

DECLASSIFIED


E.O. 11652, Sec 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

NND#

760050

894.30 / 1-146--12-3146 -47-48-49

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS



September 13.

Rm/R 1945

Dear Dean,

There has been some crossing of wires in regard to the "ship sinking" problem in relation to the Moscow Declaration of which I spoke to you after lunch.

Doc Mathews at the meeting yesterday asked me to take up the matter with you and get your decision. After the meeting he discussed it with Jack Hickerson and they decided to refer it to Jimmie Dunn first. Doc, I suppose in his haste to get away, did not mention this to me. Jack is telephoning to Jimmie in the morning. He thinks we should consult before sinking. He will come to you after he has talked with Jimmie. I did not tell Jack of my conversation with you, nor have I communicated with SWNCC. I thought it best for you to tell Jack of our conversation if you consider it desirable to do so.

A message has gone to Admiral Nimitz telling him to withhold action pending advice.

Yam
J.C.V.

JOHN CARTER VINCENT

894.30/9-1345

CS/CVE

Document Must Be Returned to

DC/R
Anal 4
Rev
Cat *W*

894.30/9-1345

ER
ms

FS 210083

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

PREPARING OFFICE WILL
TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE
MESSAGE:

Collect

Charge Department:

Charge to

VIA
WAR
DEPT

Department of State

TOP SECRET

NO PARAPHRASE
NECESSARY
TOP SECRET

October 17, 1945

11a

AMEMBASSY,

MOSCOW.
2175

FOR THE AMBASSADOR: Please deliver the following message from
me personally to Mr. Molotov:

QUOTE While in London I advised you that the United States
Government desired to sink the units of the Japanese fleet which were
surrendered to the United States Navy and that I had requested that
this action be delayed until I could inform you and Mr. Bevin of our
plan. You did not then present any views.

I am writing now to say that the Navy again has communicated with
me, and if you care to express any views with reference to this plan,
I should like to hear at an early date so that I can advise the
officials of our Navy.

With best wishes. UNQUOTE

Byrnes
BYRNES

S:JFB:DHM

TOP SECRET

SENT

894.30/10-1745

894.30/10-1745
Confidential File

TOP SECRET COVER SHEET

INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE OF DS-747

1. Access to this document shall be limited to those persons requiring the information in the performance of their duties.
2. Handling, storage, reproduction, destruction, and accountability for this document must comply with specific procedures set forth in security regulations.
3. The white copy of this form is a record of persons who have read or had disclosed to them any part of the document identified in Item 2.
4. Each person who receives this Top Secret document or reads any part of it shall sign his name and give other information requested in the appropriate space (Items 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11).
5. When document is destroyed or transmitted outside the Department, the white copy of Form DS-747 is removed and placed in the canceled accountability file of the last responsible Top Secret Control Officer.
6. Procedure for filing Form DS-747
 - a. Blue copy retained by Top Secret Control Officer of area preparing Top Secret Cover Sheet, in his canceled accountability file.
 - b. Pink or yellow copy filed by Top Secret Control Officer receiving document, in his accountability control file. When document is released to jurisdiction of another Top Secret Control Officer, corresponding pink or yellow copy is transferred to canceled accountability file.

**COMPLETE INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THIS FORM ARE FOUND
IN SECTION 194.4, MANUAL OF REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES**

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COMPLETE INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THIS FORM ARE FOUND
IN SECTION 194.4, MANUAL OF REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES

21083

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION: S
INFO:

S DSH-1969-GH
U This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (TOP SECRET)

Moscow via War

Dated October 18, 1945

Rec'd 2:45 p.m.

*Em -
matt
28.
m
c*

Secretary of State

Washington

3594, October 18, 8 p.m.

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY

I took the occasion of my call on Molotov today to hand him your personal message regarding sinking of the Japanese fleet.

(REDEPT 2175, October 17) Molotov, after reading your message stated that he would have to study it and consult with his naval authorities before making a reply. He inquired whether it was a question of sinking the entire fleet, both surface and submarine. I told him that I had no further information other than that contained in your message, which I interpreted to indicate the entire fleet. He asked whether I had any information as to the number, character and condition of the Japanese fleet in addition to what I had given Stalin in August.

He referred

*xr
940.00119PW*

DOR - EUR Unit	
Anal.	<i>EA</i>
Rev.	<i>E</i>
Int.	
Dist.	

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

894.30/10-1845

Confidential File

TOP SECRET

-2-, #3594, October 18, 8 p.m., from Moscow via War.

He referred to an estimate which the Navy Dept had sent me on August 31 for transmission to Stalin at his request. I explained that I had no further information but that his naval authorities might have received later information through the Soviet representatives in Japan.

HARRIMAN

JT

TOP SECRET

FORM DS-747
8-4-54

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TOP SECRET COVER SHEET

1. TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBER

RM/R
1034-IA

4. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S) (Origin, subject, reference no. or other pertinent data)

Tel - 3594 from Moscow
10/18/45

2. COPY INFORMATION

ACTION COPY _____ INFORMATION COPY _____

TELEGRAMS, DESPATCHES, ETC. _____

COPY NO. _____ OF _____ COPIES

5. FORWARDED

6-14 '63
(Date)

Mary A. Hutcheon
(Top Secret Control Officer)

3. DATE AND NAME OF PERSON PREPARING FORM

6. PERSONS TO WHOM ROUTED OR READING DOCUMENT

7. OFFICE SYMBOL

8. SIGNATURES

9. DATE RECEIVED

10. DATE READ

11. DATE RELEASED

Edith Brangle

PB

L. Sturgeson

6/24/63

6/24/63

F.S 21083

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
CLEAR
AIRGRAM

Full rate
Collect Day letter
(Night letter)

Charge Department:
Full rate
Day letter
Night letter
Charge to

VIA AIR MAIL
7
DEPT.

Department of State

Washington,

TOP SECRET

NO DISTRIBUTION - NO STENCIL

October 20, 1945

NO PARAPHRASE
NECESSARY
TOP SECRET

8 PM

AMEMBASSY

MOSCOW
2197

US URGENT

FOR HARRIMAN. Please deliver the following message to Molotov:

QUOTE. Replying to your message of October 19, I agree to the disposition of the Japanese fleet suggested by you and am advising the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom and China of your suggestions and my agreement with your suggestions.

With reference to the merchant marine of Japan, I am advised that what is left of the merchant marine of Japan is necessary for the evacuation of Japanese from the islands they sought to conquer and from the mainland of China to Japan. The available ships will probably be needed for some time. No plans have been made for the disposition of the Japanese merchant marine and we will be glad to discuss with you and our other Allies plans for a long range distribution of these ships. UNQUOTE.

DCR - EUR Unit
Anal. *SW*
Rev. *[Signature]*
Dist. _____

[Signature]
BYRNES

SENT

S:JFB:lk

Enciphered by _____

Sent by operator *M.* _____

TOP SECRET

894.30/10-2045

894.30/10-2045
Confidential File


DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

S - Mr. Secretary

I believe we
should give Hariman
this information he
requests.

HFL



October 22, 1945

EUR - Mr. Matthews:

Subject: Disposition of Japanese
Merchant Marine.

I am informed by Mr. Martin, A-C, that the Department has not yet arrived at a policy for the disposition of the Japanese Merchant Marine. He says, however, that a paper on this subject is now on the process of preparation in the Shipping Division and that the first draft should be received by the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWNCC on November 1st.

Another paper on Japanese reparations which is also in process does not include the subject of this memorandum.

John P. Gardiner
John P. Gardiner

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE
~~DIVISION~~ OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

October 20, 1945

S - Mr. Secretary:

As nearly as I can ascertain from our Far Eastern Office, Mr. Clayton's office, and the Navy, no plans have been worked out for the ultimate disposition of the Japanese merchant marine nor has much thought yet been given to the question. The Navy has gone on the assumption that all Japanese merchant ships would be required for some time to come for the repatriation of the large numbers of Japanese troops and civilians still outside the Japanese home islands. Hence the plans for the study of the subsequent fate of Japanese merchant ships have had a rather low priority.

In your reply to Mr. Molotov on this point, I venture the offhand and purely personal suggestion that you tell him that all Japanese merchant vessels seem to be required for the present for the evacuation of Japs from the lands they attempted to conquer and that we would be glad to discuss with the Soviet and our other Allies plans for the long-range disposition of the Japanese merchant marine.

HFM

H. Freeman Matthews

This Document must be Returned
to the RM/R Central Files

894.30/10-2045

CJC 894.30/10.2045

RM/R
Anal <i>7</i>
Rev <i>[Signature]</i>
Cat <i>[Signature]</i>

EUR:HFM:TMT

FS 210083

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

TOP SECRET FILE

ACTION-S
INFO:

S
U
See 1 Matthews
36 1 Vincent
C

IMK-956 -H
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Moscow via War

Dated October 21, 1945

Rec'd 1:25 p.m. EU 21st



Secretary of State,
Washington,

PRIORITY

3617, October 21, 7 p.m.

TOP SECRET FOR SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN

REDEPTS 2197, October 20, 3 p.m.

It would be most helpful as background if I could be informed of Molotov's suggestion of October 19 regarding disposition of Japanese fleet to which you have agreed.

Message contained in above-mentioned telegram delivered to FONOF today.

HARRIMAN

REP

SECRET

894.30/10-2145

TOP SECRET FILE

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
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TOP SECRET FILE

TOP SECRET

403
39



PS 21083

PREPARING OFFICE
WILL INDICATE WHETHER

TELEGRAM SENT

TO BE TRANSMITTED
TOP SECRET - OTP
CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTED
CLEAR
AIRGRAM

Collect { Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge Department:

Full rate
Day letter
Night letter

Charge to \$

Department of State

Washington,

TOP SECRET

October 22, 1945

NO STENCIL - NO DISTRIBUTION
NO PARAPHRASE NECESSARY
rect

US URGENT

noon

AMEMBASSY

MOSCOW.

2199

REURTEL 3617, October 21, 7 p.m., following is text

of Molotov's communication to me of October 19:

QUOTE I have received your message regarding the Japanese fleet on October 18th.

Having considered the proposal of the Government of the United States regarding the scuttling of the vessels of the Japanese fleet, the Soviet Government is ready to agree that the large vessels of the Japanese navy such as battleships and cruisers as well as Japanese submarines be scuttled. As regards the remaining part of the Japanese navy the Soviet Government has claim that one fourth of the vessels of this Japanese fleet, beginning with destroyers and floating vessels of lesser tonnage be transferred to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government would also like to receive information as to how it is proposed to handle the Japanese merchant marine. END QUOTE

Enciphered by **EUR:HFMatthews:TMT**

Sent by operator *HF* M., 19

VR

TOP SECRET

894.30/10-2145

TOP SECRET FILE

TOP SECRET

Byron

EUR Unit

VR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INCOMING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF CENTRAL SERVICES TELEGRAPH SECTION

ACTION-S
INFO:

S
U

INX-956 -H
This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SECRET)

Moscow via War
Dated October 21, 1945
Rec'd 1:25 p.m. 21th

894.30/10-2145

Secretary of State,
Washington,

PRIORITY

3617, October 21, 7 p.m.

TOP SECRET FOR SECRETARY FROM HARRIMAN

REDEPTS 2197, October 20, 3 p.m.

It would be most helpful as background if I could be informed of Molotov's suggestion of October 19 regarding disposition of Japanese fleet to which you have agreed.

Message contained in above-mentioned telegram delivered to FONOF today.

HARRIMAN

REP

SECRET

RM/R
Final <u>7</u>
Rev. _____
Cat. _____

SECRET FILE

894.30/10.2145-

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : S -- Mr. Secretary

FROM : FE -- Mr. Vincent

SUBJECT: Disposition of Japanese Vessels

DATE: October 26, 1945

At the request of Mr. Matthews, this morning I told the Chinese Ambassador Dr. Wei Tao Ming and Sir George Sansom of the British Embassy of our decision with regard to the disposition of the remaining vessels of the Japanese Fleet. I said that we had decided to destroy all large vessels of the Japanese Navy, such as battleships and cruisers, as well as Japanese submarines; and that destroyers and floating vessels with lesser tonnage would be divided equally among the four powers, that is, the U.S.S.R., U.K., China and the U.S. In imparting this information I made no reference to our discussions of the subject with the Soviet Union.

Neither Dr. Wei nor Sir George made any comment other than to say they would notify their Governments.

RM/R
Central
Files
894.30/10-2645

J.C.V.

~~Let me know~~

Has Vase Sauer tomorrow
what's but he has any
Comments

CS/Y

Copy to: EUR - Mr. Matthews
U - Mr. Acheson

I have talked with
Sansom and he
sees no objection to
publicity.

J.C.V.

Doc/R
Anal 4
Rev
Cat

Mr. Eastern
Affairs Office

FE:JCVincent:ead

894.30/10-2645

FE-JCV

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
OCT 29 1945
DIRECTOR
Department of State

October 25, 1945

RM/R

EUR - Mr. Matthews

SA/B - Walter Brown

W.B

OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DIRECTOR
OCT 26 1945
MR. MATTHEWS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

This
RM/R
Central
Files
894.30/10-2545

Subject: Statement on Japanese Fleet

Will you please keep in touch with me with reference to a statement which the Secretary can issue in connection with the disposition of the Japanese fleet? You will recall our conversation of Wednesday about this.

CS/E

✓

DC/R
Anal 4
Rev
Cat NG

894.30/10-25-45

FE-JCV²

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum · UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : EUR - Mr. Matthews

FROM : FE - Mr. Vincent

SUBJECT: Disposal of Japanese Naval Assets



Dear Mr. Matthews:

attached is all I have

Before I drive ahead giving the British and Chinese this information about the ship I should like if possible to know a little more about the matter. For instance, I assume but do not know the Secretary has accepted this Russian proposition. Can you let me have the file?

Sec War & Sec Navy have been informed by Sec B. J. W.

Another thing: Should we, through SWNCC, inform the Army and Navy of this proposed type of settlement before I tell the Chinese and the British? And one other question: Is it your understanding that I simply tell them that this is to be the disposition or am I supposed to get their concurrence? I am not worried about the Chinese but the British may have some ideas of their own.

Tell them I believe

J.C.V.

FE:Vincent:ALM

Ans	✓
Rev	
Cat	CV

CS/CVE

894.30/10-25-45

OFFICE MEMORANDUM • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

10/25/45

Mr. Matthews:

In connection with the attached memo, Mr. Vincent has an additional question:

"Are the British and Chinese to be informed that this is the disposition unilaterally decided upon by us or to be told that it is one on which we have decided after having reached an agreement with the Russians".

Mr. Vincent has a preference for the unilateral approach. He said he considers the problem a tricky business.

TMT

Unilateral
HT

12/12/45

State Department
Central Files
This Document Is Returned to

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NAVY MEMBER - SWNCC

DISPOSITION OF THE JAPANESE FLEET

Reference: SWNCC 186 Series

74000119 Central (Japan) 12-545

There is attached a copy of a note of December 5 from the British Embassy in which is set forth the British view regarding the disposition of the Japanese Navy. In discussing this question with an officer of the Department, on December 12, an official of the British Embassy stated that although the Embassy's note of December 5 does not so indicate, the British Government is aware of the U.S. Government's position regarding disposition of the Japanese Navy, and that he assumed that further exchanges on this subject would probably be on a technical level between Navy Department officials and the British Joint Staff Mission.

894.30/12-1245

James Clement Dunn

Attachment:

From British Embassy,
December 5, 1945.

OS/M

FE:JKPenfield:ead
12-12-45

JA JBC EWR

894.30/12-1245

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NAVY MEMBER - SWNCC**DISPOSITION OF THE JAPANESE FLEET**

Reference: SWNCC 186 Series

There is attached a copy of a note of December 5 from the British Embassy in which is set forth the British view regarding the disposition of the Japanese Navy. In discussing this question with an officer of the Department, on December 12, an official of the British Embassy stated that although the Embassy's note of December 5 does not so indicate, the British Government is aware of the U.S. Government's position regarding disposition of the Japanese Navy, and that he assumed that further exchanges on this subject would probably be on a technical level between Navy Department officials and the British Joint Staff Mission.

James Clement Dunn

Attachment:

From British Embassy,
December 5, 1945.

FE:JKPenfield:ead
12-12-45

740.00119 Contra Japan/12-25-45

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 18, 1945

RM/PA
FILES

FE - Mr. Penfield,

The attached file is returned to you for disposition. Mr. Dunn has signed the memo and the matter has been introduced into SWNCC. It will be brought out as a "slant" of the 186 series, for information.

Incidentally, we changed the memo to read "Memo for SWNCC" instead of "Memorandum for the Navy Member" because the Army is also interested in this problem. I feel sure you have no objection to this.

H.W.M.
H.W.M.

Returned to
894.30/12-1845

OS/M
894.30/12-1845

[Handwritten mark]

Ambassade de France
aux Etats-Unis

NO 13
PS/JYB.

155
L'ambassadeur 1/12/46
JYB

Rm/R

FE
DC/R
JK

Washington, le 8 janvier 1946.

Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 8 - 1946
DENSITY INDEX
reply drafted
1/12/46
JYB
P

CENTRAL TRANSLATING DIVISION
20166
RECEIVED
JAN 9 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DC/R

894.30/1-846

L'Ambassadeur de France présente ses compliments
à Son Excellence le Secrétaire d'Etat p.i. et est chargé
de lui faire la communication suivante.

Ayant appris que les unités de la Flotte de
guerre japonaise doivent faire prochainement l'objet d'un
partage entre les Alliés, le Gouvernement français a l'hon-
neur de faire valoir ses droits à en recevoir une juste part.

Du fait des opérations de guerre en Extrême-Orient
résultant de l'agression japonaise, la France a subi, tant
par bombardements que par sabordages, des pertes qui n'attei-
gnent pas moins de dix neuf mille cent vingt tonnes de navi-
res de guerre. L'avis colonial "Amiral Charner", endommagé
par l'aviation japonaise ~~sest~~ sabordé le 9 mai 1945. Le
croiseur "La Mothe Picquet" a été coulé par bombardement
le 12 janvier. Un sous-marin, quatre avisos, six patrouil-

LR
740.00119 P.W.

CS/VJ

894.30/1-846

Son Excellence
l'Honorable Dean Acheson,
Secrétaire d'Etat p.i. aux Etats-Unis,
Washington, D. C.

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MAR - 6 1946

FILED

.../

leurs, trois canonnières, un dragueur, une gabare ont été perdus. Quatre de ces batiments ont été coulés en action; les douze autres se sont sabordés en mars 1945.

L'arsenal de Saïgon, du fait des opérations militaires, a été détruit aux deux tiers. Les stocks de matières premières et d'approvisionnements qu'il contenait ont été pillés et dispersés.

Le Gouvernement français se permet d'autre part de rappeler la contribution qu'a apportée sa Flotte à la guerre contre le Japon. La France y a, à la vérité, consacré toutes les forces dont elle pouvait disposer. Elle a détaché en permanence en Extrême-Orient le plus puissant de ses batiments de surface, le "Richelieu", ainsi qu'un croiseur léger et deux avisos. Elle a engagé, après mars 1945, dans les guérillas anti-japonaises, les équipages de ses flottilles d'Indo-Chine.

Pour compenser les pertes qu'elle a subies à la fois dans sa Flotte et dans l'équipement de ses bases, la France estime être en droit de réclamer un navire de surface

.../

3

.../

de gros tonnage, de préférence un porte avions et quatre destroyers modernes de 2.100 à 2.300 tonnes. Elle demande en outre le remplacement de son outillage portuaire détruit et la possibilité d'utiliser dès maintenant, en accord avec les Commandants en Chef intéressés, le matériel naval japonais qui se trouve en Indo-Chine.

Ce sont ces demandes que l'Ambassadeur de France est chargé de transmettre à Son Excellence le Secrétaire d'Etat p.i. Il a instruction de faire ressortir que le Gouvernement français ne comprendrait pas que ne lui soient pas accordés, dans la répartition de la Flotte japonaise, des avantages analogues à ceux qui seraient consentis à l'URSS dont la flotte d'Extrême-Orient ne semble pas avoir subi de pertes notables./.

M. Henri Bonnet est heureux de saisir l'occasion de la présente note pour renouveler à l'Honorable Dean Acheson les assurances de sa très haute considération.



-425

156

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CENTRAL TRANSLATING DIVISION

[TRANSLATION]

TC No. 20166

EMBASSY OF FRANCE
IN THE UNITED STATES

Washington, January 8, 1946

No. 3

PS/JYB

The Ambassador of France presents his compliments to His Excellency, the Acting Secretary of State and is charged with communicating the following to him:

Having learned that the units of the Japanese Navy are shortly to be divided among the Allies, the French Government has the honor to claim its right to receive a fair share.

As a result of military operations in the Far East resulting from Japanese aggression, France has suffered, from both bombing and scuttling, losses amounting to not less than nineteen thousand one hundred and twenty tons of naval vessels. The Colonial dispatch boat "Admiral Charner", which was damaged by Japanese Aviation, was scuttled on May 9, 1945. The cruiser "La Mothe Picquet" was sunk by bombing on January 12. One submarine, four dispatch boats, six patrol boats, three gunboats, one dredger and one lighter have been lost. Four of these vessels were sunk in action; the twelve others were scuttled in March 1945.

The Saigon Navy Yard was two-thirds destroyed as a result of military operations. The stocks of raw materials and supplies which it contained were pillaged and scattered.

The French Government takes the further liberty of recalling the contribution made by its Fleet to the war against Japan.

His Excellency
Dean Acheson
Acting Secretary of State
of the United States
Washington, D.C.

In

LR
740.00119P.W.

F.W. 894.30/1-846

-2-

157

In fact, France devoted to it all the forces at her disposal. She detailed permanently to the Far East the most powerful of her surface vessels, the "Richelieu", as well as a light cruiser and two dispatch boats. She engaged, after March 1945, in anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, the crews of her flotillas in Indochina.

To compensate for the losses which she suffered in both her Fleet and her base equipment, France feels that she has a right to claim one surface vessel of large tonnage, preferably an airplane carrier, and four modern destroyers of from 2,100 to 2,300 tons. She requests in addition the replacement of her destroyed harbor equipment and the opportunity to use, from now on by agreement with the Commanders-in-Chief concerned, the Japanese naval matériel which is in Indochina.

These are the requests which the Ambassador of France is charged with transmitting to His Excellency the Acting Secretary of State. He has been instructed to point out that the French Government would not understand failure to grant to it, in the division of the Japanese Fleet, advantages analogous to those granted to the U.S.S.R., whose Far Eastern Fleet appears not to have suffered very great losses.

Mr. Henri Bonnet is happy to avail himself of the occasion of the present note to renew to the Honorable Dean Acheson the assurances of his very high consideration.

[Initialed] H.B.

[Stamp of the Embassy of France, Washington]

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

RW/R.

OFFICE OF
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 16 1946
DIRECTOR
Department of State

TO : FE - Mr. Penfield

DATE: January 15, 1946

FROM : JK - Mr. Martin

SUBJECT: French note on Japanese naval materiel in Indo-China

I do not see how this country has any direct interest in the disposition of Japanese naval materiel captured in Indo-China. Such materiel is war booty whose disposition is subject to the policies of the theater commander under whose authority it is seized. This would apply to all types of naval materiel whose title was held by the Japanese Navy or Army.

In so far as the French note may make reference to Japanese property not owned by the Japanese Navy or Army, the French are entitled to take possession of such property and charge its value against their reparations claim on Japan.

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R M / R.

January 17, 1946.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Captain R. L. Dennison, U.S.N.,
Op. 35, Navy Department, Room 3047.

FROM: Mr. Penfield,
Office of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State.

SUBJECT: Desire of French for Share of Japanese Naval
Vessels and Japanese Navy Materiel in Indochina.

There is attached a copy of a translation of a note of January 8, 1946, from the French Embassy and a copy of comments thereon by Mr. Martin.

Any views you may have on the nature of the reply which should be made to the French would be appreciated.

Enclosures:

1. From French Embassy,
January 8, 1946
(translation).
2. Memorandum by Mr.
Martin, January 15, 1946.

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163

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to His Excellency the French Ambassador and has the honor to refer to the Ambassador's notes no. 3 of January 8, 1946, and no. 60 received on January 22, 1946, regarding the desire of the French Government for replacement of destroyed Saigon Navy Yard harbor equipment; to use, by agreement with the Commanders in Chief concerned, the Japanese naval materiel which is in Indochina; and to receive from the Japanese fleet one surface vessel of large tonnage, preferably an airplane carrier, and four modern destroyers of from 2100 to 2300 tons.

It is considered that disposition of Japanese naval materiel captured in Indochina is subject to the policies of the appropriate military commanders, and this Government therefore has no objection to any arrangements which the French authorities may

make

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make with these commanders regarding such materiel.

This Government considers that disposition of Japanese property in Indochina not owned by the Japanese Army or Navy and transfer to Indochina of Japanese equipment from outside Indochina are matters for decision in accordance with reparations policies which may be agreed to by the Allies. This Government, for its part, has no objection to the French Government's taking possession of and using such property in Indochina pending final settlement in accordance with these policies.

In the view of this Government all Japanese combatant naval vessels should eventually be destroyed and it has been agreed that submarines and combatant vessels larger than destroyers are to be destroyed. Many of the Japanese destroyers and surface vessels of lesser tonnage are at present being used for repatriation work, for minesweeping, and for other tasks connected with the implementation of the Japanese surrender.

In view of the considerations mentioned in the Ambassador's notes under reference, this Government

is

165

-3-

is agreeable in principle to making suitable arrangements for the transfer to the French Government of part of the United States share of Japanese surface vessels of destroyer class and lesser tonnage, when the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers determines that they are no longer needed for any task connected with the implementation of the Japanese surrender.

Department of State,

Washington,

March 1, 1946

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Ambassade de France

aux Etats-Unis

PS/RL

No 60

Washington, le

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
DIVISION OFFICE
MAR 3 - 1946
STATE

Handed to Mr. Vincent 1/22/46

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Office of
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
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DEPUTY DIRECTOR
Department of State

CENTRAL TRANSLATING DIVISION
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DC/R

L'Ambassade de France présente ses
compliments au Département d'Etat et a l'hon-
neur de lui faire la communication suivante.

Par une note en date du 8 janvier

1946, l'Ambassadeur de France a présenté à
son Excellence le Secrétaire d'Etat la de-
mande officielle du Gouvernement Français
de se voir attribuer une part dans le parta-
ge de la flotte japonaise. Il a été chargé
de faire ressortir, à l'appui de cette deman-
de, la contribution qu'a apportée la France
à la lutte contre le Japon en même temps que
les pertes subies par la flotte française du
fait de la guerre résultant de l'agression
japonaise.

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MAR 11 1946

2.

Le Gouvernement Français a affecté en effet à la lutte contre le Japon toutes les unités navales dont il pouvait disposer sur le théâtre d'opération d'Extrême-Orient, et en particulier, le bâtiment de ligne "RICHELIEU" qui a fait partie de la flotte de l'Océan Indien du 1er avril 1944 jusqu'à la capitulation du Japon. Au cours de cette période, le "RICHELIEU" n'a pas effectué moins de six opérations couronnées de succès contre les forces navales et les bases japonaises.

Le haut-commandement allié s'est plu à rendre hommage aux brillantes actions de ce bâtiment et à les souligner en réservant une place spéciale à son commandant et à son équipage lors de la reddition de Rangoon et de Singapour.

En ce qui concerne les pertes de la flotte française en Extrême-Orient, l'Ambassade de France est chargée de joindre aux indications figurant dans sa note du 8 janvier, les précisions suivantes sur la nature et le tonnage des unités

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en question ainsi que les conditions dans
lesquelles elles ont été perdues.

LAMOTHE PICQUET	Croiseur de	7.249 t.	Coulé par bombardement allié du 12/1/45 Endommagé au cours d'un engagement avec l'avia- tion japonaise puis sa- bordé le 9/3/45.
AMIRAL CHARNER	2ème Classe Aviso Colonial	1.969 t.	
LAPEROUSE	Aviso	781 t.)	Sabordés le 9 mars 1945 pour éviter d'être cap- turés par les Japonais.
MARNE	Aviso	601 t.)	
FRANCIS GARNIER	Aviso	639 t.)	
PEGASE	Sous-marin	1.379 t.	Coulé en Cochinchine.
TAHURE	Aviso	644 t.	Torpillé par sous-marin.
ASTROLABE	Patrouilleur	315 t.)	Coulés par bombardements alliés.
OCTANT	Patrouilleur	315 t.)	
BERYL	Patrouilleur	1.800 t.	Coulé en 1944
CAPITAINE COULLON	Patrouilleur	1.100 t.)	Sabordés en mars 1945, pour éviter d'être cap- turés par les Japonais
ARMAND ROUSSEAU	Patrouilleur	250 t.)	
PAUL BERT	Patrouilleur	650 t.)	
VALEUREUX	Dragueur	650 t.)	
AVALANCHE	Canonnière	128 t.)	
MYTHO	Canonnière	95 t.)	
TOURANE	Canonnière	95 t.)	
CAMPANH	Gabare	550 t.)	

19.210 tonnes (Washington)

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4.

L'Ambassade se permet d'attirer de nouveau l'attention du Département d'Etat sur l'importance que le Gouvernement Français attache à sa demande et saisit l'occasion de la présente note pour lui renouveler les assurances de sa très haute considération.

A.L.

Washington, le 22 janvier 1946.



159

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CENTRAL TRANSLATING DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[TRANSLATION]

1946 JAN 28 AM 11 57



TC No. 20478

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EMBASSY OF FRANCE
DS BRANCH

IN THE UNITED STATES

PS/RL

Washington

No. 60

The Embassy of France presents its compliments to the Department of State and has the honor to inform it of the following:

By a note dated January 8, 1946, the Ambassador of France presented to His Excellency the Secretary of State the official request of the French Government that a share in the division of the Japanese Fleet be allocated to it. He was charged with pointing out, in support of that request, the contribution made by France to the struggle against Japan and, at the same time, the losses suffered by the French Fleet because of the war which resulted from Japanese aggression.

Government

The French/in fact assigned to the struggle against Japan all the naval units at its disposal in the Far Eastern theater of operations; in particular, the ship of the line "RICHELIEU", which was part of the Indian Ocean Fleet from April 1, 1944 until the capitulation of Japan. During that period, the "RICHELIEU" carried out no less than six successful operations against the Japanese Naval Forces and Japanese bases.

Department of State
Washington, D. C.



F.W. 894.30/1-2246

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160

(2)

The Allied High Command was pleased to pay tribute to the brilliant actions of this ship and to signalize them by reserving a special place for her Commanding Officer and crew on the occasion of the surrender of Rangoon and Singapore.

With regard to the losses of the French Fleet in the Far East, the Embassy of France is charged with adding to the information contained in its note of January 8, the following details concerning the character and the tonnage of the units in question, as well as the conditions under which they were lost:

LAMOTHE PICQUET	2d-Class Cruiser	7,249 t.	Allied Sunk by bombing on 1/12/45
AMIRAL CHARNER	Colonial Dispatch Boat	1,969 t.	Damaged in the course of an engagement with the Japanese Air Force, then scuttled on 3/9/45
LAPEROUSE	Dispatch Boat	781 t.)	Scuttled on March 9, 1945 to prevent capture by the Japanese
MARNE	Dispatch Boat	601 t.)	
FRANCIS GARNIER	Dispatch Boat	639 t.)	
PEGASE	Submarine	1,379 t.	Sunk in CochinChina
TAHURE	Dispatch Boat	644 t.	Torpedoed by a submarine
ASTROLABE	Patrol Boat	315 t.)	Sunk by Allied bombing
OCTANT	Patrol Boat	315 t.)	
BERYL	Patrol Boat	1,800 t.	Sunk in 1944
CAPITAINE COULLON	Patrol Boat	1,100 t.)	
ARMAND ROUSSEAU	Patrol Boat	250 t.)	Scuttled in March 1945 to prevent capture by the Japanese.
PAUL BERT	Patrol Boat	650 t.)	

161
(3)

VALEUREUX	Mine-sweeper	650 t.)	
AVALANCHE	Gunboat	128 t.)	
MYTHO	Gunboat	95 t.)	Scuttled in March 1945
TOURANE	Gunboat	95 t.)	to prevent capture by
CAMPANH	Lighter	550 t.)	the Japanese..

19,210 tons (Washington)

The Embassy takes the liberty of again inviting the attention of the Department of State to the importance which the French Government attaches to its request , and avails itself of the occasion of the present note to renew to the Department the assurances of its very high consideration.

[Initialed]

Washington, January 22, 1946

[Stamp of the Embassy of France, Washington]

162

18.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
CENTRAL TRANSLATING DIVISION

[TRANSLATION]

TC No. 20478

EMBASSY OF FRANCE
IN THE UNITED STATES
PS/RL

Washington

No. 60

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The French^{Government} in fact assigned to the struggle against Japan all the naval units at its disposal in the Far Eastern theater of operations; in particular, the ship of the line "RICHELIEU", which was part of the Indian Ocean Fleet from April 1, 1944 until the capitulation of Japan. During that period, the "RICHELIEU" carried out no less than six successful operations against the Japanese Naval Forces and Japanese bases.

Department of State
Washington, D. C.

(2)

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(3)

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TOURANE	Gunboat	95 t.)	to prevent capture by
CAMPANH	Lighter	550 t.)	the Japanese.

19,210 tons (Washington)

The Embassy takes the liberty of again inviting the attention of the Department of State to the importance which the French Government attaches to its request, and avails itself of the occasion of the present note to renew to the Department the assurances of its very high consideration.

[Initialed]

Washington, January 22, 1946

[Stamp of the Embassy of France, Washington]

PS/RL

No 60

L'Ambassade de France présente ses compliments au Département d'Etat et a l'honneur de lui faire la communication suivante.

Par une note en date du 8 janvier 1945, l'Ambassadeur de France a présenté à son Excellence le Secrétaire d'Etat la demande officielle du Gouvernement Français de se voir attribuer une part dans le partage de la flotte japonaise. Il a été chargé de faire ressortir, à l'appui de cette demande, la contribution qu'a apportée la France à la lutte contre le Japon en même temps que les pertes subies par la flotte française du fait de la guerre résultant de l'agression japonaise.

Département d'Etat,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

2.

Le Gouvernement Français a affecté en effet à la lutte contre le Japon toutes les unités navales dont il pouvait disposer sur le théâtre d'opération d'Extrême-Orient, et en particulier, le bâtiment de ligne "RICHELIEU" qui a fait partie de la flotte de l'Océan Indien du 1er avril 1944 jusqu'à la capitulation du Japon. Au cours de cette période, le "RICHELIEU" n'a pas effectué moins de six opérations couronnées de succès contre les forces navales et les bases japonaises.

Le haut-commandement allié s'est plu à rendre hommage aux brillantes actions de ce bâtiment et à les souligner en réservant une place spéciale à son commandant et à son équipage lors de la reddition de Rangoon et de Singapour.

En ce qui concerne les pertes de la flotte française en Extrême-Orient, l'Ambassade de France est chargée de joindre aux indications figurant dans sa note du 8 janvier, les précisions suivantes sur la nature et le tonnage des unités

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en question ainsi que les conditions dans
lesquelles elles ont été perdues.

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	2ème Classe		allié du 12/1/45
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			engagement avec l'avia-
			tion japonaise puis sa-
			bordé le 9/3/45.
LAPEROUSE	Aviso	781 t.)	Sabordés le 9 mars 1945
MARNE	Aviso	601 t.)	pour éviter d'être cap-
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ASTROLABE	Patrouilleur	315 t.)	Coulés par bombardements
OCTANT	Patrouilleur	315 t.)	alliés.
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CAPITAINE COULLON	Patrouilleur	1.100 t.)	
ARMAND ROUSSEAU	Patrouilleur	250 t.)	
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VALEUREUX	Dragueur	650 t.)	pour éviter d'être cap-
AVALANCHE	Canonnière	128 t.)	turés par les Japonais
MYTHO	Canonnière	95 t.)	
TOURANE	Canonnière	95 t.)	
CAMPANH	Cabare	550 t.)	

19.210 tonnes (Washington)

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4.

L'Ambassade se permet d'attirer de nouveau l'attention du Département d'Etat sur l'importance que le Gouvernement Français attache à sa demande et saisit l'occasion de la présente note pour lui renouveler les assurances de sa très haute considération.

Washington, le 22 janvier 1946.

MAR 11 1946

SECRET

No. 1866

To the

Officer in Charge of the American Mission,
Paris

The Secretary of State transmits for the information of the Officer in Charge copies of two notes from the French Embassy dated January 18, 1946 and January 22, 1946 concerning a request by the French Government for a share in the division of the Japanese fleet, and the Department's reply thereto of March 1, 1946.

894.30/1-2246 IN WE SD. (RC JK)
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Enclosures:

Notes No. 3 and 60 from the French Embassy

Note of March 1, 1946 from State Department to French Embassy

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JCHB.

In reply refer to Initials and No.

Op35-DJL
Ser. No.
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NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

SECRET

Office of **WASHINGTON**
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
JAN 27 1946
DEPUTY DIRECTOR
Department of the Navy
file with Mr. Embury 2/27/46

29 January 1946

From : The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations/
Politico-Military Affairs.

To : Mr. J. K. Penfield,
Office of Far Eastern Affairs,
Department of State.

Subject : French Claim for Share of Japanese Naval
Vessels and Japanese Material in Indo-
China.

Reference : (A) Your memorandum of 17 January 1946,
on same subject.

1. As regards the French claim for Japanese naval vessels to compensate for her naval losses in the Far East, I believe we should take the same stand as we have regarding her claims for a share in the ex-German fleet. Judged on its merit, the French claim has little, if anything, to recommend it. However, the following stand might not be inappropriate:

a. It is the United States intent that the remnants of the Japanese fleet, of a tonnage larger than a destroyer, be destroyed.

b. The United States Government is favorably disposed in principle toward making available to the French Government, a part of the United States share of the surface vessels, of destroyer class and lesser tonnage, formerly belonging to the Japanese Navy.

2. With regard to the French request to use Japanese naval material now in Indochina, I see no objection to this, provided it is done subject to the policies of the theater commander. I agree with Mr. Martin, that it is clear that Japanese property, not owned by the Japanese Army or Navy may be seized by the French, provided its value be charged against their reparations claim on Japan.

R. L. Dennison
R. L. DENNISON,
Capt., U. S. N.

SECRET

Confidential File

894.30/1-2946

894.30/1-2946

April 1, 1946.

TOP SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE.
FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

In accordance with instructions of March 28, 1946, from the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, there is enclosed for your confidential information a copy of SWNCC 186/12 in regard to transfer to the Soviet Union of Japanese destroyers and surface combatant vessels of lesser tonnage. By informal action the Committee approved this paper on March 28.

Enclosure:
SWNCC 186/12,
copy no. 69.

TOP SECRET

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FE:JKPenfield:hst

JA
hst

Confidential File

F.W. 894.30/3-2846

894.30/3-2846

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LETTER AND ENCLOSURES FROM THE STATE-WAR-NAVY
COORDINATING COMMITTEE RE TRANSFER TO SOVIET
UNION OF JAPANESE DESTROYERS AND SURFACE
COMBATANT VESSELS OF LESSER TONNAGE.

MARCH 28, 1946

~~TOP SECRET~~

TOP SECRET

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

File
filed
Office of
EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAR 29 1946
Director
Department of State
tel Moscow
4/1/46
memo to
US ref
filed
4/1 DCR

SWN-4090
28 March 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Transfer to Soviet Union of Japanese Destroyers and Surface Combatant Vessels of Lesser Tonnage.

- References:
- a. SWNCC 186/10
 - b. SWNCC 186/11/D
 - c. SWNCC 186/12

By informal action on 28 March 1946 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee approved SWNCC 186/12.

Copy No. 68 of SWNCC 186/12 is forwarded herewith for guidance and such implementation as is deemed appropriate. It is requested that the enclosed Copy No. 69 of SWNCC 186/12 be forwarded to the United States representative on the Far Eastern Commission for his information.

It is further requested that the State Department communicate to the government of the U.S.S.R. the substance of the note in Appendix "C" of the approved paper.

In approving this paper, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee agreed that no part of this report be released to the press at present.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

H. Freeman Matthews
H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS,
Acting Chairman

Enclosures:
Copies Nos. 68 and 69,
SWNCC 186/12

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894.30/3-2846

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TOP SECRET

SWN-4090

Memo for Secy of State

Re: SWNCC 186/12

FOR SIGNATURE OF

MR. MATTHEWS

APR 11 1950

add

TOP SECRET

**TOP SECRET**

THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

SWN-4090
28 March 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Transfer to Soviet Union of Japanese Destroyers and Surface Combatant Vessels of Lesser Tonnage.

References: a. SWNCC 186/10
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In approving this paper, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee agreed that no part of this report be released to the press at present.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

H. FREEMAN MATTHEWS,
Acting Chairman

Enclosures:
Copies Nos. 68 and 69,
SWNCC 186/12

TOP SECRETTOP SECRETCOPY NO. 68SWNCC 186/1221 March 1946Pages 29 - 36, incl.STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEETRANSFER TO SOVIET UNION OF JAPANESE DESTROYERS
AND SURFACE COMBATANT VESSELS OF LESSER TONNAGEReferences: a. SWNCC 186/10
b. SWNCC 186/11/DNote by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

HAROLD W. MOSELEY

Secretariat

SWNCC 186/12**TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

E N C L O S U R E

TRANSFER TO SOVIET UNION OF JAPANESE DESTROYERS
AND SURFACE COMBATANT VESSELS OF LESSER TONNAGE

Report by the
State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East

THE PROBLEM

1. To determine what stand should be taken with reference to the Soviet request for the immediate transfer of certain Japanese vessels.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. See Appendix "A".

DISCUSSION

3. See Appendix "B".

CONCLUSIONS

4. It is concluded that:

a. There is no reason to modify the position taken in SWNCC 186/10 (see paragraph 2, Appendix "A") regarding the disposition of Japanese combatant vessels;

b. The final disposition of the Japanese merchant fleet can be decided only as a part of broader decisions to be made by the Far Eastern Commission involving the whole question of reparations and the future economy of Japan; and

c. It would be desirable to use a portion of the Japanese merchant and naval vessels for the repatriation of Japanese soldiers (and also Japanese civilians, if the U.S.S.R. so desires) from areas occupied by Soviet forces, but vessels used for such purposes should remain under the direct control of SCAP. It would be appropriate for the Soviet member of the Allied Council for Japan to make direct application to SCAP for the assignment of Japanese vessels to these tasks.

TOP SECRET

RECOMMENDATIONS

5. It is recommended that:

a. Upon approval of this paper by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

(1) The report be forwarded to the State, War, and Navy Departments and to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for guidance and implementation, where appropriate;

(2) This paper be forwarded to the United States representative on the Far Eastern Commission for his information; and

(3) The State Department be requested to communicate to the Government of the U.S.S.R., the substance of the appended note (Appendix "C").

b. No part of this report be released to the press at present.

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX "A"

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. Agreement has been reached between the U.S., the U.K., the U.S.S.R., and China that all large vessels of the Japanese Navy such as battleships and cruisers as well as Japanese submarines would be destroyed and that destroyers and surface combatant vessels of lesser tonnage would be divided equally among the four powers.

2. In SWNCC 186/10 of 10 January 1946 the Department of State was requested to obtain the formal agreement of the U.K., the U.S.S.R., and China to the following procedure:

"When the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers determines that the destroyers and surface combatant vessels of lesser tonnage of the Japanese fleet are no longer needed for repatriation work, for minesweeping, or for any other task connected with the implementation of the Japanese surrender, he will so inform the United States Government, and the United States Government will then arrange with the interested governments for an equal division of these vessels between the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., China, and the United States."

3. A letter, dated 18 February 1946, from Ambassador Wei Tao Ming to Mr. Byrnes stated China's agreement to this procedure. No reply as yet has been received from the U.K. The Soviet reply, given in an enclosure to SWNCC 186/11/D, states:

"Mr. Harriman as early as October 21, 1945 informed the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. V. M. Molotov, on behalf of Mr. Byrnes, of the agreement of the Government of the USA to the transfer to the Soviet Union of one-fourth of the remaining ships of the Japanese naval fleet beginning with destroyers and surface vessels of lesser tonnage. In this same letter it was indicated that the Government of the USA expressed willingness to

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discuss with the U.S.S.R. and other Allies a plan for the division of the Japanese merchant fleet.

"Proceeding from the above and taking into account the fact that considerable time has already passed from the moment of reaching an understanding on the question of the Japanese naval fleet, the Soviet Government thinks that it would be expedient to proceed (this has the sense of 'proceed at once' translator's note) to the realization of this understanding on the transfer of the above-cited portion of Japanese combatant vessels to the Soviet Union.

"As regards vessels of the Japanese merchant fleet, in the opinion of the Soviet Government it also seems expedient to make a division of them among the four interested governments, U.S.S.R., USA, Britain and China, in the very near future.

"In as much as Japanese combatant and merchant ships are also needed by the command of the Soviet troops for repatriation and other purposes connected with the implementation of the capitulation of Japan, the Soviet Government believes that it would be most expedient of all to discuss the question of using these vessels immediately after they have been divided among the four interested countries."

4. The Potsdam Declaration states:

"(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives."

5. In reply to a suggestion from General Marshall that negotiations with the Soviet authorities for the repatriation of Japanese from Manchuria be started either in the field or else from Washington, Mr. Byrnes on 7 March 1946 informed General Marshall that the first of his alternative approaches

TOP SECRET

was more likely to produce satisfactory results. Mr. Byrnes also stated that he had been informed by the Soviets on 21 December 1945 that all troops in Manchuria had been disarmed and evacuated to Soviet territory as war prisoners. Mr. Byrnes concluded with the statement that, in view of the desirability of removing Japanese civilians as soon as possible from Manchuria, he was in hearty agreement with General Marshall's suggestion that the U.S.S.R. be offered shipping facilities for the repatriation of Japanese civilians.

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APPENDIX "B"

DISCUSSION

1. The Soviet reply to the U.S. proposals regarding the disposition of Japanese combatant vessels in no way invalidates the conclusions of SWNCC 186/10 or the reasons behind these conclusions. Consequently, there is no need to modify the position taken in SWNCC 186/10.

2. No decision has as yet been made regarding the final disposition of the Japanese merchant fleet, and no decision is possible except as a part of broader decisions involving the whole question of reparations and the future economy of Japan. These are policy problems to be settled by the FEC, and, consequently, the final decision regarding the disposition of the Japanese merchant fleet must await further policy decisions by the FEC.

3. The Soviet reply states that "Japanese combatant and merchant ships are also needed by the command of the Soviet troops for repatriation and other purposes connected with the implementation of the capitulation of Japan". This statement opens the question of the repatriation of Japanese troops from areas occupied by Soviet forces. The repatriation of all Japanese soldiers was promised in the Potsdam Declaration, but, as yet, no repatriation from Soviet occupied areas has taken place, and the U.S.S.R. instead has evacuated all Japanese troops captured in Manchuria to Soviet territory. The Japanese Government and political parties have expressed considerable concern regarding the repatriation of Japanese from areas occupied by Soviet forces. In view of this situation, it would be to the advantage of the U.S. to encourage the U.S.S.R., to start at once the repatriation of Japanese troops in Soviet hands and to agree to the repatriation of Japanese civilians, if the U.S.S.R., decided to repatriate them also. The use of Japanese vessels for this purpose would be appropriate, but,

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as in the repatriation of Japanese from areas occupied under the control of SACSEA and China, the Japanese vessels engaged in this work should remain under the direct control of SCAP. The proper procedure in having a portion of the Japanese ships assigned to the task of repatriating Japanese troops (and civilians) from areas occupied by Soviet forces would be for the Soviet member of the Allied Council for Japan to bring the problem to the attention of SCAP.

TOP SECRETAPPENDIX "C"SUBSTANCE OF THE NOTE TO BE COMMUNICATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE U. S. S. R.

With reference to the letter, dated 12 February 1946, from Mr. Lozovski to Mr. Kennan, regarding the disposition of Japanese destroyers and surface combatant vessels of lesser tonnage, the United States Government recognizes that Japanese vessels may be needed by the Soviet command for repatriation and other purposes connected with the implementation of the capitulation of Japan. Japanese vessels under the control of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers are at present being used for such purposes in various parts of the Far East, and it would, therefore, be appropriate to assign some of these vessels to repatriation work and other tasks connected with the implementation of the Japanese surrender in areas occupied by Soviet forces. The Soviet member of the Allied Council for Japan might, accordingly, request the Supreme Commander to assign a suitable proportion of the Japanese vessels under his control to these tasks.

It is felt that the assignment of Japanese vessels to such tasks should not be connected with or in any way prejudice the ultimate disposition of these vessels. In fact, as long as the vessels are engaged in repatriation work and in other tasks connected with the implementation of the Japanese surrender, they should remain under the control of the Supreme Commander and should not be considered available for final disposition. The division of Japanese destroyers and surface combatant vessels of lesser tonnage between the four powers should, therefore, await the completion of these tasks.

The final disposition of the Japanese merchant fleet involves the broader problems of reparations and the future economy of Japan. A final decision on its disposition, therefore, must await further policy decisions by the Far Eastern Commission.

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6 April, 1946

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Secretary of State
State Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

Enclosed you find a copy of a letter which has been sent to the United Nations Council, the Secretary of the Navy, Senator Mead (N.Y.), Senator Huffman (Ohio), and Senator Johnson (Colo.), Congressional representatives of our various home states.

We do not ask you to take action on our request but would sincerely appreciate any assistance you could give us if this matter should come within your cognizance.

Yours truly,
H. H. Croy
H. H. Croy
386 South Logan Street,
Denver, Colorado

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
APR 15 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
APR 23 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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OFFICE OF
SPECIAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS
APR 23 1946
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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CS/A

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6 April, 1946

United Nations Organization
National Contingents Of Armed Forces Committee
Hunter College
New York, New York

Gentlemen:

To the best of our knowledge, the problem of the ultimate disposition of naval vessels of former enemy nations is under your supervision. We further understand that the disposition of the five Japanese "I" Class submarines, the I-201, I-203, I-14, I-400, and I-401, now at the United States Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii, is pending your decision.

We hereby petition you to sell or lease one of these submarines to a crew of veteran submariners which we propose to organize.

It is our intention to tour various ports of the United Nations for the purpose of exhibition to the peoples of the world this unique type submersible of the former Japanese Navy. Being young veterans of World War II and finding ourselves on the verge of honorable discharge from the United States Submarine Force, we feel a strong desire for a peaceful, adventurous pursuit. At the same time we expect to realize considerable profit through the collection of small fees from visitors at exhibition ports.

We realize that the removal of certain secret and confidential materials now aboard the vessels would be necessary before one of them could be placed on general exhibition. We are interested only in the hull intact with such appurtenances and enough of its main propulsion and auxiliary power machinery as would be required for safe navigation on the surface under its own power. We would desire that all furnishings and fixtures of no value in military investigation and research be left aboard the vessel.

We are fully aware that the commission is engaged in making momentous decisions at this time but hope that they will not consider this request an impertinent proposal by a group of irresponsible soldiers of fortune. We realize the work involved in making detailed plans and the amount of energy which must be expended if these plans are to be materialized, especially by a group of inexperienced business-men.

Since we are anxious to proceed with our plans, we would appreciate a reply in the near future, if it should be no more than an official statement of the commission's policy regarding the disposition of the vessels in question.

We, the undersigned, servants of the people of the United States, respectfully request your careful considerations of our proposal.

In reply, kindly address Lieut. (jg) H. H. Croy, USNR, U.S.S. Apogon (SS308)
In Care of Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California.

Respectfully,

H. H. Croy
H. H. Croy

D. H. Funsett
D. H. Funsett

W. H. Hayes, Jr.
W. H. Hayes, Jr.

W. C. Jordan
W. C. Jordan

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : IS - Mr. Rusk
FROM : IS - Mr. Blaisdell
SUBJECT:

DATE: April 24, 1946

Since JA, which I had thought was the proper Division to prepare a draft reply to this letter, has declined to do so, I presume we should prepare an acknowledgment along the lines indicated by Mr. Thompson in his penciled notation attached.


Will you please have such a draft reply prepared?

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APR 26 1946

In reply refer to
IS

Dear Mr. Croy:

I wish to acknowledge your letter of April 6 to the Secretary of State which enclosed a copy of a letter which you and your associates have written to the United Nations, the Secretary of the Navy and others.

It seems to me that in addressing your letter to the Secretary of the Navy you placed your proposal before the Department which would be best able to give you information and advice on the vessels you named.

Sincerely yours,

Donald C. Blaisdell
Acting Chief
Division of International Security
Affairs

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Mr.	Mr. Croy
Room	
Dist.	

Handwritten initials: DR, WJ

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CR
APR 26 1946

Mr. H. H. Croy,
386 South Logan Street,
Denver, Colorado.

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THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

SWN-4208
26 April 1946

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

Subject: Transfer to Soviet Union of Japanese Destroyers and Surface Combatant Vessels of Lesser Tonnage.

- References: a. SWNCC 186/12
- b. SWNCC 186/13



On 28 March 1946 the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in memorandum SWN-4090 requested the State Department to communicate to the Government of the U. S. S. R. the substance of the note in Appendix "C" of SWNCC 186/12.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it most desirable that this note be supplemented, in whatever fashion the Department of State may find most expedient, by additional information substantially as follows:

"On 14 September 1945 the United States Chiefs of Staff issued a directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, a copy of which was forwarded to your high command, requiring that he coordinate the use of captured Japanese shipping in the repatriation of Japanese nationals from all areas and in other matters connected with the capitulation of Japan. In order to carry out this directive, requests were made to the Soviet command as to the amount and condition of Japanese shipping recovered in Soviet areas, but this information has not been furnished. It will be recognized that a fair assignment of Japanese vessels to employment in the repatriation of Japanese from the various areas can be made only if the requirements of the task and the quantity of vessels captured in all areas are made known to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Consequently, a request for the assignment of Japanese vessels, in addition to those now in possession of the Soviet command, for repatriation of Japanese nationals and other purposes connected with the implementation of the Japanese surrender, should be accompanied by sufficient data, both as to the amount of captured

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Japanese shipping already in the possession of the Soviet command and as to the purposes for which additional Japanese shipping is required by the Soviet command, to permit the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to make an equitable assignment of vessels, from total available resources recovered from the Japanese, to the various tasks to be accomplished."

In approving SWNCC 186/13 (copy of which is attached) the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee concurred in the foregoing views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

For the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee:

J. H. H.

JOHN H. HILLDRING,
State Member,
State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Enclosure:

Copy No. 55, SWNCC 186/13

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165 -

TOP SECRETCOPY NO. 55SWNCC 186/13**TOP SECRET**22 April 1946Pages 37 - 39, incl.STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEETRANSFER TO SOVIET UNION OF JAPANESE DESTROYERS
AND SURFACE COMBATANT VESSELS OF LESSER TONNAGE

Reference: SWNCC 186/12

Note by the Secretaries

The enclosure, a memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee from the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is circulated for consideration by the Committee.

ALEXANDER D. REID

B. L. AUSTIN

HAROLD W. MOSELEY

Secretariat

SWNCC 186/13**TOP SECRET**

169

TOP SECRETE N C L O S U R ETHE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Washington 25, D.C.

SM-5564

• 21 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE:

Subject: Transfer to Soviet Union of Japanese Destroyers
and Surface Combatant Vessels of Lesser Tonnage

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have received SWNCC 186/12, which was forwarded to them for guidance and appropriate implementation, and have forwarded a copy of the report to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) for his information. Further implementation can be accomplished by SCAP within the framework of orders previously issued requiring that he coordinate the use of captured Japanese shipping in the repatriation of Japanese nationals and for other purposes connected with the capitulation of Japan.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are apprehensive that the phrasing of the note which has been communicated to the Government of the USSR (Appendix "C" to SWNCC 186/12) may invite the submission of arbitrary demands for shipping for undisclosed or vague purposes which may be a source of embarrassment for SCAP and the United States.

It has been the position of the United States that all shipping recovered from the Japanese, regardless of the area in which recovered, should be employed in the repatriation of Japanese nationals and for other purposes connected with the capitulation of Japan, and that SCAP should coordinate its use for these purposes. To permit SCAP to accomplish this function it is essential that he know what shipping is available for the task and that he be informed as to the number of Japanese to be repatriated from each area. Attempts

170

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to obtain data as to Japanese shipping in the hands of the Soviets have failed, and unless such data are available to SCAP, and firm repatriation requirements are presented to him, he will have no basis for judging what additional shipping should be allocated to the Soviet area nor for correlating the reception of repatriates from that area with those from other areas. The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore consider that the presentation of the data needed by SCAP should be made a prerequisite to the allocation to the Soviets of shipping recovered from the Japanese.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that SWNCC 186/12 has been approved and that, as a result of the recommendations of that paper, the Department of State has communicated to the Government of the USSR the substance of the proposed note. They consider it most desirable that this note be supplemented, in whatever fashion the Department of State may find most expedient, by additional information substantially as follows:

"On 14 September 1945 the United States Chiefs of Staff issued a directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, a copy of which was forwarded to your high command, requiring that he coordinate the use of captured Japanese shipping in the repatriation of Japanese nationals from all areas and in other matters connected with the capitulation of Japan. In order to carry out this directive, requests were made to the Soviet command as to the amount and condition of Japanese shipping recovered in Soviet areas, but this information has not been furnished. It will be recognized that a fair assignment of Japanese vessels to employment in the repatriation of Japanese from the various areas can be made only if the requirements of the task and the quantity of vessels captured in all areas are made known to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Consequently, a request for the assignment of Japanese vessels, in addition to those now in

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possession of the Soviet command, for repatriation of Japanese nationals and other purposes connected with the implementation of the Japanese surrender, should be accompanied by sufficient data, both as to the amount of captured Japanese shipping already in the possession of the Soviet command and as to the purposes for which additional Japanese shipping is required by the Soviet command, to permit the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to make an equitable assignment of vessels, from total available resources recovered from the Japanese, to the various tasks to be accomplished."

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/s/ A. J. McFarland

A. J. McFARLAND,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Secretary.

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Charge Department:

Washington

Charge to

Paraphrase before communicating except to Government agencies.
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MOSCOW.

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AS supplement to letter addressed by you to Lozovski along lines DEPTTEL 599, April 1, you should communicate substantially the following to FONOFF:

QUOTE On 14 September 1945 the United States Chiefs of Staff issued a directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, a copy of which was forwarded to your high command, requiring that he coordinate the use of captured Japanese shipping in the repatriation of Japanese nationals from all areas and in other matters connected with the capitulation of Japan. In order to carry out this directive, requests were made to the Soviet Command as to the amount and condition of Japanese shipping recovered in Soviet areas, but this information has not been furnished. It will be recognized that a fair assignment of Japanese vessels to employment in the repatriation of Japanese from the various areas can be made only if the requirements of the task and the quantity of

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of vessels captured in all areas are made known to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Consequently, a request for the ~~assignment~~ ^{assignment} of Japanese vessels, in addition to those now in possession of the Soviet command, for repatriation of Japanese nationals and other purposes connected with the implementation of the Japanese surrender, should be accompanied by sufficient data, both as to the amount of captured Japanese shipping already in the possession of the Soviet command and as to the purposes for which additional Japanese shipping is required by the Soviet command, to permit the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to make an equitable assignment of vessels, from total available resources recovered from the Japanese, to the various tasks to be accomplished UNQUOTE.

Richard
Acting

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Washington

Charge to

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No paraphrase necessary.
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MAY 9 1946
7 pm

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

TOKYO

INFO: WAR DEPT CHIEF OF STAFF

FOR POLITICAL ADVISER

REURAD C-60653 / 894.30/5646

Support of USSR of general principles quoted Paragraph 1, Appendix A, SWNCC 186/12 was contained in letter to Secretary Byrnes signed Molotov dated October 19, 1945. On Oct 26, 1945 Dept orally informed British and Chinese Ambassadors that QUOTE we had decided to destroy all large vessels of the Jap Navy such as battleships and cruisers as well as Jap submarines and that destroyers and floating vessels with lesser tonnage would be divided equally among the four powers, that is, with the USSR, UK, China and the US UNQUOTE

As stated in paragraph 2, Appendix A, SWNCC 186/12 formal agreement was requested of UK, USSR and China to procedure outlined in Dept's communication quoted therein. Replies have been received from the USSR

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and China as noted in paragraph 3. No formal reply has been received from UK.

With regard to further developments in respect of subject matter of paragraph 3 of same Appendix, note quoted in Appendix C was communicated to Soviet Foreign Office on April 5. On May 4 Dept sent to Embassy Moscow for transmittal in substance to Soviet Foreign Office as supplement to note delivered April 5 the text proposed by JCS in SWNCC 186/13, 22 April 1946, which paper it is assumed you possess.

Acheson
Acting

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5-8-46

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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Tokyo
Dated May 6, 1946
Rec'd 1:12 p.m., 6th

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From: GHQ XCAP Tokyo Japan
To: War Department for WARCOS; Secretary of State
(WAR pls pass)
Nr. C 60653 6 May 1946

*Telegram to
Atcheson 5/8/46
JW: JRE*

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Soviet member Allied Council is raising questions
in regard to disposition of Jap combatant Naval vessels.
(Is Atcheson's 201 May 6th).

Please inform me as to date or dates of agreement
between United States, United Kingdom, USSR and China on
basic principles referred to in Para 1 of Appendix A of
SWNCC 186/12, 21 March 1946, also as to any further
developments in respect to subject matter of Para 3 of same
Appendix.

End

ACTION: Gen Vandenberg (for State Dept)
INFO: Gen Hull

CM-In-1356 (6 May 1946) DTG: 060310Z fg

CLASSIFICATION CHANGED
TO SECRET
BY AUTHORITY OF <i>Ambassador Tokyo</i>
<i>Dep. 1012</i> DATE <i>5-8-50</i>
BY <i>Robye A. Gibson</i>

MAY 17 1946

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DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE INCOMING TELEGRAM

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PI	✓

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
MAY 9 - 1946
5:10
DIRECTOR
Department of State

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Moscow via War

Dated May 9, 1946

Rec'd 12:20 p.m., 9th

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SECSTATE

1478, May 9, 9 a.m.

Supplementary communication on disposition of Jap fleet (REDEPTEL 836, May 4) made in letter to Lozovski on May 8.

HORACE SMITH

JT

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DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

MAY 14 1946

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS MAY 23 1946 DIRECTOR Department of State

Tokyo, May 14, 1946

TOP SECRET

No. 419

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS MAY 24 1946 DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUBJECT: Soviet Protest in Connection with SCAP Directive on Destruction of Japanese Naval Vessels

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECEIVED MAY 25 1946 10 09 AM

War - Capt Bonesteel in Penfield - 7E
The Honorable Mary-Capt Wishes this to go
The Secretary of State, Stennisism to War Mary-7E
Washington. OP 35- 5/23/46

I have the honor to refer to this Mission's telegrams 201, May 6, 1946, and 214, May 9, in regard to a protest by the Soviet Member of the Allied Council in connection with a recent SCAP directive to the Japanese Government concerning the destruction of Japanese naval vessels and to the Department's telegraphic instruction 299, May 10, on this subject.

There are enclosed, as listed below, copies of correspondence on this subject which has passed between Lieutenant General K. Derevyanko, Soviet Member of the Council; Major General Paul J. Mueller, Chief of Staff on behalf of the Supreme Commander; and myself, as Chairman and Member for the United States to the Council. A copy of the directive of April 30, 1946 to the Japanese Government, subject, "Destruction of Former Japanese Naval Vessels", is also enclosed.

The principal points raised in General Derevyanko's letter of May 3, 1946 are as follows:

1. The time allowed for consideration of the draft directive was too short, especially as the Soviet Government was not consulted concerning the basic problem and the directive appears to be the result of an American unilateral action.
2. Representatives of the Members of the Council should be allowed to witness the destruction of former Japanese naval vessels. A collateral question involves the disposition of Japanese transport submarines.
3. Vessels for experimental target use should also be allocated to the Soviet Government.
4. An executive committee should be formed to compile a list of allocable Japanese naval vessels.

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5. The executive committee should also have cognizance over auxiliary vessels of the Japanese navy.

6. Allocable Japanese naval vessels should not be utilized for repatriation purposes.

7. The destruction of special facilities and ammunition is an integral factor in the disarmament of the Japanese navy.


In reply to General Derevyanko's letter of May 3, the Chief of Staff, Major General Paul J. Mueller, explained the chain of command through which policy decisions are transmitted to the Supreme Commander and stressed that, in general, the questions raised by General Derevyanko were beyond the scope of the Supreme Commander's authority. General Derevyanko was also advised that the suggested establishment of an executive committee is not in accordance with the Moscow Communiqué, and that the temporary use of Japanese vessels for repatriation purposes and the destruction of Japanese submarines are both in accordance with instructions received from the United States Government.

In his letter of May 7, 1946 to General MacArthur, General Derevyanko reverted to the question of the time permitted for consideration of the directive and contended that his recommendations had not been given consideration. He suggested that the Council as a whole should consult and advise in the name of the Council.

In reply to this letter, I reiterated that the basic principles for the disposition of Japanese combatant naval vessels were agreed upon by the Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britain and China, and mentioned the impracticality of calling a meeting of the Council for discussion of each individual directive as well as the desirability of continuing the present procedure of informal consultation and presentation of views.

It would appear that the subject directive is being utilized by General Derevyanko in an endeavor to increase the time for consideration by Council Members of proposed SCAP directives, to expand the functions of the Council, and to circumscribe actions of the Supreme Commander by seeking to establish his dependence upon prior advice by the Council acting as a unit. There is also involved a Soviet desire to preserve vessels to be allocated to the Soviet Government and to throw the entire burden of repatriation upon United States vessels.

Respectfully yours,


George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosures:

As listed on page 3.

180

-3-

Enclosures:

- ✓ 1. SCAP Directive 910,
April 30, 1946.
- ✓ 2. From General Derevyanko
to General MacArthur
(translation), May 3, 1946.
- ✓ 3. From Chief of Staff to
General Derevyanko, May 5, 1946.
- ✓ 4. From General Derevyanko
to General MacArthur
(translation), May 7, 1946.
- ✓ 5. From Mr. Acheson to
General Derevyanko, May 10, 1946.

*Enclosures
attached.**Jerm*

Original and hectograph to Department

Copy to American Embassy Moscow
Copy to American Embassy London
Copy to American Embassy Chungking
Copy to American Legation Canberra

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Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 419 dated May 14, 1946, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Soviet Protest in Connection with SCAP Directive on Destruction of Japanese Naval Vessels".

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 045.93 (30 Apr 46)GD
(SCAPIN - 910)

AFPO 500
30 April 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.

THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.

SUBJECT : Destruction of Former Japanese Naval Vessels.

1. All former Japanese surface combatant naval vessels which are:
 - a. Within the Japanese Empire.
 - b. Readily towable.
 - c. Larger than destroyers.
 - d. Not employed by the occupation forces or in the repatriation service,

are to be destroyed by scrapping or other approved manner within one (1) year of this date. All such vessels are hereby released to the Imperial Japanese Government for this purpose.

2. It is estimated that Naval Combatant vessels presently engaged in repatriation service will be available for destruction under a similar directive about November 1946.

3. The Imperial Japanese Government will:
 - a. Coordinate action, in compliance with this directive, with the Commander Naval Activities, Japan and the Commanding General, Eighth Army.
 - b. Submit to Commander Naval Activities, Japan:
 - (1) An outline of the over-all plan for the accomplishment of this directive.
 - (2) Quarterly reports indicating the status of the program and estimated date of completion.
 - (3) Plans for specific scrapping operations.
 - c. Submit to Commanding General, Eighth Army, applications of private contractors for newly established salvage and scrapping activities or applications as necessary to extend present industrial activity to include salvage and scrapping. Applications will be submitted as required by Occupational Directive No. 3, dated 22 September 1945.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER:

B. M. FITCH,
Brigadier General, AGD,
Adjutant General.

Information of General Application Pertaining to Directive Number (SCAPIN - 910) File AG 045.93 (30 Apr 46)GD, subj: "Destruction of Former Japanese Naval Vessels".

1. With reference to Memorandum (SCAPIN-910) to the Imperial Japanese Government, the following is published for the information of all concerned.
2. In accordance with instructions received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, SCAP is responsible for the destruction of the Japanese Navy at such times and places and in such a manner as he sees fit. Such destruction applies to all combatant vessels, except those which have been selected for U.S. target or experimental use and vessels of destroyer class or lesser tonnage for which other disposition has been directed in classified communications.
3. In implementation of the JCS instructions COMNAVJAP has prepared an outline plan which has been approved by SCAP. SCAP responsibility extends to insuring ultimate destruction and partial Japanese action to attain this end is embodied in attached SCAPIN. Additional Japanese action in destroying vessels now employed or those not coming within description of paragraph 1 of attached SCAPIN, will be covered in later directives.
4. It is contemplated that COMNAVJAP action in connection with paragraph 3 of attached SCAPIN would be from a Naval technical point of view to insure that proposed Japanese action is adequate and progresses satisfactorily in order to carry out the outline destruction plan mentioned in paragraph 2 above. COMNAVJAP will also pass the overall plan of paragraph 3a(1) of attached SCAPIN to SCAP and CG 8th Army for info, and the specific plans of paragraph 3a(3) to CG 8th Army for info or action as necessary. CG 8th Army action in connection with paragraph 3 of attached SCAPIN consists of general cognizance and routine surveillance over the industrial operations relevant thereto, including salvage, scrapping and miscellaneous associated activity, in accordance with existing directives.
5. Command instructions incident to paragraph 3 above follow through command channels.

J. W. MANN
Lt Colonel, AGD
Asst Adjutant General.

Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 419 dated May 14, 1946, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Soviet Protest in Connection with SCAP Directive on Destruction of Japanese Naval Vessels".

General of the Army
Douglas MacArthur,
Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers
GHQ
Tokyo

Dear General,

I have the honour to bring to your attention the following reply on the draft memorandum to the Imperial Japanese Government concerning destruction of certain former Japanese Naval Vessels as well as concerning the opinion of the General Headquarters on this matter.

1. The subject stated in the memorandum is of vital importance in the light of its proper realization. The gravity of the subject requires proper discussion and full concord on the part of all interested Governments.

In this connection it seems unjustified to require an answer on this memorandum within 48 hours, especially so that the draft of this memorandum is an instruction received from the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff on which the Soviet Government was not advised and whose consent was not asked for as to this matter. Besides this, as it is understood from the draft of the memorandum, a part of the former Japanese naval vessels have already been sunk by the American Forces. Consequently this proposal in fact seems to be one to arrange an agreement for what has already been done.

2. Having no principal objections against the destruction of the Japanese naval vessels classified in the draft of the proposal or against scrapping those vessels which are not to be distributed among the four Allied Powers the Soviet Government does find it expedient to have representatives of the Members of the Allied Council for Japan during the destruction of the above mentioned Japanese naval vessels.

All the Members of the Allied Council for Japan should be supplied in copies with official properly arranged documents on the destruction of the Japanese naval surface vessels and submarines. Since the draft of the memorandum does not specify what is to be done with Japanese transport submarines, the Soviet Government believes that these submarines would be either destroyed or included into the list of vessels to be distributed among the four Allied Powers.

3. The Soviet Government has nothing against handing over to the United States for experimental use as targets of the above mentioned Japanese Combatant vessels. Simultaneously the Soviet Government would consider it proper to have some ships of this category handed over to the Soviet Government to use them as targets.

4. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to begin right now registering and compiling accurate lists of the Japanese naval vessels to be distributed among the four Allied Powers.

Accordingly

-2-

Accordingly the Soviet Government suggests that a committee comprising competent representatives of the four Allied Powers be immediately set up which should set to work not later than by the end of May 1946.

5. Since the draft of the memorandum does not specify the fate of the auxiliary vessels of the Japanese navy (military transports, tenders, repairships, floating docks, icebreakers, hospitalships, tugs and others) which also should be included among the vessels to be distributed among the four Allied Powers, the Soviet Government considers it proper to charge the Committee suggested in paragraph 4 with the task of registering and compiling the list of vessels of this category as well.

6. The Soviet Government does not consider it advisable to use the combatant vessels to be distributed among the four Allied Powers for repatriation purposes having in mind their total unfitness for such task.

Accordingly the Soviet Government considers it necessary that measures be taken to immediately discontinue the use of these vessels in repatriation service as well as measures to preserve them up to the time of distributing them among the four Allied Powers. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to use large Japanese naval vessels which are to be destroyed as well as transports and ships of the Merchant Japanese fleet in the repatriation service instead of the above mentioned vessels.

7. The disarmament of the Japanese navy would not be complete without destruction of special facilities and ammunition. The Soviet Government, therefore, believes that all such special facilities and ammunition will be also destroyed including naval as well as air torpedoes, mines, ammunition for naval and shore artillery, naval air force bomb supplies and others.

The Members of the Allied Council for Japan should also receive copies of official documents properly arranged on the destruction of all these facilities and ammunition.

Sincerely yours,

(s) K. Derevyanko
(t) K. DEREVIANKO
Lt. General
U.S.S.R. Member of the
Allied Council for Japan.

N 40126
"3" May 1946

Enclosure No. 3 to Despatch No. 419 dated May 14, 1946, from The United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Soviet Protest in Connection with SCAP Directive on Destruction of Japanese Naval Vessels".

5 May 1946.

Lieutenant General K. Derevyanko
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Member of the Allied Council for Japan

Dear General Derevyanko:

General MacArthur asked me to reply to your letter of 3 May 1946 concerning destruction of certain former Japanese naval vessels. He feels that you are under misapprehension with regard to the subject matter thereof.

The directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are in accordance with the basic principles in this matter that were agreed to by the four Allied Powers. The action being taken by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is merely executive and is pursuant to instructions issued through the United States Government.

You will note by reference to the Moscow Communique of 27 December 1945, that the United States Government is the channel through which Allied decisions are communicated to the Supreme Commander. The agency for this purpose employed by the United States Government is the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In general, the questions you raise in your letter as to governmental policies are ones quite beyond the scope of the Supreme Commander's authority. They are being handled, as I understand it, upon the highest governmental level.

The suggestion relative establishment of an executive committee representing the Allied Powers is not in accordance with the Moscow Communique which established the Supreme Commander as the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan and which provided that in all cases action will be carried out under and through the Supreme Commander.

As regards the temporary use of Japanese vessels for purposes of repatriation, the current procedure is in accordance with instructions received by the Supreme Commander from the United States Government, notice of which, I understand, was communicated to the Soviet Government. The destructions of Japanese submarines is in process pursuant to similar instructions.

General information on the disposition of Japanese war materials is being publicly announced from time to time. Detailed information on this subject, if desired by you, can be made available by SCAP Headquarters upon compilation.

Very cordially yours,

PAUL J. MUELLER
Major General, GSC
Chief of Staff.

Enclosure No. 4 to Despatch No. 419 dated May 14, 1946, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Soviet Protest in Connection with SCAP Directive on Destruction of Japanese Naval Vessels".

ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN
TOKYO
OFFICE OF THE MEMBER
FOR
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

TO THE SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE ALLIED POWERS

General of the Army D. MACARTHUR.

Copy: TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE ALLIED COUNCIL, MR. G. ATCHESON.
TO THE MEMBER OF THE ALLIED COUNCIL MR. M. BALL.
TO THE MEMBER OF THE ALLIED COUNCIL, LT. GEN. CHU.

Dear General,

In reply to the letter from Your Headquarters concerning the project of the memorandum to the Japanese Government on the demolition of the Japanese War vessels, which I received on the 26 April 46, at 9.30 a.m., I have asked you in my reply dated 27 April 46, to postpone the issue of the above mentioned memorandum in view of the extreme importance of the question and the impossibility of giving you my opinion on the matter within 48 hours.

However, on the 30 April 1946, I have received the copy of this memorandum under No. 910, 30 April 1946, already issued by the Headquarters and containing the instructions to the Japanese Government on the demolition of the war vessels of the former Japanese Fleet.

Evidently the memorandum was issued without taking into consideration of my recommendations, which in the course of the above mentioned circumstances I was able to present on the 3 May 1946.

I am obliged therefore to present a written proof on the matter and to announce my decisive protest against the fact that my request on the above question was not taken into consideration.

Similar actions do not allow the Allied Council to give advices and consultations to the Supreme Commander on questions concerning the projects on directives to the Japanese Government - and this does not agree with the decisions of the Moscow Conference of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs about the functions and the full power of the Allied Council for Japan.

In view of that, I am making a suggestion and am asking my honorable colleagues, the Members of the Allied Council, to give their opinion and to join in this proposal:

According to the 5th article on "The Position of the Allied Council for Japan", the Supreme Commander will consult and advise the Council before issuing orders on essential matters, but not it's separate Members, as it is being practiced now. It will be

more

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more expedient and in accordance, in letter and spirit, with the agreement of the Moscow Conference of the Three Ministers of Foreign Affairs, that all the projects of memorandums concerning essential matters would be discussed by the Members of the Council during the meetings of the Council and that all the recommendations for the projects of the memorandums would not be presented to the Supreme Commander individually, by each member of the Council, but in the name of the entire Council, according to the "Position of the Allied Council for Japan".

Respectfully yours,

The Member of the Allied Council for Japan
for the U.S.S.R.

Lieutenant-General /DEREVYANKO K.N.?

No.....

"7" May 1946.

Enclosure No. 5 to Despatch No. 419 dated May 14, 1946, from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, on the subject "Soviet Protest in Connection with SCAP Directive on Destruction of Japanese Naval Vessels".

AP0 500

May 10, 1946.

My dear General Derevyanko:

General MacArthur has asked me to reply to your letter of May 7, 1946, copy of which you kindly sent to me, with further reference to the question of the disposition of Japanese combatant naval vessels.

Note has been taken of the statement in your letter that the directive No. 910 of April 30, 1946 to the Japanese Government on this subject was issued without giving consideration to the recommendations which you put forth. I find difficulty in perceiving a basis for this assertion in view of the circumstance, mentioned in General Mueller's letter to you of May 5, that the basic principles of this matter were given consideration by and were agreed to by the Soviet Government and the three other directly concerned Governments. I may assure you, as of my own knowledge, that the Supreme Commander gave full and personal consideration to every aspect of the matter which you discussed in your letter to him of May 3.

I may add that the views expressed in your letter to General MacArthur of May 3 in regard to the directive were not identical with the views expressed on that subject by your colleagues on the Council. Under these circumstances, which were apparently envisaged in the Moscow Conference, the Supreme Commander is empowered to make the decision. In this instance his decision was supported by two of the Members and the views of the remaining two were opposed to each other. It may be mentioned also that all of the questions raised by your letter are not encompassed within the subject matter of the directive. As stated above, the basic principles for the disposition of Japanese combatant naval vessels were agreed upon by the Governments of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Great Britain and China. The other questions raised in your two communications were not touched upon by the directive and were not placed before the Members of the Council. These are questions, as stated in General Mueller's letter of May 5, which are beyond the scope of the Supreme Commander's authority.

The question of seeking comment on proposed directives within a certain period received, as I recall, extended discussion in one of the meetings of the Council.

Regarding

Lieutenant General K. Derevyanko,
Member for the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics,
Allied Council for Japan,
Tokyo, Japan.

-2-

Regarding the procedure followed in consulting Members of the Council as to contemplated directives, I offer the opinion that in view of the large number constantly being issued, it would not be practicable to call a meeting of the Council for discussion of each individual directive. Individual consultation appears to be provided for in paragraph 7 of the terms of reference. The present procedure does not place any obstacles in the way of consultation among interested Members of the Council and to my mind definitely has important advantages. It provides a simple, private and informal means for the exchange of views and for the conduct of appropriate business between the Supreme Commander and the Members of the Council. Moreover, in many instances individual Members may prefer to present the individual views of their Governments on a given matter. The present procedure permits of the presentation of individual views and at the same time does not hinder the presentation of joint views of two or more Members.

I am sending a copy of this letter to our colleagues on the Council for their information.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE ATCHESON, JR.
Chairman and Member for
the United States,
Allied Council for Japan

Copies to British Commonwealth
and Chinese Members,
and Secretary-General.

Reply refer to

TOP SECRET

May 27, 1946.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

TO: Colonel C. H. Bonesteel, III,
WDGS, Operations Division,
Room 3E779, Pentagon Building.

FROM: Frederick B. Lyon, Chief,
Division of Foreign Activity Correlation.

SUBJECT: Transmission of State Department
Top Secret Despatch.

Transmitted herewith for your information is one copy of Department of State Top Secret Despatch No. 419, dated May 14, 1946, from Tokyo, on the subject "Soviet Protest in Connection with SCAP Directive on Destruction of Japanese Naval Vessels."

894.30/5-1446

Enclosure:

As stated above.

DCR NE Unit	
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A true copy of the signed original. *cc*

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TOP SECRET

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894.30/5-14

In reply refer to
FC

May 4, 1946.

TOP SECRET

TO: Captain Robert L. Dennison, USN,
Room 3047, Navy Building.

FROM: Frederick B. Lyon, Chief,
Division of Foreign Activity Correlation.

SUBJECT: Transmission of State Department Document.

894.30/5-1446

Transmitted herewith for the information of the appropriate officials of the Navy Department is one copy of Top Secret Report No. 419 (with enclosures) from the United States Political Adviser for Japan, dated May 14, 1946, from Tokyo, on the subject Soviet Protest in Connection with SCAP Directive on Destruction of Japanese Naval Vessels.

894.30/5-1446

DCR - NE Unit

Mr. *mt*

Mr. _____

Mr. _____

Dist. _____

A true copy of the signed original. Inal. *cc*

Enclosure:
As stated above.

Place
FC:RECarroll:abc

TOP SECRET

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COMMUNICATIONS 894.30/5-1446

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

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File

40.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : The Secretary

DATE: June 6, 1946

FROM : FE: Mr. Vincent

SUBJECT: Disposition of Japanese Merchant Fleet.

1. We have not agreed to divide the Japanese merchant fleet.

You made the following statement with regard to the Japanese merchant marine in a message to Molotov sent to Moscow October 20, 1945:

"With reference to the merchant marine of Japan, I am advised that what is left of the merchant marine of Japan is necessary for the evacuation of Japanese from the islands they sought to conquer and from the mainland of China to Japan. The available ships will probably be needed for some time. No plans have been made for the disposition of the Japanese merchant marine and we will be glad to discuss with you and our other Allies plans for a long range distribution of these ships."

At Moscow on December 24, 1945, you replied to a question on the merchant fleet from Molotov as follows:

"Mr. Byrnes said that the Navy had informed him that it was necessary to use all possible Japanese vessels for the transport of supplies, etc. As soon as these operations were completed, he would instruct them to get in touch with the Soviet and British authorities and settle the matter."

As stated in SWNCC 186/12 and communicated to Moscow, in our telegram 599, April 1, 1946:

"The final disposition of the Japanese merchant fleet involves the broader problems of reparations and the future economy of Japan. A final decision of its disposition, therefore, must await further policy decisions by the Far Eastern Commission."

2. Our messages of April 6 and May 8 to which you refer were letters from the Embassy at Moscow to the Soviet Foreign Office. These letters were based on Department telegrams

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Japanese Affairs Division
Emmerson

Nos. 599

This Document Must Be Returned to
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