THE HISTORY OF THE GREAT EUROPEAN WAR







THE HISTORY OF THE
GREAT EUROPEAN WAR

TYPES OF THE BRITISH ARMY.

ROYAL DUBLIN FUSILIERS. (SERVICE DRESS.) — ROYAL FIELD ARTILLERY — ROYAL ARMY FLYING CORPS. — 9TH LANCERS. — GORDON HIGHLANDERS.

THE HISTORY OF THE GREAT EUROPEAN WAR

ITS CAUSES AND EFFECTS

BY

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AUTHOR OF
"THE STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF BELGIUM IN EUROPEAN WARFARE"
"THE ZOLLVEREIN," ETC. ETC.

ASSISTED BY EMINENT NAVAL AND MILITARY EXPERTS

VOLUME II

LONDON
CAXTON PUBLISHING COMPANY, LIMITED
CLUN HOUSE, SURREY STREET, W.C.



CONTENTS

BOOK II

THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS AND RELATIONS RESULTING IN THE WAR—Continued

CHAPTER XIII

BRITAIN AT WAR WITH GERMANY

Germany's ultimatum to Russia—Germany declares a state of war—Britain desires to know if neutrality of Belgium would be respected—Terms of the German ultimatum—Germany menaces France—British steamers detained at Hamburg—Austria now proposes mediation, but Germany declines on account of Russian mobilisation—Germany mobilises—France mobilises—German invasion of Luxemburg—French Cabinet Council—France agrees to respect neutrality of Belgium—Belgium prepared to defend herself—Germany had thitherto induced Belgium to have confidence in her—Her assurances of 1911 and 1913—Belgium now reinforces her army as a measure of precaution—Germany suggests that she will respect Belgium's neutrality—Holland mobilises—Germany refuses to speak with certainty—Belgium mobilises—Germany's ultimatum to Belgium—Reply of Belgium—France offers to support Belgium—Belgium declines to appeal to the guarantors—King of Belgium appeals to King George for diplomatic support—The reply—Britain protests to Germany—King of Belgium addresses the Belgian Parliament—Germany endeavours to seduce Britain from her support of Belgium—The German proposal—Britain's ultimatum to Germany—The general results of the tension of the preceding few days—The meeting of Parliament—Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. John Redmond and Mr. A. J. Balfour speak—Britain's mandate to her Government—The speech of Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister—Sir Edward Goschen's dispatch—Sir Maurice de Bunsen's dispatch . . . . pp. 1–25

CHAPTER XIV

BRITAIN IN HER RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND RUSSIA

I.—*General Relations :* Until 1890 Britain antagonistic to France and Russia—In 1891 France and Russia come to an understanding—In 1903 Germany and Britain part company—The Anglo-French Entente Cordiale, 1903—The Anglo-Russian Entente, 1907—The Triple Entente.

II.—*Anglo-French Relations :* 1882–91 : Anglo-French relations—Incident to colonial policy of France—Tunisia—Egypt—Britain buys share of Suez Canal—The Condominium—Arabi Pashi—Quelled by Britain—Who then settles in the country—But assured France that she did not intend to remain in the country—She acquires Equatoria and Uganda—Abyssinia—Madagascar—West Coast of Africa—Nigeria—The Far East—Newfoundland. 1891—1902 : Another period of struggle—Franco-Russian Treaty marks an epoch—Imperialism for both France and Britain—Resultant hostility—

Tunisia—The Capitulations—Britain consents to their abolition—Preferential customs duties—Britain's policy of "the open door"—Morocco—Interest of France therein—Political influence of Britain in Morocco—Anglo-French conflict there changes to accord—Egypt—Mission of Major Marchand—Fashoda—Bitter feeling in France—Treaty of 1899—An Abyssinian railway—Conflicts in Red Sea and Madagascar—Senegal—Siam—Anglo-French Treaty, 1896—France believes Britain wants all Asia—Chino-Japanese War, 1895—Antagonistic diplomacy of France and Britain in relation to China and Japan—French and British failures and successes—Scenes in French Parliament—Bitter feeling between Britain and France—*The Entente Cordiale*—M. Delcassé and M. Paul Cambon—An isolated France liable to be the prey of Germany—Reasons for closer association between France and Britain—Spirit of "give and take"—Mutual support of armies and navies—The mission of M. Cambon—His first work—Arbitration in 1901—1903: King Edward's visit to Paris—His speech there—Return visit to London of M. Loubet—Rapprochement announced—Conventions of 1904—Visits of French and British fleets—Germany strikes the one note of dissatisfaction—End to naval rivalry between France and Britain—The two armies—The Great Convention of 1904—Settles the Moroccan and Egyptian questions as between Britain and France—The terms of the settlement—Abyssinia and Siam then settled—France and Britain unite for peace.

III.—*Anglo-Russian Relations and the Franco-Russian Alliance*: Anglo-Russian hostility—In the years preceding 1891 Britain indifferent to the maintenance of Turkish Empire—Russia then took the place of Britain—Russia's lack of seaboard—Her projects in the East—The Eastern Question—Afghanistan—Tibet—Russia leaves the Triple Alliance—Isolated among the Powers—Gambetta advocates Franco-Russian alliance—Military position of France, 1887—Russia and France become more friendly—Franco-Russian Treaty, 1891—1891 to 1901 a period of strained relations—*The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 1902—Its influence in the East—The important articles of the Treaty of Alliance—British opposition to it—Russia and Tibet—Anglo-Tibetan Treaty, 1906—Persian Gulf—Second Anglo-Japanese Treaty, 1905—Its importance in present war—Tended to Anglo-Russian amity—*The Accord of* 1907 . . . pp. 26–52

BOOK III

THE CAMPAIGN OF THE ALLIES

CHAPTER I

BRITAIN COMMANDS THE SEA

The mobilisation of the British Fleet—Sir John Jellicoe commands—His career—The disposition of the Fleet—The North Sea—The German Fleet—Britain commands the sea—Freedom for British maritime commerce—That of Germany held up—The mines in the North Sea—*Fighting commences*—Sinking of the *Königin Luise*—The loss of the *Amphion*—Letter of a survivor—Sinking the German submarine U 15—The *Birmingham's* fine fight—Life on a German submarine, from a sailor's letter—German commerce raiders—The *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*—Her exploits—Sunk by the *Highflyer*—The fleets in the Mediterranean—The *Goeben*—Plucky fight by the *Gloucester*—The *Goeben* runs to Messina—Her theatrical demonstration there—Her escape—Takes refuge in the Dardanelles—Bought by Turkey—Digging out the German Fleet—The Bight of Heligoland—The dash of the British destroyers, the *Fearless*, *Arethusa*, *Liberty*, and *Laurel*—Their fight with the German cruisers, the *Mainz* and the *Köln*—The *Lion* and the other Dreadnoughts join in—The British victory . . . . pp. 53–73

CHAPTER II

THE BRITISH NAVY

German and British naval rivalry—Naval Forces of the Powers in 1898—First German Naval Law—Foundation of Germany's modern naval power, 1900—Fifth German Naval

Law—Its real object—Britain's efforts—The two-power standard—British fleet reorganised and redistributed—Kaiser's letter to Lord Tweedmouth—The first Dreadnought—The new era—The "Contingent Four"—The final reorganisation of 1912—*Naval Warfare*—Command of the sea—Blockade—Britain a naval Power—*The British Navy*—How controlled—The Lords of the Admiralty—Mr. Winston Churchill—Prince Louis of Battenberg—Lord Fisher—*Different classes of warships*—Auxiliaries—The fleets engaged in the war—German, French, Austrian—Early British Navy—Dockyards—Introduction of steam—Ironclads—The struggle between guns and armour—The two theories—Capital ships—Pre-Dreadnought to Hyper-super-Dreadnought—Dreadnought armament—Cruisers—Their functions—Reconnaissance—Protection of commerce—Destruction of enemy's commerce—The *Emden*—The hunt for the German commerce raiders—The battle-cruiser—Engaging the enemy—Torpedoes—Danger to blockading fleet—The destroyer—"Destroyer-destroyers"—The submarine . . pp. 74–99

CHAPTER III

GERMANY'S EXIT FROM ASIA

The Japanese intervene—Kiau-chau—The bombardment of Tsing-tau—Its fall—German opinion—Togoland—Bismarck Archipelago—German New Guinea—Samoa—Hoisting the British Flag . . . . pp. 100–109

CHAPTER IV

NAVAL GAINS AND LOSSES

The North Sea mines—The *Amphion*—*Birmingham*—*Pathfinder*—The sinking of the *Hela*—The three cruisers, the *Aboukir*, *Hogue* and *Cressy*—Reports of the captains—Narratives of survivors—The torpedoing of the *Hawke*—The *Pegasus*—Revenge on her destroyer—The commerce raiders: the *Königsberg* and the *Emden*—The cruise of the *Emden*—The "De Wet of the Seas"—Her captures—She sinks a Russian cruiser—Tracked down at Keeling Cocos Island—Engaged by the *Sydney*—The fight—The end of the *Emden*—Her captain—The *Cumberland* at the Cameroons—The captain of the *Amphion* again—His feat with the *Undaunted*—Four German destroyers sunk—The *Amiral Ganteaume*—The fight off the Chile coast—Where was the *Canopus*?—Germany raids the East Coast—A submarine mined—The loss of the *Yorck*—The *Niger* sunk in the Downs—The loss of the *Bulwark* . . . . pp. 110–138

CHAPTER V

GERMANY INVADES LUXEMBURG AND BELGIUM

The Luxemburg-Belgian frontier—Germany invades Luxemburg—Protest of the Grand Duchess—Advance into France—The invasion of Belgium—Limburg—Verviers—Crossing the Meuse—The resistance at Visé—The destruction of the town—Fighting at Argenteau—Advance towards Liége—The city of Liége—Its fortifications—German plan of campaign—The attack on the forts—Sanguinary fighting—The Germans break through the defences—They trickle into the city—Belgian troops evacuate Liége—The occupation by the Germans—The forts still intact—Description of the fighting by Belgian officer—The ultimate destruction of the forts—The heroism of General Leman—The tribute of a German officer. . . . . pp. 139–153

CHAPTER VI

THE GERMAN ROAD THROUGH BELGIUM

Liége—The route through Belgium proposed by the Germans—They cross the Meuse between Visé and Huy—Attain Tirlemont—French arrive at Dinant—Warenne—Louvain—

Belgian Government retires from Brussels to Antwerp—Germans occupy Brussels—Namur falls—Battles of Mons and Charleroi—Ghent occupied—Sack of Louvain—Belgians fall back on Antwerp—Siege of Antwerp—Belgian Government retires to Ostend pp. 154–157

CHAPTER VII

DESTRUCTION AND DEATH

Belgium—Its towns and people—Fighting the invader—Looting and murder—The struggle at Diest and Haelen—*Brussels*—The departure of the Government—The refugees—Awaiting the Germans—Burgomaster Max—The entry of the invader—The Proclamation—The German army marches through the city—A spectator's account—The city fined—The Burgomaster again—An instalment of the fine paid—*Louvain*—Occupied by the Germans—Its historic associations and buildings—The University—Belgian sortie from Antwerp—Repulse of Germans—Their revenge—Major von Manteuffel—The sack of Louvain—The scenes in the streets—Destruction of the churches and other buildings—Murder of the citizens—Horror of the world—British Official Statement—*Malines*—The bombardment—Destruction of Cathedral tower—Killing the people—Resistance of the Belgians—*Antwerp*—The Zeppelin raid—Devastation and death—The city and its fortifications—Belgian preparations—The German advance—The fighting at the forts—The assault on Fort Waelhem—and on other forts—Germany effects a breach in the fortifications—The River Nethe—The burning of Lierre—Germans attempt to cross the river—Belgian resistance—British reinforcements—Statement of Admiralty—German aeroplane drops Proclamations—City full of refugees—Conditions in city—The bombardment—The oil tanks fired and ships in harbour sunk—The lurid scene at night—The flight from the city—Evacuated by the troops—The entry of the Germans—Review of their troops—Account of American correspondent—The internment of British marines. pp. 158–186

CHAPTER VIII

BRITAIN'S ARMY TAKES THE FIELD

The Expeditionary Force—Its mobilisation—The railway stations—Departure of reservists to join their units—Scenes at the camps—Messages of the King—Instruction of Lord Kitchener—Completion of mobilisation—Army secretly leaves the camps for ports—Departure from ports of embarkation—Arrival in France—Sir John French in Paris—Scenes in streets—The marches through Boulogne—Welcome by the people—The Expeditionary Force leaves for the front . . . . pp. 187–195

CHAPTER IX

THE GREAT RETREAT: MONS TO PARIS

The French frontiers—The left wing of the Allied Armies—The German advance begins—The battle at Charleroi—The British troops arrive—Take up position on the line Condé-Mons-Binche—The fight at Mons—The British cavalry—Tribute by Germans—The strength of the combatants—Enemy concentrate on British force—"General French's contemptible little army"—Maubeuge abandoned—Retirement to Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies line—The fighting during the retirement—Fighting at Landrecies—Gallantry of the Guards, artillery, and infantry—Further retreat to Noyon-Chaunay-La Fère—The work of the Royal Flying Corps—Battle rages a week—More artillery work—German reinforcement—French arrive to assist British—Amiens evacuated—British base changed—General retirement of left wing—Sharp action at Compiègne—Crossing the Marne—Further retreat across the Seine—The invaders at the gates of Paris—French Government removes to Bordeaux—Maubeuge yet holding out—The Declaration of the Three Allies—A casual fight—Wounded soldiers tell of enemy gun-fire—Another account of German fighting . . . pp. 196–213

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

COLOURED PLATES

Types of the British Army . . . *Frontispiece*

FACING PAGE

Types of the French Army 26

COLOURED MAPS

General Map of Belgium (Folding) 138

Forts of Liége 146

BLACK-AND-WHITE PLATES

Herr von Bethmann Hollweg 4

King of the Belgians 14

Raymond Poincaré 44

The Loss of the "Aboukir," "Hogue," and "Cressy" 56

Krupp's 86

Sir John French 112

The Sack of Louvain 142

The Battle of the Rivers 156

Brilliant French Attack in the Argonne . . 164

FACING PAGE

AN INCIDENT IN THE RETREAT FROM MONS . . . 180

A HEROIC DEED OF THE ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY NEAR COMPIÈGNE 196

BLOWING UP OF A BRIDGE ACROSS THE AISNE. . . 212

MAPS AND ILLUSTRATIONS IN THE TEXT

PAGE

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE OPERATIONS OF THE "GOEBEN" . 65

MAP SHOWING KIAU-CHAU 101

MAP SHOWING TSING-TAU FORTS 105

MAP ILLUSTRATING THE OPERATIONS OF THE "EMDEN" . 127

SECTION OF ONE OF THE FORTS OF LIÉGE . . . 145

THE FORTRESS OF DINANT 155

THE CITADEL OF NAMUR 172

MAP SHOWING THE FORTIFICATIONS OF ANTWERP . . 177

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE RETREAT FROM MONS . . 209

THE HISTORY OF THE GREAT EUROPEAN WAR

ITS CAUSES AND EFFECTS

BOOK II

THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS AND RELATIONS RESULTING IN THE WAR—Contd.

CHAPTER XIII

BRITAIN AT WAR WITH GERMANY

Germany's ultimatum to Russia—Germany declares a state of war—Britain desires to know if neutrality of Belgium would be respected—Terms of the German ultimatum—Germany menaces France—British steamers detained at Hamburg—Austria now proposes mediation, but Germany declines on account of Russian mobilisation—Germany mobilises—France mobilises—German invasion of Luxemburg—French Cabinet Council—France agrees to respect neutrality of Belgium—Belgium prepared to defend herself—Germany had thitherto induced Belgium to have confidence in her—Her assurances of 1911 and 1913—Belgium now reinforces her army as a measure of precaution—Germany suggests that she will respect Belgium's neutrality—Holland mobilises—Germany refuses to speak with certainty—Belgium mobilises—Germany's ultimatum to Belgium—Reply of Belgium—France offers to support Belgium—Belgium declines to appeal to the guarantors—King of Belgium appeals to King George for diplomatic support—The reply—Britain protests to Germany—King of Belgium addresses the Belgian Parliament—Germany endeavours to seduce Britain from her support of Belgium—The German proposal—Britain's ultimatum to Germany—The general results of the tension of the preceding few days—The meeting of Parliament—Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. John Redmond and Mr. A. J. Balfour speak—Britain's mandate to her Government—The speech of Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister—Sir Edward Goschen's dispatch—Sir Maurice de Bunsen's dispatch.

DIPLOMACY failed, as we have already seen, to prevent war, as a consequence of the assassination of the Archduke, between Austria and Serbia. Let us now follow the course of the subsequent diplomatic negotiations. On the morning of July 31 the German Ambassador called upon Sir Edward Grey in London. At once Sir Edward informed him

that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward which would make it clear that she and Austria were striving to preserve European peace and that Russia and France would be unreasonable if they rejected it, then Great Britain would not only support that proposal even as against Russia and France, but even if these Powers would not accept it, Britain would have nothing more to do with the consequences. Otherwise, if France became involved, Britain would be drawn in.

The Czar of Russia himself was also personally appealing to the German Emperor in the name of their old friendship to mediate at Vienna. The appeal was to deaf ears.

So a prospect of peace continued, if indeed it ever really existed, for only a few short hours. Austria, notwithstanding her recent expression of intention to submit her ultimatum to Serbia to discussion between herself and Russia, suddenly and without any reason began to move her troops against Russia as well as against Serbia. Now was Germany's opportunity to play her real hand. The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg sent information—inaccurate, of course—to Berlin that the whole of the Russian army and fleet were being mobilised. Thereupon Germany addressed an ultimatum to Russia, requiring that the Russian forces should be demobilised, otherwise the German Government would consider it necessary to order the total mobilisation of the German army on the Russian and French frontiers if within twelve hours Russia did not give an undertaking to comply with the German demand. At the same time a state of war was proclaimed by the German Government, general mobilisation of the German forces being publicly proclaimed on the following day, August 1. Germany now took the view that an end had been put to a peaceful solution of the crisis, and that she must prepare for all emergencies.

Sir Edward Grey being kept informed by the British Ambassador at Berlin of the state of affairs there, recognised even on July 31 that there was every prospect of an immediate mobilisation in Germany. Accordingly on that day, though still trusting that the situation was not irretrievable, he felt that it had become essential to the British Government, in view of existing treaties, formally to ask whether the French and German Governments were prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium. So on that day the British Ambassadors in Berlin and Paris were instructed to discover the intentions of Germany and France respectively in regard to this important matter. At the same time the British Minister at Brussels was directed to inform the Belgian Foreign Minister that, on consideration of the possibility of a European

war, the British Government had asked France and Germany whether each was prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium, provided it was violated by no other Power. The Belgian Government was also informed that Great Britain assumed it would maintain to the utmost of its power, the neutrality of Belgium, which Great Britain desired and expected other Powers to uphold and observe.

The German communication to Russia, giving the latter Power twelve hours within which to demobilise, was, on the admission of Herr von Jagow—the German Foreign Minister—himself, to the British Ambassador in Berlin, in the form of, and in fact, an ultimatum. It will be noticed that the German demand was for a complete demobilisation in the south as well as in other parts of the Czar's dominions. If complied with, it meant that Russia would cease her mobilisation in the south, and so put an end to her demonstration against the Austrian operations in Serbia. The object of Germany was thus by a threat of her own mobilisation to force Russia to abandon the attitude she had hitherto taken up on behalf of Serbia.

Until Germany received a reply to her ultimatum, she refused further to consider the proposals which had been made by the Allied Powers for the preservation of peace by means of a mediation. Even had the reply of Russia been an acceptance of Germany's demands, then it was not sure that Germany would have proceeded to support the proposal for the mediation. This would appear from the conversation between Sir Edward Goschen and the German Foreign Secretary, in which the latter informed the British Ambassador that "if the answer from Russia was satisfactory he thought personally that the British proposal merited favourable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before the Emperor and Chancellor."

In Paris, though there were no differences at all at issue between France and Germany, the German Ambassador there was in the meanwhile making a menacing communication to the French Government, and requesting an answer the next day. He intimated that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the reply was not satisfactory. He required France, in effect, to restrain Russia and so leave Serbia at the mercy of Austria and Germany. He evidently anticipated the inevitable reply, for directly he left the French Foreign Office, having delivered himself of his threat, he proceeded to pack up, with a view to a speedy departure.

On Saturday, August 1, the British Foreign Office learnt that the German authorities at Hamburg had forcibly detained steamers

belonging to the Great Central Railway Company, and other British merchant ships. No ground could be ascertained to justify this detention. Sir Edward Grey at once communicated with Berlin, requesting the German Government to send immediate orders that these ships should be allowed to proceed without delay. He seized the opportunity also to mention that the effect on British public opinion would be deplorable unless this were done. Moreover, he emphasised the fact that the British Government were most anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and he accordingly hoped that Germany would be equally careful not to take any step which would make the situation between the two Powers impossible. When this was brought to the notice of Von Jagow, he at first expressed the greatest surprise and annoyance, and promised to send orders at once to allow the ships to proceed without delay. Later on, however, it appeared from his own statements that all foreign ships were then being detained as well as the British, for the alleged reason that mines were being laid and other precautions being taken. The release of these British ships was said by him at the time to be a special favour to the British Government.

On the same day Sir Edward Grey received a communication from the Russian Government that Austria was ready to discuss the Serbian difficulty with Russia on the basis of the following proposal:

> If Austria consents to stay the march of her troops on Serbian territory, and if, recognising that the Austro-Serbian conflict has assumed the character of a question of European interest, she admits that the Great Powers may examine the satisfaction which Serbia can accord to the Austro-Hungarian Government without injury to her sovereign rights as a State and to her independence, Russia undertakes to preserve her waiting attitude.

At once the British Minister informed Sir Edward Goschen of this fact, also that Russia would be glad if the British Government would assume the direction of the proposed discussions. Not only Germany but the six Great Powers concerned were all informed of this.

Sir Edward Goschen, on receiving these instructions from Britain, at once proceeded to the German Foreign Office at Berlin and there interviewed Herr von Jagow, the Foreign Secretary. For a long time there was much argument on the part of Sir Edward Goschen that the chief dispute was between Austria and Russia, and that Germany was only drawn in as Austria's ally. "If, therefore, Austria and Russia are, as is evident, ready to discuss matters, and Germany does not desire war on her own

HERR VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG.

The Chancellor of the German Empire, the author of the cynical phrase, "fighting for a scrap of paper," in referring to our solemn treaty obligation to support the independence and liberty of Belgium, to which Germany herself stood signatory.

account, it seems to me," urged Sir Edward, "only logical that Germany should hold her hand and continue to work for a peaceful settlement." Von Jagow replied, that Austria's readiness to discuss the matter was the result of German influence at Vienna; "and had not Russia mobilised against Germany," proceeded the Secretary of State, "all would have been well; but Russia, by abstaining from answering Germany's demand that she should demobilise, has caused Germany to mobilise also. Russia has said that her mobilisation does not necessarily imply war, and that she can perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war; this is not the case with Germany! She has the speed and Russia has the numbers, and the safety of the German Empire forbids that Germany should allow Russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions. The situation now is that, though the Imperial Government has allowed her several hours beyond the specified time, Russia has sent no answer. Germany has therefore ordered mobilisation, and the German Representative at St. Petersburg has been instructed within a certain time to inform the Russian Government that the Imperial Government must regard this refusal to answer as creating a state of war."

On August 1 Germany ordered a general mobilisation of the navy and army to commence on the following day. It will be remembered, however, that Germany had already declared a state of war. As a result of such a declaration six classes of the German troops were automatically called up. Of these six classes, three were sufficient to bring their covering troops up to war strength, the remaining three being the reserve. The state of war was accordingly mobilisation under another name. This was done by Germany, as well as was the subsequent general mobilisation ordered by her, notwithstanding that on July 29 Russia had offered to stop all her military preparations if Austria would recognise that the conflict with Serbia had become a question of general European interest, and would eliminate from her ultimatum the points which involved a violation of the sovereignty of Serbia. Although some Russian mobilisation had in fact taken place, yet it was very limited, local and partial, and mainly directed towards Austria. Moreover, on the very day that Germany had ordered mobilisation, Russia had given an assurance that she would on no account commence hostilities if the Germans did not cross the frontier. It was only after a decree of general mobilisation had been issued in Austria, on August 1, that Russia in her turn ordered a general mobilisation of her army and navy. Even then, notwithstanding these mobilisations, Russia expressed

herself ready to continue conversations with the German Ambassador with a view to preserving peace. France, already forty-eight hours behind Germany in mobilisation, had yet not only not mobilised, but had even ordered her troops not to go nearer to the German frontier than a distance of ten kilometres, so as to avoid any ground for accusations of provocation to Germany. These French forces on the frontier had then opposed to them eight German army corps on a war footing, and an attack by the German army was expected at any moment. Under these circumstances the French Minister of War ordered the mobilisation of his army, but at once announced to the Powers that this act was undertaken purely for defensive purposes.

The following dispatch from the British Ambassador at Vienna to Sir Edward Grey shows the light in which Germany's ultimatum to Russia was regarded:

VIENNA, *August* 1, 1914.

I am to be received to-morrow by Minister for Foreign Affairs. This afternoon he is to see the French and Russian Ambassadors. I have just been informed by the Russian Ambassador of German ultimatum requiring that Russia should demobilise within twelve hours. On being asked by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the inevitable refusal of Russia to yield to this curt summons meant war, the German Ambassador replied that Germany would be forced to mobilise if Russia refused. Russian Ambassador at Vienna thinks that war is almost inevitable, and that as mobilisation is too expensive to be kept for long, Germany will attack Russia at once. He says that the so-called mobilisation of Russia amounted to nothing more than that Russia had taken military measures corresponding to those taken by Germany. There seems to be even greater tension between Germany and Russia than there is between Austria and Russia. Russia would, according to the Russian Ambassador, be satisfied even now with assurance respecting Serbian integrity and independence. He says that Russia had no intention to attack Austria. He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that most terrific consequences must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with His Excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and that his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.

It is the intention of the French Ambassador to speak earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do. I fear that nothing can alter the determination of Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course, if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany.

War, or the immediate prospect of it, now extended beyond Austria and Serbia. On August 1 German troops were not only already on the French frontier, but had even made incursions across it. Germany had delivered an ultimatum to Russia which was bound, as intended by Germany, to end in war between the two Powers. German troops were invading Luxemburg—the small independent state between part of Germany, France and Belgium, whose neutrality had been guaranteed by all the Powers with the same object as the similar guarantee of Belgium. Not one blow had yet been struck, or threatened, either by Russia or France, certainly not by Belgium or Luxemburg, and yet more certainly not by Britain. Coincident almost with the violation and invasion of Luxemburg, the Minister of State of that country received from Germany a telegram announcing the intended movements of the latter Power. Thereupon Luxemburg telegraphed to Britain as follows:

LUXEMBURG, *August* 2, 1914.

The Luxemburg Minister of State, Eyshen, has just received through the German Minister in Luxemburg, M. de Buch, a telegram from the Chancellor of the German Empire, Bethmann-Hollweg, to the effect that the military measures taken in Luxemburg do not constitute a hostile act against Luxemburg, but are only intended to insure against a possible attack of a French army. Full compensation will be paid to Luxemburg for any damage caused by using the railways which are leased to the Empire.

Later on in the same day, Luxemburg again telegraphed to Britain, protesting energetically against the German aggression:

LUXEMBURG, *August* 2, 1914.

I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's notice the following facts:—

On Sunday, August 2, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Romich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

But France and Luxemburg were not the only objects of German aggression. Following up the methods already initiated in Hamburg against British shipping, 100 tons of sugar were being compulsorily unloaded, on August 1, from the British steamship *Sapho* at Hamburg, and detained. Similar action was being taken with regard to other British vessels loaded with sugar. In fact, for this and the next few days, until August 4, British ships were continually being detained at Hamburg, Cuxhaven and other German ports. All this was being done by Germany in direct contravention of international law. Protests were made at the time by the British Government, but were ineffective and ignored by Germany. Thus Germany had already commenced aggressions against Britain which would, under the circumstances, have justified warlike operations on the part of Britain.

But to return to Belgium. We have already stated that on July 31 the British Government had asked both the French and the German Governments whether they were prepared to engage to respect the neutrality of Belgium. At the same time Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to the British Minister at Brussels, as follows:

FOREIGN OFFICE, *July* 31, 1914.

In view of existing treaties, you should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that, in consideration of the possibility of a European war, I have asked French and German Governments whether each is prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium provided it is violated by no other Power.

You should say that I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other Powers to uphold and observe.

You should inform the Belgian Government that an early reply is desired.

That night a French Cabinet Council was being held at the Elysée in Paris. The French Foreign Minister was at that meeting, when Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador, called upon him to know what France would do in respect to the neutrality of Belgium. A note was taken by the Minister of Britain's inquiry and at once placed before the French Cabinet. It took a very short time for France to make up her mind on this point. Within a moment or two the reply came; it was as follows:

French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating that neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to assure defence of her own security, to act otherwise This assurance has been given several times. President of the Republic spoke of it to the

King of the Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day.

Belgium, too, had made up her mind! The question was asked earlier in this work, " Has Belgium a soul ? " In deciding as Belgium now did, she answered that question once for all. " Belgium expects and desires," stated her Foreign Minister, " that other Powers will observe and uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the utmost of her power." He went on to inform the British Minister that, in the event of the violation of the neutrality of their territory, they believed that they were in a position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations between Belgium and her neighbours were excellent, he continued, and there was no reason to suspect their intentions, but he thought it well, nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies.

Before this, however, the attitude of Germany in relation to Belgian neutrality had already on more than one occasion, in very recent years, been the subject of consideration and even decision by Germany herself, the conclusion always announced being that Germany would respect the neutrality. Whether such was the conclusion in fact may, in the light of our knowledge of German diplomatic duplicity, be doubtful. But there can be no doubt whatever that such a conclusion was openly expressed and published by Germany, if only for the purpose of misleading Belgium and lulling her into a feeling of security so that she might not apprehend and prepare for a German invasion.

In the year 1911, at the time of the Moroccan crisis, when war between France and Germany was likely to break out at any time, the question of the proposed Dutch project concerning the fortification of Flushing came to the front in this connection. It began to be widely believed that in the event of the war between France and Germany taking place, Belgian neutrality would be violated. As a fact, Belgium then was filled with a feeling of distrust of Germany, public opinion being that she and Holland were working together, particularly in regard to the proposed fortifications, with a view to future operations against Belgium. Accordingly, in order that public opinion might be reassured, and these feelings of distrust be diminished, Belgium suggested to Germany that a Declaration in the German Parliament on the occasion of the debate on foreign affairs would be a reassuring and valuable procedure. Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg readily replied to this suggestion, at the same time intimating that he appreciated the feelings which inspired it. He took the

opportunity in his reply to declare that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality, but declined, however, to make the public declaration as suggested. His ground was that by so doing Germany would weaken her military situation in relation to France, which being reassured as regarded the northern region, could concentrate all her forces on the east. Two years later, in May 1913, when no such international difficulties existed as in 1911, Herr von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister, made a speech at a sitting of the German Budget Commission. He then said, according to the semi-official *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, as reported in the *Morning Post*: "The neutrality of Belgium has been determined upon by international conventions, and Germany is determined to respect those conventions." This declaration, however, was regarded by many German politicians, especially the social democrats, to be vague and unsatisfactory, and they accordingly endeavoured, but without success, to get Herr von Jagow to speak more plainly.

On July 24, 1914, when the political atmosphere of Europe was becoming very unsettled and there then appeared to exist some possibility of a future development in which the interests of Belgium might be involved, the Belgian Foreign Minister, M. Davignon, addressed a signed but undated letter to the Belgian Ministers in foreign capitals, on which, however, they were to act only when advised so to do by a telegraphic dispatch. It ran, again quoting the *Morning Post*, as follows:

The international situation is grave. The eventuality of a conflict between several Powers cannot be dismissed from the preoccupations of the Government of the King. Belgium has observed with the most scrupulous exactitude the duties of a neutral State which are imposed on her by the treaties of April 19, 1839. Those duties she will unswervingly fulfil under all circumstances. The friendly dispositions of the Powers towards her have been affirmed so often that Belgium feels confident that her territory will remain outside any attempt should hostilities break out on her frontiers. All the measures necessary to secure the preservation of her neutrality have nevertheless been taken by the Government of the King. The Belgian army is mobilised, and is being sent to the strategic position chosen to assure the defence of the country and respect for her neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and of the Meuse are in a state of defence. It is scarcely necessary for me to insist, Monsieur le Ministre, on the character of these measures. They have no other object but to place Belgium in a position to fulfil her international obligations; they have not been, and cannot have been, inspired, as is evident, either by an intention to take part in an armed struggle of the Powers or by a feeling of distrust towards them. An identical communication has been made to the other Powers which have guaranteed Belgian neutrality.

But to proceed again to the end of July 1914. Events were moving very rapidly. Austria's ultimatum to Serbia had been delivered, the reply received and rejected by Austria, and on the 28th Austria had declared war upon Serbia. Russia had announced that she would resist in arms any attack by Austria upon Serbia under the circumstances. It was known, too, that Germany was not only allied to Austria, but was prompting her in this action against Serbia, and that, therefore, if the war between Austria and Serbia could not be localised, not only Russia but Germany, and France as the ally of Russia and the certain objective of Germany, would join in, with perhaps the assistance on the side of Russia and France of Britain. So Belgium, on July 29, placed her army on a reinforced peace footing. This was not by any means a mobilisation by Belgium of her forces, and in notifying the reinforcement of her army to her Foreign Ministers, she pointed this fact out. Mobilisation would, if necessary, occur later on as an extreme measure of precaution. What was then done was justified by the following statement, issued by M. Davignon to the Belgian Ministers abroad:

> By reason of the small extent of its territory, the whole of Belgium constitutes, so to speak, a frontier zone. Her army, on the ordinary peace footing, has only one class of troops under arms. On a reinforced peace footing, her army, with its divisions and cavalry division, by reason of the calling out of the three classes, has effectives similar to those of the corps permanently maintained on the frontier zones of the neighbouring Powers.

As stated already, Belgium on July 31 had declared to Britain through our Minister in Brussels that she intended to defend her neutrality. M. Davignon at the same time remarked on the fact that, though France and Britain had assured him that the neutrality of Belgium would be respected, yet no such assurance had been received from Germany. He communicated at once with the German Minister at Brussels desiring that the assurance should be given at once. The German Minister then stated that he had every reason to believe that the attitude of Germany would be the same as it always had been and as it had been expressly announced by his own predecessor only a short time before—namely, that Germany would respect the neutrality of Belgium. Nevertheless, dissatisfied with Germany's reticence, when at all times she should have spoken promptly and to the point, Belgium considered it necessary at once to mobilise, and so did, though in this respect only following the example of Holland, which had already mobilised. In conversation that day with Sir Francis Villiers, the British Minister at Brussels, M. Davignon stated that

the recent date of new military law of Belgium and the temporary character of the measures which they had to take on the occasion of its introduction, made urgent and comprehensive arrangements essential. The neighbours and guarantors of Belgium should therefore interpret the mobilisation as a profound desire on the part of Belgium to maintain her neutrality herself.

The fair words of the German Minister at Brussels spoken by him on July 31 were soon to be proved unjustified. On the other hand, the mobilisation of Belgium was discovered to be more than justified. On August 2 that same Minister presented to Belgium the famous ultimatum of that date. It ran as follows:

August 2, 1914.

(*Very Confidential.*)

Reliable information has been received by the German Government to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory against Germany.

The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of the utmost goodwill, will be unable, without assistance, to repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect of success to afford an adequate guarantee against danger to Germany. It is essential for the self-defence of Germany that she should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Government would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to enter Belgian territory.

In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the German Government make the following declaration :—

1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain an attitude of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom in full.

2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.

3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared, in co-operation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all necessaries for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German troops.

4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will, to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.

In this event, Germany can undertake no obligations towards Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the two States must be left to the decision of arms.

The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the friendly ties which bind the two neighbouring States will grow stronger and more enduring.

In this connection it is important to note the clear and precise nature of the French recognition of Belgian neutrality. On July 31 the French Minister at Brussels informed M. Davignon that no incursion of French troops should take place into Belgium even if important forces should be massed on the frontiers of the country; that France would not care to assume the responsibility of committing, in regard to Belgium, the first act of hostility; and that instructions in that sense would be given to the French authorities. He also said: "I am authorised to declare that in case of an international conflict, the Government of the Republic, as it has always declared, will respect the neutrality of Belgium. In the hypothetical case of that neutrality not being respected by any Power, the French Government, to safeguard its own defence, might be allowed to modify its attitude."

In reply to Germany's ultimatum, Belgium declared most emphatically that she would fight for her independence and integrity. The Belgian Government protested that the intentions "attributed to France are in contradiction with the formal declarations which have been made to us on August 1, in the name of the Government of the Republic. Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, a violation of Belgian neutrality should come to be made by France, Belgium would fulfil all her international duties, and her army would oppose to the invader the most vigorous resistance. The attempt upon her independence which the German Government threatens would constitute a flagrant violation of the rights of nations. No strategic consideration justifies violation of right. Were it to accept the propositions that have been put to it, the Belgian Government would sacrifice the honour of the nations and at the same time go back on its duties towards Europe. Conscious of the part that Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the world's civilisation, it refuses to believe that the independence of Belgium can be preserved only at the price of violation of her neutrality. If that hope is ill-founded, the Belgian Government is firmly resolved to repel by every means in its power any attempt upon its right."

Early in the morning of August 3—in fact, in the middle of the night, at 1.30 a.m.—the German Minister at Brussels hurried anxiously and eagerly to the residence of the Secretary-General of the Belgian Foreign Office. One would expect that his errand

had been one of supreme importance. It was, however, to complain to Belgium that, as he alleged, French bombs had been dropped in Germany and French cavalry had crossed the Franco-German frontier into Germany, although there had yet been no declaration of war between Germany and France. The Secretary-General remarked at once, that all that was none of his business, nor could he see how it could interest Belgium, and certainly, considered as a matter of general information, it hardly justified a visit at such an hour. To this the German emissary had no reply. It was only another instance of the tactless and crude diplomacy of Prussia. In some vague fashion the Kaiser must have thought that this action of France—which parenthetically, it may be observed, never took place at all—would in some way or other justify Germany's violation of Belgian territory.

Later on in the day, the French Government through their attaché at Brussels offered the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government. At once the latter sent the following reply :

> We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the Powers. The Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take.

This reply was communicated to the British Government.

On the following day, August 4, the King of Belgium telegraphed a personal appeal to King George for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium, saying :

> Remembering the numerous proofs of Your Majesty's friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870, and the proof of friendship you have just given us, again I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of Your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.

The appeal was not made in vain.

Sir Edward Grey at once communicated with the British Ambassador at Berlin informing him of the appeal. Sir Edward at the same time stated the position as it then stood between Germany and Belgium, and that Belgium had refused the proposal of Germany as being a flagrant violation of the law of nations. Thereupon, on behalf of the British Government, Sir Edward Grey formally protested to Germany against this violation of a treaty to which Germany was a party in common with Britain, and requested an assurance by Germany immediately that the

THE KING OF THE BELGIANS.

demands made upon Belgium would not be proceeded with and that her neutrality would be respected by Germany. While this protest of Great Britain was before the German Foreign Office, Germany in Belgium was presenting a note to the Belgian Foreign Minister stating that, as the Belgian Government had declined the "well-intentioned proposals" submitted to them by the Imperial Government, the latter would, "deeply to their regret," be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable in view of "the French menaces"! At the same time, the British Minister at Brussels was, on instructions from Britain, informing the Belgian Government that if pressure were applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, Britain expected that they would resist by any means in their power, and that Britain would support them in every such resistance; and moreover, that the British Government in this event were prepared to join Russia and France, if desired, in offering to the Belgian Government at once common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against them and a guarantee to maintain their independence and integrity in future years.

Soon after the receipt by King Albert of a telegram in reply to his from King George, he and the Royal Family proceeded to the Belgian Parliament House, where they were greeted by a cheering and enthusiastic Chamber. With deep emotion, the Belgian King made a speech to his Parliament. He said:

Never since 1830 has a graver hour sounded for Belgium. The strength of our right and the need of Europe for our autonomous existence make us still hope that the dreaded events will not occur. If it is necessary for us to resist an invasion of our soil, however, that duty will find us armed and ready to make the greatest sacrifices. Our young men have already come forward to defend the Fatherland in danger. One duty alone is imposed upon us—namely, the maintenance of a stubborn resistance, courage, and union. Our bravery is proved by our faultless mobilisation and by the multitude of voluntary engagements. This is the moment for action. I have called you together to-day in order to allow the Chambers to participate in the enthusiasm of the country. You will know how to adopt with urgency all necessary measures. Are you decided to maintain inviolate the sacred patrimony of our ancestors? No one will fail in his duty, and the Army is capable of performing its task. The Government and I are fully confident . . . I have faith in our destinies. A country which defends itself gains the respect of all. That country does not perish. If the foreigner, in defiance of the neutrality of which we have always observed the exigencies, violates our territory, he will find all Belgians grouped round their Sovereign, who will never betray his Constitutional oath, and who is supported by a Government invested with the absolute

confidence of the whole nation. God will be with us in this just cause. Long live independent Belgium !

The Belgian Socialist leader, Vandervelde, was created a Minister of State. All Belgian parties were now united to defend their country.

In London, Germany was still manœuvring in order to prevent British support of Belgium. The very day that Britain was advising Belgium to defend her independence and integrity and promising to support her in conjunction with Russia and France, or even alone if necessary, and German troops were actually invading Belgian territory, Prince Lichnowsky was communicating to Sir Edward Grey a telegram which he had just received from Berlin. As a last resort, Germany was endeavouring to ensure the neutrality of Britain by promising that even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium Germany would under no pretences whatever annex Belgian territory. The following is the text of the telegram:

BERLIN, *August* 4, 1914.

Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever, annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne out by fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please impress upon Sir E. Grey that German army could not be exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a question of life or death to prevent French advance.

Later on in the day, Britain addressed an ultimatum to Germany giving the Kaiser until midnight wherein to withdraw from Belgium and to agree to respect the neutrality of that country. The telegram was as follows:

FOREIGN OFFICE, *August* 4, 1914.

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must

repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by twelve o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

Not only in England and on the Continent, but even in the more distant parts of the world, such as the United States and the British Colonies in particular, a mighty unrest and anxiety had been increasingly manifest right from Monday, July 27, the day when the crisis seemed to become imminent. On that day Sir Edward Grey was endeavouring to arrange a Conference to settle the difficulty; but Germany, though approving his endeavour in principle, declined to be a party to summoning Austria before a European tribunal. On the London Stock Exchange there were heavy falls in prices; the Bourses were closed in Vienna, Budapest and Brussels; in Paris the Coulisse was closed, and French Rentes fell 5. On the following day, the 28th, Austria declared war on Serbia; Russia mobilised in the direction of Austria in four army districts, and the Kaiser telegraphed to the Czar protesting against the mobilisation. In New York there was a heavy liquidation of securities; the Montreal Stock Exchange remained open only during the morning; and at Toronto the Stock Exchange was open for only ten minutes during the whole day. On the 29th Belgrade was bombarded by the Austrians; Germany, France and Belgium prepared for war; the Bourses of Petrograd, Amsterdam and Montreal closed altogether; Mr. Asquith was describing the situation as "one of extreme gravity"; Germany was now begging Great Britain to remain neutral provided she did not touch Holland and took nothing from France but her colonies, though Germany at the same time refused to promise that she would not invade Belgium. The next day Sir Edward Grey rejected the overtures of Germany; the Kaiser threatened war against Russia unless the latter Power demobilised, notwithstanding the Czar's explanation that the mobilisation was against Austria only; the Bank Rate in England rose from 3 to 4 per cent., and in France from 3½ to 4½ per cent.; the Bourses at Rome and Milan now also closed. On July 31 the Czar, with a view to assisting a pacific settlement, sends a cordial telegram to the Kaiser promising that his troops will take no provocative action while the negotiations continue, to which the Kaiser replies that he hears of mobilisation on the Russian-German frontier, and declares the peace of Europe depends upon Russia; the Stock Exchanges are closed in England and the United States; the

Bank Rate is raised to 8 per cent.; in Paris, where the Bourse, alone of all the great Bourses of the world, continues open, there is a run on the banks, but prices are nominal. On August 1 Germany delivers her ultimatum, and at 5 o'clock in the afternoon declares war against France and Russia; Germany and France mobilise; the Germans begin to march through Luxemburg, the Grand Duchess protesting, but submitting to overwhelming force; and the Bank Rate in England rises to 10 per cent. On the following day the Russians enter Germany, and fighting commences between the French and Germans; in France a moratorium is declared, financial settlements being postponed to August 31; England promises France naval protection in the North Sea; the British Naval Reserves are mobilised, and the King in Council orders the first Royal Proclamation announcing a British Moratorium. By this time it had been found impossible to get gold in Paris, and the Bank of France had made arrangements to issue small notes.

We now come to August 3, a Monday and Bank Holiday in England. It was now known that Belgium had rejected the German ultimatum, and that Italy, one of the partners in the Triple Alliance and so well in touch with German and Austrian diplomacy and intentions, had proclaimed her neutrality. The British Fleet was being mobilised: throughout the country and the Empire the nerves of the people were on edge; the atmosphere was electrical. For years and years, and particularly during the more recent years, the one outstanding political uncertainty had been the time and occasion when Britain and Germany would find themselves at war: its inevitableness had for a long time been acknowledged. There was a great wave of feeling through Britain and the Empire that, whatever the cost, perhaps it would be for the best that the war should take place now and the uncertainty be ended once for all. A great anxiety was felt in regard to the proceedings which would take place that afternoon and evening in the British House of Parliament. The House met at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Sir Edward Grey at once made a speech which summarised perfectly the British position as it was then conceived. This speech insisted not only upon the obligation of Britain to protest as effectively as possible against Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality, but disclosed for the first time the secret arrangement come to between France and Britain in 1912. The part of the speech which related to that arrangement should here be set out in full:

In this present crisis, up till yesterday, we have also given no promise of anything more than diplomatic support. Now I must make this ques-

tion of obligation clear to the House. I must go back to the first Moroccan crisis of 1906. That was the time of the Algeciras Conference, and it came at a time of very great difficulty to His Majesty's Government, when a general election was in progress, and Ministers were scattered over the country, and I—spending three days a week in my constituency and three days at the Foreign Office—was asked the question whether, if that crisis developed into war between France and Germany, we would give armed support. I said then that I could promise nothing to any foreign Power unless it was subsequently to receive the whole-hearted support of public opinion here if the occasion arose. I said, in my opinion, if war was forced upon France then on the question of Morocco—a question which had just been the subject of agreement between this country and France, an agreement exceedingly popular on both sides—that if out of that agreement war was forced on France at that time, in my view public opinion in this country would have rallied to the material support of France.

I gave no promise, but I expressed that opinion during the crisis, as far as I remember almost in the same words, to the French Ambassador and the German Ambassador at the time. I made no promise, and I used no threats, but I expressed that opinion. That position was accepted by the French Government; but they said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, "If you think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish to give it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts." There was force in that. I agreed to it, and authorised those conversations to take place, but on the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time arose.

As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime Minister; I consulted, I remember, Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of State for War; and the present Prime Minister, who was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. That was the most I could do, and they authorised that, on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of the Government free whenever the crisis arose. The fact that conversations between military and naval experts took place was later on—I think much later on, because that crisis passed, and the thing ceased to be of importance—but later on it was brought to the knowledge of the Cabinet.

The Agadir crisis came—another Morocco crisis—and throughout that I took precisely the same line that had been taken in 1906. But subsequently, in 1912, after discussion and consideration in the Cabinet, it was decided that we ought to have a definite understanding in writing, which was to be only in the form of an unofficial letter—that these conversations which took place were not binding upon the freedom of either Government; and on

November 22, 1912, I wrote to the French Ambassador the letter which I will now read to the House, and I received from him a letter in similar terms in reply. The letter which I have to read to the House is this, and it will be known to the public now as the record that, whatever took place between military and naval experts, they were not binding engagements upon the Government :—

"MY DEAR AMBASSADOR,

"From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not, to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

" You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

" I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common."

Lord Charles Beresford.—What is the date of that ?

Sir E. Grey.—November 22, 1912. That is the starting-point for the Government with regard to the present crisis. I think it makes it clear that what the Prime Minister and I said to the House of Commons was perfectly justified, and that, as regards our freedom to decide in a crisis what our line should be, whether we should intervene or whether we should abstain, the Government remained perfectly free, and *a fortiori*, the House of Commons remains perfectly free. That I say to clear the ground from the point of view of obligation. I think it was due to prove our good faith to the House of Commons that I should give that full information to the House now, and say, what I think is obvious from the letter I have just read, that we do not construe anything which has previously taken place in our diplomatic relations with other Powers in this matter as restricting the freedom of the Government to decide what attitude they should take now, or restrict the freedom of the House of Commons to decide what their attitude should be.

Well, Sir, I will go further, and I will say this : The situation in the present crisis is not precisely the same as it was in the Morocco question. In the Morocco question it was primarily a dispute which concerned France —a dispute which concerned France and France primarily—a dispute, as

it seemed to us, affecting France out of an agreement subsisting between us and France, and published to the whole world, in which we engaged to give France diplomatic support. No doubt we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support; we were, at any rate, pledged by a definite public agreement to stand with France diplomatically in that question.

The present crisis has originated differently. It has not originated with regard to Morocco. It has not originated as regards anything with which we had a special agreement with France; it has not originated with anything which primarily concerned France. It has originated in a dispute between Austria and Serbia. I can say this with the most absolute confidence—no Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war over a dispute with Austria and Serbia than the Government and the country of France. They are involved in it because of their obligation of honour under a definite alliance with Russia. Well, it is only fair to say to the House that that obligation of honour cannot apply in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that alliance. So far I have, I think, faithfully and completely cleared the ground with regard to the question of obligation.

I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. For many years we have had a long-standing friendship with France. I remember well the feeling in the House, and my own feeling—for I spoke on the subject, I think, when the late Government made their agreement with France—the warm and cordial feeling resulting from the fact that these two nations, who had had perpetual differences in the past, had cleared these differences away; I remember saying, I think, that it seemed to me that some benign influence had been at work to produce the cordial atmosphere that had made that possible. But how far that friendship entails obligation—it has been a friendship between the nations and ratified by the nations—how far that entails an obligation, let every man look into his own heart and his own feelings, and construe the extent of the obligation for himself. I construe it myself as I feel it, but I do not wish to urge upon any one else more than their feelings dictate as to what they should feel about the obligation. The House, individually and collectively, may judge for itself. I speak my personal view, and I have given the House my own feeling in the matter.

The French fleet is now in the Mediterranean, and the northern and western coasts of France are absolutely undefended. The French fleet being concentrated in the Mediterranean, the situation is very different from what it used to be, because the friendship which has grown up between the two countries has given them a sense of security that there was nothing to be feared from us.

The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought, and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the English Channel and bombarded and battered the unde-

fended coasts of France, we could not stand aside, and see this going on practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded, looking on dispassionately, doing nothing. I believe that would be the feeling of this country. There are times when one feels that if these circumstances actually did arise, it would be a feeling which would spread with irresistible force throughout the land.

But I also want to look at the matter without sentiment, and from the point of view of British interests; and it is on that that I am going to base and justify what I am presently going to say to the House. If we say nothing at this moment, what is France to do with her fleet in the Mediterranean? If she leaves it there, with no statement from us as to what we will do, she leaves her northern and western coasts absolutely undefended, at the mercy of a German fleet coming down the Channel to do as it pleases in a war which is a war of life and death between them. If we say nothing, it may be that the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean. We are in the presence of a European conflagration: can anybody set limits to the consequences that may arise out of it? Let us assume that to-day we stand aside in an attitude of neutrality, saying, "No, we cannot undertake and engage to help either party in this conflict." Let us suppose the French fleet is withdrawn from the Mediterranean; and let us assume that the consequences—which are already tremendous in what has happened in Europe even to countries which are at peace—in fact, equally whether countries are at peace or at war—let us assume that out of that come consequences unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in defence of vital British interests, we should go to war; and let us assume—which is quite possible—that Italy, who is now neutral—because, as I understand, she considers that this war is an aggressive war, and the Triple Alliance being a defensive alliance, her obligation did not arise—let us assume that consequences which are not yet foreseen and which, perfectly legitimately consulting her own interests, make Italy depart from her attitude of neutrality at a time when we are forced in defence of vital British interests ourselves to fight—what then will be the position in the Mediterranean? It might be that at some critical moment those consequences would be forced upon us because our trade routes in the Mediterranean might be vital to this country.

Nobody can say that in the course of the next few weeks there is any particular trade route, the keeping open of which may not be vital to this country. What will be our position then? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other fleets in the Mediterranean. It would be the very moment when we could not detach more ships to the Mediterranean, and we might have exposed this country from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most appalling risk. I say that from the point of view of British interests. We feel strongly that France was entitled to know—and to know at once—whether or not in the event of attack upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend upon British support. In that emergency, and in these compelling circumstances, yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement:—

"I am authorised to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be taken as binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place."

I read that to the House not as a declaration of war on our part, not as entailing immediate aggressive action on our part, but as binding us to take aggressive action should that contingency arise.

After Sir Edward Grey had concluded his speech, the leader of the Opposition, Mr. Bonar Law, arose, supporting him and the policy of the Government in whole-hearted and enthusiastic words, later to be emphasised in a speech by Mr. A. J. Balfour, the late Conservative Prime Minister. But the supreme dramatic moment came with the speech of Mr. John Redmond, the leader of the Irish Nationalist Party, who now rose to his feet, to declare, in an oration which had never been equalled within the memory of any living parliamentarian in sincerity and depth of feeling, that Nationalist Ireland was prepared to sink her differences with Ulster and the United Kingdom in order that the whole Empire, without exception, should be united in the front it would present to the enemy. He spoke as follows:

I hope the House will not consider it improper on my part, in the grave circumstances in which we are assembled, if I intervene for a very few moments. I was moved a great deal by that sentence in the speech of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in which he said that the one bright spot in the situation was the changed feeling in Ireland. In past times, when this Empire has been engaged in these terrible enterprises, it is true—it would be the utmost affectation and folly on my part to deny it—the sympathy of the Nationalists of Ireland, for reasons to be found deep down in centuries of history, have been estranged from this country. Allow me to say that what has occurred in recent years has altered the situation completely. I must not touch, and I may be trusted not to touch, on any controversial topic; but this I may be allowed to say, that wider knowledge of the real facts of Irish history has, I think, altered the view of the democracy of this country towards the Irish question, and to-day I honestly believe that the democracy of Ireland will turn with the utmost anxiety and sympathy to this country in every trial and every danger that may overtake it. There is a possibility, at any rate, of history repeating itself. The House will remember that in 1778, at the end of the disastrous American war, when it might, I think, truly be said that the military power of this country was almost at its lowest ebb, and when the shores of Ireland were threatened

with foreign invasion, a body of 100,000 Irish volunteers sprang into existence for the purpose of defending her shores. At first no Catholic—ah, how sad the reading of the history of those days is!—was allowed to be enrolled in that body of volunteers, and yet from the very first day the Catholics of the South subscribed money and sent it towards the arming of their Protestant fellow-countrymen.

Ideas widened as time went on, and finally the Catholics in the South were armed and enrolled, brothers-in-arms, with their fellow-countrymen of a different creed in the North. May history repeat itself! To-day there are in Ireland two large bodies of volunteers. One of them sprang into existence in the North. Another has sprung into existence in the South. I say to the Government that they may to-morrow withdraw every one of their troops from Ireland. I say that the coast of Ireland will be defended from foreign invasion by her armed sons, and for this purpose armed Nationalist Catholics in the South will be only too glad to join arms with armed Protestant Ulstermen in the North. And is it too much to hope that out of this situation there may spring a result which will be good, not merely for the Empire, but for the future welfare and integrity of the Irish nation? I ought to apologise for having intervened—("No, no")—but while Irishmen generally are in favour of peace, and would desire to save the democracy of this country from all the horrors of war—while we would make every possible sacrifice for that purpose, still, if the dire necessity is forced upon this country, we offer to the Government of the day that they may take their troops away, and that, if it is allowed to us in comradeship with our brethren in the North, we will ourselves defend the coasts of our country.

After this expression of the Irish Nationalist cordial sympathy with the general British policy in relation to the probable war, and some irresponsible and ineffective criticism from a Socialist, who, as future events showed, spoke practically for himself alone, the House suspended its sitting until later in the evening. On the resumption of the sitting Sir Edward Grey made another statement, subsequently obtaining a mandate from the nation to join hands with France and Russia to prevent the violation of Belgium's neutrality and the conquest of France as designed and threatened by Germany. So Britain found herself at length fighting on the side of Serbia against Austrian aggression. Parliament then proceeded to pass a Suspension of Payments Act, which gave retrospective sanction to the proclamation issued on the previous day, and establishing a moratorium, though only for bills of exchange. The Bank Holiday was prolonged until Thursday evening.

On the following day, August 4, the British Government assumed control of the railways and mobilised the British army; the Bank Rate was raised to 10 per cent.; the Germans besieged

Liége, and the Reichstag voted £265,000,000; in France a war fund of 5,000,000,000 francs was voted; and in Italy a moratorium was declared until August 20. The British Government also issued a scheme of war insurance on ships and cargoes, which met with a good reception from the ship-owners and underwriters, who decided to support it, though many underwriters felt quite competent to deal with war insurance risks themselves.

Parliament met in the afternoon, an expectant and crowded Chamber. The Prime Minister read the ultimatum which had been presented by Britain to Germany. The House gathered together in, and maintained, a calm demeanour devoid of passion but inspiring in its suggestion of unwavering resolution. Votes amounting to £100,000,000 were passed without debate, and Mr. Asquith delivered a great speech, pregnant with a noble patriotism.

That evening the German Government in Berlin summarily rejected the request made by the British Government for assurances that the neutrality of Belgium would be respected, and the British Ambassador at Berlin received his passports. Thereupon the British Government declared to the German Government that a state of war existed between Great Britain and Germany as from 11 p.m. on August 4. A dispatch of Sir Edward Goschen, dated August 8, describes the manner in which the British ultimatum was received by Germany, and how Germany appeared surprised and unable to understand that Great Britain should make war on a kindred nation, as Germany was, just for a word "neutrality" and just for "a scrap of paper." The dispatch shows also how Germany and the Kaiser could forget not only their moral obligations in respect to treaties, but also their obligations of courtesy to a departing Ambassador.

It was not, however, until midnight of August 12 that a state of war existed between Austria and Britain. A dispatch of Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador at Vienna, was subsequently published, which described the course of events in the Dual Monarchy prior and subsequent to the outbreak of war.[1]

[1] The dispatches, speeches and correspondence referred to in this chapter are set out with as little detail as possible, since, at the price of one penny, they have been published in a collected pamphlet form by the British Government. This pamphlet should be in the hands of every reader of this History. Copies can be obtained from Messrs. Wyman & Sons, Ltd., Government Printers, 29, Bream's Buildings, Fetter Lane, London, E.C.

CHAPTER XIV

BRITAIN IN HER RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND RUSSIA

I.—*General Relations:* Until 1890 Britain antagonistic to France and Russia—In 1891 France and Russia came to an understanding—In 1903 Germany and Britain part company—The Anglo-French Entente Cordiale, 1903—The Anglo-Russian Entente, 1907—The Triple Entente.

II.—*Anglo-French Relations:* 1882–91: Anglo-French relations—Incident to colonial policy of France—Tunisia—Egypt—Britain buys shares of Suez Canal—The Condominium—Arabi Pashi—Quelled by Britain—Who then settles in the country—But assured France that she did not intend to remain in the country—She acquires Equatoria and Uganda—Abyssinia—Madagascar—West Coast of Africa—Nigeria—The Far East—Newfoundland. 1891—1902: Another period of struggle—Franco-Russian Treaty marked an epoch—Imperialism for both France and Britain—Resultant hostility—Tunisia—The Capitulations—Britain consents to their abolition—Preferential customs duties—Britain's policy of "the open door"—Morocco—Interest of France therein—Political influence of Britain in Morocco—Anglo-French conflict there changes to accord—Egypt—Mission of Major Marchand—Fashoda—Bitter feeling in France—Treaty of 1899—An Abyssinian railway—Conflicts in Red Sea and Madagascar—Senegal—Siam—Anglo-French Treaty, 1896—France believes Britain wants all Asia—China-Japanese War, 1895—Antagonistic diplomacy of France and Britain in relation to China and Japan—French and British failures and successes—Scenes in French Parliament—Bitter feeling between Britain and France—*The Entente Cordiale*—M. Delcassé and M. Paul Cambon—An isolated France liable to be the prey of Germany—Reasons for closer association between France and Britain—Spirit of "give and take"—Mutual support of armies and navies—The mission of M. Cambon—His first work—Arbitration in 1901—1903: King Edward's visit to Paris—His speech there—Return visit to London of M. Loubet—Rapprochement announced—Conventions of 1904—Visits of French and British fleets—Germany strikes the one note of dissatisfaction—End to naval rivalry between France and Britain—The two armies—The Great Convention of 1904—Settled the Moroccan and Egyptian questions as between Britain and France—The terms of the settlement—Abyssinia and Siam then settled—France and Britain unite for peace.

III.—*Anglo-Russian Relations and the Franco-Russian Alliance:* Anglo-Russian hostility—In the years preceding 1891 Britain indifferent to the maintenance of Turkish Empire—Russia then took the place of Britain—Russia's lack of seaboard—Her projects in the East—The Eastern Question—Afghanistan—Thibet—Russia leaves the Triple Alliance—Isolated among the Powers—Gambetta advocated Franco-Russian alliance—Military position of France, 1887—Russia and France become more friendly—Franco-Russian Treaty, 1891—1891 to 1901 a period of strained relations—*The Anglo-Japanese Alliance*, 1902—Its influence in the East—The important articles of the Treaty of Alliance—British opposition to it—Russia and Thibet—Anglo-Thibetan Treaty, 1906—Persian Gulf—Second Anglo-Japanese Treaty, 1905—Its importance in present war—Tended to Anglo-Russian amity—*The Accord of* 1907.

I

UNTIL the year 1890 France and Russia, each working independently of one another and generally in unfriendly antagonism, were both the subjects of very cautious dealing by Britain. In fact the Anglo-French and Anglo-Russian relations during this period may be said

TYPES OF THE FRENCH ARMY.

INFANTRY OF THE LINE. (SERVICE KIT.) ARTILLERY. CUIRASSIER. CHASSEUR À CHEVAL. ZOUAVE.



generally to have been of a constantly unfriendly character. In 1891 France and Russia came to an understanding so that thenceforth they could work in harmony one with the other. They had discovered that in all their operations they were opposed by England, and often by Britain and Germany jointly, and they saw that a secure future was only possible if each of them laid aside her prejudices and worked as well as possible together. The results of this alliance were very important, and became manifest very soon. The increasing independent and aggressive activities of Germany gradually made it impossible for Britain and Germany to maintain their thitherto long-standing friendly relations, and so in about twelve years' time, by the year 1903, the Anglo-German relations had become such that it was not only possible, but good policy for Britain to change her relations with France into co-operation and friendship. As a result of this, the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale was consummated in 1903. The inevitable result of this was that four years later, in 1907, Britain and Russia came together in a formal Entente or rapprochement. Thenceforth Germany was thrown back upon the Triple Alliance, and the relations between Britain and France since 1903, and Russia since 1907, were increasingly close and cordial. In order that the relative positions of Britain, France, and Russia as they stood at the commencement of the war, particularly in relation to Germany and the Triple Alliance, should be understood, it is necessary that their history should be presented to the reader. It is proposed accordingly to deal now with these relations, and in the following mode and order :—

The unfriendly Anglo-French relations, 1882–91.

The unfriendy Anglo-Russian relations, 1882–91.

The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1891.

The increasingly harmonious Anglo-French relations, 1891–1903, culminating in the Entente Cordiale.

The increasingly harmonious Anglo-Russian relations, 1891–1907, culminating in the Anglo-Russian rapprochement.

Anglo-French cordiality since 1903.

Anglo-Russian cordiality since 1907.

II

We will first deal with the Anglo-French relations, 1882–91. The political relations of Britain and France during this period were almost entirely incident to the colonial policy of France. During the whole of this decade there was an incessant rivalry between the two Powers in Africa. So too in Asia, and also, but on more friendly lines, in Newfoundland and the New Hebrides.

It was in Africa that France, after the year 1880, first proceeded with her colonial enterprises. Tunisia was the part in which she first made herself felt. According to the French view of the position, it had been arranged between Britain and France informally, in conversation between the diplomats at the Congress of Berlin, that since Britain was receiving Cyprus from Turkey she would put no obstacle in the way of France acquiring possession of Tunisia, a design which Britain had known had been contemplated by France for many years. So satisfied was the French delegate to the Conference, M. Waddington, that all was arranged with regard to Tunisia, that when he returned from Berlin, he said to a friend, showing him at the same time a portfolio he was carrying under his arm, "My dear sir, I am carrying Tunisia inside there." Now whatever may be the actual truth as to what did occur at Berlin, France when she proceeded to take possession of Tunisia found herself opposed so very strongly by Britain, that it was not until the expiration of about sixteen years that her position there was finally settled and recognised by Britain. The difficulties that arose were particularly the disinclination of Britain to permit France immediately to occupy effectively the important strategic port of Bizerta and to conclude the commercial treaties which France put forward in relation to Tunisia and which Britain regarded as not satisfactory to her commercial interests. But these difficulties in Tunisia were really more apparent than actual. There is no doubt whatever that Britain was always favourable to the occupation of Tunisia by the French. Any difficulties that may have arisen were only in respect to matters of detail.

It was different, however, in Egypt. There the difficulties between the two countries were very grave and as time went on became graver. Until the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, French influence in Egypt was as great as, if not greater than, that of Britain. That war, however, marked the beginning of the decline of French influence in Egypt. Directly after the war, France was wise enough at once to reconstruct as speedily as she could her European power. She was, however, foolish enough openly to declare her intention, when ready, to have her revenge upon Germany and to concentrate all her political activities, for at any rate a great many years, towards the attainment of that end. The result of this was that French interests in Egypt were neglected, and Britain, encouraged naturally by Germany, was increasing her power and prestige there. Accordingly, when Egyptian affairs, becoming pressing, necessitated European intervention, Britain was in the excellent position of being able to

seize the opportunity in default of France and so settle herself more firmly in the Valley of the Nile. France, not caring to attract all Europe to Egypt, arranged that she and Britain should operate there more or less jointly.

The result was what might have been expected. France eternally occupied on the Continent, and Britain in Egypt as a maritime and Eastern Power, the position of Britain became more and more settled there. In 1874, Britain bought shares in the Suez Canal which represented the interest therein of the Egyptian Government. This again strengthened the position of Britain. France then interfered and, in 1876, the financial administration of the country was placed under the joint control of France and Britain. Later on, in 1878, the Khedive formed a Ministry in which the Minister of Finance was an Englishman and that of Public Works a Frenchman. This condominium was formally recognised by Germany and the other Powers. In 1881 occurred the rising organised by Arabi Pasha.

It was necessary now for Britain and France, or one of them, to act promptly and decisively. The Sultan of Turkey, with a view to aiding the Khedive and repressing the insurrection, had already, against the advice of France and Britain, sent diplomatic representatives into Egypt. Thereupon France and Britain each sent a warship to Alexandria not only to protect their subjects, but also as a protest against the action of the Sultan. When, however, it came to proceeding further, the two nations were no longer in accord. At first Britain suggested that the insurrection should be repressed by Turkish troops, France, however, preferring joint Anglo-French action. Later on France changed her mind and pronounced against any armed intervention whether by France, Britain, or Turkey. France again changed her mind, the result being a demonstration against Egypt with an Anglo-French fleet. Yet again did France change her mind and proposed that an international conference should be called. Meanwhile the insurrection proceeded apace, whereupon the British part of the joint fleet, notwithstanding the refusal of the French part to co-operate, bombarded Alexandria. This was followed by the occupation of Egypt by British troops and the ultimate quelling of the insurrection by Sir Garnet Wolseley. Thenceforward Britain reigned supreme in Egypt. France undoubtedly, because of her own indifference and absence of decided policy, having stood aside and contributed, so made inevitable the new British régime.

The next move was the suppression by Great Britain, notwithstanding the protestation of France, of the French share in

the Egyptian financial control. Britain then, in 1885, undertook the reorganisation of the Egyptian army and made, in 1887, proposals to Turkey that she should remain in Egypt in order to restore order and place affairs on a settled basis for a period of three years. Both the Sultan and France opposed this what then seemed to be too lengthy an occupation by Britain, but the result of this opposition was that no conclusion at all was arrived at and Britain remained, as she does to this day, in complete and exclusive and practically sovereign occupation of Egypt.

After this, the Anglo-French struggle still continued in relation to Egypt and culminated in the conversion of the Egyptian public debt in 1891, to which France consented, recognising apparently that future conflict with Britain in respect to Egypt was hopeless, without receiving anything in exchange. France nevertheless clung persistently to what was now little more than an idea, that Britain ought to and must, when the right moment came, evacuate Egypt. When the conversion of the Egyptian debt was proposed, Lord Salisbury was very particular to separate that question from the question of evacuation; though, to allay the alarms of France, Britain frequently, as in 1884, 1887, and 1890, assured France that she had no intention to remain for ever in the country.

In 1886, as a result of the Holy War so successfully carried on by the Mahdi in the Soudan, Britain fixed the Egyptian frontier at Wady-Halfa. Britain made up her mind then that she would avenge, at the least risk, the death of Hicks Pasha and the assassination of Gordon by occasional future incursions into the Soudan as and when the Mahdi power died away. So eventually, as a result of a number of brilliant warlike incursions from Egypt into the Mahdi country, Britain acquired, outside Egyptian territory, Equatoria and Uganda, but France benefited not at all.

Even in Abyssinia France began to suffer through her non-association with Britain. In 1891 Britain and Italy between them allotted to each other the spheres of influence in Abyssinia which amounted to the dividing up between themselves of that country, regardless entirely of the footing of France so far as she had one there and in that neighbourhood. This Anglo-Italian arrangement was kept secret until 1894, when France protested very strongly against it.

The conquest of Madagascar was undertaken by France in 1885. Here again France found herself in conflict with Britain, and for many years after cherished bitter memories relative to the missionaries, the British Consul who would not recognise the French occupation, and other so-called "pin-pricks." In 1890, however, the Anglo-French Treaty of August 5 saw an end to

British hostility to the occupation of Madagascar by France, but even then Britain could not refrain from indicating verbally to France that she did not regard the French occupation of Madagascar as a settled matter.

We find, during this period, the same Anglo-French rivalry on the west coast of Africa as we have already found in Tunisia, Egypt, and Madagascar. Here on the west coast, neither party, French or British, made the least effort to accomplish their respective ends in anything like a friendly spirit. Questions of frontiers were always arising and being bitterly fought. Thus although the Sierra Leone frontiers were settled by Treaty in 1889 and 1892, yet even until the year 1895 French and British troops were struggling one with the other over the same question. There was a long-drawn-out conflict also in respect to the delimitation of the frontiers of Dahomey.

On the Niger the French interests had been bought up in 1884 by the Royal Niger Company. It seemed then that France had lost for ever all interest in that region. But no: from 1881 until 1887, when France installed herself at Cabara, the port of Timbuctoo, she was actively making herself felt in this neighbourhood. The result was that, when Britain entered into the treaty by which she recognised the French Protectorate of Madagascar, she also accorded to France a sphere of influence comprising the whole country between the Niger and the Tchad, it being stipulated, however, that Sokoto should continue to be territory of the Niger Company. France did not, however, look upon this arrangement as one of any great value; in fact Lord Salisbury himself regarded the interest thus acquired by France as quite valueless, being nothing but a tract of desert land. France, however, soon began to make the most of her rights under this treaty.

We have seen elsewhere the part Britain took in respect to the Congo Free State, at the Conference of Berlin. After the Conference, Britain changed her tactics, endeavouring thenceforth to exclude France from the interior of Africa, assisting the territorial development of the Congo Free State at the expense of rights which France claimed she had.

In Asia, France and Britain were rivals, starting from a fairly equal position. In the middle of 1885 France had conquered Tonquin, and in January 1886 Britain had conquered Upper Burmah. Both nations then endeavoured to approach China by way of Annam.

Newfoundland was also the scene of much Anglo-French difficulty. On the coast was the French shore, along which France had had rights of fishing since the days of the Treaty of Utrecht.

The people of Newfoundland claimed the right to use the soil itself of the French shore, particularly to exploit the minerals which could there be found. France agreed to this in 1884, it being also stipulated that the French fishers should have the right to buy bait, etc., on land or at sea in Newfoundland without paying customs duties or being subject to burdens of that character. This arrangement did not satisfy the people of Newfoundland, so in 1885 another was arrived at. This in its turn was succeeded by yet another in 1886, by which the Newfoundland people were prevented from selling to the French fishers any bait. Another difficulty soon arose; this time it was whether the French had a right to catch lobsters as distinguished from fishing for fish. The end of this dispute was that in 1890 Britain and France agreed that the latter country might retain the lobster stations she had then established, but should not establish any more, unless giving compensation to Newfoundland. Questions, too, arose in the New Hebrides, which were not dealt with, however, to any important extent until later on.

The succeeding ten years was again a period of struggle between these two rival Powers, France and Britain. Foreign possessions and rights carried with them conflicting interests, and these interests in their turn led almost inevitably to antagonism. However much the two countries may have wished to settle down in terms of complete amity, it was impossible until some time had elapsed wherein these conflicting interests might have an opportunity to adjust themselves anew. Our story must therefore continue for the present as one of conflict and hostility. Once more we must turn to Africa, Asia, the Pacific, and Newfoundland.

The year of the treaty of France with Russia was a year which marked a new departure in the politics both of France and of Britain. In France, the treaty itself was acclaimed as an inauguration of a new era. France found herself protected against invasion by Germany and so free to enter upon a career of imperialism. The ambition of France now was to extend her empire as widely as possible throughout the entire world. In Britain, too, this year was about the date at which a definite imperialistic policy began to make its appearance in British politics. Before this there had never been, as a clearly defined programme, any British imperialistic policy. Now, however, such a policy began to emerge. It was, in short, a policy of consolidating the Empire as it then already stood and preventing any other nation doing anything or acquiring any possessions which would encroach, or be likely to encroach, upon the rights and the interests of our

Empire. Since our Empire extended throughout the world, in some places in the midst of lands which were largely open to occupation either by ourselves or other Powers, it is obvious that with any Power such as France in the field aiming at extending her overseas possessions our interests would clash and hostilities ensue.

Turning to Africa, and Tunisia in particular, one finds that difficulties arose between France and Britain in respect to the renunciation of the Capitulations.

A few lines are needed here perhaps as to the origin and development of these institutions. Their object was to enable Christians to live in security within the dominions of a Moslem monarch. They were granted in Moslem countries, such as Tunisia had always been, centuries ago when the Christian was regarded by the Moslems as a man of inferior class, who, though he might be tolerated, could be regarded only as a trader and inferior. Times have altered since then, and concessions which at the time they were made were considered as immunities without which Christians would be continually exposed to the violence of the Mohammedans—concessions which contemptuously and as of grace conferred these privileges upon the Christian trader or traveller—became eventually the corner-stone of the castle within which their successors retained and from which they defied the power that of old had conferred them. These concessions had grown in the course of time into privileges on which the Europeans in the Bey's dominions based a claim to be regarded as members of a favoured class. By virtue of the grace contemptuously accorded them in former days by the Moslems, they now asserted their right to be exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of Mohammedan tribunals and to carry with them wherever they went an *imperium in imperio*, a national divinity which hedged them in as kings. Now France, having acquired possession of Tunisia's Government and the Bey being but a shadow, the actual Government being in fact that of France, a Christian State, it was claimed by France that the days which justified the Capitulations had passed and that they should accordingly be abolished and all Christians or Europeans—for the term is almost synonymous—should in Tunisia become subject to the law and the tribunals of the country. In short, France claimed that the foreigners in Tunisia should stand in the same relation to the laws and the tribunals of that country as the foreigner in France would stand in relation to the French laws and tribunals, that is to say, entirely subject to them.

France accordingly began to negotiate with the Powers in order to obtain their consent to the renunciation of their Capitula-

tions in Tunisia. Austria was the first to consent in 1896. She was followed by Italy, Russia, Switzerland, and Germany. Britain, however, refused at first to allow her rights in this respect to be abrogated. It was not until 1897 that she consented to follow the example of the other Powers and then she imposed terms upon France which the other Powers had not demanded, and to which France submitted only because circumstances forced her.

Perhaps it is necessary to state, and here is an opportune moment to do so, that when in the course of this history we refer to particular conflicts between nations, as in this case the conflict between France and Britain over the Tunisian Capitulations, we do not as a rule suggest that either party to the conflict is either in the right or in the wrong. In each particular case at the time, no doubt each country thought she was right. The point in this history is merely as a rule to recount the conflicts as matters of fact and without discussing the merits. Still, in this case it may be mentioned that the terms imposed upon France by Britain as the condition upon which Britain consented to the abolition of the Capitulations were that until the year 1912 British cotton goods should not be subjected in Tunisia to a higher import duty than 5 per cent. *ad valorem.* It is quite conceivable in this case, for example, that Britain was justified in imposing these terms and that France, from her point of view, was entitled to regard the imposition as unfair.

But this difficulty between France and Britain in Tunisia rested on a principle which was, and probably yet continues, at the root of a very great many difficulties which have occurred, and may yet arise between Britain and other colonising Powers. Britain, as a free trade State permitting the import of foreign goods without taxation, naturally dislikes that foreign Powers should tax her exports. Britain cannot, of course, interfere with metropolitan countries of these Powers in this matter. For instance, it cannot dictate to France what France should do in regard to the exports of Britain into France herself; but when France or any other Power takes possession of a new territory, and takes such possession subject to agreement with Britain, then Britain naturally seizes the opportunity and enforces the principle of the "open door" in that territory. The policy of France and other colonising Powers has always been, and is now, to establish their Colonies on lines which will afford preference and advantage to trade with the "Motherland" to the prejudice of trade with other countries, particularly Britain.

Whilst this friction existed between these two countries in respect to Tunisia, difficulties were also arising over Morocco.

These difficulties have already been referred to from the point of view of Anglo-German relations, but a few words may usefully be said here on the subject. Since 1845, by treaty with Morocco, France had determined her Algerian-Moroccan frontiers. By the Anglo-French Treaty of 1890, France gained certain territories of the Sahara; and subsequently by a Franco-Moroccan Treaty of 1901 France obtained rights of police, and also further territories of the Sahara.

The effect of this expansion was, that France acquired a considerable political interest in Morocco. She had also, during a long period of time, developed a very considerable commercial interest in that country. Altogether, France, as compared with the other European Powers, had a preponderating interest in the Shereefian Empire. Spain's interest was not very substantial, but Germany's was greater. As for Britain, her interests may be said to have been overshadowed by her political influence. The actual position, therefore, was that France had perhaps the greatest combined commercial and political interest in Morocco, whilst Britain had the greatest solely political interest and, what in this case was the most important, influence in Morocco. Thanks to the efforts in Morocco of Kaid MacLean and his associates, the political influence of Britain in the Empire overshadowed whatever influence and interest any other Powers may have had there. The policy of Morocco itself, as directed by the Kaid, meant the complete exclusion of all Europeans, other than the British, from Moroccan affairs. France considered that she was in particular excluded, and regarded Germany as being preferred to her. Towards the end of the last century, however, this Moroccan policy began to change. The Kaid and his principal associate, Mr. Harris, began to see that order could be maintained in the Empire not by the Sultan, and not perhaps conveniently by Britain, but certainly best by France, with her experience of North African government in Algeria and Tunisia; and we find the British Consul-General at Tunis reporting the view that Britain ought not to oppose the extension of French influence in Morocco. So, during this decade, the Anglo-French conflict, with which France commenced her career in Morocco, was so changed in the course of years, that at the end it was almost an accord. It was beginning to be understood that some compensation would be due to France for our occupation of Egypt, and that Morocco could be a compensation satisfactory to both parties.

Now we turn to Egypt. We have already seen that Britain had occupied this country in such fashion that the occupation

was obviously one that would last. We have seen, too, that with Egypt as a base, or starting-point, Britain had extended on her own account through the Soudan and the upper waters of the Nile, and there she had acquired further territory and spheres of influence. To France this was an unsatisfactory condition of things. Britain herself, even so late as 1895, had referred to Egypt as the country in which we had only claims and interests. We were there, in fact, as trustees for ourselves and other Powers, France being by far the chief, as regards her interests in Egypt, of the others. France accordingly found it difficult to discover our title to the Upper Nile and to our influence in the adjacent regions. Britain had laid it down emphatically that she would not tolerate the presence of France in or about that neighbourhood. That being the position, France in 1896 secretly organised a mission, under Commandant Marchand, which, landing in Africa at Loango, was to penetrate to Fashoda, the chief town of Bahr-el-Ghazal. At the same time the French representative at the Abyssinian Court, who had obtained a concession for a railway from Menelik, was to get together an expedition and join Marchand at Fashoda. Marchand arrived at his destination in July 1898.

About two months after that the British were themselves at Fashoda. They demanded the evacuation of the place by Commandant Marchand; he refused, but the evacuation was ultimately ordered by France in November. This order was not given, however, until after the British fleet had demonstrated at Bizerta, and Tunisia ran the risk of being invaded by Great Britain. This incident of Fashoda left a very bitter taste in the mouth of France. The French believed that Britain had acted very unjustly in the matter. Britain contended that when Kitchener took Khartoum, on August 23, the Equatorial Provinces thereby became British territory. France replied that Marchand had planted the French flag in Fashoda on July 10; was it not therefore obvious that France was there before the British troops had even arrived at Khartoum? Britain also contended, and this was her primary contention, that Fashoda being in the territories of the Upper Nile belonged to Britain to the knowledge of France ever since, in 1897, the British Ambassador at Paris had officially notified to the French Government the British views as to the rights of Britain over the entire basin of the Nile. In 1899 an Anglo-French Treaty was concluded, which relegated the French possessions in Central Africa to the west of 15°. So France, at the time infinitely dissatisfied, lost all interest in the basin of the Nile and Bahr-el-Ghazal.

We next find Britain and France, in 1894, in conflict over a concession for a railway which had been granted to a French protégé by the Negus of Abyssinia. Britain would not consent to a French railway in that neighbourhood; she insisted upon it, and any Abyssinian railways, being internationalised, if constructed at all. It was not until 1906 that Britain abandoned this position.

On the Arabian coast of the Red Sea another difficulty arose, described by a French publicist as "one of Britain's constant pin-pricks." France had obtained a lease from the local ruler, and intended to establish a coaling station there; Britain interfered and prevented this.

In Madagascar there were also troubles. France in 1895 concluded a treaty with the Queen, by which the island became a French Protectorate. In the following year another treaty was concluded under which France took possession of the island without, however, altogether annexing it. Britain thereupon required an explanation of the new arrangement. Explanations were given, happily to the satisfaction of Britain, and a month or two later, without opposition from any Power, France concluded another Treaty by which she annexed Madagascar purely and simply. Ultimately, under the very satisfactory and beneficial government of France, the island was pacified and organised, and is to-day one of the most beautiful of the French colonies, in which British and Malagasy live happily and flourishing, as well as French.

On the west coast of Africa difficulties in Senegal arose and were settled in 1893, and on the Niger in 1898. After this latter year it was noticeable that the exportation of arms from Britain to the French possessions, according to the British Blue Books themselves, considerably diminished. During the previous years, whilst the French were fighting the native tribes, it had always been contended by France that Britain unfairly tolerated this traffic. It was denied, of course, but the French subsequently contended that these figures supported their allegation. France always took the view that Britain aided the native populations in their rebellions against the French, with the object of preventing the latter acquiring too powerful a position upon the Lower Niger.

In Asia the Anglo-French rivalry proceeded as persistently as in Africa. Siam, having lost all possibility of extension through Upper Burmah, by reason of the British annexation, began to make trouble with France in an endeavour to seize Annamese territory. France always took the view that in so acting Siam

had no more faithful ally than the British Government. As a result of action taken by France, a treaty was concluded between France and Siam in 1893, which defined the Siamese frontiers and by which Siam bound herself not to erect certain fortifications. In 1896 France and Britain entered into a treaty, in which both Powers agreed to respect the independence of the valley of Me-Nam and of Bangkok, France having free action to the east, England to the west. To quote a French author, "Siam no more observed the treaty of 1893 than Britain that of 1896." However that may be, differences and difficulties continued, notwithstanding these treaties, between Siam and France, until the year 1907, and Britain was always being accused by France of maintaining and encouraging them. As to the treaty with Britain in respect to that, and the action of Britain after it was concluded, the tale if told in detail would be nothing but an enumeration of actions by one side, said to be justified, and counter-actions by the other, also said to be justified. For our present purpose it is sufficient to place before the reader the Anglo-French position as it stood at the close of the decade we now deal with, in relation to Siam. Perhaps it cannot better be gathered than from the attitude of mind of the French at that time. In the medley of claims and counter-claims made against one another by the two Powers, we hear the plaint of France: "If we want to satisfy Britain, we suppose we must abandon all our Indo-Chinese possessions, and then Tonquin, Cochin-China, and Cambodia will become, like Burmah, the complement of the Indian Empire, and eventually the whole of Asia will exist only as a vast British Colony."

The period of the Chino-Japanese War of 1895 marked very clearly the very divergent interests of Britain and France in the Far East, and was remarkable for the very strenuous fashion in which each of these Powers opposed the other in order to gain an advantage for herself. Before that war, Britain was the friend of China, and as such, in spite of the opposition of Russia, obtained many commercial and political concessions, in particular at Hongkong, Kan-tong, and Shanghai. Rightly or wrongly, Britain always had the reputation of desiring to penetrate into the interior of China, using the advantages gained by these concessions as the base for her penetrating operations. So she attempted, according to French authority, to profit by the conflict arising out of Japan's designs upon Korea by installing herself at the mouth of the Yang-tse-kiang and in the Chu-san Islands; but Japan prevented the accomplishment of this design. Thereupon, again according to French authority, Britain, in order to

be revenged upon Japan for her interference, afforded material help to China during the progress of the war, anticipating a reward from a victorious China. China, however, was conquered. Britain now, yet again according to French authority, quickly transferred her affections to Japan, supporting Japan as against Russia, Germany, and France. In the efforts of Japan to acquire, as fruits of the conquest, some territorial advantages in China, France claimed that here she gained an advantage over Britain inasmuch as Japan was forced to be content with Formosa without any Chinese or Korean territory. France in her turn now wanted some reward from China. Russia having received Port Arthur, France obtained a delimitation of her Tonkinese frontiers and some other advantages. Amongst these latter were the Franco-Chinese Commercial Treaty of 1895 and the concession in 1896 to a French company of the railway of Lang-Tcheou. To equalise matters Britain then attempted to obtain from China a concession which would allow the Burmah Railway to be carried on towards Yunan. Britain was not successful in this, and the French then prided themselves upon the fact that it was through their opposition that Britain failed, an opposition which was the more easy of success because of China's memories of British assistance to Japan. Following up her success, France had already sent into China the important "Lyonnese Mission" for commercial exploitation. This mission seemed to gain for France whatever Britain sought and lost, and thus France gained, for a Franco-Belgian syndicate, a concession for the Pekin-Hankow Railway; in 1896 a reorganisation of the arsenal of Fuchow; the mineral and railway concessions in Kan-tong; and in 1898 a lease, on the same lines as that of Port Arthur, of Kow-chow and Kang-chow-ouan. Moreover, France obtained an agreement from China that no territories within the sphere of influence of the Indo-Chinese possessions of France should be alienated to any other Power. All this was not allowed to pass unnoticed by Britain, who, as a counter-move, was able to obtain some railway and other concessions, and eventually, in 1898, an important extension of her territorial possession of Hongkong.

After Fashoda Britain was more successful in China. The French complained that she became more arrogant and pushing. China began to make regulations in respect to factories and railways which tended to prevent any serious industrial enterprise on the part of France; difficulties were placed in the way of delimitations of the French territory of Kang-chow; and French and Belgian commercial missions were pillaged and destroyed and a member of the French Mission at Canton and two French officers

were assassinated. France, having great difficulty in obtaining reparation, took the view that China had thus acted at the instigation of Britain. In France itself there were lively times in the French Parliament in respect to these Chinese difficulties. M. Delcasse, in 1899, stated most clearly that Britain was not to blame and that there was no need for bad feeling between the two countries. He was, for this, reproached with being weak-kneed in his policy with Britain and taking with cowardly tolerance whatever blows Britain liked to shower upon him. When he did eventually settle these differences with Britain, it was said in France that he had submitted to " the affronts of China, to which Britain was no stranger, with an almost British phlegm " ; and even then Franco-British hostility in relation to China was not lessened until after a very violent antagonism had taken place in relation to Shanghai. When the two countries were completely reconciled in 1903, " no reconciliation," it was said, " could have been more unexpected."

We now enter upon a new era in Anglo-French relations, an era in which the two countries are destined to play a great and commanding rôle in the politics of the world. It is the era of the Anglo-French Entente Cordiale. This Entente is the foundation of the situation which has made it possible for the forces of liberty and progress to resist, as in the present war, the attack and aggressions of the Powers of despotism and oppression. The men of France who, of all others, were responsible for bringing about this Entente were M. Delcassé and M. Paul Cambon.

M. Cambon was the French Ambassador in London. He was appointed to this position in November 1898 by M. Delcassé, who was then the Foreign Minister of France. At the time M. Delcassé assumed office, he was and he subsequently became more and more impressed by the increasing aggressiveness throughout the world, and against France in particular, of the Kaiser and his Government. It was obvious to this Minister that France, standing alone, would soon be the easy prey of Germany. It was necessary, therefore, if France should be saved, that she should strengthen her position in Europe by some association with Britain. There was no reason why this should not be done. The two countries were peculiarly placed in view of such association, inasmuch as they both had their roots more than any of the other European States in principles of political and social freedom and progress. Moreover, they were the two leading colonising Powers of the world. No other country in the world could equal either as a colonising force. In some respects, perhaps—as, for example, in tariff matters—the methods of these

countries in their possessions across the seas were somewhat different; but generally, in spite of a little more officialism in French colonial administration than in that of British, the colonial administration of both countries ran on very much the same lines. As it happened, too, the preceding years of colonial development of the two countries side by side in many parts of the world had necessitated the settlement of many of the conflicting interests which were bound to arise during that time. Certainly these interests had been settled at the cost of much hostility, antagonism, and even bad feeling, but nevertheless they had, in the end, been very completely settled. Why, therefore, should not the two countries now follow out their respective destinies of expansion as friendly competitors rather than as antagonistic rivals?

It is apparent from what we have already seen that some of the difficulties of the past which were not then settled could be got over in a spirit of "give and take" and of complete amity. Probably a settlement could in no other spirit be arrived at. First and foremost was the position of Britain in Egypt. Nothing short of a consent freely given by France could put an end to the difficulties there. Then again, there was the position of France in Morocco. Here Britain could prove an ally of incalculable value to France in her aspirations in that quarter. In the East, in Siam in particular, was also to be found a scene where complete settlement was only possible between friends. So, too, in regard to the ambitions of France in relation to Abyssinia, and her grievances, undoubtedly somewhat legitimate, about the fishing grounds off Newfoundland. And as for strengthening her position in Europe, it was obvious that an intimate association between the two countries would be an advantage in this respect to France. Big and efficient as France's army might have been, it yet could do with the support of another Power, even though it be a Power of so little military character as Great Britain. When, however, the maritime position was considered, then it was obvious that Britain and France could work together to the undoubted advantage of both countries, as also to the particular advantage of France. Britain could concentrate her naval forces in the North Sea and in the Channel, and France, relieving Britain there to a considerable extent, could concentrate in the Mediterranean.

M. Delcassé appreciated all this, and much more in fact, when he sent M. Cambon to London. The main object of the Ambassador's mission was to bring about an understanding between France and Britain. No one was more fitted for this

delicate and difficult task than the Ambassador, who thitherto in most difficult positions, particularly at Constantinople, had so brilliantly and effectively represented the interests of France. When M. Cambon accepted this position in 1898, Britain, as we have already seen, was if anything antipathetic to France, believing that her true friend on the Continent was Germany. One can appreciate, therefore, how difficult was the task of the French Ambassador; and what made his position in this respect yet more difficult was the affair of Fashoda, which, occurring as it did almost immediately after his appointment to London and giving rise to the most bitter feeling between the two countries, did much to render it almost impossible for France and Britain even to come together upon terms of merely official friendship. The only hope for the Ambassador lay in the aggressions of Germany, which thenceforth were to be felt and suspected as much in Britain as in France.

The Entente Cordiale, following on the Alliance, had remarkable results. France and Italy grew closer together. That, in its turn, drew Italy closer to Britain. France and Spain later on became leagued in friendship. Eventually, and most important of all, Britain and Russia joined hands. So, in the end, we find the Triple Entente composed of Britain, France, and Russia, and around it friendly nations such as Italy and Spain.

The first work of the new French Ambassador was to conclude the Anglo-French Treaty of 1898, relating to Africa, the effect of which was that France resigned all pretensions to the basin of the Nile and the Bahr-el-Ghazal. There is no doubt that France in thus settling this question, which also weakened her rights in Egypt, was actuated very strongly by her desire to show goodwill to Britain. She had to do what she could in the face of the then official Anglo-German amity, making the most of the fact that Lord Lansdowne, and later Sir Edward Grey, the Liberal Foreign Minister, were not only inclined towards France, but personally were convinced that Anglo-German friendship was not and could never be anything more than a vain symbol. In 1901 France and Britain agreed to submit to arbitration two African difficulties, *The Sergent Malameine* and *The Wahima* affairs. In one of these, France had to pay, and in the other France received compensation. In the following year some friendly diplomatic progress was made in regard to Newfoundland and Siam.

In the year 1903 matters came to a head. A great speech, indicating the desire of France to work amicably with Britain, was delivered by the French Ambassador to the French Chamber of Commerce in London. M. Delcassé made a speech of like

character a few days afterwards in the French Parliament, and two months later, in May, King Edward VII. paid a visit to Paris. A banquet was given in his honour by the President at the Elysée. After the banquet there were the usual toasts, and in these the most friendly sentiments were expressed by the President in relation to Britain and by the King in relation to France. Nevertheless, a cool atmosphere seemed to pervade. Real feeling did not appear to be so warm as the spoken word. Shortly afterwards, however, the King made a speech at a gathering of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris. This speech struck the right note, indicating and creating at the same time the true sentiment in words and in tone. He let it clearly be understood that the friendship of the two countries was his constant and most serious preoccupation.

"I am firmly convinced," said His Majesty, "that the days of hostility between the two countries are happily ended, and I hope that in the future, history, when it shall study the Anglo-French relations during the century in which we now live, will be able to find only an amicable emulation in the commercial and industrial domain. I hope that in the future, as in the past, France and Britain may be regarded as the champions and pioneers of civilisation and of pacific progress. I do not know two countries in the world whose mutual prosperity depends more one upon the other. There may have been misunderstandings and causes of dissension in the past, but all that has, I know it well, happily passed and been forgotten." Two months later, in July, President Loubet with M. Delcassé paid a return visit to London. On this occasion, at a royal banquet in honour of the French President, King Edward said: "I hope that the reception that you have received to-day has convinced you of the true friendship—in fact I may say affection—that my country has for your beautiful France. For my part, I shall never forget the reception which was recently given me and the sentiments I then expressed and which I have always entertained for France. I have the hope that our countries shall preserve always the most intimate relations one with the other and the most profound friendship." After the French President left our shores, the King addressed to him a telegram, saying: "It is my most ardent desire that the rapprochement between our two countries shall be durable."

The rapprochement thus announced produced at once the Convention for Arbitration of 1904 and the Anglo-French Convention of 1904. Thenceforward, the relations between the two countries continued on the most friendly footing.

Subsequently, the French and British fleets visited Britain and France; the Municipal Council of Paris and the London County Council exchanged visits; King Edward on several occasions visited Paris, sometimes incognito, sometimes as King, meeting French Ministers; the French and British Chambers of Commerce were made the scenes of further expressions of this international goodwill; President Fallières paid a visit to London; and the Press of both countries joined heartily in and have ever since shown their sympathy with this great combination of two of the most civilised nations of the earth.

Throughout the whole world, the one and only note of dissatisfaction was that struck in Germany by the Kaiser, his Ministers, and his Press. The Kaiser regarded Germany thenceforth as more and more isolated, and devoted all his energies to stirring up difficulties between Britain and his country, intriguing with our Oversea Dominions in order to weaken the bonds which bound together the British Empire and pursuing a colonial and foreign policy for Germany the object of which was not only the furtherance of real German interests, but the destruction of Britain's prestige and influence among the nations. In what manner he did this, and with what success, appear in the chapters we have devoted to the history of Anglo-German relations during the present century.

In one important matter, in particular, the Entente Cordiale had a substantial and world-wide effect. Thenceforth there was to be no naval rivalry between the two countries; thenceforth France was not to dispute with Great Britain the command of the sea; thenceforth the British and French navies were to develop on lines of mutual service. In short, these two navies were to be regarded as but one and devoted to one main purpose, namely the maintenance of French and British commerce and overseas possessions and to the defence of the two countries. In like manner, and with like objects, the armies of the two nations thenceforward were reorganised. As to the fleets, that of Great Britain was regarded as the chief, the French navy being merely supplementary. As to the military force, from the point of view of European necessities the French army was regarded as the important unit, the British as a supplement. All this was obvious from what in fact occurred after the Entente first had its being. Subsequently, when the war commenced, it was made public that this joint action of the two Powers was founded on a secret arrangement.

We have already referred to the Convention for Arbitration. This Convention was the first step on the road towards the actual Treaty of Entente. By it, the two Powers agreed to submit any

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(PRESIDENT OF FRANCE)

Has done much to cement the bond of friendship between Britain and France; both by word and deed has he made the Entente a very real thing which the war has now sealed in blood. He has successively held various public offices in the Administration of France with brilliant success. He is an orator of great gifts, as his glowing tributes to King Edward proved. During his term of office he has entertained and been entertained by the King and other members of our Royal Family, and by the King of Spain.

differences between them to arbitration except such as touched their vital interests or their independence or honour or the interests of third Powers.

We have already indicated, necessarily very sketchily, the many difficulties which in the past had existed between France and Britain in relation to their foreign or colonial possessions and interests and the antagonisms and occasional bitter feelings resulting therefrom. The great Convention of 1904, that of the Entente, put an end to this state of things. The Convention contained nine articles and was supplemented by four declarations which concerned Egypt and Morocco, Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides. The Convention itself dealt with Newfoundland and Western Africa.

We need not trouble our readers with the details of the settlement of the Newfoundland fishing difficulty. A few lines, however, may be devoted to Africa. On the west coast France gained an extension of territory in Gambia, and some islands opposite French Guinea. She also gained a tract of desert which joined up the French territories of the Soudan and those to the east of the Niger and in the neighbourhood of Lake Chad, thus consolidating territories which had thitherto been scattered and difficult to deal with. Other concessions were also obtained by France in these parts of Africa.

When, however, we come to the declaration concerning Egypt and Morocco, we come to something which was not only of vital importance to the two countries primarily concerned, but so settled matters between them as to affect the ambitions of Germany, which depended for their realisation almost entirely upon a continuance of conflict between Britain and France. As to Egypt, Britain specifically declared, with the acquiescence of France, that she had no intention of changing her policy in that country. France, in her turn, declared that she would not embarrass that policy by requiring that a term be fixed to the British occupation or in any other manner whatsoever. The difficulties arising out of Egyptian finance in which France was interested were also settled. Stipulations, too, were included in the declaration regulating certain port dues, the service of French officials, the control of Egyptian antiquities, the schools and the French language. The Suez Canal was left entirely in the hands of Britain. As regards Morocco, France declared, with the acquiescence of Britain, in similar terms to those of the declaration of Britain in relation to Egypt, that she had no intention of changing her policy in that country. Great Britain responded to this declaration by a formal recognition that France had the

exclusive right to maintain order in that country and to assist it in all the administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms of which it had need, and further declared that she would do nothing to embarrass the action of France in these directions provided that such action left intact the treaty rights of Great Britain in Morocco. And further, to assure the free passage to the Straits of Gibraltar, the two Governments agreed not to allow any fortifications or strategic works whatever to be constructed on that part of the Moroccan coast between Melilla and the right bank of the River Sebu.

Later, in 1906, the two countries settled their differences in regard to Abyssinia, which since 1896 had never ceased to divide them; and in 1907 Siam was finally dealt with. France and Spain also concluded a Mediterranean arrangement which in effect amounted to an accord between Spain and Britain. The object of this arrangement was to ensure the *status quo* in the Western Mediterranean. Thenceforward also, at the Peace Conference of The Hague, France and Britain worked strenuously together to further the general peace movement, always finding themselves, however, opposed bitterly by Germany.

During the period preceding the year 1891 the views of Britain in relation to the preservation of the integrity of the Turkish Empire showed a fundamental change. Britain had become mistress of Egypt, and so regarded herself as independent, from the point of view of India, of Turkish ascendancy on the Bosphorus. Having the Suez Canal, Britain took the view that she could be indifferent as to who might possess the Bosphorus. So no longer, for the time being, did Britain regard the Ottoman Empire as the all-important buffer State between India and the approach thereto of Russia. The result was, that Britain became indifferent to the maintenance of Turkey in Europe, and so could watch with complacency, and even if necessary encourage, the Balkan States gradually falling away from the Ottoman Empire. Russia then took the place of Britain, for a very short period, as the great defender of the integrity of Turkey, and so, for the time being, naturally became the great opponent of a dismemberment which would be the inevitable result of the encouragement of Balkan independence. Russia's action in relation to the Balkans is dealt with elsewhere. Here we shall now refer especially to other fields of Russian ambitions and activities.

The great difficulty of Russia's position in Europe has always been its lack of a generally useful seaboard; in fact, to obtain access to "free seas" has been, and always must be, the greatest object of Russia's foreign policy. There are three great seas

towards which Russia might extend—the Mediterranean, through the Balkans; the Indian Ocean, through Turkestan, Afghanistan, and Persia; the Pacific Ocean, through Tibet and Manchuria. Up to the present, any extension of Russia through the Balkans to the sea has not been a matter for serious consideration; but when we consider the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean we are in touch with projects of Russia which have been within the region of practical politics for some very considerable time. Britain especially has been interested in these projects, particularly from the point of view of the Indian Empire. In fact, one may say that for the last forty years, until a comparatively recent period, only two European Powers were really interested in what has been generally known as the Eastern Question—namely Great Britain and Russia.

Until 1880 very little had been done by Russia which could be said to threaten very seriously the interests of Great Britain in the East. Britain was then mistress of Afghanistan. Russia had before that done her best to acquire a footing in Afghanistan, but events had ultimately so occurred that, at the date we have just given, Russia may be said to have been in a hopeless position, so far as acquiring influence in Afghanistan was concerned. In fact, after that date, particularly in 1882, 1883, 1887, and later in 1895 and in 1902, Russia had explicitly declared that she intended to avoid any relation with Afghanistan, it being fully understood by her that this country should be considered as within the sphere of British influence. Nevertheless, she continued jealously to watch the approaches to Afghanistan. In 1881 and 1885 Russia had established herself on the very borders of Persia and Afghanistan, between the Caspian Sea and the Pamirs at Askhabad and Merv; and later on, in 1887, she established herself to the south of Merv, between the rivers Mourgav and Heriroud. In 1888 Britain proceeded to penetrate Tibet, and endeavoured to open up the country, towards China, to British commerce, but Russia opposed this movement very vigorously, supporting the Lama of Tibet. It was not until 1904 that the Anglo-Russian struggle for Tibet was brought to an end.

We have seen that up to the year 1891 and certainly during the decade immediately preceding that year, there existed a continuous struggle between Britain and Russia and Britain and France, particularly in relation to their respective attempts towards territorial expansion. During the whole of this time Britain was on friendly terms with Germany and, generally speaking, where German and British territorial aspiration conflicted, a harmonious co-operation ruled rather than antagonism.

For all practical purposes Austria and Italy did not count outside Europe. In Europe, however, they were a force, and for some years Italy had been in alliance with Germany in the Triple Alliance. This position meant, in short, that Britain and the Triple Alliance were, during the decade to which we have referred, always opposed either to France or to Russia. In fact, during the latter years of that decade the association between Britain and the Triple Alliance was apparently so intimate that France and Russia regarded the position very much as though, instead of a Triple Alliance, there had been a formal Quadruple Alliance. It is obvious that under these circumstances either France or Russia, acting alone, would be but a weak and ineffective opponent to Britain.

It is not surprising, therefore, that under these circumstances France and Russia should have gradually approached one another. Originally, as we know, Russia had been an original member of the Triple Alliance instead of Italy, who succeeded her. One must therefore assume that fundamentally Russia was more in accord with the Triple Alliance than with France. Russia had certainly dissociated herself from the Triple Alliance because in her view Bismarck had attempted to treat her as a catspaw and had, in the end, played her false. Her experience of the Alliance having thus been so unhappy, Russia, though recognising her isolation among the Powers and consequently her weakness, was, nevertheless, not eager to associate herself again with any other State or States and run the risk of another experience of the same character. She certainly, at first, had no burning desire for a close association with France. In 1874 and 1875 Russia joined with Britain in preventing Bismarck declaring war again on France; she so acted, however, without any show of personal friendship with France and continued afterwards to maintain a very cool reserve in her French relations.

So far back as about the year 1882, France herself had shown some indication of a desire for a formal accord with Russia. At the time of the Anglo-French troubles in Egypt consequent upon the insurrection of Arabi Pasha, Gambetta advocated, as openly and persistently as circumstances then would permit, a friendly alliance with Russia. He went even farther and suggested an alliance with Britain. "A Russian alliance," said he, on one occasion, "would be for France like a reserve of capital. Supported by both London and St. Petersburg, France would be invincible." But Russia did not then take kindly to the republican institutions of France, and for the next few years, rather as a consequence of the lack of tact on the part of France in her dealings with Russia, the Franco-Russian relations tended rather

against than towards an intimate association. By the year 1886 France had become still more anxious for a Franco-Russian Alliance, but in Russia no anxiety in the same direction was apparent.

In 1887 the Germany military position was such that France became seriously alarmed. She then felt still more keenly the need of Russia. The French Foreign Minister then said on one occasion, referring to M. de Laboulaye, the Ambassador of France to Russia: "Our safety is in the hands of M. de Laboulaye." Soon, however, matters began to progress. The Czar himself began to take a personal and more friendly interest in the Government and affairs of France. So when it was probable that France would appoint as her Foreign Minister M. Floquet, a man who had gone out of his way in the past to give expression to anti-Russian sentiments (although as a fact he was one of those French statesmen who were anxious to see France and Russia in alliance), the Czar, through his Ambassador at Paris, managed matters so that that office was occupied instead by M. Goblet.

So matters stood for at least a year, when the waters again became troubled, but only momentarily. The Czar Alexander III. gradually became more sympathetic to republican institutions as represented in France; Russian loans were repeatedly subscribed for in France; Russian war material began to be manufactured in France; in 1890 France even ordered the arrest of some Russian nihilists who had taken refuge in Paris; the French fleet paid a visit to Cronstadt; and the President of the French Republic, M. Carnot, received from the Czar the Grand Cross of St. Andrew.

In August, 1891, the Franco-Russian Treaty was formally concluded. The fact was published to the world, but the terms were kept secret. One point, however, was at once made clear. The treaty was not directed against the Triple Alliance and still less was it intended as an instrument against Britain. It was entirely a defensive alliance. If France were to attack Germany with the object, for instance, of recovering the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine or even if it were to attack Britain, the treaty would not operate. Its sole object was to create something by way of a counterbalance to the weight of influence of the Triple Alliance, and by so establishing to that extent an equilibrium, to preserve the peace of Europe.

Britain was of course interested in the treaty, but she showed no bad feeling whatsoever. On the contrary it seemed to drive her towards greater friendship with both France and Russia, though the exigencies of her foreign politics and of her then relations with Germany necessarily put off the day upon which Britain, France, and Russia could join hands openly, boldly, and once for all.

After the year 1891, up to the year 1901, was a period during which the relations between Britain and Russia were for ever in a state of anxious strain. Armenia in 1895, and Crete in 1897, gave rise to a keen hostility between the two Powers, particularly on the part of Russia. In Constantinople German influence was taking the place of British, and throughout the entire Ottoman Empire the place of both British and Russian; and where Germany was opposed to both Powers, she consistently allied herself, whenever possible, with Russia as against Britain. In the Balkans it was a case of Russia against Germany, Austria, and Britain. So, everywhere and always, in the Near East antagonism existed between the two Powers. It was the same thing farther east, in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. The Boxer Insurrection in China in 1900 afforded Russia an opportunity to move her troops into the extreme east, but after the insurrection was repressed, these troops remained in Manchuria under the pretext of assuring the security of the Trans-Siberian Railway and its dependencies, Russia endeavouring to obtain such a concession from China as would eventually cause all Manchuria, like Port Arthur, to become a Russian province. Against this Britain energetically protested, but the Chinese Government seemed favourable to Russia's wishes. As, however, Germany, in her gradual development of hostility to Britain, began, as incidental thereto, to support the Russian pretensions, notwithstanding her old promises, China began to hesitate somewhat in her favourable attitude towards Russia. Britain thereupon joined with Japan, in a joint Note to China, protesting against the occupation of Manchuria by Russia, and subsequently entered into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. The result of this was a complete victory by Britain, China refusing the concession so much desired by Russia.

This Anglo-Japanese Treaty profoundly affected and increased the influence of Britain in the East. Subsequent events proved also that it would later on increase the influence of Japan in the west and in Europe in particular. The present war has shown that conflict with Britain is no longer a conflict with the British Isles alone, but a conflict with the British Empire, an Empire which extends throughout the world. So an Alliance between Britain and Japan meant that Japan became allied to interests of world-wide extent. The treaty was expressed to subsist for five years, but has ever since been in force as a consequence of periodical renewal. It comprised six articles, the main drift of which was that the two parties mutually recognised the independence and integrity of China and of Korea, and declared that each of them

divested herself of all aggressive tendencies against the other. The important articles may be summarised as follows :

(1) In view of the special interests possessed by Great Britain in China, and the fact that Japan, in addition to like interests, is interested to a particular degree from the political point of view as well as the commercial and industrial in Korea, the contracting Powers agree that both may take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard these interests, if ever menaced, whether by the aggressive action of the Powers or by trouble in China or in Korea necessitating the intervention of one of the two contracting Powers for the protection of the life and the property of its subjects.

(2) If Great Britain or Japan, in order to defend its abovementioned interests, should be implicated in a war with another Power, the other party will maintain a strict neutrality, and direct its efforts to prevent any other Powers taking part in hostilities against its ally. If, in such case, any other Power should take part in hostilities against that ally, the other party will come to its aid and wage war in common with her, and conclude peace in common accord.

Some British critics greeted this treaty with expressions of deep dissatisfaction, contending that Britain had thereby resigned its position of splendid isolation for one of "splendid complication." As a fact, however, the treaty has been valuable to Britain from the first. At once, as a result, Russia evacuated Manchuria, and, as the latest consequence, Japan, as the ally of Britain, attacked Germany in the Far East and laid siege to Kiau-Chau.

Britain now proceeded to follow up her success in Manchuria with an attempt to arrest the progress of Russian influence in Tibet and upon the Persian Gulf. There was every reason to believe that Russia was aiming at the annexation of Tibet, though, in reply to Britain, she had emphatically and repeatedly declared that such was not her design. However, her methods in Tibet were such that the conclusion was irresistible that, notwithstanding her fair words, Russia did intend to do what she was credited with. Britain very promptly sent an Expedition into Tibet ; proclaimed a new Lama friendly to herself, in the place of one who had shown pro-Russian leanings ; and finally, in 1906, concluded a treaty with Tibet, which was ultimately countersigned by China, in which the sovereignty of China over Tibet was recognised, and under which Britain was paid by China the cost of the Expedition, and received substantial commercial advantages for herself in addition to throwing open to the world the Tibetan markets. In the Persian Gulf, Britain

easily counteracted, in 1903, the influence of Russia by a brilliant pacific demonstration.

During the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–5, there were again many Anglo-Russian differences, but ultimately these were settled in a friendly spirit.

A few days before the Treaty of Peace between Russia and Japan, Britain concluded with Japan in 1905 a second treaty, designed to strengthen the Alliance of 1902. The first article, one of very great importance, runs as follows :

"If, by reason of an unprovoked attack or of an aggressive action, one of the two contracting parties is implicated in war for the defence of its territorial interests, or its special interests, the other Power will come immediately to the assistance of its ally ; will make war in common, and conclude peace in mutual accord."

We now see how certainly Japan was justified in her intervention in the present war. The treaty of 1902 operated only when a party was attacked by two Powers at least, whereas the latter treaty operates when a party is attacked by one only. At first sight one would not expect that this treaty of 1905 would have tended towards Anglo-Russian amity ; as a matter of fact, it initiated the conversations between London and St. Petersburg which, thanks to the diplomatic skill of Lord Lansdowne, ended in the Anglo-Russian accord of 1907.

The idea of an Anglo-Russian Entente may be said to have been first in a practical sense suggested when M. Loubet, then the President of the French Republic, received in 1901 a visit from the Czar Nicholas II. ; and Russia would always thenceforth seem to have been prepared to settle her differences with Britain so that the two Powers might become allies, or at least friends. So in 1904 the Russian Ambassador in Paris, after the conclusion of the Anglo-French Entente, expressed himself in the most explicit terms as pleased with the arrangements which had been come to, and he went further—in speaking to a representative of the French journal, the *Temps*, he smilingly said : "Is there not a proverb which says, 'The friends of our friends are our friends'? Who knows if once more that will not be verified?" Britain herself was certainly not slow to find, and make the most of, an opportunity to show her friendly disposition towards Russia. As already stated elsewhere, she acted as Russia's advocate with Japan when terms were being settled at the conclusion of peace between that Power and Russia.

In 1905 Russia recognised formally that Afghanistan was a country, in fact if not in law, which was a Protectorate of Great Britain.

BOOK III

THE CAMPAIGN OF THE ALLIES

CHAPTER I

BRITAIN COMMANDS THE SEA

The mobilisation of the British Fleet—Sir John Jellicoe commands—His career—The disposition of the Fleet—The North Sea—The German Fleet—Britain commands the sea—Freedom for British maritime commerce—That of Germany held up—The mines in the North Sea—*Fighting commences*—Sinking of the *Königin Luise*—The loss of the *Amphion*—Letter of a survivor—Sinking the German submarine U 15—The *Birmingham's* fine fight—Life on a German submarine, from a sailor's letter—German commerce raiders—The *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*—Her exploits—Sunk by the *Highflyer*—The fleets in the Mediterranean—The *Goeben*—Plucky fight by the *Gloucester*—The *Goeben* runs to Messina—Her theatrical demonstration there—Her escape—Takes refuge in the Dardanelles——Bought by Turkey—Digging out the German Fleet—The Bight of Heligoland—The dash of the British destroyers—The *Fearless, Arethusa, Liberty*, and *Laurel*—Their fight with the German cruisers, the *Mainz* and the *Köln*—The *Lion* and the other Dreadnoughts join in—The British victory.

WAS it an accident—a mere coincidence—or was it a predetermined plan based on knowledge or reasoned anticipation? Whatever the answer to this question may be, it is at least certain that for Britain it was a happy circumstance, and for Germany nothing short of a disaster, that just prior to the outbreak of war the British Fleet had been fully mobilised in home waters. On the morning before the day on which war was declared between Germany and Britain, the British Fleet lay off our shores, perfect in material and personnel save for a comparatively few men who had been allowed to visit their homes on leave, and had not yet managed to return to their ships. On August 2 all the British Naval Reserves were called up. By August 5 the great fleet, perfect in its equipment, had sailed into the unknown. Two battleships, one completed and the other shortly due for completion, which had been ordered in this country by the Turkish Government were at once taken over by Britain. These received the names of *Agincourt* and *Erin.* Two destroyer leaders, belonging to Chile, and lying in this country under the same circumstances, were also taken over by us. These were named the *Faulkner* and the *Broke*. In appointing Sir

John Jellicoe as Admiral in supreme command His Majesty the King addressed the following message, which was also communicated to the senior naval officers on all stations outside of home waters:

> At this grave moment in our national history I send to you, and through you to the officers and men of the Fleets of which you have assumed command, the assurance of my confidence that under your direction they will revive and renew the old glories of the Royal Navy, and prove once again the sure shield of Britain and of her Empire in the hour of trial.
>
> GEORGE R. I.

The appointment of Sir John Jellicoe as Admiralissimo of the British Fleet was not only anticipated by those who had an inner knowledge of the workings of the Admiralty, but was also enthusiastically welcomed both by all classes of the navy and the general public. Of all men holding high rank in the service, he had had perhaps the widest sea experience, and had also had an almost unique experience in general naval administration and organisation. As a seaman, administrator and organiser, he had shown himself to be a man of cool and determined judgment and action. As a former Sea Lord and member of the famous Dreadnought Design Committee, he had been associated in the creation and equipment of the ships of the fleet over which he was now to have supreme command. The great reforms, too, which had been initiated in the navy by Lord Fisher had received a large share of his attention and energy.

Born in 1859 the son of a father who had attained supreme rank in the Mercantile Marine, he naturally found himself at an early age in the Royal Navy. Even in the first stages of his career as a Cadet and as a Sub-Lieutenant, he achieved remarkable distinction. In 1882, as a Lieutenant, when serving on board the *Agincourt* in the Egyptian war, he gained the Egyptian Medal and the Khedive's Bronze Star for distinguished service. Returning to England, he made a special study of gunnery, winning a brilliant prize. In 1886 he again showed in a signal fashion the gallant stuff of which he was made. A ship lay stranded on a sand-bank near Gibraltar, the waves breaking over her and beating her in. At once, conscious only of the necessity for action, Lieutenant Jellicoe gathered together a crew of volunteers, and with them launched a boat and fought the raging seas in a desperate effort to rescue the crew of the wrecked vessel. The frail boat, however, could not live in the angry waters. She was quickly capsized, and he and his crew thrown into the sea and washed ashore, saved only by the cork jackets which fortunately they were wearing. For this he received the Silver

Medal of the Board of Trade for Gallantry. Later on, in 1893, he was Commander of the *Victoria*, when she collided with the *Camperdown* and sank with her Commander and all her crew of 400. Fortunately for his country, he rose again, although 21 officers and 350 of his men sank beneath the waves. Still later, he was severely wounded during an engagement with the Boxer insurgents in the expedition to relieve the Legation at Pekin.

He married the daughter of Sir Charles Cayzer, Bart., whose sister married Rear-Admiral Charles Madden. It was more than a coincidence that the Rear-Admiral was appointed to be his Chief of Staff. As a Naval Strategist and Tactician, the Rear-Admiral is second only to Admiral Jellicoe himself.

In 1907 Admiral Jellicoe was promoted to the rank of Captain, and was placed on the Ordnance Committee. Later on he was Flag-Captain to Admiral Sir E. H. Seymour in the *Centurion* on the China Station. Returning to England, he became Superintendent of the building by contract of ships of war, and later on was appointed Naval Assistant to the Comptroller of the Navy. In 1905, after in the meanwhile having commanded the *Drake* for a short period of time, he was appointed Director of Naval Ordnance and Torpedoes. Promotion and honours now followed fast and thick. In quick succession he became Rear-Admiral in the Atlantic Fleet, a Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty and Comptroller of the Navy, Vice-Admiral commanding the Atlantic Fleet, Vice-Admiral commanding the 2nd Division of the Home Fleet, and Second Sea Lord of the Admiralty. He is a Knight Commander of the Royal Victorian Order, a Knight Commander of the Bath, and is entitled, if he cares under the circumstances, to wear the decoration of the Order of the Red Eagle, which was conferred on him by the Kaiser for his services in China.

It is impossible to state with certainty the manner in which the fleets and squadrons of this country and the others engaged in the war were distributed at the commencement of hostilities. A general idea, however, may be obtained. In the northern waters, the British Fleet consisted of 46 battleships, 14 armoured cruisers, 6 light cruisers, and about 70 destroyers, with 14 battleships and a considerable number of cruisers of all ages and conditions in reserve. In addition, there would be very considerable torpedo flotillas at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham. France had at least 15 battleships and armoured cruisers, and a very powerful force of torpedo craft and submarines. Russia had 9 battleships and cruisers, and about 100 destroyers and submarines. This Russian fleet was confined to the Baltic Sea. As against these forces of the Allies, Germany had probably 29 battleships, 7

armoured cruisers, about 30 light cruisers, and about 150 torpedo craft and submarines. This disposition of naval forces shows that the main burden of the Allies rested on this country, Germany, from the point of view of numbers of ships, being hopelessly outclassed. The German Fleet, based mainly on the North Sea, was there met by the British Grand Fleet. And Germany was, and is, equally out-classed from the point of view of quality of men—a factor equally important with ships. The training of the German sailor had never been comparable to that of the British seaman. Nor must it be forgotten that the Germans are not a maritime nation.

In the Mediterranean, the position was somewhat different. There the one enemy Power, Austria, possessed a naval force hopelessly ineffective as against that of the Allies, but of the Allies, France was best represented, taking upon her shoulders, in her turn, the main burden and responsibility of the operations in that sea. In the Black Sea, Russia had a small squadron of battleships and a flotilla of destroyers.

The first blow sustained by Germany was for her probably the most disastrous of all she sustained in the whole of the operations directed against her by the Allies throughout the war. Germany, at the commencement of the war, hacked her way through Luxemburg, Belgium, and the north of France, occupying the whole of Belgium, and claiming this operation as a great victory; but as a victory it cannot be compared to the silent victory gained by the British Fleet, when, at the commencement of hostilities, it interned the German Navy in its home harbours. In doing this, the Allied Naval Forces—for all practical purposes the British Fleet—effected as much as though it had fought the German Fleet from the North Sea, through the British Channel, turning it away from the ports of Belgium, France, and Great Britain. In doing this, the British naval force absolutely prevented Germany, by the agency of her fleet, operating against the Allies in support of her military movements on land.

Britain, having thus acquired and maintained the command of the North Sea and the English Channel, was enabled without any haste or anxiety whatever to transport an expeditionary force to France without the loss of one man, or even one animal or article of war. So, with perfect facility, troops were enabled to be transported from Canada to England, and the great contingents were brought from India, Egypt, and French Madagascar and Northern Africa to Marseilles. At once the whole of the Mercantile Marine of Germany then on the ocean or in foreign ports was held up. From practically the first day of the war, it



THE LOSS OF THE "ABOUKIR," "HOGUE," AND "CRESSY"

The sinking of three of our cruisers in the North Sea emphasised in the most vivid manner the price of our command of the seas, and the terrible power of the hidden submarine. Disasters of such magnitude, while deplorable in their loss of life, show the nation that the men of the Fleet have the same fighting spirit of old and know how to face death unflinchingly as did their forebears.



was impossible for any German merchant ships to traverse the highways of the sea. Great fleets of German mercantile shipping were detained, and yet remain in foreign harbours, as, for instance, in New York. The moment war was declared the entrances to these harbours were watched by British ships, waiting to capture any German vessel that dared to venture out. Needless to say, such was the command of the sea by our navy that none dared do so. It is estimated that the value of the German ships of commerce thus held up amounted to very many millions of pounds.

As the British Fleet thus held up German maritime commerce, so it kept open the ocean ways for the transport of the ships of commerce of the Allies. An interesting testimony to the effective character of the operations of the fleet at the commencement of hostilities appeared in a weekly report on the Milling trade, which stated as follows:

> Business is now settling down to something like normal conditions, thanks, of course, to the power of our wonderful navy. Far from our supplies being held up by German warships, theirs are entirely cut off by ours, except what may reach them in neutral ships, via Dutch ports.
>
> Of course the war is not yet at an end, and it would be a mistake to be too optimistic; but, all things considered, the probabilities are that we shall be able to obtain sufficient oversea supplies throughout the season.
>
> From a German paper published ten days ago we learn that the price of wheat in Berlin was as much as 25*s*. per cental. If this quotation, which is equivalent to about 120*s*. per quarter, be correct, it will be seen that German consumers have now to pay about four times as much for their wheat as we in this country.
>
> Who can say after this that our navy is anything but a magnificent scheme of insurance at a very low premium? Imagine what would have happened if we had been in the position of Germany, with practically all our immediate and prospective imports cut off in a fortnight.

But Germany was able to do one thing. She at once commenced to mine the North Sea, hoping, though at the risk of endangering neutral shipping, thus to cripple the operations of the British Fleet. The mine-laying as carried out was quite illegal. Not only were the mines laid in improper places—that is to say, in the open sea, in the track of neutrals and non-belligerents—but the vessels engaged in the task were subsequently discovered to be disguised as neutral fishing-boats and even, in one case at least, under the Red Cross, as though occupied in hospital work.

On August 5 one of her "legitimate" mine-layers was fortunately destroyed by our fleet. It was about nine o'clock in the morning. The scene was the North Sea, about seventy miles to the north-east of Harwich. A flotilla of British destroyers, in-

cluding and led by H.M.S. *Amphion*, their mother ship, was making a wide sweep to the coast of Holland. It had been anticipated that Germany had laid mines on the cross-channel sea route from Harwich and the estuary of the Thames on the assumption, mistaken as it fortunately happened, that it would be by this route that England would transport her Expeditionary Force to the Continent. Only that assumption could have justified, even if it did, the laying of mines in the open sea on a route so crowded with shipping, so largely neutral too, as this one. As a fact the ship which bore home to Germany her Ambassador to England, on his return in consequence of the declaration of war, followed so closely in the wake of the *Amphion* that she herself would probably have struck the mine which dealt destruction to the *Amphion*. It was also possible that the German mine-layers were likely to attempt to continue their barbarous work quite regardless of the awful injuries they might inflict on the shipping and seamen of the neutral nations, particularly of Denmark, Holland, and Sweden. Then, again, there was reason to believe that the Germans were active in the neighbourhood with destroyers and submarines endeavouring as best they could to diminish our preponderance in naval war materials. In fact there had been every indication during the preceding few days of a renewed energy on the part of Germany in the prosecution of this part of her operations.

After an hour's search and steady watching, the news came to the *Amphion* from a trawler that a suspicious ship had been seen " throwing things overboard " in a position which the trawler indicated. The flotilla thereupon cautiously but steadily moved onward, in accordance with this information. Presently over the far horizon there came into sight a vessel which, as she gradually drew into view, had an appearance and movements which aroused suspicion. It must be the ship which had been " throwing things overboard." She was steering east. The signal was given and four of the destroyers with a sympathetic quickening of speed started off, like greyhounds slipping from the leash, and gave chase. She was in fact the German mine-layer *Königin Luise*. It was obvious that it was not her business to face a fight. She was quickly off on her homeward journey, trying the distance with her guns, however, at the oncoming destroyers. There was a sharp exchange of shots. The four destroyers spread around their prey in an encircling movement, the *Amphion* and the rest plugging as hard as they could the retreating enemy. The end was what might have been anticipated. In about an hour's time the *Königin Luise* was rounded up and sunk.

The *Amphion* at once drew near and picked up the survivors

from the sunken ship. After doing this, she proceeded with the pre-arranged plan of search, carrying it out without incident until dawn on the following morning. The *Amphion* was then on her return course, and nearing the scene of the *Königin Luise's* operations. She now altered her course somewhat so as to avoid the dangerous mined zone. For about three hours, until 6.30 a.m., this was successfully done; then the *Amphion* struck a mine.

A sheet of flame instantly enveloped the bridge, which rendered the captain insensible, and he fell on to the fore and aft bridge. As soon as he recovered consciousness, he ran to the engine-room and stopped the engines, which were going at revolutions for 20 knots. As all the fore part was on fire, it proved impossible to reach the bridge or to flood the fore magazine. The ship's back appeared to be broken, and she was already settling down by the bows. All efforts were therefore directed towards getting the wounded into a place of safety in case of explosion, and towards getting her in tow by the stern.

By the time the destroyers closed, the ill-fated ship was too injured to be towed, and it was clearly time to abandon her. The men fell in for this purpose with the same composure that had marked their behaviour throughout. All was done without flurry or confusion, and twenty minutes after the mine was struck the men, officers, and captain left the ship. Three minutes later another explosion occurred, which enveloped and blew up the whole fore part of the vessel. The effects showed that she must have struck a second mine, which exploded the fore magazine.

Debris falling from a great height struck the rescue boats and destroyers, and one of the *Amphion's* shells burst on the deck of one of the latter, killing two of the men and a German prisoner rescued from the cruiser. The after part now began to settle quickly, till the foremost part was on the bottom, and the whole after part tilted up at an angle of 45°. In another quarter of an hour this, too, had disappeared.

Captain Cecil H. Fox, who was in command of the *Amphion*, afterwards spoke in the highest terms of the behaviour of the officers and men throughout. Every order was promptly obeyed without confusion or perturbation.

This incident was remarkable in two respects. First, the disaster from its peculiar nature was, in all probability, the most searching test of discipline to which the crew of a British ship had ever been subjected. Such danger and disaster had never before been within the experience of British seamen. Secondly, the *Amphion* was the first British ship for close upon one hundred years to be destroyed by the act of an enemy.

The *Amphion* was destroyed, as already stated, by reason of striking a concealed mine in the sea. Any other ship, passing over the same spot, neutral or belligerent, fishing or commercial, would have been liable to the same fate. As we have seen, even the ship which conveyed home the German Ambassador to Britain only by a happy chance herself escaped the fate of the *Amphion.* Stringing such mines across the open sea, as these were strung by Germany, for any ship whatever to chance upon unexpectedly, was an act not only prohibited by international law, but was one that filled every civilised mind with revulsion. Of the crew, the Paymaster and 130 men were lost. The captain, 16 officers, and 135 men were saved. All not killed by the explosion were taken off by the accompanying destroyer's boats before the ill-fated vessel sank. In addition to the crew who were killed, there were also 20 German prisoners of war confined in the fore part of the ship who came to a like end.

The following is a letter written from the Naval Barracks at Devonport by one of the survivors of the *Amphion.* It was addressed to a relative, and gives a vivid idea of the horrors of naval warfare :

When it (the explosion) happened I really thought my number had gone up, there to stay, but through the care of the good God above, I have been spared a most terrible death. It is the nearest that I have been to the end, and the experience will last me a lifetime.

It is too terrible to relate. I lost both my chums in the disaster. One was in the wireless room decoding with the Paymaster, who also lost his life, and the other asleep in the mess. It must have been sudden death for both of them, which is indeed a mercy for the dear chaps.

I cannot say whether I shall go to sea again, but if they stand in need of my poor services, I am quite ready to go, and, if necessary, go altogether, for it is for the King, Country, Home, and Loved Ones that everyone is fighting for.

I little expected, as I stood looking over the side, thinking to go down any minute, that I should have the privilege of once more seeing the dear ones at home.

Everything and everybody seemed to float before my eyes during those trying minutes while we stood in two lines awaiting our fate. I have never seen such bravery and coolness in the face of death in all my life. I cannot imagine how I managed to keep cool and collected through it all, but not a man moved until he had orders to do so.

Two days after the disaster it was announced that Captain Fox had been appointed to command the *Faulkner* for command of the Third Destroyer Flotilla.

But mines were not the only weapon in the hands of Germany.

Though her fleet was bottled up by Britain, yet she found it was possible for her to show what she could do with her submarines. She certainly chose an early opportunity. When the war commenced, the possibilities of submarines were in doubt, not only by Germany, but also by the allied naval authorities. Though Germany had maintained a rigid secrecy about everything connected with the under-sea arm of her navy, yet it was generally understood not only that the organisation of her Submarine Flotilla was thorough and efficient, but that she regarded submarines as a particularly effective and perhaps almost practically invulnerable weapon as against the great warships. But she appears to have commenced operations by organising a daring and extensive reconnoitring under-water trip to the coast of Scotland. On Sunday, August 9, her submarines engaged in this venture happened to encounter the light Cruiser Squadron of the British Navy. Our fleet, however, was on the look-out and quite prepared. So the result can be summed up very shortly. The enemy paid the penalty.

It was just dawn. But daylight could scarcely penetrate the heavy fog and mist which then hung over an angry wind-lashed sea, on which a whip-like rain was falling so fast and thick that it was only with the greatest difficulty the watch could keep their eyes open. On one ship, the *Birmingham,* could be faintly discerned the approach, not of ships, but the minute shapes and glistening trail of the periscopes of submerged assailants. No enemy or force could be more deadly in its action, or have its movements more closely shadowed with obscurity and mystery. One thing was certain. The periscopes determined the fact that there were submarines about. One thing, however, was quite uncertain. How many submarines, if any, were there in the neighbourhood, entirely submerged, in the sense that not even their periscopes were showing upon the surface of the water? Only one manœuvre was possible on the part of the now very much alert ship—constant, speedy, and eccentric movement, and an attack to be determined by the visible periscopes. The *Birmingham* was now moving at her highest speed. She fired the first shot, directing it at the body of the submerged submarine, but in the line of the visible periscope. So fine was her seamanship and brilliant her gunnery, that this minute object, the periscope, was probably then completely shattered. But four more shots were fired. They followed in quick succession, the projectiles hurtling through the air with sharp shrill shrieks, casting up, when they entered the water, columns of spray more than 100 ft. high.

Even yet, however, there was ground for apprehension on the

part of the *Birmingham,* and also her sister ships. These latter, in the blinding rain, the fog, and the mist, could see nothing but the spots of light which heralded the discharges and an occasional column of spray. Yet the *Birmingham's* projectiles had passed tip over base between the masts of at least one of them. Did the *Birmingham* want help? This query was now flashed to the fighting cruiser. "No, thanks; all over," was the laconic reply. The blinded submarine was now necessarily beneath the waters, rushing here and there, at a very great speed, the unfortunate wretches within her stifling in their close prison. But at any moment, by accident, she might strike a ship, dealing deadly destruction. So, quite properly, the ships of the fleet sheered off as quickly as possible.

The *Birmingham* was left to finish off the hidden enemy. The submarine would be forced to rise to the surface in order to obtain air. Then the *Birmingham* should be ready. She did so rise, and her suffocating inmates doubtless thought they could safely come up under cover of the probably friendly fog and obtain a draught of the air for lack of which they were perishing. But their inevitable hideous fate awaited them. Within a moment of the reappearance of the doomed vessel she was shot again and at once rammed by the watchful cruiser. She now sank once for all beneath the surface. So short a time was the submarine at the surface before final destruction came that it was only just possible for the observers to notice that she was "U 15" of the German Flotilla, one of the finest and most up-to-date of her vessels of that type.

The Admiralty lost no time in subsequently informing the Lord Mayor of Birmingham about the brilliant action on the seas of his city's namesake.

The following remarkable story of the German submarine trip to the Scottish coast, said to have been told by a member of the crew of one of the boats engaged, originally appeared in a German newspaper, being published in England through the Central News.

At a distance of 1,500 metres from the enemy we were playing the accordion, and the enemy never once heard us. More than once, when our motors were going at full blast, we could not hear ourselves Our ears did not hear what the accordion was playing, but we told the tune from the movements of the player, his looks, his fingers as they glided over the keys, his feet as they beat time; from the instrument itself; and we shouted the song in chorus. Shouted—with all the force our lungs still possessed, and yet we heard nothing of our own song, so noisy are the engines in a submarine.

What do I know of the journey to the Scottish coast? Almost nothing.

We knew but one thing: "Victory or death." Comfortable in such a nutshell of a boat it is not! The crew's quarters are certainly no ball-room, and it is no mountain breeze that one's lungs respire.

Petroleum, petroleum, and, yet again, petroleum! How one snatches at the air when the thing comes up again!

We were ten days on the way. We did not know where it was going. "To death or to victory—more than that I don't know myself at present," said our commander. And then we went out to sea with the other submarines. At first together, then we separated

The "U 15" we never saw again; she fell before the enemy.

All the way along the English coast we went, at times under water. Six hours' work and six hours' sleep, for ten whole days!

And there is no order given; one hears nothing as sound. What a deaf-mute one is! One hears with the eyes and speaks with the hands and feet, as has already been seen. Thus a gentle kick, "Now then, you! Pay attention there! Look out! The mate wants to speak to you." There is a lot of work for a few men to do, especially if the boat is under water, so that every man must be at his post.

So the days passed by. A little while under, a little while on top—that was the only variation.

And then, for once, there came a sensation. One after another had to leave his place for a minute and take a peep through the periscope. It was the prettiest picture I ever saw.

If Germany had had an opportunity at the commencement of the war—that is to say, if her Grand Fleet had not been bottled up as it had been by Britain—she would have placed on the seas an immense and powerful fleet of merchantmen transformed into armed cruisers. One such merchantman, which did succeed in getting to the sea as an armed auxiliary cruiser, was the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse.* This vessel was a liner in the Nord-Deutsche-Lloyd Atlantic service, built in 1897, and one of the fastest and largest vessels in the North Atlantic trade. Her last peaceful voyage was made when she started on July 21 from New York for Cherbourg and Bremerhaven. When war broke out, she turned herself into an armed cruiser with 10 guns of approximately 4-in. calibre, her endeavour being to arrest British traffic between this country and the Cape.

She had at first a certain measure of success, for on August 15, about ninety miles from Tenerife, she stopped and overhauled the Union Castle liner *Galician.* Subsequently, however, she abandoned her prey, having apparently been alarmed by what she took to be a British cruiser. She also captured off the north of Iceland a trawler, from which she took fifteen Grimsby fishermen as prisoners of war. Later on she came across the New Zealand Shipping Company's vessel, the *Kaipara.* This vessel,

two days after she had touched Monte Video, received a wireless message from Glasgow, requesting her to avoid all trade routes, dim the brilliancy of her lights, and, if possible, not to bunker. From that message, she assumed that Britain was involved in war and so avoided the trade routes. But on August 16 the *Kaiser Wilhelm* came across her track. She was boarded by a boat from the German vessel, the boat's crew smashing up the *Kaipara's* wireless apparatus, placing explosives in the stoke-hole and seizing and carrying away the passengers and crew as prisoners of war. Directly everybody had left the ship, the *Kaiser Wilhelm* opened fire on her. It took about an hour and a half to sink the *Kaipara*, and during that time fifty-three shots were fired. When on board the *Kaiser Wilhelm*, the captain received his prisoners with every courtesy, and took the greatest care as to their comfort. At the same time, however, he seized the opportunity to let them believe that the best part of the British Navy had already been destroyed by the Germans, that the Russians had fled from Warsaw, and that the Germans were within ten miles of St. Petersburg. Later on in the same day, the *Kaiser Wilhelm* sighted the Elder Dempster vessel *Nyanga* and proceeded at once to take her crew prisoners and blow her up. The next day the German cruiser coaled from a vessel painted to represent a Union Castle boat. A week later she was off Las Palmas coaling from three German colliers. Whilst so engaged H.M.S. *Highflyer* came up. At once the captain of the *Kaiser Wilhelm*, anticipating a hot fight, had his prisoners transferred to one of the colliers, in order that they should be out of danger's way.

The *Highflyer* was a light cruiser of 5,600 tons as against the nearly 14,000 tons of the *Kaiser Wilhelm*, but carrying eleven 6-in. and 12-pounder guns. She was primarily a Training Ship for Naval Cadets. The *Highflyer* now having caught her prey with the aid of wireless information, and whose tracks she had been steadily dogging for some time, at once set to work. So good and effective was her gunnery, that one of her first shots disabled the German ship's port-quarter gun and took part of the bridge away. The *Kaiser Wilhelm* never really had a chance. Her guns were outranged by those of the *Highflyer*. The German shells dropped invariably short of the British cruiser. At first the liberated prisoners on the collier had the experience of being under fire in the sense that the shells of both vessels whizzed over their heads, but the collier steamed gradually away, and it was not until after she had proceeded about twelve miles that the doomed German vessel sank.

The sinking of the German raider gave much satisfaction in

Britain. She had already done some substantial damage to British trade, and whilst afloat was always a menace; but one has to place on record, once the *Kaiser Wilhelm* is removed from the Cape trade route for ever, the courtesy and consideration with which her captain performed a duty which, to judge by his statements and demeanour to those he captured, was not by any means palatable to him.

One man was unfortunately killed on board the *Highflyer*, and five were slightly wounded. The survivors from the *Kaiser Wilhelm* were landed before the vessel sank.

The operations of the *Kaiser Wilhelm* were particularly remarkable inasmuch as she contented herself merely with destroying and sinking her prizes, never, in any case, attempting to capture and carry them or their cargoes away. Possibly she was so afraid of meeting British cruisers that she dared not stand by her prey in order to effect a capture. But most probably she knew that she could do nothing with the ships if captured, and so considered her duty done, though it could effect nothing more than mere destruction and some terror to unarmed merchantmen.

The London Geographical Institute

But now, in a distant sea, the Mediterranean, another German ship was beginning to stir the waters.

It is not so many years ago that naval experts regarded the Mediterranean as the scene of the settlement of the next great world conflict. Germany, however, and in this case perhaps rightly, never seemed to fall in with this view, and so we found, at the outbreak of the war, that country was represented in the Mediterranean by only one ship of any importance. That is to say, the *Goeben*. What Germany did believe was that when war did break out it would be one in which she would be associated with Italy as well as Austria in the Triple Alliance. Here Germany made a very grave miscalculation. One of the first blows she received was from Italy, when that country declared her neutrality. Had Italy joined in the war in conjunction with Germany and Austria, then the naval position in the Mediterranean would have been such that our forces would have been only slightly superior in strength to those of the Triple Alliance. Italy's defection, however, so disturbed the dreamt-of equilibrium that, at the outbreak of the war, we found ourselves overwhelmingly superior in naval force to both Germany and Austria in the Mediterranean Sea. Whatever fleet of the enemy there was there of any importance was that of Austria. Germany was represented by only one man-of-war—the *Goeben*.

It is very remarkable that Germany should have sent this ship to the Mediterranean. In the North Sea, associated with her Grand Fleet, she would have been a powerful weapon of offence and defence. In the Mediterranean, alone, in face of the overwhelming superiority of the French and British, she was, for all practical purposes, useless. Germany had, no doubt, sent the *Goeben* into the Mediterranean with very mixed motives. In the first place, so powerful a vessel as this in Mediterranean waters might have had a diplomatic value ; and, in the second place, her presence there was doubtless intended to some extent as an advertisement for her builders. It is difficult to discover that as a fact the *Goeben* ever did become a diplomatic asset. She was, however, successful as an advertising agent to the extent of attracting at least one order—by Greece for the construction of the *Salamis*—for the Vulcan Company. She was one of the finest men-of-war in the German Navy—the last word in the construction of cruisers five years since.

On finding herself in the Mediterranean at the outbreak of war, it was necessary that she should do something to justify, or even as an attempt to justify, her existence and presence there, so, with valiant daring, associated with a small German cruiser, the

Breslau, and the gunboat *Panther* of Agadir fame, she commenced operations. Here and there about this sea these ships were, from time to time, reported to the vessels of the Allies. She had interrupted the voyages of a few small peaceful merchantmen, searching for wireless; and it appeared that she had bombarded, for no rational purpose whatever, some insignificant and unfortified ports on the Algerian and Tunisian coast—Bona and Phillipeville. But what was more important was the fact that about this time it was necessary to the Allies that the Mediterranean should be absolutely free for the safe transport of troops to Marseilles from the ports of Egypt, and special attention had also to be paid by the warships of the Allies in guarding the route of the French army corps from Africa to France.

In the early days of August the small British cruiser the *Gloucester* managed to get into touch with the *Breslau.* Though lower and smaller, she crashed a whole broadside into the German vessel, at once following her up. The *Breslau* soon slightly turned, and fired a few guns individually. Again the *Gloucester* let the German ship have another complete broadside, discharged as though it were one gun. The fate of the *Breslau* seemed to be certain. She would either be sunk or be captured.

Now, however, at this critical moment, the giant *Goeben* came speeding to the rescue. The *Gloucester,* even now undismayed as ever, discharged a broadside into the *Goeben,* and turned away, the *Goeben* in steady pursuit. The cannonade continued. A steady and effective firing was poured forth by the *Gloucester,* being returned only irregularly, and with less effect, by the *Goeben.* The *Gloucester* was now doing all she could to entice the *Goeben* to follow her, perhaps to some spot where the *Goeben* might meet her match in some British ship of war of more equivalent power, but, turn or circle round the *Goeben* with as enticing a movement as she could, yet the German ship was too wary to be led into any trap. There was nothing left then for the *Gloucester* but to steam a steady course away from her antagonist, the *Goeben* being much the swifter, as also the more powerful vessel, following swiftly in pursuit. It seemed as though it was now the *Gloucester's* turn to be either sunk or captured; but no, suddenly turning her side to her pursuers, the *Gloucester* once more gave an exhibition of her perfect gunnery, sending a whole broadside into the *Goeben.* So effective was this attack, that the big German, with funnels lost and with a heavy list, withdrew, unwilling to run the risk of another example of the *Gloucester's* deadly gunnery, and, putting on full steam, made up to the *Breslau,* and with her disappeared over the horizon.

The *Gloucester* returned to her sister ships, who had now safely secured for the time being the transport of the French troops they were then interested in, and reported her adventure. Ascertaining that the two German vessels were at Syra, the British vessels directed their course thither. The Germans, however, had hidden themselves amongst the Cyclades and Sporades islands. Our ships, scattering, searched for them, but it was like looking for a needle in a bundle of hay. Ultimately, by intercepting wireless messages, it was discovered that the German ships had taken refuge at Messina, in Italian territorial waters.

The British Fleet followed the fugitives there, but were, of course, unable to take action. The only course to be pursued was to wait until the time allowed the German ships by international law to remain in neutral waters had expired, and to deal with them as they emerged from the Straits and the Italian territorial waters. This work was left to a few small vessels, the great ships of the Allies having other work elsewhere demanding their attention. The *Goeben* and the *Breslau* did not, however, know this. They thought that the whole Mediterranean fleet of the Allies was at their heels. They little imagined that their pursuers now were only small vessels which they could have shattered and dropped to the bottom of the sea.

The *Goeben* had now drawn upon herself the attention of the whole world. Her captain had publicly announced at Messina that his intention was to clear out of the Straits into the Mediterranean, and, if necessary, fight the whole of the fleet of the Allies in order to do so, and that once in the open sea the *Goeben* would startle and strike terror into the souls of her enemies. A Berlin newspaper, the *Lokalanzeiger* of August 12, as translated by *The Times*, in excited and inflated language drew the attention of the world to the proposed hazardous expedition of the great German ship. The following is an extract:

> Admiral and officers go again on shore on the 5th to the German Consulate; wills, letters home, objects of value, among them a photograph of the Kaiser with an autograph signature, were deposited there, and then the last preparations are made for the great Hussar ride. The sun sinks deeper; dark shadows spread over the Straits of Messina. Stronger smoke the chimneys; through the stillness rings the sound of the anchor chain as the anchor is pulled up. The crowd swarms thousand-headed to the harbour; then resounds clear from the flagship *Goeben* the music of "Heil dir im Siegerkranz." Officers and crew stand on deck with their heads uncovered. Three roaring "hurrahs" to the War Lord ring over to the shore, where the crowd remains silent, struck by the cheerful calm and confidence with which German seamen go forth to fight. Only the moon lights them on

their nocturnal trip. Deep silence—the roar of cannon has been heard perhaps in the distance—the wreckage has been found of an English ship—but as yet definite information is lacking of all that happened to the lurking foe. One thing alone we know—they are through.

As a fact, what the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* did was, after leaving port with bands playing and flags flying, straightway to scuttle ingloriously for safety from Messina, hugging closely the local neutral territorial waters into the Dardanelles. They were not attacked. They were not even pursued. It had been better if they had not so vaingloriously boasted that they had made their wills, and that they were fixed in their intention to fight to the death, seeing that their intention was really to avoid a conflict. The striking difference between naval and land warfare is that on the sea a fleet, by escape, can almost invariably avoid a conflict. This the *Goeben* did. This the *Goeben* intended to do.

The theatrical emptiness of the conditions under which these ships left Messina is more apparent, when it is known that, having attained the Dardanelles, they proceeded forthwith to haul down the German flag, and to sell themselves to the Turks for £4,000,000. One of the finest vessels of the German Navy was thus sold, under the least heroic circumstances possible, without having fired a shot in anything like equal conflict. The probabilities are that both Turkey and Germany then knew that the day was not far distant when Turkey herself would take a hand in the great war. Had Turkey then done her duty, she would have forced the ships once more into the open sea, directly the time prescribed by international law had expired which is allowed an armed ship for temporary refuge in a neutral port. The purchase of these ships by Turkey outraged every accepted principle of international law. After-events clearly explained why Turkey not only purchased the vessels, but, on their entrance into the Dardanelles, permitted a remarkable fraternisation between their officers and Turkish officials.

In the North Sea there is a Gibraltar. Its name, however, is Heligoland, but, unlike the veritable Gibraltar, it is in the possession of Germany, and not in that of Britain. Heligoland is a small island some forty-six miles from Cuxhaven, which covers the entrance to the Kiel Canal, and in or near which the German High Seas Fleet is probably generally lying. It is also about the same distance from the Naval Arsenal at Wilhelmshaven. It is, in fact, the apex of a triangle having its legs on Cuxhaven and Wilhelmshaven, and so this place is a vital outpost in the German scheme of coast defence.

At the beginning of the war there was a general cry in this

country that "Britain wants nothing for herself." It is probable that this cry will eventually be modified particularly in respect to Heligoland. Until the year 1890 this island, with its great strategic value, had been for over a hundred years a British possession. In that year it was exchanged with Germany for Zanzibar. A recent German naval writer described Heligoland in the following manner:

> The centre of the strategical basis of the German Fleet, distant about forty miles from the mouths of the Elbe, the Weser, and the Jade. It is a fortress of the most modern kind, furnished with the newest weapons, and fortified with the utmost technical skill. Its guns, contained in armour-plated revolving towers and bomb-proof casemates, dominate the sea over a circle from twenty to twenty-five miles in diameter. Powerful moles, some 650 yards long, protect the flotillas of torpedo-boats and submarines; and great stores of ammunition and supplies facilitate the provisioning of our ships. As the pivot for the movements of our fleet, as a support and place of refuge for the smaller craft, and as a place of observation, Heligoland does invaluable service to the German Fleet in the North Sea.

One can imagine from the foregoing that of all the maritime outposts of Germany, Heligoland would be the most dangerous for a British Fleet to interfere with, particularly would that be so when one realises how effectively the island has been fortified since it passed into German hands. Nevertheless, towards the end of August, within the first month of the war, the British Navy did get to work in this neighbourhood, and with no small effect.

The first naval fight of any importance that took place in the North Sea between the British and German Fleets occurred on August 28. Ever since the commencement of the war British submarines had been watching off the Bight of Heligoland, keeping constant vigil in order to obtain such information as would give the British Fleet an opportunity to descend upon the out-lying German naval forces. All this had been done naturally without the knowledge of the British public, and, curiously, just before this eventful day people, notwithstanding the great services the fleet had already rendered, were asking for some spectacular naval action.

These submarines had been infesting the Bight, in spite of persistent attempts on the part of German destroyers and cruisers to drive them off. They could not be driven off. Eventually, they had completed their observations, and obtained the information as to the enemy's movements which they had so patiently sought. Communicated to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir John Jellicoe, he at once made preparations for an onslaught upon

that part of the German Fleet which alone was open to any sort of attack. So the Grand Fleet became the scene of activity. A small but powerful squadron of battle-cruisers, light cruisers, and destroyers was detached in order to create the necessary force for the intended operation, and it would seem that, very wisely, Sir John Jellicoe had decided that his force should, as compared with the German force he intended to attack, be overwhelmingly superior. This was necessary, not only to ensure victory as against the enemy's ships, but also because of the peculiar and grave dangers which were to be run by reason of the vicinity of Heligoland to the probable scene of conflict.

The naval force intended to be attacked consisted of a fleet of German destroyers and cruisers operating in and in the neighbourhood of the Bight of Heligoland, guarding the approaches to the German coast.

These are the details of the British forces engaged: First there were the battle-cruisers in the command of Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, who also was in command of the whole operations, consisting of the battle-cruisers *Lion*, *Queen Mary*, *Princess Royal*, *New Zealand*, and *Invincible*, all ships of the Dreadnought type, three of them carrying 13·5 in. guns, and two 12-in. guns. Second in strength was the First Light Cruiser Squadron, commanded by Commodore W. E. Goodenough. This squadron consisted of four cruisers—the *Southampton*, *Birmingham*, *Lowestoft*, and *Nottingham*—each carrying 6-in. guns. It was the function of these powerful and effective vessels, working in conjunction with submarines, to support a strong force of destroyers. It was the onerous and perilous duty of the destroyers to push forward and operate so as to bring the German Fleet into action and prevent its escape and avoidance of conflict with the British force. The Flotilla of Destroyers was led by the *Arethusa*, commanded by Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt. This vessel had only just been completed, and though newly commissioned and the officers and men being new to their ship, yet she went to sea, and fought, as will be seen, a sharp action with the greatest credit. Amongst the other destroyers in the flotilla may be mentioned the *Liberty*, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander N. K. W. Barttelot; the *Laurel*, commanded by Commander F. S. Rose; the *Goshawk*, commanded by the Hon. Herbert Meade; the *Ferret*, commanded by Commander Geoffrey Mackworth; and the *Laertes*, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Goldsmith. Another vessel which took a leading part in the action was the *Fearless*, commanded by Captain W. F. Blunt, which went out from the main fleet with two submarines to act as a decoy. The German force was found

to consist of not only a large flotilla of destroyers, but a number of powerful cruisers such as the *Mainz* and *Köln*.

In the dark hours of the early morning, in swelling seas, the darkness emphasised by mist and fog, the *Fearless*, the *Arethusa*, and their accompanying flotilla of destroyers crept steadily and stealthily towards the Bight of Heligoland. Suddenly, when steaming close to the shores of the island, beneath the very guns of its powerful fortifications, they came into sight of the German destroyers. This they managed to do, to the intense surprise of the Germans, notwithstanding the careful look-out which the enemy had been keeping, and the fact that aeroplanes were watching from above lest the British should make such an attack as they now had. Doubtless the fog and the mist had concealed our forces from the watches in the air-craft overhead. Certainly, directly the fighting had commenced, the aeroplanes carried swift information to the German Fleet, bringing up at once to the assistance of the German destroyers the more powerful cruisers of the type already referred to, and which it was the duty of the destroyers to entice out into the open sea.

The German destroyers having been sighted, forthwith, without a moment's loss of time, the British vessels opened fire on the German destroyers, and now occurred, if ever, an exemplification of Lord Fisher's principle that in naval warfare "One should hit first, and keep on hitting afterwards." Full speed ahead, these British boats dashed towards the German, shells flying thickly. According to some accounts, the British vessels had to encounter not only the guns of the German ships, but also the powerful artillery of fortified Heligoland.

The *Fearless* justified her name. Acting well her part of decoy, she went forward into the midst of the German destroyers, fighting as she went, and necessarily exposing herself to the combined attack of the whole of the German flotilla. For the time, it was one British vessel against a host of German. The audacity of the onslaught was evidenced by the fact that in her bows were discovered, after the fighting, nineteen marks made by the enemy's shells. Her gunnery was perfect. The speed, coolness, and accuracy of the firing of this gallant vessel stood out in remarkable contrast to the nervous and often inaccurate work of the Germans; and well it might, as, for some time, to the best of their ability, as many as five enemy ships concentrated their efforts upon her. In a very short time, when the large German cruisers had come up in response to the summons of the aeroplanes, she found herself in conflict even with them. But greatest deed of all was that, at a distance of about 6,000 yards, she opened fire and persisted in

so deadly a firing upon one of these large vessels, that eventually the German cruiser burst into flames and sank beneath the seas.

The *Arethusa* meanwhile was equally busy. At first fighting as an advance-guard of the flotilla, like the *Fearless*, she gallantly wrought havoc at tremendous odds upon the enemy's destroyers. Soon, like the *Fearless* she was drawn, a willing combatant, into conflict with one of the German cruisers, the *Mainz*, which had now come up to the relief of the destroyers. The fighting was very keen, one sailor said it was " like Hell." Not only had the *Arethusa* and the others engaged in the fighting to hold their own against the destroyers and the now arrived cruisers, but so to manœuvre as to entice them out into the open sea, where the British battle-cruisers could join in the conflict. The *Arethusa*, after once finding her range, which entailed the expenditure of only one or two shots, with remarkable skill and good-luck managed to fire a shot that struck and completely put out of action one of the bow guns of the enemy. Now, almost right merrily, she began and continued to pound her shot into the German cruiser with all her might and main, but the cruiser was still a much too formidable opponent. She, in her turn, also poured her shot into the *Arethusa*, one shell finding its way into the engine-room, and so causing the gallant little vessel to reduce her speed. It looked then as though the *Arethusa* would very speedily end her career on the bottom of the Bight. Another German cruiser was also now engaging her. Fortunately, however, she and her companion ships had done their work so well and effectively—the *Mainz* was actually sinking by her head, her engines stopped, besides being on fire—that now the battleships and battle-cruisers were on the scene, and the position of the enemy had been so forced by the destroyers that the burden of the fight henceforth was on the broad shoulders of the British Dreadnoughts. Altogether, the *Arethusa* was in action for about eight hours, but not until she had seen the last of the enemy, though her engines were so disabled that she had to be towed to Chatham, and her guns were only partially manned, did she retire from the conflict.

The Light Cruiser Squadron was the first to appear, and they very speedily reduced the German cruiser, the *Mainz*, which until then had centred her attention upon the *Arethusa* and the *Fearless*, to an indescribable condition. That was, in fact, the end of the *Mainz*. The other German cruiser, the *Köln*, was now engaged by the First Battle Squadron, which had just come up. She too was sunk.

CHAPTER II

THE BRITISH NAVY

German and British naval rivalry—Naval Forces of the Powers in 1898—First German Naval Law—Foundation of Germany's modern naval power, 1900—Fifth German Naval Law—Its real object—Britain's efforts—The two-power standard—British fleet reorganised and redistributed—Kaiser's letter to Lord Tweedmouth—The first Dreadnought—The new era—The "Contingent Four"—The final reorganisation of 1912—*Naval Warfare*—Command of the sea—Blockade—Britain a naval Power—*The British Navy*—How controlled—The Lords of the Admiralty—Mr. Winston Churchill—Prince Louis of Battenberg—Lord Fisher—*Different classes of warships*—Auxiliaries—The fleets engaged in the war—German, French, Austrian—Early British Navy—Dockyards—Introduction of steam—Ironclads—The struggle between guns and armour—The two theories—Capital ships—Pre-Dreadnought to Hyper-super-Dreadnought—Dreadnought armament—Cruisers—Their functions—Reconnaissance—Protection of commerce—Destruction of enemy's commerce—The *Emden*—The hunt for the German commerce raiders—The battle-cruiser—Engaging the enemy—Torpedoes—Danger to blockading fleet—The destroyer—"Destroyer-destroyers"—The submarine.

NAVAL supremacy is of two kinds: general and local. General naval supremacy consists in the power to defeat in battle and drive from the seas the strongest hostile navy or combination of hostile navies wherever they may be found. Local superiority consists in the power to send in good time to, or maintain permanently in some distant theatre, forces adequate to defeat the enemy or hold him in check until the main decision has been obtained in the decisive theatre. It is the general naval supremacy of Great Britain which is the primary safeguard of the security and interests of the great Dominions of the Crown, and which for so long was the deterrent upon any possible designs prejudicial to or inconsiderate of their policy and safety. Great Britain also had the power, by making special arrangements and mobilising a portion of reserves, to send, without courting disaster at home, an effective fleet of battleships and cruisers for the defence of her overseas dominions. And these communities were also protected and their interests safeguarded by the power and authority of Great Britain so long as her naval strength was unbroken.

This power, both specific and general, began to be threatened in 1898, mainly by Germany.

In 1898 the German fleet, the smallest in European waters, was a negligible quantity in relation to the naval forces of the other Great Powers. The following table shows this very clearly:

	Armoured Ships.	Cruisers.	Coast Defence.	Torpedo Craft.
Britain	88	154	60	313
France	60	74	24	288
Russia	39	29	27	188
Italy	30	23	—	212
Germany	28	24	13	127
Austria-Hungary	15	17	4	79

We have seen elsewhere how, responding to the congratulatory telegram of the Kaiser to President Kruger in 1895, the British Government commissioned a special service squadron by way of protest and also to indicate to Germany how impotent she was in world politics in consequence of her weakness on the seas. This action of the British Government taught Germany two lessons—that she should not demonstrate against another Power unless she was in a position to make the demonstration effective, and that in order to be able to demonstrate in the future against another Great Power whenever she felt it might be necessary she should at once create an effective navy.

Forthwith an agitation commenced in Germany for a great navy, the result being that in 1898 the first of the German Naval Acts came into being. This measure, which was intended to provide for the following six years, was of a comparatively modest character, proposing the establishment during that period of 20 battleships, 8 coast defence ships, 12 large cruisers, and 29 small cruisers. But soon events were to happen destined to accelerate still more rapidly the development of Germany's naval power. The South African War broke out, and the British fleet stopped the German steamship *Bundesrath*, which was suspected of carrying ammunition of war to the Boers. This incident profoundly disturbed the German people. It cut them to the quick to know that, as against Britain, the German Empire was powerless on the seas. So the six-year programme of the Law of 1898 was found no longer adequate to satisfy German ambition. A new Naval Law was consequently introduced in 1900. In the preamble was contained an explicit declaration of the tactical objects for which the German fleet thenceforth was to exist.

This declaration is now historical. It marked the foundation

of Germany's modern naval policy. It ran as follows: "In order to protect German trade and commerce under existing conditions, only one thing will suffice—namely, Germany must possess a battle fleet of such strength that even for the most powerful naval adversary a war would involve such risk as to make that Power's own supremacy doubtful. For this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the German fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, for, as a rule, a great naval Power will not be in a position to concentrate all its forces against us." It was also pointed out that even if a great sea Power should succeed in confronting Germany with superior forces, the enemy should be so considerably weakened in overcoming the resistance of a strong German fleet that, notwithstanding a victory gained, the enemy's supremacy would not at first be secure any longer by a sufficient fleet. The Power referred to by Germany as the "enemy" was Britain.

This new Navy Act of 1900 practically doubled the German fleet establishment incorporated in the measure of 1898.

Following closely on the return to power of the Liberal Party in Great Britain, which was conceived by Germany to be pledged irrevocably to a policy of retrenchment in naval and military expenditure, a still further Naval Act was passed in Germany in 1906. This measure provided for the construction of six additional armoured cruisers for foreign service which had been struck out of the Act of 1900 by the Reichstag. In 1908 was passed another German Naval Law of one single clause. This Act accelerated the construction of battleships by reducing their effective life by one-fifth.

The next step by Germany was to pass a great expansion measure in her fifth Naval Act of 1912. The main feature of this law was not, however, the increase in the new construction of capital ships, though there was in fact a very important increase provided for, but rather the increase in the striking force of ships of all classes which would be immediately available at all seasons of the year.

By this law a third squadron of eight battleships was to be created and maintained, in full commission, as part of the active battle fleet. As the law stood before, the active battle fleet would have consisted of seventeen battleships, four battle or large armoured cruisers, and twelve small cruisers. By the new law, however, it was to consist of 25 battleships, 8 battle or large armoured cruisers, and 18 small cruisers. Again, before the new law, owing to the system of recruitment which had prevailed in Germany, the German fleet was less fully mobile during the

winter than during the summer months. This also was affected by the operations of the fifth Naval Act. Not only was the fleet increased in strength, but rendered much more readily available. Of a total of 144 torpedo-boat destroyers, 99 were to be maintained in full commission, instead of only 66. In addition to this, 72 new submarines were to be built, 54 of which were to be maintained with full permanent crews. Taking a general view, the effect of the new law was that nearly four-fifths of the entire German navy would thenceforth be maintained in full permanent commission—that is to say, instantly and constantly ready for war.

So great a change and development in the German fleet involved necessarily important additions to its personnel. In 1898 the officers and men of the German navy amounted to 25,000. In 1912 that figure had reached 66,000. The new law added 15,000 officers and men, making a total of 101,500 in 1920. The cost of these increases in men and in material during the six years subsequent to 1912 was estimated to amount to more than £10,000,000.

The effect of the new naval law was to produce a remarkable expansion of strength and readiness. The number of battleships and large armoured cruisers to be kept constantly ready and in full commission was raised from 21, the then figure, to 33. This addition of 12 was an increase of about 57 per cent. The new fleet in the beginning included about 20 battleships and cruisers of the older type. But gradually, as new vessels were built, the fighting power of the fleet rose, and at the commencement of the war it consisted very largely of modern vessels. The complete organisation of the German fleet, as intended in 1912, was to be five battle squadrons and a fleet flag-ship, comprising 41 battleships in all, each attended by a battle or armoured cruiser squadron, complete with small cruisers and auxiliary of all kinds and accompanied by numerous flotillas of destroyers and submarines. But this full development was capable of realisation only step by step. Nevertheless, it was anticipated that by the year 1914 there would be two squadrons in existence entirely composed of what are called "Dreadnoughts," and a third made up of good ships like the *Deutschlands* and the *Braunschweigs*, with another additional five Dreadnoughts and battle-cruisers. In the preamble to the law of 1900 already set out, it will be noticed that Germany's ambition was to acquire a fleet "in order to protect German trade and commerce." This great fleet, however, designed by the law of 1912, was not, at the commencement of the war or any time prior to that, so far as it had been constructed,

used at all for duties of commerce protection, nor was it even used in discharge of Colonial responsibilities. Nor, moreover, was even its composition and character adapted to those purposes. As a fact, it was concentrated and kept concentrated right up to the commencement of the war in close proximity to the German and British coasts. The real object, therefore, of this fleet and of Germany's naval expansion in general is obvious.

Now, what had Britain been doing in the meanwhile? To tell the tale in detail of Britain's efforts in the direction of naval expansion during this period would take too long; an outline must suffice. During the period about the year 1898, when Lord Goschen was First Lord of the Admiralty, the supremacy of the British navy was undoubted, inasmuch as it had been constructed on such lines that its strength was in absolute conformity with the Two-Powers standard. This standard was one laid down and observed by Britain as governing her naval construction, and meant that she would, as a rule never to be departed from, build a battleship larger and even more powerful, for every battleship built by the two fleets in Europe next in strength to the British navy. At this time these two fleets were those of France and Russia. In 1904, as a consequence of the German Fleet Laws of 1898 and 1900 and the obvious ambitions of Germany, it became necessary for Britain to reconsider her position in relation to other naval Powers, and particularly Germany. It was recognised that the new German navy was one of a most efficient type, and was so fortunately circumstanced as to be able to concentrate almost the whole of its fleet in waters where it was an increasing menace to Britain's safety. The United States and Japan were also coming to the front as naval Powers. Then, in accordance with a long-standing policy, the Mediterranean was the centre of the naval defence of the Empire. The newest and best ships were to be found in the Mediterranean Fleet, the North Sea being practically neglected. The Home Fleet was full of obsolescent ships and insufficiently manned.

Now, however, great changes began to take place in the organisation and distribution of the fleet and in the organisation of the Board of Admiralty itself. But perhaps the most notable feature in the reform now initiated was the introduction of the Dreadnought type of ship in place of vessels with a mixed armament. The public were and have ever since been impressed with the size and cost of the Dreadnoughts and other subsequent vessels of that type. But size and cost were not the real characteristic of the Dreadnought type. Before the first Dreadnought

was laid down, several other Powers had already constructed or begun to construct ships of even greater size and costing immense sums of money. The outstanding characteristic of the Dreadnought was its gun power and speed on a relatively small displacement. The idea was to get rid of the smaller guns and concentrate upon the large, thus doing away with the then generally adopted system of diversity of armament. The decisive factor in a naval engagement had been proved to lie in the larger guns capable of giving smashing blows. Why therefore hamper the ship with the smaller guns which had little or no value as a decisive factor? Thus came into existence the Dreadnought.

With the Dreadnought commenced a new era in naval construction. All Pre-Dreadnought battleships then in course of construction became obsolescent. The other naval Powers were then building the old style of ship. They had now to start afresh with the Dreadnought type after Britain had already found for this type a place in her fleet. Thus Britain, for the time being, maintained a more than ever decided supremacy.

In 1909 a fresh impetus was given to the development of the British fleet, by the laying down of four large armoured ships and four other ships, known subsequently as the "Contingent Four." In the following year the fleet had been so redistributed that the naval forces designed for home service were believed to amount to a complete security. The Home Fleet was no longer the shadow or skeleton of a fleet it had been ten years before. It then consisted of two fully manned divisions, of a third division formed of the nucleus crews which were capable of complete mobilisation, and of a fourth division of ships in the special Reserves. It also had associated with it the Atlantic Fleet, a fully manned fleet which was based upon Dover. Great Britain had then as many as seven Dreadnoughts in commission, Germany having only two. With regard to ships of an earlier type than the Dreadnought, this country had an overwhelming superiority. In 1912, as a consequence of the fifth German Naval Law, Britain had once more to reconsider her naval position. In that year this country possessed 18 battleships and battle-cruisers of the Dreadnought class, against 19 of that class possessed by all the other Powers of Europe. In 1914 it was estimated that the figures would be 31 to 33. Now it was a question not of providing for the construction of more ships so much as increasing the efficiency of the naval forces already in existence. This was the task which Mr. Winston Churchill undertook when he succeeded to the position of First Lord of the Admiralty. The War Staff was

reorganised yet again, the fleet in the home waters was worked to yet a still greater efficiency, and last, but not by any means least, the officers as well as the men of the lower deck were dealt with in regard to pay and promotion and other matters, so that thenceforth a remarkable spirit of harmony and enthusiasm pervaded the whole naval service. And so things stood at the outbreak of the war. A fleet as powerful and efficient as any expert, who during the preceding ten years had struggled against parsimony and unreasonable pacifism for an adequate naval force, could desire.

Great Britain being an insular Power, relies for the most part naturally and almost necessarily upon naval force as distinguished from military force for her defence and her general warlike operations abroad. Every danger of a military character to which Britain may reasonably expect to be opposed, can be best met outside her own territory—at sea. Preparedness for naval war, against naval attack and for naval offence, is thus preparedness for most warlike conflicts in which she is likely to be involved. On the Continent of Europe she has never yet in modern times been called upon to fight on land with an army, except generally in alliance with and primarily for the benefit of one or more Continental Powers. And so in regard to the overseas dominions generally. Except in India and in her dominions abroad from disaffected natives, Britain has no reasonable ground to anticipate offensive warlike operations against her, other than invasion over the seas. So Great Britain has always maintained a standing army the small numbers of which indicate clearly that aggression could never be her policy except, perhaps, in those distant regions whither the great armies of the world could not act against her unless, in order to effect their own transport, they had first wrenched from her the control of the sea. No modern State has long maintained a supremacy by land and by sea—one or the other has been held from time to time by this or that country, but not both. Great Britain has always chosen naval power, and wisely so chosen.

The British navy is controlled by the Board of Admiralty, composed of a First Lord, who is a member of the Cabinet and directly responsible to Parliament for the work of the Board; four Sea Lords, of whom the First has a general responsibility practically equivalent to that of the First Lord; and a Civil Lord. There are also two Secretaries—one Parliamentary and Financial, a political officer changing with the change of Government; and one Permanent, and independent of political changes. Nominally on an equality, the First Lord is supreme, though

because of technical necessity he must work harmoniously, and in time of war almost as the subordinate, of the First Sea Lord. And this is so because the strategy of naval warfare is directed in general by the Board of Admiralty. In modern warfare, in the case of military operations on land, the Secretary for War has little or nothing to do with the strategic operations of the Army, these being the concern of the Commander-in-Chief on the field of battle. In the case of naval warfare, however, operations are directed in general by the Board of Admiralty. It is obvious, therefore, that in time of war the First Lord, who is generally only a statesman or politician, must find himself a subordinate to his chief colleague, the First Sea Lord, who is a naval expert.

The directions from the Admiralty at home have not always been acceptable to and in accordance with the views of the Admiral of the Fleet. A striking instance of this occurred in the naval campaign of 1690, when, against his own judgment, and in consequence of the express instructions of the Admiralty, Admiral Lord Torrington engaged the French navy in the Battle of Beachy Head—a fight which ended in a victory for the French. For failing to win this battle, Lord Torrington was tried by court-martial, but acquitted. Until more recent years Lord Torrington was very generally regarded as an incapable seaman, and his defeat as the result of his incapacity. But now naval experts regard his view of the situation and his conduct of the fight as perfectly sound and capable. On the other hand, when Lord Barham was at the Admiralty and Nelson on the seas, and Britain was effectively asserting herself as Mistress of the Sea, the Admiralty was essentially the strategist and the Admiral the instrument. The operation of Craig's expedition was carried out and directed by Nelson and Barham respectively, who have since been described in this connection as "a combination of warlike energy and strategic insight without a parallel in the history of naval warfare." Very largely, therefore, as one looks to General Joffre and Field-Marshal French in relation to the operations of the armies in France and Belgium, so one must look to the Board of Admiralty, and particularly to the First Sea Lord, in relation to the general strategic operations of the British fleet.

At the commencement of the war, Mr. Winston Churchill was First Lord and Prince Louis of Battenberg First Sea Lord. Very shortly afterwards, however, Prince Louis of Battenberg retired, his place being taken by Lord Fisher. The latter is the man of all others who was responsible for the organisation of our

fleet. He has also the reputation of being our greatest living seaman. His principle, too, that when the hour comes one should "hit first and keep on hitting," is one which has a singular appeal to British sentiment.

The warships of the British navy may be divided into three general classes. The first class consists of battleships and battle-cruisers. These ships are frequently classed together as battle-ships, capital-ships, ships-of-the-line, and line-of-battle ships. The second class consists of cruisers of various types. Of these cruisers there are two classes: first, the cruiser class; second, the light cruiser class. The first of these classes consists of armoured cruisers and first-class protected cruisers; the second consists of second- and third-class protected cruisers and unarmoured cruisers, scouts, and light armoured cruisers. The third general class of warship is composed of torpedo-boats, submarines, torpedo-destroyers, and destroyer-destroyers. In addition to the warships strictly so-called are the auxiliary ships. These include vessels of various types destined for miscellaneous work in connection with the navy. Thus there are three repair-ships fitted out specially for the purpose of repairing warships when at sea, in order to obviate the necessity of a return to a dockyard. Eight ships are employed in hydrography—that is to say, mapping out the sea. Again there are depot-ships that attend to the needs of torpedo-boats, destroyers, and submarines. In addition to all these is a squadron of seven old cruisers which are used in mine-laying operations, and a fleet of former torpedo-gunboats and steam trawlers which have been fitted out for service as mine-sweepers—that is, to fish up the mines laid by the enemy. At the commencement of the war the fleets of the conflicting Nations stood in comparison as follows, according to a table prepared by *The Scientific American* (see next page).

The conception of "the command of the sea" lies at the very foundation of naval effort. The immediate object in naval warfare is that one belligerent shall destroy the naval force of the other. The belligerent who has attained that object, either absolutely or for all practical purposes, is said to have obtained the command of the sea. Unless, however, it is a command of the sea—as in the case of the early wars between Britain and Holland—that is the one and only object of the war, such a result is generally not decisive between the belligerents in the war as a whole. The obtaining of the command of the sea must be accompanied by the occupation or conquest of some territory of the enemy, an operation which generally must involve military or land conflict.

To secure the command of the sea means no more than securing the effective control of all such maritime communications as are or can be affected by the operations of the belligerent. In times of peace, no Power has or can claim command of the sea. It is only in time of war that the expression has any practical meaning. Except for an extent of three miles around the coasts of States—in their territorial waters—the sea is open freely and equally to all nations. It is but a great highway, differing mainly from highroads on land inasmuch as it is trackless. The command of the sea, in war-time of course, therefore means that the Power that possesses it may freely move its ships hither and thither across the seas without any sort of interruption or prevention by an enemy, by reason of the fact that the enemy has no naval forces effective to interrupt or prevent. To destroy absolutely the naval forces of the enemy is obviously to gain command of the sea. The only other way in which it may be gained is by putting those forces out of action. When, however, they are put out of action without being destroyed, there always remains the possibility of their returning to action. Unless, therefore, the enemy's naval forces are destroyed, at least in the sense that they are put out of action permanently, command of the sea is obtained only temporarily.

Having attained the command of the sea, it follows that its possessor may move its naval forces across the seas without let or hindrance. Ships of war of this naval Power may proceed freely to the coasts of the enemy;

	Completed Effective Ships of the Contending Navies.										Relative Strength of the Triple Entente and Dual Alliance.			
Type of Vessel.	Germany.		Austria.		Great Britain.		France.		Russia.		Triple Entente.		Dual Alliance.	
	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.	No.	Tons.
Dreadnoughts	16	351,519	3	60,030	31	661,650	4	92,368	—	—	35	754,018	19	411,549
Pre-Dreadnoughts	20	242,800	6	74,613	40	589,385	18	262,675	7	98,750	66	950,810	26	317,413
Coast Defence Ships	2	8,168	6	41,700	—	—	1	8,800	2	10,380	3	19,180	8	49,868
Armoured Cruisers	9	94,245	2	13,380	34	406,800	20	201,724	6	63,500	60	672,024	11	107,625
Cruisers	41	150,747	5	13,815	74	382,815	9	46,095	9	52,845	92	481,755	46	164,562
Destroyers	130	67,094	18	9,450	167	125,850	84	35,812	91	36,748	342	198,410	148	76,544
Torpedo Boats	—	—	39	6,852	49	11,488	135	13,426	14	2,132	198	27,046	39	6,852
Submarines	21	14,140	6	1,686	75	30,362	64	27,940	30	6,506	169	64,808	27	15,826
Total tons completed	—	928,713	—	221,526	—	2,208,350	—	688,840	—	270,861	—	3,168,051	—	1,150,239

its transports may carry armies; its maritime commerce may pursue the even tenor of its way—there is no fleet in existence to hinder. On the other hand, the enemy's armies cannot be transported across the sea, there cannot possibly be any invasion of the country of the Power holding the command of the sea, and the maritime commerce of the enemy is almost entirely at the mercy of the other.

A blockade is an instance of merely temporary or partial command of the sea. The enemy's fleet is locked up in its harbour. Whilst so locked up it is powerless, and the other belligerent has, in relation to that fleet, the command of the sea. But though thus in command of the sea, its command is limited by the particular circumstances of the case. The blockading fleet cannot itself move where it will across the sea, except at the risk of putting an end to the blockade and releasing the enemy's fleet. The blockading fleet, moreover, is liable to casual attack, as by torpedo or air-craft, by the blockaded fleet, and is also subject to a moral deterioration amongst its personnel by reason of the persistent watching and to the necessity for partial removal and change for repair. The blockade must eventually be determined. If the blockaded fleet submits without fighting, then there is an end to the matter. If, however, it has any strength at all relative to the blockading fleet, it must come out to the sea and fight. And this is what the blockading fleet must itself really desire. Its real object is, necessarily, the destruction, not the mere internment, of the blockaded fleet. So, therefore, a blockade, when carried out by a fleet superior to that blockaded, as of course it must be, is never, curious as it may seem, a blockade at all. It is rather a persistent anxious invitation on the part of the blockading fleet for the other fleet to come out and to fight, rather than an attempt by the blockading fleet to keep the other inside its harbour.

Even so far back as prior to Cæsar's landing in this country, Britain had a navy. In the reign of King Edgar, about a thousand years ago, a British fleet divided into three squadrons, and said to have comprised over three thousand armed warships, was organised upon distinctly modern lines. Subsequently, the navy was for centuries composed of ships which were primarily merchantmen, but were supplied as occasion required by their owners to the King and fitted out and manned by them for the purposes of naval warfare. Later, the Crown itself had its own ships as well. So in the fleet raised against the Spanish Armada in 1588 there were 34 of the Queen's ships and 163 merchantmen, specially commissioned and armed and manned for the occasion.

Later on, warships became more and more specialised as time progressed and necessity required; but, nevertheless, even at the present day the naval forces of the realm consist not only of the fleet already described, but also of a reserve of merchant-ships which can be called upon and armed in the event of war, such as the ships of the Cunard Line, including the *Lusitania* and the *Mauretania,* whose armament in this circumstance would consist of twelve 6-in. guns.

In the fifteenth century, national dockyards were established in this country by the opening of one at Woolwich, many others being opened in subsequent years. Now, however, the only national dockyards which construct or rather put together large warships are those at Portsmouth and Devonport. Smaller ships of the cruiser class are built at Chatham and Pembroke, submarines also being built in the yard at the latter place. At Sheerness torpedo craft are repaired. In the course of another year or two, a great repairing establishment, now in course of construction, will be opened at Rosyth, on the Firth of Forth.

Steam, as a motive power, was first introduced into the navy in 1822, when a wooden-paddle steamer of 238 tons was built at Deptford. The employment of steam as a substitute for sails was strenuously discouraged from the first by the seamen of the sail era. It was only after many years of experiment and effort that ultimately steam entirely took the place of wind. At first the Admiralty admitted that steam might possibly prove useful in small vessels for towing ships of war out of harbour against contrary winds, but at the same time the Admiralty stated that "they felt it their bounden duty on national and professional grounds to discourage to the utmost of their ability the employment of steam-vessels, as they considered that the introduction of steam was calculated to strike a fatal blow to the naval supremacy of the Empire." Both the paddle and the screw were equally opposed. The paddle was believed to be too obviously liable to damage in action and the screw was regarded as being likely to interfere with the steering of the ship. After forty years from the days of the *Comet,* for the first time a ship-of-the-line was actually designed and built as a screw ship. This was the 80-ton gun *Agamemnon.* Before this, however, there were over one hundred steam-propelled ships in the fleet, including several first-rate line-of-battle ships which a year or two before, though laid down as sailing ships, had been converted while on the stocks into screw steamers. Many years had to pass, however, before the last of the masts and yards was scrapped, and the old-time sailor had to stand aside finally and recognise that time and the maritime

engineer had no further use for him in a modern scheme of sea existence. Even as late as 1903, boys destined for the navy were yet learning a seamanship of the sail era.

The other and perhaps the more important revolution in the construction of warships was the introduction of iron. Here, again, the seamen of the sail era opposed the new ideas. Not until the wooden Turkish fleet had been annihilated by the guns of the Russians at Sinope and the French iron ships had successfully withstood those guns at Kinburn, were the authorities of the old school at all convinced that change in the material of construction was necessary. H.M.S. *Warrior*, our first sea-going ironclad, was launched at Blackwall at the end of 1860. She was a compromise. As far as her midship section was concerned, she was a floating square iron box, her ends being unarmoured and liable easily to be pierced. This ship was built by Britain as a reply to the armour-clad warship *Gloire*, which France had already laid down. The *Warrior* was fully rigged as a ship—that is to say, she carried square yards on all her three masts. Even while this ship was being constructed the Admiralty were ordering the laying down of several wooden two- and three-decker steamships and obtaining money for replenishing the Government timber sheds. Very soon, however (in 1863), so great a sweep was made of our timber vessels that when sold they fetched no more than the price of firewood. So only eight years after Sinope, the Admiralty with remarkably prompt decision recognised that henceforth wooden ships were useless.

The introduction of iron in the construction of warships began a new era in regard to ordnance. Then began the battle between guns and armour. This has continued ever since, and has produced ships protected by almost impenetrable coats of mail of twelve and fourteen inches of hardened steel, and guns which, requiring longer to build than the ships themselves, are capable of flinging shells weighing a ton each over a distance of eight miles through an incredible thickness of armour. No sooner was a gun invented capable of penetrating armour, than a new and superior kind of armour was invented, capable of keeping the new projectile out of a ship's inside. Following the lead of France, all the naval Powers of the world had now to rebuild their fleets. Though France thus obtained the lead, yet, owing to our then unrivalled supplies of iron and splendid shipbuilding resources, the balance was soon turned in our favour, although at great cost. From the time of the Spanish Armada right down to the days of the *Warrior*, not only had there been no great or far-reaching changes in warship designs, but there had been very



KRUPP'S.

This famous cannon foundry, where most of the engines of war employed by the German nation are manufactured, is situated in Essen, a town in the Rhenish Prussian coalfields. In 1848, when the business was founded, there were employed only 74 men—to-day they number an army of over 60,000—sixty thousand men engaged in the manufacture of death-dealing instruments of war for the great European War Lord.

little change or improvement in the ordnance. The *Warrior* fired a shot only 2 lb. greater in weight than that of the heaviest gun mounted on our ships at the Armada. The guns in action at Trafalgar were little more effective than those used at the time of the Armada. We have seen that the shell of our modern ships attains a weight of a ton. The weight of the shell of the 7-in. gun of the *Warrior* was only 115 lb. In 1876 the *Inflexible* carried four 80-ton guns with a calibre of 16 in., firing projectiles of 1,700 lb. These 16-in. guns could penetrate 24¾ in. of wrought-iron at the muzzle. In 1881 the *Conqueror* carried 12-in. heavy breech-loading guns. These fired projectiles of 714 lb. with a muzzle-energy of 18,060 foot-tons. The latest type of 12-in. gun, however, fires a shell of 850 lb. with a muzzle-energy of 53,400 tons.

The projectile of a 12-in. gun weighs 850 lb., that of a 13·5-in. gun 1,440 lb., and that of a 15-in. gun about 1 ton. The respective ranges are 5, 6, and 7½ miles. Each of these guns is theoretically as capable of getting through hostile armour as the others, but, apart from range, the heavier guns have the advantage of more accurate fire. The bigger the gun the easier it is to secure a hit —that is to say when comparing the largest guns. But it is almost impossible to fail to hit the mark with an up-to-date 4-in. gun as carried on a destroyer or small cruiser.

So far as can be judged, the British navy places its confidence in its gunnery as against its armour. It would seem to stand or fall very much on an initial offensive. The German navy adopts the contrary principle. So a British armoured ship has an amount of armour protection rarely exceeding 25 per cent. of her total weight, the comparable percentage in the case of a German ship being 30 or even 35 per cent. The war will prove which of these two theories or principles works out the better in actual practice.

As this War will, more than any war in the history of the world, be a war of mechanics and mechanical devices, and as, moreover, the theories and principles of the mechanical developments of science will be put to the test, it will be worth while considering for a moment the various units of the Navy from the mechanical point of view.

A warship is a fortification floating on the sea, completely equipped with weapons, men, supplies and motive and other necessary power. Unless such a ship goes out of her way to engage in attacks on land and land fortifications or otherwise, she operates generally against vessels having the same characteristics as her own. A warship may even be called a floating gun-carriage.

In the early days of naval warfare, certainly until the time of the Spanish Armada, a sea fight was an affair of supreme confusion and disorder. Each ship would appear to have the right and even found it necessary to mark down, quite independently of her sister ships, her prey in the enemy's fleet, and each man in each ship did much the same thing. As, however, big-gunnery developed and became more and more important, so inevitably fighting became more orderly and subject to general principles, and each man became more subordinate as a fighting individuality. Ships of war were constructed as big as possible, and with as many big guns as could conveniently be dealt with and manœuvred. The guns for the most part were fired from the sides. Inevitably it came about that the proper order of disposition and progress of a number of such vessels was a line with each ship well astern of the leader and those in front. Inevitably, too, it came about that only the largest and most powerful ships were allowed inside this line. All fleets developed naturally in this fashion. So the normal action between two fleets was an action between two lines of ships, each firing broadsides on to the other. To-day the principle is the same. There is no room, and there never has been in the history of naval warfare since the early days of gunnery, for weak ships in these lines.

We can now understand the term "line-of-battle ships." Such a term referred to "ships fit to lie in a line." Either of these terms designated ships of the class which to-day are generally referred to as "capital ships," or more generally perhaps as "battleships." So a battleship is a vessel not only fit to lie in a line, but constructed entirely with that object and destined to take a place in that part of the fleet which engages the enemy in decisive battle. The British navy at the commencement of the war had seventy-one of these battleships. Of these forty are known as "Pre-Dreadnoughts"—that is to say, were constructed before the introduction of the "Dreadnought" type into the British navy. The majority of these Pre-Dreadnoughts mount three types of gun, forming a main, a secondary and an anti-torpedo armament, respectively. The main armament consists of four 12-in. guns in two turrets, one forward and one aft. The secondary battery is made up of twelve 6-in. guns, six on either broadside. In the rest of the Pre-Dreadnoughts are to be found variations, sometimes very considerable, of the type just described.

In 1905 the Admiralty, as already stated, decided to construct a battleship of a type which has since become known and famous as the "Dreadnought" type. It was a natural development of the

principle of unification which had already developed so considerably in ships and fleet. The secondary armament was done away with. So, where the typical Pre-Dreadnought carried as a secondary battery twelve 6-in. guns, six on either broadside, the Dreadnought in their stead carried as in the main armament 12-in. guns. A Dreadnought was accordingly armed with only a main and an anti-torpedo battery—ten 12-in. guns in the former and twenty-four 12-pounders in the latter. This was the actual armament of the original ship called the *Dreadnought*. Her length is 490 ft., being 100 ft. longer than our oldest battleships, and her nominal displacement is 17,900 tons. She was the first battleship to be fitted with turbines, and so, notwithstanding her great size, being 1,400 tons increase on the "Lord Nelson" type, had a remarkably high speed of twenty-one knots. The ten 12-in. guns are mounted in five turrets, one forward and two aft on the centre line, and two abreast on the beams. Of these ten guns, eight may be fired on either broadside. At the same time her anti-torpedo armament was made more effective. A number of ships were constructed on these principles and composed the famous Dreadnought class. Towards the end of the Dreadnought period, however, the last three ships constructed were arranged so that the whole of the ten guns, instead of eight only, could, on being swung over, be fired on either broadside.

In 1911 the "Super-Dreadnought" class took the place of the Dreadnoughts. Instead of 12-in. guns, the armament now comprised 13·5-in. In the anti-torpedo battery sixteen 4-in. guns took the place of the original Dreadnought twenty-four 3-in. 12-pounders. There were also three torpedo tubes. The *Orion* is the name of the ship originally typical of this class. The *King George V* class quickly followed the *Orion*, with further improvements. This was again followed by the *Iron Duke*. In the *Iron Duke* there is carried as an anti-torpedo battery the same number and calibre of guns—that is to say, twelve 6-in. —as were carried by the Pre-Dreadnought. Moreover, the *Iron Duke* had four torpedo tubes instead of three, and was also furnished with two 3-in. guns on special mountings for attacking air-craft.

The introduction of the Dreadnought class, that is to say of the all-big-gun ship, was regarded and may be taken as the commencement of a new era in battleship construction. Though in point of time Britain was the first to launch a Dreadnought, yet actually at least two other Powers, the United States and Japan, were already either commencing or about to commence the construction of Dreadnoughts. This new departure was viewed in

Britain with some apprehension. It seemed to mean that all the naval Powers were then commencing *de novo* with the construction of their respective fleets. So Britain, it was thought, would lose the lead. As events have turned out, however, the lead has not been lost. This is evident when one compares the relative strength of the fleets at the commencement of the war.

But neither Dreadnoughts nor Super-Dreadnoughts were long to satisfy the ambitions of naval constructors. As the Dreadnought had to give way to the Super-Dreadnought, so, shortly before the war, the Super-Dreadnought itself had to give way to the Hyper-super-Dreadnought. Ships of this class, of which the *Queen Elizabeth* and the *Royal Sovereign* are varying types, were decided upon in 1912. The Queen Elizabeths, five in all, should be completed during the first twelve months of the war. The Queen Elizabeths are armed with eight 15-inch guns, firing shells of about one ton weight—more than twice as heavy as those fired by the original *Dreadnought*. The anti-torpedo battery is made up of sixteen 6-in. guns and twelve 12-pounders. There are five torpedo tubes. The speed of these ships is very high, namely, twenty-five knots, and they depend entirely upon oil fuel for raising steam in their boilers. The substitution of this fuel for coal increases enormously the radius of action of the ship burning it, and economises space at the same time.

It is the characteristic of the battleships we have been describing that they operate in a fleet. The inevitable condition of naval fighting, inasmuch as both belligerents seek, as a matter of principle, a decisive conflict, is that the battleships operate in a moving concentrated concert. At the same time, they are not the beginning and the end of the naval forces—they are the base of a still greater organisation consisting generally of the lighter and different types of vessels, such as the cruisers and submarines, which operate dispersed at varying distances around and from the battleships. The cruisers, which range from vessels larger in size even than the battleship herself down to the "Scout" type of less than 3,000 tons, are designed to fulfil varying and most important functions in relation to their battleship centre. So, too, the submarines and torpedoes.

The characteristic functions of cruisers are at once varied and most important, and it will be seen that they are not only necessarily incidental to the operations of the battleships, but take an inevitable place in the whole organisation of the fleet. A cruiser is first and foremost a ship of high speed—higher, as a rule, than that of a battleship. Quick movement is imperative for a cruiser. Her field of action is far less confined than that of the

battleship. She moves across the ocean from end to end, as well as within more restricted areas, always ready to fight if necessary as she moves. Her armament, because of her speed and her incidental construction, is accordingly light as compared with that of the battleship. The smaller and speedier the cruiser, the lighter the armament. It is the duty of the cruiser to scour the seas in order to obtain information for the commander as to the position, the movements and the strength of the main forces of the enemy. Whilst so operating it is generally no part of her duty to attack the enemy's battleships when in the course of her voyages she may encounter them. It is for her rather to avoid conflict and proceed with her own legitimate work, which may be to return with information. On the other hand, it may be her duty to fight a cruiser of the enemy which she may encounter.

Another and most important part of her duty is to protect our commerce and to prey upon the commerce of the enemy. Whilst preventing the enemy attacking and capturing our ships of commerce, she must do her best to sweep the maritime commerce of the enemy off the seas. By thus protecting our maritime commerce, she prevents the enemy obtaining command of the sea, and whilst effectively preying on the maritime commerce of the enemy, she maintains the command of the sea for Britain. So long as, because of the operations of our fleet and our cruisers in particular, the whole of the maritime commerce of the enemy is effectively kept off the sea, Britain may be said, to a very great extent, to have dealt a blow against the enemy more or less decisive, as the enemy's country may depend or not on her overseas commerce. Were an island Power such as Britain to have her maritime commerce swept off the sea, the enemy could pride itself on having gained an advantage which would be very little less than a complete victory. And as with maritime commerce, so with transportation. The transport of troops across the sea by the enemy must be prevented. At the same time Britain must preserve the power to transport her troops whithersoever and whensoever she pleases.

Interference with the enemy's maritime commerce is, if effectively decisive and absolute and the work of a belligerent who has and can maintain the command of the sea, a most important operation, though at best only generally a secondary one, of naval warfare. "But," in the words of Admiral Mahan, "regarded as a primary and fundamental measure, sufficient in itself to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion, and a most dangerous delusion." Its complete justification is only possible when it is a

serious attempt by a sufficiently powerful belligerent to retain or obtain the command of the sea, otherwise, except for its moral effect, it is nothing but a merely harassing manœuvre. The moral effect, however, of even a slight interference with maritime commerce would appear to be very great. The operations of the *Emden* in the Indian Ocean, though relatively ineffective, inasmuch as the few captures effected made no substantial difference whatever to the rate of insurance, yet did in fact have such a moral effect that the Indian merchants particularly concerned made representations to the Imperial Government which indicated that they were more than even seriously perturbed. It must be accepted as a now well-established fact in the light of history that, however absolute may be the command of the sea by a particular Power, yet it must suffer here and there and now and then some relatively slight pin-prick in the form of the destruction of some of its maritime commerce by the enemy, if the latter has any naval force at all at its disposal.

A cruiser engaged in the destruction of the enemy's commerce is generally in an extremely favourable position, inasmuch as her capture is a matter of very great difficulty. She has the unlimited ocean wherein to move, not being bound to follow any settled route whatever ; provided she can obtain from time to time adequate supplies of fuel, food, ammunition, and necessary repairs, she may evade capture for perhaps an indefinite period. It is possible to have and maintain secret bases for these supplies in out-of-the-way coasts. It is also possible, and not very difficult even, to obtain coal and fuel from captures.

During the first months of the war some eight or nine German cruisers were believed to be at large in the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Indian Oceans. Searching for these vessels, and working in concert under the various Commanders-in-Chief, were upwards of seventy British (including Australian), Japanese, French, and Russian cruisers, not including auxiliary cruisers. Among these were a number of the fastest British cruisers. The vast expanses of sea and ocean and the many thousand islands of the archipelagos offered an almost indefinite choice of movement to the enemy's ships. In spite of every effort to cut off their coal supply, it was maintained by one means or another in the face of increasing difficulties. The discovery and destruction of these few enemy cruisers was therefore bound to be largely a matter of time, patience, and good luck. The public were forced to have confidence that the Commanders-in-Chief and the experienced captains under them were doing all that was possible and taking the best steps to bring the enemy to action.

This state of affairs was signally illustrative of the ease with which one or a few cruisers may escape a very great number of pursuing cruisers when the trackless and boundless ocean is the scene of operations. While ships of commerce pursue the trade routes, it is only necessary for the commerce destroyer to hide in the adjacent and absolutely untravelled sea and raid the route when and where she pleases and pick up whatever may be found at the moment. Should the merchant ship pursue her voyage outside and without regard to the regular route, the work of the preying cruiser would be more difficult, inasmuch as both she and her hoped-for prey would be scattered apart over the seas. The vastness of sea which would enable an enemy cruiser to avoid capture is as effective to protect the traffic of commerce. By marshalling merchantmen in regular convoys at stated intervals, the efforts of the enemy cruisers may be more than neutralised. A course such as this, however, would not be taken unless the maritime commerce of a particular route should be seriously threatened to a substantial extent, as it would necessitate a considerable restriction of trade.

The precise functions of the cruiser have been the subject, within recent years, of considerable discussion, with the result that they have in general not been very clearly determined even in respect to the protection of our commerce. It was argued that cruisers would be unnecessary, as no enemy with which Britain might find herself engaged would have sufficient cruisers herself effectively to attack our merchantmen, especially as no bases would be available for supplies. The operations, however, of the German cruisers already alluded to have proved what should have been apparent—that only a very few cruisers are sufficient seriously to dislocate overseas trade, and are not easily caught by even an overpowering fleet of pursuing cruisers. Then with regard to securing information as to the enemy's movements, it was contended that this function would be performed so effectively by wireless and air-craft as to leave cruisers without occupation in this connection. Here, again, the war has not justified the assumption that the great days of the cruiser have past.

But in addition to the functions we have already dealt with, there are two which undoubtedly are within the province of a cruiser type of vessel. There are the vessels, the latest to be built, which are designed to replace the torpedo-destroyer. These will be referred to again later on. There are also the battle-cruisers.

" A battle-cruiser is, as its name implies," writes Mr. Thurs-

field in his valuable little book on *Naval Warfare*, "a vessel not only fitted, by reason of its armour and armament, 'to lie in a line' whenever occasion may require, but also exceedingly well qualified by its armour and armament, and still more by its speed, to discharge many of the functions of a cruiser either alone or in company with other cruisers. In this latter capacity it can overhaul nearly every merchant ship afloat, it can scout far and wide, it can push a whole reconnaissance in cases where a weaker and slower cruiser would have to run away if she could; it can serve as a rallying-point to a squadron of smaller cruisers engaged in the defence of this or that vital line of communication, and alone or in company with a consort of the same type it can hold the terminal and focal points of any such line against almost any number of hostile cruisers inferior in defensive and offensive powers to itself. Such are its powers and capacities when acting as a cruiser proper. But it may be thought that in the stress of conflict it will have very little opportunity of displacing these very exceptional powers, because an admiral in command of a fighting fleet will never, when anticipating an engagement with the enemy, consent to weaken his fighting line by detaching so powerful a unit for scouting or other cruising purpose. That is as it may be. It will depend on many circumstances of the moment, not to be clearly anticipated or defined beforehand: on the strength of the enemy's forces; on the personality, sagacity, and fortitude of the admiral—whether he is or is not a man of mettle and temper ascribed to Nelson by Admiral Mahan in a passage already quoted; on the comparative need as determined by the circumstances of the moment for scouting for information, for cruising for the defence of trade, or for strengthening the battle line for a decisive conflict to the uttermost extent of the nation's resources. It is unbecoming to assume that in the crisis of his country's fate an admiral will act as a fool or as a poltroon. It is the country's fault if a man capable of so acting is placed in supreme command, and for that there is no remedy. But it is sounder to assume that the admiral selected for command is a man not incapable of disposing his force to the best advantage. 'We must,' said Lord Goschen on one occasion, 'put our trust in Providence and a good admiral.' If the nation cannot find a good admiral in its need, it is idle to trust in Providence."

Considered as a line-of-battle ship, a battle-cruiser has at least two important functions. She is the vessel to give chase to an enemy fleet which is in retreat or declining action, and also at the decisive moment to join in an engagement at the critical position.

The occasion when the battle-cruiser would fulfil the first of

these two functions would be when the enemy's fleet is sailing away, either retreating from its opponent or refusing to engage in action, its opponent desiring action. Orders would be given to the battle-cruisers to pursue the enemy. Because of their high speed the cruisers could catch up the retreating fleet, and because of their effective armament would be able to so engage the enemy in its rear as to force the enemy fleet either to proceed and leave its rear to the mercy of the cruisers and the rapidly approaching supporting fleet, or stay supporting its rear and thus, against its will, engage in action with the pursuing fleet. So an enemy who may not want to fight may be forced to fight. The other function is illustrated by the intention expressed by Nelson before Trafalgar, though as a fact it was found unnecessary to carry it out. Nelson's idea was to keep his fleet in a position of sailing. "That the order of sailing is to be the order of battle, placing the fleet in two lines of fourteen ships each, with an advance squadron of eight of the fastest-sailing two-deck ships, which will always, if wanted, make a line of twenty-four sail on whichever line the Commander-in-Chief may direct," when these met with a squadron of fast ships. In those days cruisers used to be kept with, though detached from for the time being, the main fighting fleet in such a position that they could be used in the course of the coming action as an auxiliary to the main fighting fleet just in that position where at the time the reinforcement would be likely to make action decisive.

The torpedo is not a ship or boat—it is a projectile. A torpedo, however, differs from the projectile that leaves the muzzle of a gun. The shell or bullet is not only expelled from its gun by an explosive charge behind it, but it derives its entire velocity throughout its course from the explosion of that charge. On the other hand, a torpedo derives its velocity throughout its course by the propulsion of machinery inside itself, the motive power of which is compressed air. Nevertheless, it may be expelled from its tube, which is the torpedo's "gun," by a small charge of powder or compressed air. It is in fine an automobile projectile. Again, the projectile of a gun has its course through the air describing a curve which may, if its range be a long one, reach a height of 20,000 ft. before falling towards the object at which it is aimed. A torpedo need not be ejected from its tube in the air; it may also be ejected from a submerged tube. When the torpedo is ejected in the air, it drops into the water, its machinery immediately commences action, and, settling down at a depth which may be predetermined, proceeds through the water at a high speed, the rate of which also can be predeter-

mined, towards its object. On striking its object, the fore part of the torpedo, which is termed its "war-head," containing a very powerful charge of damp gun-cotton, explodes, rending the under-water skin of the ship attacked, and so either sinking her or doing such great damage as to put her at least temporarily out of action. The power of the explosion may be so great as to sink by its action the largest warship afloat.

One effect of the introduction of the torpedo into naval warfare was to change entirely the methods of blockade. Formerly, a blockading fleet could have its battleships placed at fixed stations or cruising within narrow limits to keep in close touch with the in-shore squadron. Now a battleship cannot safely be left anywhere within reach of an enemy's torpedo craft. By night the battleships are more or less at the mercy of any torpedo vessel which is operating on the surface, but such a torpedo vessel which drops her torpedo into the water from above is less formidable—if indeed she is formidable at all—during the day. She can, of course, be seen and may easily be dealt with. Since an above-water torpedo vessel is effective only at night, and is but the comparatively helpless target of the enemy during the day, it follows that she can operate only at a distance of not more than one to two hundred miles from her base, inasmuch, having regard to the speed at which she can travel, she must go to and fro between dusk and dawn. A submarine can, however, remain at sea for many days, as she can sink beneath the surface whenever attack is likely. So she can approach her object when submerged, unknown and unexpected. If the approach of a submarine is detected, the best, if not the only effective, defence is to steam away. So a modern blockading fleet of battleships, because of torpedoes, must either remain stationed in an adjacent sheltered anchorage, if such exists, adequately defended against torpedo attacks if it be within the range of the enemy's torpedo craft, or it must keep on the move outside that range.

The first torpedo-boat built for the British navy was the *Lightning* in 1877, a vessel of 87 tons, 460 horse-power, 85 ft. long, with a maximum speed of 18 knots. Until 1885, however, the British Admiralty did little or nothing in regard to these vessels, and this was so though other nations had already fully recognised the value of this type of craft and had provided themselves accordingly. Russia, for instance, had 115 torpedo-boats. Then the British Government commenced to build torpedo-boats in vast numbers, and since then have never slackened in their energies in this respect. In 1890, two British torpedo-boats of the first class of 130 ft., and with a speed of 23 knots, succeeded in crossing

the North Atlantic. Torpedo-gunboats, or "catchers," were then constructed, excellent sea boats, fast and handy, of about 700 tons. Very soon, however, in 1893, the *Havock* was built.

With this boat, the torpedo-boat destroyer, or the "Destroyer," as she is more usually termed, was introduced into the British navy. Vessels of this type not only carried torpedo-tubes themselves, but were also fitted with an armament of one 12-pounder and five 6-pounder guns. Their speed and armament enabled them easily to overhaul any enemy torpedo-boat and destroy her. Torpedo-boats pure and simple now disappeared entirely, giving place to the destroyer, which not only fulfilled the function of torpedo-boats, but also that of the "catcher." The *Havock* was a vessel of 240 tons, 3,500 horse-power, with a speed of nearly 27 knots, being 180 ft. in length with three 6-pounder guns. Since then, year by year, the destroyer has been improved so that we find by the year 1912 boats of the "Laertes" class. These boats have a tonnage of 965 and a speed of 29 knots. They carry three 4-in. guns, one machine-gun, and two double torpedo-tubes. Others are being constructed, particulars of which are not available.

Originally, the torpedo was regarded as almost solely a defensive weapon, one useful for the smaller naval Powers in order to protect their coasts and harbours. Now, however, the torpedo has developed into an active and most powerful weapon of offence. On and across the ocean, the modern destroyer not only is the instrument for the destruction of the torpedo craft of the enemy, but is a very effective destroying agent when operating against hostile battleships.

The surface-keeping destroyer has, in her turn, brought into existence the "Destroyer-Destroyers," a type of cruiser to which reference has already been made. As the battle-cruiser stands at the head of the cruiser class as the largest and most powerful, so the destroyer-destroyer stands at the foot of that class as the smallest, cheapest, and fastest vessel protected by vertical armour ever projected for the British navy. They are strong enough and fast enough to overhaul and cut down any destroyer afloat. They are all between 3,500 and 4,000 tons in displacement, carry an armament of three 6-in. and eight 4-in. guns, burn oil fuel only, and have a speed of thirty knots. Not only do cruisers of this class act as destroyers, but they fulfil another and important function, inasmuch as the destroyers themselves can fall back upon them for support when too hardly pressed.

The most modern and perhaps one of the most effective instruments in naval warfare is the "Submarine." This vessel, as her name indicates, is one which is capable of moving beneath the

surface of the sea. She is, in short, an under-surface torpedo-boat, her armament being the torpedo. The latest types of submarine are known as the "D" and "E" classes. So far as it is possible to obtain information as to the details of these classes, a "D" submarine would appear to have a displacement of about 600 tons, and the "E" a displacement of about 800 tons. Each boat would carry three torpedo-tubes and have machinery of 1,200 horse-power for surface work and 550 for submerged work, with speeds of 16 and 10 knots when respectively awash and submerged. On some boats of the "D" class a gun is carried on a disappearing mounting, so that it can be stowed away below when the vessel is about to descend. The boats of the "E" class, in addition to the torpedo-tubes, carry two 12-pounder guns. A still later type, the "F" class, is believed to have a displacement of 1,500 tons, an armament of four 12-pounder guns, and six torpedo-tubes, and speeds of 20 and 12 knots.

A submarine operates, of course, under the great disadvantage in one sense though a great advantage in another, beneath the surface of the sea, unknown and unseen, when once submerged, by the object which she attacks. This, however, must be read with the important qualification that when submerged, the periscope of the submarine is dictinctly visible at a considerable distance. The periscope is the eye by which the submarine sees. In the submarines of the latest types there are two periscopes to each vessel. The periscope is a long tube connected with and rising perpendicularly from the submarine to and above the surface of the water. At the bottom of the tube inside the submarine is a chart, or screen, upon which, by an arrangement of mirrors in an opening at the top, is thrown a picture of the scene upon which the opening looks. In bad weather, by reason of the spray and height of the waves, the outlook of the periscope upon the surface is so obscured that it has then little value as a guide for the submerged vessel. So in such weather a submarine is very largely *hors de combat.* The battleship, which is generally the objective of a submarine, is unfortunately unable with certainty to disable an approaching submarine though, seeing its periscope, she knows of her advance. Only by constantly being on the move herself is a battleship at all safe from submarine attack. When so moving a submarine is bound to rise at intervals to the surface in order to take observations. When a submarine has thus risen, the battleship finds her opportunity. Then, too, when operating beneath the surface, a submarine is under the very great disadvantage of having to steer in order to aim, since her torpedo-tubes are of the fixed type.

On reference to the detail of the British navy as it existed at the commencement of the war, it will be seen that the submarine is very well and powerfully represented. Since 1901, when submarines were first introduced into the navy, the Admiralty has continuously increased and improved the vessels of this class. There have been great advances in size and speed. The first submarines displaced only 120 tons when submerged, and carried only one torpedo-tube, the speed being only 6 to 7 knots. This improvement continued from the "A" class, which immediately succeeded the original class of 1901, steadily up through the "B" and "C" classes to the latest "D" and "E." Only one of the "A" class is now in the effective list of the navy—the submarine "A 5," which was launched in 1904. With this great advance in size and speed, there has also been a corresponding development in the formation and multiplication of submarine flotillas.

CHAPTER III

GERMANY'S EXIT FROM ASIA

The Japanese intervene—Kiau-chau—The bombardment of Tsing-tau—Its fall—German opinion—Togoland—Bismarck Archipelago—German New Guinea—Samoa—Hoisting the British Flag.

IN quite the early stages of the war, Japan determined to intervene as an ally of Britain in the East, and, by destroying the Eastern naval forces of Germany, to maintain peace in the waters of her neighbourhood. So she presented an ultimatum to Germany. In effect the ultimatum required Germany to remove her warships from the waters of the Far East, and to relinquish Kiau-chau, her leased territory in China. Unless Germany complied with these demands by 3 a.m., London time, on August 23, Japan would proceed against her with warlike operations. Of course nobody expected that Germany would comply with this ultimatum. Of all the overseas possessions of Germany, Kiau-chau, a territory of about 117 square miles, with its fine harbour and fortified town of Tsing-tau, was the most cherished. Sixteen years before, in 1898, Germany had obtained a lease of the territory for ninety-nine years from China, had developed and fortified the town of Tsing-tau, lavishing a wealth of money and energy on that place and the whole territory, and had designed it as a starting-place and base for a great extension of German possessions and power in the Far East. Here Germany had comfortably settled down in her "place in the sun"; and, moreover, with characteristic energy, was proceeding to exert an influence far beyond the leased territory, even arbitrarily extending her authority in to the neighbouring Province of Shantung.

Tsing-tau, soon after the outbreak of war, was not only occupied by a considerable force of German soldiers, but also by large numbers of Germans, who, in view of the war, had fled there for protection, from China and other parts of the East. The German Eastern Squadron, which was based on Kiau-chau, consisted of two armoured cruisers and three light cruisers and some gunboats. The British Squadron in the Far East was twice that size, France in addition having two armoured cruisers there. Japan as a

naval force was exceptionally powerful, and it would seem to have had at least twenty-eight large battleships and cruisers, including five Dreadnoughts, and also several flotillas of destroyers and submarines. So far as was known, Germany had no submarines at Kiau-chau, but was believed to have made very efficient arrangements for the defence of the approaches to Tsing-tau by extensively and heavily mining the bay and its adjacent waters.



Germany did not comply with the Japanese ultimatum. Memories of the bombastic manner in which she originally took possession of the place alone must have prevented her. It was when Prince Henry of Prussia departed to assume command of the German China Squadron that the Kaiser first launched upon the world his since never-forgotten observations about the "mailed fist of Germany." It was then that the German press with one

voice acclaimed the occasion as marking the time that had then come for the German Eagle to spread out its wings once more and show the world what it could do. It was in relation to German efforts in the Far East that the Kaiser first drew public attention to the fact that he and his armies were descendants of Attila and his Huns.

No territory has yet had so sinister a history during so short a period of time as Kiau-chau has had. Acquired by the Kaiser from China by a species of blackmail, it remained in his hands as a persistent menace to the peace of the Far East. It was to Japan as a raging, aching tooth. It was a cause—perhaps one of the chief causes—of the Russo-Japanese War. Its existence as part of the dominions of the Kaiser made it necessary not only for Britain and France, but even for the United States, ever to remain on the alert against some unwarranted German aggression.

So it is not to be wondered that the world did not expect that the Kaiser would, without some sort of fight, comply with Japan's ultimatum.

Without reckoning those who may have fled to Kiau-chau primarily as a place of refuge, the garrison of Tsing-tau was estimated, at the date of the ultimatum, to be made up of about six thousand seamen and marines. There were probably four companies of Seamen Gunners, four companies of Marines, some Cavalry and Field-gunners, and a company of Sappers. The whole of the defences were under naval control, and the Governor was a naval officer. Already the first and second Japanese Squadrons had left Tokio, under the command of Admiral Diva, their destination being kept secret. But some Japanese cruisers were known to be near the coast in the neighbourhood of Kiau-chau, probably with a view to landing troops and undertaking operations against the forts of Tsing-tau on shore. Theoretically, ships are not used against forts, for the simple reason that as a rule ships cannot materially damage fortifications ; so the design of the Japanese may have been to attack the place both by land and sea. In view, however, of the great superiority of the Allied naval forces, it was quite possible that the attack might proceed on lines exceptional to the rule.

Directly after the expiration of the period stated in Japan's ultimatum, the Japanese Fleet commenced the bombardment of Tsing-tau. But already, on Saturday, August 22, in the afternoon, a British ship of war had had an adventure in the neighbourhood of the fort. A German destroyer, *S.* 90, was found on the adjacent seas. A British destroyer, the *Kennet*, at once gave chase, and so hot was she on the track of the German that she came too

close to the batteries of Tsing-tau. The result was that she had to give up the chase, permitting the German destroyer to escape, and, though not herself materially damaged, yet sustaining substantial casualties. Three British seamen were killed and seven wounded.

The Allies began by seizing and occupying the islands, of which there are a considerable number, at the entrance to the bay. They followed this up by endeavouring to remove all the mines that Germany had laid. It was said that they had already removed 1,000 of these mines before commencing serious operations. Of course the Japanese were experts at this kind of work, for they had had the advantage of the experience of the wars with China and Russia. Moreover, the Japanese sailors, belonging as they do largely to the fisherman class, were able to undertake the work with exceptional facility and success.

In very leisurely fashion indeed did the Allied Fleet set about the attack. For one thing, it was now decided that the town should be reduced by a joint land and sea assault, and accordingly it was necessary that the operations of the land forces should be in complete accord with the operations of the fleet. For another, the result of the attack was certain. One day or other in the near future Tsing-tau must fall, the attacking force was so powerful. Aircraft was used, Japan sending up sea-planes over Kiau-chau continuously, the aviators showering bombs on to the doomed town.

In the meanwhile, the mine-sweepers, expert though they were, were unable to carry through their work without suffering some injury. In one or two instances they struck a mine and were blown up. Never before in the history of naval warfare had mines been so largely employed. They extended for a distance of more than eight miles from the coast, rendering it most difficult, and for a time impossible, for Vice-Admiral Kato, who was in command of the Japanese attacking forces, to approach with his fleet within effective range. At the outset, too, our battleships had to contend with a violent storm, from which, however, they came out safely, though with some loss of life. Then, in time, the fleet succeeded in effectively blockading the port. No neutral or belligerent vessel was allowed in or out. This was a real blockade, and not as in the case of the British Fleet in the North Sea. The British Fleet, although blockading in effect the German Fleet, was yet endeavouring to entice it out into the open. Here, in the Far East, the fleet of the Allies was blockading Tsing-tau with a view to the absolute internment of the German ships inside the port, and the eventual attack and seizure of the place itself.

And again, at Tsing-tau Germany had no submarines wherewith to intimidate the blockading fleet. The mines, however, proved to be a constant source of dread and danger. Not for one moment were the seas at all clear of them. One incident of remarkable bravery may here be mentioned. Three British sailors, finding some floating mines, jumped into the sea under the shower of shots from the fortress, and, swimming to the mines, successfully disposed of them.

This work of preparation and blockade proceeded for about a month. But it was not by any means a month of uneventful monotony. Aircraft, mining, and mine-sweeping operations were going on all the time. So, too, was a heavy, death-dealing bombardment—the fleets on to the forts, the latter on to the fleets. But eventually the Japanese and British forces, including troops from India and the Colonies, were landed safely in various strategic positions in Kiau-chau, directed towards an attack on the forts of Tsing-tau. The Japanese landed on September 2 and the British on September 23 and 24. Then, on September 27, the Allies made a great onslaught on the German citadel. With such success was this performed, that on the following day they were able to occupy the outer defence of the town, the Prince Heinrich Hill, and the right bank of the river Li-tsun, about seven miles to the north-east of Tsing-tau. During the first week of October the Allies opened a heavy fire on the fortress. Each side now began to make the utmost of the possibilities of aircraft—Germans and the Allies; the aeroplanes of each were pursuing and being pursued by those of the other, shots being fired and bombs dropped continuously.

All this was followed up within a week or so by sapping operations carried day by day nearer to the doomed city and by the destruction of portions of the forts by the fleet, in the course of which operations a Japanese cruiser unfortunately struck a mine and was destroyed, suffering a very considerable loss in human life. Such a bombardment as was now proceeding was, on both sides, necessarily a most calculated and cold-blooded business. So mechanical was it, in fact, that even ever-present death was unable to introduce into it an appreciable element of real excitement. A fatality was the merest detail. The effect on ship or fort was what mattered. But it was not, however, until the end of this month (on October 31, the birthday of the Japanese Emperor) that the bombardment became general—that the forts found themselves engaged all round, both with seamen on the water and troops on land, and with siege guns on earth and naval armament on sea. Storms and bad weather had delayed opera-

tions, but once commenced, this general and final bombardment was fast and furious, lasting for about a week, until seven o'clock on the morning of November 7—seventy-six days after Japan had declared war—when Tsing-tau capitulated. By then the forts had been all destroyed and reduced to heaps of rubble; great oil-tanks had been fired on, the oil spreading in every direction, burning fiercely and throwing up to the heavens, as it spread, lofty flaming columns, illuminating the whole town; houses had been reduced to ruins, streets ploughed up, and many of the people of Tsing-tau, struck with fragments of shells, had been visited by sudden and awful death. For four days a black darkness had reigned supreme every night, lighted up though, here and there, by the fire of war, the electric light installation having been destroyed, as also the wireless station.



The place was courageously and bitterly defended, the British and Japanese in their turn fighting with persistent determination and energy. The supreme moment arrived on the night of November 6. Then General Joshimi Yamada led a storming party,

which captured the central fort in the main line of defence, taking 200 prisoners. The Germans fought now for their very lives, desperately endeavouring, at the same time, to repair the damage done to their batteries. Their efforts were futile. Do what they would, the Allies' shells killed the beleaguered German forces, demolishing their batteries as fast as they were repaired. The remaining forts and portions of the defences were now stormed by the attacking force. British, Indians and Japanese fought side by side; against their bayonets and the shells of the heavy guns on land and sea outside, the Germans were helpless. It remained only for the point of the bayonet to give the finishing touch to the work of the Allies. Suddenly, at seven o'clock in the morning of the 7th, after a night of desperate and bloody fighting, the white flag of surrender was hoisted by the Germans. Tsing-tau had been taken. The territory of Kiau-chau had now passed from the possession of the Kaiser.

Four thousand and forty-two German prisoners were taken. The Japanese losses were about two hundred killed, the British forces suffering only twelve fatalities. Captain Fitzmaurice, who commanded the British section of the blockading fleet, at once received congratulations by telegram from Their Imperial Japanese Majesties. Brigadier-General N. Barnardiston, M.V.O., was in command of the British forces. On Tuesday, November 10, Tsing-tau was formally taken over by the Japanese, the conquering troops entering on the following day. By the terms of surrender, the Governor and all combatants were made prisoners of war, and all property was handed over in its then condition.

It is not difficult to imagine the feelings in Germany on learning of the loss of Kiau-chau. It is nevertheless interesting to notice some expressions of opinion in particular. The President of the German Reichstag telegraphed to the Kaiser condoling with him He said that the entire German nation had been shocked by the fall of Tsing-tau, which, defended to the last moment, ultimately yielded to superior strength. He added: "A work of German hands, founded by your Majesty, with the co-operation of the whole nation, as a point of support for German culture, has fallen a prey to the envy and covetousness of the Allies," and predicted that the day would come when German culture would once more replace them.

Captain Persius, the naval correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, wrote as follows:—

Now that the gigantic battle has reached its close, it is clear that the task of our enemies has not been an easy one. Tsing-tau has been defended far longer than any one thought possible. The Japanese have assisted the

> English in destroying the most brilliant work of German colonisation. England will reap the harvest sown by her short-sighted Government in a time not so far distant. Germany has lost Kiau-chau for the present, but not for ever.

But the most characteristic outburst was to be found in an article in the *Lokalanzeiger*, in which the following appears, as communicated by Reuter's Special Service :—

> Germans will never forget the heroic fighting at Tsing-tau, and those who have defended the colony. Never shall we forget the brutal violence of the yellow robbers, nor England who instigated them. We know that we cannot settle our account with Japan at present. For years she will still enjoy her booty. Our mills will grind slowly, but even if years should pass before the right moment comes at last, then a shout of joy will resound through Germany : Woe to you, Nippon !

One of the principal objects which Germany had in view at the commencement of the war was the acquisition of increased overseas territory. She was jealous, in particular, of the British and French colonial possessions. She wanted them badly. In fact, she openly and officially stated, just before the outbreak of the war, that the French colonies were particularly desired by her, and that the real object of the war was their acquisition. During the first four months of the conflict, however, instead of acquiring further overseas territory, Germany began steadily to lose that which she already had. These losses were undoubtedly very serious and extensive. Nevertheless, one must not overlook the fact that Germany had always ostensibly taken up the position that in the event of a great war, her retention or loss of her colonies would be decided by conflict on land in Europe. Of course, as against that, we have the important fact that Germany created and developed her fleet almost entirely with a view, not only to the maintenance of her then overseas dominion, but to the acquisition of more.

Kiau-chau went out of the possession of Germany under the circumstances already related. Much earlier, however, in the history of the war other of her overseas possessions had passed into the hands of one or other of the Allied Powers. On August 26 Togoland was seized and occupied by the British. On the 30th of the same month the New Zealand Navy took possession of Samoa. On September 11 an Australian naval expedition captured the German headquarters in New Guinea, following up this success by occupying with Australian forces the seat of government of Kaiser Wilhelm's Land in German New Guinea. On October 7

Japan occupied the capital of the Marshall Islands in the Pacific, subsequently handing them over to Britain.

So, in the first few months of the war, Germany had already been denuded of a great part of her colonial possessions. In such of these possessions as remained—German South-West Africa and German East Africa, for instance—operations were already in progress on the part of the Allies, destined apparently to a successful issue.

The seizure of Togoland by the British was really a very simple matter. At the same time it was an operation of profound importance, for this colony contained a powerful wireless station. Without any resistance whatever being offered, the British force from the Gold Coast Colony seized the port of Lome, the capital of the colony. The wireless station, which was situate some distance inland, had to be left to a later operation.

Samoa was occupied by Britain with equal facility, but with perhaps more caution. An advance detachment of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force was ordered to seize Samoa, and left Wellington for that purpose on August 15. The expedition, under the general command of Rear-Admiral G. E. Patey, K.C.V.O., was at once met on the high seas by three British cruisers, the *Psyche*, the *Pyramus*, and the *Philomel*. Then, for a week or so, in order to avoid the German armoured cruisers which were known to infest the Pacific waters, the squadron cruised about the island-studded sea, in and out, here and there, making no regular progress, feeling its way, nightly, as much northward as possible, in all the mystery and darkness of extinguished and shaded lights.

In the meantime, two more cruisers joined them, the *Australia* and the *Melbourne*; and, after calling at New Caledonia, where they met with an enthusiastic reception from the French, they got safely away on Sunday, August 23. The ships now had to wait for the French cruiser the *Montcalm*. This vessel having come up to them, the whole company of ships, now eight in number, made a straight course for Fiji. Having there gathered some information as to the disposition of the enemy's strength, the fleet now steamed in a direct course for Samoa, arriving there, at the beautiful island of Upolu, in the early dawn of Sunday, August 30.

The first business was to sweep the harbour for hidden mines. Having done this, and being assured of some safety, the *Psyche*, under the command of Captain Marshall, steamed into the harbour of Apia under a flag of truce, demanding the surrender of the town. The Germans were thunderstruck. They certainly expected a visit from a fleet, but it was a German one, not a British

or one of the Allies, that they had in their minds. However, they submitted to the inevitable with good and even courteous grace. The town was at once peaceably surrendered, and the troops of the Allies came swarming into the place, boatload upon boatload landing waist-deep through the surf, from the ships of the expedition now stationed outside. The German flag was at once hauled down, and with appropriate form and ceremony, in the presence of the whole community—leading Germans and the principal native chiefs, as well as the officers, crews, and troops of the expeditionary force—the British flag was hoisted in its stead.

For fourteen years the German flag had here flown in all its pride. Now, bare-headed, silent, and sorrowful, the Germans stood round and watched a New Zealand soldier lower it with scant ceremony to the ground. Later on, with deep and natural emotion, they gathered round the outskirts of the three-sided square of notabilities who assisted in the hoisting of the British emblem. British and French troops and guns had occupied and guarded the streets and public buildings of their town, and had seized the wireless station. On the sea, not far away, could be seen the white ensign of the British and the tri-colour of the French ships. Close at hand were the stars and stripes proudly waving over the American Consulate. The glory of Germany in this place had now at last departed.

The hoisting of the British flag was an impressive sight. At a given signal the flag was fixed at the foot of the staff. Then came the deep roaring boom of a gun from the *Psyche*. The flag rose an inch. Another boom; the flag rose another inch. The guns of the *Psyche* boomed thus twenty-one times, and, coincident with the last, the flag arrived at its place at the top of the mast. Now came the Royal Salute, followed by the National Anthem, and enthusiastic cheers for King George V; and, to complete the ceremony, Colonel Logan, the new Governor, read the Royal Proclamation annexing the territory. The ceremony thus concluded, the troops formed up, and, to the accompaniment of the martial strains of their band, marched back to their quarters.

So Samoa passed into the hands of the British. So, with like ceremony and under similar circumstances, had Britain occupied the other German possessions already mentioned.

CHAPTER IV

NAVAL GAINS AND LOSSES

The North Sea mines—The *Amphion*—*Birmingham*—*Pathfinder*—The sinking of the *Hela*—The three cruisers, the *Aboukir*, *Hogue* and *Cressy*—Reports of the captains—Narratives of survivors—The torpedoing of the *Hawke*—The *Pegasus*—Revenge on her destroyer—The commerce raiders: the *Königsberg* and the *Emden*—The cruise of the *Emden*—The "De Wet of the Seas"—Her captures—She sinks a Russian cruiser—Tracked down at Keeling Cocos Island—Engaged by the *Sydney*—The fight—The end of the *Emden*—Her captain—The *Cumberland* at the Cameroons—The captain of the *Amphion* again—His feat with the *Undaunted*—Four German destroyers sunk—The *Amiral Ganteaume*—The fight off the Chile coast—Where was the *Canopus*?—Germany raids the East Coast—A submarine mined—The loss of the *Yorck*—The *Niger* sunk in the Downs—The loss of the *Bulwark*.

DURING the first four months of the war naval operations, other than those in the distant parts of the world, as for instance the destruction of Kiau-chau and the naval battle off Valparaiso, and such guerilla and buccaneer tactics as were most strongly exemplified by the *Emden*, were confined generally to the North Sea and its neighbourhood, and consisted substantially, if not almost entirely, of experiments in the efficacy of mines, torpedoes, and submarine work.

The first warlike stroke on the seas was that in which the *Amphion* was mined and sunk, and the sequel in which the British ship, the *Birmingham*, sank the German submarine *U* 15. This was followed up very shortly by the fight in the Bight of Heligoland, which was primarily, and almost entirely so far as the German fleet could control the operations, a fight between destroyers. On this occasion Britain had the satisfaction of following up the destruction of the submarine *U* 15 by sinking several of the German destroyers which were engaged in that fight. Later on, on September 5, H.M.S. *Pathfinder* was blown up and sunk by a German submarine. Again Britain was not long delayed in her revenge, for in about a week's time the German cruiser *Hela* was sunk by our fleet. The operation was one of the most satisfactory in the early days of the war, and must be placed to the credit of Lieutenant-Commander Horton, the Commander of Submarine *E* 9. This vessel was the first of her kind to score a victory with her torpedoes. On Sunday morning, September 13, about 10 o'clock, she came across the

German cruiser the *Hela*, about six miles south of Heligoland, well inside the Bight. At once she fired two torpedoes at the enemy. One of these torpedoes struck the cruiser's bow, and the other struck her amidships. The German vessel thereupon burst into flames and sank within an hour, her crew finding safety in a number of enemy merchant vessels which were in the vicinity. The *Hela* was one of the oldest type of small German protected cruisers. She was constructed in 1896, refitted in 1910, had a displacement of over 2,000 tons, and carried a normal complement of 178 officers and men.

This daring and successful exploit on the part of the submarine was one for which the Commander and his gallant crew deserved, and in fact received, the highest praise.

In the meanwhile, the unlawful and barbarous mining operations of the Germans had sunk the Wilson Liner *Runo*, and, greatly daring, a relatively powerful German squadron, consisting of two cruisers and four destroyers, had succeeded in sinking fifteen peaceful fishing-boats in the North Sea. Under no circumstances whatever could the sinking of a non-belligerent ship, such as the *Runo*, by hidden mines, be justified. Moreover, such an operation could do little, if anything, to impress the British public with a sense of respect for or fear of the German navy and its operations. On the contrary, this cowardly and wanton action strengthened the belief of the British navy and people that the German fleet was dominated and moved solely by the panic-stricken instinct of the poltroon. But that two German cruisers and four destroyers could think it consonant with their dignity to sink a few harmless fishing-boats, with their innocent crews, settled the matter in the minds of the British once for all. Henceforward there could be no doubt that the German navy would not come out and fight in the open in anything like equal engagement. Its policy was evidently one of secret attacks by overwhelming forces on any victim, belligerent or otherwise, whose absence of strength of resistance was such that German "victory" would be assured.

The disaster to the *Pathfinder* is worthy of special notice. Commanded by Captain Francis Martin Leake—a very honourable name in the naval service, for his ancestor was an Admiral of the fleet and First Lord of the Admiralty in the time of Queen Anne—this vessel, of about 3,000 tons and the parent ship of a flotilla of destroyers, was engaged in much the same kind of duty as had been that of the *Amphion*. Two other fishing-boats had recently been blown up by fouling German mines off the East coast. It was necessary that something should be done. It was the duty of the *Pathfinder* to do it. Accordingly, on Saturday, September 5,

she was patrolling the North Sea, off the East coast, on the look-out for mines and for the enemy's torpedoes and submarines. On the afternoon of that day, when about twenty miles off the East coast, she herself struck a floating mine and foundered very rapidly. The impact of the mine with the cruiser must have occurred, it was believed, near the magazine, for such was the force of the explosion that she was thrown upright in the water and, in that position, literally blown to pieces. A huge cloud of smoke followed the explosion, which was so great that its shock was felt on board a trawler over ten miles away. Lifeboats and trawlers at once steamed to her rescue, but the only sign of the *Pathfinder* was a sea covered with wreckage of the most heterogeneous description and chiefly in the smallest possible fragments. The loss of life was necessarily very heavy. Of a crew of 264 only about 50 were rescued; fortunately of these latter the captain was amongst the number. Only very shortly before the disaster occurred, several large trading steamers had passed near the spot. It was almost a miracle that one of these non-belligerent ships had not suffered a fate like that of the *Pathfinder*.

But Britain was now to experience a more serious blow.

On September 22 the country was thrilled with the news that early in the morning three of our cruisers, the *Aboukir*, the *Hogue* and the *Cressy*, had been torpedoed and sunk. It ultimately appeared that they had been attacked by a German submarine flotilla of five vessels, the submarine *U* 9 being the one responsible for the disaster. The cruisers, at the time they were assailed, were steering a certain course in the North Sea not very remote from the Dutch coast. The *Aboukir* was leading, and the *Hogue* and the *Cressy* were at stations about two miles in her rear. Not only were the three cruisers all lost, but nearly 60 officers and so many as 1,400 men met with sudden and unexpected death. The commander of the *Aboukir*, Captain John E. Drummond, was amongst those saved. The *Aboukir* was the vessel first attacked and torpedoed, and it was whilst the *Hogue* and the *Cressy* had closed in and were standing by to save the crew that they also were torpedoed. It was stated that the loss suffered by Germany in this attack was the sinking of two of her submarines, but of this there was no specific confirmation. A considerable number of officers and crew of the ill-fated vessels were saved by H.M.S. *Lowestoft*, commanded by Captain Kennedy, and by a division of destroyers, trawlers, and boats. This affair was the more painful a blow to Britain because of the fact that hitherto the naval losses in the war had fallen so greatly upon the enemy. Germany had lost seven cruisers, including the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*,

SIR JOHN FRENCH.

Commander of the British Expeditionary Forces. Began his career as a cadet in the navy for four years, but joined the army at twenty-two. He served through the Egyptian Campaign of 1884–5, had command of the cavalry division in Natal and commanded practically every successful operation in the Transvaal up to the conclusion of the war. Created Field-Marshal in 1913.

and two armoured liners, whilst Britain's losses had been limited to three cruisers only. Now six British cruisers altogether had gone.

Shortly afterwards the Admiralty issued the following interesting statement with reference to this tragic affair :—

The facts of this affair cannot be better conveyed to the public than by the attached reports of the Senior Officers who have survived and landed in England.

The sinking of the *Aboukir* was of course an ordinary hazard of patrolling duty. The *Hogue* and *Cressy*, however, were sunk because they proceeded to the assistance of their consort and remained with engines stopped endeavouring to save life, thus presenting an easy and certain target to further submarine attacks. The natural promptings of humanity have in this case led to heavy losses which would have been avoided by a strict adherence to military considerations. Modern naval war is presenting us with so many new and strange situations that an error of judgment of this character is pardonable. But it has been necessary to point out for the future guidance of His Majesty's ships, that the conditions which prevail when one vessel of a squadron is injured in a minefield or is exposed to submarine attack are analogous to those which occur in an action, and that the rule of leaving disabled ships to their own resources is applicable, so far at any rate as large vessels are concerned. No act of humanity, whether to friend or foe, should lead to a neglect of the proper precautions and dispositions of war, and no measures can be taken to save life which prejudice the military situation. Small craft of all kinds should, however, be directed by wireless to close on the damaged ship with all speed.

The loss of nearly 60 officers and 1,400 men would not have been grudged if it had been brought about by gunfire in an open action, but it is peculiarly distressing under the conditions which prevailed. The absence of any of the ardour and excitement of an engagement did not, however, prevent the display of discipline, cheerful courage and ready self-sacrifice among all ranks and ratings exposed to the ordeal.

The duty on which these vessels were engaged was an essential part of the arrangements by which the control of the seas and the safety of the country are maintained, and the lives lost are as usefully, as necessarily, and as gloriously devoted to the requirements of His Majesty's service as if the loss had been incurred in a general action. In view of the certainty of a proportion of misfortunes of this character occurring from time to time, it is important that this point of view should be thoroughly appreciated.

The loss of these three cruisers, apart from the loss of life, is of small naval significance. Although they were large and powerful ships, they belonged to a class of cruisers whose speeds have been surpassed by many of the enemy's battleships. Before the war it had been decided that no more money should be spent in repairing any of this class, and that they should make their way to the sale list as soon as serious defects became manifest.

REPORT BY COMMANDER BERTRAM W. L. NICHOLSON, R.N., LATE OF H.M.S. "CRESSY" *September* 23, 1914.

Sir,—I have the honour to submit the following report in connection with the sinking of H.M.S. *Cressy* in company with H.M.S. *Aboukir* and *Hogue* on the morning of September 22.

Whilst on patrol duty *Aboukir* was struck at about 6.25 a.m. on starboard beam. *Hogue* and *Cressy* closed and took up position, *Hogue* ahead of *Aboukir* and *Cressy* about 400 yards on port beam.

As soon as it was seen that *Aboukir* was in danger of sinking, all boats were sent away from *Cressy* and picket boat was hoisted out without steam up; when cutters full of *Aboukir's* men were returning to *Cressy*, *Hogue* was struck, apparently under aft 9·2-in. magazine, as a very heavy explosion took place immediately after the first explosion. Almost directly after *Hogue* was hit we observed a periscope on our port bow about 300 yards off. Fire was immediately opened and engines put full speed ahead with intention of running her down. Our gunner, Mr. Dogherty, positively asserts that he hit the periscope and that the submarine then showed her conning tower, which he struck, and the submarine sank. An officer standing alongside the gunner thinks that the shell struck only floating timber, of which there was much about; but it was evidently the impression of the men on deck, who cheered and clapped heartily, that the submarine had been hit. This submarine did not fire a torpedo at *Cressy*.

Captain Johnson then manœuvred the ship so as to render assistance to crews of *Hogue* and *Aboukir*. About five minutes later another periscope was seen on our starboard quarter. Fire was opened; the track of the torpedo she fired at range of 500 to 600 yards was plainly visible, and it struck us, starboard side, just before the after bridge; the ship listed about 10 degrees to starboard and remained steady—time 7.15 a.m. All watertight doors, dead-lights and scuttles had been securely closed before the torpedo struck ship. All mess stools and tables, shores, and all available timber below and on deck had been previously got up and thrown over the side for saving of life. A second torpedo fired by the same submarine missed and passed about 20 feet astern. About a quarter of an hour after the first torpedo had hit, a third torpedo, fired from a submarine just before starboard beam, hit us in No. 5 boiler-room—time 7.30 a.m. The ship then began to heel rapidly, and finally turned keel up, remaining so for about twenty minutes before she finally sank at 7.55 a.m. A large number of men were saved by the casting adrift of a pattern 3 target; the steam pinnace floated out of her crutches, but filled and sank.

The second torpedo which struck *Cressy* passed over sinking hull of *Aboukir*, narrowly missing it. It is possible that the same submarine fired all three torpedoes at *Cressy*.

The conduct of the crew was excellent throughout. I have already reported the splendid service rendered by Captain Phillips, master of the trawler *L. T. Coriander* and his crew, who picked up 156 officers and men.

I have the honour, etc., etc.,

BERTRAM W. L. NICHOLSON,
Commander, late H.M.S. *Cressy*.

REPORT BY COMMANDER REGINALD A. NORTON, R.N., LATE OF H.M.S. "HOGUE"

September 23, 1914.

Sir,—I have the honour to report as follows concerning the sinking of H.M. ships *Hogue*, *Aboukir*, and *Cressy*.

Between 6.15 and 6.30 a.m. H.M.S. *Aboukir* was struck by a torpedo The *Hogue* closed the *Aboukir*, and I received orders to hoist out the launch turn out, and prepare all boats, and unlash all timber on the upper deck. The two lifeboats were sent to the *Aboukir*, but before the launch could get away the *Hogue* was struck on the starboard side amidships by two torpedoes at intervals of ten to twenty seconds. The ship at once began to heel to starboard. After ordering the men to provide themselves with wood, hammocks, etc., and to get into the boats on the booms and take off their clothes, I went, by Captain Nicholson's directions, to ascertain the damage in the engine-rooms. An artificer engineer informed me that the water was over the engine-room gratings. While endeavouring to return to the bridge the water burst open the starboard entry port doors, and the ship heeled rapidly. I told the men in the port battery to jump overboard, as the launch was close alongside; and soon afterwards the ship lurched heavily to starboard. I clung to a ringbolt for some time, but eventually dropped on to the deck, and a huge wave washed me away, I climbed up the ship's side, and was again washed off.

Eventually, after swimming about from various overladen pieces of wreckage, I was picked up by a cutter from the *Hogue*, Coxswain L. S. Marks, which pulled about for some hours picking up men and discharging them to our picket boat and steam pinnace, and to the Dutch steamers *Flora* and *Titan*, and rescued in this way Commander Sells, Engineer-Commander Stokes, with legs broken, Fleet Paymaster Eldred, and about 120 others. Finally, about 11 a.m., when we could find no more men in the water, we were picked up by H.M.S. *Lucifer*, which proceeded to the *Titan* and took off from her all our men except about 20, who were too ill to be moved.

A Lowestoft trawler and the two Dutch ships *Flora* and *Titan* were extraordinarily kind, clothing and feeding our men. My boat's crew, consisting mainly of R.N.R. men, pulled and behaved remarkably well. I particularly wish to mention Petty Officer, 1st Class, Halton, who, by encouraging the men in the water near me, undoubtedly saved many lives.

Lieutenant-Commander Phillipps-Wolley, after hoisting out the launch, asked me if he should try to hoist out another boat, and endeavoured to do so; the last I saw of him was on the after bridge doing well. Lieutenant Tillard was picked up by the launch, got up a cutter's crew, and saved many lives, as did Midshipman Cazalet in the *Cressy's* gig. Lieutenant Chichester turned out the whaler very quickly.

A Dutch sailing trawler sailed close by, but went off without rendering any assistance, though we signalled to her from the *Hogue* to close after we were struck.

The *Aboukir* appeared to me to take about thirty-five minutes to sink floating bottom up for about five minutes. The *Hogue* turned turtle

very quickly (in about five minutes) and floated bottom up for some minutes. A dense black smoke was seen in the starboard battery, whether from coal or torpedo cordite I could not say. The upper deck was not blown up, and only one other small explosion occurred as we heeled over.

The *Cressy* I watched heel over from the cutter: she heeled over to starboard very slowly, a dense black smoke issuing from her when she attained an angle of about 90 degrees, and she took a long time from this angle till she floated bottom up with the starboard screw slightly out of the water. I consider it was thirty-five to forty-five minutes from the time she was struck till she was bottom up.

All the men in the *Hogue* behaved extraordinarily well, obeying orders even when in the water swimming for their lives, and I witnessed many cases of great self-sacrifice and gallantry.

Farmstone, able seaman R.N.R., H.M.S. *Hogue*, jumped overboard from the launch to make room for others, and would not avail himself of assistance until all men near by were picked up; he was in the water about half an hour.

There was no panic of any sort, the men taking off their clothes as ordered and falling in with hammock or wood.

Captain Nicholson, in our other cutter, as usual, was perfectly cool, and rescued a large number of men. I last saw him alongside the *Flora*.

Engineer-Commander Stokes, I believe, was in the engine-room to the last, and Engineer-Lieutenant-Commander Fendick got steam on the boat-hoist and worked it in five minutes.

I have the honour to submit that I may be appointed to another ship as soon as I can get a kit.

I have the honour, etc.,

REGINALD A. NORTON,
Commander, late H.M.S. *Hogue*.

Words would fail to convey any idea of the effect of this tragic happening to the people of the Empire. It was not so much that three good ships had been lost: that was a matter of comparative unimportance. What struck at the hearts of the people was the fact that, as a consequence of the sinking of the ships, the gloom of a deep sorrow had descended on so many hundreds of homes. Consolation was possible only by recognising the heroism with which our sailors behaved, going down to their watery graves doing their duty nobly to the very last. At no moment during the fighting, or in the subsequent struggle for life in the waves, was there anything like a panic. Our seamen never lost their nerve or self-command. Perhaps the best idea of the character of the occurrence and the conduct of our men can be derived from the statements of the survivors. Accordingly we set out one or two of these, the gravity of the event justifying the devotion of so much space to it. The first is an account of his experiences

given by a survivor of the *Aboukir* to a correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph* :

I was on watch below at the time the ship was struck. I could not say exactly what the hour was, but I should think it was just after half-past six when our ship got her death-blow. The weather had been uncertain, and the sea was still a bit choppy. The first thing of which I was conscious was a tremendous explosion, which shook the whole ship.

The first idea that came into the heads of me and my mates was that we had struck one of their infernal mines ; of course, we knew afterwards that it was a torpedo discharged by a submarine. After the explosion I tumbled up as quickly as possible. Some say a second torpedo was discharged. As to that I cannot say. The first certainly was enough to settle us.

When I got up I found no excitement. We had seen nothing of the submarine, and everybody believed it was a mine. Orders were given by the officers of the ship and carried out with absolute quiet.

In a few minutes—it might have been almost a few seconds—the ship heeled over till her top rail was almost touching the water. The order was then given, " Every man save himself." I took off my boots. There was no need to dive. I simply slid into the water.

I really could not tell you what length of time elapsed between the striking of the vital blow and the sinking of the cruiser. You don't think of time in a job of this description. It might have been five minutes. It certainly was not more than ten. I had time to glance around before touching the water. I could see the *Cressy* and the *Hogue* hastening to our assistance. It was a plucky thing on their part, but, of course, only what you would expect in the British Navy.

I do not believe they had caught sight of the submarines, and naturally they would think they were in the midst of a minefield. I have learnt since that that was their opinion. Before they could get up to us our ship had disappeared.

From what has been told me by others I must say the daring of these German submarines was amazing. They must have seen us a long way off when we could not see them, and they came right up under the nose of our guns.

I believe they got a smack at us with their torpedoes at a distance of a few hundred yards. Only the *Cressy* caught sight of the submarines. She was not able to fire some of her guns for fear of hitting our own boats picking up survivors, but she let loose two of them. Whether the shots got home or not I cannot say. The *Cressy* had stopped, and had launched her boats, when she was torpedoed. Both she and the *Hogue* would have been able to dodge the submarines by manœuvring if they had known sooner that the enemy was in the vicinity. But I will say this, that the Germans took us by surprise, and made the most of their opportunity. I was in the water for some time before I was picked up, but what does that matter? We were out on a risky job, and we took our chance.

The next is the tale of an engineer of the *Aboukir* given to a correspondent of the *Times*:

I was below [he said] when it happened. The weather was bad when the ship reeled under the shock of a tremendous explosion. At first we thought we had struck a mine, but we found that we had been torpedoed, probably between the first and second boilers. A great hole was torn out of her side.

Men on the upper deck were killed instantly. More below tumbled up as quickly as possible, but everything was quiet and orderly. As the ship was heeling over, the order was given " Every man for himself." It was not till then that I took my boots off. There was no question of jumping off the ship. Her deck was almost at a right angle with the water, and I just slid into the sea. I don't know how long it all took—it might have been five minutes and it might have been ten.

When we were struck the *Hogue* was not far away. She and the *Cressy* rushed to the rescue, in spite of the fact that they thought we had been mined. For all they knew they might have been rushing through a whole bed of mines. When they stopped and lowered boats for us the submarines fired their torpedoes. The *Cressy* gave them two shots from her guns, but I don't know if the shots got home. If the *Hogue* and the *Cressy* had not stopped they might have escaped. It's hard luck—but it's in the day's work, and the work must be done, or you couldn't be sitting here in safety. That's all.

The third is the story of Dr. Gerald Knowles Martin, a surgeon on the *Cressy*, which was published in the *Morning Post*:

The disaster occurred about forty miles off the Hook of Holland. Lieutenant Gabbett, the navigator, was probably the only person who could tell exactly where we were, and he is one of the officers reported missing. Captain Johnson was in command of the ship. When I last saw him he was in the water, and even then he was thinking of others. I heard him instructing the men to keep their mouths closed and breathe through their noses. Those who could not swim and were clinging to wreckage he counselled to keep their legs in motion so as to avoid losing warmth.

At about half-past six in the morning on the day of the disaster I was awakened by the chaplain. I asked him the time, and he told me the *Aboukir* was sinking. I expressed my incredulity in one short word, and turned over to go to sleep again. But he persisted that what he had said was true, and I got up and dressed hastily in flannel shirt and trousers and great-coat and rubber boots. I knew that if I had to swim for it I could throw off my clothes without difficulty. Going on deck, I found that the *Aboukir* was going down. The weather was fine and clear, but the sea was choppy, the waves being about ten feet high. Such a sea is very favourable for the operations of submarines. As I scanned the decks of the *Aboukir* I noticed with admiration the wonderful order there was maintained even at that critical time. There was absolutely no sign of

panic. Our boats reached the *Aboukir* and took off twenty or thirty of her crew. About half an hour after being struck she turned turtle. I could see her keel above the water before she sank; there was no noise of any explosion. Before the *Aboukir* sank the *Hogue* was hit by a torpedo. By this time all the boats of the cruisers had been launched. Owing to the state of the sea it was difficult for a practised eye, and impossible for an unpractised eye, to discern the periscope of a submarine. I cannot profess to have seen a submarine, but when our gunner fired at a submarine and the shell burst I saw two men come to the surface and swim towards us.

Within a few minutes of our firing the gun at the submarine we were struck by a torpedo on our starboard side. The effect was similar to that which would have been produced by the vessel running against a huge rock. I was rendered unsteady on my feet for the moment, although I did not actually fall. We had been getting everybody on deck, and this took some time, as the crew numbered 800. From the quarter-deck I could see that the men were throwing into the water every piece of loose timber or furniture they could find. Every one was calm and collected; the behaviour of officers and men was admirable. It was before the *Cressy* was struck that our gunner fired at a submarine and apparently hit it. A few minutes later the first torpedo hit us. About a quarter of an hour later a submarine is said to have fired two torpedoes at us. The first missed, but the second struck us. The *Cressy* was struck by two torpedoes, and then the Germans saw we were not going to sink, so they sent another torpedo into us. The second torpedo struck the ship when I was standing just outside the quarter-deck, and could hear the inrush of water. The sinking may have been about ten minutes afterwards. The second submarine was seen by our gunner, and he fired at her, but he was hampered by the fact that the men of the *Aboukir* and the *Hogue* were swimming about close by.

After the *Cressy* was struck the second time Captain Johnson gave the order "Every man for himself!" I was washed off by a big wave. Prior to this I had stripped myself of my clothes. I went down a considerable distance under water, and as soon as I got to the surface I took a breath and struck out, so as to avoid being drawn under by suction. I saw the *Cressy* keel upwards; there were perhaps fifty men clinging to her. Some men supported themselves on hammocks, but after a time the hammocks ceased to be watertight.

Luckily I am a good swimmer, and after I had gone about a hundred yards I came across a long plank to which half a dozen men were clinging. I caught hold of it, and after I had been hanging on to it for a quarter of an hour some of the men were giving out and began to sit on the wood, forcing it under the water.

Leaving the plank, therefore, I struck out and swam on for some time till I came across a man who beckoned to me. I got to him, and found he had a table under one arm and a piece of wood under the other. He gave up the table to me. I looked round for something else to swim to, and caught sight of a fishing-smack to the windward. After a long swim I found it was getting nearer and nearer. I shouted for all I was worth, swimming all the time. At last the crew spotted me and sent their small

boat, which picked me up. I was taken on board the *Coriander* at twenty minutes past ten, after having been in the sea for two hours and a half. Fortunately the water was not so cold as might have been expected.

After the *Aboukir* was struck Midshipman Wykeham Musgrave, a little boy of fourteen, swam to the *Cressy*. We had no sooner taken him on board than our ship was struck, and he had to take to the water again. Eventually the boy was rescued after a most extraordinary experience.

The fourth is from a letter from her son Hubert to Mrs. Penny of Deal, a widow, who had three sons on board the *Cressy*:

Just a brief message to tell you how brother Alfred and I parted as the ship took her final plunge. The scene was terrible. After the captain gave the order "Every man for himself," the sea became literally alive with men struggling and grasping what they could to support themselves, whilst, to add to the horror and the confusion, the Germans kept firing their torpedoes at us. It was a sight I shall never forget. Before I went into the water I was granted one wish, for I suddenly stumbled against brother Alf; and although the decks were awash, we were just permitted to shake hands and kiss each other and tell each other that, whichever got saved, he was to tell dear mother that our last thoughts were of her. We could see nothing of brother Louis, so with a hurried goodbye we plunged into the water together, and we saw no more of each other. I shall never forget that parting. I was in the water two hours before being picked up.

But unfortunately this was not an isolated disaster. Another British cruiser, the *Hawke*, was destined soon to meet her fate at the hands of a German submarine, unable, because of the character of the attack, even to make the slightest attempt at defence. The *Hawke*, which was commanded by Captain U. P. Williams, was cruising in the North Sea on Thursday morning, October 15. There was no sign of any hostile craft in the vicinity. Suddenly, without any warning, she was hit. It was the attack of a torpedo, which must have struck a "ready" magazine. There was at once a terrific explosion, a violent vibration throughout the ship, and immediately the *Hawke* rose as if she had struck a rock. The ship was filled with dust and smoke, and her fixings were flying about everywhere. Her crew at once made for daylight as hard as they could. On deck it was a case, by command of the captain, of "every one for himself." Orders were given for the lifeboats to be lowered; yet, though these were all provisioned and ready, because of the position of the ship it was impossible to lower them. Attempts were made, but as the boats were lowered they were holed, stove in and swamped. There was nothing for it except for the crew to take to the water as best they could

with life-belts or even without. Only one boat of all the lifeboats on board was available. So the *Hawke* went down, leaving nothing above but a huge bank of smoke and hundreds of struggling and bleeding men fighting the bitterly cold waters and crying and shouting for assistance. Only about five minutes expired between the striking of the torpedo and the sinking of the ill-fated ship. Of the crew only a very few were saved.

In the meantime the *Pegasus* had experienced a bitter stroke of the fortune of war in a sea far distant from the scenes we have just been contemplating. The *Pegasus*, under the command of Commander Inglis, had already been distinguishing herself by destroying the wireless station at Dar-es-Salaam, and sinking the German gunboat *Möwe*. She was not a very powerful boat—only a third-class cruiser; but her career had shown that she was made of gallant stuff, and fully capable of performing the very useful though onerous and hazardous duty of slaying destroyers and making observations. On September 19 it was necessary for her to put into harbour in order to clean her boilers and repair her machinery; so she was to be found on that day in Zanzibar harbour, a spot which afforded her no protection whatever, being practically an open roadstead. Now came on to the scene the *Königsberg*, a German cruiser of overwhelming strength as against the *Pegasus*. The *Königsberg*, up till then, had been engaged in raiding commerce in the Indian ocean. Now she had an opportunity of engaging with the little *Pegasus*, which was, if nothing else, at least a warship and not a merchantman. On the open sea the *Pegasus* would have been no match whatever for the *Königsberg*, but lying as she then lay unprotected in Zanzibar harbour, she was a particularly easy prey for the German. The tale can be told in a very few words. She was nothing but a target of which the *Königsberg* had the absolute range; so the *Königsberg* was enabled to choose her own position for firing. She did so, and, at a range which made it impossible for the *Pegasus* to reply to her, poured her broadside into the British ship. It required only about fifteen minutes of this sort of work hopelessly to disable the gallant little cruiser. Having completed her work, the *Königsberg* turned and steamed away to the south, the *Pegasus* being subsequently towed away and grounded. Out of a crew of 234, the *Pegasus* had 2[illegible] killed and 80 wounded; little, if any, damage was suffered by the *Königsberg*.

A lady living at Zanzibar who witnessed the fight wrote an account of it, which was subsequently published in the *Morning Post*, as follows:

ZANZIBAR,
September 22, 1914.

It was truly a dreadful sight, that fight. Well, it was not a fight; it was simply butchery. The poor little *Pegasus* was at anchor in the harbour. We could not see her, as the next house to us juts out into the sea further than we do, but we saw the *Königsberg* all right. It woke me up at 5.30 (on Sunday, it was just dawn). First I thought, just as I woke, it was a most terrible thunderstorm—the *Königsberg* was broadside on, the great brute, and five guns going all at once. We saw the five flashes all along her, and then the awful bang and sort of rip that sets your teeth on edge. We all three stood at the window and watched it all. We did not know that she might not shell the town directly she had finished off the *Pegasus*. At 5.45 she stopped and started to come in, and then she seemed to change her mind and turned back and started again shelling the *Pegasus*, which had not a dog's chance from the start. The *Pegasus* is an obsolete boat, and her range is only about 4,000 yards, and the *Königsberg* got well out of her range and simply butchered her. It was pathetic to see all the *Pegasus*'s shells falling short into the sea. Twenty-five were killed and seventy wounded, and ten missing, blown to bits.

The wounded in hospital were all so plucky and so gloriously brave; the matron said that men desperately wounded laughed and said, "I'm all right now, missus; you leave me and see to Bill; he wants it more than I do." Ever so many died on Sunday and three more yesterday. All the ones who died were buried at Grave Island in the harbour. All naval men are buried there.

The *Gascon* came in as a hospital ship. She left yesterday for the Cape with about forty odd wounded. We have had funerals every day; oh, such dreadfully pathetic ones. Of course they could not have coffins, so were just carried on stretchers and covered with a flag.

This "daring" venture on the part of the *Königsberg* was the means of that vessel shortly afterwards meeting her own end. Her attack on the *Pegasus* having indicated her whereabouts, a concentration of fast cruisers was arranged by the Admiralty in East African waters, and a thorough and prolonged search by vessels in combination was made. This search resulted, on October 30, in the *Königsberg* being discovered by the *Chatham*. The enemy was hiding in shallow water about six miles up the Rufigi river, opposite Mafia island in German East Africa. Owing to her greater draught, the *Chatham* could not reach the *Königsberg*, which probably lay aground except at high water. Part of the crew of the *Königsberg* had been landed and were entrenched on the banks of the river. The *Chatham* immediately bombarded both the entrenchments and the vessel herself. The German cruiser was then locked in by colliers, which were sunk by the British ship in the only navigable channel, and so imprisoned for the

time being and placed in a position which made it impossible for her to do any further harm. Later on she was destroyed.

The *Königsberg*, as a commerce raider, had done no great things, only one British ship having fallen a victim to her. The German commercial raider which was really disturbing Britain was the *Emden*. Now the vessels which had been searching for the *Königsberg* were released to join in the large combined operations by fast cruisers which had already for some time been in progress against the *Emden*.

Stationed at Kiau-chau in the earliest days of the war was the German cruiser, the *Emden*. She was a small armoured cruiser of 3,600 tons, with a speed of 25 knots, carrying ten 4-in. guns, eight 5-pounders, four machine-guns, and two submerged torpedo tubes. She had a complement of 321 officers and men. Her commander, soon to attain a meteoric world-wide notoriety, was Captain von Müller. Kiau-chau was no place for the *Emden*. Germany knew that very soon the harbour and forts would be attacked and taken by the Allies, and the few vessels found there would inevitably be destroyed. It would therefore be better that the *Emden*, a well-equipped vessel with an exceptionally daring and resourceful commander, should leave Kiau-chau in Chinese waters, and, as a free lance, range anywhere and everywhere over the wide ocean, seeking what victims chance would provide in the shape of peaceful merchant vessels of the Allies.

Until September 10 the world was unconscious of even the existence of the *Emden*. On that day, however, until the 14th, she became the centre of the world's attention. The British ship the *Indus* was in the Bay of Bengal, when she was hailed by a German cruiser, subsequently discovered to be the *Emden*, which was accompanied by the Hamburg-Amerika liner the *Markomannia*, acting as a collier. A shot from the *Emden* across the bows of the *Indus* showed to the officers of the latter vessel very plainly and effectively the character and objects of the *Emden*. The German thereupon transferred to her own decks the crew of the *Indus*, and, having secured her prisoners, proceeded to sink the British vessel. The gunnery of the *Emden* cannot be said to have been very brilliant, for it took her more than an hour to sink the *Indus*. The following day the *Emden* sighted the British merchantman the *Lovat*, and, following the same procedure as in the case of the *Indus*, took off the merchantman's crew, transferred them to the *Markomannia* and bombarded and sank the unfortunate trader. A few hours after this had been done, another British ship, the *Kabinga*, was captured, an armed crew being placed on board by the *Emden*. Later still

in the same day the *Killin* was seized and taken possession of; this vessel was sunk by the *Emden* on the following day. Shortly after the *Killin* had thus been disposed of, the *Diplomat* was sighted, and was at once boarded by the German. Her crew was taken off and placed in the *Kabinga*. Within an hour or two the *Diplomat*, in her turn, was sunk by the *Emden*.

Undoubtedly this was a smart day or two's work on the part of the *Emden*. She was enabled to do so well mainly because she had intercepted wireless messages announcing port departures, and therefore knew the position of all the vessels. But her energy and enterprise in relation to the wireless was also a reason why she was unable to do still more damage. Amongst the vessels she stopped and searched was the Italian *Loredano*. Being a neutral, of course the *Emden* had to let her go her way unharmed and uninterfered with. But the commander of the *Loredano*, Captain Giacapello, at once warned all the British vessels with which he came into contact, and they in their turn, where they possessed the apparatus, passed on the information across the seas by their wireless. This action of Captain Giacapello's is noteworthy by reason of the fact that it might have involved him and his ship in various serious complications. Nevertheless he took the risk, being inspired by a feeling of humanity and revulsion at the sacrifice of property which he had witnessed in the case of the *Diplomat* and others. It is to the credit of the Government of Bengal that they recognised the good services of Captain Giacapello by presenting him and his crew with a testimonial and presents. Not only was the *Emden* prevented from further incursions for the time being on ordinary merchant vessels, but what was of far greater importance, British transports laden with horses designed for the war were enabled to avoid capture.

The *Emden* had now made herself felt as a menace to shipping in these waters. The British Admiralty was quick to recognise the position. At once orders were given forbidding all departures of shipping westwards from Rangoon, boats going eastwards only at their own risk. All sailings from Calcutta and Colombo were cancelled. The Calcutta marine insurance agents, after contemplating the heavy risk of rates, decided to withdraw the existing list and not to substitute another for it. Exporters particularly were depressed. Shipping had already been scarce, and their trade consequently almost at a standstill, by reason of the British Government having required the use of all available vessels for the purpose of transporting troops to Europe. This work having been completed, the business men of Calcutta had been looking forward to a brighter prospect. The *Emden*,

however, had once more disturbed the markets, and prevented the resumption of export trade. Her presence rendered the coastal waters too insecure. A touch of irony was added to the situation by the fact that at this moment the British Government were urging Indian merchants to accelerate homewards a shipment of hides for the army for saddlery, boots, and so forth.

The following very interesting statement was made by a gentleman who sailed in the *Diplomat* to a press interviewer:

> The fact [he said] that we sailed in squally weather, and that such weather has been prevalent in the Bay of Bengal for some weeks, probably explains the successful raid by the *Emden*. From the moment we left the Sandheads and dropped our pilot until the moment when, eighteen hours later, the *Emden* captured us off Puri, there were intermittent rain-showers when it was impossible to see fifty yards ahead. On Saturday night we never troubled to extinguish the lights, so confident were we, although subsequently we learnt that three British ships, the *Indus*, the *Lovat*, and the *Killin*, had already been sunk.
>
> About noon on Sunday we saw ahead of us a group of four vessels, in the centre of which was a warship, which the officer on the bridge supposed to be British with convoys. The manner in which the supposed convoys were lying raised our suspicions, however, and these were subsequently confirmed by the Prussian eagle on the *Emden's* bows and the shell which whistled across our own bows. An officer, late of the Hamburg-Amerika line, who was serving his two months' annual reserve training when war broke out, was deputed to board us. His boatmen carried Mausers and side arms. Their first act was to hoist the German flag in the *Diplomat*, and the next to smash our wireless. Otherwise every courtesy was shown us, and we were allowed to take our personal effects on board the already captured *Kabinga*, which subsequently brought us back. The *Emden* was in a dreadfully dirty condition, after seven weeks at sea without touching at a port. She was coaling from the Hamburg-Amerika *Markomannia* (ten knots), which was attached to her, and from the Greek *Anthroporus*, collier, captured for running contraband.
>
> Once aboard the *Kabinga*, where we found the crews of the three vessels previously sunk, we had to watch our own vessel sent to the bottom. The German marksmanship was very defective. It took nine rounds to sink the *Killin* and five to sink the *Diplomat*. The first shot struck the *Diplomat* head-on in the bows near the waterline. The other four hit her broadside-on, and then she sank gamely, finally standing head-on with her stern in the air, like the *Titanic*.
>
> The *Trabboch* was caught and treated in identical fashion during Sunday night. On Monday evening the *Kabinga*, with 450 captives on board in a space intended for 75 persons, was set free. The Germans lowered their flag before sinking the *Diplomat*, and an Italian vessel standing by dipped her flag as the *Diplomat's* stern went up.

The action of the captain of the *Loredano*, who warned and saved the *City of Rangoon*, deserves public recognition.

Other inoffensive unarmed ships were dealt with in similar fashion by the German raider about this time, but her next exploit of striking importance was her raid on Madras.

At half-past nine in the evening of September 23, the *Emden* suddenly appeared off Madras harbour. With remarkable audacity her commander at once started firing on the great oil tanks there. Those of the Asiatic Petroleum Company and the Standard Oil Company were undamaged. The Burma Oil Company had six tanks, and of these two were set on fire, two damaged, and the remaining two were untouched. But for a favourable wind, the effects might have been much more serious. Two natives and a boy on board a vessel in the harbour were killed. Beyond the foregoing, there were no casualties or damage, except that the telegraph office and a seaman's club-house were also hit without substantial effect, and some goods in trucks on the harbour wharf were riddled. At once the Madras land forces replied to the *Emden's* guns. The raider, however, immediately extinguished her lights and disappeared into the darkness. The whole affair lasted only about a quarter of an hour, creating no panic or excitement whatever. The damage done to the oil tanks was estimated at about £15,000.

After her exploit at Madras and her mysterious disappearance into the darkness, it was found that the *Emden* had steamed on to Pondicherry, about a hundred miles farther south. No damage, however, was done to that place by her. She merely coaled there and subsequently once more mysteriously disappeared. But she soon again was seen and made her presence felt. On the last day of September, she captured six more merchantmen; of these, four were sunk, one being released. But interest in her movements had, long before this, become very acute. A great fleet of cruisers was searching every corner of the seas in order to effect her capture. The task, however, was a very difficult one. It could be fairly compared to that of searching for a needle in a hay-stack. The scene of the *Emden's* operations was ideal; not only did a great many ships pass to and fro along well-known routes, but there was an area in which to operate of 17,320,500 square miles, studded with many islands, most convenient for shelter, and surrounded by many obscure bays and inlets. But in the middle of October she met with a temporary check. On that day H.M.S. *Yarmouth* sunk the *Markomannia* and also a Greek steamer which had been accompanying the

Emden. Both these ships were doubtless in attendance as carriers of coal, ammunition and food. Undoubtedly the destruction of these two attendant ships placed the raider in a very awkward position. She had already received the sobriquet of the De Wet of the seas; now she had to live up to her title. As De Wet in the Boer War had been enabled to continue his career only by living on the countryside he was for the time being raiding, so now it would be necessary for the *Emden* to obtain her supplies from the ships she might meet and capture. But even this prospect could not be quite satisfactory. She might obtain coal and food, but ammunition was not likely to come her way. Her subsequent career was, therefore, adventurous and hazardous. As a fact, she was inevitably nearing her end.

On October 20 she had another stroke of luck. She captured seven ships, sinking five of them. This coup was made possible only by the *Emden* continuing ceaselessly to intercept wireless messages. It would appear that she had taken in messages from

the British, China and Indian stations. Every German sailing ship on the seas, however small, was equipped with an installation, in order to assist as much as possible the efforts of such raiders as the *Emden*, and undoubtedly there were many ships with wireless installations which were in fact German, though sailing under neutral flags.

One of the outstanding features of the cruise of the *Emden* and of her operations was the remarkable courtesy and consideration of her captain. As a commerce-destroyer he had acted with the utmost energy, and even ruthlessly; but when it came to a question of human life, or even the convenience and comfort of the non-belligerents who had fallen into his hands, he seemed to act upon principles so humanitarian as to make it difficult to believe that he was an officer of the same Power as that which was responsible for the awful barbarities perpetrated in Belgium and the north of France. Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the fact that he was a seaman, and not a soldier, for, speaking at any rate of the first few months of the war, the humanity and courtesy of the officers of the German Navy stood out in striking contrast to the general barbarity of the officers of the Army. The following account, taken from the *Daily Telegraph*, of the capture of the *Kabinga*, written by the wife of her captain, is a remarkable tribute to the courtesy of Von Müller:

> The ship was saved a similar fate only because I was on board, and as the weather was unsettled and the sea a little rough the German commander was courteous and gallant enough not to allow a lady in an open boat; otherwise we were to leave within two hours after our capture. A few of our things were to be packed in bags, as we were to be allowed a few necessities.
>
> It was 11 p.m. on Saturday, September 12, when we were stopped by a shot across our bows, and at first it was thought it was an English cruiser that was holding us up. All the lights were put out on board the *Emden* and on the two attendant ships, one a Greek collier with coal and the other a Hamburg-American. You can imagine the state of mind of all on board when the small boat drew alongside and we heard them talking in German. We were taken prisoners, and thirty armed men were distributed about the ship. We followed the *Emden* for two days and two nights whilst she made her various captures, not knowing any minute what our own fate would be.

By the time the career of the *Emden* had come to a close her captain had been acclaimed by the British in particular as not only a courteous foe, but a sportsman and one who "played the game." It is necessary, however, to draw attention to the fact

that we now approach a period in his career when his actions were, to say the least, unsportsmanlike, if not unlawful. But it may be urged that now his case was desperate. On October 28 the Russian cruiser *Zhemtchug* was lying in the roadstead at Penang. This vessel was one which, acting under the orders of a British Admiral, had recently rendered great service in convoying ships. A strange vessel approached. She appeared to be a four-funnelled cruiser and was flying the Japanese flag. She was, in fact, the *Emden*. But the *Zhemtchug*, and not even the guardships, had recognised her in the darkness. The *Emden*, for one thing, would have been expected to be flying her own flag, the German, and was also known as having only three funnels. Captain von Müller, however, had disguised his ship by rigging up a dummy fourth funnel. Then, without hauling down the Japanese flag and disclosing her real nationality, the *Emden* came down at full speed on the *Zhemtchug*, opened fire, and discharged a torpedo which exploded in the Russian vessel's stern. The *Zhemtchug*, which was fully cleared for action, immediately opened fire on the enemy, but a second torpedo exploded in her forepart and sank her. Only by the subterfuge adopted by Von Müller could the *Emden* have succeeded in this attack, for the *Zhemtckug* was a fast vessel, sufficiently armed with quick-firing guns to have been able to have made a good defence, and equipped also with five torpedo tubes. But this was not all that the *Emden* then did. She seized the opportunity to torpedo and sink a French destroyer which was also lying in the harbour. This affair meant altogether the loss of 86 lives; 250 men were saved, and of these 112 were injured. Why the *Emden* should have torpedoed the destroyer instead of sinking her with gun-fire, the proper method, is a mystery. One is bound to assume that the *Emden* was short of ammunition. If that was so, it also explains why the *Emden* did not seize the opportunity then afforded her to attack the town of Penang as she had previously attacked Madras.

A week or so then elapsed. We are now at length to witness the ending of the *Emden*. And it was quite time for the end to come. As a result of this elusive vessel's activity Burma had been completely cut off from all communication with the outer world except by telegraph; Rangoon had not received any mail for several weeks; in fact, the Burma maritime trade had practically ceased. India had also suffered very substantially. The whole of the orders of the jute market had been withdrawn, and fears were entertained that Argentine orders would share the same fate. During the month of September alone the importation of cotton piece goods had fallen off by over two millions ster-

ling. This was a loss which meant much to Lancashire as well. The rice, hides and skin markets were also seriously affected. Even in ancient and holy Benares the diminished demand for silk manufactures and the total cessation of tourist traffic had given to that city an anxious interest in the proceedings and fate of the *Emden*. Events were, in fact, so developing that the successes of the *Emden* were likely to impress the crude native mind as an indication of a substantial German success in the naval war. It was, nevertheless, a curious thing that although the *Emden* was operating around Colombo, she never touched an Australian liner, and all the premiums paid to the Government on the Canal route to and from Australia were accordingly clear profit. On the whole, Indian rates of insurance were scarcely moved.

At the time that the *Emden* commenced operations in the Bay of Bengal the seas had only just been the scene of the departure of the last transport vessels of the Indian contingent to the European seat of war. The *Emden* was too late to interfere with them. Now, on November 9, the transports with the Australian contingents were on the Pacific and Indian oceans within a hundred miles of Keeling Cocos Islands. But for some time a large combined fleet of fast cruisers had been engaged over an immense area in the search for the German raider. French, Russian and Japanese vessels were all working in harmony with British cruisers. The *Emden* had been completely lost ever since her raid on the bay of Penang and the sinking of the Russian cruiser *Zhemtchug*. Wireless information now arrived, however, at the Australian ships accompanying the colonial transport that she was off the Keeling Cocos Islands, in the vicinity of the transports, and had landed an armed party on one of the islands in order to destroy the wireless station and to cut the cable, and was to meet a collier there in order to coal. The telegraphists, directly they sighted the vessel, had noticed her dummy funnel, and, believing her to be the *Emden*, had cabled to Singapore, whence the news was passed across the seas. The transports stopped immediately, and the *Sydney*, of the Australian Navy, under the command of Captain Glossop, when about fifty miles from the islands, at once made for the islands. Off the Cable Station Island she found the *Emden*. The enemy was taken completely by surprise, and was at once engaged by the *Sydney* in a sharp action. The *Emden* made for the North Keeling Island, about fifteen miles away, fighting bravely and making a most involved corkscrew-like course, the *Sydney*, broadside on as far as possible all the time, keeping in close contact with her. So destructive was the *Sydney's* gun-fire from the commencement

that it seemed a miracle that the *Emden* could keep afloat and steam as she did. Her voice pipes and torpedoes had been put out of action quite early in the fight. In the end, when the North Keeling Island was reached, nothing of her stern remained except a few bent and tangled ribs. Every gunlayer except one was killed, and scarcely any deck hands remained. The ship was a veritable shambles. Curiously, the forecastle was only slightly injured, and this was probably the reason why the captain was uninjured. The remnants of the crew, who had throughout fought their fight most unconcernedly and gallantly, gathered in this part of the ship when the fires drove them from the other parts, and there they were found, on the capture of the ship, dazed by their awful experiences. The most extraordinary incident, though, was that of seven men who were blown into the sea alive from one of the *Sydney's* broadsides. The *Sydney* herself did not escape unscathed. The *Emden* is stated to have fired no less than 1,500 shells, of all sorts and descriptions, from first to last, and the curious assortment was probably due to the fact that she must have used up almost every projectile she possessed. After the fight it was discovered that the *Sydney* had been hit about fourteen or fifteen times, sides, deck, rigging and funnels all showing signs of a very effective fire. Eventually the *Emden* was driven ashore the North Keeling Island and burnt. The *Sydney* sustained a loss of 3 killed and 15 wounded. The other ships of the Australian Navy, including the *Melbourne* and a cruiser, having in the meanwhile received a wireless message from the hotly fighting *Sydney*, steamed at highest speed, flames issuing from their funnels, towards the scene of the fight. From the *Sydney's* message it was believed that the *Emden* was likely to escape, and in her flight steam in the direct path of the convoy. There was tremendous excitement on the transports. "Can't I be off to attack the *Emden* ?" had the captain of the cruiser persistently signalled to the commander of the *Melbourne*. "No, wait a bit," had been the constant reply. Now at last his ship and the *Melbourne* were in pursuit. But when they arrived at North Keeling Island they found that the *Sydney* had completed her work.

So strongly had the courageous and daring energies of Captain von Müller impressed our Navy that, on the destruction of the *Emden*, her captain was allowed, on the express instructions of the British Admiralty, to retain his sword as a mark of our respect for his valour. At the same time, one cannot but feel it a pity that an otherwise perfect career of gallantry was spoiled by the incident of the Japanese flag in Penang harbour. The captain

and survivors, including a Prince Hohenzollern, a relative of the Kaiser, were taken to and landed at Colombo, there being no cheering, at the express request of the British authorities, for the wounded and captured, though Germans, had shown themselves to be heroes. Captain von Müller was singularly moved by this courtesy. The men who had been landed at the Cable Station Island subsequently escaped in a schooner. During the course of her career as a commercial raider the *Emden* had cost this country, India, and the Far East more than £4,000,000. Her depredations had raised the price of tea, tin and rubber, and prevented the rate of insurance, though always very low, from yet being still further lowered. One can well understand how her capture and destruction was a matter, not only for congratulation to our Navy, but for enthusiastic satisfaction to British merchants.

We now return to the North Sea to note the sinking of four German destroyers. Before, however, entering into details in regard to these operations, it is necessary, whilst commerce raiding is yet in our minds, to notice the very effective work of the *Cumberland*, commanded by Captain Cyril Fuller. She was a cruiser of nearly 10,000 tons, and about the end of September she captured nine merchant steamers off the Cameroon River on the west coast of Africa. These vessels had a total tonnage of 31,000 tons, were in good order, and most of them contained general outward and homeward cargoes and considerable quantities of coal. They all belonged to the Woermann Line, in which the Kaiser himself was a large shareholder. The Cameroon had already been the scene of an attempt by a German steamboat to sink the British gunboat, the *Dwarf*, with an infernal machine in her bows. This attempt had luckily failed, the steamboat herself being captured. Only two days afterwards the *Dwarf* was purposely rammed by a German merchant ship. Again she escaped, the enemy being wrecked for her pains. But to come to the North Sea.

One of the earliest incidents in the war was the sinking of the *Amphion* and the almost miraculous escape of her Commander, Captain Fox. Very shortly afterwards Captain Fox was appointed to the new light cruiser *Undaunted*. On October 17 he had yet another sensational experience. Accompanied by the destroyers the *Lance*, the *Lennox*, the *Legion* and the *Loyal*, the *Undaunted* steamed out of Harwich with the object of observing and dealing with, if possible, a certain amount of "liveliness" which had recently prevailed in the North Sea. All the ships' companies were jubilant and eager to get into the danger zone.

They had not, however, to restrain their enthusiasm for any length of time. Within a few hours, when heading up northwards and skirting the Dutch coastline, the smoke of four vessels was sighted. Chase at top speed was at once given. The five vessels, two on each side of the *Undaunted* in the centre, tore through the seas, water and spray flying all over them and covering them fore and aft. The vessels thus sighted and chased turned out to be four German destroyers. These steamed their hardest before their pursuers, endeavouring either to escape them altogether or to obtain a strategic position. They found it impossible to escape—a fight was inevitable. Nor had they time or opportunity to take up the position they would have desired. The British flotilla at once opened with a most effective fire. Almost immediately one of the destroyers was hit and disappeared beneath the seas. The three that were left then commenced to attack the British ships with torpedoes, but ineffectively. Another of the enemy's vessels was now seen to be out of action. So deadly was the British gunnery that she was ablaze fore and aft. Her funnels, torpedo tubes and all deck fittings disappeared like magic in the dense fumes given out by the deadly lyddite shells which the British ships were firing. As the second vessel went down the British ships had arrived at the neighbourhood of the scene of the sinking of the first. It was a fearful sight. Not only was the surface of the water strewn with blackened débris and wreckage, but scorched and maimed wretches were struggling agonisedly in the water, striving against fate to be preserved from death. But the British could not stop to help, however much humanity prompted them, for to have done so would have been death to them—a lesson dearly bought in the sinking of the *Aboukir*, the *Hogue* and the *Cressy*. Then their ships would have been sure marks for the torpedoes of the Germans. So the two other German destroyers now speedily shared the fate of their colleagues. Masses of seething flame, shrouded in the densest smoke, they toppled over on their beam-ends like wounded birds, righted themselves level with the surface for but a second, and then, with a final plunge, bow first, sank beneath the waves.

In this manner were the German destroyers, *S* 115, *S* 117, *S* 118 and *S* 119 sunk by Captain Fox and his gallant colleagues and crews. The Germans fought like heroes, but were outmanœuvred and matched against superior gunnery. In less than four hours the last of the four, battered and bested, went to the bottom. They fought to the end, the majority going down with their ships. Between thirty and forty Germans were rescued

and made prisoners. The British detachment suffered only the slightest casualties, and none of the ships were seriously damaged.

In about a week after this it is recorded that H.M.S. *Badger* sunk another German submarine.

It should have been no part of our tale. German barbarity, however, has brought it in. It is the inhuman and tragic incident of the *Amiral Ganteaume.* She was a French passenger steamer off the French coast, carrying from Calais to Le Havre a pitiable company of 2,000 unarmed, ruined and distracted refugees, many of them being women and small children. Suddenly, in broad daylight, on October 26, this defenceless ship was made the object of a deliberate torpedo attack by the Germans. The first intimation of the occurrence to the crowded ship was a violent explosion. The German submarine had done its work only too well. By pure chance, and the greatest good fortune, the British steamship, the *Queen,* was then a short distance off the *Amiral Ganteaume,* and succeeded, after heroic efforts on the part of the captain, crew and even some of the passengers, in rescuing most of the wretched refugees before the doomed vessel sank; but forty of the unfortunates fell victims to this cowardly blow of the Germans.

The scene now shifts again. We are in the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of Chile, in the neighbourhood of Valparaiso. On Sunday, November 1, the British cruisers, *Monmouth* and *Glasgow,* and the armed merchant vessel, the *Otranto,* were met by a German squadron in a heavy sea. The German squadron consisted of the cruisers *Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig* and *Dresden,* ships which, apparently unshadowed, had escaped from Kiau-chau. The German squadron was relatively so powerful that fighting, as matters stood, would have been folly on the part of the British ships. They accordingly waited for the *Good Hope,* the flagship of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, which was in the neighbourhood, to join up with them. Whilst so waiting the Germans were enabled to secure a strategical advantage by obtaining the inshore position. This meant that, while the Germans were more or less invisible against the coast, the British ships were silhouetted against the sunset.

Even with the advent of the *Good Hope,* the German force was overwhelmingly superior to that of the British. The *Scharnhorst,* for one thing, had for many years held the German gunnery record. Apart from that the German ships were more numerous, more modern, better gunned and better protected. The following, omitting the *Otranto,* which counted for practically nothing, shows the contrast between the two forces:

BRITISH

Good Hope, armoured cruiser, launched 1901; displacement, 14,100 tons; complement, 900; nominal speed, 23½ knots; armament, two 9·2-in. guns, sixteen 6-in., twelve 12-pounder guns, two torpedo-tubes; armoured belt 6-in. amidships.

Monmouth, armoured cruiser, launched 1901; displacement, 9,800 tons; complement, 540; nominal speed, 24 knots; armament, fourteen 6-in., nine 12-pounder guns, two torpedo-tubes; armoured belt 4-in. amidships.

Glasgow, light cruiser of the Town class, launched 1909; displacement, 4,800 tons; complement, 367; armament, two 6-in. guns, ten 4-in., four 3-pounder guns, two torpedo-tubes.

GERMAN

Scharnhorst, armoured cruiser, launched 1906; displacement, 11,600 tons; complement, 765; nominal speed, 23 knots; armament, eight 8·2-in., six 6-in., eighteen 24-pounder guns, four torpedo-tubes; armoured belt 6-in. amidships.

Gneisenau, sister vessel to *Scharnhorst*; launched 1906.

Leipzig, light cruiser, launched 1905; displacement, 3,560 tons; complement, 303; nominal speed, 23 knots; armament, ten 4-in., two 1-pounder guns, two torpedo-tubes.

Dresden, light cruiser, launched 1907; complement, 361; armament, same as *Leipzig*; nominal speed, 25.

Nurnberg, light cruiser, launched 1906; displacement, 3,450 tons; complement, 322; armament, same as *Leipzig*; speed 25 knots.

The relative entire gun-power of the two squadrons may be compared from the following:

ARMAMENT

German		*British*	
16	8·2-in.	2	9·2-in.
12	6-in.	32	6-in.
30	4·1-in.	10	4-in.
36	24-pdrs.	20	12-pdrs.
10	1-pdr.	7	3-pdrs.

These figures show a decided advantage in favour of the Germans; but the advantage of the enemy was in actual fact much greater, so great as to stand, on one calculation, as at 70 German to 53 British. This was so because, owing to the weather conditions, only the upper-deck guns could be fought. The Germans, too, obtained a great advantage at the commencement, before the arrival of the *Good Hope*, by very seriously disabling the *Monmouth*.

Having stated the above facts, the result is obviously a foregone conclusion. It mattered not how heroically and brilliantly the British seamen may have fought, yet, out-manœuvred and out-ranged as they were with superior armament, victory was

bound in the end to lie with the Germans. In this engagement the British fought at "fearful odds" in the real and exact sense of the term. They fought, though, as the Germans themselves admitted, bravely and tenaciously to the end.

Undoubtedly the result of this fight was a blow to Britain. It was not, however, a blow which could have any serious consequences, or even any practical consequences at all, in the naval war itself as a whole. The action was fought in a distant sea without reference to any substantial object. It left the British fleet as a whole as it was before—overwhelmingly superior to that of the German. The result, nevertheless, gave rise to much comment and criticism at home. Why did not the Admiral decline the conflict when the conditions were so adverse? The answer was found to be that he was not in a position to do so, having been out-manœuvred by the Germans and forced to fight and take a certain defeat. The Germans, therefore, obtained their victory not only because of their superiority, but also and primarily because of their initial success in manœuvring. It was understood at home that H.M.S. *Canopus* had been sent by the Admiralty to reinforce Admiral Cradock's squadron. The *Canopus* must have been somewhere in the vicinity. She was not, however, engaged in the fight. The forcing of the conflict, therefore, without the *Canopus* among the British ships only emphasises the skill of the German manœuvring. It was reported that a wireless message had been sent to the *Canopus*, informing her of the position; but this message was spoilt in transit by the Germans "jamming wireless signals," in other words rendering the message inaudible.

These first few days of November were undoubtedly interesting, though, viewed in true perspective, the result of the German efforts during that period did not substantially improve their position.

On November 3 a German squadron raided the east coast of England on the same day that Britain was successfully bombarding the town of Akabah in the Red Sea. That, however, was a detail. That the British coast itself should be raided was an occurrence almost unthinkable. And what a raid it was! Some shots were fired off Yarmouth and Lowestoft, aimed apparently at nothing in particular, and certainly neither hitting nor damaging anything at all. Not even were the nerves of the East Anglians shaken. It would seem, but nothing can be said with certainty, for the whole operation is shrouded in mystery, that a German squadron emerged from its lair, and, getting near the east coast, but too far away for any useful purpose, fired a few shots, turned back, and disappeared. The coast gunboat, the *Halcyone*, was at the time engaged in patrolling the coast. At once, on her report, a

naval movement took place with a view to pursuing and engaging the now fast retreating German fleet; but their flight was so speedy and the darkness of eventide was spreading over the seas so quickly that it was impossible to bring the Germans to an engagement. The rear German cruiser in retirement, however, found an opportunity to initiate a new naval operation of a peculiarly devilish character. We had become accustomed to mines sown broadcast in the open sea, and there left to deal death to any passing vessel, whether belligerent or no; but we were now to learn and experience a new method of mine-laying. As the rearmost German cruiser fled she threw out behind a number of mines, apparently mines without any form of anchor. One of the British submarines, *D* 15, pursuing the retreating fleet was sunk by exploding one of these mines. Of the crew, two officers and two men who were on the bridge of the submarine, which was running on the surface of the water, were saved. The *Halcyone* had done her part, too, to harass the enemy. For about a quarter of an hour she fought them. This action of the *Halcyone's* was undoubtedly exceptionally heroic—a small gunboat against a fleet! It was a miracle that she survived. She put into port, however, afterwards, comparatively undamaged. Certainly her aerial was somewhat damaged, her bridge had been struck, and there was also a hole caused by shot in one of her funnels; but otherwise she showed no sign of having been engaged in battle.

On the whole, the Germans came off worst on this expedition, for, on entering Jahde Bay on their return home, their cruiser *Yorck* struck a chain of mines—it was doubtful whether these had been laid by themselves or the British—blocking the entrance to the bay, and sank. Thus were the Germans hoist, most literally, with their own petard. The *Yorck* was no mean ship, being an armoured cruiser of 9,000 tons, somewhat superior as a unit to our *Monmouth*, which had only a day or so before been so disastrously engaged off the coast of Chile. But from the point of view of the war as a whole, the loss of the *Yorck* was a greater blow to Germany than the loss of the *Monmouth* to Britain. Germany had so few cruisers that she could ill afford to lose one.

The same day a gunboat flotilla of our Navy was supporting the Belgian left flank.

But the enemy were venturing even nearer to the heart of Britain than the east coast. On November 12 they had a German submarine operating in the Downs, and operating very successfully. She torpedoed the British gunboat, the *Niger*, which was then lying there. This disaster occurred within sight of the British

shores. There was even a large crowd on the sea front, attracted there by the heavy gun-firing. This crowd heard the loud roar of the terrific explosion which took place when the torpedo struck her prey, and saw rise the dense columns of black smoke. They saw also the bows of the gunboat settle down into the water and the vessel disappear entirely into the heavy sea which was then running. At once, notwithstanding the gale which was blowing, a great crowd of shore boats put off to the rescue; so, out of crew of 95, only about 8 were missing.

On the 23rd Britain had her turn again. On that day a British patrolling vessel rammed the German submarine *U* 18 off the northern coast of Scotland, with the result that shortly afterwards she foundered, one only of her crew being drowned, the others, officers and men, being rescued and captured. On the same day the German torpedo-boat, *S* 124, collided with a damaged steamer in the Sound and was sunk.

Yet another incident occurred before the end of November. On the 26th a great British naval disaster occurred. The *Bulwark*, a battleship of 15,000 tons and a representative ship of the older Pre-Dreadnought type, was blown up whilst lying at Sheerness. The loss of the ship itself was a comparatively small matter, but the nation was saddened beyond adequate expression by the fact that between 700 and 800 lives were lost. The Vice- and Rear-Admirals who were present reported their conviction that it was an internal magazine explosion which rent the ship asunder. There was apparently no upheaval in the water, and the ship had entirely disappeared when the smoke had cleared away. The force of the explosion was so great that it shook houses situated so far away as six miles. The whole occurrence was shrouded in mystery. At the time, there was a wide belief that it was the work of some traitor, but, as a result of an inquiry subsequently held, it was ascertained that the disaster was due entirely to accident. The loss of the ship, however, did not sensibly affect the military and naval position.

A GENERAL MAP OF BELGIUM,
Indicating the Fortified Towns.

CHAPTER V

GERMANY INVADES LUXEMBURG AND BELGIUM

The Luxemburg-Belgian frontier—Germany invades Luxemburg—Protest of the Grand Duchess—Advance into France—The invasion of Belgium—Limburg—Verviers—Crossing the Meuse—The resistance at Visé—The destruction of the town—Fighting at Argenteau—Advance towards Liége—The city of Liége—Its fortifications—German plan of campaign—The attack on the forts—Sanguinary fighting—The Germans break through the defences—They trickle into the city—Belgian troops evacuate Liége—The occupation by the Germans—The forts still intact—Description of the fighting by Belgian officer—The ultimate destruction of the forts—The heroism of General Leman—The tribute of a German officer.

AS against Germany France had two land frontiers. On the east was the frontier from Luxemburg down to Switzerland, and northward and westward was the Luxemburg and Belgian frontier from Luxemburg to the sea. The eastern frontier had been very effectively fortified, from Verdun in the north to Belfort near Switzerland. The fortification of this frontier was so strong that it had always presented a most serious obstacle to any invasion. The Luxemburg-Belgian frontier, on the other hand, could hardly have been said to have been fortified at all, as a whole, and so presented a convenient and easy road for any advance by Germany into France, provided that Germany could invade France before French mobilisation could be completed. Such an invasion would in all probability, at any rate at the beginning, have been completely successful. It would have meant that the German army could have occupied the entire north of France, and perhaps even Paris, the capital, before the French army had found it possible to be in the field completely ready and able to deal with the enemy.

But the advantages of the Luxemburg-Belgian frontier would have thus been available to Germany to their fullest extent only in the event of Belgium allowing the German army to overrun her territory, or, to nearly as great an extent, if the Belgian army, though resisting the Germans, should be easily set on one side. As will be seen presently, Belgium did not allow the German army to pass through her territory without resistance, and that resistance was itself so imposing that the time occupied in

breaking it down afforded France an opportunity to complete her mobilisation in time to prevent irreparable disaster.

The mobilisation of the French army would, in the ordinary course, have taken at least ten or twelve days.

As a fact, Germany did make up her mind at the commencement of the war to direct her main efforts towards an invasion of France by the Luxemburg-Belgian frontier, contenting herself during these operations merely to hold the eastern Franco-German frontier. So we find that Germany initiated her warlike operations by a violation of the neutral territories of Luxemburg and Belgium. Luxemburg, a state without any military force whatever, was bound to submit subject to an ineffective protest against the violation. Belgium, however, resisted in arms all Teutonic persuasion and coercion. But what was of signal importance was the fact that this resistance was so strenuous and proved to be so effective as to make it necessary for Germany to spend much time and effort before she could reach and cross the Franco-Belgian frontier. It may have been that Germany never expected that Belgium would resist; but whatever Germany may in fact have expected as to this, one thing is certain, that she never expected that the resistance of Belgium would be so effective as it turned out to be.

So before we come to the invasion of France by Germany, we have to deal with the preliminary invasion of Luxemburg and Belgium by Germany, the determined and patriotic resistance of which, by the Belgians, proved to the world, how, even in days of the coldest commercialism, a small nation, independent thitherto, and interested solely in manufactures, trade, and finance, could fight for its hearth, home, and rights.

On Sunday night, August 1, the citizens of Luxemburg retired to rest at peace with all the world, and without any apprehension of invasion. Luxemburg, a neutralised state, had no enemies. She had given offence to no other state, least of all to either of her neighbours, Germany, France, or Belgium. The city of Luxemburg itself was absolutely unfortified, though so situated, and having such natural and physical advantages, that had it been fortified, as years before it had, it could have opposed a very serious resistance to any invasion. In times long past the fortress of Luxemburg, placed on a mighty rock there, had been regarded, as a fortified stronghold, as second in strength and importance only to the rock of Gibraltar. In 1867, however, the Powers, when then neutralising the State of Luxemburg, had insisted on the dismantling of the city. Prussia was one of the powers which so insisted. In exchange for this dismantling

of the fortress, the Powers, including of course Prussia, guaranteed that Luxemburg should be safe from invasion, that her territory should be inviolate, and that therefore there would never be any need in the future for Luxemburg herself to provide for her own defence. This being the state of affairs, as we have already said, Luxemburg went to rest on the night of August 1 without fear, and with a feeling of absolute security.

The morning dawned and the Luxemburgers awoke, and to their astonishment and dismay they discovered that, as a thief in the night, Germany in the darkness had invaded their state and seized their city. The highway from Germany to France ran right through the city by road and by rail across the great bridges of Luxemburg. These bridges, the railways, the stations, and the roads were now in the hands of the Germans; moreover, it was noticed that the German troops were under the command or direction of officers who, until then, had lived in Luxemburg, and, though Germans, had been trusted and respected by the citizens. Now it was discovered that these former German residents of Luxemburg were something worse than spies. The passage of the German military trains across the Grand Duchy was ensured.

At once the Luxemburg authorities began to make some protest. Defenceless and at the mercy of the Germans though they were, yet they could not in honour allow their territory to be violated in order that Germany might steal a march upon France in some quarrel with which the Luxemburgers had no concern. The Chief Minister of State proceeded to the Adolf Bridge, one of those in the occupation of the German troops, interviewed the commanding officer, produced a copy of the Treaty of 1867 by which Prussia had guaranteed the neutrality of the State, and demanded that the troops should be withdrawn. His action was without effect. The German officer admitted that he and Germany were fully aware of the Treaty and its terms, but it was their intention, notwithstanding the Treaty, to use the territory of Luxemburg for warlike operations. The Grand Duchess, the sovereign of Luxemburg, now made her appearance on the scene and endeavoured to block the bridge with her motor car. The gallant lady was forced, however, to return home. Her rights, as well as those of the country she was representing, were contemptuously flouted by the Germans. The Luxemburg Commandant also joined in the protest; but with a pistol at his head he was terrorised and forced to be content with merely uttering his protest. Without fortifications and without troops, Luxemburg was now helpless in the hands of the Germans,

Not content with thus seizing the territory, roads, and railways of Luxemburg, the Germans now proceeded to more reprehensible action. Houses, farms, trees, and crops were ruthlessly destroyed. Nothing was left which might give cover to an enemy. Private citizens were arrested in considerable numbers on the impossible excuse that they were or might be spies. The whole of the State was occupied by German troops with a view to facilitating the concentration of the German army.

Within a day or so the Germans, coming from Trèves, had moved through Luxemburg, particularly over the Wasserbillig and Remic bridges, into France in the direction of Longwy, Villerupt, and Thionville.

The immediately pressing objective of Germany, however, was Liége. On August 2, when Germany was already in possession of Luxemburg, Belgium was hardly yet satisfied that Germany would actually violate her neutrality; but Germany, having made up her mind to do this, no doubt long since, was now proceeding with all speed to effect her purpose. On August 3 German troops were crossing the Germano-Belgian frontier to the north of Luxemburg. There were then not many of these troops, for they were only a covering force; nevertheless they were believed by the German authorities to be sufficient to take Liége. Limburg, a place immediately on the frontier, was the first Belgian town to be occupied by the Germans, an occupation which was effected without resistance by the surprised and unprepared inhabitants. The next Belgian town to be occupied was Verviers, and on the same day Belgium was also invaded by German troops without any sort of resistance at Dalhem, Franconchamps, and Stavelot.

The enemy was now creeping up towards Liége from the south-east. To the north-east of Liége, Germany had approached Visé, a small town on the Meuse, about six miles north of Liége, intending there to cross the river and penetrate right into Belgium, and also to descend upon Liége from the north along the river. The Meuse at Visé is about 300 yards wide. It was then spanned by a fine bridge. This bridge, however, was destroyed by the Belgians directly it was known that the Germans were approaching. Accordingly, when the enemy had arrived at the river, in order to cross they had to do so by a pontoon bridge and boats. This was not an easy matter. Not only were the Germans within range of the guns of the Liége forts, which did not cease firing upon them, but they were also subjected to a persistent harassing fire from the Belgian soldiers. A shell destroyed the pontoon bridge directly it was constructed. The enemy had then to

THE SACK OF LOUVAIN

No acts of the Germans have evoked such world-wide revulsion as the barbarities inflicted upon historic Louvain. Many of the priceless relics and architectural beauties of the ancient university town were reduced to shapeless heaps of rubble. Pillage, massacres, and barbarities unspeakable followed in the wake of the Prussian invasion.

build another, and in many little boats cross the river, their horses swimming over, the Belgian forces meanwhile being kept at a distance by fire from the German mitrailleuses. After a long and bitter fight the Germans were able to cross the river and throw the Belgians back a considerable distance. The enemy then took possession of Visé, but this was not accomplished until after a struggle which lasted for three days.

When the Germans first attempted to cross the river, they expected to arrive at Liége within two days, and at Paris within ten. The resistance at Visé upset this calculation altogether. Very naturally the Germans were greatly exasperated, but what did more than anything else to rouse their bad blood were the guerilla tactics with which the Belgians persisted in the defence of their town, even when the Germans had already occupied it. The enemy, finding that still the Belgians continuously inflicted heavy casualties upon them, absolutely lost all control over themselves and their actions. Acting more like a savage horde than a civilised army, they drove the unfortunate inhabitants of Visé out of their houses, and burnt down to the ground the whole town. As these people, men, women, and children, were thus being driven from their homes, they were indiscriminately shot by the Germans, women and children even being driven before the invading troops as a shield.

Visé, thus reduced to ruins, now gave way to the village of Argenteau, a place about two miles away, as the next scene of devastation and bloodshed. But the delay caused by the difficulties which the German troops had encountered in crossing the Meuse meant a great deal for Liége. Not only did the delay afford time to General Leman, the commander at Liége, to strengthen his position and prepare for the assault of the enemy, but it had upset the plans of the Germans to such an extent that it was impossible for them to make an effective advance upon Liége directly from the north on the bank of the Meuse, which they had now reached. So the real fight at Liége took place on the German side of the river from the north-east and from the south-east, the investing army being primarily composed of troops that had marched there direct without having first attacked Visé.

Liége, which lies in a strikingly picturesque situation, was the centre of the most industrial and densely populated portion of that smaller half of Belgium whose inhabitants were of Latin race, and whose mother tongue was French. They were known as Walloons. It rises on the high bank of the Meuse, which flows through the city and forms an island, which was connected with

the right bank by five bridges and with the left by six bridges and a small foot-bridge. The principal part of the town lies on the left bank, and there contained the public buildings, the churches, and the university. Liége was a very flourishing and up-to-date town, full of fine buildings and beautifully laid out. The cosmopolitan character of its university was not without its significance; nearly half of the students were foreigners, the greater part being Russians and Poles. Coal-mining formed the basis of the industrial prosperity of Liége, but, almost as important, was the manufacture of weapons of all kinds, which had enjoyed a world-wide reputation since the end of the eighteenth century. A few miles from Liége—just outside, in fact—is Seraing, which is connected with Jemappes, on the opposite bank of the river, by a suspension-bridge. Seraing was remarkable as the seat of numerous ironworks and manufactories, the most important being the vast establishment formed in 1816 by the late John Cockerill, an Englishman. The workshops and offices occupied an area of 270 acres, and the mines, furnaces, engine-shops, iron and steel works were able to produce materials for ironclads, bridges, hundreds of steam engines, locomotives, and other objects that are manufactured with iron and steel. Some 12,000 hands were employed. The first locomotive used on the Continent was built at Seraing; the lion on the field of Waterloo was cast there, and there the machinery used in boring the Mont Cenis tunnel in 1860 was made. Beyond Seraing there were extensive coal-mines, glass-works, and iron manufactories.

But Liége demands our particular attention now on account of the fact that it was a fortified centre, designed entirely as an obstacle to invasion from Germany. The fortifications consisted of twelve detached forts, which were erected according to the plans of General Brialmont in and after the year 1886, and surrounded the city at various distances ranging from three and a half to five and a half miles. Liége was bound to be dealt with by any army invading Belgium from Germany. Should such an army ignore or neglect Liége, and cross the Meuse lower down, and so march through Belgium, the result would be that its line of communications would run between Antwerp and Liége, and farther down between Antwerp and Namur, all three places strongly fortified, and would run the very grave risk of most certainly being cut off. So doing, the army would find itself in Belgium without food, ammunition, or anything necessary for its existence as an army. On the other hand, having once reduced and occupied Liége, the army would gain the roads and railways from Germany through Belgium into France for its own use and support.

The fortifications consisted, as already stated, of twelve forts surrounding the city. These forts constituted an almost ideal ring fortress. The forts, though isolated, were so placed in relation to one another that each might easily be supported by two others, in some cases by three, and in one case even by four. The main avenue of advance by Germany through Liége was by railway and road through the deep ravine of the Vesdre River. This was blocked by two forts. So, too, at the entry in Liége and its exit along the Meuse there were two forts, one each side



SECTION OF ONE OF THE FORTS OF LIÉGE

at each of these points; and filling up the circle were the other forts, making up the number of twelve.

Of these twelve forts, there were six on each side of the river Meuse, the whole twelve being so arranged that the circle of forts was divided by the river into equal half-circles. Those on the left bank of the river should be noticed particularly in order that the operations against Liége may be understood. On the north-eastern part of the semicircle were the three forts, Barchon, Evégné, and Fléron. Barchon commanded the valley of the Meuse and the approach from Visé, and crossed fire with, and so

commanded and supported Pontisse, the fort close to it on the other side of the river, and Evégné, its neighbour on the right. The latter fort commanded the plateau with all the lines of communication which passed in its neighbourhood ; it crossed fire with its neighbour on each side, namely Barchon and Fléron. Fléron commanded the railway from Aix-la-Chapelle and the approach from Hervé, and crossed fire with its neighbours Evégné and Chaudfontaine. These three forts comprised the north-eastern segment of the circle. The following three made up the south-eastern segment. First, next to Fléron, was Chaudfontaine. This commanded the valley of the Vesdre and the country between that river and the Ourthe, and also the approach, the road and railway, from Verviers to Aix-la-Chapelle ; it crossed fire with Fléron and Embourg. The latter fort commanded the valley of the Ourthe, the railway and road from Esneux, and the approach, highway and railroad, from Aix-la-Chapelle ; it crossed fire with Chaudfontaine and Boncelles. Boncelles commanded the whole of the region between the Ourthe and the Meuse. It crossed fire with Embourg and with Flémalle, the neighbouring fort on the other side of the river Meuse. Of these six forts, Barchon, Flérons, and Boncelles were great triangular forts, the others being only small triangular or quadrangular forts.

In order that these forts should fulfil their functions effectively, it was necessary that the area between each—the interval, generally about two or three miles in length—should be occupied by troops sufficient in number and force. The line of troops and forts together were the real fortification. The forts, however, were always considered feeble in one respect—namely, that it was not easy, by reason of the configuration of the land, for one to work with and support the other. The siege showed another and very grave weakness. The forts, though probably impregnable at the time they were constructed, about twenty-five years before, were now, by reason of the great improvement and increased effectiveness of siege artillery, unable to set up a prolonged resistance.

The great battle of Liége commenced during the night of August 4 and 5, and ended with the surrender of the town on the 8th. The desperate resistance of the gallant Belgians gave to this fight a notable place amongst the most heroic in history. As regards men, the Belgians were outclassed and outnumbered. The Belgian troops had had nothing like the experience or training of the German, and numbered, at the outside, only 22,500, against 88,000 German on the first day, increased to 120,000 on the second. It was impossible for them, adequately, to

MAP SHOWING THE
FORTS OF LIÈGE.



The London Geographical Institute.



occupy the intervals between the forts. Moreover, the Belgian armament was far inferior to that of the German army. So inadequate was the defence of the city, both in numbers of men and character of armament, that the German army believed that its work would simply be lightly to brush aside the Belgian resistance, if any, and march victoriously through Liége and so on over and along the great main highway into France. This was a remarkable miscalculation. They had omitted entirely to take into account the psychological factor. They had disregarded the characteristic martial spirit of the Belgians, and the patriotic enthusiasm in defence of home and country that they were to add to their more mechanical efforts of mere soldierly routine.

This huge German army ultimately invested Liége on the left bank of the river against the six forts already described with an enormous semicircle of soldiery, extending from Visé right round to below Huy, representing the united strength of the 7th, 10th, and 9th German Army Corps, under the command of General von Emmich. At the beginning the German cavalry got into contact with the Belgian outposts to the east of the forts. The investing semicircle followed this up by launching columns upon columns of densely massed German troops against different objectives. So separate masses concentrated their attention upon the forts of Fléron, Barchon, and Evégné, which constituted the north-eastern segment; other masses attacked the south-eastern segment of forts, Chaudfontaine, Embourg, and Boncelles.

In the north-eastern segment the Germans devoted their attention particularly to the fort Fléron and the areas between that fort and its two neighbours, Chaudfontaine and Evégné. Here the Germans suffered enormously. The intervals between the forts were so well occupied and defended by the Belgians with machine-guns and rifles, supported by the artillery of the fort itself, and obstacles, such as trenches, barbed wire entanglements, and mines, that the Germans were thrown back with tremendous loss. It was a terrible struggle—mainly an artillery fight—very murderous indeed for the Germans. Against Fort Barchon the Germans made an attack in fanlike formation, at one time almost forcing their way through the fortified zone. A brigade of the Belgian Reserve came up, however, in a counter attack, repulsing the Germans so that they retired in the greatest disorder imaginable, suffering enormous losses as well as the destruction of a number of their heavy pieces of artillery. The central German column made Fort Evégné its objective. The attack, however, was resisted not only by the artillery of the fort,

which was primarily operating against it, but also by that of the two neighbouring forts, Fléron and Barchon.

So, notwithstanding superior numbers, the most effective artillery possible, and a reckless disregard of human material, the Germans were for the time being defeated in their attempts in the north-eastern segment by the heroic resistance of the defenders. At this time the commander of the German army called upon the beleaguered town to surrender immediately—threatening, in default, that a Zeppelin would be launched which would drop bombs upon the buildings of the Belgian headquarters. The reply to this demand came very promptly. The Belgians at once redoubled both the fire from their forts and their offensive in the intervals between. This had the effect of repelling the German troops for some miles. Thereupon the Belgian forces left the line of the forts, and pursued the flying enemy, so accentuating and still further demoralising their retreat.

While events were thus happening in the north-east, the German troops were making a desperate attack on the Belgian positions in the south-eastern segment from the neighbourhood of Huy. They were here attacking forts Boncelles and Embourg with all their force and energy. Apart from the troops inside the forts, the Belgians themselves at first had only about fifteen hundred men in this neighbourhood. Nevertheless the attack failed. The Germans now desisted from a direct attack upon the forts themselves, preferring to concentrate upon the Belgian lines defending the intervals between. The result at first was very satisfactory to the attacking forces. The Belgian line was forced back for nearly a mile. The position was very critical: at any moment the Belgian line might be forced and the Germans be through. But General Leman, who was in command of the Belgian forces, was quite equal to the occasion. Without any hesitation whatever, he at once brought all the troops at his disposal to the assistance of the threatened line. It was now composed of fifteen thousand men instead of about fifteen hundred. Night came. The fighting then developed into a hand-to-hand encounter with the bayonet, and in the darkness there was much confusion, for everything was so obscure. But notwithstanding obscurity and confusion, the Belgians by desperate and strenuous use of the bayonet, a weapon which seems always to have put fear into the souls of the Germans, were enabled to maintain their position as a whole. Nevertheless a small column of Germans managed to squeeze through the line here and get into the town.

When inside the town these men partially disguised themselves, and with remarkable audacity made for the Belgian head-

quarters. Notwithstanding their disguise, however, when they were about fifty yards from the building they were recognised by the police, and, after a violent conflict in the streets, were thrown out of the town.

But as the morning of the 6th advanced, it became more and more impossible for the small Belgian forces in the intervals between the forts to prevent the breach of their lines by the overpowering masses of Germans, who were now hurled against them in ever-increasing force. Fight as they would, and fight as they did most gallantly, it was also impossible to withstand the German artillery, which was now being directed with more persistence and accuracy against the forts and their defenders. The Germans were even shelling the town itself; and though in the south-east the gallant fifteen hundred had been reinforced, yet that very reinforcement itself meant that in the north-east the defending line in the intervals there were by so many men the weaker—and men could be as little spared in the north-east as in the south-east. So the German onslaught, now directed particularly to the intervals between the north-eastern forts, was overpoweringly strong. The result was that, though for the time being they were prevented from entering the city from the south-east, yet it became increasingly easy for them to break through from the north-east. During the whole of the day of August 6, the German army began to trickle through, increasing in numbers, into the city itself, the bombardment continuing with ever more devastating effect. Things being as they were, General Leman now took the only wise course. He seized the opportunity that yet presented itself to send away from the intervals the Belgian troops who were defending them, in order that they might pass inland through the city and join up with the main Belgian army farther in the country. That General Leman was able to do this successfully at the very time that the Germans were, in the absence of resistance, passing into Liége is in itself remarkable evidence of his resource and skill.

So August 6 and 7 saw the gradual practical occupation of Liége by victorious German troops; and yet not one of the forts had been put out of action. The forts on the left bank, which have already been enumerated, were still fighting against the German advances. The forts on the right bank could do little, for had they bombarded Liége under the present circumstances, they would have done more to injure Liége and Belgians than to retard the occupation of the city by the Germans. It was not until some considerable time after the occupation of the city by the Germans that the forts were completely destroyed.

Between the Belgian retreat and evacuating of the city and the complete German occupation of the place only a very short interval occurred. But during this time, and also before the retreat, there was little or no excitement there. The inhabitants passed their time rather in a state of resigned inactivity. Though for a time there was no police, yet there was never any disorder or crime. Except for some misuse of the white flag by the Germans during the course of their attack upon the forts and defences of the city no substantial complaints could reasonably be made against the Germans at this time. Notwithstanding the very effective and unexpected resistance they had experienced at Liége, and the enormous loss of life they had sustained incidentally, the Germans did not yet apparently appreciate as they ultimately did the enormous task they had before them before they could deliver their intended blow against France. This was probably the reason why Liége suffered at first so very lightly from the point of view of useless destruction of life and property.

But the fighting preparatory to the occupation was of such a character that the Germans sustained a loss of life so enormous as to be hardly credible. The German commander apparently thought that by hurling mass upon mass of men against the forts themselves, as well as against the defending Belgian lines, he could easily and speedily break through the fortified zone. He was sadly mistaken. At any rate he was not successful in his design until tens of thousands of his men had been uselessly, from the point of view of his objective, slaughtered. A mass of men would be thrown on the forts and lines, to be met only by a deadly fire from machine-guns and rifles, the result being that the mass would be as a whole annihilated. That mass would be succeeded by another. The same thing would happen, and the second mass left dead heaped on the first. Yet another mass would be brought forward, and the heap of dead would rise yet higher, and so the attack went on. Eventually the height of German dead became itself a very barrier defending the Belgians against further German onslaught—the German soldiers going to their death only by force of the irresistible driving power behind them. These masses of dead ultimately disposed themselves about the field of battle, as a result of the avenue- cutting fire of the defenders, like closely situated haystacks.

The following realistic account of the work of these desperate days was subsequently given by a Belgian officer and published in the *Daily Telegraph*:

Some of us late arrivals only managed to get to our posts when the German attack began. It was night-time. We replied sharply with our guns. Until the dawn came we had no very distinct idea of what our practice was. Then we noticed heaps of German slain in a semicircle at the foot of our fort. The German guns must have been much less successful, because they rarely hit us that night. They did better at daybreak. We did better still.

As line after line of the German infantry advanced, we simply mowed them down. It was terribly easy, monsieur, and I turned more than once to a brother officer and said " *Voilà !* They are coming on again in a dense close formation ! They must be mad." They made no attempt at deploying, but came on, line after line, almost shoulder to shoulder, until, as we shot them down, the fallen were heaped one on top of the other in an awful barricade of dead and wounded men that threatened to mask our guns and cause us trouble. I thought of Napoleon's saying—if he said it, monsieur, and I doubt it, for he had no care of human life—" C'est magnifique ! Mais ce n'est pas la guerre ! " No, it was slaughter—just slaughter !

So high became the barricade of dead and wounded that we did not know whether to fire through it or to go out and clear openings with our hands. We would have liked to extricate some of the wounded from the dead, but we dared not. A stiff wind carried away the smoke of the guns quickly, and we could see some of the wounded men trying to release themselves from their terrible position. I will confess that I crossed myself and could have wished that the smoke had remained.

But, would you believe it, the veritable wall of dead and dying actually enabled those wonderful Germans to creep closer, and actually charge up the *glacis* ? Of course they got no farther than half way, for our maxims and rifles swept them back. Of course we had our own losses, but they were slight compared with the carnage inflicted upon our enemies.

France signified its deep appreciation of the resistance to the German advance set up by Liége by conferring upon that city the signal honour of the Cross of the Legion of Honour.

Before the Belgian troops evacuated the city, they took the wise precaution to blow up all except two of the bridges which joined the island city of Liége to the mainland surrounding it. The rivers Meuse, Ourthe and Vesdre here so divide and join, it should be noted, as to make the city within the fortifications an island. The roads, rail and others, which ran from Germany through Belgium into France here cross these bridges to pass through Liége. The forts being still intact and yet in the hands of the Belgians, notwithstanding the German occupation of the city, and the bridges being destroyed, Germany was thus without possession of the main asset of the place. She had not control of the lines of communication. It was not until August 19 that

the enemy were in a position finally to destroy the forts. They were able to accomplish this only by bringing up from Germany special siege guns, which had been secretly prepared with a view to use in the anticipated assault upon Paris. The Germans never expected that these great guns would be required at Liége, or on any occasion before Paris was reached. But once they were brought on to the scene and began to play, the forts at Liége were doomed. Though impregnable at the time they were constructed, from the point of view of the siege armament then available, yet against these most modern and up-to-date weapons of attack the forts were practically defenceless.

Yet the Belgian garrisons in the forts did not surrender. They were determined that Germany should not obtain possession of the forts. They might be so valuable to them at a later stage in the war, when the day came for their retreat. So, with a heroism almost unparalleled in history, the Belgians who constituted the garrisons of the forts met their death incidentally with the destruction of the forts. The commander himself, General Leman, did not leave Liége when the Belgian troops evacuated the city, but retired to Fort Loncin and there directed operations. When that fort was blown up by a German shell, his life was preserved almost by a miracle. He was discovered by the Germans unconscious among the debris, and by them taken a prisoner into Liége.

Subsequently the General wrote a letter to the King of the Belgians, which, after stating that the greater part of the garrison of the fort had been buried under the ruins, proceeded as follows:

> That I did not lose my life in that catastrophe is due to the fact that my escort, composed of Commander Collard, a sub-officer of infantry, who has undoubtedly perished, the gendarme Thevenin, and my two orderlies, Vanden Bossche and Jos Lecocq, drew me from a position of danger, where I was being asphyxiated by gas from the exploded powder. I was carried into a trench, where a German captain named Grüson gave me a drink, after which I was made prisoner and taken to Liége in an ambulance.
>
> I am convinced that the honour of our arms has been sustained. I have not surrendered either the fortress or the forts. Deign, Sire, to pardon any defects in this letter. I am physically shattered by the explosion of Loncin. In Germany, whither I am proceeding, my thoughts will be, as they have ever been, of Belgium and the King. I would willingly have given my life the better to serve them, but death was denied me.

A German officer in the following letter pays a notable and moving tribute to the heroism of this gallant general:

General Leman's defence of Liége combined all that is noble, all that is tragic.

As long as possible he inspected all the forts daily to see everything was in order. By a piece of falling masonry, dislodged by our guns, both General Leman's legs were crushed. Undaunted, he visited the forts in an automobile. Fort Chaudfontaine was destroyed by a German shell dropping in the magazine. In the strong Fort Loncin, General Leman decided to hold his ground or die.

When the end was inevitable, the Belgians disabled the last three guns and exploded the supply of shells kept by the guns in readiness. Before this, General Leman destroyed all plans, maps, and papers relating to the defences. The food supplies were also destroyed. With about a hundred men General Leman attempted to retire to another fort, but we had cut off their retreat. By this time our heaviest guns were in position, and a well-placed shell tore through the cracked and battered masonry and exploded in the main magazine. With a thunderous crash the mighty walls of the fort fell. Pieces of stone and concrete 25 cubic metres in size were hurled into the air. When the dust and fumes passed away, we stormed the fort across ground literally strewn with the bodies of the troops who had gone out to storm the fort and never returned. All the men in the fort were wounded and most were unconscious. A corporal with one arm shattered valiantly tried to drive us back by firing his rifle. Buried in the debris and pinned beneath a massive beam was General Leman.

"Respectez le Général. Il est mort," said an aide-de-camp.

With gentleness and care, which showed they respected the man who had resisted them so valiantly and stubbornly, our infantry released the General's wounded form and carried him away. We thought him dead, but he recovered consciousness, and, looking round, said, "It is as it is. The men fought valiantly"; and then, turning to us, added, "Put in your despatches that I was unconscious."

We brought him to our Commander, General von Emmich, and the two Generals saluted. We tried to speak words of comfort, but he was silent—he is known as the silent general. "I was unconscious. Be sure and put that in your despatches." More he would not say.

Extending his hand, our Commander said, "General, you have gallantly and nobly held your forts," General Leman replied, "I thank you. Our troops have lived up to their reputations." With a smile, he added, "War is not like manœuvres"—a reference to the fact that General von Emmich was recently with General Leman during the Belgian manœuvres. Then, unbuckling his sword, General Leman tendered it to General von Emmich. "No," replied the German Commander with a bow, "keep your sword. To have crossed swords with you has been an honour," and the fire in General Leman's eye was dimmed by a tear.

CHAPTER VI

THE GERMAN ROAD THROUGH BELGIUM

Liége—The route through Belgium proposed by the Germans—They cross the Meuse between Visé and Huy—Attain Tirlemont—French arrive at Dinant—Waremme—Louvain—Belgian Government retires from Brussels to Antwerp—Germans occupy Brussels—Namur falls—Battles of Mons and Charleroi—Ghent occupied—Sack of Louvain—Belgians fall back on Antwerp—Siege of Antwerp—Belgian Government retire to Ostend.

LIÉGE having thus been occupied by the Germans, a result attained with a loss of about 20,000 men, they at once fined the city two million pounds and took as hostages a number of the leading citizens. The invaders now began to force their way through Belgium. First, however, they proposed to Belgium, notwithstanding the resistance she already had opposed to the German army, that she should allow them a free passage across the country into France, promising to do no more harm than was unavoidable to land, people, and property, and to pay an indemnity for such harm as might be done if Belgium would agree to the proposal. But Belgium stood steadfast. She refused absolutely: she had made up her mind to fight to the death. One important step which Belgium took, in earnest of her determination, was immediately to destroy as much as possible of the railway communication which might be of use to Germany.

The German army accordingly had no other alternative than to fight its way through Belgium. At once they began to make some progress. The German plan of campaign appears to have been to run a line of occupation from Liége to Antwerp and Ostend, through Hasselt, Diest, Louvain, Malines, Termonde, Ghent and Bruges. Having occupied that line, she could next, or as nearly as possible simultaneously, pass through Belgium into France by the several great roads which ran from that line southward towards Paris. From Liége the road to Paris would pass through Namur and Dinant. Farther west the road from Hasselt would pass through St. Trond, Eghezée, Gembloux, Charleroi, to Maubeuge; and still farther westward there was the road from Antwerp, through Malines, Brussels and Mons to

Valenciennes and Cambrai. So it would be possible for the Germans, with luck, by these three roads to advance southward to the line Mons, Charleroi, Namur, and thence on to Paris.

From the Belgo-German frontier the Germans now threw across the Meuse, the whole distance along that river from Visé to Huy, an immense and ever-increasing armed force. But notwithstanding the great numerical superiority of the German troops, amounting as they did even at first to so many as at least a quarter of a million men, the losses always being made up from reserves, the entire Belgian army not exceeding one



THE FORTRESS OF DINANT

hundred thousand men, including a large proportion necessarily confined to garrison duty, the Belgians from the commencement harassed the invading horde most insistently and effectively. In fact, it was only after several repulses that the Germans were able to occupy Tongres and St. Trond; and later on, after violent fighting, they suffered very serious defeat for the moment at Diest, Haelen, Eghezée, and particularly at Tirlemont. So by August 14, though the German army had penetrated as far as Tirlemont, yet it was not in any sense an effective occupation. One thing, however, the German troops had done very effectively, and that was to lay waste and to devastate the

whole country through which they had passed. By August 15 the French had entered Belgium and occupied Dinant, finding the Germans in full retreat from Diest and pursued by the Belgians through St. Trond to Waremme. After two assaults, on August 15 and 16, the German army, after having destroyed the place, took possession. Now the Germans were making for Namur, and King Albert, having already moved back his troops on to Louvain, had found it necessary, in view of probable eventualities, that the Belgian Government should retire on August 17 from Brussels to Antwerp. The day after this, on the 18th, the general German advance across Belgium may be said to have commenced in real earnest. At Tirlemont and Gembloux fierce outpost fighting had taken place, the Belgians being completely defeated and compelled to retire. On the following day, the Belgians, sustaining another serious defeat at Aerschot, were forced to seek shelter in the great entrenched camp of Antwerp. On the 20th the Germans gained the day at Louvain and occupied Malines. The next day found the German army entering into an unresisted occupation of Brussels, the Belgian capital, an unfortified city which, in order to prevent the disastrous incidents of bombardment, had already been evacuated by the Belgian troops.

A day or two passed, and Namur, having been evacuated by its garrison on August 23, fell into the hands of the invaders. This place had always been considered by reason of its similar fortification to be as strong a fortress as Liége. It had even been believed that it could resist an assault for many months. After the experience at Liége, it was obvious that fortifications, even the most recent, could not prevail against the heavy German artillery, particularly against the enormous siege guns. In this struggle, which had taken place after about fifty years, between siege guns and armour, it was found that the guns had won the day. So the evacuation and fall of Namur may be explained by the strategic reason that the garrison would have been left to be taken prisoners if the resistance of Namur had been prolonged.

Now commenced the battles of Mons and Charleroi, coincident with the recapture of Malines by the Belgians and the institution by the invader of a new civil and municipal government for Belgium. Ghent, unresisting, was occupied by the invader, and on the following day, August 25, Louvain was sacked and destroyed. This town, with its beautiful buildings, university, celebrated churches and libraries, was pillaged and reduced to cinders—a fate which was shared, in face of all rules of international law, by other Belgian towns such as Aerschot, Tirlemont, Malines and Termonde. For a week now little more occurs than

THE BATTLE OF THE RIVERS.

A detachment of the Belgium Artillery preparing to take up a position of attack on Alost after having been driven out by the Germans. In this they were successful, but their success was short-lived, the ever-increasing horde of Germans compelling them to retire upon Antwerp.



desperate fighting between the Belgians and the invader for the possession of the towns just mentioned; sometimes the Germans being thrown out of a town already conquered, at other times the Germans retaking possession, but ultimately all falling into the hands of the invader. The German troops were always guilty of unparalleled barbarities and excesses.

Subsequently, and until September 9, when the Germans again tried to make terms with Belgium to put an end by arrangement to this resistance, which was day by day becoming more disastrous to the German plans in regard to France, the Belgian and German armies were constantly in touch in desperate conflict. On September 10 and 11 it seemed that the tide had turned. The Belgians had recaptured Malines and Termonde, and were again in occupation of Alost. But the Belgian success was but short-lived. Without a day's delay German reinforcements were brought up from the French frontier and the Belgians once more routed. There was nothing now for Belgium except to fall back upon Antwerp. On September 15 the invaders made their first attempt upon Antwerp. In reply to this the Belgians cut the dykes and flooded the surrounding country, the result being that the German army was thrown back, suffering an immense loss of men and guns. The Belgians seized their opportunity, and in a successful sortie from Antwerp defeated for a time the enemy. On September 25 the Germans reorganised their attack upon Antwerp. In a fortnight's time, on October 9, the Belgian army having evacuated the city, the Germans entered and took possession, after a bombardment which had been commenced on the 7th. Anticipating this end, although on October 3 the garrison had been reinforced by the British Naval Brigade and Marines, the Belgian Government on the 7th had transferred itself to Ostend.

CHAPTER VII

DESTRUCTION AND DEATH

Belgium—Its towns and people—Fighting the invader—Looting and murder—The struggle at Diest and Haelen—*Brussels*—The departure of the Government—The refugees—Awaiting the Germans—Burgomaster Max—The entry of the invader—The Proclamation—The German army marches through the city—A spectator's account—The city fined—The Burgomaster again—An instalment of the fine paid—*Louvain*—Occupied by the Germans—Its historic associations and buildings—The University—Belgian sortie from Antwerp—Repulse of Germans—Their revenge—Major von Manteuffel—The sack of Louvain—The scenes in the streets—Destruction of the churches and other buildings—Murder of the citizens—Horror of the world—British Official Statement—*Malines*—The bombardment—Destruction of Cathedral tower—Killing the people—Resistance of the Belgians—*Antwerp*—The Zeppelin raid—Devastation and death—The city and its fortifications—Belgian preparations—The German advance—The fighting at the forts—The assault on Fort Waelhem—and on other forts—Germany effects a breach in the fortifications—The River Nethe—The burning of Lierre—Germans attempt to cross the river—Belgian resistance—British reinforcements—Statement of Admiralty—German aeroplane drops Proclamations—City full of refugees—Conditions in city—The bombardment—The oil tanks fired and ships in harbour sunk—The lurid scene at night—The flight from the city—Evacuated by the troops—The entry of the Germans—Review of their troops—Account of American correspondent—The internment of British marines.

THE operations summarised in the last chapter would, if told in detail, unfold a tale of enthralling interest. But space prevents such a tale being told. With a summary, incomplete and unsatisfactory as it may be, one is bound to be content, though it is necessary that one should exercise one's imagination and endeavour to reconstruct the events that occurred. The scene of the operations may easily be pictured. Belgium is a small, very thickly populated country, sprinkled all over with many towns and villages, large and small, situated closely together. Some of these towns, such as Liége, Charleroi and Antwerp, for instance, were centres of great commercial, manufacturing, and industrial interests and undertakings—towns that were, and had been for centuries, pre-eminent throughout the world for their enterprise and success in these directions of human activity. Other towns had quite opposite characteristics and appearance. As compared with the up-to-date commercial cities of Belgium, they seemed but back-waters in the stream of modern civilisation. Nevertheless, in fact, these towns too were pre-eminent in activities of an importance equal to, if not greater than, those of the places already instanced. As these latter represented the physical, material, and conventional elements in modern civilisation, so did

the quiet secluded centres represent the mental, ideal, and artistic. Of such places of calm in the midst of a world of struggle and trouble Louvain was a remarkable instance. The countryside itself, too, throughout the whole country, was cultivated so closely and intensely as even to outrival the agricultural system of France. Everywhere throughout Belgium, in commercial or manufacturing centres, in ecclesiastical or artistic towns, and even throughout all the rural districts, the entire population was devoted with an almost unique industry to labour and progress. There were no idlers in Belgium ; nor were there any folk without ideals. In fine, Belgium and the Belgians stood in the very front rank of the advance-guard of Western civilisation. Such, roughly and sketchily, was the scene in which these devastating and deadly warlike operations had taken place, and the people against whom they had been directed. It remains now only to figure the actual deeds which took place in the struggle which has already been summarised.

The peaceful and harmless people did their best—it was indeed an heroic best—to resist the invader and to preserve inviolate their country. So they fought strenuously and desperately against the onslaught of the ever-increasingly enormous and powerful German horde of invasion. But, much more unfortunate than most peoples in such a plight known to modern history, they fought an enemy who was not content to fight on humane or civilised or even merely lawful lines. They fought one who regarded reckless and ruthless devastation and destruction as a necessary and lawful incident in his operations—one who regarded a barbarous terrorising of Belgium as in itself both an object and a means to the attainment of the object. So we can picture, though very inadequately, the troubles which took place : the outpost and even guerilla fighting, in which often even great reinforced masses of enemy soldiery of all arms were repulsed, but in which ultimately the invader had his way ; the attacks on and the defences of the cities and villages, doomed at length to become the prey of the Germans ; and everywhere throughout the campaign, after the first week or so, the destruction of the crops, the firing of the public buildings, churches and libraries and their priceless contents, the looting of property—from the household gods of the poor peasant to the unique art treasures of the wealthy citizens—and, almost unbelievable, the mutilation and cold-blooded murder of harmless women and children.

One must, however, be content with a mere notice for the time being of one or two of the leading incidents in these inhuman operations.

Perhaps the struggles at Diest and Haelen indicate as well as any other the vast amount of fighting of a similar character which now took place almost throughout Belgium, and the energy and desperation with which the Belgians resisted the advances of the invader—sometimes, for the occasion at least, with some degree of success.

At Diest the Germans had in the field more than 10,000 men, composed of cavalry, artillery, and a small force of infantry. Opposed to this was the Belgian force of about 7,000 men, composed of a cavalry division and a mixed brigade, with several mitrailleuses. Knowing that, in order to reach Diest, it would be necessary for the enemy to cross the Gethe at Haelen, the Belgians took up their principal position there, stationing a short distance beyond some horse artillery, with the idea that at the right moment the enemy might be turned. Here also the Belgians strengthened their position with barricades, entanglements, and entrenchments. Directly the Germans appeared on the scene, at about eleven o'clock in the morning, a fierce artillery fire was commenced. This continued right through the afternoon with very deadly effect upon the enemy. Time after time the Germans hurled themselves in apparently overwhelming force against the barricades and entrenchments, but, strive thus as they would, repulse was always the inevitable end, the Belgian fire was so accurate and insistent. These desperate attacks of the Germans always meant certain death to the great mass of the soldiers who took part in them. By the time the afternoon was well advanced, about six o'clock, the Germans had had more than enough of it. Their men and horses had fallen like flies, and as a whole the invading army was completely shattered. The order to retreat was then given, the retreat itself having the character more of a disorderly rout.

At five o'clock the following morning the Germans once more commenced the assault. On this occasion the enemy's force was yet stronger than before, and their position was much more advantageous. Nevertheless the result was the same as on the preceding day. The enemy was repulsed.

This effective resistance absolutely amazed the Germans. Even yet they were under the impression that their progress through Belgium was to be but a light and easy task. Even yet, despite their many reverses, they retained their old contempt for the Belgians as soldiers. The following incident illustrates this remarkable attitude of the German mind. Among the German prisoners brought into Diest was a captain of the Medical Corps, who cast sneering glances over the Belgian officers. When ordered

by the Belgian Commandant to attend the wounded in the hospital, he took no notice except to reply, with an indignant gesture, "Sir! I am an officer." It was only when the Commandant in a voice of thunder rejoined, "We Belgians are officers: you must obey orders," that he was able to appreciate the fact that Germany and the German army were not invincible. He then very quickly did as he was told. Quite pathetically one prisoner turned to a war correspondent exclaiming, "Here am I, a Baron, Captain of Hussars, and a prisoner of Belgium! It is unbelievable!"

It was now, when the enemy discovered that Belgium intended to oppose a substantial resistance to his advance, that the atrocities, which soon were to hold up the German army to the execration of the whole civilised world, began to make their appearance. There is no doubt that the Germans lost their heads entirely. On that ground, perhaps, could be explained the fact that in the attack on Haelen the Germans even put Belgian women and children in the front and, when retreating, killed several civilians. But the real reason for the atrocities is to be found in the specific orders of the Kaiser given to his army to devastate everywhere and spare none if such action was necessary completely to cow and terrorise the unhappy Belgian people.

Fighting was also proceeding on a long line extending from Diest in the north, down through Tirlemont and about Namur to Dinant and Givet in the south. Germany was here aiming at the destruction of Namur and the occupation of Brussels on the road through Belgium to France.

As stated in the preceding chapter, the Belgian Government left Brussels for Antwerp on August 17. It is a coincidence that the British Expeditionary Force completed its landing on the Continent on the same day.

Brussels, the capital of Belgium, was not a fortified city. It was known by the Belgian military authorities, as an absolute certainty, that if and when the Germans should reach Brussels no effective resistance whatever could be opposed to their occupation of the city. To have attempted a defence would have drawn upon Brussels an assault and bombardment which, apart from the fact that it would have destroyed much of the city, including its unique public buildings and beautiful churches, would have meant death to immense numbers of the citizens. Brussels is one of the most beautiful cities in the world. It has even been compared to Paris and named the "little Paris." Perhaps this name indicates as well as any other the beauty of the city. If one can imagine a Paris shorn of its more sordid detail, an inevitable

component in every great metropolitan city, and concentrated in a place having just an ideal area and population, one can then arrive at some idea of the beauty and attraction of Brussels. This city, the residence of the King, the headquarters of the Belgian Government, with its beautiful churches, municipal buildings, libraries and streets, was reverenced with a more than merely patriotic veneration by every true Belgian. At all costs its desecration must be avoided. So, fortunately because of the absence of fortifications, it became a duty in the most rightful sense to allow the invader free and unresisted entrance and occupation.

From the departure of the Government on the 17th, the nerves of the citizens were on edge. Daily and eventually hourly they awaited apprehensively the advent of the enemy. At times, tolerated by the civic authorities with a view to easing the minds of the people, sporadic and unorganised attempts were prepared, as by the erection here and there of rough-and-ready barricades, to offer some sort of resistance. But though the Government had left the city, there yet remained, when the right moment came, one supreme controlling power—the great Burgomaster, Adolphe Max. He, with remarkable firmness and resource, then prevented any harmful and useless expenditure of patriotic energy on the part of the citizens. The hour did at length arrive. On Wednesday, August 19, it was known that the Germans were in the immediate vicinity of the city, and that very shortly, on the following day most probably, they would be at the gates demanding admittance. During many days past an increasing number of refugees from the outlying countryside had poured day by day and hour by hour into the city, in order to find some place where they might lay their heads in safety and be out of the reach of the ruthless invading horde. In those days the appearance of the city was pitiful in the extreme, thronged as it was with those unfortunate people of different social and financial positions originally, but now all equally penniless, footsore, weary and miserable, carrying generally small bundles containing their most cherished possessions. But most pitiable of all was the sight of the unfortunate wayworn and weeping mothers, with their little sobbing—almost hysterical—children, hanging stiffly—too tired to walk—on to their skirts, the husbands and fathers in most cases far away, in the unknown, with the army, or dead. Unnerved, even starved and incapable of reasoning effort, their one fixed idea was to push even yet farther on beyond Brussels itself. It seemed to them that in no place that side of the sea would they be safe from the insult, mutilation and violation which they associated by their own experiences and the tales of their friends with the German advance. So train-

load after train-load of these unfortunates speeded from Brussels to the coast.

The right moment had now arrived, so word came from the Burgomaster that there must be no resistance to the entrance of the enemy. The people at first, naturally not in the confidence of the military authorities, and so not understanding the position, were simply stunned. They had hoped for and anxiously anticipated a struggle at their barricades for their beloved city, even though death to them might have been the inevitable result. Nevertheless the Burgomaster had his way—and very wisely. The barricades were abandoned and the martial enthusiasm of the inhabitants was instantly transformed into a patriotic obedience. Never did the Belgian character attain a nobler height than now, in the implicit obedience with which the citizens of Brussels so readily supported their burgomaster. There was no dismay, however, among the population. M. Max soon issued a formal proclamation enjoining a scrupulous avoidance of acts of insult or violence against the Germans.

The first thing in the morning of the 20th, the Burgomaster had an interview outside the city with General von Arnim, the General commanding the German army. This interview had the following result:

(1) The free passage of German troops through Brussels. (2) The quartering of a garrison of 3,000 men in the barracks of Daily and Etterbeck. (3) Requisitions to be paid for in cash. (4) Respect for the inhabitants and public and private property. (5) The management, free from German control, of public affairs by the municipal administration.

The Burgomaster immediately placarded a proclamation in this sense on the walls of the city.

At once the German troops began to march through the city, and General von Arnim published the following proclamation:—

German troops will pass through Brussels to-day and on the following days, and are obliged by circumstances to demand from the city lodging, food and supplies. All these matters will be regularly arranged through the municipal authorities.

I expect the population to conform itself without resistance to these necessities of war, and in particular to commit no act of aggression against the safety of the troops, and promptly to furnish the supplies demanded.

In this case I give every guarantee for the preservation of the city and the safety of its inhabitants.

If, however, there should be, as there has, unfortunately, been elsewhere, any act of aggression against the soldiers, the burning of buildings, or explosions of any kind, I shall be compelled to take the severest measures.

At three o'clock in the afternoon, through streets thronged with silent citizens watching the scene with heavy hearts, the German army of occupation began to enter the city. This army consisted of about 10,000 men; but, as a matter of fact, some 200,000 German troops passed through the city during that and the following day. For hour after hour this great mass rolled forward to the west through the fine broad streets of Brussels, an overwhelming procession of infantry, cavalry, artillery and every kind of armament and other conveyance and accessory. The troops had evidently been prepared for this triumphal march. Their clothing and their movement were perfect, as though on parade in time of peace. Not a button was missing, and there was not a halting step. Many Belgians now saw the goose-step for the first time, and—the irony of it!—in their own loved city. Undoubtedly this demonstration was designed, and had for some time been prepared for, with a view to impressing the people of the city with the strength of the invader and the impossibility and even absurdity of resistance.

The whole procession, besides ordinary troops, included ambulance, commissariat, telegraph and similar sections. A spectator has recorded the scene as follows:—

> There were, he said, hundreds of motor-cars and waggons, and innumerable horsed vehicles of every description. Among the latter were traps piled high with what was obviously officers' luggage, including hundreds of suit-cases of different sizes and descriptions.
>
> The equipment of all the forces that I myself saw was wonderful—every detail perfect and in order. I noticed that of the thousands of carts that passed not one had been requisitioned; each was intended for its military purpose, and bore the Government mark.
>
> This was the case, too, with the artillery, which I saw pass towards Waterloo. The equipment was complete to an astonishing degree. All the girths were new, and I observed that there were even spare shoes for every horse. These were attached to the stirrups.
>
> During this part of my journey I walked alongside the moving artillery columns, and started counting the guns. I stopped, however, at 230, and cannot even guess how many more there may have been.

The Germans had been in possession of Brussels only an hour or so when, following the precedent they had established at Liége, they levied a fine, or perhaps more correctly a war contribution, upon the city. But in this case the fine was much larger. It was no less a sum than eight million pounds. With an equal eye to other practical points, the Germans at once took possession of the post and telephone offices, the railway stations, the public buildings and barracks. Hostages were taken for the good

A BRILLIANT FRENCH ATTACK ON THE GERMAN POSITION IN THE ARGONNE

The fighting quality of the French Army is never shown to better advantage than in making desperate offensive charges. The German guns stationed on the Argonne heights were pouring a murderous cannonade of bursting shell into the French trenches, and, despite drenching rain and long hours spent in sodden trenches, the French infantry advanced stealthily up towards the German batteries and engaged in a fierce hand-to-hand conflict, in which the Germans were defeated, the French relentlessly pursuing the retreating enemy. In the rain-drenched and sodden ground the heavy German guns sank to their axles and had to be abandoned as the Crown Prince's Army fled in inextricable confusion.

behaviour of the citizens, and, from the manner in which these were selected and later on the conditions of payment of the fine were discussed, it was evident that long before the occupation, probably before the invasion itself, Germany was in possession of a list of the most wealthy and influential citizens, with the exact figures and particulars of their fortunes and possessions. The Royal Palace of Justice, the finest building of its kind in the world, was broken open and turned into barracks. Brussels was now cut off from communication with the world with the exception of Germany.

Interminable negotiation then took place between the German authorities and the Burgomaster with regard to the eight million fine. The Burgomaster, in view of the fact that all cash had already been taken out of the banks, persisted that its collection must take time and that, at best, it could be paid only by instalments. The position was complicated too, later on, by General von der Goltz, who was then sent from Germany by the Government, demanding a contribution of eighteen million pounds from the province of Brabant. The Burgomaster and the city were threatened that Brussels and the citizens would suffer if the fine were not paid at once. M. Max could only reply that he could not raise the money, and that perhaps, under the circumstances, Germany had better get it in herself. Ultimately, after much worry, the Germans themselves being unable to obtain the money, they were forced to accept what the Burgomaster was able to pay, namely £800,000 on account.

M. Max had already been confirmed as Burgomaster, with the Civic Council as the authority responsible for the municipal administration of the city; but the payment of the fine was not the only matter which created friction between him and the conquerors. Very shortly after the occupation General von Luttwitz, who had been appointed military governor of Belgium, imposed by proclamation an immense order of many thousand police bye-laws upon the city. The public read the proclamation with ridicule. Since it was both an interference with the rights of the Civic Council as the police authority, and likely to provoke mischief by its blundering foolishness, the Burgomaster, in the interests of public order and security, issued a counter proclamation reassuring the citizens of the endeavours for their protection, and enjoining pacific conduct and restraint. The Burgomaster's announcement, not having been submitted and passed in the first instance, was considered a defiance. German soldiers were sent out as billstickers with sheets of blank paper to cover it over. During the following night the blank paper was found to have

been oiled and made transparent. This produced a threat that if such a trick were repeated the police would be disbanded and replaced by the military.

A struggle now ensued between the Belgian population of Brussels, as represented by the Burgomaster and the Civic Council, and the German invaders. In substance this was a struggle between the moral rights of the citizens on the one hand and the military absolutism of the enemy on the other. The Civic Council insisted upon its rights, since it was responsible to the military authorities to preserve order and to administer the affairs of the city in its own old accustomed fashion. The military authorities could not put up with this limitation of what they conceived to be their peculiar rights, but, do what they would, they could not cow the Council. Ultimately, as a final effort, the military authorities began to press for the £1,200,000 still due in respect of the fine. The Council refused to pay on the ground that it could not get the money in. Upon this M. Max was arrested and the Council and citizens were informed that he would not be released until the money was found. The Council made no move. It was known that the Burgomaster, filled as he was with the old Netherlandish spirit of hatred of oppression, would prefer continued arrest and even death to unwarranted oppression of the people. The Germans now retaliated by threatening them with a German burgomaster and German military patrols. The citizens were also told that if there were riots the city would be bombarded. But even here the Germans failed. The penalty was bravely paid by M. Max. He was taken away to a German fortress. The people, however, remained quiet, notwithstanding the methods of their German masters; and so the quiet moral force of the citizens of Brussels prevailed over the material force of the invaders' militarism.

We now turn to Louvain. This city and its neighbourhood was the scene of strenuous and desperate fighting between the Belgians and the invading hosts of Germany for three days, from August 18 until the 20th. Belgium had a force of about 20,000 men. The enemy, however, was here pressing on towards Antwerp with an overwhelming force against which even the 20,000 were as nothing. The Belgians never expected, however, to utterly defeat and rout the Germans at this place. The most they could hope to do, and this was the object of the fighting, was to retard the progress of the enemy's forces towards Antwerp. Delay, if only for a day or so, might have meant the salvation of Antwerp. So, on the countryside round Louvain, on the road to Antwerp, the Belgians fought insistently and heroically, and also with such

skill that ultimately they were able to retreat in force to the support of the main Belgian army engaged in the defence of Antwerp, without the immediate knowledge of the enemy, and in time to avoid being cut up entirely by the German force. Under these circumstances the Germans occupied Louvain.

This city was one of the most remarkable centres of art, learning and culture in the world. It had for long been known as the Oxford of Belgium, being the seat of an ancient university which had enjoyed a universal reputation for centuries. The associations of this university with Britain had been very intimate even so far back as early in the sixteenth century. In that period it was of all other universities in Europe the centre from which radiated the first light of humanist culture. Erasmus himself, one of the greatest scholars and most cultured of men, in the best sense of the words, the world has known, was a supervisor of the studies at one of the colleges there. So from Louvain the " Prince of literary Europe " directed the studies of the scholars of the future. Sir Thomas More, one of the greatest figures in English history, had an intimate acquaintance with the university and its professors. The greatest classical scholar the world has known, Lipsius, was also a professor there. The great geographer Mercator, the chemist van Helmont, and the founder of modern anatomy Andreas Vesalius, are but a few of the many great names that can be mentioned as having had intimate associations with the university.

One of the most remarkable architectural features of the city was the building which, many centuries ago, had been erected for the purpose of a Cloth Hall. That was in the days of Louvain's pre-eminence as a commercial city. This exceptionally beautiful and ancient building became, in the fifteenth century, the headquarters of the university. But perhaps still more remarkable, architecturally and archæologically speaking, than even the Cloth Hall, was the Town Hall of the city. This, too, was erected in the fifteenth century, and has been described as one of the most extraordinary and lovely architectural productions that human genius ever created. The majestic and beautiful old Gothic church of St. Peter, ecclesiastically the central point of Louvain, had a reputation among the lovers of the beautiful and the antique throughout the whole world, as also had the less magnificent, yet equally beautiful and interesting churches of St. Jacques and St. Gertrude ; and in these buildings, as also in the many other graceful and ancient structures with which the city was filled, reposed some of the most remarkable, valuable and interesting works of art—survivors, as a rule, of the inimitable craftsmanship

and artistry of the Netherlands of the middle ages. Illuminated manuscripts, printed books, bindings, bronze and other statuary, wooden carvings, enamels, oil paintings and other treasures—none of which any man or corporation of modern times would have been rich enough to tempt Louvain to part with—were here, in this city, lovingly and proudly preserved for the pleasure and benefit of mankind. But words fail to describe Louvain in such terms as it deserves in the present connection—words which, if they are to mean anything at all, should satisfy the world that here in this city were buildings, furnishings and articles which, of all of the same class to be found anywhere, should have been exempt from ruin and destruction at the hands of a barbarous soldiery.

But this city was soon to be the scene of devastation and ruin at the hands of the Germans. It was sacked by them with a recklessness and brutality unparalleled in any instance of destruction by war in the history of the world. The German army were now far outdoing the barbarities of the Huns of Attila.

On August 23 the Belgians had made a sortie from Antwerp, dislodging the Germans from Malines, and seizing eventually Aerschot, Termonde and Alost. The Germans then obtained reinforcements and made a desperate and successful effort to recover the positions from which they had been dislodged. A reference to the map will show that Louvain, Malines, Termonde, and Alost form round Brussels an arch something greater than a semicircle, the middle point of which, Malines, is the point nearest to Antwerp. This group of towns was practically an outer defence of that city. Alost was also the half-way position on the road to Ghent. Germany was now determined, in order, as she appears to have conceived, to ease her progress to Antwerp, to terrorise, as far as possible, the Belgian populace and even the Belgian army. She accordingly commenced a campaign of atrocity and destruction, and so every city which was not of strategical importance to herself, but of some military use to the Belgians, was ruthlessly destroyed. So, with the exception of Malines and Alost, these towns were almost completely razed to the earth. Malines and Alost were themselves very seriously damaged.

The excuse given for the sack of Louvain by the Germans was that it was a necessary result of operations which were forced upon them by the guerilla tactics of both the Belgian troops and practically all the inhabitants. But it was also suggested that the German officer in command, Major von Manteuffel, gave the order to sack and destroy the town in order to disguise the undisciplined behaviour of his troops. The truth is that this

operation was carried out in pursuance of a predetermined plan of campaign based altogether on a principle of terrorisation.

The barbarous outrage commenced with the German soldiers breaking into all the houses of the town in which armed citizens might be expected to be found, and at once putting to death on the spot every civilian either found with weapons or even only suspected. This brought about some most terrible scenes of street fighting. Old men, sick people, women and children were all shot. At the same time part of the town was being shelled by artillery, the great church, the university, libraries, and many of the other architectural and artistic features of the place being either completely destroyed, irreparably ruined, or substantially damaged. The inhabitants were hiding in their cellars, one so concealed discovering to his horror that the house above him was on fire. The situation was terrible. The people in the houses were bound either to go down into the cellars and hide and run the risk of burial alive as the result of the shelling, or to stay in their houses and be shot by the infuriated marauding Germans, or to go out into the street and be shot like rabbits leaving their burrows. Those in the cellars and the houses had the awful experience of their houses crashing down with and on top of them, the ruins becoming a mass of flames. Those in the streets were forced to pass over bodies, already dead, of their neighbours, many of them being of old people and priests, and then, suddenly stopped by the enemy's rifles, were shot. Those soldiers who were not engaged in raiding the houses and shooting the people in the streets were pouring petrol upon the houses and buildings and lighting it with matches. Others were rounding up men and women of all ages and conditions, and taking them as hostages to the railway station; and there, each time it was heard that a soldier had been shot in the town, ten of these unfortunate people were foully slaughtered in cold blood. Never in modern history had there occurred so devilish a massacre of innocents at the hands of an army of a state claiming to be civilised. General and indiscriminate slaughter was the command. There was no mercy for any one—old man, priest, woman or child. No tears or pleading could move the soldiers, who, filled with the lust of blood, were brutes rather than men.

At night the scene was awful. No one was asleep, and no one wanted or tried to sleep. The whole city, now an infernal holocaust, resounded continuously with the thunderous roar of the artillery and the whistling shrieks of the hurtling shells, the latter as they burst showering fire down on to the devoted city; the buildings burning everywhere, the rising columns of flame shed

a lurid glow over the town, whose streets piled and strewn with ruins, running with blood, and choked with the dead, made a scene of horror unimaginable and indescribable.

Under these circumstances did the unfortunate civilian Belgians, including the Burgomaster, the Dean, and other notables, suffer martyrdom for the honour of their country, and the unique buildings and treasures of the city of Louvain were destroyed.

The whole civilised world stood aghast at this outrage against civilisation. Mr. Asquith, the British Prime Minister, described the sack of Louvain as "the greatest crime committed against civilisation and culture since the Thirty Years' War; with its buildings, its pictures, its unique library, its unrivalled associations, a shameless holocaust of irreparable treasures lit up by blind barbarian vengeance."

Our own official Press Bureau issued the following statement:

Yesterday it was announced that the Belgian town of Louvain, with its Hotel de Ville, its churches, University, Library, and other famous buildings, had been utterly destroyed by the soldiers of the Kaiser.

The excuse for this unpardonable act of barbarity and vandalism is that a discomfited band of German troops returning to Louvain were fired upon by the people of the town, who had been disarmed a week earlier. The truth is that the Germans, making for the town in disorder, were fired upon by their friends in occupation of Louvain—a mistake by no means rare in war.

The assumption of the German commander was, under the circumstances, so wide of probability that it can only be supposed that, in the desire to conceal the facts, the first idea which occurred to him was seized upon as an excuse for an act without parallel in the history of civilised peoples.

Louvain, a town of 45,000 people, a seat of learning, famous for its ancient and beautiful churches and other buildings, many of them dating from the fifteenth century, has been utterly destroyed by one of the Kaiser's commanders, in a moment of passion, to cover the blunder of his own men.

A town which in the Middle Ages was the capital of Brabant; a University founded in 1426 and ranked in the sixteenth century as the first in Europe; an Hotel de Ville, dating from 1448, one of the most beautiful examples of late Gothic architecture; several churches of about the same date—to name one only, St. Pierre, with its wonderful stained-glass windows, its beautiful tabernacle, and its richly-carved organ, dating from 1556: all these have gone to revenge a fancied offence against the troops of the Kaiser.

Only yesterday it was announced that the Emperor William had stated that "the only means of preventing surprise attacks from the civil population has been to interfere with unrelenting severity and to create examples which by their frightfulness would be a warning to the whole country." The case of Louvain is such an "interference" without even the miserable excuse suggested.

Louvain is miles from the scene of real fighting. In International Law it is recognised that " the only legitimate end which the State would aim at in war is the weakening of the military forces of the enemy," and the rules under the Annex to Convention IV of 1907, which expanded and amended the provisions of the Declaration of Brussels, lay down that " any destruction or seizure of enemy property not imperatively called for by military necessities " is forbidden.

In destroying the ancient town of Louvain the German troops have committed a crime for which there can be no atonement, and humanity has suffered a loss which can never be repaired.

Save in the case of a few solitary exceptions, such as Brussels, Ghent and Bruges, substantially the same tale may be told of the other towns and villages occupied by the Germans as that told of Louvain. The only essential difference was that in places other than Louvain the destruction was not so wanton in the sense that the buildings and objects destroyed had not the same unique and world-wide interest and value. But the populace, women and children in particular—and these after all count for more than mere town halls or pictures—suffered an equally horrible fate.

The fact should be appreciated that as a rule each of the places which the Germans ultimately occupied were often retaken by the Belgians, perhaps more than once, before finally the Germans completely effected their occupation. Malines, the seat of the metropolitan Archbishop of Belgium, is an instance of this. On August 20, the second day of the battle of Louvain, the Germans, having overcome the strenuous resistance of the Belgians, occupied that ancient ecclesiastical city—also well known to the world for its lace industry. Mechlin lace had a reputation equal to that of Brussels or Valenciennes. On the 24th, however, the Belgian army came out of Antwerp and repulsed three German divisions in the neighbourhood of Malines at Vilvorde, on the east of the railway line from Brussels to Antwerp. The principal engagement in this attack occurred at Londerzeel, the result being that the enemy were driven out of that place. Disappointed and angered at their defeat, the Germans revenged themselves by bombarding Malines for about two hours, one of the effects of which operation was seriously to damage the cathedral, which, with its beautiful tower, had a world-wide reputation as a magnificent piece of architecture. But, for the moment, the Germans were unable to recover possession of the town. They were forced to retreat. This, very reluctantly, they did, threatening the inhabitants, however, that they would soon come back in greater force. Three days afterwards, the 27th, their threat was faithfully carried out. They did return. It was very late at night,

nearly midnight, when all the inhabitants of Malines were asleep, that the enemy arrived on the scene. Without any warning whatever the enemy commenced to bombard the place, their artillery continuing its foul work for nearly an hour. The famous peal of bells in the tower of the cathedral was now destroyed, and most of the public monuments were hit and ruined. The people, roused from their beds, took refuge in the cellars, and in large numbers distractedly ran hither and thither through the streets. Many suffered death from shell fire; the burgomaster and the sheriff saving their lives only by taking refuge in the cellars of the Town Hall. Having thus "routed out" all the inhabitants and sufficiently inspired them with terror, the Germans brought their bombardment to an end. The burgomaster thereupon, taking advantage of the cessation of the deadly hail of shell, called the population together and gave them orders to leave the town. This the people did, notwithstanding their panic-stricken and pitiable condition, in very good order, moving out of the city to the neighbouring villages, finding refuge where they could in churches, schools, and barns. Those of the inhabitants of the city who were foolish enough to remain behind suffered very dearly for their folly. On the following morning until midday the Germans renewed and carried on their bombardment, killing large numbers of the inhabitants, the survivors finding it absolutely necessary to flee. Except for the tower, which continued to remain intact, the cathedral was now almost entirely destroyed;



THE CITADEL OF NAMUR

the Town Hall and the beautiful church of St. Peter were also reduced to masses of ruins; the Courts of Justice were damaged very severely, and the streets throughout the whole city were rendered almost impassable by reason of the houses which had been destroyed, the debris of which lay strewn across the roads.

The Belgians did not, however, suffer this bombardment passively. During its whole course the Belgian forts in the neighbourhood did not cease to reply to the German artillery. But the end was inevitable. What forts of a character such as those in this neighbourhood could hope to resist the artillery which had already shown itself capable of reducing the almost impregnable defences of Liége and Namur? Nevertheless, about a fortnight afterwards, as a result of the general operations carried on by the Belgians against the Germans in the meanwhile, which entailed very heavy fighting and much loss of life to both sides, the Belgians again, for a little time, reoccupied their city of Malines, and also some others which they had lost—as for instance Termonde and Alost. But only for a very short period of time; eventually, and very soon indeed, afterwards, the Germans were in possession once more. In order to make quite certain of the occupation and subjugation of Belgium, the enemy had now called to their assistance strong reinforcements from their armies now on the French frontier. So the enemy was prepared to attack Antwerp.

Monday night, August 24–5, was a date which marked the beginning of a new epoch in the conflict of mankind. It was the date of the "Antwerp Horror," which called forth from Count Bernsdorff the callous remark: "War, you know, is not afternoon tea."

At about midnight to one o'clock in the morning of that night, when all civilian Antwerp non-belligerents, old men, women, and children, were asleep, resting as peacefully as would be possible under the circumstances that Antwerp, so far as they knew, was either then being strenuously beleaguered or on the point of being beleaguered by the German army, a terrific explosion, sounding like a frightful cannonade, took place in their midst and awoke them once more to the realities of war. Eight shrapnel bombs of high explosive and destructive power had been dropped upon the sleeping city by one of those huge structures, a Zeppelin airship, which, lightless, had silently sailed, under cover of the darkness of the night, low down, about 700 feet over the house- and steeple-tops, with the intention of dropping death and destruction unawares from the skies. The bombs were all dropped within a period of about twenty minutes. The damage done to property was very considerable. The airship

most probably came from the aviation ground at Düsseldorf, and had stealthily moved over the forts outside the city, eluding the gunners there, and passed the quays, purposely making no attack upon them. Its object was not to fight the fighters or fighting places, but, guided by a German who knew Antwerp well through having lived there before the war, to attack the public buildings, such as the Bourse and the Law Courts, and to reach if possible the temporary Royal Palace, where it might manage not only to destroy the building, but even visit the persons of the Queen and the little Princes and Princess, who were there sleeping, with an instant unexpected death. No bomb did in fact find the Royal Palace, or any other building deliberately aimed at. The bombs fell, however, in their near vicinity. One bomb narrowly escaped the tower of Antwerp Cathedral, Another, falling into the courtyard of the Hospital of St. Elisabeth, tore a great hole in the ground, smashed a window, riddled the wall with the fragments, but killed no one, though a crucifix over the bed of a sick child was smashed to pieces. The bomb destined for the barracks missed its mark, but, instead, visited a harmless civilian, who was sitting at his window, with instantaneous death. Streets upon streets were devastated; about sixty houses were almost entirely destroyed, and about nine hundred were more or less damaged.

Though the bombs were all aimed at public buildings, the Government offices, and especially the Royal Palace, and though much damage was in fact done to property, yet such damage was not the most significant result of the attack—that was the personal hurt to the populace. The killed and the wounded were all non-belligerents, men, women and children—policemen, domestic servants, and so forth. According to the inquest held by the judicial authorities, ten people, all civilians, including four women, were killed, and eight wounded, and some mortally. And death and wounds visited these unfortunate innocent people in the most terrible fashion imaginable. The sick in the hospital certainly, as we have just seen, escaped as though by a miracle—the hospital where Germans who had been wounded in the war were receiving equal care with the Belgians themselves! It was in the houses that were destroyed that the most fearful scenes were witnessed. In one house alone, four persons were killed; one room of that house was in fact a veritable "chamber of horrors," the remains of the mangled bodies being scattered in every direction. In the house opposite, a husband and wife whose only son had just died in battle were killed—a whole family had been wiped out. A woman who was looking out of the

window to see what the noise was had her head torn off by a bomb. An eminent surgeon-major in the American army, who had had experience of eight campaigns, of which one was against the Boxers in China, stated that he had never seen an act of war so ruthless and so horrible as the sight of three young girls mutilated and defaced, and of the dead young mother, all slaughtered in their beds at night. A party including public men and ambassadors who inspected the scene of devastation were all terror-stricken. One, the ambassador of a Great Power, was so horrified that he found it impossible to enter the house to which we have referred which contained that ghastly "chamber of horrors."

On August 5, about three weeks before, the German commander had warned General Leman at Liége that if forts did not surrender, the Zeppelin fleet would move. The avowed policy of the Kaiser was, in war, amongst other things, to strike terror and dread into the hearts of all the civil populations his army might encounter. The use of the Zeppelin airship and the use, in particular, of the airship at Antwerp, was quite in accord with this policy. But it signally failed to accomplish its object. Whatever may have been the predominant feeling in Antwerp and amongst the Belgians generally as the consequence of this bandit warfare, most certainly it did not, in the slightest degree, diminish their intention to resist the invader to the last. As a fact, it but encouraged and inspired them to further and even more vigorous effort.

Of all German territorial ambitions, perhaps the two most important were that she might one day possess Antwerp and Amsterdam. Antwerp is one of the most important commercial ports in the world. That it should have remained in the hands of Belgium had always been a deeply seated grievance to Germany, especially as so much of the commerce which passes in and out of Antwerp had always been German. Germany was now on the threshold of Antwerp. Now, if ever, was her opportunity to obtain possession of the city. Antwerp, having originally been regarded as the beginning and end of Belgian resistance in case of invasion, had been fortified very strongly. Before the war the city had been regarded as an almost impregnable stronghold. But by the time Germany began to invest the city, the fall of Liége and Namur had proved that, however strongly fortified Antwerp might be, German artillery was yet able, given sufficient time and opportunity, to reduce it. The fortifications consisted originally of three lines of defence: the advance line, with nine forts scattered on the south and on the west, fifteen miles from Antwerp; the

second line, with fourteen forts surrounding the town at a radius of about four miles; the third line being the wall of circumvallation itself.

But after the Franco-Prussian war Belgium began to appreciate the necessity for making better provision for her own defence. After a long and acrimonious discussion it was decided, following the advice of General Brialmont, that Liége and Namur should be fortified, in order to guard the Meuse road, and to shelter the main army during the first stage of mobilisation. But Antwerp was to continue, however, as thitherto, the great stronghold of Belgium, the principle being the same—that the army and Government might have a place, more or less impregnable, to which they might retire as a last resort. The two bridge-heads on the Meuse were merely to provide some temporary protection of the southern and eastern frontier. According to Brialmont, there would be three stages in a fight against invasion: the first would be the struggle at the bridge-heads, the second a fight near Brussels, and the third the last conflict at Antwerp.

The importance of Antwerp being obviously so great, measures were taken about seven years before the war to make the fortifications still more impregnable than before. The work decided to be done was arranged to be completed by January 1913. The first operation was to destroy entirely the walls surrounding the city; the second line was to be transformed to an *enceinte continuée,* so that it would sustain a prolonged bombardment. The first, or advance, line of fortifications was to be completed by the construction of thirty forts and redoubts. This outer and very important line was supposed not to have been completed so far as it should have been a year or so before the war. It was, in fact, then admitted that the line was so far incomplete that, if it had then been necessary to defend Antwerp, the defence would have had to abandon it. As a result of this disclosure, the works were pushed forward with extra energy. From 80,000 to 100,000 men were considered necessary effectively to defend the two lines, the mere preliminary investment of the town by the enemy being estimated to last one month and require at least 200,000 men. It is doubtful whether, even after all these efforts, the fortifications had been completed now that, at last, the enemy was at the gates.

The last, or outermost, ring of these defences was situate at an average distance of about six or seven miles from the centre of the city. Approaching from Brussels and Louvain through Malines, the invading army would be confronted with two important forts in that ring, Fort Waelhem and Fort Wavre Ste. Catherine.

The London Geographical Institute

On the inner side of these forts, as well as of the other forts on that—the south—side of the ring, were the rivers Nethe, Rupel and Scheldt ; consequently, if a besieging force should effect a breach in any part of this side of the ring, it would still have to negotiate the water which intervened between it and the inner ring, the rivers themselves running in close proximity inside round

this part of the outer ring. In preparation for the anticipated siege, the Belgians had, of course, destroyed the bridges over these rivers. The inner ring of forts was furnished with guns which were quite capable of protecting the forts against any bombardment by field guns of the days of thirty years ago. As against siege guns as improved at the time of the commencement of the war, these forts had little value. Having regard, too, to the fact that this war witnessed in the siege guns of the Germans an efficiency and power which was hardly known before, it can also be said that the forts in the outermost ring had little effective strength as against the German attack. It was only necessary, therefore, for the Germans to break through any part of the outermost ring, and then, even without crossing the water within, Antwerp would have been at the mercy of their artillery. The rivers themselves were not more than six miles from Antwerp, whereas the range of the German siege guns was about eight or nine miles. So, from the first, Antwerp was doomed.

On Monday, September 28, the Germans commenced their assault upon the town. As at Liége, they were in a hurry, over-estimating their own strength and underestimating, as usual, the strength of their opponents. They appeared to believe that all they had to do was to move forward, and then, with little or no effective resistance, storm the forts, cross the river, and enter the city. According to their own account, they had a force of about 250,000 men available for and engaged in the attack. The probabilities are, however, that they had no more than 150,000. These men, however, were well provided with artillery, large numbers of field-guns, some heavy pieces of 11-in., and one or two of the famous 16-in. "Black Marias," as the guns of the last-named calibre had been nicknamed by the British soldiers. These "Black Marias" were capable of throwing shells more than 800 lb. in weight. To render success yet more certain, they also carried with them, in order to fire buildings, shells filled with naphtha, so designed as to scatter a rain of flaming oil. The "Black Marias" could only be transported across the country at the expense of much time and immense labour, and when brought on to the scene could be used only when placed on specially constructed concrete foundations, or, at a pinch, foundations of a like material of any buildings which might be found on the spot and could be demolished. In so great a hurry, however, were the Germans to commence work that they began the attack on Antwerp, paying special attention to Forts Waelhem and Wavre Ste. Catherine, before the 16-in. mortars could be used. They launched great masses of men against the forts, and these, supported by the

artillery available, might reasonably have been expected successfully to storm the forts.

The bombardment which now commenced was truly terrific, lasting throughout the day and night of September 28 and the following day. It was remarkable, however, how little determining effect this bombardment had, having regard to the weapons and men in use. These circumstances, added to that of the gallant and skilful resistance of the Belgians, account for the fact that it was not until the 29th that Fort Wavre Ste. Catherine was silenced. Its magazine was then exploded. It is doubful whether this explosion was caused by a projectile of the enemy, or by the premature bursting of one of its own shells, but the explosion, coming as it did after the fort had already been badly battered and smashed up, half its guns being put out of action, settled the matter, and the Belgians were forced to abandon it. The Germans now concentrated their attention on Forts Waelhem and Lierre, especially on the former. On the 30th Fort Waelhem was so badly shattered that for all practical purposes it was put out of action. Germany then particularly turned her artillery upon Forts Lierre and Koningshoyckt. These too, before the close of that day, suffered the fate of Fort Waelhem, the still heroically resisting Fort Wavre Ste. Catherine at length also giving up the struggle. The village of Lierre, in the neighbourhood of the fort of that name, was partly destroyed by fire, flames and smoke rising high to the heavens for several days—a significant indication of German success so far.

During the whole of this attack on the forts, the Germans were recklessly prodigal of their men. The result of this, and of the strenuous resistance of the defenders, was that very many thousands of the enemy were killed and wounded. This great loss of life seems to have had the usual effect of stirring up the worst elements of the German nature, for, with no apparent reason other than that of revenge, the enemy now destroyed the city waterworks, which were situated close to Fort Waelhem. This reduced the population of Antwerp to the supply of water afforded by such wells as were within the city limits, and had the very serious result of making it impossible to put out any fires which should occur as a consequence of the bombardment.

On October 2 the position was such that the Germans were enabled, through the breach in the fortifications which they had now effected, to burst through the fortified ring and proceed to the city. It was not, however, until early morning on the 6th that they succeeded in crossing the river Nethe. At first they attempted the crossing at a point near Fort Waelhem. But this

effort failed by reason of the opposition of the Belgians. The enemy then made another assault on an extended front reaching from Duffel to Lierre. In this they ultimately succeeded.

The Belgians fought with the most remarkable energy, resistance and desperation at the river near Waelhem. At the second attempt of the Germans, between Duffel and Lierre, the Belgian forces were strengthened by the British Naval Brigade, but notwithstanding that the persistent efforts of the Germans eventually enabled them to cross the river—though this was done in the end only after a pontoon bridge had been erected. One can imagine the scene. Hour after hour during all these days, bodies of Germans made attempts to cross the river at various points and to build the pontoon bridge; but during the whole of the time these efforts was met by a shattering deadly fire from the Belgian and British guns, which blew away whole blocks of Germans as fast as they arrived on the scene. Nevertheless the Germans persisted. So great were their numbers that it was necessarily only a question of time, and they were able to cross the river. Even the bridge itself was swept away, together with its burden of unhappy passengers, on several occasions.

Sunday, October 4, was the great day. The British reinforcements, consisting of three Marine and Naval Brigades, were then entrenched in a position which dominated the area in which the Germans were attempting to cross the river. The following statement, published by the Admiralty, describes the movements of the British forces :—

> In response to an appeal by the Belgian Government, a Marine Brigade and two Naval Brigades, together with some heavy naval guns, manned by a detachment of the Royal Navy, the whole under the command of General Paris, R.M.A., were sent by His Majesty's Government to participate in the defence of Antwerp during the last week of the attack.
>
> Up till the night of Monday last, October 5, the Belgian army and the Marine Brigade successfully defended the line of the Nethe river. But early on Tuesday morning the Belgian forces on the right of the Marines were forced by a heavy German attack, covered by very powerful artillery, to retire, and in consequence the whole of the defence was withdrawn to the inner line of forts, the intervals between which had been strongly fortified. The ground which had been lost enabled the enemy to plant his batteries to bombard the city. The inner line of defences was maintained during Wednesday and Thursday, while the city endured a ruthless bombardment. The behaviour of the Royal Marines and Naval Brigades in the trenches and in the field was praiseworthy in a high degree, and remarkable in units so newly formed; and, owing to the protection of the entrenchments, the losses, in spite of the severity of the fire, are probably less than 300 out of a total force of 8,000. The defence could have been maintained for

From the original drawing, by permission of "The Sphere."

AN INCIDENT IN THE RETREAT FROM MONS.

The retreat from Mons witnessed many deeds of quiet heroism which afford striking testimony to the glorious humanity and chivalry of the British Tommy—deeds which show that while war on the one hand tears aside the thin veneer of civilisation and reveals it in all its barbarous brutality, on the other hand it can transcend to heights of sublimity. A number of wounded were sheltered in a church over which the Red Cross flag was flying. The Germans began to shell the building, so that the unfortunate wounded, bearing the still more unfortunate wounded as best they could, had to seek safety in flight.



a longer period, but not long enough to allow of adequate forces being sent for their relief without prejudice to the main strategic situation.

The enemy also began on Thursday to press strongly on the line of communications near Lokeren. The Belgian forces defending this point fought with great determination, but were gradually pressed back by numbers. In these circumstances the Belgian and British military authorities in Antwerp decided to evacuate the city. The British offered to cover the retreat, but General de Guise desired that they should leave before the last division of the Belgian army.

After a long night march to St. Gilles the three naval brigades entrained. Two out of the three have arrived safely at Ostend, but, owing to circumstances which are not yet fully known, the greater part of the 1st Naval Brigade was cut off by the German attack north of Lokeren, and 2,000 officers and men entered Dutch territory in the neighbourhood of Huist, and laid down their arms in accordance with the laws of neutrality. The retreat of the Belgian army has been successfully accomplished. The naval armoured trains and heavy guns were all brought away.

The naval aviation park having completed the attack on Düsseldorf and Cologne already reported, has returned safely to the base protected by its armoured cars. The retreat from Ghent onwards of the Naval Division and of the Belgian army was covered by strong British reinforcements.

Vast numbers of the non-combatant population of Antwerp, men, women and children, are streaming in flight in scores of thousands westwards from the ruined and burning city.

By October 6 not only the forts already named had been reduced, but also Forts Kessel and Broeckem. In the meantime, too, the Germans had endeavoured, with their usual foolish tactlessness, to conquer the hearts of the inhabitants of Antwerp by means of an appeal contained in a proclamation which, on October 2, they dropped in vast numbers from a Taube aeroplane which flew over the city. The document, translated into English, was as follows :—

PROCLAMATION

BRUSSELS,
October 1, 1914.

BELGIAN SOLDIERS !

It is not to your beloved country that you are giving your blood and your very lives ; on the contrary, you are serving only the interests of Russia, a country which is only seeking to increase its already enormous power, and, above all, the interests of England, whose perfidious avarice is the cause of this cruel and unheard-of war. From the beginning your newspapers, corrupted by French and English bribes, have never ceased to deceive you and to tell you falsehoods about the origin of the war and about the course of it ; and this they continue to do from day to day. Here is one of your army orders which proves it anew ! Mark what it contains !

You are told that your comrades who are prisoners in Germany are forced to march against Russia, side by side with our soldiers. Surely your good sense must tell you that that would be an utter impossibility! The day will come when your comrades, now prisoners, returned to their native land, will tell you with how much kindness they have been treated. Their words will make you blush for your newspapers and for your officers who have dared to deceive you in such incredible fashion. Every day that you continue to resist only subjects you to irreparable losses, while after Antwerp has capitulated your troubles will be at an end.

Belgian soldiers! You have fought long enough in the interest of the Russian princes and the capitalists of perfidious Albion! Your situation is desperate. Germany, who fights only for her own existence, has destroyed two Russian armies. To-day there is not a Russian to be found on German soil. In France our troops are setting themselves to overcome the last efforts at resistance.

If you wish to rejoin your wives and children, if you long to return to your work, in a word, if you would have peace, stop this useless strife, which is only working your ruin. Then you will soon enjoy the blessings of a happy and perfect peace!

Von Beseler,
Commandant in Chief of the Besieging Army.

It will easily be believed that this precious proclamation had nothing of the effect desired by the Germans. On the contrary, it strengthened the civilian population in their determination to stand by the Belgian Government and its military operations. This determination was evidenced in no uncertain manner by a resolution of the City Council carried on October 5, which, in specific terms, bade the General commanding the defence to be guided solely by military considerations, without regard to property interests in the city, and pledged him the whole-hearted support of the civil population. Thereupon, in order not to embarrass the military authorities in arriving at a decision as to their future procedure, orders were given that civilians should leave the town in order to escape the dangers of a probable bombardment.

Already the city was full to overflowing with people, most of whom were themselves refugees from other parts of Belgium, having left their own towns and homes as a consequence of the German advance and devastation. Hundreds of thousands of Antwerp citizens had already left the city for Holland, Ostend, France, or England; hundreds of thousands of refugees into the city had already passed on and out in the wake of the citizens; yet hundreds of thousands, in fact nearly a million of people, were still in the city, mostly refugees, on the 5th. So the city,

from this time onwards, through the 6th and 7th of October, was as full as, if not fuller than, in times of peace. But all the people seemed to be living, during the day, in the street, especially in those streets and places which were more in the centre of things; though curiously, but explicable in view of Belgian experience of German methods, the neighbourhood of the cathedral was carefully avoided. Since the commencement of the assault the good people of Antwerp had always retired to rest at an unusually early hour; after eight o'clock nobody could be seen in the streets; night would pass without a sound, except at rare intervals the uncanny reverberation of the footfall of a belated wayfarer. At eight o'clock the restaurants were closed, and no drink or food could be purchased; all public lights were extinguished, trams had ceased running since six o'clock, and all blinds were drawn, so that no light whatever should be thrown on to the streets. So far as artificial luminant was concerned, the city of Antwerp was as dark at night as an unlighted and secluded part of the country.

A few moments before midnight on October 7, the final bombardment of Antwerp commenced. It was preceded by a demand from the general commanding the German forces that the city should be delivered up to him, and a request for a plan of the city, so that in the event of bombardment some measures could be taken to avoid useless destruction of ecclesiastical and other particularly valuable buildings of a like protected character. The demand was refused, but a plan was furnished; and it is believed that copies were distributed by the German general amongst his artillery. The bombardment continued until the morning of the 9th, when the city surrendered, the burgomaster meeting the German general between eight and nine o'clock.

During the whole of this period there was nothing but a continued thunderous cannonading. The first day the cannonading was not only on the part of the enemy, but also, by way of reply, from the Antwerp forts of the inner ring. The bombardment appears to have been carried out by the Germans on a systematic plan, the object of which was to avoid the destruction of life and of all buildings of a protected or valuable character. So the ultimate damage sustained by the city was slight and limited very largely to the destruction of property of relatively little value or importance. There was also comparatively little loss of life. On the 8th the reply of the Antwerp forts ceased, the garrisons retreating; and the whole Belgian army, as well as the British reinforcements, began to move out of the doomed city, making their way towards Ostend and that neighbourhood. That same day the authorities in Antwerp fired the great tanks of oil. One can

imagine the great quantity of this oil, when it is remembered that it represented the store of the whole of the Antwerp oil trade with Belgium, Germany and Holland. Ships in the river were dealt with so as to be valueless to the Germans when they entered into occupation—the engines and machinery were blown up by dynamite, and many were sunk.

The night of the 8th was the occasion of a remarkable scene. Low over the whole of the city hung a dense black pall of smoke, one gigantic head of innumerable columns of fire proceeding from all parts of the city from the burning oil and fired buildings. Beneath this pall the black darkness was fiercely illuminated here and there by the ascending columns of fire, shells were continuously bursting and dropping showers of fire, and amidst all was heard the continuous thunder of the guns and the shrieking of the shells.

Antwerp, one of the world's greatest cities, thus fell in a fitting scene.

On Wednesday, October 7, it was estimated that there were about half a million of people left in Antwerp. By noon the following day there were only a few hundreds. During this short space of time the great mass of stricken humanity had left the city. Boat-load after boat-load had left by the river for England, France, and elsewhere; the boats were packed and the landing-stages a seething mass of waiting humanity. For miles and miles on the few yet open main roads leading from the city, there was a steady, slow-moving mass of people making their way either towards Ostend and that neighbourhood, or towards Holland. So thick were the throngs that progress was only possible at less than a walking pace. The high-powered motor-car, the horsed carriage, the dog-drawn cart, the cycle, the hand-cart, the athletic pedestrian—all had to proceed at a pace so slow and laboured that even the aged and infirm were impatient. The dress of these refugees was almost weird in its infinite variety, but one feature was common—all were apparently clothed in garments hastily donned without reference to the occasion and already much weather-worn. The conveyances were loaded not only with the aged and children, but with a most heterogeneous assortment of bundles and articles. Everybody carried something. Here would be seen an old woman carrying a market-basket filled with some of her most treasured possessions; here a middle-aged man, perhaps, with a little string-bag-full; here a fashionably dressed man and woman struggling with a great trunk between them, each with a hand on a handle; and here a child lovingly clasping her golliwog or doll to her breast. Here and there a woman

would faint, or some accident would occur, and a doctor would be discovered in the crowd. Nurses, too, were in the crowd. And certainly doctors and nurses were wanted, for more than one child was born on the wayside. Fortunately the weather was perfect.

On Friday night a German force entered the city, the bulk of the invading army taking possession on the following afternoon. Then General von Schutz, the Governor of Antwerp, and Admiral von Schroeder, the centre of a glittering staff, held a great review of the German troops in front of the Royal Palace in the Place de Meir.

A vivid description of the scenes incidental to the German army occupying the city was written by Mr. E. Alexander Powell, correspondent of the *New York World,* and printed in the *Times* :—

For five hours the mighty host poured through the streets of the deserted city, while the houses shook to the thunder of their tread. Company after company, regiment after regiment, brigade after brigade swept past, until the eye grew weary of watching the ranks of grey under the slanting lines of steel. As they marched, they sang, the canyon formed by high buildings along the Place de Meir echoing to their voices roaring out the " Wacht am Rhein " and " A Mighty Fortress is our God."

Each regiment was headed by its field music and colours; and when darkness fell and the street lamps were lighted the shrill music of fifes and rattles of drums and the tramp of marching feet reminded me of a torch-light election parade. Hard on the heels of the infantry rumbled artillery, battery after battery, until one wondered where Krupp found time or steel to make them. These were the forces that had been in almost constant action for the last two weeks, and that for thirty-six hours had poured death and destruction into the city, yet the horses were well-groomed and the harness well polished. Behind the field batteries rumbled quick-firers, and then, heralded by a blare of trumpets and the crash of kettledrums, came the cavalry, cuirassiers in helmets and breastplates of burnished steel, hussars in befrogged jackets and fur busbies, and finally the Uhlans, riding amid forests of lances under a cloud of fluttering pennons.

But this was not all, nor nearly all. For after the Uhlans came blue-jackets of the Naval Division, broad-shouldered bewhiskered fellows with caps worn rakishly and the roll of the sea in their gait. Then Bavarian infantry in dark blue, Saxon infantry in light blue, and Austrians in uniforms of beautiful silver-grey; and, last of all, a detachment of gendarmes in silver and bottle-green.

Before the actual military occupation of Antwerp, half a dozen motor-cars, filled with armed men wearing grey uniforms and spiked helmets, entered the Porte de Malines and drew up before the Hôtel de Ville. The door-keeper, in the blue and silver livery of the municipality, cautiously opened the door in response to the summons of a young officer in a voluminous grey cloak. " I have a message to deliver to the Communal Council,"

said the young man pleasantly. " The Communal Councillors are at dinner and cannot be disturbed," was the door-keeper's reply. " If monsieur will have the kindness to take a seat until they finish ? " So the young man in the spiked helmet seated himself on a wooden bench, and the other men in spiked helmets ranged themselves in a row across the hall.

After a quarter of an hour's delay the door of the dining-room opened, and a portly Councillor appeared, wiping his moustache. " You have a message you wish to deliver ? " he inquired. " The message I am instructed to give you, sir," said the young man, clicking his heels sharply together and bowing from the waist, " is that Antwerp is now a German city, and you are requested by the General commanding his Imperial Majesty's forces so to inform your townspeople, and to assure them that they will not be molested so long as they display no hostility towards our troops."

The Burgomaster then went out to the motor-car to obtain the best terms he could. General von Schutz informed him that, if the outlying forts were immediately surrendered, no money indemnity would be demanded from the city, though all the merchandise in the warehouses would be confiscated.

As already stated, the Belgian army had retreated from Antwerp before its surrender. The main portion of that army and the 2nd British Naval Brigade as well as the Marines had retired upon Ostend while the communications remained open. The 1st Division of the Belgian army, which was the last to leave Antwerp, had been engaged in rendering the place useless to the besiegers, but was not delayed by this work too long for it to be impossible to retreat—though to do this it had to fight with the Germans north of the Scheldt a succession of rearguard actions. The 1st British Naval Brigade were forced, though fighting tenaciously, across the Dutch frontier at Huist. A division of the Belgian army were also compelled to cross the boundary into Holland. So a considerable force of Britons and Belgians were lost to the Allies, being interned by the Dutch. It was, however, a matter of the greatest satisfaction to the Allies that once more the Belgian army had eluded the grasp of Germany.

CHAPTER VIII

BRITAIN'S ARMY TAKES THE FIELD

The Expeditionary Force—Its mobilisation—The railway stations—Departure of reservists to join their units—Scenes at the camps—Messages of the King—Instruction of Lord Kitchener—Completion of mobilisation—Army secretly leaves the camps for ports—Departure from ports of embarkation—Arrival in France—Sir John French in Paris—Scenes in streets—The marches through Boulogne—Welcome by the people—The Expeditionary force leaves for the front

WE have seen how very promptly the British Navy, immediately on the outbreak of hostilities, sailed away into the unknown, there to take its part in the fight against the fleets of the enemy. Nor was the British Army in any degree backward in following this example.

For some years the British Army in England had been so organised that a great part of it, roughly 120,000 men, was established as an Expeditionary Force, capable of immediate mobilisation for a campaign to be fought abroad. There were six divisions made up of 110,000 men, with a supplementary cavalry division of 10,000 men and two supplementary cavalry brigades. This force, to the extent of about two-thirds of its strength, was always in arms ready for movement, being under these conditions composed mainly of the younger men who were still serving their term of enlistment. To complete its full strength it would be necessary to call up the reserves. On mobilisation this would be done, the result being not only that the force would be brought up to its full strength in point of numbers, but also in quality of *personnel*, the reservists being older men who had already been fully trained and generally seen active service. As finally mobilised, and as it left this country, the Expeditionary Force was made up very much to its full strength, though the details were not made public.

The mobilisation of the Expeditionary Force and the ultimate transport to France of that force, with its landing there at Boulogne and other ports, together constituted a remarkable triumph of methodical and business-like organisation on the part of the War Office. It has been said that this operation was one of the greatest feats ever performed in the preliminary stages of any war. Nowhere in England—in the country districts; in

the great centres of population; on the railways; in the neighbourhood of the camps; at barracks; at docks—could be seen any evidence of unreasoning hurry or agitation. The whole thing was arranged and brought off in as cool and methodical a manner as a great business house might be expected to cope with its everyday distributive organisation. The plans for mobilisation had been laid down originally, and perfected, in time of peace. When in time of war it was necessary to act, it was found that the machine worked perfectly.

The time allowed for the mobilisation was fourteen days. On the evening of the last day, Monday, August 17, Lord Kitchener reported to the King that the Expeditionary Force had been completely mobilised, and that in addition, after continuous operations on the sea, which did not result in even a single casualty, the troops had been concentrated on the shores of France.

The General Officers Commanding received the order to mobilise on August 4. Forthwith the whole machinery began to move. It then seemed to move silently and with irresistible force, as though by its own momentum, straight to its successful end. By three o'clock in the morning of August 5, an hour or two after the commencement of the war, the postmen throughout the country were delivering to most of the reservists their orders to rejoin. All over the country public notices were posted calling the men to arms. Together with his orders, the reservist received a warrant for his journey. Every class of the community was affected by the mobilisation, and responded without any waste of time. All of them, from highly placed business men who, without notice, had hurriedly left behind them important positions, down to casual labourers, rolled up to the depots, already open to receive them, and at once were fully clothed and equipped; then without a hitch they were all entrained to their various battalions—some to Portsmouth, Aldershot, or Plymouth, others to Colchester and other centres. This movement was in full swing during the whole of Wednesday and Thursday.

Without creating any sort of excitement, yet in sight everywhere in the streets, were men hurrying forward, generally with friends, either in uniform or carrying bundles, obviously to the public on their way to their units. At the great railway stations, however, where necessarily large bodies of these men met in order to entrain, the scenes were more lively. Men there met old comrades, and indulged in cordial and mutual recognitions and welcomes, comparing notes with one another as to their experiences since last they had been together. But most of the men were accom-

panied not only by civilian men friends, but by their women folk and children. The prevailing atmosphere amongst the soldiers was one of delight and satisfaction at now having an opportunity to fight the foe that every Briton had known for so many years past would ultimately have to be dealt with by our Army. There was never any feeling other than that of victory, so all were filled with an animated content. Nevertheless this satisfied condition was for the moment very substantially modified by the circumstance that in so very many cases loved ones were being left at home. It could not be otherwise—the wives, sweethearts, and children were everywhere mournful if not weeping. For them this war was a horrible tragedy; it meant that their husbands, fathers, and sweethearts were leaving them under circumstances which made it possible, and even probable, that they would never return. It was certain that of the crowd, some, if not the greatest number of the men now going to the front, would either fall on the field of battle or return wounded or diseased. What wonder, therefore, that the loving women and children should imagine that the objects of their especial devotion should be amongst that number? And yet on the whole the soldiers were sent forth with a cheerful and encouraging farewell.

The entire country was now alive with soldiers and reservists, in uniform and out, moving about on all the railway lines. There was no bustle, however, for everything went quietly and with method, and so every man eventually found himself at his destination. In addition to fixed depots or headquarters such as Aldershot, there now sprang up in many parts of the country temporary Concentration Camps. It was at these centres that the final organisation of the Expeditionary Force took place. But even now and here there was no confusion, and no suggestion of feverish haste. At Aldershot, for instance, all that was apparent was that more work than usual was being done there. Men were moving hither and thither; parties were being marched from one place to another; recreation grounds were being turned into horse lines; and unceasingly collections of horses and bodies of reservists from the regimental depots were being brought into the camp. But there was no confusion, no hurry; every man knew exactly what he had to do, and did it without fuss or bother. So it was in the Concentration Camps. In a day, or really within even a few hours, troops of all kinds would flock into the place: Artillery, Horse and Foot, Royal Engineers, Royal Army Medical Corps—in fact, a self-contained little army. Men were there from all parts of Britain, Englishmen from the Northern, Southern, and Midland Counties; Highlanders; Welshmen and

Irishmen—all animated by the common sentiments of loyalty to their King and determination to fight as British soldiers, and for the honour and prestige of their country. Nowhere at any time was there any hitch even in the slightest detail. As regards what is known as "war outfit," which comprises equipment of all sorts, clothing, regimental supplies, etc., our Army organisation had never before been in such a position of readiness. Even the boots not only fitted the wearers, but were even already known to be comfortable. So too with regard to the *matériel* of all descriptions, and more especially the ammunition. So remarkably perfect was the organisation in even the smallest, yet most important, detail, that each rifleman, for instance, found himself equipped with a rifle the stock of which just fitted into his particular shoulder, and was so made as to suit his own length of arm.

Whilst all this work was proceeding in connection with the Expeditionary Force, the Special Service Section of the Territorial Force, which had already been called up, was doing important duty in guarding against spies every railway line, bridge, culvert, and cutting, and looking after the safety of all Government stores, harbours, docks, and transports.

The public at large throughout the country knew nothing of all this—everything was done quietly, almost secretly. With the farewells at home, or at the stations, ceased all connection of the civilian population with the military. Henceforth the public saw or heard little more than the occasional troop train or marching unit. Within two days the whole force was fully mobilised; only a very few men were missing when the roll was called, and the whereabouts of these even were known, and arrangements had been made so that they might ultimately join. In like manner the Special Reserve had been mobilised.

In this manner came into effective being the Expeditionary Force. Nothing now remained except to depart for the scene of action. So on August 9 the King issued the following message to his Army, expressing his confidence in the men and encouraging them in the task before them.

August 9, 1914.

You are leaving home to fight for the safety and honour of my Empire.

Belgium, whose country we are pledged to defend, has been attacked, and France is about to be invaded by the same powerful foe.

I have implicit confidence in you, my soldiers. Duty is your watchword, and I know your duty will be nobly done.

I shall follow your every movement with deepest interest, and mark with eager satisfaction your daily progress; indeed, your welfare will never be absent from my thoughts.

I pray God to bless you and guard you and bring you back victorious.

GEORGE R.I.

Knowing what we do, and shall know, of the general conduct of the German Army, and of the instructions which had been given to it by the Kaiser, the above message of the King to our men has a more than usual significance; and the following instructions, or rather advice, to the soldiers from Lord Kitchener, which they were required to keep in their pay-books, is also of more than passing interest.

You are ordered abroad as a soldier of the King to help our French comrades against the invasion of a common enemy. You have to perform a task which will need your courage, your energy, your patience. Remember that the honour of the British Army depends on your individual conduct. It will be your duty not only to set an example of discipline and perfect steadiness under fire, but also to maintain the most friendly relations with those whom you are helping in this struggle.

The operations in which you are engaged will, for the most part, take place in a friendly country, and you can do your own country no better service than in showing yourselves in France and Belgium in the true character of a British soldier.

Be invariably courteous, considerate, and kind. Never do anything likely to injure or destroy property, and always look upon looting as a disgraceful act. You are sure to meet with a welcome and to be trusted; your conduct must justify that welcome and that trust. Your duty cannot be done unless your health is sound. So keep constantly on your guard against any excesses. In this new experience you may find temptations both in wine and women. You must entirely resist both temptations, and, while treating all women with perfect courtesy, you should avoid any intimacy.

(Signed) KITCHENER, *Field-Marshal.*

The Army thus perfectly equipped—made up of young men in the supreme strength and ardour of their youth, and the strengthening element of maturer reservists, furnished with suitable and comfortable clothing and equipment, and directed and led by generals in whom every confidence was reposed and who would see that their men were well-fed and cared for—was now ready to move from its many centres throughout the country to the ports from which it should depart from our shores. As the mobilisation itself had been carried out and perfected quietly without confusion, and even in secrecy, so the departure was effected without either the knowledge of the public or even, except as to momentary details, by the soldiers themselves. When on the occasion of former wars our troops had left England, their departure had always been the scene of an encouraging public

demonstration in farewell. This great war, however, broke with the old tradition. It was to be a fight with a powerful enemy on the near Continent, so, having regard to telegraphic and other means of information, it was not wise that our preparations and intentions should be too widely known. The troops were therefore not accompanied from their quarters to the trains, or from the trains to the boats, by martial strains or cheering crowds. As a fact, their departure was everywhere and always as much as possible at night and with every secrecy. Though a camp might be situated near a railway station, the men, when they did depart, were moved without warning to another station for entrainment, though that station might be very much farther away than the other. Along the dark roads, watched only by moon and stars, they marched, voiceless, and with as little noise as possible from the horses' hoofs and the rumbling guns. The only public knowledge of a departure was such as would be sleepily half-gleaned by some countryside inhabitant disturbed in his midnight slumber by an unusual movement along the road beneath his chamber window. The unit would then, at the end of perhaps a long, weary, and almost ghostly tramp, arrive at a wayside railway station, where awaiting them, with only a surprised and drowsy porter or two about, would stand their train. Into this train very quickly they would turn, and then at express rate, with blinds down, along a specially cleared line, the unit would be steamed right to and within the port of embarkation. Before they departed from their camp, the soldiers would not know the day or even hour of their departure; until they arrived at the railway station they would not know the name of the station to which they were marching; and ultimately, when on board the transport, it was probable that unless they had a knowledge of the place of their own, or had gathered information from some colleague who had, they would leave our shores for a destination unknown to them, not even aware of the name of the port from which they had set sail. Silently, almost mysteriously, the transports would weigh anchor and leave the docks. There would be no demonstration whatever at this the final departure of our brave men from Britain's shore—no cheering or farewells, no "Good luck, Bill, come back soon," no "Good-bye, lass," no band playing inspiriting martial music, no shrill shrieking of many whistles or penetrating hooting of syrens, no song or badinage, no solemn tense moments as a ship passed gradually out of sight and hearing of the quay—the Great War now commencing was already breaking new ground in every direction.

In this manner the whole of the Expeditionary Force of about

120,000 men, with their equipment, horses, and artillery, left British soil.

At Boulogne, and the other ports of disembarkation, the French and the British transport authorities had now for about a fortnight been making preparations for the reception of our men. The whole town of Boulogne, in particular, was feverishly expectant. On the heights near the old city a great camp had been prepared for the reception of the British soldiers in the near vicinity of the spot where, a century before, Napoleon had encamped his army while waiting for the opportunity, which fortunately never arrived, to cross the waters and invade our Island. That this neighbourhood should be the scene of welcome and of the reception of the British troops as the allies of France is a remarkable illustration of the change in nations as well as in people that time always brings about. The day came at last when the first British transport steamed into the harbour at Boulogne with the first instalment of our soldiery. From that moment, day after day, transport followed transport in unbroken succession. The procession seemed almost interminable. Several were berthed at once, others immediately taking the places of those that had discharged their passengers.

On August 13, at 6 o'clock in the evening, a great event happened. Field-Marshal French arrived at Boulogne on the scout "Sentinel." The quay was crowded. General Daru, the Military Governor of Boulogne, was standing there white-haired and white-moustached—the embodiment of the precise militarism of France—to receive the Commander of the British troops. Sir John French, accompanied by his Staff, left his ship and landed, and the two Generals met formally, and with perfect dignity saluted one another. The following day Sir John French proceeded to Paris to the headquarters of the French Army. His reception when he arrived at the railway station at Paris and as he proceeded thence to the War Office there was remarkable in its spontaneous enthusiasm. At the station itself, the Gare du Nord, he was met by M. Malvy, the Minister of the Interior representing the French Government, Sir Francis Bertie, the British Ambassador in Paris, and many other distinguished personages. Crowds of excited and enthusiastic people managed to get inside the station. The place rang with the cheers and acclamations of the people. "Vive l'Angleterre," "Vive la France" rang out clearly and persistently amongst other cries equally indicative of the united spirit which now bound together the French and the British nations. It was as though there was but one nation: it was as though Sir John French was a Frenchman as well as British. Proceeding from

the station in a motor-car to pay his respects to the President of the French Republic, the British Field-Marshal found a reception in the streets of Paris so warm that his car could proceed only at a walking pace through the ways which were packed with an ardent people. Again, and right through to his destination, patriotic cries once more rang out, French and British indifferently, and frequently cries, acclamations, and shouting were not sufficient for the expression of the people's feelings, and so the "Marseillaise" would be sung by a thousand throats to be followed by "God save the King." In this manner did France in her capital receive the Commander of the British Army. But to return to Boulogne.

The quays and the whole of the waterside were thronged with French soldiers and war equipment. Into this throng were discharged transport after transport of our soldiers. As near as possible to the scene gathered increasing and continuous crowds of men, women, and children of the town, eager to see the arrival of the British. In time, but necessarily by instalments, the British troops formed up and marched through the town to their camp. Now were the longed-for opportunities of the French people. They could see, speak to, cheer, and even shower presents upon and take mementoes from our troops as they swung through the streets of this famous town. The march through Boulogne was a unique and enviable experience to every member of the British forces. It must have been a great surprise to them. However much they may have anticipated a warm welcome, they never, in the wildest flights of their imagination, could have pictured the enthusiasm with which they would inspire the people of Boulogne. And perhaps there was good ground for such an inspiration. The people certainly expected to see a fine body of troops enter their town, but it must have been a surprise to discover that our men were so hard and keen in appearance, so trimly clothed and so perfectly equipped. The Scotch regiments, in particular, took the fancy of our Allies. They could never tire of watching them: their admiration for them could never cease.

The marches were from the quay through narrow but well-built business streets and up a wide fine street which led past the old-walled town. The pavements were so thronged with people that they overflowed into the roads. The throngs were even greater than those which were accustomed to witness the religious procession of "Our Lady of the Seas." The excitement was indescribable. The air seemed charged with a magnetic patriotism; there was one constant roar and refrain of acclamations, music,

cheering, and singing. Again was heard the cry "Vive l'Angleterre" from the French on the pavements, returned with unrestrained depth of feeling from the ranks of the British soldiers with a "Vive la France." The skirl of the bagpipes seemed, however, to dominate all sound. The pipers were as magicians. Our soldiers, perhaps, were accustomed to them. On the French populace, however, they acted as incentives to an almost unrestrained outburst. "Bravo!" came from the French, "Hurrah!" from the British; and this was followed by the question emphatically put by the soldiers themselves to themselves, "Are we down-hearted?" to be answered at once in the old accustomed way with a thunderous "No!" It took but a little time for the good people of Boulogne to learn this litany. Soon people and soldiers were tossing it about among themselves. At one moment the people would shout "Are we down-hearted?" in broken English, and the soldiers would reply with the inevitable "No!" At another moment the query would be put from the ranks and the answer would come from the people. And then, here and there emerging from the cheers with inevitable success, the music of the now world-renowned British war song "It's a long, long way to Tipperary," and the French soon learned this song too. So for a time, until their departure for the front, the British troops took possession not only of the town, but of the very hearts of the people of Boulogne.

A few days elapsed and once more it was time for another departure; once more the British soldiers had to move on not knowing yet again their precise destination, conscious only of the fact, as they had been from the first day of mobilisation, that step by step they were approaching, nearer and nearer, the enemy. Once more they were entrained or proceeded by motor. The scenes now, however, at this departure were more lively than those on their departure from their camps in England. They often left in daylight in the midst of French soldiers and even in the midst of encouraging crowds of French women and children. Their railway carriages they inscribed with chalk with such phrases as "Non-stop to Berlin," amid the frantic approval of the French onlookers, who soon found out the meaning of the otherwise to them mysterious words. As they departed from Boulogne, our soldiers were not the same in appearance as when they landed and first experienced the hospitality of the town. Buttons and regimental badges were often missing. They had been left behind, perhaps with the heart of the giver, occasionally in the charge of some fair French maiden. But they wore other favours and flowers; these the tribute of the fair to the brave.

CHAPTER IX

THE GREAT RETREAT: MONS TO PARIS

The French frontiers—The left wing of the Allied Armies—The German advance begins—The battle at Charleroi—The British troops arrive—Take up position on the line Condé-Mons-Binche—The fight at Mons—The British cavalry—Tribute by Germans—The strength of the combatants—Enemy concentrate on British force—"General French's contemptible little army"—Maubeuge abandoned—Retirement to Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies line—The fighting during the retirement—Fighting at Landrecies—Gallantry of the Guards, artillery, and infantry—Further retreat to Noyon-Chaunay-La Fère—The work of the Royal Flying Corps—Battle rages a week—More artillery work—German reinforcement—French arrive to assist British—Amiens evacuated—British base changed—General retirement of left wing—Sharp action at Compiègne—Crossing the Marne—Further retreat across the Seine—The invaders at the gates of Paris—French Government removes to Bordeaux—Maubeuge yet holding out—The Declaration of the Three Allies—A casual fight—Wounded soldiers tell of enemy gun-fire—Another account of German fighting.

FRANCE on her mobilisation at once concentrated her forces upon her frontiers. The most important of these was the Eastern Frontier, immediately adjacent to Germany and running from Belfort near the north of Switzerland up northwards to Luxemburg. This frontier was protected from the north at Verdun, southward through Toul, Epinal, and Belfort, by immensely strong fortifications at these places, and a chain of forts between. Verdun itself was the turning-point towards the other land boundary of France, her North-Eastern Frontier. This frontier was not nearly so well protected as the Eastern, for it ran along the confines of Luxemburg and Belgium, which, being neutralised States, were in fact, or would have been had their neutrality been respected, impregnable fortifications in themselves. Nevertheless there were fortified towns on this frontier, as for instance Maubeuge, Lille, Dunkirk, and others, though generally speaking, the fortifications on this line were, at the outbreak of hostilities, in an incomplete and substantially ineffective condition. So, by violating the neutrality of Luxemburg and Belgium, Germany was enabled to throw her forces against the weakest part of the frontier defences of France. Moreover, having taken the initiative, as Germany in fact did, and having taken it under circumstances of remarkable duplicity, the German troops were enabled to com-

From the original drawing, by permission of "The Sphere."

A HEROIC DEED OF THE ROYAL HORSE ARTILLERY NEAR COMPIÈGNE

The heroic stand of "L" Battery is one which will go down to posterity in the annals of the British Army. The Battery was surprised in such a position that only three of the guns could reply to the deadly cannonade from the German guns, but those were at once manned by the few survivors of the deadly German onslaught, and were so magnificently served that one by one they silenced the German guns. At last only one out of the three guns remained, and only three men to defend the position. They, crouching behind the shield, served the gun with such deadly effect that only one gun of the German Battery remained in action when they were rescued from their perilous position.



mence operations before France was properly in a position to deal with them. The French line of defence was accordingly made up of a left wing from the sea to Verdun, the centre or pivot, and of a right wing from Verdun to Belfort.

As already stated, the mobilisation in France required about twelve days to complete; consequently Germany had the advantage to this extent over France, and made good use of it, for within the first two or three days of August she threw a considerable force through Luxemburg into France upon Longwy and that neighbourhood. Here the German invading army found itself, as it intended, to the north and north-west of Verdun, the pivot of the French frontier defences, operating against the left and weaker wing. But France did not allow more than a day or two to pass before herself appearing in the field, here to resist the invader. By almost superhuman efforts she brought troops up to Longwy, and even into Belgium, towards Neufchâteau, by August 6. This operation was quite successful at first, preventing further invasion, if not, in fact, completely repelling the invader. The Germans, however, lost no time in bringing up reinforcements, with the result that France soon suffered a severe reverse, losing Longwy, and had perforce to fall back upon the country between the Argonne and Verdun. By this time, however, the French had penetrated Belgium farther to the left, fighting there against Germany in support of the Belgian Army. So we find France occupying Dinant and defending this citadel against the enemy; and with her ally spread out along to the west through Charleroi and Mons, endeavouring to save Namur. The Franco-Belgian line at this stage accordingly extended as a fighting force from Mons to Luxemburg.

On this line commenced on Friday, August 21, after some preliminary skirmishing, the great battle in which the fighting at Charleroi was the preliminary and first operation.

On the one side, the northern, were the Germans, on the other the Franco-Belgian Allies; the Germans, however, particularly from Mons through Charleroi to Phillipville, having a great and preponderating advantage in point of numbers.

During the first two days of this great battle an attack and defence took place in the neighbourhood of and in the town of Charleroi which will rank, according to past standards, as in itself one of the greatest battles in history. And yet this Battle of Charleroi was but an incident in the great and widely extended battle which continued to rage for at least a week longer. Charleroi now takes pride of place with Balaclava.

On Tuesday the 18th, the railway line between Charleroi

and Namur, one of the three lines which radiate from Charleroi, being cut at Moustier, a large body of French troops of all arms poured out of the town towards the north-east The next day Charleroi made preparations for the reception of the enemy. It was occupied by the French Fifth Army, largely composed of troops from Algiers. Houses and shops, the iron, glass, and engineering works were all for the most part closed and shuttered, and the inhabitants were ordered to keep indoors. The French troops, who had been rushed up during the night, took up their positions with mitrailleuses on the canal bridges, and even upon the roof of the station in the lower town. This was a part of the town from which the old ramparts had many years before been removed, and was now a prosperous extension and part of the original city. On Thursday the Germans began to enter the town. The inhabitants were in a state of intense excitement. The first-comers of the enemy were a party of German Death's-head Hussars, commanded by a young lieutenant who, until only very recently before, had been in the employment of the Delet Engineering Works at Charleroi. The people, through some misunderstanding, imagined that these soldiers were English, and so received with cheers and cries of "*Vive les Anglais*" men whose real errand was the destruction of their town, and who, when they finally departed, would leave behind them ruin, blood, and death. The Hussars, too, were labouring under a similar kind of mistake, for they had no idea that Charleroi was already occupied by the French, and so they ambled into the town with every feeling of confidence and security as though paying a visit to friends. But the mistake was soon discovered. The French attacked them and they suffered considerable loss—fifteen at least were killed or wounded.

It was not until the following morning, Friday the 21st, that the Germans advanced upon the town in strength, then, from the north-east, their presence outside was made felt by a shell which came crashing through the roof of the railway station. This shell was but the commencement of a well-sustained and most effective bombardment. But more than that, it was the beginning of the general operation of the allied armies against the German armies of the Belgian plain and the Ardennes. The roads to the south and to the west were then crowded with people flying from the town. Old men and women, mothers carrying and dragging small children, dog and other vehicles filled with the hastily gathered treasures and necessities of the poor, all pushed on with feverish haste. To get on and to get away from Charleroi—that was the one idea. The one effort of all was

to escape the Germans and the death and destruction which had hitherto always accompanied them.

The Turcos now made a sortie, a gallant dash, but, meeting with a much stronger force of the enemy than was anticipated, were bound to return to the town. But again, notwithstanding that repulse, the Turcos and the Zouaves with renewed ardour and with a brilliant and almost unparalleled gallantry burst out of the town, determined to do their best to save the place or to die in the attempt, and made a mad, almost superhuman attack upon the German battery, even bayoneting the very gunners, who eventually turned and fled, to quote a French officer, " like flies, their blood flowing in fountains on all sides." Of these Turcos and Zouaves only about a hundred returned unscathed from the charge. And the bombardment went on. The Germans had a battery of machine guns installed in the belfry of a church close to the town.

Bravery alone could not in the end effectively resist the overpowering and ever-increasing mass of the enemy's force, which now thrust itself steadily step by step through the suburbs, and ultimately to the very heart of the town.

We have heard repeatedly that it always was the intention of the German War-Lord that his army should "hack" its way, if necessary, through to Paris. It certainly hacked its way through into the centre of the town of Charleroi, but here it hacked a defending force which stoutly opposed it during the whole progress, the French in their turn hacking the Germans and endeavouring, as far as lesser power and mass would allow, thus to prevent the invasion of the town. The fighting in the streets was really indescribable. Invaders and invaded, all were massed together so closely that it is difficult to believe that there was sufficient room for even the most limited movement in the nature of fighting; for the very dead, because of the mass, retained their upright position, there being no space through which to fall.

However, inevitably the Germans succeeded in the end in their onslaught, and the Allies were repulsed; but not until Sunday, August 23, after four days of this desperate fighting, did the enemy gain complete possession of the town; then the Allies entirely fell back, having suffered tremendous loss.

On August 22 the Franco-Belgian Army was already beginning to retire from Charleroi. The evening before this, however, the British troops had so practically completed their concentration that on the following day Sir John French, who had already been in consultation with General Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief, was able to move his forces to positions which would

best carry out the plans which the French had already designed and followed in their campaign. Henceforth, Britain took her place with France and Belgium as one of the three units together making up the allied army.

The Germans were sweeping southward in tremendous force on a line from the Meuse at Dinant to Namur, and thence westward past Charleroi and Mons. To meet this advance of the enemy, Sir John French took up a line extending along the canal from Conde on the west, through Mons and Binche on the east, thus forming the western flank of the Allies' left wing. From Conde to Mons inclusive was assigned to the 2nd Corps, and to the right of the 2nd Corps from Mons the 1st Corps was posted. The 5th Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche. The 3rd Army Corps had not yet arrived on the scene. It was not until fighting took place later on at Le Cateau that any part of them came. Then one division of 20,000 men arrived by train, and getting out went straight into action, taking a very effective part in the fighting. So, for the moment, in the absence of that Corps, the cavalry had to act both as reserve as well as in reconnaissance. Under Generals Allenby and Chetwode a few advance squadrons of cavalry penetrated as far as Soignies, encountering, with advantage, the enemy.

In the afternoon of Sunday the 23rd the Germans commenced an attack on the Mons line apparently in some strength and particularly threatening the position from Mons. At least four German army corps were engaged in the attack on the British position, succeeding so well that the French troops in the line were being forced back, leaving the British entirely dependent on their own resources on the line from Mons to Conde. A German sergeant of Hussars, who was wounded at Mons, tells the following graphic story of the dash and workmanlike swordplay of the British light cavalry:

> The English infantry, so far as I saw them, is a joke, but I'll take off my hat to their cavalry every time, and to the French cavalry too. We were all big men on big horses, and when we lined up at Mons my captain rode out in front and said we were going to meet some English cavalry in a few minutes, and he wanted us to stamp them all out. He added that we would show these big-mouthed English what a German cavalryman could do. Well, we looked over at the English line and laughed. They were not heavy men, and their horses, which they managed like polo ponies, were lighter than ours. They shortened their stirrups, and we laughed some more. None of them had on tunics. Some wore Glengarry (stable) caps, some hats, and some were bare-headed. A good many had their sleeves rolled up.

Then came the charge. At first the English rode close, but before they struck us they spread out and came on bent over like jockeys with their sabres up in front of their eyes. Those devils rode right through us, and then rode back and went through us again. They cut with their sabres, and then cut back, and I actually saw the heads of our men go right off at one stroke and roll to the ground. We've only one cut, and then we come back to position with the sabre. They cut us Hussars to pieces. After that we shortened our leathers so that we could rise up and put more behind a sabre cut.

Sir John French, now recognising the possibility of his being driven from the Mons position, ordered a reconnaissance of the position in the rear, a position which rested on the fortress at Maubeuge on the right, and extended west to Jenlain, south-east of Valenciennes, on the left. The position was reported difficult to hold because standing crops and buildings made the digging of trenches very difficult and limited the field of the fire in many important localities. It nevertheless afforded a few good artillery positions.

The British forces at the command of Sir John French amounted to considerably less than 100,000 men. The fact that the Germans were advancing in a strength of several army corps, about 300,000 men, already enthused by the victories they had gained at Charleroi and Namur, came as a great surprise to the British General, as information up to now, the last moment, as derived from the French, was that the enemy consisted of only a small force. The position of the British was accordingly almost desperate—it was a case of less than 100,000 men holding a line of about twenty-five miles against an assault of more than 300,000 men.

The Germans were, in fact, now concentrating the whole strength of their forward movement against that part of the left wing of the allied armies—the western flank—which was entirely composed of British troops. There is no doubt that this proceeding on the part of the enemy was designed. The Germans were anxious to get at grips with the British, and if possible to inflict upon them, at the earliest opportunity, a crushing defeat; this was the opportunity. With a force more than three times as great as that of their opponents the Germans hoped to force their way round the left flank of the British forces and so hem it in against the fortress of Maubeuge and thus surround the British, and then advance southward to Paris, destroying entirely in the course of this operation the effective organisation of the whole allied left wing.

One can imagine the eagerness with which the Germans in their mighty hosts advanced—to wipe out the hated British; for an Imperial order had gone forth, on August 18, to the German forces, directing them

> to devote the whole of your attention to the treacherous English and to walk over General French's contemptible little army.

Certainly Berlin subsequently denied the authenticity of this order, but the circumstantiality of its publication discounted very much the denial. Moreover, its tone was consistent with that of the usual matter of the speeches of the Kaiser and his entourage, and, only about one month afterwards, the Crown Prince of Bavaria issued an order equally discourteous and insolent.

Had the British Army made a definitive stand against the enemy in the position in which it now found itself, it would without any doubt whatever have become the victim of the designs of the enemy. The result would have been that probably no force whatever at the command of the Allies, as matters then stood, could have set up any successful opposition to a conquering advance by the Germans through France.

Sir John French accordingly decided on the 24th to retire to another position, fighting step by step during the retreat, thus retarding the advance of the enemy. The idea was that this retreat should so continue until the fortunate moment should arrive when the Allies could so redispose the forces of their left wing as to be in a position not only effectually to prevent a further advance of the enemy, but also to take up the offensive and throw him out of the country. A retreat such as this was necessarily an operation full of great danger and difficulty; for not only were the German forces so very superior to the British in number, but already our men were in a state of great exhaustion. The horses were also in a similar condition.

Leaving the fortresses of Maubeuge and Lille to look after themselves, Field-Marshal French on Tuesday the 25th, having so far retired under circumstances which had resulted in immense loss to the enemy through the heroic and strenuous fighting of our men, took up his position in the evening on the Cambrai—Le Cateau—Landrecies line.

The fighting in the neighbourhood of Mons and the retreat from that town to the line just mentioned, a distance of about thirty-five miles, the work of four days, became famous in the history of the war as "The Battle of Mons." During

the whole of this period the immensely overpowering enemy never for one moment allowed our troops any rest or respite. Throughout the whole time there was a continuous and desperate struggle, the Germans unsuccessfully endeavouring to turn the retreat into a rout, the British on their side endeavouring, and with success, to hold their own and prevent the Germans destroying their force. Sir John French was determined, and his men were with him in his determination, that no power on earth should destroy their resistance during the retreat. Merely considered as a march the feat was remarkable, but when one appreciates the fact that the retreat was a forced march accompanied by this constant fighting it is difficult to praise the men and officers who took part in it in too high terms. The immediate objective was to continue the retreat until some substantial obstacle, such as the River Somme or the River Oise could be put between the British troops and the enemy, thus affording the British the necessary opportunity for rest and reorganisation. So during these days of strenuous bloody struggle, the tale consists of continuous fighting, the infantry firing on both sides with mutual deadly effect, but the British engaging the enemy wherever possible with the bayonet—for in this we always had the advantage of the enemy, who loved not too close contact with cold steel. Artillery and cavalry also were at work; no arm was unoccupied for a moment.

With a view to making a stand at the Cambrai—Le Cateau—Landrecies position, the ground had already been partially prepared and entrenched. It was impossible, however, for the British to occupy the position, the onslaught of the German hosts was too great, the result of their enormous superiority in numbers. Efforts were made by Sir John French to obtain assistance from the French troops, but these, as a consequence of their exhaustion, were unable to co-operate with the British until the 27th. Had it been possible for them to have arrived on the scene on the 26th, the most critical day of the retreat, there is no doubt that the Allies could have occupied the Cambrai—Le Cateau—Landrecies position for a longer period; without them it was necessary to continue the retreat. The Germans were pressing the British, particularly in Landrecies; there the whole of the 9th German Army Corps, coming down through the forest on the north of the town, heavily attacked the 4th Guards Brigade. The Brigade fought most gallantly, and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss in issuing from the forest into the narrow streets of the town—a loss which was estimated from reliable sources as from 700 to 1,000 men. At the same time the 1st

Division, under Sir Douglas Haig, was heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. Here the British were joined by two French Reserve Divisions, with the result that, partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to the skilful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his corps from an exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night, they were able at dawn to resume their march southwards. The following letter, written by a sergeant in the 4th Guards Brigade, gives a very lively idea of the action at Landrecies:

> We had a rough time of it, but our boys were as lively as crickets under fire—as cool as you could wish. It was getting dark when we suddenly found out that the Kaiser's crush were coming through the forest.
>
> We soon found out their game: it was to cut off our force, who were retiring on to Cateau covered by our cavalry. We had not long to wait before they swarmed out of the forest and entered the small town from different directions.
>
> But we got them everywhere and stopped them, not a man getting through. About 200 of us drove them down a street, and didn't the devils squeal when at close quarters they fell in their scores and we jumped over them to get at the others!
>
> Then we had to race away to another point, where they were hurling masses at us. It looked at one time as if they would get round us, but they got a surprise packet, for we cleared the streets and drove them back.
>
> We were sorry to lose Captain Windsor Clive, who was a gentleman and a soldier. He was knocked over by the bursting of a shell, I think—which maddened our fellows, I can tell you.
>
> I don't know how many we accounted for, but I saw quite 150 heaped together in one street. We had to continue our retreat and had little rest until we got to Compiègne on September 1.
>
> Here the brigade had a shaking up. It was the Germans' last desperate attempt to get through. What really happened I hardly know, but never did the Guards fight as they did that day.

Everywhere throughout the British lines our men were confronted with a terrible fire from the enemy. There had been no time to complete the trenches, but nevertheless the troops showed a magnificent front to the enemy's deadly hail. The artillery, although always outmatched by at least four to one, made a continuously splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents. So overwhelming was the German attack that complete annihilation would have been the fate of the British had not the retreat been continued. To make this retreat at all successful it had to be covered under circumstances of signal gallantry. It was only a most devoted intrepidity and determination on the part of the artillery, which had itself suffered heavily,

and the fine work done by the cavalry—" they do as they like with the enemy," reported Sir John French, " until they are confronted by thrice their number. The German patrols simply fly before our horsemen"—that made possible the final completion of this most difficult and dangerous operation. " The German troops will not face our infantry fire," again says the British Commander-in-Chief.

Now, during the succeeding two days, the 27th and 28th, followed the further retreat, for a distance of another thirty-five miles, to the line Noyon—Chauny—La Fère. There, having thrown off the weight of the enemy's pursuit, the troops halted, having concluded for the moment a period of the heaviest and most deadly fighting imaginable, which had commenced at Mons on Sunday afternoon, August 23, and really constituted one long-drawn-out battle.

It would be impossible adequately to particularise all the officers and men who had especially distinguished themselves in this remarkable operation. Sir John French, however, in his Dispatch did place on record his deep appreciation of the valuable services rendered by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, and referred particularly to the work of the Royal Flying Corps. The following is an extract from the Dispatch:

> I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the Army under my command on the morning of August 26 could never have been accomplished unless a Commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct the operation. . . .
>
> I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship's notice the admirable work done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David Henderson. Their skill, energy, and perseverance have been beyond all praise. They have furnished me with the most complete and accurate information, which has been of incalculable value in the conduct of the operations. Fired at constantly both by friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have remained undaunted throughout.
>
> Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in destroying five of the enemy's machines.

A battle raging for nearly a week, in which on one side are engaged more than 300,000 troops of all arms, and on the other troops of less than 100,000 men, taking place along a line of about twenty-five miles, and onwards through that breadth for a distance of about seventy miles, could not be described in understandable detail within any reasonable limits. A really adequate description would require a whole volume.

In the old days a battle was generally a conflict of one

mass of men against another, operating within a very limited area and lasting only a few hours: fighting in this great war developed on entirely different lines.

Here and there at different times, during the whole period of the historic retreat we have summarised above, occasionally happened something in the nature of a battle in the generally accepted sense of the word.

There was such a fight on Monday morning, August 24, in and to the south of the town of Mons. The British artillery supported by infantry, about 13,000 of them, entrenched in a valley three miles from Mons, were shelling the town, endeavouring to dislodge the Germans. The artillery of the enemy in the town replied smartly and effectively, not confining its fire to the assailing artillery, but throwing its bursting shells over the hills on to the entrenched British infantry, following this up with a charge on to the entrenched troops of about 9,000 cavalry. This force, however, powerful as it was, was ineffective to throw back the British, amongst whom were included a strong contingent of gallant Welshmen. Accordingly the Germans developed their attack by moving along the left flank of the British, as fast as they could, about 60,000 more men! Under such circumstances, 70,000 German troops, supported by their artillery, could have but one result when pitted against the British "handful": the latter were bound to retire, and this retirement was no small feat.

Already, before Mons, the British had fought a long series of desultory combats, and had been under heavy shell fire, and, what to them was far worse, a constant series of thunder-showers; yet they marched, for the most part during the night, in the close, stifling darkness which follows blazing hot days, a distance of more than seventy miles, full of cheery confidence, singing nearly all the way, and entirely bathed at times in the radiance of the enemy's searchlights. During this operation practically none of the men fell out, and those who did generally very shortly afterwards reported themselves. There was little time for rest. The enemy persisted in his advance, and all those many weary miles had the British troops to march, and fight too, before they could find a position at which to make a stand. At length they did this near the line where the general retreat for the time being was entrenched. For a little time fortune smiled on our men; a few batteries of our artillery were able to be excellently placed. The German artillery were soon in position also. A duel of shell commenced. Aided by aeroplanes, from which the Germans were enabled to obtain

information as to the British position, the enemy now did his work well. The British, however, did theirs better: so fierce and effective was the British artillery fire that the Germans were forced to retreat, our troops having, moreover, brought down all their aeroplanes, five in all. So, for the moment, this small part of the British forces found rest. Fighting on these lines was perhaps generally quite prosaic in its character, but sometimes the movements and operations of the combatants partook something of the character of the romantic.

The rest, however, was always very short and very troubled. The retiring force had been closely followed up by two of the enemy's cavalry columns; but these columns did not by any means have it all their own way. Generals Gough and Chetwode, with the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades, were careful to seize this opportunity to show that the British army, though retreating, was doing so in good order and for strategic reasons. With their cavalry they attacked and routed the leading German regiment with such considerable effect as almost to break it up.

Again, however, on the 29th the position was very serious. At one o'clock on that day nine or ten German army corps, about 400,000 men at least, were advancing against the Allies. The forces of the latter had at length been strengthened by the arrival of large French reinforcements, but even though so strengthened, the Allies were hopelessly outnumbered and overpowered by the enemy. There was nothing, therefore, to be done except proceed with the retreat. Accordingly, General Joffre and Field-Marshal French arranged that the allied forces should now retire towards the line Compiègne—Soissons. This movement was effected before the close of the day, the German pursuit being checked by a vigorous and continuous attack on their forces by the French.

But the troubles of the Allies were not yet, by any means, over. Far from the time being ripe for taking the offensive, the present problem was how to avoid an apparently imminent disaster. The right flank of the German army had reached a point which appeared seriously to endanger the British line of communication with Havre. Amiens had been evacuated by the British, and the enemy had moved a reserve division into that town. The British base was accordingly changed to St. Nazaire, an advance base being established at Le Mans. In the meantime the French had inflicted a very severe defeat upon the German Guard Corps, but, in view of the necessity to maintain the plan of a general retirement, General Joffre decided not to pursue this advantage.

The retirement of the Allies had now become general in the sense that it was not confined merely to the retreat of the British forces from Mons, but was a retreat of the left wing of the French defence in almost its entirety. The retreat had commenced at Mons, where the enemy had directed his greatest force, later on being continued in the eastern part of the wing. General Joffre's strategic conception was to draw the enemy on at all points until a favourable position was created from which to assume the offensive. Whilst closely adhering, however, to this conception, the French Commander found it necessary to modify from day to day the methods by which he sought to attain this object, owing to the development of the enemy's plans and changes in the general situation. So, in conformity with the movement of the French forces, the British retirement continued practically from day to day, and, although they were not severely pressed by the enemy, rearguard actions took place continuously.

On September 1 the British, when retiring from the thickly-wooded country to the south of Compiègne, found themselves involved in a sharp cavalry action. At first they lost a horse artillery battery, and several officers and men were killed and wounded, but with the help of some reinforcements they not only recovered their own guns, but succeeded in capturing several of the enemy's. Another somewhat severe rearguard action took place when our men got into some very difficult forest country near Villers-Cotterets, the Horse Guards Brigade suffering considerably in this instance.

The river Marne had been crossed by the British forces between Lagny and Signy-Signets by September 3. Up to this day Field-Marshal French, at the request of General Joffre, had been defending the passages of the river as long as possible and had blown up the bridges in its front; now, again at the request of the French Commander-in-Chief, the British force continued its retirement to a point some twelve miles in the rear, with a view to taking up a second position behind the Seine. So keen was the pursuit of the enemy that they already had thrown bridges over the Marne and crossed the river in considerable force, and were threatening the Allies all along the line. It being no part of the plan of the Allies to take the offensive yet, they contented themselves with several small, but inevitable, outpost actions.

The enemy were now, by September 5, across the Marne in great force, practically at the gates of Paris; but though the original plan of the Germans was undoubtedly to advance south direct upon Paris, yet it would seem that, about September 4, they changed their plans. Their main columns were now found



by air reconnaissance to be moving in a south-easterly direction, generally east to a line drawn through Nanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq. The British forces had fallen back upon the Seine.

The day of September 4 marked the culminating point of the great crisis. The French Government, the Ministers and the leading banks had already abandoned Paris for Bordeaux on the previous day. This abandonment of the capital was not, however, anything more than a measure of precaution, and part of a plan on the part of the French Government to give a new impulse to the national defence. General Gallieni was appointed Military Governor of Paris and Commandant of the army of Paris, with instructions to defend the city against the menacing invader. " These instructions," said the General in a proclamation he at once addressed to the citizens, " I shall carry out to the last letter."

Maubeuge, a fortified city near Mons which the British had been forced to leave to itself at the commencement of their retreat, was still bravely holding out. Ever since the commencement of the battle of Mons this town had been continuously bombarded by the Germans with extreme violence, but, notwithstanding three of its forts had been destroyed, it had so far successfully resisted the assault.

In London, at the Foreign Office, the following important

declaration had been signed on behalf of Britain, France, and Russia:

> The undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments, hereby declare as follows:—The British, French, and Russian Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war.
>
> The three Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies.
>
> In faith whereof the undersigned have signed this declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.
>
> Done at London in duplicate, this 5th day of September, 1914.
>
> E. Grey
> Paul Cambon
> Benckendorff.

During the latter days of this great retreat, the British had not been engaged in any great battles, though rearguard and outpost actions were taking place continuously, and the enemy was for ever threatening them either at the rear or on their flanks. The whole retreat, in fact, was more like one great battle lasting many days and at times raging furiously, and dying away towards the end.

The weather was generally very hot—almost tropical. When not fighting, or indulging in the rare treat of a rest, or pushing through the country at night by forced marches, the army would be marching somewhat wearily and oppressed by the heat, but nevertheless with bright, lively and brave spirits, along some broad sunny French road, bordered on either side by tall poplars, and by a vast cultivated plain on which from distance to distance little groups of harvesting girls and old men were busy, as if they lived in the most peaceful region of a peaceful country. The horizon would be edged and capped here and there by hill ranges and wooded crests. When the march attained an elevation in the road, a backward glance would reveal the troops covering the road for a tremendous distance to the rear like some huge dream-serpent. The equipment and the commissariat were always perfect. But the high road was not always the path of the army. Dispatch riders would gallop up to and along the column to the commander; there would be conferences among the officers and orders would be passed down the line; the men would then leave the road and pass across the adjoining fields. In time, perhaps, they would hear the thunder of artillery or

the sharp detonations of rifle-shots. The pace would now be accelerated. The men would run, alert and apprehensive, and eventually would reach and climb the hills that in their march they had seen bordering the horizon. Having reached the summit, they would instantly drop down, so concealing themselves and their movements, but with a clear view of a yet more distant and hitherto concealed range of hills, from which the enemy are fighting a division of the Allies in the plain between. The German artillery on the opposite hills can be distinctly seen, the men moving hither and thither shifting the guns. There are great flashes of fire succeeded by heavy re-echoing reports. Now our men on the crest of their hill send volley after volley in the direction of the enemy; our heavy guns have been prepared for action and our quick-firers begin to share in the general conversation. More troops ascend the hill and reinforce the first-comers. The German fire has now been directed to our hill, and the men who a little while since were light-heartedly marching along the sunny road find themselves in the midst of a hail of shell and shot. Curiously, though, these men are more light-hearted and enthusiastic than they were when, for the moment free from danger, they passed along the country road. Seizing every opportunity, the British make for the plain, and endeavour to occupy a distant spot as a step towards the enemy. A short run, then a drop into the grass to fire, and up again with another dash forward and yet another drop. So our force would gradually near the enemy. Comrades would fall once for all here and there, as some German bullets found their billets. Eventually the spot of ground, the object of the rush, would be attained, but only a comparatively few men arrive safely, the others who started in the dash having been left dead scattered on the intervening plain. Here the scene is horrible. Shells are falling, fired from the German artillery, exploding as they fall. Agonised, almost inhuman, cries follow, and one looks round to find five or six men so shattered as no longer to have any human semblance. Most, fortunately, are killed at once, and lie dead in peace. Some are not so fortunate: one man has both his legs blown off, and is still alive and conscious, imploring his comrades to kill him. But this small action, not to be dignified by the name of battle, is soon over. Our artillery in a very short time get the better of the German. A German battery which has been turned in our direction is struck by two shells simultaneously, the artillery-men at the guns being swept away and the two guns destroyed. Our infantry take advantage of the success, and with their rifles shoot as accurately and as coolly as though in

competition at a range. The effect is deadly; the enemy retreats.

A vivid picture of terrible German gun-fire was given to Mr. G. Renwick, the special correspondent of the *Daily Chronicle* at Boulogne, by a wounded soldier:

"The enemy were something under a kilomètre in front. It was two o'clock in the morning, dark, and with few stars about.

"Our officers came along—I should tell you that we were, at that particular spot, about 2,000 strong—and told us to lie down and sleep where we were.

"We were making ourselves as comfortable as possible, when a light or something betrayed us to the enemy. We had been getting a pounding that day, and only needed the word to go to sleep.

"Hardly were the first of us down on our backs than we found ourselves in an inferno of bullets. It was like a thunderclap bursting a few yards above us.

"We could do nothing. Down upon us the shrapnel bullets hailed; we went down by the score. Practically at the same time the enemy's maxims opened on us, and we were almost without shelter. From above and from in front the bullets rained. We could do nothing; we saw we were caught.

"Every now and again a flashlight flared in our eyes, making the thing more ghastly still. It flitted along our lines like a great ghost as it was; then in its track came a thicker hail of shrapnel and a deadlier shower of bullets from the maxims.

"We lay down, we crawled along, we got up, ran, but there was no getting out of the hail of bullets. 'Leave everything and retire' was the order, and there in the darkness we did what we could to carry it out. But each one could only act for himself.

"I don't know how long it lasted; possibly it did not last very long. But when there was some light to see by, I could see about a score of us wandering over the country."

Here the little soldier stopped, and, dropping his voice, began again.

"Yes, I think you can put it at thirty. At least my mate and I could find no more."

"Thirty! You mean survivors?"

"Yes, that's it. Thirty of us were left at the most—out of—two thousand. We were wiped out; that's all there's to it.

"It was the first time the German artillery really got at us. As a rule, their big gun fire was mighty poor, though they did go in for quantity."

The attack on our army near Charleroi was described to the same correspondent by another soldier as follows:

"At times we could hardly hold our rifles, they were so hot. Often we had no trenches, no cover of any sort. We had just to dig up a heap of earth a foot high or so and lying behind it, pelt away for all we were worth.

BLOWING UP A BRIDGE ACROSS THE AISNE AT SOISSONS

A small party of Royal Engineers endeavouring to stop the German advance, managed to place a charge, but one by one were killed by the German sharpshooters before they were able to light the fuse. One after another dashed forward to light the fuse; and as one man fell, another rushed to take up the task until the death-roll numbered eleven. Then for a moment the Germans ceased firing in sheer wonder, and in that moment the bridge was blown up, for the twelfth man, racing across the deadly zone where his comrades lay, lit the fuse—but the hero fell dead beside his gallant comrades.

" Our shooting, I can assure you, was as steady as though our men were at the rifle ranges, and ever so often in front of our positions we could see the dead accumulating in great heaps.

" Far away on my right I saw at one time the British cavalry charging. We took the risk, and looked up to see it. Upon my word! it was a magnificent sight.

" I was too far off to see what happened when they got home, which they did with magnificent dash. I don't think they lost heavily—at least, not very heavily—for we saw them get back again."

" And the Germans: what do you think of them? " I asked.

" Not a great deal, as shots; but the way they came on, again and again, throughout the day, was great. They're a brave lot, and it took us all our time to hold them back. They had such enormous numbers."

And let this also be noted to the credit of the enemy—it appears in the official report of " Eye-witness " :

During the rearguard action of the Guards Brigade on September 1 the Germans were seen giving assistance to our wounded.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD.,
LONDON AND AYLESBURY.