

D. D. 1500-B-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
26 January 1940.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA
FLAGSHIP

26 Jan. 1940

Dear Betty: -

The remarks in your letter of 18 Jan. about the situation in the Far East, the possibility of something breaking without warning and my need to be mentally prepared are somewhat disquieting.

When the China incident started and on every opportunity until after I left the job as Asst. C.N.O. I used to say to Bill Leahy "Be sure to impress on the boss that we do not want to be drawn into this unless we have allies so bound to us that they can not leave us in the lurch."

There is a possibility that the constant repetition had something to do with the trip of Ingersoll.

When this understanding was reached it had some value but under present conditions it has little value as it affords us the use of a base in exchange for an obligation to protect about 2½ continents.

I strongly feel that you should repeatedly impress on the boss that an Orange war would probably last some years and cost much money, my guess is 5 to 10 years 35 to 70 Billion dollars.

I have always thought that our Orange Plan was chiefly useful as an exercise in War Planning, to train officers in War Planning and to serve as a basis for asking for appropriations and as a guide for developing our Navy and its shore facilities. As to actually executing the O-1 plan I hope we will never be called on to do that unless the Administration fully realizes the probable cost and duration of such a war and unless our people are prepared to support an expensive war of long duration.

Even if we could take Truk what would we have. A secure anchorage, nothing else, several thousand miles from our nearest drydock and adequate repair facilities and still hundreds of miles from the enemy country. Of course it could not be taken without some underwater damage. To actually put on real pressure we would have to have a real base. That would take many years and much money. We ought not to go into a thing like this unless we expected to see it through.

I hesitate to write you because the written word is so easily misunderstood, also I do not know what your ideas are, what you are telling the boss, what is the meaning of our diplomatic moves, or our Senators talks, or our neutrality patrol. But you are the principal and only Naval Advisor to the boss and he should know that our Fleet can not just sail away lick Orange and be back at home in a year or so. Also the probable cost of any war should be compared the probable value of winning the war.

When we commissioned the San Diego DDs we used the facilities of San Diego Base, Active DD Tenders, ~~or~~

working parties from active DDs and their

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tenders and Mare Island Yard. I think that an excellent job was done but if it had been a real Mobilization, all of these activities would have been fully occupied. How long would it have taken San Diego Base to have done this and its other mobilization work without any outside assistance? A war plan if it is to be executed should be based on realities.

All of this letter may be needless but I know that if you do not tell the boss what you really know and feel about the probable cost and duration in Orange War NOBODY will.

I would hate to see our leaders make a move from which they could not gracefully withdraw, and which would eventually force us into a war, half heartedly supported by our country. In other words before this Nation takes a step I hope we will carefully examine the direction we are heading, where we will eventually go and be prepared to resolutely pursue the course whatever the cost.

I will finish this letter after I see Adm. Sharp and send it to you by him.

/s/ JOR

1 Feb.

I have seen ^{Sharp}~~Sharp~~ and he has told me about his work on this trip.

The Minor Joint Exercise and Critique have been completed. There was no evidence of any friction or discord. The exercise certainly led the Army to believe that the Navy is highly efficient.

There is danger that many erroneous conclusions will be drawn from this exercise. Of course in actual war we could not have done anything like using all boats from BBs, CLs & CAS for landing. The boats would not have been on board and ships could not have come in shore and stopped for 25 men while lowering boats. There was no sea, no surf and nothing but Ideal weather.

If we ever do anything like this again I hope we have adequate warning, plenty of time, and proper preparation.

I am sending this by Comdr. Curtis.

Hastily

/s/ J O Richardson

Defense Note: In handwriting.

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23 Feb

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

C.N.O.

I have not answered this -

Nimitz had a letter from Andrews and wrote him the substance of my letter to Taffinder -

Then later sent him a copy of my letter to Taffinder -

In my opinion further reply is not necessary unless to say that Nimitz has written to Andrews -

R.L.E.

Defense Note: In handwriting.

辯護文書一五〇〇一B11

一九四〇年一月二十六日附ジエーラー。リチャードソン提督
ツチ。アール。スターク提督宛書翰

合衆國艦隊司令長官旗艦ベンシルバニヲ

一九四〇年一月二十六日

拜啓 一月十八日附貴官ノ書翰中極東ニ於ケル事態ニ關スル意見事件不
意發生ノ可能性及ビソレヲニ對シテ小官ノ覺悟ガ必要デアルトイフコト
ニハ何カ不安ナモノヲ感ジテキマス。

支那事變勃發當時及ビ小官ガ海軍作戰部長トシテ戰ヲ辭シタ後ニア
ラユル機會ニ於テ小官ハビル。リーヒーニ對シ常ニ次ノ如ク云ツテ來マ
シタ。

「我々ヲ窮地ニ置キザリニ出來ナイ程密接ナ關係ニアル同盟國ガ無イ限
リ我々ハ之ニ卷込マレタクナイト云フ事ヲ「ボス」ニ確カニ銘記サセテ
欲シイ。」



不斷ノ反復ハイソルノ旅行ト關係ガアルラシイ。
コノ諒解ヲ得々時ハソノ價值ガアツタガ、現在ノ状態デハソレハ一基地
ノ使用ヲ許ス代リニ二ツ半ノ大陸ヲ保護スベキ義務ヲ負ハネバナラヌノ
デ、殆ド價值ガナイ。

小官ハ貴官ガ「ボス」ニ「オレンヂ戦争」ハ多分數年間繼續シ多額ノ費
用ヲ要シ、小官ノ推測デハ五年乃至十年三五〇億弗乃至七〇〇億弗デア
ラウト繰返シテ銘記サセルベキデアル事ヲ痛感スル。

小官ハ常ニ我が「オレンヂ計畫」ガ主トシテ戦争計畫ノ演習トシテ即チ
戦争計畫ニ於ケル將校ノ訓練、並ビニ豫算請求ノ基礎トシテ又我が海軍
及ビソノ港施設發展ノ爲ノ手引トシテ役立ツト云フ意味ニ於テ——
有益デアツタト考ヘテ來々。「〇第一計畫」ヲ實際ニ遂行スルコトニ關
シテハ小官ハ政府ガ全面的ニ大体ノ戦費トカ、ル戦争繼續期間ヲ自覺ス
ルノデナケレバ又我が國民ガ長期費用ノカカル戦争ヲ支持スルダケノ覺
悟ガナケレバ我々ハ決シテソレヲ遂行スベク要求サレナイ事ヲ望ムモノ
デアアル。

タトヘ我々が「トラツク」ヲ獲得シ得タトコロデ得ルモノハ何デアラ
 ウ。完全ナ從地ト云フダケノコトデアアルシカモソレサヘ我が方ニ一
 番近イ乾船渠及ビ適當ナ修理所カラハ數千哩離レ敵國カラ尙幾百哩モ
 離レテ居ル。勿論或程度ノ水中ノ損害ナシニハソレヲ獲得スル事ハ出
 來ナイ。實際ニ壓迫ヲ加ヘル爲ニ我々ハ實質的ナ基地ヲ得ナケレバナ
 ラナイ。

ソレニハ多年ノ歲月ト多額ノ費用ガカ、ル。我々ハソレガヤリ通セル
 期待ガ出來ナイナラバコノヤウナ事態ニ立入ルベキテハナイ

小官ハ書面ノ言葉ハ誤解サレ易イノテ貴官ヘ書面ヲ認メル事ヲ躊躇ス
 ル。ソノ他小官ハ貴官ノ御考ヘガ如何ナルモノデアルカ、貴官ガボス
 ニ何ヲ話ツテ居ラレルカ我が外交、處置又ハ上院議員ノ談話、又ハ中

立艦艦ニ就イテ知ラナイカラデアアル。

シカシ貴官ハ「ボス」ニ對シテ主ナ唯一ノ海軍顧問デアアルカラ彼ハ我が
 艦隊ガ「オレンヂ」ヲ貢シテ約一年位デサツサト斷固スルコトハ出來ナ
 イノダトイフ事ハ知ツテ居ナケレバナラナイ。又如何ナル戦争デモソノ

我が進ンデキル方向並ビニ如何ナル機往ヲ拂ハウトモ斷呼既定方針ニ遵テ
スベキソノ目標ヲ見極メル事ヲ望ムモノデアアル。
シヤイブ海軍大將ニ會見シテカラ擱筆シ彼ニコノ書翰ヲ托スル事トスル。

印 ジェー、オー、アール

二月一日

シヤイブト會見、彼ハコノ旅行中ノ仕事ニ就イテ小官ニ語ツタ。
小聯合演習及ビソノ批評ハ終ツタ。軋轢又ハ不和ノ跡ハ認めラレナイ
コノ演習ハ陸軍ニ海軍ノ實力ガ十分アル事ヲハッキリト信ジサセタ。
コノ演習カラ多クノ誤ツタ結論ノ出ル危険ガアル。勿論若シコレガ實
デアツタナフバ上陸ノ爲ニ輕巡洋艦軍艦ト云ツタ戦艦ヲ全部使用スル様ナ
事モ出来ナカツタデアラウシ、ボートモ艦上ニナカツタデアラウシ、二十
五人ノ爲ニ船ヲ岸ニ近ツケテ停船シボートヲ下ロス事モ出来ナカツタデア
ラウ。

辯護証 筆書

演習ノ際ハ海モ荒レズ波モ無ク理想的ナ天氣デアツタ。
若シ再ビ斯カル事ヲ爲ル様ナ事ガアレバ充分ナル警戒ト充分ナル時間
ト相堂ノ準備ヲ望ム。

カーテイス海軍大佐ニ托ス

勿々

印ジエーオー、リチャードソン

海軍作戦司令部

作戦部長

二月二十三日

小官ハ之ニ對シ返事ヲシナカツタ

ニミツツ「ハ」アンドリュースヨリ替翰ヲ受取り、小官ノタフインダー宛替翰ノ要旨ヲ彼ニ書イタ

其ノ後タフインダー宛ノ寫シヲ彼ニ送ツタ

小官ノ意見デハ「ニミツツ」ガアンドリュース宛替翰ヲ送ツタトイフ以外ソレ以上ノ返事ハ不必要デアル

アール、エル、イー

辯護側注 筆替