff Gunnery Officer
SASAKI, Akira	Commander	Staff Air Officer
WADA, Yushiro	Commander	Staff Communication Officer
NAGATA, Shigeru	Commander	Staff Navigation Officer
WATANABE, Yasuji	Commander	Staff Operations and Plans Officers
ARIMA, Takayasu	Commander	Staff Torpedo Officer
SEIMI, Ichiyoshi	Commander	Staff Supply Officer
OTA, Kanai	Commander	Meteorologist attached to Staff
<u>FIRST COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (RADIO INTELLIGENCE):</u>		
KAKIMOTO, Gonichiro	Rear Admiral	Commander
ARISAWA, Naosada	Commander	Deputy Chief of Staff
<u>E-TEAM:</u>		
<u>SECOND FLEET:</u>		
KONDO, Nobutake	Admiral	Commander
YANAGIZAWA, Kuranosuke	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff
OISHI, Tamotsu	Commander	Staff Navigation Officer
<u>FOURTH FLEET:</u>		
INOUE, Semi	Vice Admiral	Commander
<u>FIFTH FLEET:</u>		
HOSAGAYA, Boshiro	Vice Admiral	Commander
<u>ELEVENTH AIR FLEET:</u>		
TSUKAHARA, Nishizo	Vice Admiral	Commander
KUSAKA, Jinichi	Rear Admiral	Chief of Staff
<u>A-TEAM:</u>		
<u>THIRD FLEET (amphibious forces for southern invasions):</u>		
TAKAHASHI, Ibo	Vice Admiral	Commander
ISHIHARA, Hajime	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff
<u>SIXTH FLEET:</u>		
SHIMIZU, Mitsumi	Vice Admiral	Commander
KANOAKA, Tomojiro	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff
<u>FIRST AIR FLEET (Carrier Fleet):</u>		
MAGUMO, Chuichi	Vice Admiral	Commander
KUSAKA, Ryunosuke	Rear Admiral	Chief of Staff
GENDA, Minoru	Commander	Deputy Chief of Staff

"On 3 September, officers involved studied classified material. Prisoner of war was assigned to "N" Team (Commander in Chief Combined Fleet). That afternoon, Commander WATANABE - Admiral YAMAMOTO's hard-working, fact-finding Plans and Operations Officer - handed the prisoner of war an outline of conditions under which the games were to be held, and requested fifty copies. These terms, which set forth a working basis for the games, contained the heart of the forthcoming

1 November Operation Order No. 1. Extensive preliminary planning was indicated. The prisoner believed that these plans must have been under development for several months. This was the first time that the prisoner of war realized that something of unusual significance was in the air.

"On 5 September, the prisoner of war was attached directly to Commander SABAHI, Commander in Chief Combined Fleet's Staff Air Officer. When he entered the smoke-filled room at about 1000, he found PEARL HARBOR plans under discussion. The Japanese apparently expected to catch all major United States Fleet units in the Pacific in PEARL HARBOR as well as units believed recently transferred from the Atlantic. The prisoner was surprised to overhear that "N" Team expected to lose one-third of the units participating in the attack on HAWAII: one AKAGI Class Aircraft Carrier and one SORU Class Aircraft Carrier were estimated as sunk.

"On 6 and 7 September, the conference of "N" Team debated the best means of assaulting PEARL HARBOR. (The prisoner of war, who was adept at the abacus - calculating board - was often used during these sessions to estimate fuel used by fleet units at varying speeds). It was during this stage of planning that Captain KUROJIMA (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral ITO (Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on HAWAII. The cool and precise ITO was (surprisingly) in favor of an early landing, and YAMAMOTO was inclined to agree, but the intuitive, temperamental KUROJIMA won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistics problems. The prisoner of war believes that ITO's plan was a last-minute, improvised idea, and that - when KUROJIMA's argument succeeded - the basic plan continued as originally intended.

"These early sessions, the prisoner of war said, seemed confined primarily to two general problems: first, the details for a successful surprise raid on PEARL HARBOR; and second, a carefully worked-out schedule for occupying MALAYA, BURMA, DUTCH EAST INDIES, THE PHILIPPINES, the SOLOMONS, and Central Pacific Islands - including (ultimately) HAWAII. Neither AUSTRALIA nor NEW ZEALAND was apparently considered as immediate military objectives; the Japanese intended simply to cut them off from outside help. The prisoner of war heard INDIA mentioned only once, when some senior officer remarked "that's where friction with GERMANY will begin".

"The conferences (and "games") were ended about 13 September. The prisoner helped carry the notes to KURE, and thence by launch to the NAGATO, YAMAMOTO's Flagship, which was anchored at Hashirajima. About half of the staff were already on board.

"On 15 September, all the staff with four yeomen (not including prisoner of war) journeyed to the IWAKUNI Air Group to confer with the Army. The prisoner of war remembers TERAUCHI mentioned, but cannot recall other names. He insists, however, that TOJO - then still War Minister - was not present. It was widely rumored (but never confirmed by other evidence) that the Army conferees at this meeting had not previously learned of plans to attack PEARL HARBOR.

"The NAGATO remained at Hashirajima for about six more days. At the end of September, the main body of the Japanese Fleet moved to SAEKI. There were four revisions of Combined Fleet Operation Order No. 1 while the Flagship was at SAEKI, though no major changes were made.

"On 1 November, the final printing of the order was started, requiring almost three days to complete. Two copies were sent to the Army. Staff officers of other fleet units at SAEKI called for copies in person. In all, 300 copies were distributed. Operation Orders No. 2 and No. 3, designating Y-Day and X-Day, were issued on 5 and 10 November, respectively.

"(Comment: The enemy naturally uses East Longitude Time in his Operation Order - i. e., the date of 8 December for the PEARL HARBOR attack is correct ELT.)

"The prisoner of war once knew the Operation Order intimately. Over a period of weeks, he has labored to reproduce on paper as much of the Order as he could remember. This version is obviously incom-

plete and not to be compared with the original document, but in main outline is believed to be substantially as printed. Notes in parentheses were added by the editor.

"Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI BAY
1 November 1941

'COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

'The Japanese Empire will declare war on the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS.

'War will be declared on X-Day.

'This order will become effective on Y-Day.

GENERAL SITUATION:

'(a) Policy toward the UNITED STATES.

'In spite of the fact that the Empire has always maintained a friendly attitude toward the UNITED STATES, the UNITED STATES has interfered in all the measures which we have taken in self-protection for the preservation of our interests in EAST ASIA. Recently, she has blocked our speedy settlement of the CHINA Incident by aiding the government of CHIANG KAI-SHEK and has even resorted to the final outrage of breaking off economic relations. While senselessly prolonging Japanese-American negotiations, she has continued to strengthen her military preparations. She offers a threat to us in the form of a concentration of her Fleet in the PACIFIC OCEAN, thus attempting to exert on us both economic and military pressure.

'Policy toward GREAT BRITAIN.

'BRITAIN is aiding the government of CHIANG KAI-SHEK and, acting in concert with her Allies and the UNITED STATES, in interfering with our program of construction in EAST ASIA. Recently she has been steadily building up the defenses of her bases in EAST ASIA in an attempt to threaten us.

'(c) Policy toward the NETHERLANDS INDIES.

'Although economic negotiations of a peaceful nature have been underway with us for a number of months, the NETHERLANDS INDIES has been led by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES to reject flatly the continuance of mutually beneficial economic relations. Recently she has threatened the fortunes of JAPAN which have been built up as a result of persevering work through long years.

'(d) The ports and the vast fertile regions of the coast of CHINA have been occupied by us and most of her great cities captured. CHINA, however, supported by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, has not yet awakened from the deluding dream of "Fight the war and Save the Country" and is attempting total resistance to JAPAN in the form of a "scorched earth" policy for all CHINA.

'While organized resistance is gradually becoming weaker, the prevalence of guerilla warfare has obliged us to commit large numbers of troops to permanent garrison duty there. If we are to secure decisive victory, BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, the powers behind CHINA, must be destroyed.

'(e) Policy toward the SOVIET UNION.

'The strength of SOVIET forces on the SOVIET-MANCHUKUOAN Border is formidable.

'The UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS is maintaining a vigilant alert, awaiting developments. However, if the Empire does not attack the SOVIET UNION, it is believed that the SOVIET UNION will not commence hostilities.

'OUR SITUATION:

'The Fourth Fleet has largely completed preparation in the Mandated Islands, as has 11 Air Fleet (Naval Shorebased Air) at essential bases in CHINA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND. The state of repair of our ships and planes is generally excellent and the efficiency of their personnel has markedly improved.

1 This mention of the completion of preparations by Japanese Units at essential bases in THAILAND prior to 1 November 1941 raises interesting questions as to the nature of Japanese-Thai relations at this time.

'STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES:

'To drive BRITAIN and AMERICA from Greater EAST ASIA, and to hasten the settlement of the CHINA Incident. In addition, it is expected that when BRITAIN and AMERICA have been driven from the NETHERLANDS INDIES and the PHILIPPINES, an independent self-supporting economic entity may be firmly established. The vast and far-reaching fundamental principle, the spiritual guide of our nation, (the "Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof - HAKKO ICHIU), may be demonstrated to the world. To this end we will use all the military strength necessary.

'STRATEGY:

'The strategy to be adopted against BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and the NETHERLANDS will be as directed in the Annexed Volume. X-Day and Y-Day will be announced later.

'If before Y-Day the enemy is believed to have been able to ascertain our plans, the execution of X-Day will be made the subject of a special order.

'If before X-Day we should be attacked by the enemy, his attack will be crushed with all available strength. All commanding officers will act in conformance with "Strategy to be Adopted in the Case of an Enemy Attack".

'In the case of the SOVIET UNION, every effort will be made to avoid provoking hostilities. At the same time, every effort will be made to insure the secrecy of our plans. If the enemy should ascertain our plans, military operations will immediately be begun in accordance with "Measures to be Taken in the Case of an Attack by the SOVIET UNION".

'Circulation of this order is limited to Fleet and Force Commanders. These Commanders will take every possible measure to prevent leakage of these plans prior to their being carried out.

'Precaution: Disposal of this Order:

This Order must be burned when no longer of use. If there is any danger of its falling into enemy hands as the result of a ship sinking or some other untoward occurrence, the responsible Commander shall personally make immediate disposal of it.

'Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1

'ANNEXED VOLUME

'1. Joint Army-Navy operations will be carried out in accordance with the "Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement".

'2. A Striking Force (Carrier Task Force), having 1 Air Fleet (Carriers and Escorts) as its main element, will depart its naval bases or operating areas about X-16 day and will set course, by way of TANKAN BAY (HITOKAPPU BAY, ETOROFU Island, KURILES) for PEARL HARBOR, the base of the American Pacific Fleet, where it will deliver a surprise attack. X-Day is expected to be during the early or middle part of December.

'3. Targets for attack are airfields; aircraft carriers, battleships, cruisers and other warships; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land installations, in that order.

'4. From the time set by the Force Commander for the Striking Force to leave port in JAPAN, strict radio silence will be observed. Communications will be via ordinary broadcast system. The code book to be used will be "(not certain)". The following communications abbreviations will be in effect:

"Many warships in PEARL HARBOR". - "The fate of the Empire".

"No warships in PEARL HARBOR". - "The cherry-blossoms are in all their glory".

"The weather is clear and visibility good in the region. Suitable for an attack". - "Climb Mount FUJI".

"The time to commence the attack is 0520". - "The depth of the moat of HONNOJI Temple is 0520".

"All forces attack". - "Climb Mount NIITAKAI".

etc.

'5. The course and the disposition of the attacking units will be determined by the Striking Force Commander.

'The Commander of the Striking Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he determines the course and disposition of the attacking units. Care must be taken to avoid ordinary merchant shipping routes and to keep the plans from disclosure under any circumstances whatever.

'6. Procedure to be followed in case of discovery before the attack either by a ship of the nation against which war is to be declared, or by a ship of a neutral nation (including the SOVIET UNION):

'(a) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a nation against which war is to be declared, make immediate preparation to attack and sink it.

'(b) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a neutral nation, the ship should immediately be detained until it can do us no actual harm; strict surveillance should be kept of its radio transmission. In case it should make any transmissions which might prove harmful to us or give us reason to fear that our plans might be revealed, the ship will be seized by a destroyer which will make immediate attack preparations.

'(c) In case of discovery by a foreign ship more than 600 miles from the objective, the ship will be detained and radio transmission forbidden. However, if it seems highly probable that our general intentions have been guessed, an attack should be made immediately, if between X-5 Day and X-Day. If before X-5 Day, the Striking Force Commander will decide the disposition of the ship, depending on the circumstances. In the case of detention of an enemy ship, "B" method will be followed.

'7. The The Commander of the Surprise Attack Force (Submarine Force), having 6 Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will have most of the submarines leave the western part of the INLAND SEA on X-20 Day to attack PEARL HARBOR. Its entire strength will be disposed so as to command the harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escaped from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance before the attack, and if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after the flights of planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered.

'8. Joint Army-Navy operations should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Central Headquarters Agreement. The disposition of forces will be determined by the Commander of the Advance Force (principally Second Fleet Cruisers and destroyers). The Commander of the Advance Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he decides on the course and disposition of the attacking units.

'The point of departure for the ships of the Malay and French Indo-China Forces will be BAKO and the point of departure for the Philippines Occupation Force will probably be PALAU.

'9. The capture of English and American troops and ships in CHINA will be arranged by the Commander-in-Chief of the China Area Fleet. The occupation of HONG KONG will conform to the provisions of the Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement and is the responsibility of the Commander, 2 China Expeditionary Fleet.

'10. English and American merchant ships which are in ports under Japanese sovereignty at the time of the outbreak of the war or which are in ports which may be taken are to be captured if possible.

'Soviet shipping is to be kept under surveillance after undergoing a rigid inspection.

'It should be so planned that none of our shipping will be in foreign ports when the war breaks out.

¹The prisoner is in error on this point. The forces for the invasion of MALAYA departed from HAINAN, while a sizeable portion of the Philippine Expeditionary Force embarked at MAKU.

'11. Beginning on Y-Day the Commander of 1 Combined Communication Unit will send false messages to give the impression that the main strength of the fleet is in the western part of the INLAND Sea.

'After Y-Day has been determined, the Japan Steamship Company passenger vessel TATSUTA MARU, which is scheduled to proceed to the west coast of AMERICA, will sail; arrangements will be made to have her return while en route. (This was done, and Allied passengers were interned; the same procedure would have been followed with any trans-Pacific liner scheduled to sail in this period).

'When Y-Day has been determined, the Commandant of the Yokosuka Naval District will allow as many men of his command as possible to go ashore so that the number of men on liberty in TOKYO and YOKOHAMA will give a false impression. (Another prisoner of war confirms this).

'12. The Commander in Chief of 4 Fleet (Mandates Fleet) will expedite the attack and occupation of British, American and Dutch bases in the North and South Pacific, acting in close cooperation with forces of 11 Air Fleet in the South Pacific. Enemy air power within our sphere of operations will be checked and communication between AUSTRALIA and the mainland of the UNITED STATES will finally be cut.

'It is expected that in this manner AUSTRALIA will be isolated and dominated completely. The natural resources of all kinds which the vast continent of AUSTRALIA boasts will then fall to us. (The dates for execution of assault and occupation of various British, United States, Netherlands bases were then listed in this paragraph - a few of which follow:)

(1) GUAM - about X plus 2.
(2) WAKE - about X plus 7.
(3) (The dates for the invasions of RABAU and the islands from the SOLOMONS to the FIJIS, SAMOA, and SANTA CRUZ groups were all entered.)

'13. The date for the seizure of MIDWAY is set as late Spring of 1942. The date for the occupation of the HAWAIIAN Islands is scheduled for October 1942.'

'Herewith are two of the above referenced documents:

"THE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.

'The object of Imperial Headquarters, Army Department and Imperial Headquarters, Navy Department in setting forth clearly the division of duties and command in joint operations was to promote a maximum display of efficiency. (According to prisoner of war, it was issued at the end of October 1941. A resume of the contents follows:)

'1. The highest ranking Army officer for SUMATRA, BORNEO, the MALAY Peninsula, CELEBES, and the PHILIPPINES (including FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND) will be Field Marshal TERAUCHI, Hisaichi. His command will be called the Southern Army and its headquarters will be in SAIGON.

'2. Plans for escorting large Army convoys and the place, time and date for landings.

'3. Agreements on Aerial Warfare Agreements on the places to be attacked by both Army and Navy planes and on the places, dates and times of attacks by Army or Navy planes acting independently. Agreements on the airfields to be used, such as "XX Airfield will be used primarily by the Army and secondarily by the Navy."

'4. Supply plans.

'Plans for the supply of Army landing forces to be effected by Army shipping and for the Navy's support of same.

'5. Communications Plans.

'6. Agreement on occupied territories, cities, and resources such as "The BANDJERMASIN Oil Refinery will be controlled by the Navy."

"MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A SOVIET ATTACK

(Prisoner of war does not remember the date exactly, but it was the end of October - and stated in effect:)

'It is believed likely that we shall not be attacked by the SOVIET UNION unless we attack first, but in case JAPAN is attacked first, 5 Fleet (Northern Force) will counterattack with all its strength and maintain local supremacy.

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku
Commanding, Combined Fleet "

"Flagship AKAGI, SAEKI Bay
10 November 1941

'STRIKING FORCE OPERATION ORDER NO. 1

- '1. All ships will complete battle preparations by 20 November.
- '2. The fleet will rendezvous at TANKAN Bay. (HITOKAPPU Bay, ETOROFU Island, KURILES).
- '3. Inasmuch as the plans for the coming operation must be kept absolutely secret, strict security will be maintained in regard to them, up to the time they are explained to the crew after port of departure in JAPAN has been cleared.
- '4. Break-down of attack plane units:
The AKAGI First Attack Plane Unit
Unit Commander: Lieutenant Commander XX
First Carrier Attack Unit
Etc. (details not recalled by prisoner of war).
- '5. Fleet Cruising formation
(Including retiring formations)
- '6. All transmission of messages is strictly forbidden.
Transmission and reception will both use the TOKYO No. 1 broadcast communications system.

Nagumo Guichi
Commanding
Striking Force"

"Verbal explanation by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet of ambiguities in Combined Fleet SECRET Operation Order No. 1. (Printed version of an explanation of details not covered in the order delivered to the High Commanders in an informal talk.):

'1. That the coming declaration of war against ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES will usher in a great war of survival with the two leading naval powers of the world.

(That this war is really one in which our existence is in question, one in which we have no choice but to strike with our military power.

'2. That our Navy, in engaging a worthy enemy, is about to realize an ambition which dates back to the foundation of the Imperial Navy many years ago.

'3. That the alliance with GERMANY was not desired by the Navy, but was a project favored by the Army which thought it would hold the SOVIET UNION in check. (!)

'4. That the campaigns in the NETHERLAND INDIES and in the PHILIPPINES will be preceded by the securing of advanced bases in THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA. It is believed that these operations will come off in extremely smooth order.

'The Navy will be able to secure sources of oil supply swiftly by means of these campaigns.

'5. In connection with the attack on PEARL HARBOR, reports indicate that a gigantic fleet, which includes the Atlantic Fleet, has massed in PEARL HARBOR.

'This Fleet will be utterly crushed with one blow at the very beginning of hostilities. It is planned to shift the balance of power and thereby confuse the enemy at the outset and deprive him of his fighting spirit.

'Our objective, however, lies more than three thousand miles away. In attacking this large fleet concentration it is to be expected that countless difficulties will be encountered in preserving the absolute security of the plans. If these plans should fail at any stage, our Navy will suffer the wretched fate of never being able to rise again. The success of our surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR will prove to be the "WATERLOO" of the war to follow. For this reason the Imperial Navy is massing the cream of its strength in ships and planes to assure success.

'All of the planes of Carrier Division 1, Carrier Division 2, and Carrier Division 5 will be concentrated in the attack on OAHU. If there are any ships which escape, almost the entire submarine

strength of 6 Fleet will be in command of the harbor mouth and will concentrate torpedo attacks on them. In addition to these, the destroyer strength of (Destroyer Squadron 1) will be deployed in a screen (mainly for night attacks) and the fast battleships of Battleship Division 3 deployed in a fourth echelon. If the main force of the enemy fleet should escape from PEARL HARBOR and make for the open sea, it will be waylaid by the main body of our fleet.

'6. The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. 6 Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor.

'7. It is clear that even if AMERICA's enormous heavy industry productive power is immediately converted to the manufacture of ships, planes and other war materials, it will take at least several months for her manpower to be mobilized against us. If we insure our strategic supremacy at the very outset of the conflict by attacking and seizing all key points at one blow while AMERICA is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operations in our favor.

'8. Heaven will bear witness to the righteousness of our struggle. It is hoped that every man will exert his full efforts toward the realization of the objectives of this holy way by determinedly carrying out our original purpose, in the full realization of the unparalleled opportunity which this war offers.'

"Communications Plans:

(Prisoner of war does not know about these; no details.)

"Supply Plans (outline):

The Naval bases of YOKOSUKA, KURE and SASEBO will be rear supply bases. BAKO, PALAU, TRUK and OMINATO will be forward supply bases. In addition to these, supply ships will be attached to each fleet.

"Combined Fleet SECRET Operation Order No. 2 "5 November
"Y-Day will be 23 November."

"Combined Fleet SECRET Operation Order No. 3. "10 November
"X-Day will be 8 December."

"During the actual attack on PEARL HARBOR, the prisoner remained aboard the NAGATO in the Empire with the Flag of Commander in Chief Combined Fleet. Details of the Carrier Commander in Chief Combined Fleet. Details of the Carrier Task Force which conducted the raid are known from other prisoners and from documents.

"The Task Force sortied from ETOROFU Island, in the KURILES, on or about 27 November (East Longitude Time), and headed eastward under a heavy front before turning south to the attack. The composition of the Force, which was commanded by the late Vice-Admiral NAGUMO (Commander in Chief 1 Air Fleet) is fairly well established. The enemy had six carriers: KAGA, AKAGI (Carrier Division 1) SORYU, HIRYU (Carrier Division 2) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (Carrier Division 5 less HOSHO); two battleships: HIYEI, KIRISHIMA (Battleships Division 3, less KONGO and HARUNA); three cruisers: TONE, CHIKUMA (Cruiser Division 8), plus ABUKUMA; elements of Destroyer Squadron 1; and about twenty submarines.

(Comment: It is of interest to note that all six carriers and both battleships participating are now identified as sunk, plus the Cruiser CHIKUMA; the majority of other units involved are also believed sunk or severely damaged, although definite identification is not yet possible).

"One of the Japanese' chief headaches during the sortie was the fueling problem. One well informed prisoner who was a Chief Petty Officer on fueling detail described emergency measures required to keep the speedy SORYU and HIRYU in fuel. These two ships were fueled daily, and drums carried as supercargo were unloaded by bucket-brigade when

the fast dash to the plane-launching point was begun. At that, the SORYU arrived back at KURE with only 95 tons of oil in her tanks. Oil tankers coming alongside the Task Force to fuel units had considerable trouble, and visibility was so bad that "towing spars" for position keeping were almost constantly in use.

CINCPAG-CINCPOA Weekly Intelligence, Vol. 1, No. 22, pp.1-14)

8. 4 NOVEMBER 1941

Diary belonging to unknown member of 41 Infantry Regiment contains the entries quoted below. 41 Infantry Regiment participated in the attack on MALAYA, which was mounted from the port of SAMA on HAINAN Island:

"12 October 1941 - Reached WOOSUNG Pier and returned to KIANGWAU Barracks.

"23 October - OKABE Force was assembled and heard an address from a newly appointed brigade commander, Major General KAWAMURA, Saburo. There will be a general inspection of the three battalions tomorrow.

4 November - Jungle combat training for expected type warfare.

13 November - Received rations and other necessary items for tropical combat (medicines, and clothing, etc).

"20 November - Anchored off-shore HAIKOW on HAINAN Island....

"2 December - Weighed anchor and sailed again for SAMA.

15 December - Assisted by our guns and tanks, our unit was the first to enter GUBUN Street. Captain OMORI, First Lieutenant NIKKI and Second Lieutenant TAKAHASHI were killed. First Lieutenants OKANO and YANAGIZAWA were wounded.

9. 10 NOVEMBER 1941

It is stated on the cover of the below-quoted pamphlet entitled, "Just Read This and the War is Won", that a copy is to be issued to each Japanese soldier before he embarks for overseas. The frontispiece consists of a map of SOUTH CHINA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA, THAILAND, BURMA, the FEDERATED MALAY States, the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, and a small section of the Northwest AUSTRALIAN Coast. The date of publication of the pamphlet is not definitely known. A captured copy, however, is stamped by 55 Division Infantry Group as having been received on 10 November 1941 (Elements of 55 Division figured prominently in the attack on GUAM and in the BURMA Campaign during December 1941.) Furthermore, its length and the nature of the contents are such as to indicate original preparation at a date considerably prior to this. Pertinent sections of this pamphlet are reproduced below:

"What sort of place is the southern field of operations?

"(1) It is the treasury of the Orient which has been invaded by the white men of ENGLAND, AMERICA, FRANCE and HOLLAND.

"(2) One hundred million Orientals are being oppressed by three hundred thousand white men.

"It amounts to this - these whites possess scores of Oriental slaves from the moment they are born. Is this the intention of God?

"(3) It is a source of world supply of oil, rubber, tin, etc.

"Rubber and tin are essential for military supplies and for these valuable resources the southern countries are the most plentiful in the East. The malevolence of ENGLAND and AMERICA, who have prevented JAPAN'S purchasing these materials by just means, is one of the reasons which necessitates the present military operations.

It is quite clear that the NETHERLAND EAST INDIES and FRENCH INDO-CHINA cannot oppose JAPAN alone, but with the support and threats of ENGLAND and AMERICA they are showing hostility to JAPAN. The lack of oil and iron is JAPAN'S weak point, but lack of rubber, tin and tungsten is the weakest point of AMERICA. AMERICA'S chief sources of supply of these is from the SOUTH SEAS and Southern CHINA. If these could be stopped, it not only would enable JAPAN to obtain the much-wanted oil and tin but it would stick a knife into AMERICA'S sorest spot. The essence of AMERICA'S opposition to JAPAN'S southward advance lies here.

"(4) It is a land of perpetual summer.

"Bananas and pineapples are plentiful all the year around; at the same time troublesome malaria-mosquitoes are everywhere. In the JAVA and SINGAPORE Areas motor roads have been developed everywhere, but there are many uncivilized places, jungles and swamps where neither man nor animals pass.

"Why must we fight and how must we fight?

"(1) By the Imperial will for the peace of the Orient.

"The MEIJI Restoration saved JAPAN from invasion by foreign powers. The SHOWA Restoration by complying with the Imperial Will for the peace of the Orient must rescue Asiatics from disputes amongst themselves and the invasion of the white race and return ASIA to the Asiatics. Peace in Asia will ensue and this will be followed by peace in the world being firmly established.

" JAPAN is given a great mission to save MANCHURIA from the designs of SOVIET RUSSIA, free CHINA from exploitation by the ENGLISH and AMERICANS, and then aid the independence of THAILAND, ANNAM and the PHILIPPINES, thus to bring about the happiness of the natives of the SOUTH SEAS and INDIA. This is the spirit of equality and brotherhood.

"(2) While destroying the enemy show compassion towards those without crime.

"Understanding this war as one between races, we must enforce our just demands on the Europeans, excluding Germans and Italians, without extenuation.

"(3) Is the enemy stronger than the Chinese Army?

"Comparing the enemy with the Chinese Army, since the officers are Europeans and non-commissioned officers for the greater part natives, the spiritual unity throughout the army is zero. It must be borne in mind that the number of airplanes, tanks and guns are far superior to those of the Chinese Army. However, not only are these of old types but their users are weak soldiers so they are not of much use. Consequently night attack is what the enemy fears most.

"(4) We must be prepared for the war to be a prolonged affair and proceed with every preparation for a drawn out conflict.

"What course will the war follow?

"Long voyage followed by landing operations.

"All fields of operations are in the SOUTH SEAS over a thousand miles from FORMOSA. Some places take a week to ten days to reach. This wide sea is crossed by convoys of several hundred warships and merchantmen. Looking back, our ancestors conquered this rough sea and carried on trade and fought with wooden sailing ships hundreds of years ago. After several days journey in the confines of ship-board, enemy resistance on the shores must be overcome and landings enforced.

"What to do aboard ship:

"The most important thing in landing operations is the maintenance of secrecy. If the enemy gets to know in advance where we plan to land, it will be very difficult.

"There are many instances where a simple thing written in a letter has been the cause of the defeat of a whole army, or where a word dropped over a glass of wine in a cafe just before departure has been the cause of secrets coming to the ears of spies.

"Remember how the 47 RONIN kept their secret through such trials until they had avenged their Lord; encourage one another and do likewise.

"There is a timely story of a soldier attached to a certain unit, who, landed in Southern China during the present incident, wrote a letter and dropped it in the sea, sealed in a bottle. The letter was carried by the tide to the coast of KOREA. Supposing the letter had reach VLADIVOSTOK - what would have been the consequence? Often a clue is caught by aircraft and submarines which are at sea to find out the movements of our transport ships. Care must be observed in the disposal of dirt and rubbish.

"Battle:

"(1) Squalls, mist and night are over all.

"EUROPEANS are dandies, and delicate and cowardly. Therefore, rain, mist and night attacks are the things they detest most. They consider night suitable only for dances but not for fighting - we must take advantage of this.

"(2) Unlike the Chinese soldiers, our present enemy may use gas. If you cast aside your gas mask because of the torment of wearing it in the heat, the consequence may be serious.

"Action in particular zones:

"Action in swamps and paddy-fields:

"FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND are, next to JAPAN, the chief rice-producing countries, and there are paddy-fields everywhere and large swamps here and there. When passing through these places, each soldier must use snow shoes (TN: made of straw and stick).

"The present war is a war with JAPAN's rise or fall at stake. What is at the bottom of AMERICA's action of gradually prohibiting the export of oil and iron to JAPAN, as if to strangle her slowly by "silk-wool"? If they stopped the export at once, JAPAN, in her desperation, might march into the south. If the export of the rubber and tin of the south, are checked by JAPAN, AMERICA'S own sufferings will be far greater than those of JAPAN, who is harrassed for want of oil and ore. It has been the policy of AMERICA up to now not to anger JAPAN, though weakening her.

"JAPAN has waited too long - if JAPAN is patient any longer our aircraft, warships and motor cars will not move. Five years have passed since the beginning of the CHINA Incident. Over 1000,000 comrades have exposed their bones on the continent. The arms of CHIANG KAI-SHEK, who killed these comrades, were sold mostly by ENGLAND and AMERICA. Both ENGLAND and AMERICA are prejudiced against the solidarity of the Oriental races as something that stands in the way of their making the Orient their permanent colonies and are concentrating every effort on letting JAPAN and CHINA fight. Our allies, GERMAN and ITALY, are continuing a battle of death in EUROPE against ENGLAND, AMERICA and SOVIET-RUSSIA. AMERICA is already assisting ENGLAND and is essentially participating in the war. For the existence of JAPAN herself and her obligation to the three-country alliance, not a minute longer must be endured. JAPAN is confronted with a great mission, bravely to put the last finishing blow as representatives of the Oriental race to their invasion of several hundred years. Our incomparable Navy is in full readiness and is infallible: 5, 5, 3 is the ration in figures but if spirit is added it is 5, 5, 7. Moreover, half of the BRITISH Navy has been smashed by GERMANY. For the Navy now is the best time. The Chungking Government's umbilical cord is joined to ENGLAND and AMERICA. Unless this cord is severed soon, the JAPAN-CHINA Incident will never be permanently settled. The total settlement of the holy war is the present war. The spirits of over a hundred thousand warriors are guarding us. The mass for the dead comrades is to win this war.

"Whilst showing our heartfelt thanks to the Navy, who, conquering thousands of miles of sea and removing enemy interception, are protecting us without sleep and rest, we must fully repay them for their trouble with good war results. We are privileged with an important and honourable mission to stand as representatives of the Asiatic race and to reverse the history of the world, succeeding our glorious history of 2,600 years and for the trust and reliance in us of His Majesty the Generalissimo. Both rank and file with one mind must exhibit the real value of JAPAN's sons at the full-dress display watched by the whole world. The completion of the SHOWA Restoration to free ASIA in realization of the Imperial Will, which is for peace in the East rests on our shoulders.

"Across the sea,
Corpses in the water;
Across the mountain
Corpses piling up on the field.
I die only for the sake of the Emperor,
I will never look back."

(ATIS Captured Document No. 7396)

10. 15 NOVEMBER 1944

a. The pamphlet entitled "Message to Warriors in the South Seas", was issued on 15 November 1941 above the signature of Major General HORII, Tomitaro, Commander of the South Seas Detachment which comprised the main force in the attack on GUAM. A complete translation of the document is set forth below. The blank boxes in the text occur in the original document. In some captured copies of this pamphlet, the possessors have written in the ideographs for AMERICA, GREAT

BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS

"RESTRICTED"
"A Guide for Warriors in
The South Seas"

"Headquarters of the South Seas Detachment

15 November 1941

HORII Force, Staff - Educational Pamphlet No. 1

Instructions regarding the attached; "Message for Warriors in the South Seas"

"To all units and militarized civilian personnel under my command;

"This pamphlet, together with the previously distributed "Collection of Imperial Rescripts", to which are annexed; "Field Service Instructions" and "Just Read This and the War is Won", is morale in the field.

15 November 1941

HORII, Tomitaro

Commanding General, South Seas Detachment

"Instructions given to the officers, men and civilian employees under His Majesty the Emperor and under my command, on the occasion of the formation of the South Seas Detachment and their departure for operations;

"In obedience to the orders of His Imperial Majesty, I now take command of your honoured unit as an independent force, and am about to undertake a vital duty. I cannot repress my deep emotion, and I feel keenly the gravity of my responsibility.

"I am convinced that the world situation surrounding EAST ASIA faces an unprecedented crisis, and the fate of the Empire hangs in the balance. I believe that all of you, habitually bearing in mind the Imperial Edicts, have obeyed the orders of your superiors, and have striven with all your might; however, at this time when your unit has been newly organized and is about to take the field you are to stress to yourselves these three great principles with fullest courage:-

"The strict observance of military discipline; the strengthening of esprit de corps; and the determination to fight to the death for certain victory. Whether you be under the higher commands or under the command of subordinate officers, whether you be officers or militarized civilian personnel, true to the spirit of loyalty, you are to have faith in, and assist, the combined action of the land and sea forces working together as one body; thus you shall do your utmost to utilize the results of your training to display the combined fighting strength of the Detachment.

"You will take care of yourselves, bear in mind my wishes, and upon the opening of hostilities determine to exalt still more the true worth of the Detachment, swiftly bringing the Holy War to a successful termination, and thereby carrying out the Sacred Imperial Desire.

"These are my instructions.

HORII, Tomitaro

Commanding General, South Seas Detachment

"Message to Warriors of the South Seas Detachment"

"15 November 1941;

"The purpose of the forthcoming campaign is to exalt to the world the virtues of His Imperial Majesty, the Marshal Commander in Chief, and to complete the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Our great mission is to shatter at one stroke the attempts of [] [] [] [] to obstruct the disposal of the CHINA affair, and the spreading of the Imperial Way far and wide in these territories. For us, the Imperial Forces, it would be inexcusable if, through a chance miscalculation or negligence, the Holy War ceased to be truly a holy war,

and the glory of the Imperial Throne were marred.

"Officers and men shall, needless to say, bear in mind the mission of the Imperial Forces, and while on active service shall regularly recite the Imperial Rescript issued to the military. The present message to soldiers in the South Seas is now given to the officers, men and militarized civilian personnel of our Detachment, upon whom rests a grave duty, as an exhortation regarding military discipline.

(1) "Do not wantonly kill or injure the civilian population: In battle, we must overwhelm and destroy the enemy with courage and determination. However, to kill or wound in the excitement of the moment those who have thrown down their arms and surrendered is not in accordance with the spirit of our BUSHIDO. In particular, the natives are those whom we must lead in the future in order to rebuild EAST ASIA. Wantonly to kill or injure unresisting natives is to mar the honor of the Imperial Forces, and is moreover an unworthy act, contrary to our mission. However, needless to say, you must not be deceived by the enemy through misplaced compassion. There should not be one single man among our warriors in the SOUTH SEAS who strays from the path of loyalty.

(2) "On no account are looting and outrages upon women permitted. Although such occurrences have been rare, it is deplorable that, having regard to the honor of the Imperial Forces, men in the flush of victory should wantonly break into houses, and destroy or loot property. In extreme cases, there have even been vicious men who have outraged women. Whether the victims be whites or natives, and whatever may be the cause, this is something which will on no account be permitted in the South Seas Detachment. Our Detachment shall go forward, strictly maintaining military discipline and respecting public morals in every way, and, bearing in mind the Emperor's desire that the Imperial favor be proclaimed far and wide, every soldier, tempering sternness with mercy, shall strive to make it manifest. Even the sullen population - the women - all must be inspired with the courtesy of our South Seas warriors.

(3) "Buildings and materials in enemy territory shall not be set afire without authority. Captured property often suffers from fires and other unexpected disasters. These occur mainly when the enemy is retreating, but cases are not unknown where they have been caused by the occupying forces, either through carelessness, or momentary excitement. Whatever the cause, not only do such actions cause suffering among the civilian population through shortage of materials, and make their eventual pacification difficult, but they seriously interfere with the billeting of our own troops. At all times, and places, fires are a social tragedy. Our South Seas soldiers will show their prowess by endeavoring to anticipate the enemy and prevent him from carrying out such destruction.

(4) "Be thorough in security and the prevention of espionage. That incautiousness is the greatest enemy is particularly true in safeguarding military secrets. Especially when we consider the coming operations, one word, or one action, can have enormous consequences for the whole of our forces. Spies are always near us, and in order to prevent espionage there is nothing better than: "See nothing, say nothing, hear nothing". A scrap of paper, a casual word of greeting, may have the gravest consequences. This time in particular, as already announced, not even a postcard will be permitted, not only during the course of our operations, but even prior to embarkation. Superiors must be strict in their surveillance, and subordinates must submit to them. They must not be misled by wild rumors. Thus, trusting and cautioning one another, the duty of our South Sea Warriors at this time is to be true to their country and their homes by safeguarding our secrets.

(5) "Take care of ammunition and materials - reduce your personal effects. Our detached Force will fight independently over a long period, and replenishments from the rear will be extremely difficult. One bullet or one bamboo stick can effect the fighting strength of the whole unit. Owing to the nature of the coming fight, deep thought must be given to the careful preservation and sparing use, not only of arms and ammunition but of all materials generally. On the other hand those who appropriate the souvenirs of a strange country and fail to bear in mind the spirit of the soldier who dies and does not return, not only reduce their fighting efficiency, but are liable to fail to distinguish between honest purchase and loot. Therefore the carrying of such articles is strictly forbidden.

"This warning and admonition is given so that our South Sea Warriors, who are sworn to loyalty and austerity, can still further exalt their martial spirit.

"All of the above is in accordance with the Imperial Rescript. In order that one and all may firmly uphold the moral principles, and display the dignity of the Empire to the world, we have especially given examples simple to understand, yet easy to violate, so that each may meditate and follow them. Units which thus maintain military discipline, always have success in war. You are all proceeding to the front, in the service of your country. However, if by any chance any one commits a fault or is examined for an offence, not only will he betray the hopes of his family and his community at home, darken their future, and reduce to naught the record of meritorious service he has built up, but his action will tarnish the honor of the forces in other areas, and affect adversely the completion of the Holy War. This would indeed be deplorable. Beloved South Sea Warriors, take this to heart!"

(ATIS Captured Document No. 89, pages 1-4)

b. The South Seas Detachment, referred to in Paragraph 10a above, was already organized under the command of Major General HORII, Tomitaro, by 15 November 1941. This specially organized and significantly named detachment constituted the force which attacked GUAM on 10 December 1941 and later moved on to RABAU and NEW GUINEA.
(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 41, pages 10)

11. 16 November 1941

The professional notebook of Ensign NAKAMURA, Toshio, contains the following passage:

"Address by Our Captain Upon The Occasion Of My Boarding Ship

"Delivered by Captain TAKAHASHI, Yuji (of the Heavy Cruiser KAKO) 16 November 1941.

"For three years you have studied your duties diligently. And now I believe that as you stand here, at the battle front, your emotions have been heightened as you sense impending action.

"When you reflect upon it, this is no training squadron; you have been assigned directly to the front. Officers in charge of your guidance and their assistants have been selected; but the fact of the matter is that each and every one of them has his battle station and shall not be able to devote his whole-hearted attention to your instruction. You appreciate, I am sure, the present situation, and will not depend on others too heavily. You must undertake your duties assertively, with a healthy spirit of initiative. Moreover, at this time special emphasis should be given to the caution 'Always be at your station!' It is extremely important that line officers always be on deck, they are able to master anything that comes along. In short, the present situation is certainly nearing its climax; indeed, it is in its most pregnant stage. I earnestly desire from you an uncommon amount of determination and effort."

(JICPOA Translations, Item No 4986, pages 1, 67)

12. 18 NOVEMBER 1941

Diary, belonging to Superior Private YAMASHITA of 3 Battalion, 41 Infantry Regiment, contains the following entry: "18 November 1941 - About 1530 hours left SHANGHAI which has so many memories for me and boarded RYUJO MARU at 1730 hours....with KIATING as the objective, the brigade has been deployed for maneuvers in order to exploit all the more its success as a mechanized force. We are keenly feeling the pressure of the situation and orders have eventually come. The time has finally come for us to display activity. Are we going to be at war with the three powers A, B and D(TN: Letters are written in English in the original). With a feeling of serious tension, I am aware that the most gratifying event since the beginning of Japanese history is the fact that we have now set out for the field. 21 November - Anchored in sight of TAKAO."

(ATIS Current Translations No 45, page 27)

13. 22 NOVEMBER 1941

a. Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shikedi (JA 100037), a third class seaman who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a member of the crew of the Aircraft Carrier KAGA, gave the following chronology for the operation. Upon reinterrogation this prisoner revised his estimates of time in the manner set forth in Paragraph 16b below. All times are Japan time.

"Assembly of Task Force:

"Task force assembled at TANKAN (indicated by prisoner as HITOKAPPU Bay), ETOROFU Island in the KURILES about the middle of November 1941 under the command of Vice-Admiral NAGUMO, Chuichi. The Aircraft Carrier KAGA left SASEBO on 7 November, proceeded south of KYUSHU up the east coast of JAPAN, and arrived at TANKAN on 15 November 1941. The Aircraft Carrier SORYU, three oilers and one supply ship arrived on 16 November. The Aircraft Carriers ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU arrived on 17 November. The Battleships HIEI and KIRISHIMA, the Aircraft Carriers, AKAGI and HIRYU, a heavy Cruiser (thought by prisoner to be of TONE Class) and two destroyers arrived at TANKAN before 20 November. Three "I" Class submarines joined the task force upon its departure from TANKAN

"Outward passage:

"Task force sailed at 1400 on 22 November 1941.....They proceeded east until 4 December, when course was altered to south. They did not zig-zag. Speed was thirteen knots. Japan time was kept throughout.... On 28 November, KAGA assumed Number 2 State of Readiness. Gun crews were closed up in two watches. Ships were darkened from now on.

"On 2 December, the Commanding Officer of the KAGA, Captain OKADA, Jisaku, addressed the ship's company. He announced that the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet had been summoned by the Emperor, who had informed him that war would be declared against AMERICA on 8 December. The KAGA was now proceeding toward HAWAII, and at 0100 on Saturday planes would take off to attack PEARL HARBOR....."

"Task force altered course to the south on 4 December"

(ATIS Interrogation Report Serial No 230, pages 2-7)

14. 23 NOVEMBER 1941

Partial translation of a file dated July - December 1941, entitled "No. 3 Situation of Both Sides Prior to the Outbreak of War," issuing authority unknown is set forth below. The section quoted is not dated, but it is apparent from internal evidence that it antedates 23 November 1941.

"IV. The TANAKA Detachment will start embarking at TAKAO between 23 and 25 November. The plan of embarkation is as shown on the attached sheet.

"As from 0 hours on 26 November, the detachment will come under the direct control of Lieutenant General HOMMA, Masaharu, Commander of 14 Army. The troops newly attached to the force will come under the command of TANAKA Detachment as of 0001 hours on 26 November.....

"Preparations having been finally completed, the convoy carrying TANAKA Detachment sailed at 1700 hours on the 7th from MAKO Anchorage in the PESCADORES under the direct guidance of escorts. Sailing through the Straits of FORMOSA in a rough sea, the officers and men were in high spirits. No enemy airplanes or submarines were encountered.

"During the evening a squall came up but the convoy sailed on. All were ready and anxious to meet the enemy."

(ATIS Current Translations No. 46, pages 2-3)

15. 26 NOVEMBER 1941

a. Prisoner of War KAWAKITA, Katsumi (JA(USA) 147987, who participated in the attack on PEARL HARBOR as a member of the crew of the Destroyer KASUMI wrote out the following account of the operation. His written account has been supplemented in respect to several details by additional interrogation: "Farewell, many memories of the home port. After leaving YOKOSUKA Harbour on the 15th of November our crack 18 Destroyer Division progressed directly towards HITOKAPPU (TANKAN) Bay in the KURILE Islands with the Destroyer FUCHIKA leading and followed consecutively by the KASUMI, ARARE, and the YOEN.

"In the early dawn of the 21st, we entered TANKAN Bay, our destination. Aircraft carriers, destroyers and other ships entered the bay the following day. This is where our Imperial Navy organized her greatest operation ~~on the morning of the 26th~~, the operational commanding officer, Vice-Admiral Nagumo, Chuichi, passed the brief order, 'Attack PEARL HARBOR'.

"Thus, we left our fatherland behind and advanced through the high waves of the PACIFIC. Our advance was led by the Destroyer OGORO consecutively followed by 16 Destroyer Division; the Light Cruiser, ABUKUMA; the Battleship HIEI; the Aircraft Carriers AKAGI, KAGA, ZUIKAKU, SHOKAKU, SORYU, and HIRYU; the Battleship KIRISHIMA; 8th Destroyer Division; 2 submarines; 1 heavy oil tanker, and the Heavy Cruisers TONE and CHIKUMA on both flanks.

"First the destroyers fired their ball ammunition, followed by the fire of the cruisers and then by that of the battleship, ending with the take-off and landing practice of the airplanes from the aircraft carriers at dusk. After 10 or more days of traveling through rough weather and sea in an easterly course on the Northern Pacific, we finally approached PEARL HARBOR, HAWAII.

"On the early dawn of December 8, we reached a point 400 kilometres off-shore of the HAWAIIAN Islands. As the sun rose the wide expanse of the sky cleared and the sea was calm. The weather was good as if planned for the great initial victory of YAMATO's Airplanes.

"As the battle flag rose on the mast of the Flagship AKAGI the carrier-borne planes left the decks one after another from each of the carriers and in a magnificent formation of approximately 300 airplanes disappeared in the direction of PEARL HARBOR. Immediately, reports of glorious successes came in.

"Again, the second attack unit made up of approximately 200 attack and fighter planes of the ship departed bravely to conquer.

".....another great and glorious victory. However, who would know of the remembrances of the holy sacrifices of the Imperial Army behind the glories. Approximately 15 of our planes and 5 special submarines failed to return. Only one enemy flying boat came to attack.

"Thus each ship turned back simultaneously. En route to our home port we passed MIDWAY and WAKE safely and sighted our islands on the night of the 20th.

"I can remember the natural tears which came to each one's eyes. It is the soul in that figure praying for the eternal welfare of the fatherland which he longs for that is the Japanese man.

"Thus to our home port on the 25th and then to the Kure Naval Depot."

(ATIS Interrogation Notes not previously published)

b. Address No 29 by the Commanding Officer of the Light Cruiser KATORI, attached to 6 Fleet, dated 26 November 1941 (Wednesday) at sea, and bound with a number of news reports and official communiques summarized by 00/61 Naval Intelligence Section, is set forth below. Part of the page was burnt. A complete translation of the remainder is given:

"Thirty-seven years ago, when a declaration of war between RUSSIA and JAPAN was inevitable, the Emperor MEIJI approached the RUSSIAN Government asking them to reconsider the declaration of war and to do everything possible to avoid the consequent calamity. We were extremely grateful for his benevolence.

"Recently when Ambassador KURUSU was ordered to the UNITED STATES - I do not know whether he was sent for the same purpose as in the above incident before the Russo-Japanese War or not - but at least I believe that he carried with him the Emperor's sincere hope that the evil of this war would be prevented. It is clearly known that this procedure is the tradition of our Empire.

"In spite of the Emperor's benevolence, however, the American statesmen are arrogant and think that they are the greatest people in the world, and nothing can shake their belief. I suppose, therefore, in spite of the attempt of Ambassadors NOMURA and KURUSU to prevent war, there is no hope of a peaceful settlement.

"Ultimately, there is no other way to determine the outcome than by using our own force. At this particular time, we of the KATORI, attached to 6 Fleet are about to take our place in the disposition of the fleet. Not only the submarine force, but also the air force and surface units are mobilizing. It will not be long before operations begin.

"I would like you to understand that when we put to sea the day before yesterday it was not for an ordinary voyage, but for something entirely different. At this time, I would like you to bear in mind that we have an opportunity which comes but once in a lifetime....."
(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 67, page 1)

c. Diary, presumably belonging to member of 44 Infantry Regiment, contains the following entries:

"17 November 1941 - Today we held review and ceremony for leaving for the field participated in by all personnel of the force....

"21 November - Advance party left in the morning. Unit commander in charge of military flags left about 1300.

"23 November - It rained during the morning and we departed in the rain. We left from ASAKURA Station at 1950. We arrived at SAKAIDE, about 0500....

"24 November - Departed SAKAIDE. MATSUE MARU left harbor at 1810.

"25 November - We left the Inland Sea facing east and headed southeast.....

"26 November - Our battle zone will be GUAM Island....In the morning I went on deck and saw transports to the left, right and rear. On anti-aircraft observation duty.

"28 November - Arrived at HAHAJIMA about 1650.....

"1 December - Held maneuvers during morning. Went on anti-aircraft observation duty. About 1500 ship (TN; or "ships") got under way. Roused at 2200 for landing operations. Roused again at 0100. About 0700 we returned to HAHAJIMA Harbor.....

"4 December - Gave BANZAI facing toward ASAMIYAZO and left the Harbor of HAHAJIMA. At 0930 we proceeded southeast to "X". We received an order announcing the declaration of war. We expected to land at "X" on the 10th....."

(ATIS Captured Document No. 98, pages 1-3).

16. 27 NOVEMBER 1941

a. Undated captured map reproduced as Figure 2, establishes the date of departure from ETOROFU of the task force which subsequently launched the attack on PEARL HARBOR as 27 November 1941. The authority responsible for the issuance of this map is not specified, but the source is obviously official.

Figure 2 - Translation of captured Japanese map showing courses of Japanese aircraft carriers during period November 1941 - April 1942.

(SOPAC Translations, Serial No. 01480, Item No. 643)

b. Prisoner of War YOKOTA, Shigeki (JA 100037), (the same prisoner who gave the information quoted in Paragraph 13a above), upon re-interrogation, revised his version of the time schedule kept by the task force during the PEARL HARBOR operation as follows:

"15 November 1941 - Aircraft Carrier KAGA left SASEBO. Proceeded south of KYUSHU and up the east coast of JAPAN.....

"22 November - The Battleships HIEI and KIRISHIMA and the Aircraft Carriers AKAGI and KIRYU arrived at TANKAN, ETOROFU Islands in the KURILES.

"23 November - Aircraft Carrier KAGA arrived at TANKAN.

"24 November - Aircraft Carrier SORYU arrived at TANKAN.

"25 November - Aircraft Carriers ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU arrived at TANKAN.

"27 November - Task force left TANKAN for HAWAIIAN Area. Three submarines joined it on leaving the harbor.

"28 November - KAGA assumed Number 2 State of Readiness and anti-aircraft lookouts were posted."

(ATIS Interrogation Report, Serial No. 268, page 8)

c. Prisoner of War FURUKAWA, Masayuki, stated that:

"He was aboard the Aircraft Carrier SHOKAKU, when it participated in the PEARL HARBOR Attack and gave the following account (all hours in TOKYO time):

"On 20 November 1941, the SHOKAKU sailed from OITA to an anchorage in the north called TANKAN (Prisoner not sure of location). It arrived about the 25th to find the Battleships KIRISHIMA and HARUNA, the Aircraft Carriers KAGA, AKAGI, HIRYU, SORYU, ZUIKAKU; two or three cruisers and several destroyers.

"On 27/28 November, the fleet sailed taking a northerly course south of the ALEUTIANS. On December 4, the Captain of the SHOKAKU informed the crew of the intended strike and prisoner says he was worried because he feared that an AMERICAN counter-attack would follow. On the night of 5 December, the ships turned south.

"General quarters came at 2300, 7 December and the planes took off at 0200, 8 December....."

(JICPOA Preliminary Interrogation Report No. 7, Serial ADM-101022, 10 January 1944, pages 5-6)

17. 28 NOVEMBER 1941

a. Diary of Second Class Seaman KAMIMURA, Tsuneya, contains the following entries:

"22 November 1941 - Went to YOKOHAMA in the afternoon. Was invited aboard the ARIMA MARU for supper.

"24 November - Sailed at 1400 hours. It is said that we are taking a direct route southward to TRUK. Outside the harbor we sighted the HIKAWA MARU.

"Particularly on this voyage an air of seriousness prevails which has been lacking on most occasions. Received 10 Yen through telegraphic remittance. I presume that we will not be receiving any pay for a substantial period.

"2 December - Left TRUK at 0900 hours for KWAJALEIN. We cruised, sharply on the lookout for mines. Today, is the fifth day of preparations and dispositions have been completed. It is rumoured that on the sixth day the Navy is to advance on a simultaneous general attack. Can it be a fact? Though I try to consider it calmly, my eyes and body reveal the state of excitement.

"7 December - In the morning, after inspection of our division was concluded, the ship's captain gave us an address and read the Imperial Message. We were instructed that action would commence on 0001 hours on the morning of the 8th. I was very excited on hearing that JAPAN would declare war on the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES. Comfort packets were distributed among us. Was mighty glad to receive them. At 1900 hours we separated from the special service ship. After anchoring I drank beer and got drunk."

(ATIS Current Translation No. 78, pages 1, 13 and 15.)

b. Personal history register of First Class Private YAMAKAWA, Tadatoshi, of 41 Infantry Regiment contains the entry quoted below. The original attack on MALAYA was mounted from SAMA.

"28 November 1941 - During assembly off SAMA Harbor on HAINAN, was transferred to a hospital ship from KYUSHU MARU.

"1 January 1942 - Overtook his own unit at KAMPAR, PERAK.
(ATIS Current Translations No 64, page 17)

18. 29 NOVEMBER 1941

a. SAKIGAWA Force (2 Company, 55 Transport Regiment) embarked on the CHINA MARU from 22-24 November 1941 at SAKAIDE. On 29 November 1941, aboard the CHINA MARU, First Lieutenant SAKIGAWA issued the following operation order:

"SAKI Operation Order No 2
SAKIGAWA Force Order
29 November, 1500 hours
CHINA MARU

"1. The detachment will attack GUAM Island (The name "GUAM" has been inserted in ink. At the time of mimeographing the order, the specific name of the island was left blank.)

"The enemy situation on GUAM is shown on the special sketch (sketch not attached to document.)

"The main strength (presumably of the South Seas Detachment) will capture the coastal base of PORT APRA, while a part of the strength seizes AGANA City.

"2. The main strength (presumably of the SAKIGAWA Force) of the force will land on the MADA (presumably MATA) Coast Sector, while another part of the force will land in the TOMITA Bay Area. They will accompany the detachment's landing and serve as supply and transport.

"3. 1 Platoon will land at TOMITA Bay and assist TSUKAMOTO Detachment's landing.

"4. Headquarters and 2 and 3 Platoons will assist KUSUNOSE Force's landing on the MADA Coast.

"5. Second Lieutenant ITO (plus one noncommissioned officer and three enlistedmen) will land with the second wave and will reconnoitre a landing area for the main strength of the company.

"6. I will land with the third wave, accompanied by the main strength of the company, and will prepare for our subsequent advance.

First Lieutenant SAKIGAWA
SAKIGAWA Force"

(ATIS Document No. 1541, page 2)

b. Diary, owner and unit unknown but presumably a member of the South Seas Detachment, contains the following entries;

"18 November 1941 - From 1000 hours infantry group held war exercises under Major General HORII, Tomitaro.

"24 November - Left MANUJAME at 0630 hours. Boarded MATSUE MARU at 1530 hours. Sailed at 1800 hours.

"28 November - 1650 hours stopped over at HAHAJIMA Island, OGASWARA Archipelago."

"29 November - Went ashore for communication. AMERICA has disguised herself till now. We are going to meet the enemy at GUAM Island with ever increasing spirit.

"3 December - Landed HAHAJIMA at 0230 hours to wash clothes. It seems that the Japanese-American talks will finally break down.

"4 December - Worshipped the Imperial Palace at 0830. Gave 3 BANZAIS! There was a speech. JAPAN-AMERICA, War! It looks as though the hardships we have borne until now will be rewarded! We have received life for SHOWA's reign. Men have no greater love than this. Convey to sail! 0900! Now, prosper, fatherland!

"4 December - South HAHAJIMA Island at 1422 hours. 'The empire had decided to go to war against AMERICA, BRITAIN and HOLLAND. The Southern District Army will quickly capture important regions in the PHILIPPINES, BRITISH MALAYA and the DUTCH INDIES after beginning attack on 8 December.

'For this purpose the first Japanese - American attack will be carried out.

'The South Seas Detachment will cooperate with 4 Fleet to capture GUAM. If there is no separate order, the landing will take place on 10 December.

'HORII Operation Order A, No. 17. Each unit will act according to Order A, No. 7 which has already been issued."

"8 December, 1100, war declared!"

(ATIS current Translation No. 64, page 1)

c. Diary, owner and unit unknown, but presumably a member of the South Seas Detachment, contains the entries set forth below; The entry of 29 November 1941 anticipates a Japanese landing north of TALOFORO Bay on GUAM. The MADA or MATA Coast referred to as a landing site for the SAKIGAWA Force in Paragraph 18a above is directly north of TALOFORO Bay.

"22 November 1941 - 0327 hours. Reached SAKAIDE. 1000 hours. Inspection tour of the CHERIBON MARU.

"23 November - 1700 hours. Left SAKAIDE.

"27 November - Sighted BONIN Islands. 0800 hours, reached HAHAJIMA Island.

"28 November - 0900 hours. Went to YOKOHAMA MARU for liaison.

"29 November - Training for boarding motor barges during the morning. It has been decided that battalion will land on the north side of TARO Bay (presumably TALOFORO Bay on GUAM).

"2 December - Anchorage point penetration training from 2000 hours.

"3 December - Battalion officers to meet on YOKOHAMA MARU from 0900 hours. Training in smoke flare and gas. Conference of company commanders decided to land at IRIYA Bay. Two first-class cruisers came to the anchorage point to escort us and we feel very safe.

"4 December - The convoy left at 0900 hours.

"6 December - Heard the Japanese news broadcast in the salon. Our mission is to attack UNITED STATES".

(ATIS Current Translations No. 52, page 31)

d. Diary belonging to IFUJI, a member of PALAU No. 3 Defense Unit, contains the following entries:

"29 November - War? All leave was cancelled and I heard that a huge army unit is out here somewhere. (Written at PALAU.)

"5 December - We received a written order from commanding officer of No. 3 Base to take up No.2 Guard Dispositions from today; it is really going to be a serious affair.

"6 December - It is said that American airplanes are reconnoitering our positions.

"8 December - Declared war on AMERICA and GREAT BRITAIN."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 527, page 8.)

19. 1 DECEMBER 1941

Firing plan issued by 48 Field Antiaircraft Battalion, on 1 December at KEELUNG Harbor in FORMOSA specifies that the following precautions will be taken:

"Battalion will cooperate with KEELUNG Army Air Defense Force against air attacks. All units will protect KEELUNG Anchorage by endeavoring to destroy enemy planes as far as possible outside the harbor..."

(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 11, pages 8, 10)

20. 2 DECEMBER 1941.

a. Diary, owner and unit unknown, contains the following entries:

"24 November 1941 - Embarked on DAIFUKU MARU (3,523 tons) of N.Y.K. Line at SAKAIDE.

"26 November - Destroyer UZUKI is escorting our convoy.

"2 December - Loaded horses at HAHAJIMA.

"4 December - Order of HORII, Tomitaro, South Seas Detachment, Commander;

"On 2 December Imperial JAPAN decided on war with GREAT BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, and HOLLAND. Imperial JAPAN will, on 8 December, carry out its first air-attack against the UNITED STATES. This detachment will, if there is no special order, land on GUAM."

(ATIS Current translations No. 23, page 4c.)

b. Diary of NISHIMURA, Haruichi, member of 1 Special Naval Landing Party, YOSHIMOTO Unit, contains the following entries:

"7 November 1941 - Conscripted.

"30 November - Boarded KIRISHIMA MARU at UJINA. Escorted by Destroyers Nos. 36 and 37. Headed for PALAU.

"2 December - Heard over radio that American fleet (5 ships) had left harbor. Heard that we are to land on the PHILIPPINE Islands after resting at PALAU.

"5 December - Arrived at PALAU.

"6 December - Enemy submarine sighted 5000 meters away.

"7 December - Relations between UNITED STATES and JAPAN are getting worse.

"8 December - War was declared at 8:00 A.M. KATSUDA MARU sunk."

(ATIS Bulletin No. 470, pages 15-16)

21. 3 DECEMBER 1941

Extract from 77 Flying Regiment Operation Order A-12, dated 3 December 1941 at SAMA Airfield, specifies the following precautionary measures:

"2 Squadron will cooperate with 70 Airfield Company and serve in the air defense of SAMA. Airplanes taking hostile actions will be shot down..."

(ATIS Document No. 15963)

22. 4 DECEMBER 1941

a. Diary belonging to HAMANO, Yonekichi, of South Seas Detachment contains the following entries:

"4 October 1941 - Called to serve in the Litter Company of the Western No. 32 Force for temporary duty at 1300. Later, waited at the Marugame Commercial School until 15 November. Moved to the Marugame Middle School.

"22 November - Embarked at SAKAIDE Harbor at 1300. Weighed anchor at night.

"23 November - Looked as if we dropped anchor and waited in SAKA Bay. Weighed anchor at night.

"27 November - Entered CHICHIJIMA Harbor of the OGASAWARA Archipelago.

"28 November - Left port in the morning and entered HAHAJIMA the same day. Waited at this port.

"4 December - Left HAHAJIMA with the object of capturing the American Island of GUAM. This same day our country decided to declare war on ENGLAND, the UNITED STATES, and FRANCE (sic) on 8 December.

"10 December - At 0200, our South Seas Detachment (waiting for this moment to bomb) received orders to make a landing. Bombing started on the 8th."

(ATIS Current Translations No. 48, page 34.)

b. File of reports, entitled "THAILAND Operations," belonging to 77 Flying Regiment, contains the following passage:

"4 - 7 December 1941 - Protection of 25 Army transport convoy and preparation for occupation of THAILAND."

(ATIS Bulletin No. 1518, pages 304.)

c. Diary belonging to MORIKAMI, Shigeo, of HORII Force (South Sea Detachment), TAKAMORI Unit, contains the following entries:

"22 November 1941 - Our departure for SAKAIDE leaving familiar ZENTSUNJI behind. About 1930 hours left SAKAIDE Harbor behind, bound in 00 direction.

"23 November - About 0500 hours our ship stopped. A mountain can be seen to the east, and a factory zone below it. My friends were saying that it was SENSUJI.

"27 November 1941 - We also put in at TSUCHIJIMA on OGASAWARA Island at 0100 hours. We again departed for HAHAJIMA at 1100 hours.

"28 November - Landed the horses at Oki Village Grammar School on HAHAJIMA.

"3 December - Sailing preparations.

"4 December - Will depart for GUAM Island, however, GUAM is called OMIYA SHIMA.

"5 December - Will depart at 1000 hours. We are cruising safely.

"6 December - Cruising safely. We will disembark in three days.

"8 December 1941 - Imperial Headquarters. War was declared against ENGLAND, and the UNITED STATES at 1230 hours. In the afternoon, I heard from Captain TAKAMORI that HAWAIIAN Islands are being bombed by our air force. The PHILIPPINES and HONG KONG are also being bombed. At 0800 hours of the 8th, our TAKAMORI Unit worshipped the Palace. We will finally begin landing from 1200 hours on the 9th. On the morning of the 8th, some islands could be faintly seen for the first time."

(ATIS Current Translations No. 49, page 34)

d. Diary of ONO, Shinsaburo, unit not specified, contains the following entries:

"22 November - Sailed from SAKA.

"24 November - Headed for TONAN after passing KISHU Harbor

"26 November - Landed at OGASAWARA Island.

"27 November - landed at OGASAWARA, HAHAJIMA and transported horses...

"2 December - Returned to VENICE MARU.

"4 December - 1000 hours. Departed for our destination, GUAM."

(ATIS Captured Document No. 82, page 1)

e. Diary belonging to TAKAHASHI, Yaichi of South Sea Detachment, Antiaircraft Unit, TAKAHASHI Platoon contains the following entries:

*14 November 1941 - We finally received orders to go to the front. On 28 July we had separated from the friendly 73 Force in KOREA and we were reorganized as 47 Antiaircraft B attalion. On 14 November at 0900, we carried out the last ceremony of farewell on the parade ground. When we were leaving for the front, Commander FUGHIYAMA gave instructions and read written oath addressed to the Imperial Palace. I have no reluctance in giving my life and being killed in action. We went up to the GOKU Shrine to pray for our ultimate victory. We received sacred SAKE from from god. Then we shouted "BANZAI" three times and dismissed.

*At 1900, we entrained. We were on a freight car. About 50 troops. All were waiting the time for leaving the friendly KAINEI....

*17 November - at 0600, we eventually arrived at FUSAN Station. We stayed in FUSAN City today.

*18 November - Today 180 Force is leaving. At 1300, the loading was finished. It was about two years since we were on a ship. The inside of the ship was the same as when we came on her. After a time I noticed that the ship was sailing.

*19 November - This is JAPAN. It was two years since I had seen JAPAN. UFINA, the ISO Unit was divided into two groups here, then we were all embarked on the big ships. I was in the TAKAHASHI Platoon. The ship was the MATSUE MARU.

*On the 23rd at 0600, we arrived at our destination, SAKAIDE. At 1730, we finally left. We did not know where we were going. On the 28th at 1630 hours, we caught sight of a big island northeast of the ship. Several ships which had come before us were at this island, HAHAJIMA. It was four days since we SAKAIDE....

*4 December - At 0930 hours, we eventually left the island. We immediately began to prepare for combat. Approaching enemy position. We were on board 18 days, and every day was the same routine. On 11 December at 0100 hours, we came, at last, face to face with enemy positions. We have a mission on GUAM Island." (ATIS Current Translations, No. 68, pages 33-34)

f. Diary, belonging to an unspecified member of 41 Infantry Regiment, contains the following entries:

*5 September 1941 - Attached to 1 Company, 41 Infantry Regiment. Instruction by battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel MORITA....

*20 November - Headed for WOOSUNG, aboard the AOBAYAMA MARU.

*21 November - Left WOOSUNG for SOUTH SEAS.

*24 November - Reached northernmost tip of HAINAN Island.

*4 December - Left SAMA. Convoy of 28 ships, escorted by the Navy, headed for SINGAPORE."

(ATIS Bulletin No. 183, page 12)

g. Diary and notebook belonging to MORITA, Yutaka, of 144 Infantry Regiment contains the following entries:

*21 November 1941 - 0140 hours. Arrived SAKAIDE Station in KAGAWA Prefecture. Boarded the transport MOKU MARU with No. 9 Company, one company of mountain artillery, 3 guns, 50 horses, cavalry, and a part of engineer unit.

*1 December - Afternoon. Prepared for landing. Held landing practice. Warships and transports started out of CHICHIJIMA at 1800 hours preparatory to departure.

*2 December - 0030 hours. Waited two hours with landing equipment but the motor boats were not ready and the landing was cancelled. The ships and transports returned to CHICHIJIMA, at 0600 hours. 1330 hours. Four warships, eight aeroplanes. Loaded some more horses on the ship again.

*4 December - 0930 hours. Warships and transports which were in readiness at HAHAJIMA Harbor sailed for their destination.

*5 December - Convoy sailed toward the South.

*10 December - Landed GUAM Island at 0400 hours."

(ATIS Current Translations No. 10, pages 17-19)

h. Diary belonging to Leading Private MATSUURA, Sagaei of 144 Infantry Regiment contains the following entries:

*29 September 1941 - Received induction orders.

*5 October - Entered service

*8 October - Completed mobilization.

*22 November - Embarked. Sailed in the evening. Arrived off OSAKA in the morning. We did not sail during the day. Set sail at night. Headed due south. We sailed southward till the morning of 27th. When I went up on deck in the morning, I saw a little island. It was one of the Bonin Islands.

*27 November - Reached CHICHI Island. Departed at 0900 hours the same day. Reached HAHAJIMA Island before noon and anchored. There are not many people living on this island. Ships come here one after another. The bay is filled with large ships. It seems as though there are about seven or eight men-of-war here too. At first there were names on the warships; UZUKI, YUZUKI, and KIKUZUKI etc., but the names were taken off. This transport ship had MI written on the smoke stack but it also has been removed. Horses were unloaded on HAHAJIMA Island. Horses and dogs romped around the hills. Those who had previously been here say that the women are not beautiful but they speak the Tokyo dialect. We fished to pass the time till the 4th December. In the meantime horses were loaded. I suppose we are again headed for hot places. We had mosquito nets and lunch boxes made for us.

*4 December - Today, we are really going to set out for our destination. We sailed around 10 o'clock. We started in the morning with a warship as escort. It was the KUROGAME. They were practically all carrying airplanes. As soon as we entered this harbor, two airplanes were started as if they had rehearsed going out on reconnaissance. There were many escort ships. As long as the Navy is present, there is nothing to be afraid of.

*6 December - Tomorrow, we are told, GUAM Island will be attacked and occupied. During the voyage all necessary preparation of arms, such as 150 rounds of ammunition, were in readiness. With these we can kill. It is heavy but I feel like taking more.

*10 December - At 0200, we will bid farewell to this boat. We got on this boat on the 21st and started to sail on the morning of the 10th. We lived on it for 20 days. At night we made various preparations for tomorrow's landing. I packed food for 3 meals in my haversack along with 150 rounds of ammunition. It is supposed to be packed as light as possible but it is very heavy. We landed on one portion of the island which was barely visible in the dark. We anticipated enemy fire but did not encounter any. We landed successfully without incident."

(ATIS Current Translations No. 62, pages 19-20)

i. Diary belonging to Second Lieutenant EBUCHI, Shigeru, of 144 Infantry Regiment contains the following entries:

*21 November 1941 -0800. Received orders at embarkation office. Inspected interior of MOJI MARU....

*22 November - Left for SAKAIDE Station to meet the unit. About 1900 hours departed from SAKAIDE.

*23 November - Entered OSAKA Harbor. Here prepared everything and finally got started for our destination. Received orders to take safety precautions.

*27 November - About 0800 hours. Reached HAHAJIMA. The transport ships assembled one after another. Drill on transferring from ships to boats.

*28 November - Continued unloading horses. Studied method of handling special equipment.

*29 November - Various training plans were worked out according to imaginary combat zone.

*2 December - Four cruisers entered port in the afternoon. On the whole the troops are in high spirits.

*3 December - Finished unloading horses yesterday. Ready to leave. Four cruisers and a mine-sweeper entered port.

*4 December - Departed from HAHAJIMA at 9:30.

*6 December - convoy sailed for GUAM, Captain AKASHI. Orders were issued to the section commanders.

*7 December - North of SAIPAN at 1300 hours we were overjoyed with good news by radio. The battles at HAWAII and the PHILIPPINES were successful. Our objective, GUAM, has been bombed.

(ATIS Current Translations No. 12, page 11)

j. Diary belonging to IMOTO, Gumpei, of French Indo-China Expeditionary Force, 106 Land Duty Company contains the following entries:

*1 November 1941 - Reached SAIGON at 0600 hours

*27 November - Left SAIGON at about 1400 hours

*28 November - En route

*29 November - En route

*30 November - En route TAIKAI MARU

*1 December - Safely arrived in the morning at HAINAN Island

*2 December - Still anchored at HAINAN

*3 December - Remained aboard TAIKAI MARU until 1600 hours and transhipped to KASHII MARU. Stayed aboard that night.

*4 December - Departed at 0600 hours for our destination.

*7 December - Reach SINGORA safely at 2400 hours.

*8 December - At 0300 hours, made preparations for opposed landing. Around 0600 hours an opposed landing was made. Took the enemy completely by surprise."

(ATIS Current Translations No. 57, page 8)

k. Diary, belonging to IMASHIRO, Tsuruma, of 144 Infantry Regiment, contains the following entries:

*7 October 1941 - Inducted into Western 34 Force.

*23 November - Left SAKAIDE on CHERIBON MARU.

*27 November - Arrived HAHAJIMA in OGASAWARA Islands.

*4 December - Left HAHAJIMA.

*10 December - Occupied GUAM by opposed landing."

(ATIS Current Translations No 48, page 16)

l. Diary, belonging to KOSHIMOTO, Shosaburo, unit unknown, contains the following entries:

*23 November 1941 - At 0200 left camp. At 1300 hours on the 23rd, we boarded the CHERIBON MARU. After 1400, departed from our SAKAIDE Harbor and went southward. There was nothing but sea. Lived three days on board and on the morning of the fourth day, saw an island. This was our dear HAHAJIMA. At this island, we landed with men and horses. During a week's stay, we cultivated our energy. On December 4th, we boarded ship again leaving this island behind. Once more it became a ship life for me. As we went south, it gradually became warmer.

*9 December - at 2000 hours at last the time has arrived to carry out our duty.

*10 December - 0200 commenced landing. Due to certain circumstances of the ship, it was about 1100 when we landed."

(ATIS Captured Document No. 87, page 1)

m. Diary belonging to SATO, Ghitoshi, of South Seas Detachment contains the following entries:

*14 November 1941 - Departed for FUSAN.

*15 November - Travelling south by train.

*16 November - Still on train.

*17 November - Approached KEIJO.

*18 November - Loaded guns on ship and sailed from FUSAN Harbour.

*20 November - Entered MOJI Harbour at 0700 hours, loaded coal at UJINA Harbour, was separated from battery commander and Second Lieutenant TAKAHASI. Loaded guns on MATSUE.

*22 November - Left UJINA Harbour for SAKAIDE. Went through Inland Sea.

*23 November - Left SAKAIDE in the evening.

with naval escort.

"8 December - Made opposed landing at SINGORA, THAILAND."
(ATIS Current Translations No. 57, page 31)

b. Diary, owner and unit unknown, contains the following entries:

"24 November 1941 - Arrived at HAIKOW, HAINAN Island.

"27 November - Left HAIKOW

"30 November - Arrived at HUMEN.

"2 December - Left HUMEN

"4 December - Arrived SAMA Harbor

"5 December - Sailed from the harbor at 0400 hours for operations.

"8 December - Arrived at SINGORA, MALAY Peninsula at 0140 hours."

(ATIS Bulletin No. 747, page 6)

24. 6 DECEMBER 1941

Diary, owner unknown, contains the following entry:

"6 December 1941 - Aboard DAIFUKU MARU. MIYAJI Platoon (3 Platoon) Orders for landing attack on GUAM;

"1. Condition of enemy and terrain at the landing site has already been pointed out. This company is to be the first in line on the left of the battalion."

(ATIS Captured Document No. 99, page 1)

25. 7 DECEMBER 1941

Diary belonging to MIYAKE, Yoshitaka, of Sasebo 5 Special Naval Landing Party contains the following entries:

"24 November 1941 - Left for PALAU at 1000 hours..

"25 November - At 2000 hours we were ordered to change our course and go directly to SAMA, HAINAN Island.

"4 December - Arrived SAMA Harbor at 0800 hours. Departed on the 7th for CAMRANH Bay. Captain spoke on the declaration of war with ENGLAND, the UNITED STATES and the NETHERLANDS. The entire crew rejoiced. At last the day of revenge has arrived.

"9 December - Arrived CAMRANH Bay."

(ATIS Current Translations No. 57, page 21)

SECTION II. FURTHER PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

26. TRAINING PROGRAMS

a. Extract from article entitled, "Biography of the late Admiral YAMAYA, Tahin" by Captain HIROSE, Hikota, appearing in the "Battle Front Library," an official Navy Ministry publication dated 1 November 1943, reads as follows:

"In June 1918, he became Commander in Chief of the 2 Fleet. In January 1919, he was promoted to the rank of Admiral and became Commander in Chief of 1 Fleet. Later he was appointed Commander in Chief of Combined Fleet, and immediately instituted a rigorous program of secret training for the war against the UNITED STATES."

(ATIS Current Translations No. 114, pages 1, 3)

b. "Japanese Land Operations" (Campaign Study No. 3), a publication issued by the Military Intelligence Service, United States War Department and based entirely on Japanese sources gives the following account of JAPAN's preparations for war:

"The units and commanders designated for the various tasks in the war for which they were preparing were selected months in advance, and were concentrated in special training areas where the terrain and climatic conditions approximate those in the regions where they were to fight. The Malayan Army trained in HAINAN and INDO-CHINA, the Philippine Force in FORMOSA and both units practiced landing operations during the late summer and fall of 1941 along the SOUTH CHINA Coast. Even the divisions chosen to attack HONG KONG were given rigorous training in night fighting and in storming pill boxes in the hills near CANTON....

"Japanese commentators made no secret of the fact that the High Command was fully informed for a year before the war as to the strength, disposition and likely plans for defense of their then potential enemies....

"Task forces" organized during the summer of 1941 trained and worked together continuously (i.e. Joint Army - Navy forces) until the outbreak of hostilities....

"The troops used in their operation (at VIGAN on LUZON) as well as those used in the subsequent landing at LINGAYEN, had been carrying out landing operations all summer along the CHINA Coast, from CANTON to the INDO-CHINA Border. Little if any military advantage resulted from those operations, and it would now appear that they had been intended solely for training....

"Japanese accounts give only a hint of their years of painstaking surveying and espionage work throughout the KRA Isthmus and the MALAY Peninsula, but they are quite frank in describing preparations made during the summer and fall of 1941. These included negotiations with THAILAND for the landing of troops on the KRA Isthmus, for the use of the BANGKOK - SINGAPORE Railroad, and for arrangements to cache supplies for the use of the Expeditionary Force.

"The troops assigned to make the initial landings were selected officers and men, drawn from units which had long service in CHINA, and organized into two divisions especially equipped for the work they had to do. All of the troops which were to be used in the campaign had been given exhaustive training during the fall in selected areas of INDO-CHINA and HAINAN Island, where the terrain approximated that over which they were to fight. When these units landed in MALAYA, far from being unused to the climate and the country, as the BRITISH expected them to be, they were trained and seasoned jungle fighters, the equal of any troops with whom they were to come into contact. The divisions which made the landings had spent the month of September in executing landing operations on the South China Coast, in conjunction with units which were practicing for similar tasks in the PHILIPPINES.

"As the time appointed for the attack grew near the troops were withdrawn from their training areas and assembled on HAINAN Island,

where large forces could be concentrated in complete security far from the eyes of spying 'foreigners'. Here they were completely reequipped with new guns, vehicles and other equipment of the latest type. A few weeks' training with the new material and the expedition was ready for its big test....

"Two divisions which had seen very little activity in the march down the peninsula, but which were composed of veteran soldiers of the CHINA Campaign who had received special training in river crossings in preparation for this very task of storming the Straits of JOHORE, were now brought up to relieve those divisions which had fought their way down the Peninsula." (Japanese Land Operations (Campaign Study No 3), pages 9, 21, 35, 45, 46).

c. Colonel YOKOYAMA, Yosuke, Commanding Officer, 15 Independent Engineer Regiment, in a report on that regiment dated 25 May 1942, made the statement quoted below. It is noteworthy that the training which they received is of precisely the type most essential to warfare in MALAYA and especially for the assault on SINGAPORE:

"As shown in summary of the war service record on a separate sheet, this unit was organized from the 4 Engineer Regiment in September 1938.

"From the end of last December the unit took part in the capture of MALAYA and SINGAPORE and the SUMATRA Operations.

"Although originally the function of this unit was that of an 'A' regiment, which is similar to that of divisional engineers, this unit was trained for about a year with special emphasis on attacking pill-boxes and operations with flatbottom boats with outboard motors attached. (These boats are used in river operation crossings). Thus all personnel can handle these boats. As an 'E' regiment they have become capable of making crossings of large rivers.

"They have received a citation and certificate of merit from the Army Commander for the engagement at PINYANG and also two citations for the MALAYA Operation and for making a crossing in the face of the enemy at SINGAPORE." (SOPAC Translation, Serial No. 0825, Item No. 519, pages 1, 2, 4).

d. "Navy Eagles over the PHILIPPINE Skies," a series of interviews by ADACHI, Kazuo, a reporter, with naval air personnel engaged in the PHILIPPINES Operations, quotes an unnamed Japanese pilot to the following effect:

"I think that I will not be able to ever forget the first excitement which I experienced on 8 December. As I watched that formation of troops advancing on MANILA and experienced that certain emotion, I was so glad that I was born a man that I could not hold back the tears because of the job I felt. We had gone through intensive training over a long period of time in preparation for this battle, and now we have dealt a spectacular blow. (ATIS Enemy Publications No. 6, page 23)

27. CONSTRUCTION OF BASES

Translation of a captured document entitled "Precautions in respect to Billeting and Supplies, based on the Special Characteristics of PALAU", dated 1 July 1942, issued by 35 Infantry Brigade Headquarters, reads as follows: "Essential Points:

"PALAU is the seat of the South Sea Island Government. Ever since it became a mandated territory as a result of the First World War, our government has anticipated what it would be today. It has been a place difficult to administer, and the Navy has steadily completed its equipment as an operational base.

Major General KAWAGUCHI
Brigade Commander."

(SOPAC Translations, Serial No. 01564, Item No. 673, page 20)

28. ECONOMIC PREPARATIONS

Extract from orders issued by Chief of Staff ISEKI Force, IMADA, Shintaro, to the Commanding Officer KONDO Force, KONDO, Shinhachi, dated 25 August 1941, reads as follows:

"Due to the present international situation and the increase in national military preparations, the importance of exploiting and utilizing the resources of this area must be considered. The accumulation of these military supplies will be subdivided into procurement by military authorities and purchases by civilian agencies. The items to be acquired by civilians are copper ore, copper wire scraps, copper scraps, brass scraps, cases, melted cases, tin, coin, pewter and antimony ore.

"Scrap iron in NORTH CHINA will be acquired by the Nippon Iron Industries Company. Other resources to be acquired are nickel, cobalt, tungsten ore, molybdenum ore, copper lead, zinc, quicksilver, steel and other minerals.

"An investigation squad organized by an army has reported the probable presence of iron, sulphur, fluorspar and zinc in the vicinity of YANCHENG and of iron in SUEHCHUANLING."

(ATIS Bulletin No. 1555, pages 29-30)

29. PREPARATION FOR MIDGET SUBMARINE RAID ON PEARL HARBOR

a. "Heroes of the Special Naval Attack Unit", an account of the submarine attack on PEARL HARBOR, dated 6 March 1942, written by Captain HIRAIDE, Hideo, Chief of Navy Information Department of Imperial General Headquarters, states that:

"At the time of the iconoclastic blow against outrageous AMERICA, who disregarded our great motive and mission of world peace, and even attempted the life of the Japanese Empire, we furiously struck the first blow at the heart of the enemy at the risk of our lives. With all reverence to the men of the Special Naval Attack Unit who lost their lives in this great accomplishment, I make this report. 'Imperial General Headquarters Communique (1500, 6 March):

'The glorious, incomparable, strong attack upon PEARL HARBOR by the Special Naval Attack Unit has already been officially publicized. The plans of attack which struck terror in the hearts of all nations throughout the world, were conceived and executed by Lieutenant IWASA and several other officers. The plans were conceived by these men out of their sense of patriotic and loyal duty, several months in advance, in case of such emergency, and were secretly submitted to the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets through their superior officers.

'After the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet had carefully studied these plans, he found that they would be successful and could be followed; so he accepted the fervent desires of the submitters...As a result of the preparatory training and manufacturing experiments, which were carried out night and day without sleep or rest within a short period of time, both by the tacticians and technicians, and even by the workers - while maintaining strict secrecy within the department - they were able to complete their work before the beginning of this battle...

'This attack as in the report, was conceived by Lieutenant IWASA and other officers. They elaborated a plan by themselves. Wishing to do their loyal and patriotic duty, these men planned this achievement which was regarded as humanly impossible. Thereafter, during a period of several months, these men secretly carried out difficult training, indescribable by mere words, in order that there might not be any chance errors...'

(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 6, pages 6-7)

b. Lecture No. 4, entitled "Sincerity", in a printed booklet published in October 1942 by 51 Division Headquarters, contains the following passage:

"Then too, recently in the CHINA Incident and in the Greater East Asia War, our native land may well be proud of having produced the war heroes - Captain Ifzuki on land and Commander IWASA on the sea. Of course, at the very beginning of the war, the daring exploit of Commander Iwasa, and of the nine heroes under his command at PEARL HARBOR, was a sublime achievement, the thought of which brings tears. When we consider the time secretly spent in preparation

for and anticipation of the deed itself, we feel that it is something inexpressibly magnificent. It is known that the special submarine undertaking was devised and executed by the nine heroes themselves. Although heroes, these men were not of wood or stone. Rather, I believe they were men possessed of superhuman enthusiasm and also of superhuman devotion. For their unswerving devotion during the months of bitter struggle when their minds were forever on their training, we are filled with the feeling of looking up at a model of loyalty which influences both gods and men."

(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 80, page 16)

SECTION III. PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE AND RECONNAISSANCE

30. GENERAL

a. A table entitled "Simplified Table Showing Changes in the Southern Situation since August 1941," issued by 20 Division Headquarters, is set forth as Figure 3. The table is not dated, but it is evident from internal evidence that the data was accumulated prior to the outbreak of war. Only those positions of the table containing information which appears to have been derived from confidential Japanese sources are reproduced. (ATIS Document No. 9003, not previously published.)

TAKE IN FIGURE 3

(Figure 3 is attached)

Figure 3. Excerpt from table showing changes in the southern situation since August 1941.

b. A sketch, issued by the Army Air Defense Unit and labelled, "Air Defense Intelligence Report No 1," showing dispositions and strengths of Allied Air Forces in South Sea Islands is reproduced as Figure 4. The sketch is dated 6 December 1941 but an annotation states that it was prepared "before the crisis."

(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 11, page 16)

TAKE IN FIGURE 4

(Figure 4 will be found on p. 16 of Enemy Publications No. 11. Reduce to page size, and, when possible, eliminate the Romaji.)

Figure 4. Translation of sketch showing dispositions and strengths of Allied air forces in South Sea Islands.

31. PRE-WAR SUBMARINE RECONNAISSANCE OF PEARL HARBOR

a. Captured book entitled "Characteristics of Submarines and Antisubmarine Operations", undated, issuing authority not specified, contains the following passage. A sketch which accompanies it, is reproduced as Figure 5:

"4. Reconnaissance and Scouting:

"Before the surprise attack on HAWAII, JAPAN's best submarines (about thirty of them) had been assigned to scouting and reconnaissance duty at PEARL HARBOR."

(ATIS Document No. 15807, not previously published.)

TAKE IN FIGURE 5

(Figure 5 is attached) (Check with original)

Figure 5. Translation of sketch showing Japanese submarine patrols in the vicinity of PEARL HARBOR prior to the surprise attack.

32. JAPANESE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

A file of handwritten sheets, dated July - December 1941, entitled "No 3 Situation of Both Sides Prior to the Outbreak of War," issuing authority not specified, reads in part as follows:

"The strength of the American Garrison Army in the PHILIPPINES was 12,000 (American about 5,500; native about 6,500). Because of the international situation, however, this number was increased by about 5,200 Americans and 6,000 natives, so that by July of this year, the total reached 22,000. The Filipino National Guard and patrol scouts were included under General MacArthur, the American Far Eastern Army Commander who was to undertake the united command of all troops in the PHILIPPINES.

"Status of the American Garrison Army:

"1. Philippine Division:

24 Infantry Brigade was not in operation in peace time, but its Headquarters was established at SANCHIMAGO about July 1941.

"2. 94 Tank Battalion (American) was newly organized at Fort STOTSENBERG.

"3. The strength of the Air Force has increased successively as follows:

Army

24 Pursuit Regiment	P-35
3 Pursuit Squadron	P-36
17 Pursuit Squadron	P-38
20 Pursuit Squadron	P-40
24 Pursuit Squadron	27 planes at NICHOLS Field above types included.

19 Bomber Regiment	
1 Pursuit Squadron	
14 Bomber Squadron	B-17 (12 planes)
28 Bomber Squadron	B-18 (13 planes)
36 Bomber Squadron	(Type of plane unknown)
2 Reconnaissance Squadron	O-19, O-46, O-47, O-52
19 Reconnaissance Squadron	(13 planes)

"2. The Philippine Defense Regulations call for development of divisions of 7,600 officers and men. (Referred to on separate sheet.) However, indications are that many divisions are far from complete and some even lack regiment commanders. Also the required equipment is not provided and some infantry regiments are not equipped with infantry guns.

"3. Training points in LUZON are as follows:

APARRI	LAGAG	VIGAN
BANQUED	TORIDANITO	
ECHAGUE	TUGUEGARAO	

"12 Infantry Regiment is training in LUZON.

"4. For defense purposes, LUZON is divided into northern and southern districts.

"5. According to information, an American ship and four submarines appeared on the horizon east of GARANPI, TAKAO Province, in FORMOSA at about 1810 hours, 30 November. Also at about 1830 hours a large ship and 3 submarines sailed south in the vicinity 10 miles northeast of GARANPI. It is reported that enemy submarines left MANILA around 16 December for various places and that some of them are operating in the vicinity of PALAU.

"(2) It appears that a few days ago 12 Infantry Regiment in Northern LUZON moved to Central LUZON at USHINGAN. According to interception, there was a telegram asking that 70 millimetre and 40 millimetre shells be sent to the troops at APARRI, TUGUEGARAO and ECHAGUE situated along the CAGAYAN River. It would appear that these shells are for the native army and also that the main strength is to be assembled in Central LUZON. Planes reported in Central LUZON, are as follows:

Fighters	130
Bombers	30
Navy patrol planes	20
Total	180

(ATIS Current Translations No 46, pages 1 and 2)

33. PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES

a. Three captured sketches, undated, issuing authority not specified, showing disposition and strength of NETHERLANDS East Indies forces on the islands of JAVA, SUMATRA and BALI are reproduced as Figures 6, 7 and 8. Although the sketches are not individually dated, one of them bears the note "1935 to the present". The present would seem from internal evidence to refer to 1940 or 1941.

(ATIS Current Translations No. 106, pages 61-63)

TAKE IN FIGURES 6, 7, and 8.

(Figures are attached. Captions are written on bottom of each figure. Reduce them to page size or smaller as convenient.)

b. The lengthy background of Japanese espionage and subversive activity in the NETHERLANDS East Indies is attested by the following passage from an article entitled "New Life of the People of SUMATRA:

"It was the ACHIN People who fought against HOLLAND and very bravely defended their independence to the end. The ACHIN People are naturally fearless. Their native place is on the northern edge of SUMATRA; in area it is one and a half times the size of FORMOSA, and it has the sea on three sides. Again, there are many mountains and geographical factors. Due to these the natives were able to resist fiercely for 40 years following 1873. Controlled by one family, these warriors hid in the woods and often conducted violent guerrilla warfare, harassing the Dutch troops. The last ten years it was a chronicle of chivalry that the Japanese Youth BAN, Motohiko, struggled hard to assist the young tribal chief PANNAMU. However in 1922 BAN, Motohiko, was recalled to JAPAN by the Foreign Office and the ACHIN finally broke up their swords and submitted."

(ATIS Document No. 6984, not previously published)

c. An insight into more recent phases of possible Japanese espionage in the NETHERLANDS East Indies is provided by the following excerpt from an account of the Japanese Operation against JAVA written by an unnamed staff officer, a lieutenant colonel, and published in the OSAKA MAINICHI:

"It was dark when we arrived at BANDOENG. Late that night, I went into a room of the old HOMAN Hotel, where I stayed over 2 years ago...."

"For the purpose of meeting the Army Commander in the afternoon, I went to the IFURA Hotel, north of BANDOENG. I asked for the old room which I took the year before last."

(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 32, page 11)

34. PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE IN NEW GUINEA

The following intelligence report on BRITISH NEW GUINEA is based on the observations of Major TOYOFUKU, Tetsuo, in March 1941. The experience gained by this officer was subsequently utilized through his appointment to the staff of the South Seas Detachment, the force which later fought over this same country. The preface and text of the report read as follows:

"Military Data on BRITISH NEW GUINEA"

"General Staff Headquarters

"Reproduced by: General Headquarters, Southern Army.

Headquarters, Eastern Detachment, 1 October 1942.

"This data was compiled from the report of an inspection by Major TOYOFUFU, Tetsuo, March 1941, and from data obtained and arranged thereafter.

"References perused for data are: "Military Report on British-owned NEW GUINEA", published by the Naval General Staff September 1940; Volume II of "NEW GUINEA Sailing Directory", published by Hydrographic Department; Charts Nos. 854, 857, 859, 878, and other necessary maps.

"Part I - Military Value of BRITISH-owned NEW GUINEA and the SOLOMON Islands:

"These possessions, together with the Dutch East Indies Archipelago, form a natural barrier intersecting the Pacific Ocean from north to south. The northern end is within the radius of action of our bombers from most of our South Sea Mandated Islands, and the southern end is within the radius of action of bombers from the northern part of AUSTRALIA. (It is approximately 1000 kilometers from TRUK and PONAPE Islands in our South Sea Mandate to RABAU, capital of the Australian Mandated Territory; approximately 1250 kilometers from COCKTOWN, NORTH AUSTRALIA, to RABAU, and approximately 600 kilometers to PORT MORESBY.) They are separated from the Australian Continent by the narrow TORRES STRAIT. Consequently, possession of this territory would make it easy to obtain the command of air and sea in the South West Pacific and to acquire "stepping stone" bases for operations against AUSTRALIA. Control of the southern coast of NEW GUINEA, in particular control of TORRES STRAIT, would cut communications between the South Pacific Ocean and Dutch East Indies as well as the Indian Ocean Area; and would force the enemy fleet to detour to the Southern coast of Australia.

"As mentioned above, it is considered that this is strategically important territory for Japanese operations in the South Seas, especially against AUSTRALIA. Moreover, JAPANESE forces should consider it very fortunate that the places used as bases for air and sea forces in this territory are not few.

"Part II - Observations on Landing Operations in British-owned NEW GUINEA:

1. General Observations:

"NEW GUINEA itself is over 2500 kilometers long and over 720 kilometers at its widest part. The area of the British-owned section alone is approximately 400,000 square kilometers. It is the world's second largest island, being larger than Japan Proper by approximately 20,000 square kilometers.

"The area of the BISMARCK Archipelago is approximately 50,000 square kilometers and corresponds to the combined area of our FORMOSA and SHIKOKU. However, the population of these territories (IN: NEW GUINEA and BISMARCKS) is approximately 850,000 natives, most of whom live in the coastal regions.

"Nowhere are these territories as yet developed.

"Since the greater part is uninhabited, the communications facilities naturally are poor, and even the roads are like the government roads of Australian-controlled NEW GUINEA, whose total length is only 136 miles (approximately 218 kilometers) of which 109 miles is in the Central Province, 16 miles in the Eastern Province, and 11 miles in Southeastern Province. It is recognized that these roads only connect the villages in the vicinity of the coast.

"In regard to present military preparations, it appears that there are small forces and installations in the important political and transportation centers such as RABAU, PORT MORESBY, etc. The other sections of the territory are not defended at all.

"Landing operations on these various islands can, therefore, be carried out easily at any place where it is possible to land. However, advance and occupation from the captured points by land would be extremely difficult and practically impossible in view of the undeveloped road system and the difficulty of supply. Therefore, even if a point is occupied, it will only secure the vicinity of that point, and occupation of the whole territory will be difficult unless the enemy's fighting spirit is completely demoralized. This is more the case especially in view of the small strength of JAPANESE forces being used in this area.

"Therefore, it is best to occupy the important cities in order to gain control over the entire island group. Thus it would be advisable to attempt landing operations at RABAUL, LAE (capital of the Australian Mandated Territory) and PORT MORESEBY (capital of Australian-controlled NEW GUINEA), which are points of military, political, economic and communications importance. How much strength should be used for the capture of these territories will depend on the operations plan of the Japanese Forces. However, considering the weakness of the enemy's present defenses and the strength that will be sent to this area by the Australians in the future, a great strength will not be required. There are dwellings in these cities, but commodities, especially food and drinking water, are scarce, and self-sufficiency for a long period would be difficult. Our necessities, especially rice, bean paste (miso) and soy sauce, are not stored at all, so there is no other way but to depend on supply from the rear.

"The difficulty of supply from the rear must be recognized and it will be necessary to carry large quantities....

2. Landing Operations at PORT MORESEBY:

"(1) General Condition of Harbor and City:

"PORT MORESEBY, which was founded in 1873, is the government seat of Australian-controlled NEW GUINEA and the provincial government seat of Central Province. It has a good wide harbor, and the bay is entered by passing between HANUDAMAVA Island (at the mouth of the harbor) and BOGIROHODGEI Point, approximately 1.5 miles to the east. At the beginning of 1940 there were approximately 800 Europeans, approximately 20 Chinese and no Japanese residents. The natives (approximately 2000) have built their village over the water and live apart from the white residents. The city is situated between TUAGUBA Hill and ELA Hill on the eastern shore of the harbour, and is the centre of the government, military affairs, economics, transportation, communications, etc. of Australian-controlled NEW GUINEA. There are various offices, including government offices and branch offices, a radio station, a government-managed electric power plant, church, school, European and native hospitals, and ice plant, bank, hotels, etc.

"(2) Value of PORT MORESEBY as a Naval Base:

"Although the harbour is rather small for a fleet base, it is fairly deep (maximum 10 fathoms), and the bottom is alluvial soil, and one or two squadrons could anchor without difficulty. A space between the coral reefs outside of the harbour offers a very wide anchoring place large enough for a large fleet to anchor. However, installations for repairs and supply have not been fully established, so it is valuable only as a port of call.

"(3) Military Preparations:

"The Government of the Commonwealth of Australia is establishing a naval station, including an air base, in the territory, as a defense against JAPAN. Information obtained by observation of the actual area follows:

"(a) Garrison Strength:

"Army:

"There is a barrack at GRANVILLE EAST (approximately 1 kilometer northeast of the city), which, judging from its size and the amount of equipment, can accommodate approximately 1,000 men. The present garrison appears to be composed wholly of infantry troops, without artillery.

***Others:**

*A Royal Australian Artillery Detachment (2 officers, 38 non commissioned officers, and privates, who arrived with 6 inch guns) apparently is stationed on ELA HILL and will be reinforced, judging from the fact that the number of barracks on the hill is being increased.

***Navy:**

*The strength is not known but appears to be about 30 men. The orderly room is located at the side of the government pier. The station ship has not been identified; only 2 or 3 launches have been identified.

***(b) Installations:**

*A road for military use has been built to the top of ELA HILL and two 6-inch guns are placed on top of this hill. The main line of fire of these guns apparently is directed toward BASILISK PASSAGE. The guns are exposed on top of the hill. According to information, they will be increased by 2 more guns. In addition to the KILA KILA airfield approximately 4 kilometers east of PORT MORESEBY) an airfield for military use, approximately 11 kilometers from PORT MORESEBY (location unknown) is expected to be constructed. A single road parallel to the coastal highway and halfway up the hill of TUAGUBA is being constructed.

*According to information received in October 1939, the government is constructing a place inland to which non-combatants can be evacuated in case of war at PORT MORESEBY. (its location is not known.) Japanese people are carefully watched by the officials. Travel to Japan by local residents and the entry of Japanese ships is prohibited.

***(h) Passage of Channels:**

*The greatest difficulty in a landing operation at PORT MORESEBY would be passing through the waterways. There are three channels entering the harbour of PORT MORESEBY. LILJEBLAD Passage on the extreme west has a very strong current and shoals. This passage cannot be used in general because there are shallows before the mouth of the harbour. Therefore, it is difficult to enter this passage. BASILISK Passage, in the centre, is the channel used by vessels at present, but it is about 6 kilometers from the gun emplacements on ELA HILL and thus is within the guns' effective range. In general, unless the gun emplacement is destroyed, it would be difficult to enter through this channel. PADANA NYHUA, at the extreme east, is quite wide (about 900 meters) and is outside the effective range of the gun emplacement (about 18,000 meters). This channel should be selected for an entrance. However all 3 waterways are neither very deep nor wide, and could easily be covered with mines and other obstacles. These obstacles must be cleared first of all. If a place where the NATEARA and SINAVI coral reefs can be passed over with boats could be found, then an approach could be made without risking the danger of passing through the channel. Anchoring outside a coral reef is very difficult, so in such a case the transfer to boats would have to be made while drifting.

***Food:**

*Little meat is stored in the cold storage plants of the various companies. There are pastures for cattle, pigs and goats, but their number is not known. Fresh fish are abundant, but there are no vegetables.

***Fresh water:**

*This area, in general, consists of barren mountains and is dry for the period of 8 months between June and January each year. The rainfall is very small. The residents who depend on rainfall sometimes have to transport water from other areas in order to maintain their means of living. The Government has constructed water storage tanks with galvanized iron roofs for use during droughts, at a place 137 meters above sea level southwest of

TUAGUBA HILL in back of the city, and this water storage is used in emergencies. Their capacity is said to be several tens of thousands of tons, but this is not definite. The problem of drinking water is most urgent in this area, and the extension of a water supply line is especially important in planning the establishment of a harbour. According to rumour it is planned to bring the water down from the IALOKI River and arrangements for this will be completed about August of this year.

"Fuel:

"It is said that 5000 drums of gasoline, 3000 drums of heavy oil, a large quantity of motor oil, etc., are stored in CARPENTER'S Warehouse. The nature of the gasoline used for airplanes is not known.

"Automobiles:

"For military use - about 50.

"For civilian use - about 200 (no buses).

"Part III - Value of BISMARCK Islands and British-controlled NEW GUINEA as an air base in case of war with BRITAIN and AMERICA.

"1. Essentials:

"As explained in Part I, the BISMARCK Islands are within the radius of action of bombers operating from most of our South Sea Mandated Islands. In turn, TORRES STRAIT and the northern part of AUSTRALIA are within aerial domination from the BISMARCK ISLANDS and British-owned NEW GUINEA and this territory, in general, is judged to possess an important value from the standpoint of air operations in a war against BRITAIN and AMERICA. In particular, if air superiority over TORRES Strait is gained it is thought that it would be advantageous in cutting off enemy communication between the Pacific Ocean and Dutch East Indies, as well as the Indian Ocean.

"In regard to the possession of airfields in this area, the first principle is to use established airfields, and if necessary to construct new ones on farmland in flat areas.

"The established airfields are not wholly adequate to fulfill military requirements, but some of them can be utilized immediately and they can be extended with a small expenditure of labour.

"As fuel is difficult to obtain in this area, in general it must be supplied from the rear. Much of the equipment for repairs and construction is inadequate.

"The condition of the established airfields, landing fields and air route net at present in British-owned NEW GUINEA is as shown in Appendix Map No. 10 (TN. Map not attached).

"2. Value of BISMARCK Islands and their Vicinity: (appended Map No 6, Reference No 6) (TN Not captured)

"(1) Essentials:

"The established airfields in the BISMARCK Islands and their vicinity are two landplane fields at RABAU and VUNAKANAU, and it is planned to construct others at KAVIENG (northeastern end of NEW IRELAND), NAMATANAI, BUKA Passage (the strait separating BOUGAINVILLE and BUKA Islands in the SOLOMONS), and KIETA (the capital of BOUGAINVILLE). Only one place in the harbour of RABAU is used for seaplanes but another is located at KIEG on GALANA Island, across the LOLOBO (northeastern coast of NEW BRITAIN). While the situation regarding aviation gasoline is not known, apparently almost none at all is stored. Planes operating on a regular schedule apparently refuel at SALAMAU or MORESBY on the return trip. There are no reports of aviation gasoline being supplied at RABAU.

"3. Value of Island of NEW GUINEA:

"(1) Essentials:

"There are airfields and landing fields on the Island of NEW GUINEA. Most of them are concentrated in MORCEE Province because they are used by planes that transport gold from mines developed in the province. The airfields used mainly by landplanes are at SALAMAU, LAE, WAU, MADANG, WEWAK, PORT MORESBY, etc., SALAMAU and WAU are the only two airfields on which we have definite

information at present. To discuss the value of the airfields in British-owned NEW GUINEA from the above data is futile. However, since these (TN: the two airfields at SALAMAU and WAU) are typical of those used by the regular air lines, I believe they are sound references for use in estimating the others. It seems that the only specially-constructed seaplane base is at PORT MORESBY.

(ATIS Document No 2712, not previously published)

35. PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE IN AUSTRALIA

a. An annotated sketch showing the disposition of AUSTRALIAN military forces as of July 1940 is reproduced as Figure 9. The sketch appears to have been issued by OSAMU (TN: 16 Army) Group Headquarters.
(ATIS Current Translations No 21, page 34).

NOTE IN FIGURE 9

(Figure 9 will be found on page 34 of CT 21. Keyall English text on map. Omit the Japanese. "HARU Group Headquarters" in lower left should read "OSAMU Group Headquarters." Figure may be reduced, if desirable.)

Figure 9. Translation of sketch showing dispositions of Australian forces as of July 1940.

b. Table issued by OSAMU (TN: 16 Army) Group Headquarters, dated July 1940, and setting forth the organization of the Australian Army, reads as follows:

A U S T R A L I A N A R M Y O R G A N I Z A T I O N

AUSTRALIAN ARMY HQ (MELBOURNE)

NORTHERN MILITARY DISTRICT (BRISBANE)

First Army Corps District (BRISBANE)

- Artillery (KELVIN GROVE)
 - 5th Field Artillery Regiment
 - 11th Field Artillery Regiment
- Australian Heavy Artillery
- Australian Engineer Unit (KELVIN GROVE)
- Australian Signal Unit (KELVIN GROVE)
- Duty Unit (KELVIN GROVE)
- 1st Cavalry Brigade (BRISBANE)
 - No. 2/14 Light Horse Regiment
 - 5th Light Horse Regiment
 - 11th Light Horse Regiment
- 7th Infantry Brigade (BRISBANE)
 - No 9/49 Battalion
 - 15th Battalion
 - 25 Battalion
 - 47th Battalion
 - 61st Battalion
- 11th Infantry Brigade (TOWNSVILLE)
 - 26th Battalion
 - 31st Battalion
 - 42nd Battalion
 - 51st Battalion
 - 1st Garrison Battalion

EASTERN MILITARY DISTRICT (SYDNEY)

Second Army Corps District (SYDNEY)

- 1st Heavy Field Artillery Regiment
- 1st Anti-aircraft Regiment
- 5th Heavy Artillery Regiment

Australian Tank Unit
Australian Survey Unit

1ST CAVALRY DIVISION (SYDNEY)

21st Field Artillery Regiment (MARRICKVILLE)
Divisional Signal Unit (PADDINGTON)
Divisional Duty Unit (MARRICKVILLE)

2nd CAVALRY BRIGADE (ARMIDALE)

1st Light Horse Regiment (MG)
6th Light Horse Regiment
7th Light Horse Regiment
12th Light Horse Regiment
2nd Armoured Regiment

4th CAVALRY BRIGADE (PADDINGTON)

15th Light Horse Regiment
16th Light Horse Regiment (MG)
21st Light Horse Regiment
24th Light Horse Regiment

1ST DIVISION (SYDNEY)

Artillery Unit (PADDINGTON)
1st Field Artillery Regiment
7th Field Artillery Regiment
Divisional Engineer Unit (CROWS NEST)
Divisional Signal Unit (CROWS NEST)
Divisional Duty Unit (PADDINGTON)

1st Infantry Brigade (NEWCASTLE)

2nd Battalion
33rd Battalion
41st Battalion

8th Infantry Brigade (CROWS NEST)

18th Battalion
30th Battalion
35th Battalion
36th Battalion

2ND DIVISION (SYDNEY)

Artillery Unit (PADDINGTON)
9th Field Artillery Regiment
14th Field Artillery Regiment
18th Field Artillery Regiment

Divisional Engineer Unit (PADDINGTON)
Divisional Signal Unit (PADDINGTON)
Divisional Duty Unit (MARRICKVILLE)

9th Infantry Brigade (MARRICKVILLE)

1st Battalion
4th Battalion
17th Battalion
45th Battalion

5th Infantry Brigade (PARRAMATTA)

20/19 Battalion
54th Battalion
56th Battalion

14th Infantry Brigade (PADDINGTON)

3rd Battalion
13th Battalion
34th Battalion
55/53 B attalion
Sydney University Battalion
2nd Garrison Battalion
11th Garrison Battalion

SOUTHERN MILITARY DISTRICT (MELBOURNE)

Third Army Corps District (MELBOURNE)

Australian Tank Unit
2nd Heavy Field Artillery Regiment
6th Heavy Artillery Regiment

2ND CAVALRY DIVISION (MELBOURNE)

22nd Field Artillery Regiment (MELBOURNE)
Divisional Signal Unit (MELBOURNE)
Divisional Duty Unit (MELBOURNE)

3rd Cavalry Brigade (MELBOURNE)

17th Light Horse Regiment (MG)
20th Light Horse Regiment
26th Light Horse Regiment (MG)
1st Armoured Regiment

5th Cavalry Brigade (MELBOURNE)

4th Light Horse Regiment
8th Light Horse Regiment
No. 13/19 Light Horse Regiment

3RD DIVISION (MELBOURNE)

Artillery Unit (MELBOURNE)
2nd Field Artillery Regiment
4th Field Artillery Regiment
8th Field Artillery Regiment

Divisional Engineer Unit (MELBOURNE)
Divisional Signal Unit (SOUTH MELBOURNE)
Divisional Duty Unit (SOUTH MELBOURNE)

4th Infantry Brigade (MELBOURNE)

14th Battalion
22nd Battalion
29th Battalion
46th Battalion

10th Infantry Brigade (CAULFIELD)

No. 24/39 Battalion
37th Battalion
53rd Battalion

15th Infantry B rigade (BRUNSWICK)

No. 57/60 Battalion
58th B attalion
59th B attalion

4TH DIVISION (MELBOURNE)

Artillery Unit (MELBOURNE)
10th Field Artillery Regiment
15th Field Artillery Regiment
Divisional Engineer Unit (MELBOURNE)
Divisional Signal Unit (MELBOURNE)
Divisional Duty Unit (South MELBOURNE)

2nd Infantry Brigade (MELBOURNE)

5th Battalion
6th Battalion
32nd Battalion
Melbourne University Battalion

6th Infantry Brigade (MELBOURNE)

7th Battalion
8th Battalion
23/21 Battalion
38th Battalion
3rd Garrison Battalion
12th Garrison Battalion

Fourth Army Corps District (ADELAIDE)

6th Cavalry Brigade (KESWICK)

3rd Light Horse Regiment
18th Light Horse Regiment (MG)
No. 9/23 Light Horse Regiment

3rd Infantry Brigade (KESWICK)

10th Battalion
27th Battalion
43rd Battalion
48th Battalion
4th Garrison Battalion
A part of Australian Heavy Artillery Unit
13th Field Artillery Regiment

Sixth Army Corps District (HOBART)

22nd Light Horse Regiment
No. 12/50 Battalion
40th Battalion
6th Garrison Battalion
6th Field Artillery Regiment
Australian Heavy Artillery Unit
Australian Anti-aircraft Unit
Australian Survey Unit

WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT (PERTH)

Fifth Army Corps District (PERTH)

13th Infantry Brigade (PERTH)

11th Battalion
16th Battalion
28th Battalion
44th Battalion
10th Garrison Battalion
10th Light Horse Regiment
25th Light Horse Regiment (MG)
3rd Field Artillery Regiment
7th Heavy Artillery Regiment

Seventh Army Corps District (DARWIN)

Port Moresby Defense Unit (Heavy Artillery)
Darwin Mechanized Artillery Unit (Heavy Artillery)
Australian Anti-Aircraft Unit
New Guinea Volunteer Regiment

36. Security Measures.

Prior to 8 December 1941 precautions against the leakage of information were detailed and thorough. An official document dated September 1941 shows that 19 Division in KOREA took most elaborate precautions to prevent any news of military value from being obtained by nationals of other countries.

Extracts from Counter-Espionage Regulations drafted 30 September 1941, held by 47 Field Anti Aircraft Artillery Battalion based 19 Division Staff Report.

Measures to be taken while awaiting orders.

No. 1 Policy

Periodically and progressively reform instruction will be given concerning counter-espionage and various regulations. Do not permit natives of enemy territory to participate in our schemes for obtaining intelligence of any kind. At the same time the arousing of a positive consciousness in officers and men (employees included) so they can act in themselves to nullify and completely crush the various plans and strategies of the enemy. Thus, by hoodwinking the enemy and hiding our own plans we will have nothing to fear in putting our military preparations into operation.

Para 21. Restrict the contact of military personnel with foreigners especially those outside barracks, to that of official business. (Particularly in regard to language study and religion).

Precautions will particularly be taken with Englishmen, Americans, Russians and anti-"Hitlerites" of whom there are a large number even though they are German, to avoid malicious behaviour or prevent discovery of our intentions.

Control the association of Korean Christians with Englishmen and Americans.

Para 22. Watch the conversation of the families of soldiers, especially children and restrict their acquisition of matters that concern the army.

Acting in concert with the provincial authorities particularly the school authorities, keep control over wild rumours and false reports from students (T.N. school children) and make an attempt to guide them in such matters.

Each household will report domicile, etc. of all Koreans employed by the commander of the unit to which it is associated.

Be strict in supervision and investigation of merchants, especially Koreans entering and leaving the compound of the official residences.

Para 28. Enforce directions concerning prevention of espionage when having dealings with gendarmes and with government and private schools of each province in KOREA. Also with post offices, journalists, etc.

Para 54. Develop in soldiers the faculty of preventing espionage and let them develop their own resourcefulness. It is expected that they will be on special guard in contact with Koreans, etc. (For example, Koreans examining the contents of soldiers' wastepaper baskets.)

(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 10, pages 7, 11, 13, 15)

SECTION IV. PUBLICATIONS OF MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE

36. GENERAL

A survey of captured documents indicates that a considerable number of training manuals, instructions, etc., bearing directly on subsequent military operations were published during the year and a half preceding the outbreak of war. Normal military programs may well account for the greater part of these publications. In many instances, however, their subject matter serves to document the trend of Japanese military interest, while in a few cases official statements prefaced to publications are clearly indicative of the approaching crisis. A list of pertinent publications chronologically arrayed according to date of issue, is set forth in the following paragraph.

37. LIST OF PUBLICATIONS

a. List of military secret documents retrieved, belonging to 41 Infantry Regiment, dated 9 July 1942, contains the following items:

<u>Date of Preparation</u>	<u>Subject</u>
30 April 1940	BRITISH MALAYA: Military Geography and General Description
1 November 1940	DUTCH EAST INDIES: Military Geography
1 November 1940	DUTCH EAST INDIES, Military Geography (Separate volume)
30 August 1941	BRITISH BORNEO: Military Geography and General Description.
15 October 1941 (ATIS Current Translations No 45, page 9)	The Resources of BRITISH MALAYA

b. Fragments of aeronautical map of BORNEO and JAVA, published in February 1941 by Staff Headquarters, Army Survey Department. Marked "Secret".
(ATIS Bulletin No 313, page 1)

c. Mimeographed file belonging to 55 Medical Unit containing:
(1) References for ration supply in tropical areas, dated 10 March 1941, by West 32 Force.
(2) Suggestions in regard to rations and clothing aboard transports in tropical areas, dated June 1941 by No 4 Section of "I" Manouever Research Party.
(ATIS Bulletin No 192, page 1)

d. Index list of military secret documents taken over by Confidential Books Officer of 41 Infantry Regiment on 10 October 1942.

Prepared by War Ministry:

<u>Date of Preparation</u>	<u>Subject</u>
April 10, 1941	On the rapid training of men for air service.

(ATIS Bulletin No. 142, page 1)

e. Colored map entitled "Great East Asia and Pacific", issued by Cabinet Printing Department on 30 April 1941. Pencilled near NEW GUINEA is the comment - "Future treasure of JAPAN, Population 300,000."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 261, page 2)

f. Printed Map of "The Greater East Asia - Prosperity Sphere and the Pacific Ocean", issued as weekly supplement to No 238 Information Board Report on 30 April 1941 by Government Printing Bureau marked - "Not to be copied".
(ATIS Bulletin No. 457, page 4)

- g. 10 maps of road construction on HAINAN ISLAND, dated July 1941, issuing authority not specified.
(ATIS Bulletin No 436, page 16)
- h. Printed Manual entitled "An Introduction to British Army Weapons" with illustrations, published by Army Technical Headquarters, dated September 1941.
(ATIS Bulletin No 201, page 2)
- i. Colored map entitled, "East Asia Co. - Prosperity Sphere, Large Map of Western Pacific Ocean," published in September 1941, issuing authority not specified. Insets include: Map of world, sketch map of military installations of SINGAPORE, detailed map of JAVA, and detailed map of HAWAIIAN Islands.
(ATIS Bulletin No 234, page 1)
- j. Infantry Field Fortifications Manual, Part I, issued in September 1941. The introduction contains the following passage:
"This book is one which was experimented with in this school for the purpose of preparing for the revision of the manual on field fortifications, and although there may still be room for further improvement, in view of the present situation it has been, with the approval of the authorities, published and distributed without further delay."
September 1941
Head of the Army Infantry School
NAKA, Nagatara."
(ATIS Enemy Publications No 50, page 1)
- k. Reference Manual on Landing Operations, compiled by Inspector General of Military Education, dated 18 September 1941. Introduction contains the following passage:
"This book was distributed without delay in order to furnish materials for reference on landing operations."
(ATIS Enemy Publication No 25, page 1)
- l. Wartime Service Instruction for Master of Ships, published by Navy Department, dated 30 September 1941, and marked "Military Secret." General Instructions state as follows: "This book indicates the service instructions which should be observed by all Japanese shipping masters during the war. Even in time of peace this book is employed in case of threatening feeling due to the hostility of other countries."
(ATIS Bulletin No 172, page 1)
- m. Printed Handbook entitled "Aircraft of the Southern Countries" published in September 1941 by General Staff Headquarters and supplemented in January 1942.
(ATIS Bulletin No 145, page 2)
- n. Printed Handbook entitled "Identification of SOVIET, AMERICAN and BRITISH planes", published in September 1941 by Inspectorate General of Military Education.
(ATIS Bulletin No 145, page 2)
- o. Pamphlet entitled, "Research Data on UNITED STATES Army Tactics, No 7, an Example of the Defensive Disposition of a United States Army Infantry Regiment," issued by Staff Headquarters, 10 October 1941, reproduced by 51 Division Operations Section, 18 December 1942, stamped "Confidential."
(ATIS Bulletin No. 257, page 2)
- p. Printed Pamphlet containing Japanese - Malayan vocabulary dated October 1941 issued by Naval General Staff.
(ATIS Bulletin No 1024, page 13)

q. Printed Manual entitled "Tropical Hygiene Handbook" edited by Medical Bureau, Navy Department, published by Bureau of Education, Navy Department, dated October 1941.
(ATIS Bulletin No 539, page 14)

r. Printed Booklet entitled "Simple Medical Manual for the Tropics". Compiled by Naval Medical Department, dated November 1941, containing maps of Southeast Asia, the Malay Archipelago and Oceania.
(ATIS Bulletin No 412, page 14)

SECTION V. CONCLUSIONS

1. The Imperial Japanese Government had positively committed itself to the waging of war against the UNITED STATES of AMERICA, GREAT BRITAIN, and the NETHERLANDS by the end of October 1941. At that time the Army and Navy Departments of Imperial General Headquarters jointly issued "The Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement". This seems to have been the basic document specifying the relative commands, spheres of jurisdiction, tasks and responsibilities of the two services in all cases where joint Army-Navy operations were envisaged.
2. Also at the end of October 1941 official consideration was given to the possibility of a Soviet attack on JAPAN resulting from JAPAN's attack upon AMERICA, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS. It was decided that this was unlikely unless JAPAN attacked first. Nevertheless, defensive measures were specified.
3. Present evidence is insufficient to establish with greater precision the date upon which the decision to attack was formally taken. It is noteworthy, however, that plans for the attack on PEARL HARBOR had been finally formulated at the naval war games held in TOKYO from 2 to 13 September 1941, and that the essence of these plans was embodied in the resume of conditions under which these games were to be held, issued on 3 September 1941. Preliminary and partial planning undoubtedly extends back much farther. One source claims that the midget submarine unit had been studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard for a year and a half prior to the attack on PEARL HARBOR. By 15 September 1941 preparations had progressed to such a point as to necessitate a joint Army-Navy conference at IWAKUNI on the problems of the coming operations. It seems a valid presumption that the period between 15 September and the end of October 1941 was in large part occupied with the working out of the details of "The Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement."
4. By 1 November 1941 the basic plan for all naval operations attendant upon the commencement of hostilities had been settled. This was embodied in Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 1, dated 1 November 1941 aboard Admiral YAMAMOTO's flagship, the NAGATO, at SAEKI Bay. It is noteworthy that this document mentions the existence of still further military preparations prior to 1 November 1941. It states "The Fourth Fleet has largely completed preparations in the Mandated Islands, as has the Eleventh Air Fleet at essential bases in CHINA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND".
5. By 5 November 1941 it had been decided that the above-mentioned Secret Operation Order No. 1 should become effective on 23 November 1941, designated as "Y-Day". This decision was embodied in Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 2 issued on 5 November.
6. The date for the official declaration of war was not finally announced until 10 November 1941. Upon that date Combined Fleet Secret Operation Order No. 3 was issued. It stated "X-Day will be 8 December".
7. The Japanese military authorities were both far-sighted and thorough in certain of their preparations for the present war. Selected units were given specialized training in jungle warfare and amphibious operations; secret agents were dispatched to future zones of operation for purposes of espionage and reconnaissance; maps of crucial areas were prepared far in advance; morale and training literature was written and distributed to units; special striking forces were organized, equipped with tropical issue and staged to carefully selected assembly areas where a maximum of security was assured; and the necessary transport and convey facilities were arranged.

SECTION V. CONCLUSIONS

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VI
(12)

The Japanese Government and the High Command were farsighted and thorough in their preparations for the attacks on Pearl Harbor, Singapore, Malaya, Hongkong and Shanghai, the Philippines and Thailand. By September 15, 1941 preparations had progressed to such a point as to necessitate a joint Army-Navy conference at Iwakuni on the problems of the Operations preparatory to the attacks. The period between September 15, 1941 and the end of October 1941 was in large part occupied with working out the details of "The Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreements." The Eleventh Air Fleet completed preparations at bases in China, French Indo-China, and Thailand prior to November 1, 1941. Selected Units were given specialized training in Jungle warfare and amphibious operations; secret agents were despatched to future zones of operations for purposes of espionage and reconnaissance; maps of crucial areas were prepared far in advance. Morale and training literature was written and distributed to Units; special striking forces were organized, equipped with tropical issue and staged to carefully selected assembly areas where a maximum of security was assured; and the necessary transport and convoy facilities were arranged.

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ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

RESEARCH REPORT

No. 191

Date: 1 Dec 45

JAPAN'S DECISION TO FIGHT

Document No. 1628

Doc. No. 1628; Page 1

SECTION I. CHRONOLOGY OF JAPANESE MILITARY
PREPARATIONS, JANUARY 1941 ---
8 DECEMBER 1941

1. INTRODUCTION

a. General

'Japanese preparations for the 'War for Greater East Asia' far antedate the actual outbreak of hostilities on 8 December 1941. Available references documenting these preparations are as yet fragmentary, especially in respect to specialized training operations in tropical warfare reputed to have taken place throughout the summer and fall of 1941. As the date of the opening of hostilities is approached, however, pertinent references grow more plentiful, until for the month of November 1941 it is possible to piece together a fairly comprehensive picture of Japanese military preparations. The main aspects of these preparations (by the army) which have been established to date (1 January 1945) are as follows:

(2) Specialized Training Programs. - -

The official unit reports refer to the periods 27 July - 7 December 1941, 12 October - 14 November 1941 and 10 October - 8 December 1941 as having been devoted to preparation for the PHILIPPINE Operations, the MALAYAN Operations and for the landing operations which were to accompany the Greater East Asia War.

Units receiving this training were stationed in MANCHURIA, the vicinity of SHANGHAI and at PALAU respectively.

(4) 'Just Read This and the War is Won.' - -

By 10 November 1941, copies of a pamphlet entitled, 'Just Read This and the War is Won', had been received by 55 Division Infantry Group. The text is clearly premonitory of the imminence of war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS. (See Paragraph 9 below.) Copies of this were issued to each Japanese soldier before embarkation for overseas. The date of publication of this pamphlet is not definitely known, but its length and the nature of the contents are such as to indicate original preparation at a date considerably prior to 10 November.

(5) Organization of South Seas Detachment. - -

The significantly named South Seas Detachment was already organized, on paper at least, by 15 November 1941. It comprised the force which took GUAM on 10 December and later moved on to RABAU and NEW GUINEA.

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(6) 'Message to Warriors in the South Seas.' - -

On 15 November, the commander of the South Seas Detachment, Major General HORII, Tomitaro, issued a 'Message to Warriors in the South Seas,' addressed to all personnel serving under his command. This message forecasts with great explicitness the coming of war. No date of outbreak is mentioned, but the tenor of the communi-

tion is that of a commander to his troops on the even of battle.
(See Paragraph 10 below).

(7) Mounting of Attack on GUAM. - - Certain elements of the newly formed South Seas Detachment were being routed to a staging area in JAPAN as early as 14 November 1941. A part of 47 Anti-aircraft Battalion, for example, left its station in MANCHURIA and was transported to the port of SAKAIE in Norther SHIKOKU, via FUSAN and UJINA. A major portion of the South Seas Detachment appears to have rendezvoused there. On 22, 23 and 24 November, various units embarked and departed for the OGASAWARA (BONIN) Islands. The transports arrived at their destination on 27 November 1941, some touching briefly at CHICHIJIMA enroute to HAHAJIMA. At HAHAJIMA the troops rested, and trained. On 4 December, the convoy sailed to carry out the attack on GUAM.

(8) Operation Order Specifying Attack on GUAM. - - On 29 November 1941 at 1500 hours, First Lieutenant SAKIGAWA, Commanding Officer of 2 Company, 55 Transport Regiment, issued SAKE Operation Order No. 2. This read in part, 'The Detachment will attack GUAM Island.'

(10) Mounting of Attack on BRITISH MALAYA. - - The mounting of the attack on BRITISH MALAYA has been partially reconstructed from official documents and diaries deriving from 41 Infantry Regiment, 106 Land Duty Company, Sasebo 5 Special Naval Landing Party and 77 Flying Regiment, elements of all of which participated in the operation. The following account is believed to be substan-

tially accurate.

On 17 November 1941, 41 Infantry Regiment, which had been stationed in the vicinity of SHANGHAI since at least early October, training for the MALAYAN Operations, (See Paragraph 1, a, (2) above), held a review and ceremony in honor of their 'departure for the field'. On 18 November, elements of the regiment left SHANGHAI on the HYUJO MARU for the assembly point at SAMA on the southern shore of HAINAN Island. The diary of one member contained the following entry under date of 18 November: '. . . order have finally arrived. The time has finally come for us to display activity. Are we going to be at war with A, B and D?' On 21 November the RYUJO MARU was anchored at TAKAO. It's date of arrival at SAMA is not known, but other parts of 41 Infantry Regiment had reached HAIKOW in Northern HAINAN by 20 November. On the same date further elements of 41 Infantry Regiment embarked on the AOBAYAMA MARU and on 21 - 22 November sailed from WOOSUNG for SAMA. Part of the 106 Land Duty Company left SAIGON on the TOKOKAWA MARU on 23 November and arrived at SAMA on 25 November. On 25 November also, elements of Sasebo 5, Special Naval Landing Party, while enroute to PALAU, were ordered to change course and head for SAMA. A second section of 106 Land Duty Company embarked on the TAIKAI MARU at SAIGON on 27 November and arrived at HAINAN on 1 December. On 3 December, 2 Squadron of 77 Flying Regiment was ordered to cooperate with 70 Airfield Company in the air defense of SAMA. By 4 December, the assembly was complete. On 4 - 5 December, the convoy sailed for

Page 3:

(11) Mounting of Attack on the PHILIPPINE Islands. - -

Available evidence concerning the mounting of the attack on the PHILIPPINE Islands is meager. It has been established, however, that the TANAKA Detachment embarked at TAKAO in FORMOSA between 23 and 25 November 1941. On 26 November the TANAKA Detachment came under the direct control of Lieutenant General HOMMA, Masaharu, Commanding General of 14 Army and in command of Philippine Operations. Between 25 November and 7 December, the TANAKA Detachment left TAKAO for the naval port of MAKO in the PESCADORES. They remained there until 7 December when, at 1700 hours, they departed for the attack on APARRI in Northern LUZON.

(13) Knowledge of Imminence of War Displayed by Individuals.- -

Various individuals displayed advance knowledge or suspicion of the imminence of war. It is not certain in some cases whether this was based on information derived from reliable official sources or from rumor and popular gossip. Nevertheless, as early as October 1941, the rumor was current at TRUK that war would break out with the UNITED STATES between 25 December 1941 and 1 February 1942. On 18 November, a member of 41 Infantry Regiment commented on the probable imminence of war with "A, B and D." On 26 November, a member of 44 Infantry Regiment, South Seas Detachment, wrote, 'Our battle zone will be GUAM Island.' Two other members of the South Seas Detachment displayed similar knowledge of impending hostilities, on 29 November.

Between 2-7 December knowledge of the scheduled outbreak of hostilities on 8 December became quite general among members of striking forces. On 2 December the Captain of the Aircraft carrier KAGA announced to the crew that war would commence on 8 December. On 4 December Major General HORII, Tomitaro, Commanding General of the South Seas Detachment, issued a formal statement to the effect that Imperial Japan had, on 2 December 1941, decided to declare war on the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, and NETHERLANDS (See Paragraphs 17a, 20a and 22 below). Thereafter knowledge of their objective appears widespread among members of the South Seas Detachment. Evidence of similarly widespread knowledge among the forces assembled at SAMA for the MALAYAN Operation is more scanty, but there appears to have been some awareness of their goal.

(14) Air Defense Precautions. - - On 1 and 3 December orders for the air defense of KEELUNG and SAMA respectively were issued by 48 Field Antiaircraft Battalion and 77 Flying Regiment. These clearly anticipated the possibility of enemy air attacks."

SECTION I. CHRONOLOGY OF JAPANESE MILITARY
PREPARATIONS, JANUARY 1941 - -
8 DECEMBER 1941

1. INTRODUCTION

b. Organization of Material

The evidence upon which the foregoing summary is based is set forth in full in the following paragraphs. References have been arranged chronologically in accordance with the date of the most significant entry contained in the diary or other captured document under examination.

In order further to clarify the sequence of Japanese military preparations, a table setting forth a day by day breakdown of significant activities for the period 10 October - 7 December 1941 has been included as Appendix A.

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SECTION I. CHRONOLOGY OF JAPANESE MILITARY
PREPARATIONS, JANUARY 1941 - -
8 DECEMBER 1941

9. 27 JULY 1941

a. Preparation for PHILIPPINE Operations

"An extract from 4 Air Army Ordnance Order No. 12, dated
26 March 1944 reads as follows:

'Death certificate and service record of Sergeant GOTO,

Takeo:

Unit - - 25 Water Purification Unit

Year of conscription - - 1939 . . .

Service : 27 July 1941 to 7 December 1941 - - Manchurian
Border Defense and preparation for the PHILIPPINE Operations.'

(AFIS Bulletin No. 1060, page 10)"

APPENDIX A. -- DIARY OF JAPAN'S PREPARATIONS FOR
WAR, 10 OCTOBER - - 7 DECEMBER 1941

DATE	SOURCE		REMARKS
	TYPE	UNIT	
10 October 1941	Report on Conditions	42 Anchorage Group	"We left OSAKA on 10 October and reached our destination at PALAU on 16 October where we established an anchorage headquarters. Then we made preparations for the landing operations which were to accompany the war for Greater East ASIA."
12 October 1941	Personal History Register	41 Infantry Regiment	"12 October to 14 November 1941 - - prepared for Malayan operations in the vicinity of SHANGHAI."
1 November 1941	Operation Order	Combined Fleet	Basic order specifying attacks on PEARL HARBOR, and various other British, American and Dutch Possessions.
4 November 1941	Diary	41 Infantry Regiment	"Jungle combat training for expected type warfare."
10 November 1941	Morale Literature	55 Division Infantry Group	Copy of, "Just Read this and the War is Won", received by 55 Division Infantry Group. *(See attached sheet)*1
13 November 1941	Diary	41 Infantry Regiment	"Received rations and other necessary items for tropical combat (medicines, clothing, etc.)."
14 November 1941	Diary	South Seas Detachment, 47 Antiaircraft Battalion	"We finally received orders to go to the front...at 0900 hours we carried out the last ceremony of farewell on the parade ground. When we were leaving for the front, Commander FUCHIYAMA gave instructions and read a written oath addressed to the Imperial Palace. I have no reluctance in giving my life and being killed in action. Went to the Go-Ra Shrine to pray for our ultimate victory at 1900 hours we entrained." "Departed for FUSAN."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	

(#1 - Attachment to Chart - 10 Nov 1941 - Morale Literature)

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SECTION I. CHRONOLOGY OF JAPANESE MILITARY
PREPARATIONS, JANUARY 1941 - -
8 DECEMBER 1941

9. 10 NOVEMBER 1941

It is stated on the cover of the below-quoted pamphlet entitled, "Just Read This and the War is Won", that a copy is to be issued to each Japanese soldier before he embarks for overseas. The frontispiece consists of a map of SOUTH CHINA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA, THAILAND, BURMA, the FEDERATED MALAY States, the NETHERLAND EAST INDIES, and a small section of the Northwest Australian Coast. The date of publication of the pamphlet is not definitely known. A captured copy however, is stamped by 55 Division Infantry Group as having been received on 10 November 1941 (Elements of 55 Division figured prominently in the attack on GUAM and in the BURMA Campaign during December 1941.). Furthermore, its length and the nature of the contents are such as to indicate original preparation at a date considerably prior to this. Pertinent sections of this pamphlet are reproduced below:

"What sort of place is the southern field of operations?

"(1) It is the treasury of the Orient which has been invaded by the white men of ENGLAND, AMERICA, FRANCE and HOLLAND.

"(2) One hundred million Orientals are being oppressed by three hundred thousand white men.

"It amounts to this - - these whites possess scores of Oriental slaves from the moment they are born. Is this the intention of God?

9. 10 NOVEMBER 1941 (Cont'd)

"(3) It is a source of world supply of oil, rubber, tin, etc.

"Rubber and tin are essential for military supplies and for these valuable resources the southern countries are the most plentiful in East. The malevolence of ENGLAND and AMERICA, who have prevented JAPAN's purchasing these materials by just means, is one of the reasons which necessitates the present military operations.

It is quite clear that the NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES and FRENCH INDO-CHINA cannot oppose JAPAN alone, but with the support and threats of ENGLAND and AMERICA they are showing hostility to JAPAN. The lack of oil and iron is JAPAN's weak point, but lack of rubber, tin and tungsten is the weakest point of AMERICA. AMERICA's chief sources of supply of these is from the SOUTH SEAS and Southern CHINA. If these could be stopped, it not only would enable JAPAN to obtain the much-wanted oil and tin but it would stick a knife into AMERICA's sorest spot. The essence of AMERICA's opposition to JAPAN's southward advance lies here.

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"(4) We must be prepared for the war to be a prolonged affair and proceed with every preparation for a drawn out conflict.

"What course will the war follow?

"Long voyage followed by landing operations.

"All fields of operations are in the SOUTH SEAS over a thousand miles from FORMOSA. Some places take a week to ten days to reach. This wide sea is crossed by convoys of several hundred warships and merchantmen. Looking back, our ancestors conquered this rough sea

9. 10 NOVEMBER 1941 (Cont'd)

and carried on trade and fought with wooden sailing ships hundreds of years ago. After several days journey in the confines of shipboard, enemy resistance on the shores must be overcome and landings enforced.

"JAPAN has waited too long - - if JAPAN is patient any longer our aircraft, warships and motor cars will not move. Five years have passed since the beginning of the CHINA Incident. Over 1,000,000 comrades have exposed their bones on the continent.

(*2 - Attachment to Chart - 15 November 1941, Morale Literature)

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SECTION I. CHRONOLOGY OF JAPANESE MILITARY
PREPARATIONS, JANUARY 1941 - -
8 DECEMBER 1941

10. 15 NOVEMBER 1941

"Message to Warriors of the South Seas Detachment

"15 November 1941:

"The purpose of the forthcoming campaign is to exalt to the world the virtues of His Imperial Majesty, the Marshal Commander in Chief, and to complete the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Our great mission is to shatter at one stroke the attempts of / / / / / / / / to obstruct the disposal of the CHINA Affair, and the spreading of the Imperial Way far and wide in these territories. . . ."

10. 15 NOVEMBER 1941 (Cont'd)

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" . . . Units which thus maintained military discipline, always have success in war. You are all proceeding to the front, in the service of your country. However, if by any chance anyone commits a fault or is examined for an offense, not only will he betray the hopes of his family and his community at home, darken their future, and reduce to naught the record of meritorious service he has built up, but his action will tarnish the honor of the forces in other areas, and affect adversely the completion of the Holy War, This would indeed be deplorable. Beloved South Sea Warriros, take this to heart!"

(ATIS Captured Document No. 89, pages 1-4)

"The South Seas Detachment, referred to in Paragraph 10 above, was already organized under the command of Major General HORII, Tomitaro, by 15 November 1941. This specially organized and significantly named detachment constituted the force which attacked GUAM on 10 December 1941 and later moved on to RABAU and NEW GUINEA.

(ATIS Enemy Publications No. 41, page 10)

APPENDIX A

DATE	TYPE	SOURCE UNIT	REMARKS
15 November 1941	Morale Literature	South Seas Detachment (This detachment under Maj. Gen. Horii constituted the force which attacked Guam on Dec 10 & moved on to Rabaul & New Guinea - See Pg. 17 - 10. last Par).	Pamphlet entitled, "Message to Warriors in the South Seas", issued above signature of Major General HORII, Tomitaro. (See attached sheet)*2
16 November 1941	Notebook	Speech by Captain TAKAHASHI, of heavy cruiser KAKO.	"For three years you have studied your duties diligently. And now I believe that as you stand here at the battle front your emotions have been heightened as you sense impending action. . . In short, the present situation is certainly nearing its climax; indeed, it is in its most pregnant stage. I earnestly desire from you an uncommon amount of determination and effort."
17 November 1941	Diary	41 Infantry Regiment	"Today we held a review and ceremony for leaving for the field, participated in by all personnel of the forces."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment, 47 Antiaircraft Battalion.	"At 0600 hours we finally arrived at FUSAN station."
18 November 1941	Diary	41 Infantry Regiment	"Left SHANGHAI on RYUJO MARU. . . orders have eventually come. The time has finally come for us to display activity. Are we going to be at war with A, B and D?"
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"From 1000 hours the infantry group held war exercises under Major General HORII, Tomitaro."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment, 47 Antiaircraft Battalion.	"Sailed from FUSAN."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment.	"Loaded guns on ship and sailed from FUSAN."

APPENDIX A

DATE	TYPE	SOURCE	UNIT	REMARKS
19 November 1941	Diary	South Seas Detachment, 47 Antiaircraft Battalion.		"Arrived at UJINA (from FUSAN). ISO unit was divided into two groups here. Then we were all embarked on large ships. I was in the TAKAHASHI platoon. The ship was the MATSUE MARU."
20 November 1941	Diary	41 Infantry Regiment		"Anchored off shore HAIKOW, HAINAN ISLAND."
	"Prisoner of War" FURUKAWA			"Aircraft carrier SHOKOKU sailed from OITA."
	Diary	4 Infantry Regiment		"Headed for WOOSUNG aboard the AOBAYAMA MARU."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment		"Entered MOJI Harbor (from FUSAN) at 0700 hours. At UJINA Harbor was separated from Commander, Second Lieutenant TAKAHASHI. Loaded guns on MATSUE MARU."
21 November 1941	Diary	41 Infantry Regiment		"Anchored in sight of TAKAO (Aboard RYUJO MARU)."
	Diary	44 Infantry Regiment		"Advance party left in the morning. Unit commander in charge of military flags left about 1300 hours."
	Diary	41 Infantry Regiment		"Left WOOSUNG for South Seas."
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment		"0140 hours - - arrived SAKAIE station. Boarded MOJI MARU with 9 Company."
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment		"Received orders at embarkation office. Inspected interior of MOJI MARU."
22 November 1941	Prisoner of War JA 100037	41 Infantry Regiment		"After training for MALAYAN operations near SHANGHAI, left WOOSUNG, SHANGHAI."
	IMCV			"Battleships HIRI and KIRISHIMA, aircraft carriers AKAGI and HIRYU arrived at TANKAN."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment		"Left SAKAIE, inspection tour of CHERIBON MARU at 1000 hours."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment		"Embarked at SAKAIE at 1300 hours. Weighed anchor at night."

APPENDIX A

DATE	TYPE	SOURCE		REMARKS
			UNIT	
22 November 1941	Diary	South Seas Detachment,	TAKAMORI Unit	"Left ZENTSUJI for SAKAIDE, about 1930 hours left SAKAIDE Harbor."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment		"Sailed from OSAKA."
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment		"Sailed in evening" (from SAKAIDE.)
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment		"About 1900 hours departed from SAKAIDE." (Presumably aboard MOJI MARU)
	Diary	South Seas Detachment		"Left UJINA Harbor for SAKAIDE."
23 November 1941	Diary	TANAKA Detachment		"TANAKA Detachment began embarkation for MAKO."
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment		"Left ASAKURA station 1950 hours, arrived at SAKAIDE about 0500 hours."
	Prisoner of War JA 100037			"Aircraft carrier KAGA arrived HONGKONG."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment		"Left SAKAIDE."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment		"Looked as if we dropped anchor in OSAKA Bay. Weighed anchor at night." (Diarist left SAKAIDE on 22 November).
	Diary	South Seas Detachment		"About 0500 hours our ship stopped. My friends say this is SENSUJI." (Diarist left SAKAIDE on 22 November).
	Diary	South Seas Detachment 47 Anti-Aircraft Battalion		"At 0600 hours arrived at SAKAIDE" (From UJINA, presumably aboard MATSUE MARU). "At 1730 hours we left SAKAIDE. We don't know where we are going."
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment		"Arrived off OSAKA in the morning, sailed that night."
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment		"Entered OSAKA Harbor. Here prepared everything and finally got started for our destination. Received order to take safety precautions."
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment		"Left SAKAIDE on CHERIBON MARU."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment		"Left SAKAIDE aboard CHERIBON MARU about 1400 hours."

APPENDIX A

DATE	TYPE	SOURCE UNIT	REMARKS
23 November 1941.	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Left SAKAIDE in the evening." (Presumably aboard the MATSUE MARU).
	Notebook	144 Infantry Regiment	Boarded CHERIBON MARU in SAKAIDE Harbor.
	Diary	106 Land Duty Company	"Left on transport TOKOKAWA MARU (from SAIGON)."
24 November 1941	Diary	44 Infantry Regiment	"Departed SAKAIDE on board MATSUE MARU."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Left MARUAME and boarded MATSUE MARU. Sailed at 1800 hours."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Embarked on DAIFUKU MARU of N. Y. K. Line at SAKAIDE."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Headed for TONAN after passing KISHU Harbor." (Diarist left OSAKA on 22 November).
	Diary	41 Infantry Regiment	"Reached northernmost tip of HAINAN ISLAND" (From WOOSUNG).
	Diary	Unit Unknown	"Arrived HAIKOW, HAINAN Island."
	Diary	SASEBO 5 Special Naval Landing Party	"Left for PALAU at 1000 hours."
25 November 1941	Diary	106 Land Duty Company	"Arrived SAMA, HAINAN Island" (aboard TOKO MARU from SAIGON). "Transferred to KASHII MARU."
26 November 1941		TANAKA Detachment	TANAKA Detachment came under the direct command of Lieutenant General HONMA, Masaharu, Commanding General of 14 Army.
26 November 1941.	Diary	44 Infantry Regiment	"Our battle front will be GUAM Island. .in the morning I went on deck and saw transports to the right, left and rear."
	Diary	South Seas	"The destroyer UZUKI is escorting our convoy" (diarist is aboard DAIFUKU MARU).

APPENDIX A

DATE	TYPE	SOURCE UNIT	REMARKS
26 November 1941	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Landed at one of the OGASAWARA Islands" (diarist sailed from OSAKA on 22 November.)
27 November 1941	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Arrived at HAHAJIMA."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Arrived at CHICHIJIMA."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Put in at TSUCHIJIMA (sic). Left for HAHAJIMA."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Landed at HAHAJIMA in the OGASAWARA Islands and unloaded horses." (Diarist left OSAKA on 22 November and landed on OGASAWARA Islands on 26 November).
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment	"Reached CHICHIJIMA" (from OSAKA) "Reached HAHAJIMA before noon of the same day. There are not many people living on these islands. Ships come here one after another. The bay is filled with large ships. It seems as if there were about seven or eight war ships held here. At first there were names on these warships - UZUKI, YUZUKI and KIKUZUKI, but the names were taken off. This transport had M. K. written on the stack but it has also been removed . . . we fished to pass the time till 4 December . . . I suppose we are again headed for hot places. We had mosquito nets and lunch boxes made for us."
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment	"Reached HAHAJIMA about 0800 hours. The transport vessels assembled one after another. We had drill on transferring from ships to boats."
	Diary	106 Land Duty Company of French-Indo- China Expeditionary Force.	"Reached SAIGON about 1400 hours" (presumably aboard TAIKAI MARU)."

APPENDIX A

DATE	SOURCE		REMARKS
	TYPE	UNIT	
27 November 1941	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment	"Arrived HAHAJIMA" (aboard CHERIBON MARU).
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"We were escorted by the warship UZUKI" (diarist is presumably aboard MATSUE MARU en route from SAKAIDE to HAHAJIMA).
	Notebook	144 Infantry Regiment	"Stopped at HAHAJIMA, OGASAWARA Island" (aboard CHERIBON MARU).
	Diary	Unit unknown	"Left HAIKOW."
28 November 1941	Diary	44 Infantry Regiment	"Arrived HAHAJIMA at 1650 hours" (aboard MATSUE MARU).
	Personal History Register of first class private.	41 Infantry Regiment	"During assembly off SAMA on HAINAN Island was transferred to hospital ship from KYUSHU MARU."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Stopped over at HAHAJIMA" (aboard MATSUE MARU).
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"YOKOHAMA MARU is at HAHAJIMA."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Arrived at HAHAJIMA from CHICHIJIMA."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Arrived HAHAJIMA from TSUCHIJIMA" (sic).
	Diary	South Seas Detachment, 47 Anti-Aircraft Battalion	"At 1630 hours we caught sight of a big island northeast of the ship. Several ships which had gone before us were at this island, HAHAJIMA" (aboard MATSUE MARU from SAKAIDE).
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment	"Studied method of handling special equipment (at HAHAJIMA)."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Arrived OGASAWARA Islands" (presumably aboard MATSUE MARU).

APPENDIX A

DATE	TYPE	SOURCE UNIT	REMARKS
29 November 1941	Operation Order No. 2	SAKIGAWA FORCE (2 Company, 55 Transport Regiment.)	"The Detachment will attack GUAM."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"AMERICA has taken off the mask with which she has disguised herself till now. We are going to meet the enemy at GUAM Island with ever increasing spirit."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Training in boarding motor barges during the morning. (at HAHAJIMA). It has been decided that battalion will land on the north side of TARO Bay" (presumably TALOFOFO Bay on GUAM Island)."
	Diary	PALAU No. 3 Defense Unit	"War? All leave was cancelled and I heard that a huge army unit is out here somewhere." (written at PALAU).
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment	"Various training plans were worked out according to emergency combat zones" (at HAHAJIMA).
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Landed at HAHAJIMA" (presumably from MATSUE MARU).
30 November 1941	Diary	Special Naval Landing Party, YOSHIMOTO Unit	"Boarded KIRISHIMA MARU at UJINA, Escorted by Destroyers Nos. 36 and 37. Headed for PALAU."
	Diary	Unit unknown	"Arrived HUMEN" (from HAIKOW).
1 December 1941	Diary	44 Infantry Regiment	"Maneuvers and landing operation training at HAHAJIMA."
	Firing Plan of 1 Dec 1941	48 Field Anti-Aircraft Battalion	"Battalion will cooperate with KEELUNG Army Air Defense Force against air attacks. All units will protect KEELUNG Anchorage by endeavoring to destroy enemy planes as far as possible outside the harbor."

APPENDIX A

DATE	SOURCE		REMARKS
	TYPE	UNIT	
1 December 1941	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment	"Practiced landings at CHICHIJIMA."
	Diary	106 Land Duty Company of French-Indo-China Expeditionary Force	"Arrived safely in the morning at HAINAN Island" (from SAIGON presumably aboard TAIKAI MARU).
2 December 1941	Diary	41 Infantry Regiment	"Weighed anchor and sailed again for SAMA" (from HAIKOW).
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Received training in anchorage point penetration from 2000 hours."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Diary entry made at HAHAJIMA on 4 December 1941 reads as follows: 'Order of HORII, Tomitaro, Commander of South Seas Detachment 'On 2 December the Emperor of JAPAN has decided on war with GREAT BRITAIN, UNITED STATES and HOLLAND. Imperial JAPAN will, on 8 December carry out its first air attack against the UNITED STATES. This detachment will, if there is no special order, land on GUAM.'"
	Diary	1 Special Naval Landing Party, YOSHIMOTO Unit	"Heard over radio that American fleet (5 ships) has left harbor. Heard that we are to land on the Philippine Islands after resting on PALAU."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Returned to VENICE MARU" (at HAHAJIMA).
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment	"Four cruisers entered port in the afternoon. On the whole the troops are in high spirits." (at HAHAJIMA).
	Diary	Unit unknown	"Left HUBEN" (for SAMA).
3 December 1941	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"It seems that the Japanese-American talks will finally break down."

APPENDIX A

DATE	SOURCE		REMARKS
	TYPE	UNIT	
3 December 1941	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"The battalion officers are to meet on the YOKOHAMA MARU from 0900 hours. Training in smoke flares and gases. The conference of company commanders decided to land at IRIYA Bay. Two first class cruisers came to the anchorage point to escort us and we feel very safe." (Written at HAHAJIMA).
	Operation Order A-12 of 3 December 1941	77 Flying Regiment	"2 Squadron will co-operate with 70 Airfield Company and will serve in air defense of SAMA. Airplanes taking hostile action will be shot down."
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment	"Ready to leave. Four cruisers and a minesweeper entered port. (written at HAHAJIMA).
	Diary	106 Land Duty Company, French Indo-China Expeditionary Force	"Remained aboard TAIKAI MARU until 1600 hours and transferred to KASHIIMARU" (written at HAINAN).
4 December 1941	Diary	44 Infantry Regiment	"Left HAHAJIMA and proceeded southeast. Received an order announcing the declaration of war. We expect to land at 'X' in 10 days."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Worshipped the Emperor's Palace at 0830 hours. Gave three BANZAI's. There was a speech. JAPAN, AMERICA War! It looks as if the hardships we have born until now will be rewarded. We have received life for SHOWA's reign. Men have no greater love than this. Convoy to sail! 9999! Now, prosper, fatherland!" South HAHAJIMA Island at 1422 hours: "The Empire has decided to go to war against AMERICA, BRITAIN and HOLLAND. The Southern Area Army will quickly capture important regions in the PHILIPPINES, BRITISH MALAYA and the DUTCH INDIES after beginning

APPENDIX A

DATE	SOURCE		REMARKS
	TYPE	UNIT	
4 December 1941			<p>attack on 8 December 1941. For this purpose the first Japanese-American air attack will be carried out. The south Seas Detachment will cooperate with the 4th Fleet to capture GUAM. If there is no separate order, the landing will take place on 10 December. HORII Operation Order A, No. 17; Each unit will act according to Order A, No. 7 which has already been issued."</p>
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"The convoy left at 0900" (from HAHAJIMA).
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Left HAHAJIMA with the object of capturing the American island of GUAM. This same day, our country decided to declare war on ENGLAND, UNITED STATES and FRANCE, on the 8th of December."
	Battle Reports. Entitled "THAILAND Operations"	77 Flying Regiment	"4-7 December 1941 - Protection of 25 Army transport convoy and preparation for occupation of THAILAND."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment TAKAMORI Unit	"Will depart for GUAM Island. However, GUAM is called OMIYA SHIMA."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"1000 hours - Departed for our destination, GUAM" (written at HAHAJIMA).
	Diary	South Seas Detachment, 47 Antiaircraft Battalion	"At 0930 we eventually left the island (HAHAJIMA). We immediately began to prepare for combat."
	Diary	41 Infantry Regiment	"Left SAMA. Convoy of 28 ships escorted by the Navy headed for SINGAPORE" (from HAINAN).
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment	"Warships and transports which were in readiness at HAHAJIMA Harbor sailed for their destination."
	Diary	144 Infantry	"Departed from HAHAJIMA at 0930."

APPENDIX A

DATE	SOURCE		REMARKS
	TYPE	UNIT	
4 December 1941	Diary	106 Land Duty Company; French Indo-China Expeditionary Force	"Departed at 0600 hours for our destination" (written at HAINAN aboard KASHII MARU).
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment	"Left HAHAJIMA."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Left HAHAJIMA."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"0900 - left OGASAWARA Island."
	Operation Order A-16 of 4 December	48. Field Anti-aircraft Battalion	"Instructions for antiaircraft defense during the coming landing operations, presumably on LUZON." (written at KEE-LUNG aboard MONTREAL MARU.)
	Diary	Unit unknown	"Arrived SAMA" (from HUNEN).
	Diary	PALAU No. 3 Defense Unit	"We received a written order from Commanding Officer of No. 3 Base to take up No. 2 guard dispositions from today; it is really going to be a serious affair."
	Diary	South Seas Detachment, TAKAMORI Unit	"Departed at 1000 hours" (from HAHAJIMA). We are cruising safely.
	Diary	106 Land Duty Company	"Thirty transports headed toward the theatre of operations with a naval escort." (written at SAMA).
	Diary	Unit unknown	"Sailed from harbor" (SAMA) at 0400 hours for operations.
6 December 1941	Diary	South Seas Detachment	"Our mission is to attack the UNITED STATES" (written while en route to GUAM).
	Diary	No. 3 PALAU Defense Unit	"It is said that American airplanes are reconnoitering our positions."

APPENDIX A

DATE	TYPE	SOURCE UNIT	REMARKS
6 December 1941	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment	"Tomorrow, we are told, GUAM Island will be attacked and occupied."
	Diary	144 Infantry Regiment	"Convoy was sailing for GUAM, Captain AKASHI. Orders were issued to the section comman- ders."
	Diary	Unit unknown	"6 December 1941 - aboard DAIFUKU MARU, MIYAJI Platoon No. 3. Platoon orders for landing attack on GUAM: '1. Condition of enemy and terrain at the landing site has already been pointed out. This company is to be the first in line on the left of the battalion.'
7 December 1941	Intelligence report	TANAKA Detachment	TANAKA Detachment sailed from MAKO at 1700 hours.

SECTION II. FURTHER PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

26. TRAINING PROGRAMS

b. Campaign Study

Japanese Land Operations (Campaign Study No. 3), a publication issued by the Military Intelligence Service, United States War Department and based entirely on Japanese sources gives the following account of JAPAN's preparations for war:

"The units and commanders designated for the various tasks in the war for which they were preparing were selected months in advance, and were concentrated in special training areas where the terrain and climatic conditions approximate those in the regions where they were to fight. The Malayan Army trained in HAINAN and INDO-CHINA, the Philippine Force in FORMOSA and both units practiced landing operations during the late summer and fall of 1941 along the SOUTH CHINA Coast. Even the divisions chosen to attack HONG KONG were given rigorous training in night fighting and in storming pill boxes in the hills near CANTON....

"Japanese commentators made no secret of the fact that the High Command was fully informed for a year before the war as to the strength, disposition and likely plans for defense of their then potential enemies....

"Task forces" organized during the summer of 1941 trained and worked together continuously (i. e. Joint Army-Navy forces) until the outbreak of hostilities

26. b. Campaign Study, Cont'd.

"The troops used in their operation (at VIGAN on LUZON) as well as those used in the subsequent landing at LINGAYEN, had been carrying out landing operations all summer along the CHINA Coast, from CANTON to the INDO-CHINA Border. Little if any military advantage resulted from those operations, and it would now appear that they had been intended solely for training. . .

"Japanese accounts give only a hint of their years of painstaking surveying and espionage work throughout the KRA Isthmus and the MALAY Peninsula, but they are quite frank in describing preparations made during the summer and fall of 1941. These included negotiations with THAILAND for the landing of troops on the KRA Isthmus, for the use of the BANGKOK--SINGAPORE Railroad, and for arrangements to cache supplies for the use of the Expeditionary Force.

"The troops assigned to make the initial landings were selected officers and men, drawn from units which had long service in CHINA, and organized into two divisions specially equipped for the work they had to do. All of the troops which were to be used in the campaign had been given exhaustive training during the fall in selected areas of INDO-CHINA and HAINAN Island, where the terrain approximated that over which they were to fight. When these units landed in MALAYA, far from being unused to the climate and the country, as the British expected them to be, they were trained and seasoned jungle fighters, the equal of any troops with whom they were to come into contact.

26. b. Campaign Study (Cont'd)

The divisions which made the landings had spent the month of September in executing landing operations on the South CHINA Coast, in conjunction with units which were practicing for similar tasks in the PHILIPPINES.

"As the time appointed for the attack grew near the troops were withdrawn from their training areas and assembled on HAINAN Island, where large forces could be concentrated in complete security far from the eyes of spying foreigners. Here they were completely re-equipped with new guns, vehicles and other equipment of the latest type. A few weeks' training with the new material and the expedition was ready for its big test . . .

"Two divisions which had seen very little activity in the march down the peninsula, but which were composed of veteran soldiers of the CHINA Campaign who had received special training in river crossings in preparation for this very task of storming the Straits of JOHORE, were now brought up to relieve those divisions which had fought their way down the Peninsula."

(Japanese Land Operations (Campaign Study No. 3), pages 9, 21, 35, 45, 46).

SECTION II. FURTHER PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

26. TRAINING PROGRAMS

c. Training for Assault on SINGAPORE

Colonel YOKOYAMA, Yosuke, Commanding Officer, 15 Independent Engineer Regiment, in a report on that regiment dated 25 May 1942, made the statement quoted below. It is noteworthy that the training which they received is of precisely the type most essential to warfare in MALAYA and especially for the assault on SINGAPORE:

"As shown in summary of the war service record on a separate sheet, this unit was organized from the 4 Engineer Regiment in September 1938.

"From the end of last December the unit took part in the capture of MALAYA and SINGAPORE and the SUMATRA Operations.

"Although originally the function of this unit was that of an "A" regiment, which is similar to that of divisional engineer, this unit was trained for about a year with special emphasis on attacking pill-boxes and operations with flatbottom boats with outboard motors attached (These boats are used in river operation crossings). Thus all personnel can handle these boats. As an "E" regiment they have become capable of making crossings of large rivers.

"They have received a citation and certificate of merit from the Army Commander for the engagement at PINYANG and also two citations for the MALAYA Operation and for making a crossing in the face of the enemy at SINGAPORE."

(SOPAC Translation, Serial No. 0825, Item No. 519, pages 1,2,4)

SECTION II. FURTHER PREPARATIONS FOR WAR

28. ECONOMIC PREPARATIONS

a. Collection of Metals

Extract from order issued by Chief of Staff ISEKI Force, IMADA, Shintaro, to the Commanding Officer, KONDO Force, KONDO, Shinhachi, dated 25 August 1941, reads as follows:

"Due to the present international situation and the increase in national military preparations, the importance of exploiting and utilizing the resources of this area must be considered. The accumulation of these military supplies will be subdivided into procurement by military authorities and purchases by civilian agencies. The items to be acquired by civilians are copper ore, copper wire scraps, copper scraps, brass scraps, cases, melted cases, tin, coin, pewter and antimony ore.

"Scrap iron in NORTH CHINA will be acquired by the Nippon Iron Industries Company. Other resources to be acquired are nickel, cobalt, tungsten ore, molybdenum ore, copper, lead, zinc, quicksilver, high grade asbestos, high grade mica, nonferrous metals, steel and other minerals.

"An investigation squad organized by an army has reported the probably presence of iron, sulphur, fluor spar and zinc in the vicinity of YANCHENG and of iron in SUEHCHUANLING."

(ATIS Bulletin No. 1555, pages 29-30)

#1628

RESTRICTED

1978

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
RESEARCH REPORT
No. 131
1 Dec 49

JAPAN'S DECISION TO FIGHT

RESTRICTED

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

A.P.O. 500
1 December 1945

Published for the information of all concerned.


By command of General MacARTHUR:

R. K. SUTHERLAND,
Lieutenant General, United States Army,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

C. A. WILLOUGHBY,
Major General, G.S.C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2.

スマトラ兵力配備要圖



註: 地名ノ横=アルキ印ハ
 モトノ假名書キヲソノママ
 ロマ字書キニシテ示ス
 (譯者註 原圖ヨリ嚴密ニ複製ス)

第七圖 スマトラ島蘭印軍, 配備及兵力ヲ示セル要圖, 翻譯

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

21 Aug. ,1946

TO: TRANSLATION CONTROL

Attached is Document No. 4076-C for Comyns-Carr

Arrange for translation as follows:

German to Eng. and German to Jap. of telegram #60293-6, Ott to

Ribbentrop 10 July, 1941.

Mark tran. 4076-C.

geo

(NOTE: DO NOT REMOVE FROM ATTACHED MATERIAL)

