



DUKE
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY



FRIENDS OF
DUKE UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY

Frank Baker

Beutson Richard 78
St. Mary Le Bone Lane

London cop^d 6th 1785

~~N^o 757~~

N^o 700

~~N^o 364~~

~~Wetherby~~

~~N^o 9 Birch Lane
1795.~~







A
COLLECTION
OF
TRACTS,

Publish'd in Vindication of

*Mr. LOCK's Reasonableness of
Christianity, as deliver'd in the
Scriptures;*

And of his E S S A Y,

C O N C E R N I N G

Humane Understanding;

A Catalogue of the Tracts is in the
following Page.

By S A. B O L D E, *Reſtor of Steeple. Dorſet.*

London: Printed for A. and J. Churchill,
in Pater-noster-row, 1706.

GOLDEN

1849

RAILS

Wm. H. ...

...

...

...

...

...

...

R. B. A.
8687
c. 1

The C A T A L O G U E.

A Short Discourse of the True Knowledge of Christ Jesus: To which are added, Some Passages in the Reasonableness of Christianity, and its Vindication. With some Animadversions on Mr. *Edwards's* Reflections on the Reasonableness of Christianity; and on his Book, entituled, *Socinianism Unmasked*. Printed 1697.

A Reply to Mr. *Edwards's* brief Reflections, on a short Discourse of the true Knowledge of Christ Jesus: To which is prefix'd, A Preface, wherein something is said concerning Reason and Antiquity in the chief Controversies with the *Socinians*. Printed 1697.

Observations on the Animadversions (lately Printed at Oxford) on a late Book, entituled, *The Reasonableness of Christianity, as delivered in the Scriptures*. Printed 1698.

Some Considerations on the Principal Objections and Arguments which have been published against Mr. *Lock's* Essay of *Human Understanding*. Printed 1699.

A Discourse concerning the Resurrection of the same Body: With two Letters concerning the necessary Immateriality of *Created thinking Substance*. Printed 1705.

THE CATALOGUE

A

... of the ...
... of the ...
... of the ...
... of the ...

M

... of the ...
... of the ...
... of the ...
... of the ...

O

... of the ...
... of the ...
... of the ...
... of the ...

P

... of the ...
... of the ...
... of the ...
... of the ...

R

... of the ...
... of the ...
... of the ...
... of the ...

A SHORT
DISCOURSE
OF THE
True Knowledge
OF
CHRIST JESUS.

To which are Added;

Some Passages in the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. and its *Vindication*.

With some *Animadversions* on Mr. Edwards's *Reflections on the Reasonableness of Christianity*, and on his Book, Entitled, *Socinianism Unmask'd*.

By S. Bold, Rector of *Steeple, Dorset*.

For other Foundation can no Man lay than that is laid, which is Jesus Christ, 1 Cor. 3. 11.

LONDON: Printed for A. and J. Churchill, at the *Black-Swan* in *Pater-Noster-Row*. M DC XC VII.

125000219

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

LIBRARY

PHYSICS DEPARTMENT

5720 S. UNIVERSITY AVE.

CHICAGO, ILL. 60637

TEL: 773-936-3700

FAX: 773-936-3701

WWW.CHICAGO.EDU

PHYSICS DEPARTMENT

5720 S. UNIVERSITY AVE.

CHICAGO, ILL. 60637

Philip. III: 8.

Yea doubtless, and I count all things but loss for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord.

THE Apostle doth not here speak of any thing that was *proper* to himself either as an *Apostle*, or a *Christian* of an *extraordinary growth*, but what was *common* to him, with every *True Believer*, or *sincere Christian*. For these words are but part of the *Illustration* he annexes of that *Property* of true Believers or *Christians* he had laid down in the last Clause of the third Verse of this Chapter, who *have no confidence in the Flesh*.

In the seventh Verse he relates the different *Opinion* and *Judgment* he had of Matters with relation to *Justifica-*

tion and *Salvation* before he was *Converted*, from what he had of them after his *Conversion*. Those things which before his *Conversion* he reckon'd *Gain*, *i.e.* which he thought were the *matter* of a Persons *Righteousness*, the things which being enjoy'd would *Justifie*, and render a Person *acceptable* to God, and warrant his being *confident* of *Salvation*, he accounted *Loss*, after he was effectually *Regenerated*: Because he then knew that *Christ* alone is our *Righteousness*, and that he only can *save* us.

In these words he declares again, with great *Earnestness*, that he looks upon the possession and enjoyment of all those things he formerly thought would *constitute* Persons *Righteous* and *Happy*, and every thing else *distinct* from *Christ*, that any can place their confidence in, to be of no more *moment* and *consideration* to these *Purposes* than heaps of *Dung*, and *Dross* can be to the *nourishing* of a Man's *natural Life*, and to the making of him *Wealthy*. And as *Christ* alone is our *Righteousness*, and he only

only can *justify* and *save* us, so it is by the *knowledge of Christ*, that we come to be *interested in Him*, and to receive from him *those*, and all those singular and inestimable *Benefits and Blessings* He is *intrusted to dispence*. This knowledge of Christ Jesus is so adapted to this end, hath such a *Connexion* with it, by *Divine Ordination* and *Appointment*, hath such an *Excellency* in it, such a *Power, Efficacy*, and *Virtue* for the deriving of these Mercies and Blessings to us from *Christ*, that all other things are perfectly *insignificant* to this purpose, but when *depended on for Justification and Salvation*, are a very great *Detriment and Damage*.

In order to a more distinct understanding of these words, I will briefly consider four things in them, and then conclude with shewing some *Uses* we should make of what shall be discoursed.

The Four things I shall briefly consider are, First, *The matter of this Knowledge the Apostle speaks of*.

Secondly, *What kind of Knowledge it is of this point, which the Apostle*

doth thus magnifie and extol, and give such a preference to?

Thirdly, *Wherein the excellency of this Knowledge doth consist?* And,

Fourthly, *The account the Person who knows Christ Jesus aright, doth make of all other things.*

First, I shall consider what is the matter of this Knowledge the Apostle here speaks of, or what is the object to be known. This he expresseth in these words, Christ Jesus, that is, that the Person God had promised to send into the World to be the Saviour of Sinners, was Him who is generally known, and was signally distinguished from other People by this Name Jesus; or that He who is commonly known, and peculiarly spoken of by this name Jesus, is the Person God did design, and promise to send into the World to be the Saviour of Sinners. That this Jesus is the Christ, the Person God hath anointed and commissioned to this Office; and that He is the only and the all-sufficient, and most gracious Saviour of Sinners. That Jesus is the Christ (the Person God hath commissioned to be the Saviour of Sinners)

is the *Proposition* I conceive the Apostle here speaks of, the object of that Knowledge here commended. And this is the *Gospel* strictly and most properly considered, *Luk. 2. 10, 11. Act. 4. 12.* The fulfilling of the *Prophecies* which went before concerning the *Messiah*, or the Person God had promised to *send*, in this *Jesus*; and his declaring that he was that *Person*, and doing *such things* to confirm the truth of what he *Taught*, as could not be wrought and effected but by the *extraordinary* and *immediate Power* of *God*, afford sufficient *Evidence* to persuade Men of the truth of this *Proposition*, that *Jesus is the Christ*. This I take to be the matter or object of that Knowledge the Apostle here speaks of. Not that I think a bare *speculative Knowledge* of this *Article* or *Proposition* is the Knowledge the Apostle doth thus *magnifie* and set such a *value* on. Therefore I shall consider,

Secondly, What kind of Knowledge of this *Proposition* it is, the Apostle doth here speak of. And it is such a Knowledge as doth effectually deter-

mine the Person, and cause him to *resign* up himself *entirely* to *Christ Jesus* to be saved by him in his *own way*. Such a knowledge of him, as makes the Person to *take* him for his *Lord*; so that he will use his *serious, honest, and best endeavours* to understand what he hath taught and revealed, and will *assent to, believe and observe* whatever he shall attain to know He hath taught or revealed; and will *depend* wholly on *Him* to receive from *Him* in his *own way*, the *benefits* He is *intrusted to dispence*. The notional and speculative knowledge of *Christ Jesus*, hath its *usefulness*, being the *Foundation* on which the other is builded, but it may be without the latter, and therefore is not *saving*, but the *latter* cannot be without the *former*, no more than a *Superstructure* can be without a *Foundation*. A Man may have a notional knowledge of a *Truth* that is of extraordinary *moment and usefulness*, and yet not be duly *affected* with it; his knowledge may have little or no influence on him, because he does not apply it to its proper *end*, he does not descend to consider how
much

much it doth concern himself. Were there a Person that could infallibly cure some certain *Distemper*, and the proof of this Truth were most strong and clear, so that there were no room for *doubt* and exception, a Person who does not apprehend himself annoyed with that *Distemper*, tho' he is satisfied that such a Person can infallibly cure it, will not be prevailed with, and determined by his knowledge, to yield up himself absolutely to his *Conduct*, tho' when he comes to be convinced that he is dangerously ill of that Disease, and that he cannot be cured any other way, but by committing himself entirely to that Person, his knowledge will have this effect on him, that he will *render* himself up entirely to his *guidance* and *management*. When we are *thoroughly sensible* that we are *Sinners*, under the *Curse of the Law*, and justly *obnoxious* to the most *heavy displeasure* and *wrath* of *Almighty God*, and that there is no way for our obtaining *Peace* with *Him*, *Pardon* and *Salvation*, but by *Jesus Christ*, then our knowing him to be the *only*, the *all-sufficient*, and a
 most

most compassionate and gracious Saviour of Sinners, will dispose and influence us to *resign up our selves* without *reservation* to his *Conduct*, and to *rely* and *depend* on *Him* to save us in his *own way*. He came to *seek and to save those who are lost*, who are truly *sensible* of their *lost estate*. All your *knowledge* will not avail you to *Salvation*, tho' you can *Discourse* ever so *accurately* on every *point* in your *Bible*, till it have this effect on you, to make you *resign up your selves unfeignedly* unto *Christ* as your *Lord*. But the Person who is brought to *this*, is *Christ's Disciple*, a true *Believer*, and real *Christian*, tho' as yet he does not know any other *Doctrine* *Christ* hath taught, but only engages *heartily* to use his best endeavours to *know* and *understand* his *Lord's Will*, and to assent unto and perform the *same*, as he shall attain the *knowledge* of *it*; and resolutely applies himself to *fulfil* and execute that *engagement* with all *Industry* and *Fidelity*. This is that which *constitutes* and makes a Person a sincere *Christian*, a real *Disciple* of *Christ*, and a true *Believer*. And his

his *regular* outward *signifying* and *testifying* of this, gives him a *Right* to the external *Denomination* of a *Christian*, &c. The true notional knowledge of Christ Jesus is the *same* for the *matter*, with the spiritual and practical knowledge of *Him*; but this latter makes the Person perceive the *usefulness* and *necessity* of *Christ Jesus* to himself, and begets in him *suitable Affections* to Christ. He who thus knows *Christ Jesus* is sensible, that He is the most necessary and useful *Good* to him, and therefore cannot but *love* him, *resign* up himself *entirely* to Him, *trust* in Him, and *labour* to understand and know his *Will*, that he may *explicitely* believe what he hath *taught*, and *actually* observe and perform what he hath *appointed* and *commanded*, that thus he may *approve* his *Fidelity*, and *obtain* the *ends* particularly or more especially intended by *his Lord*, in the several *instances* he shall *understand* to be taught by *Him*, relating either to *Belief* or *Practice*. He knows that *Christ Jesus* is *worthy* of all his *Service*, and therefore gives up himself unto Him, *implicitly* and
with-

without *exception*, to follow his *Conduct*, both as to *Faith* and *Obedience*. Thus when he finds or understands, that *Jesus Christ* hath taught that He is *God*, and that He commissioned his *Apostles* to teach *so*, and that they did it very expressly, he *heartily assents* to this *Truth*, and believes, that He is *God*, because He hath taught it. And his not being able to solve all *difficulties* that *curious* and *contentious People* may start about this *matter*; or to say much, or any thing concerning the *Mode*, or way how He is *God*, is no *obstacle* to his *firm* and *steadfast Belief* of it, seeing he knows *Christ* hath declared it; no more than his not being able to *reconcile* some *matter of practice* he understands *Christ* hath enjoyned him, to his *worldly Interest*, can excuse him from performing it. Because his *Resignation* to *Christ* was absolute and entire in both respects, and he did not *Capitulate* with *Christ*, to believe nothing but what he should be able to *dive* to the *bottom* of, and give a *rational account* of the *mode* and *manner* of, or to *obey* him only in such *Instances* as
 he

he should know how to reconcile to his *worldly Interest* and *Convenience*. What falls short of this practical knowledge of *Christ Jesus*, is not in Scripture account the *knowledge of Christ Jesus*. *He that saith I know him, and keepeth not his Commandments is a lyar, and the truth is not in him,* 1 John 2. 4. This is that knowledge of *Christ Jesus*, the *excellency* whereof is *such*, it *obscures* and *stains* the *Glory* of all things which can come in *competition* with it. So that the true Christian accounts all things but *loss* (as the Apostle expresseth himself) *for the excellency of it*. Which shall lead me to consider,

Thirdly, *In what the excellency of this knowledge of Christ Jesus doth consist*. Concerning which I shall mention these particulars:

1st. *In the excellency of its object*, (which is the revelation or discovery God hath made that *Jesus Christ* is the *Person* He hath sent and commissioned to be the *Saviour of Sinners*) and in the *proportion* it hath to the *special Intendment* of that *Revelation*,

on, viz. that we may resign up our selves intirely to him, and thereby be made his Disciples, and be interested in Him, as our Saviour; or more briefly, that we may believe in Him, and be saved by him, or be made *true Christians*, and *partake* of the *Benefits* which belong to *them*. It is not the bare knowing that there was such a *Person* as Jesus Christ in the *World*, no nor that He was the *Son of God*, and *assumed our Nature*, &c. but that He was *sent, appointed, and commissioned* by God to be the *Saviour of Sinners*. This is the *immediate*, the most *proper*, and *strict object* of *Christian knowledge*, and saving Faith. Had the Son of God, meerly of his own *accord*, assumed our *Nature*, performed the most *perfect Obedience* to the *Law*, and suffered *Death* for our sakes, how great soever the *intrinsic value* of his *Condescension*, *Performances*, and *Sufferings* would have been, this would not have *constituted* or made Him the *Saviour of Sinners*: Nor would our *knowing* and *believing* all this; have *availed* us to *Justification* and *Salvation*. That
 which

which makes what He *did* and *suffered* to be accepted for us, and makes Him the *Saviour* of Sinners, was his being appointed and commissioned to be their *Saviour*. And it is our knowing Him to be the Person that God did send and commission for this purpose, and knowing it so, as to answer the design of this Revelation, which doth make us *Christians*, and interest us in Him as our *Saviour*. For I have given them the words which thou gavest me, and they have received them, and have known surely that I came out from thee, and they have believed that thou didst send me, John 17. 8.

2dly. In that it is a special effect and fruit of the Holy Spirit of God, I will give them an Heart to know me, that I am the Lord, and they shall be my People, and I will be their God, for they shall return unto me with their whole Heart, Jer. 24. 7. Wherefore I give you to understand, that no Man speaking by the Spirit of God, calleth Jesus accursed, and that no Man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy Ghost, 1. Cor. 12. 3. Tho' the
Lord

Lord Jesus doth not oblige himself not to give forth the special Influences of his Holy Spirit to any, but in and with their serious using their natural Abilities, and the common assistances of the Spirit generally afforded, in those ways he hath appointed, in order to Peoples partaking of his supernatural Aids and Blessings, yet he *obliges us* thus to make use of the *means* he hath *ordained*; and we have not any reason to expect these supernatural effects any other way. When he does *extraordinarily*, and out of his common and *Instituted* way, work on, awaken, convince, and effectually convert Sinners, as he did *Saul*, when Travelling on such a wretchedly wicked design towards *Damascus*, he does it not as *King* and *Ruler*, but as *absolute Lord*. And when we find our selves so inlightned, and powerfully wrought on, in the use of *Instituted means*, that we are effectually determined to yield up our selves intirely to Christ, as our Lord, this effect is from the *special influence of the Holy Spirit*, and must be attributed unto *Him*. Faith is the gift of God,

tho'

tho' ordinarily conferred along with our making use of the natural Powers we are endued with in the ways and methods instituted for this end, as reading and hearing the Word, Meditation, Prayer, &c. There is no natural *connexion* between our employing of our natural Abilities and Powers in these ways, and this *happy effect*, for God hath not obliged himself to bestow *this Blessing* by the Rules and Laws he hath established to observe, in the ordinary way of his Providence, in ordering and governing the World, so far as doth concern and relate to Man. The *connexion* between them is purely *Gracious*, by virtue of the *Laws and Rules* He hath *fixed* to proceed by, in the *dispensation of his Grace*. We may by that *concurrence* God affords in the way of his *ordinary Providence*, attain to as great a measure of speculative, notional, discursive *knowledge* of what the Gospel doth teach, as we can of those matters which are treated of in *other Books*, provided we do *proportionably* apply our *Study* to them. But when in our using our natural Abilities these ways,

we are brought to close unfeignedly with *Christ*, and *yield* up our selves *entirely* to his *Conduct*, this is owing to a *divine Influence* vouchsafed beyond the *ordinary course* of *Providence*, and is from God's proceeding with us according to his *Law of Grace*. The' we cannot apprehend in what way the Spirit doth *effect*, and bring about this excellent and happy *change* in us, so as certainly to *distinguish* what is done by the *Spirit*, from what is done by our *natural Abilities* co-operating; yet we know by the *effect* that He hath exerted his *wonderful Power*; and to Him must all the *Glory* be *ascribed*, who is the *principal agent* in this business.

3^{dly}. *In the singular and inestimable Benefits* which do accrue unto us upon our thus knowing of *Christ Jesus*. Of which Benefits I will now name but these two.

I. *God's justifying of us, and owning us to be in the Covenant of Grace*. By *Justification* I do mean something more than his *Pardoning* all our past Sins, even a *change* of our *State*, his *acquitting* and *discharging* us from
the

the *Law of Works*, as a *Covenant of Life*. Were all my Sins freely pardoned, and I left under the *Law of Works*, this *Pardon* would not *avail* me any thing, if my *Life* were at all *continued*, for my very next *performances* would fall so *short* of what that *Law requires*, I should immediately be in the *same state* I was in before my *Pardon*. We are all under the *Law of Works* till we do so know Christ Jesus, as to yield up our selves unreservedly unto his *Conduct*. Indeed, we are not now so under the *Law of Works*, as our first Parents were immediately on their *Transgression*, and before that *gracious Promise* that *the Seed of the Woman should break the Serpent's head*, was given them, for till then they were purely under the *Law of Works*, and had no *remedying Law* to make use of for their *Relief*. We are naturally still under that *Law of Works*, only we have this *advantage*, that now there is a *Law of Pardon*, or a *remedying Law concurrent* with it, if we will make use of it. But till we comply with, and accept of that *Law, i.e.* do

yield up our selves absolutely to *Christ Jesus*, the other Law stands in full force against us.

Our so knowing of *Christ Jesus* as hath been mentioned, is our *actual consenting* to the *gracious tender and offer* God hath made to all Sinners, without excepting any, whereby we come to be really in the *Covenant of Grace*. What is ordinarily called the *Covenant of Grace*, is only the *Declaration and Testament* which *Christ* hath made of the *Grace of God*, or the *Blessings* he will bestow on all those who do or shall *unfeignedly consent* to yield up themselves *absolutely to Him*. It is a *Covenant* only with those who do thus *consent* unto it. And upon our *giving* up our selves thus to *Christ*, God owns us to be in *Covenant* with Him. Of this *Covenant Christ Jesus* is the *Mediator*, to whom it pertains to see, that *both parts* of the *Covenant* thus consented to be *performed*. We are to do what is assigned to us, *i. e.* we must *follow Christ's Conduct* in every thing we shall know he hath *ordained* for us, and therefore must use our *honest endeavours* to understand what

what he hath *taught*; and upon our doing *so*, we come to be *entitled* to the *Benefits* God hath *promised*, which *Christ* is also to see *accomplished*, and made *good* unto us. When we know *Christ Jesus* aright, we are *delivered* from the *power* of *darkness*, and *translated* into the *Kingdom* of his dear *Son*, Col. 1. 13.

2. *Power* to perform such *Obedience* as God will *graciously* accept. This *knowledge* of *Christ Jesus*, which is a *special* effect of the *Holy Spirit*, is not a *dead* notion, but the *Light of Life*, a *divine* *vital* principle, which hath an *influence* on all the *Powers* of the *Soul*, and *Faculties* of the *whole Man*, *spiriting* and *directing* them all in a *good* measure, in ways *suitable* to its own *Nature*, and the *end* for which it is *given*. It *possesseth* the *Soul* with a *predominant* *Love* to *Christ*, and *influences* the *Person* to *labour* after a *Conformity* to Him. It puts the *Person* upon *considering* and *enquiring* what things *He*, whom he hath taken for his *Lord* hath *revealed*, what he doth *Command*, and in what *manner* it *behooves* him, now he hath thus *resigned* himself to Him, to be-

have himself; and it furnishes him with ability to execute the same, by deriving fresh supplies of strength from that Holy Spirit who is the Author of this divine vital Principle. It disposeth and enclineth him to do those good Works Christ hath commanded him, and to use those means Christ hath enjoyned, in order to his receiving greater measures of the influences of the Holy Spirit, Eph. 2. 10. Such a Person's Good Works and Obedience are accepted with God, not because of their intrinsic worth, but only for the merit of Christ, who hath procured the Law of Grace, and is the mediator of the new Covenant. Our best Works cannot merit Salvation, that is the purchase of Christ's Blood. We are justified and saved by Faith, and that is the Gift of God; so that we have nothing to boast of, tho' very much for which we are to be thankful. Our good Works are an evidence of the truth of our Faith, and that our knowledge of Christ is of the right kind: And such is the Grace of God through Christ, that the more we abound in them, the greater shall our

Reward

Reward be; not because of their *Merit*, but because of his *gracious Promise*, assigning *degrees of Glory*, in proportion to our *abounding in new Obedience*. We do not derive *Power* from *Christ* to *merit* any thing for our selves, but we receive from Him *Power* to perform such *Obedience* as shall for *his sake* be *accepted* and *rewarded*. Upon our performing such *Obedience*, we shall receive *freely* the *Blessings* He hath *merited*, and which for his sake are made over to us in the *Covenant of Grace*. Our *Works of Righteousness* and *Goodness* do not make us *Righteous* and *Good*, but they prove and discover us to be *so*, *i. e.* that we are endu'd with a *divine Principle*, have our *Natures changed*, and do *know Christ Jesus aright*, as *vital acts* do not make a *living Creature*, but they prove that the *Creature* which performs them, hath a *principle of Life* from which those *acts* do flow.

4thly. Another excellency of this knowledge is, that it puts a check to *vain Curiosity*, to a search after empty and less necessary *Speculations*, and de-

livers us from all carnal and groundless Confidence, and engages us to a commendable Diligence, by determining our enquiries after such things as are most certain and true in themselves, and will be most useful and profitable unto us, by advancing us both in intellectual and moral Accomplishments and Perfections. For it obliges us to employ our honest and best endeavours to *understand*, and make a *right use* of what *Jesus Christ* hath taught and revealed; which are matters of such excellency, that all other things are of little account with those who understand the use and importance of these, as the Apostle plainly testified, when he said, he accounted all things *but loss*, &c. Which brings me to consider,

Fourthly, What account he who knows *Christ Jesus* aright doth make of all other things. The Sence a sincere Christian hath of the excellency of this *knowledge*, discovers it self in the great alteration it makes in his *Opinion* and *Judgment* of all other things from what they were before. He doth set now a *just estimate* upon
all

all worldly Enjoyments, and outward Privileges relating to Religion, and external performances in Religion, according to their several Natures, Places, and Ranks, to their use and ends. He does not absolutely condemn them, as evil in themselves, or as altogether useles to any good purposes, for should he *do so*, he would be *faulty*. He owns them to be the good Gifts of God, that a very good use may be made of them, is thankful to God for them, if he enjoys them, and *praiseth God* for bestowing them on others. He acknowledges they have a beauty and excellency considered in their proper place and season. But then he esteems them as the Apostle did, as altogether useles to the business here spoken of, *viz.* to be the matter of our Confidence, yea, extremely hurtful when depended on for Justification. To be but loss, yea dung when compar'd with, and set in opposition to this knowledge of Christ Jesus, which hath an excellency in it, unspeakably greater than all other things have, and which alone can avail and profit us to Justification and

Sal-

Salvation. That *divine Light* which discovers *Christ Jesus* to a Person, as the Person commissioned by God to be the Saviour of Sinners, and effectually causeth him, from a sense of his own Sin and Guilt, to yield up himself entirely to Him, to be saved by Him in his own way, doth discover all other things to him in such a *true* and *disparaging manner*, that he plainly perceives they cannot bear any *proportion* with *Christ*; and therefore he accounts them to be *loss*, as to the business of *Justification*. If I do not esteem *Christ Jesus* worthy enough to be the *sole object* of my *dependance*, I do *not know him aright*. And if I set up any thing in the World, as that I will trust to, and depend on for *Justification*, more than *Christ*, or equally with Him, I acknowledge a greater, or an equal virtue and efficacy in that, with what I pretend to believe is in *Christ* for this purpose. Or if I depend on any thing together with *Christ*, tho' in an *inferiour degree*, I do not take him to be the *only and all-sufficient Saviour of Sinners*, and so have not that knowledge of *Christ*

Christ Jesus here spoken of. Indeed, there are *other things* we may depend on, and make the *ground* of our *Perswasion* and *Confidence*, that we are *Justified* and shall be *Saved*, as those which are *sure*, *certain*, and *never-failing Evidences* of our *Interest* in *Christ*, as our *Saviour*, and that we do know Him aright. But there is not any thing but *Christ* and his *Righteousness*, we may trust to, and depend on for *Justification* and *Salvation*, *i. e.* as *that*, for the *sake of which* we shall be *Justified* and *Saved*.

From what hath been discoursed we may take notice,

First, *That Persons may have great Measures of Speculative Knowledge concerning Christ Jesus, and what he hath taught, and not be True Christians.* The Apostle indeed doth tell us, that *whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God*, which is the same with his being a *True Christian*, 1 *John* 5. 1. but it is evident, beyond all doubt, by his following discourse, that he doth not speak of a bare *specula-*

culative Knowledge, but of such a Knowledge and Faith as I have been giving an account of. Such a Knowledge or Belief that Jesus is the Christ, that is, the *Person God hath commissioned to be the Saviour of Sinners*, as doth effectually cause a Person to resign up himself entirely to Him, doth constitute him a *True Christian*. Whatever Knowledge or Faith People may have, which falls short of this, will not profit them to *Justification*, nor have a due effect and influence on their Lives. The most *pompous Presences* will not prevail for our *acceptance* with Christ, where this is wanting, *Mat. 7. 22, 23*. Therefore,

Secondly, *We ought to make a thorough and impartial search concerning our selves, whether we be true Christians*. Whether we are so fully persuaded that *Jesus is the Christ*, that we do *sincerely* yield up our selves, without any *reservation* to follow his *Conduct*. It is not enough that we call our selves *Christians*, and pretend to own him for our *Lord*, as *Mat. 7. 22, 23*. discovers. But we must justify the *Truth* of our owning him to be

be *our Lord*, by employing our selves heartily to *understand* what He hath taught, and to *believe*, and make *such use* of what we attain to *know* He hath taught, as we shall perceive he intends and appoints. For,

Thirdly, *Tho' a right knowledge of this one point, that Jesus is the Christ, doth constitute and make a Person a Christian; yet there are many points Jesus Christ hath taught and revealed, which every sincere Christian is indispensibly obliged to endeavour to understand, and make a due use of.* When a Person becomes a True Christian, he doth resign himself (as you have been told) entirely unto *Christ Jesus* as his *Lord*, and obligeth himself, without any reservation, to use his *serious, honest, and sincere endeavours* to know what he hath revealed, and to *assent* unto, and make *such use* of what he shall attain to *know* he hath revealed, as the *nature, or particular intendment* thereof (so far as he shall know the same) doth *direct*. He doth not *capitulate* and *compound* with *Christ*, that he will assent unto, and make such use as he orders, of *just*
such

such a *number* of *Articles*, but will be excus'd from concerning himself to *extend his knowledge, or practice any further*. It is out of my *Reach* (and I am perswaded it is out of the reach of any Man, or Body of Men) to assign a *precise number* of *Articles* which are necessary to be *explicitly known* and believed by all *sincere Christians*, and *beyond* which no Christian is obliged to endeavour to *proceed* in his *Faith* and *Obedience*. Peoples *Capacities*, *Opportunities*, and *Advantages* are very *various* and *different*. Many things may be *necessary* for some Christians to *believe*, which are not *necessary* to be believed by *others*; because some do attain to the knowledge of them, and a great many more may never attain to the knowledge of them, and this not because of any *faulty omission* or *neglect* to use their *honest endeavours* to understand what *Christ* hath made known to the World, but from *something else* which will not be *reckoned* to them for a *fault*. I think a certain number of *Articles* cannot be fixed on (besides this, that *Jesus is the Christ*) which
 we

we may *peremptorily* determine must of necessity be explicitly known and believed, or *no Person can be saved*. For the *belief* of the other *Doctrines* Christ hath taught, doth not constitute or make a Person a *True Christian*.

Perhaps some may be now ready to say, *that's well*, for then we are *safe* tho' we be *Ignorant*, and continue *Ignorant* of all the *Doctrines* Christ hath taught, besides this, that *Jesus is the Christ*; or if we should come to know them we are *safe*, tho' we refuse to *believe* them, and make that *use* of them Christ *appoints*; for we do believe most firmly that *Jesus is the Christ*, and so we are *True Christians*, and therefore *safe*, and need not trouble our selves about *knowing* or *believing* any thing more.

Nay, now you are *out*, most dangerously and wretchedly *out*. Believe as much as you *can*, besides this *Article*, your belief will not make you a *True Christian*. It is the *right knowledge* or belief of this *Article*, that *Jesus is the Christ*, that makes a Person a *True Christian*. But the believing of *this*, doth not *exclude* your be-

believing of other *Articles*, or *discharge* you from any obligation to believe *other points*, or make your believing of other matters *needless*. But it brings you under an *indispensable obligation* to endeavour to know and believe *more*. Tho' the belief of other points is not *necessary* to constitute a Person a *True Christian*, yet *other things* are *necessary* to be believed by him that is a *True Christian*. The true Christian is obliged to use his best endeavours to know what Christ hath revealed, and to assent unto, and make a right use of what he attains to know Christ hath revealed. And if you do not do *thus*, you do not *approve* your selves *True Christians*, you do not acquit your selves as true Christians ought, and must acquit themselves. It you either *neglect* to enquire after, and to use your honest endeavours to know what Christ hath revealed, or *refuse* to assent to and make a *good use* of what you *know* he hath revealed, you have just reason to *conclude* you are not *True Christians*, and do not *know* Christ Jesus *aright*, whatever you affirm in your words.

There

There are many things Christ hath taught and revealed so *plainly*, so *clearly*, so *distinctly*, you cannot but know *some* of them, if you *seriously* endeavour to know what He hath *revealed*; and what you know he hath revealed, you must assent to and *make use of*, if you do *rightly know* and believe Him to be the only Saviour of Sinners.

If it be now ask'd what are those particular Points or Articles Christ hath revealed, which are necessary for Christians to endeavour to know, and which being known to be revealed by Him they must indispensably assent to, and make use of: I answer, that what Christ hath revealed, is *propounded* to us in *certain words* which make distinct *Sentences* and *Propositions*, and being thus *considered*, they are *objects* of assent, and matters of *Faith*; tho' when we consider the nature of the Truths thus *propounded*, and their special Intendment, they may be conveniently reduced to particular *Heads*, to which particular *Denominations* may be assign'd. Some of these I will name, together with

some particular Propositions Christ hath taught, which properly belong to these Heads.

As 1st. Those Propositions which describe his *Person*, and instruct us *who he was*, whom God did *send* and *commission* to be the *Saviour of Sinners*. As that *He is God, the Son of God, the only begotten of the Father, God over all, blessed for ever*, John 1. 1. Rom. 9. 5. *The Son of God*, and the *Messias* are often used in the *New Testament*, as *Reciprocal Terms*, not as if the *strict Idea*, the term *Messias*, doth stand for, were the same *the Son of God* doth stand for, but because *He who is the Son of God is the Messias*, and *He who is the Messias is the Son of God*; both these Propositions I believe, because I find that *Christ Jesus* and his *Apostles*, by *his order*, did teach *them*. I do not think that *He was the Son of God* because *He was the Messias*, as the *Socinians* assert; nor yet, that *He was the Messias* because *He was the Son of God*, as some affirm in opposition to the former, but that *the Son of God was the Messias*, because the *Father* did not think fit to

commission any but his *own Son* to be the *Saviour of Sinners*. When a true Christian understands that Christ Jesus hath taught that *He is God*, He must assent unto it, and endeavour to use it for the nourishing, strengthening, and confirming of his *Faith in Him*. To assure him that He is *all-sufficient* to fulfil the Work He hath *undertaken*, and to which He is *commissioned*. And to direct and justify his *paying Divine Honour and Worship to Him*. So also that He *was made Flesh*, did assume our whole Nature, and was true Man, *Job. 1. 14. Mat. 1. 16. Luke 1. 31.* which may satisfy us, that He was in a *Condition and Fitness* for that part of His *Work* which did consist in His *Suffering* in our *stead* and on our *behalf*; and that He hath a most *tender* and *compassionate concern* for us, whose Nature He did *assume*, *Heb. 2. 14. Heb. 4. 15.*

2dly, Those Propositions which acquaint us with the *occasion* of His undertaking this *Office*, and being commissioned to *it*. As, that by the *Fall of our first Parents*, sin entered into the *World*. That we are all fallen short

of the Glory of God. And that we are by Nature the Children of Wrath, Rom. 3. 23. Rom. 5. 12. Eph. 2. 3. which may convince us more thoroughly, of our great need of such a Saviour, make us have more low and humble thoughts of our selves, and inspire us with most admiring and elevated gratitude and thankfulness, to and for Him.

3dly, Those Propositions which instruct us that the sending of this Saviour did proceed and spring purely from the Free Grace, Mercy, and Love of God. God so loved the World that He gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have everlasting life, &c. John 3. 16, 17. 1 John 4. 9. Eph. 2. 4. to the 9th. This is proper to engage our Admiration and Love. Here is room for our exerting them in their fullest strength and force.

4thly, Those Propositions which teach us in what ways, and by what steps He did, and doth execute, and will finally accomplish the Work and Office He Undertook. As, 1. By Revealing the Father, and making His Will

Will known to the World, John 1. 18. Heb. 1. 1, 2. John 15. 15. Whereby we are furnished with the most useful, pertinent, necessary and profitable Instructions; do know where we are to employ our Searches and Enquiries to the best purpose: And what we may without fluctuation, doubt, or wavering, and with the greatest confidence entertain, and depend upon for their Truth.

2dly, *By fulfilling all Righteousness, and leading the most Innocent, unblemish'd, exact and holy Life, Mat. 3. 15. 1 Pet. 2. 21. Acts 10. 38. Thus He has set us an Example in His own Life. Hath visibly commended and discovered the amiableness of what He Commands and Enjoyns. And hath shewn us in the most convincing and obliging way, how we ought to demean and behave our selves. And hereby we perceive that He was admirably fitted for another part of what pertained to Him in His Estate of Humiliation, viz. making Himself a Sacrifice for our sins, Heb. 7. 26, &c.*

3dly, *By suffering very many hardships, innumerable reproaches, and indignities, enduring the Wrath of*

God, and actually dying in open view as a Malefactor on the Cross, offering up himself a Sacrifice to satisfy Divine Justice for the sins of the World, and giving his Soul a Ransom for Sinners; Acts 2. 23. and 36. Heb. 9. 26. 1 Pet. 3. 18. 1 Tim. 2. 6. which discovers the most execrable nature of Sin, how extremely loathsome and hateful it is to God, and therefore should be so to us. This manifests the Condescension and Love of Christ to us, in the most affecting manner that can be imagined. And is the most potent Argument to kindle and excite the truest Love in our Souls to Him, and calls for our exerting Love to Him in its most powerful actings, 2 Cor. 5. 14. 15.

4thly, By rising again from the dead the third day, 1 Cor. 15. 4. Rom. 1. 4. Rom. 4. 25. Hereby the Prophecies which were before concerning Him, and His own Predictions were most exactly verified and fulfilled. This gives a most certain undeniable demonstration that His Sacrificing of Himself, and his Death were accepted of God, and are prevalent for all the purposes for which they were intended.

This

This strengthens our *Faith* and *Hope* in *God*. And assures us of the *certainty* of our *Resurrection* at the *end* of the *World*, 1 Pet. 1. 21. Rom. 8. 11.

5thly, By *Ascending up into Heaven* in the *sight* of *His Disciples* (after He had given full proof of the truth of His *Resurrection*, and commissioned them to *Preach His Gospel* to all the *World*) That there He may in His *exalted Estate*, perform what further *pertains unto Him* as the *Saviour of Sinners*, Mark 16. 19. This assures us of the *efficacy* and *prevalence* of His *Intercession*, and the *solid ground* we have to *depend upon Him* for whatsoever He hath *warranted us to ask* in His *Name*, and *expect from Him*, Heb. 7. 14, 15. John 14. 1, 2, 3.

6thly, By *sending and giving forth the Holy Spirit* for the *purposes and ends* for which He hath *promised Him*, viz. for the *making of His Word and Ordinances effectual*, for the *Conversion of Sinners*, and the *Edification and Comfort* of true *Believers*, John 14. 16, 17, and 26. And here by the way we may take notice, that He hath taught how we are to *conceive of*

the *Holy Spirit*, certifying that *He is God*, Acts 5. 3, 4. 2 Cor. 3. 16, 17. Now when a true Christian understands, that *Christ Jesus* hath given this account of the *Holy Spirit*, He is as *much obliged* to believe it, as He is to believe that *Jesus is the Christ*; and when he understands that *Christ* hath taught that the *Father, Himself*, and the *Holy Ghost* are God, that He saith such things of *them*, and requires such *Homage* and *Worship* to be paid unto *them*, as are *peculiar* unto *God*, and certifies that these *Three* are *One*, (Matth. 28. 19. 1 John 5. 7.) He is obliged to assent unto and believe this *Truth*, as well as any thing else that *Christ* hath taught. It is as hard for me to reconcile a Persons denying, or not believing *this*, when he knows that *Christ Jesus* hath taught *it*, with his being a *sincere Christian*, or having *unreservedly resigned himself up to Jesus Christ*, as any Man can pretend it is to him, to tell how *these three can be God*, and yet there be but *one God*. I believe that the *Father, Son*, and *Holy Spirit* are God, because I find that *Christ Jesus* hath taught *so*.

And

And if any Man can pretend he hath ground to believe this *Article* to be *false*, or to *with-hold* his *assent*, when he knows that Jesus Christ hath *taught* it, he cannot with *colour*, pretend he has just reason to believe that *Jesus* is the *Messias*, nor to believe any *one* point upon his *Authority*. For if we question the *Truth* of any *thing* we know He *taught*, we have the like *reason* to *question* the *Truth* of every *thing* He *taught*. He that is upon such *Terms*, can hardly deserve to be accounted a *true Christian*. He must be *extraordinarily soft* and *favourable* to himself, if he can *persuade himself* that is *one*. If I were not fully *persuaded* that *Christ Jesus* understood the *Divine Nature*, and knew how to *speak* of it, better than any *meer Man*, I should not take him to be *my Lord* and *Saviour*. It may be some will say, they do believe what *Christ Jesus* hath *taught*, but they cannot believe the *Doctrine* of the *Trinity* as it is taught in certain *Creeds*, which are but of *Humane Composure*. To such I would say, if you really know, and heartily believe all that *Christ* hath
taught

taught concerning this matter, it is as much as I can desire, and as much, as you ought to believe concerning it. But tho' other words are now ordinarily used in teaching of this *Doctrine*, than are used about it in the *Holy Scriptures*; yet the *Doctrine* is but the same which *Christ* taught. The other Words and Terms which are now used, do not add any thing to his *Doctrine*; they were not originally intended to make the *Doctrine* more perfect than *Christ* delivered it. The *Doctrine* continued as it was taught in the *Holy Scriptures*, till some presumptuous (not to say malicious) Persons assumed to themselves to affix such a sinister Interpretation and Construction to the Words of *Christ*, as did exceedingly alter His *Doctrine*, very much depreciating *Christ* Himself and the *Holy Spirit*, degrading *Christ* into a meer Man (though He Himself taught that He was God) and teaching that the *Holy Spirit* was but the Power or Virtue of God, and not God. When this Method was used to corrupt the Faith of *Christ*, sincere Christians found it expedient to make use of
other

other Words, which have been successively retained. But they used not these words, with a design to teach more than Christ had taught, only to deliver what He had taught, with a denial of that corrupt Sense false Teachers had stampt upon His Words. So that the Doctrine of the Trinity as it is ordinarily taught amongst us, is no other, than that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are God, as Christ hath taught they are, and that we do reject that Sense and Construction, which Men of their own Heads, and without any Authority have affixed to Christ's Doctrine. It is but the Doctrine Christ hath taught, with an opposition to, and denial of that Addition of Words, and Diminution of Sense, which other People had introduced touching that which Christ had taught.

To say that this Doctrine is *contrary to Reason*, is in effect to deny that *Jesus is the Messias, or Christ*. Can the *Fountain of Light and Reason*, teach any thing that is *contrary to Reason*? Does not the *Messias*; He that was commissioned to teach Men the
Mind

Mind of God, know what is consonant to Reason, better than we do? It is not to be expected that People should in good earnest believe this Doctrine, till they are fully persuaded that Jesus is the Christ, and when they heartily believe that, there can be no ground to deny their assent to this, or any other Doctrine, they know he hath taught. We have this notice by Supernatural Revelation, that the Father is God, and that the Son is God, and that the Holy Ghost is God, which we could not know by the meer Light of Nature. Now if those who say this Doctrine is against and contrary to Reason, do mean no more, than that they find Christ hath revealed it, but they cannot understand any more concerning it, than what He hath revealed, they are in the right, but they would do well, to express their meaning by decent and proper Terms, which may signifie the Sense they have of their own and Humane weakness, and not throw Unworthy and Blasphemous Aspersions on a most certain Divine Truth and Doctrine. He that heartily believes that Jesus is the Christ, and

takes

takes Him *unfeignedly* for his *Lord* and *Saviour*, will believe whatsoever he knows *Christ* hath taught, and will be contented to wait to know more than He hath taught concerning any *Article*, till He shall be pleased to make a further discovery of it. Our knowing that the *Holy Spirit* who is promised, is God, affords us great encouragement to depend upon Him for; and to expect from Him *Aids* and *Assistances* suitable to our occasions, and such *Influences* as will render our *dutiful labours*, and endeavours *prosperous* and *successful*.

7thly, By coming at the end of the *World* in unconceivable *Glory*, at which time He will raise the dead, judge the *World*, and render to every one according to his *Works*, Acts 10. 42. Acts 17. 32. 2 Cor. 5. 10. This, if any thing, should keep us in a continual holy Awe of Him; and have a very powerful and good *Influence* upon our *Conduct* at all times, if we have any care for, or regard to our indisputably greatest *Interests*. And therefore true *Christians* should concern themselves very much to understand as particularly as they

they can, and make a good use of what Christ hath taught relating to what I shall hint unto you in the next place.

5thly, Those Propositions which acquaint us with the *Evil Acts* and *Vicious Inclinations* and *Lusts*, Here requires us to *abstain* from and *mortifie*; and the *moral Duties* He commands us to *perform*, as also in what manner it is His pleasure we *should do them*. These are either *general* or *particular*: Those that are *general*, oblige us to renounce all *corrupt affections*, and abstain from every *Wickedness* and *Sin*, and to exercise our selves in all the *Duties* we owe to *God*, our *Neighbours*, and *our selves*, without descending to mention particular instances, but engaging us to employ our enquiries about them, that we obtain as *distinct* a knowledge of them as we can; such are *Tit. 2. 11, 12.* *2 Cor. 7. 1.* Those which are *particular*, do name certain *Vices*, *Evil Acts*, and *Lusts* we must carefully *shun* and *avoid*, and *subdue* certain *Graces*, *Virtues*, and *good Acts*, we must employ ourselves in. These may be reduced to *three Heads*,

Heads, viz. Those which concern all Christians in common. Those which belong to them according to the several Relations they stand in unto others. And those which pertain to them according to the various Estates and Conditions the Providence of God doth place them in. We should endeavour to be as distinctly acquainted with these, as we can, that our Conduct may be Regular, Orderly, and Exact, and may beautifie and adorn our Profession. These make up the greatest part of that Revelation Jesus Christ hath made of the Will of God unto the World. These are dispersed through the whole Body of those Sacred Records which contain the Discoveries He hath made of the Father's Mind, so that we cannot attend to any page of the same, but we shall be sure to meet with some of them. Amongst all the things that Christ Jesus hath taught, these are the least disputed, but with profoundest Grief be it spoken, none are more neglected, and more contradicted in the Practices and Lives of the Many.

6thly. Those Propositions which relate what *Privileges* do pertain to them who do know *Christ Jesus aright*, which acquaint us what *Benefits, Advantages, and inestimable Blessings* such Persons do partake of at *present*, and may further expect with good *assurance* both in *this Life* and the *next*. As that they partake of the *Holy Spirit*, and are made his *Temples*, 1 Cor. 6. 19. Rom. 8. 9. Have all their Sins *Pardoned*, are *Justified* and admitted into the *new Covenant*, are *Sanctified*, and made partakers of the *Divine Nature*, Eph. 1. 7. 1 Cor. 6. 11. 2 Pet. 1. 3, 4. Rom. 3. 24. are made the *Children of God*, John 1. 12. Gal. 3. 26. Rom. 8. 14, 15. Have the *Holy Angels* to Minister, and do many *good Offices* to them, Heb. 1. 14. That all *occurrences*, even the most *afflicting* that shall be ordered forth unto them, shall be *over-ruled* to their best *advantage*, Rom. 8. 28. That their *Bodies* shall at the end of the World be raised *Glorious Bodies*, Phil. 3. 21. And that they shall inherit *Eternal Life* and *Happiness* in the *next World*, and have their *Glorious Recompences* ad-
vanc'd

vanced in *proportion* to what they *Suffer* for the *sake of Christ*, and the *improvement* they make in their *Obedience* unto Him at present, *2 Thes.* 1. 10. *Matth.* 25. 21, 34. These things, and every thing else which Christ hath taught of the *like Nature*, are very proper and powerful *Arguments* to quicken us to, and *animate* us in the *work and business* He doth *assign* us, whilst we continue in this *World*, and to support and *comfort* us under all the *Calamities* and *Sufferings* that may befall us *here*.

7thly. Those Propositions which inform us what *Ordinances* He hath *Instituted*, and in what *manner* they are to be *observed*: As *Baptism*, the *Ministry of the Word*, and his *Supper*, *Matth.* 28. 19, 20. *Eph.* 4. 11, &c. *Matth.* 26. 27, 28. *1 Cor.* 11. 23, &c. These are appointed to be used as *Pledges* and *Assurances* of the *Gracious Respect* God hath to those who *heartily believe* in *Christ*, as *Testimonies* of our *Submission* and *Love* unto our *Lord*; and as *means* by which we are to receive *greater measures* of the *Graces* and *Influences* of the *Holy Spirit*.

D Christ

Christ Jesus hath taught many *Propositions* relating to every one of these *Heads*, the knowing and understanding of *which*, will contribute much towards our arriving at as *clear, distinct, and full knowledge* of these *matters* as is *expedient* for us. And He hath taught very many *Propositions* which may be reduced more pertinently to other *Heads* to which proper *Titles* may be assigned. Yet,

4^{thly}, Tho' there is not any thing *Jesus Christ* hath taught; but it is *most certainly true*, and hath its *proper use*; there are *some things* of more *common and eminent Importance*; the *knowledge* of *which*, hath a most plain, direct, and immediate *tendency*, to nourish and *strengthen* our *Faith* in *Him*, to excite and maintain in us, *Devout, Pious, and Divine Affections*, and to assist and help us in *forming* our *Conversations* so, that they shall not only be *Innocent*, and *without Offence*, but *Exemplary*, and *worthy of imitation*. And *these* are the *matters* a *True Christian* should in the *first place*, and principally endeavour to be acquainted with, tho' he is not absolutely

solutely to confine himself to them, but must labour to obtain the knowledge of more, if he can, and to be continually growing in *True Faith* and *Godliness of living*. Therefore,

5thly, A good Collection of those *Propositions*, which are of the greatest moment to *True Christians* to have a good knowledge of, and which Christ and his Apostles did most of all insist on, and peculiarly commend to Peoples *special notice*, will be of great use to *True Christians*, in order to their attaining a more *ease* and speedy *Information* in matters which will be of *notable use* to them. Tho' we may not say to true Believers with reference to any *certain number* of *Articles*, as God Almighty doth to the *Waves of the Sea*, *Thus far shall ye go, and no farther*, nor positively determine that such a number of *Articles* must of *necessity* be explicitly understood and believed by every *True Christian*; yet their being provided with such a *Collection of Articles* well attested by the *Holy Scriptures*, would be very *serviceable*, and yield them much *advantage*, if they have not a *distinct*

notional knowledge of them, before they are effectually brought to believe or know (in the manner before related) that *Jesus* is the Person God appointed and commissioned, to be the *only Saviour* of Sinners. For,

6thly, This *advantage* doth accrue to People by their being *early* instructed in the *Doctrines* *Christ Jesus* hath taught, and obtaining a true *notional knowledge* of the main matters delivered in the *New Testament*, that when they come to know *Christ Jesus* *savingly* they do *immediately* believe those *Articles* in *another manner*, and make a *better use* of them than they did *before*. And thus they will be excused from a great deal of *Pains*, they must otherwise take, to get the knowledge of these *points*, before they can apply themselves, to make a *farther Progress*. Besides, the *notional knowledge* of such *Articles* if attended to, with any *tolerable Application*, will conduce very much to Peoples *Conviction*, and dispose them to submit themselves to *Jesus*, as the *Christ* and resign up themselves entirely to his *Conduct*.

7thly,

7thly, It is so far from being a *Blemish* and *Disadvantage* to the *Christian Religion*, that Christ Jesus hath taught so many *Articles*, it is its *inestimable excellency*. It is a *singular Benefit*, for which every good Christian ought to be very *thankful*. Indeed if no Man could be a *True Christian*, till he hath an *explicite knowledge* and belief of every thing Christ hath taught, then none but Men of *extraordinary parts* and *pains* could be *True Christians*, if any could be so. But the matter is so ordered, that nothing is made necessary to *constitute* a Person a *Christian*, but what the meanest of *Mankind* is capable of; and yet there is no *Indulgence* to *Sloth* and *Idleness*, nor *excuse* for *wilful Ignorance* in any, because there is nothing necessary to make a Person a *True Christian*, but his knowing that *Jesus* is the Person *God* hath sent, and *commissioned* to be the *only Saviour* of *Sinners*, so as to take Him *unfeignedly* to be his *Lord*. And this doth *indispensably* oblige him to use his *best endeavours* to know, and make a *right use* of what Christ hath *Revealed*. And He hath provided

provided so *abundantly* for the improving and bettering of our *Minds* and *Practices*, that how long soever we live, we may be *growing* and *increasing* in the knowledge of *those matters*, which will exceedingly improve and beautifie our *Intellectuals*, advantage and adorn our *Conversations* and *Lives*.

Therefore let us remember what the Wise Man saith, *Wisdom is the principal thing, therefore get Wisdom, and with all thy getting get Understanding*, Prov. 4. 7. Let us labour to understand aright the Doctrine of *Christ Jesus*, and get the knowledge of *Him* as our *Lord*, and endeavour continually to grow up more and more in the knowledge of *Him*, and of what *He* hath revealed. Then we shall know by *Experience*, that the *excellency* of this *knowledge* is such, that all that words can express concerning it, falls abundantly short of discovering the *whole Truth*. The *pleasure* that ariseth from the most accurate *discourse* concerning *Christ Jesus*, is as much short of what a *Person* perceives in *himself*, upon his
know,

knowing Christ Jesus *savingly*, as the *satisfaction* which springs from the most *Philosophical* description of *Honey*, is short of that pleasure *Jonathan* felt in *himself* when his *Eyes* were *opened*, and all his *faculties* revived upon his *tasting* it. The *excellency* of *Food* is unexpressibly better perceived by an *hungry Person*, when he finds himself *refreshed* and strengthened upon his *eating* and *digesting* it, than by any words that can be used to set forth its *Nature* and *Properties*. When you come to know Christ Jesus so, as to yield up your selves entirely to Him, you will be fully of *St. Paul's* mind, and account *all things but loss*, for the *excellency* of the knowledge of *Christ Jesus your Lord*.

Books

Books lately Printed for *Awnsham*
and *John Churchil.*

- T** *Alent's Chronological Tables*, fol.
Cambden's Britannia, fol.
Mr. *Boyl's General History of the Air*, 4^o
Machiavil's Works.
Sir *Roger L'Strange's Aesop's Fables*, fol.
Sir *Richard Baker's Chronicle* continued.
Mr. *Lock of Human Understanding*, fol.
———— of *Education*.
———— of *Money, Interest and Trade*.
Tanner's Notitia Monastica.
Bishop *Wilkins of Prayer and Preaching*,
enlarged by Dr. *Moor Bishop of Norwich*
and Dr. *Williams*.
Dr. *Hody of the Resurrection*.
Sir *W. Temple's Miscellania* compleat.
Dr. *Patrick's New Version of the Psalms*.
Gentleman's Religion, twelves.
Le Clarc's Logica, twelves.
Dr. *Leighton Arch-Bp of Glascow*, his *Sermons*;
Royal Grammar, &c. octavo.
Prince Arthur by Dr. *Blackmore*, fol.
Three several *Letters for Toleration*.
Bishop *Hopkins's 4 Vol. of Sermons* and other
pieces.
Selden's Table Talk, octavo.
A *Discourse concerning the Love of God*,
twelves.
Meriton's Guide for Surveyors of High-ways,
octavo.
An *Abridgement of Mr. Lock's Essay of Hu-*
man Understanding, by Mr. *Wynn*, octavo.

SOME
P A S S A G E S
I N T H E
Reasonableness
O F
CHRISTIANITY, &c.

P. A. S. A. O. S.

C. R. I. S. T. I. A. N. I.

SOME
PASSAGES
IN THE
Reasonableness
OF
CHRISTIANITY, &c.
AND ITS
VINDICATION.

With some

ANIMADVERSIONS

On Mr. *Edward's* Reflections on the Reasonableness of Christianity, and on his Book, Entituled, *Socinianism Unmask'd.*

By *S. Bold*, Rector of *Steeple, Dorset.*

LONDON: Printed for *A. and J. Churchill.* at the *Black Swan* in *Pater-Noster-Row,* MDCXC VII.

80 ME

PASSAGES

THE

RECOLLECTIONS

OF

CHRISTIANITY

AND

WINDICATION

WITH

A NEW EDITION

By the Author of the former Edition, and of the
"The Christian's Duty," &c. &c.
LONDON, Printed by J. DODD, in Pall-mall.

By the Author of the former Edition, and of the
"The Christian's Duty," &c. &c.

LONDON, Printed by J. DODD, in Pall-mall.
MDCCLXXII.

TO THE
READER.

AFTER I had Preached the foregoing Sermon, Mr. Edwards's Book against the Reasonableness of Christianity falling into my Hands, occasioned my perusing of that Treatise again a second time with more attention; Whereby I came to be furnished with a Truer, and more Just Notion of the main design of that Treatise, than I had, upon my looking over it Cursory presently after it was published.

To the Reader.

If the following Papers shall help any to understand the true State of the Controverſie betwixt thoſe two Celebrated Writers, and induce People to conſider more ſedately the Juſt grounds of our believing Jeſus to be the Meſſias, and the indiſpenſable Obligation thoſe who do believe in him are under, to ſearch after the Knowledge of what he hath Taught and Commanded; and to believe and obey the ſame, by Virtue of the aforeſaid Belief; I ſhall not be ſorry that I have ſpent a few days in reading deliberately the Books to which they Relate. I am a perfect Stranger to both Authors. I am not certain that I ever heard the Name of the Author of the Reaſonableneſs, &c. mentioned. I am perſuaded I never ſaw Mr. Edwards. But he is a Perſon for whom I have a Particular and Great Reſpect, becauſe of ſeveral Treatiſes he hath publiſhed, which do not abound with Magiſterial Rant, but diſcover him to be an Excellent Critick, a Perſon of great Reading, and good Judgment. I hope he will

To the Reader.

will oblige the Publick. with more Treatises, Enrich'd with such Solid Learning, as his former Books are replenished with, and beautified with that Calmness of Temper, which did peculiarly adorn his first Productions.

That there are more Truths taught in the New Testament than this, That Jesus is the Messiah, and which are therefore to be Learned and Believed, is most certain; and to make this Demonstrably Manifest (which I fancy was Mr. Edwards's great design) when it is denied, or called in question, is a very Laudable Undertaking, but it doth not at all affect the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. which excellently discovers what is to be believed, to make Men Christians, that hereby they may be engaged to acquaint themselves well with the True Reasons and Grounds of our believing that Point, and may not any longer wear the Profession of Christianity, as they do their Cloaths, but become Understanding and Judicious Christians, upon sound Conviction; and so perceive the Obligation they are under to Study dili-

To the Reader.

gently the Holy Scriptures, that they may advance in the Knowledge, Belief and Practice of what, that Jesus hath revealed, whom they believe to be the Messias. And could People be brought to this, the Adversaries, to some of the Great Doctrines taught in our Bibles, would have little ground to hope, they should do any great Exploits, by their insisting on small Critical Niceties, or making a Clamour, because no more can be known at present, concerning some Doctrines, they have no liking to, than what is Revealed. For it is enough for a good Christian, to believe what is Revealed. To know Christ Jesus aright, and follow his Conduct sincerely, are so necessary, and of such Efficacy to our Safety, Establishment and Comfort at present, and to our future Blessedness, that you cannot be prompted to attend to any thing of equal moment, by

Your Faithful

Servant, &c.

S. B.

SOME

SOME

P A S S A G E S

IN THE

Reasonableness

OF

CHRISTIANITY,

As delivered in the Scriptures.

IN this Treatise we have as clear, distinct, and full Proof (I think) as can with Reason be desired, That Jesus, and his Apostles did not teach any thing as necessary, to be believed, *to make a Man a Christian,* but only this one Proposition, *That Jesus of Nazareth was the Christ, or the Messiah.* That the proof of this Point, was the principal thing aimed

at, and intended in that Treatise, seems so clear to me, I cannot imagine how any Man can doubt of it, who attentively peruses these Words, in Page 192. “ I challenge them, to
 “ shew that there was any other Do-
 “ ctrine (*viz.* than this, That *Jesus*
 “ of *Nazareth* was the *Messiah*) upon
 “ their assent to which, or disbelief
 “ of it, Men were pronounced Belie-
 “ vers, or Unbelievers, and accord-
 “ ingly received into the Church of
 “ Christ, as Members of his Body, as
 “ far as meer believing could make
 “ them so, or else cast out of it. That
 it is not a bare notional Knowledge of the before-mentioned Proposition, that is discoursed of in this Treatise, is very evident, by the Author’s frequent declaring, that by believing this Proposition, he means such a Faith as makes the Person believing it, *to receive Jesus for his King and Ruler*: As in Pages 96, 208, &c. The Author doth no where teach (that I do observe) that Jesus Christ, and his Apostles did not deliver any Doctrines to be believed besides this *one*, or that Christians are not obliged to believe
 any

taught by our Saviour in the Gospel, which the Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. hath omitted. “ These (he tells us) are Mat-
 “ ters of our Faith, under the Gospel: And he adds an account of what he takes to be the sense of these Articles: Tho’ I have read over the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. with some Attention, I have not observed those *formal Words* in any part of that *Book*, nor any Words which are *capable* of that *Construction*, provided they be considered with the Relation they have to, and the manifest dependance they have on what goes before, or follows after them. I acknowledge the Scriptures Mr. *Edwards* doth mention, do contain *Matters of Faith* to be believed by those who are *Christians*, and attain to know that Jesus Christ did teach them. But that Mr. *Edwards* should have proved, to make his Discourse reach the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. was This, That the *explicite Knowledge*, or belief of those *particular Scriptures*, or his *Interpretation* of them, is *necessary* by *Christ’s Appointment*, to constitute, or make a
 Per-

Person a Christian. These Scriptures do effectually overthrow, or confute that Proposition Mr. *Edwards* hath started, and then charged on the Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. but they do not affect any Proposition that Author hath advanced, that I know of.

In the next place Mr. *Edwards* finds fault with the Author of the Reasonableness, &c. "because he did not proceed to the Epistles, and give an account of them, as he did of the Gospels, and the Acts of the Apostles: And saith, It is most evident to any thinking and considerate Person that he purposely omits the Epistolary Writings of the Apostles, because they are fraught with other Fundamental Doctrines, besides that one, which he mentions, P. 109, 110.

Now what Mr. *Edwards* doth mean by Fundamental Doctrines, is not very clear to me. If he means all the Doctrines taught in the Epistles, or all the Propositions delivered in the Epistles concerning just those particular Heads, he immediately mentions, it

lies upon him to prove, that Jesus Christ hath made it necessary, that every Person must have an explicate Knowledge and Belief of all these, before he can be a Christian; which I do not see he hath attempted. If by Fundamental Doctrines, Mr. *Edwards* doth mean some Doctrines which are of special Importance, and which for that Reason, sincere Christians should principally endeavour to get the knowledge of, it cannot with any Justice be laid to this Author's charge, that he did not proceed to the Epistles, and give us an account of those Doctrines from them: Because that did not pertain to his Undertaking; who was not enquiring what Doctrines are of greatest moment to be understood, and believed by them who are Christians, but what was necessary to be known and believed to a Person's being a Christian. If what Mr. *Edwards* doth alledge, can be assigned for the Reason why this Author did purposely omit the Epistolary Writings, methinks it is most evident to any thinking and considerate Person, that it would have kept him from gi-
ving

ving the World that account he hath given, of what the Gospels and the Acts of the Apostles deliver concerning the Subject of his Enquiry and Discourse: For there are many important Doctrines taught both in the Gospels and the Acts, as well as in the Epistles, besides this, That Jesus is the Messiah. But how many soever the Doctrines be which are taught in the Epistles, if there be no Doctrine, besides this, That Jesus is the Messiah, taught there, as necessary to be believed, to make a Man a Christian, all the Doctrines taught there, will not make any thing at all against what this Author hath asserted, nor against the Method he hath observed: Especially considering we have an Account in the Acts of the Apostles of *what* those Persons, by whom the Epistles were writ, did teach as necessary to be believed to People's being Christians. And whereas Mr. *Edwards* speaks, p. 111. of this Author's "not vouchsafing an Abstract of these Inspired Writings; *viz.* The Epistles: This Author doth not appear to have had a Design of giving an Abstract of

any of the Inspired Books, if by Abstract be meant, a summary Account of all the Doctrines contained in them. As to the Gospels, and the Acts of the Apostles, he gives an Account of what they inform us, was taught by Christ and his Apostles as necessary to be believed to the making of a Man a Christian. And if he had proceeded to give the like account of the Epistles, that would have been as little satisfactory, as what he hath done already, to those who are resolved not to distinguish betwixt what is necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian, and those Articles which are to be believed by those who are Christians, as they can attain to know that Christ hath taught them. We believe Jesus to be the Christ, or Messiah, not barely because he said he was the Messiah, but because of other Evidences, manifesting and confirming that Truth. But he that is a Christian, believes other Doctrines, because he knows that Jesus, whom he believes to be Messiah, hath taught them. Now had this Author quoted all those Passages in the Epistles that are for his purpose, as *1 Cor.*

3. II. and I *Joh.* 5. 1. he would still have left out all those Doctrines Mr. *Edwards* doth reckon up: And no just occasion could any Man have had from thence, to charge him with disowning those Doctrines, or passing those parts of the Epistles where they are delivered, by, with contempt.

If there be any true Reasoning in what Mr. *Edwards* doth further write in this Discourse against the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. it is to me so clouded, by his way of expressing himself, I am too dull to perceive what his Reasons are, and wherein the strength of them doth lie. And therefore shall say little to his other Pages, till you come to Page 120. where Mr. *Edwards* doth hint, that there is *not any thing more difficult in this proposition [The Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one God, or Divine Nature] than in that other [Jesus is the Messiah.]* Now let that be as Mr. *Edwards* saith, yet I see no proof, that the belief of the former Proposition is, that which doth constitute and make a Man a Christian. No nor that the belief of that, and all the
other

other Propositions he hath mentioned in his Discourse, either exclusive of, or in conjunction with the latter, doth make a Man a Christian. That which is to be proved in opposition to the *Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* is this, That Jesus Christ and his Apostles have taught that the belief of some one Article, or certain number of Articles, distinct from this, that *Jesus* is the *Messiah*, either as exclusive of the belief of this, that *Jesus* is the *Messiah*, or in conjunction with the belief of this Article, doth constitute and make a Person a Christian. But that the belief of this, that *Jesus* is the *Messiah*, alone doth not make a Man a Christian.

Whereas Mr. *Edwards* saith, p. 115. The Author of the *Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* “pretends to contend for one single Article, with the exclusion of all the rest, for this reason, because all Men ought to understand their Religion. I cannot perceive any ground for such an assertion. The Author of the *Reasonableness, &c.* assigns why he asserts and contends that it is the believing that

that *Jesus* is the *Messiah*, which makes a Person a Christian, is this (if I understand him aright) because God doth not require the belief of any thing but this, to make a Man a Christian, or that *Jesus Christ* and his *Apostles* did not propose or teach any thing but this, as what was to be believed to make a Man a Christian. The Authors words are these. “*God* “out of the Infiniteness of his Mercy “has dealt with Man as a compassionate and tender Father. He gave “him Reason, and with it a Law. — “But considering the frailty of Man, “apt to run into Corruption and Misery, He promised a Deliverer, whom “in his good time He sent, and then “declared to all Mankind, that whoever would believe Him to be the “Saviour promised, and take him “rais’d from the Dead, and constituted the Lord and Judge of all Men, “to be their King and Ruler, should “be saved. *Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. p. 301.* So that the Reason why he contends that nothing more is absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation, or to make a Person

son

son a Christian is, because God hath declared, this is all that He absolutely requires to be believed to this purpose. Which I think is as good a Reason as can possibly be given. Then the Author of the *Reasonableness; &c.* observes, that “The All-merciful God
“seems herein to have consulted the
“Poor of this World, and the Bulk
“of Mankind.” Which words are not propos’d as a Reason why nothing more is necessary to be believed to make a Person a Christian, but as a Pious Reflection, or Inference how evidently the Goodness of Mankind appears, in that He requires no more to a Persons being a Christian, than *the belief of that plain intelligible Proposition* before-mentioned. So far is this Ingenious Author from aiming at what Mr. *Edwards* affirms, p. 117. viz. “That we must not have any
“point of Doctrine whatsoever in our
“Religion, that the Mob doth not
“at the very first naming of it per-
“sectly understand, and agree to; That he declares himself in these very words: *The other parts of Divine Revelation, are Objects of Faith, and*
are

are so to be received, Reasonableness, &c. p. 299. which is so far from excluding all other Articles of Faith, or from setting up one Article with the defiance of all the rest, that it attributes the just Honour to every thing that can be the Object of a Christian Belief. The Question is not, how many Articles may be necessary to be believed by one who is a Christian? But whether any thing more than this, that Jesus is the Christ or Messiah, is of necessity to be believed, to make a Man a Christian? And I do not perceive, that Mr. Edwards hath offered any thing that is at all cogent for the Affirmative.

Some Passages in the Vindication
of the Reasonableness of
Christianity, &c.

THE Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity confirms me in my Opinion, that I was not mistaken in thinking, that that Author's

thor's design was not to determine
 how many Articles of Faith Christ
 and his Apostles have taught, but
what they required to be believed to
make a Man a Christian. " Convince
 " but Men of the Mission of Jesus
 " Christ, make them but see the
 " Truth, Simplicity, and Reasonable-
 " ness of what He himself taught
 " and required to be believed by his
 " Followers; and you need not doubt
 " but being once fully perswaded of
 " his Doctrine, and the advantages
 " which all Christians agree are re-
 " ceived by him, such Converts will
 " not lay by the Scriptures; but by a
 " constant reading and study of them,
 " get all the light they can from this
 " Divine Revelation, and nourish
 " themselves up in the words of Faith,
 " and of good Doctrine, as *St. Paul*
 " speaks to *Timothy, p. 8.* Whatever
 " Doctrines *Mr. Edwards* would have
 " to be believed, if they are such as
 " our Saviour and his Apostles requi-
 " red to be believed, to make a Man
 " a Christian, he will be sure to find
 " them in those *Preachings and famous*
 " *Testimonies* of our Saviour and his
 " Apostles

“ Apostles that I have quoted. And
 “ if they are not there, he may rest
 “ satisfied that they were not proposed
 “ by our Saviour and his Apostles, as
 “ necessary to be believed to make
 “ Men Christ’s Disciples, p. 11. The
 “ Reason I gave why I had not
 “ gone through the Writings in the
 “ Epistles to collect the Fundamental
 “ Articles of Faith, as I had through
 “ the Preachings of our Saviour and
 “ his Apostles, was, because those
 “ Fundamental Articles were in those
 “ Epistles promiscueously and without
 “ distinction mixed with other Truths.
 “ And therefore we shall find and dis-
 “ cern those great and necessary points
 “ best, in the Preachings of our Savi-
 “ our and the Apostles, to those who
 “ were yet Ignorant of the Faith, and
 “ unconverted. p. 14. Give me leave
 “ now to ask you seriously whether
 “ these which you have here set down
 “ under the Title of *Fundamental Do-*
 “ *ctrines*, are such (when reduc’d to
 “ Propositions) that every one of
 “ them is required to be believed to
 “ make a Man a Christian, and such
 “ as without the actual belief thereof
 “ he

“ he cannot be saved. If they are not
“ so every one of them, you may call
“ them Fundamental Doctrines, as
“ much as you please, they are not
“ of those Doctrines of Faith I was
“ speaking of, which are only such as
“ are required to be actually believed
“ to make a Man a Christian, *p.* 15, 16.
“ The necessary Articles of Faith are
“ in the Epistles promiscuously deli-
“ vered with other Truths, and there-
“ fore they cannot be distinguished
“ but by some other mark, than being
“ barely found in the Epistles. *Id.*
“ He should have remembred, that I
“ speak not of all the Doctrines of
“ Christianity, nor all that is publish-
“ ed to the World in it, but of those
“ Truths only, which are absolutely
“ required to be believed to make any
“ one a Christian, *p.* 30. This is a
“ serious Truth, that what our Savi-
“ our and his Apostles Preached and
“ admitted Men into the Church for
“ believing, is all that is absolutely
“ required to make a Man a Christian.
“ But this is without any *desiance of*
“ *all the rest*, taught in the Word of
“ God. This excludes not the belief
“ of

“ of any one of those many other
 “ Truths contained in the Scriptures
 “ of the Old and New Testaments
 “ which it is the Duty of every Chri-
 “ stian to study, and thereby build
 “ himself upon our most Holy Faith ;
 “ receiving with stedfast belief and
 “ ready obedience, all those things
 “ which the Spirit of Truth hath
 “ therein revealed. But that *all the*
 “ *rest* of the Inspired Writings, or, if
 “ you please, *Articles, of equal neces-*
 “ *sity* to be believed to make a Man a
 “ Christian, with what was preached
 “ by our Saviour and his Apostles ;
 “ that I deny, p. 30, 31.

Some Animadversions on Mr. Edwards's
Book Entituled, Socinianism Un-
mask'd.

THE Introduction doth not
 prompt me to expect any great
 strength of Argumentation in the fol-
 lowing Discourse, if the Author keep
 on in the strain in which he hath writ
 these pages, and make his whole Book
 of a piece with his Beginning.

Chap. 1. were a Man obliged to judge of the Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. and of this Book Stiled *Socinianism Unmask'd*, by the account given of them in the second and third pages, and part of the fourth of this Chapter, he would be apt to determine the former, one of the illest Books, and worst writ, that was ever published: And the latter, the most Accomplished Treatise amongst Humane Writings.

Mr. Edw. p. 5. persists in his representing this Proposition, *There is but this one Truth* (viz. *That Jesus is the Messiah*) necessarily to be assented to, by Christians (which is his own Proposition) and this Proposition, *There is but this one Truth* (viz. *that Jesus is the Messiah*) absolutely required to be believed, to make a Man a Christian; (which is the Authors Proposition he sets himself to oppose) to be the very same. Yet if he prove in the following part of his Book, that no person can be a Christian, or Member of Christ, till he explicitly understands, and actually assents to every thing that any Christian may be obliged to assent

assent unto, or indeed to any one Article distinct from this, *That Jesus is the Messiah*; I shall acknowledge he hath effectually confuted the main point insisted on, in the *Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* and its *Vindication*: But whereas Mr. *Edw.* produces some lines out of p. 192. of the *Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* to justify his charging that Author with the *formal words* (spoken of before) I shall refer any intelligent and fair Reader, to peruse that page, and try whether he can discern any ground (considering what goes before and after) to put such a construction on that Authors words, as Mr. *Edw.* doth; for I confess I am not sagacious enough to perceive it. Yet if Mr. *Edw.* had set down the Authors Challenge (which I have already transcribed) which is placed just between those words he doth quote; I think he would have done the Author a great deal of right, and have assisted his Reader, in conceiving duly, what it is the Author of the *Reasonableness, &c.* doth insist on; and what the point is his Adversary is to speak

to, in order to his confuting that Book, and invalidating the large Evidence there produced, from Christ, and his Apostles for the confirming of what that Author asserts.

Mr. *Edw.* undertakes, p. 7. to shew that besides that one Fundamental “ Principle or Article which the Au-
 “ thor of the *Reasonableness*, &c. so
 “ often mentions, there are *others* that
 “ are as necessarily to be believed, to
 “ make a Man a Christian; yea, to
 give him the denomination of a Be-
 liever in the Sense of the Gospel. Now,
 this is the point Mr. *Edw.* is to keep
 to; and if he prove this, which he
 professeth he hath undertaken to prove,
 he doth effectually confute the *Rea-
 sonableness of Christianity*, &c. if I
 am capable of making a Judgment in
 the case. Yet within a few lines, p.
 8. Mr. *Edw.* saith, “ He will let the
 “ Reader see, that it is as necessary for a
 “ Convert to Christianity to assent to
 “ them (*viz.* most of those other Ar-
 “ ticles he had barely enumerated in
 “ his former Discourse) as to that o-
 “ ther he (*viz.* the Author of the *Rea-
 sonableness*, &c.) so frequently spe-
 “ cifies.

“cifies. But this is quite another point. For the Question is not, what Articles a Convert to Christianity may be obliged necessarily to believe; for he must necessarily believe as many Articles, as he shall attain to know that Christ Jesus hath taught. The Question is, what is necessary to be believed to make a Man a *Convert to Christianity*? For a *Convert to Christianity*, is, I conceive, the same with a *Christian*.

Mr. *Edw.* then lays down several Propositions, which are indeed Divine Truths, and of great use and moment to be known and believed, by those who are Christians; even such Propositions, that the Knowledge of them may conduce much to dispose People to be Christians. But I do not see any Proof he produceth, that the believing of all or any of those Propositions doth *make a Man a Christian*, or that the believing of these, together with this, *That Jesus is the Christ*, is necessary to *make a Man a Christian*: So that the due believing that Jesus is the Christ, or Messiah, doth not of it self constitute a Man a Christian, which

was the thing he undertook to Prove.
Yet.

Chap. 2. Mr. *Edw.* saith, p. 22.
 “ He thinks he hath sufficiently proved
 “ that there are other Doctrines besides
 “ that; That Jesus is the *Messiah*, which
 “ are required to be believed to make
 “ a Man a Christian. But I think the
 utmost he hath proved, is only this,
 that there are other Doctrines which
 those who are Converts to Christiani-
 ty, are obliged to believe, which is
 far enough from being the matter in
 Debate. And then Mr. *Edw.* asks,
 “ Why did the Apostles write these
 “ Doctrines? Was it not that those
 “ they writ to, might give their assent
 “ to them? To which it may be
 answered in his own words, *Yes verily.*
 But then it may be asked again, were
 not these Persons Christians, to whom
 the Apostles writ *these Doctrines*,
 and whom they required to assent
 unto them? *Yes verily.* And if so,
 what was it that made them Christians,
 before their assent to *these Doctrines*
 was required? If it was any thing be-
 sides their believing *Jesus to be the*
Messiah, that ought to be instanced
 in,

in, and made out. And not those Doctrines they were *afterwards* required to assent to, upon Jesus his Authority, and by *virtue* of their *believing Him* to be the *Messiah*. In p. 23. Mr. *Edw.* sums up all he had said (in the former Chapter) of his necessary Propositions into a *Syllogism*, and saith, "The proof of the second Proposition in that *Syllogism*, is easily effected thus. The belief of those things which have immediate respect to the Occasion, Author, Way, Means, and Issue of our Salvation; and which are necessary for knowing the true Nature and Design of it, is the belief of such things, without the knowing of which, a Man cannot be Saved. But such is the belief of the preceding Articles, *Ergo*. Here Mr. *Edw.* stops, whereas he should have proceeded to prove that Jesus Christ, or his Apostles have taught, that no Man can be a Christian, or shall be Saved, unless he have an explicit Knowledge of all those things which have immediate respect to the Occasion, Author, Way, Means, and Issue of our Salvation, and which are necessary

cessary for our knowing the true Nature and Design of it. But this he hath not done. It is a very good Argument, to another purpose: But without another *Medium* it will do no *Feats* in the present Case. Mr. *Edw.* p. 24. takes notice, "That in "Vindication of the *Reasonableness*, " &c. p. 16. the Author asks this "Question, Whether these which you "have set down under the Title of "Fundamental Doctrines, are such " (when reduced to Propositions) "that every one of them is required "to be believed, to make a Man a "Christian; and such as without "the actual belief thereof he "cannot be Saved? And the Substance and Strength of Mr. *Edw.* Answer (if I apprehend him aright) is this, "That no Man besides himself "ever started such a thing; representing the Question, as if the Author had asked, Whether those Propositions must be *always actually believed*; whereas the Question is only, Whether a Person cannot be Saved, without the actual belief of those Propositions? Now, that a Man can believe particular Propositions, and not actually

ally believe them, is much above my capacity to understand. It is acknowledged those *Propositions* are in our *Bibles*; and they are there for this *purpose*, that they may be *believed*, as *Mr. Edw.* saith, and so is every other *Proposition*, which is taught in our *Bibles*. But how will it thence follow, that no Man can be a Christian, till he particularly know, and actually assent to every *Proposition* in our *Bibles*?

Chap. 3. In this Chapter *Mr. Edw.* reflects upon the *Reasons*, given by the Author of the *Reasonableness*, &c. for his not going through the *Epistles*, to Collect the *Fundamental Articles* of Faith out of them. And saith, "He assigns this as one Reason; the
" *Epistles* being writ to those who
" were already Believers; it could not
" be supposed, that they were writ to
" them, to teach them *Fundamentals*.
To this *Mr. Edw.* answers, "By the
" same Argument that he would per-
" suadeus, that the *Fundamentals* are
" not to be sought for in the *Epistles*;
" we may prove that they were not to
" be sought for in the *Gospels*, and in
" the *Acts*, for even these were writ
" to those that believed, p. 38. Now
the

the force of that Author's Reason doth not lie in this, that the Persons the Epistles were writ to, were Believers: But in this, That the Principal Design, and main occasion of the writing of these Epistles, was not to teach what Points must of necessity be believed, to make Men Christians. And the Persons they were writ to, being Believers, was a very plain Evidence, that that could not be the main Reason of the writing of those Epistles; which the Author of the *Reasonableness*, &c. expresseth in these words, *The Epistles being all written to those, who were already Believers and Christians; the occasion and end of writing them, could not be to instruct them, in that which was necessary to make them Christians.* Reasonableness, &c. p. 294. But the *Gospels*, and the *Acts of the Apostles* being principally writ, to teach People what it was that Jesus Christ, and his Apostles did require a belief of, in order to their being Christians, together with the Evidence, and Proof of that which is to be believed for the making of them Christians: These are the Writings where

we

we are with greatest assurance to seek for the Knowledge of that, the belief whereof doth make a Man a Christian. Tho' St. *Luke* did Dedicate his Gospel, and the *Acts of the Apostles* to the most Excellent *Theophilus, an Eminent Believer*: And both the Gospels and *Acts* are written for the use of Believers, as Mr. *Edw.* observes; yet they were not writ to teach him, or them Fundamentals; that is, to teach them what they must believe, in order to their becoming Believers or Christians. They are of great use to Believers, to put them in mind of what they have assented to, to confirm and strengthen their Faith, and to advance their knowledge of him they believe in, to greater Clearness and distinctness, &c. but it cannot reasonably be supposed, that they were writ to Believers for this end, to make them Believers, who were so before. |

Mr. *Edw.* saith, "Another feigned ground of his omitting the *Epistles*, "is this, because the fundamental Articles are here promiscuously, and without distinction, mixed with other Truths.

“ Truths. To which Mr. *Edw.* makes
 this Reply, “ On the same account he
 “ might have forbore to search for
 “ Fundamental Articles in the *Gospels*,
 “ for they do not lie there together,
 “ but are dispersed up and down; the
 “ Doctrinal and Historical part are
 “ mixed with one another, but he
 “ pretends to sever them; why then
 “ did he not make a Separation be-
 “ tween the Doctrines in the *Epistles*,
 “ and those other matters that are
 “ treated of there? He hath nothing
 “ to reply to this; and therefore, p.
 40. Nay, hold there, and forbear
 making Inferences from those last
 words, for should the Old Gentleman
 at *Rome* say so, *è Cathedra*, I believe
 it more than probable, that he would
 be foully out, notwithstanding his
 conceited, and avowed Infallibility.
 The Author of the *Reasonableness*, &c.
 owns that the Doctrines necessary to
 be believ'd to make a Man a Christian,
 are to be found in the *Epistles*, but
 that we shall find and discern those
 great and necessary points best in the
Preachings of our Saviour, and the
Apostles, to those who were ignorant of
 the

the Faith, and unconverted, Vindicat. p. 14. So that the reason here given, why he sought them in the *Gospels*, and *Acts*, and not in the *Epistles*, is this, *because they were to be found and discerned best there.* And if this be not a good Reason, I know not what is. Methinks no Learned and Wise Man should be ashamed to imitate this Author, in searching for the weightiest Truths, only there where they may be *best found and discerned.* Whereas Mr. *Edw.* saith, "Necessary Truths may be distinguished from those which are not such, by the Nature and high importance of them, p. 41. I would mind you, that necessary Truths, are Truths or Doctrines necessary to be believed for that end, or purpose they relate to. So that we are not to judge of their necessity, so much by their own intrinsic Nature, as by the relation they have to that end we propose to our selves, or at least ought to propose. The necessity of a Persons believing this single Truth, or such a number of Truths, in order to his being a true Christian, ariseth from God's declaring and making

king

king known that the belief of that Truth, or such a number of Truths, is necessary to make a Man a Christian. The necessity of a Christians believing any particular Truths Christ hath taught, doth not arise so much from the Nature, and high importance of them, as from his knowing that Christ hath taught and revealed them.

Chap. 4. What Mr. *Edw.* here saith of *Turks* and *Devils*, &c. is writ after such a rate, I think it needless for me to say any thing to it. If you read p. 193, 194. and 300, 301. of the *Reasonableness*, &c. I think you will easily perceive the *Reasonableness of Christianity* administred no just ground for such Discourse. Yet the most considerable and best Expressions (excepting strict Scripture-Quotations) I have yet met with in this whole Discourse, happen to be dropt amongst the *Stuff* with which this Chapter is crowded, *viz.* Those which declare Mr. *Edwards*'s Notion of Evangelical Faith. As, "That a true Evangelical Faith is a hearty accepting of the *Messiah* as he is offered in the Gospel,

“spel, p. 56. But whereas Mr. *Edw.*
 “saith this Author brings us no ti-
 “dings of any such Faith belonging
 “to Christianity, or discovered to us
 “in the Scriptures, which gives us
 “to understand that he verily believes
 “there is no such Christian Faith, p.
 “56, 57. I think Mr. *Edw.* is much
 mistaken both in his Assertion, and his
 Inference, for such I conceive is the
 Sense of his latter words. If the Au-
 thor of the *Reasonableness*, &c. had
 not brought any tidings of such a
 Faith, I think, it could not be thence
 justly and regularly inferr’d, that he
 verily believes there is no such Chri-
 stian Faith. Because his enquiry and
 search was not concerning *Christian*
Faith, considered *Subjectively*, but
Objectively, what the Articles be which
 must be believed to make a Man a
 Christian? And not with what sort of
 Faith, these Articles are to be believ-
 ed? So that if he had not said one
 word concerning Faith *Subjectively*
 considered; he might have as true and
 just a conception, and belief concern-
 ing this matter, as any Man living.
 And tho’ Mr. *Edw.* could not find *one*
word

word about this compleat Faith of the Gospel in those pages, (viz. 191, 192. &c.) where he expected it; yet there are several words about it in that Book. As in all those pages where he speaks of *taking and accepting Jesus to be our King and Ruler*. Where can you find a truer or more exact account of Christian Faith, than what this Author hath given us in these words, *But considering the frailty of Man, apt to run into corruption and misery, he (i. e. God) promised a Deliverer, whom in his good time he sent, and then declared to all Mankind, that whoever would believe him to be the Saviour promised, and take him now raised from the dead, and constituted the Lord and Judge of all Men, to be their King and Ruler, should be Saved,* p. 301.

Chap. 5. Mr. Edw. continues in this Chapter to give vent to something, to which I will not adventure to assign a *Proper Name*, and pretends it is all against what the Author of the *Reasonableness of Christianity* hath writ; when it is all against a conceit of his own framing, and there is not
any

any thing that I can find in the *Reasonableness*, &c. that hath any likeness to it; viz. what he affirms (in the former Chapter) “The Author of the *Reasonableness*, &c. tells Mankind again and again, that a Christian Man, or Member of Christ, need not know, or believe any more than that one individual point which he mentions, p. 59. If any Man will shew me those words, in any part of the *Reasonableness*, &c. I shall suspect I was not awake all the time I was reading that Book. And I am as certain as one awake can well be, that there are several passages in that Book, directly contrary to those words. And there are some expressions in the *Vindication* of the *Reasonableness*, &c. one would think, if Mr. *Edw.* had observed them, they would have prevented his mistake.

Mr. *Edw.* p. 73. certifies, “He design’d his Papers for the satisfying of the Reader’s doubts about any thing occurring concerning the matter before us, and for the establishing his wavering Mind; and for that reason will answer a Query or
D “Ob-

“ Objection, which some, and not
 “ without some shew of ground may
 “ be apt to start; *viz*, how comes it to
 “ pass, that this Article, of Faith, *viz*.
 “ That Jesus is the *Messias*, or Christ,
 “ is so often repeated in the *New Testa-*
 “ *ment*? Why is this sometimes urged
 “ without the mentioning of any o-
 “ ther Article of Belief? I think the
 Quæry should be put thus, Why did
 Jesus Christ and his Apostles require
 assent to, and belief of this one Article
 alone, *viz*. That Jesus is the *Messias*,
 to constitute and make a Man a Chri-
 stian, or true Member of Christ (as it
 is abundantly evident they did, from
 the *Reasonableness of Christianity*) if the
 belief of more Articles is absolutely
 necessary to make and constitute a
 Man a Christian?

Mr. *Edw.* to clear this Objection
 (as he hath framed it) and to give a full
 and satisfactory answer to all doubts
 in this affair, offers these ensuing par-
 ticulars:

I. “ It must be considered, that the
 “ believing of Jesus to be the promised
 “ *Messias*, was the first step to Chri-
 “ stianity, and therefore this, rather
 “ than

“ than any other Article, was pro-
 “ pounded to be believed by all those,
 “ whom either our Saviour or the
 “ Apostles invited to embrace Chri-
 “ stianity, p. 74. But here it may be
 Queried, by whose Authority are we
 obliged to consider, *That the believing*
of Jesus to be the promised Messias, is
but a step or the first step to Chri-
stianity? And not Christianity it self!
 If Mr. Edw. had proved that Jesus
 Christ or his Apostles had taught so, the
 Controversie had been at an end: But
 he offers nothing of this nature, only
 gives us his own word for it. As p.
 50. he had said, that “ the belief of
 “ Jesus’s being the *Messias*, was one of
 “ the first and leading Acts of Christian
 “ Faith. Now Christian Faith here,
 must be the belief of something or
 other; and if it be the believe of any
 thing besides this, that Jesus is the
 Christ, or *Messias*, that other thing
 should be specified, and it should be
 made appear, that the belief that Je-
 sus is the *Messias* or *Christ*, without the
 belief of that other Proposition, is
 not Christian Faith. Now I apprehend
 that Christian Faith, and Christianity,

considered subjectively (and an act of Christian Faith, I think, cannot be understood in any other sense) are the very same. And how an act of Christian Faith can be but a step to Christianity, is above my Capacity to conceive. For Christian Faith, or Christianity (if I be not mistaken) is that which constitutes a Man a Christian. But Mr. *Edw.* perhaps by Christianity and Christian Faith, doth not mean that Faith which constitutes a Man a Christian, but the belief of all, or a considerable number of Propositions, which are of great importance to be known and believed by those who are Christians. Now that Faith which constitutes a Man a Christian, differs very much in the *ground* of it, from that Faith, whereby one that is a Christian, believes the particular Doctrines which Christ and his Apostles have taught. A Christian believes what Propositions he attains to know that Jesus hath taught, for this reason, because he knows they were taught by that Jesus, whom he believes to be the *Messias*. But a Man believes Jesus to be the *Messias*, because of the Evidence

and

and Proof that is given, that this Jesus was the *Messias*. And the believing Jesus to be the *Messias*, is so far from being but a *step to Christianity*, or a *leading act of Christian Faith*, it is *Christianity it self*, or *Christian Faith it self*. That which constitutes and makes a Man a Christian, a Believer, a Disciple, or Subject of Christ, is his believing Jesus to be the Christ, so as to yield up himself unreservedly to believe and practise whatsoever he shall attain to know he hath taught and commanded him. This is all that is necessary to make a Man a Disciple, or Subject, &c. to one who appears to be Commissioned to admit Persons into such Capacity and Relation on those terms: If by *Christianity* we understand the particular Doctrines or Articles Jesus Christ hath proposed to be believed by those who are Christians: The belief of any or all of these Doctrines, is not *strictly Christian Faith*, but *the Faith of Persons who are Christians*. And to determine which is the first act of this sort of Faith, we must have recourse to particular Persons, unless it can be proved

that every Christian, doth undoubtedly obtain the knowledge of one certain Proposition Christ hath taught, before any of them doth know any other. For if one Christian attains in the first place, to know that Jesus hath taught, that by dying on the Cross, he offered up himself a Sacrifice to satisfy Divine Justice for the Sins of the World; his believing this point, because he knows Jesus hath taught it, is the first act of Christian Faith in him, taking Christian Faith in this larger sense. But if another Christian doth not attain to know in the first place, that Christ hath taught this Doctrine; nor till after he knows several other Truths which Christ hath taught: His belief of this, when he comes to know Christ hath taught it, will be so far from being the first act of Faith in him, that all the Doctrines he knew Christ had taught, before he knew that he hath taught this, must take place, and be reckon'd in the order of his believing before this. That Faith which is strictly Christian Faith, and makes a Man a Christian, *viz.* believing Jesus to be the
Christ,

Christ, doth not barely *make way for the embracing of all other Articles, or become a passage to all the rest*, as Mr. *Edw.* expresseth himself, p. 75. but it lays an indispensable obligation upon the Person, to embrace and believe whatever Articles he shall attain to know Jesus Christ hath taught, and to use his best endeavours to acquire such knowledge. This is Christianity, properly so call'd. And the several Truths which Christ, and his Apostles have revealed, are the Doctrines, which those who are Christians, must endeavour to understand and believe, because Jesus, whom they believe to be the Christ, or *Messias*, hath taught and delivered them to the World, and for the special use of his Disciples and Followers. A Man may believe several of the Doctrines taught by Christ and his Apostles, who does not believe that Jesus is the *Messias*; but then he does not believe them with the Faith of a Christian; that is, for that reason why a Christian must and doth believe them, *viz.* his knowing that they were taught by that Jesus whom he believes to be the Christ, or *Messiah*.

2. Mr. *Edw.* saith, "It is to be re-
 "membred, that though this one Pro-
 "position or Article be mentioned
 "alone in some places, yet there is
 "reason to think and be persuaded;
 "that at the same time, other matters
 "of Faith were proposed, p. 76. Sup-
 "posing is no Proof in this case. You
 may suppose as many matters of Faith
 discoursed of at one and the same time
 as you please; but the point to be
 proved is this, That some other Point
 or Article of Faith besides this, that
 Jesus is the Christ, was proposed to
 be believed, to make them Christians.
 It is all along acknowledged, there are
 many Articles proposed for Christians
 to believe, but the Proof is wanting,
 that more than this one Article was
 proposed to be believed, to make Men
 Christians. If there be reason to think
 and be persuaded, that other matters
 of Faith were discoursed of at the same
 time, it seems very plain and evident
 to me, that there was not any Article
 but this one, that Jesus is the *Messiah*,
 the belief whereof was necessarily re-
 quired to make them Christians, be-
 cause there is nothing but this Recor-
 ded,

ded, which was insisted on for that purpose.

3. Mr. *Edw.* saith, " This also must
 " be thought of, That though there are
 " several Parts and Members of the
 " Christian Faith, yet they do not all
 " occur in any one place of Scripture,
 " p. 76. — *And consequently*, if we
 " would give an impartial account of
 " our Belief, we must consult those
 " places of Scripture where the Arti-
 " cles of the Christian Faith are; and
 " they are not all together, but dispers'd
 " here and there: Wherefore we must
 " look them out, and acquaint our
 " selves with the several particulars
 " which make up our Belief, and ren-
 " der it entire and consummate, p. 77.

That there are several Propositions and Articles delivered by Christ and his Apostles; which Christians must endeavour to know and believe, is very true; as also that these do not all occur in any one place of Scripture, and therefore Christians must look them out, &c. But this is no Proof that all that is absolutely necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian, is not to be found in any one place of Scripture;

Scripture ; much less that no Man can be a Christian, till he hath an explicite knowledge of every Proposition Christ and his Apostles have taught. The place of Scripture Mr. *Edw.* here quotes, *viz. Rom. 10. 9.* I take to be a full confirmation of what the Author of the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. asserts. The words are these, *If thou shalt confess with thy Mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thy Heart, that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved.* The plain meaning and sense of which words, I think is this, If thou shalt confess, or make profession with thy Mouth, that thou dost take Jesus for thy Lord, and this verbal Confession, proceeds from, and is the genuine Fruit of an unfeigned hearty belief, grounded upon solid, substantial Evidence, such as God's raising him from the dead is, that he is the *Messias*, thou shalt be saved. But how this Scripture should have such a construction fastened to it as this, if thou believe Christ's Resurrection, and all other Truths he and his Apostles have taught, thou shalt be saved; so as to exclude every Man from Salvation,

tion,

tion, that believes Jesus to be the *Messias*, and yet attains not to an explicit knowledge and belief of every thing Christ and his Apostles have taught, is not obvious to me.

4. Mr. *Edw*, saith, " This (which is the main answer to the objection) " must be born in our minds, that " Christianity was erected by degrees, " according to that Prediction and " Promise of our Saviour, *That the Spirit should teach them all things, Joh. 14. 26. And that he should guide them into all truth, Joh. 16. 13.* " We " are not to think that all the necessary Doctrines of the Christian Religion were clearly published to the " World in our Saviour's time, p. 78. It is true, all the Doctrines which Christ and his Apostles taught, were not delivered at once, but gradually, and at several times. But what is this to the proving, that all that was necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian, was not clearly published in our Saviour's time? Will not that make a Man a Christian now, which made the Apostles themselves Christians? Christians in different times may

may be furnished with a less or greater number of Truths and Doctrines, which they must endeavour to understand and believe. But the Belief of *that*, which makes one Man a Christian, or ever did make any Man a Christian, will at any time to the end of the World, makes another Man a Christian. The Faith of Christians may encrease and extend to a greater number of Objects, or Articles, as they are discovered and made known, but there can be no difference as to *that*, the belief *whereof*, doth make a Man a Christian. What is absolutely necessary to be believed to make one Man a Christian, at any time, is absolutely necessary to be believed to make others Christians, at any time, and in every part of the World. And nothing else is or can be absolutely necessary to be believed, to make any Man a Christian. If *Mr. Edw.* instead of *distinguishing of times*, had distinguished between what is necessarily to be believed, to make a Man a Christian, and what Doctrines have been taught and delivered by Christ and his Apostles, which those who are Christians must labour

labour to understand and believe, I fancy he would not have been of the Opinion, that the enlarging of the *Revelation*, did make more necessary to be believed, to make a Man a Christian at one time, than was necessary for that purpose at another.

Chap. 6. Here Mr. *Edw.* falls foul with the Author of the *Reasonableness*, because he did not treat of matters, which pertained not to his Subject. Because he did not discourse of the *Trinity*, and the *Deity of our Saviour*, which are particular Doctrines proposed to be believed by them who are Christians. Whereas that Author's business was to enquire, not what points are proposed to be believed by Christians, but what is necessarily to be believed, to make a Man a Christian. Mr. *Edw.* appears mightily out of humour also, because the Author of the *Reasonableness*, &c. did not mention some passages in the Gospels which did not belong to his Enquiry, and because he did not explain some Scriptures, as he would have them explained. Now I think it appears evidently enough, by some of the former Papers, that there
is

is no just ground to accuse any Man to be an *Anti-Trinitarian*, or a *Socinian*, because he asserts that believing Jesus to be the *Messias*, is all that is necessarily required to make a Man a Christian. I farther add, that the belief of the *Trinity*, and that Jesus *the Son of God, is God*, doth not constitute a Man a Christian. Nor can any Man believe these Doctrines, or any other Doctrines taught in the Gospel, with the Faith of a Christian, till he is a Christian, and believe them, because he knows they were taught by Jesus Christ, whom upon just grounds he believes to be the *Messias*. It is not fair and just to charge a Man with rejecting these Doctrines meerly because he does not interpret some particular Texts to the same purpose others do. For he may believe these Doctrines, though he does not think all those Scriptures cogent proofs of them, which some may alledge for the proof of them. The Author of the *Reasonableness*, &c. had observed that *the Messias, and the Son of God, were synonymous Terms amongst the Jews in our Saviour's time*, p. 37. 49. 50. Hence

Mr.

Mr. *Edw.* takes occasion to write many pages about these *terms*. But I do not perceive that he pretends to offer the least proof that these terms, were not synonymous terms amongst the *Jews* at that time, which is the point he should have proved, if he designed to invalidate what this Author saith about that matter.

Chap. 7. In this Chapter Mr. *Edw.* seems much disturbed; because the Author of the *Reasonableness*, &c. "Makes nothing of the force of that
 " Demonstration (as he calls it) of his
 " being a Disciple of *Socinus*, viz.
 " That when he mentions the ad-
 " vantages and benefits of Christ's
 " coming into the World, he hath not
 " one syllable of his satisfying for us,
 " or by his Death purchasing Life and
 " Salvation, or any thing that sounds
 " like it, p. 94. The Scripture Do-
 ctine of Christ's Satisfaction, is of mighty importance, for a true Christian to be well acquainted with. But that a Person must be a *Socinian* because he omitted that *particular*, when discoursing of the advantages and benefits of Christ's coming into the
 World,

World, unless he had expressly promised to name every one of them, does not appear *Demonstratively* unto me, sup-
 posing Christ's Satisfaction were in *Strictness* to be reckoned amongst the *Benefits and Advantages* which accrue and redound, either to Sinners or Believers, from Christ's coming into the World. For the mentioning of *some*, is no denial of *other Advantages*. But I conceive, *Satisfaction* is not so *strictly* to be termed an *Advantage*, as the *Effects and Fruits* of it are, and the ends themselves, for which this Satisfaction was made. Some of the *main ends* for which Christ came into the World, were these. To procure us the *Pardon of Sin*. The *Holy Spirit* to enable us to walk in all pleasing before God, and to secure to us *Everlasting Glory and Blessedness*. These are the great *Benefits and Advantages* (speaking strictly) of Christ's coming into the World. Of the two last the *Author of the Reasonableness, &c.* hath discoursed amongst the *Benefits, &c.* of Christ's coming into the World; and the other he hath spoken of in the former part of his Book. The Do-
 ctine

ctrine of Satisfaction, instructs us in the way, how Christ did by Divine Appointment, obtain these Advantages for us.

Chap. 8. This is the last Chapter Mr. *Edw.* writes directly against the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, and its *Vindication*, or rather against the *unknown Author*. But this Chapter is to entirely of the same *Strain* with those foregoing pages I have pass over in silence, I shall say no more of it; but that my dulness is such; I cannot discern the least appearance of reasoning in it.

If you believe Mr. *Edwards's* account of the *Reasonableness*; & if you will conclude it likely to do abundance of hurt, especially to *St. Paul's Church-yard*. And indeed, I am persuaded it will as certainly be the Cause of very much mischief, as *Tenterton-Steeple* was the Cause of the *Goodwin Sands*.

Were the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. generally read with *deliberation*, and rightly understood, and (what I apprehend to be) its *main design* well followed, it would be of

eminent use, amongst other good purposes, to these two.

First, *To effect an happy alteration in particular Persons.* For if more time and pains were employ'd, in bringing People to a sound Conviction, and full persuasion, that Jesus is the Christ, and only Saviour of Sinners, and of their own personal need of Him, and less of each in Squabbling about Terms, Men have devised to express their own Conceits relating Points which Christ and his Apostles have delivered in easie and unaffected words, there would not be such great numbers every where, who pretend to be Christians meerly because it is the Fashion and Mode of the Country to make that Profession; but we might upon good grounds expect that multitudes would be Christians upon a Rational and Wise Choice: From whence it would follow, that as they would be able to justify their Faith, and give a good Reason of their Hope to any who should discourse with them concerning the same; so they would be more inquisitive after, and observant of the

Laws

Laws of Christ, and would be disposed to yield a becoming Assent and Submission to the several Truths and Doctrines they shall attain to know were taught by Him.

Secondly, To overthrow and ruine Faction in Religion, and promote that Concord, and good Affection amongst Christians, which would render them mightily serviceable to one another, put them into a condition, to reap singular advantage from all Publick ministrations, which would make the whole number of Christians appear to the World as one entire and well compacted Body, and effectually remove those pernicious Prejudices against our most Sacred Profession, which too many take occasion to entertain, from the humour-some Separations, and groundless Divisions which do most unmercifully prevail amongst Christians. The Men of Art in all the Parties, appear agreed (how distant soever they be one from another in other matters) not to speak in favour of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. But if this Agreement of theirs doth arise from the ob-

vious tendency that Book hath to promote the *Happy Concord* beforementioned, what can be thought better of it, than that it is an *Evil Conspiracy* to continue and maintain *Unchristian Discords*, for private *Selfish Ends*, to the exceeding great *Detriment* of *Religion*, and the *Publick Good*? In short, if the *Reasonableness* of *Christianity* as delivered in the *Scripture*, doth merit no worse a *Character*, on any other account, than it doth justly deserve, because it advanceth and so fully proveth this Point, *That Christ and his Apostles did not propound any Articles as necessarily to be believed to make a Man a Christian, but this, That Jesus is the Christ, or Messias*, I think it may with great Justice be reputed, one of the *best Books* that hath been published for at least *these Sixteen Hundred Years*.

THE END

A
R E P L Y

T O

Mr. *EDWARDS'S*
Brief REFLECTIONS

O N

A Short Discourse of *the True*
Knowledg of Christ Jesus, &c.

To which is prefixed

A P R E F A C E,

Wherein something is said concerning
Reason and Antiquity, in the chief
Controversies with the Socinians.

By *S. Bold*, Rector of *Steeple, Dorset*.

One is your Master, even Christ, Mat. 23. 10.

London, Printed for *A. and J. Churchill*, at the
Black Swan in *Pater-noster-Row*. 1697.

REFLECT

THE
MORNING

OF THE
SUNDAY

OF THE
YEAR

OF THE
COUNTRY

OF THE
WORLD

OF THE
HEAVENS

T H E

P R E F A C E to the Reader.

I Have been preaching a considerable time on the Epistle of St. Paul to the Philippians, and coming to the 8th Verse of the third Chapter of that Epistle, I preached the Sermon on which Mr. Edwards hath bestowed his Reflections. I had not any Thoughts of making that Sermon more publick than the other Sermons I had preached on that Epistle, till I afterwards found the Proposition laid down in that Sermon, most unmercifully traduced by Mr. Edwards in his Books writ against the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. The Sermon was published, because I thought it did plainly manifest that the Proposition did not impair any of the Doctrines taught in the New Testament, but did assert and secure to them all, their Authority, did preserve them in the Places where Christ had set them, and for the Uses for which he intended them. The Animadversions were designed to intimate that Mr. Edwards had mistaken, or misrepresented the Proposition, and to hint that in certain Respects the Considerations Mr. Edwards had offered against the Proposition were deficient. But Mr. Edwards hath fancied other things, and therefore puts a different Construction on them both.

I should be inclined to think it something strange that the Proposition discoursed of in the following Papers (the Truth of which Proposition the most Ingenious Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. hath so fully proved from the Testimony of Christ and his Apostles) should be so coarsely treated, but that I am very well satisfied that there is no great Cause to

wonder, that even learned and good Men do differ in their Apprehensions about Matters of no small Moment, and that neither Learning, nor Piety, no nor both together, are always strong enough in this imperfect Estate, to restrain the Fondness Men have for Notions they have a great while espoused, from expressing it self in its Natural Dialect. The Primitive Christians had a more honourable Esteem of this Proposition, when they thought it of much greater Consequence than their Lives. The Christians were at first persecuted, not so much for any particular Doctrines they professed to believe, but for Jesus's Name sake, that is, for their owning Jesus to be the Messias. And afterwards, when the Christians were murdered with a more immediate Respect to particular Doctrines they would not renounce, because they knew Jesus, whom they believed to be the Messias, had taught them, or would not embrace Doctrines for which there was no Proof that Christ ever taught them, it was the Respect they had to Jesus as the Messias, that did dignify their Sufferings, and advance them to the Crown of Martyrdom. The great Point of Anti-Christianism (at least next to a professed disowning Jesus to be the Messias) consists in setting up an Authority to make any thing a part of Religion, which Jesus Christ hath not authorized. And the great Malignity of that lies in this, that it involves a tacit denying that Jesus is the Messias.

Those who are of the Opinion, that true Christians are obliged to endeavour to encrease extensively in Knowledge and Faith, and yet think that the Belief of more Articles than this, that Jesus is the Messias, is indispensably necessary to make or constitute a Man a Christian, may (if they consider Matters well) perceive that the Notion of the Absolute Necessity of the Belief of more Articles to make a Man a

The PREFACE.

v

Christian, will prove in its just Consequences very injurious to Christ's Authority. For those things, the Belief whereof doth constitute a Man a Christian, must be the Rule and Measure by which he is to judge and determine what he is to endeavour to know and believe. So that whatever he can be obliged to endeavour to know and believe, by virtue of his being a Christian, must have a clear and plain Connection with every one of those Articles, which are absolutely necessary to be believed to make him a Christian. Its having ever so plain and immediate a Connection with one, or two, or more of those Articles, will not prove he is obliged to believe it, if there be yet more Articles, the Belief of which was necessary to make him a Christian; because it answers not, or comes not up to that entire Rule, by which he is to judge, whether he be obliged to believe it. For in that case it falls as really short of answering the Rule by which he is to proceed, as a Person's judging that a due believing that Jesus is the Messias, makes a Man a Christian, falls short of the Truth, if the Belief of more Articles is indispensably necessary to make him a Christian. Thus his knowing that Jesus Christ hath revealed such a Doctrine, brings him not under an Obligation to believe it, but he may notwithstanding that withhold his Assent. If it shall be said, that knowing Christ hath revealed it, he is by virtue thereof obliged to believe it with respect to the end for which it is revealed: I answer, that if a due Belief that Jesus is the Messias do not constitute a Man a Christian, a Christian is to judge by all that which is necessarily to be believed to constitute him a Christian, of his being obliged to believe any Point to any Purpose in Religion; for what is necessary for any Purpose in Religion, concerns him as he is a Christian, and so is not to be judged of by what doth not constitute him a Christian,

stian, but by what doth constitute him a Christian, be that the Belief of more or fewer Articles.

Mr. Edwards hath thought fit to reproach the Proposition I speak of as a Socinian Doctrine, and a way to extirpate the Christian Religion out of the World, and to introduce Infidelity. But I think it is the only Point that can with full Assurance be advanced and insisted on effectually, and with the greatest Ease and Speed, to prostrate the Opposers of Christ's Divinity, and of the Doctrine of the ever blessed Trinity, and to overthrow all the false and corrupt Notions which disfigure the Christian Church, yea which do prevail in the World. The Doctrines or Articles which Christians are to endeavour to understand and believe, are those which are delivered in the New Testament. And the Reason why they are to believe the Doctrines which are taught there, is the Authority of Jesus, considered as the Messias. Whoever believes that Jesus is the Messias, must assent to the Truth of every Proposition he knows that Jesus hath taught; for his Testimony is the Great Evidence of the Truth of those Propositions. If any Man pretends to believe that Jesus is the Messias, and yet will reject or refuse to believe what he knows he hath taught, he doth thereby manifest that he is not a true Christian, i. e. that he doth not indeed believe that Jesus is the Messias. Those who say they would not believe such or such a Doctrine, if it were expressly taught in the New Testament, do plainly declare they do not own those Books to be divinely inspired. And if they should say they would not believe them, if Jesus Christ himself did deliver them, they would more immediately declare that they do not believe him to be the Messias. The Ebionites, who out of Design pretended to believe Jesus to be the Messias, were so sensible of this, that because they would

would not acknowledg him to be God, they rejected the Books of the New Testament, and provided themselves another Book (which had not that Doctrine in it) which they pretended did contain the Doctrines which he taught.

It hath been the way of those who have set themselves against the Holy Scriptures, or some of the Doctrines taught in them, either to advance some Doctrines as necessary to be believed, which are not taught in those sacred Writings, or to alter some of the Doctrines taught in them, by annexing their own Sense and Interpretation to the Words in which Jesus Christ and his Apostles delivered them. Of this latter sort were those who opposed the Divinity of Christ, and the Doctrine of the Trinity, which occasioned the Primitive Christians to make it their Business to shew that the Words which Christ and his Apostles used did import a great deal more than what those Persons pretended was the full Sense of them. Those false Teachers, and their Successors, especially those who have of late contended against these Doctrines, applied themselves to an Artifice very common amongst them who have set up to combat the Doctrines of our Blessed Saviour, and undermine the Christian Religion, which is, to endeavour to enlarge the Controversy as much as possible, that thus they might have the more room to turn in. They have by this Means obtained certain unhappy Advantages. They have amused and bewildered many of the weaker sort of People. They have found out many Evasions and Shifts under which to hide and shelter themselves. They have created Persons of prodigious Learning and Parts much unnecessary Trouble. Whereas had they been kept strictly to this one Point, that Jesus is the Messias, and not suffered to start from that and its immediate Consequence, the Controversy would

have been brought to a speedy Issue, by producing the *Messias's own Words*. For then the utmost they could do would be only to talk of *Accents, Articles, and Copies*, which I conceive are *Topicks* they do not much care now to insist on; and amongst other *Reasons*, (besides their having been so often baffled already) because very few *Persons* (in comparison) would regard the *Debate*, when those things would be all they could discourse of. But they have exceedingly extended the *Controversy*, by prevailing with the *Orthodox* to fix on other *Topicks* for *Discourse*. They have greatly indangered the *Truth*, under a Pretence of being revenged on those *Terms* the *Antient Christians* had settled for the expressing of their Sense concerning these *Doctrines*, in opposition to those who formerly set themselves against these *Doctrines*. And thus the *Controversy* is run into *Antiquity* and *Reason*. By which means the *Socinians* and the *Orthodox* have had opportunity to produce very great *Proofs* of the *Strength* of their *Natural Endowments*, and their acquired *Accomplishments*. Upon these *Points* we have had of late very notable *Encounters*. The *Orthodox* have (all things considered) acquitted themselves bravely, and with singular *Dexterity* (except some of them falling together by the *Ears* one with another, that their *Adversaries* might have some breathing *Space*, and a little *Diversion* to boot) but I am apt to suspect that the great *Reason* why they have done so little *Execution*, is because they have yielded, for a while, to lay aside the *Sword* of the *Spirit*, the *Testimony* of the *Messias*, and have consented to fight their *Adversaries* at their own *Weapons*. Did I enjoy my former *Health*, I should think it a very pleasant *Diversion* to see *Prizes* plaid this way by *Persons* who are well-skill'd at these sort of *Weapons*, provided the *Matters* in *Debate* were of another *Nature*. But in the present

Mat-

Matters these Methods seem to me little other than if David had laid down his Sling and Pouch, and had gone forth to fight the huffing Philistine in Saul's Armour. Neither Reason nor Antiquity can determine any thing immediately concerning these Doctrines, whether they be true or not, whether we are to believe them or no. Our Certainty of their Truth depends entirely on the Testimony of Jesus Christ. The Proofs that Jesus is the Messias lie level to the Senses or Reason of Mankind. And if we have Reason to believe that Jesus is the Messias, and are convinced of that, his Testimony affords us as good and satisfactory Reason, why we should believe what we know he hath taught, as the Testimony of our Senses can yield us, why we should believe any Proposition which respects their proper Objects. Our Reason doth not immediately judg concerning the thing treated of in the Proposition, but concerning the Evidence, whether it be such as by virtue of it we ought to assent to the Proposition. The Reasonableness of our believing any particular Doctrine, taught in the New Testament, as delivered there, depends upon the Reasons we have to believe that Jesus is the Messias. And if we are fully satisfied that we have sufficient Reason to believe him to be the Messias, our Reason must certify us, that it is the most reasonable thing in the World to believe whatever we know he hath taught. For could there be any Reason to doubt whether what he hath said is true, we could not have sufficient Reason to believe that he is the Messias. If we believe him to be the Messias, his Testimony is the fullest Evidence we can desire of the Truth of what he hath taught. And if we allow the Evidence to be compleat and full, tho we cannot form a distinct Idea of the Matter treated of, we have all imaginable Reason to believe the Proposition.

When our Adversaries talk of Reason, as to these
Mat-

Matters, they seem to mean, that the things discoursed of must be brought down to that degree, that laying aside Revelation, we may form distinct and clear Notions of the things themselves, by the sole Exercise of our natural Faculties, so that by contemplating them we may find out intrinsick Reasons to believe or assent to the Propositions Christ hath delivered concerning them. Which is the absurdest thing that can be. For herein they require that the Nature of the things should be altered, and they renounce Revelation, whilst they pretend to avow and own it. And they might with every jot as much Reason, require that People should judg of Sounds by their Eyes, and of Colours by their Fingers. If we were to judg of the Matters themselves, and to form the Propositions originally our selves, there would not be any need of such Revelation as we now have, the Messias would not have had any occasion to have said any thing of them, but then we must have had new Faculties, and those proportioned to what is discoursed of. But the Propositions being delivered down to us, there is no need of our having new Faculties, it is enough to render it most reasonable for us to believe the Propositions, that we have new Evidence administred to our old Faculties.

*When our most learned Divines speak of Reason, as to these Doctrines, they do not speak of the Doctrines delivered by Christ and his Apostles, for no Reason can be assigned for our believing them under that precise Consideration, but only the Testimony of Christ. But they speak of those Terms in which the Church hath delivered her Sense, in opposition to those who represented the Words of Christ when applied to these Matters, as signifying no more than the Words of any ordinary Man do, when concerned about most obvious and common things. And thus they shew that those Terms comprehend a great deal more in them than that
other*

other sort of People pretend is signified by our Saviour's Words; and that the Notions these Terms do stand for, are very consonant to the Reason of Mankind. But they do not pretend that these Terms, as strictly expressing those Notions, do exhaust the whole that is comprized in our Saviour's Words. For should they do so, they would pretend to comprehend the Matters themselves Christ doth speak of, and to set them forth in a clearer Light than he hath done.

A Doctrine or Proposition is reasonable, when it truly relates or expresseth the Reason of the things about which it is concerned; that is, when the Subject and Predicate have such a Connection in the Proposition, as doth truly express and signify the Connection there is betwixt what the Subject and Predicate do stand for, and note in the things spoken of. Now there is a very great Difference between my understanding the Reason, the Order, the Relation there is between the things spoken of in the Proposition, i. e. wherein that Order doth consist, or what it is that constitutes that Order, and my having Reason to believe the Proposition, which doth relate and declare that there is a certain Order, Relation, and Reason between them, or belonging to them. Evidence is the Reason or Ground of my Assent and Belief. And tho' the things spoken of are in their own Nature above my reach, yet there may be such Evidence of the Truth of the Proposition, as may be sufficient to oblige my Belief of it. The Testimony of my Senses concerning their proper Objects, is the Reason of my assenting to the Truth of Propositions which respect those Objects, and not my being able to philosophize about those Objects, either after the old or new way. I believe the Doctrines I know Christ hath taught, not because I can comprehend and philosophize on the Matters spoken of, but because I know that Jesus, whom I believe to be the Messiah, hath taught

taught them. He fully understood the Order of the Things he spake of, and his Testimony is as full Evidence to engage my Belief of whatever I know he hath taught, as my Sight is, to oblige my Assent to Propositions relating to the proper Objects of that Sense. These Doctrines are not propos'd to us for Speculation, but for our Use and Benefit. We have Evidence enough, even as much as we can with Reason desire, of the Truth of these Propositions, if we believe that Jesus is the Messias; and our blessed Saviour hath given us full Direction what Use we are to make of them, that we may partake of the singular Advantages he will communicate those ways. And if instead of quarrelling and wrangling about Matters which are far above our loftiest Speculations, we would submissively betake our selves to the Methods our Lord doth advise and prescribe us, we might confidently expect the most exhilarating Satisfaction concerning these Points. If any Man will do his Will, he shall know of the Doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of my self. John 7. 17.

Whereas the Socinians pretend that these Doctrines do contradict our natural Notions: that is a Suggestion so gross, one might wonder how rational Men could ever entertain such a dry and senseless Conceit, unless it hath sprung from hence, that hearing that these Doctrines must necessarily be believed to make Men Christians, they have concluded that the Truth of these Doctrines must be judged of by their natural Notions. And to speak the Truth freely, I know not how to remove the Difficulty, as long as that Prejudice continues. But this I dare affirm with the greatest Assurance, that it cannot with any Colour be said that any of the Doctrines which Christ hath taught do contradict our natural Notions, and therefore not these in particular: for they do not treat concerning

Matters of which we have any natural Notions. Now if these Matters were spoken of in such a way, that to speak in the same manner concerning those things of which we have natural Notions, would be a Contradiction to our natural Notions, it cannot with any Sense be said, that there is such a Contradiction, when the Matters discoursed of are such, as we have no natural Notions of. The Application of Words must be according to the Truth of Things, otherwise the Propositions would be false, and contradict the Truth. Jesus Christ delivered his Doctrines in the Words he used, because those Words do truly express the Reason there is in the things he spake of; and we are to believe those Propositions on his Authority, because he hath faithfully related the Truth concerning the Things he speaks of. And if we believe him to be the Christ or Messias, we can have no Pretence to doubt of the Truth of what we know he hath taught. Could we be satisfied that a certain Person hath a distinct Sense from what is common to Mankind, and that there are Objects peculiar to that Sense, we should have as much Reason to believe what he saith concerning those Objects, as we have to be satisfied that he hath such a Sense, that there are Objects peculiar to it, and that he is a Person of Discernment and Integrity. And if he should speak of those Objects in such a manner as would be a Contradiction to our natural Notions, did he speak so concerning those things which are the Objects of our Senses, and precisely under that Consideration, we should have no Reason to say he contradicts our natural Notions, whilst he discourses of things which we know nothing at all of, but purely by his Information. He is to accommodate his Words to the Reason and Truth of the Things he discourses of, not to the Notions we have of Matters which are quite different. And the Reason we have to believe what he saith of those things,

things, bears a Proportion to the Reasons we have to be satisfied of his Credibility, and depends not at all on our forming clear and distinct Notions of the things themselves, much less on our adjusting what he saith to the Notions we have of other things, which are perfectly of another Nature.

The main Business of Antiquity, with relation to these Doctrines, is either, 1st. To shew upon what Occasion other Words than those in which Christ and his Apostles delivered these Doctrines, were made use of in asserting and teaching them. Or, 2dly. To shew that the Primitive Christians did manifest that they did believe the Words in which Christ and his Apostles delivered these Doctrines, do comprehend a great deal more than what the Opposers of the Divinity of Christ, and of the Holy Ghost, pretend is the full Sense of them. Or, 3dly. To shew that the Sense in which we understand the Terms, in which we ordinarily speak of these Doctrines, was the agreed and settled Sense of them, in the Christian Church, when these Terms were fixed on to be ordinarily used in discoursing of, and professing our Belief of these Doctrines.

Thus the Discourses about Reason and Antiquity do not immediately reach these Doctrines, as Christ hath taught them, but the way of expressing them when we deliver our selves concerning them in other Words than Christ hath done. When we use other Terms in speaking of these Doctrines, than Christ hath delivered them in, our Words are accommodated to the natural Notions we have of Things: And tho these Notions comprehend much more than the Notions do which we oppose, yet they do not contain the whole Meaning of Christ, as delivered in the Words he hath used, for that far surpasses our Capacities. So that when all is done, we must come to this at last, to believe these Doctrines as Christ hath delivered them,

them, and for this very Reason, because he hath taught them. Now before a Person can be brought to this, he must believe that Jesus is the Messias. And if the due Belief that Jesus is the Messias doth not constitute a Man a Christian, I cannot imagine how the Belief of other Articles can constitute him a Christian, seeing that Belief is the formal Reason of his believing the other Articles, and his believing other Articles is no more but a repeated Belief of that Article, in proportion to the Occasions which are administered to him for it. Produce as large a Proof as is possible, that the Church hath all along taught such a Doctrine, that she hath taught it in such Words, that she understood those Words in such a Sense, before a Person can be satisfied regularly that he is obliged to believe it, he must be convinced that Jesus is the Messias, and he must be satisfied that that Jesus hath taught it. The like may be said as to Reason. When you have produced as many Reasons as you can, that there may be more Subsistencies than one in the Divine Nature, you can neither prove the Necessity, nor the Certainty, nor the Number of them, by Reason. But as to all these Matters, the Testimony of the Messias must determine our Belief. Our Reason doth not only fall short, as to the manner how these things are, but also as to the Truth and Certainty of them. And our Reason cannot assure us that this is all that is imported by and comprehended in the Words, in which the Messias hath delivered his Doctrines.

Mr. Edwards in his Socinian Creed, p. 130. doth stile the Proposition discoursed of, (tho he words it otherwise than it ought to be) A Mushroom Notion, that hath no Root and Foundation, and saith, It is probable it will soon decay and come to nothing. But this Notion is not of such a late Origin

as he pretends, if Christ and his Apostles are to be credited concerning it. And tho I pay Mr. Edwards a great Defeience, yet I must declare I cannot but prefer their Word to his. It is so far from having no Root and Foundation, that it is the Root of the New Testament, and the Foundation on which the Christian Church is built. And whereas he saith, It is probable it will soon decay and come to nothing; Probabilities are of little Weight, when placed in the Ballance against Certainties. I am perswaded it will continue safe to the end of the World, because the Messias hath undertaken that the Gates of Hell shall not prevail against it, Mat. 16. 18.

If all the Deists, Scepticks, Socinians, &c. in the World, should pretend to approve of the Proposition discoursed of, and that they do believe that Jesus is the Messias, I shall not renounce the Proposition on that account. But if they continue regardless of, oppose, or refuse to endeavour to understand and believe the particular Doctrines the Messias hath taught, I will maintain in opposition to them all, that they do not believe that Jesus is the Messias, with such a Faith as is necessary to make a Man a Christian.

Tho I think I am not mistaken about the Point debated, yet I will attend diligently to Scripture and Reason, and endeavour to yield a just Submission to them, tho offered by the meanest Man living. But if Imperious Ramble shall drop from the Learnedest Person in the whole Universe, touching this Matter, it will not be honoured with either of those Titles, but be utterly disregarded by, Reader,

Your Faithful Servant,

S. BOLD.

A Brief Reply to Mr. Edwards's Brief Reflections, &c.

THE Reverend Mr. *Edwards* hath caused a *Postscript* to be tack'd to his *Socinian Creed*, intituled, *Brief Reflections on a short Discourse of the true Knowledge of Christ Jesus, &c.* That Reverend Author, amongst his other *Excellencies*, is taken notice of for his Skill in *Critical Learning*, which requires a *guessing Faculty*. This *Talent* he hath been pleased to exercise to a considerable *Extent* in the present Papers, termed *Brief Reflections, &c.* But as it is often the *mishap* of those who *indulge* much to *Conjectures*, that their *Guesses* are not always *right*, so it happens to Mr. *Edwards* in the *present Case*: For notwithstanding his *Gatherings*, and *Findings*, and many *probable Shows*, there is not (to my particular knowledg) *one word of Truth* in the whole *Lump* of his *Guesses*. He is every jot as much out in every particular *here*, as he was in his former Writings, when he both assured his *Reader* he could not believe Mr. *L.* was the Author of the *Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* and substituted his Reasons why he could not believe it; and yet he is *peremptory* in these Papers, that that same *Gentleman* was the *Author* of that *Treatise*. So that it is evident Mr. *Edwards* is not so *sure* in his *Guesses*, no not when he hath declared the *Grounds* on which they are *erected*, as, that either other People, or he

B

himself

himself may depend on them, as *infallible Oracles*, or of such *Credibility*, that any stress should be laid on them; tho he *sincerely protests that he intends to give vent to Truth (and that only)*.

Mr. *Edwards* hath thought fit to continue his *late way* of Writing in these Papers, wherein (considering the number of Pages) there is as much *Banter*, as in his *Socinianism Unmask'd*. These parts of his *Discourse* I shall pass over very *lightly*; for whatever Impression such Passages may make on those who have not been inured to such kind of *Treatment*, they make very little on me, who have been accustomed a long time together, to be entertained with such sort of *Reflections*, not only from Persons in all Respects very much *below* Mr. *Edwards*, but from some, who wore a more *sublime Character*, both in *Church* and *State*, than Mr. *Edwards* doth, (I do not say than he deserves in the *Church*) tho I am of Opinion, if all their *Reading* were put together, it would not amount to *one half* of what Mr. *Edwards* is *Master of*. These things only respect my *Person*, not the *Cause*: and as for my self, I can bear with Peoples dealing with that as they please; they can hardly entertain more contemptible Thoughts of me, than I ought to have of my self. And if their loading me by their words, with all they have a mind to, may but help me to be duly low in my own Thoughts, I shall reap more Advantage by it, than they can from the Pleasure they feel in the exercise of that *Faculty*. I have met with many, very much beneath Mr. *Edwards*, in respect of *laudable Accomplishments*, every whit as ready and expert in this sort of *Talk* as he appears to be, which makes me conclude, that this *kind of Discourse*
doth

doth not result from the *eminency* of Mens *Parts*, but that Mr. *Edwards's* having made no greater a Proficiency in it, proceeds from *Nature's* being under the restraint of those *noble Endowments* in him, which many want, who have the *other* in common with him.

Indeed in some Pages, Mr. *Edwards* doth use much softer, and more kind Expressions than I could expect from him; for which excess of Charity, I return him my thanks (provided the *King of Ham* may not be thought to have a Hand here) as also that he hath taken such speedy Care, by altering his *Tone*, to prevent my being over much swoln, because of those *favourable words* which happened to *drop* from his *Pen*. Wherein his Prudence, with respect to himself, may not be altogether unworthy of Observation: for not knowing but my weakness might be such, those *gentle Words* might from a Person of his *Figure*, perfectly overwhelm me with *Joy*, that he might not be thought to have a Hand in my *Death*, he hath been pleased to determine me a *Felo de se*, saying he hath dispatched himself. Mr. *Edwards* is pleased to say, any Man may discern a *Mercenary stroke* all along the *Animadversions*. This, it's true, I ought not to look upon as said to me, because Mr. *Edwards* is positive I did not write them; but lest all who read him, should not take his Word for it, and therefore think the *Aspersions* sticks on me, I may take leave to say on my own behalf, that I think I have hardly ever appeared on a *fashionable Subject*, or to accommodate my Discourse on any Subject to a *predominant Humour*. I am certain I never knew any Man write against me, who fail'd of *speedy Preferment*. And I heartily wish Mr. *Edwards*

may meet with the same *Fortune*; and that in some proportion to his *just Deserts*, and those *eminent Qualifications* with which he is *stored*, and for which I mightily *reverence* him. For tho I cannot justify every Expression he useth, yet I am persuaded he is a very *good Man*, as well as a Person of very *much Reading*. 'Tis true, there seems to be some *Vinegar* in his *Ink*; but I am sensible that Men of *warm* and *choleric* *Tempers* are somewhat apt to be *testy*, and may need some *Grains of Allowance*, (tho they may not apprehend it) as well as those who are of such a *cold* and *phlegmatick* *Constitution* as I am. A pious Zeal is not always in all Circumstances *Judicious*. A *hot Fancy*, when it begins to *rove*, will (without a great deal of *Care*) take a large *Compass*; and when upon the *reflecting Pin*, will have a *fling* at every thing within its *view*. And therefore I do not wonder that the *Sermon*, *Preface*, *Animadversions*, *Author*, nay a *Gentleman* quite unknown to me, if not to Mr. *Edwards* also, and *Booksellers* should have a *share*, yea that the *Street* or *Row* should be brought in, and that the *Sign* too, must come in for a *Rarity*.

The first thing Mr. *Edwards* lays to my charge in my *Sermon* is, that I have *contradicted* the very *Proposition* I had laid down. Now if this be *true*, I am undoubtedly *guilty* of a very great *fault* in *Discourse*. But tho *Mode* and *Figure* were not necessary to confute what I had said, they would not have done any hurt if they had been used to make the *Contradiction* manifest: Nor would it have been an *imputation* to any Person's *Ingenuity*, who is professedly, and with very good Reason against *Clipt Christianity*, to have set down my words entirely without *clipping* of them.

To shew that I contradict the Proposition I laid down, Mr. *Edwards* doth first of all set down the Proposition it self in these words ; *There is but one Point or Article necessary to be believed for the making a Man a Christian.* And then he produceth other words in my Sermon, which he saith do contradict that Proposition. *This* (saith Mr. *Edwards*) *he pretends to maintain as an undeniable Truth (viz. the forementioned Proposition) and yet he declares that other Points are necessary to be believed.* Sermon, pag. 32.

Answ. My words were thus, pag. 32. Tho the belief of other Points (or Articles) is not necessary to constitute a Person a Christian, yet other things (or Articles) are necessary to be believed by him who is a true Christian. I did not say that other Articles are necessarily to be believed to make a Man a Christian ; if I had said so, I had contradicted the Proposition before mentioned ; but I only said there are other Articles necessary to be believed by him who is already made a Christian, when he understands them, and knows that Jesus Christ hath taught them.

Again, Mr. *Edwards* produceth part of a Sentence in p.29. of my Sermon. The words I confess are all mine, but they do no more contradict the Proposition I laid down, than my words last discoursed of did contradict it ; as the Reader may plainly see, if he will take the Pains to read the whole Sentence as it lies in that Page referred to, where he will find my Proposition, and the words Mr. *Edwards* quotes in the same Sentence. Afterwards Mr. *Edwards* sets down some other words to make out his *Charge*, that I have contradicted the Proposition I had laid down, referring to p.33.

of my Serm. which words are not precisely mine; but I do not insist on that, for as they are set down by him, they do not contradict my Proposition. Mr. *Edwards* then adds, that I reckon up several Articles and Propositions, which are the very same which he had mentioned in his Discourses against the Conceit of one Article. I will not stay to compare them, to see whether they are exactly the same. The Sermon was writ before I saw his Discourses. I may have read them all somewhere or other, I pretend not to be *an Original*, but I did not then mind any particular Author, where I had read them altogether. Upon such Occasions I only set down what occurs to my Mind, so far as I apprehend pertinent, without troubling my self to try whether I can recollect where I have read any Sentence or Phrase. I am beholden to some or other (for ought I know) for every Passage and Word I write. Now (saith Mr. *Edwards*) if there be other Points, and particular Articles, and those many, which a sincere Christian is obliged, and that necessarily and indispensably, to understand and believe, and assent unto (he should have said, to endeavour to understand, &c.) then this Writer doth in effect yield to that Proposition which I maintained, viz. That the Belief of one Article is not sufficient to make a Man a Christian, and consequently he runs counter to the Proposition which he had laid down.

Answ. If there are more Articles, &c. which a sincere Christian is obliged to endeavour to understand, and then believe, it doth not immediately follow, that the Belief of more than this one Article, That *Jesus is the Messias*, is necessary to make a Man a Christian. It must first be proved that the explicate Knowledg and Belief of all those

those Articles, any Christian may be necessarily, &c. obliged to endeavour to understand and believe, is necessary to make a Man a Christian. And then it will follow, that the Belief of this Article, *That Jesus is the Messias*, is not sufficient to make a Man a Christian. But the Discourse now, is not concerning the *Truth* of either Mr. Edwards's Opinion, or of mine, touching that Matter, but whether I did contradict the Proposition I had laid down. Now supposing the Proposition I had laid down were *false*, my declaring that there are many Articles which a sincere Christian is necessarily obliged to endeavour to understand and then believe, doth not contradict my Proposition; for my Proposition was not, That a sincere Christian is not obliged to endeavour to know, and believe any more than this one Article, *That Jesus is the Messias*. If it were clearly proved, that Jesus Christ hath taught, that the explicit Knowledge and Belief of all those Articles, which any Christian can be necessarily obliged to endeavour to know and believe, is absolutely necessary to make a Man a Christian, then it might very fairly be said, that my Proposition doth contradict the *Truth*; but it could not with any colour, even then, be pretended that my declaring that there are other Articles, which sincere Christians are necessarily obliged to endeavour to know and believe, doth contradict the Proposition I had laid down. For (saith Mr. Edwards) *I bring the Business to this issue, If the believing of one single Article be enough to constitute a Man a Christian, then the Belief of something more is not necessary, and indispensable.*

Answ. If the right Belief of this *single Article*,
 B 4 that

that *Jesus is the Messias*, be enough to constitute a Man a sincere Christian, then the Belief of something more is not necessary, indispensably necessary to make a Man a Christian. Nor hath Mr. *Edwards* produced any Passage out of my Sermon, which affirms that any thing more is necessarily, &c. to be believed, to constitute a Man a Christian. For (saith Mr. *Edwards*) *the knowing or believing of more may be some Ornament and Embellishment to him, (viz. a Christian) yet it cannot be said that it is necessary and indispensable.*

Answ. True, it cannot be said to be necessary to make him a Christian, but it may be said to be necessary, and that he is indispensably obliged to endeavour to know it, and believe it, with respect to those Ends and Purposes for which it is revealed, and for which he is commanded to endeavour to know and believe it. If Mr. *Edwards* speaks here of knowing and believing Doctrines which Jesus Christ and his Apostles have taught and revealed, (for if he means knowing and believing other Matters, it is not to our purpose) the distinguishing of *Gospel-Doctrines* into necessary, and such as are only for *Ornament and Embellishment*, seems somewhat *harsh* to me: A *Distinction* in Matters of Faith, very like to that in *Practicals*, between *Evangelical Precepts and Counsels*. The Reason Mr. *Edwards* doth assign for his saying that the knowing and believing of more than what is necessary to constitute a Man a Christian, cannot be said to be necessary and indispensable, is this, *because nothing is so (viz. necessary and indispensable) in Christianity, but what contributes to the making a Man a Christian, a sincere Christian.*

Answ.

Answ. We are now discoursing concerning the *Articles* which are necessarily to be believed (whether one or more) not concerning the *Faith* with which they are to be believed, therefore what is necessary to a Man's being a sincere Christian is not the Subject of our Enquiry here. By this term *Christianity*, therefore Mr. *Edwards* must mean the *Articles necessarily to be believed* to make a Man a *Christian*. And the term *Christianity*, in this Proposition, *There is nothing necessary and indispensable in Christianity, but what contributes to the making a Man a Christian*, must then signify either a certain precise Number of *Articles* collected out of the *New Testament*, the Belief of every one of which is indispensably necessary to make a Man a *Christian*: Or, *all the Doctrines, Propositions, and Articles*, which Christ and his Apostles have taught, and are contained in the *New Testament*. If Mr. *Edwards* understands *Christianity* in this latter Sense, then this Proposition, *There is nothing indispensably necessary in Christianity but what contributes to the making a Man a Christian*, must be understood (I think) in one of these Senses.

1. *There is no Doctrine, Proposition, or Article in the New Testament, but the explicit Knowledg and Belief of it is indispensably necessary to make a Man a Christian; because there is no Doctrine, &c. in the New Testament, but what contributes to the making of a Man a Christian.* And if this be his Meaning, then the *Articles* he hath reckoned up are not sufficient, when believed, to make a Man a *Christian*, because there are a great many more *Articles* in the *New Testament* than those he hath named. And it will be very hard for any Man to prove, that no Man can be a *Christian* till he hath

hath an explicit Knowledg and Belief of every particular Article taught in the *New Testament*.

2. *There is no Article, &c. taught in the New Testament that is indispensably necessary to any purpose, but what is indispensably necessary to make a Man a Christian; and that because there is no Article there, necessary to any purpose, but what contributes to the making a Man a Christian.* If this be his Sense, then no Man who is already a Christian, can (in his Judgment) be under an indispensable Obligation to endeavour to know and believe any thing more of the Mind of Christ, than he knoweth already. He is not indispensably obliged to endeavour to grow in *Knowledg and Faith*, at least *extensively*: but if there be more *Doctrines* in the *New Testament* than he already understands and believes, he is perfectly at liberty with respect to them all. He may endeavour to know and believe them if he thinks fit, else not. Now if this be true, my saying that there are other Articles, which those who are Christians already are indispensably obliged to endeavour to know and then believe, is false, but yet it doth not contradict the Proposition I had laid down.

3. *There is no Article in the New Testament indispensably necessary to make a Man a Christian, but what contributes to make a Man a Christian.* If this is Mr. *Edwards's* meaning, there may be much of *Truth* in it, tho there seems to be more than what is true in it. There is no Article in the *New Testament* indispensably necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian, but what is indispensably necessary to that purpose. This is most true and certain. But if Mr. *Edwards* doth mean that there is nothing in the *New Testament* that

that may contribute to the making a Man a Christian, but it is indispensably necessary to be believed to make any Man a Christian, I think he is much mistaken. For there are many things the Knowledge whereof may contribute to make a Man a Christian, and yet the Knowledge of them doth not make him a Christian. And more things may contribute to the making of one Man a Christian, and fewer to the making of another Man a Christian. There is a very *great Difference* between what may *contribute* to the making of a Man a Christian, and what is *indispensably necessary to constitute and make a Man a Christian*. But let this be as it will, it doth not prove the Contradiction insisted on. Supposing Mr. *Edwards* in the right in all these Matters, they amount to no more, than that either my Proposition is false, or that what I have said in other Places of my Sermon are false; but they do not prove that those Passages do contradict the Proposition I had laid down, which is the thing Mr. *Edwards* labours to prove. If the term *Christianity*, in the Proposition we are speaking of, be taken in the *first Sense*, then there is supposed a certain Number of Articles necessarily to be believed to make a Man a Christian, and so the Proposition amounts to this; *There is no Article amongst those which are necessarily to be believed to make a Man a Christian, but what contributes to the making a Man a Christian*. And if there be more Articles than this, *that Jesus is the Messias*, necessarily to be believed to make a Man a Christian, then it is granted, that every one of them must contribute as much as pertains unto it, by Christ's Appointment, to make a Man a Christian. But whether the Belief of this Article alone,

alone, that *Jesus is the Messiah*, or whether the Belief of more Articles be indispensably necessary by Christ's Appointment to make a Man a Christian, is not the Point now betwixt Mr. *Edwards* and me, but whether the Passages he hath produced out of my Sermon do contradict the Proposition I had laid down. But Mr. *Edwards's* Proposition, taken in this Sense, is nothing to the Contradiction he speaks of. *Wherefore* (saith Mr. *Edwards*) *it undeniably follows that when this Gentleman acknowledges that there are more Articles than this one proposed to be believed, and that necessarily and indispensably, he must needs grant that those Articles which are thus necessary and indispensable, are necessary to make a Man a Christian.*

Ans. If I had said there were more Articles than that one, proposed to be necessarily believed to make a Man a Christian, I had granted what Mr. *Edwards* doth say I must needs grant, and then I had contradicted the Proposition I had laid down; but no such Passage is produced by Mr. *Edwards* out of my Sermon. When I said there were more Articles necessary to be believed, I said they were necessary to be believed, when known by him who is a true Christian, not necessary to be believed to make him a Christian, who is a Christian before he believes or knows them; but necessary to those Ends for which Christ hath ordained them to be believed by them who are Christians. And when I say there are many Points or Articles which Jesus Christ hath taught and revealed, which sincere Christians are indispensably obliged to endeavour to understand, and then believe; the indispensable Obligation I speak of ariseth from Christ's exerting his

Authority in commanding them who are Christians to endeavour to know and believe those Points, and from their solemn Engagement to do so, in their resigning up themselves entirely to him. Which methinks should be very clear to every one who will acknowledg that Christ's Command, and a Christian's most solemn Engagement, can bring him under an indispenfable Obligation. And now I think the *Case is plain*; and if there be *Prejudice* on either side, let the indifferent Reader judg who is most likely to be *mastered* by it.

He goes on (saith Mr. Edwards) *still to contradict himself, saying a true Christian must assent unto this, That Christ Jesus is God, p. 35.*

Answ. My Words were these, When a true Christian understands that Christ Jesus hath taught that he is God, he must assent unto it. *Observe it* (saith Mr. Edwards) *He Must, he owns here that there is an absolute Necessity of this Belief.*

Answ. What? to make a Man a Christian? I neither said so, nor did I say there was an absolute Necessity of that Belief. I was speaking of one who is a Christian; and such an one, I said, is under an indispenfable Obligation to *endeavour* to understand what Christ hath taught concerning himself; and understanding that he hath taught that he is God, he must assent to it, it is his *Duty* to do so, he is under an *Obediential Necessity* to assent to it. *Whereupon* (saith Mr. Edwards) *I ask him, Is this Belief necessary to make a Man a Christian or not?*

Answ. Seeing my Words were so very plain, I cannot understand what occasion there was to ask this *Question*. I will not encroach on their *Propriety*, who assume to themselves the *Knack*-of *Guessing*,

Guessing, but will declare my Sense freely. I mean no Ill. And if I am mistaken, or in an *Error*, I am ready to receive *Instruction*, to be convinced by good Evidence, and to be reduced to the *Truth*. I think *this Belief* is not *absolutely necessary* to make a Man a *Christian*; and that no Man can believe *aright* that *Jesus is God*, till he is a *Christian*, and believes it because he knows that *Jesus*, whom he believes to be the *Christ* or *Messias*, hath taught it, at least till he knows that he who was to be the *Messias* is *God*. And in *this case* he must know that *Jesus* was the *Messias*, before he can know *he is God*. If any Man pretend he can or does rationally believe that *Jesus is God*, upon any other account, I am pretty certain he doth not believe it as a *Christian* ought to believe it. 'Tis well if a clamorous decrying this *Notion*, that the *right Belief* that *Jesus is the Messias*, is that which constitutes and makes a Man a *Christian*, does not contribute to further *Socinianism*, &c. tho contrary to the *Intentions* and *Designs* of *learned* and *good Men*, who happen to yield a little further to their *Passions* than in strictness they ought. *That Jesus is God*, is an *Article* to be believed by those who are *Christians*, not by those who are not yet *Christians*. Men cannot judg of Matters, nor believe any thing but according to the *Light* and *Evidence* they do enjoy. And if we make the *Belief* of *this* and *other Articles* which are *peculiar* to those who are already *Christians*, indispensably necessary to make Men *Christians*, they who are not *Christians* will judg of *this* and *those other Articles*, according to that *Light* they have, whereby to judg of things in their *present State*. I do not wonder
that

that many are *Socinians*, and that many do treat the *great Articles* of the *Gospel* so very *indecently*. For hearing that these *Articles* are to be believed to make them *Christians*, they will and must judge of them by the mere *Light of Nature* and *Reason*, and therefore will not admit of any thing but what lies *level* with, or is *proportionate* to the *Light* by which they are to judge. Let the *Articles* necessarily to be believed be *more* or *fewer*, they will judge of every one of them by the *same Rule*, and must do so, till they have *another Rule* to judge of *Matters* by. And till a *Man* is a *Christian*, he hath no *Rule* whereby to determine his *Judgment* and *Faith* absolutely, but natural *Light* and *Reason*. I think it is as *unfair* to exact *Belief* of any *Man* that *Jesus is God*, before he is a *Christian*, as to require a *Man* to judge *aright* concerning an *Object* peculiar to a *Sense*, that he hath not. Did *People* generally heartily believe *Jesus to be the Messiah*, I am persuaded a much *greater Veneration* would be manifested for the *Books* which make up the *New Testament*, and the *Doctrines* delivered in them, than is commonly discovered. I apprehend that the *irreverent Opposition* that is made to some of the *greatest* and *most momentous Doctrines* taught in the *New Testament*, proceeds more from the want of a *due Belief* that *Jesus is the Messiah*, than from an *Affectation* to combat those *Doctrines*. When a *Man* doth *duly believe* that *Jesus is the Messiah*, he hath as *satisfying Evidence* of the *Truth* of every *Article* he attains to know *Jesus* hath taught, as the *brightest natural Evidence* can be, to satisfy concerning *Matters* within the *Verge* and *Compass* of *Nature*. The *Grounds*, the *Motives*, the *Inducements*

duancements (I speak not concerning supernatural Influences on the Mind and Heart) to believe what is indispensably necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, are accommodated to our natural and rational Powers. But I cannot say so concerning the particular Doctrines of the Gospel, which are to be believed for this very Reason, *Because Jesus hath revealed and taught them.* Natural Reason is of great use in order to our being Christians, and so it is after we are Christians; but it is not the immediate Rule by which our Belief of the Doctrines delivered in the Gospel is to be determined; for that is to be founded on, and resolved into Christ's Authority, exerted in his declaring and teaching those Points.

He cannot say (saith Mr. Edwards) It is not, (viz. That the Belief that Jesus is God, is not necessary to make a Man a Christian) because to believe him to be God, who really is so, is no indifferent thing in Christianity.

Answ. A Man must know that Jesus is God, before he can believe him to be God: And if a Man cannot know him to be God, before he is a Christian, then that Belief is not absolutely necessary to constitute a Man a Christian. But what Mr. *Edwards* doth mean by *Christianity* here, is as hard to understand, as in some other Places where the same Term is used by him. If he mean, that when a Christian knows that it is taught in the New Testament, that such an one is really God, it is no indifferent thing whether he believe it or no, that is, he is not left to his Liberty to believe it or not, he saith the very Truth. But if he means that a Person cannot be a Christian, till he believes that whomsoever the New Testament doth de-
clare

clare is really God, is so ; I am so far from saying so, that I think he must be a Christian before he can believe them to be so, notwithstanding they really are so. Indeed no Man can be a true Christian till *he believes him to be God who really is so* ; he must believe the true and living God : But that is so far from constituting a Man a Christian, that it is the very first Principle and Ground of Natural Religion ; therefore I do not think that to be Mr. Edwards's meaning here. *But (saith Mr. Edwards) this is absolutely requisite to constitute a Man a Christian ; for a Man cannot be such, unless he hath a Knowledg of him that is true God.*

Answ. It is absolutely requisite to constitute a Man a Christian, to know him who is true God ; for otherwise, he who is a Christian, could not be under any Obligation to believe Jesus to be God. But notwithstanding Jesus is really God, and a Man cannot be a Christian without knowing *this Jesus*, who is really God ; it will not follow from thence, that the knowing him *to be God*, is absolutely necessary to make a Man a Christian. It is not a Man's believing that Jesus is God, that constitutes him a Christian : what can *constitute* a Man a *Christian*, but the right and due believing *him to be the Christ or Messias, who really is so* ? It was not his being God, that constituted him the Christ or Messias ; for then he would not have been *freely*, but *necessarily* the *Christ and Saviour of Sinners*. A Man cannot be a true Christian, unless he knows him who is true God ; because he who is the Messias or Christ, is true God ; and a Man cannot be a true Christian, unless he know him who is the Messias or Christ. But it is not the knowing him to be true God, but the right knowing of him to

C

be

be the Messias, or Christ, that doth constitute or make a Man a Christian: could a Man know him to be *God*, without knowing him to be the *Christ*, this Knowledge would but constitute him a *Theist*, not a *Christian*. Whether it doth inevitably follow from what I had said, that I must hold, that the assenting to this Proposition, that Christ Jesus is God, is necessary to make a Man a Christian; and whether I have *in effect positively said* (as Mr. *Edwards* doth phrase it) that the believing of more than that one Article before mentioned, is absolutely requisite to make a Man a Christian, I leave the Reader now to determine. But for my own part, I am not sensible that I have yet contradicted the Proposition I had laid down, which is the thing Mr. *Edwards* is still upon.

In another Place (saith Mr. *Edwards*) speaking of the Account which the Scripture gives of the Holy Spirit, viz. That he is God, he adds, that a true Christian is as much obliged to believe this, as to believe that Jesus is the Christ, pag. 40.

Ans. What my words are, may be seen in the Page referred to. But certainly I did not say, that a Person is as much obliged to believe that, to make him a Christian, as he is to believe that Jesus is the Christ, to make him a Christian. See here (saith Mr. *Edwards*) the force and energy of Truth, it will make its way through the Teeth of those who oppose it.

Ans. Let the Reader consider my words referred to before, and then conclude whether the Force and Strength of Prejudice doth not appear so great as to prevail sometimes with People to oppose Truth in spite of their Teeth, and Lips, yea and Eyes too.

Mr. Edwards saith I have plainly and professedly contradicted the Proposition I had laid down; for this (saith he) is the Case, If a true Christian be as much obliged to believe one as the other, then it is certain that Christianity is as much concerned in the Belief of the one as of the other; and if so, then a Man cannot be a Christian without this Belief.

Ans^r. The former part of that Speech may be true, or otherwise, according to the Sense in which the term *Christianity* shall be understood. But there is no consequence at all, that because one who is a Christian, may be as much obliged to believe that Truth, or Doctrine, as the other; therefore the Belief of it is so necessary, that a Man cannot be a Christian without it. It is as necessary for me to believe that *Jesus* was at *Cana of Galilee*, and turned *Water into Wine* there, as it is, that he was *Crucified* without the *Gates of Jerusalem*; because I have the same Evidence for the one, I have for the other. But I cannot say it is of as much importance for a Man to know the one, as it is to know the other; much less can I say that no Man can be a Christian, till he knows and believes that *Jesus was at Cana in Galilee, &c.* And tho I cannot submit to this non-sense, that a Man can be a Christian, tho he believe not those things without which he cannot be a Christian; Yet if any Man will call this non-sense, viz. That a Man may be a Christian without the explicit Belief of several Articles, which after he is a Christian, he may be obliged to believe, I can submit very easily, and with a great deal of Reason to it.

Mr. Edwards having thus concluded his Proof of my *self-Contradiction*, is pleased in the next Page to set down these words. Tho he appears in

the Form of a Preacher, yet he hath said nothing answerable to the specious Title of his Sermon, The true Knowledg of Christ Jesus; but on the contrary, hath said very ill things, to the lessening, and impairing, yea to the defaming of that Knowledg and Belief of our Saviour, and of the Articles of Christianity, which are necessarily required of us.

Ans^w. If Mr. Edwards had affirmed that I had said nothing answerable to what he would have said on that great Subject, *The true Knowledg of Christ Jesus*, had he undertaken to discourse of it, I should readily agree to it: But seeing he saith I have said nothing answerable to the Title of my Sermon, it would not have been unfair to have set down the true Title of my Sermon, which was, *A short Discourse of the true Knowledg, &c.* And if I have said nothing answerable to the Subject, yet the Sermon is something answerable to the Title; for then it must be acknowledged short with a Witness. If I have said (as Mr. Edwards affirms) any thing to the lessening, impairing, or defaming of the Knowledg and Belief of our Saviour, or of any Articles in the *New Testament*, I cannot be sorry enough for it. I am sure I had no Design to say any thing of that Nature or Tendency; I think I have expressly asserted, that *all the Doctrines* in the *New Testament* are of *Divine Authority*; that being known by Christians to be taught there, they must be believed by them; that Christians are obliged to use their utmost endeavours to know them; and that Peoples attaining to a Knowledg of them before they are true Christians, may contribute much to the bringing of them to be true Christians. Indeed I did not assert, that the Belief of them all is indispensably necessary

necessary to make and constitute a Man a Christian, but did declare it was my Opinion, that the right Belief of this one Article, *That Jesus is the Christ or Messias*, doth constitute and make a Man a Christian. Now whether the Belief of this one Article alone, or of more Articles, be indispensably necessary to make a Man a Christian, doth not depend on my Judgment, nor on the Judgment of any other Man. That must be learned from Christ and his Apostles: If they have determined for more than the one before mentioned, then more are necessary, let who will say the contrary. If they have determined for the one abovenamed, then that alone is indispensably necessary to the purpose spoken of, tho all the World should oppose it, and say it is not sufficient for that end, but more Articles must necessarily be believed to make or constitute a Man a Christian. Every honest and good Man, who discourses of the Point, will speak according to the best of his Judgment. And if any Persons differ in their Judgments about this, recourse is to be had to the *New Testament*, to see who accords best with what Christ and his Apostles have said upon the Matter. Now this I am certain of, that *Jesus Christ*, and his Apostles, do insist upon this one Article, to be believed to make Men Christians, and that they have taught many other Doctrines in order to their being known, believed, and made use of. Upon the best Inquiry I have been able yet to make, I cannot find that they have required the Belief of any of those other Doctrines, as absolutely necessary to make a Man a Christian. The Reverend Mr. Edwards, and many other very Learned and Godly Persons (whom I very greatly honour,

and reverence for their Labours, Piety, and extraordinary Accomplishments) do think, they perceive that Christ and his Apostles did teach and deliver some of those Doctrines, as necessarily to be believed, to make a Man a Christian. There is then some mistake on one side, or on the other. Now before I entertain a *disparaging Thought* concerning any of those, who are of a *different Judgment* from me in this Matter, the Point ought to be placed in a very good Light, and be exceeding clear on *my side*: And an equitable Person will perhaps reckon I may with Reason expect that the *other Point* be made very plain, before those who espouse it, do grow *Stormy and Tempestuous*, because I declare my Opinion, and calmly represent wherein I conceive the weakness of what any of them do offer for the Support or Illustration of their Judgment, doth lie. It is agreed on both sides, that Jesus Christ and his Apostles have taught, that the Belief of that *one Article* I insist on, is indispensably necessary to constitute and make a Man a Christian. They alledg several Texts to prove certain other Propositions, as necessarily to be believed to make a Man a Christian, as that other Article is. I acknowledg the Scriptures they quote, are full Proof that the *Propositions* contained in them, are *Divine Truths*. But that is not the thing for which they produce those Scriptures, for so far we are agreed; but they produce them as *Proofs*, that *Jesus Christ*, and his *Apostles*, have taught, that the *explicit Belief* of those *Propositions*, is indispensably necessary to make a Man a Christian. I own they fully prove the former, but I am utterly at a loss to find how they *prove the latter*, which is
the

the *thing* they are brought to *prove*, and the *very Point* concerning which we *differ*, viz. That Jesus Christ and his Apostles have as plainly taught (not that these Propositions are Divine Truths, but) that the Belief of these Propositions, is as necessary to constitute or make a Man a Christian, as they have taught that the Belief that Jesus is the Christ or Messias, is necessary to make a Man a Christian.

Great Care is to be taken to preserve the Doctrines of the *New Testament*, in their *Purity*, and in their *proper Order*. All the particular Doctrines there taught, are the Doctrines of Christ; they are revealed that they may be learned, and then believed upon his Authority; every one of them hath its peculiar and proper Intendment, and is to be used and improved especially for that purpose. If a Person insists on the Necessity of one Article, for a purpose for which Christ did not intend it, he attributes that to it, which doth not belong to it. And if a Person oppose and reject the Necessity of any Article, as to the purpose for which it was intended, he does not give it *its full due*. In this Case we are not only to consider, whether Christ hath taught and revealed such or such an Article, but also for what end and purpose he doth more especially require it should be learned and believed. Now it is agreed on all Hands, that the *Belief that Jesus is the Messias*, is by *Christ's appointment*, necessary to make a Man a Christian. The Notion that the *due and right Relief*, of this alone, doth constitute a Man a Christian, preserves to all the other Articles, all the *Necessity* that Christ assigns them, unless it can be made out, that he hath made the Belief of

every one of them, or of a certain Number of them necessary to this very purpose: And till that be very clearly proved, there seems no great Reason, that he who advanceth the aforesaid Notion, should be treated presently as if he came immediately out of the *Bottomless-pit*, and would fill the whole World with *Locusts*, and worse Plagues than ever *Egypt* was afflicted with, if not doomed peremptorily and without delay, to bear all the *invidious Characters and Epithets* that an exalted *fiery Genius* can make a shift to jumble together.

The Notion of the *one Article*, may induce those who embrace it, to esteem more Persons Christians than the other Notion can allow of; for they of the former, must reckon all those Christians, who give *credible Evidence* that they believe indeed that *Jesus is the Messias, and accept of, and submit to him as their Lord*: and thus far I fancy the Advantage is on the former's side, for I conceive there is no hurt in letting *Charity, as well as Patience, have its perfect Work*. And if I be not much mistaken, that Notion contributes most to engage People to take particular Care, that the Belief of *Jesus's being the Messias*, may be very well, and firmly settled in their Hearts: yea, it seems to me, to be the surest way to bring them to the sound Belief of the other Articles. But let these things pass for *Suggestions*, that come from a *cold phlegmatick Temper*; yet methinks *this Notion* should be acknowledged to comport best with the *Honour* of the *Gospel*, since it acquaints Christians, that by virtue of their being Christians, on the account of their unfeigned Belief of this Point, they are under an indispensable Obligation

gation to endeavour continually to encrease in the Knowledge and Belief of what Christ and his Apostles have taught. Whereas by the other Notion, (according to Mr. *Edwards*) when once they believe *as much* as is *necessary* to make them *Christians*, they need not concern themselves to know any thing more of what Christ and his Apostles have taught, except for *Ornament-sake*.

This we are sure of, that *Jesus Christ* and his *Apostles* do lay a *particular stress* on this *one Article*, for the *Purpose* discoursed of: And it is not so evident that they require the explicit Belief of any more Articles as absolutely necessary to make a Man a Christian.

Besides, if the Nature of the thing be well considered, *viz.* what we mean when we use the term *Christian*, it may afford some Light to this Matter. Is the true Account of a Christian, one who believes just such a number of Doctrines? or one who believes in *Jesus Christ*? who owns *Jesus* to be the *Christ*, and therefore hath devoted and yielded up himself entirely to learn from, and be governed and saved by him?

Moreover, if all those Articles Mr. *Edwards* insists on are not to be expressly mentioned in the Definition or Description of that *Faith* which justifies a Sinner, and constitutes him a Christian, then something will be left out of it, which must necessarily be explicitly believed, according to his Notion, in order to his Justification, and to his being a Christian; but if no particular Article besides this, that *Jesus is the Christ*, is to be inserted into it, then I conceive it must be granted, that *is is only the Belief of that Article that doth make and constitute a Man a Christian*. In a word, if
the

the Belief of more Articles be necessary to make a Man a Christian, then those who are for the Necessity of the one Article alone as to this purpose, do not attribute to other Articles their full due; and if the right Belief of that one Article be all that is absolutely necessary to make a Man a Christian, then those who insist on the explicit Belief of more Articles, as absolutely necessary to that purpose, attribute more to them than Christ Jesus hath ordered. And it may be worth their Consideration, whether they do not *derogate* therein from the *Honour* due to *Jesus as the Messias*. If the Lord Jesus hath appropriated this unto himself, that the due believing him to be the *Christ* or *Messias*, shall of it self constitute and make a Man a Christian, so that he will own and acknowledg those for his *Disciples*, and to be *Christians*, who do so believe him to be the *Messias*, as to consign themselves entirely to him, we cannot introduce any other Articles (tho only such as he hath expressly taught) to be Sharers with this Article in this Business, but we raise them to a *Post* he hath not assigned them. Believe as many Articles which Christ hath certainly taught as you can, and let them all have all the Honour Christ appoints them to have, and use them for the Purposes he assigns them to, but set not any of them without his *certain Order* in the *Throne* with himself. Jesus Christ and his Apostles have constantly insisted on the Necessity of Peoples believing this Article, that *Jesus is the Messias*, to make them *Christians*: And if they have not as particularly discriminated some other Articles as thus necessarily to be believed to make Men Christians, from the rest they have taught,
Men

Men may sooner exceed the Bounds they ought to observe, when they betake themselves to single out more Articles as necessarily to be believed to make Men Christians ; I say, they may sooner exceed their just Limits, than even a forward Imagination will suggest.

Mr. *Edwards* in the next place is for *addressing himself more closely to me (if he can do it) than he hath done already.* And here he speaks of my *debasing my self and the Post I am in.* But what he hath said doth not convince me, that I *debase my self, or the Post I am in,* by publishing the *Truth* : And the Proposition I laid down may be the *Truth*, tho it were granted I had *contradicted* it in my Sermon. It is my asserting the *Proposition* (I conceive) which he reckons my *debasing my self, &c.* not the *Contradiction.* For he hath got over that Part of his Charge, and is to speak *more closely to me (if he can)* than that amounted to. Nor do I think it a *debasing of my self* to endeavour to set a Gospel-Truth in its true Light, let who will advance it, when I perceive any Attempts made to obscure and darken it. But if that *great and eminent Person* was the *Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity*, Mr. *Edwards* now affirms was the Author of it, he can be no Disparagement to the Cause. Any rational Person may then be satisfied, there is more to be said for it than every hasty Opposer may be aware of. Nor do I wonder Mr. *Edwards* should find so much fault with my way of Writing, since he undertakes to *blame some Expressions* in that *Author*, whose Words are so accurately adapted to what he speaks of, that I thought no Man who pretended to judg of *Stiles*, would have reflected

flected on him on that account. As for those sorts of *Sparks* Mr. *Edwards* reckons up in the next place, I have no Acquaintance with any of them, no more than I have with the *Field-Officer*, whom I never heard of till now. But if any of those kinds of Folk Mr. *Edwards* doth speak of have been induced by reading *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, to believe aright that *Jesus is the Messias*, and do therefore seriously endeavour to know and believe the other Doctrines Christ and his Apostles have taught, and do behave them agreeably thereunto, they do not deserve the *Denominations* he gives them. If they continue *Deists*, *Scepticks*, &c. and yet pretend to admire *the main Point, the Reasonableness of Christianity* hath advanced, they exceedingly pervert it, and carry themselves most unreasonably. But we must not quit the *Truth*, because the greatest Enemies to it do pretend to approve it, but rather acquaint the World with the right and true Use they should make of it. We shall make but ill Work on't if we will quarrel *Divine Truths*, and sacrifice the *Doctrines of the Gospel*, whenever *bad Men* shall out of Design set up for, and cry them up. If they find they can prevail *this way*, it will not be long before they will get, not this Article, but every one of those Mr. *Edwards* has a mind should be absolutely necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian, from us.

Mr. *Edwards* being in the mood, hath found out a way both to make me a *Journey-man* to, and to rank me with the *Patrons* of the same Person, in less than the space of one-whole Page. But that Eminent Person he speaks of needeth not any of the *Patrons* he hath assigned.

As for my *unknown Friends* who have signified their Affection by Mr. *Edwards's* Pen, I heartily thank them for their Respects ; and would much rather they should fear without, than with Cause. I would not willingly disoblige any Man, but be a Friend to every Man, and serve all Men to the utmost of my Power. But *Friends* or *Enemies* make little Alteration with me, when *Truth* is concerned. Their Expectation from *one Article to none*, I suppose is brought in rather for *Wit* than for *Friendship*, and therefore I must pass over that *bluntly*, for I pretend not to the *Faculty*. Yet I would tell them seriously, that those who shall insist on the Absolute Necessity of twenty Articles to be believed, to make a Man a Christian, if they make but little account of that *one* I insist on, may sooner part with their whole score, than another who is well settled in the Belief of that one, will either part with it, or any other Article he knows is founded upon that one. However, *Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall*. If my Friends have by this time, in any measure recovered their *Amazement*, I would, in order to their better Establishment, and to prevent their being so easily *staggered* again, propound a few Questions to them, supposing all along what Answers they would make to them. I would ask them : 1. Do you believe or think that you are Christians? *Answ.* Yes. 2. Upon what Ground, or for what Reason do you believe that? *Answ.* Because we do believe all those Articles which are necessarily to be believed to make People Christians. 3. What be those Articles which must necessarily be believed to make People Christians? *Answ.* Here I will suppose them

to name all those Articles Mr. *Edwards* hath mentioned. 4. Upon what Ground do you assent unto, and believe these Articles? *Answ.* Because Jesus Christ and his Apostles have taught that these Articles are necessarily to be believed to make Men Christians. Very well; but not to interrupt our Discourse now, I will consider at present but one part of your Answer, *viz.* That you believe these Articles, because you know that Jesus Christ and his Apostles have taught them. For I conceive you here ground your Belief upon *their Authority*, and so believe them, because you know they taught them, before you believe them under that *precise and formal Consideration*, as Articles necessarily to be believed to make you Christians. For I suppose you have that Esteem and Veneration for Jesus Christ, as to look upon your selves obliged to believe whatever you know he hath taught. Therefore I ask, 5. Were you not Christians before you believed all these Articles, because you knew that Jesus Christ and his Apostles had taught them? *Answ.* No, for who can submit to such Nonsense as to believe or think they are Christians, who do not believe those things, without the Belief of which they cannot be Christians? 6. Why do you believe these Articles, because Jesus and his Apostles have taught them, rather than because any other Persons have taught them? *Answ.* We believe them, upon our knowing that the Apostles taught them, because we know the Apostles were commissioned by Jesus to publish his Mind, and Will, and Doctrines to the World. And we believe what we know Jesus hath taught, because we believe he was the *Christ* or *Messias*.

7. Why

7. Why do you believe, or what hath induced and determined you to believe that Jesus is the Messias? Here I doubt, with many Persons, the main stop would be. But I will suppose my Friends can answer this Question with very good Judgment; tho they might tell me without answering in a Circle, and believing as the Collier did, that they believed Jesus to be the Messias, because they believed the forementioned Articles: that is, they understood those Articles, and did believe them to be Truths, on other Considerations, distinct from this, that Jesus whom now they believe to be the Messias had taught them; and that Belief of them did contribute much to induce them to believe that Jesus was the Messias. Here I shall only mind my Friends, that that former Belief of these Articles, tho joined with the consequent Belief *that Jesus is the Messias*, is not pretended to be that which made them Christians; but their believing those same Articles after another manner, and upon a distinct Consideration, after they did duly believe Jesus to be the Christ, from that or those Considerations on which they believed them before, is that which made them Christians: for you could not believe them, because they were taught by Jesus as the Messias, till you did believe him to be the Messias, tho you might upon other Considerations be induced to believe those Articles to be true. Now if my Friends think they have given very good rational Evidence, from which they may justly perswade themselves that they are Christians; I must tell them, they may be very good Christians, but they have not produced any Proof that they are Christians, according to their own Notion. Indeed if that Proposition be true,

at which upon my laying it down Mr. *Edward's* faith they have been staggered, they may this way prove that they are Christians. But if the Belief of all those Articles be absolutely necessary to make them Christians, the precise Belief of all of them cannot be such a Proof or Evidence that they are Christians, as we are speaking of: For we speak not of *inward Sensation* (if I may use that term) or *Sentiment*, as Monsieur *Claud* and some French Authors speak, but of *discursive rational Proof*, and *this as to Matters of Faith*. A Man's believing that Jesus is the *Messias*, is no Proof that he believes any one of the *particular Doctrines* taught in the Gospel. But his believing *particular Doctrines* for this Reason, because Jesus whom he believes to be the *Messias*, hath taught them, is a good Proof that he does believe that *Jesus is the Messias*. And if the Belief of more Articles than this one, that *Jesus is the Messias*, is absolutely necessary to make a Man a Christian, it is *utterly impossible* that any Man should obtain a *rational, discursive, argumentative Satisfaction*, that he is a *Christian*, with respect to *Matters of Faith*, tho I may safely enough extend the *Assertion* further. For let a Man believe ever so many particular Doctrines, taught by Christ and his Apostles, that Belief will prove no more, but that he believes *Jesus is the Messias*. The Belief of those Articles can be no Evidence with respect to one another, that is, the Belief of one of those Articles cannot be a Proof that you believe another, tho you do really believe it. Now methinks the *Resolution* of this *Question*, *What is it that doth make or constitute a Man a Christian*, ought to issue in *that* into which all the *Evidences* respecting (I will say) both Faith and Practice,

that

that can be justly produced to prove a Man a Christian, must be *resolved*; and that is (if I be not much mistaken) a *Belief that Jesus is the Messias*. But now I return to the latter part of the Answer given to my 4th Question, and with regard to that I would ask my Friends, 8. How do you know that Jesus Christ hath required the Belief of all those Articles you have named, as absolutely necessary to make People Christians? Here you must take notice, that it will not serve your turn, to shew that Jesus Christ hath taught them all, and then say that they are therefore to be believed. For the very same is to be said of a great many more Points. But you must answer how you come to be satisfied, that Jesus Christ doth require the explicit Belief of every one of those Articles, as necessary to make People Christians. If you answer, that such and such a learned and godly Man doth say so: You are to be minded that that Answer is feeble, in the present case; and that you build your Perswasion, that you are Christians, on a very *weak bottom*. What will you answer when you are told, that other learned and godly Men have insisted on certain other Articles (and I could name some of no mean Character who have been very earnest for some Points, which I think Jesus Christ hath not taught) as necessary to be believed to make Men Christians? If those who insist on some other Articles as necessarily to be believed to make Men Christians, be in the right, you are not yet Christians, notwithstanding you believe all those Articles most firmly, which you have named, because there are more or other Articles necessarily to be believed to make you Christians. But supposing all those Articles you have men-

tioned are necessarily to be believed to make Men Christians, I ask you in the last place, 9. How do you know that these are all the Articles which are necessarily to be believed to make Men Christians? For it is past doubt, that Jesus Christ hath revealed and taught many more Articles to be believed. Can you shew now, that he hath more expressly or plainly declared that *this precise Number* you insist on, are absolutely necessary to be believed to make People Christians, than he hath that any, or all of the rest are? If not, who hath *Authority to distinguish* in this case, where he hath not distinguished, so as to determine *this and this Article*, &c. are necessarily to be believed to make Men Christians, but *that and the other Article* are not necessary, whenas there is the *same Authority* for Peoples believing the *one* as the *other*, when known?

In the next place, Mr. *Edwards* doth particularly and with Earnestness exhort and entreat me to attend, and apply my self to what he apprehends of great moment to me on this occasion. I shall therefore now more particularly address my self to him. *Reverend Sir*, I receive your *Exhortation* and *Counsel* with a *Gratitude* (as near as I can) *proportioned* to the *Kindness* with which you *tender it*; and will endeavour to make a good Use of it, depending for Preservation and Stability in the *Faith of the Gospel*, on *Jesus as the Messias*. But, *Sir*, it is not the first time I have met with an honest warm Exhortation that hath had no *Connection* with what has been pretended to be the *Ground* of it. I receive it kindly, considered in it self. But, *Sir*, if any Persons who are not *well-disposed* shall happen to read it, and perceiving on how *sandy a Foundation* it is built, shall conclude all your, and perhaps

haps other good Mens *fervent Exhortations* and *pathetick Obtestations*, are the Effects of *Indiscretion*, and stand upon no better a bottom than this; the Damage would not have been very great if this had been communicated privately, and not committed to publick view. And, Sir, having pondered *John 6. 67.* I am not satisfied, that by *going back* there, is meant an unfeigned well-grounded Belief, that *Jesus was the Christ or Messias*, and an entertaining the Doctrines and Articles he taught, purely upon his Authority; but the direct contrary: Nor do I see any Reason to think, that that kind of Faith was the Cause of *Judas's* betraying his Lord, but that *going away*, and *betraying*, was from their want of that sort of Faith and Christianity.

*A Reply to Mr. Edwards's Reflections on
the Animadversions.*

MR. *Edwards* employs above two Pages here in relating his Guesses, and his Reasons for them, and determines I was not the Author of them; so that he is willing to excuse me from the *crude and shallow things offered in them to the Publick*; yet he is partly of the Mind I was desired to publish them as my own, after they had been transmitted to me. And in another Place, after he is positive that I was not the Compiler of the *Animadversions*; he saith (because he apprehended that he had something for his Advantage, with respect to me) it is probable I might prick in here and there a fine Flower; which seems to be said for no other Reason, but to make way for his bringing in, as he thought;

thought, *some finer Flowers of his own.* I will not concern my self about his *Guesses*, nor their *Supporters*, any further than by taking notice of the Reason he gives, why I was desired to publish the *Animadversions* as my own, viz. *That it might be said, that a Man with a Name, &c. warranted the late Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* To which I have this to say, That a much more Reverend (Rector) I am sure I may say *DIVINE*, than the *Rector of Steeple*, hath vouched that *strange Notion*, for which some do decry the *Author of the Reasonableness, &c.* and the *Animadverter*. Nor am I afraid, or ashamed to subscribe my Name to any one *Article* I know that *Reverend Divine* hath taught. That *Reverend Man* had a Name, and did with open Face, and without a *Vizour*, warrant the Proposition laid down by the *Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* and contradicted not in my *Sermon*, but in the *Books* the *Animadversions* relate to. This *Reverend Person* I speak of, was the most Reverend *St. John*, who with open Face, and without a *Vizour* hath taught, That *whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God*, 1 John 5. 1. which every one, I suppose, will acknowledge to be as much as to say, a *Christian*. Now if the Belief of more *Articles* was absolutely necessary to make a Person a *Christian*, let a Man believe *this* with what sort of Faith soever, it could not with Truth be said, that *whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God*. But I am very confident *St. John* knew as well, what was necessarily to be believed to make a Man a *Christian*, as the most Reverend Man that hath lived since his Days. Thus there was no need that I should be desired to publish the *Animadversions* as my own, that the *No-*

tion might come forth with a Name ; for it was openly warranted by a much better Name before.

As for the *unsufferable Blunder* Mr. Edwards hath found out in the *Epistle to the Reader*, any one who looks upon the *Epistle it self*, may perceive the right of that Matter (reading *cursorily* instead of *curfory*, as Mr. Edwards hath well and truly observed) when it is determined whether the word *Treatise* doth more properly belong to the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, or to a *single Sermon*: For the Press was out no more in printing *that* instead of *this*, than it was in the other word Mr. Edwards hath been pleased to rectify. Mr. Edwards's endeavour to make the Animadverter contradict himself, is just the same with what he did to shew I had in my Sermon contradicted the Proposition I had laid down ; and that having been answered, there is no need of replying to the Charge, here being no *auxiliary Strength* added to it. But I like his making those Doctrines taught in the New Testament, which are not absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, meer *Conveniencies* here, with respect to those who are Christians, no better than I did his making them meerly *Ornamental* in his *Reflections on my Sermon*. There is no one Doctrine taught in the *New Testament*, but it is *absolutely necessary* to make up the *entire Body* of that Revelation Christ hath committed to his *Church* ; yet I am not certain that Mr. Edwards will say, that it is absolutely necessary to the making of any Man a Christian, that he must explicitly know and believe every Doctrine contained in those Writings ; for then there will be nothing left for *Conveniency* and *Ornament*.

Mr. Edwards saith, it is worth the Reader's observing

that notwithstanding he had in 12 Pages together (viz. from the 8th to the 20th) proved that several Propositions are necessary to be believed in order to our being Christians; yet this sham-Animadverter attends not to any one of the Particulars which he had mentioned, nor offers any thing against them, but only in a lumping way, dooms them all in these magisterial Words, I do not see any Proof he produceth, pag. 21.

Ans^r. The matter is truly thus; The Animadverter did not take much notice of the number of the Pages, for if that had been 1200, it had been the same thing to him. But he acknowledged the Places of Scripture Mr. Edwards did quote in those Pages, were full Proof of the Truth and Divine Authority of the Propositions contained in them, yea he owned that the Knowledg of those Propositions might conduce much to dispose People to be Christians. But neither of these things was the Matter in Question, but this, viz. Whether Mr. Edwards had proved that Jesus Christ and his Apostles had taught, that the Belief of those Propositions was indispensably necessary to make Men Christians. The Animadverter did not affirm that Mr. Edwards had not said he had fully proved what he had undertaken to prove, viz. the Point just now mentioned: But it seems the Animadverter was so ill natur'd, he would not take Mr. Edwards's bare word for Proof, but having read those Pages, declared what was the utmost that Mr. Edwards's Proof did extend to, and that he did not see any Proof produced in those Pages of this Point, That Jesus Christ or his Apostles had taught, that those Propositions must necessarily be explicitly understood and believed to make a Man a Christian; which was the Point to be proved. Thus he delivered

delivered his own Sense, but without the least intimation that *all the World must be led either by his, or Mr. Edwards's Eyes.* He left the Reader to try, whether he could see in those Pages any Proof, *that Christ and his Apostles had taught, that the Belief of those Propositions is absolutely necessary to make a Man a Christian;* and thither I must refer the Reader too, to try his Skill, for I cannot see any thing like a Proof of that which was the thing to be proved. Now I think an Animadverter deals very fairly, if he takes notice how far what is offered for Proof can reach, and then observes what was the precise Point to be proved, and leaves the Reader to try whether he can stretch what was produced, and make it come up to the very Point that was to be proved.

Then Mr. *Edwards* finds fault with the Animadverter for passing over those Pages so lightly, where he *evinced this Truth, that the Son of God, and the Messiah, were not Terms of the very same Signification, nay that among the Jews they were not reckoned so;* for the Animadverter says no more to all this, but that he did not perceive that Mr. *Edwards* pretended to offer the least Proof that these Terms were not synonymous Terms in our Saviour's time.

Ans. Mr. *Edwards* might have evinced both the Points he names, and yet not have proved that they were not synonymous Terms amongst the Jews at that time. I have looked over those Pages Mr. *Edwards* refers to, and if I understand him aright, he doth hardly allow of any synonymous Terms in the same Language. For all Terms considered singly in themselves, do stand for distinct Ideas. Terms (I conceive) are said to be syno-

nimous, on the account of their being alike applied, to express or signify one and the same Subject or Thing. And thus, whether the one or the other be made use of with reference to that thing, the whole is signified by that which is used, that would be signified if the other were used. And when both are used together, there is not a *Tautology*, but the latter is brought in by way of *Apposition*. Thus, tho' *Face*, *Ground*, and *Knees*, stand for *distinct Ideas*, considered simply in themselves, yet if these Phrases, *to fall on the Face*, *to fall on the Ground*, &c. were commonly used amongst a People, to signify *one certain Posture*, he that should use one of those Phrases would say the very same thing as he, or another would, should he or the other express themselves by one of the other *Phrases*, notwithstanding *Ground*, *Face*, and *Knees*, be not the same things, neither do those Words signify the same things amongst that People, when considered singly in themselves. But that the terms *Messias*, and *the Son of God*, when applied to *him* whose *Titles* they are, were not reckoned amongst the Jews to be terms of the very same Signification, is a Passage I cannot find in those 5 or 6 Pages where Mr. *Edwards* saith he hath evinced it. That those terms, *Messias*, and *the Son of God*, simply considered, have not the very same Signification, is so evident, there is no need of a *Text* to prove it. And as for that *Text*, Acts 8. 37. what Mr. *Edwards* doth say concerning it, amounts to this, that *if Christ and the Son of God are there of the same Signification, the Words do sound thus, I believe that Jesus Christ is Christ.* But I think they amount to somewhat more, *viz.* that *Jesus Christ is The Christ,*

Christ. It cannot be denied that Jesus Christ is sometimes used in the *New Testament* as a proper Name, as in *John* 17. 3. and if it be so used in *Acts* 8. 37. that Text will not answer Mr. Edwards's Design. But whether there is such an *absurd Tautology*, if those Terms be taken in that Text to be of the same Signification, as Mr. Edwards saith there is then, in *that Confession*, I shall leave the Reader to judg, when I have set down the Account the Author of the *Reasonableness*, &c. doth give of the Sense of that Text, p. 34. I believe that he whom you call *Jesus Christ*, is really and truly the *Messiah* that was promised. I acknowledg there were *different Grounds* of those two Denominations, (and so I am apt to think there were of all synonymous Terms) but when they came to be indifferently used, to design the same Person, each of them in its full Latitude comprehended all that the other did, tho when considered apart, as to the Grounds and Reasons of their Application, they had distinct and peculiar Significations. The famously Learned and Reverend Bishop *Pierston* saith, that *to be the Christ*, and *to be the Son of God*, were by the *Jews themselves* accounted equivalent. *Exposit. on the Creed*, p. 105. I acknowledg Mr. Edwards hath closely urged what he hath delivered in the Pages he speaks of, but I can no more perceive that he hath at all proved that the Terms spoken of were not *synonymous-Terms* amongst the *Jews* in our Saviour's time, than the Animadverter could. And therefore I may say that whatever *Olaus Magnus's Gladiator* might do, by looking on his *Adversaries Weapons*, it was not possible for the Animadverter to blunt the Edg of Mr. Edwards's Arguments here, be-
cause

cause they never had any. There may perhaps be some *Keeness* in some of his Words and *Phrases*, but as for his other *Weapons* the *Gladiator* himself would have lost his Labour in looking upon them.

Mr. *Edwards* then saith, *he had secured his Proposition before he formed his Syllogisms, and therefore it was not necessary to add any further Medium, and to proceed to another Syllogism, as the Reader may satisfy himself.*

Answ. Let the Reader then satisfy himself; I will only mind him that the Point Mr. *Edwards* was to prove was this, *That there are other Doctrines besides this, that Jesus is the Messias, necessarily to be believed to make a Man a Christian.* The Medium he useth to prove this, is, that there are other Doctrines besides this, *required (viz. by Christ or his Apostles, for they are their Words he doth alledg to prove that other Doctrines are required) to be believed to make a Man a Christian.* Now if he hath proved every Proposition laid down in the Chapter before that in which his Syllogisms are, to be a Doctrine taught by Jesus Christ or his Apostles, that is not the Point; you must see whether he hath proved *that Jesus Christ and his Apostles have required the explicit Knowledg and Belief of every one of those Propositions to make a Man a Christian.* It is not enough if he hath proved that they have required them to be believed; but the Proof must be, that they have required them to be believed particularly for this very purpose, *to make a Man a Christian.* And if Mr. *Edwards* hath done that, still his Syllogisms will be faulty, even according to his own Words. For if the very thing he had been proving
was

was this, that other Propositions besides this, that Jesus is the Messias, are necessarily to be known and believed to make a Man a Christian, and had been proving this by the Testimony of Christ and his Apostles, shewing that they have required the Belief of more Propositions as indispensably necessary to make a Man a Christian, when he reduced the Sum of his Discourse into Syllogisms, that very Medium by which he had been proving his Proposition, should be brought into his Syllogisms, otherwise the Sum of his Discourse could not be there. And *that* is not in either of his Syllogisms. What he pretends he hath proved is not *this*, that all those things which have immediate Respect to the Occasion, Author, &c. of our Salvation, are to be believed; but *this*, *That Jesus Christ or his Apostles have required an explicit Knowledg and Belief of all those things which have immediate Respect to the Occasion, &c. of our Salvation, as indispensably necessary to make a Man a Christian.* I might also observe to the Reader, that allowing Mr. Edwards's Syllogism to comprise the Sum of his Discourse, it proves a great deal too much; for it proves that *the Belief of all those Propositions* he hath laid down in his former Chapter, *is not sufficient to make a Man a Christian.* For all those who do acknowledge there is not any thing in the New Testament but what Jesus Christ hath revealed, cannot deny that every Proposition in the New Testament hath *immediate Respect to the Author of our Salvation.* So that by virtue of his Syllogism no Man can be a true Christian, till he hath an explicit Belief of every Proposition that is taught or delivered in the New Testament.

Mr. *Edwards* reflects on the Animadverter's Confidence, and taking a liberty to assert what he pleases, because he saith there is no Enquiry in the Reasonableness of Christianity concerning Faith subjectively considered.

Answ. I will not retort the Aspersions. But I must say, that those are not the Animadverter's Words. He doth take notice that *subjective Faith* is spoken of in that *Treatise*; and so it might be, and yet not be the Point that Author did chiefly propose to enquire into. Who is so fit to satisfy us what it was he propos'd to enquire after, as the Author himself? who tells us, it was *what God requires us to believe now under the Gospel, (viz. to make or constitute us Christians) Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. p. 25.* Yet a little before he spake of Faith, subjectively considered. I do not know, neither do I pretend to guess what that Author's Judgment is concerning certain particular Doctrines taught in the New Testament. He may be as Orthodox in every one of them, for ought I know, as any Man in the World. But this I am certain of, the Accounts he gives occasionally in this *Treatise* of Faith considered subjectively, comprehend not only *the Assent of the Understanding, but the Consent or Approbation of the Will, and also a firm Trust and Reliance*; which I think is as full an Account of that Faith as Mr. *Edwards* hath given of it. But notwithstanding that Author hath spoken of Faith, considered subjectively, which the Animadverter did not deny, but expressly affirmed, as may be seen in the Animadversions, p. 32. yet the thing that Author proposed to enquire after was, *what Articles are required to be believed to make a Man a Christian.*

Christian. Again saith Mr. Edwards, *How can this Animadverter come off with peremptorily declaring that subjective Faith is not enquired into in the Treatise of the Reasonableness of Christianity, when in another Place, p. 35, 36. he avers that Christian Faith, and Christianity, considered subjectively, are the same?*

Answ. The Animadverter doth not any where declare what he is here said to declare, and therefore cannot fairly be charged with declaring it *peremptorily*. But if he had declared it *peremptorily*, what *Connection* is there betwixt *that* and his averring that Christian Faith and Christianity, considered subjectively, are the same, that it should be thought in that case so hard a thing for him to *come off*, unless he had likewise *peremptorily* declared that the Author of *the Reasonableness* principally designed to discourse of Christianity considered subjectively? Perhaps it will still be said, the Animadverter hath averred that Christian Faith, and Christianity, considered subjectively, are the same. 'Tis true, there are those Words in the Animadversions. For Mr. Edwards having said, that *the Belief of Jesus's being the Messiah, was one of the first and leading Acts of Christian Faith*; the Animadverter took notice, that Christian Faith in that Proposition Mr. Edwards had laid down, must be understood subjectively, because an Act of Christian Faith cannot be understood in any other Sense, as the Animadverter's Words are, in the Parenthesis Mr. Edwards hath been pleas'd to leave out of the Sentence he quotes. So that what the Animadverter said was this, Christian Faith considered subjectively, and Christianity considered subjectively,

ly,

ly, are the very same. Now is not this very true, and consistent enough with his saying that the Enquiry the Author of the *Reasonableness of Christianity* propos'd to make, was not concerning Christian Faith considered subjectively, but objectively? Should another Person have published such *weak and sorry* Stuff, and have suggested it as an invincible Difficulty to be got over, peradventure some would have said, *One would have thought a Man might be ashamed to appear in the World with such poor Tackling.*

In the next place, Mr. *Edwards* is much offended, because the Animadverter pass'd over the 4th and 8th Chapters of his *Socinianism unmask'd*, and some of his former Pages, with a bare Acknowledgment that he was *too dull to perceive any Appearance of Reasoning in them.* In which (saith Mr. *Edwards*) *there is nothing tolerable or excusable; but this one thing, his Truth and Modesty,* (by the way, I may take notice that *Truth and Modesty* may pass for two things with some who are not over-fraught with an Opinion of their own innumerable Excellencies; and that it would be no inconsiderable Ornament to some Books, if much of either were to be found in them) *in confessing himself to be dull, which yet the Reader was convinced of before this Acknowledgment.*

Answ. Poor Animadverter! well worthy to be pitied! who having been at the pains to read over a great many flaunting Pages, to find out something that had at least the Appearance of Reason; and finding no such thing, was forc'd at last to entertain the Reader with a most *obvious Truth*, having the Modesty to appropriate *that to himself, rather than blame the Author.* But why should

should this Omission be so *unexcusable and intolerable*? The Animadverter did not promise to reply to every thing Mr. *Edwards* had writ in those Books; and he did take notice of as much as concerned the one Article. If a Man could not modestly lay down his Opinion of the absolute Necessity of believing only that Jesus is the Messias to make a Man a Christian, with an intimation that the due Belief of that one Article brought People under an indispensable Obligation to endeavour to know and believe all the other Articles that Christ and his Apostles have taught, but immediately an *Under-puller to Racovianism, Turkish Spy*, and twenty more such sulphureous Eruptions must blaze abroad against him; what might be expected if those *dainty Strictures* the Animadverter hath passed over so gently had been brought under a severe Examination? One would think an Author were grown very *pettish*, if he think himself unsufferably affronted, when his Books are touched by a Reader, who hath not so much Penetration as to perceive *Reason*, where there is *none*. But the Animadverter was not *decisive* that there was not Reason in those Parts of Mr. *Edwards's* Books; he only acknowledged he did not perceive the Reasons which might lie hid there, and left the Reader to try his Skill, whether he could find out what had escaped him when he look'd over those Pages. Now I have read over those Chapters and Pages the Animadverter pass'd over in such an *intolerable and unexcusable* manner, and can find no more Appearance of Reasoning in them than he did. But without any Offence to a piece of Mr. *Edwards's* *one thing*, I may say I am not so dull but I can perceive in those

Chap-

Chapters and Pages a great many empty Flourishes, many obvious Mistakes, and a great many things not consistent with strict Reasoning. In those Chapters I meet with these and such like Sayings, *This great Musty (viz. the Author of the Reasonableness, &c.) hath given us a hopeful Draught of Christianity; and it was fit the English Reader should know that a Turk according to him is a Christian, for he makes the same Faith serve them both. The very Devils are capable of all that Faith which he (viz. the Author of the Reasonableness, &c.) saith makes a Christian Man. He (viz. the Author of the Reasonableness, &c.) tells them again and again, that a Christian Man, or Member of Christ, need not know or believe any more than that one individual Point which he mentions. Here is an effectual Plot to undermine Stationers-Hall, for all Systems and Bodies of Divinity, Philosophy, &c. must be cashier'd: whatever looks like System must not be bought or sold. This will fall heavy on the Gentlemen of St. Paul's Church-yard, and other Places. If other People can perceive any great Strength of Argumentation in these and many like Passages, much Good may their Sagacity do them. I may be content they should pass for pretty Flowers to enchant the thoughtless, but I must decline Truth, if I should say, I can take them for potent Reasons.*

Mr. Edwards, amongst his other Findings, seems to have found a piece of Wit where nothing but Truth was intended. And tho the same Genius that found out the Wit may hide or spoil it at pleasure, the Country-man's Saying was as true as the other, which is as much as I was concerned in. Yet it may be his Agonistick Effort, to spoil the Wit he had espied, by jumping from the Steeple of a Church

Church to the Name of a Parish, will pass with some for no more than a C — Pun.

In the next place Mr. *Edwards* gives a very particular Account whom he understands by *Mens of Art*. And indeed he hath exceedingly dignified the *Phrase*, making it *synonymous* with other Terms, which properly denote *Persons* and *Societies*, for which I have a *very profound Veneration*. (I see now he is not at utter Defiance with synonymous Terms, provided the word *Synonymous* be left out.) I value no Man the less for his having had the Happiness of an *University Education*, but am very ready to pay unto such all the Respect due to the *Characters* they have that way acquired, and to receive from them all the *Instruction* my shallow Capacity can admit. I have a very great Esteem for all the *sober Heads both of our Church, and of those who dissent from it in the Point of Discipline and Ceremonies*. I highly honour the whole *Body of Protestant and Reformed Churches abroad as well as at home*. But whether these are properly to be called *Artists in Religion*, others may determine. I use not the *Phrase* in that Sense. I would not disparage any of them to such a degree as I conceive that doth import. No, I abhor the Thought of imputing to them I reverence *so much and so justly*, that they should be *Masters* of the *Trick* of importing and advancing the rate of *Countreband Goods in Religion*. But there are *some things* in all the *Parties* I know any thing of, which are not of *Christ's Institution*; and there are some *Persons* in every *Party* who appear to lay more stress on *those things* than can be justified, so that they seem to appropriate *Christianity* to themselves, and will very hardly allow others to be

Members of the Church of Christ, who come not up to their *Terms*. These are the Persons on every side, I call the *Men of Art*. And if any have a mind to applaud their being in a *Confederacy on that account*, I do not desire to enter into their *Secret*. I affect not any dividing Denominations and Characters amongst those who *heartily believe Jesus to be the Messias*, entirely depend on his *Merits*, faithfully submit to his *Authority*, and diligently observe his *Laws*. I prefer the *Communion of the Church of England*, for many Reasons, before any other I know in the World; yet there are some things relating to her, which I do not think to be of her *Essence*, nor indispensably necessary to her *truest Advantage and Honour*. I am not so fond of some of these things as many some Years past appeared to be. My Business is not to endeavour to draw People to a *Party precisely* under that *Consideration*, which imports neither more nor less, according to my Apprehension, than making them *Sectaries* and *Schismatics*, properly so called. I am desirous to contribute what I can to bring People to be true Christians, who are not so, and to further those who are so, towards the Knowledge and Belief of all the *Doctrines* that Christ and his Apostles have taught, and in all *Godliness of Living*. And I am ready, according to what Ability I have, to remove *unjust Prejudices* and *ill-grounded Scruples*, which any have unhappily imbibed with respect to that *Communion*, I think on several Accounts most *eligible*. But I cannot come up to that *Height*, to think that none are *Christians and Members of the Church of Christ*, who are not in every thing of my *Perswasion*. I express my self thus freely,

that

that none may harbour unjust Prejudices concerning me, but make what Use they please of what I have said. For I desire not any of the *temporal Advantages* of the *Church of England*, if any of those things be really of her *Essence*, or any way regularly conducing to her *truest Benefit*, which I think are not so.

Mr. *Edwards* and I have declared our Opinions about the Book called *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. and we differ exceedingly in our Opinions. He saith, *he is sure he hath proved his*. (And in other Places he acquaints his Reader that he *hath fully proved what he hath undertaken against that Book*.) I will not say any thing peremptorily in the Matter. But I think a *clear plain Proof* will discover it self. I confess I am apt to suspect a Person is somewhat *conscious* that what he offers for Proof hath some *Defect*, when he is very importunate with People to take *his Word* for it, that he hath proved the Matter. And if those People Mr. *Edwards* hath found are more confirmed of late than ever in the Truth of what he hath writ on this Subject, have obtained their Confirmation this way, I think they are Persons rather to be pitied for their *Weakness*, than to be reckoned Patterns worthy to be imitated.

To conclude, If any Man shall produce *plain and clear Proof* that *Jesus Christ* or his *Apostles* have taught that the Belief of any one Article besides that which we have been discoursing of, is absolutely necessary to make or constitute a Man a Christian, I hope I shall be as ready to offer my *right Hand* to burn the Sermon, the Animadversions, and these Papers, as any Man in the World shall be to require it. But Persons telling me that I scorn Reason and
Argu-

Argument, and multiplying such kind of Phrases, or saying with what Assurance soever that they have *proved*, yea *fully proved* it, will not convince me. As Fines and Imprisonments did not formerly in another case, alter my Judgment, (and here by the way I may acquaint those who are still living, and were most *eager* and *fierce*, and did *resent* with an *Excess of Passion*, my suggesting to them *whose Work* they were doing, that if they have not been convinced by the Course of Affairs since, they may now receive *full Satisfaction* that I was not so much mistaken as they at least in pretence thought I was, if any Credit be due to a certain Book which came to my Hands the latter end of the last Week, along with the Papers to which I have been replying, entituled, *The Secret History of Whitehall, from the Restoration of Charles II. down to the Abdication, &c.*) I say, as *Fines, Imprisonments*, and the *predominant Language* of those *Times*, did not alter my Judgment then in another case, so *Raillery* and *Banter* will not do it in the *present Case*. If all the *soaring Writers* in *Europe* should bestow their *invidious Epithets* on me, and vent their *fanciful metaphorical Flirts* against me on this Account, I think I shall stand my *Ground*, and pass the whole over with a *deserv'd Contempt*.

F I N I S.

OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

Animadversions

(*Lately Printed at OXFORD*)

ON A

Late BOOK,

ENTITLED, THE

Reasonableness of Christianity,

As delivered in the

SCRIPTURES.

By S. BOLD, Rector of Steeple, Dorset.

*Not for that we have Dominion over your Faith,
But are Helpers of your Joy, for by Faith ye
stand, 2 Cor. 1. 24.*

L O N D O N :

Printed for A. and J. Churchill, at the Black
Swan in Pater-Noster-Row. 1698.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

LIBRARY

PHYSICS DEPARTMENT

5720 S. UNIVERSITY AVE.

CHICAGO, ILL. 60637

TEL: 773-936-3700

FAX: 773-936-3701

WWW.PHYSICS.UCHICAGO.EDU

OBSERVATIONS
ON THE
ANIMADVERSIONS
ON THE

Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.

Observations on the Preface.

IT cannot be denied but that a wrong Construction may be put upon a very good and useful Book: And that what it discourses of may be represented quite contrary to what the Author designed, and hath delivered in most intelligible, apposite, and plain Expressions. Now if a Person who pretending to write against a Book, he does not rightly understand, or mis-represents, doth propose any thing that is pertinent in opposition to that Book, it is very rational to suppose his doing so is rather to be attributed to *Chance*, than to the *Exactness* of his *Judgment*, and his certain *Intention*. For it is hardly to be conceived that a Rational Person will deliberately and advisedly write any thing

B

but

but what he conceives hath a clear Connection with what he directly and immediately proposeth to be the Subject of his Discourse. And though at some distance he aims at the Book he talks of, yet he mainly designs to confirm the Propositions he lays down (as he conceives) directly contrary to those delivered in that Book. But if the Propositions on both sides are in Truth very well consistent, though he doth not apprehend so, he can hardly offer any Considerations to weaken the Force, or expose the Truth of the Propositions advanced by the Author he professeth to oppose, but those very Considerations will as certainly wound his own Propositions, and reflect as unluckily on them as they can on the other: which it will not be allowed to suppose a wise and prudent Writer could design. Whilst he mistakes the Author he in Words opposeth, let him confirm and establish his own Assertions ever so strongly, he does not at all distress what that Author hath indeed Published. One Man affirms, that *all the Doctrines which are absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, or to Salvation, are laid down in the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles.* Another professeth to oppose this, and therefore lays down, and elaborately endeavours to prove this Proposition, *That the Epistles are part of the Rule of Saving Faith.* Now both these Propositions are very true, and consistent; and whatever Arguments can be produced to prove the latter, comport very well with the Truth of the former, and cannot at all invalidate, but may very much confirm it. But if he who undertakes to prove the latter, do let fall Passages which reflect on the former Proposition, those Passages have really the same ill Aspect with relation to his own Proposition, they have to the other. The whole amounts to no more, than if one should

should declare that all that is absolutely necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian, or to Salvation, is delivered in the Epistles. And another out of a sort of Zeal for the Gospels and the Acts should professedly oppose that Proposition, and publish a Book to prove that the Gospels and Acts are part of the Rule of Saving Faith. But when the Question is this, seeing the Doctrines absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, are laid down both in the Gospels and Acts, and in the Epistles, *In what parts of the New Testament may it be best discerned which be the Doctrines that are absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians?* Then certain Reasons may be assigned why they may be better discerned by consulting the Gospels and Acts, than the Epistles.

Peoples misrepresenting a good Book may be derived from various Originals, as Wilfulness, Inadvertence, Weakness, Prepossession, &c. I will not suspect that the Author of the *Animadversions* (lately Printed at Oxford) on the *Reasonableness of Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures*, hath misrepresented that excellent Treatise, through an Indulgence to any thing for which he may be justly blamed, because he writes for the most part with so much Temper, and hath made a Profession in the Close of his Preface so every way becoming a worthy and good Christian. But if I understand the true Meaning of the Author of the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. as expressed in that Treatise, it is mightily misrepresented in those *Animadversions*, how innocent and harmless soever the Author may be in what he has done.

That I may do both these Authors all the Right I am able, I will observe all along, wherein they do agree, and give as true, impartial, and distinct an

Account of the Sense of the *Reasonableness of Christianity* as I can, in those Points treated of, especially in the First and Third Parts of these Animadversions; and take some notice of what this Author hath offered, against what he hath alledged out of the *Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* And that I may proceed the more orderly, I will begin my Observations where the Author of the Animadversions begins his; *viz.* P. I. of his *Preface*: Where he declares his Agreement with the Author of the *Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* That *the most Rational Means of silencing all Religious Controversies, is to take the Scriptures for the only Rule of Faith.* This I apprehend is a true Account of the Judgment of the Author of the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, concerning this Matter: And I conceive he agrees with the Author of the Animadversions, in the main of that Reason which he hath annexed to that Proposition. Though to express what I apprehend, a more clear and full Account of the Sense of the Author of the *Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* I will take the Liberty to word it in some Places, otherwise than this Author hath done, and to add one Passage or Clause he hath not inserted.

‘ For there might be some probable Grounds to
‘ hope for a happy Conclusion of all Disputes in
‘ Religion, if all Parties would joyn issue in this, that
‘ no Christian ought to be required to believe any
‘ thing but what is enjoyned by the clear and ex-
‘ press Declarations of Scripture, nor any thing so
‘ enjoyned, till it be made appear to him, that it is
‘ so enjoyned; and that no Christian may reject, or
‘ withhold his assent from any Article which ap-
‘ pears to him to be plainly delivered in the Holy
‘ Scriptures. The Clause I shall add is this, That
nothing ought to be required to be believed as ab-
solutely

solutely necessary to make Men Christians, but what is injoyned by the clear and exprefs Declaration of Scripture to be believed for that purpose. And I add this Clause for this Reason amongst others, because whoever imposeth on People certain Doctrines (though the Doctrines are really Christ's Doctrines) as absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, which Christ and his Apostles have not declared to be absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, doth as really advance a *Foreign Authority*, and set it up equally with Christ's, as he doth who imposeth any thing as a necessary part of the Christian Religion, which Christ and his Apostles never made a part of it. For notwithstanding the Doctrines which are affirmed to be absolutely necessary to be believed to make men Christians, be Doctrines which Christ hath taught; yet if he hath not taught that the Belief of them is absolutely necessary to make Men Christians, but only requires them to be believed for other Purposes, the requiring the Belief of them as absolutely necessary to make Men Christians, must be built upon a Foundation and Authority distinct from Christ's and his Apostles; which therefore at best can be but Humane Authority. Till this Clause is agreed to, the former Clauses in the Reason, will not avail much, to put a happy Conclusion to Religious Controversies. Besides, I cannot understand why the assumed Authority of the several Parties may not be yielded to, for the deciding of particular Controversies in Religious Matters, as well as for the determining and assigning what Points are to be believed in order to any Peoples being Christians. I leave it to others to enquire how much, Men's assuming Authority to impose certain of Christ's Doctrines, without his War-

rant, as absolutely necessary to be believed, to make Men Christians, hath contributed to their Stretching the like Authority further, even to make some things Parts of the Christian Religion, which Christ and his Apostles have not authorized, which is infamously done in the Church of *Rome*, and perhaps in some degree, in most of the Parties truly termed Protestant. It may be easy to prove to those who are Christians, that they are to believe such or such Doctrines, by shewing them plainly that Christ Jesus, whom they have received to be their Lord, hath taught them. But when we require those who are not Christians to believe them, as absolutely necessary to make them Christians, we must undertake to prove to them, the Truth of those Doctrines by some other Medium than Christ's Authority. For it cannot rationally be expected that People who do not believe Jesus to be the Messiah, or the Christ, will assent to, believe, and receive Doctrines, meerly because he, they do not believe to be the Christ, hath taught them. And when they are brought to believe that Jesus is the Messiah, so as to take him for their Lord and King, if that do not constitute them Christians, it will not suffice to make them Christians, to prove to them that Christ hath taught such or such Doctrines, which therefore they must believe, but it must be proved to them, that that same Jesus hath taught that these same Doctrines are absolutely necessary to be believed to make them Christians, unless their believing this Branch upon some other Authority will serve the turn: And if that will do the Business, why may they not be required to believe that Jesus is the Messiah upon the same Authority? and consequently all the other Doctrines the said Authority shall be pleased to avouch? The Difference is not much in rational Discourse, whether

ther a Person believes a certain Doctrine to be Christ's, which he never taught, upon the Testimony of such a Person, or Church; or whether he believes a Doctrine Christ hath certainly taught, to be absolutely necessary to a certain Purpose, which Christ never declared to be absolutely necessary to that purpose, upon the same Testimony or Authority. For the Ground, Foundation, and Reason of the Belief in both Cases is the very same, and is an Authority distinct from Christ's.

In the next place, the Author of the Animadversions relates, what he thought was the main Design of the Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. in these Words: ' The main Design which the Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. seems to have had, is, to lay down such a Scheme of Faith only, as he finds delivered in Scripture, and not to rest satisfied with those Collections of Articles, which are to be met with in the common Systems, without any sufficient warrant from Scripture. I will keep as near as I can to this Author's Words, in relating what I conceive to be the Truth touching this Matter. The main Design of the Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. seems to have had, as to one main part of his Book, was to lay down such a Scheme of those matters of Faith only, that are absolutely necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian, as he found delivered in the Scripture; but not to lay down such a Scheme of those Matters of Faith, as he found in Scripture, which any Man after he is a Christian, may be necessarily obliged to Believe. The Reason why the Author of the Reasonableness did not rest satisfied with those Collections of Articles which are to be

met with in the common Systems doth not appear to be, because all or most, or perhaps any of the Articles in some of those Systems were without any sufficient Warrant from Scripture: Though it may be, the Composers of those Systems might assert something concerning several of those Articles, for which there might not be any sufficient Warrant from Scripture. There might be sufficient Warrant from Scripture for the Articles themselves; and not the like Warrant for every thing those Authors might deliver concerning them. But the Reasons why he was not satisfied with those Collections seem to me to be, 1. Because those Collections did not agree; some of them consisting of more, some of fewer Articles, and those which had the greatest number, left out some of the Articles which were insisted on, or inserted in another. 2. Because it was pretended by the Composers of those Systems, or their Followers, or both, that all the Articles collected into those Systems were necessarily to be believed to make Men Christians. Now according to that Notion, what certainty could there be, who were Christians, or to be admitted and owned as such? whilst there was so great a Disagreement concerning the Articles which were absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians? For those who were Christians according to the Composers and followers of one System, were not Christians according to the Followers of another, because they wanted something in their Judgment, absolutely necessary to make them Christians. The Design of those who write Systems of Christian Divinity (I apprehend) should be to collect those Articles which are mainly insisted on in the New Testament, and to which most or all that is delivered in those Sacred Writings may be pertinently

nently and conveniently reduced, together with an account of the principal things there taught, concerning those Articles. And if the Composers of Systems did carefully distinguish the Articles those Sacred Writings teach, are absolutely necessary to be believed to make men Christians, from those which are of great Moment to be known and believed by them who are already Christians, I am of Opinion, the Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity would not think their doing so, any Blemish to their Systems, and that he would not be dissatisfied with any of those Articles of which their Systems should consist, nor with any thing they should say concerning those Articles, which had sufficient warrant from Scripture.

‘ And to this end (saith the Author of the Animadversions) he has run through the Gospels and Acts to discover upon what Terms our blessed Saviour, who first founded, and his Apostles, who afterwards built up Christianity, admitted Men into that Religion.

Answer. The Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity finding so great a Disagreement amongst the Writers of Systems, concerning the Articles which must necessarily be believed to make Men Christians, did betake himself *to the sole reading of the Scriptures*, to discover upon what Terms our blessed Saviour, and his Apostles did admit Men for Disciples or Christians, or did own them to be Christians: And upon his having made an *attentive and unbiassed Search* throughout the Scriptures, upon what Terms they admitted Men into the Christian Religion; he found that what those Terms were, were best to be discerned in the Gospels and Acts of the Apostles; and for that Reason, confined himself in his giving an account of those Terms, to the frequent
and

and exact Relations which are given of them in those parts of the New Testament.

‘ And (saith the Author of the Animadversions) ‘ having declared at large all that he can find required by them to make a Man a Christian, which ‘ he tells us was only the believing Jesus to be the ‘ Messiah; he concludes, that nothing ought to be ‘ made necessary to be believed now, which was ‘ not so then; nor any Articles imposed upon us, ‘ which were not enjoined in order to Salvation, ‘ in those parts of Scripture which he has considered; which alone, according to him, declare the ‘ Conditions upon which Men are denominated Believers or Christians.

Ans^w. The Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity having shewn at large, that Jesus Christ and his Apostles did not require any thing to be believed as absolutely necessary to make a Man who believed in the only True and Living God, a Christian, but only this, that Jesus was the Messiah: He concluded that nothing ought now to be imposed on Men, as absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, which is not enjoined as absolutely necessary to be believed in order to Salvation, in the Gospels and Acts, in which parts of Scripture, the Conditions upon which Men are denominated Believers or Christians, are best to be discerned. But I do not remember that he doth any where say, that the Gospels and Acts are the Parts of Scripture, which alone declare the Conditions upon which Men are denominated Believers or Christians. He doth expressly declare, that the Articles necessarily to be believed to make Men Christians, are to be found in the Epistles, *Reasonab. of Christianity, &c. p. 295.*

‘ This way of examining our Faith by the Scrip-
 ‘ ture (saith the Author of the Animadversions)
 ‘ had been an unexceptionable method for fixing the
 ‘ measure of it, if he had omitted no Articles which
 ‘ are there made as necessary to be believed by all
 ‘ Christians, as what is observed in his Treatise.

Ans. The Method then observed by the Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. was unexceptionable for the fixing the Measure of Faith, so far as he was inquiring after it; viz. what Articles are absolutely necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian (not what Articles may be necessary to be believed by all, or any who are already Christians) provided he did not omit any Articles which the Scripture makes absolutely necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian. And if he hath omitted any such Article, that may be a good Exception against his *Collection*, but not against his *Method*. But had he collected a certain Number of Articles delivered in the Scripture, proper to be believed by them who are Christians, and then affirmed that every one who is, or ever shall be a Christian, must necessarily, explicitly believe every one of them, and no Christian must believe any more; I think there would have been very just Ground to have excepted against his *Collection*, how unexceptionable soever his way of examining our Faith had been; unless he could have proved that every Christian shall have both Capacity to understand every one of them, and Space enough to be convinced that every one of them is delivered in Scripture. Many more Articles may be necessary to be believed by some Christians than may be necessary to be believed by other Christians; because some may attain to the Knowledge of more Articles, and that they are delivered in Scripture, than many other very good
 Christians

Christians can. The Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. appears to be a Person, whose Understanding and Charity are of a different Size from theirs, who are for Persons swallowing Articles of Faith, as some People do Pills, a precise Number (because said to be taken out of such a Box, or of such a Persons prescribing) to make their Operation certain, without understanding either what they are made of, or for what particular Reasons they are to be administered.

For that there are others required even to make a Man a Christian in these parts of Sacred Writ, from whence he hath extracted his Article of Faith, is (saith the Author of the Animadversions) what I purpose to make appear in the following Observations.

Ans^w. Prove from any part of the New Testament that there are other Articles distinct from those the Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity doth insist on, which are taught by Christ and his Apostles to be absolutely necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian, you do your business as effectually, as if you prove it from the Gospels and Acts. But this Author intends to prove more than this, not only that there are more Doctrines in the Gospels and Acts absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, than the Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity hath set down in his Treatise; but that there are Doctrines in the Epistles, which are not in the Gospels and the Acts; which yet are absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians; as appears from these following Words:

As also to shew that there are some distinct Articles from what are set down in the Gospels and Acts

Acts, delivered in the Epistles, that are absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation.

Answ. Here this Author undertakes to shew, not that there are Articles in the Epistles distinct from all which are set down in the Gospels and Acts, which may be necessary to be believed to Salvation; for both these Authors agree as to that: But that these distinct Articles are absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians, or to Salvation. So that should a Person upon sound Conviction, heartily yield up himself without any Reservation, unto Jesus Christ, as the Messiah; and unfeignedly receive him for his Lord, to be absolutely governed by him; yea, should sincerely follow his Conduct as long as he lives, and having attained the Knowledge of all the Articles taught in the Gospels and Acts, does firmly assent to, and believe every one of them, and makes such use of them as Christ requires, in short, though he repents truly of his Sins, turns to the Lord heartily, and cleaves unto him with purpose of Heart all his Days, yet happening to die before he doth explicitly know and believe these distinct Articles delivered in the Epistles, he is no Christian, nor can possibly be saved, notwithstanding his being ignorant of them cannot justly be imputed to him as his Fault. This is a Notion which must be very clearly proved from Scripture, before I can submit to, and embrace it. This Point, the Author of the *Animadversions* undertakes to prove. He tell us:

‘ In answer to that Assertion of our Author, that
 ‘ it is not in the Epistles that we are to learn what
 ‘ are the Fundamental Articles of Faith, with some
 ‘ others of the like Nature.

Answ.

Ans. The author of the Reasonableness of Christianity doth not say the Fundamental Articles of Faith, *viz.* those Articles which are absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, are not in the Epistles, but he saith they are there; yet what they are may be best discerned in the Gospels and Acts: *First Vindication of the Reasonableness, &c.* p. 14. This Point is so fully cleared, and strongly discoursed in his *Second Vindication*, p. 132, 133, 134. the Reason of Mankind I think can raise no colourable Objection against it; I shall refer the Reader thither for a thorough understanding of the Matter, and perfect Satisfaction concerning it; unless what this Author hath undertaken in his Animadversions can be proved, *viz.* That there are certain Articles in the Epistles which are not in the Gospels and Acts, which are absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians. If this can be proved, then it will be plain, that it is in the Epistles that we must necessarily look for some of those Articles, which are necessarily to be believed to make Men Christians, for then they are not all to be found in the Gospels, and in the Acts, and it will be in vain to look for them all there, where they are not all to be found.

‘ Which is the Reason (saith the Author of the
 ‘ Animadversions) that I give the Title of a Vin-
 ‘ dication of the Epistles to the former part of these
 ‘ Papers.

Ans. The former Part of these Animadversions being designed to answer the Reason why the Title, *A Vindication of the Epistles*, is given to it, we are not to look for Proofs of their Divine Authority, that being acknowledged on both sides, or if we find any thing of that Nature there, how useful soever the said Considerations may be, with Relation
 to

to that Matter, it is all besides the present purpose, which is to prove that the Epistles were writ for this very purpose, *viz.* to acquaint People with other Articles than what are set down in the Gospels and Acts, which are absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians; or at least, that there are such Doctrines delivered in the Epistles. If there be any thing then in this First part of the Animadversions which belongs not to one of these Points, it is so far foreign to the present Debate.

This Author seems to suggest in the Third Page of his Preface, by placing my Name in the Margin, that I have given such an Account of the design the Author of the Reasonableness, &c. had in publishing his Treatise, as is not consistent with that Account the Author himself hath given of the Design he had therein, in the Sixth Page of his First Vindication, where he saith he *chiefly designed it for those who were not thoroughly and firmly Christians.* Of which, saith this Author, I find no Intimation in the Treatise it self. But a Person may find it in the Title, especially after the Author hath minded him in the same Place, that he is to learn from the Title, for whom he chiefly intended it; and hath in his Second Vindication manifested how proper the Title was to furnish the Reader with a true and just Account of the Persons for whom his Treatise was chiefly designed. The Account I gave of his Design, it's true, was different from that the Author hath given of his Design in the Place quoted; but it is very consistent with his: For he gives an account of the Persons for whom he chiefly designed his Treatise: I gave an Account of the principal Point he designed to prove and clear in that Treatise. But I do not remember that I any where said, that *That was his only Design*, what way soever
this

this Author had to know that *I believe that to be his only Design*, nor that I have declared that I had considered his Treatise *with very great Care and Application*; though this Author is pleased to lay those Words to my Charge.

‘ This Author also observes, That I am of Opinion, that there is nothing more required to make a Man a Christian, than the believing Jesus to be the Messiah.

Answ. I acknowledge I have expressed my self to this purpose, That nothing is required as absolutely necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian but this, that Jesus is the Messiah; and that a due believing that Jesus is the Messiah, is the Faith which doth constitute or make a Man a Christian. And the Reason why I expressed my Opinion in that manner was, because Mr. *Edwards* did suppose the Belief of the True and Living God, and had expressly excluded the Consideration of that Article out of the Discourse; though whether he had reason to do so, with Relation to the Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity, may be fully seen in that Author’s Second Vindication of his Treatise.

‘ But had he (adds this Author) given himself a little more leisure to consider into what Faith he himself was baptized, and into what he baptizes others, he must have acknowledged that the explicite believing in Father and Holy Ghost, is as much required of every one initiated into Christianity, as believing Jesus to be the Messiah: For the Faith in the Holy Trinity has always been required in order to Baptism.

Answ. Whether this Author, or I, have given our selves most leisure to consider into what Faith we were baptized, or others are to be baptized, I cannot

cannot tell, but I suspect my Apprehensions concerning *Baptism*, are not in every respect the same with his: which of us hath considered the Matter with most exactness is not to be determined by me: nor can the Reader make a just Decision of the Point, whilst I reserve my own Thoughts to my self; which I continue to do, that no Addition may be made to the Points now in dispute. But though I acknowledge the Faith in the Trinity, or the explicite Belief of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity is as much required of every one who is *initiated into Christianity*, when they understand that Jesus Christ hath taught it, as the explicite Belief of any other Doctrine they know he hath taught, is, or can be; and that the Person who is to administer Baptism to others, ought explicite to believe the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity; yet I am very far from being certain that every one who is *to be initiated into Christianity*, must necessarily explicite believe the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity. I am not yet convinced that Jesus Christ or his Apostles did ever require the explicite Belief of the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, as absolutely necessary in every Person who was to be Baptized. It may be my Opinion, that a Person cannot be a Christian, without partaking of the gracious Influences of the Father, Son and Holy Ghost (wherein I may perhaps differ from some worthy, learned and good Men, as much as I may from this worthy Author about the Point of Baptism). But I do not perceive any Ground to conclude that a Person's partaking of their gracious Influences, doth necessarily depend on his explicite knowing and believing all that Jesus Christ hath revealed and taught, concerning the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

‘ Indeed (saith this Author) at the first, Men
 ‘ might be denominated Christians upon the bare
 ‘ believing Jesus to be the Messias; yet when there
 ‘ was more revealed concerning him, and conse-
 ‘ quently a larger Faith required, they could no
 ‘ more have continued Christians, if they had not
 ‘ believed this also, than if they had still been alto-
 ‘ gether Unbelievers.

Ans^w. The Question here will be, whether Men might at first be truly and justly denominated Christians, upon the bare believing Jesus to be the Messias? I think the bare believing Jesus to be the Messias, was not at any time enough to denominate Men truly Christians: but that believing him to be the Messias, so as to take him for their Lord, King, and Ruler, was at first absolutely necessary to make, and so denominate them truly Christians. And such a believing him to be the Messias, I think, will make Men Christians to the end of the World. But to speak strictly and properly, it is the due believing of Jesus to be the Messias (which consists in Mens believing him to be the Messias, so as to take him for their absolute Lord and King) which makes or constitutes Men Christians. And it is their professing of this Faith, that denominates them Christians. When more Articles of Faith were revealed, and those who professed themselves to be Christians, did know they were revealed, and it was known, that they did understand that Jesus Christ had revealed or taught them, they could not justly retain the Denomination of Christians, if they did not own and acknowledge their Belief of them; not because the Belief of these Doctrines was absolutely necessary to continue them Christians, but because their refusing to acknowledge them, when it was known they understood that that Jesus they pro-

professed to have received for their Lord, had taught them, was a Demonstration that they did not sincerely take him for their Lord, and so had not that Faith which was absolutely necessary to make them Christians. It was not their believing these new Articles, which did continue them Christians, but that did further Evidence they were Christians, or did really believe what was absolutely necessary to be believed to make them Christians. The continuance of that Faith which makes a Man a Christian, continues him a Christian; not his obtaining a new sort of Faith, or acting and exerting the aforesaid Faith regularly, with relation to new Objects, as they come to be proposed to, and understood by him.

This Author makes one Observation more on what I have writ, which is to this Effect, That I have been a little too hasty in expressing my Opinion of *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. in the Words set down in the Two and Fiftieth Page of my Animadversions. The Reason he assigns for this Observation, is delivered in these Words, *Pref. p. 4.* ‘ Since, I suppose, he will hardly deny that Mr. *Hobs* writ within that space, who maintained the very same Assertion.

Answ. I do not deny that Mr. *Hobs* writ within these Sixteen Hundred Years; but that he maintained the very same Point maintained in *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. is more than I can affirm. I received so early, such a Character of Mr. *Hobs's* Writings from my aged Tutor, the Learned Mr. *Lawson*, as created in me such an Aversion to that Author's Books, I do not remember that ever I read half a Score Pages of any thing Mr. *Hobs* hath published. But I dare say, if Mr. *Hobs* hath maintained this very same Assertion that is main-

tained in *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. viz.* that the believing that Jesus is the Messiah, so as to take him heartily for our Lord and King, is all that Jesus and his Apostles required as absolutely necessary to make Men Christians, who did believe in the True and Living God, he maintained a very great and important Truth: And if he never published any Notion less true, and less useful than that, he could not justly fall under the Censure of any of those who have employed their Pens against him. But if Mr. *Hobs*, or any other Person had writ on this, or any other Subject, a Book that was absolutely the best that has been published this Sixteen Hundred Years, *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* may for all that, be justly reputed *one of the best Books* which hath been published within that Space; and this, for the Reasons I laid down in the Close of my Animadversions, which I conceive are of that Nature, they cannot be invalidated by the bare mentioning of Mr. *Hobs's* Name. And if I am not mistaken, the latter Reason this Author gives why he needed not to reflect any further upon any thing I had propounded, *viz.* 'because there does not seem to be any thing very material, which was not before observed in *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* or the Author's *Vindication* of it, doth in some measure justify the Character I gave of that excellent Treatise. For certainly it cannot be a Blemish to a Treatise, that it discourses its Subject so clearly and so fully, that very material Answers may be brought from the Treatise it self, to whatsoever is produced by way of Objection against it. Some Authors write after such a rate, their own Books may be pertinently made use of to confute their Notions. But the Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* (whoever he is) seems to have
 this

this peculiar Excellency and Advantage, that he treats the Points he discourses of in such a manner, he fully answers his Adversaries, before they can make their Objections publick. I write not to justify my self or any one else in Errors or Mistakes, but to vindicate, and clear (if I can) disguised Truth, and wrong'd Innocence, and let those who are contrary minded, know, I cannot be of their Judgment till they produce other kind of Arguments against the Book they profess they oppose, than are fully answered in that Author's Writings, which they knew were publick, before theirs were offered to common view. And though there is nothing very material in these Papers, which has not been observed before in the Writings of the Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* I shall not account that a just Prejudice against them: For if the Answers here propounded be very material to what is alledged against *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* it cannot reasonably be supposed that the Objections insisted on, should be of any great weight with me. And my deriving the Answers from that Authors Writings, I hope may pass with Persons of Candor, Reason and Discernment, for some justification of the Value I set on *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.*

Observations on the Vindication of the Epistles.

THIS Author begins his Animadversions with that Part to which he gives this Title, *A Vindication of the Epistles*: And he enters on this Part with assigning Two Reasons why *the Reasonableness of Christianity* doth not (as he saith) give such Satisfaction to an inquisitive Mind, as might prevent all Exception against it, whether it was designed for the Benefit of those who were not thoroughly and firmly Christians, or to be a general Rule of Faith to all sorts of Men?

Answer. That Author's Design was to give a clear and distinct Account of what Articles or Doctrines are absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians: And the Treatise gives me full Satisfaction concerning this Matter; because it lays down all that Jesus Christ and his Apostles have declared to be thus necessary, and nothing but what they have declared to be so. And his giving so full and large Proof, that Christ and his Apostles did require the Belief of the Articles he hath laid down, and did not require the Belief of any other Article, as absolutely necessary to make Men Christians, rendered his Treatise very proper to be published for *the Benefit of those who were not thoroughly and firmly Christians*. For nothing can tend more to the Benefit of such Persons, than a clear, distinct, full and true Information of what is absolutely necessary to be believed by them, in order to their being Christians. What this Author understands by a *General Rule*

Rule of Faith to all sorts of Men, I do not know. The whole New Testament is the General Rule of Faith to all Christians, as the Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. hath declared. And the Doctrines he hath insisted on, are the Doctrines absolutely necessary to be believed by those who are not Christians, to make them Christians.

The First Reason this Author gives why *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. does not seem to give Satisfaction to an inquisitive Mind is, ' because it introduces a new Scheme of Belief, in ' Opposition to the anciently received Doctrine of ' the Church.

Ans. Here I must observe, it is not opposite to *the most anciently received Doctrine of the Church*: Because it is the very same Scheme Jesus Christ introduced, and his Apostles constantly kept to, in admitting of Unbelievers into the Church.

His Second Reason is, ' Because it doth not answer the full Sense and intent of Revelation, which ' is the only Reason and Measure of our Faith.

Ans. Here I must observe, it doth answer the full Sense and Intent of Revelation, as to what the Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity* was inquiring after: Because it delivers all that Revelation requires to be believed as absolutely necessary to make Men Christians; and we are not to insist on any thing as absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, but what *Revelation, the only Reason and Measure of our Faith*, in this Case, doth declare is absolutely necessary to be believed to that end. Whoever affirms any Doctrine (though the Doctrine it self is revealed) is absolutely necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian, which Revelation doth not declare to be so, affirms it without Reason (according to this Authors own Ar-

guing) because Revelation is the only Reason why we are to affirm any Doctrine is absolutely necessary to be believed to this purpose; and so he goes beyond the only Measure of our Faith in this Matter. The Reason why we are to insist on such or such Doctrines as absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, is, because Revelation requires the Belief of them as absolutely necessary to make Men Christians, not barely because the Doctrines are revealed; for then every Doctrine which is revealed must be absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make a Man a Christian, because the Reason assigned for the Particulars we are minded to insist on, extends to every particular which is revealed, and obliges as much to every one, as to any one. For make your Catalogue as large as you will, if you leave out any one Doctrine, or any Branch of it, that is revealed, your Catalogue cannot possibly answer the *full Sense and Intent of Revelation*, unless a defective, partial Scheme of Faith, can answer the full Sense and Intent of Revelation; or some parts of Revelation have no Sense, and were revealed for no purpose or Intent: Both which are equally incapable of Proof, and altogether unreasonable to suppose.

This Author declares, *p. 4.* what it is he undertakes to prove in this First part of his Book. His Words are these: ' It shall be my business in the
' First Place, to prove that there are Doctrines in
' the Epistles, distinct from those delivered in the
' Gospels or Acts, which are as absolutely necessary to be believed, and to be made Fundamental
' Articles of Faith, as any other Parts of Revelation.
' on. That is, in short, that there are Doctrines in the Epistles distinct from any delivered in the Gospels and Acts, which are absolutely necessary to be
expli-

explicitely believed to make Men Christians. The Argument he makes use of to prove what he hath undertaken, is this, (to word it so, as that it may reach the Point he hath undertaken to prove)

‘ Some of the Doctrines set down in the Epistles
 ‘ which are distinct from any delivered in the Go-
 ‘ spels and Acts, have been confest (*viz.* by the
 ‘ Church) from the very First Ages of Christiani-
 ‘ ty, to be altogether as necessary to be actually (or
 ‘ explicitely) believed unto Salvation, as any
 ‘ whatsoever.

Here I shall observe, that before this Argument can do the Business for which it is brought, the Author must 1. Relate what he means or understands by the Term *Church*. 2. He must prove clearly, that whatsoever the Church (in the Sense in which he understands that Term) hath from the first Ages of Christianity, confest to be absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, is so, and that the Confession or Testimony of that Church, is the sole, or ultimate Rule, by which the Question concerning what is absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, or to Salvation, is to be resolved and determined. That is, That we are not to be determined in this Matter by the Testimony of Christ and his Apostles, but by the Churches Testimony; at least that it is thus, as to the Doctrines which are divinely revealed and set down in the New Testament. 3. He is then to set down the particular Doctrines he hath a regard to, in this place. And 4. He must prove that from the very First Ages of Christianity, the Church hath confest that every one of those Doctrines is absolutely necessary to be explicitely believed to make Men Christians, or to Salvation. It is not the bare saying that the Church hath such an Authority; nor

nor the bare affirming such a Matter of Fact concerning the Church, that will prove the Business in Hand. The explaining and full proving the Particulars already named, will require some time and Consideration. And when they are fully cleared, and substantially confirmed, there will not be any need to inquire *whether*, or *how the Church was imposed on*? In the mean time I shall lay down a few Considerations which I conceive are true, and consonant with the Judgment of the Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. 1. That which makes a Doctrine of supernatural Revelation, absolutely necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian, is not its being placed in one part of the New Testament or in another, but the Divine Determination that it must be necessarily believed for that purpose. 2. That our knowing that such a Doctrine is absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, depends upon God's declaring that the Belief of it is absolutely necessary to make Men Christians, let this Declaration lie in what part of the New Testament soever. 3. That what is revealed to be absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, may be better discerned in the Gospels and Acts, than in the Epistles, though the same Doctrines are likewise to be found in them. And this for the Reasons the Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. hath assign'd. 4. The New Testament comprehends the entire Revelation the Lord Jesus Christ hath made of the Mind of God. In which Sacred Writings, our Blessed Saviour declares what Articles are absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men his Disciples and Subjects, or Christians; and in these Holy Scriptures he hath also delivered, or declared all the Laws of his Kingdom, by which those he admits for his Sub-

jects

jects must be govern'd ; so that they are not to admit or receive any thing for a Part of their Religion, as Christian, but what he hath taught and delivered in some part of these Holy Writings. 5. The enquiry is not how many are the Laws of Christ's Kingdom, or how many Articles he hath taught and delivered, which those who are his Subjects are obliged to endeavour to understand, believe and observe, but what are those Articles he doth require to be believed, as absolutely necessary to make Men his Subjects or Christians? 6. All the Doctrines delivered in the New Testament, are equally Divine Revelations, and are therefore to be received with equal Degrees of Assent, by all those Christians who do understand them, and know that they are revealed or delivered in those Sacred Writings. But these Doctrines are not absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians. Indeed there are several Doctrines which I know are delivered in the New Testament, which have not the like Effect and Influence on me at present, in proportion to their Nature, that other Doctrines have, which I know are taught there : But this Difference ariseth not from the Nature of the former Doctrines, which is always the same and unalterable ; nor from my not receiving them with equal Degrees of Assent, for I do receive them with equal Degrees of Assent, being as firmly persuaded they are Divine Revelations, as the other ; but this Difference spoken of now, ariseth from something else, *viz.* my present State and Circumstances, or the like.

Now (saith this Author) if several of the Doctrines contained in those parts of Revelation, (*viz.* the Epistles) have all along down from the Apostles Times, been reputed necessary to be believed to Salvation, then certainly they ought not

‘ to be denied to be absolutely subservient to that
 ‘ end, without the Proof of one, or all these things
 ‘ (which are Five in Number).

Ans. 1. It is not particular Persons or Churches
 reputed things to be absolutely necessary to be be-
 lieved to Salvation, that makes them absolutely ne-
 cessary to be believed to Salvation. In the very ear-
 ly times of Christianity, even long before the Apo-
 stles decease, there were People professing themselves
 Christians, and who set up for Teachers in the
 the Church, who affirmed certain things were ab-
 solutely necessary to Salvation, which were not so ;
 as is undeniably evident from *Act.* 15. 1. 2. When
 this Author shall be pleased to set down plainly, the
 Doctrines his Words seem to have a Secret Relation
 to, a Judgment may be made, whether they were
 justly reputed absolutely necessary to be believed ex-
 plicitly to make Men Christians, or not, by consi-
 dering whether Christ and his Apostles reputed
 them absolutely necessary or not. 3. If the Church
 did originally repute any Doctrines to be absolutely
 necessary to be explicitly believed to Salvation with-
 out warrant, the successive continuance of that Re-
 putation, cannot make those Doctrines to be abso-
 lutely necessary. Length of Time, and reiterated,
 Applause, cannot advance an original Mistake into
 Truth. The Second Concoction will not in this
 case, rectify the Error of the First. 4. A Person
 who doth suppose, yea, acknowledge that several
 Doctrines delivered in the Epistles, which are di-
 stinct from any taught in the Gospels and Acts,
 have been justly reputed necessary to be believed to
 Salvation, may regularly, and with good Warrant
 deny that they are absolutely necessary (for that I
 suppose) this Author means (for otherwise the Con-
 sequence he draws is not to his Purpose) though he
 useth

useth the Word Subservient) to be believed to Salvation, without being obliged to prove either one, or Five Negatives. For many Doctrines may be very justly reputed necessary to Salvation, which are not absolutely necessary to Salvation. And therefore when it is inferred that such and such Doctrines are absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to Salvation, if they have all along been reputed necessary to be believed to Salvation, the Consequence may be regularly denied, and no necessity follow thereupon, that the Person denying it, must be obliged to prove : 1. *That the Authors of the Epistles were not divinely inspired.* 2. *&c.* And for that Reason I suppose it is that this Author applies himself, in the Remainder of this part of his Animadversions, to prove these Five Points : 1. That the Authors of the Epistles were Divinely Inspired. 2. That the Apostles had Authority or Commission to deliver some things for necessary Articles of Faith. 3. That some of their Doctrines were writ with a Design that all Christians should be necessarily required to believe them to Salvation. 4. That there is no Contradiction in the Epistles to the other parts of Scripture. 5. That some of those Doctrines are of equal Necessity to be explicitly known to make a Man a Christian, with this, that Jesus is the Messiah. But First of all, the fullest Proof imaginable, of every one of these Points, will not in the least confirm the Proposition or Argument they are immediately designed to confirm, *viz.* That all those Doctrines delivered in the Epistles, which are distinct from any that are taught in the Gospels and Acts, which the Church from the first Ages of Christianity, hath confessed to be absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians, are absolutely necessary

to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians. For there is not any Connection between the Truth of any, or all of these Five Points, and the Churches Authority, by her continual Confession to make any Doctrines which are only to be found in the Epistles, absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians. If it shall be said that it is not pretended that the Churches Confession makes them absolutely necessary to be believed, but discovers and proves that they are absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians. I answer 1. The Proof of the forementioned Points, is no Proof at all of the Churches Confession, but must be supposed, and is Antecedent to the Churches Confession. 2. That the Churches Confession doth not discover or prove that those Doctrines are absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians: it discovers or proves no more, but that the Church did think those Doctrines were absolutely necessary to be believed explicitly to make Men Christians. Now when the Question is whether the Church hath thought right concerning this Matter? that Question must be determined (if she have not Authority to make (at least) revealed Doctrines absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians) by ascending higher, and seeing what Jesus Christ and his Apostles have declared is absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians: which is the way the Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. took, to discover what Doctrines are absolutely necessary to be believed to the aforesaid purpose, without making any Hubbub concerning the Church in the matter. The Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. hath not writ one Word, that I can find, that hath any Tendency to the Disadvantage of the Christian Church; but

but very much that would contribute greatly to her Honour and Interest, were People generally of the Mind to attend her greatest Concernments heartily, without suffering themselves to be swayed by their own petty Interests, and peevish Humours, which they sacrilegiously dignify with her Name. She might enjoy a profound Rest, and become daily more and more truly Glorious, would other People let her be quiet, and not disturb her Repose, by a rude abusing her Name, to justify their espousing and talking for Matters, both Scripture and Reason do disclaim. *Secondly*, The exactest Proof of the Four First Points, will not afford any Proof of what this Author declares shall be his Business to prove in this First Part of his Book; *viz.* ' That there are Doctrines in the Epistles distinct from those which are delivered in the Gospels and Acts, which are absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians. The Truth of the Four First Points is agreed on, on both Sides, especially some allowance being made for that Latitude of Expression in which the Third is laid down: So that it is only the Fifth and Last Point on which the Controversy doth depend. It will therefore be needless to make any Observations on what this Author offers for the Proof of his Four First Points, unless he happens to mistake any thing in *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. which he brings in under these Heads, or misapplies what he hath to say on these Points, to that Treatise, or some Passages in it.

This Author bestows his Seventh Page in setting down an Objection that hath some Relation to his Two First Points. I think the Objection is not accurately expressed, but that I shall pass over, and only take notice of his speaking of Doctrines proposed

posed to be believed upon *the Absolute Promise of Salvation*. This is a Passage I confess, I do not well understand. I know there are at this time many amongst us, who make a great Noise in affirming That Salvation is absolutely promised to some Persons, and the Stir they have made about or with that Notion, I apprehend, was an occasion of the Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity*; &c. applying himself to search with particular exactness into the Holy Scriptures, to find out in what Manner Salvation is there promised: But I do not conceive that this Author of *the Animadversion*: is one of that Party. Now, I think there is not an absolute Promise of Salvation in all the Scripture: And that if there were such a Promise, there could not be any thing absolutely necessary to be believed unto Salvation.

‘ For an Answer to this (*viz.* Objection spoken of before) it will (saith this Author) be material to examine First, whether nothing is absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation, but what is declared to be so, or whether any Doctrine, upon which Salvation is proposed, is singly of it self sufficient for it? P. 8. He immediately adds, This seems to be a Query of no small Importance.

Here I will 1. Propound some Reasons why it may be justly affirmed that a due believing Jesus to be the Christ or Messiah, doth constitute and make Men Christians. 2. I will consider what this Author propounds to be examined. 3. I will take Notice of what this Author hath here writ upon this Point.

First, I will lay down some Reasons why it may be justly affirmed that a due believing that Jesus is the Messiah or Christ, doth constitute and make a
Man

Man a Christian. As 1. Because Jesus Christ and his Apostles did admit Persons to be his Disciples, and owned them for Christians, upon their believing this Doctrine, without requiring the Belief of any other Doctrine to this purpose, provided they did believe in the True and Living God: as every where appears in the Accounts given of their admitting Disciples. 2. Because they have promised Salvation to the due Belief of this Doctrine, without requiring the explicate Belief of any other Gospel-Doctrines together with this, as absolutely necessary to Salvation. 3. Because Salvation is not promised to the Belief of any one, or Number of Doctrines separately from this Doctrine. 4. Because no other Doctrine Christ or his Apostles have taught, can be believed aright, but by virtue of the Persons believing this Doctrine. Let a Man believe all the Doctrines delivered in the New Testament upon Considerations purely distinct from this, that they are Doctrines taught by Jesus Christ, whom he hath received for his Lord, he does not believe them as a Christian ought to believe them, nor will his Belief of them on those Accounts, at all avail him as to Salvation, by virtue of any Promise in the Gospel. He that believes any of these Doctrines with the Faith of a Christian, or as a Christian is to believe them, does but repeat or re-act his Belief that Jesus is the Christ, with a precise Determination of that Belief to those Doctrines as known and considered to be taught by Christ. Now if a Man cannot believe any of these Doctrines as they ought to be believed, or for that Reason for which they are to be believed, till he is a Christian, with what consistency can it be pretended, that the Belief of any of these Doctrines is absolutely necessary to make a Man a Christian? Upon what Evidence

upon what Authority must a Man believe any of these Doctrines to make him a Christian? They are not parts of natural Religion. Will a Man's believing them in Submission to humane Authority make him a Christian? If it be said he must believe them upon Christ's Authority who hath revealed them, then he must first of all believe that Jesus is the Messiah or Christ, and so as to take him for his Lord. If it shall be said that is granted, and therefore it is affirmed that that Belief is the first Act of Faith, and the first Step to Christian Faith; but, that Faith doth not constitute or make a Man a Christian, till it be compleated and grown up to a certain Size, by additional Acts of Faith, believing a precise Number of Articles more. It may then be ask'd, what we are to call, or what we must understand by that Faith, of which believing Jesus to be the Christ, is the first Act? It's said, 'It is not Christian Faith, and if it be properly said to be an Act of Faith, what Name soever shall be given to it, it must be Antecedent to what is but the Act of it. But how it can be an Act of Christian Faith, and yet but a Step to Christian Faith, has some more Difficulty in it. But further, it may be enquired, if the due believing Jesus to be the Christ, do not constitute a Man a Christian, how can the limited exercising of this Faith, with respect to a certain Number of Doctrines, constitute him a Christian, when all, or the main Excellency of his believing those Doctrines, is derived from his believing Jesus to be Christ? Does a Creature's being endued with Reason make him a Rational Creature, or his exerting and exercising his Reason to certain degrees about a precise Number of Objects? Again, it may be queried not only what are those additional Articles, but upon whose Authority

ty, or for what Reason must they be believed, to be absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians? 5. Because it is only the due Belief that Jesus is the Christ, which doth or can constitute a Person a true Disciple or Subject of Christ. The Belief of all the other Doctrines in the Bible, taken separately from this, will not make a Man a Christian: For if it would, a Man might be a Christian though he did not believe Jesus to be the Christ. And so believing Jesus to be the Christ, could neither be the first Act (as is said) of Christian Faith, nor an absolutely necessary Step to Christian Faith. Add the Belief of all other Doctrines in the Bible to the Belief that Jesus is the Christ, they cannot make the Man a Christian. The Additional Belief is but Evidence and Proof that he doth believe that Jesus is the Messias, so as to take him for his Lord: And if a due belief that Jesus is the Christ, doth not constitute a Man a Christian, all other Belief is so far from constituting him a Christian, it will not amount to a Proof that he is a Christian. A due Believing that Jesus is the Messiah or Christ, is the grand Principle of a Christian's Belief and Practice, as to all the particular Doctrines of Faith, and Rules of Good living laid down by Christ in the whole Scripture. This brings the Person under an indispensable Obligation to endeavour seriously to know what Christ hath delivered both as to the one and the other. This obliges him to believe whatsoever Doctrines he shall attain to know Christ hath taught, and to perform and practice whatsoever he shall attain to know Christ hath made his Duty. It is this that preserves to all the Doctrines of Faith and Rules of Practice delivered to us in the Holy Scriptures, their full Force and Obligation. Hereby we perceive them to be the Doctrines

and Laws of him we have received for our Lord, whom we are on that account to believe, and obey in every thing we understand is his declared Will.

Secondly, I will now consider what this Author propounds to be examined; *viz.* ' whether nothing ' is absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation, ' but what is declared to be so, or whether any Do- ' ctrine upon which Salvation is proposed, is singly ' of it self sufficient for it ?

Here are Two Questions, proposed as if they were but one, differently worded: I will say something in general touching this Matter, and then speak more particularly to it. In general I shall observe, that there is a great difference between these Three Things. 1. A Doctrine's being declared to be absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation. 2. Salvation being promised to what is absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation. 3. Salvation being promised to the Belief of something, but not under this precise Consideration, as absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation. To believe in the only True God, is declared to be absolutely necessary to Salvation, and it is impossible that a Man should believe a right, that Jesus is the Messiah, without believing in the only True God. For a Man cannot believe that Jesus was sent by the True God, and is constituted King by him, except he believe in that God who did send him, &c. Now, notwithstanding this Belief is absolutely necessary to make a Man a Christian, or to Salvation, yet it doth not make him a Christian, nor is Salvation promised to it. Salvation is promised to that Faith which doth make a Man a Christian, which is believing Jesus to be the Christ or Messiah, so as to take him for our Lord. But Salvation was not proposed to any upon their believing Jesus to be the Christ,

Christ, but only those who first of all acknowledged their Belief in the True and Living God: And therefore those who did not believe in the only True God, were always instructed concerning the True God, and called on to believe in him, before Salvation was promised to them, upon their believing Jesus to be the Messiah. If Salvation is promised upon the believing of other Points, or to any Matters of Practice, it is not promised to those Matters, as absolutely necessary to be believed, &c. unto Salvation; but the Promise is made (with respect to those Matters) to them who do already believe Jesus to be the Messiah. Some things are absolutely necessary to Salvation, to which no Promise of Salvation is made. And Salvation may be promised to some things which are not absolutely necessary to Salvation.

More particularly, here are Three distinct Questions to be considered. 1. Whether nothing is absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation, but what God hath declared to be so? To this I answer Affirmatively: For God only hath a right to determine and fix the Terms on which he will bestow Salvation: And what his Determination is, cannot be known till it is declared: Nor can any declare his Determination but himself. The Church hath not a Right or Authority to declare any thing in this Matter, but what God hath declared concerning it. And every particular Person hath Right to examine whether the Church doth, or hath declared as she ought. For that Revelation which is the Rule by which the Church is to govern herself in her Declaration about this Matter, is the Rule by which every particular Person is to examine and judge for himself, whether the Church hath declar-

red right, and delivers truly what God hath declared in his Determination concerning this Matter.

2. Whether Salvation is promised to every particular that is required as absolutely necessary to Salvation? To this I answer Negatively. If God hath made the Belief of more than one Article absolutely necessary to Salvation, the Promise of Salvation is not made to any of them apart, but to them all in Conjunction. Therefore the Belief of the only true God, and that Jesus is the Messiah, must go together, and Salvation is not promised to one alone, for though the believing Jesus to be the Messiah cannot be without the former, yet the former may be without the latter. Moreover there is something absolutely necessary to make a Man a Christian, which no Man nor Church can particularly determine what it is. For a Man cannot rationally believe that Jesus is the Messiah, but he must first have or understand some Evidence and Proof that he is the Messiah; but Men cannot determine upon what Proof a Man must necessarily believe it, because God hath provided Men with great Store of eminent Proofs, proper to convince them that Jesus is the Messiah, and hath not bound up himself that he will not give forth his effectual Influence and Blessing with any, but one Instance amongst that great variety of Argument, with which he hath furnished Men in order to their Conviction. Now Salvation is not directly promised to the Belief of the Argument proving, but the Article proved; though sometimes the one is put for the other, and the Belief of the Article proved, is expressed by believing the Argument which proves it.

3. Whe-

3. Whether any Doctrine, upon the believing of which Salvation is promised, is singly of it self sufficient for Salvation? I answer, Salvation is not promised to the Belief of any one Doctrine considered singly in it self; yet Salvation might have been promised to those who sincerely believe Jesus to be the Christ, upon their believing certain other Doctrines, and the Belief of those Doctrines not be absolutely necessary to Salvation. As a Person may believe a Doctrine which is absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation, and yet have no true Title to Salvation, because Salvation was never promised to the Belief of that Doctrine alone. So Salvation might have been promised to the Belief of certain Doctrines, and yet a Person might be saved though he did never attain explicitly to know and believe those Doctrines, because the explicite Belief of them is not made absolutely necessary to Salvation. The main, if not the whole Excellency and Dignity of a Person's believing the particular Doctrines delivered or taught in the New Testament, to be believed by Christians, consists in this, that that Faith is an Act of Submission or Obedience to that Jesus, they have received to be their Lord. As a Man may believe in the True God, and yet not believe in Jesus Christ, and so may miss of Salvation because he doth not believe all that is absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation, so a Man may believe several Doctrines taught in the New Testament, and not believe that Jesus is the Messiah, and so may miss of Salvation, because he does not believe all that is absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation, though the promise of Salvation had been annexed to the Belief of those Doctrines, in them who do unfeignedly believe that Jesus is the Christ, and who believe them in obedience to him. But

Salvation is not promised to the Belief of any Doctrine which does not suppose Jesus to be the Messiah.

Thirdly, I will now take some Notice of what this Author doth say to these Matters : ‘ If this (saith he) be made the only Rule whereby to judge of Fundamentals, *viz.* a Doctrine’s being expressly declared to be necessary to be actually believed to Salvation ; we should I fear by this means raise several Exceptions against a great part of Religion. p. 8.

Ans^w. The Question here is, by what Rule we are to judge what Articles are absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, or to Salvation? The Author of the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. says, the Rule we must judge of this Matter by, is the Declaration God hath made of his Determination concerning this Matter, by Jesus Christ and his Apostles. *No*, saith this Author, and his Reason is, he fears then Men will raise several Exceptions against a great part of Religion. I do not know what Men will do, but the Question will be, whether they will then raise just Exceptions against a great part of Religion? Our Fears must not rob God of his Right. But I am certain, by keeping closely to God’s Declaration, no just Exception can be raised against any one Part of the Christian Religion. What this Author saith after, concerning Matters of Faith, and of Practice, I think is fully answered in the *Second Vindication of the Reasonableness*, &c. p. 83, 84. and thither I refer the Reader for Satisfaction, if he needs any. I shall only observe that Salvation is not promised in the New Testament, to any Matter of Faith or Practice, but but with respect to the Belief of this Article, That *Jesus is the Messiah*. Let any Man produce a Promise

mise of Salvation to an Unbeliever, (if he can) upon his believing any other Doctrine, or performing any Matter of Practice, considered separately from his believing Jesus to be the Messiah. Salvation is not promised to any, but those who believe that Jesus is the Messiah; and when it is promised to such, with relation to other Matters, the Promise then hath a respect to that Article, to which it was primarily promised, and respects *those other Matters as Fruits, Effects and Evidences* of their sincere believing in Jesus Christ; except where the Promise respects not Salvation in General, but *Degrees of Happiness or Glory.*

‘ If in Matters of Faith (saith this Author) nothing is to be required for a Fundamental, but what is so proposed, and to which Salvation is expressly annexed and promised, it would very probably make way for a very unintelligible Faith, in which Christians could not possibly agree.

Answ. Here the Author seems to speak concerning the Doctrines which those who are Christians must endeavour to understand and believe; and if so, it is besides the Question. But that Peoples keeping close to God’s Declaration, either as to Doctrines absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, or as to Doctrines they are to believe afterwards, hath a probable tendency to make way for a very unintelligible Faith, is very strange to me. Is the surest way to have the most intelligible Faith, for People to go as far as they can from God’s express Declarations? There will be some Difference indeed amongst Christians as to the particular Doctrines they believe, some believing more Articles, some fewer, and this must needs be, till they be all equal in their Knowledge. Yet in the way excepted against, they will every one be obliged to believe

lieve and practise according to the extent of their Knowledge, and to agree in Faith and Practise, so far as they do in Knowledge. And let People advance what Notions they please, concerning what Articles are necessary to make Men Christians, they cannot rationally agree any further than they will this way; unless they must all be stak'd down to believe just one set of Doctrines, without extending their Endeavours after Knowledge any further. And if this be a way to prevent Peoples raising *Exceptions* against a great part of Religion, I cannot excuse it from doing *unsufferable Wrong* to a great part of Religion. In believing Jesus to be the Messiah, so as to take him for our Lord and King, we yield up our selves intirely to him, to believe and practise whatsoever we shall know he hath taught and commanded: And therefore we must not suffer our selves to be coupt up, and confined to a precise Number of Doctrines and Laws, but must every one employ our best Endeavours to be continually increasing and improving in Knowledge, Faith and Holiness. This believing Jesus to be the Messiah, doth not imply our explicite believing a certain Number of Doctrines he hath taught, but it is a submitting our Faith implicitly to him, believing that all he hath taught is true, with a Disposition and purpose to search after, and endeavour to know what Doctrines he hath particularly taught, and to believe on his Authority, whatsoever we shall understand he hath taught.

For (saith this Author) if nothing more is to be believed as (it should be, absolutely) necessary to Salvation, than what is so proposed, then it will follow, that no more than the bare Proposition which is declared to be of that great importance, is to be assented to. As suppose in that Proposition

tion — *He that believeth that Jesus is the Messiah, hath Eternal Life* ; if what is there required to be believed is singly of it self sufficient to Salvation, then it must be so as it is there proposed, without any farther Explication of it : because there is no Explication proposed to be believed to the like Promise.

Ans^w. This Author by assenting to a bare Proposition, seems to mean a Person's assenting to, or believing that certain Words he never heard before, nor understands any thing of the Sence or Meaning of any of them (that is an insignificant Sound) comprehend and express a real Truth, which is absolutely impossible ; for though the Words may be a Proposition to him who utters them, and to those who understand them, they are no Proposition to him, who never heard, nor knows any thing of them ; and therefore cannot be assented to by him. *By Explication of it*, this Author here seems to mean, proper Interpretation ; viz. declaring in another Language what the Terms in the said Proposition did ordinarily signify, amongst them who were accustomed to the Language, in which the Proposition was first of all delivered ; or declaring by other Words in the same Language, the several simple Ideas, of which those complex Ideas were made up, for the expressing of which those Terms were used. Yet in the next Page he seems to understand by Explication, ' All those Doctrines which are delivered in the Holy Scriptures, that either relate the Grounds and Reasons (why we are to believe the Proposition he speaks of) of such a Faith, which is required to Salvation. And that explain the Nature and Extent of it. If this Author be of Opinion, that the explicate Belief of all the Grounds and Reasons that are delivered in the Holy Scriptures

tures, why, or upon which, People ought to believe that Jesus is the Messiah, and of every particular that is said in Scripture concerning Jesus Christ, and every Branch of his Office is as absolutely necessary to make a Man a Christian, or to Salvation, as the belief that Jesus is the Messiah, is, I think it will require a considerable time to prove clearly the Truth of that Opinion, and if we may introduce an account of our Fears in Discourses of this Nature I may take Liberty to declare, I am afraid this Notion, if it prevail, will *unavoidably fill the World with endless Wranglings and Distractions*. For I suspect all People will not presently agree how many the Texts be, and which they are, which relate all the things before spoken of, not to say any thing of the improbability of their sudden Consent to understand every one of the Texts in the same Sense. Or if they shou'd fall immediately into an Accord about all these Matters, I suspect the Ground of their Consent will not be very *intelligible*.

It was never pretended (that I know of) that Eternal Life is promised to those who shall believe that this Proposition, *Jesus is the Messiah*, is true, without understanding the Sense of the Terms of which it doth consist. To believe a Proposition, is not for a Person to believe he hears a Sound, but to be satisfied of the Truth of what is affirmed, or denied in the Proposition; which a Man cannot be, unless he understands the Sense of every part of the Proposition. *For a Man cannot possibly give his Assent to any Affirmation or Negation, unless he understand the Terms as they are joyn'd in that Proposition, and has a Conception of the Thing affirmed, or denied, as they are there put together. But let the Proposition be what it will, there is no more to be understood than is expressed in the Terms of that Proposition.* Second Vindic. of the

the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. p. 59. This Proposition, Jesus is the Messiah, was first of all delivered to the Jews, and consists of Terms which were very common and familiar amongst them, which had a determined settled signification amongst them. The one was the Proper Name of a Person, the other ordinarily stood for the Description of a Person they lived in expectation of, according to the Account *Moses* had given them of him a long time before. See *Deut.* 18. 15. to the 20. and *Act.* 3. 22, &c. They did not need any Interpretation of the Proposition. And People of another Language needed no other Interpretation of it, than what was necessary to furnish them with the Knowledge of the Sense in which those People to whom the Proposition was first delivered, understood those Terms. Whosoever doth duly believe that Proposition, doth oblige himself to *hearken to*, that is, to believe and obey whatsoever this Jesus hath delivered, so far as he shall obtain the Knowledge thereof, and to endeavour seriously to know what his Mind and Will is: Which Faith makes a Man a Christian, and hath the Promise of Eternal Life made to it. The Proposition doth not comprehend in it an explicate Account of all the Matters of Faith which a Christian is to endeavour to know and believe, nor is the explicate Knowledge of them necessary to a Man's believing that Proposition: But his believing of it, brings him under an Obligation to endeavour to know them all, and to believe explicitly whatsoever he shall attain to know Jesus hath taught; which is to be the great Work and Business of the Remainder of his Life, when he is a Christian. Those Jews, and *Lewd Fellows of the baser sort*, at *Thessalonica*, who set themselves against *Paul* and *Silas*, understood that their preaching that Jesus was

the Christ (for that was the great Point they opened and alledged in the Synagogue there) amounted to this, that he was the Person they persuaded the People to receive for their Lord and King. For how malicious soever their intent was, in accusing them before the Ruler, it is most plain from their Accusation, that they clearly apprehended that *Paul* by preaching that Jesus was the Christ, did mean that they were to take him for their King; *saying that there is another King, one Jesus, Act. 17. 7. Vid. Second Vindic. of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. p. 108, 109.*

‘ For besides (saith this Author) if every Text of
 ‘ Scripture must be looked upon as sufficient to Sal-
 ‘ vation, upon the Belief of which, eternal Life is
 ‘ promised, even the very Scripture will hardly be
 ‘ found reconcilable to it self. For though in some
 ‘ Places Salvation is promised to those who believe
 ‘ Jesus to be the Messiah; yet in others it is decla-
 ‘ red to be Life Eternal to know the only true God,
 ‘ *as well* as Jesus Christ whom he hath sent. Both
 ‘ of which Places, if they must be understood in
 ‘ their limited Sense, will be almost found contra-
 ‘ dictory to each other: Because the one proposes a
 ‘ larger Faith to Salvation, than is required by the
 ‘ other. *p. 9.*

Answw. The Propositions here spoken of, as they are delivered in the Scripture, are in effect the same. For it is not possible for a Man to believe that Jesus is the Messiah, without believing antecedently in the only True God. The Word of Salvation by Christ is not sent to any but those *who fear God, Act. 13. 26.* But I deny that it is any where in Scripture declared to be Eternal Life to know the only True God, *as well* as Jesus Christ whom he hath sent: That is, either of them separately.

rately. The Text of Scripture which comes nearest to these Words is *Joh. 17. 3.* where the Knowledge of the only True God, taken apart from the Knowledge of Jesus Christ as sent by him, is not declared to be Eternal Life. But the Knowledge of both is declared to be Eternal Life. I wave a particular considering what this Author saith, p. 9, 10. concerning the true Notion of *believing in Christ, when alone required to make a Man a Christian*: Because the plain Truth of the Matter we are discoursing of consists in this; *viz.* That the sincere Belief of all those Doctrines Christ hath declared, are absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation, is of it self sufficient to Salvation. But this is so far from *excluding*, that it doth include a necessity of believing other Doctrines, if the Person is allowed space to obtain the Knowledge of more Doctrines which Christ hath revealed, and that he hath revealed them. Yet if the Person who sincerely believes the aforesaid Doctrines, should dye before he could obtain the Knowledge of any other Doctrine Christ hath taught, he will receive the Salvation promised to the Belief of those Doctrines he doth believe: Christ knows his Sincerity, and will not fail to perform the Promise he hath made to him. There are many, even very many Articles Christ hath revealed, which those who are Christians are necessarily obliged to endeavour to know, and then explicitly believe; and as many of these Doctrines as they do attain to understand, whether they be delivered in the Gospels, or Acts, or Epistles, are Fundamental to them. But the Explicite Belief of these Doctrines is not absolutely necessary to make Men Christians, or to Salvation. *Our Faith is true and saving, when it is such as God by the new Covenant requires it to be: But it is not intire and consummate till we explicitly be-*

lieve

lieve all the Truths contained in the Word of God. For the whole Revelation of Truth in the Scripture, being the proper and entire Object of Faith; our Faith cannot be entire and consummate, till it be adequate to its proper Object, which is the whole Divine Revelation contained in the Scripture. Second Vindic. of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. p. 310.

This Author p. 11. distinguishes betwixt ' Truths
' which are only to be believed upon the general
' Ground of Faith, which is the Veracity of God;
' and those of a higher Nature, which have an im-
' mediate Tendency to the Salvation of Mankind,
' and the Method by which our Saviour has obtain-
' ed it for us: And these latter sort of Truths (he
' saith) are to be explicitly believed by all, in or-
' der to their Salvation: And the Reason he gives
' for this, is, because the only End for which he
' hath revealed these Truths, is the Eternal Bene-
' fit and Happiness of Mankind.

Answ. This seems to be a Distinction without a Difference; for seeing they are all Divine Revelations, the Ground and Reason of our believing them is the very same, and every Way equal, *viz.* because God hath revealed them. If it be revealed that some of these Doctrines are absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, or to Salvation; we must believe them to be so, and that the Ground or Reason of that Belief is Divine Revelation. But if Men will believe them to be absolutely necessary to be explicitly known, &c. in order to Salvation, and God hath not revealed any such thing concerning them, their Faith in that case will want a just Foundation or Reason. But it's said, *These Truths of a higher Nature have an immediate Tendency to the Salvation of Mankind.*

Answ.

Anfw. Christ's observing the Methods appointed him by the Father, in order to his obtaining Salvation for Mankind, had undoubtedly their appointed Tendency to his obtaining Salvation for Mankind. But the Doctrines which relate what those Methods were, have not the same Tendency to the Salvation of Mankind; nor can a Person's believing those Doctrines which declare that Christ hath observed these Methods, and thereby obtained Salvation for Mankind, be properly said to have an immediate Tendency to the Salvation of Mankind. But that which should be proved is this, that Christ or his Apostles have revealed that the explicit Belief of all those Doctrines which declare what was necessary on Christ's part, in order to his obtaining Salvation for Mankind, is absolutely necessary to make a Man a Christian, or to a Person's being entitled to, and partaking of the Salvation which was so obtained.

But 'tis said, *These respect the End for which he has revealed any thing to us, and that is only the Eternal Benefit and Happiness of Mankind.*

Anfw. If this be only the End for which God hath revealed any thing to us, and therefore these are absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation, this will bring in all the other Truths to be absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation; and so the general Direction here laid down to distinguish fundamental Truths, will be of no use. For those Truths, being things God hath revealed to us, and the Eternal Benefit and Happiness of Mankind being the only End for which he hath revealed any thing unto us, they must equally respect the same End, and consequently be equally necessary to be explicitly believed in order to that End. But I fancy the Author's Meaning was thus; That the only

E

End

End for which God revealed those Truths of a higher Nature, is the Eternal Benefit and Happiness of Mankind. That is (to bring it home to the present purpose) the only End why God revealed those Truths, was to make the explicite Belief of them absolutely necessary to Salvation. And if this were proved, the Controversy would be at an End. But I think the great Reason and End why God hath revealed those Doctrines which declare the way and Method how our Saviour did obtain Salvation for Mankind, was, that Christians might know and believe the way, how the Lord Jesus Christ did procure and purchase Salvation for Sinners, and that they might make such use and improvement of these Truths, as he particularly directs, or their own Natures are proper to suggest. Some Doctrines may be of greater consequence to be explicite known and believed by those who are Christians, than many others may which are revealed. But the Point in discourse is not concerning weighty, or important Truths, with respect to those who are Christians; but concerning Doctrines absolutely necessary to be explicite believed to make Men Christians. See *Second Vindic. of the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. p. 87, 88. and 172, &c. That the Salvation of Mankind was obtained by Christ's observing such and such Methods, we know only by Divine Revelation. But notwithstanding our Salvation was obtained in such ways, and we are certain of the same from the Testimony of Christ, we are not to affirm that the explicite Belief of the Doctrines which declare these Truths, is absolutely necessary to make Men Christians, or to Salvation, without Christ's Warrant. The ways and Methods related in these Doctrines, were necessary to be observed by Christ, in order to his obtaining the Salvation of

Mankind, and so might several others, for ought we know, which are not revealed. But it will not thence follow that the explicite Belief of every thing which necessarily pertained to Christ in order to his obtaining Salvation for Mankind, or of every thing of that Nature which is revealed, is absolutely necessary to be believed, in order to our receiving from him, the Salvation which he hath purchased. There is no more absolutely necessary to be believed in order to Mens partaking of that Salvation, than what Christ absolutely requires to be believed, in order to his dispensing it unto Men. Our believing explicite the several Steps Jesus was to take for the obtaining of Salvation for Mankind, has not the same Relation, to our receiving that Salvation from him, on the account of what he hath done and suffered, as his doing and suffering those things had, to his obtaining Salvation for Mankind. He has by certain Methods obtained to himself a Right to dispence Salvation to those who shall unfeignedly take him for their Lord and King. But his Right to bestow Salvation on Persons, doth not depend on, nor is limited to their explicite believing every Doctrine which relates any of the Steps, he was indispensably obliged to take and observe, in order to his obtaining and being invested with that Right.

In Matters of revealed Religion, Revelation is the Ground or Reason of our Faith, let the Matter revealed be what it will; of greater or less importance. And where the Reason of our Assent is the same, the Act must be the same.

I agree with this Author, p. 13. That 'the Design of Miracles was not immediately to give Authority to particular Doctrines, but to testify in general that those who wrought them had such a

‘ Commission from God as they professed. And in my Judgment, this is no contemptible Argument to prove, that the due believing Jesus to be Christ doth make Men Christians. His Miracles did not immediately and directly, but only consequentially prove the particular Doctrines he taught. But they did most eminently prove he was the Messiah ; and they were wrought for this purpose to induce People to become his Disciples, or Christians, or to own and acknowledge him to be the Messiah. If those Persons whose Faith did answer the Intendment of the Miracles, were Christians, I think it cannot handsomly be denied, that the Faith which made them Christians, was a Belief that Jesus was the Messiah.

Yet if it shall be clearly proved that the Explicite Belief of any one Article distinct from this, *That Jesus is the Messiah*, is required in any part of the New Testament, as absolutely necessary to make a Man, who acknowledges and believes in the True and Living God, a Christian, I will acknowledge that something absolutely necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian, is omitted in *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. and I have Reason from that Author’s Books to believe that he will do the same. But as that Doctrine must be known, before it can be proved to be absolutely necessary to be believed to make a Man a Christian ; so I must know what it is, before I can be satisfied that it is such a Doctrine. And it may very reasonably be desired of them, who affirm that there are more Doctrines absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, that they would draw out a just Scheme of them. No, saith this Author, ‘ It will be sufficient to our present purpose, if we can produce ‘ any Doctrines, that are absolutely enjoyned to be
‘ believed

believed by all Christians, &c. p. 16.

Answer. This is quite from the present purpose; for the enquiry is not what Doctrines are enjoyned absolutely to be believed by all Christians? but what Doctrines are declared by Christ and his Apostles to be absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians? Yet I do not think it an easy Task to prove a certain Number of Articles absolutely necessary to be believed by all Christians. But if that could be done, it would signify little to the present purpose. It is acknowledged that there are very many Doctrines which those who are Christians are obliged to use their best Endeavours to understand explicitly, and then believe; and that some of these Doctrines are not expressly delivered in the Gospels, and also that some of those Doctrines which are taught in the Gospels and Acts are more fully expressed and explained in the Epistles. But the Proof is yet wanting, that the explicite Belief of every one of these Doctrines, and the fullest Explanations of them is absolutely necessary to make Men Christians. And before they can all be proved to be Doctrines which are absolutely necessary to be believed for this purpose, their Number must be precisely determined, and a particular Account must be given of every one of them: For can any thing be more absurd, than to pretend to prove that People must necessarily believe, and believe explicitly no one knows what, to make them Christians?

But supposing some Person will undertake to draw out a full and just Scheme of the Doctrines he will affirm, are absolutely necessary to be explicite-ly believed to make Men Christians, without waiting for his Proof, that the Belief of every one of them is absolutely necessary, and that there is not

one more absolutely necessary to be believed for that purpose (for I doubt either his Collection or his Proof will not immediately satisfy all Parties) I will propose Two or Three Questions to be considered, which I think not altogether impertinent to the present purpose. When a Man is convinced that Jesus is the Christ, and that it is both his Duty and his Interest to receive him for his Lord, to believe and do whatsoever he shall attain to know he hath taught and commanded, must he delay and forbear to receive him for his Lord, till he hath sought out, and learned a certain Number of his Doctrines? If he must not so delay, but immediately take him for his Lord, and openly avow and profess that he doth believe Jesus to be the Messiah, and owns him for his Lord, what Denomination belongs properly to him, upon his making this Profession? The Denomination which belonged to him formerly, does not (I suppose) properly belong to him, now he hath renounced publickly his former Masters, and declares he is peremptorily resolved to cleave to and follow Jesus Christ, without any Reservation. If it shall be said, he must defer his Resigning up himself to Christ, till he hath learned a certain Number, or (perhaps with equal Reason) all the Doctrines Christ hath taught, not only in the Gospels and Acts, but in the Epistles too; I would humbly ask, for what Reason must he so long defer the Resignation of himself to Christ? I suppose, not because he hath Assurance he shall live long enough to do that, after he hath taken some or all of his Doctrines to task, and hath had them under his Examination. Must he first of all sit in Judgment upon Christ's Doctrines, and see whether they are reasonable, and fit, and convenient for him to assent to? and that he shall act wisely and prudently to take
the

the Author of them for his Lord? If so, how shall it be made appear that such a Person receives him for his Lord, as Christ orders? and consequently that he is a Christian in the Gospel Sense? Is his believing those Doctrines before he takes Christ for his Lord, a believing them as a Christian should and must believe them, purely for his sake, or because he hath taught them? seeing he must first know and believe them, before he adventure to receive him for his Lord, and trust him with his Faith? In this case his believing these Doctrines, seems rather the Reason of his taking Christ for his Lord, than Christ's Authority the Reason of his believing those Doctrines. Our blessed Saviour tells us plainly with what Disposition we must receive him for our Lord, so as if any thing he shall require us to believe or obey, cannot be acknowledged or performed, without exposing us to the greatest temporal Inconveniencies and Hazards, we must sustain and encounter them, and deny our selves to the laying down of our Lives, rather than relinquish our Fidelity to him. But I do not find that he any where requires we should go to work with his Doctrines, and then, if we like them, come and submit to him, and take him for our Lord. Besides, how Men can be said to believe these Doctrines as taught by him who is the Messiah, or Christ, before they believe him to be the Christ, and have yielded up themselves to him to believe what he hath taught, is not very intelligible to me; nor how a Man's believing any thing Christ hath taught, purely because he hath taught it, can make him Christ's Disciple: It may discover that he is Christ's Disciple, but it cannot constitute him Christ's Disciple.

If this demand of a just Scheme of all the Articles that are absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians (if more than are set down in *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* are absolutely necessary) be not satisfied, prove what you please of the necessity of believing more Articles, you get no more by it, than to overthrow the Notion you oppose, without advancing one more useful; and you leave People under an utter uncertainty, whether they are, or ever shall be Christians, how many Articles soever they do, or may explicitly believe; and what Persons are to be admitted and owned for Christians, yea, whether there were ever any Christians in the World, at least since the Apostles Days. People may make what Noise they please with the Word CHURCH, but this Notion, if stuck to, will serve the Church, as those did her Lord, who cloathed him in Purple, and cried Hail to him in Derision. If a Hundred Articles are absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians, and you can name but Ninty Nine of them, he that shall believe those Ninty Nine, and not explicitly know and believe the other one, will fall as really short of being a Christian, as another who believes but one of the whole Number. And if this should be the Case of her, that's called the Church, she is perfectly unchurch'd, and not one of her Members is a Christian, nor can ever obtain a just Title to those Characters, till they have recovered that one Article from which they have strayed. It is very easy, according to the Notions offered by them, who oppose *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* to prove that they are not Christians. But that which I cannot comprehend is this, For what Reason they take so much Pains to prevail with others to believe, that they are not what they profess themselves

selves to be. For my part, I do hope, and will believe they are Christians, in spite of all their Arguments to the contrary ; unless I had as sure Evidence that they are not sincere in their Profession, as they give of the Mistake of their Judgment in the present Point.

This Author certifies he will endeavour hereafter to shew there are ‘ Some Doctrines in the Epistles ‘ distinct from those contained in the Gospels or ‘ Acts, which are of that Nature, without the Belief of which, though we may grant Men might ‘ be saved before they were known, yet when they ‘ were divulged, they could no more be stiled true ‘ Christians without the Belief of them , than if ‘ they had not at all believed, *p.* 17.

Ans. When our belief of a Doctrine is grounded purely upon the Nature of the Doctrine, we believe it only as we are rational Creatures, and do employ our Reason about the Doctrine it self, considering it's Nature, and not as Christians, for the only Ground of our Belief, as Christians, is Divine supernatural Revelation. And let the Nature of the Doctrine be what it will, Revelation is the Ground and Reason of our believing it. If you will therefore produce Doctrines absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, because of the Nature of them, you must fetch them from Natural Religion, and they are to be judged of as to their Nature, and the Reason of our believing them, by Natural Reason, without any regard to Revelation ; which is a Notion that will do Christianity, I doubt, but little Service. Hitherto it hath done no considerable Hurt.

The divulging of more Doctrines to be believed by Christians, as they should attain the Knowledge of them, did not make more Doctrines absolutely necessary

necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, than were absolutely necessary to that purpose before they were divulged: For if it did, every new Doctrine, when it was divulged, became a new Condition, to be explicitly consented to, in order to any Man's admission into the *Covenant of Grace*; and consequently there were so many *New Covenants*. Yet these other Doctrines, when they were divulged, were necessarily to be believed by those particular Christians, who did understand and know them, and so they are now; not to make them Christians, but by Virtue or Reason of that Obligation they are under by being Christians, to believe whatsoever they shall know their Lord hath revealed. The Difference between those who were Christians before these Doctrines were divulged, and those who become Christians since, is this: They were obliged by their being Christians, or believing Jesus to be Messiah, to believe whatsoever he had or should reveal, when they should know the same, now his Revelation is compleated, those who believe him heartily to be the Messiah, are thereby obliged to believe whatsoever he hath Revealed, as they attain the Knowledge thereof. For a more clear and full understanding of these things, see *Second Vindication of the Reasonableness, &c.* p. 82, 83, 252, &c. 337, &c. 343, 344.

Whereas this Author saith, p. 17. 'It will be necessary to consider an Objection, or rather an Evasion of the Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* since it intimates that he believes as much of the Epistles, and in as true a Sense as any Man whatsoever. And then relating some Passages in p. 299. of *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* afterwards saith, 'They do not seem altogether unexceptionable, p. 18. I shall observe that the

the Author of *the Reasonableness, &c.* doth in p. 298. begin his Answer to an Objection concerning the Epistles, or to this Question: *Whether the Truths delivered in the Epistles may be believed or disbelieved by a Christian without any Danger?* To which he answers, *That the Law of Faith being a Covenant of Free Grace, God alone can appoint what shall be necessarily believed by every one whom he will justify; what is the Faith which he will accept, and account for Righteousness, depends wholly on his good Pleasure. For it is of Grace and not Right that this Faith is accepted; and therefore he alone can set the Measures of it.* Where we have the most Rational Evidence for that Point, that (I think) Words can express. Afterwards, in p. 299. he answers directly to the Question, affirming that *the other Parts of Divine Revelation, are Objects of Faith, and are so to be received; they are Truths, whereof none that is once known to be such, may or ought to be disbelieved, &c.* Yet notwithstanding, he affirms the Doctrines in the Epistles, are *Divine Truths, very weighty to us now, and which no Christians who know them, may disbelieve; This Author saith, these Passages are not altogether unexceptionable.*

For though these allow the Truths contained in the Epistles, to be Objects of our Faith; yet they do not suppose them, or any Parts of them, to be more so, than any other Places of Scripture, which have no Relation to the Salvation of Mankind, and which we are only bound to believe to be true, upon the Veracity of God that revealed them. p. 18.

Ans. The Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* teacheth, *That the Truths contained in the Epistles, are Objects of our Faith; because they are Divine Revelations, or Divine Truths.* And this Author, p. 11. teacheth, *That the only End for which*
 God

God hath revealed any thing to us, is the Eternal Benefit and Happiness of Mankind. The Author of the *Reasonableness, &c.* doth not detract from the Honour due to any part of Divine Revelation: But asserts, That as they are all equally Divine Revelations, so they are all equally Objects of our Faith, when known, and have all a Relation to the Salvation of Mankind. But how this Author will reconcile his teaching, That *the only End for which God hath revealed any thing to us, is the Eternal Benefit and Happiness of Mankind;* with his saying, That *some Places of Scripture have no Relation to the Salvation of Mankind;* I cannot tell, without a very singular Account of what is meant by Doctrines having a Relation to the Salvation of Mankind. Some Doctrines acquaint us with the Gracious Purpose of God towards Sinners; and with the Ways and Methods how Jesus Christ obtained Salvation for Mankind, which may be said to have an *Historical Relation* to the Salvation of Mankind. Some Doctrines are absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make and constitute Men Christians, and entitle them to that Salvation: Which Doctrines may be said to have a *Conditional Relation* to our Salvation. There are Doctrines which those who are Christians must endeavour to understand, and explicitly believe, as they attain to know them. Such are those which belong to the First Head, and a great many more delivered in the New Testament. These have not an *Immediate Relation* to our Salvation: But they may be said to have a *Consequential, and Obediential Relation* to our Salvation. The Doctrines we are now discoursing of, are those which pertain to the Second Head. And if any Man think there are Doctrines in the Epistles distinct from those laid down by the Author of *the Reasonableness, &c.* that are

are absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians, and entitle them to Salvation, when he shall set down a List of them, and produce his Proof that every one of them, is absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians, &c. a Judgment may be made of them: But till this is done, the distinction of *Revealed Truths, to be believed upon God's Veracity; and Truths of a higher Nature,* will be of little or no use unto me.

I shall here further observe, That 1. It is certain the Doctrines which relate what Christ hath done, and suffered, have not the same Relation to the Salvation of Mankind, the Obedience and Sufferings of Christ had. The Doctrine which instructs us what was paid to obtain Salvation for Mankind, is not the Price it self, with which that Salvation was purchased.

2. The Belief of these Doctrines hath no Relation to the Salvation of Mankind: The most that can be pretended with any Colour, is only that the Belief of these Doctrines hath a Relation to the Salvation of the Person who doth believe them, or to whom they are delivered and made known.

3. The Relation the Belief of these Doctrines hath to his Salvation, who doth know and believe them, is the very same, which the Belief of any other Doctrines delivered in the New Testament, hath to his Salvation who doth know and believe them; which consists in this, That it is an Act of Submission and Obedience to Jesus, whom he hath taken to be his Lord. Whatever those Matters be, which notwithstanding they are revealed in the New Testament, some are pleased to Term *Indifferent Matters,* a sincere Christian is as much obliged to believe them, when he knows they are revealed

vealed there, as he is to believe any other Matters which are revealed there.

For 4. The Reason of my believing any Doctrine as I am a Christian, is, Divine Revelation, and not the Nature of the Doctrine, that is, of the Matter taught: And therefore my believing one Doctrine, hath the same Relation to my Salvation, that my believing another Doctrine Christ hath taught, hath to my Salvation: they being equally Acts of Obedience to Christ, and the Ground and Reason of each Belief being the very same. Yet I will acknowledge, that if our Belief of these Doctrines (this Author hath a respect to) had the same Relation to our partaking of Salvation, the Obedience and Sufferings of Christ (which were the real Price, and a proper purchasing of Salvation for Mankind) had to the purchasing of Salvation for Mankind, the Belief of them would be absolutely necessary to Salvation. But then I must add, we should hereby as properly purchase our own Salvation, as Jesus Christ did Salvation for Mankind, which is a Notion I cannot easily be reconciled to.

5. If a Judgment is to be made from the Nature of Doctrines, what Doctrines are absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians; or to Salvation, then this Necessity of believing them to this Purpose, must be obvious to the Natural Reason of Mankind; and every Man must judge for himself (by considering the Nature of these Doctrines) which and how many are absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation: which is a Notion, that as it lays aside Christ's and his Apostles Authority to determine the Matter; so it will not do the Church any great Service, without pretending that one certain Man, or a Number of Men, is
to

to make this Judgment from the Nature of the Doctrines Christ and his Apostles have taught, and all others must rest satisfied with, and depend wholly on his or their Determination. This indeed may have a Tendency to raise humane Authority to a great height, in the most important Business of Religion, but then it will be no Advantage to the Nature of Doctrines: for hereby People will be determined to take them for Doctrines absolutely necessary to be believed, not from their perceiving that such a necessity arises from their Nature, but from bare humane Authority. - Nor can they be certain that he or those who have judged them to be absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation, have been determined in their Judgment, by the Nature of their Doctrines, and not by their own arbitrary Pleasure, till they have resolved the Matter themselves, by exercising their own Reason about the Nature of the particular Doctrines, which shall be recommended to, rather imposed on them.

It plainly appears by what the Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. hath writ, that though he doth not think the Epistles the most proper parts of the New Testament to be consulted, in order to our discerning which be the Doctrines Christ and his Apostles did require to be believed as absolutely necessary to make Men Christians, or to Salvation, yet that he thinks the Doctrines contained in the Epistles, are Fundamental Articles, to be actually believed by Christians now, as they obtain the Knowledge of them. And that they are to make such use of them, as they shall understand they ought to make of them, either by considering their Nature, or what they find the Scripture doth instruct concerning the same. See *Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. p. 300. *Second Vindic. of it*, p. 201. and 319.

But

But, saith this Author, ' These Doctrines which
 ' have a Relation to the Salvation of Mankind, are
 ' to be believed upon another Ground, besides that
 ' of mere Revelation. p. 19.

Ans^w. Upon what Ground are they to be believed, besides the Veracity of God who revealed them? Is that Ground better or worse? doth it lay a greater or less Obligation on People to believe them, than Divine Revelation does? I expect not to meet with a better Reason, why I am to believe any of Christ's Doctrines, than this, that he taught them. Those who will not acquiesce here, may wander where they please for Satisfaction, provided they will not go about to compel others to rove with them. Moreover, are not those places of Scripture, where these Doctrines lie, Historical? declaring the Way and Method how Jesus obtained Salvation for Mankind. And is there any way for People to know, that what is declared in those Doctrines, had a Relation to the Salvation of Mankind, but Revelation? It had no natural Relation to the Salvation of Mankind. How is it possible then to know from its Nature, that it was graciously appointed to have a Relation to that End? We cannot know any thing more from the Nature of a thing, than the Nature of the thing is fitted to discover. If it be said, that the Discourse is not concerning the Nature of the Thing treated of in the Doctrine, but concerning the Nature of the Doctrine it self. I answer, we can learn no more from the Nature of the Doctrine than the Doctrine doth deliver: Therefore if the Doctrine do not declare that the Belief of it is absolutely necessary to Salvation, we cannot learn any such thing from the Nature of the Doctrine, because the Nature of the Doctrine doth not deliver any such thing. Besides,
 the

the Doctrine it self being a Divine Revelation, Divine Revelation is the only Reason and Ground of our believing it: And the Nature of that Doctrine consist in this, that it is a Divine Revelation.

In the next Place, this Author considers the Authority of our Saviour intrusted in his Apostles which is exprest in their Commission, *Mat. 28. 19, 20, 21.* Which Commission as it invests them with as full a Power of teaching whatsoever was necessary to Salvation, so it lays as great a Necessity upon others of believing them, as if Christ himself had taught in his own Person. *p. 19, 20.*

Ans. Very true: But all that Jesus Christ himself did teach, was not, nor is not absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed, to make Men Christians, or to Salvation; only so much of it as he required to be believed, as absolutely necessary thereunto. And the same is to be said as to the Apostles. Our Saviour intrusted his Apostles with Authority to *Disciple* People to him, and upon their avouching him for their Lord, to Baptize and externally admit them into his Church, and then to teach them the other Doctrines he had authorized them to divulge, as the Laws of his Kingdom, and Masters they were to learn, and having learned, must necessarily believe. But he did not intrust them with an Authority to make a *New-Covenant* with People, and to require the Belief of more Articles as absolutely necessary to make them, Christians, or to Salvation, than he himself had required as absolutely necessary to be believed for that purpose. The Epistles are part of that Revelation Christ hath given to be the Rule of all Christians Faith. But no other Doctrines are absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians, or to Salvation, than those, on the believing and owning of
 F which,

which, Christ and his Apostles did admit those Unbelievers, to whom they preached, into the Church and Kingdom of Christ; if our Saviour himself did understand the Covenant of Grace, and the Terms on which People were to be admitted into it; or if the Apostles did understand their Commission. For they neither required the explicate Belief of those Distinct Doctrines they have delivered in their Epistles, as absolutely necessary to make Men Christians, in their Preaching to Unbelievers; if we may credit the Relation given of the Method and Tenour of their Ministry, in the Acts of the Apostles; Nor do they in their Epistles any where require the explicate Belief of these Doctrines as absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians. They have in their Epistles delivered many Doctrines which Believers or Christians are to be pressed to endeavour to understand, and explicitly believe on hazard of their Salvation; which (I conceive) they had pressed on those who were converted, before they writ their Epistles, as well as they did then, and afterwards. But they do not any where in their Epistles teach that these Doctrines are absolutely necessary to be believed explicitly to make Men Christians, or to Salvation. See *Second Vindic. of the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. p. 76, 83, &c.

In p. 23. this Author saith something concerning the Covenant of the Gospel, but gives not a clear and distinct Account (in my Judgment) of that Covenant, and the Conditions thereby made absolutely necessary for our obtaining Happiness, though he truly saith, *This is fully done in the Covenant of the Gospel.*

The Covenant of the Gospel, in short, (I think) is this: That all those shall have Eternal Life, who do so heartily believe Jesus to be the Messiah, or Christ, as to receive him for their Lord, with invincible Purpose and Resolution to be absolutely governed by him, so far as they shall obtain the Knowledge of his Pleasure, let what Inconveniences, Difficulties, or Hardships soever happen to be in their way; and that they will seriously apply themselves to know his Pleasure. Eternal Life is the Benefit or Blessing here Promised by Christ. The Condition he appoints to be complied with, or performed on our Part, in order to our being entitled to receive that Benefit from him, is not an explicite believing a certain Number of particular Doctrines, he, or his Apostles should teach, but only a believing him to be the Messiah, or Christ, so as to take him absolutely for our Lord and King.

‘ And as the Conditions are necessary to be
 ‘ known (saith this Author) before we can per-
 ‘ form them (which is very true, and undeniably
 ‘ certain,) so God has taken sufficient care to give
 ‘ us a full Revelation of them; first in a large Hi-
 ‘ story of the Method that Christ made use of, for
 ‘ the purchasing of our Redemption, and the Mi-
 ‘ racles which he wrought for the Confirmation of
 ‘ his Mission and Doctrine. p. 23.

Answw. I. God has given us a large History of the Method Christ took by his Order, to purchase our Redemption, that is, to purchase to himself a Right to publish the aforesaid Covenant, and to perform what is there promised, to them who shall comply with, and perform the Conditions there expressed. But neither the Method, nor the explicite believing of it, is made the Condition on our

part, of the Covenant. The actual observing of that Method, was Christ's part, in order to his obtaining or purchasing to himself the Right before mentioned. And seeing he hath revealed that he did take this Method for this End, it is an Article, a *Fundamental Article*, to be believed by every one who hath received him for his Lord, and is thereby entred into Covenant with him, or with God through him, when he knows that he hath revealed it. 2. The History of the Miracles Christ wrought, is a mighty, proper, and powerful Inducement to us, to believe that he is the Messiah, and a very good Introduction to our taking him for our Lord.

‘ And *Secondly*, In a more full and clear Manifestation, by the coming of the Holy Ghost, of all those things, which were required of us to be believed.

Ans. The Holy Ghost was sent, or poured forth on the Apostles, to inable them to work Miracles to prove their Mission by, or from Christ, to publish the same gracious Declaration Jesus Christ had made before, and to admit those who should receive Jesus for their Lord, into his Kingdom, upon their professing the same, and acknowledge them for his Subjects, and to instruct and teach them, and leave to the Church, a particular, compleat Account, and Body of all the Laws of Christ's Kingdom, which must be studied, believed and observed by his Subjects, as long as they live. These are not the Conditions which are absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed, or consented to, to make Men Christians, but they are the Laws of Christ's Kingdom, which those who receive him for their Lord and King, are to endeavour to learn, and as they attain to know them, explicitly believe and ob-

observe ; which is a good, and full Employment for them, as long as they live, after they are Christians, let their Lives be lengthened to ever so great an Extent. But the Holy Ghost was not given to the Apostles, to empower them to make a *New Covenant* with People, by making more Articles absolutely necessary to be believed to Make Men Christians, than Christ himself had made so ; though they were to produce more Proof and Evidence of what he had made absolutely necessary to be believed, than was given before ; and were to furnish Christians with a more compleat Body of the Laws of that Kingdom they were Members of, than was before published. See *Second Vindic. of the Reasonab.* p. 89, 90, 325, 330. It may therefore with great Truth, and I think, for that Reason, without any absurdity be affirmed, that all things which are absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to Salvation, are fully and clearly contained in the Gospels. See *Second Vindic. of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* p. 73.

In p. 30. This Author discourses concerning the Apostles Creed ; and saith, That ‘ The Articles of ‘ that Creed are not to be looked on as the only ‘ Fundamentals, unless we also firmly believe the ‘ natural Consequences and Conclusions from them, ‘ and the frequent Explanations of them which are ‘ set down in the other Parts of Revelation. That is, those Explanations of them which are set in the Epistles distinct from what is said of them in the Gospels and Acts.

Answ. I will wave taking Notice of several things which might be observed here, from the Generality and Extensiveness of the Expressions here used : And shall only put this Author in mind, that the Question he should peremptorily answer to, is this ;

Whether all that is absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed by Christ's and his Apostles Appointment, to make Men Christians, be contained in that Creed? If those who answer this Question Negatively, be in the Right, let them talk what they please of the great Esteem and Veneration they have for *this Creed*, and *the Church of England*, there is no help for it, but both the one and the other must unavoidably fall under a very ugly Reflection; for the more full clearing of which, and answer to what this Author hath further writ on this Subject, I shall refer to the *Second Vindic. of the Reasonab. p. 74, &c. 77, 163, 169, &c.*

In p. 31, and 32. This Author offers considerations in answer to a Passage he quotes out of p. 297. of *the Reasonab. of Christianity, &c.* I shall here only observe, *First*, That these Considerations are grounded upon Two great Mistakes: 1. A Supposition that the Force of the Argument he opposeth, depends upon the time when the Gospels and Acts, and when the Epistles were writ; *viz.* which were writ first. Whereas the Force of the Argument lies in this: That those Truths delivered in the Epistles cannot be absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians, which were not revealed till after the Decease of many who were Christians. By the Epistles we understand what Doctrines the Apostles were intrusted to instruct Christians in; but supposing the Acts, and every one of the Gospels had been writ after all the Epistles, they acquaint us most clearly and distinctly what were the Doctrines which Christ and his Apostles propos'd as absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed by Unbelievers to make them Christians. 2. A Supposition that the Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* rejects the Epistles

files from being part of that Rule of Faith, that Christ hath given to Christians; for which I cannot perceive the least Ground.

Secondly, that this Passage this Author pretends to answer, hath the full Evidence of Demonstration, with respect to the Words immediately before it. Having declared that the Authors of the Epistles were inspired from above, and writ nothing but Truth, and in most Places very weighty Truths to us, &c. He adds, *But yet every Sentence of theirs must not be taken up and looked on as a Fundamental Article necessary to Salvation, without an explicate Belief whereof, no Body could be a Member of Christ's Church here, nor be admitted into his Eternal Kingdom hereafter.* Where we see what he means by Fundamental Articles, in the very next Sentence, which is the Passage reflected on by this Author, and delivered in these Words; *If 'all, or most of the Truths declared in the Epistles were to be received and believed as Fundamental Articles, what then became of those Christians who were fallen asleep (as St. Paul witnesses in his First to the Corinthians, many were) before these things in the Epistles were revealed to them?*

To this Passage in the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. p. 294. *The Epistles being all written to those who were Believers and Christians, the Occasion and End of writing them, could not be to instruct them in that which was necessary to make them Christians.* This Author replies in these Words:

‘ This seems rather to strengthen than lessen the
 ‘ Force of the Argument, That the Apostles had
 ‘ taught those same Doctrines for Fundamentals be-
 ‘ fore, which they afterwards communicated as sa-
 ‘ cred Depositums of their Faith, p. 33.

Ans. Supposing they had taught the very same Doctrines before, to the Christians or Churches they afterwards writ to, and so they were Fundamentals to those Christians who had been instructed in them; yet there is no force in the Argument that these Doctrines are absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians; or were so to them, till it be proved, that they had propounded these Doctrines to be explicitly believed to make them Christians.

In answer to another Passage quoted out of the same Page of *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* this Author propounds this Question; ‘ How can it be proved, that all those the Epistles were written to, understood all the Fundamentals of Religion?’

Ans. The Question is, whether they were Christians, though they did not understand all those Doctrines you call Fundamentals here? If they were Christians, then those you call Fundamentals, were not absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make them Christians. If any shall say, they were not Christians, to whom the Apostles writ their Epistles, they may, if they please, excuse my want of Complaisance, in declaring I shall chuse to believe the Apostles rather than them.

Again, saith this Author, ‘ May there not be supposed to be some less knowing amongst them?’

In answer to which, I ask, Were those less knowing Persons, Christians? if not, how came they to be concerned in the Epistle? or how came they to be Members of the Church to which the Epistle was writ? The latter part of the Question, ‘ And some who would not thoroughly believe several Doctrines of Christianity, without such an Au-
‘ tho-

' thority the Apostles had, &c. seems not to bear a propitious Aspect to what this Author formerly advanced, as *the way to distinguish Fundamental Truths from other Parts of Divine Revelation*. What this Author further saith on this Subject, is no more than what I think is sufficiently answered in my Animadversions, p. 26, 27. But I do not perceive how it will follow from what this Author hath said, that it cannot be better discerned by consulting the Gospels and Acts, what are the Articles Christ and his Apostles propounded as absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians, than the Epistles: And if that do not follow from his Discourse, nothing follows from it, that is to the purpose against *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* Nor will it follow ' The Apostles were unfaithful ' to their Trust, or that they clog Mens Faith with ' unnecessary Points of Belief, because they have ' taught several Doctrines which are not absolutely ' necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men ' Christians, but which Christians must labour to ' understand, and which will then be necessary to ' be explicitly believed by them. The Apostles Fidelity to their Trust, is not to be judged of by Mens prejudicated Fancies, and therefore Persons had need take heed of determining that ' The Apostles ought certainly to be blamed for Writing ' such Doctrines in their Epistles, as are not absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make ' Men Christians. It is no Argument of an *unwary Christian*, but the Duty of a good Christian, to embrace the Doctrines delivered in the Epistles, when he knows them, and that they are delivered there, as firmly as any other Doctrines whatsoever.

' But

‘ But (saith this Author) if it can be proved that
 ‘ the great and principal End of the Writing of
 ‘ their Epistles, was to deliver several Doctrines
 ‘ that should be necessarily believed to Salvation by
 ‘ all who were converted to the Faith, we are ob-
 ‘ lieged to believe them as such, p. 35.

Ans. Very true: But then 1. If what you suggest here, was the great and principal End of writing their Epistles, the Cause is clearly given up to the Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* For then the great and principal End of the writing of their Epistles, was not to deliver several Doctrines absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians, or Converts to the Faith. 2. It will not be easy to prove that all that are Christians, must necessarily explicitly believe every Doctrine delivered in the Epistles, though the Doctrines are necessarily to be believed by all Christians who do understand them. This Author then proceeds to prove, what he hath declared, to be the great and principal End of writing the Epistles, was really so, by producing many Places out of them: All which I may pass over without any Observation, because it is not pretended that they prove any thing more, than that those who are Christians must necessarily believe them. But because this Author sometimes infers, That *the explicite Belief of them is absolutely necessary to Salvation*; I will briefly intimate what I conceive to be the proper import of those Places of Scripture he quotes: 1 Cor. 14. 37. speaks not barely of Christians, but Persons who pretended (at least) to be inspired. But take it of Christians, all who did know what he had writ, or that he had writ things, were to believe explicitly or implicitly, that the things he writ were the Commandments of God, because they knew he had given

ven full Proof of his Apostleship; and in the same manner are Christians now to acknowledge the same. *1 Cor. 15. 1. &c.* Is a very plain Account how he had preached to them, that Jesus was the Messiah, and what sorts of Proofs he had propounded for their Conviction, and that they had believed this Gospel, as also that this was the Faith by which they were saved and made Christians, without the believing of which, whatever else they believed would not avail them to Salvation. *Vid. Second Vindic. of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. p. 269.* The Apostle in his Third Chapter of this Epistle had declared, that Jesus Christ is the Foundation, without borrowing other Articles to underprop it, (some proof of which he here minds them of) and that all the other Articles of the Christian Religion, are Superstructures erected on that Foundation. *Rom. 10. 9.* hath been formerly considered. *Vid. Second Vindic. of the Reasonab. &c. p. 303, &c.* *1 Tim. 3. 16.* Is a Motive to *Timothy* to take care to behave himself in the Church of God, as he ought. *1 Th. 4. 1.* Is a Direction to Christians to take heed of entertaining the Doctrines which false Teachers would obtrude on them; certifying they might justly conclude those to be false Teachers, who did deny Jesus Christ to be real Man. The 14th and 15th Verses are express, that believing Jesus to be the Son of God, or the Messiah, doth make a Man a Christian. Whether believing him to be the Son of God, be a distinct Act here from the believing him to be the Messiah, may be considered when we come to the place where it is to be shewed: *2 Cor. 1. 13.* Doth not, considered strictly, declare any thing more than that they did know and own the Truth of what he had writ in the former Verse concerning his Conversation.

2 *Thef.* 2. 15. shews that Believers or Christians must take care to hold fast whatever Doctrines they have been instructed in, and fully assured are Christ's Doctrines. Not one of these Places of Scripture considered by it self, nor all of them considered together, do prove that the Apostles enjoyed the explicite Belief of all that they writ in their Epistles as absolutely necessary to Salvation. These and innumerable other Places of Scripture, are of great use to those who are of the same Judgment with the Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. to shew them that are Christians, that they ought to set a very great value on the Writings of the Apostles, that they ought to be very diligent in endeavouring to acquire as distinct a Knowledge as they can, of the Doctrines they have delivered in their Epistles, that they ought to take great care to retain and hold fast what Doctrines they have learned from their Writings, and that they must not entertain any Doctrines for Articles of their Faith, but what Christ and his Apostles have taught.

‘ And (saith this Author) it would be absurd to
 ‘ imagin that the Apostles should fill their Writings
 ‘ with any of the Doctrines of Christianity, if they
 ‘ did not impose a necessity upon Men of believing
 ‘ them, p. 37.

Ans. True, if Christians when they know they have writ them, should be at liberty not to believe them. But would it be absurd to imagine they should fill their Epistles to Believers or Christians, with Doctrines of Christianity, if they did not impose an absolute necessity on Unbelievers to believe them all explicately to make them Christians? Is every particular Doctrine that is to be believed, to be explicately known and believed by Unbelievers to make them Christians? so that when once they
 are

are Christians, there is nothing more for them to endeavour to know and believe ?

‘ And here (adds this Author) it is not material
 ‘ whether the Epistles were written to those who
 ‘ were already Christians, and whether designed
 ‘ to teach them any Doctrines, to instruct them in
 ‘ what was necessary to make them Believers ; but
 ‘ it is sufficient that they could not continue true
 ‘ Christians or Believers, without acknowledging
 ‘ the Doctrines there delivered for fundamental Ar-
 ‘ ticles of Faith, and necessary to be believed by all
 ‘ Christians.

Ans. I am not certain that I comprehend what this Author means by *Material* here, and in some other Places. But I think the Apostles would have thought it very impertinent for them to attempt, and utterly impossible to teach those who were Christians, any Doctrines they were ignorant of, which were absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make them Christians, or Believers. And according to the Sense which I put on the Word *Material*, on such occasions as this, I conceive it very material, whether the Persons the Epistles were writ to, were Christians, before they did explicitly know and believe the Doctrines the Epistles were designed to instruct them in, for if they were, the explicite Belief of those Doctrines, could not be absolutely necessary to make them Christians. How Christians were under a necessity of believing them, when they understood them, hath been formerly shewed. But they might continue good Christians without acknowledging they were necessary to be believed by all Christians. It was sufficient to acknowledge that all Christians ought to endeavour to know them, and that they are necessary to be believed

lieved by all Christians, when they understand them to be Doctrines taught by the Apostles.

To what this Author hath further writ in this Page, I will only say these Two things; 1. That those to whom the Apostles writ their Epistles, did profess to believe all that was absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, otherwise they would not have writ to them under the Name of Christians. 2. That there are very few, if any Christians, who have a perfect Knowledge of all the Articles of Faith delivered in the New Testament, and yet other People may be very good Christians, and take the Epistles for a part of the Rule of their, and other Christians Faith.

In p. 38. This Author appears not willing to admit ' That the Epistles to the *Corinthians*, *Galatians*,
' *Thessalonians* and *Philippians*, were writ upon particular Occasions, because they were designed for
' whole Provinces, and obliged a great Number equally with those Churches they were sent to.

Ans. That which made the Epistles oblige Christians who were out of the Provinces, made them oblige all the Christians in the Provinces; therefore passing over Metropolitcal Controversies, I will take Notice of these few things: 1. All the Epistles were designed for the use of the whole Church of God, in that and all succeeding Ages; yet they might be writ upon particular Occasions, and for that Reason be directed immediately to those particular Churches or Persons, who were more especially concerned in those parts of them, which have a respect to the particular Occasions of their being written. 2. It will be very hard to give a rational and satisfactory Account of many Passages in the Epistles to the *Corinthians*, &c. if there

was

was no particular occasion of writing them to those Churches. Some may be apt to suspect they have Ground to think the Apostles were not well advised (which is a Jealousy, those who believe they were inspired, should not be forward to suggest) in writing several things which are to be found in these Epistles, if there was no particular Occasion of writing them to those Churches to which they were sent, and particularly addressed. 3. That which makes the Epistles oblige all Christians, is this, that they are Divine Revelations ; and therefore all who acknowledge they were writ by inspired Persons, and are of Divine Authority, must be obliged by them : for their being writ on particular Occasions does not lessen or impair their Authority. 4. What is precisely limited in these Epistles to the particular occasions on which they were writ, did not then oblige any directly and immediately, whose Circumstances were not the same, and they will oblige all whose Occasions are the same, to the End of the World.

This Author further takes notice, That ‘ The First Epistle of St. *John*, is directed to all Christians, &c. p. 39.

Ans. From that, I think we may rationally argue, that it can directly concern none but those who are Christians ; and that its main design could not be to instruct them in the Doctrines absolutely necessary to be believed by them, in order to their becoming Christians.

This Author in p. 44. doth acknowledge, That ‘ The general Design of the Epistles was to settle and strengthen Men in the Faith, &c.

And if so, must they not be in the Faith, that is, Christians, before they could be settled and strengthened, &c. in the Faith? And is not the Design of them the same still? *viz.* not to teach Articles absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians, but to settle and strengthen those who are Christians, in the Faith.

‘ But (saith this Author) it cannot be denied
 ‘ that the Epistle to the *Hebrews* doth contain some
 ‘ Doctrines absolutely necessary to be believed to
 ‘ Salvation by all Christians, if this may be grant-
 ‘ ed, that the same Faith was required after Con-
 ‘ version, both from Jew and Gentile, p. 39.

Ans. This is wholly foreign to the present Purpose: For the Enquiry is not about what is, or may be necessary for Christians, or Persons after they are converted, to believe? But what Doctrines are absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians? Yet because this Author frequently speaks of some Doctrines being *absolutely necessary* to be believed to Salvation, by all Christians, some of which Doctrines are not to be found any where but in the Epistles; I will propose Two or Three short Questions to be considered by the Reader: 1. Must every Christian explicitly believe these Doctrines? 2. Can any Christian explicitly believe a Doctrine he knows nothing of? 3. If he must know the Doctrines proposed to be believed, and must know that Jesus Christ hath taught them, before he can be obliged to believe them; how can any Doctrine be absolutely necessary to be believed by Christians to Salvation, when there are Conditions necessary to his being obliged to believe them? There are Doctrines absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, because without
 be-

believing them they cannot be Christians. But there cannot be any other Doctrines absolutely necessary to be believed by one who is a Christian; for by being a Christian, he is obliged not to believe any Doctrine, but upon certain Conditions. He must explicitly know the Doctrine, before he believes it, and he must know that it is a Doctrine which Jesus, whom he hath taken for his Lord hath taught. A Christian is not to believe Doctrines at all adventure, nor upon every ones Word, who has a mind to thrust Doctrines upon him. His believing a Doctrine must be an intelligent, rational Act of Submission and Obedience to his Lord. All the Doctrines any Christians (whether before Jews or Gentiles) can be obliged to believe, are laid down in the New Testament. They are not limited to one particular part of those Sacred Writings. And all Christians must endeavour to know as many of them as they can, and then believe them. But there is not a precise Number of Doctrines set down in any one Part of Scripture, as absolutely necessary to be believed by any Christian, or beyond which a Christian is not to endeavour to extend his Belief.

In p. 47. This Author by way of Reply to what he hath quoted out of the *First Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. p. 14. where that Author declares the Reason why he did not go through the Epistles to collect the Fundamental Articles of Faith, &c. propounds certain Questions, whereof the principal is this: 'But how are these Fundamental Points to be found in the Gospels and Acts, better than in the Epistles?'

Answer. Though I think a very solid, strong, rational and invincible Answer is given to this and the

other Questions, in those very Lines this Author hath quoted out of the *First Vindic.* from which he hath taken occasion to propose these Questions; yet because the same Author hath expressed himself more largely concerning this Matter, in his *Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* I shall refer the Reader to p. 141, 142. of that Book, where I think he may find as compleat Satisfaction to these Queries, as can reasonably be desired. But since this Author doth here, as well as in several other places, speak of Truths revealed, or delivered, or taught in the New Testament, ' Which he saith, ' have no respect to Man's Salvation, and which ' are things indifferent; I shall take leave to ask a few Questions. For what End were those Truths taught in the New Testament, which have no respect to Man's Salvation? Which be those Truths Christ hath taught, which have no respect to those Peoples Salvation, who do believe them purely because they know he hath taught them? Is it indifferent whether Christians believe, or do not believe any thing which they know Jesus Christ hath taught? Are they to govern themselves in their Submission to, and believing of what Christ hath taught, by the Apprehensions they, or other Men shall be pleased to cherish, of the Respect or no Respect his Doctrines have to Man's Salvation? Will not such a Notion, if it take place, make shrewd Work when dexterously managed, both with the Truths which are taught, and the Rules of Practice which are laid down in the New Testament? As for those Truths which have a nearer, or more remote Connexion with what is absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians, the Reader may advance himself much, both in

Know-

Knowledge and Piety, by an attentive serious perusing what the Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. hath writ concerning the same, in his *Second Vindic. of the Reasonab. &c.* p. 74, 75.

‘ The Terms of Salvation (saith this Author) are as plainly and clearly set down in the Epistles, as in the Gospels, p. 47.

Ans. Those Doctrines which are absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation, may be as plainly and clearly set down in the Epistles, as in the Gospels, and yet not be as clearly distinguished in the former, as in the latter, from other Doctrines, which are not absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to Salvation.

This Author hath (I think) in his 50th Page, overturned all that he hath writ against *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. in this First part of his Book; especially if he will allow that the Persons he speaks of, before he comes to the middle of that Page, were Christians, before they explicitly believed every particular Truth they were taught, during their Lives. For if they were, the Question will not be, how many Articles they did believe in all? But what those Articles were, the Belief of which, made them Christians? If they were not Christians, till they did explicitly believe the very last Articles which were taught them during their Lives, their Belief of those Articles, joyn'd to those they had learned before (whatever they were) made them Christians: And if they did not every one happen to learn and believe the very same Article in the last place, or one that made each Man's Faith exactly the same, the explicate Belief of one Article made one Man a Christian, and the explicate Belief of another Article made another Man a

Christian, which is utterly impossible. For no Man can be a Christian, without that which is absolutely necessary to make a Man a Christian.

Could I meet with a Passage in *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* which I could justly think to have a Tendency, to impair the Divine Authority of the Epistles, or lessen Peoples Esteem for them, I hope I should as heartily dislike it, and be as ready to caution People against it, as another Person; notwithstanding I make so great account of the Book it self. And though I have writ so many Pages, in order to the clearing some Mistakes (as I conceive) in this First part part of the *Animadversions on the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* yet I fully concur with the worthy Author of them, in what I apprehend was his principal Design. There are many very excellent and useful things in this part of his Book: He writes very well, and like a very good Man; and had not his misapprehending *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* led him out of his way, and somewhat bewildred him, his Discourse (according to my Judgment) would have been without a Blemish; unless his using sometimes, a greater Latitude in his Expressions, than is rigidly justifiable, may be reckoned one, notwithstanding it is but a keeping Pace with the most Applauded and Learned Writers.

Our enjoying the Epistles as well as the Gospels, and Acts, is a Mercy for which we can never be sufficiently thankful. May we all set a just Value on them, read them attentively, study them diligently, and make that Improvement we ought, of our being favoured with so inestimable a Blessing; then we shall reap singular Benefit from them, and one End aimed at in *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* will be greatly advanced.

Observations on the Reason of Christ's coming into the World.

THE Title this Author hath given to the Second Part of his Animadversions is, *Of the Reason of Christ's coming into the World.* I will pass over this Part very briefly, because this Author seems to find fault with some Passages in *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. on purpose to take Occasion to discourse of Christ's Satisfaction; whereas the Author of *the Reasonableness*, &c. hath laid down very good Reasons (I think) why he did not think it proper, for him to insist on that point, in his Book.

I do not find that the Author of *the Reasonableness*, &c. hath declared it was his Design to discourse of the Reason of Christ's coming into the World, in the Pages this Author hath chosen to Animadvert on, in this part of his Book. The true Reason of Christ's coming into the World (I think) was the Father's Appointment. A very true and excellent Account is given in *the Reasonableness*, &c. of the great End for which Christ came into the World, though not in the Pages to which this Author doth here confine himself. In these Pages, the Author of *the Reasonableness*, &c. takes notice of the Occasion of Christ's coming into the World, and of *what Men are restored to by Jesus Christ.* These Benefits may perhaps be properly enough called collateral, or concomitant Ends of his coming into the World, because particularly intended; but they

comprehend not the whole End of his coming into the World. It is agreed on both sides, that *Bliss and Immortality were lost by Adam's Fall*: Immortality, the Author of *the Reasonableness*, &c. saith, is restored by Christ to all Men, but Eternal Bliss is not restored by Christ absolutely to any Man. (I meddle not with the Case of those who dy in their Infancy) and what is absolutely necessary. in order to any Man's obtaining by Christ, a claim of Right to Eternal Bliss, is the Subject of a great part of *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c.

The Obedience, and Sufferings of Christ, cannot, I conceive, be properly called the Reason of his coming into the World, nor the End thereof, any otherwise than a Means is called a Subordinate End. But though I said Christ's restoring Immortality to Man, was agreed on both sides, yet this Author seems to be dissatisfied with the Account the Author of *the Reasonableness*, &c. hath given of it, and if I apprehend him aright, because he doth not include Bliss, in his Notion of Immortality.

Now this I think is the Truth of the Case, Immortality, as lost by *Adam's Transgression*, is restored to all Men by Christ, in that he will raise them all from Death. And he hath purchased Eternal Bliss for them, on the Terms the Author of *the Reasonableness*, &c. hath given a large and full Account of from the Testimony of Christ and his Apostles. That is, that all who heartily take Jesus for their Lord, and Faithfully obey and follow him, shall at the Resurrection be everlastingly blessed. The great and famous *Atbanasius*, who was never reputed an Enemy (that I know of) to Christ's Satisfaction, hath more than once declared it was his Judgment, that Christ came into the World to purchase

Immortality for Mankind. I have not his Works by me, and therefore can neither relate his Words, nor refer particularly to the Places, but I think I may depend upon it, that my Memory doth not fail me, as to his Notion. But without laying any stress upon his Authority, I ask what can be pretended for Mens being Immortal, any other way than by Christ, by those who acknowledge that Sin hath brought Death upon all Men? If the Resurrection be the Fruit of Christ's Undertaking, and Performance, how could it have been possible for guilty Man to suffer, after he was dead, if Christ had not come? The Discourse is concerning Men, not concerning separate Spirits.

This Author, p. 57. makes the Reasons of Christ's coming into the world, and the End of his coming to be the same, and saith, ' It was to make Satisfaction for the Sins of the whole World, and to restore Mankind to the Favour of God by suffering in our stead, and being made Sin for us.

Satisfaction it self, was not the ultimate End of his coming into the World. His Sufferings and Death were parts of the way and means, by which he was to obtain what was the End of his coming into the World. His Death, and his Resurrection too, had a Relation to a further End, *viz.* his being *Lord both of the Dead and Living*, Rom. 14. 9. In his Sufferings and dying, he had an Eye and Regard to what was the great End of his Undertaking *Heb. 12. 2.* that his Death had a Relation to this, is most evident from *Phil. 2. 7,* to the 12th. He hath purchased Immortality for Mankind absolutely. But he hath not purchased Pardon and Bliss for Men absolutely, but upon certain Conditions, *viz.* their believing in the True God, and in him as sent

by him; so as to take him unfeignedly for their Lord and King. So that the true End of Christ's coming into the World, was to obtain to himself a Kingdom, or to be a King, and to have a Right to dispence and confer Pardon and Eternal Blessedness on those who should become his sincere Subjects; which I think is as plain as can be, if we will take his own Word for a Proof of it. *Pilate therefore said unto him, art thou a King then? Jesus answered, thou sayest that I am a King; to this End was I born, and for this Cause came I into the World, that I should bear Witness unto the Truth, every one that is of the Truth beareth my Voice.* Th. 18. 37.

In p. 60. This Author hath these Words concerning Christ's satisfying for our Sins: ' We do not mean that Christ suffered the same Punishment, which we should have done, but only that the Dignity of his Person made his Sufferings equivalent to the Eternal Punishment of a whole World of Sinners.

Ans. Christ's Satisfaction is a very great and weighty Point: But either I, or many who have writ concerning it, are under some Mistakes, with Reference to it. I conceive Christ did not satisfy the Law for Sinners, which they had broken: For had he suffered the same Punishment which they should have suffered, that would not have satisfied it, because it required *Personal Punishment alone*, and did not run, that the Offender or another should suffer it. And *Equivalent Sufferings* could not satisfy it, because there was no such *Proviso* in the Law. Christ's Satisfaction, I conceive, did not consist in his Sufferings being *equivalent* to the Eternal Punishment of a whole World of Sinners, by reason of the *Dignity of his Person*: For if the Dignity of his Per-

Person made his Sufferings equivalent to the Eternal Punishment of a whole World of Sinners, the *Degrees* of his Sufferings could not signify any thing to his making *Satisfaction*; the Dignity of his Person was the same, whether his Sufferings were greater or less, and could confer the same Vertue to one, as to many Degrees. The laying the whole Stress of Christ's Satisfaction on the Dignity of his Person, I suppose was that, from whence some took occasion to vent, that ungrounded dangerous Notion (which still infects too many) *That one Drop of Christ's Blood was sufficient to save many Worlds of Sinners*: Which makes the greatest parts of Christ's Sufferings utterly useless, as to Satisfaction; and in the natural and just Consequences of it, throws most horrid Aspersions both on God, and Christ.

I conceive the Satisfaction of Christ, consisted in his perfect fulfilling the Law that pertained to him as Mediator here upon Earth, antecedently to his Resurrection. All the Instances and Degrees of which Obedience and Sufferings were appointed by his Father, with infinite Wisdom, and for most good and wise Reasons. That his Obedience and Sufferings, had the Virtue and Efficacy of making Satisfaction for Sinners, provided they should comply with the Terms he should propose to them, was from the Father's appointing and accepting them for that Purpose; as well as for several other Purposes they had by the same Appointment a Relation to, both with respect to Christ himself, and those who should believe in him; not to say any thing of the respect they had to all Mankind, and the Benefits that redound therefrom to all Men.

Observations on the Third Part.

THE Title given to this Part is, *What we are to believe concerning Christ*. This Author saith; p. 65. That 'The Author of *the Reasonableness, &c.* and Mr. *Hobs* agree so exactly concerning the necessity of believing this one Article only, (*viz.* that Jesus is the Christ) and in the Method they have taken for the Proof of it, by citing several Texts from the Preaching of our Saviour, and his Apostles in the Acts, and no further, that they only differ so much as a Copy does from an Original. Yet this Author is so *ingenuous*, he grants This can be no good Reason for rejecting what the Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* hath asserted, if his Doctrine be otherwise found agreeable to the whole Tenour of Scripture.

Ans. I desire no more but that these Words may be added, *so far as it discourses concerning what the Author of the Reasonableness, &c. was enquiring after, viz. what Articles are absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed by one who acknowledges the true God, to make him a Christian.* A few Days ago, I accidentally met with a Book, entituled, *Hobs's Tripos*; and perceiving that one part of it was entituled *De Corpore Politico*, I was so curious as to read that Part, to see whether he did there treat of Religion, and what he did say concerning it. In the Sixth Chapter of the Second Part of it, I found him discoursing very agreeably to what this Author quotes out of the Eighteenth Chapter of his Book *De Cive*. Mr. *Hobs* doth proceed, in this Book I speak of, further

ther than the *Acts*, citing several Texts out of the *Epistles*. And if I reach his Sense and Design, Mr. *Hobs's* Notion is vastly different from that laid down in the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. Mr. *Hobs's* Notion seems to be this; *That one who is a Christian cannot be necessarily obliged to believe any more Articles than this, that Jesus is the Messiah.* That one who is a Christian, is necessarily obliged to believe as many Articles, as he can attain to know are taught in the Holy Scriptures, is the Notion of the Author of the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c.

I think Mr. *Hobs's* Discourse is neither consistent with it self, nor with that, he intended it should support. His Expressions are many times so general, they comprehend enough to overthrow all he aims at. He seems willing that several Distinct Articles should be absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to Salvation; though how his bringing in the Belief of the Scriptures amongst them, can be consistent with what he principally designed, is above my Reach. But when he comes to prove his *Fundamentals* (as he calls them) he produceth no Scriptures, but what particularly teach this Doctrine, that *Jesus is the Christ*, and therefore at last concludes, this is the *only Fundamental Point of Faith*. But if he would have spoken exactly and truly, he should have said, The only Point, *absolutely necessary*, to be explicitly believed by those who acknowledge the only True and Living God. *Though other Points* (saith he) *may be true, they are not so necessary to be believed, as that a Man may not be saved, though he believe them not.* As to the former Part of this Assertion, I shall take Notice, that he only saith, *They may be true.* But the Author of the *Reasonableness*, &c. saith, *They are Divine Truths*; and that

that *they must be received with stedfast Faith, &c.* As to the latter part of Mr. *Hobs's* Assertion, I shall observe, that the Point is not, whether a Man may not be saved, though he believe them not; But 1. Whether the Belief of them is not necessary to Salvation, in him who doth know they are taught in the Holy Scriptures. 2. Whether a Christian subject may without hazard of his Salvation, do Actions in Obedience to his Sovereign, which imply a Denial of them, notwithstanding he knows they are revealed in the Scripture? Mr. *Hobs* declares for the affirmative. p. 214. Mr. *Hobs* saith, *the Belief of that Point (viz. That Jesus is the Christ) is sufficient for the Salvation of any Man whosoever he be, p. 208.* That is, let a Man know ever so many Doctrines delivered in the New Testament, and that they are taught there, he is not obliged to believe them. *Nothing (saith he) is truly a point of Faith, but that Jesus is the Christ, p. 110.* The Author of the *Reasonableness, &c.* delivers the direct contrary Truths. And these are Notions which cannot possibly consist with a Person's believing Jesus to be the Christ, so as to take him heartily for his Lord and King. Yet Mr. *Hobs* saith, *Christian Faith consisteth in acknowledging our Saviour Christ to be King of Heaven; and therefore we must endeavour to obey his Laws, p. 211.* But it seems believing what our Saviour hath taught, was not (with Mr. *Hobs*) any part of our Obedience to him. The contradictory of this, is what the Author of the *Reasonableness, &c.* hath delivered most justly for the Truth. Mr. *Hobs* seems to lay much stress on this, *that the Controversies of Religion (amongst Christians) are about Points unnecessary to Salvation;* by which I conceive he means, unnecessary for
 Chri-

Christians to believe. But a Points being controverted, doth not make the Belief of it unnecessary. Men may raise and maintain Controversies about what Points they please; but I am obliged to believe what I do know Jesus Christ hath taught, and to endeavour to know as many more Doctrines which he hath taught, as I can, and to believe explicitly as many as I shall attain an explicite Knowledge of, let other People dispute and make as many Controversies about them as they please. Controversy may occasion and engage Christians to enquire more accurately, whether Christ hath said any thing concerning the Points and what he hath taught concerning it. And what a Christian understands Christ hath taught concerning it, he is necessarily to believe, let those who controvert it, say what they will.

I find Mr. *Hobs* was for a *Publick Conscience*, and for *Peoples transferring their Right of Judging in matters of Religion, to another*. Which Notion agrees well enough with that of a great many Persons in the World. He differs from them in this, That he is for having the Right transferred to the *Civil Magistrate*, p. 214, 215. Perhaps he was then, or had a mind to be in Favour with the Civil Magistrate. Those who are willing to part with their *Consciences*, and put them forth to *Trust*, no doubt, are desirous to place them where they think it will be most for their own *Advantage*. But I think there cannot be a Notion more contrary to what the Author of *the Reasonableness, &c.* delivers, than this is. Many more Particulars might be mentioned, to discover that what is laid down in *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* hath no Agreement with the Notions Mr. *Hobs* advanced, but stands at the very
same

same Distance from them, the Doctrines delivered by Christ and his Apostles do, but I think these are enough to satisfy any indifferent and impartial Person.

In p. 66. This Author proposeth to examine
 ‘ Whether the Son of God, and Messiah, or Christ
 ‘ always signify the same in Scripture.

Ans^w. This is not the Question to be examined, with respect to what the Author of *the Reasonableness*, &c. doth assert. But whether the Son of God, and the Messiah or Christ, do always signify the same, when they are used either alone, or together, in those Places of Scripture, which declare what it is the due believing whereof doth constitute or make People Christians? or which relate what Christ and his Apostles did propose to People acknowledging the True God, to be believed to make them Christians, and upon their believing of which, they did own and acknowledge them for Christians? That these Terms, when thus made use of in Scripture, do signify the same, I think the Author of *the Reasonableness*, &c. hath proved very clearly and fully in that Book, and in his *Second Vindication* of it, they very plainly appear to signify the same with *St. Paul* on such occasions. For soon after his Conversion, 'tis said, *he preached Christ in the Synagogues, that he is the Son of God, Act. 9. 20.* That which he proposed to be believed was this, That Jesus Christ of *Nazareth*, or that Person who was eminently known by the Name Christ, is the Son of God. Now in *v. 22.* it is said, *he confounded the Jews* (the Persons who opposed this Doctrine) how did he confound them? By *proving this is the very Christ.* Now if the Son of God, and the Christ, or Messiah, did not here signify the same, his proving that

that the Person he preached of, was *very Christ*, could not be a Proof, and such a Proof as would confound the Jews, that he was *the Son of God*. I acknowledge the Son of God, is an Expression that denotes our Saviour's Divinity, in very many Places of Scripture, even in all those where it is made use of, in declaring and teaching that particular Doctrine. But the Author of *the Reasonableness*, &c. was not enquiring in how many Senses, that Phrase, the Son of God, was used in Scripture, but what its Sense and Meaning is, in such Places of Scripture, as I before spoke of. *The Reasonableness*, &c. neither treats of our Saviour's Divinity, nor enquires how many things Christians must endeavour to know, and then believe, concerning Christ. But it lays down the Articles which Christ and his Apostles have taught, are absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians, by Virtue of their believing of which aright, they will be necessarily obliged to employ their best Endeavours, to attain to a sound Knowledge of what Christ hath taught, and to believe our Saviour's Divinity, and the other Doctrines which are delivered in all those Sacred Writings, which make up the entire Rule of Christian Faith, when they know that they are taught there.

This Author urges, That *'The Son of God is of a larger Signification than the Christ, or Messiah, in John 20. 31. But these things are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, &c.* Because the Design of St. John's Gospel was to assert the Divinity of Christ, against those that opposed it. Now if those Phrases mean only the same, then St. John himself does not assign the true (I suppose he would say, the compleat, or

' or full, and adequate) Reason for his writing
 ' that Gospel; for it appears that he had certainly
 ' another End in it, than barely to prove Jesus to
 ' be the Messiah. But if they mean differently,
 ' and *Son of God* does there denote Christ's Divini-
 ' ty, then we have in that forementioned Passage,
 ' the whole Intention of the Apostle, assigned for
 ' his writing that Gospel, namely, to shew that
 ' Jesus was the Christ, and that he was God,
 ' p. 68, 69.

Ans. I acknowledge St. *John* did design in his Gos-
 pel to assert the Divinity of Christ, and that he
 hath proved his Divinity at large, in his First Chap-
 ter (as this Author most truly declares) and I think
 he hath very clearly taught it, in other Parts of
 his Gospel too. I think likewise, it is past doubt,
 that St. *John* in writing his Gospel, did design to
 instruct People in several other Doctrines, besides
 Christ's Divinity, as he hath actually done; for I
 cannot be persuaded, that those other Doctrines
 were dropt there by Chance; so that to shew that
 Jesus was the Christ, and that he was God, could
 not be the *whole Intention* of the Apostle, in writing
 that Gospel. Further, I think this Author and I are
 agreed, that the Miracles our Saviour wrought,
 were not *immediate Proofs* of the *Doctrines* he
 taught, but of *his Mission*, or that he was the *Christ*.
 Moreover, *the Son of God*, denotes something be-
 sides our Saviour's Divinity, or being God, in those
 places of Scripture, where it is used for the Proof
 of that Point; but St. *John* is not giving an Ac-
 count in this Passage, *Chap. 20. 31.* of his whole
 design in writing that Gospel, but of the Reasons
 why he did so largely relate the *Signs and Miracles*
 which Christ did; which Signs and Miracles did
 not

not prove any thing more, directly and immediately, than that he was the *Messiah*. Thus *the Christ*, and *the Son of God*, seem here to signify the same.

In p. 73. This Author saith, That ' What might be sufficient to denominate a Man a Believer, or a Christian during the actual Ministry of Christ, would not truly entitle any one to that Character after our Saviour's Assention, and for this Reason, because we do not find from the whole History of the Gospel, that any of those who believed on our Saviour, had a just Knowledge of him, or what was the true End of his coming into the World.

Answer. The direct contrary appears by the Acts of the Apostles, where we constantly find the Apostles propounding just the same Articles Jesus himself did, to be believed, in order to Peoples being Christians, or denominated Believers. And if Christ admitted Persons during his Ministry, into the same Covenant People are admitted into since his Assention, what was sufficient before for that purpose, must be so after his Assention. But what this Author means by a *just Knowledge* of Christ, and the true End of his coming into the World, I must not undertake to determine; therefore I shall only ask, Whether they had a *true Knowledge* of Christ, and the End of his coming, so far as was absolutely necessary to make them Christians? If they had, their not knowing any thing more than what was then revealed, and made known to them, in order to their being Christians, cannot be a good Reason why what was sufficient to warrant their being denominated Christians, should not be sufficient to warrant Persons being denominated

H

Chri-

Christians now, unless together with the Proof that there are more Articles revealed now, than were then, there be also as clear Proof that all, or some of these latter Articles, are now required to be explicitly believed for that Purpose.

But (saith this Author) ' It is natural to infer
' from *Act.* i. 6, 7, 8. that the Apostles had not
' yet attained to that clear Knowledge of him,
' and the Design of his coming, which it was neces-
' sary they should be endewed with, p. 74.

Ans. They had not all that Knowledge of Christ, and of his Design, which it was necessary they should be endowed with, in order to their own Advantage, and to their giving the World that entire and compleat Revelation, Christ would make of his Will by them. But it cannot be infer'd that they had not all that Knowledge which was absolutely necessary to make them Christians: were there no Christians upon Earth, after Christ's Ascension, till after the Descent of the Holy Ghost? or were not the Apostles Christians, till they were endewed with a clear Knowledge of all those things Christ would make known, for the Benefit of his Church, and which they were gradually to instruct People in, and commit to writing for the use of future Ages? Can no Man be a Christian, till he hath an explicite Knowledge of every Particular, in the fullest import of it, which is delivered in the Scripture, and hath a respect to Jesus, as the Messias? Which is the true Notion of believing Jesus to be the Messias, absolutely necessary to make Men Christians, that he is the Person God hath sent to be our King and Saviour, whose Doctrines and Laws we are conscientiously to endeavour to learn, and believe and observe, as we attain

to know them; Or, That he is the Person sent from God, &c. who hath taught these and these particular Doctrines, neither more, nor fewer (and so as touching his Precepts) every one of which; we do actually believe and practice? Can no Person be a Christian now, till he hath as explicit and full a Knowledge of every thing Christ hath taught and revealed, as that Apostle ever had, who was endowed with the largest measure of Revelation? whatever he did know this way, had a respect to Jesus as the Messiah: And the very last Information he had this way, acquainted him with something concerning the Messiah, which he did not so clearly and fully know before; so that he could not form *a just and adequate Rule of Faith concerning him*, till he knew that.

‘ It will not (saith this Author) alter the case, by
 ‘ saying, That those who died then in that Faith,
 ‘ were undoubtedly saved; for that would be no
 ‘ more an Argument, than the proving that be-
 ‘ cause a Jew was saved before Christ’s coming in-
 ‘ to the World, by Virtue of Christ’s Mediation,
 ‘ in the Observance of the Mosaick Law, he
 ‘ might be equally capable of Salvation now, in
 ‘ the Profession of that Religion, p. 74.

Ans^w. What this Author hath delivered in these Words, would afford room for many Remarks: But I shall only observe, That believing that Jesus is the Messiah, was not absolutely necessary to Salvation, before he came into the World; nor was any thing more absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation, under the Mosaick Dispensation, than God had made absolutely necessary to be believed for that purpose, under it. But at the coming of our Saviour, a New Covenant being

substituted in the Place of the Mosaick Dispensation, it was under a New Condition, *viz.* the believing and taking Jesus to be the Messiah our King, and submitting to his Law. If that Dispensation were not abrogated, but did still continue the way of Salvation, nothing more would now be absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation, than what was made so by that Constitution. And if the Christian Dispensation were to be abrogated, and another to come into its room, whereby something distinct from what is contained in the Gospel, or Christian Dispensation, should be made absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation, the Belief of every thing delivered in the New Testament, would not, when the Gospel Dispensation was at an end, be sufficient to Salvation. But the adding of more Revelations, which are to be studied, and explicitly believed when known, doth not alter the Dispensation, or make more absolutely necessary to be believed to Salvation, or to interest a Person in that Dispensation, than was at first absolutely necessary to that Purpose; any more than every new Law made in a Nation, doth alter the Constitution of that Government, and make something more absolutely necessary to be known, and explicitly assented to, to make a Person a Subject of that Government, than was absolutely necessary to that Purpose before. Will any serious considering Christian affirm, that Jesus Christ will reject any Person, who by the gracious Influence of the Holy Ghost, is effectually brought to receive him with all his Heart, to be his Lord and King, and sincerely endeavours to fulfil that Engagement? people are generally very willing to believe that Jesus has died for them, and satisfied for their Sins, and they can

can be contented to own him for a Prophet, to furnish them with Notions; but they are not so easily prevailed with to give Substantial Evidences, that they do heartily take him for their King. Were they generally brought to a sound Belief and Acknowledgment of his *being their King*, they would make a much better Improvement of what he hath deliver'd in the Holy Scripture concerning his *Priesthood*, and his *being a Prophet*, than they commonly do, notwithstanding the great Zeal they pretend to discover for those *Offices*. The Courses they ordinarily allow themselves in, are evidently and utterly inconsistent with their receiving Jesus unfeignedly for their *King*, and their preserving a Sense of that Relation upon their Spirits, whatever way they have got to reconcile them to the Notions they entertain concerning his other *Offices*.

‘ For (saith this Author) we are to direct our
 ‘ Faith and Practice according to the most full
 ‘ and clear Revelation of God’s Will, and to believe
 ‘ that to be necessary to Salvation, which appears
 ‘ from the full extent of Revelation, to be requir’d
 ‘ in order to it, p. 74.

Ans. Those who are Christians are to direct their Faith and practice according to the fullest Measure of the Knowledge they can attain, of what God hath revealed; that is, They must believe explicitly, and actually perform whatsoever they can attain to know Christ hath taught, and made their Duty. And in order to their attaining to the clearest and fullest Knowledge of their Lord’s Will, they must take care they do not confine themselves to a certain Number of Articles and Precepts of Mens collecting, but must diligent-

ly read and study the entire and compleat Revelation Christ hath made of his Fathers Pleasure in the Holy Scriptures, Yet we are not to believe any Article is absolutely necessary to Salvation, but what he hath revealed to be so; for if we do, we transgress our Bounds, and go further than the utmost extent of Revelation reaches, as to that Matter, and consequently do that, which we have no warrant for in Divine Revelation. It doth not follow, that because Christians are not to believe any thing as an Article of the Christian Faith, but what is taught in the New Testament, and must endeavour to know as many of the Doctrines which are taught there, as they can, and believe every one as they attain to know them, therefore every Doctrine delivered in the New Testament, is absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians.

‘ But (saith this Author) if all that was absolutely necessary to Salvation, or to denominate Men truly Christians, was the bare believing Jesus to be the Messiah (the believing Jesus to be the Messias, so as to take him absolutely for their King) why should our Saviour promise the Mission of the Holy Ghost, to instruct them (*viz.* his Disciples) farther in what they ought to believe concerning him? p. 75.

Ans. Our Saviour did not promise the Holy Ghost to instruct them in what they were to believe to make them Christians (for they were Christians when the Promise was made to them, or how could they be his Disciples?) but in such Matters as they must believe, when instructed in, by Virtue of their having received him for their Lord, and as other Christians must endeavour to understand, and then believe on the same Account.

To what purpose did they oblige themselves in taking Jesus for their Lord, to believe whatever he should teach them, if they knew and believed before, all that they should ever be obliged to believe?

‘ This Author thinks he hath Reason to conclude from *Act. 10. 43. &c.* That we are to understand by believing Jesus to be the Messiah, in this and almost all other Places, the full extent and meaning of those Words, as they are explained by this, and other Apostles in all Parts of Scripture, because they were all of them inspired by the same Holy Ghost, and therefore must all have the same Meaning. And that therefore the believing Jesus to be the Messiah, as it is now required for a Fundamental of our Faith, must comprehend the full Sense, that is given of it in Scripture, p. 76, 77.

Ans^w. If I comprehend the Force of this Author’s arguing here, it is thus: The Apostles, by the Term *Messiah*, did understand all those particular Doctrines they have delivered throughout the Holy Scriptures, concerning that Jesus of whom they preached; so that by Peoples believing Jesus to be the Messiah, they meant their believing explicitly every one of those Doctrines. This Notion now is built upon this Supposition, that the Apostles when they preached Jesus to any, they did particularly acquaint them with every one of those Doctrines, and then promising them Pardon, &c. if they did believe Jesus to be the Messiah, they declared to them, that by believing Jesus to be the Messiah, they meant the explicite believing of every one of those Doctrines they had proposed to them. The Reason given for this Supposition, is (as I apprehend) this, They were all inspired by

the same Holy Ghost, and therefore must all have the same Meaning; that is, I suppose, they must all understand the Term Messiah in the same Sense, *viz.* as signifying precisely every one of those Doctrines. Many Remarks might be made on this Occasion. I will only observe, 1. That the Supposition is perfectly precarious, without any warrant at all from Scripture. Several of these Doctrines might be propounded as very proper Inducements, to believe Jesus to be the Messiah, but that is not the Point in Discourse, but whether the Term Messiah did with the Apostles, signify just such a set of Doctrines. 2. The Holy Ghost was not given to the Apostles to teach them the Meaning of the Term Messiah, for they understood it very well before; nor did they in preaching to the Jews, use the Term Messiah, in a Sense they never heard of before, and which would therefore need a particular Explanation; but as a Term so common and so distinctly understood amongst them, as the Term in any Nation is commonly understood by the Inhabitants, which expresseth, and signifieth their Supream Governour. All the Apostles understood the Term Messiah in the same Sense, and used it in the same Sense, in which those who heard them did commonly understand it. Their Business was not to preach and explain New Terms, nor to tack New Meanings unto Old Terms. 3. In their preaching to Unbelievers they insisted on such Considerations as were most proper to convince them, that Jesus was the Messiah, according to the known and common Meaning of the Term, and not such as did immediately prove the Truth of a certain Number of New Doctrines, which they were Strangers to,

and

and which must make up a New Sense for an Ancient Word. 4. We have good Warrant from the Scripture to believe that the Apostles were not instructed at once, but gradually, in the Doctrines concerning Jesus, which are delivered in the several Parts of Scripture, and therefore they could not mean every one of these Doctrines, constantly, by the Term Messiah, for they could not acquaint their Hearers at first, with any more of these Doctrines, than they were at that time instructed in, and if they added more Doctrines when they were instructed in more, as the Sense in which they understood the Term Messiah, they used it then in a New Sense and Meaning. It may be said, but now we have a full Account in the Scripture, of the full Meaning in which the Term Messiah is to be used, and consequently what is to be understood by believing Jesus to be the Messiah, taking the Term Messiah, to signify every one of the Doctrines delivered in the Scripture concerning Jesus, and therefore these are to be collected out of the Scripture, and Persons must now explicitly believe every one of them, in order to their believing Jesus to be the Messiah, in the full Sense given of it in Scripture. 'Tis very true, all the Doctrines we are to believe concerning Jesus, are set down in the Scripture. But it may be ask'd, seeing all these Doctrines are not set down in any one place of Scripture together, for this End, to whom is the Office of collecting them for this purpose committed? And what assurance shall People have, if uninspired Men may undertake it, that their Collection is compleat? For if any one Passage be omitted, distinct from what shall be in the Collection, those who shall believe every one of those

those Articles which shall be proposed to them, will not believe that Jesus is the Messias, in the full Sense given of that Term in Scripture, and therefore, according to this Notion, will not be Christians. It may further be enquired, whether those who shall believe explicite every one of these Doctrines, will be obliged to endeavour to know and believe any more Doctrines? If the Answer be No, then either these are all Doctrines which are delivered in Scripture, or there are some Doctrines taught in the Scripture, which Christians are not obliged to endeavour to know, though they have Opportunity to understand them, or to believe them, though they do know them. If the Answer be, Yes, it may be asked, how that comes about? Perhaps it will be said, because amongst the Doctrines before spoken of, this is one, That Jesus is our King, and therefore to testify our Submission and Obedience to him, we are to endeavour to know and believe other Doctrines. This indeed is a way whereby they may acquire some assurance to themselves, and give Evidence and Proof to others, that they believe Jesus to be their King, but not (according to the Notion we are now discoursing of) that they believe him to be the Messiah, or that they are Christians. How comes it to pass, that seeing the explicite Belief of every one of the other Doctrines is equally necessary to make them Christians, with the Belief of this, only a part of that Faith which makes them Christians, must oblige and govern them after they are Christians? Whence is it, that some Doctrines delivered in Scripture, must be believed in Obedience to Jesus, and others not, whilst he is equally the Teacher of them all.

This Author saith, That ' Though no more is
 ' set down, *Act. 8. 37.* but that the Eunuch belie-
 ' ved that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, yet no
 ' doubt there is more implied: For *Philip* in-
 ' structed him in the Christian Religion, from that
 ' Chapter of *Isaiab*, (*viz.* which the Eunuch was
 ' reading) which Doctrines were, no doubt, re-
 ' quired as absolutely necessary to be believed.
 ' Besides, since *Philip* baptized him, no doubt but
 ' he did it in that Form which Christ himself en-
 ' joined, in the Name of the Father, Son, and
 ' Holy Ghost; and then it will follow that the Be-
 ' lief and Confession of the Three Persons was re-
 ' quired, p. 77, 78.

Ans. It is not at all doubted, but there is some-
 thing absolutely necessary to be believed by an Un-
 believer, in order to his becoming a Christian,
 besides that, the due believing whereof, doth con-
 stitute him a Christian. For a Man cannot believe
 a Proposition to be true, without some Proof and
 Evidence that it is true. Now the enquiry is not
 what Arguments and Proofs are absolutely necessa-
 ry to be believed to bring a Man to the due Be-
 lief of what is absolutely necessary to be believed
 to make him a Christian. That is a Question no
 Man can possibly determine, by assigning one in
 particular, or a precise Number. For the Argu-
 ments, Proofs, and Evidences are many and vari-
 ous; and God has not limited himself to make
 only one of them effectual, nor obliged himself
 that he will not give forth his Blessing, but with
 a certain Number of them in conjunction. He
 that doth duly believe all that is absolutely neces-
 sary to be believed to make Men Christians, is a
 Christian, whether he was brought to this Belief,
 by

by the Belief of more or fewer Arguments. There are Truths to be believed antecedently to a Man's believing what is absolutely necessary to be believed to make him a Christian, and there are Truths to be believed by him after he is a Christian, the due believing of which, are Proofs and Evidences that he doth believe what is absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians. But it is not the Belief of the one sort, or the other sort of these Truths, nor of both together, which is the *Faith* that constitutes Men *Christians*; but only the Belief of that, to which the Belief of those other Truths, hath an Antecedent, or Consequential Relation. How many Doctrines the Eunuch was instructed in, or what those Doctrines were in particular, we cannot tell, because they are not revealed to us; but what it was, upon the believing of which, he was owned for a Christian, and Baptized, is expressly declared, and we have Reason to believe, that if the explicate Belief of more Articles had been required of him, as absolutely necessary to make him a Christian, they would have been set down and expressed in his Confession. I think also, it is more than probable that the Eunuch was baptized *in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost*, unless it can be proved, that that Form was in those Days confined, or appropriated to the Apostles, who were intrusted with conferring the miraculous Gifts of the Holy Ghost. Whatever Articles the Eunuch did explicitly believe at present, he was by believing *Jesus* to be the *Messiah*, obliged to endeavour to know explicitly and believe as many more as he could, both concerning *the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost*, even all that was, or should be revealed concerning them,

them, which I think reaches the whole extent of the New Testament.

In p. 78, &c. This Author undertakes ' To shew that the Gospels and Acts are directly opposite to our Author's Scheme of Doctrine, and this he will do by shewing, they do require much more to be believed concerning our Saviour, than barely that he was the Messiah.

Here this Author proves very well, and learnedly the Divinity of our Blessed Saviour, and on that Account we cannot set too high a value on his Book. He also mentions some other Doctrines, very clearly delivered in the Gospels and Acts. But the Reason why he offers these things in Opposition to *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. I suppose, was his mistaking the Design of that Treatise. The Author of *the Reasonableness*, &c. did not propose to enquire how many Doctrines are delivered in the Gospels and Acts, concerning our Saviour, but what Christ and his Apostles did require, as absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians. Reckon up therefore as many Articles as you please, which are clearly and expressly taught in the Gospels and Acts, yea, in all the New Testament, this will not affect, or make any thing against the *Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. unless withal you prove that Jesus or his Apostles, required the explicate Belief of all, or some of them, which are distinct from this, that *he is the Messiah* whom we are to take for our Lord and King, to make Men Christians.

Whereas this Author saith, ' That the most Learned amongst the Jews did appropriate the Title $\lambda\omicron\gamma\theta$, to their expected Messiah, and also

' be-

' believed he should be God. So that this may be
 ' a very good Reason for our Saviour, and his A-
 ' postles requiring no more to be believed in their
 ' preachings amongst the Jews, than that Jesus was
 ' the Messiah, since if they once firmly believed
 ' that they must necessarily believe him to be God,
 ' p. 78, 79.

I shall only observe, 1. That the Sense of the
 Term *Messiah* is here acknowledged to be very
 different, from what this Author has before declar-
 ed the Apostles meant by it.

2. That here is no Supposition that the People
 did not know what was meant by *Messiah*, and
 therefore must have it either interpreted or explain-
 ed to them, but an Acknowledgment that our Sa-
 viour and his Apostles did use the Term, according
 to the familiar and commonly known meaning of
 it amongst the Jews.

3. That supposing the Jews did generally be-
 lieve *the Messiah should be God*, yet they must be-
 lieve that *Jesus of Nazareth* was the *Messiah*, be-
 fore they could believe him to be *God*. And it be-
 ing this only, that he was the Messiah, which was
 propounded to be believed to make them Chri-
 stians, it must be a right believing of this, that did
 make them Christians; how near a Connection
 soever their believing any thing else, which they
 knew and believed concerning him who should be
 the Messiah, might have with their believing Jesus
 to be the Messiah. Supposing they did generally
 believe that their expected Messiah should be God,
 yet those who believed other Persons to be the
 Messiah, and consequently believed them to be
 God too, were not Christians. So that it was
 not the believing a Person to be the Messiah,
 nor

nor a believing that Person to be God, that made People Christians, but a believing *him* to be the *Messiah*, who really was the *Messiah*.

‘ But as we are obliged to know who was the
 ‘ Author of our Being, so also must it be equally
 ‘ a Crime not to know clearly, who, and what he
 ‘ was, that could be the Author of our Salvation,
 ‘ p. 87.

In answer to this, I shall only say, That we are obliged to endeavour to know as much as we can, of that God, who is the Author of our Being. This holds true as to all Men, and so Christians are obliged to endeavour to know as much as they can of him, who is the Author of their Salvation. It is a Crime to be *wilfully Ignorant* of any thing, that is revealed of him who is the Author of our Salvation.

‘ There could be no Reason (saith this Author)
 ‘ for the defending his Divinity (*viz.* our Saviour’s)
 ‘ with so much Care and Concern (as St. *John*
 ‘ did defend it) if it was not absolutely necessa-
 ‘ ry to be believed to make a Man a Christian, or
 ‘ if there was no Danger in believing him to be
 ‘ only Man, p. 87.

Ans^w. 1. The Reason we have to defend Divine Truths, when opposed and denied by Persons, is not to be taken barely from the End for which they are to be believed, but also from their Nature, *viz.* because they are Divine Truths, and therefore Truths to be believed, and which may by no means be denied.

2. He that believes Jesus to be the Messiah, does not therein believe him to be *only Man*; he believes him to be Man, but not *only Man*; for that is not propos’d to his Belief, when it is propos’d
 fed

sed to him, to believe that Jesus is the Messiah. And by believing him to be the Messiah, he obliges himself to believe whatsoever he shall attain to know is revealed concerning him.

‘ Believing in Christ (saith this Author) if it mean any thing, must be interpreted of every thing that Scripture has required to be believed concerning him. So that this we may be certain is a Fundamental, that as Christ is the Author of our Salvation; So that Revelation is the just Measure of our belief in him, and that we must not believe either more or less of him, than we are warranted by Scripture, p. 92.

Answw. Revelation is the just Measure of what we are to believe concerning Christ. So that a Christian, let his Advances in Knowledge be ever so great, must not believe any thing concerning him, but what he is warranted, or at least apprehends upon mature Consideration, he is warranted by Scripture. But that a Man cannot be a Christian till he doth explicitly believe every thing the Scripture doth warrant People to believe concerning Christ, is a Notion the Scripture doth not any where warrant. Were this Notion true, no Man can be a Christian, whose Knowledge of every thing relating to Christ, is not every way equal to that, of the most learned, sagacious, and understanding Person, in the whole Christian World, or that ever was, or ever will be in the World. Nay, according to this Notion, it may be justly questioned, whether ever there was a Christian since the Apostles Days. For there may be Ground to question, whether any uninspired Man did, or will attain to a just and adequate Know-

Knowledge of every thing the Scripture doth reveal concerning Christ.

‘ But it will probably be objected (saith this Author) to all this, that though it is granted, that there are several Articles to be believed by those who are throughly Christians, yet there was no more required by our Saviour himself, or his Apostles, to make a Man a Christian, or in order to his Admission into Christianity, than the believing Jesus to be the Messiah, and that this is all which the Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c. contends for.

The Objection is not proposed in its full weight, but that I need not insist on, for if the Answer reach it, as it is here laid down, it will serve the turn.

‘ In answer to this (saith this Author) it may be observed, First, That the forementioned Articles, as well as others that might be named, are of the same Nature with that one Article of believing Jesus to be the Messiah, and are a Repetition of it in all its Branches, p. 92, 93.

Answer. This Answer is not at all satisfactory, because it is wholly concerning another matter, than that treated of in the Objection. The Objection is concerning what our Saviour and his Apostles have required to be believed to make Men Christians. The Answer is concerning the Nature of Articles. Moreover, it is not easy to understand what is meant here, by several distinct Articles being of the same Nature with this, *That Jesus is the Messiah.* This Author hath formerly distinguished betwixt the Nature of several Doctrines, and their being Divine Revelations. Now, consider several particular Doctrines singly in themselves, and abstractedly from their being Divine Revelations, they are not

of the same Nature one with another, how can they then be every one of the same Nature with this, that Jesus is the Messiah? I agree with this Author, that a Person's believing explicitly certain particular Doctrines Jesus hath taught, for this Reason, because he knows, that Jesus who is the Messias, hath taught them, is a Repetition of his Belief of that Article, the Ground and Reason of his believing every one of the other Doctrines. But if his believing certain particular Doctrines, be but a Repetition of his believing that Jesus is the Messiah, how can the repeated, or rather limited exercise of that Belief, as to particular Branches or Doctrines, make Men Christians, if the due believing Jesus to be the Messiah, do not constitute Men Christians? Besides, the Reason of our believing Jesus to be the Messiah, is quite different from the Reason why we believe these particular Articles.

‘ But Secondly, there was more required even to make a Man a Christian, than the Belief of Jesus being the Messiah; for our Saviour himself required the believing in the whole Trinity: For this was the Commandment which our Saviour gave his Disciples, *That they should teach all Nations, baptizing them in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. i. e. They should first instruct them in whom they were to believe, and then baptize them into that Faith,*
p. 93.

Answer. The command was to *Disciple all Nations,* that is, not first instruct them in the particular Doctrines: those who believe Jesus to be the Messiah, must believe upon his Authority, when they know he hath taught them, but by propounding such
Con-

Considerations and Arguments as are most proper to convince and satisfy them that Jesus is the Messiah, bring them to own him to be Messiah, so as to take him for their King and Ruler, by engaging themselves without any Reservation to learn of, and obey him. And then they were to baptize them in the Name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, after which, they were to teach them the Particulars they were to believe and do, by Virtue of their having taken him to be their Lord, which Particulars comprehend the whole Revelation Christ hath made, concerning the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. That is, the whole Doctrine delivered in the New Testament.

In p. 95. This Author saith, He will ' Examine
' the Reasonableness of that Article of Faith, the
' Author of *the Reasonableness of Christianity*, &c.
' hath insisted on, and set down in the largest
' Terms, p. 301.

What this Author means by the Reasonableness of that Article, is not very plain. I suppose he doth not mean, that he will examine whether it is reasonable a Man should believe that Article. If he means the Reason why that Author hath declared, That this is the only Article absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed, by those who believe in the True God, to make them Christians, that Reason is clearly this, because our Saviour and his Apostles have not required the explicite Belief of any other Article but this, for that purpose. Yet because the Author of *the Reasonableness*, &c. observed, *That the Almerciful God seems herein to have consulted the Poor of the World, and the Bulk of Mankind.*

This Author, ' For a clearer Examination of
 ' this, proposeth certain things to be considered.
 ' *First*, supposing God either had, or should re-
 ' veal any thing to Mankind, and make the Belief
 ' of it a Condition of Salvation, which the Rea-
 ' son of Man could not comprehend, and we had
 ' all the Evidence the thing was capable of, that
 ' the Revelation proceeded from God, would this
 ' *Incomprehensibleness* of it, be a sufficient Plea for
 ' our rejecting it ?

Ans. No : But 1. There is a great difference
 betwixt an Article's being absolutely necessary to
 be explicitly believed to Salvation, and an Article's
 being absolutely necessary to be explicitly belie-
 ved, when known, by Reason of a Person's belie-
 ving what is absolutely necessary to be explicitly
 believed to Salvation. The Difference is as great
 as betwixt an absolute Necessity, and a conditional
 Necessity. There are Articles which the Reason
 of Man cannot comprehend, the Belief of which
 is necessary to those who know Christ hath taught
 them, yet the explicite Belief of them is not made
 absolutely necessary to Salvation. Nor can the ex-
 plicite Belief of any Number of particular Do-
 ctrines taught in the New Testament, be properly
 said to be the Condition of Salvation ; for if it
 could, he who should explicitly believe them all,
 could not be obliged to believe one more. The
 Condition of Salvation, *Now*, is believing Jesus
 to be the Messiah, so as to take him without Excep-
 tion or Limitation to be our Lord and King. And
 hereby we are obliged to believe as many Doctrines
 as we can attain to know he hath taught. So
 that a true Christian never believes so many Do-
 ctrines, but he is still under the same Obligation
 to

to believe more, when he attains to know more, and that Christ hath taught them. It is in Matters of Faith as in Matters of Practice, let a Man do ever so many things which Christ commands, if he obstinately allow himself in the wilful Violation of any one Command he knows Christ hath enjoyned him, he is not a sincere Christian. So let a Man believe ever so many Articles, if he obstinately refuse to assent to any one Article, he knows Christ hath taught, he is not a true Christian. His obstinate, wilful Refusal to believe that one Article, is a plain Demonstration he hath not *that Faith*, which is *the Condition of Salvation*; and that the *Assent* he gives to those other Doctrines, hath some other *Original*. A sincere Christian's believing particular Doctrines when known, is the genuine and necessary Fruit and Effect of that Faith, which is the Condition of Salvation. These A&S of Faith, are but a partial, limited exerting of that Faith which made him a Christian, and is the Condition of Salvation, in such Proportion as his explicate Knowledge doth reach, attended with a promptness and readiness to extend it further, as he shall attain to know more of his Lord's Mind. This true and sincere believing Jesus to be the Christ, so as to take him for our Lord and King, is the Faith which is the Condition of Salvation. And hence it is, that *this Faith* doth avail, and is effectual to the Salvation of them, who are Honest, and Cordial, notwithstanding they happen to be ever so much beneath others in natural and acquired Accomplishments.

2. Should God now reveal any more Articles as absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to Salvation, than what Christ and his Apostles de-

livered as absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to Salvation, whether the Reason of Man could comprehend them or not, they would alter, and make a *New Covenant*.

3. If the Author of *the Reasonableness, &c.* had of his own Head declared that no Article is necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians, but this, *That Jesus is the Messiah*, and for this Reason, because God could not reasonably require the Belief of any Article, as absolutely necessary to Salvation, but what illiterate and labouring Men can comprehend, there would have been just Ground to examine and contradict what he had said. For this had been an intruding on God's Right and Prerogative, and a presumptuous prescribing to him.

But 4. The Author of *the Reasonableness, &c.* doth expressly declare, that *what is the Faith God will accept, depends wholly on his good Pleasure*, p. 298. So that he might have made the Belief of Articles, which the Reason of Man cannot comprehend, absolutely necessary to Salvation.

5. The Author of *the Reasonableness, &c.* did search the Scriptures, to find what are the Articles, the Belief of which God hath made absolutely necessary to Salvation, and he hath given a full Account of what he found there concerning this Matter.

6. It is an eminent Demonstration of the Condescension and Goodness of God towards Man, that whereas he might have made the explicit Belief of incomprehensible Articles, absolutely necessary to Salvation, he hath not made the explicit Belief of any, but that plain and intelligible Proposition, the Author of *the Reasonableness, &c.* hath

hath set down as absolutely necessary to Salvation. This Discovery of the Divine Condescension and Goodness, ought to be taken Notice of, by those who have a Sense of it; and the Reflection the Author of *the Reasonableness*, &c. hath made on this Occasion, is so pertinent and so pious, I do a little wonder that Pious and Good Men, can prevail with themselves, to make invidious Animadversions upon it.

‘ But *Secondly*, Why all this Concern for the
 ‘ Illiterate, and Men of weak Capacities, as though
 ‘ it would be so very prejudicial to them, to be ob-
 ‘ liged to believe what they cannot comprehend?
 ‘ p. 96.

Answer. If God is pleased to shew his Concern for the illiterate, and Men of weak Capacities, it is very fit that Writers and Good Men should take Notice of it. And though we are obliged to believe explicitey whatsoever we shall attain to know God hath revealed, be matters discoursed of ever so much above our Comprehension; yet it may be very prejudicial to the illiterate Men, and some *Offence* against Jesus Christ, to require of them the Belief of Articles they cannot comprehend, as absolutely necessary to their Salvation, when Jesus Christ doth not require the explicite Belief of any such Articles, as absolutely necessary to that Purpose; and more particularly because it is a Subjecting their Faith to some other Authority than his, who is their only Lord.

‘ For the Mysteries of Religion, which are in-
 ‘ comprehensible, are equally so to all, p. 96.

Very true; But some learned Men can say a great many things, whether they understand what they say, or not, concerning the Mysteries

of Religion, which illiterate Men cannot comprehend. And their Authority may as well oblige them to believe their incomprehensible Speeches, as absolutely necessary to Salvation, as Mysteries, which Jesus Christ hath not made absolutely necessary to that purpose.

‘ But lastly, since our Author is of Opinion,
 ‘ that it would be very advantageous to Mankind
 ‘ in general, to have only such a Religion as is
 ‘ very easy to be understood by all sorts of Men,
 ‘ we ought to consider how very intelligible his
 ‘ Rule of Faith is, if compared with that of our
 ‘ Church, and how agreeable his one Article is,
 ‘ to the Comprehension of Vulgar Capacities,
 ‘ p. 98.

Ans. To this, the Author of *the Reasonableness,*
 &c. hath given a very full Reply (I think) in these
 Words: *He should have remembered that I speak not*
of all the Doctrines of Christianity, nor all that is
published to the World in it; but of those Truths only
which are absolutely required to be believed to make any
one a Christian, &c. First Vindication of the Rea-
 sonableness, &c. p. 30.

Here I expected some Discovery, that our Church had taught somewhat contrary, or exceedingly different, touching this Matter, from what is delivered in *the Reasonableness,* &c. concerning it. But that Comparison is not pursued. I shall therefore say no more, but that our Church doth require the explicate Belief of all that Christ and his Apostles have made absolutely necessary to be believed to make Men Christians, and presses to a serious, diligent care, and endeavour to understand as much as may be, of what Christ and his Apostles have taught, without limiting People
 to

to a precise Number of Articles, beyond which they must not dare to stir; and if she had not done so, I should not have that high Esteem for her, I most justly have.

‘ This Author bestows his 99th Page, and most of the Two following Pages in shewing that this Proposition, *Jesus is the Messiah*, is not easy to be understood.

I will not undertake to declare what his Design is, in this, I suppose he doth not make a Question, whether the Belief of that Proposition, is absolutely necessary to make Men Christians, and therefore that it must be understood. For he contends, That there are many more Propositions, together with this, equally necessary to be explicitly known and believed to make Men Christians. So that he doth not exclude, but acknowledge that the Belief of this Proposition is absolutely necessary. Now this Proposition is alike easy to be understood, whether the due believing of it, doth make a Man a Christian, or the explicite believing of a great many more Propositions together with it, be absolutely necessary to make a Man a Christian. For I suppose it will not be denied, that it is as easy to understand this one Proposition, standing alone, as to understand this same Proposition when it is joined with a great many others which are also to be believed. The making the explicite Belief of more Propositions distinct from this, that *Jesus is the Messiah*, absolutely necessary, together with the explicite Belief of it, to make Men Christians, doth not make that Proposition more easy to be understood, than it would be, if the explicite Belief of those other Propositions were not made absolutely necessary to make Men Christians.

The Way this Author takes to shew that this Proposition is not easy to be understood, is by supposing, *an inquisitive, labouring, illiterate Man*, who knows many things which are delivered in the New Testament, and who understands what it is for *Books to be Divinely inspired*, but is ignorant what is meant by a *Saviour*, asking several Questions concerning this Proposition; and another much more ignorant than him, answering to every one of these Questions. I neither like the Questions, nor the Answers, as they are set down in these Pages, therefore I shall only observe

1. That whoever will reply directly to an impertinent Question, must unavoidably give an impertinent Answer. Wherefore when Questions are not rightly propounded, he that puts them, must be made sensible of his Mistakes, and assisted to form them aright.

2. That if a Person is Inquisitive concerning the Sense of this Proposition, That Jesus is the Christ, or only Saviour of Sinners, and doth acknowledge the true God, make him but throughly sensible of his own Sin and Guilt, and he will then easily understand what is meant by a Saviour. Then his Inquiries will be, how he may be satisfied that the Person discoursed of, is by God's Appointment, the only Saviour of Sinners? and on what Terms he may with good warrant expect Salvation from him? To which Questions there are very proper, clear, and plain Answers to be given.

3. Most of the Questions proposed in this Author's Pages, when rightly formed, must have such Answers made to them, as Christ doth authorize us in the Scriptures, to give to them. But what Entertainment can you expect his Answers will have
with

with them, who are not truly convinced, and therefore do not really believe he is the Messiah. Convince your Querist, though roughly, of that, *viz.* That Jesus is the Christ or Messiah, so that he does truly receive him to be his Lord and King, and then you will find him in a fair way, and very well disposed to receive Satisfaction, when you make him perceive that your Answers to his Questions, are the very same which Christ himself has given to them, or such as he doth warrant you to offer for Peoples Satisfaction in those Cases.

This Author concludes his Book with observing, That *those Parts of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. which treat of the Necessity of Revelation, the Conditions of Repentance, Good Works, &c. seem to carry an Air of Piety along with them, and to be writ with such Strength of Judgment, as may be supposed that the Author had thought more upon them, than upon any other parts of that Treatise.*

As I think those parts of *the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c.* here approved by this Author, have a very pious Relish, and are writ with a Strength, Vivacity, and Fineness, very much above what is common; so I fully concur with this *Worthy Author*, in all, or most of the Points he hath treated of in his Book, which I have not made some Remark on, in these Papers. I will conclude with taking Notice, that as we are very apt to Imagine a Person hath thought well on a Point, when he treats it to our liking; so we are very prone to fancy he is defective, or in an Error, when his Discourse upon a Subject, is not such as we would have it to be. Yet the Mistake may really be in our selves, and may arise from our having
not

not exactly enough considered the Matter, when we impute Neglect or Remifness in Study to him, whose Sentiments are opposite to ours. In fuch a Cafe, People are not to be concluded by the Opinions of thofe who are for the one fide, or the other, but ought to defcend into, and impartially weigh the Merits of the Cafe.

F I N I S.

PREFACE

TO THE READER.

READER,

I Am not concerned to enquire why other Persons have given such accounts as they have, of the main Proposition laid down in the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. of the Design that Author had in publishing his Treatise, and of the Reason why he observed the Method he hath taken to clear and prove the great Point treated of there. It may suffice to declare why I apprehend that his Proposition, his Design, and the Reason of his Method are very different from what they have represented them; which in short is, because I cannot help it. The Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. being perfect Master of his own Notions, hath expressed them in such perspicuous and proper Terms, I must offer Violence to my own Understanding and Reason, to put that Construction on them, which some have assigned them.

The worthy Author of the Animadversions, &c. having very particularly related what he took to be the Design, &c. of the Author of the Reasonableness, &c. occasioned my setting down all along as I read his Account, what I conceived was the Design, &c. of the aforesaid Author; and my making some Observations on what he offered

ferred in answer to those Passages he quoted out of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. which are now published to prompt others to peruse attentively that excellent Treatise, and to make themselves Masters of the Truths there delivered; and because I am persuaded that neither the Doctrines delivered in the New Testament, nor Christians, can have their full Right done them, till People do understand and entertain the great Point insisted on in the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. and do preserve themselves under the Influence and Conduct of it. It is a Notion, that tends not so much to gratify some People's Ambition, and serve their secular Interest, as another may; But it is more adapted to the Advantage of pure and undefiled Religion, and will contribute more to Christians Growth in Scripture Knowledge, and all Godliness of living, and to their rational Comfort and good Assurance, than any other Notion I am acquainted with.

One thing which hath occasioned many to entertain a Prejudice against the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. I conceive is a wrong Notion they have imbibed concerning those Compositions we call Creeds, viz. Their fancying that all the Articles contained in all, or some of the Creeds, are absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians. Concerning which, I shall observe.

1. That not one of the Authors we have, who wrote in the first Century after Christ, doth make any mention of a Creed in their Days. So that we cannot have any certainty that there was any such thing, during the First Hundred Years after Christ, though we are very sure there were Christians during that space.

2. Creeds were not originally designed to relate what Articles were absolutely necessary to be explicitly believed to make Men Christians (though some did afterwards turn them to that purpose) but to direct the Clergy, and those who were to instruct Christians in the Matters of Religion

ligion, what Heads, Points, or Articles and Doctrines of Faith they were to take particular Care to discourse of, and insist on in order to their building up Believers in their most Holy Faith. Of this very good Evidence might be produced from Antiquity, if there were occasion.

3. We have no certainty concerning the precise Number of the Articles which did make up the First Creeds. We are certain that some of the Articles that now constitute the oldest Creeds we have any Knowledge of, were not at first in them, but were afterwards added on particular occasions.

4. A Doctrine's being placed in a Creed, is so far from making the explicate Belief of it, absolutely necessary to make Men Christians, that it doth not make it an Object of Christian Faith. No Doctrine is an Object of Christian Faith, but what Jesus Christ or his Apostles have taught. And a Christian's Faith must be grounded on Evidence that he or his Apostles have taught it. Now the placing of a Doctrine in a Creed, doth not make it a Doctrine that Christ, &c. have taught, nor doth it sufficiently evidence that they have taught it. A Christian as such, is not to believe any Doctrine because it is in a Creed; though when he is convinced that Christ, or his Apostles have taught such or such a Doctrine, which is placed in a Creed, he is to believe it. He that should say that Faction first occasioned Men's composing of Creeds, and that the Abuse of Creeds hath contributed no small Assistance to the maintaining and keeping up of Factions, would not be wholly disbelieved. Creeds are of great use, if they be used aright. We may say of a Creed as the Apostle doth of the Law, 1 Tim. i. 8. We know that it is good, if a Man use it lawfully.

I hear that some who (having a Mind to talk of what they do not understand) apply themselves to rail against the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. in that Phrase, with which the worst of Men made such a Noise under

Preface to the Reader.

under the late Reigns, affirming confidently upon their own Word, that it is contrary to the Church of England. If these People are capable of thinking, would they exercise that Faculty to any good purpose, they might easily perceive that when Jesus Christ and his Apostles have determined a point, it is the most scandalous and wicked Aspersions that can be devised, to pretend to introduce the Church of England in opposition to them. Had these People that respect for, and would they pay to the Church of England that Deference which is due to her, they would not prostitute her venerable Name at every turn, in Imitation of those bad Persons who neither believing in our Blessed Saviour, nor in the Living God, do constantly prophane their Sacred Names, when ever they have a mind to give vent to some unreasonable Passion.

There is one thing which should particularly recommend the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. to good Christians, and for which they can hardly set too great a value on it, viz. That it fully resolves some Difficulties in our Saviour's Conduct (which I think) were never thoroughly cleared to the World, till it was published.

Some time after the following Observations were sent to the Press, I met with some Papers writ by Mr. Edwards, against the Author of the Reasonableness of Christianity, &c. and against my self; but to pass them over without saying any thing of them, is the greatest Civility that can be expressed to that Writer,
by

Your Faithful Servant,

S. B O L D.

OBSER.

SOME
CONSIDERATIONS
ON THE
Principal Objections
AND
ARGUMENTS

Which have been Publish'd against

Mr. *Lock's* Essay

OF

HUMANE UNDERSTANDING.

By SAMUEL BOLD, Rector of
Steeple, Dorset.

Re enim intellecta, in verborum usu faciles esse debemus.
Cic. de Fin. l. 3.

LONDON:
Printed for A. and J. Churchill, at the Black
Swan in Pater-Noster-Row. 1699.



S O M E
C O N S I D E R A T I O N S

On the Principal

Objections and Arguments

Which have been Publish'd against
Mr. *Lock's* Essay of *Humane Under-
standing*.

§1. **I**T is no Disparagement, I conceive, to any Book, nor an Attributing more to Mr. *Lock's* Essay of *Humane Understanding*, than it most justly deserves, to say, That Essay is a Book the best Adapted of any I know, to serve the Interest of Truth, Natural, Moral, and Divine: And that it is the most Worthy, most Noble, and best Book I ever read, excepting those which were writ by Persons Divinely inspir'd. This excellent Treatise having been published several Years, and received through all the Learned World with very great Approbation, by those who understood English, a mighty Out cry was at last, all

on the sudden, raised against it here at Home. There was, no doubt, some reason or other, why so many hands should be employed, just at the same time, to Attack and Batter this *Essay*; tho' what was the weighty consideration, which put them all in motion, may, perhaps, continue a long time a Secret. Several Persons have discovered their Inclination to find fault with this Treatise, by nibbling at several passages in it, which it appears they did not understand, and concerning which they have been at a loss how to express themselves Intelligibly. Some have spoken handsomly of the Author, others have treated that Incomparable Gentleman with a rudeness peculiar to some, who make a Profession of the Christian Religion, and seem to pride themselves in being of the Clergy of the Church of *England*. But whatever Reputation may accrue to them on either of those accounts, their Conduct doth not contribute any thing to the Honour either of the one or of the other.

§ II. The principal Passages in this excellent Treatise, which have been insisted on as faulty, are these two: First, *Certainty of Knowledge is, to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, as expressed in any Proposition. This (saith Mr. Lock) we usually call Knowing, or being certain of the Truth of any Proposition. Essay of Humane Understanding, B. 4. c. 6. § 3.* Secondly, *We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any meer natural Being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own*
Ideas,

Ideas, without Revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think, or else joined and fixed to Matter so disposed, a thinking immaterial Substance: It being, in respect of our Notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive, that God can, if he pleases, super-add to our Idea of Matter a faculty of thinking; than that he should super-add to it another substance, with a faculty of thinking; since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of Substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created Being, but meerly by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator. Essay, &c. B. 4. c. 3. § 6. To which I will add, the better to shew Mr. Lock's sense, the following words, which he immediately subjoyns on this occasion; which those, who have thought fit to except against what he says here, have thought fit always to omit, how fairly I will not say. Mr. Lock's following words are, For I see no contradiction in it, that the first Eternal thinking Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, should, if he pleased, give to certain Systems of created senseless Matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception and thought; tho', as I think, I have proved, lib. 4. c. 10. it is no less than a contradiction to suppose Matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of sense and thought) should be that Eternal first thinking Being.

§ III. Against the first passage, viz. Certainty of Knowledge, is to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, as expressed in any Proposition. There are two Charges exhibited: First, That

the Proposition is not true. In consequence of which, *the way of Ideas* is condemned as *no way at all to Certainty, or Knowledge*; and in opposition to the way of Ideas, we are told, That to argue or make Inferences from *Maxims*, is the way to *Knowledge or Certainty*. Secondly, That the Proposition is inconsistent with, and of dangerous consequence to the *Articles of the Christian Faith*.

§ IV. First, It is said that the Proposition is not true. Now, in order to make a right determination, whether the Proposition be true or no, it may be fit to consider in what the Truth of a Proposition doth consist: For, I suppose it will be allowed, that our being certain of, or knowing the Truth of a Proposition, doth consist in our perceiving that wherein the truth of the Proposition doth consist; otherwise we may know, or be certain, that a Proposition is true, tho' it be not true, which carries such a sound with it, I conceive few will be ambitious to grant it, whatever way they take to attain to Certainty. The truth of a Proposition consists in words being so put together in the Proposition, as exactly to express the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas they stand for, as really it is. This Mr. Lock calls *Certainty of Truth*, just before those words in his Book which are pretended to be faulty. This passage I take for granted, will be permitted to pass for true, not only because no objection hath been started against it, after so strict a scrutiny, to find out something from whence a colour might be taken, to give the Book an ill Name, but because otherwise it
must

must be owned, that a Proposition may be true tho' it is not true ; or tho' the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas, signified by the terms which make up the Proposition, is not such as the Proposition doth express. And if the truth of a Proposition doth consist in what hath been related, it is most evident that our being certain of, or knowing the truth of a Proposition, must consist in our perceiving that the Ideas, for which the words, which make up the Proposition (or of which the Proposition doth consist) do stand, do so agree, or disagree, as the Proposition doth express. For there is no way, by which we can attain to be certain, or to know that the Ideas do so agree, or disagree, as the Proposition doth declare they do, but by perceiving that they do so agree, or disagree, unless certainty, or knowledge of the truth of Propositions, may be had without *perception*, or without perceiving the truth of what is expressed. And if it may be had, without perceiving the truth of what is expressed, perception is of so little moment, or use to certainty, or knowledge, that those who can digest that Notion, may easily be of the opinion, That Matter considered merely as an extended, bulky, figur'd Substance, may be certain of, or know the truth of Propositions, tho' it cannot think or perceive. This I suppose may suffice, to manifest that Mr. *Lock's* Proposition is true ; and consequently, that the way of Ideas is a sure, and indeed the only way to Certainty or Knowledge, so far as Men are capable of attaining to know the truth of Propositions. Yet because

another way to Certainty or Knowledge is proposed in opposition to the way of Ideas, *viz.* The way of Maxims, or of Arguing, and making or drawing Inferences from Maxims, I will briefly consider that way, and what opposition it hath to the way of Ideas. But several Propositions, commonly reputed and looked on as Maxims, being not true, unless taken in a very limited sense, I will change the term Maxims, and place Self-evident Propositions in its room. Now Self-evident Propositions have this in common with other Propositions, That they consist of Words, which stand for Ideas. And there is no way, by which a Person can be certain, or know the truth of a Proposition, we call Self-evident, but by perceiving that the Ideas, signified by the words of which the Proposition doth consist, have such a connection or agreement, or repugnancy, or disagreement, as the Proposition doth express; for tho' the Proposition be such, that no other Idea is needful, or can be made use of to help any Man to a certainty, or knowledge, that the Proposition is true, because the Ideas signified by the words, have, by an immediate comparison of them, a visible agreement, or disagreement, yet no Person can be certain, or can know that the Proposition is true, who does not perceive that the Ideas, signified by the terms of which the Proposition doth consist, do so agree, or disagree, as the Proposition doth express. Nor can it be said to be a Self-evident Proposition, to him who doth not perceive that the Ideas do so agree, or disagree, as the Proposition declares

clares they do. And if there can be no way, by which Persons can attain to be certain of the truth of those Propositions we call Self-evident, but this of perceiving the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, as expressed in them, the only way, by which we can attain to know the truth of other Propositions, must be that of comparing Ideas, that being the only way whereby we can attain to perceive their agreement or disagreement.

§ V. A Person's being certain of the truth of a Proposition we call Self-evident, doth not make him know the truth of another Proposition. It may be a great help to his attaining to know the truth of other Propositions, but it will not contribute any other way to his being certain of the truth of other Propositions, than as it helps him to perceive that the agreement, or disagreement of the Ideas, signified by the words which make up those Propositions, is such as the Propositions express. He that knows the truth of a Self-evident Proposition, may, by the help of that Proposition, easily attain to be certain of the truth of another Proposition, which hath an immediate connection with it; but his knowledge of the truth of the latter Proposition, will consist in his perceiving that the Ideas, signified by the words of which it consists, have such agreement, or disagreement, as the Proposition doth express: For, if he does not perceive that, he cannot be certain that the Proposition is true, tho' he is most certain that the former Proposition is true. If the Proposition he would know the truth of, be some-

what remote from the Self evident Proposition, by the means of which he may attain to know the truth of it, he must make use of intermediate Ideas : And whether the process be from the Proposition to be proved, to the Self-evident Proposition, or from the Self-evident Proposition to that he would know the truth of, all the intermediate Ideas must have a Self-evident agreement, or disagreement, with one another, throughout the whole train of the Argumentation : And this agreement, or disagreement, must, all along, in every step be perceived, or certainty of the truth, of the Proposition to be proved, cannot be obtained. If any one of the intermediate Ideas, have not a Self-evident agreement, or disagreement, with those next unto it ; or if it have such agreement or disagreement with them, but the Person who would know the truth of the Proposition doth not perceive it, his knowledge will unavoidably stop there, and cannot possibly proceed any further, any more than the parts of a Chain can hang together, when one of the Links is broken and lost ; or than a Person can from *One*, make up the Number *Five*, and yet leave out either 2, 3, or 4. This I take to be demonstratively certain, unless Certainty or Knowledge may be had without Perception. Perhaps it will be pretended, that we come to Certainty or Knowledge, not by perceiving the agreement or disagreement of Ideas, but by Inferring, or making Rational Deductions from known Self-evident Principles, or Propositions. To this I answer, That he who doth Rationally infer

ar.y

any thing, or makes a Rational Deduction, does not do it, that by that means he may attain to Certainty or Knowledge, but that he may assist and help others to that Knowledge or Certainty he hath already obtained, by laying before them, in a train of Propositions, the connection of all the intermediate Ideas, whereby the first and the last are tied together. For a Person to make a deduction Rationally, doth suppose his being Certain, or Knowing, or perceiving that what he deduces, hath such an agreement or disagreement, with the Propositions from which he doth deduce it, as his Inference doth express. If a Man will infer, and make deductions Rationally, he must antecedently perceive the agreement, or disagreement, of the Ideas about which he is concerned, otherwise he can have no reason to make Deductions: And if he does make Deductions, and they prove to be Rational, it is meerly by chance that they do so; and he cannot be properly said to have made them Rationally. If a Man will infer, and make Deductions at all Adventures, before he can be certain that his Inferences are true, he must examine them, and compare the Ideas in the Propositions from which he hath deduced them. He cannot be certain that his Inferences, consider'd barely as Propositions, are true, any other way, than by perceiving that the Ideas, signified by the words of which they consist, do so agree, or disagree, as those Propositions express. He cannot be certain that they are true, consider'd as Inferences, any other way than by perceiving the agreement, or disagreement, they have

have with the Propositions from which they were deduced. Inferring, and making Deductions, seems not to me to be the only way to Certainty, but comparing Ideas, which is the only way to perceive their agreement or disagreement. And Self-evident Principles, or Propositions, and the use that can be made of them to help us to Certainty, are so far from having any opposition to the way of Ideas, that neither their Truth can be known, nor any Profitable Use (with respect to Truth) be made of them, but by the way of Ideas.

§ VI. The second Charge produced against this Proposition, is, That it is of dangerous consequence to, and inconsistent with *the Articles of the Christian Faith*. This Charge seems to be grounded on the last words of Mr. *Lock's* Proposition, *viz. As expressed in any Proposition*. Now some Propositions come to us by Divine Revelation; and several of these Propositions are such, we cannot perceive by comparing the Ideas, signify'd by the words of which they consist, that they do so agree or disagree, as the Propositions do express. It follows therefore, from Mr. *Lock's* Proposition, that we cannot be certain of, or know the Truth of those Propositions; and this is said to be inconsistent with, or of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith, but I cannot understand for what reason it is said to be so. For as the truth of all Propositions, come they to us by what way soever, consists in what hath been before mentioned, so our being certain of, or knowing the truth of any Proposition, let it come to us
by

by what way soever, must consist in that, wherein our being certain of, or knowing the truth of any Proposition doth consist: For the way how a Proposition is brought to us, doth not alter its nature, consider'd as a Proposition, nor the nature of Certainty, or Knowledge, which are fixed, and unchangeable, and always the same, and therefore cannot make Certainty, or Knowledge of its truth, to consist in any thing, but what Certainty or Knowledge of the truth of a Proposition, brought to us some other way, doth consist in. If it shall now be ask'd, Whether, seeing there are certain Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelation, and we cannot perceive that the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas, signify'd by the words in those Propositions, is such as the Propositions express; Mr. *Lock's* Proposition is not inconsistent with, and of dangerous consequence to those Articles of the Christian Faith? I answer, That when an account is given of the determined Ideas, for which those phrases, *inconsistent with*, and *of dangerous consequence*, do stand, whether they are used in different senses, or both be designed to signify one and the same thing: And what that, or those precise Ideas are, which are meant by them, distinct and proper Answers may be given to the Question, or Questions propounded. If by inconsistent with those Articles, is meant inconsistent with the truth of those Articles; and so the Question amounts to this, Whether that Proposition of Mr. *Locks* can be true, and those Articles true too? The Answer is Yes, very well; for the truth

truth of those Propositions doth not depend on our being certain of, or knowing the truth of them. If by inconsistent with those Articles be meant, that we cannot be certain of, or know the truth of those Articles, then the Question will be, Whether it will not follow from Mr. *Lock's* Proposition, that we cannot be certain of, or know the truth of those Articles? To which the Answer is, Yes. But the Proposition, for all that, is inconsistent enough with those Articles, tho' it cannot consist well with Peoples pretending to know what God hath set out of their reach, and which they cannot attain to know. It is no wrong at all to those Articles, to say we cannot be certain of, or know the truth of them; it is a speaking of the truth, and an attributing unto them the preheminance which God hath given them. If Persons are resolv'd they will use this phrase, inconsistent with Articles of the Christian Faith in this sense, there is no help for it; yet Mr. *Lock's* Proposition will continue true, and cannot do any injury to any *one Article of the Christian Faith*. But what will become then (may some say) of those Articles of the Christian Faith, or of those Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelation, and the truth of which we cannot be certain of, or know? Answer: They will continue just as they are, very great, even Divine and Incomprehensible Truths; and they are to have all the Entertainment given them by us, that Divine Revelation designs they should have. Whatever Propositions are brought to us by Divine Revelation, and proposed to us
by

by it, to be the Objects of our Knowledge, they are so formed, that we may perceive that the agreement or disagreement of the Ideas, signified by the words of which they do consist, is such as the Propositions express. And we have no other way to be certain of, or to know the truth of those Propositions, but by perceiving that the Ideas do so agree, or disagree, as the Propositions express. But as for those Propositions, which come to us by Divine Revelations, and are such, that we cannot perceive that the Ideas, signify'd by the words of which they consist, have such agreement or disagreement, as the Propositions express, they are not proposed to us, by Divine Revelation, to be *Objects of our Knowledge*, but only of our *Faith*. And tho' we do not, nor can know, or be certain of the truth of these Propositions, yet if we do firmly, and with full assurance, believe them to be true, because we have good satisfaction that God hath revealed them; and if our belief of their truth, hath all that efficacy and influence on us, which Divine Revelation requires, we do fully answer the design of Divine Revelation, with respect to these Articles of the Christian Faith. But is not Faith (may some say) a Reasonable Act? Yes: But all reasonable Assent is not Certainty or Knowledge. My assent to the truth of a Proposition, or my believing it to be true, is a Reasonable Act, not because I am certain, or do know that it is true, but because my Assent is founded on such Evidence that it is true, as is every way sufficient to justify my Assenting to

to it. There cannot be a more Reasonable Act, than to believe the truth of that Proposition, which we are on good grounds satisfied is declared to be true, by that God who cannot Lye. Let any Man produce a Proposition, that Divine Revelation hath brought to Light, and make it appear to me that it came to Men by Divine Revelation, I shall believe it, or assent most firmly to the truth of it, tho' I cannot know the truth of it; and my doing so, will be a most Reasonable Act, because my assent will be grounded on Divine Testimony. But let that Person, or any other Persons, frame another Proposition in Philosophical Terms, concerning the same matter, and then pretend, that that Proposition declares something more concerning that matter, than God hath revealed concerning it, if I cannot perceive that the Ideas, signify'd by the words of that Proposition, do agree or disagree as the Proposition expresses, I cannot be certain, or know that the Proposition is true; nor will my assenting to the truth of it, upon his or their saying it is true, be a Reasonable Act. For the Proposition being about a matter out of his or their reach, I have not sufficient evidence to assure me that it is true; yet, notwithstanding the latter Proposition doth consist of different words from the former, if it be declared that neither more nor less is meant by these words, than is signify'd by those in the other Proposition, I can assent to the truth of it, and my assent will be a Reasonable Act, because tho' they are two distinct Propositions consider'd as to the words, yet as to sense they

they are but one, and exactly the same. Well, but at this rate, what becomes of the *Certainty of Faith*? Answer. *Certainty*, and *Faith*, are two words, which stand for, or signifie two distinct Acts of the Mind; and they can no more be properly affirmed of one another, than those distinct Acts can be said to be one and the same. Indeed, a Person may use the word *Certainty*, or *Knowledge*, if he please, for Assent, grounded upon probable Evidence, or for Assent founded on Authority, or for any other Idea he hath a mind to call by that Name; and if he certifies what the Idea is, he hath a mind to signifie by that word, his Discourse may be Intelligible, if he constantly use the word in that sense. But if he will oppose another Person, who hath declared that he useth the word *Certainty*, and *Knowledge*, strictly taken, in the same sense, and doth not declare that he takes the word *Certainty* in another sense, his Discourse will unavoidably be very obscure, if not perfectly unintelligible: For it will be presumed he useth the word in that sense, in which the other Person had declared he did use it, when all the while he means another thing by it.

§ VII. When it is said that Mr. *Lock's* Proposition is of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith, if something else is signify'd by it, than what was meant by the former phrase, a distinct Account should be given of what is intended by this phrase. If any shall pretend that the true and just consequence of Mr. *Lock's* Proposition is this, That the Ar-
 ticles

cles of the Christian Faith are not to be believed, the Proposition pretended to be deduced is a very wicked Proposition. But then it is as plain, and certain as any thing can be, That it can no way be drawn from Mr. *Lock's* Proposition, which has no relation at all to any Articles of Faith, or Belief, either Christian, or other. If Mr. *Lock's* Proposition can concern, or affect any *Christian Articles*, they must be *Articles of Christian Knowledge*, not of *Christian Faith*. And his Proposition is so far from being of dangerous consequence to Articles of Christian Knowledge, that it gives the true Account wherein the knowledge of those Articles doth consist, as will most evidently appear, when any of those Articles shall be instanced in and considered. If it shall be pretended, that from Mr. *Lock's* Proposition it may be regularly inferred, That no Man ought to believe, that any Proposition is true, but what he can attain to know the truth of, and that he ought not to assent to the truth of it, till he attains to be certain of, or to know the truth of it, and that this is what is meant, when it is said to be of dangerous consequence to the Articles of the Christian Faith; then, in the first place it is to be acknowledged, that the Proposition intended to be regularly deduced from the other, is certainly of most dangerous consequence to those Persons, who shall suffer themselves to be enslaved by it, and this with respect to Articles of the Christian-Faith. But then, in the second place, it is great Injustice to charge Mr. *Lock's* Proposition with that, which can only in Justice

be

be laid to the charge of another Proposition; especially to do so before it is proved, and made to appear, that that dangerous Proposition can regularly be inferred from Mr. *Lock's* Proposition, which is a point altogether incapable of being proved, for there is no possibility of shewing any connection between them: The two Propositions are as far distant from one another, as the East is from the West. From what hath been already said, I think it may with reason enough be concluded, that the principal Accusations, advanced against Mr. *Lock's* Proposition, are altogether groundless.

§ VIII. Certainty, or Knowledge did, and will, always consist, in what Mr. *Lock* declares it doth consist; and the way to attain Certainty was always by comparing Ideas. What measures of knowing soever those have, who speak most slightingly of the way of Ideas, all their knowledge is owing to it, how little soever they are aware of it, or how strongly soever they are inclined to attribute it to something else. There were Persons, in all Ages, who attained to certain measures of knowledge, and were never able to declare distinctly and fully how they came by their Knowledge. They generally stopped in their Accounts, at the Artificial Methods, whereby they were assisted in comparing of Ideas, (tho' they took no notice of that) which was the true and natural way by which they perceived their agreement or disagreement, and obtained knowledge. Mr. *Lock* is the first Person I have heard of, who hath observed, and acquainted the World, in what

C

Know:

Knowledge, or Certainty doth consist. By which discovery he hath done Mankind so great a kindness, in directing Men plainly to the most certain, easie, and speedy way to attain Knowledge, so far as they are capable of it: And how to bound their Enquiries, so as not to spend their Labours in fruitless Endeavours, to know what is out of Humane reach, and what they can never attain to certainty in, that Men will never be able to pay him thanks enough, for the good Offices he hath done to the World, nor to testifie sufficient Praises unto God, for the Light and Favour he hath reached forth, and imparted unto Mankind by him.

§ IX. The second passage which hath been thought faulty in Mr. Lock's *Essay of Humane Understanding*, is this: *We have the Ideas of Matter, and Thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any meer Material Being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own Ideas, without Revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed, a Power to perceive and think, or else joyned and fixed to Matter so disposed, a thinking immaterial Substance. It being in respect of our Notions, not much more remote from our comprehension to conceive, that God can, if he pleases, superadd to our Idea of Matter a Faculty of Thinking, than that he should superadd to it another Substance, with a faculty of Thinking, since we know not wherein Thinking consists, nor to what sort of Substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, which cannot be in any created Being, but meerly by the good pleasure and bounty of the Creator,*
 &c.

&c. *Essay of Humane Understanding*, B. 4. c. 3. § 6. Against this passage, two things are offered: First, It is suggested that it is not consistent with the Souls Immortality; or at least, takes off very much from the evidence of its Immortality. Secondly, It is pretended, that from the Nature of Matter, it may be proved to be false.

§ X. First, It is suggested, that what Mr. *Lock* hath here said, is not consistent with the Souls Immortality, or at least takes off very much from the evidence of its Immortality, for if what Mr. *Lock* doth say be true, it cannot be Demonstratively proved that the Soul is not Material. And if the Soul be nothing but a Material Substance, it must be made up as others are, of the cohesion of solid and separable parts, how minute and invisible soever they be, and must be dissolved when Life is ended. And it takes off very much from the evidence of Immortality, if it depend wholly upon God's giving that, which of its own nature it is not capable of. *Ans.* 1. The Immortality of the Soul doth not depend on our knowing, or perceiving by demonstrative proof, in the way of Reason, that it is Immaterial; nor doth our having a Rational Perswasion, that the Soul is Immortal, depend on our knowing that it is Immaterial.

§ XI. Mr. *Lock* doth not say that the Soul is Material: He owns that we have the highest degree of probability that it is Immaterial, but that we cannot attain to demonstrative Certainty or Knowledge, by comparing the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, that the Soul is an Immaterial Substance, tho' we may this way know

that it is a Spiritual Substance. What Mr. *Lock* saith is this, *We cannot, by the contemplation of our own Ideas, without Revelation, discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think; or that we cannot demonstratively prove, by meer Principles of Reason, or Philosophy, either the Materiality or Immateriality of the Soul, but that the point is above our Reason, and what we cannot be fully assured of but by Divine Revelation.* For this his Assertion, he hath produced some Reasons, which have not been proved to be invalid, or weak, by any of those Authors I have seen, who have declared their dislike of this Assertion. And if the Reasons he hath given for his Assertion cannot be refuted, but are solid and unanswerable, it will not be easie to prove that his Assertion may justly be blamed. To prove Mr. *Lock's* Proposition false, either the Materiality, or Immateriality of the Soul, should be demonstratively proved, for he denies that either of them can be demonstratively proved. The surest way to prove the falseness of a Proposition, which denies that a thing can be demonstrated, is to demonstrate that thing. I know an Attempt hath been made, by one who condemns the way of Ideas, as no way at all to Certainty, to demonstrate *that Matter cannot Think, or that God cannot superadd to any System of Matter a Power of Thinking; which demonstration is manag'd in the way of Ideas.* But tho' what is offer'd there, for demonstration, would sufficiently prove that *Solidity is not a Power of Thinking,* if that needed proof, yet I think it doth not afford any sort of evidence that Omnipotency

cannot superadd both *Solidity*, and a *power of Thinking*, to one and the same Substance, which was the point to be demonstrated. Besides, the way of Ideas being condemned, as no way at all to Certainty, those who are of that mind, cannot with any reason pretend, that what hath been offered for a demonstration of this point, is really a demonstration of it. For if they can think it to be a Demonstration of the point, they cannot avoid being obliged to renounce their *other thought*, and think the quite contrary, whether they may judge it proper and convenient to acknowledge the same openly or no. If what hath been offered for a Demonstration of this point, be really a Demonstration of it, the way of Ideas is undoubtedly a way to Certainty; yea, and a way to Certainty about a point, which I am inclined to think cannot be demonstrated any other way.

§ XII. 3. If the Soul were *nothing but a material Substance*, what follows those words in the objection might perhaps pass with some for a plain Truth: but for my part, I cannot comprehend how any thing, that hath life, should be nothing but a material Substance; for Life is no part of, nor hath any necessary connection with the Idea, signified by these words, *Material Substance*. Nor do I perceive any necessity, that a Material Substance endued with Life, must lose its Life, because by some Accident, or within a certain period, the gross and sensible parts of it must fall off from those more fine and insensible parts which God hath ordered to be the Seat of Life. And those who think they can prove demonstratively, that the Soul is a created Immaterial Substance, must take heed

heed of affirming that the Soul is *nothing but a created Immaterial Substance*, lest that Assertion prove of dangerous consequence to, and inconsistent with the Articles of the Christian Faith; for if the Soul be nothing but a created Immaterial Substance, it is not a Spiritual, or Thinking Substance; for the power of Thinking, is a power which God superadds to our Idea, whether of Material, or created Immaterial Substance, and which neither the one, nor the other can have, *but meerly by the good pleasure, and bounty of the Creator*, as Mr. Lock most judiciously and Piously observes. But Mr. Lock doth not any where say, That the Soul is nothing but a Material Substance, or that we cannot know, by contemplating our Ideas, that the Soul is nothing but a Material Substance. Indeed, Mr. Lock hath these words, *We have the Ideas of Matter and Thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know, whether any Material Being thinks or no.* From these words, *Any meer Material Being*, some may, perhaps, in their haste, have taken occasion to think, that Mr. Lock's Notion was, that for ought we could know, the Soul might be nothing but a Material Substance. To rectifie which mistake, I think it may be sufficient to note, that *meer Material*, in Mr. Lock's Sense, is not oppos'd to a power of Thinking, (which we cannot know but God may superadd to our Idea of Matter) but to an Immaterial Substance, considered as joyned to a Material Being.

§ XIII. 4. It is not very easie to comprehend what is meant by these words, *It takes off very much*.

much from the evidence of Immortality, if it depend wholly upon God's giving that, which of its own nature it is not capable of. For no created Substance can have any thing more, than God is pleased to give it. It is not very intelligible to me, that God should give to any thing, that which its nature is not capable of, especially if by Nature be here meant, what I find some Persons do sometimes mean by that word, *viz.* Substance; for what Substance is capable of, even after that solidity is added to it, is more than any Man can know. And if Omnipotency can add a power of Thinking to solid Substance fitly disposed, no Man can be certain that solid Thinking Substance is not of its own nature capable of Immortality; but whether a created Being shall be Mortal or Immortal, is not to be determined by our considering its nature, but by understanding the pleasure of God concerning it. The Humane Nature is the same now it was in the first Ages of the World; but that Men do not now ordinarily live above a hundred Years, is not to be resolved into this, that the Humane Nature is not capable of being continued longer in Life, than that space, but into the pleasure of God, that now Men shall not ordinarily live to a greater Age; for Men did ordinarily, in the first Ages of the World, live many hundreds of Years; and that they did so, was purely to be attributed to the Divine Pleasure. And had it been the pleasure of him, who kept Men then so long in Life, that Men should not die, they would have been Immortal. If the evidence of Immortality,

consists in Immateriality, the Immateriality of the Soul must be demonstratively proved, before Persons can perceive the evidence of the Souls Immortality. For if any person takes it for granted, that the Souls Immateriality may be demonstratively proved from, or by certain Principles of Reason, and from thence perswades himself that the Soul is Immortal, and upon after-trial and examination he shall find that his Principles he depended on are uncertain, and cannot afford him such proof as he was perswaded they would yield, his discovering the uncertainty of his own Principles, which he went upon in point of Reason, will, according to a Notion lately advanced, weaken the Credibility of the Souls Immortality; when considered purely as a Matter of Faith. And if this be true, great and speedy care should be taken to produce demonstrative proof, that the Soul is an Immaterial Substance, not only to make Men certain that their Souls are Immortal, but to secure the Credibility of Divine Testimony. But blessed be God, we have a sure Foundation for our Faith to rest on; for the Testimony of God will never fail, but always remain firm and true, how short soever the Principles of Reason may fall, of bringing us to Certainty or Knowledge, concerning several Articles of Faith, or Propositions, which come to us by Divine Revelation. It may be proved, to the highest degree of probability, that the Soul is Immaterial; but no demonstrative proof being yet produced in the way of Reason, that the Soul is Immaterial, I cannot understand why any person

son

son should pretend it must follow that the Soul must be Mortal, if it be a Material Substance, with a superadded power or faculty of Thinking; and in that respect, or on that account, a Spiritual Substance, tho' not Immaterial, for Material and Mortal have no necessary connection. And therefore we cannot be certain, by contemplating the Ideas those words stand for, that every Material Substance must be Mortal. And he who shall affirm, that every Material Substance must necessarily be Mortal, will, if he adhere to his Assertion, find himself obliged to deny, at least, two Articles of the Christian Faith, or two Propositions which come to us by Divine Revelation, 1. That Man became Mortal by Sin, or that *the Wages of Sin is Death*; for it is past doubt, that one part of Man, when first created, was Material: And if every Material Substance must necessarily die, Man must have died, tho' he had never sinned. 2. That after the Resurrection Men will be Immortal; for, after the Resurrection, one part of Man will be Material.

§ XIV. Secondly, It is pretended that this passage, in Mr. *Lock's* Essay, which I have been discoursing of, may from the Nature of Matter be proved to be false. I will, 1st. Say something of this point in general; and then, 2dly. Consider particularly what the last Author I have seen, who finds fault with this passage, doth say concerning it, who I think takes in the whole strength of what others have proposed, who have on this Account formed objections against it.

§ XV. First, I will say something concerning this point in general. Substance, I conceive, will be acknowledged on all hands to be rightly divided into Material and Immaterial; but how many various, different Powers, or Faculties, these sorts of Substances are capable of receiving, is what surpasses Man's Understanding. Yet whatever Powers they are capable of receiving, God can give or superadd unto them if he pleases; whether he hath given to either sort all the Powers it is capable of, is more than we can be certain of, by the bare Exercise of our Reason. He may, for any thing we know to the contrary, give to certain Material Systems fitly disposed, some Powers, which he also gives to Immaterial Substances. Amongst these we may reckon the power of Thinking, which neither Material, nor Immaterial Substances, can have, whether God will or no. And whether it hath been his pleasure to superadd this power only to the Idea we express by Immaterial Substance, or also to the Idea we express by Material Substance, is a point we cannot be fully assured of but by Divine Revelation. The power of Thinking, added to a Substance, whether Material, or Immaterial, makes that Substance, Spirit. Material Substance, Immaterial Substance, and Spirit, are terms which stand for three distinct Ideas. And tho' Spirit, or Spiritual Substance, doth not imply Matter, or Material Substance in its Idea, yet the power of Thinking being superadded to Matter, will make it Spirit, or Spiritual Substance. Just as Spirit doth not imply Immaterial

rial Substance in its Idea, yet the power of Thinking being superadded to Immaterial Substance, makes it Spirit or Spiritual Substance, which it could not be, without a power of Thinking added to it. To ask therefore peremptorily, whether Matter can think or not? is to propose an obscure Question which wants explaining. If by the Question be meant, Can God add a power of Thinking to Matter or no? The Answer will be, We have no demonstrative proof for either part of the Question; and therefore cannot be certain concerning the Matter. But if by the Question be meant, Can Matter Think without having a power of Thinking superadded to it? The Answer is plainly, No. But the way of Arguing, that then the Substance which Thinks must be Immaterial, is not very clear, for Immaterial Substance can no more Think, than Matter can, without a power of Thinking added to it: And whether it be Material, or Immaterial Substance, to which the power of Thinking is added, that Substance thinks, tho' it be by virtue of a power superadded to it, without which it could not think, or considered barely as Material, or Immaterial Substance. Solidity, and a power of Thinking, are perfectly distinct, and quite different Powers; yet if God can superadd a power of Thinking to a solid Substance, there is no necessity that the Substance which Thinks must be Immaterial, for Substance, and a power of Thinking, are as distinct as Material and Immaterial. The Material Substance thinks, tho' not precisely under this consideration, but

as having another Power added to it, whereby it is enabled to do that, which it could not do without it, *viz.* to Think. And tho' the Idea of Thinking will not prove the substance which thinks to be immaterial, it will, if superadded to Matter, prove that the substance which thinks hath another power than that which made it Matter, and will as certainly prove it to be a Spiritual Substance, as Solidity can prove it to be a Material Substance; Solidity, and a power of thinking, are very different powers, but they are not contradictory. And there is no inconsistency, in supposing that the same substance may have more distinct modifications than one, let them be ever so different one from the other, whilst they are not contradictory. We cannot attain to Certainty, that God cannot add a power of Thinking to Matter, tho' we may say that he cannot make the same substance to be material and immaterial at the same time, because this latter is a contradiction.

§ XVI. Secondly, I will now consider what the last Author I have seen, who finds fault with this passage in Mr. *Lock's* Essay, doth say concerning it. This Author is the Reverend Mr. *Jenkin*, who having quoted out of Mr. *Lock's* *Essay of Humane Understanding*, part of what I have before transcribed out of that Book, hath (in the 46 and 47 pages of his *Preface* before his *Reasonableness and Certainty of the Christian Religion*) the words which shall be marked all along as I come to them, as these following words (with which he begins his Reply to what he quoted

ted

ted out of Mr. *Lock*) are, “ But it seems not
 “ intelligible, how God should superadd to
 “ Matter this faculty, or power, or modifica-
 “ tion, of thinking, unless he change the na-
 “ ture of Matter, and make it quite another
 “ thing than it is, or joyn a substance of ano-
 “ ther nature to it. *Answ.* It is very common,
 even with noted Authors, to express themselves
 in such a manner, that tho’ at first view their
 Sentences seem to have a very plausible appear-
 ance, yet, upon a stricter consideration, their
 Sense proves to be so uncertain, and undetermi-
 ned, that it is very hard to know what they do
 mean. I will suppose that here, by, *It seems not*
Intelligible that God should, &c. is meant, That
 Men cannot understand, how God should, or
 can superadd a Power, &c. of Thinking to
 Matter, but either, by changing the nature of
 Matter, or by joyning a Substance of another
 nature to it. And I think it not Intelligible,
 how this proves any thing against Mr. *Lock’s*
 Proposition, to which it is opposed. For tho’
 we cannot understand how God should do this,
 but by one of the ways before-mentioned, (and
 it seems supposed by this Author that we can un-
 derstand how God can do it, either of those
 ways) yet he may do it some other way, which
 is not intelligible to us. And if he can do it,
 in a way, which we cannot understand how he
 should do it, it is most certain, that we cannot
 know, or be certain that he cannot do it. God
 hath done, and does do many things, which
 we cannot understand the manner how he did,
 or does do them. Therefore it is no proof that
 God

God cannot do a thing, because we do not, or cannot understand the manner how he can do it. But seeing God can do things, and we cannot understand how he can do them, this is a very just and good Reason, why we should not pretend to know he hath not done such a thing, when we cannot alledge any thing more to justify our pretence, but this, that we cannot understand how he should do it. If we could understand how God might superadd a power of Thinking to Matter, this would not prove that he has done it. In like manner, our not being able to understand how he should do it, can be no proof that he hath not done it. These words considered as they are offered for an Answer to what *Mr. Lock* hath said, seem to carry with them two suppositions, which should be taken for true: 1. Here is supposed, that God hath not done any thing, which we cannot understand how he should do; which supposition is apparently a mistake, and void of Truth. 2. Here is supposed, that it is intelligible how God should add a Thinking Power to Matter, either of the ways here assigned, but with this intimation, That it can be demonstratively proved, that he hath not done it either of those ways, and therefore that he hath not done it at all. Without these suppositions, I think it not intelligible, how these words can concern what *Mr. Lock* hath said, who doth not side with either part of the Question, Whether God has, or has not; added a Thinking Power to Matter, but saith, That neither part of the Question can be demonstratively proved. To prove this way,

way, against Mr. *Lock*, That God has not added a Power of Thinking to any System of Matter, the truth of both the Suppositions should be made undeniably plain and clear, and then the intimated demonstration should be produced. The demonstration not being laid down, no Judgment can be made of it, nor by it. But the two ways assigned, by which it is supposed intelligible how God should add a Power of Thinking to Matter, may be a little considered. The first way by which it is supposed intelligible, how God might add a power of Thinking to Matter, is, by changing the nature of Matter. And by changing the nature of Matter, I conceive, by the words following, we are to understand, making it quite another thing than it is. Now, I think it is altogether unintelligible, how God should superadd to Matter a Power of Thinking, by making it quite another thing than it is; for then it must cease to be Matter. Indeed, it is not intelligible that God should superadd a Thinking Power to Matter, and not make it another thing, (tho' not quite another thing) than it was before that Power of Thinking was superadded to it. But tho' by superadding that Power to it, it would be made another thing, yet it would not cease to be what it was before: It would still be Matter, tho' nothing but Matter. A new Power cannot be superadded to any thing, but that thing must continue what it was before, tho' by that super-addition it hath what it had not before. Should Matter cease to be Matter, no Power or Faculty could be added to it. Mr. *Lock* saith,

faith, We cannot be fully assured, any other way than by Divine Revelation, whether God has, or has not, super-added a Power of Thinking to any System of matter fitly disposed. Now to say in opposition to this, That God cannot do it, but by making matter quite another thing than it is, doth carry along with it an unintelligible Supposition, or rather an express Contradiction, *viz.* That God can super-add something to matter, by making that same matter cease to be matter. But it is undeniably certain, that if solid Substance be capable of having a Thinking Power super-added to it, God can super-add that Power or Faculty to it, tho' we cannot understand the way or manner how he should do it. And we cannot, by comparing our Ideas, attain to Certainty, or Knowledge, whether matter is capable, or not, of having a Power of Thinking super-added to it, because we cannot this way reach to know the utmost Capacity of matter. And if matter be capable of having that Power super-added to it, we cannot be fully assured any other way than by Divine Revelation, whether God has super-added that Power to any Systems of Matter: For God is not necessarily obliged to super-add to any thing, every Power it may be capable of.

§ XVII. The second way proposed, how God might super-add a Power of Thinking to Matter, is, *By joyning a Substance of another nature to it.* Answ. 1. The joyning of a Substance of another nature to matter, will not super-add a Power of Thinking, unless that Sub-

Substance of another nature has the Power of Thinking joyned to it. The Power of Thinking, is a Power super-added to Substance, whether the Substance be material, or immaterial, to which God is pleased to super-add it. 2. The joyning of an immaterial Thinking Substance to Matter, is not a super-adding to matter the Faculty of Thinking. The Faculty or Power of Thinking in this Case, is appropriated to the immaterial Substances, and is not a Power super-added to matter. 3. It is every jot as unintelligible to us, *how* an immaterial substance should be joyned to a material substance, as how a Power of Thinking should be super-added to a material substance. And I think it altogether unintelligible, that God should super-add a Power of Thinking to Matter, this way. Tho' we cannot understand how God should joyn an immaterial Thinking Substance to some Systems of Matter, yet this cannot be a good Reason why any Man should pretend to be certain, or to know that God cannot, or has not joyned an immaterial Thinking Substance to some Systems of Matter. Neither is it a demonstrative proof, that God cannot, or has not, super-added a Power of Thinking to some Systems of Matter, because, for ought we know, he can, or has joyned an immaterial Thinking Substance to some Systems of Matter. We cannot attain to Certainty concerning what he has done as to these matters, nor can we be fully assured what he has done, but by Divine Revelation. Tho, as Mr. *Lock* saith, we have the highest degree of probability, that the Power

of Thinking is super-added to immaterial substances ; and that those Systems of Matter, in which there is a Power of Thinking, have an immaterial substance joyned to them, to which that Power of Thinking is super-added.

§ XVIII. “ But the Question is, Whether a Faculty of Thinking can be produced out of the Powers, and various Modifications of Matter ?
Ans. If this be the Question, it is a very dark and obscure one. The Question, as here worded, seems to suppose, or grant, that Powers are super-added to our Idea of Matter, upon its being variously modified. And then enquires, whether out of those Powers, another Power (*viz.* The Power of Thinking, if that be the meaning here, of the Phrase, a Faculty of Thinking) distinct from them, can be produced ? Now, as one Power cannot operate on another Power, so neither can one Power be produced out of other Powers. To talk of one Power of Matter being produced out of another Power of Matter, seems to me altogether unintelligible ; for I cannot imagine what can be meant by it, unless it be either that one Power of Matter contains, in the Bowels of it, another Power, which may one way or other be extracted out of it, the former still continuing, which I conceive is not consistent with good sense ; or that one Power of Matter doth contribute to its having another Power, which is as little intelligible as the former. And is much the same thing, as to say, That that Power of Matter which makes it *Iron*, contributes something to its having that Power which makes it
Gold :

Gold: Or that that Power which makes Matter to be *Wax*, contributes to its having that Power which makes it a *Loadstone*: Whereas the Powers which make Matter to be *Gold*, and *Loadstones*, are as perfectly different from the Powers which make Matter to be *Iron*, and *Wax*, as they are from that Power which makes Matter to be *Wood*, or from those Powers which make Matter to be any of those other things to which we assign other *Specifick Names*. As Matter being modified a certain way, has a certain power super-added to it, which it had not before it was so modified, so, being modified another way, it hath another power super-added to it, different from the former. Now it is not possible we should know how many powers may be super-added to Substance, whether having, or not having, the modification of Solidity, unless we could accurately understand how many ways it can be modified. A thousand Questions may be proposed concerning Powers, whether they can be super-added to a Substance that has the modification of Solidity upon its being variously modified, to which no Answer can be given, which can be demonstratively proved. And amongst other Reasons, because we cannot know the precise modifications, on which those Powers must depend, we are not admitted so far into the Secrets of Nature, as to be able to take cognizance of all the various real Constitutions, on which all the Powers, which may be super-added to our Idea of Matter, may depend. If before any Man knew any thing of the *Loadstone*, this Question had been put, *viz.* Whether God had super-added to a System of Matter,

fitly disposed, a power to draw Iron to it? No Man then living could have given an Answer to it, which he could have proved demonstratively. Had the Question been answer'd negatively, we are now very well assured, the Answer had been false. If the Answer had been affirmative, tho' it had been really true, yet the Answer could not then have been proved demonstratively. The Question, with relation to what Mr. *Lock* hath said, seems to me to be this, Whether a demonstrative proof can be produced that it is, or is not the pleasure of God, that a Power of Thinking shall be super-added to our Idea of Matter, upon a System of Matter being modified in a certain manner? And this Question cannot be satisfactorily resolved any other way, than by producing a demonstrative proof either of the one part of the Question, or of the other; for till the demonstrative proof is produced, we must continue uncertain, and ought to acknowledge, that the point surmounts our view, is too difficult for us to resolve demonstratively, and that it doth not come within our notice. Mr. *Lock* doth not discourse there, of what may be produced out of the Powers, and various modifications of Matter, but of what God can super-add, if he please, to Matter fitly disposed: So that, the Question here cannot be, Whether a Power or Faculty of Thinking will necessarily result out of the Powers of Matter, upon its being in a certain manner modified? But whether Omnipotency cannot give to a System of Matter, fitly disposed, a power of Thinking, which could not be produced out of the Powers and various

Various Modifications of Matter? There is no reason at all to imagine, that the Power of Thinking must be produced out of the Powers and various Modifications of Matter, because a System of Matter, *fitly disposed*, is taken notice of as requisite, or necessary, in order to its having a Power of Thinking super-added to it. For that the Matter be *fitly disposed* is necessary, whether God give the power of Thinking immediately to it, or mediately, *viz.* By joyning to it an immaterial Thinking Substance. And as it doth not follow, that because the System of Matter must be *fitly disposed*, to have an immaterial Thinking Substance joyned to it, therefore this immaterial Thinking Substance can be, or is produced out of the Powers, and various modifications of Matter; so neither doth it follow, that because the Matter must be *fitly disposed*, to have a Power of Thinking, given or super-added to it, therefore the Power of Thinking can be, or is produced out of the Powers and various Modifications of Matter. Which ever way it is, that a power of Thinking is lodged in, or super-added to a System of Matter *fitly disposed*, there is something added to the System of matter so disposed, by the good Pleasure and Bounty of God, which could not be produced out of the Powers, and various modifications of matter. But *how* God does it, which ever way it is, is alike unintelligible to us; nor can we demonstrate which way it is.

§ XIX. “ And we can have no more Con-
 “ ception, how any modification of matter can
 “ produce Thinking, than we can how any

“ modification of Sound should produce Seeing. *Answ.* Allowing all this to be true, it is no demonstration of that for which it is brought. If there is any strength in this Proposition, with relation to what it should prove, it must lie either in the term *How*, or in these words, *We can have no Conception*; or else, *In the comparing of the Modifications of Matter, with the Modifications of Sound*: And Arguing, or Inferring, that because, or if no modification of sound can produce Seeing, then no modification of matter can produce Thinking. That which this Proposition should prove is this, That the Power of Thinking cannot be super-added; or that it is not the pleasure of God, that the Power of Thinking shall be super-added to Solid Substance, let it be modified in what manner soever. Now, first of all, If the force of the Proposition brought to prove this, do lie in the term *How*, it must derive its force from this Supposition, That no power can be super-added to Solid Substance, however modified, but what we can conceive *How* it should be super-added to it. That is, That no System of Matter, whose real Constitution we cannot accurately understand, can have any power; which is, in effect, to affirm, That solid Substance cannot have any power super-added to it. For all the Powers that all Systems of Matter can have, depending entirely on their real Constitutions, to which we are perfect Strangers, none of them must have any powers at all, because we cannot conceive *how* any powers should be super-added to solid substance, or cannot conceive their real
 Consti-

Constitutions, or not exactly understand the precise modifications of Matter, whereby they are made such Systems. Secondly, If the force of the Proposition spoken of, consists in these words, *We can have no Conception*, then it derives its force from this Supposition, That no power can be super-added to solid substance, but what we can conceive can be super-added to it, tho' we may not be able to conceive how it can be super-added to it. Now this is a Supposition that makes all the Powers of all Systems of matter, to depend not on their real Constitutions, but on our Ability, to conceive that they can have them; whereas there are innumerable Powers super-added to solid Substance, which we cannot conceive can be added to it, because those Systems of Matter, which have them, come not under our observation and notice. This must needs be acknowledged by all, who do not fancy that all Material Beings fall under their inspections, and that they can take a Survey of every one of them. Moreover, we can conceive certain Powers to be super-added to certain Systems of matter, which are not super-added to them; of which, a multitude of Instances might be given, there being nothing almost more common, than for Persons to conceive that certain Systems of matter have such Powers as they really have not. Thirdly, If the force of this Proposition doth lie in comparing *the modifications of Matter* with *the modifications of Sound*, and inferring, that if no modification of *Sound* can produce *Seeing*, that then no modification of matter can produce *Thinking*, then the term

How, and these words, *We can have no Conception*, are super-numerary; for if they cannot impart any strength to either part of the Proposition considered absolutely, they cannot add any weight to the comparison. Leaving out therefore those words, the Proposition is thus, Any modifications of matter can no more produce Thinking, than any modifications of sound can produce Seeing. This Proposition is true, both the parts of it are so; but then it is not any thing to the purpose, for which it was intended. Turn it into an Hypothetical Proposition, that it may have the form or appearance of an Argument, and it must run thus, If no modification of sound can produce Seeing, then no modification of matter can produce Thinking. Here both the Antecedent and Consequent are true, but then the Consequence can never be proved; there is no connection between the Proposition inferred, tho' it is true, and the Proposition from which it is inferred, tho' that also is true. The reason why both the Antecedent and Consequent are true, is, because no modification can produce an Act: And therefore, had the Proposition run thus, If no modification can produce an Act, then no modification of matter can produce Thinking, then the consequence had been unexceptionable. But in the former Proposition, the Inference hath no ground at all to support it, because the deduction is not from this, That modifications cannot act, but from such a sort of modifications, as could not produce the Act specified, supposing that modifications could produce Acts; for if a modification could produce

produce an Act, a modification of matter might produce Thinking, tho' no modification of Sound could produce Seeing. But *Thinking*, and *Seeing*, being both Acts, they must suppose Powers, and the enquiry not being whether modifications can act, for it is past doubt that modifications cannot act: For not modifications, but substances so and so modified, or having such and such Powers, are Agents, and do produce Acts. The Proposition will come nearer to the subject we are discoursing of, if it be worded thus, If no modification of sound can produce the power of seeing, then no modification of matter can produce the power of thinking. Now because I do not know what Notions some Persons may have of modifications producing powers, or in what sense they may understand those words, I will state the present Enquiry as plainly as I can, and then consider this Proposition or Argument more particularly. We are very sensible that it is the pleasure of Almighty God, that solid substances being variously modified, should have several Powers, by which Powers they are fitted and enabled to do several sorts of Acts, or produce various Effects. The Enquiry therefore is, Whether it can be demonstratively proved that it is, or is not the pleasure of God, that matter being in a certain manner modified, should have a power of thinking, whereby it may be enabled to think? And to demonstrate that it is not the pleasure of God, that matter, however modified, should have a power of thinking super-added to it, this Argument is proposed, *viz.* That if no modification of sound can produce the

the power of seeing, then no modification of matter can produce the power of thinking. The sense then of this Argument must be this, If it is not the pleasure of God, that a power of seeing should be super-added to sound, what way soever it can be modified, then it is not the pleasure of God, that a power of thinking should be super-added to matter, whatever way it can be modified. Now, this is apparently so un-concluding a Proposition, I cannot think any Man will insist on it, or pretend, that by modifications of sound producing a power of seeing, can be meant producing that power in it self; but that, because various modifications of sound do produce various sensations in other things, therefore producing the power of seeing, must be understood of producing it in other subjects. Let the Argument then, to its utmost advantage, run thus, If it is not the pleasure of God, that a power of seeing should be super added upon any modification of sound, to those subjects in which the various modifications of sound do ordinarily produce certain sensations, then it is not the pleasure of God that a power of thinking should be super-added to solid substance, in what manner soever it can be modified. That I may neither pass over this Argument, without taking any notice of it, nor yet bear too hard upon it, I will only offer these three Considerations concerning it, 1. That supposing the Argument to have any strength in it, it would labour under this unhappiness, That it would prove a great deal more than it should. 2. That such a Reason may be assigned, why no modification of
 sound

found can produce Seeing, or why it is not the pleasure of God that a power of seeing should be super-added upon any modification of sound, &c. as the like cannot be assigned, that it is not the pleasure of God, that a power of thinking should be super-added to matter upon its being in a certain manner modified. 3. That we cannot argue regularly from the modifications of sounds, to the modifications of matter. First, That supposing this Argument to have any strength in it, it hath too much: It would labour under this unhappiness, That it would prove a great deal more than it should, and quite over-turn the whole course and order of Nature, and the ordinary Providence of God in the material World. For the Argument cannot be restrained and limited to the power of thinking, but must, and will reach, to all powers in matter, and so prove that it is not the pleasure of God, that any power should be super-added to matter, upon its being any way modified; which, to me, has this sound with it, That tho' it is the pleasure of God, that matter may be variously modified, yet it is not the pleasure of God that it should have any power at all, *i.e.* Be capable of any Action. Place any other powers in the room of those which are named, the Argument will be every jot as good as it is, and the Propositions, of which it consists, will be every whit as true as they are with these that are mentioned. And therefore I forbear to reflect on the fundamental Error that presseth the Argument, and on that faulty Presumption this way of Arguing imports, in under-
taking

taking to determine what is, or is not the pleasure of God, without any either Real, or Verbal Discovery from him, concerning it. Secondly, Such a Reason may be assigned why it is not the pleasure of God, that a power of Seeing should be super-added upon any modification of sound, to those Subjects, in which the various modifications of sounds do usually produce certain Sensations; the like to which, cannot be assigned, Why it is not the pleasure of God that a power of Thinking should be super-added to matter, upon its being in a certain manner modified, for sound, and the various modifications of it, are only Ideas in our Minds, and are in the Bodies we denominate from them, only powers to produce those Sensations in us, to which we give the Names by which we call them. *Loud, Sbrill, &c.* in Idea, are but the certain Bulk, Figure and Motion, of the insensible parts in the Bodies themselves, which cause those Sensations in us. They are but certain Powers, that are in Bodies, by reason of the particular Constitutions of their primary Qualities, to operate after a particular manner on one certain Sense, or Organ of Sense, *viz.* The Ear, by agitating variously the Animal Spirits, which are in that Organ when duly disposed to receive their impressions. The same modification of matter may produce in it a power, which will produce in us different Sensations, but by operating on different Organs of Sense, fitted to receive its impressions. One and the same modification in the external Object, may produce different Effects or Sensations in us, because it operateth on different

rent Organs, adapted in us for different purposes. The various modifications of sound cannot produce in us seeing, because it is the pleasure of God, that the Ideas those Bodies communicate to us, which we call in general various modifications of sound, should be conveyed to us not by the *Eye*, but only by the *Ear*, from whence they are distinguished from those Ideas we are to receive by our *Eyes*. We have in this matter a plain real discovery of the pleasure of God, but we have not the like in the other case, about which the Argument I am speaking of is concerned. But the true reason why no modification of sound can produce a power of Seeing, is because neither sound, nor any modification of it, can produce any power at all: They can no more produce a Power of Hearing, than they can a Power of Seeing. Let the Organ of Hearing be disordered, and have no Animal Spirits in it, that can be agitated by external Objects, no sounds, nor modifications of sound, can produce a Power of Hearing in it. Thirdly, That we cannot argue regularly from the modifications of sound, or of any sensible qualities to the modifications of matter; and the reason of this is evident, *viz.* Because they do differ *Toto Cælo*. The modifications of sounds, are only Ideas in our minds; the modifications of matter, are the real, but unknown Constitutions of things existing in Nature. If there can be any room to argue concerning Thinking, from the modifications of Sound, it cannot be concerning the Power of Thinking, but only about the modifications of Thought. Thus, if
any

any Man should offer any thing concerning the modifications of Thought, so incoherent as this is, *viz.* That the modifications of sound can produce Seeing, this obvious inconsistency may be made use of regularly enough, to convince him, and others, of the Absurdity and Incoherence of the other Assertion. But to say that a power of Thinking cannot be super-added to the substance of matter in any case, because the Ideas we receive only by one sense, cannot be got by another sense, hath no connection at all, and is so far from being a demonstration, it is not good sense. In short, the whole of this Argument amounts to no more than this, If secondary qualities cannot produce Powers (which it is certain they cannot) then God cannot, by the modification of its primary qualities, give Powers to matter; whereas all the Powers of matter, so far as we can observe, depend on them, as their Source, Spring, and Original, by the Pleasure and Ordination of God, as appears by the whole Series and Order of Nature and Providence. These words, *We can have no more Conception how any modification of matter can produce Thinking, than we can, how any modification of Sound should produce Seeing,* must be understood concerning the Reality of a Consequent or Effect, following upon a System of matter being fitly disposed or modified, either to receive a Power which it had not before, or to occasion an Act in a Subject endowed with a certain Power to Act in a certain manner upon certain occasions. Now, I conceive, it is past all doubt, that various modifications of matter are
necessary

necessary to occasion, if not produce, certain different Acts in Subjects which are endued with Power to exert those different Acts, on different Occasions, tho' we may not know how those different modifications of matters do occasion or produce those different Acts. And tho' no modifications of matter can produce Thinking in the System of Matter, which is the Subject of those modifications, yet a certain modification of matter, may be requisite and necessary to the preparing and making a System of Matter meet to receive a Power of Thinking. And I think it equally easie to conceive, how any modification of Sound should produce Seeing in the Bell, or Harp, &c. that makes the sound, as how it should produce Hearing in it.

§ XX. " All Modifications of Matter are the same as to this point. *Ans^w*. If it is not the pleasure of God, that a Power of Thinking should be super-added to our Idea of Matter, upon any modification of it, then all modifications of Matter are the same as to that point. And it is acknowledged very probable, that it is not the pleasure of God to super-add a Power of Thinking to matter any way modified. Yet bare saying, that all modifications are the same as to that point, is not proving it; and it is not probable proof we are looking after, (tho' such hath not yet come under consideration) but demonstrative proof. Mr. *Lock* saith we have the highest degree of probability; those therefore who will oppose him, ought to take care, that what they offer be true demonstration, otherwise all they say will be to no purpose. That
Matter

Matter being variously modified hath different Powers, the several Objects we converse with do clearly demonstrate. And we shall hardly be able to demonstrate, that all modifications of matter are the same, as to the power of Thinking; till we attain to know what are all the Modifications and Powers that Matter is capable of, unless we can give such true Accounts of the nature of Matter, and the nature of Thought, as will demonstrate that these two are incompatible; which we cannot do, without understanding exactly in what the nature of each doth consist. All modifications of Matter are no more the same, as to Matter having a Power of Thinking super-added to it, than they are the same as to Matter having an Immaterial Thinking Substance joyned to it. And I believe all modifications of Matter are not thought by this Reverend Author, to be the same as to this point; for if they be, *a Thinking Rock, or a Thinking Post,* would be every whit as intelligible as a Thinking Man.

§ XXI. “ And Matter may as well be made
 “ no Matter, by modifying, as be made to
 “ Think by it. *Answ.* This is Affirming, but
 not Demonstrating. That Matter should be
 made no Matter by modifying it, is altogether
 unintelligible, and impossible; for let it be mo-
 dify'd ever so many ways, it will still be Mat-
 ter. It may be proved Demonstratively, that
 Matter cannot be made no Matter, by modi-
 fying it; and if demonstrative proof were pro-
 duced, that Matter, however modify'd, can-
 not have a Power of Thinking, the Dispute
 would

would be at an end. But that Matter, under a certain modification, should think, when a Power of Thinking is super-added to it, is consistent enough, and as intelligible, as that it should exert any other A&t, when it hath a Power super-added to it, to exert that A&t. It is not said that Matter is made to think by any modifications, that are proper to it considered barely as Matter, tho' by some of these modifications of the Substance, which we know not, it may, for ought we know, be disposed and made fit to have a Power of Thinking super-added to it, by which it shall be enabled to think. This Power of Thinking is not proper or peculiar to material Substance; nor can we prove demonstratively that it is so to Immaterial Substance; but for any thing we know to the contrary, it may be super-added both to the one and to the other. For if the same Substance may be so modified as to be sometimes material, and sometimes immaterial, (as is granted in this very Dispute) it is not impossible to suppose it may have the Power of Thinking, when it is material, as when it is immaterial: For as the Power of Thinking, when super-added to Immaterial Substance, doth not make it cease to be Immaterial, so being super-added to material Substance, it doth not make it cease to be material; tho' being super-added to both, it makes both to be Spiritual Substances, which neither of them could be without it.

§ XXII. " This is just as if a Man should maintain, That tho' all Immaterial Substances are not extended and divisible, yet some

“ of them may possibly be; or Omnipotence
 “ may super-add to them a Faculty of Exten-
 “ sion and Divisibility; for Immaterial Substan-
 “ ces may become Divisible and Material by the
 “ same Philosophy, by which we may con-
 “ clude that Matter may Think; which is the
 “ same thing as to become Immaterial, and to
 “ surpass all the Powers and Capacities of Mat-
 “ ter. *Answ.* Our Author is here got as far
 from his point as he was before, when upon
 the Modifications of Sound; for here he is gone
 from the Modifications of Matter, to the Trans-
 mutation of Substances. That I may do this
 Paragraph, and the Point discoursed of, what
 Right I can in a few words, I will, 1. Offer one
 Consideration concerning the Subject of our
 Discourse. 2. Shew what I apprehend is the
 great mistake of those who write against what
 Mr. *Lock* hath said concerning it. 3. Take no-
 tice of some mistakes in this Paragraph. First, I
 will propose one Consideration concerning the
 Subject of our Discourse, *viz.* That the Power
 of Thinking being a Power super-added to Sub-
 stance, and all Substance being either Material
 or Immaterial, the Substance to which this
 Power of Thinking is super-added must be of
 one of those sorts. It is not made either the
 one or the other, by having that Power super-
 added to it; tho' being super-added, it makes
 the Substance, to which it is super-added, Spi-
 ritual Substance. As the Power of producing
 in any Sensitive Animal the Idea of Blueness or
 Acidity, or any other distinct Power being
 super-added to any solid Substance, doth not
 make

make that Substance Matter, but only makes it to be a Substance to which such a Denomination will belong, as doth arise from its having such a Power super-added to it, when the Substance is considered precisely as having that Power. The precise Denomination to be added to Substance, upon its having any Power super-added to it, is to be taken from the Power which is super-added to it, without considering what other Power that Substance hath; from which it will be denominated, when consider'd as having that Power. If it be said, that to be Immaterial, and to Think, be the same, that is not true, for the Negation of one Modification in Substance, *viz.* Solidity, is not the Position of another Modification in Substance, *viz.* Thought. Immaterial Substance is alike capable of having Solidity, or Thought, or both those Modifications, or any other Modifications super-added to it, which it shall please God to super-add to it. Perhaps, it will be said, that the same Substance has indeed a Power, or is capable of Thought, or of Solidity, whenever God p'leases to bestow either of them on it, but that God cannot give Solidity, and Thought, to any Substance both together. Now, this is the very Question in Debate, and remains to be demonstrated. If it be said that Actual Thinking is to Immaterial Substance as Actual Solidity is to Material Substance, inseparable from it, these two things are to be demonstrated, 1. That God has created any Substances that must be always in Action, or else cease to be Substances, *i. e.* Substances of such a nature, from which God cannot take

away the Action they have, without destroying the Substance it self; or that God hath created a Substance that must always Think, for Thinking is an Action. 2. That if it be so, how it will follow from thence, that because God has made some Substances not Solid which Think always, therefore he cannot give to Substances, that have the Modification of Solidity, a Power to Think sometimes. Solidity, and Thinking, are evidently distinct Ideas, and we not knowing what Modifications may be super-added to our Idea of Substance without Solidity, cannot prove that every Immaterial Substance has the Modification of Thinking super-added to it; and therefore we cannot prove that it has the same proportion to Immaterial Substance, that Solidity has to Material. If it be said, But we know that some Immaterial Substances have the Power of Thinking, I answer, true. But can we thence demonstratively infer, that the Power of Thinking cannot be super-added to any Material Substances without making them Immaterial? We know that Mobility is super-added to some Material Systems, can we thence demonstratively infer, that Mobility cannot be super-added to Immaterial Substances, without making them Material?

§ XXIII. Secondly, I will mention what I apprehend is the Grand mistake of those who argue against what Mr. *Lock* hath said concerning this Point. Their Discourses seem to intimate, that they think that there are but two sorts of Modification which can be super-added to our General Idea of Substance, *viz.* Solidity,

ty, and Thinking. Hence I conceive it is, that they make *Immaterial*, and *the Power of Thinking*, to stand for the same Idea; and that they are so positive, that should a Power of Thinking be super-added to Matter, Matter would be made no Matter; and that some, with an express rejecting of the consideration of modified Matter, do ask, Can Matter Think? Which Question so put, seems to me, to be in other words, This, is Solidity, Thinking? If Matter can Think, it is not by virtue of Solidity, but by virtue of such a Power super-added to the Substance, under a certain Modification, that it may Think, tho' it be Solid. If the Power of Thinking can be super-added to Matter, it is not the Power or Modification which can Think, but that to which the Modification or Power is super-added, *viz.* The Substance which has the Modification of Solidity. To ask therefore, whether Matter can Think, and at the same time expressly exclude all consideration of the Power of Thinking, is to ask whether Substance can Think by the sole virtue of Solidity? Or whether the Power of Thinking is included in our Idea of Solidity? Which is much what, as to ask whether Substance can produce that Act by virtue of one Power, which it cannot produce but by virtue of another. What occasion can there be to ask such a question, unless it proceed from an opinion that Substance, having the Modification of Solidity, cannot have any other Power super-added to it, but what must depend upon its Solidity? For if it can, and amongst others this of Thinking, then tho' solid Substance cannot think

merely as it is Solid, yet having the Power of Thinking super-added to it, it may think. How many sorts of modifications can be super-added to our Idea of Substance, surpasses our comprehension, but any modification super-added to it, will entitle it to a denomination answerable to that modification; and that denomination, together with another Name, or with words signifying a denial of it, added to substance, will as perfectly divide substance, as the Terms Material and Immaterial do. Upon another modification being super-added to either of those kinds of substances, another denomination will belong to it, when considered merely with relation to that modification. Should the modification of Motion be alone super-added to our Idea of substance, it would make it Substance with motion. And Mobile and Immobile Substance, would as perfectly divide Substance, as solid and unsolid Substance, *i. e.* Material and Immaterial do. This Mobile Substance could not certainly be concluded by us to have either the modification of Solidity, or of Thinking, by reason of its Mobility. Should Mobility be super-added to a substance, which hath the modification of Solidity, it would be a substance with Solidity and Mobility. Should the modification of Thinking be super-added to a Substance which hath those other modifications, it would be a substance with Solidity, Mobility, and the Power of Thinking. That which would move, and think, would be Matter, or solid Substance; the super-adding of the modification of Thinking, would not destroy the other modifications; that which would think

think would be Matter, as well as that which would move : For the modification could not think, but that which had the modification of Solidity, *viz.* The Substance. We are sensible that it is the pleasure of God, that various Powers should be super added to solid Substance, upon its being variously disposed or modify'd. How many the Powers be, which it is the pleasure of God shall be super-added to our Idea of Matter, upon its being variously disposed, we cannot tell. Hereupon this Question is put, whether it is the pleasure of God, that the modification or power of Thinking shall be super-added to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed? Mr. *Lock* saith, The Question is too abstruse and difficult for us to resolve demonstratively. In opposition to this, or to prove the contrary, it is ask'd whether Matter, without any regard to modifications, can think? Now can this import any thing else, than either that the super-adding of modifications, to our Idea of Matter, signifies not any thing to Matter's producing certain Acts, or that no modifications can be super-added to our Idea of Matter? If modifications can be super-added, neither this Question, nor the Answer that belongs to it, can contribute any thing to the proving that the modification of Thinking cannot be superadded to our Idea of Matter.

§ XXIV. Thirdly, I will mention some of the mistakes which may be observed in the Paragraph before set down. First, It supposes several things, every one of which is wrong, as 1. The words, referring equally to both the parts of the sentence which goes immediately before them,

and taking them to be the same in sense, tho' different in words, suppose Mr. *Lock* to say, in effect, that matter may, by modifying, be made no matter; for which there is not any ground, but a mistaken Imagination. 2. It supposes that it hath been demonstratively proved, that the modification of thinking cannot be superadded to a solid substance. 3. That it is as Intelligible, that Immateriality may be superadded to our Idea of Matter, as that that modification, which makes substance to be matter, may be super-added to our Idea of substance. 4. That Mr. *Lock* concludes, that the modification of Thinking may be super added to matter, whereas he saith it cannot be demonstratively concluded. 5. That Immaterial, in the strictest sense of that Term, as contradistinguished from matter, (for so the word is to be understood in the present Dispute) and the Power of Thinking, stand for the same Idea. 6. That we can know all the modifications or powers Matter is capable of; for without that, we cannot know what surpasses all the Powers and Capacities of Matter, except what is a contradiction to our Idea of Matter, which a Power of Thinking cannot be proved to be, by bare saying, That Immaterial, and a Power of Thinking, are the same. In short, the point is thus: We have full Conviction that there is a Power of Thinking in some Systems of Matter. Hereupon a Question arises, Whether this modification of Thinking be the modification of the same substance that has the modification of Solidity, or the modification of another Substance, which not being solid,

lid, is united to the material substance? Some answer it is a modification of the substance of that matter; others answer it is a modification of an Immaterial substance, joyned to those Systems of Matter. Mr. *Lock* saith the Question cannot be demonstratively determined, but that the highest degree of probability is on their side, who say it is a modification of an immaterial substance. This displeases: Therefore to demonstrate that a Power of Thinking cannot be super-added to our Idea of Matter, or be a modification of Matter, we are told that Immaterial, and a Power of Thinking, are the same Idea; and that a Power of Thinking cannot be super-added to our Idea of matter, but matter must be made Immaterial, or no matter. Now, it is most evident, that *Immaterial*, and a *Power of Thinking*, are as distinct Ideas, as *Material* and *Immaterial* be. And that should Matter be made no Matter, or be changed into Immaterial Substance, Substance would only lose that modification which made it matter, and that it could not think till the modification or power of thinking should be superadded to it. Secondly, The Instance proposed in this Paragraph is not rightly stated: If we would propose a Case concerning Immaterial Substances, that should be parallel to that which hath been under our consideration, we should first fix on some positive modification, which is as essential to all Substances which have not the modification of Solidity, as Solidity is to all those which are material. To say, the modification of Thinking is so, is *but saying*. How can we know that every substance

that

that is not solid, hath the power of thinking super-added to it? Having fixed on this modification, we should fix on another modification, that the Question being proposed, Whether it is a modification of immaterial substance, or no? More probable Arguments might be produced on the one side than on the other, but no demonstrative proof could be brought either way. If in this case, some should be positive that it is a modification of Immaterial Substance, and the highest probability was on their side, others should be as peremptory on the other side; and at last, a Person of greater Consideration and Temper, should say the point does not admit of any demonstrative proof, but probability carries it for them, who say, it is a modification of Immaterial substance, and that therefore we must leave the point (till demonstrative proof can be produced one way or other) as God hath laid it before us, and follow, and be contented with probability, whilst God is not pleased to afford us any greater Light concerning it; what damage would any way redound from this persons saying thus? Would that Wise, Prudent, and Good Man, and Lover of Truth, deserve to be evilly reflected on, because he would check Peoples vain Curiosity, convince the Materialists that they fight against the highest degrees of Probability, and put others in mind that they should not give the Adversaries to a good Cause, the Advantages they do, by presuming to know more of the point, than it is the pleasure of God they should know of it in this imperfect Estate? I speak not this with respect to the Reverend

Mr.

Mr. *Jenkin*, (who concludes his Discourse with these words, *But tho' I have, upon this occasion, mentioned this Gentleman here, yet it would be a great injury done him, to rank him with the Authors of the Oracles of Reason*) but some other Writers, who have on this occasion Indulged a *Licentiousness*, which Moral Heathens would be ashamed of. Thirdly, There is not any thing in this Paragraph, nor in all that this Learned Author hath said, with relation to what Mr. *Lock* hath delivered, that can any more prove that the modification of Thinking cannot be super-added to our Idea of Matter, than it can that other modifications cannot be super-added to it. For Instance, Let a Person, who hath a mind to affirm that the modification, or power of active moving, or motivity, cannot be super-added to our Idea of Matter, but that it is a modification peculiar to Immaterial Substance, place a power of moving in this, and the foregoing Sentences, in the room of a power of Thinking, and those very words will as fully demonstrate his point, as they do the other.

§ XXV. That which may be regularly deduced from the passage in Mr. *Lock's Essay of Humane Understanding* before quoted, and on which so many have thought fit to reflect, is this, That People should not pretend a demonstrative certainty concerning Things, which cannot be demonstratively proved; which is a very great Truth, and which would be of extraordinary good use, would People strictly and rigidly govern themselves by it. The greatest Service that can be done to *Truth* and *Godliness*, is to preserve
our

our *Reason* within its proper Bounds, and to let *Faith* have its just scope. I very much question, whether any thing can give bad Men greater advantage in their endeavouring to promote *Scepticism*, and in their opposing and talking against *the Articles of the Christian Faith*, than Christians, and especially Divines, or Clergymens detracting any way from *the Credibility of Divine Testimony*, and making an Ostentation of knowing Things which God hath placed perfectly out of Humane reach; And treating others scurrilously, who are more modest, and more inquisitive than themselves, because they will not acknowledge that the Truth of certain Propositions can be demonstrated, meerly because they say, They can, tho' they will not be prevailed with, to be at the pains to demonstrate their Truth.

F I N I S.

E R R A T A.

PAGE 2. l. 33. for *Natural* r. *Material*. p. 12. l. 10. r. *Consistent*. p. 13. l. 11. r. *Revelation*. p. 16. l. 27. r. *pretended*. p. 17. l. 18. r. *knowledge*. p. 22. l. 20. after *any* r. *meer*. p. 31. l. 29. after *tho'* r. *tot*. p. 33. l. 10. r. *Substance*. p. 45. l. 1. r. *offer* r. *affirm*.

A
DISCOURSE
Concerning the
RESURRECTION
OF THE
Same Body :
WITH TWO
LETTERS.

Concerning the Necessary
IMMATERIALITY of Cre-
ated Thinking Substance.

*Secret things belong unto the Lord our God,
Deut. 29. 29.*

*London : Printed by S. Holt, for A.
and J. Churchill at the Black-Swan
in Pater-Noster-Row, 1705.*

THE
PREFACE
TO THE
READER.

THE DISCOURSES which follow, are not design'd to prove either, 1. That the Raised Body will not be Philosophically the same, which was before vitally united to the Soul; Or 2dly. That God has superadded a Power of Thinking to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed; But, to enquire into the strength of those Arguments which the very Learned and Reverend Dr. Whitby, and some other Authors have lately Published to prove the Resurrection of the same Body Philosophically Considered, is a Necessary Article of Christian Faith; And of those Considerations, which Mr.
A 2 Brough-

The Preface.

Broughton, and the Ingenious Mr. Norris have insisted on as Demonstrative Proofs, that God cannot add a Power of Thinking to any System of Matter, in what manner soever disposed; And so to reduce these Points into the State in which the infinitely wise God has thought fit to leave them, with respect to Men.

It is not fit that Rational Creatures should have any thing put upon them, as Demonstratively Certain, as long as the Proofs produc'd to support so mighty an Assertion, are intrinsically Defective, and fail of setting the Proposition in so clear a Light as is boasted of. Nor is it safe, that Christians should have any Propositions intruded on them, as Necessary Articles of Christian Faith, which are not evidently Parts of Divine Revelation, yea, clearly taught in the New Testament. Admit a Breach to be made on People in these matters, you sap the Foundation of all True Religion; you do in effect, throw up the whole of Protestantism at once. If the generality of People's Minds be tainted as to these matters, it is not to be wondred at, if the Numbers be great amongst us, who are impatiently desirous to have a Prince Reign over them, who will be sure to Countenance their Acting with a suitableness to these Sentiments, That Reason
and

The Preface.

and Scripture are to be Sacrificed : That Implicite Faith is the sole Privilege of Mankind ; And blind Submission is the whole Duty of a Christian : and who will not be satisfied with any thing less, than Entire Communion with the Church of Rome.

It is of the most dangerous consequence, to impose on People in these sorts of matters. Make them Slaves here, shackle their Reason, and their Faith, All is gone. Discretion, Morality, and Religion, will soon be quite lost. It is very manifest, my Thoughts about the matters discoursed of, agree with those an Excellent Gentleman lately Deceased, had of them : Not because they were his thoughts ; for I think it a very unworthy thing, & great disparagement to a Rational Creature, to entertain and espouse Notions, meerly because they are other Men's : Yet I do not think it any prejudice to what I have Writ, that that Great Man was of the same mind. I have good reason to think he understood as well, if not better, than any Man in Europe, how far Humane Reason, unassisted by supernatural Revelation, can reach in such a Case as two of the following Discourses are concerned about ; And that he understood the Holy Scriptures much better than any ; yea, all those who have
Pub-

The Preface.

Published their Explications and Interpretations of them; at least, all whose Writings of that Nature have come within my View.

It may be, some will think me out here, because I do not appropriate the understanding of Scripture to a particular Sett of Men. They may enjoy the satisfaction they take in their own Opinion, without being disturbed by me. But I hope I may (without damage to any) declare it is my Opinion, That those who judge of the Sense of Scripture by Girdles, or Caps, or any Habit, are as likely to be mistaken as any of their Neighbours. It was the Assertion of a Man of great Mr. Selden. Fame, that Lay-men have best Interpreted the hard Places in the Bible, such as Johannes Picus, Scaliger, Grotius, Salmasius, Heinsius, &c. He that produces better Reasons for his Interpretations of Scripture, than can be produced for any other Interpretations of them, passes with me for the best Interpreter or Explainer of Scripture, without concerning my self at all about his Garb, his Character, or Profession.

*I am not Ignorant that many have Writ against that Excellent Gentleman I spake of;
And*

The Preface.

And that some of them had Admirable Talents : But I am apt to think those Great Men, by affecting to oppose him, had the Ill Luck to straggle ; It was their Misfortune they were got quite out of their proper Provinces. This I am sure of, whenever I Read their Productions of this kind, I cannot avoid calling to mind a Saying of the Celebrated Monsieur de la Bruyere ; with which Passage I will conclude this Address, but without any Application, save what Mr.

Bruyere himself gives it. A Charact. &c.
certain Magistrate arriving p. 6.

by his Merit to the first Dignities of the Gown, thought himself qualified for every thing : He Printed a Treatise of Morality, and Published himself a Coxcomb.

Faint, illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. The text is arranged in several lines and appears to be a list or a series of entries.

T H E

INTRODUCTION.

ARTICLES of Christian Faith, are Truths of very great Importance. Their Author has set them before the World in such a Light, and with such Evidence, as is sufficient to obtain them Credit, with all Unprejudiced Men. 'Tis very manifest, that every good Man ought to have an affectionate concern for them, because their Original is undoubtedly Divine: The Relation they have to the Happiness of Mankind, is plain and direct: And the Influence they will have on People, when Entertain'd aright, to make them Regular and Exemplary in their Conversations, is Mighty and Invincible. But we cannot do the Articles of Christian Faith their just Right, unless we guard our selves effectually against all the Artifices and Wiles, which have been, are, or shall be made use of, to prevail with People to entertain certain Doctrines, as Necessary Articles of Christian Faith, which are not so in Reality; and which therefore ought not to be made Equal with, and to have that Honour attributed to them, which peculiarly belongs to those Doctrines which were Revealed and Taught by our Lord Jesus Christ, and his Apostles.

B

It

• The Introduction.

It has been often observed, that the Beauty of the Christian Faith hath been much defaced, and its Purity much corrupted, by Foreign Mixtures. This has been matter of frequent and loud Complaints; and many Attempts have been made towards a Reformation. In some Places very considerable Effects have follow'd; yet in very few, if in any Places, hath the Gospel of Christ had its just and full Veneration paid to it.

Christianity suffers much in the World, not only by the Grand Blotches which in some Places do almost overspread the Face, and Profession of the Christian Faith, but also by those Encroachments that are made on the Christian Faith, by advancing Human Interpretations of Gospel Doctrines, into Necessary Articles of Christian Faith. It may with too much Reason be suspected that the Faith of a great part of those who profess the Reformed Religion, is but a meer Medley; consisting of Articles which have no just Foundation in the Holy Scriptures, (or which they do not know to have any such Foundation there) as well as of some which are certainly taught in the Bible. Who can relate distinctly the many and the great Advantages which would accrue to the Christian Church, if all the Doctrines, which are purely Human Interpretations, but are Dignified with the Venerable Character of Necessary Articles of Christian Faith, were culled out from those which Christ hath taught; and that the Professors of the Christian Faith would be prevailed with, to give the Latter all the Veneration which is due to them, and to pay the Former no more Respect than they justly deserve? With what an amiable and winning Lustre would the Christian Faith

The Introduction.

Faith appear to all the World? How entire and unmangled an Honour would be paid every where to the only Head of the Christian Church? With what Cordial Love and Friendship would Believers be Beautified? With what wonderful Success would they then mutually build up one another in their most Holy Faith? Then should we be inspired with Devotion, Genuine and Noble, Pure and Rational, and our Prayers would be both Fervent and Effectual! This would have a mighty power on our Lives, and cause our Conversations to comport with the Purity and Tendency of our Faith! This would give so Mortal a Wound to Heresie and Schism, that neither the Names nor Things would find place any more! Then there would be an end of merciless Wranglings and Quarrellings about obscure and useless Conceptions, and Human Systems would no longer deflower the Bible. But this is a Work which requires time, as it deserves the conjoynd Pains of the clearest Heads, and most disinterested Spirits.

It may not perhaps be amiss to take notice of one Proposition, which hath lately been contended for, which has been earnestly affirmed to be a Necessary Article of Christian Faith, by some late Writers, (and particularly by a very worthy Reverend * Doctor in Divinity, who * Dr. Whitby. has been as industrious to serve the Protestant Cause as any Man living, and is a Person of extraordinary great Learning, Moderation and Piety) and to enquire whether what has been said on its behalf, doth afford satisfactory Proof that it deserves to wear the Character they have put upon it.

The Introduction.

That the Resurrection of the Same Body Philosophically Considered, is a Necessary Article of Christian Faith, was some time ago Asserted, in order to create in People an Opinion, that there was something in Mr. Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding, which is of dangerous Consequence to Articles of Christian Faith; which gave Mr. Locke an occasion to enquire strictly into the Grounds of that Assertion. Since that time two or three Authors have undertaken to Vindicate that Assertion, and to reply to some Passages Writ by Mr. Locke on that Subject. These Authors have acquitted themselves in the Contest, with a Warmth, and I think Confusion too, which seldom fail to accompany the Defence of those Doctrines, which having their Rise from Men, are affirmed to be Descended from Heaven.

*My Design at present, is to Consider briefly what these Authors have produced to make out the Truth of what they Assert; and what they have offered against the Passages they bring out of Mr. Locke's 3d. Letter to the Bishop of Worcester. In order to a more distinct apprehending the Strength and Pertinency of what they have delivered about this Matter, and how Consonant their Discourses are with their own avowed Notions, it may be proper to consider the Sense of some of the Terms in the Proposition they contend for; what they do say concerning them, and concerning some other Points, *scilicet* relating to the Matter in Dispute.*

C H A P. I.

The true Notion of the Same Body.

THE *Same Body* may be considered two ways; either in a popular Vulgar Sense, or in a strict Philosophical Sense. Being considered in this latter Sense, it must consist of the same Numerical Particles of Matter. “The Mass consisting of the same Atoms, must be the same Mass, or the same Body, let the Parts be never so differently tumbled; but if one of these Atoms be taken away, or one new one added, it is no longer the same Mass, or the same Body. Mr. *Locke’s Essay*, &c. B. 2. Chap. 27. 83. “No *Body*, upon the removal or change of some of the Particles that at any time make it up, is the very same Material Substance, or the same Body. Mr. *Locke’s* 3d. Letter, p. 173. This is the true and just meaning of these words, *The same Body*, when consider’d strictly and Philosophically. In this sense, The same Body is to be understood in the present Enquiry, concerning the Raising of the same Body, at the General Resurrection. Those who assert the Resurrection of the same Body, do not except against this account of the

meaning of these words, *The same Body*, when Philosophically considered.

Yea, they express themselves to the same Effect, when they declare in what sense they understand these words, *The same Body*, in this Enquiry. *The same Body, is the same Material Substance* which was vitally united to the Soul here, Bp. of Worcester's 2d. Letter, p. 25. *The Raised Body is the same Substance*, Numerically with the *Body sown*, Dr. Whitby's Comment on the Epistles p. 109. col. 1. *The proper Notion of the Identity of the Body, imports an absolute Sameness in Quantity as well as Matter*, says Mr. Parker, p. 6. of his *Sylvæ*, &c.

And as these last Authors do mean the same Body in this strict sense, so they do affirm that this Proposition, *The very same Body* Philosophically considered, which was vitally united to the Human Soul in this World, shall at the General-Resurrection, be raised again, is an Article of Christian Faith necessary to be explicitly believed by every one. The Bishop of Worcester having affirmed that the same Body, in the sense mention'd above, shall be raised again, is an Article of Christian Faith, Mr. Locke propounded this Question; "Is it an Article necessary to be believed by every one? And it is on the account of what Mr. Locke replied to the Bishop concerning this Matter, that those who have since asserted the Proposition, a Necessary Article of Christian Faith, have thought fit to publish what they have to say in Vindication of that Point. They do not except against the Question, nor do they give any express Answer

swer to it, so that they plainly allow the Question, and would have People understand, their meaning is, That every one must necessarily explicitly believe that Proposition. That which prevail'd with Dr. *Whitby* to write on this Subject, he declares, was his *perceiving that the Doctrine of the Resurrection of the same Body which dictb, is now either questioned, or thought unnecessary to be believed, p. 102.* This Necessity they insist on, must have relation to some Ends, concerning which, they would have done well, to have declared their Minds in express Terms: For if it is *Salvation*, either they, or some others may be in a very dangerous Estate.

C H A P. II.

Concerning Propositions of Man's Composing, when propos'd as Articles of Christian Faith.

THE Terms of that Proposition, which is of Man's Composing, and is affirmed to be an Article of Christian Faith, necessary to be Explicitly believed by every one, must have a precise determin'd Sense, which every one must understand and comprehend, in order to its being Explicitly believed by every one. For if the Terms are capable of several Senses, he that does believe the Proposition, but in a Sense different from that which is the precise

determinate Sense of them, as they express an Article of Faith necessary to be believed by every one, does not believe that Proposition, which is an Article of Faith necessary for every one to believe; tho' he does profess and declare his Faith by the very same words that others do, who do really believe what is truly an Article of the Christian Faith.

It will not here serve their turn to say, The words in which Christ hath delivered his Father's Mind about the same matter, are equivalent, and of the same import with those they use: For this is no more than to say, They understand Christ's Words in the same Sense they do those Terms, which they rather chuse to make use of, in declaring their own Notions concerning the matter. But, what assurance doth this give that they have neither taken in more, than what makes up the true and just Sense of the Words in which Christ hath delivered to all Men what they are to believe, nor left out any thing that is necessary to it? Men have an undoubted right to assign the precise sense and meaning of their own words; what it is they design to express, and would have other People understand by them. And if they design well and honestly, especially if what they speak of, is of consequence to others, and necessary for them to understand and believe, they cannot doubt of their being under a mighty Obligation to do so. But it is not so evident that they have a Right to assign to every one, the determinate Sense in which they must necessarily understand all the Words

in which Christ hath delivered any of his Doctrines. They may declare in their own words, what they conceive is the true Sense of those Propositions Christ hath taught, and the Reasons which induce them to think that the true and just Sense of them, is what they think fit to express by those other Words. But when they have done so, none are obliged without any more ado, to take their Propositions for Necessary Articles of Faith. They may, they have a Right, and they ought to consider, whether they express themselves pertinently, and to examine whether what they deliver is true or not, and accordingly to admit or reject it. Those who are convinced and satisfied by the Reasons they produce for what they say, and that they are in the right, will be of their Minds, and perhaps will chuse to express their Faith in their Dialect. But they have no right to expect others should believe their Declarations, because they say they give a true account of the Sense which Jesus Christ thought fit to deliver to all Men in other Words; nor have they a Right to oblige all People to submit to what they offer, as the Reasons why they put such a Construction on what Christ hath said, whilst they either do not perceive the strength of their Reasons, or perceiving the full force of them, are on good Grounds perswaded they are mistaken, and can produce much better, much stronger Reasons why Christ's Declarations should be understood in another Sense.

If the Resurrection of the same Body strictly considered, was an Article of Christian Faith;

If

If it were taught in those very words, or in words evidently Equivalent to them in the New-Testament, the Propositions affirmed to be Necessary Articles of Christian Faith, by those who contend for the Resurrection of the same Body, are some of them most certainly not Articles of Christian Faith. Those who are agreed what it is which Constitutes the same Body considered strictly; and who are also agreed that the Resurrection of the same Body so considered, is a Necessary Article of the Christian Faith, are nevertheless so far from agreeing which is *that very same Body* which must be raised at the General Resurrection, that they lay down Propositions, which they affirm are Necessary Articles of Christian Faith, that are not consistent, but most plainly contrary to one another. Notwithstanding their agreement in Sounds, and their zeal for the same Words, yet on one side or other, they are so very defective, they do not believe an Article of Faith necessary for every one to believe, according to the declared Judgment of each side. The late Learned Bishop of *Worcester's* Article of Christian Faith touching the Resurrection was, *That the Body that shall be raised, is not to consist only of those Particles which made up the Body when laid in the Grave, but of Particles of Matter which were some time or other Vitally united to the Soul.* Dr. *Whitby* and Mr. *Parker* say, The Article of Christian Faith necessary to be believed by every one, is, *That the Body which shall be raised, shall consist of all, and only those Particles, which made up the Body when it was laid*

Resurrection of the same Body. 7

in the Grave. The Author of a sort of a Book Entitled, [*An Account of Mr. Locke's Religion,*] declares peremptorily that *the very same Body shall be raised again.* But which Body he means, I cannot fix on, any farther, than as to *St. Paul's* Body, and the Bodies of those People at *Rome,* and *Philippi,* to whom he wrote his Epistles. His Article is plainly different from theirs, who believe either of the former Doctrines. He saith *that St. Paul,* Rom. 8. 11. 23. Phil. 3. 21. *certainly understood the Bodies, which he, and the Romans, and Philippians then had,* p. 149. Whereby he plainly means the Bodies of all Ages, for he has no reason to think there were not in those Churches Persons of all Ages. And in respect of *St. Paul,* who writ those Epistles at different times, it is a plain contradiction; whose Body strictly considered could not be the very same at writing both of them. These Propositions are so opposite and contrary, they cannot all of them be true. And then certainly they cannot all of them be Articles of Christian Faith, necessary to be Explicitly believed by every one. Fix on which of them you will, to be the Necessary Article, all who believe the Resurrection of the same Body in either of the other Senses, (if in one of those Senses, it can be said to be the same Body) do not believe the Necessary Article, tho' they express their Faith by the very same words. Thus, either the Bishop did not, and those who side with him do not, or the Doctor, and those who believe his way in this Matter, do not believe an Article of Christian Faith
neces-

8. *A Discourse concerning the*

necessary to be believed by every one. If the Anonymous Author's Article (what it is I know not) be the Necessary Article, all of both the former sorts, are wretchedly out of the way. And if any of the named, or intended Propositions, is a Necessary Article of Christian Faith, all, of two of the Parties are every jot in as bad plight, with respect to the Faith of the Resurrection, as any Man who believes not any one of them. What a condition must Multitudes of People be in at this rate, if at the great Judgment, they were to be proceeded with according to the Measures decreed by Men of too much Heat, and Byass'd Affections! And who, not being duly mindful of their own Infirmities, do advance their own, or other Mens Interpretations, into Articles of Christian Faith necessary to be believed by every one! Supposing the Resurrection of the same Body was expressly taught in the New-Testament, many more Propositions may be formed concerning the same Body Philosophically considered; and, for ought I know, be affirmed with as much Reason to be Necessary Articles of Christian Faith, as any of those already named, or that referred to, because not yet discovered.

The late Assertors of the Resurrection of the very same Body, are not contented that the Resurrection of the same Body should be an Article of Faith; But it must be the Resurrection of that very same Body, which they are pleased to determine and assign, which they think fit to distinguish from all the Bodies Philosophi-

Philosophically considered, People have, from their coming in, to their going out of the World. *I only assert (saith Dr. Whitby) the Resurrection of that Body which died, or was corrupted, and am not in the least concerned for any Changes that it underwent before,* p. 107. If by it, here, the Dr. understands the same Body Philosophically considered, there cannot be any ground to suppose it could undergo any Change before. This I conceive is very plain, That all the Bodies so considered, the Person had before, were as much his, as That was, and are as really dead and corrupted, as That is, or will be. And I do not remember any Reason assigned, why the Resurrection, when stiled *the Quickening of the Dead*, if the Body is only then spoken of, may not as well be understood of those Particles of Matter, which made up the first Body the Person had, or which Constituted his Body in any part of his Life, as of those which make up his Body in the very last part of it. Indeed Mr. Parker saith, *The Holy Scriptures do promise that the Raised Body shall be Materially the same with that laid in the Grave, or consist of the same Individual Particles which were united at the point of Death,* p. 5. But he did not (I suppose) think it convenient to discover to the World any more, than that upon his Word they may take it, that there is such a Promise, and that it is somewhere in the Holy Scriptures: For he neither reports the Words in which the Promise is delivered, nor refers to any part of the Holy Scriptures, where it may be found. And no Man's bare Affirmation does in such a Case, pass with me for a Satisfactory Reason. CHAP.

C H A P. III.

Those who assert the Resurrection of the same Body, a necessary Article of Christian Faith, appear somewhat Distrustful about it.

NOtwithstanding those who affirm, the very same Body shall be raised again at the general Resurrection, is a necessary Article of Christian Faith, do know so well what the same Body strictly consider'd doth signify, and do so often declare in express Words, that they mean the same Body in that sense, which they must, if they oppose Mr. *Locke*, yet they appear distrustful of the matter; And are not so constant and stedy in their Discourses, as might be expected from Men who are satisfied they have a promise in the Holy Scriptures to warrant and support what they say. Dr. *Whitby* (if I take him aright) clearly gives up the point, after all the pains he had bestowed on it. These are his Words, *I am far from thinking that to the raising of the same Body, it can be requisite that these Bodies should be made up wholly of the same particulars which were once vitally united to their Souls in their former Life, without the mixture of any other particle of Matter; For were this necessary to the same living Body, we could not have the same Bodies for a day; And if it be not*
necessary

necessary to make the Body continue still the same, while we live : It cannot be necessary to make the raised Body the same with that which died.

p. 107. It is certain our Bodies during this life, are continually altered, and remain not the same, Philosophically considered, for one hour, or minute together, but only according to popular acceptation. And it is as certain, that if the raised Body have any particles of matter, which were not in the Body when laid in the Grave, it will not be the same Body in that sense in which it hath all along bin pretended, every one ought to believe it to be the same ; if the Doctor intended to contend for no more, but that the Body at the Resurrection, will be the same Body, in the same sense that a man's Body is said to be the same, all the time of his Life in this World, that Excellent Author, whom he pretends to write against (whose Name, indeed, he does not mention, but whose words he quotes, tho' not with that exactness and fairness, as might have been expected from him) is not at all concerned in the controversy.

Mr. Parker also grants *It may please God at the Resurrection of the Dead, to add to the Body rising, or risen, such new particles, as may compleat the perfection of a Glorify'd Body.* It seems, he thinks some particles of Matter have a peculiar Dignity above others. But indeed, this Gentlemans Discourses are so Fashioned, I cannot understand them. *New particles of Matter,* he saith may be added, and yet it shall be the very same Body Philosophically considered,
having

having an absolute sameness in quantity as well as matter. How can this be? very well it seems. For he adds, *But then those particles are purely Additional.* One particle taken away, would make it another Body, or not the same Body, but new particles added, make no alteration, it is strictly the very same Body still. How so? Because those new particles are purely additional. *He may believe (saith he) that the same particles of matter, which the Grave received, shall be all raised, and united again; which is the sense of the Article of the Resurrection, whether we believe other perfectionative particles shall be added to them or not.* For ought I perceive, this Gentleman will License people to believe contradictions. But if he has a promise in the Holy Scriptures, as he pretends, that the very same Body which is laid in the Grave shall be raised again, and that doth import an absolute sameness in quantity as well as matter; How comes he to grant, that God may add new particles to it? It is past doubt, if God has made any such promise, he will perform it, and not break it, by vertue of this Gentlemans concession. Some men are as singular in their Faith, as they are in their way of Reasoning. They can believe that God will raise the very same Body in the strictest sense, which was laid in the Grave, That is, that when it is raised, it shall consist of all, and none but those particles of which it was made up, when it was laid in the Grave. And this they believe, because God, who cannot lye, has promised to do so, which is the surest foundation for Faith that
 can

can be. And yet, they can believe that he may add new particles to the raised, or rising Body, because those new particles are purely additional particles, that is, do make it perfectly another Body, and not the same Body which was laid in the Grave. Mr. Parker also tells us, *the rising Body shall in matter and quantity be the Body that was Buried, as a grain of Wheat changes its qualities, or that modification of parts upon which its qualities depend after it has been sown, and yet the parts after that change are materially the same with those that were sown, and in quantity too; tho' indeed a new quantity of matter once distinct from it, be so superadded to the quantity of matter which made up the Seed when it was first sown, as to constitute first the Blade, then the Ear, after that the ripe Corn in the Ear.* p. 8. Be it so; but is it the same Body when so many more parts are added than it had before?

CHAP. IV.

The Scripture Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Dead.

MR. Locke saith (for very just and good Reasons he had laid down just before)
“ It sufficeth that all the Dead shall be Raised,
“ and every one appear and answer for the
“ things done in this Life, and receive accor-
C ding

“ ding to the things he hath done in his Body,
 “ whether Good or Bad. He that believes
 “ this, and hath said nothing inconsistent
 “ herewith, I presume may and must be ac-
 “ quitted from being guilty of any thing in-
 “ consistent with the Article of the Resur-
 “ rection of the Dead, *Let. 3d. p. 178.* This
 seems to me to be the Scripture Account of
 the Resurrection, and of the Reason why the
 Dead are to be Raised: But the Opposers of
 Mr. *Locke* will not allow this to suffice. They
 will have the Resurrection of *Their same Body*
 to be a Necessary Article of Christian Faith,
 and they assign a particular Reason why that
 same Body must be Raised.

That we may comprehend what they say of
 this Matter, it will be requisite to take notice
 of three Things.

First, What it is which they say Dies.

Secondly, In what they make the Raising of
 their Same Body to consist.

Thirdly, The Reason they assign why that
 Same Body must be Raised.

These things are the more distinctly to be
 considered, because the truth of that Account
 they give of those Places of Scripture, by
 which they would prove that Proposition to be
 an Article of Christian Faith which they affirm
 is so, doth depend on the truth of what they
 say of all, or some of these Points. If they
 are

are in the Right, the Scripture Doctrine of the Resurrection doth not at all concern Dead Persons, nor indeed Dead Men; but only Dead Bodies. And if so, then what they say of the Points already mentioned, will not consist with their own Notion of a Man, or Human Person; for they make not any difference that I can perceive, betwixt them, but both go with them for one and the same.

S E C T. I.

What their Notion of a Man, or Human Person is.

I Will begin with the Account they give of what they understand by the word Man, or Human Person, or what they say doth constitute a Man. Mr. *Locke* in his Excellent *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, B. 2. Chap. 27. gives a very distinct and clear account in what the Identity of the same Body doth consist; In what the Identity of the same Man doth consist; And what constitutes the same Person. But some Men seem to affect Ignorance, and Confusion in their Writings about Matters of this Nature; and more especially, because they were not Taught them sooner, or because the Information comes not from the place, or person, or in the way they like. “ The Identity of

“ the same Man (Mr. *Locke* saith) consists in
 “ nothing but the Participation of the same
 “ continued Life, by constantly fleeting Par-
 “ ticles of Matter in Succession, vitally United
 “ to the same Organized Body, *B. 2. C. 27.*
 9. 6. Had this one thing been minded by
 those who make the Raising of the same Body
 a Necessary Article of Christian Faith, it might
 have prevented some gross Passages which they
 have Publish'd in their Discourses about the
 same Body. Mr. *Parker* starts an Objection
 with relation to the Raising again of the very
 same Body; which, if it had been expressed
 with Exactness, it would have been very hard
 for him, or any Man else, to have given a Ra-
 tional Answer to. His Reply to it, is set down
 in these words: *This Objection is of no force, pro-*
vided we assert those Particles shall be reunited into a
Body, which were Buried, because whatever we make
to be the Principle and Foundation of Identity, 'tis
agreed on all sides, that so long as the life of the
Body is uninterrupted, whatever Particles it may
from time to time have lost by Perspiration, or ac-
quir'd by Nutrition, the several Actions performed
at distant times, by the Body of the same Person,
are to be imputed to it as to one and the same Indi-
vidual, the Principle of Action in Human Bodies,
remaining uninterrupted as long as the Union be-
tween Soul and Body, p. 10, 11. What a heap
 of Grand Absurdities are contained in this
 Answer? And most, if not all of them, do
 spring from either an ignorant, or an heedless,
 or wilful Coufounding the Identity of the Bo-
 dy, with the Identity of the Man.

Both Dr. *Whitby* and Mr. *Parker*, do make the Vital Union of Soul and Body, to be that which Constitutes a Man, or Human Person; for they are with them the same, as was observed before, tho' the latter is as distinct from the former, as the former is from the Body. They express their Thoughts thus. *As for a Man to be born at first, signifies the production and union of the Essential Parts of an Individual Man, His Body and Soul; so to be born again, or born from the Dead, implies the Restitution and Reunion of his Body, and his Soul; a Man only by that, becoming the same entire Person which he was before,* Dr. *Whitby*, p. 106. *No Man (saith Mr. Parker) strictly speaking, comes into the World with a Soul and Body, but his Soul and Body make up that Him, which comes into the World,* p. 27. Vital Union of Soul and Body, they both acknowledge, makes or constitutes a Man. And would they consider a little, they might easily perceive, that Vital Union of the same Soul with a Body, makes or constitutes the same Man, whether the Union hath been interrupted or not, and whether the Body consist only of the same or other Particles of Matter. The Body to which the Soul was at first united, did at that time consist of a certain number of Particles of Matter, which made it Precisely and Philosophically that same Body, to which the Soul was first United. When any Particles of that Matter were any way lost, or more and new Particles were added to them, the Body was no longer that same Body, to which the Soul was first of all United. These Authors own, that as long as

the same Soul continues Vitally United to a Body, there is the very same Man, tho' the Body is not Philosophically the same all that time. The same Body Philosophically considered then, is not necessary to a Man's being the same Man; for if it were, a Man would continue no longer the same Man, than his Body did consist of the very same Individual Particles. And to me it appears as certain, that the very same Body strictly considered, is as necessary to continue the same Entire Man in being here, as it can be at the Resurrection, to make the same Entire Man again. If the Vital Union of the same Soul, and a Body makes the same Man from Birth to Death, tho' in that time the Body perhaps is so much altered, that at Death there is not any one Particle of that Matter in the Body, which made that Body to which the Soul was first united, will not a Vital Union of the same Soul to a Body duly Organized, make the very same Man at the Resurrection, whether that Body be made up only of the same Individual Particles which made up the Body at Death, or some other Particles be mixed with them?

Perhaps it will be said, 'tis true, if the Doctrine of the Resurrection did relate to Men, the very same Men would be Raised again, if the same Souls were united vitally again to Bodies, tho' those Bodies should have other Particles of Matter in them, than what made up their Bodies at Death. But the Doctrine of the Resurrection relates only to that which Dies. Let us therefore now consider what Dies,

Dies, according to the Opinion of these Authors. And then in what they say the Resurrection of Their same Body doth consist. And for what End, they declare that very same Body must be Raised.

S E C T. II.

What Dies, according to these Authors.

THAT which Dies (they say) is only the Body. *Death only happeneth to this corruptible Mortal Body, Dr. Whitby, p. 103. The Body being that alone which is by Death bereft of Life, must be that only which in propriety of Speech is said to Die, Id. p. 104. That Epithet (νεκρῶν of the Dead) can agree to nothing but the Body, Mr. Parker, p. 24.* Death, according to these Authors, happeneth only to the Body; and in propriety of Speech we are told, it is the Body only that dies. Now, I should think that in propriety of Speech, Death rather happeneth to the Man; and so the Scripture teaches. The Death of the Body, if such a Phrase may be used in strict Discourse, is only the destroying of its Compages, its mouldering into Dust, or the destroying of its Fashion, shape, Structure and Figure. But it must be only the Body which Dies, because *it is only the Body which is bereft of life.* If so, pray where is the

Man? What is become of the Person? Is he still living? The Vital Union of Soul and Body, they say, constitutes the Man, makes the Person. And this Vital Union is by Death undoubtedly broken, yet the Man is not Dead. That which Constitutes the Man, is destroyed, but the Man continues safe and sound. This, I must confess, is too mysterious for me to comprehend. But saith the Dr. *Did St. Paul and his Christian Companions, 2 Cor. 1. 9. believe that the whole Man should be kill'd by their Persecutors? Or as their Lord had taught them, that they could kill the Body, but could not kill the Soul? Matth. 10. 26. p. 105.* I answer, They did not believe their Persecutors could make them miserable in the future World. But the Soul or Body considered separately, not making *the whole Man*, but the Vital Union of them, They did not doubt but their Persecutors might break or dissolve that Union. And if the Vital Union of Soul and Body doth Constitute the whole Man, and after Death there is no restoring or raising the same Entire Man or Person, as the Dr. saith there is not, but by a Vital Reunion of the same Soul and Body, then the breaking or dissolving of that Vital Union, must necessarily be the Killing or Death of the whole Man.

It may be, it will still be insisted on that *it is only the Body that is bereft of life.* But what is that to the business in hand? According to the Notion of a Man, or Human Person, which they Assert and Establish, the dissolving of the Vital Union must unavoidably be the Death of
the

the Man. And that, one Essential part is afterwards without life, is but a Consequence of the Dissolution of the former Union. The Body's being bereft of life, is so far from being the true and proper Notion of Death, as it respects a Man according to their own Notion of him ; that if the Body after it's separation from the Soul, did continue in life, did retain in it a principle of life, or was immediately vitally united to some other vital Principle, yet that Vital Union being dissolved which Constituted the Man, would be as really dead, as he would be, if both Soul and Body were bereft of life.

And tho' the Dr. is pleased to argue, that the Body only dies, because it is the Body only that is bereft of life, yet neither he, nor Mr. *Parker* do make the Death of the Body to consist in its being bereft of Life, but in its being corrupted, and having its Figure, and the Contexture of its Parts broken and changed, after the Vital Union is dissolved. Which will plainly appear by the Account they give of what they take to be the Sense of the Article of the Resurrection ; which is the next thing to be Considered.

S E C T. III.

In what they make the Resurrection of the same Body to consist.

They acquaint us with their opinion of the Resurrection of *their same Body*; declaring in what the raising of that same Body doth consist; They express their Notions of it in these Words. *We may believe that the same particles of Matter which the Grave received shall be all raised, and united again, which is the sense of the Article of the Resurrection.* Mr. Parker p. 6. *The proper notion of a Resurrection consists in this, That it is a substantial change, by which that which was before, and died, or was corrupted, is produced the same thing again.* Dr. Whitby p. 106. *The Resurrection of the Dead can only signify the Resurrection of the Bodies of the Dead, with the reunion of them to those Souls to which they were before united, which makes this Resurrection advance into a Resurrection of Life.* And seeing that which never fell, cannot be said to be raised up, that which did never die, cannot be restored from Death, Men cannot properly be said to rise again from the Dead, but in respect to that part, or that state which had fallen, and was Dead; And as for a Man to be Born at first, signifies the production and union of the essential parts of an individual Man, his Body and Soul,

Soul, so to be Born again, or Born from the Dead, implies the restitution and reunion of his Body and his Soul, a Man only by that becoming the same entire person which he was before. Id.

The Sense of the Article of the Resurrection, Mr. Parker saith, is this, *the raising and uniting again all the particles of Matter which the Grave received.* That is (as I apprehend) The Resurrection of the same Body, doth consist in collecting or gathering together all the particles of Matter, of which the Body was made up at Death, and compacting and fashioning them again into the very same Body they formerly made. Dr. *Whitby* appears to be of the same mind. For tho' *a substantial change*, importing a change of the Substance, and so, that the very same thing should be reproduced, by changing it's Substance, is what I cannot understand; Yet his saying that *the resurrection of the Dead, can only signify the resurrection of the Bodies of the Dead,* And declaring that the reunion of them to those Souls, to which they were formerly united, makes that resurrection advance into a resurrection of *Life*, seem's clearly to signify that by the resurrection of the same Body, he means, the gathering together, and uniting all the particles which formerly made up the Body into the same Body again; and that the uniting this Body thus raised, to the same Soul, to which it was before united, is something distinct from the Resurrection of the Body, which was compleat before, and advances the Resurrection which was past, into a Resurrection of *Life*; that is, makes the Body which is raised, a living Body.

Body. When the Doctor said, the Resurrection of the Dead, can only signify the Resurrection of the Bodies of the Dead, he neglected to acquaint his Readers, what was to be understood by *the Dead*, in the last part of that sentence. *The Bodies of the Dead*. The enquiry might be here, *of the Dead what?* If the answer is, *Bodies*. The Bodies of the Dead Bodies, will not be very Intelligible. If the answer be, *Men*. That will contradict what was said, when we were told what dies, *viz.* That Death happeneth only to the Body. And if the Resurrection of the Dead can only signify the Resurrection of the Bodies of Dead Men, the Dead Men, will notwithstanding the Resurrection of their Bodies, continue Dead.

The proper notion of a Resurrection (says the Dr.) consists in this, That it is a substantial change, by which that which was before, and died, or was corrupted, is reproduced the same thing again. Now, passing over a substantial change, it is plain the Doctor takes the proper notion of a Resurrection to import the reproducing that which was before, and died, the same thing: And that which was before, and died, was the Body; Death happening only to the Body. But this Body, when Dead, that is, without Life, continues the same thing it was before, till it corrupts, and therefore cannot be raised, that is, be reproduced the same thing again before it is corrupted; for till then, it remains the same thing or the same Body it was before. If it be said, it is now without Life, whereas before it was vitally united to a Soul, and the Resurrection

on with respect to such a Body, is a reproducing it the same thing it was before, that is, a Living Body, or a Body vitally united to a principle of Life, (and I will suppose, to the very same principle of Life, to the very same Soul, to which it was before united.) Then I must take notice that the vital union of it to the same Soul, makes the very same Man which was before. And if this is the proper notion of a Resurrection, the proper notion of a Resurrection, must consist in reproducing the same Man which Died. For it is not possible in this case that the same Body should be reproduced; because that actually Exists, and the vital union is a reproducing of the same Man. Thus, the proper notion of a Resurrection, when the Body is without Life, and not corrupted, or any of its particles dissipated, is the reproducing the same Man.

But if the Body is corrupted, what is the proper notion of a Resurrection then? I Answer, It is the reproducing the same thing again. Now, what must be understood by the same thing here? I suppose, The same Body it was, before it was corrupted; which must consist in gathering and uniting together all the individual particles of Matter which made up the Body before it was corrupted. So that the proper notion of a Resurrection, when the Body is not corrupted, relates to the Man; But when the Body is corrupted, then the proper notion of a Resurrection relates only to the Body. Now some may be apt to say, if this last be the proper notion of a Resurrection, the very same
Body

Body may be raised, and yet continue as Dead, or as much without life, as it was, when laid in the Grave; And to what purpose must the Body be thus raised? The Answer these Authors give to that Question is another thing to be taken notice of; And is to this effect.

S E C T. IV.

For what end the same Body is to be raised again.

THE very same Body strictly considered, must be raised up again at the general Resurrection, that it may receive Rewards or Punishments for the Good or Ill things it formerly did. Mr. Parker saith, *The end for which the Apostle says the Body shall be raised, is, that it may suffer for those Ill things, or be rewarded for those Good things, to the doing of which it has been instrumental.* p. 10. Dr. Whitby saith, *The Body is to be raised and reunited to the to the Soul, to receive Rewards or Punishments with it, or to be instruments by which the Soul shall be Rewarded or Punished.* p. 107. Without enquiring where the Apostle doth say, what, it is affirm'd he does say, for it is easy for any one to produce pieces of Scripture, which he would have to be interpreted and understood according to his own mind; I shall observe, that if the Body can any way be the proper subject of Rewards and Punishments, it cannot be capable of either, whilst
it

it is without Life. And therefore being raised, it must be vitally united to a principle of Life to render it capable of Rewards and Punishments. Now at this rate, the very same Body may be raised, and continue as void of Life, as it was when laid in the Grave; Yea it may be made the same Living Body it was before, and and so as capable of Rewards and Punishments, as Life can render it, and the same Man not exist. The same Soul is necessary, tho' not the same particles of Matter, to constitute the same Man; But the same Soul is not necessary to make the same Body, the same living Body; because a vital union to any principle of Life, will serve for that. But the Dr. saith, there must be *a reunion of the Body to the same Soul to which it was before united, which makes that Resurrection advance into a Resurrection of Life.* Now, if by Resurrection of Life he means, doth make the raised Body, a living Body; then there is no necessity of the same Soul for that purpose, because it may be effected another way. If by Resurrection of Life, he means what that phrase is designed to signify in the New Testament, I conceive he is much mistaken; for the Dr. speaks of the Resurrection in general, whereas in Scripture that Phrase relates only to the Resurrection of the Just, in express opposition to the Resurrection of the Wicked. I conceive this is plain, that if the reunion of the same Souls with Bodies, whether Philosophically the same or not, is an Article of Christian-Faith, it is an Article distinct from that of the Resurrection of the Dead, as taught by them,
who

who affirm that the Resurrection of the Dead in Scripture, relates only to the Body, and that Men do not die, and therefore are not to be raised. It seems clear to me, that according to their account of a Resurrection, the same Body may be raised, and be without life; the same Body may be made anew the same living Body, and the same Man not Exist. The same Body, and the same Soul may be again vitally united, and so the same Man be reproduced, and the same Person not exist. And whereas they say, the End, why at last the same Body must be again made a living Body, yea, and be vitally united to the same Soul to which it was before united, is, that it may be rewarded or punished; Yet, if Life will make the Body capable of rewards and punishments, the same Soul is not Necessary. And if the same Soul be vitally united to it, there will of necessity be the same Man; and then it will not be the Body, but the Man which will be rewarded or punished, if Rewards or Punishments shall without any more adoe be terminated on that Subject. But Rewards and Punishments coming into Consideration, it may be fit to take notice, that they cannot be Righteously dispens'd but into Persons; And that the Scripture Doctrine of the Resurrection plainly refers to Persons. The Term *Resurrection*, when the raising of the Dead is spoken of, doth not properly belong either to the Soul, or to the Body, but only signifies such a vital union of the same Soul with a Body, as is necessary to the Reproduction of the very same Person who Died.

Mr. Parker saith, p. 29. *Unless we alledge this Proposition, the Dead shall be raised with the very same Bodies that they had before in this life, to be an Article of Faith, as it stands for the Sense of this Proposition, The Dead shall Rise, we cannot believe the Article of the Resurrection to be true in a Sense whercin we are obliged to believe it to be true.* And all the Ground, I find, he has to say so, is, because the Body only Dies. He is positive and exprefs, That the Body only Dies: And that nothing is raised but that which Dies. And in what he makes the raising of the Body to consist, has been already related. Now let any Man living, take the words of the Proposition above-mentioned, (and affirmed to be an Article of Faith necessary to be Explicitely believed by every one) in Mr. Parker's declared Meaning of them; and make Sense of them as they are there put together, if he can. The Dead shall Rise, is a very plain Proposition, which every one may easily understand. But what an extravagant Arrogance must it be, for any Man to assume to himself Authority to oblige every one to believe it is Unintelligible, and does comprehend in it, the Absurdest Nonsense that can possibly be devised?

C H A P. V.

Arguments to prove the Resurrection of the same Body, a Necessary Article of Christian Faith.

THE Substance, and entire Strength of what has been produced from Scripture, to prove the very same Body strictly considered, shall be Raised again at the General Resurrection, is an Article of Christian Faith, is to be found in the very Learned and Reverend Dr. *Whitby's* Discourse upon this Subject, in his Preface to the first Epistle to the *Corinthians*: And he hath added such other Considerations, as he thought proper to induce People to reckon it an Article of Christian Faith. For which Reasons, I shall take little or no notice of the other Writers, and consider particularly what the Learned Dr. offers, in Proof of that Point.

S E C T.

S E C T. I.

The Opinion of Heathens, that Christians believed the Resurrection of the very same Body, Considered.

IN the first place he informs us, *The very Heathens look'd upon it, as a Fundamental Doctrine of Christianity, and the Ground of their most raised Hopes; and therefore to defeat their Hopes, burnt the very Bones of Christian Martyrs, and reduced them to Ashes, and then threw those Ashes into the River Rhodanus, p. 102.* It is very certain, the Heathens did misrepresent some of the Doctrines of Christianity, which one would have thought it hardly possible for them not to understand aright: And it is not very unlikely, that they might mistake, or not understand exactly other of its Doctrines. However, their Facts will not certainly prove, They perfectly understood what the Christians believed concerning the Resurrection of the Dead. If they thought Christians did believe that the very same Body Philosophically considered, should be raised again, they had no occasion for the Purpose assigned, to scatter the Ashes of their Bones into the River, when so many Particles of their Bodies had been dissipated by Burning
D 2 them.

them. Their taking this method to defeat the Christians Hope, is a much plainer Argument, that they understood not the Faith of Christians concerning God's Omnipotence, than that they were acquainted aright with their Belief touching the Resurrection of the Dead. These Facts of theirs, were effects of their Passion and Rage, not of their Reason: And their Irrational Facts, will hardly amount to a solid Proof, that the Proposition contended for, was a Doctrine believed by all Christians in their days. But suppose Christians did at that time, believe the Resurrection of the very same Body in the strictest Sense; That will at most, prove no more than that they did then understand the Scriptures which deliver the Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Dead, in that determinate Sense. It will not prove that he who believes what the Scriptures teach concerning the General Resurrection, must necessarily believe the Resurrection of the Dead in that Sense. Men of eminent Piety, and fervent Devotion, are not Infallible Interpreters of Holy Scripture. But alas! how few, if any of the Martyrs and Primitive Christians did descend into this Philosophick Enquiry, but understood the same Body in the vulgar Sense? The Primitive Christians and Martyrs apply'd themselves to more useful and noble Business, than forging Articles of Faith for all People, by jumbling Philosophick Notions with the plain Dictates and Instructions of their Lord. This was a Work that suited better with Men, who living in a more corrupt state of the
Church,

Church, were not more intent on winning Sinners to Christ, than they were industrious to make Profelytes to a Sect or Party.

S E C T. II.

The Testimony of Ancient Orthodox Writers Considered, as to this Point.

Secondly, **T**HE Dr. endeavours to prove by some Quotations out of Ancient Christian Writers, That the Resurrection of the same Body strictly considered, *was the Antient and Received Doctrine of the Orthodox Professors of the Christian Faith.* Now, whether they were Orthodox in what they professed to believe, as to this, and other matters, can be known no other way, than by comparing the Doctrines they professed to believe, with what is taught in the Holy Scriptures concerning those Points. As for their Interpretations, they are like other Mens; Just of so much Weight and Authority, as the Reasons and Evidences are, which they produce to shew that the Sense in which they understand such Portions of Scripture, is the Proper and Genuine Sense of them; and that, in which they ought to be understood, rather than in any other. The Passages the Dr. quotes out of some of the Antient Christian Writers, may prove that

some of the Antient Christians did believe what those Sentences express ; but they will not prove that all Orthodox Christians did believe the same. Those Quotations do not prove those Authors Orthodox in believing what is contained in them. And by what the Dr. quotes out of those Antients he alledges in this Matter, it seems pretty clear to me, that those Authors did not consider or understand the Body Philosophically, or in the Dr's Sense, in the Doctrin of the Resurrection.

S E C T. III.

That the Resurrection of the same Body is truly Grounded on the Scriptures, Considered.

Thirdly, **T**HE Dr. proceeds to shew, (as he saith) that *This Doctrin of the Primitive Christians, is truly Grounded on the Scriptures, and therefore ought to be received and owned as an Article of Christian Faith.* But here, it may properly enough be ask'd, which Doctrin of the Primitive Christians he will shew is truly Grounded on the Scriptures? For the Doctrines concerning the Resurrection, as delivered in the Passages he Quotes out of the Antients, are various, and (as I conceive) not one of them the same, with that he asserts

is

is an Article of Christian Faith. According to St. *Clement*, People are to come to Judgment in that very Flesh, in which they were called to the Christian Faith: And therefore not necessarily with those very Bodies they had just before they died. According to *Irenaeus*, all the Flesh of all Mankind must be raised. And according to *Tertullian*, it is Man's Flesh, indeterminately as to any part of his Life, which must be raised. Thus these Primitive Christians did not agree about the Matter one with another, nor any of them with the Dr. and with those who affirm that this Proposition, *The very same Body Philosophically considered, that is laid in the Grave, shall be raised up again at the General Resurrection,* is an Article of Christian Faith necessary to be Explicitely believed by every one.

I cannot therefore expect the Dr. should strictly prove their various Sentiments, to be truly Grounded on the Scriptures. For tho' I know he hath been a very diligent laborious Reader of the Fathers, and doth very justly pay them a great Veneration, Yet I am satisfied, he hath such a regard to Reason and Good Sense, he doth not take the Primitive Christians to be *Orthodox* in those Points, in which he doth not agree with them. He did not therefore design, (I may safely conclude) to shew that their Doctrines were truly Grounded on the Scriptures, any further than he apprehended them to be the same with that, which he asserts is a Necessary Article of Christian Faith. The Doctrine then, which he purposed to shew, is

truly Grounded on the Scriptures, is, That the very same Body which is laid in the Grave, shall be raised again at the General Resurrection. This Doctrine, it is said, is truly Grounded on the Scriptures. It is not expressly taught there: For if it was, there would not be any occasion to graft it on those Texts of Scripture, which are alledged by them who affirm, it is a Necessary Article of Christian Faith.

The late Assertors of this Doctrine, are at present peremptory, that it is a Necessary Article of Christian Faith, and that it is truly Grounded on the Scriptures. Yet it may behove them to consider calmly, whether they will stand to it, and undertake to maintain and make all this good, at the General Resurrection, if it shall then appear, that some new Particles of Matter are in the Bodies with which the Dead shall then come? And whether they are certain they shall at that time, if the Case prove so, have assurance enough to Impeach the Almighty and most Righteous God, for acting contrary to, and inconsistently with their Necessary Article of Christian Faith? Whether they will then dare to affirm he has not raised the Dead? That the very same Persons are not reproduced, which lived formerly, because what he hath done in the business of the Resurrection, doth not exactly agree with their Philosophick-Scheme, and the Interpretations they have Magisterially Tack'd to what he has taught? It may with great reason be questioned, whether some Men will as confidently assert at the Great Judgment, that cer-
tain

tain Propositions were Necessary Articles of Christian Faith, to be Explicitely believed by every one, as they have affirmed them to be so in this World ; and especially when they had got the Secular Power to support them in what they said, and to degrade and disparage it self, by executing their Revenge on them who would not slavishly submit to an Authority they claim'd, but had no right to. This being designed only with respect to the haughty, insolent Intruders on Christ's Prerogative, is express'd by much, too mildly. They have great reason to question or debate the Matter with themselves. Yet because most People, when heated with a mighty Conceit of the Doctrines they do believe, and finding it is necessary at least for the present, that they believe them, are too much inclined to have their own Persuasions the Measure of other People's Belief, It is very fit they sedately consider, whether they have right, to affirm any Proposition is an Article of Christian Faith necessary to be believed by every one, but which they are sure they may without any Hæsitancy or Trepidation, justify to be so at the Great Day.

Those who assert the Proposition I am speaking of, is a Necessary Article of Christian Faith, have provided such a Necessary Article for all Christians to believe, as no Man can in an ordinary way know is True. Yea, which (if it is an Article of Christian Faith) will render it impossible for any Man after the Resurrection, to know that he is the same Man or Person he

was formerly : For seeing he is absolutely ignorant of, and cannot know the Numerical Particles his Body did consist of, when laid in the Grave ; and he cannot by this Article be the same Man or Person, unless his Body do consist just of the same Numerical Particles that Body did consist of, which was laid in the Grave, he will never be able to know, or be strictly certain, that he is the very same Man or Person which formerly lived in the World.

Those who have attempted to prove the Proposition under Consideration, a Necessary Article of Christian Faith, and truly Grounded on the Scriptures, should first of all have considered, whether they can produce good-Evidence that the Notion of the same Body Philosophically Considered, ever entred into the Minds of them who Writ the Books of the New Testament ? And that if they could prove that, Yet unless they could also prove, that they had given publick Notice to all for whom their Writings were designed, that they used the Words by which they have delivered the Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Dead, to signify precisely the very same Body Philosophically Considered, we ought in reason, to understand them in a popular and common Sense.

C H A P. VI.

Proofs from Scripture Considered.

THE sure way to prove a Proposition an Article of Christian Faith, is to shew it is taught in the New Testament. Those who are fully perswaded that the whole Mind of God, revealed by Jesus Christ to the World, is contained in those Sacred Records, will not admit any Doctrine, whatever Character it may have on other accounts, to be an Article of Christian Faith, which cannot be made appear to be delivered in some part of that Book; And they readily entertain, and firmly believe any Proposition, when clearly and fully manifested to be taught there. To prove that the same Body strictly considered, shall be raised again at the General Resurrection, several Portions of Scripture are alledged. And the other Considerations which have been offered in favour of, and to countenance the Assertion, that that Proposition is an Article of Faith, Yea, to prove it is one, having been taken notice of in the preceding Chapter, I shall now consider what has been produced from Scripture to prove the truth of what they affirm.

The Places of Scripture produced out of the New Testament, to prove the Resurrection of the
the

the very same Body strictly considered, an Article of Christian Faith, are these, *Rom.* 8. 11. Some Verses in the 15th Chap. of the First Epistle of St. Paul to the *Corinthians.* *John* 5th. 28. *Rom.* 8th. 23. and *Philip.* 3d. 20, 21. But the Proposition pretended to be a necessary Article of Christian Faith, is not taught in any of these portions of Scripture, nor is it grounded on any of them considered by themselves, nor on all of them considered together; But upon the Interpretations or Senses they who quote these places of Scripture to countenance their Assertion do put upon them. Now, if their Interpretations of these Scriptures be not undoubtedly true, the proposition they would support and justify by those Interpretations, cannot by vertue of them, be an undoubted and necessary Article of Christian Faith. And their Interpretations of most of these places of Scripture, do suppose the Truth of one or both of these Propositions, *viz.* 1. That the Man or Humane Person doth not properly Die, but only the Body. 2. That a Man, or Humane Person, is no longer the same Man, or Humane Person, than his Body doth consist of the very same numerical particles of Matter. Both which Propositions are most apparently not true; utterly inconsistent with their own established notion of a Man, or Human Person; And do obviously contradict the common sense of mankind. *The same person (says Dr. Whitby) cannot be raised again without the raising of his Body, to be united to his Soul, much less be raised from the Dead, without raising that of him which was*

Dead,

Dead, which only was his own, and not another Body, which before was no part of him. p. 107. Thus much in general concerning their Scripture proof. Let us now consider the particular places of Scripture, they alledge to make good what they affirm.

SECT. I.

Rom. Chap. 8th. V. 11. Considered.

THE first portion of Scripture brought to prove their proposition an Article of Faith is *Rom. 8. 11.* *But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the Dead, shall also quicken or make alive your Mortal Bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you.* That is, (says Dr. Whitby) *He shall raise them from the Dead, for that ζωοποιᾶν, and ἐγείρειν, to quicken and raise up, are with relation to this matter, words of the same import,* we learn from *John 5. 21. p. 103.* But notwithstanding such good evidence that these phrases are on this occasion of the same import, they are often used by the Dr. in his Discourse relating to this Matter, as signifying two things perfectly distinct. And if the Body only dies, and the raising of the Dead, is the same thing with quickning of the Body, then the Scripture Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Dead, is only, that the same Dead Bodies shall be quickned, or made living Bodies again, without determining

termining that they shall be reunited to the same souls to which they were before united. But notwithstanding those two Greek Words may be of the same import, when used with relation to the same thing, yet neither the one, nor the other, nor both of them do necessarily note, that the general Resurrection at the Last Day is spoken of, when they are used; But the sense of them must be learnt from the matter which is discoursed of. And it appears plain to me, that in this 11th. v. of the 8th. Chap. to the *Romans*, the general Resurrection at the Last Day is not so much as hinted at. The Apostle here declares and proves that sincere Christians must and will lead truly Regular and Obedient Lives, because the Spirit of Christ in them, is a vital principle, effectually influencing them in whom he dwells to a Holy and new Obedience. *Shall make alive your mortal Bodies*, that is, shall enable you to offer up your frail decaying Bodies, living sacrifices unto God, to yield them, and the members of them, instruments of Righteousness unto Holiness, and to employ and use them in the actual and steady performing of that Obedience and Duty which Christ your Lord enjoyns you. This seems to me the genuine sense of the Words, considering what goes before, and what follows after them. This is what *St. Paul* often puts them in mind, is their great duty, and to which he exhorts and presses Christians with variety of very pertinent and powerful considerations, and in phrases very like, and near a kin to those used in this verse as in the 6 and 12 Chap. and other parts of this Epistle. Sect.

S E C T. II.

The Quotations out of 1 Cor. 15th. considered.

TH E second portion of Scripture alledged to prove that the same Body strictly consider'd must be raised again, consists of some Verses in the 15th. Chapt. of the 1st. Epistle of St. Paul to the *Corinthians*, viz. V. 35, 42, 43. and 53. Yet this whole proof depends entirely on this supposition; That it is only the Body that Dies. For the sake of which notion, *The Dead*, must signify the Bodies of the Dead. And to give more countenance to it, two Questions are propounded, which it is pretended cannot be answered but by the help of *σῶμα*, The Body, viz. *What is the substantive to the pronoun and adjective four times mentioned? and what is the Nominative Case to περὶ αὐτῶν, if σῶμα is not? Yea (saith the Dr.) the Apostle argues thus, The Dead shall be raised up, δεῖ γὰρ, for this Corruptible (Body) must put on Incorruption, p. 103. And again, The Apostle proves οἱ νεκροὶ ἐξερδέσονται the Dead shall be Raised, because this Corruptible must put on Incorruption, v. 53 p. 104. Here I take the Dr. to be very much out, not only because he expressly declares in this Discourse, that the apostle is not proving the truth of the Resurrection*

surrection in this part of the Chapter, but had entirely dispatch'd the question concerning the truth of the Resurrection of the Dead, in that part of the Chapter which precedes, v. 35. But also because, these words, *For this corruptible must put on Incorruption*, do not at all refer to the raising of the Dead; But are a reason given by the Apostle why those people who shall be found alive, who shall not Die, and therefore will have no need, nor be in a Condition to be raised from the Dead, must be changed. As will appear most plain by comparing this 53.v. with that before it.

But what can be said to the Questions that are propounded? If *σῶμα* is not the Nominative Case to *σπέρειαι* v. 42, 43. what is? Several Answers may be given to the Question, *τὰ σπέρμα*. That which is sown, may be the Nominative Case. And if thereupon it be ask'd, Is not that which is Sown, the Body? I Answer, no. That which is here spoken of as Sown, is the Person, or Man, who is to Die. Man during his abode in this World, is compared to a Seed Sown, and as the Seed after it is Sown, must die in order to its Springing up again, and producing Fruit, so Man, whilst he Lives in this World, is said to be Sown, and he must die in order to his being raised again; for unless Death intervene there can be no Resurrection. *The Resurrection of the Dead, that is,* (saith the Dr.) *of the Bodies of the Dead.* I will suppose, he means Dead Bodies, Bodies Corrupted, or without Life, (for otherwise he must own that Death, does not happen, only to the Body, or else what he saith will not be Intelligible.)

gible.) Now, the Dead Body cannot be the Nominative Case to the Verb. For by that which is sown, we cannot with Reason, or Sense, understand the dead Body, because that which is sown, is to die, or must die, in order to a Resurrection. But if the Doctor will discover what that *It* is, *v.* 38. to which God giveth a Body, he will easily find out another Nominative-Case, so that there will be no need to call the dead Body out of the Grave to resolve Difficulties. And that which is the Nominative-Case to the Verb, may properly enough be the Substantive to the Pronoun, and Adjective spoken of. If *κοικμος* is the Substantive to the Pronoun, *τὸ* in *v.* 36. 37. and unto *αὐτῷ* in *v.* 38. Where the Apostle speaks of Grain that is sown, and must Die, in order to its being Quickened, what hinders that *ανθρωπος* may not be the Substantive to the Pronoun, and Adjective, and Nominative-Case to the Verb, in the Places insisted on? Where Man is compar'd to a Grain sown, is call'd a Seed, and is said to be Sown whilst he lives on Earth, and must Die, that he may be raised Incorruptible, and Immortal. Yet, 2. If *σωμα* must be the Nominative-Case to the Verb, &c. I do not perceive how that will contribute to prove, that the Body, at the Resurrection, must be Philosophically the same with that laid in the Grave. Mr. *Lock* hath said that, which if it had been well consider'd, might have prevented proposing those Questions, which are represented, as of huge

E Weight,

Weight, and that cannot be answer'd but by the help of *σωμα*. His Words are these.

‘ The Scripture being exprefs, that the same
 ‘ Persons should be raised and appear before the
 ‘ Judgment Seat of Christ, that every one
 ‘ may receive according to what he had done
 ‘ in his Body; it was very well suited to com-
 ‘ mon Apprehension which refin’d not about
 ‘ Particles, that had been vitally united to
 ‘ the Soul) to speak of a Body which each
 ‘ one was to have after the Resurrection, as
 ‘ he would be apt to speak of it himself. For
 ‘ it being his Body, both before and after
 ‘ the Resurrection, every one ordinarily speaks
 ‘ of his Body as the same, though in a strict,
 ‘ and Philosophical Sense, as your Lordship
 ‘ speaks, it be not the very same *Let. 3. p.*
196. But, 3. To give a compleat Answer, and
 fully manifest, that the Questions are ground-
 less, and such as no stress at all is to be laid
 on. It may be observ’d, that τὸ φθαρτὸν τέλο,
 ἢ τὸ θνητὸν τέλο. *v. 53, 54.* has not *σωμα* for
 the Substantive, as the Doctor supposes, but
 is put in the Neuter Gender absolutely, and
 stands to represent the Persons, in whom so
 great a Change shall be wrought. This ap-
 pears plain, *v. 42. ἔτω &c. ἐν φθόρα, i. e. τὸ*
φθαρτὸν τέλο, σπειρεται. That is, Mortal corrup-
 tible Men are sown, being corruptible and
 weak. Nor let it be thought strange, that
 I interpret φθαρτὸν and θνητὸν two Adjectives
 of the Neuter Gender, to signifie Persons,
 seeing in this very Chapter, the Apostle uses
 two Adjectives of the Neuter Gender, to sig-
 nifie

nific the Persons of *Adam*, and *Christ*, v. 46. To which might be added, *Matth.* 1. 20. and *Luke* 1. 35. In which Places the Person of our Saviour is spoken of in the Neuter Gender. To either of which Places here mention'd, I hope the Doctor will not add the Substantive *σῶμα*, to make out the Sense. Thus I think it is very manifest, that here is meant, *This Mortal Man shall put on Immortality, and this Corruptible Man shall put on Incorruptibility.* As as for the Nominative-Case to *σπείραι*, I am perswaded the Doctor will easily find one, without introducing *σῶμα*, when he has a little better consider'd the Sense of the Place, where the Apostles Purpose is to speak of *venegi*, Mortal Men being Dead, and rais'd again, and made Immortal. And the better to lead him into it, since Grammatical Construction, and the Nominative Case do weigh so much with him, I will quote him a Verse out of *Virgil*, where, by finding the Nominative-Case to the two Verbs in it, he may come to discover, that Personality, as contradistinguished both to Body, and Soul, may be the Nominative-Case to Verbs. The Verse is,

*Linquēbant dulces animas, aut agra trahēbant
Corpora-----* Enead. lib. 3. v. 140.

The Apostle had in this fifteenth Chapter of his first Epistle to the *Corinthians*, prov'd the Truth of the Resurrection of the Dead to that degree, it must be acknowledged, People are in Reason oblig'd to believe it;

And by the Tenour of his Discourse, it appears plain, that he was speaking of Persons, and prov'd that Dead Persons shall Rise again. But the Doctor, and these other Writers say, No. For, by the *Dead*, we are to understand *Dead Bodies*. But this is unquestionably certain, *viz.* That the Apostle proves the Resurrection of the Dead, in opposition to those who denied the Resurrection of the Dead. *How*, say some among you, that there is no Resurrection of the *Dead*? v. 12. The Apostle then must mean the Resurrection of the Dead, in the same sense those did against whom he argued, and who did deny the Resurrection of the Dead. And if those who denied the Resurrection of the Dead, did mean by the Dead, not Dead Men, but Dead Bodies, the only thing they denied, was, that Dead Bodies should be quickned or made living Bodies again. So that they might (for ought I perceive) or did believe the Resurrection of dead Men, or dead Persons; but they did not believe that the very same Bodies which were laid in the Grave, should be made again living Bodies. If it be said, They could not believe the Resurrection of dead Men, whilst they did not believe the Resurrection of the same Bodies; because dead Men cannot be raised again, but by a vital union of those very Bodies which were laid in the Grave, to the very same Souls to which they were united before; I answer, this is no Argument or Reason at all. For, supposing that Notion of what is necessary to the raising of the same Man, right, They might think

think that the same Soul vitally united to a Body, tho' not consisting just of those Particles of Matter which were laid in the Grave, would constitute the very same Man. If they only denied that the same Body shall be quickned, or made a living Body again, They might very firmly believe that dead Persons shall be raised again. And if it were true, that dead Men cannot be raised again, unless the very same Bodies be vitally united to the same Souls, their fault or mistake might only be an Error in Philosophy, *viz.* In thinking that a Man might be the very same Man, tho' his Body did not consist of the very same Numerical Particles.

Besides, Is there the least probability, that if the Identity of the Body at the Resurrection, had been the thing denied, that it would not have been more plainly Express'd? or that the Apostle setting himself to prove it, would have argued in the manner he did? Where he neither mentions expressly what he was to prove, nor says any thing that without the extreamest violence imaginable, can be wrested to favour that Sense? Can it reasonably be thought, the Apostle would take so much pains to contradict a Notion, demonstratively true in Philosophy? And which being overturned, must most evidently demonstrate the future Judgment to be Unrighteous, if at that time Men shall be Sentenced to receive Rewards or Punishments according to any Actions or Works, done in Bodies which did consist of any Particles of Matter, but what made up the Bodies which were laid in the Grave.

The Error held by them, the Apostle oppos'd, appears to me plainly, That dead Persons shall not be raised again; And his Discourse fully proves that dead Persons shall rise again, without saying any thing expressly concerning the Body. Having finished his Proof, that the Dead shall be raised, he introduces one, *v. 35.* speaking to this Effect. Tho' no direct answer can be made to what you have offered, to prove that dead Persons shall be raised again, Yet there are certain Difficulties attending this Doctrine, which till they are solved, may justify or excuse People's suspending their belief of it. These Difficulties, to which you have not said any thing in your Discourse of the Resurrection, are, 1. How the Dead shall be raised? 2. With what Bodies shall they then come? You have been proving that dead Persons shall be raised again, but have not given any account of the manner how they shall be raised; Nor have you given any information what Bodies they shall have at that time; whether they shall come with the same Bodies they had formerly, or with other Bodies? I therefore desire to hear what you have to say to these Questions, How are the Dead raised? And with what Body do they come? There is no need to understand any thing more by *ποία σῶματι*, than *which, or what Body*; *viz.* Whether strictly the same Bodies they had formerly, or other Bodies? The word *ποίῳ*, does not make the Enquiry to be necessarily concerning Qualities, as is evident from St. *John* 10. 32. *διὰ ποῖον αὐτῶν ἔργον λιθαρίζε με?*

For which (not for what kind) of those good Works do ye Stone me? and many other places of Scripture. In answer to these Questions, the Apostle saith it is a foolish thing to make such Enquiries, and refuse to believe the Doctrine of the Resurrection so clearly proved, and so well Established, if People's Curiosity be not gratified about Enquiries, which neither concern them, nor the truth of the Doctrine propos'd to be believed; as these are, even the last, which demands what Body the Dead shall come with. For it no way concerns us to know of what Particles of Matter the Bodies shall be made up, which Men shall have at the Resurrection, any more than it does one who soweth Grains of any sort of Corn, to know of what Particles of Matter the Bodies of those Grains shall be made up, which shall spring and grow from those which are sown. That which is sown, must die before it can be quickned. And when Men sow Grain in order to their receiving Fruit, or a Crop, they do not sow meerly the Body of the Grain, and expect to reap just the same Body again; but they sow the bare Grain, and God giveth (we know not how) not the very same Bodies the Grains had when they were sown; yet to every Grain or Seed that springeth up, or groweth, or is produced, *a Body as pleaseth him*; so that every Seed springs up in, and produceth its own sort of Body. And whether Men's Bodies at the Resurrection, shall be made up of the same Particles their Bodies did formerly consist of, or of other, is perfectly indifferent.

They will then be as much their own Bodies, as those were they formerly had. And how different soever they will then be in Qualities, from what their former Bodies were, that depends not on the Particles of which they shall be made, whether the same of which their Bodies were formerly compos'd, or other. Their Bodies shall at the Resurrection be made up of such Particles of Matter, as pleaseth God. This we are sure of, and we know not any more of that matter, nor is it needful or expedient for us, to have any further Instruction concerning it. What God requires us to believe, is, that the Dead shall be raised again. He doth not oblige our Faith, as to Particles of Matter. He having not thought fit to acquaint us with what he will do as to that, if we of our own accord adventure to determine, and prescribe to him, we must be unavoidably guilty of very great Presumption: And if we shall pretend to scruple yielding our assent to what he hath revealed of the Resurrection, unless we may be informed what Particles of Matter Men's Bodies shall consist of at the Resurrection, the most favourable Epithet and Character our seeming *Niceness* can deserve, is *down-right Folly*.

S E C T. III.

St. John Chap. 5th. Ver. 28, 29. Considered.

THe third Portion of Scripture which is alleged to prove the Resurrection of the same Body, is John 5th. 28, 29. *All that are in the Grave shall bear his voice, and shall come forth.* The way taken to make this Portion of Scripture appear pertinent, is declaring that πάντες οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις, *All that are in the Graves,* and all the Bodies that are in the Graves, are plainly words of the same import. But it would have been something plainer, that Bodies were intended, if instead of πάντες οἱ παντα τὰ σώματα had been used. And if we must here keep strictly to the very words, here is no account of the Resurrection of any, but those who have been formally Buried, whose Bodies have been actually laid in Graves; whereas these words, *All that are in the Graves,* when used or spoken with reference to the General Resurrection, is a Phrase of the same import with, *All Dead Persons,* whether their Bodies were laid in Graves, or in what manner soever they have been disposed of, after their Decease. But some Men are such Criticks, they will not give the Spirit of God leave to
express

expresses it self in the Phrases that are in use among Men. This place of Scripture can be made to favour the Article contended for, no other way than by vertue of this Proposition, *The Body only dieth.* Which People may believe True, when it shall be proved, either that Men never die: So that when their Bodies are laid in the Graves, they are as much alive, and in good health as ever they were; Or that the Body is properly the Man, or Person. Both which are Monstrous Absurdities, according to the account these Gentlemen give of a Man, or Humane Person.

S E C T. IV.

Rom. Chap. 8th. Ver. 23d. and Philip. 3d. 20, 21. Consider'd.

THERE are two other places of Scripture from which ('tis said) this Proposition, *The very same Body which is laid in the Grave shall be raised again,* may be proved a Necessary Article of Christian Faith, viz. *Rom. 8th. 23d. We who have the first fruits of the Spirit, groan within our selves, expecting νόθεσίον, the Sonship, even the Redemption of our Bodies. And Philip. 3. 20, 21. We expect that Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ from Heaven, who shall change τὸ σαρκᾶ τῆς τωκενόςτης ἡμῶν our vile Body*
into

into the likeness of his glorious Body. Now, the force of these Scriptures, with reference to that for which they are produced, depends on these words, *Our Bodies*. And if it had been well observed, what it is that makes any Particles of Matter, *our Bodies*, it is very probable these places of Scripture would not have been alledged; because then they would have plainly appeared not at all pertinent to the purpose for which they are quoted. Besides, if the Apostle had designed in these places to teach the Proposition insisted on, as a Necessary Article of Christian Faith, it might reasonably be expected, that in teaching such a strictly Philosophical Doctrine, he would have express'd himself more plainly, and have used Terms appropriated to that sense. For, if his Intention was to teach precisely with what Bodies Men (even Believers) shall be raised at the last day, it seems very plain to me, that he intended to teach a Doctrine very different from that which is contended for, as a Necessary Article of Christian Faith; *viz.* That Believers when raised at the last day, shall come, *not with those Bodies which were laid in the Grave,* but with other Bodies. *Our Bodies*, must in these places of Scripture, signify either the Bodies Believers had when the Apostle writ these Epistles, or the words alledged out of them, or the Bodies Believers have when they read these words. *Our Bodies*, if consider'd Philosophically, must signify the Bodies we have at some certain time of life; The Bodies we have at the time when we hear or read these

these words of the Apostle, are the only Bodies which can properly and strictly be then called our Bodies. And if the Apostle designed to teach that the Bodies Believers shall have just before they die, shall be raised again, it might reasonably be expected he would have express'd himself to this Effect, *We wait for the Redemption of those Bodies which will be ours just before we shall die; And who shall change the vile Bodies we shall have just before we die, &c.* The plain meaning of the Apostle in these places, I conceive amounts to this, viz. *Rom. 8. 23.* We wait for the Happiness Believers shall enjoy after the General Resurrection. And *Phil. 3. 21.* seems to note only this, Who instead of the mean corruptible Bodies we have, and shall have during this life, will raise us with incorruptible and glorious Bodies. The Dr. indeed, appears very much concern'd for the Particles of Matter which shall be laid in the Grave: But if he please to consider the matter thoroughly, he will be satisfied that the tenderness, passion and affection he seems to have for that Body which must be laid in the Grave, rather relates to, and is a concernedness for the Body he has at present; and that considered, not Philosophically, but Vulgarly, than for Particles of Matter which he is a perfect stranger to, and which cannot be of any moment to him, but a very few hours before he must lay them aside again. There is a Passage in Mr. *Locke's* third Letter, which if duly weigh'd by those who have a fondness for their Bodies, as made up of a certain number of Particles of Matter,

would

would effect a rational Cure of that Disease which so much infects their Minds. Mr. *Locke's* words are these. "What greater Congruity the Soul hath with any Particles of Matter which were once vitally united to it, but are now so no longer, than it hath with Particles of Matter, which it was never united to, would be hard to determine, if that should be demanded, p. 177.

CH A P. VII.

What hath been Answered to Mr. Locke, Examined.

HAVING thus far considered what the late Writers have produced to justify their affirming the Resurrection of the same Body, a Necessary Article of Christian Faith, I will now take notice of what they have reply'd to some Passages writ by Mr. *Locke* concerning this Matter. Tho' they cannot vindicate the Bishop, but have forsaken him and his Necessary Article of the Christian Faith, as not to be defended, yet they would have the World believe they can Answer Mr. *Locke*. Now to set this matter in a clear light, because they have not always faithfully reported Mr. *Locke's* Words, nor set down so much of his Discourses in some places as is necessary, that the Reader may com-

comprehend aright what he hath said, I will transcribe exactly and fully what Mr. *Locke* hath delivered in those Pages, where they pretend they have spied Defects. Then I will relate the Substance of what they answer, and consider whether what they say is pertinent.

S E C T. I.

The first thing Answer'd to Mr. Locke, Considered.

THE first Advantage they pretend they have against Mr. *Locke*, is, That they can acquaint him with, or bring to his remembrance, something that he did not remember. Mr. *Locke's* words are these. “ In the New
 “ Testament. (wherein I think, are contained
 “ all the Articles of the Christian Faith) I find
 “ our Saviour and the Apostles to Preach the
 “ Resurrection of the Dead, and the Resur-
 “ rection from the Dead, in many places ; but
 “ I do not remember any place, where the
 “ Resurrection of the same Body is so much as
 “ mentioned. Nay, which is very remarkable
 “ in the Case, I do not remember in any place
 “ of the New Testament (where the General
 “ Resurrection at the last day is spoken of)
 “ any such Expression, as the Resurrection of
 “ the Body, much less of the same Body,
 “ 3d. *Ler.*

“ 3d. *Let.* p. 166. Dr. *Whitby* hath left out those words (where the Resurrection at the last day is spoken of,) And both he, and the other Writers, to refresh Mr. *Locke's* Memory, quote the places of Scripture which have been already Considered ; and which are (Except *Rom.* 8. 11.) but some of those places of Scripture Mr. *Locke* had before taken notice of, where the Doctrine of the Resurrection of the Dead, &c. was delivered. So that it is plain, he remembered those places of Scripture, and what Expressions were mentioned in them. Yet, *for his sake*, these are produced as places, where the Body, or the same Body are mentioned, tho' those Expressions are not to be found there.

But it is said, *the words there, are Equivalent to them.* And I pray what does this Story amount to ? But only this, if the World will take these Gentlemen to be Infallible Interpreters of these Scriptures, then the words in these places of Scripture are of the same import with *The Body*, and *The very same Body*. But unless their Infallibility had been before Established, their reckoning up those Texts of Scripture, could not with any reason be expected to assist Mr. *Locke's* Memory in the Case. No, nor that what they say upon those places of Scripture should do it, unless it could with reason be expected Mr. *Locke* would believe Nonsense, and Self-contradictions to be the import of what our Saviour and his Apostles taught : Whereas no Man living is more assured, and knows better than he, that they did always speak *Truth*, *Reason*, and *very good Sense*. Mr.

Mr. *Parker*, because there are *Articles of Faith in the Old Testament* (which was very singularly observed, if he thereby intended to deny that all the *Articles of the Christian Faith* are contained in the *New Testament*) *alleges* *Job* 19. 25, &c. Which place of Scripture, if considered as relating to the *General Resurrection*, is not at all to the purpose for which it is brought: For *Job* does not say that at the *Resurrection*, he shall have the very same *Body* which the *Worms* after his *Decease* should devour. He no doubt spake of the *Body* he then had, when he said *this Body*; which was so far from being *Philosophically* the same *Body* with that he had just before he died, it is very probable not one *Particle* of the *Matter*, which made up his *Body* when he spake those words, was in that *Body* of his which was laid in the *Grave*. Take these words of *Job* in a strict *Philosophick* sense, and understand the whole *Passage* concerning the *General Resurrection*, This *Portion* of *Scripture* will be a full *Demonstration*, that the *Body* after the *Resurrection* will not be that same *Body* Mr. *Parker* contends for.

Mr. *Parker* also quotes *Isaiah* 26. 19. as a most clear and express *Proof* of the *Resurrection* of the same *Body*, and a plain *Scripture*, where an *Expression* is used evidently *Equivalent* to the same *Body*. And it is true, there are these words, *My Dead Body*; by which Mr. *Parker*, it seems, did think the *Prophet* meant his own *Dead Body*. But let any *Man* attentively consider the *Chapter*, he may perceive reason enough to be satisfied,

satisfied, that the Dead Body there spoken of, was the *Carkass* of a *City*, and signified the ruinous State of *Jerusalem*.

It appears very plain by Mr. *Locke's* words, what it was he did not remember. These Authors produce several places of Scripture; and one of them a Portion of *Job*, and a Verse in the Prophecy of *Isaiab*, to help him to remember that those very words he spake of, are to be found in the New Testament, and so Circumstanced as his Limitations require. Mr. *Locke* says, he doth not remember such an Expression in the New Testament. Is that Expression in any of those places they quote from the New Testament? No. How could they then pretend to refresh his Memory by them? O! very well! Because the words which are there used, are Equivalent to those he did not remember were there. But, 1. Mr. *Locke* is not concerned in some of them, for they do not speak of the General Resurrection. And 2. as to those places which treat of the General Resurrection, the words *there* used, are not Equivalent to those Mr. *Locke* said he did not remember were in any parts of the New Testament, where the General Resurrection at the last Day is spoken of. That the words discoursed of, are not in the places alledged, is obvious to every Man's sense. But *that*, Mr. *Parker* says, is *Sophistry* and *Evasion*. Why so? Because there are words Equivalent to those insisted on, and which are not there. How doth that appear? *It is proved to the highest degree*; And that by vertue of the newest Discoveries that have

F been

been made in Natural Philosophy, *viz.* That *Men never die : And that Men continue not the same Men, any longer than their Bodies do consist of the same Numerical Particles.* Is it not something strange, if our Saviour and his Apostles intended to teach, that the very same Body Philosophically considered shall be raised again, is a certain Truth, and Necessary Article of Christian Faith, They should not at any time deliver this Doctrine in express words, nor in such words as might plainly signify what People ought to believe, and was intended to be taught? But that they should constantly express their Doctrine in such words, as cannot be wrested to that Meaning, without supposing the truth of certain Propositions, which combat the Senses of Mankind, and contradict their most Original Conceptions.

S E C T. II.

The Second thing Answered to Mr. Lock enquir'd into.

ANother passage in Mr. *Lock's* 3d. Letter to the Bishop of *Worcester*, which is found fault with, is in p. 169. where are these Words. "Your first Argument to prove, " that it must be the same Body, in this Sense " of the same Body, is taken from these words
" of

“ of our Saviour, *All that are in the Graves shall*
“ *hear his Voice, and shall come forth,* Joh. 5. 28, 29:
“ From whence your Lordship argues, that these
“ words, *All that are in their Graves,* relate
“ to no other substance than what was united
“ to the Soul in Life, because a different sub-
“ stance cannot be said to be in the Graves, and
“ to come out of them. Which words of
“ your Lordship, if they prove any thing,
“ prove that the Soul too is lodged in the
“ Grave, and raised out of it at the last day.
“ For your Lordship say’s, can a different sub-
“ stance be said to be in their Graves and come
“ out of them? so that according to this In-
“ terpretation of these words of our Saviour,
“ no other substance being raised but what
“ hears his Voice, and no other substance hear-
“ ing his Voice but what being called, comes
“ out of the Grave, and no other substance
“ coming out of the Grave, but what was in
“ the Grave, any one must conclude, that the
“ Soul, unless it be in the Grave, will make
“ no part of the person that is raised, unless
“ as your Lordship argues against me, you
“ can make it out, that a substance which never
“ was in the Grave, may come out of it, or
“ that the Soul is no substance.

To this, Dr. *Whitby* Answers, *That any one*
may reasonably hence conclude, that the Soul makes
no raised part of him that is raised, or that it is not
called or raised out of the Grave as the Body is;
But by what Logick can we hence conclude, it
makes no part of the raised person? p. 104. The
enquiry here, is not concerning the true meaning

of that place of Scripture, *John* 5. 28, 29. but whether supposing the sense assigned by the Bishop to them, is true, Mr. *Locke's* Inference be Just and Regular, *viz.* that then the Soul makes no part of the raised person, unless it is in the Grave. Which Inference, is so Just, one would wonder how it should be possible for any one who pretends to argue, not to perceive it. The thing to be considered, is the Justness of Mr. *Locke's* Inference from the Bishops words. Now, if those words in *John* 5. 28, 29. do relate to no substance, but that which was formerly united to the Soul, then, the particles of matter laid in the Grave, must be the immediate and only substance to which that consciousness must be annexed, which is necessary to make the same person, which lived formerly, and did those good or bad Works, which were done by him in this World; And if so (make the best sense that is possible of an unraised part of a raised person) the Soul will be no raised part at all of the raised person. Or if the Soul must be the Substance to which that Consciousness is, or must be immediately annexed, and must therefore be vitally united to those particles of matter which were laid in the Grave, then the words must necessarily relate to some other substance than that which was laid in the Grave, or the Soul must certainly be lodged in the Grave.

With reference to this 5th. of St. *John's* Gospel, *v.* 28, 29. the Dr. asks this Question, *Shall they come forth with the same Body, which was laid in the Grave, or with another?* p. 106. Now,
if

if by *They*, he means, all that are in the Graves, and by all that are in their Graves, he understands all the Bodies that are in their Graves, the Question will not be Intelligible; *viz.* Shall all the Bodies which are in their Graves, come forth with the same Bodies which were laid in the Graves, or with other Bodies? If by *They*, he means the persons which are dead, and enquires whether dead persons shall come out of their Graves with the same Bodies which were laid in the grave, then the Soul can be no part of the person raised, unless these words, *All that are in their Graves*, relate to some other substance besides what was laid in the Grave, or the Soul be lodged in the Grave. The words do manifestly relate to persons, who have done Good, and who have done Evil, and who must be Raised, that they may be Rewarded, or Punished according to the Good or Evil they have done. And if the words relate to no other substance but what is in the Grave, can any thing be more clear, than that the Soul either is not a Substance, or is lodged in the Grave, or will make no part of the raised person?

S E C T. III.

Other things answered to Mr. Locke fully represented and examined.

SOME exceptions have been made against what Mr. Locke hath said, p. 119. and 201. When I have Transcribed the whole Discourse, I will take notice of what hath been offered to invalidate some parts of that Discourse. “From
 “ your preceeding words, your Lordship concludes thus, And so if the Scripture be the
 “ sole foundation of our Faith, this is an Article of it. My Lord, to make the Conclusion unquestionable, I humbly conceive the
 “ words must run thus. And so if the Scripture and your Lordships Interpretation of
 “ it, be the sole foundation of our Faith, the Resurrection of the same Body, is an Article
 “ of it. For, with Submission, your Lordship neither produced expresse words of Scripture
 “ for it, nor so proved that to be the meaning of any of those words of Scripture
 “ which you have produced for it, that a Man who Reads and sincerely endeavours to understand the Scripture, cannot but find himself obliged to believe, as expressly that the
 “ same Bodies of the Dead in your Lordships sense, shall be raised, as that the Dead shall
 “ be

“ be raised. And I crave leave to give your
 “ Lordship this one Reason for it. He who
 “ reads with attention this Discourse of St.
 “ Paul, (1 Cor. 15th.) where he discourses
 “ of the Resurrection, will see that he plainly
 “ distinguishes between *the Dead* that shall be
 “ raised, and *the Bodies* of the Dead : For it is
 “ νεκροί, πάντες, οί, are the Nominative Cases
 “ to ἐγείρονται, ζωοποιηθήσονται, ἐγερθήσονται,
 “ all along, and not σώματα Bodies, which
 “ one may with reason think would some-
 “ where or other have been expressed, if all
 “ this had been said to propose it as an Article
 “ of Christian Faith, that the very same Bodies
 “ should be raised. The same manner of
 “ Speaking the Spirit of God observes all
 “ through the New Testament ; where it is
 “ said, raise the Dead, quicken or make alive
 “ the Dead, the Resurrection of the Dead.
 “ Nay, these very words of our Saviour,
 “ (John 5. 28, 29.) urged by your Lordship
 “ for the Resurrection of the *same Body*, run
 “ thus, πάντες οί εν τοίς μνημείοις ἀκούονται
 “ τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐκπερεύσονται οί τά ἀρχαῖα
 “ ποιήσαντες εἰς ἀνάσασιν ζωῆς, οί δὲ τά φαῦλα
 “ πράξαντες εἰς ἀνάσασιν κρίσεως. Would a
 “ well-meaning Searcher of the Scriptures be
 “ apt to think, that if the thing here inten-
 “ ded by our Saviour, were to teach and pro-
 “ pose it as an Article of Faith, necessary to
 “ be believed by every one, that the very same
 “ Bodies of the Dead should be raised : Would
 “ not, I say, any one be apt to think, that if
 “ our Saviour meant so, the words should ra-

“ ther have been, πάντα τὰ σώματα ἃ ἐν τοῖς
 “ μνημείοις, i. e. All the Bodies that are in the
 “ Graves, rather than all who are in the
 “ Graves, which must denote Persons, and not
 “ precisely Bodies?

“ Another Evidence that St. Paul makes a
 “ distinction between the Dead, and the Bodies
 “ of the Dead, so that the Dead cannot be
 “ taken in this 1 Cor. Chap. 15. to stand pre-
 “ cisely for the Bodies of the Dead, are these
 “ words of the Apostle, (v. 35.) But some
 “ Men will say, how are the Dead raised, and
 “ with what Body do they come? Which words
 “ Dead, and They, if supposed to stand pre-
 “ cisely for the Bodies of the Dead, the questi-
 “ on will run thus, How are the Dead Bodies
 “ raised, and with what Bodies do the Dead
 “ Bodies come? Which seems to have no very
 “ agreeable Sense.

“ This therefore being so, that the Spirit
 “ of God keeps so expressly to this Phrase, or
 “ form of Speaking in the New-Testament, of
 “ Raising, Quickning, Rising, Resurrection, &c.
 “ of the Dead, where the Resurrection at the
 “ Last Day is spoken of, and that the Body
 “ is not mention'd, but in answer to this
 “ Question, with what Bodies shall those Dead
 “ who are raised, come? So that by the Dead
 “ cannot precisely be meant the dead Bodies: I
 “ do not see but a good Christian, who reads
 “ the Scripture, with an Intention to believe
 “ all that is there revealed to him concern-
 “ ing the Resurrection, may acquit himself
 “ of his duty therein, without entering into
 the

“ the Enquiry whether the Dead shall have
“ the very same Bodies or no ; which sort
“ of Enquiry, the Apostle, by the Appel-
“ lation he bestows here on him that makes it,
“ seems not much to encourage. Nor if
“ he shall think himself bound to determine
“ concerning the Identity of the Bodies of
“ of the Dead raised at the Last Day?
“ will he by the remainder of St. *Paul's* An-
“ swer, find the determination of the Apo-
“ stle to be much in favour of the very same
“ Body, unless the being told, that the Bo-
“ dy sown is not that Body that shall be?
“ That the Body raised, is as different from
“ that which was laid down, as the Flesh of
“ Man is from the Flesh of Beasts, Fishes,
“ and Birds, or as the Sun, Moon, and Stars
“ are different one from another, or as dif-
“ ferent as a Corruptible, Weak, Natural,
“ Mortal Body is from an Incorruptible,
“ Powerful, Spiritual, Immortal Body, and
“ lastly, as different as a Body which is Flesh
“ and Blood, is from a Body which is not
“ Flesh and Blood. For Flesh and Blood, says
“ St. *Paul* in this very place, cannot Inherit
“ the Kingdom of God, (*v.* 50.) Unless, I
“ say, all this, which is contained in St.
“ *Paul's* Words, can be supposed to be the
“ way to deliver this as an Article of Faith,
“ which is required to be believ'd by every
“ one, *viz.* That the Dead should be raised
“ with the very same Bodies that they had
“ before in this Life; which Article pro-
“ posed in these, or the like plain, and ex-
“ preis

“ press Words, could have left no room
 “ for doubt in the meanest Capacities, nor
 “ for Contest in the most perverse Minds.

Let. 3. p. 198. to 202.

Three things are laid down in opposition to what is said in those Pages.

First, It is said, *The Apostle in the Places of Scripture mention'd, or refer'd to, doth not plainly distinguish between the Dead, and the Bodies of the Dead.* And the reason given for saying so, is this, *Because by the Dead, the Apostle meant the Bodies of the Dead.* Which 'tis said, appears these two Ways. 1. *There is no Substantive but Body to be found to the Adjective and Pronoun, nor Nominative-Case to the Verb, in some other Verses of the 15th. Chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, and in that part of the Chapter too, in which the Doctor expressly declares the Apostle is not proving the Truth of the Resurrection of the Dead.* 2. *It is only the Body, which in Propriety of Speech, is said to Die.* These things having been considered already, there is no need to insist on them here. Yet it may be observed, that though these Authors will not allow that *St. Paul* doth plainly distinguish between the Dead, and the Bodies of the Dead, they themselves cannot avoid distinguishing betwixt them, in their endeavouring to inform the World, what they have a mind people should believe, the Apostle did mean by the Dead. For they say, *by the Dead, the Apostle meant the Bodies of the Dead, in which words, they themselves distinguished*
 be-

between the *Dead*, and the *Bodies of the Dead*. But that which they should have proved, if they would have said any thing to the purpose against what *Mr. Locke* hath said, is either, 1. That the Spirit of God has not kept so expressly all along in the New Testament to that form of Speaking, mentioned by *Mr. Locke*, where the Resurrection at the Last Day is spoken of, as *Mr. Locke* saith he has, but has at least in some one place made σώματα Bodies, the Nominative Case to the Verbs before mentioned. Or, 2. That a Man may not with reason think that σώματα Bodies, would some where or other have been expressed, if all before rehearsed had been said to propose it as an Article of Faith, that the very same Body shall be raised. But they have not offered any thing with respect to either of these points. The Dr. might have spared some of the pains he has been at, if he had observed that *Mr. Locke* doth not insist on this, that σώματα is not expressed in every place where the Resurrection of the Dead at the Last Day is discoursed of, but on this, that it is not expressed in any of them. For if it had once been expressly taught that the very same Bodies shall be raised again at the Last Day, that would have given light, and have guided people safely in understanding the Sacred Records, where the Doctrine was so expressed, that without so particular and express Instructions concerning it, an attentive Reader, who comes not to the Holy Scripture to seek Arguments to defend Notions and Doctrines, which he is resolved to maintain, but applies

applies himself to them, purely to learn what they teach, would think himself obliged to believe that the Doctrine taught, did not precisely respect Bodies, but Persons.

Secondly, Mr. Locke having set down our Saviours Words in *John* 5. 28, 29. which had been urged by the Bishop to prove the Resurrection of the same Body, propounds this Question, " Would a well meaning searcher of the
 " Scriptures be apt to think, that if the thing
 " here intended by our Saviour were to teach
 " and propose it as an Article of Faith necessary to be believed by every one, that the
 " very same Bodies of the Dead should be
 " raised, would not, I say, any one be apt to
 " think, that if our Saviour meant so, the
 " words should rather have been, πάντα τὰ
 " σώματα ἃ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις, i. e. all the
 " Bodies that are in the Graves, than all
 " who are in the Graves, which must denote persons, and not precisely Bodies?

To this, (says the Dr.) I answer (1st.) πάντες οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημείοις, all that are in the Graves, and πάντα τὰ σώματα τὰ ἐν μνημείοις, all the Bodies that are in the Graves, are plainly words of the same import, p. 104. Now, this Answer is not satisfactory. For Mr. Locke's enquiry is not what some learned Men will say is the import of all that are in the Grave. But in what manner people might in reason expect our Saviour would have expressed the Doctrine he intended to Teach, if it was his design to propose this proposition to be believed by every one, viz. That the very same Bodies

Philosophically considered, which are in the Graves, shall be raised at the Last Day? This is clear to every one, that if our Saviours intention had been only to teach, that dead persons shall be raised again, without any design to determine any thing concerning the particles of matter of which their Bodies shall consist at that time, he could hardly have used more significative words for that end, than those in *John* 5. 28. are. Whereas, if he intended to propose this proposition as a necessary Article of Faith, *viz.* The very same Bodies which are laid in the Graves, shall be raised again, *πάντα σώματα* would have been much more express, much plainer for his purpose, than *πάντες οἱ* are. If he only designed the former, he could scarce have expressed himself more plainly for that end, than he did. If he intended the latter, he might have declared his meaning in words much more clear and express for that purpose than those were he did use. The enquiry then is, in what sense would a well-meaning searcher of the Scripture be apt to understand our Saviour? This is the Question which should have been Answered. To which no reply being made, it retains its full force.

The Dr. Answers (2dly.) by enquiring whether any one will be tempted from these Personal Demonstrative Pronouns, Thou, and He, in *Gen.* 3. 19. and *Psal.* 146. 5. to say, these words must denote the Persons, and not precisely the Bodies of Men; And thence infer, that the whole Person of Adam was taken out of the Earth, and was but
Dust,

Dust, and that the whole Person of Man returneth to his Earth : If not, why is it argued that the like Pronoun oi, They must here denote Persons, and not precisely Bodies ? This may pass for an Answer to Mr. Locke's Question, when it shall be made out clearly, that *Gen. 3. 19.* and *Psal. 146. 5.* were intended to teach that *Adam* was not at that time Mortal, but only his Body; and that Men do not Die, but their Bodies only : And that these Notions are taught more plainly by the use of Personal Pronouns, than they would be by inserting Body, or Bodies into the Propositions. Till then, it will not be of any weight. And I am of Opinion, that well-meaning Readers, when they shall search after the sense of those places of Scripture, will be apt to think that Men are there spoken of, and not precisely Bodies; and that the Personal Pronouns may contribute somewhat to justify their thinking so.

Thirdly, Dr. Whitby says, It seems a great mistake, to say the Apostle in that Appellation, Thou Fool, reflects upon him that enquires whether the same Body which was dead should be raised or no ; And that the remainder of the Apostle's Answer seems not to be much in favour of the very same Body, unless, being told that the Body sown, is not that Body that shall be, &c. can be supposed to be the way to deliver this, viz. That the Dead shall be raised with the very same Bodies that they had before in this Life, as an Article of Faith which is required to be believed by every one. And to prove there is, or seems to be a great mistake in what Mr. Locke hath said, he says, The Apostle had entirely

entirely dispatch'd the *Question* about the truth of the *Resurrection* in the former part of the *Chapter*; And v. 35. He begins the *Enquiry* not about the truth of the *Resurrection*, but about the manner in which it shall be made, and the qualities which the raised *Bodies* should have, asking the *Question* of *Philosophers*, *πείω σώματι*, with what kind of *Bodies*, or with what qualified *Bodies* do they come? p. 108, 109.

The Grounds on which Mr. *Locke* saith he does not see but a good *Christian*, who reads the *Scripture*, with an intention to believe all that is there revealed to him concerning the *Resurrection*, may acquit himself of his *Duty* therein, without entring into the *Enquiry* whether the *Dead* shall have the very same *Bodies* or no, appear substantial, firm, and unmoveable; And if those who affirm, The same *Body* strictly considered, shall be raised again at the *Last Day*, is a *Necessary Article* of *Christian Faith*, were not satisfied that they are so, one would think they should have endeavoured to have given a fair *Answer* to that part of Mr. *Locke's* *Discourse*, when they undertook to vindicate the *Proposition* discoursed of. The *Dignity* They had conferred on it, should have caus'd 'em not to have contented themselves with producing some slight *Observations*, which only relate a pretended sense of some *Scripture Expressions* they met with, in some of the following parts of Mr. *Locke's* *Discourse*.

If the *Question* v. 35. is to be understood thus, shall the *Dead* come with the very same *Bodies* they had formerly, or with other *Bodies*?

dies? It is not possible to make a rational Reply to what Mr. *Locke* hath said, nor to prove any Mistake in the Passages quoted out of him as faulty. The Dr. therefore, (I conceive) without any more ado, determines that the Question is not whether the Dead shall at the Resurrection, have the same Bodies they had formerly, but what Qualities their former Bodies shall have at the Resurrection? But what ground is there to imagine this is the sense of the Question, seeing the Body is not mentioned in any other part of the New Testament, where the Resurrection at the Last Day is spoken of; nor in this Chapter, till we come to this very Verse where the Question is put? And if we must understand the Question *v. 35.* concerning the qualities of the Bodies, the question so understood, would be every jot as pertinent, if it had been before determined that People's Bodies shall not be the very same at the Resurrection, they had formerly, as it would, if it had been determined that they should be the very same. But the Body having not been mentioned before, how can it be made out, that the Question, Whether the same Body, or another, had been moved? And then on which side the Determination had been made?

The Dr. saith, The Apostle here asks the Question of Philosophers, *ποίῳ σώματι*, with what kind of Bodies, or with what qualified Bodies do they come? And he quotes *Minutius Felix* to confirm or evidence what he saith of Philosophers. I enquire not concerning the
power

power and extent of *Minutius's* Authority in the case: But if the Point must be determined by the words the Dr. has produced from him, I will transcribe them from the Dr. and leave them to be improved to the purpose for which they were alledged, by any one who knows how to turn them that way. The words are these. *Utrum sine corpore, an cum corporibus? Et corporibus quibus, ipsisne? An in novatis resurgatur?* Here I will but just observe, 1. That the Nominative Case cannot be *Body*; for it is supposed here, that the Dead may be raised without a Body. 2. That the Question is not about the Qualities, but about the Body, whether the same; or a new one. 3. That tho' I do not think *Minutius*, or any one else hath Authority to determine the sense of any Text of Scripture, any further than his Reasons evince it; Yet *Min. Fel.* being here the Doctor's own Witness produced by himself, is good Evidence as to him. The words in v. 35. are these, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τις, πῶς ἐγείρονται οἱ νεκροὶ; ποίῳ δὲ σώματι ἔρχονται; Which words are thus Translated in our *English Bible*, *But some Man will say, How are the Dead raised up? and with what Body do they come?* And there appears not to me any need of altering our Translation in this place, unless it be to serve a Turn. 'Tis true, the Apostle doth afterwards discourse of the different qualities the Bodies of *Good People* shall have at the Resurrection, from those their Bodies had formerly. But he who shall strictly observe the Thread of his Discourse, will not perceive much reason to

think that what he saith on that Subject, was designed by him as an Answer to the Question in *v. 35.*

Besides, if what the Dr. pretends is the meaning of the Question, was the direct and proper sense of the Question, for which the Apostle gave to him who propos'd it, the Epithet, *Thou Fool*, what account can be given of the Apostle's affixing that Appellation on him, for asking a question so very pertinent; if, as is pretended, the railing of the very same Body had been just before determined; and a question to which the Apostle thought fit to give so large and satisfactory an answer, as it is pretended he did in the following part of the Chapter?

The Dr. saith, the Apostle had entirely dispatch'd the Question concerning the truth of the Resurrection of the Dead, (by which, I suppose he means, he had determined, or proved that the very same Body shall be raised again) in the former part of the Chapter. And so, from *v. 35.* he was only concerned with the Enquiry about the Qualities of the Raised Body.

Yet, when he undertook to prove out of this Chapter, that the very same Body shall be raised again, he did not alledge any thing out of the former part of the Chapter, where, it is now said, the whole of the Apostle's Proof of the Point doth lie; But all that was quoted to prove the Resurrection of the same Body, was taken out of that part of the Chapter, where, we are now told, the Apostle doth not dis-

discourse of that matter. And if here is not any Enquiry concerning the same Body, nor any thing answered touching that Enquiry, then it is pretty plain that in this part of the Chapter, there is not any thing said of the Resurrection of the same Body, nor any Determination or Proof that the very same Body shall be raised again. So that all the Proof before, pretended to be brought from this Chapter, is, by the Doctor's Confession now, no Proof at all. For he tells us here, that what he brought out of this Chapter, concerns not that at all for which it was produced by him, but relates only to the Qualities of the Body Raised, and not its Identity; that being fully dispatch'd in the former part of the Chapter. Nor can any Proof of the Resurrection of the same Body, be produced out of the former part of the Chapter, there being no mention of the Body in all the Apostle's Discourse concerning the Resurrection, till we come to v. 35.

When the Apostle adds (says the Dr.) v. 37. that which thou sowest, &c. it is evident he speaketh there not of the Body of Man, but of the Body of Wheat or of some other Grain. Very true. The Body he there speaks of, is the Body of some Grain. But I conceive, the Dr. thinks he speaks strictly in the Application, of the Body of Man; tho' I do not see any good Reason why he should be thought to speak so. The Apostle says, it is a foolish thing to enquire with what Body the Dead shall come, at the general Resurrection: For Men must die in

order to their being rais'd again; And at the Resurrection, *God will give them such Bodies as pleaseth him.* This should satisfy us: This is all we know of the matter: And here we ought to acquiese. This he represents, and illustrates by Seed sown; observing that Seed when sown, must die before it can be quickned. Now (saith St. Paul) it is not the meer Body of a Grain which thou sowest, and which must rise again, but that which thou sowest is meer Grain; and tho' the Grain has a Body when thou sowest it, yet it is not the Body that springs up, but the Grain, to which *God giveth a Body as pleaseth him.*

Yet, suppose it to be as the Dr. saith, viz. *Thou sowest a naked Grain, but God raiseth it up cloathed, with a Hull or Shell, &c.* (tho' the Apostle doth not say so) *And that so it will be with our Bodies at the Resurrection; they will not be raised naked, but cloathed upon, and that this is the whole Intendment of this Similitude, and that it ought not to be urged any further:* Yet all this is nothing at all to the Article of the very same Body. But methinks, the Dr. manifestly mistakes; when he saith, *so will it be with our Bodies at the Resurrection.* For can any thing be more plain than this, that the Apostle compares not *our Bodies*, but *Us*, not the *Bodies* of Men, but *Men themselves* to Grain: And if their Bodies are to be compared in this business, they must be compared with the Bodies of the Grains that are sown. The Grain, after it is sown, dies, and so does Man. The Grain is afterward to be quickned, and God giveth it a Body
as

as pleaseth him. The Man is to be raised, and then God giveth him a Body as pleaseth him. And it is not the Body of the Grain that is cloathed, but the Grain it self: Nor is it the Body, but the Man which at the Resurrection must be cloathed, according to the places of Scripture quoted by the Doctor.

But take the Grain, and the Man, or if you please, the Body, and consider them either as naked, or cloathed, Yet what Particles the Body shall be made up of at the Resurrection, is left undecided; And we are referred as to that matter, to the good pleasure of God. And therefore no Article of Faith necessary to be believed by every Christian, can be framed concerning it, till God shall see fit to declare his pleasure about it.

The Anonymous Author before spoken of, affirms, *The Proof of the Resurrection of the same Body*, (tho' what same Body he means is not known) in v. 53, 54. of the 15th. Chapt. of the *First Epistle to the Corinthians*, is so clear, that the light of the brightest day cannot be more clear, p. 149. The light this Portion of Scripture affords. is so great and clear, it seems either quite to have blinded this Author, or to have very much injured the sight of the late Bishop of *Worcester*, and of all those who teach that the Body which shall be raised, shall be that very Body which shall be laid in the Grave. For tho' they all quote these same Verses to prove what they affirm is a Necessary Article of Christian Faith, yet they have Opinions very different about that very Body which is to

be raised, and which they on every side say, every one ought to believe shall be raised, from the Opinion this Author must have of it, if his opinion of it in general, be consistent with what he has said of the Bodies of some particular People. And if this Author had observed the pertinency and force of what Mr. *Locke* hath Writ, p. 196, 197, 198. one would think he should hardly have prevailed with himself to say, Mr. *Locke* returned no answer to what the Bishop had said concerning those two Verses; At least, that he would have understood the Point better; than to have quoted a Portion of Scripture to prove the Resurrection of the same Body, and talk of it with so much Ostentation, which does not relate to the Resurrection, but refers to those People who shall not be in a capacity of being raised from the Dead, because they shall not die; and gives a reason why those who shall be found alive when the Dead shall be raised Incorruptible, must be changed.

Mr. *Locke* having observ'd that the Body is not mentioned, but in answer to this Question, with what Bodies shall those Dead who are raised come? so that by the Dead, cannot precisely be meant the Dead Bodies; doth afterwards take notice, that 'if an attentive searcher of the Scripture, should think himself bound to determine concerning the Identity of the Bodies of the Dead raised at the Last Day, he will not by the remainder of St. *Paul's* Answer, find the Determination of the Apostle to be much in favour of the very same Body,

Body, unless the being told that the Body sown, is not that Body which shall be, &c. can be supposed to be the way to deliver this, as an Article of Faith which is required to be believed by every one, viz. That the Dead should be raised with the very same Bodies they had before in this Life. Now in answer to this, the Dr. takes for granted, and affirms, that the same Body shall be raised, and that St. Paul had proved it in the former part of the Chapter, tho' the Body is not once mentioned there; And what he himself had produced out of this Chapter, to prove the Resurrection of the same Body, was entirely taken out of that part of the Chapter which follows the Question propounded, v. 35. And then he is at some pains to shew that Men's Bodies at the Resurrection, may be the very same for Substance they were formerly, and yet differ very much in Qualities from what they were formerly.

It is very true, the Bodies good People shall have at the Resurrection, will be invested with Qualities vastly different from those their Bodies had before they died, and which will be wonderfully to advantage. The Scripture is very plain and express as to that. Thus it will be, whether their Bodies shall then consist only of those Particles which were laid in the Grave, or of others. Whether the same, or not the same, is, for ought we know, perfectly indifferent as to this matter.

But these things do not at all concern what Mr. Locke said. If the Dr. would have answered

swered directly to that, he should have shewn that St. *Paul's* discoursing in that manner Mr. *Locke* mentions, on occasion of the Question, v. 35. concerning the Body the Dead shall come with, was a proper way to deliver the Proposition spoken of, as a Necessary Article of Christian Faith. For if it was not a proper way to deliver, &c. what Mr. *Locke* said, just before, is undisputably true, so clear and plain, that no Man who understands the Words, and takes notice of their Connection, can possibly doubt of.

C H A P. VIII.

Of admitting Propositions to be Necessary Articles of Christian Faith, if we cannot with good Reason deny they may be true.

TH O' Mr. *Locke* could not perceive any sufficient Proof brought to make it out, that the Resurrection of the same Body is a Necessary Article of Christian Faith; and doth suggest that St. *Paul's* Discourse in 1 *Cor.* 15. in answer to this Question, With what Bodies shall those Dead who are raised come? was not adapted to perswade People that the Resurrection of the same Body is a Necessary Article of Faith; He is very far from affirming, that
the

the Body at the Resurrection shall, or will be made up of other Particles of Matter; than those which made up the Body formerly. That he does not deny that the same Body shall be raised, is most plain and undeniable from his own words. 'For though I do by no means deny that the same Bodies shall be raised at the Last Day, Yet I see nothing your Lordship has said to prove it to be an Article of Faith, p. 195.

But (says Mr. Parker,) if Mr. Locke does by no means deny that the same Body shall be raised at the last day, why is he not at least content to leave that Position which he denies to be an Article of Faith, as a Position of an indifferent Nature? Why would he make out the Position it self to be Indefensible? p. 31. Again (saith he,) if Mr. Locke had suppressed what he has published against the Sameness of the Body at the Resurrection; no harm had been done by his own Confession, p. 2. Another Author propounds his Questions about this matter, in the following words. If he do not deny it, why doth he dispute so earnestly against it? Why doth he endeavour to the utmost of his power, to baffle the Arguments that are urged for the Proof of it? An account of Mr. Locke's Religion, p. 150.

These are Questions, I should not have thought worth any Man's taking notice of, except on the account of their being Impertinent beyond what is usual, and discovering, that if the Publishers of them were not very much disordered in their Heads when they writ them, they are Men of very weak Judgments, and

and perfect Strangers to just and true Reasoning. Nor would I have said any thing to them, if these Writers had not on this occasion, express'd themselves in such an Air; as manifests they thought themselves very lucky in hitting on these Enquiries; That they are of mighty weight, and do carry Conviction along with them; Yea, that they do good Service in endeavouring to possess People with an Opinion, that it is Unaccountable, and even Monstrous, for Men not to acknowledge Propositions to be Necessary Articles of Christian Faith, if they cannot deny but that they may possibly be true. Which is a Notion that offers such an Affront to Almighty God; so horribly derogates from the Lord Jesus Christ, is so contrary to the whole Tenour of the New Testament; and indeed of all Divine Revelation, tends so directly to overturn the Fundamental Principle of the Protestant Religion, and is so inconsistent with True Reason, it may with great Justice be reckoned one of the wickedest Concoits, the Grand Enemy of all Truth and Goodness, did ever suggest to any of the Children of Men.

In what I have quoted from these Writers, and which they have Published with such a shew of Triumph, there are evidently two infamous Faults. 1. What may possibly be true, is not distinguished from a Necessary Article of Christian Faith; but they are jumbled together as if they were one and the same: Can a greater Wrong be done to the Christian Religion, and Abuse to Christians, than setting the necessary
Articles

Articles of Christian Faith, on the same Foot and Level with bare Possibilities? and representing meer Possibilities, as equal to, and the same with the necessary Articles of Christian Faith? Certainly no. Unless they will say it is absolutely impossible that the necessary Articles of Christian Faith can be true. 2. Matters of Fact are here represented and affirmed to be done, which were not done. Mr. *Locke* has not published any thing against, has not disputed against the Position spoken of, has not made any such Confession as is talk'd of, has not done any one of those things they suggest, and signify that he has done. They represent Mr. *Locke*; as writing industriously against the Possibility of the same Body being raised; whereas they know, are convinced in their own Minds, that he does acknowledge the Possibility of it; and has not writ one word against it, but only against Men's affirming and teaching without warrant from Scripture, that the same Body shall be raised at the Last Day, is a Necessary Article of Christian Faith. Those who have any sense of Morality, cannot but resent Men treating them they choose to write against in this manner. I shall pass over the mighty Disingenuity of the Practice; and only observe, that if those who are most earnest to have Propositions, no where taught in the New Testament, received for necessary Articles of Christian Faith, would have a becoming regard to those Laws and Rules of Practice, which are necessary parts of the Christian Religion, and expressly taught, and often inculcated in
the

the New Testament, their way of managing Controversies would not be so justly liable to be blamed, as hitherto it has generally been.

The just and necessary occasion Mr. *Locke* had to Publish what he has writ, to shew that the Identity of the Body at the general Resurrection, is not a necessary Article of Christian Faith, is well known, to all who have with any tolerable care read the Controversy begun, and for some time continued with him, by the late Bishop of *Worcester*. And those who have read Mr. *Locke's* 3d. Letter without prejudice, and do understand strict Reasoning and good Sense, cannot but perceive that he leaves the Position of the Resurrection of the same Body, as a Position of an indifferent Nature. And if others had left it so, there had been no Controversy concerning it: But whereas God has left it, as it is in it self, of an indifferent Nature, Men have pretended to exalt it into a necessary Article of Christian Faith, And under that Consideration, *viz.* as a necessary Article of Christian Faith, It was brought into the Controversy with Mr. *Locke*, who did not write against the Position, but against Mens pretending to clap God's Stamp upon it, without warrant from God.

A Fault is imputed to Mr. *Locke*, here, by these Writers. Now, what is the Fault they lay to his charge? They say it is, that *He did not leave the Position spoken of, as a Position of an Indifferent Nature.* How does the truth of this Accusation appear? how does it appear that he does not leave it, as a Position of an

Indiffe-

Indifferent Nature? Does he any where say, that the Dead shall not be raised with the same Bodies, or that they shall be raised with other Bodies, is a necessary Article of Christian Faith? No. Does he then say, that the Dead shall be raised with the same Bodies they had formerly? No. That is what they affirm, and would have him to say, but which he shews the Scripture no where teaches. Now, can any thing be more clear, than that he leaves the Position, as a Position of an Indifferent Nature?

No doubt these Writers are displeas'd with Mr. *Locke* amongst other Reasons perhaps, because he Oppos'd the Notion they have Espous'd. And in short, the matter lies thus. Mr. *Locke* had been charg'd with Publishing in his *Essay concerning Humane Understanding*, something that was of dangerous Consequence to Articles of Christian Faith. And to make good this Charge, the Resurrection of the same Body, is produced as a necessary Article of Christian Faith; And it was pretended, there was something in Mr. *Locke's* Book, that was of dangerous Consequence to this necessary Article of Christian Faith. Mr. *Locke's* Replies vindicate the Christian Faith, and vindicate his own Book; discover a double Cheat, or Mistake at the same time, and set Truth upon its own Basis. And this is that which has thrown some People into some disorder.

Affecting Dominion over the Faith of Christians, is an old Distemper; It too easily prevails on Mankind, and where it gets possession, it makes Men very Jealous, impatient of Opposition, extreamly Surly and Waspish. These are the best things that can be said of it. Men assume to themselves a power to transform Propositions which are possibly true, into Articles of Christian Faith; and Authority to obtrude them as necessary to be believed by all Christians. Thus they attempt in Effect, to overturn the Kingdom of God amongst Men, set themselves in the Throne of the Lord Jesus Christ, vacate all Supernatural Revelation, and throw up the New Testament as an Insignificant Cypher. Where the Constitution is such, Implicite Faith, and Blind Obedience are reputed the safest and most laudable Qualities, and the surest way People can take to be esteemed Orthodox. To exercise Reason strictly, search the Holy Scriptures impartially, and assert Christianity in its Truth and Simplicity, are sure, where what People call Religion is in that State, to be reflected on with great severity, to be represented under the most odious Characters, to draw on People the most Envenomed Censures, and to expose them to a Treatment Tragical and Barbarous, beyond what undisciplin'd Nations are acquainted with. Some Neighbouring Nations afford abundant Proof of all this at present: And History will inform, it was thus in this Land some Ages ago. Introducing Propositions as necessary

fary Articles of Christian Faith, which were not warranted and taught in the New Testament, opened the way to all that Corruption in Doctrine, which in many Places overspread the Profession, and in a manner, threatned the utter Extirpation of the Christian Religion there.

The first Reformers fixed on the true and certain Rule, wise and good Men should proceed by, with respect to Articles of Faith. By a regard to which Principle, it is, that the Protestant Churches have in great measure, been freed from a Concern for a great number both of Impertinent and Evil Doctrines, which Multitudes of People, who are either ignorant or regardless of that Principle, have such a Bigotry for, as hardly permits them to have any regard to those Articles, which are indeed Articles of Christian Faith. The closer the Protestant Churches have kept to that Principle, the more they have advanced in Reformation: And if they had all steddily adhered to, and faithfully pursued that Principle, their Faith would by this time, have been as pure and unmix'd, as the Gospel it self is; which is the only and the entire Rule and Measure of Christian Faith.

But, to return to the Article; The Writers I before quoted, have shewn their concern for, and which they would have had Mr. *Locke* have left undisturbed, in the Possession some had given it, of a Necessary Article of Christian Faith. A Man's not acknowledging the Re-
sur-

surrection of the same Body, a Necessary Article of the Christian Faith, is not from a supposed impossibility, or improbability of the same Body's being raised again, but purely because the New Testament does no where teach either in general that the same Body shall be raised, or with particular Limitations to any part of Man's Life. If God raise the Dead, whether they have the same Bodies Philosophically Considered, they had formerly, or whether some other Particles of Matter be in the Composition of them, he does what he has declared he will do. If he please he can raise them with the very same Bodies, and he has not any where declared that he will not raise them with the same Bodies; for which reason, we may not deny that he will raise them with the same Bodies. On the other side, he has not any where taught that he will raise them with the same Bodies; and therefore we may not affirm *that*, a Necessary Article of Christian Faith, because we have not in that case his Authority, his Word to be the Ground of our Faith, which is the sole Foundation of Christian Faith. It is of dangerous consequence, a very evil thing, to obtrude on People Propositions, as Necessary Articles of Christian Faith, which Christ has not taught. Mr. *Locke* therefore truly deserves to be very highly Esteemed and Honoured, by every good Christian throughout the whole World, on the account of what he has published on this Subject; because of the just Concern he hath manifested for

Christ's

Christ's Authority, and the Purity of the Christian Faith.

When the Pleasure of God concerning any Matter, is declared only in general in the New Testament, and he has not thought fit to descend to make particular Discoveries what he will do as to that matter, Christians must content themselves with what he has revealed. They must not make Articles of Faith necessary to be believed by every one, of what they or other Men have a mind he should do with respect unto it. Men take too much on them, if, when God has not thought fit to oblige himself by particular Revelations concerning any matter, They will make Limiting Interpretations Necessary Articles of Christian Faith. For let such Interpretations be of ever so ancient a Date, and tho' they have obtained ever so generally those Considerations, and all that Men can possibly devise, will not raise them one degree above what they were in their first Original, *i. e.* meer Humane Opinions. All the Authority Men's Notions and Interpretations can in these Cases truly have, must be derived from the strength of the Arguments they produce to Evidence they think right.

To conclude, Those who publish to the World, they are prepared to avouch any Propositions for necessary Articles of Christian Faith, the truth of which they cannot with good warrant peremptorily deny, may perhaps on second thoughts, apprehend they have been somewhat too forward, and have a little

too violently solicited People to suspect their Concern about Articles of Christian Faith, is not so much for the saving of their own or other Peoples Souls, as for other Considerations.

A
DISCOURSE
Concerning the
IMMATERIALITY
OF THE
SOUL.

S I R,

AFTER I receiv'd Mr. *Broughton's* *Psychologia*, I took the first opportunity I could get, to read over the first part of it. I need not tell you what Expectations were rais'd in me by some parts of the Preface, nor whether those Expectations were answer'd by what is contain'd in that part of his Book I look'd over.

But in the following Papers you will find, 1st. some of those more general Thoughtgs which occurred to me, whilst I was reading those Sections that are designed against some Passages the very Learned and Ingenious Mr. *Locke* hath writ ; and 2^{dly}. some Reasons why I cannot think his Discourses so concluding, as he takes them to be.

First, I shall set down some general Considerations which came to my Mind, as I read over the first part of Mr. *Broughton's* Book ; by which it may appear he hath not Express'd himself so clearly and distinctly, nor been so fair and candid in this part of his Book, as was needful to render it, either useful or pleasing to an Indifferent, Unprejudiced, Honest Reader.

1. He hath neglected to define, *or if you will*, describe several Terms of which he makes frequent use, and which do no less need to be Explained, than any of those he hath defined. The Term, *Nature*, is very familiar with him ; and perhaps no Man ever used a Word more unsteadily than he does that. *Principle*, is also a great Term with him, yet has not any determinate settled meaning. For, if I mistake not, it sometimes signifies a Proposition, sometimes a piece of a Proposition, sometimes a single Word. *Capacity*, and *Incapacity*, are Terms of such Moment with him, that he seems to lay the whole stress of his Discourse upon them ; and therefore what is to be understood by them, should have been made very plain ;
whereas

whereas they are left undefined, and seem to be used sometimes in one Sense, and sometimes in another. The like neglect, and the like uncertainty might be taken notice of, as to several other Terms which are often to be met with in those Pages.

2. As to the Terms he hath defined, some of his Definitions do not clearly discover in what sense he intended to use them; nor do they reach the sense in which he has used them. *E. G.* His Definition of Substance, is, *That to us unknown Nature, upon which all that we do know of the Nature of any thing depends, and which is as to its Essence in general, independent on every thing but God,* p. 2. If this is a Definition of Substance, it is such an one, as leaves me as much in the dark, every jot as ignorant of what was to be defined, as I was without it. Here are several Terms that want Explanations. It is so far from being a Definition of Substance, that to me, it seems to suppose Substance as something unknown, and to be a sort of a Description of something belonging to Individual Substances, which is as much unknown to us, as what Substance it self is. Whether Mr. *Broughton* intended it so, I know not: But if I were to look for a Definition of Substance in the beginning of a Book, which was to treat of Material and Immaterial Substance, I should expect another sort of Definition than this is. If his Definition of Substance here, had nothing of obscurity and confusion in it, yet there might be just ground to doubt whe-

ther it will reach the use Mr. *Broughton* makes of the Term he so defines ; And whether he design'd it for a Definition of created Substance, or for a Definition of Substance, when he makes use of that Term, with reference unto God, as well as to other things ? If this Definition declares the meaning of the word Substance, when used concerning God, should the first parts of it be acknowledg'd pertinent, the propriety of the last Clause in it, may by some be thought not very evident. If the Definition was designed by Mr. *Broughton* to make known what he did mean by created Substance, then it may be proper to observe, that in his Arguing, he uses the Term in a different sense from that, which by his Definition he certifies he would be understood to use it in ; And the strength of his Argument consisting in his taking the Term in another, than his declared sense, it must be perfectly insignificant, if not extremely pernicious in its Consequences ; as being with a sort of Art prepared to impose upon the Easie, and to qualify such to Exult, who having no great regard for Truth, are always ready to make a Noise, if they can but be furnished with a plausible Appearance. Mr. *Broughton* bestows some Pages in proving *there must be an Immaterial Thinking Substance, Eternal, and the first cause of Motion* ; And having produced what Evidence he thought fit for this, he concludes *he hath sufficiently proved, that Thought cannot be the Property of any Substance, but what is Immaterial*, p. 10, 11, &c. But proving that God is Immaterial Thinking Substance,

stance, will not prove the Existence of created Immaterial Substance ; nor can the power of Thinking, this way prove, that such Substance must necessarily be the Subject of it. If it prove any thing, it must be this, *viz.* That uncreated Immaterial Substance is the only Subject of Thought. For proving Thought to belong only to Immaterial Substance, by proving that God is Immaterial, is not to prove that Thought belongs to created Immaterial Substance, but to uncreated Immaterial Substance.

3. Mr. *Broughton* seems not to understand what hath been writ by Mr. *Locke*, whom he professes to Answer. He represents Mr. *Locke* sometimes as affirming that *Matter may Think*. He never takes notice that Mr. *Locke* acknowledges the highest degree of Probability on the other side, and consequently that whosoever will effectually answer what Mr. *Locke* hath writ about this Subject, must both understand Demonstration, and produce strict Demonstrative Proof that God cannot superadd a power of Thinking to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed. 'Tis true, Mr. *Broughton* doth sometimes in his Discourse, applaud what he hath done, and calls it Demonstration ; but when he had in Cool-Blood look'd it all over, and acquaints his Readers what sort of Proof most of them must hope to find, he speaks of it with an Air that doth not advance it above the highest degree of Probability, *p.* 5, 6. Again, he represents Mr. *Locke* as much mi-

flaken, in saying we know nothing of Substance; (by which it is most Evident, he means we do not know what it is) because we know it doth Exist. Whereas Mr. *Locke* affirms we may know that it doth Exist, and what it does; and he himself acknowledges, *It is an unknown Nature, or Essence; And that to know what it is, may transcend all created Understanding,* p. 10.

4. Mr. *Broughton* appears very careful to observe the usual Mode of Writing against Mr. *Locke*, and to accommodate his Book to the Relish of that sort of People, who are sufficiently pleas'd with finding the Man, or Book they do not like, loaded with Execrable Aspersions. Indeed Mr. *Broughton* does not always, when he charges the Notion he opposes with a tendency to Atheism, or Scepticism (the usual Cry) expressly involve Mr. *Locke* in the Guilt, or affirm him to be either Atheist or Sceptick, but doth sometimes expressly take notice that he Excepts his Person; tho' this is done in such a way, perhaps some will be apt to think it was not so much out of respect to Mr. *Locke*, or regard to Justice, as to put a Complement on himself, and to suggest to his Readers, that they ought to look upon him as a Man of a very profound Reach, such an uncommon Thinker, he can see Consequences which others cannot see. Atheism, Scepticism, and such kind of disingenuous, and unchristian Insinuations, have taken up too much room in the Writings of those who have endeavoured

to do themselves some kindness, by professing to oppose Mr. *Locke*; whom, all who are acquainted with him, do very much Honour, because they cannot but observe that he hath a very profound Veneration for Almighty God, and a very great, and most Rational Esteem for the Sacred Scriptures; And who therefore must conclude, when they meet with Books where he is treated Rudely, that the Authors do not know him, nor understand aright what he hath writ, or that they are Men of very unworthy and ill tempers of Mind. Many have Publish'd their Writings against Mr. *Locke's Essay*; and that most of them have been very liberal in dispersing their groundless and false Accusations, their rash, unjust, unreasonable, and unchristian Censures, cannot be denied: And this they have done to as much purpose, as that Troop of Writers, who some time ago set themselves against, and thought to run down the Notion of the Circulation of the Blood, by charging it with No-Body knows how many terrible and mischievous Consequences. It has been observed, that those pretenders to Learning, who had not much Knowledge, and a mighty Stock of Confidence, were the boistrous and rude Opposers of that Notion; which still maintains its ground, is approved and justified, and built on, by all the Men of good Sense, Reason, Learning and Judgment, through the whole World; whilst the Names and Books of those who furiously oppos'd it, are either perfectly forgot, or not thought fit by Men of Reputation and Credit, to be mentioned or taken notice of.

Not-

Notwithstanding those who have writ against Mr. *Locke*, have taken a great deal of care not to forget to insert very ill-favour'd Insinuations into their Writings, and to represent what they write against, as of very dangerous Consequence; and do ordinarily abound very much with these sort of Ornaments, whether to gratifie others, or to supply the want of Reason and Consideration in themselves, I do not determine; Yet it is most certain, that many of them are really guilty of what they, without any Reason, impute to Mr. *Locke*. I have scarce met with one Book writ against Mr. *Locke*, but the Author has had the ill Luck, whilst he has been endeavouring to asperse Mr. *Locke*, to advance Notions which have a direct tendency to weaken very much, or overturn the Credibility of Divine Testimony, or Supernatural Revelation; or to open a broad way for Immorality to enter into the World with Privilege and Protection, or which may afford some seeming Assistance and Colour to Atheists in their contending against Arguments, which without such Countenance, they must have acknowledged to have been insuperable. You know how unfortunate the late Bishop of *Worcester* was, who earnestly striving, tho' in vain, to fasten some odious Insinuations on what Mr. *Locke* had writ, has published some Notions as dangerous perhaps to the Christian Religion, as any that ever were vented. And what pernicious use ill Men would make of them, if Mr. *Locke* had not furnished the World with an Antidote, none can tell; tho'

tho' the pretendedly Religious Opposers of Mr. *Locke* cannot perceive any hurt in them, or will not take notice of, and warn People concerning them, because they were advanced in opposition to Mr. *Locke*. It is an Argument that People are extreamly depraved, when the sole or principal Enquiry in order to Doctrines being approved or condemned, is who did publish them? It would take up too much time to mention the Notions of apparently dangerous Consequence, which I have taken notice of in the other Books writ against Mr. *Locke*, that I have met with. Yet with reference to Mr. *Broughton*, I may mind you of one thing, without enquiring into the tendency of some other Notions which are to be met with in the First Part of his *Psychologia*, and that is,

5. That his Zeal in opposing Mr. *Locke*, hath prevailed with him to discover a vehement Inclination to afford Atheists the utmost assistance he could, to enable them to make some opposition against the best Arguments that can be produced, to prove the Existence and Immateriality of the Deity. Mr. *Locke* in the Tenth Chapter of his Fourth Book, had produced Demonstrative Proof of the Existence of God: He also produced there Demonstrative Proof that he is not Material. Now, to furnish the Atheist with something to answer to that Proof, Mr. *Broughton* takes a great deal of pains in his Eighth Section; And if I am not much mistaken, the whole of his Discourse amounts but to this, *That if God can*
superadd.

superadd a Power of Thinking to Matter, then Matter may have a Power of Thinking in it self; that is, without God's superadding of it. But must not that Man be an Atheist in Grain, who can take this for a Rational Reply? That I may not fail to set down the entire strength of what he offers on this occasion, I will consider more particularly what he saith. I cannot (saith he) but think, that recurring to the Power of Omnipotence, to evade the necessity of owning an Immaterial Substance in Humane Nature, is so far an Apparatus to Atheism, that I should be loth to dispute with an Atheist, and maintain at the same time this as an avowed Principle of mine, That Matter may Think. For who knows then, but granting something Eternal, this something may be Matter with Thought, tho' not super-added, yet Eternally inherent in it, p. 52, 53.

In these words, here is something Mr. Broughton finds fault with; The fault he attributes to it, and the Reason he gives, why he does lay that to its charge. That which he finds fault with, is *having recourse to the Power of Omnipotence, to evade the necessity of owning an Immaterial Substance in Humane Nature.* This appears to be studiously Express'd, in such a manner as should suggest there is something Criminal in it. I suppose he would not have the thoughts, or acknowledgment of God's Omnipotency to be banish'd the World. Philosophers themselves, even those who are best stor'd with Axioms, are sometimes at a loss; Their Hypothesis will reach no further, and then they cannot help it, but they must have recourse to

God's

God's Omnipotency. Mr. *Broughton* is at last fain to take Refuge there, *Sect. XI.* So that it is not a Fault to have recourse to God's Omnipotency. Where lies the Fault then? Why, in *having recourse to it, to evade the necessity of owning an Immaterial Substance in Humane Nature.* Which seems to be much the same, as doing it without his Licence. He will have it, that there is a necessity of owning an Immaterial Substance in Humane Nature; It is his pleasure, it seems, it should be so; And to have recourse to God's Omnipotency in the Case, is an offence against the said Pleasure, and therefore cannot deserve a more favourable Construction, than that it is done to *evade* the aforementioned Necessity. Had Mr. *Broughton* declared what he means by the *necessity* of owning, &c. he would have freed his Reader from a great deal of trouble he must be at, if he will thoroughly examine this Passage, in which his Expressions are so very obscure.

To be as brief and as plain as I can, I will offer this to your Consideration, That a Man cannot be rationally said to be under a necessity of believing and owning the truth of a Proposition, but in proportion to the Evidence he hath that it is True. If the Proposition, *E. G.* That there is an Immaterial Substance in Humane Nature, can be proved to me only by probable Evidence, there is no necessity that I should own it to be more than a probable Truth. If any should require me to own it to be demonstratively true, and should insist

on

on it, that it is demonstratively true, I am in reason so far from being under a necessity to own it to be demonstratively true, I am under a necessity to the contrary, and am obliged not to own it necessarily true; because in doing so, I should offend against God's Rights, by putting a Necessity on him, when I do not know that he hath so Limited himself. Can a Reason be shewn why I should pretend to lay a necessity on God to do a thing, when he lays no necessity on me to believe it? When it is required by any, that we believe or own a Proposition to be demonstratively and necessarily true, and the utmost Evidence we have of its truth, is but probable, we cannot believe it is demonstratively and necessarily true; the thing is impossible, and we ought not to own it to be demonstratively true, we do wickedly, if we do it. And in such Case to have recourse to God's Omnipotency, assigning this as our Reason why we cannot believe it necessarily true, because we do not know but Omnipotence may do otherwise; is to act according to the Principles of true Reason, as becomes Philosophers, and is the certain Duty of good Christians; And to endeavour to blemish and stigmatize such recourse to God's Omnipotency, by styling it an *Evasion*, is very little, if at all short of Execrable Blasphemy. Mr. *Broughton* could not but know, that Mr. *Locke* affirm'd the highest degree of Probability; And I am inclined to think, that if he is really persuaded that he hath demonstrated the Proposition, he is not of the Opinion it was demonstrated before

fore Mr. *Locke* wrote, what he opposes. For then he might have spared his pains, and only have produc'd, or referr'd to the former Demonstration; nor do I see how he could then, *without vanity, say he hath carried his Proof further than where he found it*, pref. It is indeed a fault, to pretend we do not know but Omnipotency can do a thing in another way, purely to avoid owning the truth of a Proposition which is demonstrated, and proved to be necessarily true, as that we do not know but Omnipotency can make the Drops of Rain to stream from the Sun. A Proposition which Mr. *Broughton* would have parallel to this, that God for ought we know, can super-add a Power of Thinking to Matter. He submits it to *Judgment*, and so do I. Let any Man consider the whole Evidence, with respect to the Atmosphere, and to Immaterial Substance, and if it be equal on both sides, let him judge alike. That then, which Mr. *Broughton* finds fault with, (that it may be pertinent here, and concern Mr. *Locke*) must be worded to this Effect, *Having recourse to the power of Omnipotence, to evade the necessity of owning upon probable Evidence, that an Immaterial Substance is in Humane Nature, is a Proposition demonstratively and necessarily true.* This, (he saith) he cannot but think is so far an Apparatus to *Atheism*, that he should be loth to dispute with an *Atheist*, and maintain at the same time this, as an avowed Principle of his, *That Matter may Think.* So that what he chargeth on that he found

found fault with, is, that it is *an Apparatus to Atheism*. If he hath a private peculiar Notion of Atheism, which he reserves to himself, it is not for me to disturb his possession of it, nor to be solicitous in enquiring after it. But I cannot understand how a Man's owning a Divine Being, and having a recourse to God's Omnipotence upon necessary Occasions ; no, nor sometimes without a necessity, is an Apparatus to Atheism, according to the usual and ordinary Importance of that Word ; but rather that it hath the direct contrary tendency. Here the Charge is, that it is *an Apparatus to Atheism*, in other places he saith it is *Unphilosophical*. I conceive by what hath been said, it may appear that there is not any just ground for either of the Imputations. But saith he, *I should be loth to dispute with an Atheist, and maintain at the same time, as an avowed Principle of mine, that Matter may Think*. But the Case is here perfectly alter'd : A Man may recur to the power of Omnipotence in the former Case, and not maintain at the same time this, as his avowed Principle, that Matter may Think. Here Mr. Broughton must be considered, as representing Mr. Locke as owning it for his avowed Principle, that Matter may Think ; whereas Mr. Locke declares the truth of this Proposition, that God can superadd a Power of Thinking to Matter, is so in the dark, that it cannot be an avowed Principle, that Matter can Think. Whether God can superadd a Power of Thinking to Matter, or can not, he saith is not level to our Understanding ; we have

have not demonstrative Proof on either side. Yea, further, Mr. *Locke* is here represented as owning for a Principle of his, that Matter as Matter, may Think : Whereas he is express; that Matter as Matter, cannot Think. Mr. *Broughton's* Reason for all he had said, is delivered in these words, *For who knows then, but granting something Eternal, this something may be Matter with Thought, tho' not superadded, yet Eternally inherent in it?* Here seems to be an Intimation, that Mr. *Locke* affirms that Matter cannot Think, unless God superadded a Power of Thinking to it ; yet this will not hinder it from being an Apparatus to Atheism. How so ? why, who knows but the Eternal Something may be Matter with Thought Eternally inherent in it ? that is, tho' we may be certain that Matter cannot Think, unless it have a Power of Thinking superadded by God to it; yet we cannot know or be certain, that Matter cannot have Thought Eternally inherent in it. Whether this be close Reasoning, or a perfect Contradiction, I leave you to judge ; And how contradictory what Mr. *Broughton* says, is to what Mr. *Locke* affirms and demonstratively proves, may appear from the following Quotation I shall transcribe out of Mr. *Locke's* *Essay*; and the very Chapter Mr. *Broughton* is opposing. *It is impossible to conceive that Matter, either with or without motion, could have Originally in, and from it self, Sense, Perception, and Knowledge ; as is evident from hence, that then Sense, Perception and Knowledge, must be a Property Eternally inseparable from Matter, and every Particle of it,*

Essay, B. IV. C. X. §. 10. Mr. *Broughton* hath not declared what he would aim at, in disputing with an Atheist ; but if his design would be to convince him that there is a God, there would be no necessity to Interest either Materiality, or Immateriality in the dispute. Let him fully convince his Atheist, and bring him to believe there is an Eternal, Omniscient, Omnipotent Being, and he will cease to be an Atheist. And if he should conceive that Eternal, Omniscient, Omnipotent Being to be Material, that would not make him an Atheist ; Together with his believing a God, he would indeed have a wrong, an erroneous, and false Conception concerning him. And the way to deliver him from that mistake and error, would not be to treat him with those Arguments which barely prove the Existence of a God, concerning which he is satisfied already ; but with such as are proper and adapted to convince him of the mistake and error he is in. Mr. *Broughton* goes on thus ; *It's true, Mr. Locke has substantially proved that the first Eternal Being cannot be Matter ; but then as 'tis plain from the nature of his Argument, and what he expressly says at the Introduction of it, he means Incogitative Matter.* How shall I understand this ? must I take the meaning of it to be, that Mr. *Locke* hath substantially proved that the first Eternal Being cannot be Matter, but his Proof amounts to no more, than that he cannot be Incogitative Matter ? so that notwithstanding all his Proof, the first Eternal Being may be Cogitative Matter ? If so, then what Mr. *Broughton* affirms,

affirms, is a flat Contradiction : That he hath substantially proved that the first Eternal Being cannot be Matter, and yet hath not proved, but that he may be Matter. For Matter, whether Cogitative or Incogitative, is Matter. Besides, I cannot conceive that any one can prove that the first Eternal Being, who is a Cogitative Being, cannot be Incogitative Matter : For the Proposition is self-evident, and therefore not capable of Proof. Or must I take his meaning to be, That Mr. *Locke* hath proved more than he intended to prove, *viz.* That he hath substantially proved the first Eternal Being cannot be Matter ; but this was more than he design'd, for he meant to prove no more than that the first Eternal Being cannot be Incogitative Matter ? If I must understand Mr. *Broughton* in this sense, then I suppose he had no reason to be loth to dispute with an Atheist, on the account of any advantage the Atheist might hope to have, by bringing Matter into the dispute ; no, tho' he himself should be so frank, as to own he does not know but God can superadd a Power of Thinking to some parcels of Matter fitly disposed ; And this, because Mr. *Locke* had furnish'd him with substantial Proof, that the first Eternal Being cannot be Matter. But no thanks to Mr. *Locke* ; for he meant no such thing, *he means Incogitative Matter.* How does this appear ? Why, two ways. First, 'Tis plain from the nature of his Argument, and what he expressly says at the Introduction of it. Here he refers his Reader to Essay, B. IV. C. X. §. 9. And to that Chapter

ter I refer you, to see whether there is any foundation to think that Mr. *Locke* meant there, only to prove that God cannot be Incogitative Matter. He had proved Demonstratively in that Chapter that there is an Eternal, most Powerful, and most Knowing Being, or God. At §. 9. he begins his Proof that this God cannot be Material; and his Proof is fully Demonstrative. Yes, says Mr. *Broughton*, but he means Incogitative Matter. Would one have thought it possible, that any Man would have pretended Mr. *Locke* did industriously set himself to prove that an Eternal most knowing Being cannot be an unknowing Being, or Incogitative Matter? and especially after he had given so particular and full an answer to it's being said, *that notwithstanding there must be an Eternal Being, and that Being must also be knowing, yet it does not follow but that thinking Being may also be Material?* But if Men did not devise odd sorts of meanings for Mr. *Locke*, they would find no Colour to pretend to write against him. And, Secondly, to this purpose are his second thoughts upon this Subject. *Perception and Knowledge in that one Eternal Being, where it has its source, 'tis visible must be essentially inseparable from it; therefore the actual want of Perception in so great a part of the particular parcels of Matter, is a Demonstration that the first Being from whom Perception and Knowledge is inseparable, is not Matter.* This appears to me very clear, just and strong Reasoning. But how to make it prove that, for which it is alledged, I apprehend is not very easie. Yet Mr. *Broughton* labours

hours it thus. *Which I humbly conceive, proves not that Perception is not, or may not be Essential to some parts of Matter; but only that those parts, to which it is not Essential, as we find it is not to some of them, cannot be that one Eternal Being.* Here is a pretty sort of distinguishing betwixt what is Essential to one part of Matter, and what is Essential to another part of Matter; as if any thing could be Matter, and not have that which is Essential to Matter, or could be Matter and not Matter at the same time. But to let that pass, how does this prove that Mr. *Locke* did mean as is pretended? I do not find he declares here, that he had any such meaning. I should rather think he here plainly means that Perception is not Essential to any part of Matter, and that no part of Matter as Matter can Think. But Mr. *Broughton* goes on thus, *For I think there is no more reason to conclude, that because it is not Essential to some, it is not therefore Essential to any part of matter, than there is, that because it is not actually in some, it is not therefore actually in any parcel of it, which is an Inference he must deny, since our Ignorance in this Point may equally defeat our concluding against essential, as well as actual Properties, for we understand the former, no otherwise than by our knowledge of the latter.* If Mr. *Broughton* had related what he means by matter, it would easily have appeared whether he had reason to think, as he saith he doth think. But taking matter in Mr. *Locke*'s sense, it is impossible, it is a contradiction, that Perception should be Essential to any part of matter. And I dare

undertake, that let Mr. *Broughton* have any one fixed Idea, he will be pleas'd to signify by the word matter, it will presently appear to all understanding-People, when he hath made it known, that if Perception is Essential to any part of it, it must necessarily be Essential to every part of it. But how Mr. *Broughton* came to set Essential, and Actual Properties on the same Foot, I cannot imagine, unless he thought his doing so might serve a turn with some People. When he hath proved that there cannot be any Property actually in any parcel or system of matter, but what is Essential to matter, he will wonderfully Enlighten the World; and all People will then with a great deal of ease be fully satisfied, that the Sun, the Moon, and all material Systems have all the same Properties, and are in truth, but so many Green-Cheeses. The truth, I think in short, is thus. What is Essential to matter, is Essential to every part of it; and therefore every part of it, must have whatsoever is Essential to it, otherwise something may be a part of matter, and at the same time may not be a part of matter; for there cannot be any thing more plain and true, than this, that that is not matter, which wants, or is without what is necessary to make it matter, or is Essential to matter. But yet some parts of matter, tho' they cannot be without what is essential to matter, may be without certain * Properties, which God may confer on other Systems of matter.

* *The word Property is us'd rather out of Complaisance, than Choice, for I mean by it no more, than what is signified by the word Quality:*

matter. And we cannot with reason conclude, that because some Systems of matter are without, or have not actually such or such Properties, therefore God has not bestowed them on any. I may rationally conclude, that what is Essential to matter, or belongs to it as matter, is in every part of it. And when I find any Property actually in a System of matter, which does not belong to it as matter, I with reason conclude, it is a property superadded to matter, because not Essential to it. And other parts of matter being without that property, do abundantly manifest, that it is not Essential to matter, but cannot prove that it is not conferr'd on, or superadded to any parcel of matter. I can be certain, it is not a property of matter consider'd as matter, for then it must necessarily be in every part of matter. I can be assur'd, it is a property lodg'd in those Systems of matter in which I find it, which are only such as God thinks fit to bestow it on ; And yet I may not certainly know, whether it is a property immediately superadded to those material Systems, or immediately seated in an immaterial Substance, and then united to the others. But saith Mr. *Broughton*, we know *Essential Attributes no otherwise, than by our knowledge of Actual ones*. This is a clear mistake, 'tis true, Essential Properties are actually in the Subject to which they are Essential, but I cannot know them to be Essential, purely by their being actually in it ; because Attributes which are not Essential, may be actually in it, and I may know them to be actually in it.

Now if there be no way to know Essential Attributes, but by knowing them to be actually in a Subject, then there is no way at all to know them; for this is a way that doth not at all distinguish Essential Attributes, from Attributes which are not Essential: For both Essential and Accidental, or not Essential Attributes may be in the same Subject, and we may know them to be actually there. He that hath form'd in his own Mind a determinate Idea of any Subject, can easily and certainly tell what Properties are Essential, and what are not Essential to it, and needs not rove or hunt about to find out actual Existencies. I cannot know that several Properties I find in material Systems, are Essential to matter, but by considering the Idea I signify and express by the word matter, I can certainly know they are not Essential to matter. A Man may easily know whether a property he perceives to be actually in a material System, or hears discoursed of, is Essential to matter or not: But no Man can comprehend how many distinct Properties which are not Essential, God can, or will superadd, or has superadded to variously disposed Systems of matter, because he cannot comprehend God's Omnipotency, nor his unrevealed Pleasure. Whether a power of thinking can be superadded to some material System, I do not know; but I do know that thought is not Essential to what I mean by matter, nor to what Mr. *Locke* hath declared he means by that word. But if any Man means by that word, solid cogitative Substance, I do not know whether

ther any such thing doth Exist. And if there does, I cannot know the truth thereof, till I perceive a Substance which hath actually these two Properties, Extension and Thought. Indeed I perceive both in Man, but I do not know that Thought is a property superadded to that Substance which is extended: It may for any thing I know, be immediately seated in an Immaterial Substance, which is united to the other. But as for *essentially cogitative matter*, it is perfectly unintelligible to me, and nothing less than a Contradiction. Essentially Cogitative Matter; what is that? It is Matter Essentially Cogitative. And I pray what is that? It is matter whose Essence does consist in Thinking; that is, matter, the Essence of which doth consist, in that which the Essence of matter doth not consist in. With the help of this, I think I may truly say unintelligible and nonsensical Expression, *Essentially Cogitative Matter*, does Mr. Broughton endeavour to overturn all that Mr. Locke hath said, with such a clearness and strength of Reasoning, as is peculiar to himself, to prove that God is not Material. Whether he hath any ground to make such Conclusions as he doth, p. 54, and 56. you will readily perceive. But I do not much wonder that strange and injurious Conclusions should be forced into a Discourse, where I find an Author has assurance enough to tell the World, that it is Mr. Locke's avowed Principle, *That Matter may think*: And that *Essentially Cogitative Matter, is by his Objection become possible*. I have given you an account of what

Mr.

Mr. *Broughton* hath offer'd to keep Atheists in Countenance; what pains he hath been at to direct them how they may, amongst unthinking People, expose the most Rational Discourse that was ever Publish'd, to prove the Existence and Immateriality of a God. How great and astonishing is the acquired Depravity of Mankind in this Age! To what Extravagancies will a fondness for a Hypothesis carry Men! That Men should suffer themselves without any provocation, to be transported by their Passions, or in their Studies beyond all regard to Truth, and beyond all Rational Bounds! To take no care to get a right Notion of what they do oppose! Yea, to manifest a Concern that People should rather not believe there is a God, or but a material one, than that they should own Man's understanding to be so weak, it cannot reach to a Demonstrative Certainty, that God cannot superadd a Power of Thinking to such Systems of Matter as he shall think fit.

Thus, Sir, I have gone over some of the Considerations which came to my mind, as I read over the First Part of Mr. *Broughton's* *Psychologia*. And now I will proceed to take notice of what he writes against what Mr. *Locke* hath said, in the order he himself takes; whereby I shall have an opportunity, 2dly. to lay before you some Reasons why I cannot think Mr. *Broughton's* Discourses so concluding as he takes them to be.

In his *Preface*, he declares, *The Reason is but one, which runs thro' the greatest part of his Essay, and this Reason in short, is the αὐτοκίνητος, or Self-moving Power of the Soul, exerting it self in all the Operations of Thought and Spontaneous Motion. This he saith, is an Argument of old Date, and he likes it the better for that. All the best Esteemed Philosophers of Old, (some of whose Names he mentions, and many more, he saith; and we cannot doubt, but having read them all, he is very well acquainted with their Minds, tho' he has forgot some of their Names; or how much soever they might be esteem'd of Old, he does not think them worthy to be so Honoured, as having a Room in one of his Pages comes to,) unanimously Centre in this. He cannot (he tells us) but suppose they were led to it, and dwelt upon it by the same Reason; which will, I presume, incline any Man that believes God has created Spirit as well as Body. His Argument or Reason, you see, he is mightily pleas'd with; and perhaps he likes it better, because he thinks 'tis *Gray*, than because he is certain that it is Good. I am contented to suppose, he hath all the Philosophers he hath nam'd, or would have nam'd, if they had been in his way, perfectly on his side. The force of his Argument is to be enquir'd into, and if it be not fully to the purpose for which it is brought, his Philosophers, if they were an hundred times more than he can make them, will not be able to add any real strength to it. I know not any Advantage that can accrue to a Notion, if it be false,*

false,

false, because many Philosophers, and of great Fame, have approved that this Advantage may accrue to him that Espouses it after them; that if it shall appear he is mistaken, he may comfort himself with this, That some wise Men have been mistaken too. Whereas he declares expressly, that he *likes the Argument the better for that it is of old Date*; if he did not express himself so, barely because he thought it was witty to say so, I cannot but like his Honesty and Plain-heartedness in so openly owning to the World, that something sways with him, more than Truth doth. I will now take a little notice of his Argument, or Reason, and the Foundation on which it leans: But first I must remind you, what is to be proved by this Argument, and that the Argument must prove it Demonstratively, otherwise the Argument signifies nothing in the present Case. Now, that which is to be proved, is this, *That God cannot superadd a Power of Thinking to any System of Matter however disposed.* The Reason or Argument to Demonstrate this, is, *The self-moving Power of the Soul.* The Argument, if I mistake not, may lie thus. If the Soul move it self in all the Operations of Thought and Spontaneous Motion, then the Soul hath a Power of moving it self, but the former is true. Therefore, this is clear and plain; thus far the Argument is true, and Scientifick: For nothing can be more certain than this, That that which doth move it self, hath a power to move it self. This would be an Excellent Argument, would it as fully and clearly

clearly prove that for which it is alledged, if we could with equal truth argue thus. If the Soul doth move it self in all the Operations of Thought and Spontaneous Motion, then God cannot superadd a Power of Thinking to any System of Matter. Here the Connection is not so clear and plain, but some Intermediate Ideas are necessary to make out a Demonstration. I will at present suppose Demonstrative Proof, that the Soul is Immaterial Substance, and that God hath superadded a Power of Self-moving to certain Immaterial Substances: Yet this will not Demonstratively prove, that he cannot superadd a Power of Self-moving to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed. Nay, this Reason, so well lik'd for its Antiquity, and for its being attended, as is said, with the unanimous Approbation of I know not how many old Philosophers, is built upon another Reason, not Express'd, but which is deduced from the belief of something that is not Demonstrated. So that for ought I see, this mighty Reason is Erected at some distance, and leans upon a Foundation that is not pretended to be Demonstratively true. The whole, if I understand the Connection, is thus, Any Man that believes God has created Spirit as well as Body, may meet with a Reason which will incline him to use the Self-moving Power of the Soul, as a Demonstrative Reason that God cannot superadd a Power of Thinking to any System of Matter. To which I shall only say this one thing in general, *viz.* That if the Proof produced for Demonstrative, be built
upon

upon a Belief, and this Belief is not grounded upon Supernatural Revelation, the pretended Demonstration must unavoidably at last be resolved and dwindle into probability. But seeing created Spirit, as well as Body is proposed to be believed, here ariseth another Difficulty, *viz.* What we are to understand by Spirit, here? For according to the Sense in which that Term is understood, so will the Argument be stronger or weaker, which is to be Erected on the belief of God's having created Spirit as well as Body. By Body, I conceive is here meant Matter, or Material Substance; And Spirit being here used by way of distinction, or being oppos'd here to Body, should be thought to signify only Immaterial Substance, or Substance without that property which makes Substance Matter. Now, a Man may believe God hath created both Immaterial and Material Substance, and not perceive any reason to use the Self-moving Power of the Soul as a Demonstrative Reason that God cannot superadd a Power of Thinking to any System of Matter. Our believing he hath created both Immaterial and Material Substance, cannot make us certain of all the Purposes for which he created them, nor what Properties or Powers he will bestow on the one, which he will not bestow on the other. Mr. *Broughton* in his *Sect. of Union*, because the *Cohæsion of the parts of Matter* is what surpasses most Men's Comprehension, has found out a particular use for, and consequently a very good reason why we should believe God hath created Immaterial Substance,

Substance, as well as Material: For he appears very much inclined to have Immaterial Substance, the Cement to join and unite the Particles of Matter one to another. And perhaps when he hath Demonstrated Immaterial Substance was Created for this purpose, he will not find it very easie to Demonstrate it was Created for any other, or is used for any other purpose. One purpose, for any thing I know, may with equal reason be improved to the excluding of all other, as well as one Property. And if so, the Consequence will be dangerous; and instead of using the Argument and Reason abovementioned, to Demonstrate what it was brought for, it will be well if the maintainers of these Notions, do not find themselves obliged to deny that the Soul doth exert a Self-moving Power in all the Operations of Thought and Spontaneous Motion, lest otherwise they should be necessitated to own, that two distinct and independant Powers may be in the same Substance, or the same Substance may be created or used for more Purposes than one, and those independant too. And it may deserve a little Consideration, whether the latter does not necessarily prove the former, *viz.* That a Substance cannot serve or answer to two distinct independant Purposes, but by sustaining two distinct independant Powers, or Properties. Yet Mr. *Broughton*, it must be acknowledg'd, doth often use the word Spirit in another sense; as he doth also Immaterial Substance, using them indifferently one for another, and both to signify *Immaterial Substance with a Power of Thinking*

Thinking, or Thinking Immaterial Substance. Whereas Immaterial Substance, signifies no more in the present Dispute, than Substance without Extension or Solidity, or that Property which makes Substance to be Matter; And Spirit signifies Thinking Substance, or Substance to which the Power of Thinking is superadded, whether the Substance is Material or Immaterial. This Mr. *Broughton* appears aware of, p. 82. where he expresseth himself in these words, *The Word Immaterial is indeed a Negative Term, but considering it as expressing something that Thinks, which Matter cannot do, &c.* Now what doth all this amount to? But only this, That if by Immaterial, you will understand something that Thinks, and by Matter something that cannot Think; that is, something to which God cannot superadd a Power of Thinking; then when you say any thing Thinks, you mean it is Immaterial; and when you say any thing is Material, you mean it cannot Think, or is something to which God cannot superadd a Power of Thinking. Is not this very instructive, and very proper to convince, when the Question is, whether it can be Demonstrated that God cannot superadd a Power of Thinking to Matter? Certainly nothing can be more evident than this, that if by Matter we understand something to which God cannot superadd a Power of Thinking, then God cannot superadd a Power of Thinking to it. And if any Men take Spirit, and Body in these senses, and the belief that God hath Created Spirit as well as Body, they may perhaps be led
by

by some Reason which will incline them to use a power of thinking, or of self-motion, (which must here be taken to be of the same import) to prove demonstratively that God cannot superadd a power of self-motion, to what they believe he cannot add it to. But then an unhappiness attends all this, *viz.* That the Proposition believed, is the Proposition which should be demonstrated: And a power of self-motion can be of no use in this business, till it be demonstrated, that God cannot superadd any power to any thing, to which they believe he cannot superadd it. Taking those words in the aforesaid Senses, we must use them for Ideas, which are not included in the Senses in which they are ordinarily understood. The power of thinking is not included in the Idea ordinarily signified by the word Matter; and therefore it cannot belong to any System of matter, unless it be superadded to it. So neither is the power of thinking, or of self-motion included in the Idea signified ordinarily, by Immaterial Substance, when consider'd as oppos'd to Matter; And therefore Immaterial Substance can no more think or move it self, than Matter can, till a power to do so, is superadded to it. This is most certain, and must be acknowledg'd by every one, who will not affirm that Substance, barely as Substance, doth necessarily think. For Immaterial Substance, as such, is nothing but Substance; And if Substance, as Substance, doth necessarily think; there will be no avoiding of it; but Matter must think; yea, must necessarily think, be-

cause it is necessarily Substance. If created Substance must have a power of thinking superadded to it, to make it Spirit, or thinking Substance, it is undeniable that Substance whether material or immaterial, to which that power is superadded, will be Spirit or thinking Substance. Tho' we not only believe, but are certain that God hath created Substance to which he hath superadded a power of Self-motion, and that he hath created Matter or Body to great quantities of which he hath not superadded a power of Self-motion, yet, a power of Self-motion will not prove demonstratively that he cannot superadd it to certain Systems of Matter duly disposed. It depends wholly on his Pleasure. Mr. Broughton proceeds thus, *For in Consequence of this, he will find it highly reasonable, to suppose that Spirit is the Principle of Life and Sensation, and Body of Mechanism and local Motion.* What he means by Spirit here, in which of the foremention'd Senses he would have the World understand, I cannot tell. And the meaning of the word Principle, here, is so undeterminate, it increases the doubt. But whether the one or the other sense, or any new one be designed, is not very material; because both here, and in the following words, not Demonstration, but a high degree of Probability is all that is pretended. But *by what Essential Character can we distinguish these two, viz. Spirit, and Body, if they are two distinct Species of Beings?* Answer, make known what you mean, or settle determinate Ideas in your own Minds, which you design

design to signify by those words, and you may soon find out the Essential Character whereby they are to be distinguished. *E. G.* If by Spirit, is meant Immaterial Substance, it is Essentially distinguished from Matter, by its being without that Property which makes Substance Matter. If by Spirit, you mean thinking Substance, whether the Substance be material or immaterial, it is Essentially distinguished, both from meer immaterial Substance, and from meer Body or Matter, by the power of Thinking which is superadded to it. Mr. *Broughton* goes on in these words, *I grant what Mr. Locke contends for, that 'tis possible to conceive a Spirit de-vested of the Operation of Thought, and barely in his own Term, as an un-solid Substance; but it is sufficient, that we place the distinction upon the capacity and incapacity of Thought; For the other of [solid and un-solid] is no way serviceable to us, because we did not come by the knowledge of Spirit, as really Existing, by our Idea of something un-solid, but only by our Idea of something that Thinks: So that our Idea of an un-solid Substance, is not form'd from the Contemplation of any thing without us, as that of Solidity is, but is a bare Hypothesis to solve the Phænomenon of Thought.* I suppose Mr. *Broughton* in the first place means, that he grants that immaterial Substance, and a power of Thinking are not inseparable. But no place in Mr. *Locke's* Book being referr'd to, for what is pretended to be said by him, I am inclin'd to think there is a mistake, and that no such Passage can be found in Mr. *Locke's* Essay, or any Book he hath writ. He does not Discourse so loosely.

What is granted, Mr. *Locke* never contends for : And 'tis a thing utterly impossible. What follows, I cannot easily conceive ; only I apprehend that he means our Idea of Spirit is something that thinks, and that neither solid, nor unsolid is included in it ; so far he is clearly right. And had he gone one step further, and concluded from thence, that as our Idea of Spirit doth not include, so neither doth it necessarily exclude either ; and therefore that from thence we cannot be certain whether God can superadd the power of Thinking to both, or only to one of them : Then perhaps he would not have laid so great a stress on Capacity or Incapacity, as he seems to do, without explaining what he means by them, whilst he rejects the Consideration of Solid and Unsolid. As for the Existence of unsolid Substance, (as far as I perceive here) he could contentedly give it up, if it were not, that those who will have it to be certain that God cannot superadd a power of Thinking to any System of Matter, have been necessitated to multiply Beings, and therefore to form the Idea of unsolid Substance, as an Hypothesis to solve the Phænomenon of Thought. Yet in other places of his Book, he hath provided other use for unsolid Substance ; so that notwithstanding, *if a solid Substance* (as he goes on) *be possibly capable of this Faculty of Thought, then there is no necessity to recur to the Hypothesis of an unsolid Substance, to solve that Phænomenon* ; Yet there may, to solve other Phænomenons, as the Cohæsion of the parts of Matter, &c. And thus both the so
cared

cared for Hypothesis, and the Philosophical Axiom, *Entia non sunt multiplicanda sine necessitate*, are in no danger to be Cashier'd, but will retain all their Force, and still serve as many good Purposes as ever. And perhaps the Axiom may be of use to one Purpose not minded before, *viz.* That Men shou'd not unnecessarily forge Hypotheses, nor affirm their Hypotheses to be absolutely necessary with reference unto God, to particular Purposes, when the utmost Evidence they have of their being necessary to those Purposes, is but probable. *What is this, (viz. if there is not a necessity to recur to the Hypothesis of an unsolid Substance to solve that Phænomenon) but to introduce Universal Corporealism? which is neither better nor worse than Atheism.* This is very lustily pronounc'd. The Censure of Atheism is become so Trite and Fashionable, the true sense of the word is almost lost amongst some People. Every thing that pleases not a Sett of Men, is presently branded with Atheism. Where it shall be demonstrated that a Power of Thinking and of Self-motion are nothing; for it is past doubt, they are not Matter, And that the true Notion of Atheism consists in not being certain, but that some thinking Creatures may not be equally Immaterial with the Creator of all things, then it will be time to be affected with Mr. Broughton's Expostulation, and to have some regard to his Judgment about Atheism. It is not our business to make Worlds, nor to frame Hypotheses at pleasure; that by vertue of them we may averr that God hath made as

many sorts of Beings as we have a mind to. God has made the World to our hands, without asking our advice, and his ways are unsearchable to us ; And it becomes not us to be positive further than we can demonstrate. He did not in creating the World, and framing of Man, borrow Hypotheses or Axioms devised by Men a long time after the World was created, and Man formed. We do not know but that God can so frame and fashion, if he pleases, certain Systems of Matter, as to make them capable of many more Powers than he will ever bestow on any. And perhaps he will hereafter both so model certain Systems of Matter, as to make them capable of, and actually bestow on them such Properties as he doth not ordinarily bestow on any now.

Mr. *Broughton* in *Sett. III.* Discourses of Immaterial Substance, and applies himself to prove the Existence of Immaterial Substance, by endeavouring to prove *there must be one Immaterial Substance, Eternal, and the first cause of Motion.* And then concludes thus, *It is not incumbent upon me to prove, as a farther confirmation of my Principle, (which Principle he saith, p. 8. is Immaterial Substance) that there are likewise finite created Immaterial Substances : It is abundantly sufficient that there is no contradiction in the thing, and that Immaterial, as well as Material Substance, may be conceived the Object and Effect of Divine Power ; which it certainly may be, since it does not imply in its Idea any thing of absolute Perfection,* p. 13. If this is Reasoning, it is much above
my

my Comprehension : And I suppose will always remain so, till it can be clearly proved that God must necessarily Create whatever there is no Contradiction in, or can be an Object of Divine Power, or that does not imply in its Idea absolute Perfection. If what he says be true, he may abundantly prove that either *Moses* was very much out in the account he gives of the Creation of the World, or that there was a World, or a great many Worlds made, innumerable Ages before that, of the Creation of which *Moses* gives a Relation. In this same Section, he tells us he ventures to lay down this as a *Proposition next to Self-evident*, viz. *That from the difference we find in the nature of Accidents, we must conclude a like difference in the nature of those Substances to which they belong*, p. 10. If this be so, I apprehend we must conclude there are a great many more sorts of Substances, than Material and Immaterial ; For there are many Accidents or Properties, which are equally different from Thought, as from Solidity, (or Extension, which word pleaseth Mr. *Broughton* best.) And Mr. *Broughton* having seiz'd on Substance, so far as Thought and Extension can reach, and stuff'd it so full with these two Properties, which make or divide Substance into Material and Immaterial, that they are not capable of admitting any other Property, he must either provide more sorts of Substances, (for there are other Accidents, which differ as much one from another in their Natures, as they do from both the forementioned) or else there will be Accidents where

there is no Substance, to the Irreparable Damage of his Self-evident Proposition. But what reason can there be to sacrifice a Self-evident Proposition to the Honour, and for the Safety of One which is but next to Self-evident? If Mr. *Broughton* had made known in what sense the word *Nature* is to be understood, in both parts of his Proposition, it would have appeared plain whether both his Propositions can consist together, or whether the Elder must Veil and give place to the Younger. If he means by a difference in the nature of the Substance, That the Internal Constitution of an Individual Substance must be such, as it is the pleasure of God it should be, in order to its being duly disposed to have what we call a Specifick Property superadded to it; and that the Internal Constitution of another Individual Substance, must be different from that of the former, in order to its being duly disposed to receive, or to have a Property Specifically different from the other superadded to it: I say, if this is what was meant, there will be little room for dispute; but I wish he had explained his own Terms, and had here declared clearly his own Sense: For I very much suspect he intended something else, because this account of the different Nature of Substances, will not be very much for his turn. We can very well understand that Material Substances may be variously disposed; And we are sensible that God does superadd very different Properties to Material Substances, variously model'd, fram'd, and disposed. How great a variety he hath, or

can make in the Internal Constitutions of Material Substances, transcends our Understandings ; And so doth the number of the different Properties which God hath, or can superadd to Material Systems so disposed and model'd as he sees fit. The different Natures of Substances here spoken of, do not concern Substance as Material and Immaterial, for Material does not come within their Verge. The Proposition only directs how to distinguish Material Substances one from another : By the specifick Properties we find in them, we are to conclude that they are differently fram'd and model'd, in some proportion to the difference there is betwixt the Properties or Powers with which they are invested, or which are superadded to them. But should a Man talk of parting and dividing Immaterial Substance into Individual Systems, and variously modelling, fashioning, and framing, and disposing the parts of them, that they may be fitted to have different Powers superadded to them, People who had their senses about them, would be so far from hoping to be much Enlightned by him, they would be apt to suspect him not well in his Wits.

Tho' Mr. *Broughton* would venture in *Self. III.* p. 10. to lay down the Proposition abovementioned, as next to Self-evident, Yet in *Self. IV.* p. 15, 16. he acknowledges it hath its Infirmities, it is not universally true, but does fail in some Cases ; but however to make amends for its weakness on the side of Matter, he hath
found

found a way how to bring Immaterial Substance within its Clutches. It must be granted, (saith Mr. Broughton, p. 15, 16.) That all kind of difference in Properties, does not argue different Substances : For instance, Our Ideas of Solidity and Colour, are very different, and we find no immediate Connexion between them, and yet we find them consistent in the same Material Substance ; Nay, we find contradictory Qualities, v. 9. Hardness and Fluidity to Exist alternately in the same Substance. And this leads us to consider where their Connexion lies, if they have any ; and we presently find their agreement in a third thing : We find Extension susceptible of Solidity and Colour at once, of Hardness and Fluidity at different times ; and being thus united in one Attribute, they resolve into one Nature and Essence. But when we find any two Properties, which after a thorough Examination, are neither immediately Connected themselves, nor mediately by any third thing ; we must conclude by the same Rule, (and 'tis the only Rule we have in such Cases,) that they do appertain unto two different Natures and Essences.

I do not understand what it is for different Properties to resolve into one Nature and Essence. I apprehend that by one Nature and Essence, he here means one parcel of Matter ; otherwise he had no need of different times, to find hardness and fluidity in Matter. I also apprehend that he would have Extension to be the Property, which superadded to Substance, makes it Matter. I will not stickle with him about that, tho' I think him greatly mistaken ;
and

and if I reach his meaning at least in one part of his Book, he should have laboured hard to have reconcil'd himself to some other Notion of Matter ; because he seems to be of the opinion, that Extension is inseparable from God. I may be positive, that he grants that several distinct Properties, may at the same time, be in the same Material Substance, provided it be by the Mediation of Extension, which makes the Substance to be Matter. There is one thing more, I may be positive he delivers his Judgment about, *viz.* That Extension is susceptible of Properties, and at different times of contradictory Properties. In this I must dissent from Mr. *Broughton*, till it shall be made very plain, that one Property is susceptible of other Properties : Which I take to be no better, if not worse, in Mr. *Broughton's* own words, in some part of his Book, than *allowing a Self-support to Accidents*. It is only Substance that is susceptible of Properties ; And there is no way by which Properties can be Connected, but by being in the same Substance. When we perceive any Property doth Exist, we can rationally and demonstratively conclude, that some Substance hath that Property superadded to it ; but we cannot conclude so, barely from our perceiving that that Property doth Exist ; that the Substance to which it is superadded, hath another Property superadded to it. If we perceive two distinct Properties in the same Substance, we cannot have any reason to conclude they are either immediately connected to one another, or that they are mediately connected by being both

both in a third Property, which is superadded to the Substance; for then neither of the other two Properties would be the Properties of the Substance, but only the Properties of the Property which must support them, and is superadded to, and supported by the Substance. Can any thing be more absurd than this? The third thing by which they are connected, is the Substance, to which they are equally superadded. There is no more need that a third thing must intervene, that two, or more distinct Properties may be superadded to the same Substance, than there is that one Property may be superadded to it. But 'twill still be pretended, *that from the nature of the Property, we may conclude what is the nature of the Substance to which it is superadded, viz. whether the Substance is Material, or Immaterial.* Let the nature of the Property be what it will, I can certainly and demonstratively conclude no more from that, than that it is superadded to a Substance; I cannot from that Property alone, (whilst it is not the Property which makes Substance Matter) demonstratively conclude, that the Substance to which it is superadded, is Material: Before I can so conclude, that the Substance it belongs to is Material, I must some way perceive that the Property which makes Substance Matter, is superadded to it. I see something Attracted: From thence I with good reason conclude, there is some Substance to which a Power of Attracting is superadded; but I cannot demonstratively conclude from the nature of this Property, that
the

the Substance to which it belongs, has also that Property which makes Substance to be Matter ; nor can I demonstratively conclude from that Property, or its Nature, that the Substance to which it is superadded, hath not that other Property. The same may be said concerning *Thought* ; Tho' I must add, that if we may conclude any thing more from the nature of *Thought*, concerning the nature of the Substance to which it belongs, than that the Substance to which the Power of Thinking is superadded, is Thinking Substance, we must know what the nature of *Thought* is, *i. e.* wherein *Thought* doth consist, which Mr. Broughton hath not yet discovered to the World : For tho' we are, as he saith, *conscious of Thought*, that goes no further than its Existence ; so that notwithstanding that great Evidence of its Existence, Yet of its Nature we may be perfectly ignorant : And if we must conclude concerning the nature of the Substance it belongs to, from its own Nature, what conclusion can we rationally make, but that both their Natures are unknown to us ?

Supposing (saith Mr. Broughton) *that our knowledge of Extension proves the Existence of Corporeal Substance ; we are to enquire whether our knowledge of Cogitation proves the same of Incorporeal ?* p. 15. I answer, No. It does not. Upon our perceiving Extension any where, we may demonstratively prove there is some Substance to which Extension is superadded, or that there is Extended Substance, which passes
with

with Mr. *Broughton* for Corporeal Substance. And perceiving Cogitation in any Created Being, we may demonstratively prove, there is Substance to which a Power of Thinking is superadded, or Cogitative Substance. But whether the Substance to which the Power of Thinking is superadded, is Extended Substance, or not, cannot be demonstratively proved by the bare knowledge of Cogitation. From Cogitation, when perceived, we may prove a Power superadded to Substance, whether Material, or Immaterial; which neither of them has of it self, or as such; but we cannot demonstratively prove from thence, either the Absence, or the Presence of another Property. We can prove demonstratively that all Created Substance, is either Material or Immaterial. But our distinguishing Created Substance thus, doth not prove that God hath Created pure Immaterial Substance: But, taking it for granted, or supposing that he hath Created pure Immaterial Substance, our knowledge of Cogitation and Extension, will not prove that every Created Substance is either Cogitative or Extended, nor that every unextended Substance is Cogitative. Other Properties may, for ought we know, belong to, or be superadded to Immaterial Substance, which may render it as incapable of Thought, as Extension or Solidity can, when superadded to Substance. But God doth not necessarily so cramp, or limit himself by bestowing one Property on Substance, as to make it impossible for him to superadd another to it, without depriving it of
the

the former ; At least, we cannot demonstrate that he hath laid any such Restriction on himself.

Whoever shall seriously Read the 6th. Sect. of the 3d. Chapt. of the 4th. Book of Mr. *Locke's Essay*, I am perswaded will receive so much light and satisfaction, he cannot avoid concluding that the Errant'st Rustick in the World, did he understand that Section, would see very good reason to blush, and be ashamed of such Talk as is to be found in p. 20, 21. of the *Psychologia*.

But (saith Mr. *Broughton*) *things are only distinguishable by their Properties*, p. 22. Very true. But what Mr. *Broughton* should have proved, was, that by the Nature of any Property superadded to Substance, we may know whether the Substance to which it is superadded, is Material or Immaterial. 'Tis certain, Individual Beings are only distinguishable by their Properties ; every one having some one, at least, peculiar to it self, whereby it is distinguished from all others ; but it does not follow that therefore their Substances are distinguishable by those peculiar Properties, into Material, and Immaterial. The Substances may be every one of them Material, tho' the Properties are different: Yea, The Power of Thinking being superadded to Created Immaterial Substance, doth not distinguish Immaterial Substance from Material ; it distinguishes thinking Immaterial Substance, from

un-

unthinking Immaterial and Material Substances, just as being superadded to some systems of Matter fitly disposed, it would distinguish thinking Material Substance from unthinking Substance, both Material and Immaterial.

Mr. Broughton in his 5th. Sect. has made a wonderful Discovery, *viz.* The difference between Extension and Thought is so wide, that there is no third Idea to unite them in one Substance; and this must render our Endeavours to conceive them, as so united, for ever fruitless: And whatsoever we cannot conceive in Created Nature, to be so much as possible, is a repugnancy in the nature of the thing, p. 23. How wide the difference is between them, cannot be precisely determined, without an exact knowledge of what each of them doth consist in. But be the difference wider or narrower, that signifies not any thing to the want of a third Idea, to unite them in one Substance. And if any Man endeavours to conceive them so united, *viz.* by a third Idea, he deserves to lose his Labour. Yet, that whatsoever we cannot conceive in Created Nature, to be so much as this way possible, (for so he must mean, or what he saith is to no purpose here,) is a Repugnancy in the nature of the thing, is not a Proposition self-evidently true. It is rather self-evidently false. There is, to use his own words, a Repugnancy in the nature of the thing, *viz.* That a Property should not be a Property, but should be a Substance, and should do the business of a Substance; that is, support Properties.

ties. And yet by this stringing of Properties; does he pretend to prove that it is both absurd and mischievous, not to be certain that God cannot superadd a Power of Thinking to a system of Matter, so disposed as he shall think fit. For a Man to say, he does not know that God cannot superadd a Power of Thinking to any Material System, is *Unphilosophical, Absurd to the last degree, Sceptical, and a denying of the Truth of our Faculties*; And all this by the strength and vertue of our not being able to conceive a third Idea, by which Properties can be tyed unto Substance. This is the summ of this Section, and is said to be *as full an Evidence that Cogitation, and Extension cannot be in the same Substance, as Demonstrative Knowledge will bear*. Yet, one would have thought Mr. Broughton should hardly have said so; because in p. 31. one reason he gives why he likes not this Definition of Extension, *That it consists in having partes extra partes, is this, That according to it, he can have no Idea of the Omnipotence of God; And so it offends (saith he) against that Rule, Debet cum definito reciprocari*. Here, methinks, he plainly asserts that Extension belongs to God; and I hope he has no design to exclude Cogitation from him, because he cannot conceive a third Idea, by the help of which, he might Tack it unto him. *It is easy (saith he) for any one to experience in his Mind, this Repugnancy of conceiving Extension and Thought, as the Properties of one and the same Substance. Let him, as Method requires, frame as clear and distinct an Idea as he can, of each of*

them separately ; and then let him endeavour what he can to conjoyn them ; let him try to mark out an Inch of Reason, or an Ell of Contemplation ; which would be as easy to do, were the two Properties consistent, as to conceive a Reasoning Inch, or Contemplating Ell of Matter ; for wherever two Properties are united in one Substance, they may be reciprocally predicated. Thus I can conceive an extended Whiteness, as well as a white Extension. This Discourse is so very proper for Diversion, I may well leave it to be an Entertainment to those who are inclined to be merry. I shall only take notice, That if there is a Repugnancy between these two Properties being in the same Substance, the Repugnancy doth not consist in their being perfectly different Properties, (for they are not contradictory,) which have not any dependance on each other ; but in the nature of Substance, which is not to be corrected by a third Idea, and which must render it utterly incapable of both. Now the nature of Substance being acknowledg'd by *Mr. Broughton* to be unknown to us, it is plain even to Demonstration, that it is not possible we should be able to determine whether it is, or is not capable of both Properties ; And it appears strange, or rather pleasant, that one who acknowledges Substance is an unknown Nature, should take pains to prove that two Properties, and particularly by a pretended comparing them two together, cannot be both together the Properties of he does not know what : Or that the same Substance is not capable of Cogitation and Extension, of the Nature

ture and Capacities of which Substance he acknowledges, that himself and all Men are perfectly ignorant. As for his Inches, and his Ells, I may observe that a Man can no more conceive an Inch of Heat, and an Ell of Sweetness ; no, nor of his own Instances, Extension and Whiteness, nor indeed of any such Qualities, than of Reason and Contemplation. Two Properties being in a Substance, may each of them be predicated of the Substance, and as having in it the other Property ; but they cannot be predicated of one another ; Nor can those Terms which may be properly applied to the Substance, purely by vertue of its having one Property, be properly applied to it, as having another Property perfectly distinct from the former, and much less to the Property it self. Mr. *Broughton*, to prove the absurdity of what he pretends to oppose, p. 25, 26. builds upon several *precarious Suppositions*, viz. That Mr. *Locke* doth affirm that God can superadd both Extension, and the Power of Thinking to the same Substance. That it is demonstratively clear, that no parcel of Matter can be made capable of having the Power of Thinking superadded to it ; That it hath been demonstratively proved that God has superadded a Power of Thinking to Immaterial Substances, and hath united them to certain systems of Matter ; And that Mr. *Locke* to avoid acknowledging the truth of what hath been demonstrated, has recourse to Omnipotency, as a sufficient Reason in it self, why we should not assent to a truth demonstra-

tively Evident, without taking these Suppositions for granted; for none of which there is any reason or ground at all; What he saith in this *Section*, and in many other parts of his Book, is not of any weight. *There is no difficulty in supposing* (saith he) *that the Creator can Recapacitate senseless Matter, for a Reunion with Spiritual Substance. In all these Cases, (viz. that just now mentioned, and Prophecy, and suspending the Laws of Gravitation in one place,) we clearly apprehend, that the Subject is capable, and the Power sufficient, which two are the only Prerequisites to any Operation,* p. 26. These words I take notice of, not because I apprehend they are of any great use to his purpose, tho' all I can find that he appears to lay a stress on; but because they do deserve on another account, some Consideration. For here he clearly owns, that senseless Matter is not of it self capable of Union with a Spiritual Substance: But yet that the Creator can capacitate it for, or make it capable of Union with it. And when he hath shewn what this Capacitating of it for that Union consists in, more than in disposing it so, as he thinks fit for that purpose, it will be seen, whether he had ground to Exclaim against Mr. Locke, for *not ever attending to the Capacity of the Subject*. And perhaps when he composedly thinks on this, he will find no greater difficulty to conceive that God can, for any thing we can demonstrate to the contrary, as well Capacitate senseless Matter to have a Power of Thinking superadded by him to it; And that if he please, he can then super-
add

add it, as he can Capacitate senseless Matter for a Union with spiritual Substance. And if so, he will perceive the remainder of his Discourse in this Section, not very pertinent ; and that the truth of our Faculties is safe enough, allowing all that Mr. *Locke* hath said ; and that he had no very good reason to charge Mischief, and in particular Scepticism, or a great tendency to it, on what Mr. *Locke* had said, or to applaud his own quick-sightedness, in espying a Consequence which Mr. *Locke* neither did foresee, nor can disprove. As for that Notion of Mr. *Broughton's*, That a capable Subject, and a sufficient Power (for the Discourse is wholly of God's Power) are the only Prerequisites to any Operation ; I take it to be a very absurd Notion, and of mischievous Consequence. It excludes the Divine Will and Pleasure, and asserts God's being under a necessity to confer on all Subjects, all the Properties and Powers they are capable of.

What is not possible (saith Mr. Broughton) any way to be conceived, argues as much a Repugnancy in Conception, as what is contradictory Not that this is any prejudice to the belief of things that are above our Conception, upon an Authority which we do conceive to be sufficient ; but that, in our reasoning upon things, we must reject as falshood, what is impossible to be understood as truth : For indeed the very nature of a Contradiction lies in this, That it is a thing impossible to be conceived, p. 27. And in p. 28, &c. he saith, I conclude that Cogitation and Extension are found upon the Comparison, to

be inconsistent and incompatible in one and the same Substance, and that this their Inconsistency in one, is as full an Evidence of their appertaining to two Substances, as Demonstrative knowledge will bear. I should rather think, that since upon comparing these Properties, they are found not to be contradictory, and that Substance is an unknown Nature, the conclusion should be, that it is not possible to have as full Evidence as Demonstrative Knowledge will bear, that they are inconsistent and incompatible in one and the same Substance. But what he did mean by what is not possible any way to be conceived, and what follows those words, and for what purpose he delivered his sense in that manner, is not easie, if any way possible to be conceived, by considering them just as they lie in that part of his Book. I am not willing to think, he had a mind to advance this Notion, that God cannot do any thing, but what we can conceive he can do. I think he says something in some parts of his Book, that will not well consist with that, as, that *want of Conception will not prove the Impossibility of a thing.* Moreover, I cannot apprehend how any Man can believe, what it is not possible for him any way to conceive, nor how any Authority can contribute to his believing such a thing. And if Mr. *Broughton* did think what Mr. *Locke* said, could not possibly any way be conceived, some People may be apt to think it strange that he should set himself to write against what he was sensible he did not understand. However, if they find his

Discourse confused and obscure, and his Arguments weak, and not at all to the purpose, they have a satisfactory Reason of it at hand. But I conceive the true meaning and sense of this part of his Book, is to be had from observing the intent of this Section, in which the words are found. The forementioned Properties cannot be possibly conceived to belong to one and the same Substance, but they are inconsistent and incompatible in one and the same Substance; And this because we cannot conceive them as united in one Substance by a third Idea. So that after all the talk of *what is not possible any way to be conceived, and that what is not so, argues a Repugnancy in Conception, equal to a Contradiction*; It comes to no more, than our not conceiving the manner how these Properties can be in the same Substance; Yea, of their being in it, in such a particular way, as does indeed *argue a Repugnancy in Conception*. And at this rate a Man may bring in the charge of Scepticism, and the denial of the truth of our Faculties; and produce as full Evidence as Demonstrative Knowledge will bear, against any Notions whatsoever, which he has a mind not to like, but to brand and disgrace. With as much reason, perhaps, it may be said, that it is Unphilosophical, Absurd, Mischievous, and tending to Scepticism, to say that God can superadd Extension and Cogitation to Substance, or that they do belong to, or are Properties of Substance. For neither the one, nor the other is Essential to Substance; for if either, or both were so, the one, or both of

them, must unavoidably and inseparably be in all Substance: And being not essential, and inseparably connected to Substance, it may be proved in the way abovementioned, that there is a Repugnancy, and Inconsistency to be found in their being in Substance; And this, because it is not possible any way to conceive that they should be in, or united unto Substance; and that, because there is no third Idea to unite either of them to Substance: A third Idea being every whit as necessary to unite one Property to Substance, as to unite two unto it. By this way of demonstrating Points, a Man may demonstrate that People ought to reject as a Falshood, what Mr. *Broughton* asserts for a certain Truth, *viz.* That an Immaterial Substance is united to a Material Substance. For what third Idea can be found to unite Immaterial Substance to Material? Certainly the difference between these two, is somewhat wider than that between Extension and Thought. Extension, that distinguishes and separates material substance from immaterial, will hardly be thought a proper Idea to unite them, nor to be that which can make matter capable of having immaterial substance united to it. But if any one should entertain that Thought, it would be perfectly unserviceable; because there would still want a third Idea, and not only because this fancy of the necessity of a third Idea to unite things, would unavoidably carry People away in the quest of Third Idea's in Infinitum, but because Extension is not in the present Case a third Idea; but according to Mr.

Broughton,

Broughton, the very property which makes substance material, and is the only thing we can possibly conceive that hinders the substances from uniting. Thus, there being no third Idea to unite them, their Union, according to this Mode of demonstrating matters, must be concluded repugnant, inconceivable, contradictory, and inconsistent. To this, it may be replied that Mr. *Broughton*, p. 99. hath these words, *If we cannot conceive how material substances which lie nearest our Understanding, tho' not level with it, are united, in vain do we endeavour to conceive, or complain for want of Conception, how an immaterial substance is united to material.* 'Tis true, he hath those words there, and perhaps he perceived he had occasion to express himself to that purpose. And if there be not some very great difference, between uniting of substances differing as widely as possible from one another, and superadding of different properties to one and the same substance, This agreeable Thought, had it come to mind sooner, might have saved a great deal of pains. Yet in this place, That an immaterial substance is united to a material, is supposed, and taken for a demonstrated Truth, without proving it demonstratively. If it be said, that he delivers himself, p. 88. in these words, *As to the Soul's moving the Body, I have evinc'd that Matter was once moved by something Immaterial; And I think there needs no other Argument to clear this from contradiction, than the Old one, What has been, may be. Our want of Conception is so far from proving the thing impossible,*
that

that it is no Objection at all, when levell'd against *Fact*. As to the last Sentence here, I shall only propose this, suppose the *Fact* be the matter in question; So that here is still taking for granted, that there is demonstrative Proof on one side. He before saith, he hath *evinced that Matter was once moved by something Immaterial*. It is acknowledg'd that it may be demonstratively proved, that there is a Cogitative Being, who is Immaterial, and who hath not only moved, but created Matter. But Mr. *Broughton* hath not proved, nor can any Man ever prove, that something immaterial, considered purely as immaterial, did ever move matter. Neither has he produced demonstrative Proof that a created immaterial substance did ever move matter. Neither material, nor created immaterial substance can move matter, without a Power of moving it, superadded to it. And either of them with that Power superadded, will be able to do it. But he *hath evinc'd that Matter was once moved by something Immaterial, And what has been, may be*. But That *something Immaterial*, he speaks of, was uncreated; And it is certain, that God can do, what he has done. Nay, he may create, for any thing we know, or can prove to the contrary, immaterial substance; Yea, and superadd to it more Properties than we can reckon up; But if any Man will affirm, that created immaterial substance may do every thing that uncreated immaterial substance ever did, I shall not believe it. That something Immaterial Mr. *Broughton* speaks of, did create the World out of Nothing: Will he therefore

conclude, that a created immaterial substance may create a World out of nothing?

Mr. *Broughton* in his sixth Section, makes it his business to prove that *Cogitation doth require an Immaterial Substance*. And he tells us, that *Sensation is properly a Thought*: And that *this Idea of Sensation, does of it self discover something Immaterial in us*. Very right: For it discovers a *Power of Thinking* to be in us; But what is that to an *Immaterial Substance*? but there is another way whereby it discovers of it self something immaterial, *viz.* *Immaterial Substance in us*: Which is in short, thus, Because *different degrees of Heat give us the sense of Pleasure and of Pain, which are two contrary Ideas*. If pure immaterial substance, united to material, were sufficient for all this, there would be some Colour to say that Sensation did of it self discover some immaterial substance in us; but then by immaterial substance, we must understand, only a Power of thinking, or of perceiving. Let immaterial substance, properly taken, be united to material substance, there will neither be degrees of heat, nor health, nor pleasure, nor pain, till a Power of thinking, or of perceiving is superadded to one of the substances; And that Power superadded to either of the substances, will solve the Phænomenon; but will not discover to which sort of the substances it is superadded. It is certain there must be both material substance, and a Power of perceiving, or there cannot be any of the Sensations mentioned, but the absolute necessity of immaterial substance, cannot be demonstrated by any or all of them. In

In Sect. 7th. Mr. Broughton undertakes to prove, that *Physically extended Substance*, is in its nature utterly incapable of Thought. And he endeavours to execute his Enterprize, by shewing that *Matter is of a passive Nature*, and that it is *Divisible*; both which Properties, he saith, do prove that it is utterly incapable of Thought. *Matter is of a passive Nature*; that is, it can exert no operation, nor any way possibly modify it self, p. 35. There needs not much labour to prove, that a Substance with this essential Property is utterly incapable of Thought, such as we experience in our selves, p. 38. As an Effect of our thinking Faculty, we are conscious of *Spontaneous Motion* in our selves, which is a Motion neither rais'd, nor determin'd mechanically: We both move and reason from our selves; which necessarily infers the Power of motion within our selves; and this is a Power absolutely inconsistent with the passive Nature of Matter. Therefore so long as our first Idea of Matter, includes in it a passive Nature, it includes also an utter incapacity of Thought, p. 38, 39. There is another Property of Matter resulting from our first Contemplation of it, which renders it incapable of Thought, and that is *Divisibility*, p. 39. And in p. 104. he certifies that according to his Argument, a capacity of *Divisibility*, makes incapable of Thought. And if he himself had not declared that, the extent of his Argument, I should not have thought it had reach'd so far. For immaterial substance is capable of divisibility, because solidity may be superadded to it; and if being capable of divisibility, makes incapable

of thought, immaterial substance must be incapable of it, as well as material. I should have thought that instead of a capacity of divisibility, a necessity to be actually divided, should be necessary to make substance incapable of thought. But if Mr. *Broughton* had in plain and express Terms, declared what he means by *Capacity*, and *Incapacity*, the force of his Discourse would have been more easily understood, and perhaps this whole Section would have appeared perfectly needless. By what he says in p. 40, 41. I am inclined to think, that he means by matter being utterly incapable of thought, that matter considered as matter, cannot think, or has not as matter, the power of thinking in it self; and the Title of his next Section would also prompt the same Thought. If this was his meaning, the Point is so plain, it needed no Proof. And it is equally true of immaterial substance, that it cannot, as such, think, or has not in it self a power of thinking. No created substance can think, till God doth superadd to it a power of thinking. So that when he saith, *as our first Idea of Matter includes in it a passive Nature, it includes also an utter Incapacity of Thought*, we are to understand by these last words, only an absence of the power of thinking: But if he means, that its being of a passive Nature renders it such, that it is impossible for God to dispose and order any parcels of it so, that he can superadd a power of thinking to them, what he affirms, is not proved; but is impossible to be prov'd, without proving that God

can-

cannot superadd a power of thinking to any created substance. For created immaterial substance is in it self of as passive a Nature, as matter is; that is, *It cannot exert any Operation, nor any way possibly modify it self.* Therefore, Mr. *Broughton* says right, when he saith, We both move and reason from our selves, which necessarily infers *the power of motion* within our selves; whereas he would have been Egregiously out, if he had said, Which infers necessarily immaterial substance within our Bodies. For immaterial substance united to our Bodies, without a superadded power of motion, would leave our Bodies as perfectly passive, as they were without it, and be as perfectly passive as they are. Now, if the power of spontaneous motion is absolutely inconsistent with matter, because matter is in it self of a passive nature, as Mr. *Broughton* saith, then it must be absolutely inconsistent with created immaterial substance; because that is in it self of a passive nature. What Ends are likeliest to be served, and what kind of People are most likely to be gratified by such Arguments, when obtruded for Demonstration, may be fit to be considered by those who broach and maintain them.

Mr. *Broughton's* Eighth Section wears this Title, *That Cogitation cannot be superadded to Matter.* In this Section, it is, that he hath furnished the Atheist with something to say in answer to that Chapter in Mr. *Locke's Essay*, where the Existence of God and his Immateriality

riality are demonstratively proved. That part of the Section I have taken some notice of already, and will therefore now pass it over without saying any thing to it. Mr. Locke having said, that *we cannot by the Contemplation of our own Ideas of Matter and Thinking, discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some Systems of Matter fitly disposed, a power to Perceive and Think.* Mr. Broughton tells us, the sense of it he takes to consist in one of these two things. 1. That Thought may be one of the many to us unknown Properties, which Omnipotence has bestowed upon Matter. Or, 2. That there may be in Matter a capacity of Thought, when ever it pleases Omnipotence to confer it; tho' it does not lye within the compass of our Apprehension. This Account is very obscure, and needs Explanation; tho' I think what he calls the Objection, is clear and intelligible enough. Mr. Broughton's first thing, is delivered in such a manner, I should have been very uncertain in what sense to understand it, if he had not been pleas'd to explain it himself: And seeing he hath done it, it is very fit we should take it according to his meaning; which is, *that all Matter as such doth actually Think*, p. 57. I cannot conceive how it could come into his head, to put such a Construction on Mr. Locke's words. But he owns that was not Mr. Locke's sense, *but the second thing* (he saith) *is doubtless the sense of Mr. Locke and others*, p. 58. only he pretends to have mended the wording of it, by putting in the words, *Capacity of Thought in Matter*, instead, I suppose, of some Systems of Matter fitly disposed. But what he means
by

by Capacity, needs Explaining ; And the just importance of his second Thing, will, without that, I doubt, be scarce Intelligible. My own Thoughts I will express to you briefly, concerning Matter, its Powers and Capacity : So that I think a very little will afterwards need to be said, to what Mr. *Broughton* writes on this Subject, *viz.* That *the Power of Thinking cannot be superadded by Omnipotency to any System of Matter, in what manner soever disposed.* Matter, considered as matter, hath no other property, but that which makes substance to be matter. By the word Matter, we design to signify only substance with that property, which we conceive makes substance matter, *E. G.* Solidity. By matter then, we mean solid substance : Yet there are not any systems of solid substance, or matter, but what have some other properties, than solidity ; which I take to be the property that makes substance matter, or that wherein the Essence of matter consists. These other Properties, whatever they be, do not belong to those systems, meerly as they are matter, but are superadded to those systems of matter, or of solid substance. These Properties are not the same with solidity ; they are not contained in the Essence of matter, but are perfectly different Properties, and do every one afford as just ground to denominate the substance from it, as solidity doth, to denominate it from it. We evidently perceive that it is not the pleasure of God, that all systems of matter shall have all the same properties ; But that it is his pleasure to super-

superadd Powers or Properties to systems of Matter, according as they are differently modified and disposed. He does not superadd Properties indifferently to systems of Matter, but in some proportion to their being fitted for those he will confer on them. So that certain systems of Matter modified or disposed, after certain ways or manners, to us perfectly unknown, do thereby become, through the appointment and pleasure of God, capable of certain Powers or Properties which God doth thereupon superadd to them, and which he doth not (at least ordinarily) superadd to any systems of Matter which are not so modified and disposed. These are Powers or Properties not contained in the Essence of Matter, nor doth the presence of them destroy, or take away the Essence of Matter from the substance in which they likewise are. They are the Properties of the same substance, in which there is Solidity, and are as much superadded to it, as Solidity is: They do not make the Substance, by their being superadded to it, to be solid, nor intitle it to the Name, Matter, which belongs to it only by reason of its being solid: Nor does the superadding Solidity to the Substance, make it what it is, purely by virtue of other superadded Properties, or entitle it to the Names which may belong to it, by reason of their being in it. They are Properties not contradictory, but very widely different one from another; Properties superadded to the very same Substance, without Ejecting one another, or Quarreling one with
M another;

another ; They continue quietly, distinct Properties of one and the same Substance. These Systems continue to be Matter, as solid as ever, yet they have Properties which do not belong to Matter, as Matter, and which all systems of Matter have not. These Powers do not necessarily result from Matter's being in a certain manner modified, exclusively of the good Pleasure and Ordination of God, but as it is his pleasure to superadd them to systems of Matter in such or such a way modified, rather than to other systems of Matter modified after another manner ; and to which he also superadds other Properties, as he sees fit. Thus a system of Matter in a certain way modified, may be said to be capable of a Property which it was not capable of, considered barely as Matter, or before it was so modified, or before it was fitted according to the pleasure of God, to have a certain Property superadded to it. Which Property may be so far from being contained in the Essence of Matter, it may very much excel that Property which makes Substance to be Matter. Those Properties, which are evidently superadded to certain systems of Matter, are as really distinct from Solidity or Extension, as Thought is. But we neither knowing what Substance is, nor being able to penetrate the unrevealed Counsels of the Almighty, cannot arrive at a certainty whether Omnipotency has given to some systems of Matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think :

Mr. Broughton says, God cannot superadd Cogitation and Solidity, or Extension to the same Substance, because it appears to him no less than a Contradiction that it should be done. This is the reason why he asserts that God cannot do it: And it is a good reason why he may assert, that it appears to him that God cannot do it. But that may appear to some no less than a Contradiction, which is not in truth a Contradiction; nor any thing like it. But (saith he) so long as our Idea of Physical Extension, and of Cogitation, continues the same, they must remain Properties inconsistent in the same Substance, for the Reasons alledged, Sect. 6. and 7. p. 59, 60. when he shall be pleas'd to discover what Ideas he designs those words should signify, it will appear whether they be contradictory or not; but those Ideas which are commonly signified by those words, are very far from being contradictory: And as for the Reasons alledg'd in Sect. 6. and 7. they have been already considered. But in Bar to this Assertion (saith Mr. Broughton) it is pleaded, That we are doubtless ignorant of many Properties of Matter; one of which may be either actual Thought, or at least a Capacity of it: And then he attempts a formal Answer, by discoursing of Induction and Inconsistency, p. 60, &c. whereas he mistakes the Point clearly. Every Man may easily know that Matter, as Matter, has but one Property: But we cannot know how many different Properties God can add to systems of Matter fitly disposed for them, And whether the

Power of Thinking may be one, that he can superadd to some systems of Matter, we cannot know ; But Mr. *Locke* doth not say, *one of them may be either actual Thought, or at least a Capacity of it.* I cannot see any thing in what he calls his Answer, that is pertinent to what I have propos'd ; especially if it be remembered, that Matter continues passive in its own Nature, at the very time when it acts by verue of a power of Action superadded to it. But what way he has to know whether Ideas are Inconsistent and Contradictory, and which makes him assert those to be Contradictory, which others cannot perceive to be so, I cannot imagine ; only I suppose it is not that common one of Considering and Comparing them ; for if it was, it is something wonderful to me, that when he was discoursing of the Inconsistency of Properties, he should declare *he judges Mr. Locke had forgot the more common obvious way, when he said, It was impossible for us, by the Contemplation of our own Ideas, to discover, &c.* p. 62.

It is agreed that Thought is not included in the Essence of Matter. *But when we come (saith Mr. Broughton) to consider and compare our Idea of Thought, in some of its Essential Properties, with our Idea of Matter, then, I think, we have something more to say, viz. That neither is it, nor can it be included in the Essence of Matter,* p. 63, 64. Most prodigious Discovery ! And yet without so much ado ; A Man might have been certain, that what is not included in the Essence

sence of Matter, can never be included in its Essence. To confirm, or illustrate, or do something to, or for his Discovery, he tells a very honest, harmless Story of a *real and remarkable difference between first and secondary Properties*; And of a Stone rolling down a Hill: And withal acquaints us, *that a Man finding no Activity included in the first Property of Matter, he concludes it cannot assume Activity in any subordinate Quality.* For my part, I know not how to find a first Property, where there is but one. If I find Matter any where, and find more Properties than one, I find Matter, and something more than Matter, yet that which the Man concludes is of no use in our business. He should have concluded at least, that Omnipotence cannot superadd a power of Action, or a more excellent Property to it, than that which made it Matter. And if he had concluded so, not one step would have been advanced towards the discovering of truth.

Yet it seems to be a very fortunate Thought; and tho' a Man might easily have light on it, yet it deserved to be introduc'd with some Pomp, for a great deal of Work, much Execution may be done with it. It is of use for several great Purposes: It will answer Mr. Locke, and it will enlighten Mr. Newton.

This Consideration answers (saith Mr. Broughton) all that he, viz. Mr. Locke, objects from the variety of Qualities found in Matter, and the Excellency of some above others, as of Vegetation

above bare Motion; for these are all reconcilable to its first Property, and so may have a dependance upon it, tho' we know not the manner how they depend, p. 64. I will not enquire what we are to understand by Reconcilable to its first Property, and having a dependance upon it; for these are not the things we are concern'd about. The Consideration he speaks of, is this, *That Thought neither is, nor can be included in the Essence of Matter, i. e. in that Property which makes Substance Matter, therefore God cannot superadd it to any material System; for it is a Contradiction, that a Property which neither is, nor can be included in the Essence of Matter, should be superadded to a material System.* Mr. Locke takes notice of several Properties, as Motion, Vegetation, &c. which are not included in the Essence of Matter, nor cannot be included in the Essence of Matter, and are superadded to material Systems, which still continue Matter. Now the difficulty to me, is, how his Consideration doth answer what Mr. Locke hath objected? How does finding that Thought neither is, nor can be included in the Essence of Matter, answer what Mr. Locke hath objected? It cannot answer what he hath said, unless it prove, either that Motion, Vegetation, &c. are included in the Essence of Matter, *i. e.* that they are nothing but Solidity or Extension, or that God neither has, nor can superadd them to material Systems: And I cannot conceive how it should prove either of those Points. But let that be as it will, he seems pretty sure that he hath ground to accuse Mr. Locke of
being

being a little unfair in something that he has writ on this occasion. But when he proceeds to instance in Brutes, and then adds, *If one venture to go one step farther, and say God may give to Matter, Thought, Reason, and Volition, as well as Sense, and spontaneous Motion, there are Men ready to limit the Power of the Omnipotent Creator; he is a little unfair; for these Men deny Sense and spontaneous Motion, as well as Thought, Reason, and Volition to Matter: And therefore, instead of bearkning to his Complaint, of being stopt here, I must complain that he has gone a step too far,* p. 65. The words he finds fault with, and which he improves into an occasion to charge Mr. Locke with being a little unfair, and to complain that he hath gone a step too far, are taken out of the 397. p. of Mr. Locke's Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his 2d. Letter. Now, in answer to all he hath said on this occasion, I will transcribe part of the 406. p. of the same Reply, And leave you to judge whether Mr. Broughton had any ground either for his Accusation, or Complaint, and whether he has not been more than a little unfair in this matter. Mr. Locke's words in the p. mentioned, are, *Though to me Sensation be comprehended under Thinking in general, Yet in the foregoing Discourse, I have spoken of sense in Brutes, as distinct from Thinking: Because your Lordship, as I remember, speaks of sense in Brutes. But here I take liberty to observe, That if your Lordship allows Brutes to have Sensation, it will follow either that God can, and doth give to some parcels of Matter, a Power of Perception and Thinking;*

or that all Animals have Immaterial, and consequently, according to your Lordship, Immortal Souls, as well as Men: And to say that Fleas, and Mites, &c. have Immortal Souls as well as Men, will possibly be look'd on as going a great way to serve an Hypothesis; and it would not very well agree with what your Lordship says, 2. Answ. P. 64. to the words of Solomon quoted out of Ecclef. C. 3.

But to return to his former Consideration, which he tells us, will answer what he objects from Mr. Newton concerning Gravitation. But how does it answer in this Case? Why, just as before. Mr. Broughton would choose, in the business of Gravitation, to have recourse to an Immaterial, (I suppose he means) Created Immaterial Principle, or else what he suggests is to no purpose, and altogether groundless. Thus Gravitation is owing to an Immaterial Principle in all Matter, in the visible World at least; and the Union of the parts of Matter must be Effected also by an Immaterial Substance, in every part of Matter in the whole World; And yet with Mr. Broughton, Immaterial Substance is the same with Thinking Substance; So that for ought I see, by his Scheme and Hypothesis, there is no Material Being in the whole World, but what is a Thinking Being, or has an Immaterial or Thinking Substance united to it. But if this Notion will not take, his Consideration helps him to a ready Answer, viz. That Gravitation does not come up to Sense: Or if Matter hath this Power, viz. of
Gravitation

Gravitation, given it, it has not in that, receiv'd the power of Thought, p. 66. Well shot! of a Certainty. Can any thing be truer than this? It is very true, but not to the purpose: For what is this, to proving that Gravitation is included in the Essence of Matter? For if Gravitation is superadded to Matter, and is not included in the Essence of Matter, what Mr. Locke produc'd it for, is fully Establish'd by it, And Mr. Broughton's Consideration does not affect it at all.

In p. 67. and 68. Mr. Broughton says, that an *Elaborate Answer to this Objection, That we cannot conceive the manner how Matter thinks, looks to him like an Elaborate piece of Trifling, before we are satisfy'd that it can be done. And he affirms, that it is not only above, but contrary to our Conceptions, that we not only cannot conceive how it should think, but that we do conceive that it cannot think. We find insuperable Objections in our way, not only against the manner of the thing, but against the thing it self, and the bare possibility of it; and these amounting to a Demonstration, fetch'd from such Properties as we know inseparably belong unto Matter. It was objected, or at least, it was a prejudice suggested before Mr. Locke writ what is referr'd to here, that Matter could not possibly be made to think, or have a power of thinking, because we cannot conceive how it should think: And Mr. Locke in answering that Objection, hath done it so fully, that Men may very well be asham'd to insist on it. And in answering of it, he hath most clearly*
proved

proved that there are Properties and Powers superadded to systems of Matter which are not contained, are not included in the Essence of Matter ; *Perfections, Powers, and Qualities, which have no natural, or visibly necessary Connexion with Solidity and Extension, but are much more noble and excellent than the Property which makes Substance Matter.* Whereby he hath for ever confuted, and manifested the Absurdity of that mighty reputed Argument, that Matter cannot possibly be made to think, because Thought is not, nor cannot be included in the Essence of Matter ; And which, together with the want of a third Idea to couple Thought and Extension, and unite them to the same Substance, are all the Reasons Mr. *Broughton* hath alledged, why he and others can conceive that Matter cannot think. As to the Demonstration he talks of, it being, by his own Confession, fetch'd from Properties inseparably belonging to Matter, it can reach no further, than that Matter, as such, cannot think ; For they do not prove that Thought, and Extension are Contradictions. But, perhaps Mr. *Broughton* would have had Mr. *Locke* to have prov'd, that God can superadd a power of Thinking to some systems of Matter : Tho' he had no reason to expect that from him, he having declared that there is no demonstrative Proof either that he can, or that he cannot superadd a power of Thinking to some systems of Matter fitly disposed. In this, I conceive Mr. *Locke* is perfectly in the right ; And I am inclin'd to think, that all Men will conceive so too, who shall

shall impartially consider, that we cannot possibly know God's undiscovered Pleasure, nor comprehend how far his Power can extend, nor be certain of the Capacity of Substance, which is an *unknown Nature*. The most which has been demonstrated by those who have undertaken to prove, that God cannot superadd a power of Thinking to some systems of Matter fitly disposed, is, That their Intellects are not so Comprehensive as they have fancied, and would fain have others believe they are: For let them talk as much as they please of Demonstration from the Properties of Matter, and that therefore they can conceive, that God cannot superadd a power of Thinking to any systems of Matter, it amounts just to a Fantastick advancing themselves above the unavoidable weakness and imperfection of Humane Understanding. It is impossible Men should any more conceive it Demonstratively true, that God cannot, than that he can superadd a power of Thinking to some Material Systems; whilst the Particulars abovementioned, which obstruct our attaining to Demonstrative Certainty, do so unconceivably surmount the utmost Extent of our Understandings.

But (saith Mr. Broughton) here is the Point; We are conscious of our Thinking, and have all the reason in the World to believe that many other Beings are endued with the same Faculty: And hence, that is, from what we do perceive and know of Thought, we collect, that it belongs to a Subject uniform, and self-active in its Nature; which is
suffi-

sufficient to satisfy us that such a Being can think, or is capable of Thought, p. 68. From our being conscious of our thinking, and from what we perceive and know of Thought, we may demonstratively collect, that there is a Substance to which the power of Thinking is superadded. But this will not serve Mr. Broughton's turn; He therefore will collect more from the Premises, *viz. That Thought belongs to a Subject uniform and self-active in its Nature.* What he means by these last words, he does not inform us; but opposing them to Matter, we must conceive he means Created Immaterial Substance; tho' he has not proved that pure Immaterial Substance is Created. But supposing it to Exist, Created Immaterial Substance is no more self-active in its Nature, than Material Substance is: Neither the one, nor the other, has any such Power, originally or inherently in it self; and therefore, as from our perceiving Thought in our selves, we cannot certainly conclude whether the Substance, the power of Thinking is superadded to, is Material, or Immaterial: So our collecting of our own accord, that the Subject it belongs to, is *self-active*, cannot, according to Mr. Broughton's Notions, satisfy us, that such a *Being can think, or rather is capable of thought.* For if self-activity, considered as a power, distinct from the power of thinking, as here he seems to make it, must first be superadded to Immaterial Substance, how can we be sure, that that power will not fill up the whole Capacity of Immaterial Substance? Or how will you find out a third Idea to unite
this

this Property, and a Power of Thinking in the same Substance? Here, at best, he makes a Substance which hath a self-active Property superadded to it, necessary to support Thought; Self-activity must be superadded to Immaterial Substance, to make it a Foundation to bear Thought; Yet, p. 71. he saith, *spontaneous or self-motion in a Body must be such, that it can move or rest of it self; but this power is a Will, properly so called; and that Will is a mode of Thinking: Therefore if the Almighty has given it self Motion, he has first in the Order of Nature, given it Thought, as the only Foundation to bear it.* In the one place, the Subject must first in the Order of Nature, have Self-activity, as the only Foundation to bear Thought: In the other place, the Subject must first in the Order of Nature, have Thought given it, as the only Foundation to bear Self-activity. This, I acknowledge, would look very unhandfom in a staid and composed Writer: But when a Man's thoughts are shatter'd, and he becomes big with a conceit that he continually sees Repugnancy, Inconsistency, Absurdity, and Contradiction in what he opposes, there is nothing more natural, than for him to fall into the grossest Contradictions that can be; And to advance Notions, to which all the Ill-sounding Epithets he would fasten on what others have said, do most properly belong.

In the last place, Mr. *Broughton* comes to Answer a Question propos'd and explain'd by Mr. *Locke*, Lett. 3d. p. 402, 403. viz. Why
Omnis-

Omnipotency cannot give to either of these Substances, (viz. Immaterial, and Material) which are equally in a State of perfect Inactivity, the same power that it can give to the other? To this, he saith he hath several things to offer. As,

- 1. Let it be considered that God has not Created all Natures or Substances so, as to be susceptible of all manner of Properties. The Question is set down before, and the Answer is adjoyned; And whether the Answer does not very well become an Accomplish'd Philosopher, I leave you to judge. What would he have said, if he had been put to prove that God had Created pure Immaterial Substance? He hath so Express'd himself, as might occasion some to think, it is his Opinion that there are Communicable Properties; which neither Material, nor Immaterial Substance is susceptible of: But what he adds, looks as if he design'd it for a Reason of what he had said. If he has, all our reasoning from the nature of the thing, is at an end. By the Nature of the thing, we must here understand its Substance, or what he saith, can have no relation to what goes before. Formerly, we were to argue from the nature of the Accident, to the nature of the Substance, and to know the nature of the Substance, by that of the Accident; Now we must reason from the Substance, to I know not what. Must it not be a very instructive and convincing way, to Reason from an unknown Nature, as Substance is acknowledg'd to be, and an unknown Nature devoid of all Properties; and such is Immaterial Substance, consider'd as Immaterial?*

terial? And (saith he) *since we can properly Reason no otherwise, the old Principle is Established, That God may have deceived us.* I can name you a Gentleman, who likes an Argument the better for its being old: If he likes Principles the better for their being of old Date, it is to be desired he would Except, That, so lately dignified with that Character. If Men will pretend to reason from they do not know what, and affirm we cannot properly reason otherwise, they will unavoidably deceive themselves; But it will be Impious, when they have put a Cheat upon themselves, to say God has deceived them. It surmounts my Understanding, to conceive how these last words, or indeed any of those before them, can be brought in with any pertinency, with any Coherence, as an answer to the Question that was under Consideration. Mr. Broughton goes on in these words, *But as sure as our Faculties are true, and as sure as our Creator has imparted variously differing Natures to his Creatures, so sure it is, that he has tied himself to that Rule in conferring Properties upon them; that is, has conferred such, and only such as are suitable to their respective Natures,* p. 70. Here I may take notice, 1. That from the truth of our Faculties, when regularly employed about their proper Objects, we cannot in reason conclude the truth of our Notions, and Suppositions, and Affirmations, about things that are out of their reach. 2. That it is very rational on such an occasion as this, to ask whether it is demonstratively *sure*, that our Creator has imparted

variously

variously differing Substances to his Creatures?

3. That there is ground enough to Enquire whether Material, and Immaterial Substances, are variously differing Substances? And if these are only differing Substances, what other differing Substances our Creator has imparted to his Creatures, to make up the variously differing Substances; Mr. *Broughton* is so sure our Creator has imparted to his Creatures?

4. That no Proof is produc'd that God has tied himself, in conferring Properties upon his Creatures, to confer such, and only such, as Mr. *Broughton* shall conceive suitable to the Substances he shall be pleased respectively to assign them. Perhaps you will say, these are not Mr. *Broughton's* words. Very true: But I have faithfully delivered his words before, And I am not now concern'd about his words, but his sense. Can you think his meaning was, that God hath tied himself to confer only such Properties, as he himself shall judge suitable to the Substance? When he expressly declares, we cannot properly Reason otherwise, than from the Substance of the thing? And notwithstanding you have such abundant Evidence, that if God should think fit to superadd a property to a system of Matter fitly disposed, which Mr. *Broughton* does not approve of, but thinks not suitable to Material Substance, he will strait Demonstrate that God cannot do it, because he can conceive that he cannot do it; and he will give it under his Hand, that there is a Repugnancy, and Inconsistency in it; tho' it is a Contradiction: And that for a Person to
say,

say, he is not certain that God cannot do it; is Absurd and Mischievous, has a tendency to Scepticism, and shall certainly be disgrac'd, as Unphilosophical? It would satisfy some People, that God in conferring Properties on his Creatures, doth suit them to the Ends for which he designs them. 2dly. *But then* (saith Mr. Broughton) *how do we understand that such and such Natures, are capable of such, and only such Properties?* To which he answers, *Inconsistency, as I said, with some known Property in the Subject, is the chief Rule, &c. p. 71.* This is what he had said before, as he here owns; and it having been considered already, I shall say no more to it here, only I cannot conceive how this should be an Answer to Mr. Locke's Question, nor how any thing in the said Page, or the following Page, can be thought pertinent in answer to his Demand: For Spontaneous and Self-motion, tho' the word Thought is not joyned with them, *is a Power that 'tis supposed God can give to an insolid Substance, but denied that he can give to a solid Substance.* The Reason for the Denial is enquired after, and he who writ the Answer, was left at liberty to produce what Example or Instance he pleased. His last Answer is, *That Solidity is a Reductitious, not a first Property of Body, p. 72.* Now, supposing this was true, what is it to the Question? *But when* (saith Mr. Broughton) *we find every solid Substance physically extended, and divisible, and passive, then we clearly conceive, that such a solid Substance is incapable of Thought, p. 72.* Is not this a very clear

clear Answer to the Demand? We clearly conceive it incapable of Thought. Seeing and conceiving clearly, (or pretending to do so) without either Light or Reason, are of mighty use to some People, on certain Occasions. Substance, considered as extended, divisible, and passive, does not, cannot Think, but is in a state of perfect Inactivity; but it is not its being extended, and divisible, that makes it passive; that makes it to be in a state of perfect Inactivity: For Substance, whether it is, or is not extended, and divisible, is, till a power of Action be superadded, passive, and in a state of perfect Inactivity. The Question is, why Omnipotency cannot give to either of these Substances, *viz.* Extended and divisible Substance, and unextended indivisible Substance, which are equally passive, equally in a state of perfect Inactivity, the same power that it can give to the other? To which it is answered, *We clearly conceive that extended, divisible, passive Substance, is incapable of Thought.* Now if, *incapable of Thought*, do signify any thing more, than that it is in a state of perfect Inactivity, I should be very glad to find the full Importance of the Phrase laid open. And if that be the whole meaning of it, Mr. *Broughton* might, with equal light and strength, have answered the Question at once, by saying that Omnipotency cannot superadd the power of Thinking to either Material, or Immaterial Substance; and then have confirmed his Answer by affirming, we clearly conceive that both sorts of Substances are incapable of Thought.

Thought. They are both in a state of perfect Inactivity ; can neither of them Think, as such, or of themselves, And therefore Omnipotency cannot superadd the power of Thinking to either. These are not good Reasonings : It behoves us to have more Honourable Thoughts of God ; To be contented with, and make a good use of the Light he is pleased to afford us ; Not to insult the Divine Perfections, or narrow God's Power to the mean Extent of our Feeble Conceits.

Mr. *Broughton* declares, p 73. That he takes what he has said, to be a Foundation for a full Answer to all that Mr. *Locke* has objected upon this Head, to the late great Bishop of Worcester. I so far differ from him concerning what he hath said, that I am perswaded, if the 6th. §. of the 3d. Chap. of the 4th. Book of Mr. *Locke's* Essay, and the whole 10th. Chap. of the same Book, And what Mr. *Locke* hath said in his Reply to the Bishop of Worcester's Answer to his 2d. Letter, from p. 395. to p. 414. were Published together, every one would in that small Volume, find a most satisfactory and compleat Answer to every thing Mr. *Broughton* hath said on this Subject.

Sir, I have now gone through both Parts of what I propos'd in the beginning. The remaining Sections in the first part of the *Psychologia*, I leave as I found them, without making any Remarks on them. And as for the second part of the Book, I have not any thing to say

of it ; for I have not read it. I never saw the Book it is writ against ; And I have found Authors so unfair, when they have pretended to quote the words, and deliver the sense of those they write against, as makes me to lay very little stress on Quotations. Without reading calmly what is writ on both sides in a Controversy, a Man will hardly be able to make a true Judgment, whether either, or which side is in the right. When you shall be at leisure to read these Papers, I expect you will read Mr. *Broughton's* Book ; at least, so much of it as these Papers are concern'd with. And if you apprehend me mistaken in any thing, or that I have omitted any thing said by Mr. *Broughton* that is of weight, with relation to the Subject of these Papers, Your giving me notice of the same, will very particularly oblige

Your Humble,

Sept. 10th.

1703.

And much obliged Servant, &c.

REMARKS

On what Mr. Norris hath said in his First Chapter of the Theory of the Ideal World, p. 2. to Demonstrate the Immateriality of the SOUL.

Sept. 7th. 1704.

S I R,

THE first Chapter in the second Part of Mr. Norris's *Essay, towards the Theory of the Ideal World*, is designed to prove that *Matter cannot think, or that Matter is utterly incapable of Thought*; The very Subject about which Mr. Broughton bestowed so much pains in the first Part of his *Psychologia*. I did sometime the last Year, give you an account of the Reasons which induced me to think Mr. Broughton had not Effected what he undertook, but had left his Subject much what in the same state and posture in which he found it. By the following Papers, you will perceive why I think Mr. Norris has not succeeded much better, and that the Point still continues Undemonstrated. It seems a little strange, that Men of Thought should hunt so much about for probable Evidence, when they cannot but

know the Enquiry is concerning Demonstration, and that nothing less than Demonstrative Proof can be at all to the purpose. If Authors had no other design in their Writings, but to Bubble ignorant, unthinking People, I should not wonder if they did please themselves with Noise, alteration of Terms, and proving things that are foreign to what is in Question. But that is a thing so very fordid, so justly ignominious and detestable, Men of Learning, Integrity, and good Character, will be sure to keep at as great a distance from it as may be. Were it not for the Commonness of the thing, I should be tempted to wonder, how Authors of any Ingenuity can prevail with themselves, to strive to possess their Readers with wrong Notions of what is laid down by the Writers they profess to oppose, attributing to them in express Terms, what is no where to be found in their Books. Mr. Norris has, p. 34. these words, *The Author of the Letters against the Bishop of Worcester, is so liberal of Thought, as to bestow a Capacity of it upon Matter.* Which words, look as if he would have People believe, that Author did affirm, that Matter is capable of Thought; whereas, the most that can be inferr'd from any thing that Author has published on the Subject, is, that it cannot be demonstrated that Matter is not capable of Thought. I dare not attribute the aforementioned words, to want of discernment in Mr. N. Perhaps, when he shall seriously reflect on the temper of Mind he was in, when he adventur'd to publish those words, without any Reason,

son, and without any Provocation, he will be conscious that he has reason to dislike that Humour which has so long had the Ascendant in him, and has so evidently all along occasioned in him a Solicitude how to make the Author he speaks of, his Adversary.

The Arguments Mr. *Norris* produces to prove that Matter, or Extended Substance, (for with him they are the same, *wherein* (to use his own Phrase, p. 43.) *we will allow him to please his fancy*) is utterly incapable of Thought, are in number, Three, *viz.*

First, That if Matter be capable of Thought, then the natural Immortality of the Soul cannot possibly be proved.

Secondly, That the Ideas of an Extended Being, and of a Thinking Being, are distinct Ideas.

Thirdly, That if God should superadd a power of Thinking to Matter, the Species would thereby be changed; and so it would not be Matter, but something else that would think.

His first Argument is to this purpose; *If matter is capable of thought, then the natural Immortality of the Soul cannot possibly be proved.* Now, to see the full strength of this Argument, and of what he says upon it, it will be requisite to understand his Terms in his own sense: Therefore I shall set down what by his

own account, we are to understand, 1. by the word *Soul*. Then 2. What by the word *Matter*. 3. What he means by the term *Immortal*. And 4. The sense in which we are to understand a thing is *naturally Immortal*.

1. By the term *Soul*, it is most certain, he means unextended Substance. *A principle or substance distinct from matter*, p. 5. *If matter can think, it is impossible to prove we have any such thing as a Soul*, p. 8. By *Soul*, it is plain he does not mean, a thinking substance, but a substance distinct from matter. For *that we do think*, (and therefore have a thinking substance) he says, *is what we are inwardly conscious of to our selves; what we feel and know by a Sentiment, as clear and evident as that of pleasure and pain*, p. 5. Yet he doth suppose we do not know that we have a *Soul*; that is, a substance distinct from matter. And what a substance distinct from matter must signify, will best appear by taking notice,

2. Of what Idea the word *Matter* stands for with him, which he declares, is *That of an Extended Being*, p. 13. And in the next Page he tells us, *this is the general reason or essence of matter*. The Discourse being about a *Soul*, which Mr. Norris hath said signifies a substance distinct from matter, he should have used the word *Substance*, instead of *Being*, in this place; and therefore I shall keep to the word *Substance* all along, instead of *Being*, which Mr. Norris doth frequently use. Thus, by *Matter*, we
are

are to understand, *an extended substance*; And a substance distinct from extended substance, must be unextended substance.

3. The term *Immortal*, is not used by Mr. Norris to signify *Unperishable*, and as it is opposed to *Annihilation*, but he means by it *Undissolvable*, and uses it as opposed to *Corruption*. As *Immortal* is taken for *Indissolvable*, and as 'tis opposed to *Corruption*, so nothing but what is *Immaterial* can be *Immortal*; since if *Material*, it will be *Divisible*, and so *Mortal*, or *Corruptible*, p. 9. Thus, *Mortal*, *Corruptible*, and *Divisible*, are three words of the very same Importance, and by *Immortal*, we are to understand *Indivisible*.

4. For any thing to be *Immortal* in its own Nature, is to be *above the force of any created Power to destroy it*, p. 8.

This is the account Mr. Norris has given of what he means by the several Terms which make up his first Argument: So that his Argument is really thus, If extended substance be capable of thought, then it cannot possibly be proved, that unextended substance cannot be divided by the force of any created Power. Which seems to me, very like saying, If extended substance be capable of thought, then it cannot possibly be proved that nothing cannot be destroy'd or divided by the force of any created Power. But supposing the Existence of unextended substance, can any thing be more evident, than that it cannot be divided

ded

ded by the force of any created Power, tho' extended substance should be capable of thought? Thought has nothing to do in this business; for wherever it be lodg'd, unextended substance will be necessarily indissoluble, and indivisible. Thought does not contribute any thing to the Indivisibility of unextended substance, for it is in it self indivisible. Tho' I do not agree with Mr. *Norris* in his Opinion, that Extension makes substance divisible, (which, by the way, fully overturns his Argument,) yet I am very well satisfied, that whatsoever is divisible, whatsoever can be divided by the force of any created Power, must be extended.

The Immateriality, and consequently natural Immortality of the Soul, is plainly impossible to be proved, if Matter can think; Yea, that there is any such thing as a Soul in us. These are Mr. *N's* words, p. 8. And what a ghastly Aspect have they, just as they lie there! what a terrible Dinn must they make in the Ears of those who shall hear them, and not know any thing of the peculiar meaning he assigns them. It seems there are two things Mr. *Norris* has a mind should be proved, or at least that it should be possible to prove them. And it is plainly impossible to prove them, he says, if matter, if *extended substance* can think. What then is to be done? In short, we are therefore to conclude, that extended substance is utterly incapable of thought: And thus the Point is presently dispatch'd. Yet we need not be in such great haste; for the first thing that is said
to

to be impossible to be prov'd, taken in its proper sense, will appear certainly true, if extended substance can think. The first thing he says, is plainly impossible to be proved, if matter can think; is this, *viz.* The *Immateriality, and consequently natural Immortality of the Soul.* Now, the true sense and meaning of these words, according to his own account, is, that unextended substance is unextended, and consequently indivisible, or cannot be divided by the force of any created Power. And this carries so much light with it, there is no need to conclude extended substance cannot think, that from thence we may borrow a Proof it.

But if that Point is safe enough, had we not much better, without any more a-do, determine that God cannot add a power of thinking to any system of matter, in what manner soever dispos'd, than want a Proof *that there is any such thing as a Soul in us?* which is the second thing he says is plainly impossible to be proved, if extended substance can think. Yet, if we consider the true sense and meaning of all this, it amounts to no more, than that it cannot be proved there is unextended substance in us; That is, it is impossible to prove there is we do not know what, in us; or any such thing in us, as we have no Idea of. Now, what is the Inconvenience, that we cannot prove there is something in us, of which we have no Idea? We have an Idea of a thinking substance, and we have the fullest Evidence we can desire, that there is a thinking substance, (which is what the word *Soul* is commonly used to signify) in us.

Mr.

Mr. Norris says, *Indeed, had I but a clear Idea of my own Soul, such as I have of Extension, Numbers, or Figures, I might then, without troubling my self about Matter, barely by consulting that Idea, see in one and the same View, what Properties and Modifications it includes, and consequently whether Thinking be one of them,* p. 7. Here Mr. Norris takes it for granted, that he has a Soul; that is, unextended Substance, and tells us what he could see in it, if he had a clear Idea of it; whereas if he had such a clear Idea as he speaks of, of substance, tho' extended, he might with equal truth say the same of it. He would see in it all the Properties and Modifications included in the clear Idea of substance. For, tho' considering it as extended, he would find in it an additional Idea, not belonging to it barely as substance; Yet the adding of a new Property, not being the Exclusion of any of the Properties that belong to substance, as substance, he would in that clear Idea, see all the Properties, &c. which he could see in the clear Idea he talks of, of unextended substance, or what he calls his own Soul. But further, If he had such an Idea of unextended substance, as he speaks of, he might perhaps infer that it is capable of having all manner or kinds of Properties superadded to it. But he would not find Extension, or Thought, or any additional Property included in the Idea of pure, unextended substance. Again, we have but an obscure Idea of substance at the best. When we perceive any Property or Affection actually to Exist, we have

have an obscure Idea of substance that doth support it ; but of unextended substance, or substance without any property or affection, we have no Idea at all.

Since unextended substance cannot be proved to be the subject of thought, by the Idea of unextended substance, we having no Idea at all of it ; or because as Mr. N. acknowledges, we have not an Idea of it *so clear* as is sufficient for this purpose, what way is there, to prove *there is such a thing as a Soul*, as Mr. Norris speaks ; that is, unextended substance ? There is but one way to prove it, Mr. N. owns, and that is by thought. *I cannot* (saith he) *be assur'd of my having a Soul, but by my thinking*, p. 6. And again, *I cannot know that I have any substance in me distinct from my Body*, (he should have writ distinct from the substance of my Body) *but by my thinking*, p. 9. But if there be no other way to prove the Point, I suspect it will never be prov'd. For tho' thought will prove a substance vested with the power of thinking, (which with some ordinary People will pass well enough for a Soul) yet it will not prove either the presence, or absence of another property in, or from the same substance, and therefore cannot prove that the substance in which it is, is unextended. Substance, with the power of thinking added to it, is thinking substance, whether extended or unextended : By Thought, we can know there is thinking substance, or substance which has a power of thinking added to it ; And that is as much as we can know of it, by Thought. When we
per-

perceive any distinct property or affection, we can by it know, there is a substance that has that affection or property added to it ; but whether that substance has, or has not any other property added to it, or how many other properties are added to it, we cannot know, nor so much as guess at, by that one Property.

But after all, what shall we do to prove the natural Immortality of the Soul? For Mr. *N.* says, *the Soul cannot be Immortal; (that is, it is impossible for us to know or prove that it is Immortal) unless it be Immaterial.* Now, I do not know what need we have to concern our selves about the Immortality of senseless, unthinking, unextended Substance ; which is the whole that the word Soul is used for in this Controversy, more than about the Immortality of senseless, unthinking, extended Substance. Yet it is certain, that if there be such a thing as unextended Substance, it is Immortal ; that is, Undissolvable. But Mr. *Norris's* words come only to this, That unextended Substance cannot be Immortal, or Undissolvable, unless it be Unextended. But what is all this talk of the *Immortality, natural Immortality* of the Soul, to the Immortality of a thinking Substance, or if you will, of a thinking Soul? For suppose unextended Substance the subject of Thought, tho' pure unextended Substance be Immortal ; that is, Undissolvable, Yet when the power of Thinking is added to it, it is not pure unextended Substance, but is a Compound or Complex Being ; And whatever is compound-
ded

ded, if not material, or unextended, is as really dissolvable, as what is material or extended. If a thinking Being, is, as such, naturally Immortal, or undissolvable, then it will be so, if the power of thinking should be added to extended substance. If a thinking Being, is not as a thinking Being, naturally Immortal, or undissolvable, then the natural Immortality of unextended substance, should the power of Thinking be added to it, would not make the thinking Being naturally Immortal; no more than it would hinder it from being then a Complex Being. This is Mr. *Norris's* first Argument, to prove extended substance utterly incapable of thought: But I needed not to have said so much to it, as I have, because in the close of his Discourse on this Topic, he does in effect, confess it no Demonstration of the Point. But he intimates he will in the following part of his Discourse, produce *more direct and convincing Proof* of it. I will therefore now go to his second Argument, which is this, *viz.*

Secondly, That the Ideas of an extended Being, and of a thinking Being, are distinct Ideas. If there were nothing else to obstruct my expecting Demonstrative Evidence of the Point under Consideration this way, than this, that here the whole strength of Mr. *Norris's* Argument, as he manages it, depends on the truth of an Hypothesis that is at most but probable, and cannot possibly be demonstrated; this would make me suspect, that when we are got as far

as this Argument will lead us, we shall be as much in the dark as we were at first, and not one jot more certain that extended substance is utterly incapable of thought, than at the beginning. I shall not have any occasion to say any thing to a great part of what he has thought fit to publish, in treating on this Subject. I must pass over some Passages without taking notice of them, unless I would undertake to confute them by his own Hypothesis, or attempt a Discourse of the Ideal World; which may pass for a pretty Conceit, for a Man to sport and divert himself with at times. But I am apt to think it is Mr. Norris's unhappiness, who can think so very well in train, to make it so much of his business, to be Twurling Mr. Malbranche's Gig.

Mr. Norris discourses to this Effect, *Extension and Thought are two distinct Ideas, distinct in their whole kind; and therefore I can assuredly say, that Extension is not Thought. And as these are distinct, because the Ideas we have of them are so, so an extended Being, and a thinking Being, are no less distinct, because we have as distinct Ideas of them. An extended Being then, is one thing, and a thinking Being is another; and therefore as a thinking Being is not an extended Being, so neither is an extended Being a thinking Being: And if an extended Being be not a thinking Being, then is it not a plain Consequence, that an extended Being cannot think?* p. 15, 16. This indeed is (saith Mr. Norris) a dispatching Demonstration, if it be one: But we shall be the better able to judge of it, if we reduce it to Form, and then it will stand in this posture.

If

If an extended Being be really distinct from a thinking Being, then an extended Being cannot think;

But an extended Being is really distinct from a thinking Being;

Therefore an extended Being cannot think.

All the Question (saith Mr. Norris) will light upon the Minor Proposition, whether an extended Being be really distinct from a thinking Being? Which is proved again thus,

If the Ideas of an extended Being, and of a thinking Being are distinct, then an extended Being and a thinking Being are really distinct.

But the Ideas of these things are distinct: Therefore the things themselves are really so, p. 16, 17.

Now, after all the pains Mr. Norris has been at, to put his Argument into form, his Syllogisms are not at all to the purpose: For that which was to be enquir'd after, that which should be proved, is not in either of the Syllogisms. The Question is not about the distinction of Beings: Not whether a thinking Being, and an extended Being be distinct Beings? The Enquiry is about the distinction of Substances: Which is not in either of the Syllogisms. Beings may be really distinct, and their Substances be of the very same kind. The Question was, *Whether extended Substance be utterly incapable of Thought?* And his Arguments should have been reduced into form thus.

If the substance of an extended Being be really distinct from the substance of a thinking Being, then extended Substance is utterly incapable of Thought, or cannot think.

But the substance of an extended Being, is really distinct from the substance of a thinking Being ;
Therefore extended Substance is utterly incapable of Thought, or cannot think.

All the Question now will light upon the Minor Proposition, whether the substance of an extended Being be really distinct from the substance of a thinking Being ? Which, according to Mr. *Norris's* way, must be proved thus.

If the Ideas of the substance of an extended Being, and of the substance of a thinking Being, be really distinct, then the substance of an extended Being is really distinct from the substance of a thinking Being.

But the Ideas of the substance of an extended Being, and of the substance of a thinking Being, are really distinct ;

Therefore the substance of an extended Being is really distinct from the substance of a thinking Being.

When Mr. Norris shall furnish the World with two really distinct Ideas of Substance, it may be allowed that one of them is the Idea of Substance, which supports Extension: And that the other is the Idea of Substance which has the power of Thinking appropriated to it; And that he has effectually proved the Minor Proposition of the last Argument, and made his Demonstration compleat. But till he shall do that; he will seem to me to be very much out, p. 20. when he says, *All the Question will be, whether the Ideas of an extended Substance, and of a thinking Substance are truly distinct; that is, distinct in themselves, or no?* For all the Question will be, whether there be two really distinct Ideas of Substance? Whether the Idea of Substance, to which Extension is added, is really distinct from the Idea of Substance, to which the Power of Thinking is added?

We have no other way (saith Mr. Norris) to judge of the real distinction of things, than by the distinction of those Ideas we have of them, when we think about them, p. 18. Again, (saith he) Some will say diversity of Ideas does not always infer diversity of things. But I ask, does it sometimes infer it? If they say, No, I say we have then no possible way whereby to judge of the diversity of one thing from another: If they say, Yes; then they confess the Rule rightly stated and qualified to be good. And there is but one Consideration wanting to set it right, and to justify the Consequence from the diversity of Ideas, to the diversity of things, viz: That the Ideas be distinct not by Abstraction, or inadequate Conception, but in themselves; and in their

own absolute Nature; that is, that they be entire and compleat, not inadequate Ideas, p. Ib. &c. Here Mr. Norris continues his former mistake, speaking of the real distinction of Things, when the real distinction of Substances is the Point that should be proved. Nothing is more clear, than that things may be really distinct from one another; and we may know them to be so, and yet their substance may be of the same kind. Let *substances* be placed in the room of *things*, and then any Man may easily perceive how true, and how pertinent those Lines are, with respect to what was to be proved. To infer regularly a diversity of Substances, we must have divers Ideas of Substance: But to talk of inferring diversity of Substances, from the diversity of the Ideas we have of Things, would be extreamly loose and fulsome. But further, if there be a Creature that agrees with, or answers to the Idea of an *extended thinking Being*, neither the Idea of an extended Being, nor the Idea of a thinking Being, can be an adæquate Idea of that Creature. Now, if it be ask'd, whether the same Substance supports both those Properties? Upon its being answered that it is not demonstratively certain that it is, or is not; he who shall deny that, will be oblig'd to demonstrate either the one or the other. And 'tis certain, he will never be able to demonstrate either, by telling a Story of Ideas by which things are made; and that the Ideas of an extended Being, and of a thinking Being, are entire and compleat Ideas: For they are neither of them entire and compleat

pleat Ideas of the Creature spoken of, but are very inadæquate Ideas of it.

Moreover, Ideas do not prove the Existence of things: And our Ideas of things which really Exist, must be judged of by their agreement with the things themselves; They are adæquate or inadæquate, as they are a regular and compleat, or a confus'd and imperfect Collection of all the simple Ideas, which the powers or properties of the things can furnish an Observer with. But, as was hinted above, we have no other Idea of the substance of one thing, than we have of the substance of another: Nor can we regularly infer a diversity of substances, from the diversity of things; or the diversity of Ideas we have of them.

One and the same substance (Mr. N. saith) may have different Modes, or manners of Being in it self, p. 22. He will mightily oblige Mankind, if he please to discover what Idea he has of the Modification of unextended Substance.

Mr. Norris, p. 27, 28. has these words. *When I can so far divide and separate one thing from another in my thoughts, as to be able not only to conceive one of them without conceiving the other, but to have a clear and distinct Conception of one, as Existing, tho' the other were removed out of being, or were supposed never to have been; I may then conclude this to be a sure Sign---that the Ideas are absolute and compleat, such as have no dependance upon, or Communication with one another,* [Here, by the way, I may take notice, that when he can do so as to Substance, he will have no cause to complain of wanting a clear Idea of his own

Soul ; that is, of unextended Substance, and may truly apply all he saith in those latter times, to his different Ideas of Substance.] and consequently that the things whose Ideas they are, are of a Kind and Order wholly distinct. Now, this is not the Consequence, considering what he undertook to prove, which should be drawn from his preceding Discourse. But his words should have run thus, And consequently, that the Substances of the things whose Ideas they are, are of a Kind and Order wholly distinct: Which I conceive every one will easily perceive has no Connection with the Premises. He goes on in these words, *There being no further Condition wanting to confirm the Consequence from the distinction of Ideas, to the distinction of things,* (he should have said, to the distinction of the substances of things) *than the compleatness and intireness of those Ideas.* We may know that things are really distinct one from another, and not know that their Substances are of as different kinds as their Properties and Affections are. But as for the things which God has made, we must fetch our Ideas of them, from the things themselves, and not forge Ideas in our Heads, and then determine the Works of God must answer to them, because we are willing to dignify them with the Character of *Ideas that are in the Divine Mind,* and to commend our selves as People who can stare and gaze upon the *Divine Essence.*

Men cannot by the meer Exercise of their own Faculties, arrive at certainty, that God has not thought fit to put several distinct in-

depen-

dependant Properties or Affections, into one and the same Substance. But some who are wedded to an Hypothesis, would have a several Substance for every Property, if Creatures were to be formed according to their Model; yet it will not become any to be positive, that God has produc'd his Creatures, not according to his own Counsel, but their Fancies, because they are most pleas'd with the latter. When we have nothing but the sensible or evident concurrence of more Properties and Powers in the same Being, to guide our selves by, we are to acquiesce in this, that there are such and such Properties and Powers added to Substance; but whether there is only one Substance to which they are all added, or whether there are more Substances, is what transcends our knowledge: And we ought to be satisfied, notwithstanding the darkness and obscurity in which we are involved as to that matter; and not grow peevish, and throw up all possibility of knowing any thing, - because we cannot know that the substances of things are of different kinds.

Mr. Norris argues thus, *If I can neither doubt of my thinking, nor of my Being while I think, 'tis plain I can conceive a thinking Being to be, (as conceiving my self to be both thinking and being) and that while I doubt whether there be any such thing as Matter or no. And if I can conceive a thinking Being to be, even while I doubt whether there be any such thing as Matter or no, this shews that my conceiving a thinking Being to be, does no way depend upon my supposing the Existence of Matter; and*

consequently, that I might conceive it as well as I do now, tho' I should suppose Matter not to Exist; as indeed it does not, as to me, while I doubt of it, p. 29. This does indeed make some show, yet there is a small Question that does even of course arise; which being considered, will go near to manifest that it is all but Show. The thinking Being here spoken of, Mr. Norris owns is himself: And the question that starts up, and demands a solution, is this, Whether that Idea of a thinking Being spoken of, be an entire and compleat Idea of Mr. Norris? Thought added to Substance, makes a thinking Substance: And a thinking Substance may conceive it self to be both thinking, and substance, without thinking either of extended or unextended Substance; or, as Mr. Norris says, whilst it doubts of the Existence of either, or both; that is, whether there is any thing but thinking Substance that does Exist. If Thought be added to extended Substance, that extended Substance may conceive it self to be both substance and thinking, without conceiving it self to be extended: But tho' its conceiving a thinking Being (that is, it self) to be, would not depend on its supposing the Existence of extended Substance, yet that would by no means prove that its conceiving a thinking Being (viz. it self) to be, does no way depend on the Existence of extended Substance.

The I, Mr. Norris speaks of, is himself: And it is more certain Mr. Norris is an extended Substance, than that he is unextended Substance. Now let him doubt as much as he can,

when

whether there be any such thing as extended Substance, that will never prove that his conceiving a thinking Being (*viz.* himself) to be, does no way depend on the Existence of extended Substance. If he doubts whether there is any such thing as extended Substance, yet he is not certain that that thinking Substance is not extended : And to make his Argument conclude, he must be certain there is no such thing as extended Substance ; for otherwise he cannot be sure the thinking Substance he speaks of, is not extended. His doubting alters not the nature or truth of things : Yea, his doubting plainly manifests, that for ought he knows, that thinking Substance may be extended. *My conceiving a thinking Being, does no way depend upon my supposing the Existence of Matter, p. Ib.* But that thinking Substance may be extended, without your supposing it to be so, *I might conceive it as well as I do now, tho' I should suppose Matter to Exist.* But if that thinking Substance be extended, will your conceiving it to be a thinking Being, and supposing extended Substance not to Exist, alter the case ? Or will that your Idea be an entire, compleat, and adequate Idea of it ? *I am fully sure there is such a thinking Being as I conceive, even while I doubt of the Existence of Matter.* Are you fully sure, that thinking Substance is not extended ? *I am certain it is a thinking Being, and that which I am certain of, can no way depend upon that which I am in doubt of ; since if it did, it would be as doubtful as the other, p. Ib.* Your certainty arises from your consciousness of Thought, which must
be

be in some Substance, but does not determine, or make you certain, what kind of Substance it is in: And that there is not any thing of reason, any strength in what you say, will evidently appear from this one Consideration, *viz.* You will be as certain that you are a thinking Being, or that there is such a thinking Being as you conceive, tho' you doubt as much of the Existence of created immaterial Substance, and suppose as violently that unextended Substance is a pure *Non Ens.* Mr. Norris saith, *I can have an Idea of a thinking Being, tho' I had no Idea of Matter: Nay, (were such a supposition possible) tho' there were indeed no such Idea at all,* p. 32. To which I answer, He may have an Idea of a thinking Being, without having an Idea of unextended Substance; and for this Reason, that it is not possible to have any Idea at all of unextended Substance.

The Ideas of thinking Being, (saith Mr. Norris) and extended Being, are compleat and really distinct Ideas, and not one and the same Idea incompleatly considered. And if the Ideas of these things are really distinct, then the things conceived by these Ideas, are as really and verily distinct, as the Ideas themselves are, p. 39. To this I answer, 1. That things are as really distinct one from the other, as the Ideas are distinct from one another. 2. The Consequence was not to be, as it is here, then the things conceived by these Ideas, are as really distinct, &c. but thus, Then the Substances of the things conceived by these Ideas, are as really and verily distinct as the Ideas themselves are: Which is what was to be proved,

ved, but has no manner of Connection with the foregoing Discourse. To have prov'd his Point, he should have discours'd in this manner. The Ideas of the substance of thinking Being, and of the substance of extended Being, are compleat and really distinct Ideas, and not one and the same Idea incompleatly considered. And if the Ideas of these Substances are really distinct, then the Substances conceived by these Ideas, are as really and verily distinct as the Ideas themselves are. Here the Consequence is to the purpose: And it is clear, obvious, and undeniable, and nothing remains to be proved, but that the Ideas of the substance of thinking Being, and of the substance of extended Being, are compleat and really distinct Ideas: Which will be done, as soon as ever they are produc'd and brought to light.

Things will be really distinct, and the Ideas which agree with them, will be really distinct too, tho' the Substance be of the same kind. The distinction of Ideas, is from the distinction of Properties of which the Ideas mainly consist; as distinct Properties and Affections do make things to be distinct: For, as to Substance, we know no more of it, than that it does support those Properties, &c. The distinction of things, is not grounded on their Substances being of distinct kinds, but on distinct Properties added to Substance, without regarding whether other Properties are added to the same Substance or no, or how many.

An extended Substance (Mr. Norris saith) will be as distinct from a thinking Substance, as Extension

is from *Thought*, p. 41. In this, I think Mr. Norris is right. My reason is, because Extension and Thought make all the difference. But Mr. Norris should have proved, that Substance which has Extension added to it, is as distinct from Substance, which has Thought added to it, as Extension is distinct from Thought. An extended Substance, is Substance vested with Extension. Now, what Idea has any Man of that Substance, that excludes Thought, more than Extension? We have an Idea of Extension, and we see that Thought has no necessary Connection with it, nor any consequential Result from it; and therefore is not any Affection of Extension, nor does naturally belong to it: But how does it follow from hence, that it may not be made an Affection of, or be annexed to that Substance to which Extension is added? Something must be found in the Idea of that Substance that excludes Thought, more than Extension;—or else all that can be said of distinct Ideas, and distinct Beings, will not make it out demonstratively that Thought cannot be added to extended Substance.

If an extended Substance (saith Mr. Norris) can think; that is, a Substance whose Essence is to be extended, then it will be necessary that Thought should proceed from Extension, [as every Property that is in a thing, must proceed mediately or immediately from the Nature or Essence of that thing,] p. 42, &c. This Discourse would afford just ground for variety of Reflections: But I will content myself with taking notice, 1. That I apprehend the words within the Crotchets, should

should have been a little altered, to make them agree more exactly with the Importance of those before them ; and that they should have run thus, [As every Property that is in a Substance, must proceed mediately or immediately from the Nature or Essence of that Substance.]

2. That thus, from the whole Discourse, Mr. *Norris* must intimate he has such a compleat distinct Idea of Substance which is extended, he finds in it something that excludes Thought more than Extension, and from which Extension must proceed mediately or immediately.

Yet, 3. That he expresseth himself so in the former part of this Discourse, as if he had no Idea at all of Substance, considered distinctly from Matter ; but did take Matter and Substance, to be two words signifying and expressing the same Idea. For extended Substance, is, according to Mr. *Norris*, the Essence of Matter ; or to be Extended, is the Nature and Essence of what we signify by the word Matter. And here he speaks of a Substance, *whose Essence is to be Extended*. Now, if to be Extended, is the Essence of Substance, Substance and Matter, must be only two words to signify and express one and the same Idea. If he makes the *Essence of the Substance*, which is Extended, *to be Extended* ; then, according to him, there cannot be unextended Substance ; for nothing can be Substance, which has not the Essence of Substance : And at this rate, thinking Substance must necessarily be Extended. If all Substance is not Extended, then to be Extended, cannot be the Essence of that Sub.

Substance which is Material: For the Essence of that Substance which is Matter, must be the same with what is the Essence of all other Substances, be that what it will; unless the word Substance, when used with respect to Matter, has no sense, or is used very improperly. But,

4. If by a Substance whose Essence is to be Extended, he means no more than Matter or Substance to which that Property or Affection is added, which makes it to be Extended, what he hath said here, will serve his Purpose very little: Not one jot more, because he has brought in the words, *Essence* and *Nature*, than if he had left them both out. For, if a power of Thinking should be added to a Substance to which Extension is added, *To be able to think*, will be as much the *Essence* of that Substance, as to be Extended is the Essence of it: And Thought, with the various Modes of it, will proceed, not from Extension, as Mr. Norris says, or from the Substance as Extended; but from it, as having a power of Thinking. To say then, An Extended Substance is a Substance whose Essence is to be Extended, is no more in plain English, than to say, It is Matter, or a Substance which has that Property or Affection added to it, that makes it to be Extended. And if any other distinct, independant Property or Affection be added to the same Substance, it's Essence will be, to be what that Property makes it, And it will have equal Right to be denominated from that Property, as from Extension; and the Modifications belonging to it, will not be to be accounted for,

as proceeding only from Extension: For none will directly belong to it on that account, but what would have belong'd to it, if no other Property had been added to it. The other Modifications belonging to it, are to be accounted for, as proceeding from it by vertue of it's having one, or more, other Properties added to it.

Mr. Norris's Third Argument is this,

Thirdly, That if God should superadd a power of thinking to Matter, the Species would thereby be changed; and so it would not be Matter, but something else that would think. To give Matter a Power or Perfection that is no way contained in the Idea or Intelligible Essence of Matter, this would be to alter the Species; and instead of making Matter to do this or that, to make something else to do it, which is not Matter. If then God can make Matter think, it must be by something contain'd in the Idea or Essence of Matter; for as for any superinduced Perfection that is not within the comprehension of that Essence, that would make a change in the Species, p. 51. By Species here, is meant Extended Substance, the Idea Mr. Norris signifies by the word Matter. The altering of this Species here spoken of, is not the taking of Extension away from the Substance vested with it, but the giving to the same Substance, which still continues to be Extended, a Power, viz. a Power of Thinking, that is no way contain'd in the Idea of Extension, or of Extended Substance; which with Mr. Norris, is Matter.

Thus,

Thus, notwithstanding the alteration of the Species spoken of, the Substance does not cease to be Extended, but continues Extended Substance after that the Power of Thinking is given to it. Now, if any thing is done, after the Power of Thinking is given; that is, if there be Thought, it is not the Power that does it, it is not the Power of Thinking that thinks; for Powers cannot operate, but that to which the Power is given. And if the Power of Thinking be given to Extended Substance, then Extended Substance can think: For what has a Power to think, can think. If it shall be still said, But the Species is alter'd, and therefore it is not Extended Substance, or Matter, but something else that thinks, I would ask what that something else is, that thinks? If the answer be, It is thinking Substance, I would enquire whether that thinking Substance is not Extended? Which must be acknowledg'd, since we are speaking of Extended Substance, to which the Power of Thinking is given: And if that Substance which thinks, is Extended, can any thing be plainer than this, that it is Extended Substance that thinks? Neither Extended, nor Unextended Substance is contained in the Idea of thinking Substance: Add either of them to that Idea, you alter the Species. But it is certain, if the Power of Thinking be given to an Extended Substance, that Extended Substance can think, not by Virtue of its being Extended, but notwithstanding it is Extended.

According to Mr. Norris's way of Arguing here, it may with equal strength be Argued that Substance cannot think : For Thought is not contain'd in the Idea of Substance ; And Substance cannot think, except a Power of Thinking be given to it. Nor will that do : For, *if God can make Substance think, it must be by something contain'd in the Idea or Essence of Substance : For as for any superinduced Perfection, that is not within the comprehension of that Essence, that would make a change in the Species ; and so instead of making Substance to think, he would make something else to think, which is not Substance. For the Idea of a thing (Mr. Norris says) is the measure of its Species ; and if any thing be superadded, that is not in the Idea of a thing ; it must necessarily vary the Species of it. The Idea of a thing does one way or other comprehend within its Extent, whatever belongs to the thing whose Idea it is,* p. 53. Thus, according to this way of Arguing, God, instead of making Substance to think, by giving it a Power of Thinking, will make something else to think : Which sounds to me very like a Contradiction ; and is, as if he had said, that God by giving a Power of Thinking to one thing, will not make that thing able to think, but will make something else able to think, to which he has not given that Power.

Mr. Norris saith, *'Tis plain, Matter, (or Extended Substance) cannot have Thought, and remain what it is,* p. 54. With equal truth and evidence, we may say, A Soul cannot have Thought, and remain what it is, *viz. Unextended*

tended Substance. Who would have imagined that Thought should be so destructive both to Extended and Unextended Substance, or which ever may have it? Or that if Mr. *Norris's* Soul should once think, he must unavoidably fall under that Grand Misfortune of infallibly losing his *own Soul*?

The Passages already quoted, comprehend (I think) the whole force of what Mr. *Norris* hath said about the Point in question; and what has been reply'd, appears to me to make it manifest it hath not been demonstratively proved, that *Extended Substance is utterly incapable of Thought.*

I am,


S I R,

Your most Humble Servant,

F I N I S.







Richard

Richard Stevenson
Gardener in at Mary Li Bone
Lane
And at Sadminton
in Middlesex

papers

Book

Vol. 1. Hart-

ney

22

