

Doc 2890 - 2894 Evid

Folder 7

(46)

P. Lopez  
13 Jan. 47

LIST OF DOCUMENTS RE DEFENDANTS

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Def. Imp.</u>	<u>Description</u>
<del>4111</del>	Muto	Extract from interrogation of General Akira MUTO, dated 19 April 1946
EXH. <del>_____</del>	"	Extract from interrogation of (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi, dated 7 February 1946, pg. 251
<del>4108</del>	"	Extract from interrogation of MUTO, Akira, dated 15 April 1946
<del>4109</del>	"	Extract from interrogation of MUTO, Akira dated 16 April 1946
<del>2273</del>	"	Extract from interrogation of MUTO, Akira, dated 22 April 1946
<del>2898</del>	"	Extract from interrogation of MATSUOKA, Yosuke dated 15 March 1946
<del>2894</del>	"	Extract from statement of TOGO, Shigenori dated 22 and 28 February 1946.
<del>4118</del>	"	Extract from interrogation of TOGO, Shigenori, dated 19 March 1946.
<del>2890</del>	"	Excerpt from interrogation of OKA, Takazumi, 30 March 1946.
<del>4113</del>	"	Extract from interrogation of TOGO, Shigenori, dated 8 March 1946.
<del>4116</del>	"	Extract from interrogation of TOGO, Shigenori, dated 11 March 1946.
<del>2892</del>	"	Extract from interrogation of TOGO, Shigenori dated 11 March 1946.
<del>2891</del>	"	Excerpts from interrogation of TOGO, Shigenori dated 13 March 1946.
<del>2947</del>	"	Excerpt from "The Japan Times & Mail," for Thursday, March 21, 1940, article entitled "Muto Flays Bureaucrats and Parties."
<del>2893</del>	"	Extract from interrogation of TOGO, Shigenori dated 26 March 1946
<del>2948</del>	"	Affidavit of TANAKA, Ryukichi, dated 3 Jan. 46.

HA-B }  
2534A } Kimura

P. Lopez  
14 Jan. '47

LIST OF DOCUMENTS RE DEFENDANTS

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Def. Imp.</u>	<u>Description</u>
2910	Itagaki	Extract from KIDO DIARY, dated January 11, 1932.
1632 (W) 8	"	Extract from KIDO DIARY, dated May 30, 1935
2911	"	Extract from interrogation of KIDO, dated February 7, 1946.
2943A-1	"	Telegram No. 623 sent by Consul-General HAYASHI at Mukden to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA, 19 September 1931.
2943A-3	"	Cablegram from Consul-General HAYASHI to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA, dated 21 September 1931.
4134	"	Excerpt from interrogation of KIDO, dated February 14, 1946.
4135	"	Extract from interrogation of KIDO, dated February 15, 1946 - 1400-1600 hours.
2912	"	Excerpt from interrogation of KIDO, dated February 15, 1946 - 1400-1600 hours.
2905	"	Extract from interrogation of DOIHARA, dated February 5, 1946
2909	"	Extract from interrogation of DOIHARA, dated February 12, 1946
2789	"	Cable No. 1532 sent by Consul-General HAYASHI at Mukden on December 14, 1931 to Foreign Minister INUKAI.
2895	"	Extract from interrogation of ARAKI, dated February 14, 1946. <i>Cancelled</i>
2906	"	Extract from interrogation of SHIRATORI, dated March 19, 1946.
2788	"	Cable No. 1258 sent by Consul-General HAYASHI at Mukden to Foreign Minister SHIDEHARA, 12 November 1931.
625	"	Extracts from "Army Records of the China Incident" issued in February 1939 by the Vice Minister of War, addressed to armed forces concerned in Japan proper, Korea, Formosa and Manchuria.
2904	"	Extract from interrogation of HIRANUMA, dated January 12, 1946
2913	"	Article from Japan Advertiser dated Sunday, June 26, 1938, entitled "Long Preparedness is Urged by ITAGAKI".

<u>Doc. No.</u>	<u>Def. Imp.</u>	<u>Description</u>
4047-C	Itagaki	Two cablegrams sent on 11 and 18 August 1939 by Ambassador OTT from Tokyo to the German Foreign Minister, and a third cablegram sent by OTT for O.K.H. and O.K.L. and for the Army High Command and Air High Command on 6 September 1939.
✓ 2957	"	Article appearing in Japan Advertiser dated Sunday, 2 October 1938.
✓ 2958	"	Article appearing in Japan Advertiser dated March 17, 1939, entitled "Japanese Press Comments".
✓ 2959	"	Article appearing in Japan Times & Mail, dated July 7, 1939, entitled "ITAGAKI, YONAI Score Powers".

INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION SECTION

Doc. Nos. 2890 - 2894, incl

16 Jan 1947

ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT

Title and Nature: Extracts from Interrogation of Defendants TOGO, Shigenori and OKA, Takazumi

Date: 1946 Original  Copy  Language: English

Has it been translated? Yes  No

Has it been photostated? Yes  No

LOCATION OF ORIGINAL

Document Division

SOURCE OF ORIGINAL: Document Division

PERSONS IMPLICATED: MUTO, Akiba; (TOGO, Shigenori; OKA, Takazumi)

CRIMES TO WHICH DOCUMENT APPLICABLE:

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT POINTS

2890 - Interrogation of OKA, 30 March 1946

2891 - Interrogation of TOGO, 13 March 1946

2892 - Interrogation of TOGO, 11 March 1946

2893 - Interrogation of TOGO, 26 March 1946

2894 - Interrogation of TOGO, 22 and 28 February 1946

Analyst: W.H. WAGNER

Doc. Nos. 2890-2894, incl

CHARGE OUT SLIP

DATE \_\_\_\_\_ 1947 .

EVIDENTIARY DOC. NO. 2890

TRIAL BRIEF \_\_\_\_\_

EXHIBIT NO. \_\_\_\_\_

BACKGROUND DOC. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FILE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

PRESENT TRANS \_\_\_\_\_

U.S.S.B.S. \_\_\_\_\_

DEFENSE DOC. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_

Room # \_\_\_\_\_

Excerpt from Interrogation of OKA, Takazumi, 30 March 1946.

Page 7, 8, 9

- Q. As I understand it, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau is a very powerful position in the Government. Is that right?
- A. Yes, it is.
- Q. As Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau your position was comparable in power to the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. Is that right?
- A. Yes, it was comparable but the work which the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau did was different - our duties were different.
- Q. I understand that your duties would be different but your position as to power was comparable. Is that right?
- A. Yes. As you know, the influence the Army had with the Cabinet was stronger than that of the Navy. In this respect, our strength differed.
- Q. Akira MUTO was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau at this time, was he not?
- A. Yes, he was.
- Q. Did not MUTO and you frequently contact the Foreign Office in connection with the drafting of the final notification to the United States?
- A. We didn't have any discussions.
- Q. Did you and MUTO contact the Foreign Office in connection with the drafting of the final notification?
- A. Yes we did. However, I don't recall the contents of the message.
- Q. With reference to the final note that was delivered in Washington on December 7, 1941, did you have any part in preparation of this note?
- A. I only read it. I did not make any of it up.
- Q. Did you or MUTO make any revisions in the note during the period of drafting it?
- A. I do not know about MUTO but I didn't do anything to it at all.
- Q. When did you first read the note?
- A. I don't remember.
- Q. If Mr. TOGO should say that you and MUTO kept in constant touch with the Foreign Office and took part in revising the note before its final preparation, would you say he was mistaken?
- A. I really am not sure about it. I do admit I went to the Foreign Ministry quite often, also MUTO, but as far as correcting the final draft goes, I do not remember, so what Mr. TOGO says may or may not be true.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Cecil Uyehara, Civ.  
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30 day of March, 1946.

G. C. Hardin  
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Bernice Orr, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Bernice Orr

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (we) Grover C. Hardin, \_\_\_\_\_,  
and \_\_\_\_\_,

certify that on the 30 day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me ~~at~~ Takazumi OKA and according to Cecil Uyehara, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan  
Place

G. C. Hardin

March 30, 1946  
Date



INTERROGATION OF

OKA, Takazumi

Date and Time: 30 March 1946, 0900 - 1145 hours  
Place : Room 618, Meiji Building, Tokyo, Japan  
Present : OKA, Takazumi

Mr. Grover C. Hardin Interrogator  
Mr. Cecil Uyehara Interpreter  
Miss Bernice Orr Stenographer

Oath of Interpreter, administered by  
Mr. Grover Hardin:

Mr. Hardin : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that  
you will truly and accurately interpret and  
translate from English into Japanese and from  
Japanese into English, as may be required of  
you, in this proceeding?

Mr. Uyehara : I do.

Questions by : Mr. Hardin

Q. Where do you live now?

A. I live at Tsurumi.

Q. Do you live on a farm?

A. It is my own house.

Q. What business are you engaged in now?

A. I have no occupation at present.

Q. How much of a family do you have?

A. I am by myself with a maid.

Exhibit # 2890  
(Evid. Doc)

OKA, Takazumi

30 March 1946

- Q. Have you ever had a family?
- A. There was my mother but she died.
- Q. You have never been married?
- A. No.
- Q. How many brothers and sisters do you have?
- A. They have all died through sickness.
- Q. So you are alone now?
- A. That is right.
- Q. When did you retire from the Navy?
- A. In June of last year (1945).
- Q. You were born in 1890?
- A. That is right.
- Q. What month?
- A. In February.
- Q. Where were you educated?
- A. At the Naval Academy (Kai Gunheigakko).
- Q. What year did you graduate?
- A. In 1911.
- Q. You remained in the Naval Service from that time until 1945?
- A. That is correct.
- Q. Please outline your Naval career from the time you were graduated from the Naval Academy, giving the various positions you held from 1911 until the time of your retirement in June, 1945.

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- A. In 1912, I was commissioned a Second Sub-Lieutenant and was assigned to the battleship "Katori" and soon after transferred to the battleship "Hie". Not long after that I went to the Gunnery School and Torpedo School, graduated and became a Sub-Lieutenant of the First Class. Then I was assigned to a destroyer for six months and then transferred to a submarine and became an advanced student of the Torpedo School. After one year I graduated and assigned to a submarine and was promoted to a full Lieutenant of the Navy. Then in 1921, I entered the Naval Staff College (Kai Gundaigakko) and graduated after two years. Upon graduation from this college I was promoted to Lieutenant Commander. Then I was appointed instructor to the Submarine School and after six months I went to France. I remained in France for one year then I went to Constantinople where I stayed for one year and returned to Japan.
- Q. What was the purpose of your time spent in Constantinople and France?
- A. I went to Paris for studying. I went to Constantinople to attend the Straits Committee, which was a Committee in the League of Nations. After I returned to Japan, I was assigned to a submarine. After six months I was taken ill and took a holiday for one year. Then after recovering, I was appointed to the Naval General Staff. At the time of the Disarmament Conference at Geneva of the three nations, I was doing that work.
- Q. That is, you were a delegate from Japan?
- A. I was doing that work in Japan at the time the conference was taking place.
- Q. I do not quite understand what work you were doing in Japan in connection with the Disarmament Conference.
- A. I received reports from the conference and gathered them together and ordered to make such replies. That is the kind of work I did, liaison work between Japan and the conference.
- Q. You were, so to speak, the liaison agent or officer in Japan to negotiate between the Cabinet or authority here and the League?
- A. I was mainly occupied in liaison work in regards to Naval affairs with the Foreign Office.
- Q. Then I understand that you were all the time in the Navy and represented the Navy as liaison officer here at home?

OKA, Takazumi

30 March 1946

- A. At that time I was Lieutenant Commander, therefore I was not the representative, I just did the dirty work in regards to reports, gathering them and liaison work.
- Q. Your job was ministerial then and not executive?
- A. My work was ministerial.
- Q. At the same time you knew, you became acquainted with the work of the Geneva Conference?
- A. I do not remember much of the Geneva Conference as I had just entered this work. I was doing this liaison work for some time. Then I was connected with the London Conference and the Geneva Disarmament Conference.
- Q. When was it that you were connected with the Geneva Conference as liaison officer?
- A. I was connected with the Geneva Conference after the Three Power Conference: Great Britain, America and Japan.
- Q. For how long a time were you connected with the Geneva Conference?
- A. I do not remember exactly the number of years, it was quite a long time. In 1918 I went to Geneva and I was then connected with the Conference.
- Q. When were you in France as a student?
- A. In 1924.
- Q. All right, was your experience in Geneva after that or before that?
- A. It was four or five years after.
- Q. Then it was about 1928 or 1929?
- A. It was about 1930 that I was in the Geneva Conference. I went to Geneva in 1918 and in 1930 I did that sort of work in Japan. After staying about one year in Geneva, I returned to Japan and then appointed Chief of the Research Section of the Navy Ministry (Chosak). While I was in Geneva I was promoted to Captain and then returned and became the Chief of the above mentioned Section.

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After one year I was appointed Captain of the "Jinei" which is the Mother Ship of a submarine. After one year I was appointed Chief of the First Section of the Navy Affairs Bureau at the end of 1937. I stayed there for two years at the end of which time I was promoted to Rear Admiral. Then I was appointed Chief of the Third Department of the Navy General Staff. After one year I was appointed Chief of the Navy Affairs Bureau. In 1942 I was promoted to Vice Admiral. In 1944, I became Naval Vice Minister which after ten days I resigned. Then I was transferred to the Navy General Staff. In September I was appointed Commander and Chief of the Chinkai Keibufu. I again was assigned to the Navy General Staff in April, 1945. Then in June I was put on the Reserve list. That is the end.

- Q. Were you stationed in Japan in 1941?
- A. I was in Japan during 1941.
- Q. Admiral, were you here in Tokyo on December 8th?
- A. I was in Tokyo.
- Q. And at that time you were on the Navy General Staff?
- A. At that time I was in the Naval Affairs Bureau.
- Q. You were one of the secretaries of the Bureau at that time, weren't you, Admiral?
- A. At that time I was Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau.
- Q. How long before that had you been Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau?
- A. About one year.
- Q. How long did you remain Chief after December, 1941?
- A. About two and one half years.
- Q. As Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, you were present at the liaison conferences along in November and December, 1941, weren't you?
- A. I attended most of the liaison conferences but which ones I do not remember.

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- Q. Did you attend any Imperial Conferences along in October, November or December, 1941?
- A. I attended the Imperial Conference in November.
- Q. Was there an Imperial Conference in December, before the December 8th incident?
- A. I think there was an Imperial Conference before December 8th.
- Q. You acted as one of the secretaries of the liaison conference?
- A. I was one of the secretaries.
- Q. You kept in contact with the Foreign Office in the discussions with reference to the differences with the United States and the Hull notes, didn't you?
- A. I did.
- Q. Were you present at the meeting when the letter in reply to Hull's final note was drafted?
- A. I do not remember as to whether or not I attended the meeting or whether or not there was any such conference.
- Q. You were present at the Imperial Conference on December 1st or 2nd, weren't you Admiral?
- A. Most probably I was.
- Q. Wasn't there quite a discussion at that meeting about the treaty obligation between Japan and the United States and Great Britain?
- A. I do not remember them discussing treaty matters.
- Q. There was a definite agreement that there would be an attack on the United States and that Japan would go to war with the United States, wasn't there?
- A. There was almost none of those sort of things discussed at that meeting.
- Q. They were discussed at the liaison meetings, weren't they?

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A. At the December 2nd Imperial Conference, it was decided that war was inevitable but as to when the United States would be attacked and such strategic problems were not discussed. They said that they were going to continue diplomatic negotiations for some time yet.

Q. When was the note written that called off diplomatic relations?

A. I do not remember, I think the Foreign Office drafted it.

Q. All the rest of the men present there say that it was read at this meeting and that you were present.

A. I do not remember well, they may have been read.

Q. Who was the Admiral in charge of the fleet that attacked the Philippines?

A. I do not remember but if you ask the Repatriation Department, they will soon tell you.

Q. There was a meeting at the Naval Academy on December 3rd of the high officials in the Navy, wasn't there?

A. I do not know when they held strategic conferences because I do not know of strategy. If they held strategic conferences, I did not know of it.

Q. It was not a strategic conference. You were present when it was told that they would attack Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 8th and that the operations order would be given for the fleet, the Second or Third Fleet, which ever it was, to attack the Philippines would take place immediately, weren't you?

A. I did not attend any such meetings in regards to Pearl Harbor.

Q. Did you ever hear much of them making an attack on Pearl Harbor?

A. I don't remember how I obtained the information whether by hearing it or by reading reports but I knew of it after the middle of November. I most probably obtained the information by reading reports. The American side has asked me if there were any such documents so I went with that person to the Repatriation Department but we were not able to find any and the Repatriation Department sent a note containing the words which the members of that Department remembered in regard to the above incident.

Q. Do you not know that we now have the minutes of all those meetings?

A. I did not know. I am often asked but I do not remember them so well especially those in regards to the conferences.

- Q. In October, you had a talk with Prince Konoye about the subject of a war with America, didn't you, Admiral?
- A. I have not had many chances to talk personally with Prince Konoye.
- Q. You told him everybody but the Navy General Staff seemed to want war with America?
- A. I do not remember saying such a thing and I do not remember the time I met Prince Konoye. Amongst the Navy, most of them did not want war.
- Q. But the Army were the ones who were more in favor of it?
- A. In the conferences between Admiral NOMURA and Hull, the problem of removing the Japanese troops from China was brought up. In regards to the Navy, they were only garrisoned in Shanghai and the Navy's opinion was that it was quite easy to remove their forces but as to the Army, it was not a very easy job to remove their forces. Therefore, I thought that the negotiations between America and Japan would be rather difficult.
- Q. As Chief of the Navy Affairs Bureau, you were the officer through whom all other governmental functions dealt with the Navy. That is, you represented the Navy as head man in the conferences with other government offices.
- A. I was the representative.
- Q. Your conclusion was to leave the question of whether there would be war with the United States up to the Prime Minister?
- A. I did not give this to the Prime Minister, the Navy Minister did.
- Q. Who was the Navy Minister?
- A. Admiral OIKAWA.
- Q. Of course, the main subject of conversations and discussions of all meetings now through October, November and December was relations with the United States, wasn't it?
- A. On the whole, it was.
- Q. Admiral, TOJO was Prime Minister in December, 1941, wasn't he?



OKA, Takazumi

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- A. TOJO was Prime Minister in October of that year.
- Q. And continued to be all through that year and up to 1944?
- A. Yes. He was Prime Minister up until the spring of 1944.
- Q. Now, Admiral, about this Imperial Conference just before the declaration of war, that was on the 1st or 2nd of December, wasn't it?
- A. I do not remember whether it was held on the 1st, 2nd or 3rd, but it was held in the beginning of December.
- Q. And you were present at that Conference whenever it was held?
- A. Yes, I was present.
- Q. Did you act as secretary of that Conference as you had in the liaison conferences?
- A. I acted in the same capacity.
- Q. The question of the war with the United States was the main issue for discussion at that time at the conferences, wasn't it?
- A. That is right.
- Q. And they discussed there the question of the note that would be sent to the United States?
- A. I remember that the question was that war was inevitable.
- Q. And they discussed what sort of note the Foreign Office would write to the United States?
- A. I do not remember as to whether that sort of thing was discussed.
- Q. You remember that the form or the contents of the note was discussed in that meeting, don't you?
- A. They did not discuss that sort of thing so much.
- Q. They did discuss there the method of attack and how the war would be started, didn't they?
- A. The question was by looking at Mr. Hull's note they thought that the negotiations would not succeed and war was inevitable. I do not remember as to what questions were discussed incidentally at that

- Conference. At the Imperial Conferences it was just for formality and no big discussions were made there.
- Q. The Emperor said nothing, did he?
- A. He said that we must try and avoid the war as much as possible and he read a poem of Emperor Meiji and I think it was at this conference.
- Q. Do you recall what the contents or the substance of that poem was?
- A. I do not remember this poem so well as I do not have much interest in poems, but the general outline of it was why all the people of the world were in so much trouble.....
- Q. Well, at that same Imperial Conference Mr. Hull's note of November 26th was read to the Conference, wasn't it?
- A. I do not remember whether it was read or not.
- Q. Now don't you remember, Admiral, refresh your memory, that that note was read and also the Foreign Minister's reply had been prepared and it was read?
- A. I do not remember.
- Q. TOJO was present there, wasn't he?
- A. Yes, he was present.
- Q. Was a vote taken at the Imperial Conference on whether to call off negotiations with the United States or not?
- A. That sort of thing was not done.
- Q. At what conference was that done?
- A. That was not done at all.
- Q. Do you mean that there was no agreement and conference at which a decision was made to go to war?
- A. There was such a conference but at none of these conferences was there a vote held.
- Q. Everybody expressed his opinion at the conference?
- A. That is correct.

- Q. But you mean to tell me that there was just no formal vote taken?
- A. There was no voting but nobody spoke against it.
- Q. You mean everybody present spoke for the outbreak of war?
- A. Rather they said that war was inevitable rather than agreement with it.
- Q. But nobody spoke up against it?
- A. I think that nobody said anything against it.
- Q. Who was present representing the Army at these meetings?
- A. The War Minister and the Chief of the Army General Staff and perhaps the Vice Chief of the Army General Staff.
- Q. And on the Navy side, were the Navy Minister and the Navy Chief of Staff and the Vice Navy Chief of Staff present?
- A. Same as the Army, the Vice Chief was perhaps present.
- Q. Who was the Navy Minister in November and December, 1941?
- A. Admiral SHIMADA.
- Q. Who was the Vice Chief of Navy General Staff at that time?
- A. Admiral ITO. He is dead now.
- Q. Your position was Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau at that time?
- A. That is right.
- Q. What was said about how the war would be started against the United States?
- A. After the middle of November I heard of such plans.
- Q. And that was that Japan would take advantage of the situation to gain as much advantage in the initial attack as she could?
- A. The Navy's opinion was to conquer the South Seas and to establish power of entrance.
- Q. Admiral, when they decided to make the attack on Pearl Harbor, even the Japanese authorities did not expect that America would be taken by so much surprise as they were, did they?

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- A. They thought that it would not be such a big incident.
- Q. What time of day was it here in Tokyo when the news got back of the attack and the results of it?
- A. It was still dark.
- Q. Can you remember now the name of the Admiral who was in Command of the fleet in the Philippines attack on the day following the Pearl Harbor attack?
- A. It was Admiral KONDO.
- Q. That is right. I have read Admiral KONDO's interrogation and he was the man. Now, Admiral KONDO says that on the 3rd of December there was a meeting in which they were told that attack on Pearl Harbor would occur on the morning of the 8th. This was in a liaison conference of the Navy people.
- A. Most probably I did not attend this meeting. I think this was a meeting of the Navy General Staff.
- Q. Who was the overall Commander of the Navy?
- A. Prince FUSHIMI and if you omit Prince FUSHIMI, it was Admiral NAGANO.
- Q. Now, Admiral NAGANO is the man who gave instructions on the 3rd of December that Pearl Harbor would be attacked on the morning of the 8th, isn't he?
- A. Probably he was. I do not know whether it was the 3rd or not.
- Q. But it was at least some days before the 8th?
- A. Yes, but if negotiations between America and Japan were successful, we were ready to act accordingly.
- Q. Although the present plans were to attack Pearl Harbor on the 8th, they were still open minded to the negotiations with the United States and ready to recall that order or plan to attack?
- A. Yes, there was such an order issued.
- Q. But the chief difficulty with Hull's note was that he still insisted that Japan withdraw its Army from the China area?
- A. That is right.

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- Q. And Japan had determined that she wouldn't do that?
- A. I think Prince Konoye was thinking of removing the troops from China and in regards to the Navy, it was all right with us to remove our troops from China and the Navy told Prince Konoye that we would leave it up to him and if he said retreat from China, we would.
- Q. But if he said don't retreat then you would go along with him under war?
- A. Yes, we left that up to Prince Konoye.
- Q. Admiral, who were the chief leaders in determining the issue here about war with the United States?
- A. TOJO.
- Q. And who were the chief backers or supporters in the movement even outside the Government?
- A. I do not know of those sort of people and from my principals I did not meet such people so I do not know their names. The Navy did not keep company with such people and organizations and they did not come near us.
- Q. What were some of the organizations that you refer to?
- A. They were the radical parties scattered all over the place, for example, Mr. Shumei OKAWA. I think most probably there were many such kind of people around Prince Konoye.
- Q. Prince Konoye is dead now?
- A. Yes.
- Q. He was one of the chief men in that influence, wasn't he?
- A. I do not understand in what influence.
- Q. Promoting the idea of war and aggression.
- A. Prince Konoye tried to avoid the war as much as possible but he was overruled by the War Ministry at that time and so he resigned.
- Q. Who was the War Minister at that time?
- A. General TOJO.

- Q. Do you know General MAZAKI?
- A. I have heard of him but I did not meet him personally.
- Q. What did you think about his trial in 1936?
- A. I do not know much of the trial and have no special opinion.
- Q. What do you know about the affair of February 26, 1936?
- A. I do not know the deep origin of that incident, afterwards I read all sorts of things and found out the origin.
- Q. What did you find out from reading was the origin of it?
- A. It was the conflict in the Army of the different groups, together with that there were many people who upheld militarism.
- Q. Do you remember the names of the men who were convicted and executed over that business?
- A. I do not remember.
- Q. Do you remember the officers who were assassinated?
- A. I remember some of those who were killed on February 26, 1936 and May 15, 1936, but I do not remember what officers were assassinated.
- Q. Where were you at that time, February 26, 1936?
- A. I was in the Navy Ministry located in Tokyo. I do not remember well about the May 15th incident, I think I was in Geneva, perhaps, when the May 15th incident occurred.
- Q. How did you personally feel about this war with the United States when it was brought on?
- A. Once a war is started, we have to do our best and try to win it but from the very beginning things did not work out so well.
- Q. Before the war was started, how did you feel about bringing on the war?
- A. I did not think it was advisable to start a war and to the end I kept on negotiating with the Chief of the American Bureau in the Foreign Office.
- Q. Who was that man?
- A. Mr. Taro TERAZAKI

OKA, Takazumi

30 March 1946

- Q. Was he an American in the American Foreign Office here?
- A. No, he was a Japanese in the Japanese Office.
- Q. You mean you kept negotiating with the Japanese office called the American Bureau through which you dealt with the Americans?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did you know General Ott, the German Ambassador?
- A. I know of him but I have not personally talked with him.
- Q. Didn't he bestow upon you a Merit of Honor of some type from Hitler in Germany?
- A. Yes, I received such a metal.
- Q. General Ott, himself, delivered that to you in the German Embassy, didn't he?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What was the occasion for Germany bestowing that upon you?
- A. I do not know but when they wish to give these metals to the Navy they instruct the Navy that these metals will be given and the Adjutant would say give it to so and so.
- Q. You mean, Admiral, that the Army would decide who would receive these badges of honor?
- A. No, it was decided by the Navy Minister as to whom should receive them.
- Q. Do you know on what basis it was determined who would receive them?
- A. For instance in the Japan-German Pact, they had an exchange of metals or honors and even though your work may not have been related to the Pact, you would be given them.
- Q. What do you know about the Tri-Partite Pact?
- A. As I was the Chief of the Third Department of the Navy General Staff, I was not directly connected with it, but when it was concluded I went to Foreign Minister MATSUOKA and asked why it was signed and concluded.

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- Q. What did MATSUOKA say?
- A. We had a long talk and among them one was to avoid war with America, that was the best thing.
- Q. You mean he thought that by signing that Pact with Italy and Germany that it would avoid war with America?
- A. Yes, he thought that. I asked him several times to make sure.
- Q. Did you think that would help avoid war with America?
- A. I thought that it would be rather dangerous.
- Q. Of course now you know it was dangerous, don't you?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What do you know about the Anti Comintern Pact?
- A. I had almost no relations in regards to the Anti Comintern Pact. I want to make a note here, from the Navy's point of view it has been their tradition not to make such a pact with Germany or Italy and from the very beginning the Navy did not agree with this pact.
- Q. Then it looks like the Army folk pursued this program that brought about the war, doesn't it?
- A. I do not know of that but the Navy has no political power.
- Q. Who did have political power, Admiral?
- A. It was the Army and the Bureaucrats.
- Q. What was the KAMPEI TAI?
- A. I do not know very much of the KAMPEI TAI but in order to investigate and control criminal cases in the Navy, the KAMPEI TAI had to receive directions from the Navy Minister. The Navy Minister was asked to come and give an address and the outline of his address would always be treat the Navy people in a fair and just way.
- Q. Well, Admiral, what were the other organizations that had big political influence?
- A. I do not know what organizations had political power. As I mentioned before, I did not meet such people.



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Q. Of course you knew there were a lot of them in the country?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And these people were the agitators and radicals?

A. Most of them were radical.

Q. Did you know Dr. Shumei OGAWA?

A. No, I do not. I have only heard of his name.

Q. Well, you knew that he was well known in Japan, doing a lot of writing, speech making and teaching?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. And you knew him as a radical writer and teacher?

A. I do not know what kind of things he said as I have no interest in them.

Q. Didn't you ever read his book?

A. No, I have not.

Q. Did you have any connection with Section One, Department One, of the Board of Information at that time?

A. I do not understand, the Government Board of Information?

Q. Yes.

A. I had no direct relation.

Q. What was your relation?

A. People were sent out from the Navy Minister to the Board of Information.

Q. What did you have to do with being sent out or sending anybody out?

A. When the Board of Information requested such personnel, I, as Chief of the Navy Affairs Bureau, sent them.

Q. Did this organization get information from you or did you get information from the Bureau?

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A. That Board of Information was a sort of propaganda organization in the country for Japan.

Q. And it sought information from your Department?

A. For instance, on Navy day they would come and ask us what to do, the things that would be best for us to do and in regards to the Navy, they came and conferred with us.

- - -

Certificate of Interpreter

I, A. E. Klausner, 2nd Lt., 0934776  
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 9 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Arthur E. Klausner

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 30th day of March, 1946.

Roy L. Morgan  
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Hannah Kato, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Hannah Kato

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~xx~~) Roy Morgan, Chief, Investigative Division,

~~and~~ \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_

certify that on the 30th day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~xx~~) Admiral Takazumi OKA and according to 2nd Lt. A. E. Klausner, Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Room 730, Meiji Building  
Place Tokyo, Japan

30 March 1946  
Date

Roy L. Morgan

INTERROGATION OF

Admiral OKA, Takazumi

30 March 1946

INTERROGATED BY: ROY MORGAN

FILE NO. 37

Exhibit # 2890  
(8th Doc)

INTERROGATION OF

Admiral OKA, Takazumi

Date and Time: 30 March 1946, 1500 - 1700 hours  
Place : Room 730, Meiji Building, Tokyo, Japan  
Present : OKA, Takazumi (Admiral)  
Mr. Roy Morgan, Interrogator  
2nd Lt. A. E. Klauser, Interpreter  
Miss Hannah Kato, Stenographer  
Mr. A. A. Muzzey

Oath of Interpreter, administered by Mr. Morgan:

Mr. Morgan : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

Lt. Klauser : I do.

Questions by : Mr. Morgan.

Q. I understand you are Admiral Takazumi OKA. Is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. What were your duties during October of 1941?

A. I was Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau from October 14, 1941 to June 1944.

Q. Were there a number of liaison conferences between October 23, 1941 and December 8, 1941, which you attended?

A. Yes.

Admiral OKA - continued

Q. Who attended these liaison conferences?

A. TOJO, SHIMADA, KAYA, SUZUKI, NAGANO, SUGIYAMA, HOSHINO, ITO, MUTO, TSUKADA and myself.

Q. Did you have an active part in these conferences?

A. I was secretary at these conferences and went almost all the time.

Q. What were your duties as a secretary? Did you voice any opinions?

A. I did not give any opinions.

Q. I understand from Mr. TOGO that you voiced your opinion many times during these conferences. Is that right?

A. I only voiced it so far as explaining sentences.

Q. What do you mean by explaining sentences?

A. I wrote sentences that naval officials or other officials had spoken in these meetings and explained them back.

Q. I understand that you, as Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, voiced your opinion. Is this true?

A. Just in explaining is the only time I expressed an opinion.

Q. What were the discussions about during these conferences?

A. We spoke of many things.

Q. What were the things?

A. Diplomatic problems, problems of war and problems dealing with the affairs of the country.

Q. What was the problem of war that you were discussing?

A. Regarding military problems or other problems, we discussed nothing as far as tactics were concerned but spoke about internal production and resources.

Admiral OKA - continued

Mr. Morgan: I am sorry Admiral OKA but I see I have to ask you leading questions because of the manner in which you are answering me.

Q. At the beginning of the liaison conferences there were discussions concerning the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China within a specific time limit. Is that not true?

A. About that time I don't remember very well, but I don't think we discussed anything about withdrawing troops. Probably the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Army Minister discussed this problem.

Q. Who was the Prime Minister and the Army Minister?

A. KONOYE was Prime Minister and TOJO was Army Minister.

Q. After October 18 were there any discussions concerning the withdrawal of troops from China?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Do you remember that there were many discussions during these liaison conferences concerning negotiations between the United States and Japan over the withdrawal of troops from China?

A. I don't remember too well but that may have been so that they did discuss it but to the degree which they discussed it I am not sure.

Q. Do you remember the Hull note of November 26, 1941?

A. I do remember that. It was referring to the South Seas.

Q. Was there anything in Hull's note that was objectionable to Japan in your opinion?

A. The letter concerning the South Seas and the withdrawal of troops were objectionable to me.

Q. I understood you to say you had no discussions of the withdrawing of troops from China. Explain this.

A. Yes, I said that before because we did not discuss it at the conferences.

Admiral OKA - continued

Q. When was the first time you ever discussed it?

A. KONOYE was for taking the troops out but TOJO was against it and this was in October of 1941 and ultimately caused the fall of the KONOYE Cabinet. This was just between TOJO and KONOYE and the Foreign Minister and the Naval Minister. Therefore, when TOJO took over it made it very difficult to discuss the matter since he was against the withdrawal of troops in China.

Q. Were you present at the conferences with TOYODA, KONOYE, TOJO and the Naval Minister?

A. No, I was not there.

Q. How do you know about this?

A. The news came from the Minister of the Navy.

Q. Who was the Minister of the Navy?

A. OIKAWA, Koshiro.

Q. Did he tell you this?

A. Yes, he did tell me.

Q. Did you support the views of KONOYE or the views of TOJO?

A. I supported KONOYE's views.

Q. Going back to the liaison conferences after TOJO became Premier, do you mean to tell me that there were no discussions concerning withdrawing of Japanese troops from China or French Indo-China?

A. No, we didn't.

Q. Do you not recall that SUGIYAMA, SUZUKI, SHIMADA, HOSHINO, TOJO and others were opposed to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from China during a discussion at these liaison conferences?

A. I don't remember.

Q. You were present during these conferences were you not?

A. I was usually there but I do not remember.



Admiral OKA - continued

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A. I don't remember.

Q. You were present during these conferences were you not?

A. I was usually there but I do not remember.

Admiral OKA - continued

- Q. Do you recall the liaison conferences of November 28, 1941 at which discussion came up regarding the Hull note and a decision was made to wage war against the United States?
- A. I think it was the first of December that they made this decision.
- Q. I asked you about the liaison conferences, not the Imperial conference or Cabinet meeting.
- A. I am not quite sure but I still think it is December.
- Q. Regardless of the date, do you recall the liaison conferences during which there was unanimous agreement to wage war against the United States?
- A. Yes, I do recall it and believe it was the first of December.
- Q. Do you agree that the decision to wage war against the United States was proper in view of all the circumstances?
- A. I couldn't worry about it. I had to do that.
- Q. I didn't ask you that!
- A. Most of us did not think it was the right thing, but at that time we could do nothing else but declare war.
- Q. Why could you do nothing else?
- A. The circumstances at that time made it necessary for us to wage war.
- Q. What circumstances at that time?
- A. Mainly for protection or self-defense we had to wage war.
- Q. In other words, you approved the decision to wage war against the United States?
- A. Yes.
- Q. There was unanimous agreement amongst the members of the liaison conference to wage war?
- A. Yes, I think so because they all signed it. However, I did not sign because I was not an actual member.

Admiral OKA - continued

Q. What did they sign?

A. A paper from the government.

Q. What kind of paper?

A. It came from the Cabinet Secretary and was made up by the Cabinet for the purpose of the liaison conference to sign.

Q. HOSHINO was the Cabinet Secretary was he not?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. You mention that you approved the decision to wage war against the United States because of self defense. What do you mean by self-defense?

A. I felt that if Japan remained quiet we would be destroyed by England, America and Holland.

Admiral OKA: I want a Japanese interpreter.

Mr. Morgan : Why?

Admiral OKA: He could understand my position better.

Mr. Morgan : What kind of position do you have?

Admiral OKA: He could understand my feelings and thoughts better.

Q. What led you to believe that?

A. These countries were increasing the number of soldiers in the Far East and negotiations with the United States were not getting along. For these reasons I felt it was for self-protection.

Q. I would like to ask you at this time one pertinent question regarding war notification to the United States. Do you recall there was some discussion between TOGO, the Foreign Minister and Admirals NAGANO and ITO regarding notification of the United States prior to any attack?

A. I recall it.

Admiral OKA - continued

- Q. Do you not recall your conversations with NAGANO and ITO in which you also supported them in their stand that the war should be started with a maximum effectiveness and therefore no notice should be given to the United States before attack? This was after the decision to wage war and the notice to attack.
- A. I don't remember it.
- Q. Don't you recall any conversation that you had with NAGANO and ITO concerning the attack on the United States without any notice?
- A. No, I don't remember anything like that.
- Q. What was the gist of the conversation between TOGO, NAGANO and ITO regarding notification prior to any attack?
- A. I don't know.
- Q. You do remember that there was a discussion between TOGO, NAGANO and ITO don't you?
- A. I heard after the war had begun that there was a discussion between TOGO and ITO.
- Q. What did you hear?
- A. Before the attack I had not heard it and the first time I heard it was from American sources.
- Q. The first time you heard that ITO and TOGO had an argument about the time of attack was from American sources?
- A. I heard it after the war for the first time. My information came from the Demobilization Board which was set up after the war.
- Q. And then not from American sources?
- A. It did not come from American sources.
- Q. As I understand it, Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau is a very powerful position in the Government. Is that right?
- A. Yes, it is.

Admiral OKA - continued

Q. As Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau your position was comparable in power to the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. Is that right?

A. Yes, it was comparable but the work which the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau did was different - our duties were different.

Q. I understand that your duties would be different but your position as to power was comparable. Is that right?

A. Yes. As you know, the influence the Army had with the Cabinet was stronger than that of the Navy. In this respect, our strength differed.

Q. Akira MUTO was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau at this time, was he not?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. Did not MUTO and you frequently contact the Foreign Office in connection with the drafting of the final notification to the United States?

A. We didn't have any discussions.

Q. Did you and MUTO contact the Foreign Office in connection with the drafting of the final notification?

A. Yes we did. However, I don't recall the contents of the message.

Q. With reference to the final note that was delivered in Washington on December 7, 1941, did you have any part in preparation of this note?

A. I only read it. I did not make any of it up.

Q. Did you or MUTO make any revisions in the note during the period of drafting it?

A. I do not know about MUTO but I didn't do anything to it at all.

Q. When did you first read the note?

A. I don't remember.

Admiral OKA - continued

- Q. If Mr. TOGO should say that you and MUTO kept in constant touch with the Foreign Office and took part in revising the note before its final preparation, would you say he was mistaken?
- A. I really am not sure about it. I do admit I went to the Foreign Ministry quite often, also MUTO, but as far as correcting the final draft goes, I do not remember, so what Mr. TOGO says may or may not be true.
- Q. Were you not a strong advocate in attacking the United States without any warning?
- A. No, that isn't true. I did not wish to attack Pearl Harbor without warning or before a note had been sent.
- Q. Do you remember there was some discussion among the Navy people?
- A. No, I didn't have any type of conversation like that and none of the Navy people talked about it. Tactics were not discussed.
- Q. As Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau you naturally had to be acquainted with all the plans of strategy, did you not?
- A. I didn't have any relation with military or naval strategy. This all came from the Naval General Staff and I took my orders from the Navy Minister.
- Q. My understanding is that the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau was the driving force of the Navy and, therefore, would be in a position to know everything that the Navy was planning to do. Please explain.
- A. That is true. I only knew of perhaps large scale, which most people knew about naval strategy but I still maintain that the Navy strategy was taken care of by Naval General Staff.
- Q. Of course, you knew that Pearl Harbor was the first object of attack, that it was to occur around 1:25 p.m. Washington time, December 7, 1941, did you not?
- A. I am not clear about whether I knew about this or not but I believe perhaps I did.