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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
 ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

NOTE: Translation requested by COMNAVJAP.

Series of Directives Issued by the Imperial General Headquarters,
 Naval Section, to Naval Commander at Sea. 5 Nov. 1941 to 31 Dec. 1941.

711.94/4-3046

Imperial General Headquarters,
 Navy Staff Section, Directive No 1. (Summary)

5 November 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff HAGANO, Osami (永野修身):
 TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO (山本).

1. At the appropriate time the combined Fleet will dispatch the necessary forces to the predetermined key points in anticipation of the inevitable opening of hostilities with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS within the first ten days of December.
2. In regard to the foregoing dispatching of units, strict security measures will be taken to guard against surprise enemy attacks.
3. The course of operations in the event hostilities are opened with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be predetermined in the annex.

Imperial General Headquarters,
 Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 2. (Summary)

5 November 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff HAGANO, Osami.
 TO: Commander in Chief of the China Area Fleet, KOGA (古賀).

1. The Commander in Chief of the China Area Fleet will hasten the preparations of various ships for operations in preparation for the inevitable opening of hostilities with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS within the first ten days of December.
2. The Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet will take stricter security measures to guard against surprise attacks from the American and also the British troops stationed in CHINA.

3. The course of operations in the event of war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be as set forth in the annex.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 3. (Summary)

5 November 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

TO: Commander in Chief of the KURE (呉) Naval Station TOYODA (豊田);
Commander in Chief of the SASEBO Naval Station SUNIYAMA (住山);
Commander in Chief of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station HIRATA (平田);
Commander in Chief of the MAIZURU Naval Station KOBAYASHI (小林);
Commanding Officer of the CHENHAI (鎮海) Secondary Naval Base
SAKAMOTO (坂本); Commanding Officer of the MAKO (馬公)
Secondary Naval Base YAMAMOTO (山本); Commanding Officer of the
OMINATO (大湊) Secondary Naval Base OKUMA (大熊); Commanding
Officer of the PORT ARTHUR (旅順) Secondary Naval Base UKITA
(浮田)

1. The commanders in chief of the various naval stations will carry out the defences outlined in the Imperial Naval Defense Plans of the fiscal year 1941 in preparation for the inevitable opening of hostilities with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS.

2. The commanders in chief of the various naval stations and the commanding officers of the various secondary naval bases will take stricter security measures and at the same time assist the Combined Fleet in carrying out its security measures.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 4. (Summary).

20 November 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

TO: Commander in Chief of the OSAKA (大坂) Guard District
KOBAYASHI (小林).

1. The Commander in Chief of the OSAKA Guard District will carry out the defense outlined in the Imperial Naval Defense Plan of the fiscal year 1941 in preparation for the inevitable opening of hostilities with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS.

2. The Commander in Chief of the OSAKA Guard District will take strict security measures to guard against surprise attacks from American, BRITISH and Netherlands troops and at the same time assist the Combined Fleet in its security measures.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No 5. (Summary)

21 November 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO (山本).

1. If the JAPAN-UNITED STATES negotiations are successful, the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet will immediately muster and recall the operation forces.

2. The use of the power mentioned in Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Staff Section Directive No 5 will be limited to such cases as the following: the infiltration of the naval power of the UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, or the NETHERLANDS within our territorial waters to conduct reconnaissance activities, or their approaching our territorial waters and threatening us, or the carrying out of positive activities so as to imperil us even if such activities be outside of our territorial waters.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No 6 (Summary)

21 November 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

TO: Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet KOGA (古賀).

1. The use of the power mentioned in Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Staff Section Directive No 6 will be limited to the event of an attack by the American, British or Netherlands troops.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No 7 (Summary)

21 November 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

TO: Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station TOYODA; Commander in Chief of the SASEBO Naval Station SUMIYAMA; Commander in Chief of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station HIRATA; Commander in Chief of the MAIZURU Naval Station KOBAYASHI; Commander in Chief of the CHENHAI, Guard District SAKIMOTO; Commander in Chief of the MLKO Guard District YAMAMOTO; Commander in Chief of the OMINATO Guard District OKUMA; Commander in Chief of the PORT ARTHUR Guard District UKITA; and Commander in Chief of the OSAKA Guard District KOBAYASHI.

1. The use of the military strength mentioned in Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Staff Section Directive No 7 will be limited to the event of ships or aircraft of the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN or the NETHERLANDS infiltrating into our territorial waters to carry out reconnaissance activities, and to the event of their approaching our territorial waters and imperilling us with their activities.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No 8 (Summary)

13 November 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO and Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet KOGA.

1. The Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet will have the Commander in Chief of the HAINAN (海南) Guard District carry out the laying of mines for the protection of the transport anchorage at SANYA (三亚).
2. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet will have the Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet dispatch one mine layer to SANYA in the middle of January and have it cooperate with the HAINAN Guard District Force in the laying of mines in the said area.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No 9. (Summary)

1 December 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

Operations of the Combined Fleet against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be based upon the Anti-UNITED STATES-GREAT BRITAIN-NETHERLANDS Imperial Naval Operation Plan outlined in the annex.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No 10 (Summary)

1 December 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

TO: Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet KOGA.

1. The Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet, while continuing operations against CHINA with the present over-all trend in mind, will carry out the following operations:

- (a) Cooperate with the Army and destroy the CHINA-based ships of the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS; annihilate their land based military strength, and at the same time take over the authority of the said units.

(b) With the start of hostilities cooperate with the 23rd Army and capture HONGKONG with the force which has the Second CHINA Expeditionary Fleet as its nucleus. At the same time annihilate the enemy military strength based there. The essentials of the coordinated Army-Navy operations depend upon the Army-Navy control agreement concerning the HONGKONG operation.

(c) Take strict security measures in the occupied CHINA Coast areas. Prevent enemy ships and aircraft from using these areas and at the same time protect the highways along the CHINA Coast.

(d) The Second CHINA Expeditionary Fleet will, with the aid of the MAKO Guard District Force, as quickly as possible cut the underwater cables between HONGKONG and MALAYA and between HONGKONG and SINGAPORE in the vicinity of HONGKONG.

(e) Guard the Army's sea transport convoys and their assembly points, and if necessary support the operations of the Combined Fleet and the Southern Army.

2. The protection of commerce will be based on the "Essentials of the Wartime Commerce Protection Plan of the Fiscal Year 1941."

3. Communication, will be based on the "Essentials of the Imperial Naval Wartime Communications Plans of the Fiscal Year 1941."

4. In regard to propaganda and strategem they will be outlined separately.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 11 (Summary)

1 December 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

TO: Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station TOYODA; Commander in Chief of the SASEBO Naval Station TAMIMOTO; Commander in Chief of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station HIRATA; Commander in Chief of the MAIZURU Naval Station KOBAYASHI; Commander in Chief of the CHENGHAI Guard District SAKAMOTO; Commander in Chief of the MAKO Guard District YAMAMOTO; Commander in Chief of the OMINATO Guard District OKUMA; Commander in Chief of the PORT ARTHUR Guard District UKITA; and Commander in Chief of the OSAKA Guard District KOBAYASHI.

1. The Commander in Chief of the MAKO Guard District will aid the Second CHINA Expeditionary Fleet in the cutting of the underwater cable in the vicinity of HONGKONG.

2. Commerce protection will be based on the "Essentials of the Wartime Commerce Protection Plan of the Fiscal Year 1941."

3. Communications will be based on the "Imperial Naval Wartime Communications Plan of the Fiscal Year 1941."

4. Central standard time will be used.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 12 (Summary)

21 November 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station TOYODA; Commander in Chief of the MAKO Guard District YAMAMOTO; and Commander in Chief of the OMINATO Guard District OKUMA.

The Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station and the Commander in Chief of the OMINATO Guard District will place the fighter units of the KURE Naval Air Unit and the OMINATO Naval Air Unit under the command of the Commander in Chief of the MAKO Guard District after 3 December for temporary operations.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No 13 (Summary)

26 November 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station TOYODA and Commander in Chief of the MAKO Guard District YAMAMOTO.

1. Ordinary mines will be laid in the BUNGO Channel (豊後) and in the vicinity of the PESCADORES Archipelago.

2. Special attention will be given to prevent mishaps to army transports and all other ships and in order to maintain secrecy concerning the foregoing operation.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 14 (Summary)

25 November 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO; Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station TOYODA; Commander in Chief of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station HIRATA; Commander in Chief of the MAIZURU Naval Station KOBAYASHI; and Commander in Chief of the SASEBO Naval Station TAJIMOTO.

The duties of the transports engaged in the transporting of billeting squads, defense squads, special munitions sections, special aircraft depots¹ and special fuel depots will be under the jurisdiction of the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet from the time it leaves the homeland until its return there.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 15. (Summary)

30 November 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

In the event of war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS, operations against maritime traffic will for some time to come be based upon and be carried out according to the plans in the annex.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 16. (Summary)

30 November 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet KOGA.

In the event of war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS, operations against commercial traffic will for some time to come be based upon and carried out according to the plans in the annex.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 17. (Summary)

30 November 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station TOYODA; Commander in Chief of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station HIRATA; Commander in Chief of the MAIZURU Naval Station KOBAYASHI; and Commander in Chief of the SASEBO Naval Station TANIMOTO.

In the event of war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS, measures against the shipping of the enemy countries and also neutral countries will for some time to come be based upon and carried out according to the plans in the annex.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 18. (Summary)

30 November 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the CHENGHAI Guard District SAKAMOTO; Commander in Chief of the MAKO Guard District YAMAMOTO; Commander in Chief of the CHIHATO Guard District OKUMA; Commander in Chief of the POBEI Guard District UKITA; and Commander in Chief of the OSAKA Guard District KOBAYASHI.

In the event of war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS, measures against the shipping of the enemy countries, and neutral countries will for some time to come be based upon and carried out according to the plans in the annex.

Imperial General Headquarters:
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 19. (Summary)

1 December 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO and Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet KOGA.

1. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet will cooperate in the operation of the CHINA Area Fleet as regards to the HONGKONG operation by using elements of his forces.
2. The aforementioned supporting fleet will take part in operations at the necessary time. It will be under the command of the Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet.

Imperial General Headquarters:
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 20. (Summary)

1 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO; Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet KOGA, and Commander in Chief of the MAKU Guard District YAMAMOTO.

In the event of American, British or Netherlands aircraft making repeated reconnaissances over our important bases of operations and our convoys, the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, the Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet, and the Commander in Chief of the MAKU Guard District must attack and shoot down these planes.

Imperial General Headquarters:
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 21. (Summary)

1 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO and Commander in Chief of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station HIRATA.

The Commander in Chief of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station will place the main portion of the land-based attack aircraft unit of the YOKOSUKA Naval Air Unit and also one element of the land-based attack aircraft unit of the KISARAZU (木更津) Naval Air Unit under the temporary command of the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet after 6 December in connection with operations.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 22. (Summary)

1 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO and Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet KOGA.

The propanganda and stratagems which accompany the war against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, and the NETHERLANDS will be based upon and carried out according to annex one and two.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 23. (Summary)

1 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station TOYODA; Commander in Chief of the MAIZURU Naval Station KOBAYASHI; Commander in Chief of the CHENHAI Guard District SAKAMOTO; and Commander in Chief of the OSAKA Guard District KOBAYASHI.

In connection with the laying of mines in the SHIMONOSEKI Straits (下関) area and the KII Channel (紀伊) area, the mine layer KYO-SHI (巨濟) will be under the command of the Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Base. The mine layer SUISHO (成生) will be under the command of the Commander in Chief of the OSAKA Guard District.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 24. (Summary)

2 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the TAKAHASHI (高橋) Third Fleet and Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station TANIMOTO.

The ships TSUBAME (燕) and YAMOME (鷗) will be under the command of the Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet after 3 December in connection with temporary operations.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 25. (Summary)

3 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

The essentials of the operations of the E (sic) advance units are as follows: The essentials of the operations of the E (sic) advance units will be as in plan A. However if the enemy situation or other unforeseen situations necessitate the use of plan B or other temporary measures, these measures will be carried out subsequent to the decision of a conference of the army and navy commanders in that area.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 26. (Summary)

4 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet KOGA.

The execution of the authority prescribed in Paragraph One, Imperial General Headquarters, Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 10 will begin at an opportune time with the cooperation of the army in that area, at the order of the Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet after the opening of hostilities by the CHINA Area Fleet.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 27. (Summary)

8 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station TOYODA; Commander in Chief of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station HIRATA; Commander in Chief of the SASEBO Naval Station TANIMOTO; Commander in Chief of the MAKO Guard District YAMAMOTO; Commander in Chief of the OMINATO Guard District OKUMA; and Commander in Chief of the OSAKA Guard District KOBAYASHI.

1. The Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station, the Commander in Chief of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station, the Commander in Chief of the SASEBO Naval Station, and the Commander in Chief of the OSAKA Guard District will carry out the laying of ordinary mines in the following areas: URAGA Channel (浦賀); mouth of the ISE Sea (伊勢); KII Channel (紀伊); SHIMONOSEKI Strait; SASEBO Military Port; Vicinity of NAGASAKI Harbor.
2. If they think it necessary, the Commander in Chief of the MAKO Guard District and the Commander in Chief of the OMINATO Guard District will lay ordinary mines in the following areas: Mouth of ATSUGISHI (厚岸) Bay; mouth of RIKUOKU (陸奥) Bay; KURILE Islands Area; entrance to the port of MURORAN (室蘭); outside the port of TAKAO (高雄); outside the port of KEELUNG (基隆).

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 28. (Summary)

12 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet Yamamoto; Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet KOGA; Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station TOYODA; Commander in Chief of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station HIRATA; Commander in Chief of the MAIZURU Naval Station KOBAYASHI; Commander in Chief of the SASEBO Naval Station TANIMOTO; Commander in Chief of the CHENHAI Guard District SAKAMOTO; Commander in Chief of the MAKO Guard District YAMAMOTO; Commander in Chief of the OMINATO Guard District OKUMA; Commander in Chief of the PORT ARTHUR Guard District UKITA; and Commander in Chief of the OSAKA Guard District KOBAYASHI.

The shipping of the following countries will be considered as the shipping of enemy countries and will be treated as such: PANAMA, NORWAY, DENMARK, GREECE, CUBA, HAITI, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, SALVADORE, NICARAGUA, COSTA RICA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 29. (Summary)

12 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO and Commander in Chief of the YOKOSUKA Naval Station HIRATA.

The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet is relieved of operational command of the main element of the land-based attack aircraft unit of the YOKOSUKA Naval Air Unit and one element of the land-based aircraft unit of the KISARASU Naval Air Unit.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 30. (Summary)

15 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station TOYODA; Commander in Chief of the CHENHAI Guard District SAKAMOTO:

The 32d Destroyer Division will be placed under the temporary command (estimated at two weeks) of the Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station for the mopping up of enemy submarines in the western part, the INLAND SEA and the BUNGO (豊後) Channel.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 31. (Summary)

19 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

1. The restrictions against the areas in which submarines may destroy maritime traffic without warning and also the restrictions dealing with the respect for neutral shipping are hereby rescinded.
2. The same also applies to the restrictions against the destruction of maritime traffic by aircraft.
3. However, notwithstanding the foregoing paragraphs, in the event that it is obvious that a ship belongs to SOVIET RUSSIA, the ship must not be sunk. Also the neutral status of ships of neutral countries (excluding those neutral countries that are in sympathy with the enemy) must be respected when they are in the vicinity of JAPAN, along the coast of Russian-occupied territories, or along the coast of SOUTH AMERICA, south of PERU.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 32. (Summary)

23 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet TAKAHASHI and Commander in Chief of the SASEBO Naval Station TANIMOTO.

The Commander in Chief of the Third Fleet is relieved of his command of the ships TSURAME and KAMONE.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 33. (Summary)

25 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station TOYODA and Commander in
Chief of the MAKO Guard District YAMAGUCHI.

The Commander in Chief of the MAKO Guard District is relieved of
operational command of the fighter aircraft unit of the KURE Naval Air Unit.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 34. (Summary)

26 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets YAMAGUCHI.

With one element of the air force of the southern units based in
FOCMA SA, attack and destroy the enemy's air strength and bases in the south
CHINA area as you see fit.

Imperial General Headquarters,
Navy Staff Section, Directive No. 35. (Summary)

31 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.
TO: Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station TOYODA, and Commander
in Chief of the CHENGHAI Guard District SAKAGUCHI.

The Commander in Chief of the KURE Naval Station is relieved of his
command of the 32d Destroyer Division and the ship MYOSHI.

Doc. No. 14016B

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF
 ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

I#159
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 Sent by SP

NOTE: Translation requested by COMNAVJAF

Imperial General Headquarters
 Navy Staff Section, Order No. 1.

5 November 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osamu
 By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

1. It is greatly feared that there will be a war with the UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, and the NETHERLANDS. Therefore, for the sake of existence and self-defense, the Empire must be completely prepared for military operations by the first part of December.

2. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet must carry out the required operational preparations.

3. Chief of the Naval General Staff will indicate the details.

Imperial General Headquarters
 Navy Staff Section, Order No. 2

5 November 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu (永野修身).
 By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet, KOGA.

1. It is feared that there will be a war with the UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, and HOLLAND. Therefore, for the sake of existence and self-defense, the Empire must be completely prepared for military operations by the first part of December.

2. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet will carry out the required operational preparations based on Order No. 1, Navy Staff Section, Imperial General Headquarters.

3. Besides continuing the operations in CHINA, the Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet must carry out required operational preparations.

4. The Chief of the Naval General Staff will indicate the details.

Imperial General Headquarters
 Navy Staff Section, Order No. 3

5 November 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu.
 By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander of the KURE Naval Base TOYODA.
 Commander of the SASEBO Naval Base SUMIYAMA.
 Commander of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base HIRATA.
 Commander of the MAIZURU Naval Base KOBAYASHI.
 Commander of the CHINKAI Naval Station SAKAMOTO.
 Commander of the MARO Naval Station YAMAMOTO.
 Commander of the OMINATO Naval Station OKUMA.
 Commander of the PORT ARTHUR Naval Station UKITA.

1. It is feared that there will be a war with the UNITED STATES, BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS. Therefore, for the sake of existence and self-defense, the Empire must be completely prepared for military operations by the first part of December.

2. Commanders in Chief of the Combined Fleet and the CHINA Area Fleet, respectively, must carry out the required military operational preparations in accordance with 1 and 2.

3. All Commanders of Naval bases and Naval stations must carry out required preparations for military operations.

4. The Chief of the Naval General Staff will indicate the details.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 4

20 November 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu (永野修身),
By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief, KCBAYASHI.

1. It is greatly feared that there will be a war with the UNITED STATES, BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS. Therefore, for existence and self-defense, the Empire must be completely prepared for military operation by the first part of December.

2. Commanders in Chief of the Combined Fleet, the CHINA Fleet, and the Commandants of Naval Bases, and guard districts must start carrying out preparations for military operations, based on numbers 1, 2, and 3.

3. The Commander in Chief of the CSAKA Guard District must carry out the required operational preparations.

4. The Chief of Naval General Staff will indicate the details.

Imperial General Staff
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 5

21 November 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu (永野修身),
By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO.

1. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet must have at the proper time, a force necessary to carry out the operation of leaving for the appointed place.

2. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet must be able to use our military power for defense, in case we should be challenged by the UNITED STATES, BRITAIN or the NETHERLANDS, while preparing operations.

3. The Chief of Naval General Staff will indicate the details.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 6

21 November 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu (永野修身),
By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of CHINA Area Fleet, KOGA.

1. According to Order Number 2, the Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet must be able to use our military power for defense in case of a challenge from the UNITED STATES, BRITAIN or the NETHERLANDS while under operational preparations.

2. Details in regard to this will be indicated by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 7

21 November 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osamu,
By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander of the KURE Naval Base TOYODA.
Commander of the SASEBO Naval Base SUMIYAMA.

Commander of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base HIRATA.
 Commander of the MAIZURU Naval Base KOBAYASHI.
 Commander of the OHINKAI Guard District SAKAMOTO.
 Commander of the IMAKO Guard District YAMAMOTO.
 Commander of the OHINATO Guard District OKUMA.
 Commander of the PORT ARTHUR Guard District UKITA.
 Commander of the OSAKA Guard District KOBAYASHI.

1. All commanders of naval stations and guard districts must be able to exercise our military power for defense in case of a challenge from the UNITED STATES, BRITAIN or the NETHERLANDS while under operational preparations, according to Orders number 3 and 4.

2. The Chief of Naval General Staff will indicate the details.

Imperial General Headquarters
 Navy Staff Section, Order No. 8

21 November 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu (永野修身),
 By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of KURE Naval Base, TOYODA, and Commander of the OSAKA Guard District, KOBAYASHI.

The Commander of the KURE Naval Base must indicate to the Commandant of the OSAKA Guard District the required matters concerning regulations for carrying out the following actions in the guard sector within his jurisdiction.

1. Patrolling with warships and aircraft.
2. Anti-aircraft and security watch.
3. Communications security.

Imperial General Headquarters
 Navy Staff Section, Order No. 9

1 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu.
 By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO.

1. The Empire will begin war with the UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, and the NETHERLANDS in the first part of December.

2. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet must destroy the existing enemy fleet and air-craft strength in eastern waters. At the same time, if the enemy fleet attacks, they must be annihilated.

3. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet will co-operate with the Commander in Chief of the Southern army in securing the occupation of important districts in the south and must invade important UNITED STATES, BRITISH, and DUTCH bases in East ASIA.

4. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets will co-operate in the operations of the CHINA Area Fleet as he sees fit.

5. Regarding the previous matters, the proper time for the operation of motivating our strength will be indicated in a later order.

6. The Chief of the Naval General Staff will indicate the details.

Imperial General Headquarters
 Navy Staff Section, Order No. 10.

1 December 1941

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu.
 By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet, KOGA.

1. The Empire will begin war with the UNITED STATES, BRITAIN and HOLLAND in the first part of December.

2. The Combined fleets will operate according to Order number 9.

3. The Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet will continue his operations in CHINA and co-operate with the army in invading HONGKONG. Moreover, he will co-operate in the operations of the Southern Army and the Combined Fleet and annihilate the military power of the UNITED STATES, BRITAIN, and HOLLAND in CHINA.

4. Regarding the previous matters, the proper time for the operation of motivating our strength will be indicated in a later order.

5. Details will be indicated by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Staff
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 11

1 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu.

By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander of the KURE Naval Base TOYODA.

" " " YOKOSUKA Naval Base HIRATA.

" " " MAIZURU " " KOBAYASHI.

" " " SASEBO " " TANIMOTO.

" " " CHINKAI Guard District SAKAMOTO.

" " " MAKO " " YAMAMOTO.

" " " OMINATO " " OKUMA.

" " " PORT ARTHUR Guard District UKITA.

" " " OSAKA " " KOBAYASHI.

1. The Empire will begin war with the UNITED STATES, BRITAIN and HOLLAND in the first part of December.

2. The Combined Fleet will operate under Order No. 9 and the CHINA Area Fleet will operate under Order No. 10.

3. Commandants of each naval base and guard district will strengthen the defense within the districts under their jurisdiction; they will protect sea communications and take charge of destroying enemy ships in that area. And at the same time they will co-operate in operations with the Combined Fleet.

4. Details will be indicated by the Chief of Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 12

2 December 1941.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu.

By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets YAMAMOTO.

1. After 8 December the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet will start operations according to Order number 9.

2. Timely operations must be started against HOLLAND, following those against the UNITED STATES and BRITAIN.

3. Details will be indicated by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 13

14 January 1942.

FROM: Chief of the Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu.

By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander of the CHINKAI Guard District, SAKAMOTO
Commander of the PORT ARTHUR Guard District, UKITA.

The commandant of the CHINKAI Guard District will take over the present operational duties of the PORT ARTHUR Guard District from 15 January 1942.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 14

7 February 1942.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osamu.

By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets, YAMAMOTO.

1. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet will co-operate with the Commander in Chief of the Southern Army and be able to carry out operations against PORTUGUESE TIMOR (チモール) for the sake of self-defense.

2. Details will be indicated by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 15

7 February 1942.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osamu.

By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets, YAMAMOTO.

1. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets will co-operate with the Southern Army in invading the strategic areas around the ANDAMAN (アンダマン) Islands.

2. Details will be indicated by the Chief of Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 16

10 April 1942.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osamu.

By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets YAMAMOTO.

Commander of the KURE Naval Base TOYODA.

" " " SASEBO " " TANIMOTO.

Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet KOGA.

" " " " " South-western Area Fleet TANAHASHI.

Commander of the CHINKAI Guard District SAKAMOTO.

" " " MUKO " " YAMAMOTO.

1. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets will see that the Commander in Chief of the South-Western Area Fleet protects the sea communications in the following areas, with the First Sea Escort Unit: 1st Security Area (Sea north of LAT. 34°N and east of LONG. 133° will be excluded); 2nd Security Area (Sea north of LAT. 27°N line will be excluded); 3rd Security Area.

2. The Commander of the KURE Naval Base; the Commander in Chief of CHINA Area Fleet; the Commander of SASEBO Naval Base; and the Commanders of the Guard District of CHINKAI and MUKO will co-operate in the aforementioned operations.

3. Details will be indicated by the Chief of Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 17

10 April 1942.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu.

By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets YAMAMOTO.
 Commander of the KURE Naval Base TOYODA.
 " " " YOKOSUKA Naval Base HIRATA.
 Commander of the Fourth Fleet INOUE.
 " " " OSAKA Guard District KOBAYASHI.

1. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets will have the commander of the Fourth Fleet protect the sea communications of the following areas with the Second Escort Unit: 1st Security Area (Sea north of LAT. 35°N and west of LONG. 133°E will be excluded.); 4th Security Area.

2. The Commanders of KURE and YOKOSUKA naval bases and the commander of the OSAKA Guard District will co-operate in the aforementioned operations.

3. Details will be indicated by the Chief of Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
 Navy Staff Section, Order No. 18

5 May 1942.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu.
 By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

1. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet will co-operate with the army and invade the strategic points in the Western parts of (AF) and (AO).

2. Details will be indicated by the Chief of Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
 Navy Staff Section, Order No. 19

18 May 1942.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu.
 By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets YAMAMOTO.

1. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets will co-operate with the commander of the 17th Army and invade strategic points in areas around NEW CALEDONIA, FIJI and SAMOA Islands and destroy important enemy bases.

2. Details will be indicated by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
 Navy Staff Section, Order No. 20

11 July 1942.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu.
 By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets YAMAMOTO.

The Commander in Chief's invasion of MIDWAY Island, based on Navy Order 18, and his invasion of the areas around NEW CALEDONIA, FIJI, and SAMOA Islands, based on Navy Order 19, are to be cancelled.

Imperial General Headquarters
 Navy Staff Section, Order No. 21

7 October 1942.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu.
 By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base, HIRATA; Commander of the OMINATO Guard District, KAWASE (河瀬).

The commander of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base will indicate to the Commander of the OMINATO Guard District his requirements concerning the organization for patrolling sea communications in the guard areas extending from the YOKOSUKA Naval Base District to the OMINATO Guard District.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 22

21 October 1942.

FROM: Chief of the Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu.
By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander of the KURE Naval Base TOYODA.
" " " YOKOSUKA " " HIRATA.
" " " OSAKA Guard District KOBAYASHI.

1. The commander of the KURE Naval Base will indicate to the commander of the OSAKA Guard District his requirements connected with the organization of the defense of the Inland Sea and the air defense of the guard area under the jurisdiction of the OSAKA Guard District.

2. The Commander in Chief of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base will inform the Commander of the OSAKA Guard District of the organizations for the protection of sea communications in the area extending from the YOKOSUKA Naval Base to the OSAKA Guard District.

3. Navy Staff Section Order No. 8 is cancelled.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 23

4 January 1943.

FROM: Chief of the Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu.
By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets, YAMAMOTO.

1. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets will assist the army in consolidating its position in the area of the SOLOMON Islands, and at the same time, he will invade and occupy strategic NEW GUINEA, and will be prepared for future operations in both areas.

2. The Commander in Chief of Combined Fleets, will co-operate with the army and carry out evacuation operations of troops which are now in GUADALCANAL Island.

3. Details will be indicated by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 24

30 January 1943.

FROM: Chief of the Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu.
By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet YOSHIDA (吉田).

1. The Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet will co-operate with the army and occupy KWANGCHOW-WAN (leased to FRANCE) with one unit.

2. The occupation must be executed with friendliness. However, if there is resistance from the FRENCH it must be possible to use force in self-defense.

3. Details will be indicated by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 25

9 September 1943

FROM: Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osamu.
By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet YOSHIDA.
 Commander of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base TOYODA.
 Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets KOGA.
 Commander of the KURE Naval Base NAGUMO (南雲).
 " " " MAIZURU " " SHINOMI (新見).
 " " " SASEBO " " KOMATSU.
 " " " CHINKAI Guard District GOTO (後藤).
 " " " OSAKA " " MAKIDA (牧田).
 " " " OMINATO " " INCUE.
 " " " TAKAO " " YAMAGATA (山縣).

1. ITALY shall be regarded as an enemy of JAPAN.
2. The commanders in Chief of the Combined Fleets and the CHINA Area Fleet, and the Commanders of the various naval bases, and guard districts will, in carrying out the aforementioned order, use force when necessary.
3. Detailed instructions will be issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff

Imperial General Headquarters
 Navy Staff Section, Order No. 26

15 November 1943.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osamu.

By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Sea Escort Unit OIKAWA (及川).
 " " " of the CHINA Area Fleet YOSHIDA.
 Commander of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base TOYODA.
 Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets KOGA.
 Commander of the KURE Naval Base NOMURA (野村).
 " " " MAIZURU " " SHINOMI.
 " " " SASEBO " " KOMATSU.
 " " " CHINKAI Guard District GOTO.
 " " " OSAKA " " MAKIDA.
 " " " OMINATO " " INCUE.
 " " " TAKAO " " YAMAGATA.

1. The Convoy Escort Commander in Chief will have the sea escort units under his control, as their primary mission, escort convoys in the sea lanes charged to them. In addition, he will direct all naval base and guard district (excluding the KAILAN (海南) guard district) commanders in matters concerning the maintenance of sea communications and anti-submarine operations.
 2. The Commanders in Chief of the Sea Escort Unit, CHINA Area Fleet, and the Combined Fleet will mutually co-operate in maintaining sea communications.
 3. Detailed instructions will be issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff
- Supplemental Order: Navy Orders Numbers 16 and 17 are herein rescinded.

Imperial General Headquarters
 Navy Staff Section, Order No. 27

1 February 1944.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, NAGANO, Osamu.

By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet KOGA; Commander First Air Fleet, TSUNODA (角田).

From mid-February, the 1st Air Fleet will move its main strength, in successive stages, to the South Sea and PHILIPPINE areas, and will co-operate in the operations of the Combined Fleet in these areas.

Detailed instructions will be issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
 Navy Staff Section, Order No. 28

15 June 1944.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, SHIMADA, Shigetaro (嶋田繁太郎).

By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base YOSHIDA; Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets, TOYODA.

The commander of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base will place the main strength of the YOKOSUKA Naval Air Unit under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 29.

29 June 1944.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff SHIMADA, Shigetaro.
By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Sea Escort Unit OIKAWA.
" " " " " Combined Fleets TOYODA.
" " " " " CHINA Area Fleet KONDO (近 藤).
" " " " " 2nd Air Fleet FUKUDOME (福 留).

From the early part of July, the 2nd Air Fleet will deploy its main strength along the western sector of the homeland, the south-western islands and FORMOSA. While accomplishing that operation as rapidly as possible, it will co-operate in the operations of the Combined Fleets, the CHINA Area Fleet and the Sea Escort Units which are in that area.

Detailed instructions will be issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 30

19 July 1944.

FROM: Chief of the Naval General Staff SHIMADA, Shigetaro.
By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base YOSHIDA.
" " " KURE " " SAWAMOTO (澤 本).
" " " SASEBO " " KOMATSU.

The commanders of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base, the KURE Naval Base, and the SASEBO Naval Base will, on 21 July, place the 302nd Naval Air Unit (bomber-interceptors, night fighters, and land-based reconnaissance planes), the fighter unit of the KURE Naval Air Unit, and the fighter unit of the SASEBO Naval Air Unit under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief, General Defense Command.

Detailed instructions will be issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 31.

24 July 1944.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, SHIMADA, Shigetaro.
By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets, TOYODA; Commander of the 2nd Air Fleet, FUKUDOME.

1. The commander of the 2nd Air Fleet will assume operational command of the 8th Air Division.
2. The 7th and 98th Air fighter squadrons will be placed under the command of the 2nd Air Fleet commander.
3. These transfers in command will be effected 25 July. Detailed instructions will be issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 32

24 July 1944.

FROM: Chief of the Naval General Staff, SHIMADA, Shigetaro.
By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets TOYODA; Commander of the 12th Air Fleet TOTSUKA (戸塚).

From 25 July, the Commander of the 12th Air Fleet will assume operational command of the 1st Air division, and, at the same time, will act under the command of the 5th Area Army Commander in action relative to local defense operations in the HOKKAIDO and KURILE Islands areas. Detailed instructions will be issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 33.

9 August 1944.

FROM: Chief of Naval General Staff, OIKAWA, Oshiro (及川古志郎).
By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets TOYODA.
" " " " " Sea Escort Unit NOMURA.
Commander of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base NOMURA.
" " " KURE " " SAWAMOTO.
" " " SASEBO " " KOMATSU.
Commander of the CHINSHAI Guard District GOTO.
" " " TAKAO " " FUKUDA (福田).
" " " OMINATO " " INOUE.
" " " OSAKA " " ONO (大野).
" " " MAIZURU Naval Base MAKIDA.

The commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleets will assume operational command of the sea escort units, and all related Naval base and Guard district units, in accordance with the following matters:

1. The particular command is important in carrying out Operation "victory" (捷号作战), as well as the preparations for that operation.

2. Operations which especially necessitate control in the maintenance of sea communications and anti-submarine operations.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No. 34

17 August 1944.

FROM: Chief of the Naval General Staff, OIKAWA, Oshiro.
By Imperial Command.

TO: Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet TOYODA; Commander of the 2nd Air Fleet FUKUDOME.

The 29th Fighter Squadron of the 8th Air Division will be removed from the operational command of the 2nd Air Fleet commander. This transfer in command will be effected 18 August.

Doc 14016B

UAS/HI

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 35.

21 August 1944.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff, OIKAWA, Koshiro. By Imperial Command.

To : Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets, TOYODA;
Commander-in-Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet, KONDO.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet will assume operational command of the CHINA Area Fleet, in accordance with the following matters:

1. The particularly important command of carrying out Operation "Victory" as well as the preparations for that operation.
2. Operations which especially necessitate control in the maintenance of sea communications and anti-submarine operations.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 36.

1 January 1945.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff OIKAWA, Koshiro. By Imperial Command.

To : Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets TOYODA.
" " " " " CHINA Area Fleet KONDO.
" " " " " Sea Escort Unit NOMURA.
Commander of the KURE Naval Base SAWAMOTO.
" " " YOKOSUKA " " TSUKAHARA (塚原)
Commander in Chief of the Southwest Area Fleet OKAWAUCHI (大川内)
" of the SASEBO Naval Base SUGIYAMA.
Commander in Chief of the 12th Air Fleet GOTO.
" " " of the 2nd CHINA Expeditionary Fleet FUKUSHIMA, (副島).
Commander of the MAIZURU Naval Base MAKIDA.
Commander in Chief of the 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet KAWASE.
Commander of the OMINATO Guard District INOUE.
Commander in Chief of the 1st Southern Expeditionary Fleet TAYUI (田結).
Commander of the TAKAO Guard District FUKUDA.
Commander in Chief of the 4th Southern Expeditionary Fleet YAMAGATA.
Commander of the OSAKA Guard District OKA (岡).
" " " CHINKAI " " OKA.
Commander in Chief of the 1st Escort Fleet KISHI (岸).
Commander of the KAINAN Guard District GOKA (伍賀).

1. The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets will assume operational command of the CHINA Area Fleet, Sea Escort Unit, and all Naval base and guard district units.

2. Detailed instructions will be issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Supplemental Order: Navy orders number 26, 33, and 35 are hereby rescinded.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 37.

20 January 1945.

From: Chief Naval General Staff OIKAWA, Koshiro. By Imperial Command.

To : The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets TOYODA.

The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets will secretly co-operate with the Army. Later operations must be carried out in accordance with annex outline of operations for the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets.

Chief of Naval General Staff will indicate the details.

Doc. 14016B

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 37 (Annex)

Outline of Operations for the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets

Outline of Operations for the Imperial Army and Navy

20 January 1945

Imperial Headquarters Navy Section.
Imperial Headquarters Army Department.

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 - A Operations in the mainland (TM JAPAN).
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I Operational policy.

Following the changes in the world situation, the Imperial Army and Navy must devote themselves to advancing, attacking, and annihilating the forces of the enemy, AMERICA. For the realization of our war aims we must defeat the enemy's fighting strength everywhere, insure the taking of important, strategic areas from the standpoint of carrying out the war, and we must break the enemy's will to fight.

II Outline of tactical command.

- A. The Army and Navy must expect increasing difficulties in the war situation and will endeavor to gain the initiative after crushing the advance of the enemy. This initiative will see a change in operation hereafter and indomitable interceptions will be conceived in strategic continental areas, which will be very important to the defense of the homeland. While crushing the enemy attack, if the situation permits, a counter-attack, especially with air power, will be organized with the main objective of establishing progressively independent action in operational procedure.
- B. The Army and Navy will carry out an attack on the main American forces advancing in the PHILIPPINES area; and after destroying them, they will initiate another blow on the enemy's fighting strength. In the meantime, while detaining the enemy's armed might, they will quickly urge operational preparations in other areas.
- C. The Army and Navy will complete their operational planning in order to destroy the main forces of the enemy which are advancing on strategic places near the homeland, and especially to destroy their superior strength in naval aircraft. Operations in the vicinity of the East CHINA Sea should be our main concern, and within a period of two to three months, operational preparations should be speedily strengthened there in order to counter the enemy advance on the PHILIPPINES and southern part of the main islands. Regarding the enemy advance on the OGASAWARA (小笠原) Archipelego (Including IWO(硫黄)). We are endeavoring to strengthen defense installations with all our power. We are also anticipating a part of the enemy's forces to attack the KURILE (千島) area, and we are considering assaulting the direct route to the enemy's base, depending upon the situation.

Doc 14016B (Outline tactical command) (Cont.)

D. The Army and Navy opposing the advance of the main American forces should consolidate the land, sea, and especially air strength, destroy the enemy's fighting strength, and crush his plans for an offensive. At the same time despite anticipated attacks by superior enemy aircraft in other areas, we must carry out our operations, mainly with the use of ground troops. We must focus our attention on dealing the enemy power a painful blow by catching their weak point on the high seas and destroying the attacking forces in transit. Later, we must intercept his supply where the enemy lands troops, and attain our ground objectives by a concentration of fire power.

E. The operational procedure against the main UNITED STATES forces in the CHINA section will be based upon the following.

1. The quick strengthening of the war situation on the CHINA Mainland; the defeat of the enemy, in particular the American forces attacking on the eastern and western flanks; the defeat of their plans; and the establishing of defense fortifications within the homeland.

2. The strengthening of fortifications in strategic areas along CHINA's southeastern coast; the securing of air superiority in operations in the vicinity of the East CHINA Sea and in the southwestern archipelago and FORMOSA.

3. It is too soon for advances to come upon JAPAN proper, but since powerful American forces and considerable advances in part of the continent are expected, operational preparations will be speedily strengthened in the SHANGHAI and CANTON areas.

4. To carry out the program of operational fortifications mentioned above, for western CHINA, crush the advancing foe and especially arrest enemy aircraft activity. Depending on the situation, we must endeavor to broaden our foothold in western CHINA, and while stabilizing the battle situation on the continent, we must defeat the enemy's plans for a landing on the southern coast of CHINA. For this reason we must gradually strengthen our dominant position and plan this strengthening according to Operation No. 1.

F. We must establish a self-supporting method of warfare in the southern sector and our principal aim must be to seize the enemy's source of power, his Naval Air bases, and to destroy his plans. The war situation demands that we crush the enemy's intensified drive, stabilize important fortified areas, and prepare operations for the entire force.

G. The present policy for operational preparations against RUSSIA is as before.

H. The Army and Navy will attack the bases for the steadily worsening enemy air assaults, and aside from pressing those plans, we must especially defend industry and communications in the homeland and establish order. We are expecting that enemy air bases will soon be established in the OGASAWARA (小笠原) islands, and together with preparing the use of interceptory counter measures, we must especially speed the strengthening of air defense measures for the cities in the homeland.

I. The following are the important points necessary for carrying out operations abroad.

1. The Japanese force will do away with the enemy interference and while carrying out, with all our might, operations designed to bring fuel and natural resources from the South, we must especially attempt to secure sea communications between CHINA, MANCHURIA and JAPAN.

2. The Imperial force will constantly harass and menace the long enemy operational line and will endeavor to inflict losses on their supplies.

3. In order to fulfil the operational objective, we must not only plan unflinching operations in this area, but also must endeavor to strengthen extensive preparations for certain victory, in an epoch-making manner.

4. We must endeavor to improve our tactics, organization, and arms, endeavor to use surprise attacks and special attacks which are an essential element of tactics, and we must gradually strengthen our relative, material strength, even when confronted by separation from our armed might.

Doc 14016B (Cont)

III The standard of tactical command in various areas.

A. Operations on the mainland.

1. The object of the operation for establishing a necessary defense area for the mainland is to crush the advance of the enemy and so to acquire ample security for the homeland.

2. To counteract enemy air attacks we plan to subjugate the air bases and mechanized units and strengthen the air defense system in the main land; and to continue to destroy enemy aircraft. A vigorous air defense system will be put into use mainly in the air, and for this the necessary air bases will be prepared; furthermore, the secret defense will be secured.

3. Concerning the air assault by the enemy from the sea against the transportation system in the homeland, transportation centers and harbor defenses will be strengthened.

4. For the defense in depth of the homeland, advanced bases will be placed in the southern KURILES, the OGASAWARA Islands, (including IWO (伊予) Island), OKINAWA, and the islands to the South, FORMOSA and in the vicinity of SHANGHAI. The enemy cannot be prevented from landing in some part of these outer defense positions, but we must plan to inflict the greatest possible losses on him and hinder the construction of his air bases.

5. If the enemy invades the homeland, South KOREA or the vicinity of SHANGHAI, both Army and Navy air power will be used to destroy him. If the enemy advances to the KURILES, OGASAWARA, SOUTH WEST Islands, or FORMOSA, the necessary fighting power will be put forth before the enemy attack and preparations will be made. The necessary concentration of air power will be utilized in annihilating this advance.

6. The operational preparations on the main land and KOREA (朝鮮) will be strengthened and renewed regardless of all difficulties, quickly and simply. Furthermore, they must be finished, in general, by the beginning of Autumn of this year, when the state of the front will be suitable for the intense enemy air attacks which are expected. The operational plans in case of enemy landings must be altered according to the change in circumstances and in the KANTO area, KYUSHU, KOREA, they must be prepared immediately.

B. CHINA Operations.

1. The operational aim on the continent of CHINA is to crush the advancing AMERICAN forces who are the main enemy, defeat their plans, and secure the defense of the continent. Accordingly, a plan will be drawn up to destroy the enemy concentration of power at CHUNGKING (重慶).

2. In order to check the advance of the American forces against the Japanese homeland, and to defeat their plan of reaching the CHINESE coast line, the strengthening of operational preparations on the South Eastern coast of CHINA will be quickly carried out. These operational preparations will consist mainly of the securing of air and sea basis and at the most, they should be completed in three months. Generally, in order to defeat the American forces' advance on the continent, the necessary operational preparations will be carried out as quickly as possible near HONGKONG and CANTON and in the defense area at the mouth of the YANGTZE River.

3. The enemy air power in CHINA will be defeated. To accomplish this the bases must first be destroyed. You will then advance from the air and also make persistent diversionary raids into the interior.

4. Apply incessant pressure against the power of CHUNGKING and not only take every opportunity to destroy their fighting power but also strike at the weak points in the enemy's strategic warfare and administration policies, and so bring about his destruction.

5. Ensure bases for military operations; and moreover, to facilitate the acquisition of resources for the important national defense, make quick plans for stability within the occupied areas, especially NORTH CHINA and the lower YANGTZE River region.

Doc 14016B CHINA Operations (Cont)

6. Endeavor to maintain the bases for operational liaison throughout CHINA and the INDO CHINA peninsula, and especially for movements of aircraft.

7. Maintain the communication artery between JAPAN, MANCHURIA, and CHINA, so as to facilitate the movements of troops within the inner lines.

C. Southern Operations.

1. The purpose of the operations in the Southern area is to attack the invading enemy, establish key points of resistance to the enemy's plans for re-capture, and endeavor to crush the advance of the enemy toward the continent (CHINA) and JAPAN. This will facilitate operations for the entire army.

2. In the PHILIPPINES, operations will be carried on stubbornly as before, to crush the advancing enemy and while feeling the intensity of the enemy's fighting strength, to hold the important positions in the north-central section (LUZON). Use all your power to obstruct the enemy's advance against the south western islands, FORMOSA and South-eastern CHINA.

3. Strengthen the defenses in the South CHINA Sea (南支那海), mainly in INDO-CHINA and BORNEO, against enemy attack. Crush the coordinated attack against the BURMA-MALAY area; prevent consolidation of the enemy in the INDIAN and PACIFIC Oceans; maintain liaison with the CHINA Mainland in all air and land operations.

4. The forces in INDO CHINA will organize their power as quickly as possible. When the enemy advances against French INDO CHINA, secure the important coastal regions, especially the harbors.

5. After securing the important areas, expect them to be attacked by the enemy. In accordance with this strategy, make a point of holding strategic places, particularly for resources and air naval bases. Apart from this it is our aim to maintain necessary and important areas and communications to ensure the self support and independent action of the army. The various communications and resources of the air and naval bases which, it is feared may fall into enemy hands, must necessarily be demolished and destroyed when the proper time comes.

6. Cooperate as far as possible to secure and forward to the mainland all necessary material for the war effort of JAPAN.

7. Endeavor to teach the populace of the Southern areas that JAPAN takes a sincere and invariable interest in them and is well qualified to carry on a different phase of the war.

D. South-Central PACIFIC Operations.

1. The purpose of operations in the South-central PACIFIC Area is to check the enemy's strength, to threaten the rear of the enemy, and at the same time, to obtain information about the flank and rear of the enemy line. This will pave the way for operations by the entire army.

2. According to circumstances, a part of the air and naval unit will reconnoiter over long distances and make surprise attacks on the enemy's flank and rear. In this way they will endeavour to threaten disorder and especially to damage the enemy's supply lines; and will shake the enemy both physically and morally.

3. The units located there will in general maintain their freedom of movement and freedom to attack with the forces. They now have, and will also act positively, to the best of their ability to ensure the success of the operations, and will cooperate in the preparation of the surprise attacks as mentioned in the previous paragraph.

Doc 14016E (Cont)

E. Sea Communications Security Operations.

1. The purpose of the operation for the preservation of communication by sea is to facilitate the continuance of war and operations by maintaining power of air and sea in the strategic parts of the Empire, particularly the KOREAN STRAITS, East CHINA Sea, and the JAPAN Sea and by protecting transportation from the South seas to the north, especially the transportation of raw material and fuel to JAPAN.

2. The protection of the sea communications is mainly intended for the defense of the main line of communications, by perfecting direct protection for transportation between the homeland and bases through use of air units and convoy escorts at the necessary time and place.

3. It is necessary to search for secret forward enemy bases in CHINA and on the French-INDO CHINA coast, to destroy them, and to plan for the perfecting of intelligence liaison.

Doc 14016B

Lt. Savage
RIB/S.T.A.Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 38.

8 April 1945.

From: Chief of the Naval General Staff, OIKAWA, Koshiro. By Imperial Command.

To : Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets, TOYODA.

Subject: Orders pertaining to the command of operations of land and sea forces in the area around KOREA, SAGHALIEN, and JAPAN proper (excluding the Southwestern islands).

a. The commanders of the 1st and 2nd armies, the 5th and 17th area armies, and the naval land-based operations unit will, in all land operations in those areas, be coordinated and directed by (your) command.

Land operations in naval bases and stations within these operational areas, as well as all army and navy units in such bases and stations, will be under the control of the commandants of the respective bases and guard districts, who, in turn, will be under the command of the supreme army commanders of the respective areas in which they are located. Furthermore, these said supreme army commanders, during operational preparations will issue instructions dealing with such things as land defense plans and their indoctrination and training.

b. Sea and underwater operations will be under the unified command of the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets. The defense of TSUSHIMA (對馬) will be under the command of the supreme naval commander of the Korean Straits area. The army units listed on the attached sheets will, in matters necessary to the control of operations, be under the command of the said supreme naval officer.

c. Detailed instructions will be issued by the Chief of Naval General Staff.

ATTACHED SHEET

Army units which will be under the command of the naval commander in connection with sea operations:

1. SHUTANI (宗谷) coastal defense.
2. TSUGARU (津輕) coastal defense.
3. TOKYO Bay coastal defense
4. YURA (由良) coastal defense
5. BUNYO (豊原) coastal defense
6. One unit of the SHIMOSEKI (下關) coastal defense.
7. One unit of the IKI (壹岐) coastal defense.
8. One unit of the FUJIAN (釜山) coastal defense.
9. MAIZURU (舞鶴) coastal defense.
10. The unit assigned to the coastal defense of ISE (伊勢) Bay entrance.
11. Unit assigned to the defense of KAGOSHIMA (鹿兒島) Bay entrance.

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Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order 39

25 April 1945.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff OIKAWA, Koshiro.
By Imperial Command.

To: Commander in Chief of the Navy and Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets, TOYODA.

1. The Commander in Chief of the Navy will assume the duties of the Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets according to orders number 37 and 38.
2. Navy Staff Section Order No. 36 is hereby rescinded.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 40

17 May 1945.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff OIKAWA, Koshiro.
By Imperial Command.

To: Commander in Chief of the Southeastern Area Fleet KUSAKA (草鹿);
Commander in Chief of the Southwestern Area Fleet OKAWAUCHI.

1. The Southeast Area Fleet will, in close co-operation with the army units present in the area consolidate the important sectors of the southeastern area, and at the same time, will endeavor to seize a favorable moment to launch a surprise counter-attack and absorb and suppress the enemy in the southeastern area.
2. The Southwest Area Fleet will, in close co-operation with army units present in the area, plan to hold out with its maximum strength placed in strategic sectors of the PHILIPPINES area and with surprise counter-attacks, endeavor to absorb and suppress the enemy in the PHILIPPINES area.
3. The Southeastern and Southwestern area Fleet Commanders will co-operate closely with the Chief of Naval General Staff to ensure that the operation proceed without trouble.
4. Detailed instructions will be issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 41

23 May 1945.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff OIKAWA, Koshiro.
By Imperial Command.

To: Commander in Chief of the Navy, TOYODA.

1. In the event of war with SOVIET RUSSIA, the Commander in Chief of the Navy will conduct operations against RUSSIA in accordance with the separate sheet entitled: "Immediate Naval operational plan in the event of hostilities with the SOVIET UNION during the war with AMERICA, BRITAIN and CHINA."
2. The Commander in Chief of the Navy will insure strict security against SOVIET RUSSIA, while keeping in mind the necessity for not allowing a cause for an affair with the SOVIETS to arise during operations against the UNITED STATES, ENGLAND and CHINA.

Navy Staff Section, Order No 41.
Annex

Subject: The immediate naval operational plans in the event of war with RUSSIA during the present war against AMERICA, BRITAIN, and CHINA.

1. In close co-operation with the army, all important sectors on all home islands south of HONSHU (including KOREA), together with MANCHURIA, HOKKAIDO, the KURILE islands, and the southern part of SACHALLEN, will be made secure.

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At the same time the KOREA, TSUGARU (津軽), and SOYA Straits will be closed to enemy shipping, while keeping open our major sea shipping routes. The foregoing will be effected in a manner that will not hamper our operations against our main enemy the UNITED STATES.

2. Although, as a general policy, air operations will be limited to air defense operations and no offensive operation should be undertaken, there may be an instance where a good opportunity arises and a surprise offensive operation will be in order.

3. Security against enemy raiding ships and smaller craft will be strictly maintained.

4. In areas that would make likely landing beaches, preparations to counter the landings will be made in close planning with the army commander in those areas.

5. Plans will be made to intercept communications between the UNITED STATES and SOVIET RUSSIA.

6. Operations against the UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, and CHINA will continue and will follow, generally, the present operations.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 42

20 June 1945.

From: Chief of the Naval General Staff, TOYODA, SOEBU (豊田副武).
By Imperial Command.

To: Commander in Chief of the Navy, OZAWA (小澤); Commander of the TAKAO Guard District SHIMA (志摩).

1. In regard to operations, the TAKAO Guard District Commander will be under the command of the 10th Area Army Commander.

2. This transfer of Command will be effected on 25 June 1945.

3. Detailed instructions will be issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 43

28 June 1945.

From: Chief of the Naval General Staff, TOYODA, SOEBU.
By Imperial Command.

To: Commander in Chief of the combined Fleets, OZAWA.

1. The following units are hereby released from your command and are returned to their original units:

- a. The 7th Naval Air Fleet.
- b. The 98th Naval Air Fleet.
- c. The 146th Air Battalion.

2. This transfer of command will be effected at 1200, 1 July 1945.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 44

11 August 1945.

From: Chief of the Naval General Staff TOYODA, SOEBU.
By Imperial Command.

To: Commander in chief of the Navy OZAWA.

1. The commander in chief of the Navy will, without regard for losses in the operation "decisive", force, strengthen, and increase the operations against our foremost foe, the UNITED STATES; and, seizing a good opportunity, endeavor to destroy the enemy task forces.

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2. Detailed instructions will be issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 45

11 August 1945.

From: Chief of the Naval General Staff, TOYODA, SOEBU.

By Imperial Command.

To: Commander in chief of the Navy, OZAWA.

1. RUSSIA, on 9 August 1945, declared war on JAPAN and has started offensive operations against the Empire.

2. The Commander in chief of the Navy will conduct operations as was set for in Navy Staff Section Order No 41.

3. Detailed instructions will be issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 46

11 August 1945.

From: Chief of the Naval General Staff TOYODA, SOEBU.

By Imperial Command.

To: Commander of the CHINKAI Guard District, YAMAGUCHI (山口).

1. From 11 August, the MOTOYAMA (元 山) Area Special Base unit will, in land operations, come under the command of the KWANGTUNG Army Commander.

2. Detailed instructions will be issued by the chief of Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 47

14 August 1945.

From: Chief of the Naval General Staff, TOYODA, SOEBU.

By Imperial Command.

To: Commander in chief of the Navy, OZAWA.

1. Until receipt of further orders, you will not undertake any offensive operations against the UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, RUSSIA, or CHINA.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 48

16 August 1945.

From: Chief of the Naval General Staff, TOYODA, SOEBU.

By Imperial Command.

To: Commander in chief of the Southeastern Area Fleet KUSAKA.
" " " " " Southwestern " " OKAWAUCHI.
" " " " " Navy OZAWA.

1. All Army and Navy units under your command will cease hostile activities immediately and while negotiations for the termination of the war are being carried on, no battle action will be conducted, except in situations wherein enemy attack necessitates it in self defense.

2. Each of the aforementioned Commanders will immediately report the time and date of the termination of battle action, as soon as the said termination is effected.

3. Detailed instructions will be issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

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Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 49

17 August 1945.

From: Chief of the Naval General Staff, TOKODA, SOEBU.
By Imperial Command.

To: Commander of the Southeastern Area Fleet, KUSAKA; Commander of the Southwestern Area Fleet, OKAWAUCHI; Commander in chief of the Navy OZAWA.

1. Commanders of the Southeastern and the Southwestern Area Fleets and the Commander in chief of the Navy will give orders for the complete cessation of hostilities the moment orders are received from the high command.

2. Each of the above named commanders will have all rations and provisions assembled in a suitable area and will hereafter make arrangements for their management.

3. Details are to be indicated by the chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 50

19 August 1945.

From: Chief of the Naval General Staff, TOKODA, SOEBU.
By Imperial Command.

To: Commander of Southeastern Area Fleet, KUSAKA; Commander of Southwestern Area Fleet, OKAWAUCHI; Commander in chief of the Navy, OZAWA; Commander in chief of the 10th Area Fleet, FUKADOME; Commander of the TAKAO Guard District, SHIMA.

1. The orders for the complete cessation of hostilities cited in Navy Staff Section Order No 49 will take effect for all forces under the command of the Chief of the Naval General Staff on 22 August 1945 at 1200 hours.

2. At the time stated in the foregoing instructions, the Chief of the Naval General Staff, as well as all his subordinates, will dispense with further combat duties.

3. After the forthcoming Imperial Edict has been officially announced those who are classified as Japanese navy personnel and those who are classified as military attaches will be regarded as prisoners of war of the enemy forces. Also, all arms and munitions will be surrendered in compliance with the enemy orders. All those who make any final rash attempts will be severely punished. We must be patient and persevering if we are to have any high hopes for the future of our country.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 51

21 August 1945.

From: Chief of the Naval General Staff, TOKODA, SOEBU.
By Imperial Command.

To: Commander in chief of the Navy, OZAWA.

1. The chief of the Naval General Staff places the following restrictions upon his subordinates regarding the utilization of aircraft:

a. After 1200, 22 August all planes, excepting those being utilized for transport purposes, will be grounded.

b. After 1800, 24 August all aircraft are grounded.

2. Detailed matters regarding foregoing instructions will be announced by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

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Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 52

21 August 1945.

From: Chief of the Naval General Staff, TOYODA, SOBBU.
By Imperial Command.To: Commander in chief of the Combined Fleets OZAWA.
Commander of the SASEBO Naval Base SUGIYAMA.
" " " YOKOSUKA Naval Base TOTSUKA.
Commander in chief of the 3rd Air Fleet TERAOKA (寺岡).
" " " " " 6th Fleet DAIGO (戴島).
" " " " " 10th Air Fleet MAEDA.
" " " " " 5th " " KUSAKA.

1. The allied forces will begin to occupy ATSUGI (夏木) airfield, YOKOSUKA Naval base, and SHIKAYA (鹿屋) area after 26 August.

2. Imperial headquarters plans to permit the occupying forces to enter peacefully, and it intends to peacefully maintain without remorse those areas where the allied forces are to land. With this, it hopes that its sincerity will be apparent to everyone.

3. The commander in chief of the combined Fleets, the commander of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base, the Commander of the 3rd Air Fleet, the Commander of the 6th Fleet, and the Commander of the 10th Air Fleet will see to it that their subordinates presently located (on separate map) at A area surrender their arms at 1800, 27 August; those forces located at ATSUGI and vicinity will surrender their arms at 1800, 24 August. In addition, these same forces must transfer themselves to areas outside of AREA A and, as much as possible, outside of AREA B (separate map).

Those units which are unable to move will, after surrendering their arms, avoid contact with the allied forces and segregate themselves in a single area.

4. The Commander of the SASEBO Naval Base and the Commander of the 5th Air Fleet will see that their subordinates stationed in areas specified on the separate map surrender their arms, and will, by 1800, 30 August, move themselves from the present area to outside areas as stated in the foregoing paragraph.

5. If, after the forces have been moved as stated in the previous two paragraphs, the supervision of arms, munitions, and military installations necessitates the utilization of troops, a very small force of men will be given military police duties.

6. At 1800, 24 August, all vessels not already at sea will be halted.

7. All details will be announced by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 53

22 August 1945.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff, TOYODA, SOBBU.
By Imperial Command.To: Commander in chief of the Combined Fleets OZAWA.
" of the SASEBO Naval Base SUGIYAMA.
" " " YOKOSUKA Naval Base TOTSUKA.
" " " MAIZURU " " TAYUI.
" " " KURE " " KANAZAWA (金澤).
" " " OSAKA Guard District OKA.
" in chief of the 4th Fleet HARA (原).
" of the OMINATO Guard District UGAKI (宇垣).
" " " CHINKAI " " YAMAGUCHI.
" in chief of the 3rd Air Fleet TERAOKA.
" " " " " 6th Fleet DAIGO.
" " " " " 10th Air Fleet MAEDA.
" " " " " 77th Fleet OMORI (大森).
" " " " " 5th Air Fleet KUSAKA.

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1. The Imperial General Headquarters plans to surrender voluntarily its military equipment, thereby avoiding needless friction with the incoming allied forces; it hopes in this way to show its sincerity.

2. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets; the Commanders of the Naval Bases of SASEBO, YOKOSUKA, MAISURU, and KURE; the Commanders of the OCAWA, OMINATO, CHINKAI Guard Districts; the Commanders of the 3rd, 5th, and 10th Div. Fleets; the Commanders of the 4th, 6th, and 7th Fleets; and the Commander of the 1st Escort Fleet will, in accordance with the already announced order, relinquish control over their entire forces and voluntarily surrender all military equipment.

3. The commanders of all units, as stated in the foregoing paragraphs, will after the peaceful surrender of equipment, take proper measures, in the event the supervision of arms, munitions, and military setup necessitates the utilization of troops, to detail a small force of men to perform military police duties. The force shall be known as the naval security unit.

4. Details will be announced by the naval chief of the General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 54

22 August 1945.

From: Chief of the Naval General Staff, TOYODA, SOEBU.
By Imperial Command.

To: Commander of Southeastern Area Fleet, KUSAKA; Commander of Southwestern Area Fleet, OKAWAUCHI; Commander of the CHINA Area Fleet, FUKUDA.

1. The Commanders of the Southeastern Area, Southwestern Area, and CHINA Area Fleets will order the complete cessation of hostilities.

2. The surrender of munitions and arms and the carrying out of further requirements will be undertaken to the utmost of each man's ability. Their enforcement will be undertaken with the close co-operation of the army, and, after diplomatic negotiation, with the high command of the conquering allied forces.

3. Orders pertaining to the withdrawal of troops are forthcoming.

4. Details will be announced by the chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 55

24 August 1945.

From: Chief of the Naval General Staff, TOYODA, SOEBU.
By Imperial Command.

To: Commander in chief of Combined Fleets, OZAWA.

1. The Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleets, regardless of orders received in Navy Staff Section Order No 51, will keep one group of aircraft for use in the event of some important liaison matters, even after the termination of hostilities.

2. Details will be announced by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 56

27 August 1945.

From: Chief of the Naval General Staff, TOYODA, SOEBU.
By Imperial Command.

To: Commander in chief of the Southeastern Area Fleet KUSAKA.
" " " " " Southwestern Area Fleet OKAWAUCHI.
" " " " " Combined Fleets OZAWA.
" " " " " CHINA Area Fleet FUKUDA.
" " " " " 10th Area Fleet FUKUDOME.
" of the TAKAO Guard District SHIMA.

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1. The Commanders of the Southeastern Area Fleet, Southwestern Area Fleet, the CHINA Area Fleet, the 10th Area Fleet, and the TAKAO Guard District will report the hour of the complete cessation of hostilities.

After the complete cessation of hostilities, the combat orders for each commander and his unit are rescinded.

2. The Commanders of the 10th Area Fleet and the TAKAO Guard District will, after the termination of hostilities, come directly under the control of the Commanders of the Southern and 10th Area Armies.

3. Details will be announced by the chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial General Headquarters
Navy Staff Section, Order No 57

2 September 1945.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff TOYODA, SOEBO.
By Imperial Command.

To: Minister of the Navy YONAI (内).
Chief of Naval General Staff TOYODA.
Commander in Chief of the Southeastern Area Fleet KUSAKA.
" " " " " Southwestern " " OKAWAUCHI.
" " " " " Combined Fleets OZAWA.
Commander of the SASEBO Naval Base SUGIYAMA.
Commander in chief of the 8th Fleet SANEJIMA (坂 島).
Commander of the YOKOSUKA Naval Base KOTSUKA.
Commander of the MAIZURU Naval Base HAYUI.
Commander in chief of the CHINA Area Fleet FURUDA.
Commander of the KURE Naval Base KANAZAWA.
Commander of the OSAKI Guard District OYA.
Commander in chief of the 4th Fleet HARA.
" " " " " 10th Area Fleet FURUDOME.
" " " " " of the OMIYA Guard District OGAKI.
" " " " " CHINKAI " " YAMAGUCHI.
Commander in chief of the 2nd Southern Expeditionary Fleet SHIBATA (柴 田).
" " " " " 6th Fleet DAIGO.
" " " " " 10th Air Fleet MAEDA.
" " " " " 7th Fleet OMORI.
" " " " " 5th Air Fleet KUSAKA.
" " " " " 3rd " " YAMADA.
" " " " " 2nd CHINA Expeditionary Fleet KUBO (久 保).
" " " " " of the KAITAN Guard District GOKA.

1. Henceforth, all notifications pertaining to the government and Imperial General Headquarters, directed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, will be proclaimed by the Chief of the Naval General Staff and Navy Minister.

2. All matters pertaining to the navy will be proclaimed by the chief of the Naval General Staff and the Navy Minister.

*DC/R
file*

May 9, 1946

Dear Mr. Richardson:

Reference is made to Mr. Masten's oral inquiry regarding the date of receipt in Washington of Ambassador Grew's letter to President Roosevelt dated September 22, 1941, which was transmitted by the President to the State Department on October 29, 1941. A careful search has been made, but no information has been found in the Department's records relative to this question. However, for your information in this connection the Department's records show that several mail despatches from Tokyo bearing the dates September 3, September 15 and September 20, 1941 were received in the Department's Division of Communications and Records on October 27, 1941.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert S. Marks
Assistant to the Under Secretary

The Honorable
Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.

711.94/5-946

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A true copy of the signed original

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Confidential File

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DC-R

May 16, 1946

My dear Mr. Barkley:

Reference is made to your letter of April 5, 1946 enclosing a set of 169 interrogatories which the Committee desired me to consider and make such reply thereto as my recollection of the facts might warrant.

In pursuance of your request I enclose my replies to the interrogatories. I feel that most of the matters covered in my replies have already been set forth in the record of the Department of State or in my prepared statement to the Committee. I trust that my replies satisfactorily dispose of the questions concerning which the Committee has inquired.

Sincerely yours,

CordeLL Hall

Enclosure:

Replies to
interrogatories

A true copy of
the signed original
me

The Honorable
Alben W. Barkley, Chairman,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.

SA/B / JMB

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Date	<i>16</i>
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REPLIES TO INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY THE
HONORABLE HOMER FERGUSON, MEMBER OF THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1. Question:

Is it correct to say, Mr. Secretary, that the first specific point in the ten points of the American note of November 26, 1941, proposed that Japan enter a seven-power non-aggression compact? (See For. Rel. Vol. 2, 769)

Answer:

In this Government's outline of a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan communicated to the Japanese Government on November 26 there were listed in Section 2 under 10 headings steps to be taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan of which the first heading reads as follows:

"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States."

2. Question:

Is it correct to say that, in your conversation with the Japanese Ambassadors on November 22, 1941, you broached the matter of proposing to Japan SOMETIME a broad comprehensive plan involving the collaboration of other nations? (For. Rel. Vol. 2, 761)

Answer:

On November 22, 1941 I told the Japanese Ambassador that I had in mind taking up with him sometime a general and comprehensive program which we had been engaged in developing and which involved collaboration of other countries. Our

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broad approach was toward a world objective, not a local, regional or bilateral objective. While the initial step was bilateral as between the Japanese and ourselves, what we were trying to do was to get Japan to adopt a peaceful program on world-wide lines. Had we been successful Japan would have been able to satisfy all her needs by taking advantage of the principles, for example, of the Nine-Power agreement and the Good Neighbor policy. We envisaged, of course, the assumption by Japan of obligations along with the acquisition by her of rights.

3. Question:

Did the Japanese Ambassadors reply that Japan was interested in a bilateral agreement with the United States? (For. Rel. Vol. 2, 762)

Answer:

The Japanese Ambassador said that the Japanese had in mind negotiating a bilateral agreement with us to which other powers could subsequently give their adherence. The Japanese, throughout the conversations, had shown apparently little thought for the rights and interests of countries in the Pacific area other than Japan and the United States. From the outset of the conversations I had endeavored to make it clear to the Japanese that this Government could not join with Japan in disposing of questions affecting the rights and interests of the other concerned powers without consulting them prior to entering into formal negotiations on these matters with the Japanese. There could not have been, however, any doubt in the mind of the Japanese Ambassador that our conversations looked to our entering into a bilateral agreement with Japan as our immediate objective even though we held to the view that other powers should be consulted.

4. Question:

Did the Japanese Ambassadors say to you, after reading the note of November 26th and the Oral Statement of the 26th, that the American proposal was unacceptable and was to be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end? (For. Rel. Vol. 2, 766)

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Answer:

After the Japanese Ambassadors had read the documents handed to them on November 26 containing an outline of the proposed basis of an agreement between the United States and Japan and an explanatory oral statement, Mr. Kurusu said that he felt that our response to their proposal could be interpreted as tantamount to meaning the end. Neither Mr. Kurusu nor Ambassador Nomura stated that the American proposal was unacceptable.

5. Question:

Is it correct to say that the position of the State Department has been that the American note of the 26th was a necessary restatement of American policy as the only logical and practical means by which peaceful conditions might obtain in the Pacific Ocean? (For. Rel. 767, Et. Al.)

Answer:

In answer to this question, I refer to my statement before the Joint Committee on November 19, 1945 in which I said:

"Our Government's proposal was offered for the consideration of the Japanese Government as one practical example of a program to be worked out. It did not rule out other practical examples which either Government was free to offer."

In that same statement I also said:

"The Japanese were spreading propaganda to the effect that they were being encircled. On the one hand we were faced by this charge and on the other by one that we were preparing to pursue a policy of appeasing Japan. In view of the resulting confusion, it seemed important to restate the fundamentals."

That confusion prevailed both in Japan and the United States. We knew from Japanese acts and utterances that the Japanese proposal of November 20 was their last word and it was obviously desirable that

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the record of the American Government's position throughout the conversations be made crystal clear. Therefore, the proposals of November 26 were directed toward making our position utterly clear and toward keeping the door open for further conversations notwithstanding the ultimative character of the Japanese proposal of November 20. The principles set forth in our November 26 proposal were in all important respects essentially the same principles we had been proposing to the Japanese right along. Had the Japanese had the least disposition to pursue a peaceful course, a more desirable program could not have been offered to them. All Japan had to do to take advantage of our offer was to abandon her course of aggression and to adopt the accepted rules of peaceful international conduct. In the explanatory statement which accompanied the proposal there was reviewed briefly the objective sought in the exploratory conversations, namely, that of arriving at an agreement regarding Pacific questions on a basis of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations.

6. Question:

It was stated, was it not, by the American Government to Japan in the Note of the 26th that the Japanese proposal of November 20 fell short of the objectives desired? (For. Rel. Vol 2, 767)

Answer:

In this Government's communication to the Japanese Government of November 26 it was stated, "The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned." The Japanese asked

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in their proposal of November 20 that the United States agree to cease giving aid to China; that the United States desist from augmenting its military forces in the western Pacific; that the United States help Japan obtain products of the Netherlands East Indies; that the United States undertake to resume commercial relations with Japan; that the United States undertake to supply to Japan "a required quantity of oil"; while Japan on her part would be free to continue her military operations in and against China and to keep her troops in Indochina and to attack the Soviet Union, would have her funds unfrozen, would be able to buy with comparative freedom from the United States, would be assured adequate supplies of oil, and would be under no obligation to remove her troops from Indochina until she should have completed her conquest of China or conditions of peace satisfactory to her had been established "in the Pacific area".

Before and after presenting that proposal, Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu talked emphatically about the urgency of the situation and intimated vigorously that this was Japan's last word and if an agreement along those lines was not quickly concluded ensuing developments might be most unfortunate.

What Japan asked in that proposal would, had it been agreed to by the United States, have meant condonement by the United States of Japan's past aggressions, assent by the United States to unlimited courses of conquest by Japan in the future, abandonment by the United States of its whole past position in regard to the most essential principles of its foreign policy in general, betrayal by the United States of China, and acceptance by the United States of a position as a silent partner aiding and abetting Japan in her effort to create a Japanese hegemony in and over the western Pacific and eastern Asia.

Acceptance by us of the Japanese proposal of November 20 would have placed Japan in a commanding position in her movement to acquire control of the entire western Pacific area; would have destroyed our chances of asserting and maintaining our rights and interests in the Pacific; and in its final

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analysis would have meant a most serious threat to our national security. She also clung to her vantage point in Indochina which threatened the security of the countries to the south and menaced vital trade routes. Their conditional offer to withdraw troops from southern Indochina to northern Indochina was meaningless as they could have brought those troops back to southern Indochina within a day or two, and furthermore they placed no limit on the number of troops they might continue to send there.

7. Question:

Did our Government reject the Japanese note of November 20, 1941, which you described as an ultimatum?

Answer:

The Japanese proposal of November 20, which I have described in response to question no. 6, was of so preposterous a character that no responsible American official could ever have dreamed of accepting it. Nevertheless, I felt that I should not be violent in my comment to the Japanese in regard to it so as to avoid giving them any pretext to walk out on the conversations.

Therefore, despite the ultimative character of the Japanese proposal, and despite the slim possibility that Japan would elect to continue the conversations, we proposed to keep alive that possibility while restating our fundamental principles. The Army and Navy were asking for more time, as they had for months past, and I had that situation very much at heart. Moreover, we wanted to show our interest in peace up to the last split second and at the same time to expose the bad faith of the Japanese. Everything we said or did was with those considerations in mind. In drawing up a full restatement of our principles, we gave exemplifications of their application to the situation in the Pacific area, and we invited the Japanese to continue the conversations with that statement as a basis.

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8. Question:

It was stated, was it not that, therefore, the United States was setting forth to Japan a broad and comprehensive program under which the desired objectives could be attained? (For. Rel. Vol. 2, 767)

Answer:

In this Government's oral statement to the Japanese Government of November 26 it was stated, "... the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations."

As I said in my statement before the Joint Committee of November 19, 1945, in reviewing what I had told press correspondents on the day following the date of delivery to the Japanese of the communication under reference, "I found there had been so much confusion and so many collateral matters brought in along with high Japanese officials in Tokyo proclaiming their old doctrines of force, that I thought it important to bring the situation to a clear perspective. So I had recounted and restated the fundamental principles and undertook to make application of them to a number of specific conditions such as would logically go into a broad basic peaceful settlement in the Pacific area.

"There had been every kind of suggestion made as we had gone along in the conversations. I said that I had considered everything in the way of suggestions from the point of view whether it would facilitate, keep alive, and if possible carry forward conversations looking toward a general agreement, all the while naturally preserving the fullest integrity of every principle for which we stood. I had sought to examine everything possible but always to omit consideration of any proposal that would contemplate the stoppage of the conversations and search for a general agreement for peace."

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9. Question:

When did you prepare the message which President Roosevelt was to send to the Japanese Emperor the night of December 6, 1941?

Answer:

The idea of a message from the President to the Emperor had been under consideration by the President and myself as far back as the middle of October, as is clear from the record before the Committee. The message as actually sent was prepared in final form on December 6, and included contributions made in the White House as well as material contained in drafts prepared in the State Department during preceding weeks.

10. Question:

For the purpose of a question I shall quote from the President's message to the Emperor: "Thus a withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Indo-China would result in the assurance of peace throughout the whole of the South Pacific area" - - end of quotation and I ask: Is it correct to say that the withdrawal of the Japanese from Indochina, under a neutral guarantee of the integrity of Indo-China by the interested parties, was the single specific proposal of the message to the Emperor, sent by President Roosevelt on December 6th? And fulfillment of it would have assured peace in the southwest Pacific, in the opinion of the President?

Answer:

In the President's message to the Japanese Emperor the President stated that, "both Japan and the United States should agree to eliminate any form of military threat." The President was seeking to make a broad appeal. The withdrawal by Japan of its armed forces from Indochina would have assured the creation of an atmosphere which would have rendered possible resumption of conversations looking to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Conversely, Japan's refusal to accept the President's

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proposal would expose her real purpose. Indochina was the logical and by far the most feasible jumping-off place for a Japanese movement to the south. The President by his proposal for the neutralization of Indochina on July 24 had already strongly tested Japan's purposes in her continued movement south by proposing that she get out of Indochina--and the Japanese Government by its clear-cut refusal betrayed its military designs on the South Sea area. This proposal also served to expose Japan's intentions not to consider peaceful arrangements with us unless we were prepared to make all the concessions. The President was now making an additional last-minute appeal. He, of course, knew that the huge Japanese armada had already left the jumping-off place in Indochina which from our viewpoint meant that the danger of attack could not have been more imminent. Nevertheless, the President believed that he should not neglect even the slim chance that an additional last-minute appeal might save the situation. It also served to make clear to the American people and to the world our interest in maintaining peace up to the very last minute.

11. Question:

Was there anything in the December 6th message proposing a Japanese withdrawal from China -- a pledge not to interfere should the United States be drawn into war by Germany -- or a proposal for Japan's adherence to a seven-power non-aggression pact?

Answer:

Inasmuch as the November 26 proposal of this Government was already before the Japanese, the appeal to the Emperor was made specifically applicable to the critical situation created by the Japanese military movement from and within Indochina which we had very much in our minds. Indochina was the seat of the most acute and imminent danger at that moment. The other subjects at issue with Japan mentioned in your question had been thrashed out over and over again during six months of conversations.

Throughout the conversations we had vainly

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urged on Japan that she abandon conquest, including the conquest of China. We also had asked the Japanese to give up her alliance with Germany and Italy which was directed against us, but they clung to that alliance as they clung to their very life. We had fully demonstrated the utter impossibility of getting Japan to budge on these questions.

Questions 12, 13 and 38 are grouped in a single answer.

12. Question:

The Intercepted Diplomatic Messages of the Japanese show that on November 26 Nomura and Kurusu requested permission of Tokyo to request that President Roosevelt wire to a Japanese official, Premier Tojo, I presume, and ask that peace be maintained for the sake of posterity and that Japan replied with a cordial message, were you aware, on November 29, that this document was in the possession of the American Government as decoded on November 28? (Intercepted messages, Exhibit 1, page 180)

13. Question:

The Intercepted Japanese Messages show that, in November 28, the Japanese Ambassadors received from Tokyo a message that was secretly intercepted and decoded by the American Government on the same day, and which said: I quote: "I contacted the man you told me to in your #1180 and he said that under present circumstances what you suggest is entirely unsuitable" end quotation: were you aware of the existence of this document on November 30? (cf. Intercepted messages, Exhibit 1, Page 195, last two sentences of #844)

38. Question:

You saw the intercepted Japanese messages, did you not?

Answer:

I was at all times intensely interested in the contents of the intercepts. I instructed my

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secretaries to show me promptly any and all intercepts of material value and importance to the State Department. This, it seemed to me, they did. So far as I was able to judge, all of such intercepts were shown to me. The State Department was on a 24-hour basis and messages received in the Department after office hours in whatever form when important were delivered to me at my home. At this late date, in 1946, I cannot be certain whether I received and read at the time all important intercepts or whether it might be possible that some of those I have read since that time or recently are confused in my mind with what I read at the time. I kept no records as to when particular messages reached me.

Questions 14, 82 and 83 are grouped in a single answer.

14. Question:

It is proved by the Intercepted Messages, is it not, that Japan on November 28 had rejected the proposition of an exchange of peace messages between the heads of their respective states? (#844, Page 195, Exhibit 1.)

82. Question:

Will you please look at Message Number 844, Page 195, Exhibit 1, and state as to whether or not that message relates to a message from the President to the Emperor?

83. Question:

If your answer to the last question is "yes", then will you explain why the message was sent on the night of the 6th of December, 1941, when you and the President had knowledge of the message of Exhibit 1, Message 844, Page 195?

Answer:

The intercepted message cited (no. 844, Exhibit 1, page 195) seems to refer to a suggestion by the Japanese Ambassador for a Japanese initiative in proposing to this Government an exchange of messages between the President and a Japanese official, presumably the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Japanese Foreign Minister, after consulting with the

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Navy Minister, apparently did not approve of that suggestion. In the situation in which we found ourselves of grabbing at straws to save the peace, this Government believed that no possibility should be overlooked even at the last minute to appeal for peace. In any case, there was no reason why the President should not send a message to the Emperor regardless of the attitude of any particular subordinate Japanese official.

15. Question:

On November 29, 1941, you rejected, did you not, as useless a suggestion of the Australian Minister that he try to mediate through Kurusu?

Answer:

On November 29, 1941, the Australian Minister called on me and brought up the question of his conferring with the Japanese representative, Mr. Kurusu, and suggesting to Kurusu that Australia would be glad to act as a mediator. I offered no objection to his taking such a step, but merely stated my opinion to the Minister that the diplomatic stage was over and that nothing would come of such a move.

16. Question:

On November 30, or around that date, did you recommend to the President that he deliver a message to Congress on the subject of American-Japanese relations?

Answer:

On November 29, I sent to the President a draft message to Congress, which Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox had helped to prepare, together with a draft message from the President to the Emperor. In my memorandum to the President I said:

"If you should send this message to the Emperor it would be advisable to defer your

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✓ message to Congress until we see whether the message to the Emperor effects any improvement in the situation. I think we agree that you will not send message to Congress until the last stage of our relations, relating to actual hostility, has been reached."

17. Question:

What did the President say?

Answer:

I have no specific recollection as to what President Roosevelt said regarding a message to Congress. But the record is that he did not send the message to Congress.

18. Question:

Why did he not send it to Congress?

Answer:

The President and I had for some time been communicating to various members of Congress our views on the imminent dangers in the situation in connection with such matters as neutrality legislation and extension of selective service. A message to Congress during the last few days would have contained very little that was new without giving to the Japanese leaders material which would have enabled them to arouse their people against us all the more, a thing we wished to avoid so long as there was even the slightest possibility of keeping the discussions alive.

Furthermore, the powerful isolationist groups in this country would probably have renewed their oft-repeated charges of "war-mongering" and of "dragging the nation into foreign wars". The Japanese leaders would then have been in a position to play up the situation as evidencing disunity in the United States in order to gain support in Japan for plunging ahead.

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19. Question:

Did it occur to you, in making such a recommendation that, either in wording or by precedent, there applied in the situation of November 30, 1941, that clause in the Constitution of the United States which provides that, from time to time, the President shall inform the Congress of the state of the Union?

Answer:

I would say that among the considerations which led to the drafting of the message to Congress was the Constitutional clause you cite, but there was also the consideration whether sending such a message at that particular time would have been helpful or otherwise in the critical situation then existing.

20. Question:

Did you tell a press conference on or about December 3, 1941, that the Japanese Government on November 12 had taken the position that these talks were not informal and exploratory, rather that they constituted real negotiations, which were in their final stages and that in the event of their failure a critical and dangerous situation would result? (cf. For. Rel. pp 75)

Answer:

The question whether the conversations with the Japanese in 1941 constituted real negotiations was not a matter of unilateral determination. This Government had made it clear to the Japanese from the outset that our conversations must remain on an exploratory basis until we could determine whether there existed a basis for negotiations. That point was never reached. Later, the Japanese Government advanced the contention that we were in negotiation, with Ambassador Grew at Tokyo on November 12 and with us here on November 13. On that day, I made the position of this Government quite clear to the Japanese representatives, as follows:

"The Secretary, after asking the Japanese Minister to make accurate note of what the Secretary

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was about to say, replied that if we are to work out a peaceful settlement in the Pacific area he could do this only on the basis of carrying on exploratory conversations until we reached a stage when he could go to Great Britain, to China and to the Dutch and say to them that he believes that the attitudes of Japan and the United States are such as to afford a basis for negotiation and that we could call what took place thereafter a negotiation." (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, Volume II, pages 731-732)

Inasmuch as the Japanese Government did not subsequently refer to this point, it was to be assumed that it had accepted this Government's position. There was no occasion for referring to this point in conference with the press. I did, however, make clear to the representatives of the press on November 27 and again on December 3 the seriousness of the situation.

Questions 21 and 22 are grouped in a single answer.

21. Question:

From page 43 of your statement, I quote: "On November 30, I was informed by the British Ambassador that the British Government had important indications that Japan was about to attack Siam and that this attack would include a seaborne expedition to seize strategic points in the Kra Isthmus" end quotation - I ask if you recall having any information on that day from the First Lord of the British Admiralty indicating a Japanese attack upon the United States?

22. Question:

I quote from the New York Times of December first, a dispatch from London under date of November 30: "A. V. Alexander, First Lord of the Admiralty, said that "if Japan breaks with and attacks the United States we must go with the United States and I am glad we have been able to send naval reinforcements to the Far East", end quotation: Did you see any official message to the United States of such a nature?

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Answer:

I do not recall receiving any information or messages on or about November 30 from the First Lord of the Admiralty or from any other official source indicating a Japanese attack on the United States or pledging support to the United States if attacked; nor has there been found in the Department of State any record of such information having been communicated to the Department of State.

23. Question:

Was it a fact that, on November 30, and thereafter, the predominant opinion in the War Council was that the attack would come against others rather than the United States?

Answer:

While it was my judgment that the Japanese were likely to attack in widely separated areas, all observable indications pointed to the likelihood that the attack would occur in the Southwest Pacific area. The most threatening activities known to our Government, so far as I saw or heard, were the Japanese movements near the jumping-off place in Indochina. Malaya, the Philippines, the Netherlands Indies and Siam were well within range of attack from that jumping-off place. The competent and appropriate military officials, I believe, have spoken for themselves on this subject.

24. Question:

When did you first see the cablegram from Ambassador Winant, dated December 6, and received in the State Department December 6, as to the movement of the Japanese fleet toward the Kra Peninsula?

Answer:

The telegram in question, number 5918 from the American Embassy in London, England, was received, according to the records, in the State Department at 10:40 a.m. December 6. In view of the message's

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character, of the notation that it was "most urgent", and of the fact that it was headed "Personal and Secret to the Secretary and the President", it must have been shortly after its receipt that I saw it.

25. Question:

In your prepared statement to this Committee, Mr. Secretary, I find no reference to your conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on August 16, the day preceding the delivery of two notes to Japan by the President; and I ask if it is correct to summarize that conversation of August 16 in these words: to the Ambassador's "pointed" request for a resumption of the conversations you stood by your position of July 23 in which you stated that because of Japan's violation of the basis of the conversations by its seizure of Indo-China you saw no basis remaining; and after you had suggested that the Ambassador might see the President, if he desired, Nomura replied that he would be in no position to talk to the President until his Government had wired him concessions which he, as previously stated, believed his Government was willing to make in order to have the conversations resumed? (cf. Foreign Relations 11, pp 553-4)

Answer:

The conversation of August 16 with the Japanese Ambassador is correctly summarized in Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, Volume II, pages 553-554:

"The Ambassador of Japan called at his request. He proceeded to say that he had again read over the documents that he and I had had under discussion, that he had been in communication with his Government, and that he believed there were grounds for progress in the conversations. He said that his Government was very desirous of working out peaceful relations between our two countries and he elaborated further along this line and against the idea of war. He stated that he would favor concessions in order to avoid war and that from what he heard from his Government, it would make concessions in order to avoid war. He said that in fact it would be glad to have a high Japanese official meet a high American official half way between the two

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countries in order to take up the matter in its final form.

"The Ambassador then pointedly inquired of me whether conversations such as he and I had been conducting could be resumed between our two Governments. I proceeded to reiterate and repeat the circumstances leading up to the cessation of our conversations and the reasons which I set forth through Mr. Welles for their discontinuance. I did not pass further on the question which he propounded but left it as it was. The Ambassador remarked that the situation was critical and it was very important in his judgment for suitable steps to be taken to avoid serious developments but I still revealed no sign whatever of saying anything favorable about his request for a resumption of conversations. I said that as the matter stands Japan with her Army, Navy and air forces was establishing many bases in and about French Indochina under her continued policy of conquest by force, that this would mean about the last step prior to a serious invasion of the South Sea area if it should be decided upon by Japan, that such an invasion would be a serious menace to British success in Europe and hence to the safety of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States, and that, therefore, this Government could not for a moment remain silent in the face of such a threat, especially if it should be carried forward to any further extent. The Ambassador remarked that the people of Japan did not have enough foodstuffs and went to Indochina to secure such needed commodities as rice. To this I promptly replied that if Japan had been willing to go forward with a peaceful settlement of the Pacific area in line with the principles and policies the Ambassador and I had discussed, Japan would have been able peacefully and without the use or threat of force to have equal access with every other nation to world markets for rice and all other foodstuffs.

"The Ambassador repeatedly said that his country was very desirous of peaceful relations with this country in the future as well as now and that he believed his Government would make some concessions in order to resume conversations to this end. I expressed interest in this and again referred to Japan's continuing policy of conquest by force and of bitter denunciation of this country by the Government controlled press which is loudly supporting such

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a policy, and again I said that I would not be in a position to say anything relative to his request in addition to what I said some days ago when he first brought up the matter.

"I suggested to the Ambassador that the situation was very serious and that if he desired to talk to any others on this subject or to the President it would be perfectly agreeable with me and I would not consider it as in any way going around me, et cetera. The Ambassador said that he would not be in a position to talk to the President until he first telegraphed his country for instructions as to what concessions it might be willing to make in connection with a resumption of conversations."

26. Question:

In your memorandum of the conversation in the White House among the President, Ambassador Nomura and yourself on August 17, you state that the President requested the Ambassador to come to the White House (cf. Foreign Relations 11, page 554): my question is: Had the President been informed that on the previous day, August 16, the Japanese Ambassador had stated that he did not wish to see the President until he had received concessions from the Japanese Government which he, the Ambassador, believed his Government would make?

Answer:

I find from the records that I informed the President prior to the White House conference on August 17 of the substance of my conversation with the Japanese Ambassador on the previous day. I refer to President Roosevelt's telegram to Prime Minister Churchill of August 18, 1941 which is a Committee exhibit.

27. Question:

Is it correct to state that the State Department records show no offer of concessions by Japan on August 17, 1941?

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Answer:

This Government at no time in the course of the conversations of 1941 talked to the representatives of the Japanese Government in terms of "concessions" to be made by Japan as condition for an agreement. It made known to the Japanese Government that its willingness to enter into an agreement with Japan was contingent upon Japan's adopting consistently peaceful courses. At no time did the Japanese Government give any practical evidence on which this Government could rely or dependable pledges that the Japanese Government intended to pursue policies of peace.

28. Question:

When did the war with Japan become inevitable?

Answer:

The question of the inevitability of war with Japan involved two factors, the factor of Japanese plans and objectives and the factor of time.

With regard to Japanese objectives, it is clear from the record that following the advent in 1927 of the Cabinet of General Tanaka, who inaugurated the so-called "positive policy" toward China, Japan had consistently been pursuing only one fixed policy-- that of expansion by aggression. In 1931 Japan occupied Manchuria by force; in 1933, Japan seized Jehol, penetrated Chahar and extorted from China a demilitarized zone in north China. The truculent statement of Amau, spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office, on April 17, 1934, in which Japan made clear a purpose to compel China to follow Japan's dictate and to permit other countries to have relations with China only as Japan allowed, made crystal clear Japan's policies of aggression. In 1937 Japan embarked upon military operations in north China which soon developed into an all-out attack on the whole of China. On September 21, 1938 I told the Canadian Minister that I had been proceeding on the theory that Japan definitely contemplated domination, by any and every kind of means, of East Asia and the Western Pacific area. In furtherance of these

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objectives Japan in September 1940 entered into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, Japan's program thus being merged into a far-flung drive for world domination of which Japan's share was to be East Asia. On January 15, 1941 in a statement in support of the Lend-Lease bill before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, I pointed out that Japan was out to establish herself in a dominant position in the entire region of the Western Pacific and that her leaders had openly declared their determination to make themselves masters of an area containing almost one-half of the entire population of the world. In the light of Japan's steady course of expansion by force, it was manifest that she would attack in her own good time unless we surrendered our principles.

As I have repeatedly stated, this Government had fully taken into account Japan's record when it entered into the conversations with the Japanese in 1941. Nevertheless, the American Government responded favorably to the Japanese request that we enter into conversations looking to a settlement of Pacific questions even though it realized that there was but a slight chance that thereby Japan could be brought around to adopt peaceful courses.

The second factor, that of time, was considered by us in the light of contemporary developments. Through the years that the Japanese Government was standing for policies of aggression, this Government was standing for policies of peace and of law and order with justice, as is clear from the record. These opposing policies were utterly irreconcilable. We knew that we would not surrender at any time our basic principles. As a result of our close-up conversations with the Japanese, we could not escape the conclusion that Japan would not abandon her policy of aggression. Our long-standing appraisal of Japanese policies and purposes of aggression and of attacking us and other countries in the Pacific area in furtherance of those purposes, was supported by Japanese utterances and acts. As regards the element of time, I was satisfied by early October from the evidence of feverish Japanese military activities and movements, the bellicose pronouncements of Japanese spokesmen

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and of the Japanese press, reports of growing political tension in Japan, as well as from what was disclosed by the intercepted Japanese messages that the time when they would attack us was rapidly approaching.

In looking back upon the developments in their entirety during the last weeks and months prior to Pearl Harbor it can be clearly seen that our judgments and our methods of dealing with Japan as we did were overwhelmingly vindicated by Japanese acts and utterances as they later unfolded.

At any time prior to Japan's attack it lay within her power to avert a war in the Pacific by abandoning her policy of aggression, just as a bandit might avert a clash with his intended victim by suddenly becoming law-abiding. Up to that time there was always open to her an honorable and reasonable alternative to the courses of aggression which she was pursuing--an alternative which would have given her all she professed to seek in the way of access to raw materials and markets, as well as other rights and opportunities enjoyed by all nations. It lay solely within Japan's disposition to adopt a peaceful alternative and to revoke the decisions reached at the Imperial Conference of July 2, which reaffirmed Japan's purpose of subjugating China and which called for military advance to the south to establish "the great East Asia sphere of co-prosperity", that is to say, to establish Japanese domination in Southeast Asia and the islands of the Western Pacific area.

Questions 29 to 33 and 45 to 47 are grouped in a single answer.

29. Question:

When did you decide that further negotiations were useless and that you were going to turn the matter over to the army and the navy?

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30. Question:

When did you advise either the army or the navy that you were turning the matter over to the army or navy or both?

31. Question:

What had happened that you told Secretary Stimson you were turning the matter over to the army and navy?

32. Question:

Had you conferred with the President on the matter of turning the matter over to the army and navy?

33. Question:

Give date and conversation with the President on this.

45. Question:

Do you recall having a conversation with the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson, about the negotiations with Japan being terminated and that you were turning the matter over to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, or the army and navy?

46. Question:

Will you state the date and the conversation.

47. Question:

If such a conversation took place, did you consider that that conversation turned the matter over to the army and navy?

Answer:

After this Government had received and studied the Japanese proposal of November 20, which has already been described, together with Kurusu's representation to me on November 21 that Japan had nothing more to offer, it became obvious, especially in the light of Japan's menacing military movements and of the indisputable proof derived from intercepted

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Japanese messages that the November 20 proposal was their last word, that the chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically vanished. From November 22 on it was my individual view that Japan was through with any serious conversations looking to a peaceful settlement. From that day I and my associates had reached a stage of clutching at straws in our effort to save the situation. We groped about for anything that might offer any possibility for keeping serious conversations going. We gave consideration to possible choices in an effort to determine the wisest and most feasible course.

From November 22 on I did not conceal my conclusions on these points. It was on November 25 at the meeting of the War Council that I again emphasized the critical nature of the situation and stated more formally that, "the matter is now in the hands of the Army and the Navy". My most accurate recollection of my conversations along this line with the President and the War and Navy officials was contained in my statement of December 30, 1941, to the Roberts Committee. I rely upon that statement to refresh my present recollection. The portion of that statement dealing with this point is as follows:

"On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of the War Council, at which the highest officers of the Army and the Navy of course were present, I emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan: I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security

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was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. At the conclusion I with due deference expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof."

The expression, "the matter is now in the hands of the Army and the Navy", as applied in the situation which then arose, does not imply any idea of a transfer from the Department of State to the Departments of War and of the Navy of any part of the Department of State's functions or responsibilities. Nor do I think that there was any misunderstanding on the part of the President or of the Secretaries of War and of the Navy as to the sense in which this expression was used. It seemed self-evident that the Army and the Navy would be our chief reliance in the light of the critical situation known to all of us. It was, of course, the understanding of each of us that the Department of State would continue to function and coordinate its action with that of the Army and Navy, but I emphasized that we could no longer be expected materially to control the situation.

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Questions 34 and 35 are grouped in a single answer.

34. Question:

Other than the Winant message, dated December 6, received by the State Department about 10:40 a.m., December 6, 1941, did you have any other information as to the Japanese fleet movements as indicated in the Winant message?

35. Question:

If so, will you state what the information was and when you received it?

Answer:

According to State Department records, similar information was received from the Navy Department (from the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet) and from the War Department (from the United States Military Observer at Singapore). The Navy report was available in Washington at 10:57 a.m., December 6, and I am informed that the War Department report, so far as the records indicate, came in early on December 7. As I indicated in my prepared statement to the Committee, the records show several telephone conversations between War and Navy officials and myself on December 6 followed by a lengthy conference on the morning of December 7 between Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox and myself. These conversations on December 6 and 7, according to my best recollection, comprised discussion of the Japanese convoys and other information regarding Japanese military movements which we had previously received.

Questions 36 and 37 are grouped in a single answer.

36. Question:

I show you a memorandum, Exhibit 40, and ask you if there was any discussion with you or anyone else to your knowledge on this subject of armed support?

37. Question:

Who assured the British of American armed support as mentioned in their instructions to Singapore as

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shown by the message of our naval observer at Singapore to Admiral Hart?

Answer:

There was no discussion with me or with anyone else to my knowledge on the subject of advance assurances to Britain of armed American support which would have served as a basis for the telegram from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to the Navy Department quoted in Exhibit No. 40, or for the message from Singapore referred to in question 37. I do not know who, or whether anyone, assured the British of American armed support. However, after witnessing the suicidal experiences of countries like Belgium and Holland which had failed to confer with the Allies before they were invaded, it seemed to me but natural and necessary that the three or four governments deemed in imminent danger of attack by Japan may well have had conversations before the attack, subject, so far as we were concerned in the matter of commitments, to our Constitutional limitations.

38. See answer to questions 12 and 13.

Questions 39 and 40 are grouped in a single answer.

39. Question:

Do you recall the one of November 7 - "all arrangements must be completed by the 25th"?

40. Question:

Did that message cause you to give the warning to the Cabinet?

Answer:

I recall the message of November 5 (Exhibit No. 1, page 100) that, "all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th". I do not definitely recall whether the message referred to in question 39 was before me when I warned the Cabinet of the dangers in the situation on November 7. The record shows that the message in question was available on November 5, and presumably I saw it. I would say that my statement to the Cabinet was prompted by conclusions derived from a number of sources.

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Questions 41 and 42 are grouped in a single answer.

41. Question:

Mr. Secretary, you were familiar with our Exhibit 16 and Exhibit 17, wherein both Admiral Stark and General Marshall requested time?

42. Question:

Prior to your sending the note of the 26th, were you familiar with the contents of the memorandum to the President, dated November 27, by Admiral Stark and General Marshall?

Answer:

I was familiar with the joint memoranda of Admiral Stark and General Marshall of November 5 and November 27. I do not know just when those memoranda were brought to my attention, but I am satisfied that I did not see either memorandum prior to its date. I was, of course, familiar with the views of General Marshall and Admiral Stark in regard to their desire for time, and I myself was animated by a desire to do everything I could to gain time.

Questions 43 and 44 are grouped in a single answer.

43. Question:

What did you do to obtain the time as asked for by Marshall and Stark in their memorandums of November 5 and 27?

44. Question:

Did you discuss this question with the President and what was said by the President and you in that discussion?

Answer:

Generally speaking, our entire eight months of conversations involved gaining time. There was no conflict between this objective and our intensive efforts to persuade the Japanese to pursue policies of peace. After the Imperial Conference at Tokyo on July 2, 1941, the Japanese, in pursuance of the decision to move south, proceeded rapidly with the necessary preparations for a military movement on a large scale.

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It was obvious that the time of such attack as Japan would make would be of Japan's own choosing, and would depend upon Japan's own estimate of her readiness and of favoring circumstances. It was not within the power of this Government otherwise than by abject submission to Japan's terms, to halt Japan in her course. However, I endeavored at all times to treat with the Japanese in a spirit of open-mindedness, patience and good will. I sought from the outset of the conversations to explore thoroughly every possibility of bringing about a peaceful, fair and stabilizing settlement of the situation in the Pacific, and I spared no effort to keep always open a door to the continuation of the conversations. At the same time I had to be on guard against any manifestation of weakness which might have encouraged the Japanese to be more precipitate than they were in their action. In this way, I believe that we gained months of valuable time. It became clear, however, in October, as I saw it, that the Japanese had decided to strike in their own time unless this Government should be willing to yield abjectly to Japan's terms. I constantly discussed with the President the question of gaining as much time as possible and we had the subject very much in mind throughout the conversations with the Japanese.

45 - 47. See answer to questions 29 to 33.

48. Question:

Did the Secretary of State's office prepare a final draft, one ready for delivery to the Japanese, of a modus vivendi?

Answer:

A draft of the modus vivendi dated November 25 which was labeled, "final draft", meaning that that was the last draft that was made of that document, has been furnished the Committee. It cannot be accurately said that that draft was "ready for delivery to the Japanese" as it is impossible to tell what further revision might have been made if a decision had been made to offer the Japanese a modus vivendi.

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49. Question:

Did you show such a draft to the Ambassadors of Britain, China, and the Netherlands?

Answer:

The latest draft of the modus vivendi shown to the British, Chinese and Netherlands diplomatic representatives was the draft of November 24. There were only minor differences between the November 24 and the November 25 drafts.

50. Question:

I call your attention to Exhibit 19, Page 1, where you used the following words "My personal view continued as on yesterday, November 28, to be that its sending will be of doubtful efficacy. Except for the purpose of making a record it might even cause such a complication as Colonel Stimson and I referred to on yesterday." I ask you, Mr. Secretary, to explain what conversations you and Colonel Stimson had with the President and what was said by each of the parties in that conversation?

Answer:

I do not recall precisely what conversations Mr. Stimson and I had with the President on or about November 28 in regard to the proposed message to the Emperor other than the points mentioned in my memorandum which you cite. We all realized, of course, that the Emperor at that time was powerless before the military leaders. I recall very clearly that I had in mind that the sending of a message to the Emperor might have prejudiced the situation owing to the probability that such an appeal would be likely to arouse resentment among the real leaders of Japan because of our having gone over their heads, and moreover might have been interpreted as weakness, since the Japanese themselves do not normally shift from a bold front attitude to one of pleading until the situation with them is desperate. These points, to the best of my recollection, were all brought out in the discussions I had with the President and Mr. Stimson.

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51. Question:

What did you mean by the expression "for the purpose of making a record"?

Answer:

The expression, "for the purpose of making a record", has reference to the matter of making perfectly clear to both the American and Japanese peoples then and for the future that all the efforts of this Government were directed toward maintaining peace to the very end.

52. Question:

When did you first know that the President had sent a message to the Emperor?

Answer:

I was in consultation with the President at all stages of the drafting of the message to the Emperor and the message, of course, was sent through the State Department. I therefore was aware of the message being sent at the time of its sending, about 9 p.m., December 6, 1941.

Questions 53 to 56 and 84 to 87 are grouped in a single answer.

53. Question:

Was it before or after you learned of the pilot message, being message 901, Exhibit 1, Page 238?

54. Question:

Was it before or after you learned that Japan was replying to your November 26 message?

55. Question:

Was it before or after you knew the contents of any part of the 14 part message, a reply to your November 26 message?

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86. Question:

Had you learned of the receipt of any of the 13 parts of the 14 part message, being message 902, page 239, Exhibit 1, before it was decided by the President, or by you, to send a message to the Emperor?

84. Question:

When did you first learn that the Japanese were replying to your note of November 26?

85. Question:

When did you first see any of the parts of the 14 part message 902, Exhibit 1, Page 239?

86. Question:

When did you first learn that the message was to be delivered in accordance with a time later to be determined?

87. Question:

When did you first see the message number 844, page 195, Exhibit 1, which contained the language "therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in two or three days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off."?

Answer:

I cannot recall definitely the exact time when any of the messages referred to were seen by me.

During the period in which those messages were being received and distributed, my attention was focussed on reports of the extremely menacing movement made manifest by the sailing of the large Japanese armada from the jumping-off place in Indochina. Those reports thus were of more serious and urgent import than any threatening phase of intercepted messages relating to Japan's reply to our communication of November 26. As I made clear in my conversations and statements during those last

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days prior to Pearl Harbor, I felt that war would break out at any time and that the Japanese had given clear indication as to the course they would take. Notification through the intercepts of a forthcoming Japanese communication announcing that the Japanese would not continue the conversations was only confirmatory of the judgment which I had been passing on to my colleagues in the Government during the previous fortnight.

Even had the intercepted messages clearly indicated immediate war, they could only have referred to attack by the gathering Japanese forces whose movements we had been watching for days.

From the time the Japanese presented their drastic ultimatum on November 20, no intimations were given us that the Japanese would make the slightest concessions in their demands, but, on the contrary, they drove steadily forward to the attack with their armed forces, while, at the same time, misrepresenting the attitude of this Government. The Japanese reply of December 7 was a false and fraudulent statement in the worst of bad faith of Japan's case and a monstrous misrepresentation of our position in what turned out to be a brazen attempt to shift from themselves to us responsibility for their attack upon us.

Questions 57 to 60 are grouped in a single answer.

57. Question:

Did you discuss with the President the modus vivendi message?

58. Question:

If so, what was said about it by the President and what did you say to the President?

59. Question:

Did you ever discuss with the President the fact that you were not going to send the modus vivendi but were going to send the note of the 26th?

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60. Question:

If you had such a conversation or discussion with the President about that date on the modus vivendi will you give us the conversations?

Answer:

I was in constant touch with the President and consulted him fully at all stages of our consideration

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of the modus vivendi proposal. It is impossible to recall the details of the discussion, but the trend of our thought was indicated in my statement before the Committee on November 19, 1945. The President at no time expressed any dissent from views expressed by me. On November 26 I recommended to the President--and he approved--my calling in the Japanese representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals while withholding the modus vivendi plan.

Questions 61 and 62 are grouped in a single answer.

61. Question:

Was it usual for the President to confer with Ambassadors on Sunday?

62. Question:

Can you state why the meeting was held between the Japanese Ambassador and the President on Sunday, August 17, 1941, the day the President returned from the Atlantic Conference?

Answer:

Although, during the conversations with the Japanese in 1941, August 17 was the only Sunday occasion on which the President had received them, I had conversations with them by appointment made at their request on four other Sundays, namely, May 11, June 15, June 22 and December 7. I, therefore, attached no special significance to the President's receiving the Japanese Ambassador on Sunday and I do not know the reason, other than possibly the President's convenience, why the President received him on August 17 rather than an early subsequent weekday. It is true, of course, that the President did attach great importance to the communications which he made to the Japanese Ambassador on that occasion.

63. Question:

Would you say that only an extraordinary matter required that the President on a Sunday, and at the hour of his return to Washington from a conference with the head of another Government should deliver to a

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third Government a note which he said, "he regretted the necessity to deliver but which he felt compelled to deliver"?

Answer:

I would not conclude that otherwise than as indicated in reply to your question no. 62 only an extraordinary matter required the President on a Sunday, and at the hour of his return to Washington, to receive the Japanese Ambassador. The world was then on fire and the aggressor nations, including Japan, were wholly untrustworthy and treacherous, capable of undertaking a desperate stab at any time. Those of us in charge of foreign policy during this critical period were accustomed to spend most Sundays in our respective offices, including Sunday conferences involving both the President and foreign ambassadors.

64. Question:

Was the situation between the American and Japanese Governments on August 17, the following: because of Japan's violation of the basis of the conversations, by the seizure of Indo-China, the American Government had broken off informal, exploratory conversations looking to the re-establishment of traditional relations and, because of the aggression against Indo-China, the American Government had broken economic relations with Japan?

Answer:

An accurate description of the situation between the American and Japanese Governments on August 17 will be found in the two oral statements handed by President Roosevelt to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17, 1941.

I think I should add that it was my strong opinion that the Japanese had convinced themselves that we were inadequately prepared and that therefore we would make sacrifices of our principles before undertaking to fight in their defense. It was incumbent on us, in justice to the Japanese as well as to ourselves, to tell them that if they pushed us too far, we would resist. I repeatedly and pointedly made this clear

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to the Japanese representatives in my conversations with them. President Roosevelt did likewise when he conferred with Ambassador Nomura on August 17 and agreed to resume the conversations. These representations were calculated to sober somewhat the Japanese militarists bent on aggression. But the Japanese did not take them as a threat, as the record of subsequent events shows.

65. Question:

In your memorandum of the White House conversation of August 17, you say: "The President thereupon said that this Government should really bring the matters between the two Governments literally up to date and that he would, therefore, offer certain observations about the position of this Government; he added that he regretted the necessity of so doing but that he had no other recourse"; (cf. Foreign Relations Vol. 2, Page 555). Will you give the interpretation in the terms of diplomacy, of the statement by the head of one nation to another nation, with whom relations are critically strained, that he regrets the necessity of a note which he is about to deliver but that he has no other recourse but to deliver it?

Answer:

It seems perfectly clear to me that what the President regretted was that the Japanese should have created a situation which rendered necessary a message of the import of the one which he at that time delivered to the Japanese. The President was endeavoring, in friendly fashion, to impress upon the Japanese Government our attitude as I have described it in answer to question 64.

66. Question:

Do you know of any agreement with another power which had fixed the date of delivery of this note, and the second note, to be August 17?

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Answer:

I do not know of any agreement with any other power which called for delivery on August 17 of the two communications which were made to the Japanese on that date. The official record shows, however, that President Roosevelt told Prime Minister Churchill at their Atlantic meeting that he, the President, planned to see the Japanese Ambassador immediately on his return to Washington.

Questions 67 and 68 are grouped in a single answer.

67. Question:

Do you know on what date that other power took the same action as the President took in line with their agreement for the making of parallel representations to Japan?

68. Question:

Have you ever seen the text of the representations which were made by the British Government on August 17, or any subsequent or preceding date, agreed upon to be made parallelly with those made by the President on or about August 17?

Answer:

The Department has no record of any parallel action taken by the British Government corresponding to the action taken by the President vis-à-vis the Japanese on August 17, and I know of no parallel action taken by the British other than the radio address of the British Prime Minister on August 24, 1941.

69. Question:

The President by his action of August 16 was deciding ipso facto, not to await a bid which you had every reason to believe was coming from Japan. Did you suggest waiting?

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Answer:

Our judgment as to potentialities of Japanese policy had to be formed in the light of Japan's actions toward implementation of the decision of the Imperial Conference of July 2, 1941, which called inter alia for a military advance south, of Japan's rejection of the President's proposal of July 24 to neutralize Indochina, and of three months of searching conversations with the Japanese Ambassador. With these in mind, it was idle to expect that the "concessions" which the Japanese Ambassador suggested might be forthcoming from his Government would be addressed to the fundamentals of the situation, which from our point of view called for Japan's removal of the menace she was creating to the United States and other peaceful nations and for her desisting from her aggressive courses. If Japan had in fact any intention of revising her position and adopting peaceful courses, there was nothing in the President's communication to the Japanese Ambassador on August 17 which would have tended to discourage Japan from adjusting her position; on the contrary, what the President said on that occasion was calculated to help rather than hinder reconsideration by Japan of her policies. There was therefore no advantage whatever in awaiting a further Japanese initiative.

Questions 70, 71 and 72 are grouped in a single answer.

70. Question:

I find no reference, Mr. Secretary, in your prepared statement, to a communication from the Japanese Foreign Minister and an accompanying commentary by Ambassador Grew received by the State Department soon after midnight on August 18, 1941: Do you recall such documents which the State Department published in Foreign Relations 11, Pages 560-57

71. Question:

They establish, do they not, that at the time the President was delivering the first and then the second note of August 17, the Japanese Foreign Minister was delivering to Ambassador Grew a lengthy overture for the resumption of the conversations looking to a

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restoration of traditional relations? (N.B. Tokyo time, 14 hours later)

72. Question:

And in transmitting the Japanese message, Ambassador Grew quote: "with all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without every prayerful consideration..." also that the proposal was "unprecedented in Japanese history" and had been made with the approval of the Emperor and the highest authorities of the land; that is correct, is it not?

Answer:

There is no controversy about the contents of the documents referred to in Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, Volume II, pages 560-565, containing an account of the approach made by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Grew in regard to a proposal for a meeting between the Japanese Prime Minister and the President and a statement of Ambassador Grew's reaction. That Japanese proposal is discussed and analyzed at some length in my prepared statement to the Committee, which it is unnecessary to repeat here. The President and I, together with our Far Eastern advisers, were looking at the situation with the benefit of all the world-wide information available to us in Washington. We judged that the Japanese Government had no serious expectation of reaching an understanding at the proposed meeting unless the American Government surrendered its basic position while Japan rigidly adhered to and went forward with its policy of aggression and conquest. We had fully tested out the Japanese Government by preliminary inquiries and found it adamant in its position.

Nothing in the record of subsequent developments has contradicted our judgment at that time, but, on the contrary, events have vindicated it. For example,

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the memoirs of Prince Konoe subsequently published in serial form in the Asahi Shimbun, a leading Tokyo newspaper, running from December 20 to December 31, 1945, state that the Japanese army leaders agreed, in writing, on August 4, 1941, to Konoe's proposal for a meeting with the President only on condition that Japan adhere firmly to its fundamental policy and that in the event the President did not see eye to eye with the Japanese, Konoe would leave the meeting place determined to make war on the United States. Konoe also disclosed in his memoirs that at an Imperial Conference on September 6, 1941, the Japanese Government decided, in case there was no expectation within the first ten days of October to gain her demands of the United States by diplomacy, to go to war with the United States, and accordingly to parallel diplomatic efforts with military preparations.

These disclosures by Konoe show conclusively that the Japanese would attack in their own chosen time unless we should surrender abjectly to the drastic Japanese ultimatum of November 20 and that if we had made no reply instead of delivering our communication of November 26, the ten-point proposal, the Japanese would have attacked just the same.

73. Question:

On November 7, 1941, you warned the Cabinet they might look for an offensive by Japan at any time. What did you base that warning on?

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Answer:

My warning to the Cabinet on November 7 was based upon the acceleration of Japanese military activities and disquieting military disposals, especially in Indochina, the growing agitation in the Japanese press and among Japanese spokesmen for positive action, the pressure tactics employed by the Japanese Government toward forcing acceptance by this Government of the Japanese proposals, as well as the corroborative evidence of the intercepted Japanese messages.

74. Question:

When did you draft the ten point note of November 26?

Answer:

Under the modus vivendi proposal the Japanese would have been committed to affirming that their national policies were directed toward lasting peace throughout the Pacific area and that they had no territorial ambitions therein. Its acceptance was also subject to the understanding that during its life (of three months subject to a further extension) there would be further conferences looking to a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. There was attached to the modus vivendi proposal a plan of a comprehensive settlement as one practical exemplification of what we had in mind. This plan, consisting of two sections, a draft of a mutual declaration of policy and a statement of the steps to be taken by the two Governments, was common to both the modus vivendi proposal and the communication of November 26. Some of the material in section 1 was drafted months earlier, the remainder, including the material in section 2, in the course of a few days preceding November 26, and the latter part of the accompanying explanatory statement, which was not contained in the modus vivendi draft, on November 26.

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Questions 75 and 76 are grouped in a single answer.

75. Question:

At any time before it was sent, did you show it to the President or call the contents to his attention?

76. Question:

If so, what was your conversation?

Answer:

In the light of the foregoing explanation, it is clear that as the President was thoroughly familiar with the entire proposal, all that was called for was to consult with him about dropping the modus vivendi feature of the proposal. This I did by presenting to him a memorandum on November 26, a copy of which is in the hands of the Committee, and obtained his prompt approval. I do not recall the details of any conversation on this.

Questions 77 and 78 are grouped in a single answer.

77. Question:

Did you see the message from General Marshall to General Short on November 27?

78. Question:

If you saw such a note, when was its contents called to your attention?

Answer:

I have no recollection that I saw before the publication of the Roberts Report the substance of General Marshall's message to General Short of November 27, 1941.

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Questions 79 and 80 are grouped in a single answer.

79. Question:

Did not the diplomatic relations between Japan and America grow worse after November 27?

80. Question:

If they did grow worse how do you account for no other message being given to the commanders in the fields?

Answer:

Diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States could scarcely grow worse after November 27, except in the sense that the crisis foreseen by us and planned by the Japanese approached closer at hand. There was nothing fundamentally new in the diplomatic situation. That situation as we viewed it, especially from November 21 until the attack on Pearl Harbor, was that Japan might strike at any time and that the diplomatic establishment could not be expected to preserve national security.

81. Question:

Will you explain in detail if you were consulted in connection with the message to Short which contained the phrase "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act" and also in regard to not arousing the citizens.

Answer:

I have no recollection of having been consulted in connection with the considerations which entered into inclusion in General Marshall's message to Short of the phrase, "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act", or in regard to the caveat against arousing the citizens. This was primarily a military question.

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82, 83. See answer to question 14.

84, 85, 86, 87. See answer to questions 53 - 56.

88. Question:

Did not that message 844, Exhibit 1, page 195, indicate to you that your note of the 26th was not acceptable and, therefore, that war was imminent?

Answer:

I was already satisfied that the Japanese would not agree to anything short of complete yielding by the United States to Japan's demands. The intercepted Japanese message to which you refer did no more than confirm what we already knew. As I have pointed out repeatedly Japan was bent on attacking us unless we made abject surrender to her demands as an aggressor. We had no serious thought that Japan would accept our proposal of November 26. I said at the time that there was only the barest possibility of her accepting. She would have proceeded to attack us whether we had presented that proposal or any other proposal-- unless it had been one of humiliating and abject surrender--or whether we had offered no proposal at all. Furthermore, while a number of us in the State, War and Navy Departments were desirous of grabbing at any straw and therefore hoped for favorable action on the modus vivendi, most of us agreed that the chances of its acceptance were very slim. The testimony of Army and Navy officials on this point is in the record.

The November 26 proposal was another test of whether Japan was willing to abandon conquest and to adopt peaceful policies; if she were so willing she would have seized upon our ten-point program as highly desirable.

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89. Question:

Where were you on the night of December 6, 1941?

Answer:

I was almost invariably at home at night working on Departmental matters. While it is possible that I might be mistaken, my best recollection is that I was at home on the night of December 6, 1941.

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90. Question:

When did you first see or obtain information as to the contents of the following messages in Exhibit 1:

#904	Page 245
#907	Page 248
#908	Page 248
#909	Page 240
#910	Page 249

Answer:

I do not recall the exact times that I first saw or learned of the contents of the messages you cite.

Questions 91 to 96 are grouped in a single answer.

91. Question:

Did you discuss any of the intercepted Japanese messages with the President?

92. Question:

If so, give us the conversations.

93. Question:

Did you discuss any of the intercepted Japanese messages with General Marshall?

94. Question:

If so, give us the conversations.

95. Question:

Did you discuss any of the intercepted Japanese messages with Admiral Stark?

96. Question:

If so, give us the conversations.

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Answer:

At this late date in 1946 I do not recall whether I discussed any particular messages or the details of the discussion with the President, with General Marshall or with Admiral Stark. It is true that in many of our conversations, including those with Secretaries Knox and Stimson, and some with the President, some one of us would bring up one or another of the intercepted messages. But I have no recollection of discussions of specific messages.

97. Question:

Who called the meeting in your office on the morning of December 7?

Answer:

As I recall it, the meeting in my office on December 7 was the result of a mutual agreement on the part of Mr. Stimson, Mr. Knox and myself. It might have been suggested in the first instance by any one or two of us three. According to my best recollection, the proposal for a meeting grew out of a desire to continue our discussion of the situation created by the movement of the huge Japanese armada southward and westward of the southernmost point of Indochina.

98. Question:

Tell us with whom you talked personally, by phone, or messenger, about this meeting and what was said.

Answer:

I cannot recall material details beyond what I have given in reply to question 97.

99. Question:

Please state in detail what was said by the persons attending the meeting in your office on December 7, 1941.

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Answer:

As I indicated in my prepared statement to the Joint Committee as well as in my oral testimony, Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox and I in our conference of December 7, 1941 discussed the critical situation created by the large-scale Japanese military movement from the jumping-off place in Indochina. I cannot recall details of that discussion. Secretary Stimson has described the discussion in his statement to the Committee and that statement speaks for itself.

Questions 100 to 102 are grouped in a single answer.

100. Question:

Our record shows that the President saw the 13 parts of the 14 part message at about 9:30 P.M., December 6, 1941. Did you see or talk to the President from that time until after the attack at Pearl Harbor?

101. Question:

If so, give us your conversations.

102. Question:

If you did not see him or talk to him or contact him - were you available?

Answer:

I have no record of nor do I recall having seen or having talked with the President between 9:30 p.m. on December 6, 1941 and the moment of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. According to my best recollection, I was available during all of that period.

Questions 103 and 104 are grouped in a single answer.

103. Question:

Did anyone from the army, navy or State Departments, or executive offices contact you on Saturday, December 6, and/or Sunday, December 7 up to 2 P.M. Sunday?

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104. Question:

If so, give the conversations.

Answer:

I was in constant contact during Saturday, December 6, and Sunday, December 7, with officers of the State Department and of the Army and the Navy. As recorded in Annex A of my statement to the Committee, I had on those two days conferences, consultations and telephone conversations (as entered in engagement books) with representatives of the Army and the Navy, as follows:

December 6	10:45 a.m.	Telephone call from Secretary Knox
	11:50 a.m.	Telephone call from Secretary Stimson
	1:00 p.m.	Telephone call from Secretary Stimson
	1:15 p.m.	Telephone call from Admiral Stark
	1:50 p.m.	Captain Schuirmann
	5:15 p.m.	Telephone call to Admiral Stark
	8:45 p.m.	Telephone call to Secretary Knox
December 7	10:30 a.m.	Telephone call to Admiral Stark
	10:30 a.m.	Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox
	2:10 p.m.	Telephone call from Admiral Stark

In addition, I had many conferences on those days with officers of the Department of State. It would be impossible to recall the details of all the conversations which took place, but I might say that the Japanese large-scale military movement from the jumping-off place in Southern Indochina was very much in the minds of all of us who were called upon to consider that situation. We were striving to ascertain the full significance of those military movements, their probable destination, etc.

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Questions 105 and 106 are grouped in a single answer.

105. Question:

Mr. Secretary, will you agree that the official records of American-Japanese relations from August 28, 1941, until December 7, 1941, show that the Secretary of State never considered that the Japanese Government was bluffing in its assertions that, should no agreement be reached with the United States, Japan would strike?

106. Question:

In this connection, Mr. Secretary, will you agree that the records establish that the Secretary of State accepted at face value the statements in diplomatic exchanges wherein Konoye on August 28, Toyoda on September 27, Togo on November 12, Nomura on November 12, and Kurusu on November 17 and 18, indicated or said that a rupture of the conversations would mean war in the Pacific? (cf. Foreign Relations 11, Pages 572-3, 642, 719-22, 725, 740, 747)

Answer:

My view, as set forth in the record of American-Japanese relations over several years, was that Japan was not bluffing but was on a steady and fixed course of conquest which would reach us in Japan's own chosen time. I believed that Japan was playing the role of an international desperado, and it is the principal business of a desperado--whether a nation or an individual--to fight. During that period Japan believed that she was exceedingly well armed for the purpose of achieving her intended conquests in the Pacific area. She likewise knew that at that time we were by no means sufficiently armed in the Pacific to resist successfully a Japanese attack. Therefore, at the time to which your inquiry relates, I was satisfied that Japan was not bluffing but rather was giving us a last chance to yield our basic principles which would enable her to continue her course of aggression and conquest without further serious risk of successful resistance.

When we realize that Japan was carrying on flagrant aggressions and ruthless invasions of peaceful countries,

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that the United States was pleading with her from the beginning to cease her course of military conquest in close partnership with Hitler, and that all problems in the Pacific would practically settle themselves at once when Japan adopted a policy of peace, it becomes apparent that she had no more right to make demands on the United States--as though we too were an aggressor, instead of a law-abiding country pleading for peace--than an individual gangster has to assume a like attitude toward his intended victim. It is in the light of these circumstances that we viewed all the arguments which the Japanese used in trying to brow-beat the United States into yielding, such as those described in the references cited in your question.

Questions 107 to 109 are grouped in a single answer.

107. Question:

In this respect was the Secretary's evaluation of the situation at one with Ambassador Grew's, namely that the Japanese were not bluffing but could be expected to strike suddenly and dramatically?

108. Question:

Did the Secretary, with the information from Ambassador Grew that the Tojo Cabinet had advised the Emperor as to how far it would go with the United States, and, with the information from an intercepted Japanese message that a deadline had been fixed for November 25, tell the American Cabinet on November 7 that a new and sudden Japanese aggression was to be looked for? (cf. Foreign Relations 11, pages 700-1, Intercepts, Ex 1, Page 100, Peace and War, pages 135-7.)

109. Question:

Did the Cabinet thereupon vote unanimously that Secretary Knox and Under Secretary Welles should deliver addresses on Armistice Day to the end of informing the nation as to American-Japanese relations? (cf. Peace and War, pages 136-7; 776-87.)

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Answer:

In reply to these questions, I quote the first paragraph of page 29 of my prepared statement to the Committee:

"On November 7, I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was the President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to ask some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development."

I also quote a paragraph from Peace and War, pages 136-137:

"Four days later, on November 7, Secretary Hull stated at a Cabinet meeting that relations between Japan and the United States were extremely critical and that there was 'imminent possibility' that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force. It thereupon became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development. Accordingly, Secretary of the Navy Knox delivered an address on November 11, 1941 in which he stated that we were not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we were 'likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world-- on the far side of the Pacific'; that the Pacific no less than the Atlantic called for instant

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readiness for defense. On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles, carrying out the Cabinet suggestion in an address, stated that beyond the Atlantic a sinister and pitiless conqueror had reduced more than half of Europe to abject serfdom and that in the Far East the same forces of conquest were menacing the safety of all nations bordering on the Pacific. The waves of world conquest were 'breaking high both in the East and in the West', he said, and were threatening, more and more with each passing day, 'to engulf our own shores'. He warned that the United States was in far greater peril than in 1917; that 'at any moment war may be forced upon us'."

110. Question:

Subsequent to November 7, will the witness agree that the official records and his testimony here show that he advised high military officials of the Government and also the British Ambassador that a sudden attack anywhere in the Pacific by Japan must be anticipated?

Answer:

In reply, I quote from Peace and War, 2 paragraphs appearing on pages 144-145:

"On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of high officials of this Government, Secretary Hull emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan. He stated that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in his opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. The Secretary expressed his judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to

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demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.

"On November 29, 1941, Secretary Hull conferred with the British Ambassador. The Secretary said that, 'the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually over and that the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy'. He said further that it would be 'a serious mistake for our country and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions and posts before the peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this would be on the theory that the Japanese recognize that their course of unlimited conquest now renewed all along the line probably is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost boldness and risk'."

Furthermore, I and my associates were in daily consultation with the Army and Navy officials throughout the period after November 7, exchanging information and views as to the critical character of the situation.

111. Question:

Is it correct to say that the intercepted dispatch from Tokyo on November 28 (# 844 Page 195 - Ex 1) giving the reaction to the American notes of November 26, and also the intercepted dispatch from Tokyo to Berlin on November 30 (# 985 - Page 204 - Ex 1) informing Hitler of Japan's intentions, confirmed the judgements you had been stating in official councils since November 7?

Answer:

During this period all the information we received made clearer Japan's purpose to attack unless the United States yielded to her. In other words, Japan had no intention of yielding any part of her plan of conquest by force, but was giving the United States, by its proposal of November 20, a last opportunity to choose between yielding or fighting. Insofar as the intercepted Japanese messages cited in the question indicated that in consequence of the refusal of the United States to yield to Japan's unreasonable demands the Japanese intended to take forcible measures to gain their ends,

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those intercepted messages served to confirm my judgments as expressed by me in official councils, especially during those last few weeks.

112. Question:

Did not the fact that Japan, without a declaration of war, attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, confirm, in their entirety, the judgments you had been offering in official councils since November 7?

Answer:

Japan's attack on a number of points over a sweep of thousands of miles, one of which points was Pearl Harbor, at about the same time confirmed our judgment as to the critically dangerous character of the situation.

113. Question:

Do you recall, Mr. Secretary, your meeting with the Japanese Ambassadors in your apartment on the night of November 22 in which they pressed for a reply to the Japanese note of November 20? (cf. How War Came, page 304, also For. Relations 11)

Answer:

I do recall my meeting with the Japanese Ambassadors on November 22 when they pressed for a reply to the Japanese proposal of November 20. During the month of November the Japanese representatives were insistently worrying me with their importunities for a quick understanding, intimating that otherwise something awful would happen.

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114. Question:

I quote in full a secret message from Tokyo to the Ambassadors, under date of November 22, intercepted by the Army at Washington and translated on the same date:

"(Secret)

"From: Tokyo .
"To: Washington
"November 22, 1941
"(Urgent)
"# 812

"To both you Ambassadors.

"It is awfully hard for us to consider changing the date we set in my #736. You should know this, however, I know you are working hard. Stick to our fixed policy and do your very best. Spare no efforts and try to bring about the solution we desire. There are reasons beyond your ability to guess why we wanted to settle Japanese-American relations by the 25th, but if within the next three or four days you can finish your conversations with the Americans; if the signing can be completed by the 29th, (let me write it out for you - twenty-ninth); if the pertinent notes can be exchanged; if we can get an understanding with Great Britain and the Netherlands; and in short if everything can be finished we have decided to wait until that date. This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen. Please take this into your careful consideration and work harder than you ever have before. This, for the present, is for the information of you two Ambassadors alone."
(cf. Intercepts # 812, Page 165, Exhibit 1, our record)

Did you telephone the President on the night of the 22 concerning this intercepted message? (cf. How War Came, page 304)

Answer:

To the best of my recollection I did not telephone to the President on the night of the 22nd of November in regard to the intercepted message quoted in the question, and I find no record of having made such a call.

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115. Question:

Did you on November 26 hand the Japanese Ambassador an oral statement which rejected the Japanese note of November 20?

Answer:

Please refer to my replies to your questions nos. 6 and 7.

116. Question:

Did you, at the same time, hand them a tentative ten-point proposal for a broad settlement of the Pacific situation?

Answer:

Please refer to my reply to your question no. 8.

117. Question:

Did the Japanese Ambassadors say that their Government would throw up its hands because of these American documents and that their nature was tantamount to meaning the end of the conversations?

Answer:

What the Japanese representatives said is covered in the memorandum of my conversation of November 26, 1941 with the Japanese representatives, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, Volume II, pages 764-766.

As I saw the situation at that time, the Japanese had in fact already thrown up their hands, and, as subsequent disclosures show, their fleets and armed forces were then moving for an attack on some five points extending over a vast space. The attitude evinced by the Japanese on the occasion under reference was confirmatory of their fixed purpose of requiring us to surrender our basic policy while they maintained intact their policy of aggression and force.

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118. Question:

Did the reports of the Japanese Ambassadors to their Government concerning the meeting of November 26, reports known to you by the interception of the messages to Tokyo, coincide in the main with your understanding of what had taken place on November 26th?

Answer:

The published record of this Government (Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, Volume II, pages 764-766) contains a full account of the substance of the conversation which I had with the Japanese representatives on November 26. The accounts in the Japanese intercepted messages of that conversation in order to be correctly evaluated must be considered in the light of the background of the situation. It is my understanding that the main object of the Japanese Government in pressing for a reply to their November 20 proposal was to ascertain beyond any doubt whether this Government would yield to the Japanese or whether this Government was going to stand firm, and if the Japanese had learned that we were standing firm they would continue forward with their movement to attack. Our position of not yielding was already as clear as crystal to the Japanese Ambassadors, and all their talk of being "dumbfounded" at the nature of our November 26 proposal was a prelude to an attempt, by outrageously false statements uttered in the utmost of bad faith, to shift to this Government responsibility for what they were planning. As showing this thought was specifically in their minds, I quote from the Japanese message 1190 of November 26, appearing on pages 182 and 183 of Exhibit 1, as follows:

"The United States is using the excuse that she is at present negotiating with the various competent countries. In view of the fact that she will propagandize that we are continuing these negotiations only with the view of preparing for our expected moves, should we, during the course of these conversations, deliberately enter into our scheduled operations, there is great danger that the responsibility for the rupture of negotiations will be cast upon us. There have been times in the past when she could have considered discontinuing conversations because of our invasion of French Indo-China. Now, should we, without clarifying our intentions, force a rupture in our negotiations and suddenly enter upon independent operations, there

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is great fear that she may use such a thing as that as counterpropaganda against us."

The foregoing is a virtual admission that the Japanese Ambassador recognized that responsibility for a rupture would be Japan's and of a purpose to attempt to shift that responsibility.

119. Question:

There is, in the record, an intercepted message from Tokyo, # 823, Page 173, which advises Nomura and Kurusu that the deadline fixed for November 29 was to be reckoned in Tokyo time: thus when the President left Washington for Warm Springs at 3 P.M. on November 28, the time in Tokyo was 5 A.M. of November 29; do you know if there were any coincidence in the fact that the President was leaving Washington at the time of the expiration of the deadline set by Tokyo?

Answer:

I do not myself recall anything on this point. The fact was that for some days the President and I believed that the chances of meeting the crisis by diplomacy had practically vanished.

On the day the President left for Warm Springs, November 28, he told the press that he was leaving on a vacation that had twice been postponed, and that while he did not know when he would return, he hoped that it need not be before December 2, adding that he might have to return because of existing conditions in the Pacific. Asked how long he expected these conditions to exist, the President referred the inquirer to Tokyo rather than to Washington.

120. Question:

In a talk at the Thanksgiving Day dinner at Warm Springs on the night of November 29 the President said, speaking in terms of the Thanksgiving of the following year: "It is always possible that our boys

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at the military and naval academies may actually be fighting for the defense of these American institutions of ours" (cf N.Y. Times, November 30): in the circumstances would you say that the limitation to the boys of the military and naval academies was intended to have particular significance to the Japanese or to the American people?

Answer:

I, myself, would not be a party to giving the President's statement the narrow construction suggested. The statement, directed toward national defense and made to an American audience, speaks for itself.

Questions 121 and 122 are grouped in a single answer.

121. Question:

I have found, Mr. Secretary, a discrepancy in the date given by you in your statement to the Committee as to an address by Premier Tojo of Japan and your telephoning the President concerning that address and other developments; on pages 43-44 of your statement the date is fixed as of Sunday, November 30; the New York Times of the morning of November 30, fixes both occurrences as of November 29 and gives this authorized statement by the President's Secretary, Mr. Early, issued at Warm Springs on the night of November 29: I quote Mr. Early's statement: "As soon as the President returned to the cottage following the dinner this evening he found a call waiting from the Secretary of State, and they held a lengthy conversation. In view of the reported statement - an Associated Press dispatch by the Premier of Japan, the President tonight is of the opinion that he may have to leave Warm Springs tomorrow afternoon, arranging the railroad schedule so as to arrive in Washington Monday before noon": in view of this record would you say that the Tojo speech was delivered on November 29 and that you telephoned the President concerning it on November 29?

122. Question:

Will you give that conversation between you and the President.

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Answer:

I seem to have telephoned the President on November 29 instead of on November 30 as, by inadvertence, was inaccurately stated in my prepared statement to the Committee. The statement of Premier Tojo was, according to State Department records, delivered in the form of a message to a Japanese meeting held on November 30. (See Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941, Volume II, page 148.) The apparent discrepancy in time may have resulted from the fact that Japanese time is about 14 hours later than Washington time, or perhaps the message may have been available to the press prior to its delivery.

I have no record of exactly what was said in that telephone conversation. As I told the Committee in my prepared statement, in that conversation I advised the President to advance the date of his return to Washington.

Questions 123 and 124 are grouped in a single answer.

123. Question:

From Page 195 of the record of the Intercepts, Ex. 1, I quote:

"(Secret)

"From Tokyo
"To Washington
"November 28, 1941
"# 844
"Re your file #1189

"Well you two Ambassadors have exerted superhuman efforts but, in spite of this, the United States has gone ahead and presented this humiliating proposal. This was quite unexpected and extremely regrettable. The Imperial Government can by no means use it as a basis for negotiations. THEREFORE, WITH A REPORT OF THE VIEWS OF THE IMPERIAL GOVERNMENT ON THIS AMERICAN PROPOSAL WHICH I WILL SEND YOU IN TWO OR THREE DAYS, THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE DE FACTO RUPTURED. This is